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admin ad374ae208 Deploy 0.18.2 to master (#200) 2026-10-17 01:59:54 +02:00
admin c67d0cdb67 Merge pull request 'Release 0.18.2' (#199) from release-0.18.2 into release/1.0
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2026-10-16 22:31:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 ea77c63552 CHANGELOG 0.18.2: say how a no-unit forecast shows; who needs a look
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Review of PR #199. "Warns once" left out the Home row and the Settings
note, which stay while the fault lasts. "No option change" now points to
the one case that needs a look.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 21:48:05 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 75f4359aac Release 0.18.2
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Version bump to 0.18.2 and a CHANGELOG section for SAFETY-118 (#198).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 20:54:29 +02:00
admin 09a54859f2 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-118: read the peak forecast in its own unit' (#198) from SAFETY-118 into release/1.0
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2026-10-16 19:53:54 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 7d52dc1c0f SAFETY-118: a missing peak forecast reading keeps the unit-fault state
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checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 40m19s
A missing reading (unavailable, unknown, failed read, non-numeric) no longer
clears the fault: no false 'used again' INFO, no repeated WARNING, the status
row stays. Adds pv.has_reading(). DECISIONS wording fixed; tests added.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 18:19:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude f0b4e68e49 SAFETY-118: read the peak forecast in its own unit
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 40m20s
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peak_forecast_entity is read through pv.watts() by its unit_of_measurement;
the abs(raw) < 50 size rule is gone. No unit or a non-power unit means the
forecast is not used, with one warning per cause. The validator no longer
claims a kW sensor is taken as watts for this entity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 16:00:34 +02:00
admin ec2b0c3de4 Deploy 0.18.1 to master (#197) 2026-10-16 15:05:06 +02:00
admin 780c1f67bb Merge pull request 'Release 0.18.1' (#196) from release-0.18.1 into release/1.0
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checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 40m21s
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Release 0.18.1
2026-10-16 13:46:24 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 0ee3c3468b Release 0.18.1 review: CHANGELOG text fixes
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SAFETY-118 line: the add-on already turns a kW forecast into W
(main.py read_inputs, abs(raw) < 50), so only the settings-page warning is
wrong. Rounding note and rows: the new settings page; UX-44 also changed
one DOCS line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 13:03:37 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude dec8e7b69f Release 0.18.1
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 40m39s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Version 0.18.0 -> 0.18.1 (patch, no option changes) and a closed 0.18.1 CHANGELOG section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 12:08:58 +02:00
admin 8e02a0928b Merge pull request 'UX-44: contract label says every 15 minutes, not hourly' (#195) from UX-44 into release/1.0
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2026-10-16 06:59:19 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 1bd2ba1397 UX-44: contract label says every 15 minutes, not hourly
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 40m37s
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The settings page contract choice read "Dynamic, hourly" / "Dynamisch,
per uur". Belgian day-ahead prices are per 15 minutes since 2025-10-01.
Now "Dynamic, every 15 minutes" / "Dynamisch, per kwartier". One DOCS
line that called dynamic pricing "hourly pricing" now says dynamic.
test_ui_text.py part 7 fails if either label says hourly again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 05:26:32 +02:00
admin b703aaa6d5 UX-43: tariff prices take five decimals (#194)
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2026-10-16 04:30:09 +02:00
UX-43 review 92a3d3400a UX-43 review: plain wording for the DOCS line on five-decimal prices
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 03:47:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 8c954acb36 UX-43: keep each field description to one sentence (STYLE)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-16 02:29:31 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 8f72ab00d7 UX-43: tariff price fields take five decimals
ui.fixed_price, ui.day_price, ui.night_price and ui.periods step 0.00001
EUR/kWh (the period editor's price input took a hard-coded 0.01). A short
c-EUR/kWh hint is added to the four field descriptions, EN and NL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-16 01:40:40 +02:00
admin 3b7d6b7f05 Deploy 0.18.0 to master (#193) 2026-10-16 00:42:54 +02:00
admin a0e091cca3 Release 0.18.0 (#192)
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2026-10-15 23:17:10 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 44cd1fde2a Release 0.18.0: review fixes to the CHANGELOG section
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 40m17s
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OPT-15 and OPT-20 rows: the retry is two inverters only, and OPT-20 no
longer claims no other battery moves. SAFETY-111 added to known issues.
MAINT-19 marked as from code reading. Wording fixes in the SAFETY-112 and
MAINT-11 rows, UX-38 and the price service note.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 22:35:47 +02:00
Claude e7c83d3a57 Release 0.18.0: version bump and CHANGELOG section
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 40m26s
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config.yaml version 0.17.0 -> 0.18.0 and a closed ## 0.18.0 CHANGELOG
section for OPT-17, SAFETY-112, OPT-15, MAINT-11, PRICE-01 and OPT-20.
No code change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 21:37:17 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 004f859ec7 Merge PR #191: OPT-20 a refusal probe asks only PROBE_W, not the whole trade
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Reviewed at ccdb9dc: full suite 78/78, CI run 1289 green, identity equal to bf9019e. Review: PR #191 comment 2185.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 14:56:17 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude ccdb9dc17a OPT-20: test_opt20 points at MUTATION.md (test_bytecode part 5)
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infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 13:12:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 06339a2446 OPT-20: a refusal probe asks only PROBE_W, not the whole trade
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 40m47s
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The probe's trade was sized at the probing battery's rating. Its SAFETY-73
pin held 200 W of that, and the allocator put the rest on a battery with no
mode range (one in a maintenance phase): TEST-23 OPT-15 g7, -2300 W on A in
its maintenance charge for 34 s, grid 3100 W.

modetrade.decide() now asks PROBE_W for the probing battery plus what the
other chargers would have had without the probe; size() adds the probe on top
of their share, or files PROBE_W exactly, or nothing. _mode_trade() carries
the pin only on the ticks it is filed, so the window's first and last cycle
do not move another battery's share either. Modes off and modes on with no
probe are unchanged (bf9019e digests). Tests: test_opt20.py.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 13:08:59 +02:00
admin bf9019e70d Merge PR #190: PRICE-01 price_service provider, fallback chain and gate
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2026-10-14 22:47:43 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6862dea52a PRICE-01 review 3: tests for the round 3 note and dismiss; doc wording
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- test_price_secret.py: the fixed-tariff note on the real /config/validate
  route, EN and NL, and none for a spaces-only profile (web.py lang wiring).
- test_price_service.py: the start line is INFO, not WARNING; a dismiss that
  raises does not stop the cycle.
- test_maint13/test_setup_only/test_watchdog: ignore only the dismiss of the
  old card, so a create with that id is still counted.
- DECISIONS rule 7 quotes the settings note as it is; messages.py comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-14 22:07:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude c68fd275cc PRICE-01 round 3: replace the fixed-tariff notification with a log line and a settings note
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 39m6s
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G1: remove the false 'Fixed tariff not used' notification. One INFO line at
start and an info note beside the setting (EN/NL) when price_service has a
non-blank static_profile; the old notification id is dismissed at start.
DOCS, migration step 5 and DECISIONS rule 7 now say what the code does.
S05: whitespace-only static_profile counts as not set.
G2: maintenance_enabled read through MaintConfig.from_options().

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-14 20:27:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 2f261f8ba4 PRICE-01 review: spaced-token check passes the length rule; F3 default pinned
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The spaced-token check used a 5-character token, which the new 16-character
rule refuses on its own, so a validator that stopped checking spaces passed
(reviewer mutation R06). It now uses a long token and checks the reason.

Also pin F3 with no maintenance_enabled key: the default (off) holds and no
no-price words show (reviewer mutation S04). Tests only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-14 19:58:50 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 0801776645 PRICE-01 round 2: the token on no page, fixed-tariff note, token length, F3 words, test gaps
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F1: every password option is shown as ******** (set) or empty in /config/model
(options, running, ui) and in a stale refusal; the classic page draws it as a
password field; a save or validate that sends ******** or nothing keeps the
stored value. F2: a static_profile beside price_service is said once at start
(notification and log), not refused. F3 (owner, 2026-10-14): the no-price row,
Home line and notification only while maintenance_enabled is on. F4: tests for
the reviewer's R01 and R10. F5: price_service_token must be 16+ characters.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-14 18:56:51 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 4eb88f7fda PRICE-01: migration note, and the tests drive the real control cycle
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 39m36s
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- DOCS: the migration note said markup and taxes do not matter; with the
  provider they are added to the wholesale price. Step 4 and 5 now say what
  they set and what static_profile does while no source has a price.
- The gap tests run the notification through cycle(), where the check is
  called, so a check that is never called goes red.
- test header: the real-transport checks are section 11.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-14 17:03:05 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 87ad958842 PRICE-01: Dutch dates, no redirects with the token, more checks
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- The notification, status row and Home line name an earlier day in the
  language of the text ("13 okt om 21:00"); the Dutch title is "Prijzen
  ontbreken", so the body no longer repeats it.
- The token request does not follow redirects: the host is fixed in code.
- A step back up to the saved prices is one INFO line.
- Tests: whole status payload free of the token, a redirect, the 5-decimal
  edge of the old average, modes plan equal to generic_dayahead's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-14 16:54:11 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 9ac3a9d2bc PRICE-01: price_service provider, fallback chain, and the gate read from it
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A new price source, `price_provider: price_service`: the owner's price server,
one fixed HTTPS host, a bearer token (new password option
`price_service_token`), wholesale energy only so markup and taxes are added as
for generic_dayahead.

The chain is server, then energy-charts, then the prices the history store
kept. A step counts only if it has a price for now. Each step down and back up
is one log line. With every source down a site plans from what it saved.

No price for now: one status row, one Home plan line and one notification, in
English and Dutch, cleared when a price returns. With this provider the
maintenance charge gate reads the provider's prices and keeps the Home
Assistant rule: the current 15-minute price is at or below today's average.

The token is hidden on the settings page, refused when missing, and taken out
of any error text. Other providers, `off` and the Home Assistant pair take the
road they always took (scripted-day probe against 0ce7d35: one line differs,
the refusal that lists the known providers). See
DECISIONS/PRICE-01-own-price-server.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-14 16:22:24 +02:00
admin 0ce7d35f80 Merge pull request 'MAINT-11: start or stop the maintenance cycle per battery' (#189) from MAINT-11 into release/1.0
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2026-10-14 01:18:42 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6aa1c32cbb MAINT-11 review round 2: pin each cycle button to its own disabled flag
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 38m46s
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Reviewer mutations survived the round-2 page checks: Start forced always
disabled (|| true), and the two flags swapped between Start and Stop,
because the checks only looked for each flag somewhere in the file. The
check now pins each flag to its own button. No behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 00:39:37 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 5ee1061398 MAINT-11 round 2: disable the cycle buttons that cannot work
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 38m43s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Stop cycle is disabled on a battery that is not cycling. Start cycle is
disabled while any battery cycles and on a switched-off battery. Page only;
the add-on still refuses each of these. DECISIONS notes the one-battery case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-13 23:18:21 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 fd059126cb MAINT-11 review: test an empty unit at the web layer and the page's own refusal words; drop a stale comment
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 38m45s
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Two reviewer mutations survived the suite: the web layer routing only a
truthy unit (an empty unit then started the bare pick), and the page
showing the server's English instead of its own sentence by code. Both
are now checked. The bare maint_start comment that said a per-battery
unit would ship half a surface is replaced by a pointer to
_maint_unit_action(). No behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 23:06:47 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 21d8a944bc MAINT-11: start or stop the maintenance cycle per battery
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 38m46s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
maint_start and maint_abort take an optional unit. With two or more batteries
each Batteries card has Start cycle and Stop cycle buttons. One slot per site
stays: a start while a battery cycles is refused and names it (no queue). A
battery that is switched off, an unknown unit, and a stop on a battery that is
not cycling are refused with a plain message. A request with no unit is the
old call. The scheduler and the phase machine are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-13 21:37:36 +02:00
admin 79dd0770f9 Merge pull request 'OPT-15: price-run fixes (quarter edge, charge-end overshoot, refusal probe)' (#157) from opt15-price-run-fixes into release/1.0
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2026-10-13 15:04:11 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 7f0f00b01c OPT-15 review: pin the rolled export at 0 W and a battery past E; note the maintenance replay
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 38m30s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Two survivors of the review's mutations get a check each in
test_price_run_fixes.py (X1: a held export credited negative in the rolled
quarter; X4: the hold extended by a reading already past E). DECISIONS: the
slow-battery quarter (3456 W, same on e3e4ba6) and the replay of a
maintenance phase starting during the hold.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-13 14:18:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude 065792aad3 Merge release/1.0 (e3e4ba6) into opt15-price-run-fixes
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Conflicts (5 files, 9 hunks) resolved keeping both sides:
- p1.py: held_t (OPT-15) beside held_since (SAFETY-90).
- modetrade.py: chargers() takes targets (P4) and probe (OPT-15); decide()
  clears the chargers, a probing refuser included, while a battery drains
  (SAFETY-78); the docstring lists both rules.
- main.py: the roll goes into the SAFETY-90/91 projection chain
  (`_peak_proj`); the SAFETY-95 drain-tail grid_w keeps the run-edge hold on
  its other branch; the P4 forecast state and the hold state both stay.
- DOCS.md, DECISIONS: both lines kept, OPT-15 item refreshed.

Adaptations the merge needs:
- SAFETY-81 x F1: a rolled projection is not graded by the saturation alarm
  until the quarter's first sample, as the old edge tick was not, so a
  standing overload is still notified once per quarter.
- test_safety81, test_modes_p4: modes-on pins re-pinned (with a note), modes
  off pinned to e3e4ba6; test_price_run_fixes: identity pins on e3e4ba6,
  F1 reproduced at one inverter (SAFETY-91 already holds two), tests for the
  drain and the day plan against the probe.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 12:15:44 +02:00
admin e3e4ba674d Merge pull request 'SAFETY-112: say plainly that control waits for Home Assistant to start' (#188) from SAFETY-112 into release/1.0
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2026-10-13 02:48:31 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 df6bc0f76b SAFETY-112 review: grade the waiting flag where hass.py sets it
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- a 502 or refused read turns waiting on, the next good read off, and a
  read timeout never (two mutants survived without this)
- the flag changes no write with live readings, not only with 502 ones
- the page script's amber dot and batteries-tab banner for "waiting"
- DECISIONS: about 5 minutes per start stage, not "at most"

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 02:10:27 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 d94cb0c263 SAFETY-112: say plainly that control waits for Home Assistant to start
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 36m38s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
The Supervisor proxy answers 502 to every add-on read, write and websocket
until Core is RUNNING (proxy.py api()/websocket() -> check_api_state()), so
the add-on cannot control while a slow integration holds HA's start, even
with its entities live. Measured on a safety112 repro stack with the
2026.08.0 proxy code: first write 1.0-4.4 s after RUNNING, 238-300 s after
live readings. Not routed around (DECISIONS/SAFETY-112-...).

While the API does not answer, the first status row is red and is the
banner ("Waiting for Home Assistant to finish starting"), Home shows a
"waiting" state in EN/NL instead of "Needs you now", and the log adds a
"still waiting" line every 5 minutes and the wait's length at the end.
A safety stop, a stalled loop or shadow mode keeps its own headline.
Control, writes, heartbeat and the stand-down are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 01:07:51 +02:00
admin 3050fa5208 OPT-17: the solar forecast can come from several entities, summed (#187)
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2026-10-11 05:49:37 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 92a80c09b2 OPT-17 review: title the forecast row on Home; test the hint and blank rows
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 36m20s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
The new status row's id `solar_forecast` had no Home title, so Home showed
it under the fallback "Inverter connection". Add "Solar forecast" /
"Zonneprognose" to ui_text, and checks for the title, the tomorrow-gap hint
and blank list rows (review mutations R7, R9, R14 now killed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-11 05:12:35 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 9b1fa758ad OPT-17: the solar forecast can come from several entities, summed
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 36m13s
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New list options pv_forecast_entities and pv_forecast_tomorrow_entities
(same shape as pv_entities); the single-entity keys are unchanged.

- Each member is read in its own unit (Wh/kWh/MWh) in one gather and the
  day is summed. Hourly splits are merged when every member has one, else
  the total goes on the bell.
- A member missing, unavailable, stale, non-energy or bad makes that
  day's forecast unusable (no partial sum). A caution row names it by
  position; the action log names the entity once per change.
- Single key and list both set for one day: refused at start.
- A one-member list behaves exactly like the single key (test_opt17.py);
  the single-key path is byte-identical to e36565f over 24 scenarios.
- Supervisor shape measured: tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section J.

DECISIONS/OPT-17-several-forecast-entities.md has the rules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-11 02:55:58 +02:00
admin 1b6f16dba2 Deploy 0.17.0 to master (#186) 2026-10-11 01:37:01 +02:00
admin e36565fe39 Merge pull request #185: Release 0.17.0
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2026-10-11 00:58:29 +02:00
goodwe-review 808ec04dc4 REL-0.17.0 review: CHANGELOG wording fixes
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SAFETY-107 row names the tested base; MAINT-17 says code reading only;
SAFETY-105 figure is from a simulation; SAFETY-97 edge is 175 W; the
maintenance note cites MAINT-14 and MAINT-15; SAFETY-108 "about 15 s".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-11 00:21:39 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 35432ce065 Release 0.17.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 35m11s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Bump version to 0.17.0 and add the closed 0.17.0 CHANGELOG section.
No code change, no option change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 23:29:13 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 580c200527 Merge pull request #184: MAINT-15 the balancing hold ends on time with no SoC reading
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
Reviewed at 35b2a69; CI run 1238 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 01:38:29 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 35b2a699de MAINT-15 round 2: in-repo differential check, full-hold with-reading check
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 00:42:01 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 cd1bf2a694 MAINT-15: the balancing hold ends on time with no SoC reading
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 35m22s
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HOLD's time check moves into Maintenance._hold(), used by step() and
_no_soc(). A hold that loses its SoC now ends at hold_min, writes
last_completed and logs the same COMPLETE line. The 15 min HOLD line says
the hold still ends at its normal time. Behaviour with a reading is
unchanged (differential trace against db9e231).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-09 23:56:29 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 db9e2315d1 SAFETY-107: a refusal held under another writer is learned once (#183)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-09 04:29:47 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 848140c29f SAFETY-107 review: test a writer that turns round on a dead pack; say when rule 3 applies
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 35m22s
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-09 03:52:39 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 d12228d986 SAFETY-107: a refusal held under another writer is learned once
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 35m8s
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At one inverter SAFETY-52's "another writer" end tested target != loop_w.
A held refusal makes the loop ask 0 W, so any binding claim (maintenance
charge, peak guard, trade) ended it every cycle, and compute() learned it
again in the same cycle: "BATTERY REFUSES" / "ENDED: another writer" each
second on the rig. Now the held refusal is judged afresh against the
writer's ask (compute() gets the same inputs as before); it ends only if
compute() no longer finds it. Commands unchanged: 300-seed differential
trace against release/1.0, N=1 and N=2, every command and refusal state
identical. DECISIONS/SAFETY-107.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-09 03:03:06 +02:00
admin bf3ac7998c MAINT-14: maintenance with no SoC reading: charge still times out, drain holds at 0 W (#182)
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2026-10-08 22:50:52 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 61a61941bb MAINT-14 review: tests for a HOLD episode after a no-SoC charge, a MAINT-13 state file, and a true twin site at N=2
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 34m56s
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 22:14:26 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 ef35f4b925 MAINT-14: accurate no-level wording per phase; name the limit that ended the charge
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 34m54s
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 21:25:35 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 f39e52efd3 MAINT-14: maintenance with no SoC reading: charge times out, drain holds at 0 W
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 20:37:01 +02:00
admin 8a17711f60 MAINT-13: a full pack that stops at 98-99 % is not a failed charge (#181)
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2026-10-08 13:45:10 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 ea31289ec0 MAINT-13 review: tests for a stale charge record and a clock step back; DOCS names the 7 day end
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checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 34m49s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 13:08:40 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 6836f61bd4 MAINT-13 round 3: provider site, hourly fixed-tariff check, faster tests
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- A price-provider site with no fixed tariff is not a gate (its plan never
  sets `cheap`); DECISIONS §3 says so and a test pins it.
- The fixed-tariff check is worked out once an hour, not every tick.
- test_maint13: run() steps really are `step` minutes; the long loops use
  5-minute steps (the per-tick cap); wall backstop checked "not before".
- test_safety93: the drain bound is the rig's configured drain rate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 12:03:55 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Sonnet 5.5 f7b83cc75c MAINT-13 round 2: read the price gate without a new main.py option read
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 34m35s
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test_static_tariff forbids main.py reading `static_profile`; a small
static_gated() in static_tariff.py answers it, and the Controller keeps the
answer in `_price_gated` beside `cheap`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-08 11:10:33 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Sonnet 5.5 6f05b2e4be MAINT-13 round 2: gate open when nothing holds the charge back; safety93 scenario restored
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 34m45s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
- gate_open is true with no price gate set up, in a cheap window, or while the
  pack is taking charge; the stall rule and timeout now work on a no-tariff site.
- reset the save timer on a phase change; exact 5 min gap-cap test.
- test_safety93: original timeout scenario kept (B finished) plus a case where a
  due B takes the slot after A's failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Bdqr7PiaHcBnzPituu2yTC
2026-10-08 10:29:46 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 28eff568b5 MAINT-13: a full pack that stops at 98-99 % is not a failed charge
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 34m21s
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A charge is complete at SoC >= target, or at >= target - 3 once the SoC has
made no new high for 60 min of allowed charging, or when the charging time
runs out at >= target - 3. The 36 h timeout counts only the minutes the price
gate let the pack charge (plus a 7 day wall-clock backstop). A cycle that
fails (stuck drain, charge below target - 3) backs off 7 days, tells the
operator once (EN + NL), and no cycle starts on that pack in that time unless
the operator forces one. State survives a restart; old state files load.

No option added. DECISIONS/MAINT-13-full-pack-is-complete.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 09:36:06 +02:00
admin b527e99f13 SAFETY-103: no swing on old battery readings after a drain ends (#180)
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2026-10-08 04:48:26 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 c6f23a69d4 SAFETY-103 review: correct the swing after a refusal or lost link in DECISIONS
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The test table gives 1.5 kW at N=2 and 3.9 kW summed at N=3 under a
surplus, and about 1 kW after a lost link without one; not 1.9 kW.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 04:13:08 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 98dd110a4f SAFETY-103: test a dropped battery is not counted; guard a read
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 34m26s
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Mutation M13 (a battery out of the split counted in the house point)
survived; a direct check now kills it. win[0] is read through a guard
(test_named_absence).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 03:12:03 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 138e45b53f SAFETY-103: no swing on old battery readings after a drain ends
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 35m9s
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While a battery settles from its ended drain (SAFETY-95), the house point
was grid + every battery's reading. A register can be 10 s older than the
meter, so B swung 860 -> 1650 -> 870 W on A's old reading (rig check 5).

Now the house point is held and moved only as far as the meter proves:
each battery is between its last changed reading and its commands since
(a reading that changed this cycle, or a refused side, as it reads).
N=1 and 1 s registers are byte-identical to release/1.0.

DECISIONS/SAFETY-103-old-readings-after-a-drain.md, test_safety103.py.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 02:25:55 +02:00
admin df154a26d1 Deploy 0.16.0 to master (#179) 2026-10-08 01:43:37 +02:00
admin 451729c9b5 Release 0.16.0 (#178)
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2026-10-08 01:02:20 +02:00
goodwe-review 1c607a961a REL-0.16.0 review: CHANGELOG wording fixes
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SAFETY-103 swing 'by about 800 W for about 5 s'; SAFETY-99 'late, by less
than 30 s'; MAINT-10 row: one-at-a-time is not new; SAFETY-96: drop the
test-only 800 W; SAFETY-90 and MAINT-10 rows trimmed to two sentences.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-08 00:09:08 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 756b50ddbb Release 0.16.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 32m41s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
version 0.15.0 -> 0.16.0 and a closed ## 0.16.0 CHANGELOG section.
No code change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-07 23:25:14 +02:00
admin 340c7eef42 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-95: a maintenance drain that ends hands back smoothly' (#177) from safety-95-drain-end-reseed into release/1.0
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2026-10-07 17:48:53 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 4707d37019 SAFETY-95 review: test the stale-link and contradiction legs; refusal +1 only
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F1: test_safety95 checks that a dropped draining battery is this rule's
(stale link, N=3, 4000 W: grid import 676 W vs base 786 W); kills R2.
F2: _charge_track tested directly with a contradicting drain (SAFETY-91's
pin as a floor against a closed pack); kills R3. Today a drain contradicts
only through a refusal; the clause stays, as a contradiction sends 0 W.
F3: a drain ends on a refusal only when the battery will not give
(refused > 0, as _held_back()); one that will not take still drains.
Tested both signs; kills R8.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-07 16:41:16 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 9c0314a826 SAFETY-95: N=1 identity for every drain end; plainer DOCS line
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test_safety95.py: the N=1 byte-identity now covers all six drain ends
(Off and stale link were missing); end_at()/measure() read through a
default, so test_named_absence.py passes (it failed on bdec66e); a check
that a dropped battery's start is 0 W even under a pinned charge (it
kills a mutation that survived).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-07 14:36:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 bdec66e97a SAFETY-95: a maintenance drain that ends hands back smoothly (N>=2)
When a battery's drain ended (done, Off, timeout, abort, stale link,
refusal), its drain floor stayed in the site target and landed on the
others: B 0 -> +1600 W in one cycle at a 1200 W house, exporting; under a
solar surplus B gave into the export.

Now, on that cycle, the loop starts from what the others stood at plus the
battery's new command, raised to the house's own point when the house needs
more (never above last cycle's start). While the battery settles, the loop
counts the batteries at its start instead of chasing the drain's tail on
the meter. Then one slew step a cycle. N=1 is unchanged.

test_safety95.py; DECISIONS/SAFETY-95-drain-end.md; one DOCS line.
test_modes.py: opt11 n2_maint re-pinned on purpose (its drain ends by a
refusal at 1655 s; B now stays at the house's 1420 W instead of 2500 W).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 12:44:25 +02:00
admin b2f55732b6 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-96: a battery the loop cannot move does not freeze it' (#176) from safety-96-stale-unit-site-total into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-10-06 06:19:12 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 956711b801 SAFETY-96 review: keep the refusal count over a refused write; test a fast board
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F1: resetting the count on each refused write hid a battery that really
refuses behind a link refusing 1 write in 3 (never learned; learned at
358 s with the count kept). F2: a board at 0 W before its link is stale
learned no refusal untested (mutation R7 survived); now a 1 s-lag case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 05:46:32 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 88b9cd470a SAFETY-96: a battery the loop cannot move does not freeze it
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 31m44s
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At N>=2 a battery out of the split (stale link), with refused writes, or
settling after a step the loop did not make (a charge end, a rejoin) now
counts in the freeze test at its command, not its reading. Its real power
still reaches the loop through the meter. At a drop its share leaves the
loop's start point (the others take over one slew step a cycle); at a
rejoin it enters at its reading. No refusal is learned while a battery's
writes are refused. N=1 and the 46 identity digests are byte-identical.

test_safety78 part 2: the dropped-drain case now rests at B 1510 W (grid at
its -10 W aim) instead of 1500 W; the drop no longer sends B to 2500 W.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-06 04:02:03 +02:00
admin 1bf6b7f9a7 Merge pull request 'MAINT-10: maintenance start hour in local time, default 19:00' (#159) from maint-10-local-start-hour into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-10-05 23:56:19 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 1d28daf8a0 MAINT-10 review: warn when HA did not answer and TZ is UTC; test the 3 s budget
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 31m18s
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HA can take minutes to start (2026-10-05, 502 from the proxy). Then TZ holds,
which the Supervisor sets from HA's zone, so the hour stays right; only a TZ
of UTC there now logs a WARNING asking for a restart. A test pins the 3 s
budget on the zone request (a mutant without it survived).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 23:24:02 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 0b6b34f563 MAINT-10: every pack at N=2, the next DST days, plainer upgrade note
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test_maint10.py part 10: at two inverters both packs get the site zone, the
real Controller is identical for 11 UTC and 13 Brussels, and two due packs
across 24/25 Oct 2026 and 27/28 Mar 2027 start at the local hour on
successive days; a pack freed in the repeated hour does not start there.
Part 3 adds 28 Mar 2027. DOCS: an existing install keeps its saved hour, now
read as local time; an hour set to make up for UTC goes back to 19.
DECISIONS: the SAFETY-83 gate is met; section on two inverters.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 21:51:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 08fb1235fc Merge release/1.0 (0.15.0 + SAFETY-90) into maint-10-local-start-hour
Conflicts: main.py's maintenance import (base added CHARGE, HOLD; branch added
site_zone) - both kept. DOCS maintenance table: base's longer drain-rate row
kept, start hour row at 19 / local.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 21:51:04 +02:00
admin 7ef73474dc Merge pull request 'SAFETY-90: the peak guard goes on after a P1 meter gap' (#175) from safety-90-peak-guard-gap into release/1.0
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SAFETY-90: the peak guard goes on after a P1 meter gap (#175)
2026-10-05 13:23:32 +02:00
Claude (SAFETY-90 review) 24dbbd18ad SAFETY-90 review: test that a second gap does not price the first one down
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 31m12s
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 12:39:28 +02:00
Claude (SAFETY-90 review) 8dfe91e1d2 SAFETY-90 review: count the start-up seconds like a gap
While the add-on is down the batteries are at 0 W (it sets 0 W when it
stops; the ESP32 watchdog after 30 s), so the import before its first
reading was the house, not the aim. Those seconds now count at
gap_w(limit, the import seen first), and after a restart the restored
reading's held 30 s is topped up the same way. Status row: "counted as
high use". Tests take the pre-start import as the house (batteries at
0 W) and add restarts of 10/60/150 s with a restored averager.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 12:24:33 +02:00
Claude (SAFETY-90 dev) 9d3fbe1be9 SAFETY-90: the peak guard goes on after a P1 meter gap
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A meter gap past meter_max_age_s left seconds the quarter average never
counted, so the guard was blind for the rest of the quarter (rig case 7b:
3964.8 W against a 3450 W aim). Once readings are back, the missed seconds
now count at the higher of the limit and the import seen just before and
just after the gap with the batteries at 0 W (peakguard.gap_w/fill_gaps);
the gap's first meter_max_age_s is topped up to that too. Seconds before
the add-on's first reading count at the aim, and the page says part of the
period was not measured (EN/NL). The bill record is unchanged; no option.

DECISIONS/SAFETY-90-peak-guard-after-a-gap.md, test_safety90.py.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 11:46:58 +02:00
admin 21599938ea Merge pull request 'Deploy 0.15.0 to master' (#174) from deploy-0.15.0 into master
Deploy 0.15.0 to master (#174)
2026-10-05 10:17:38 +02:00
admin 3ed3302d2f Merge pull request 'Release 0.15.0' (#173) from release-0.15.0 into release/1.0
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Release 0.15.0 (#173)
2026-10-05 01:52:40 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 8c6e5bca2e Release 0.15.0: correct the SAFETY-94/97 row, add the ±170 W known issue
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Review round 1 (F1-F3) on PR #173.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 01:23:03 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 f01152b113 Release 0.15.0: bump version and close the CHANGELOG section
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config.yaml version 0.14.0 -> 0.15.0 (minor: behaviour change from
SAFETY-94/97, no option change). New `## 0.15.0` section with the contents
since 0.14.0 (cf705a9 #171, 3129dae #172) and the known issues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 00:48:04 +02:00
admin 3129daed62 Merge pull request 'CI-14: infra-pin to admin/goodwe 3b4ff84 (WITNESS-09)' (#172) from ci-14-infra-pin-3b4ff84 into release/1.0
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2026-10-05 00:45:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 64dddd64bf CI-14: infra-pin to admin/goodwe 3b4ff84 (WITNESS-09)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 00:13:01 +02:00
admin cf705a9058 SAFETY-94 + SAFETY-97: no false stale or refusal on a lagging battery; refusals graded against each battery's idle reading (#171)
infra-pin / fresh (push) Failing after 2s
2026-10-04 17:27:20 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 7d06aa674d SAFETY-97: centre the band on the idle reading clamped to 75 W
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infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 2s
Owner decision 2026-10-04 (review R1). A wrong idle reading more than
about 100 W off hid every refusal on that battery. Clamped under the band,
the band keeps 0 W +-25 W, so a battery reading about 0 W while refusing is
caught whatever was learned or restored. Samples are still taken to 250 W.
Beyond about +-170 W of idle a battery behaves as in 0.14.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 16:57:16 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 88ebf3a5a6 SAFETY-97 review: tests for four surviving mutants
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 28m57s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 2s
The N=1 stale-path refusal and SAFETY-42's parked test are centred on the
idle reading; learning stops while control is stopped or the sign watchdog
has latched. Each had no check (review mutants X7, X8, X13, X14).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 14:29:27 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 3db2b6392f SAFETY-97: test the centred stale-path refusal (mutant S10 survived)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 29m7s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
At a 5 s meter a register frozen at rest on B trips the stale gate before
the 12-cycle evidence; its refusal must be centred on B's idle reading,
or the site stops and re-trips instead of refusing B.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-04 13:07:06 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 80bfc5721e SAFETY-97: point test_safety97 at MUTATION.md; record the DC-entity option
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 29m9s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
test_bytecode requires every suite to name MUTATION.md (CI run 1158).
DECISIONS: why the integration's DC battery power entity is not the fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-04 12:51:52 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6918e154c8 SAFETY-97: "gives nothing" is graded against each battery's idle reading
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 29m7s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 2s
B's power reading shows -95 to -118 W at idle (standby draw), so the
|reading| < 100 W refusal band never held a refusing B: never at N=2,
and since SAFETY-94's shared rule not at N=1 either (review F1).

Each unit now learns its idle reading (app/idle.py): only while control
runs, the unit is not refused/stale/tripped and its command has stayed
within 50 W for 120 s; first value a 120 s mean, then a 30 min follow;
samples beyond 250 W dropped, value clamped to 250 W; saved per unit and
restored. The shared refusal evidence, compute()'s N=1 engage and end,
the unit refusal ends, the stale-path refusal and SAFETY-42's "parked"
test are centred on it. Until learned it is 0 W, the rule as it was.

Refusing B caught at N=1 28/28/65 s and N=2 24/24/60 s (1/2/5 s
meters), before never; refusing A unchanged. Healthy B with its offset,
SAFETY-94's scenarios, 96 runs: 0 stale, 0 refused. Live replay: 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-04 12:21:24 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 dd5eb6fdc8 SAFETY-94 review: tests for three surviving mutants; record two gaps
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 28m7s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 2s
- test_safety94 part 4: time under 250 W is not counted; a command that
  swaps direction every cycle is never refusal evidence; a reading moving
  away from the ask does not restart the evidence. These kill review
  mutants R1, R3 and R6, which survived the PR's tests.
- DECISIONS: at N=1 a battery with B's standby offset no longer latches
  a refusal (SAFETY-97 now covers N=1); a part-time ask is caught after
  35/d s of wall time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 01:17:52 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6759d21ea5 SAFETY-94: a healthy battery that lags or reverses is not flagged as frozen or refusing
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 28m10s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 2s
The stale-reading gate counted its 35 s from the register's last change, so
after a rest the first read after a new command tripped it (SAFETY-58; live
2026-10-03, four trips 1 s after the command). It now counts only the time
the command asked the register to move.

At N=1 the refusal engaged after 12 frozen cycles if the reading was under
100 W at that moment, which a battery reversing through its lag passes at a
1 s meter. The refusal now needs the N>1 evidence at every roster size: under
100 W, one way, for 12 cycles spanning 22 s, restarting when the reading
moves 50 W towards the ask.

DECISIONS/SAFETY-94-lagging-battery.md; test_safety94.py.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 00:15:42 +02:00
admin 3a54b253cb Merge pull request 'Deploy 0.14.0 to master' (#170) from deploy-0.14.0 into master
Deploy 0.14.0 to master (#170)
2026-10-03 12:32:16 +02:00
admin 02ed1200dc Merge pull request 'Release 0.14.0' (#169) from release-0.14.0 into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 27m3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
2026-10-03 11:29:13 +02:00
Claude f13dab1407 Release 0.14.0: changelog review fixes
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 26m57s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Slew step not one house's 400 W; three two-inverter known issues, not
four; commissioning reference covers a new install; SoC example holds
for decimal sensors; SAFETY-95 states the jump, not the export.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 11:01:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b307db1049 Release 0.14.0: version bump and changelog
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 27m2s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Two inverters are now supported for maintenance and the peak guard
(SAFETY-91, SAFETY-93). No option changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 10:30:25 +02:00
admin e51e3e02b2 Merge pull request 'CI-13: infra-pin to admin/goodwe 0c04488 (FW-05, WITNESS-08)' (#168) from ci-13-infra-pin-0c04488 into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-10-03 10:27:02 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 69dc1f0e7b CI: bump infra pin to 0c04488 (admin/goodwe#62 FW-05, #63 WITNESS-08)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 27m26s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 09:56:36 +02:00
admin 858f77cfb5 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-93: the maintenance charge end hands back smoothly, with no grid charging at a high house' (#167) from safety-93-no-grid-charge-at-charge-end into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Failing after 2s
2026-10-03 00:58:37 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 214051d1a8 SAFETY-93 review: a charge that ends by a stale link or a refusal hands back smoothly too
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 27m5s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
A battery still in CHARGE but dropped by the allocator (stale link, or a
SAFETY-73 refusal contradicting its charge) left its -2000 W in the loop's
start point, and B went 0 -> -1600 W in one cycle. The end is now noted
after the unit claims are filed: in CHARGE, live and not contradicted.
Tests: part 6 (stale link, refusal) and a spy on the guard suspension.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 00:10:21 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 05eb93f139 SAFETY-93: the maintenance charge end hands back smoothly, with no grid charging at a high house
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 26m55s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
At N>=2, when a battery's maintenance charge ended, its watts stayed in the
loop's start point and landed on the other battery (B 0 -> -1600 W in one
cycle, charging from the grid at a 6000 W house). On the cycle a charge
ends, the loop now starts from what the others stood at plus that
battery's new command. N=1 and all identity digests unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 22:38:42 +02:00
admin f3e409cf76 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-91: a held battery is drawn only after the others are full' (#165) from safety-91-held-battery-last into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-10-02 15:53:33 +02:00
admin 8b9680fc35 Merge pull request 'Deploy 0.13.0 to master' (#166) from deploy-0.13.0 into master
Reviewed-on: #166
2026-10-02 15:26:46 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 4cd604afcb SAFETY-91 review: a held-back battery is released 1 point above its reserve
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 26m26s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A SoC reading flipping across the reserve swapped ~1000 W between the
batteries on each flip (grid +-500 W with unequal lags). Also grades
next_quarter()'s staleness boundary (29.5 / 30.5 s).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 14:54:20 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6872353e2e SAFETY-91: a held battery is drawn only after the others are full
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 26m19s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
At N>=2 a battery at or under its own peak reserve now weighs 0 whenever
the site gives (not only for the peak), a draining battery's pin becomes
a floor at its drain rate so it rises before the held one gives, and a
quarter's edge is graded on the next quarter when its first telegram is
late. SAFETY-25 option A stays: the held battery is still drawn once the
others are full. N=1 unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 14:03:54 +02:00
admin 8c438ab2e6 Release 0.13.0 (#164)
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 25m53s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
2026-10-02 10:04:13 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 b37b7f95dc REL-0.13.0 review: plainer, truer 0.13.0 changelog
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 25m52s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Crash, not stop, for SAFETY-61; Watchdog off by default; its own
warning for the 50 W peak margin (also under a higher month peak);
"refuses power" for SAFETY-52/73; no one-house options claim.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 09:37:34 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 28cab03947 REL-0.13.0: cut 0.13.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 25m55s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Bump config.yaml version 0.12.0 -> 0.13.0 and close a ## 0.13.0
CHANGELOG section covering every merge since 0.12.0 (a45ed06), with the
known issues SAFETY-90/91/92/93/94. Option surface 77 -> 83, none removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 09:04:47 +02:00
admin 61072ca460 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-85: no false 'not keeping up' while maintenance or the peak guard sets the battery' (#163) from safety-85-no-false-not-keeping-up into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
SAFETY-85: no false 'not keeping up' while maintenance or the peak guard sets the battery (#163)
2026-10-01 20:52:17 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 7b723a6cd5 SAFETY-85 review: grade discharge only, over the plant's settle time
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 25m47s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Rule 2 graded each battery against last cycle's command and graded charges
too. On plantsim's battery (10 s lag) at the 2 s meter it warned at every
drain or charge start and 15 times an hour under the peak guard at N=2; a
charge tapering near full warned 11 times in 50 min (SAFETY-42 section 7).
Now a discharge is graded against the least it stood at over SHORT_CYCLES /
SHORT_SPAN_S. DOCS lists `mode-bound` under Loop reason. test_safety85 part 7:
peak guard with a dead battery, lagging plant, taper; part 3: the bound ends
with maintenance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 20:25:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 4b81387908 SAFETY-85: no false 'not keeping up' while maintenance or the peak guard sets the battery
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 25m35s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
The loop's integrator bound counts only on a cycle the loop decided. A battery
another owner set (maintenance, the peak guard, a safety limit) alarms only
when it gives more than saturation_w less than told for saturation_cycles
cycles. At N>=2 the loop is bounded while maintenance holds a battery, so it
does not wind and control comes back one slew step a cycle. The status row
counts episodes, not cycles. Digests re-pinned where behaviour changed on
purpose; DECISIONS/SAFETY-85-no-false-not-keeping-up.md has the list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-01 19:05:27 +02:00
admin 935878193b Merge pull request 'SAFETY-87: peak guard uses every battery that can still give' (#162) from safety-87-guard-uses-able-batteries into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
SAFETY-87: peak guard uses every battery that can still give (#162)
2026-10-01 12:06:41 +02:00
Claude b4d25dd485 SAFETY-87 review: DOCS, the drain rate may rise for the peak at N>=2
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 24m53s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-01 11:08:42 +02:00
Claude a4a04d203c SAFETY-87 review: grade the three surviving review mutants
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 25m5s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A battery refusing only to charge stays able; the reserve alarm is graded
on the real limit, not the aim; 'control still runs' is set on the two
peak rows only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-01 11:07:43 +02:00
Claude aa501ffec7 SAFETY-87 review: maintenance pins beside a held battery
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 26m5s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A draining battery that may still give is raised from its drain rate
towards its rating for the peak floor while another battery is held
(peak > drain); before, the floor's rest landed on the held battery. In a
HOLD, a held battery's own pin counts among the others: a held drain no
longer over-places the site, and a held charge probe no longer parks it.

Tests: test_safety87.py part 10 (drain beside a held battery, N=3 HOLD,
unknown cut-out and unread level at N=3, a stopping row outranks the
running peak alarm). DECISIONS entry updated, incl. the modes-on exception.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-01 10:50:01 +02:00
Claude d89c093318 SAFETY-87: grade the surviving mutants (dropped battery, own-floor naming, pair permission, latched row)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 24m56s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-01 09:55:29 +02:00
Claude d0db5b8c39 SAFETY-87: peak guard uses every battery that can still give
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 25m45s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
At N>=2 a battery at or under its own peak reserve is held: it gives
nothing for the peak (weight 0 while the site gives) and the guard's need
is placed on the live, non-refusing batteries above theirs. The guard is
floor-limited, and alarms, only when those cannot hold the limit at full
power for ALARM_HOLD_S. The peak alarms no longer read "Not ready" or hold
the Home page at 0 W, because control keeps running. N=1 is byte-identical.

DECISIONS/SAFETY-87-guard-uses-able-batteries.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019DBUfvndgHwaV339Fvd2gr
2026-10-01 09:29:30 +02:00
admin b8ddfd787f Merge pull request 'SAFETY-86: peak guard outranks the maintenance hold' (#161) from safety-86-peak-over-hold into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-10-01 02:27:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 1c41a1e412 SAFETY-86 review: hold the site at the peak floor while a HOLD gives
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 24m23s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
At N>=2 the holding pack's pin follows the guard's floor while the loop
still asks for +5000 W, so the ALLOCATOR "could not be placed" row was
re-logged on every 1 W change and filled the 40-row action log. While the
pin is raised, cycle() now files a site `hold` ceiling at the floor
(P_MAINTENANCE), as SAFETY-84 does for a charge. Filed only when the
holding pack gives; hi == the floor, so it never clashes with it.

Tests: a noisy N=2 house logs no ALLOCATOR row and at most one clamp
row (20 and 20 without the ceiling); the ceiling is the floor itself;
a CHARGE is not refiled at N=1. The DECISIONS entry records the owner's
2026-10-01 decision: the HOLD ends on its clock, no top-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 02:00:20 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 ba31e7c8b1 SAFETY-86: peak guard outranks the maintenance hold
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 24m17s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
During a HOLD the holding battery gives what keeps the quarter at the peak
aim. N=1: the peak floor is refiled at P_MAINTENANCE, as for a drain
(SAFETY-83). N>=2: the hold's pin is raised to the floor minus what the
other live batteries may place, so they give first. A site stop still
decides alone. The hold ends on its clock even if the level dipped.
Below the aim nothing changes (rows identical).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 00:56:34 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 513183aba3 test_peak_margin: read the month peak on the runs' clock, not today's
Part 3 read the simulated September's peak with the wall clock, so from
2026-10-01 it read no peak and crashed on every tree (4ad8298 too).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 00:56:34 +02:00
admin 4ad8298ead Merge pull request 'SAFETY-84: maintenance charge at N=2 no longer stalls' (#160) from safety-84-n2-maint-charge into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-09-30 21:00:56 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 5c9f64d87a SAFETY-84 review: check the charging pack gives under the guard, and no-P1 at N=2
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 23m51s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A 6500 W house needs more than B alone: A must give (the N>=2 suspension),
with a non-vacuous run without it (banks over the cap, 'Load too high').
Without P1 the charge is not sized, as at N=1: A charges at 2000 W.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 20:36:46 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 43a52e7f60 SAFETY-84: maintenance charge at N=2 no longer stalls
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 23m57s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
At N>=2 a cheap-window maintenance charge files a site `hi` (`charge`,
P_MAINT_SHAPE) equal to what the charging pack's own `hi` places, so the
other pack never has to give against it. The charge is sized to the
quarter's headroom under the peak aim so it yields to the peak guard, and
to 0 W under a site safety stop. N=1 byte-identical (safety84_identity).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 19:47:15 +02:00
admin 9d5b7d129a Merge pull request 'SAFETY-83: peak guard outranks the maintenance drain at N=1' (#158) from safety-83-peak-over-drain into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-09-30 14:58:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 bc6d744c6c SAFETY-83 review: banked month peak and no false alarm during a drain
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 23m23s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
test_safety83 part 1: under a month peak banked above the limit the drain
is lifted to peak - margin, and a drain the guard raises (steady or with
5 s spikes that saturate it) gives no 'Load too high' alarm; the part 3
overload still does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 13:41:47 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 79b94024cb Merge release/1.0 (OPT-11 P4, #156) into safety-83-peak-over-drain
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 13:35:28 +02:00
goodwe-agent 2f5ab1f378 MAINT-10: DECISIONS says where the release note lives
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 23m8s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 23:09:06 +02:00
goodwe-agent fbdd552555 MAINT-10: CHANGELOG draft line moves to the PR (version gate refuses an Unreleased block)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 23:08:46 +02:00
admin 1145a931ac Merge pull request 'OPT-11 P4: solar forecast and day plan' (#156) from opt11-p4-solar-forecast into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-09-29 23:01:48 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 56cafefa79 SAFETY-83: a refiled peak floor stays under a safety SET, graded directly
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 23m32s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Kills M5 (refiled at P_SAFETY) on its own sentence, not only through the
per-cycle claim check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:52:52 +02:00
goodwe-agent 02c0a3dd7b MAINT-10: maintenance start hour in local time, default 19:00
The start hour was compared with the UTC hour, so the shipped 10 started at
12:00 in a Belgian summer. It is now read in Home Assistant's time zone
(fallback: the container's TZ, then UTC, one log line says which), and the
default moves to 19. DST: a missing hour starts at the first hour after the
jump; a repeated hour starts only in its first pass. Stored options are not
rewritten: a saved 10 now means 10:00 local (DOCS, CHANGELOG).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:52:05 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 3f69c174af SAFETY-83: grade the refile at its boundary, and N=2 on its own
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 23m37s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A floor exactly at the drain rate stays at P_PEAK (kills `lo >= rate`), and
part 4's N=2 check no longer shares its failure list with N=1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:50:46 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 d77f1b1fdf SAFETY-83: peak guard outranks the maintenance drain at N=1
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 16m54s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
At N=1 the drain is the site SET at P_MAINTENANCE (60), so the peak floor
(P_PEAK, 50) was not applied and the house imported what the drain left.
Where the floor asks for more than the drain rate, main.py now refiles the
peak claim at P_MAINTENANCE, so it wins; safety SETs still park everything.
Nothing else changes: safety78_identity --diff against 35cdffe changes only
cycles where the guard wanted more than the drain; N=2 is byte-identical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:40:14 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b171ada894 Merge release/1.0 (SAFETY-78, #154) into opt11-p4-solar-forecast
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 23m54s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Conflicts: modetrade.decide() takes both the day plan (targets) and
SAFETY-78's draining flag; the Why line keeps SAFETY-78's other_cycle
ahead of the plan's word (test added).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:37:09 +02:00
Claude review c38dd1e969 OPT-15 review: bound unmeasured charge stops, test the hold's rules and M15
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
- A second unmeasured-headroom stop in a quarter latches the charge: a
  headroom missing every other cycle flipped it 1799 times in 30 min.
- Unit test of the run-edge hold's end conditions and of a small step.
- Outside its probe a refuser does not make the others rest (M15 red).
- DECISIONS: one review line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:31:52 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 0b96e3191c OPT-11 P4 review: records and text
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 4s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
- DECISIONS: the Cheap hours change and why; the no-sun replay (the gain is
  Leftover solar buying the evening's shortfall; the forecast added 0.14
  EUR); the reconstruction bias stated plainly.
- DOCS: Cheap hours ignores the forecast; a reading from before midnight
  is stale.
- The forecast line: "Solar still to come today: ..." (it is what is
  left, and it stays within the 12-word limit).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:29:00 +02:00
admin 35cdffe766 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-78: maintenance drain at N=2 no longer stalls' (#154) from safety-78-drain-at-two into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-09-29 22:20:29 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 a692560960 Merge release/1.0 (SAFETY-81, #155) into opt11-p4-solar-forecast
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:08:52 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 fbd884797d OPT-11 P4 review: Cheap hours ignores the plan; midnight-stale forecast; stricter ids
- Cheap hours only fills to the ceiling with or without a forecast, as the
  design (section 1) says. Skipping the sun's share cost 0.31 EUR on real
  2026 prices (29.72 against P3's 29.41) and saved nothing on the P3 set.
- A forecast reading from before local midnight is stale: until the
  integration refreshes, "left today" is still yesterday's 0 and
  "tomorrow" is really today.
- Forecast entity ids must be sensor.[a-z0-9_]+ (they go into the
  /api/states/<id> path).
- House profile: a stored day that is not a date, or is after today, is
  dropped instead of kept forever.
- Text: the forecast line says "for the rest of today"; the learning line
  no longer promises "tomorrow" (a plan needs one full day).
- Tests for four surviving review mutants (hour sample floor, the dear run
  after the cheap run, share by room, daytime use) and the fixes above.
- Replay tool: `--fc zero` (a forecast of no sun).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 22:08:47 +02:00
goodwe-review 516bc8b4ec Merge release/1.0 into safety-78-drain-at-two
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 18m49s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 21:53:47 +02:00
admin 4f25b24aa6 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-81: no false Load too high alarms' (#155) from safety-81-load-too-high into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-09-29 21:45:19 +02:00
goodwe-review 044fc0d5bd SAFETY-78 review: card truth while the drain waits, more checks
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 16m15s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
- homeview: no "This one does not charge" while the draining battery waits
  (no floor then, so the other battery may charge from solar).
- test_safety78: one wait line across a probe, a second episode logs again,
  the card while waiting, and a seeded sweep of the floor against every
  other claim (part 6).
- DECISIONS: the wait case, and the measured N=1 peak and N=2 charge
  follow-ups.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 21:13:31 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 f967073cfe SAFETY-81 review: 10 s hold, ERROR line per episode, more scenarios
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 20m31s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
- The alarm must hold for peakguard.ALARM_HOLD_S (10 s) on the projection's
  clock. A load that tops cap + battery for ~5 s every 30 s alarmed at every
  quarter start while the quarter landed under the aim (sine4500_fast).
- A cycle with no battery reading leaves the hold alone.
- Notified once per quarter, but the ERROR line is written per episode.
- New sim scenarios (sine4500_fast, twice7000, step6500_gap) with 5a4cdc2
  digests; control still byte-identical. Unit checks for export and the
  hold across a missing reading. test_peakguard's saturated fixture moves
  the hold start back instead of waiting it out.
- DECISIONS and DOCS updated: costs of the hold, tolerance reasoning, the
  double count in control left to a follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 20:58:37 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 fae6681e19 OPT-15: price-run fixes (quarter edge, charge-end overshoot, refusal probe)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 18m49s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
F1: with battery modes on, the peak guard projects the quarter `now` is in
even before its first P1 sample (PeakTracker.project(roll=True)), and only
a measured stop latches the period. The edge tick no longer reads "no
seconds left", so a charge is not stopped and latched at a quarter edge.

F2: after a run edge the loop is held at E until the meter shows the step
(EDGE_HOLD_S, longer while the battery still moves). The replay gained a
lag model (dead time, reading age, P1 debounce, 1 s cycles) that shows
TEST-23's overshoot without the hold.

F3: a charge refuser's SAFETY-73 probe inside a cheap run is a charger
pinned at PROBE_W, the others rest, so the probe actually runs.

Modes off stays byte-identical to 5a4cdc2 (new late-P1 identity scenarios).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 20:22:32 +02:00
Claude aabc2a27fd OPT-11 P4: tests for eight surviving mutants; guarded reads
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 23m10s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 20:22:16 +02:00
Claude af39c10893 SAFETY-78: test_safety78 points at MUTATION.md (test_bytecode)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 15m23s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 20:14:33 +02:00
goodwe-agent 6eb67c0f9c SAFETY-81: no false 'Load too high' alarms
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 16m11s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
The alarm now also needs peakguard.load_too_high(): with the battery at
full power, the quarter still ends more than 10 W over the real limit.
The battery reading is the lower of this cycle's and the last, so a meter
sample from before the battery's last increase is not counted twice.
At most one alarm per quarter. Control outputs unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 19:55:38 +02:00
Claude 5d27f8496f SAFETY-78: maintenance drain at N=2 no longer stalls
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 17m13s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
At two inverters the drain pins its pack and the site target is split
around the pin. Below the pin the other pack had to charge, the allocator
refused the opposite directions, and the site sat at 0 W with an ARBITER
line every cycle (house below or above the drain rate, or a grid charge).

main.py now files a site limit `drain` (lo = what the pin places, at
P_MAINTENANCE) at N>=2 while a pack drains, so the other pack only adds
power in the same direction. A drain that cannot give power waits with
one log line. With battery modes on, no grid charge while a pack drains,
and the other battery's card says why. N=1 is byte-identical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 19:52:51 +02:00
Claude eb10537aee OPT-11 P4: solar forecast and day plan
A Home Assistant solar forecast (Forecast.Solar, Solcast or Open-Meteo
shapes) and the add-on's own hourly house use decide, before each cheap
run, whether the sun will fill each battery before the expensive hours.
Leftover solar then buys from the grid only the shortfall; Cheap hours only
skips the part the sun covers; Solar first never grid-charges. No, stale or
failed forecast: P3 option A exactly (12 digests pinned from 5a4cdc2).

Replay (16 recorded days, forecast errors from Elia's day-ahead BE solar):
year-earlier prices P4 19.15 vs P2 19.33 / option A 19.44 / old trade 18.14;
real 2026 prices P4 29.19 vs 32.26 / 32.01 / 31.40 EUR net.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 19:29:32 +02:00
admin 5a4cdc273e Merge pull request 'OPT-11 P3: price runs per battery' (#153) from opt11-p3-price-runs into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
OPT-11 P3: price runs per battery (owner option A: selling off, Leftover solar solar-only until P4) (#153)
2026-09-29 11:37:46 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 7104515229 OPT-11 P3 option A review: wizard no longer says modes come later
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 15m14s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Step 5 said "Choosing a mode for each battery comes in a later update",
stale since P1. It now points to battery modes on the Batteries screen
(EN/NL); test_setup checks the new line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:21:32 +02:00
Claude dev agent 6dab4ec16b OPT-11 P3, owner option A: selling off, Leftover solar takes solar only
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 15m12s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Owner decision 2026-09-29. Selling is off until it can be judged on the price
the grid pays: packmode.SELLING_ENABLED = False makes read() answer
sell=False whatever the store holds, pack_sell is refused ("Selling is off
for now."), and the page has no selling switch; the sell code stays. Until
the P4 forecast, only Cheap hours only charges from the grid
(packmode.GRID_CHARGE_MODES); Leftover solar holds and gives in the
expensive runs. Help, Today and plan lines, DOCS and DECISIONS follow.
Replay, 16 days: Solar first + Leftover solar 19.44 EUR net (P2 19.33).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 10:42:58 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b014fd2e16 OPT-11 P3 review: sale shows no money, honest sell text, tests for four surviving mutants
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 14m5s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
- A sale block on the plan no longer says "Worth up to" at the import
  price: a sale earns the lower injection price.
- The selling switch help (EN/NL) and DOCS say the grid pays less than
  power costs; DECISIONS records why P3 loses on the replay.
- test_modes_p3 part 11: modes on ignore the site trade switch (R13), a
  battery in maintenance takes no part (R10), a headroom stop latches for
  the period (R8). All three mutants survived before and are red now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 03:51:15 +02:00
Claude dev agent 902524ae5e OPT-11 P3: price runs per battery
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 13m45s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Cheap and expensive hours as runs of consecutive firm price slots
(priceruns.py); each battery's role per tick from its mode (modetrade.py):
grid charging for Leftover solar / Cheap hours only, never Solar first;
holding for the expensive runs; selling per battery (pack_sell) above the
spread and the floor. The site trade is sized inside the modes (loop bound)
and the peak guard's headroom; a run edge reseeds the loop. Cheap hours only
and selling are enabled on the Batteries screen and in the HA select
(appended). The site Why row no longer says "held back" when the peak limit
pushes power up (F2). Modes off: byte-identical to 7a00f12 on the trade path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 02:37:44 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 7a00f12c76 SAFETY-79: peak guard keeps a margin below the limit (#151)
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 01:01:35 +02:00
Review AgentandClaude Opus 5.5 ce0aea30b6 SAFETY-79 review: margin under a banked month peak too; identity harness reaches headroom and maintenance
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11m50s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
- quarter_target_w() is now the margin under quarter_ceiling_w(): a peak
  banked between cap - margin and the cap was aimed at exactly, so one
  overshoot crossed the cap; above the cap the same overshoot raised the bill.
- safety79_identity.py hashes charge_headroom_w() and the shaping suspension,
  and adds n1_maint/n2_maint (cheap window, forecast across cap - 50 .. cap).
  Digests re-printed on ed739d4 and pinned; margin 0 still identical.
- test_margin_under_banked_peak; DECISIONS and DOCS updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 00:49:16 +02:00
Review AgentandClaude Opus 5.5 e6096d3e17 Merge release/1.0 (7337b79, OPT-11 P2) into safety-79-peak-margin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 00:23:14 +02:00
admin 7337b791e5 OPT-11 P2: HA entities for battery modes (#152)
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-09-29 00:13:49 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 308adc9277 Merge release/1.0 (7995e4d, UX-13 P3) into opt11-p2-ha-entities
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11m29s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:58:39 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 c664e38ef4 OPT-11 P2 review: refusals stay counted, removals survive a start with no broker
- A refusal past the log-once set or the 32 cap is counted in the log at
  1, 10, 100 and so on, so a repeated attack stays visible.
- The logged topic is printable only (no forged log lines).
- mode_announcement(): the start-up store logic, now tested with a real
  Store. A removed config topic stays stored, so a start with no broker
  cannot forget it (rename case tested).
- A test ties each HA mode option to the page's English name.
- packmode.enabled() is tested for "true", 1 and "false".
- Retained-command text, DOCS and DECISIONS updated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:58:34 +02:00
glenn schrooyen 0951cb227f Merge release/1.0 into safety-79-peak-margin
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11m36s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

# Conflicts:
#	goodwe_controller/app/uilayout.py
2026-09-28 23:56:33 +02:00
admin 7995e4df0f UX-13 P3: Simple view and Batteries screen (#150)
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-09-28 23:44:26 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 e5a0ba23d7 SAFETY-79: CI fixes - MUTATION.md pointer, no key-taking helper, fixture sized on the aim
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11m36s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
test_peakguard's over-limit fixture now sizes its load against
cap - margin, so the floor it asks for is exact wherever in the quarter
the suite runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UBtqPrG1mDLXzTEBnhEkkV
2026-09-28 23:37:55 +02:00
goodwe-review-agent a9f7d78527 UX-13 P3 review: truthful peak lines, a clock-proof test, Simple stays default
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11m10s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
- The peak limit's Why and plan block need a real power request (floor above
  0 W), not a blind or floor-limited guard. An Off battery gets the peak
  block only while it gives power. Why no longer says every battery gives.
- test_batteries_screen pins the fixture clock: unpinned it failed every
  morning. New checks cover the trade and cycle filters, the blind guard and
  an Off battery that A covers alone.
- Settings keeps only a picked view; a link to Installer is not remembered.
- Browser check: badges, unsaved change across views, locked value.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:20:33 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 b310282729 OPT-11 P2: HA entities for battery modes
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11m12s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Each battery gets an MQTT-discovered Mode select and Use switch, only while
battery_modes_enabled is true. Commands go through handle_action(), the
/action path; refusals are logged once. Retained commands are never applied.
Turning modes off removes exactly the configs announced (kept in the store).
With modes off the announcement is byte-identical to ed739d4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 23:12:04 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 7c4c8f5c66 SAFETY-79: peak guard keeps a margin below the limit
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 11m34s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
New option peak_margin_w (default 50 W, 0-500 W). The peak guard, the
forecast checks and the maintenance charge sizing aim at
peak_cap_w - peak_margin_w; the month peak, the bill, headroom, warnings
and every notice keep the real cap. Owner decision 2026-09-28.

peak_margin_w 0 is byte-identical to ed739d4 (tools/safety79_identity.py,
test_peak_margin.py part 1). validate.py rule 12 refuses a value outside
0-500, not whole, or not below the peak limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UBtqPrG1mDLXzTEBnhEkkV
2026-09-28 23:09:39 +02:00
Claude 2d2b6afb07 UX-13 P3: Simple view and Batteries screen
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11m9s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
- Batteries: one card per battery with On/Off, the mode list (cheap hours
  and selling greyed out until OPT-11 P3), level, and Now / Today / Why
  lines built in homeview.py. Replaces the OPT-11 P1 minimal cards and uses
  the existing pack_use / pack_mode actions and store keys.
- An Off battery the peak limit still needs says so with its figure; no line
  shows 0 W beside moving power (OPT-11 P1 test F2). Today says "Not planned
  yet" until OPT-11 P3/P4.
- Home's plan leaves Off batteries out, except for the peak limit.
- Settings opens on Simple: the layout's simple fields with an applies chip
  and a note, plus the battery switches and modes. Installer is one tap.
- English and Dutch words in app/ui_text; test_batteries_screen.py; browser
  check tools/ux13_browser_check.py (CHECK=1 ux13_screenshots.sh); new and
  changed screenshots only.

No control, allocator, arbiter or command module changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UBtqPrG1mDLXzTEBnhEkkV
2026-09-28 22:39:43 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 ed739d4cdb OPT-11 P1: per-battery mode limits, on/off, solar order (#149)
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
Reviewed: a mode gives way to the peak floor only as far as it needs; SAFETY-03 kept at the rail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 19:53:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 ffc9a4d721 OPT-11 P1 review: a mode never beats the peak floor; SAFETY-03 kept at the rail
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 11m4s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
- arbiter: a mode now gives way only as far as a site limit above P_MODE
  needs (_unit_modes at N>1, _site_mode at N=1). Before, the modes were
  released only when the peak floor bound S, so a trade won above the floor
  kept them and placed less than the floor (an Off battery at N=1 went to 0 W
  under a 2000 W floor), and a capped grid charge released an Off battery.
  While released, held batteries weigh 0 and carry only the shortfall.
- control: a side of the loop bound that reaches the rail is left to the
  rail, so SAFETY-03's i_clamped still fires with every battery on.
- opt11_identity: add maintenance scenarios and a 6000-case arbiter digest
  (peak floor, trades, maintenance, refusals); a5dddad digests pinned.
- tests: test_arbiter part 11, test_control (g), test_modes (0/1 refused,
  loop bound counts live units only). DOCS and DECISIONS say the new rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UBtqPrG1mDLXzTEBnhEkkV
2026-09-28 19:41:36 +02:00
Claude dev agent d69fd8fbfd OPT-11 P1: per-battery mode limits, on/off, solar order
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 10m59s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A battery's mode is a soft unit limit (source `mode`, P_MODE 35) kept
apart from the hard limits in pre_resolve(). The allocator applies it
only while the site target is decided at or below 35 (new
Resolution.deciding_priority), so the peak floor releases it and a mode
`hi` never meets the site `lo`. At N=1 resolve() applies the same rule
to the site target after stage 2. A mode range without 0 W is dropped
as a software fault, so REFUSE_SIGN stays unreachable from a mode.

compute() gets the loop bound (sum over live units of hard limits with
modes applied), so the loop never asks for watts no battery may give
and the saturation freeze never parks on them. While charging, Leftover
solar weighs 0 so Solar first fills first. Store keys pack_use and
pack_mode per battery, set by two new /action values; Off stops and
skips maintenance with a log line. Minimal Batteries cards (EN/NL).

Off by default (battery_modes_enabled); off, commands are byte-identical
to a5dddad at N=1 and N=2 (test_modes.py part 1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:51:29 +02:00
admin a5dddadf45 UX-13 P5: Dutch text, STYLE check, DOCS screenshots, period editor (#148)
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-09-28 17:06:18 +02:00
review-agent ede01b8a04 UX-13 P5 review: every STYLE rule has a mutation check, fuller jargon lists, Dutch wording, overlap partner test
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 10m44s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
- test_ui_text.py: key parity, placeholder parity, English-left-in-Dutch,
  semicolon, 25-word description and 2-sentence line each now fail on a
  spoiled input (the English-left check was not a real mutation).
- Jargon lists now cover the whole 'Not' column of STYLE.md section 4, in
  English, with the Dutch equivalents.
- nl.json: 'gewijzigd worden' where 'wijzigen' read as intransitive,
  'Bezig met bewaren' for the saving state, 'Metingen kloppen niet'.
- test_uimodel.py: an overlap that changes partners is named piece by piece
  (a surviving mutant of _tiling's partner check).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 16:54:45 +02:00
Claude dev agent 667b8e9145 UX-13 P5: Dutch text, STYLE check, DOCS screenshots, period editor
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 10m45s
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- app/ui_text/nl.json and app/uitext.py: every page word in Dutch, English
  fallback per key; the page picks by browser language. Home's sentences
  move into ui_text `home_words`, so /status?lang=nl builds them in Dutch.
- test_ui_text.py: EN/NL key and placeholder parity, STYLE limits, jargon
  lists for both languages, no inline details, untranslated Dutch caught.
  Shared rules moved unchanged to tools/style_rules.py.
- tools/ux13_screenshots.sh/.py: DOCS screenshots from the demo fixtures in
  headless Chromium; docs/img/ux13/. Battery modes (P3): no screenshot.
- "Other time windows": a list editor (ui.periods) that builds
  static_profile and names bad times, empty prices, overlaps and gaps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 16:33:32 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 8c34647d05 Merge pull request 'UX-15: setup-only mode, and wizard fixes F1, F2, meter entity, step 1' (#147) from UX-15-setup-only into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
Reviewed and live-tested on TEST-23: 0 service calls in setup-only mode; review comment 1896.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 15:27:27 +02:00
Claude review agent 39e6c260fe UX-15 review: DECISIONS states the TEST-23 run that happened (PR #147)
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It said the PR had TEST-23 evidence, but the PR says TEST-23 was not run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 15:15:51 +02:00
Claude review agent 30cba1e58d UX-15 review: shorter setup banner (PR #147)
The Home banner title was ten words; UX-08 asks for about six.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 15:06:12 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 63e7e8a133 UX-15: mutations fail named checks, not crashes
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 08:54:26 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 159d7461d8 UX-15: setup-only mode, and the wizard fixes F1, F2, meter, step 1
A new install names no inverter. When that is the startup gate's only
refusal, the add-on now serves the setup wizard in setup-only mode instead
of exiting 78. It builds no controller, MQTT client or meter task, its
HomeAssistant is read-only (every service call refuses before sending),
Controller refuses a read-only HomeAssistant, and /action answers 409.
Any other refusal still exits 78. DECISIONS/UX-15-setup-only-mode.md.

Wizard fixes from the UX-13 P4 test:
- F1: /config/validate converts what it can, so a conversion error blocks
  its own step and the live checks still run; save 422 carries steps.
- F2: saves send the model the page opened (base); only keys this page
  changed are written onto the blob stored now.
- A meter entity missing from Home Assistant is red on the last step.
- Step 1 says the reading went down after a skip that followed a fall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 08:48:21 +02:00
admin 4de96752ff Merge pull request 'UX-13 P4: the setup wizard' (#146) from UX-13-p4-setup into release/1.0
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2026-09-28 06:23:16 +02:00
review-agent 3198f346fd UX-13 P4 review fixes (PR #146, comment 1887)
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R1: first_start also needs a Store created at this boot (Store.fresh), so
    old never-started sites (both TEST-23 add-ons, one in shadow) stay on Home.
R2: a kettle skip after a fall says on the last step that the reading went down.
R3: the shadow switch goes only on the model the wizard posts, never into V.
R4: Home Assistant not answering is red on the last step.
R5: meter + solar + battery below -300 W flags a reversed battery sensor.
R6: the live checks say what to change and where.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 06:12:09 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 be57b87c34 UX-13 P4: the setup wizard for installers
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The Setup tab draws the Installer view's page model one step at a time,
from each field's `wizard` step in app/uilayout.py: meter (with the kettle
test), inverters and batteries, solar (optional), prices, peak limit
(battery modes: "comes in a later update", OPT-11), check and start.
It reuses P2's controls and saves through /config/validate and
/config/save. No route was added.

- First run: /config/model says `setup_needed` when the stored options name
  no power request entity, or on a new install (no `setup_done` and no
  `auto` in the Store, control not started). The page opens #setup only
  when opened with no route. The wizard's save writes `setup_done`.
- Kettle test: GET ha/entities?entity= reads one entity now, in W. The
  change decides: up keeps meter_invert off, down turns it on; a net or
  import/export meter that goes down blocks the step with what to check.
- Last step: validate.setup_checks() beside the refusals: the meter reads,
  each power request entity exists in HA (bad if not, SAFETY-77), battery
  levels and power with direction, solar sign, prices. Saves with
  shadow_mode on by default, then a confirmed restart naming the 0 W.
- P2 test finding (a): a stale save lists only the keys the other surface
  moved (the blob handed out on open, by fingerprint, against stored now).
- test_setup.py; tools/ux13_wizard_blobs.py makes the 88 blobs the wizard
  can save; all accepted by Supervisor 2026.08.0 AppOptions (offline).
- DECISIONS/UX-13-setup-wizard.md; DOCS "Setup, for a new install".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-28 05:31:18 +02:00
admin 515c11b380 Merge pull request 'UX-13 P2: the Installer settings view' (#145) from UX-13-p2-installer into release/1.0
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Merge UX-13 P2: the installer settings view (#145)
2026-09-28 03:54:23 +02:00
UX-13 P2 review 7be09197d4 UX-13 P2 review fixes (PR #145, comment 1880)
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1. Discard reloads /config/model: after a stale save the page kept the
   new fingerprint with the old values, so Discard + Save overwrote the
   other surface's change without a 409.
2. Removing cards back to one restores the stored inverter shape, so a
   flat site stays flat after add + remove.
3. A choice the page can only keep ("Other time windows") stays offered
   while it is the stored value.
4. A load locks every locked value again.
5. at_zero() needs an accepted 0 W write; before the first one Home says
   "Going to 0 W" (the heartbeat writes every heartbeat_s, so it clears).
6. A field with a unit drops the translation's "(W)" from its label: the
   peak limit read "Peak limit (W)" beside a kW value.
7. A mirrored choice lists the mirrored field's keys, so a search for
   static_profile finds the contract on a fixed-price site.
8. test_settings: a save refused by ui_to_options writes nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 03:43:47 +02:00
Claude 1752adf6e6 UX-13 P2: test_settings reads fields through named_absence
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-28 03:02:43 +02:00
glenn schrooyen 0a28f71872 Merge release/1.0 (28a49cc, SAFETY-73) into UX-13-p2-installer 2026-09-28 02:49:58 +02:00
Claude c9ab48d6fc UX-13 P2: the Installer settings view
- Settings tab: the Installer view (app/static/settings.js), drawn from
  app/uilayout.py through the new app/uipage.py: search, six collapsible
  groups with "n to fix / n to check / n changed" badges and an "applies
  after a restart" chip, radio cards, segmented choices, sliders with units
  (the peak limit in kW), entity pickers with search and the live reading,
  inverter cards, solar rows, locked measured values behind "Change", and
  the add-on's refusals, warnings and info beside the field they name.
- Save path: the page posts its model to the existing config/validate and
  config/save; uimodel turns it into options before the shipped validator,
  so nothing it refuses is saved. No route added. A value equal to the
  stored one is written as stored, so a save that changed nothing writes an
  identical blob. Save bar, then the restart dialog that names 0 W.
- The region choice shows its preset year; Wallonia and Brussels are listed
  as having no preset yet (TARIFF-22). "Classic settings" keeps /config.
- P1 test findings: (a) "Going to 0 W" until the last accepted power request
  is 0 W; (b) the trade blocks and the price line name the feed's own points
  ("Lowest published price"), the hour bars say "hour average"; (c) the entity
  list's WARNING gives a reason on a timeout.
- test_settings.py; test_home, test_haentities, test_uilayout extended.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-28 02:49:58 +02:00
admin 28a49ccf75 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-73: a battery that refuses, per inverter, with two or more' (#143) from SAFETY-73-per-unit-refusal into release/1.0
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2026-09-28 02:27:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 06aa09e28c SAFETY-73 review: a refusal needs 22 s of evidence, and the cut-out warning is for giving only
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- REFUSED_SPAN_S: the 12 cycles of evidence must also span (SETTLE_CYCLES-1) *
  LOOP_TICK_S = 22 s. At a 1 s meter, lagged healthy readings refused both
  units 10-16 times an hour after load steps (site held 0 W). 2 s and slower
  ticks are unchanged.
- REFUSES_ABOVE_CUT_OUT only for a refusal to give power: a full battery that
  stops taking charge is always above its cut-out level.
- test_delivery: its wedged fixture (0.2 s cycles) no longer reaches a refusal;
  the release/1.0 checks are restored and a span check added.
- test_refusal_units: lagged-reading and full-battery plants, two new checks,
  U14/U15 in the mutation table. Stale "> 500 W" wording fixed. DOCS/DECISIONS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 02:16:24 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 1a9c7523c9 Merge release/1.0 (a36dca6) into SAFETY-73-per-unit-refusal
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 01:41:54 +02:00
admin a36dca60dd Merge pull request 'UX-13 P1: page shell and Home screen on a structured /status' (#144) from UX-13-p1-home into release/1.0
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UX-13 P1: page shell and Home screen on a structured /status (#144)
2026-09-28 01:29:30 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 fad73d4012 UX-13 P1 review: Home draws only what the cycle would do
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- Trade blocks: none on a battery with no room, no sale at a negative price
  or while the emptiest battery is at arbitrage's floor, nothing when a
  level is unknown. A give after a charge may use what the charge put in.
- The refusal line names the real reason: prices not published vs gap.
- The plan's peak line uses the guard's ceiling (this month's peak once
  above the cap), as the peak card does.
- House below zero: 0 W inside the idle band, no figure beyond it.
- Price bars are "Low price" / "High price": the add-on trades in one hour.
- Control toggle: one request in flight at a time.
- test_home: the new cases; the house-sign mutation now goes red.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 01:18:33 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 5a8d832eba Merge release/1.0 (afd6af0) into SAFETY-73-per-unit-refusal
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 01:16:54 +02:00
Claude f8d63cc614 UX-13 P1: page shell and Home screen on a structured /status
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- app/static/{index.html,app.css,app.js}: tabs (Home, Batteries, Settings,
  Setup), hash routes, phone bottom tabs, light/dark. Served inlined at "/";
  the route list is unchanged, and every URL is relative.
- app/homeview.py: /status gains state, now, batteries, plan, attention,
  month_peak and control beside the old fields. The plan is what the add-on
  does today: the arbitrage verdict (the same plan.arbitrage() call as the
  cycle), the monthly cycle, the peak limit, "follows the house".
- The Home plan chart has hover, tap and keyboard-focus tooltips: price bar =
  hour and price; block = what, when, why, kWh and EUR.
- Region preset and year: in config/model (for P2) and on the Home price line.
- test_home.py; test_messages part 8 scans every Home sentence; STYLE plan line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-28 00:45:01 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 016ed5a5a3 SAFETY-73: a battery that refuses, per inverter, with two or more
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SAFETY-52's hold applied per unit at N>1 (owner, 2026-09-27, option R).
A unit that gives < 100 W for 12 cycles in one direction while asked
> 200 W, or trips its stale-reading gate on a ~0 W reading, gets a
P_SAFETY `refused` unit limit closing that direction, so the allocator
hands its share to the others within their own limits. Probe: a +-200 W
pin every 15 min, one unit at a time, only while the site asks 200 W that
way. All units refusing: the site law holds 0 W. Exits reseed the site
target from the wire. INFO plus one WARNING (REFUSES_ABOVE_CUT_OUT) above
the configured cut-out; SAFETY-42/43 no longer report a refusing unit.
N=1 unchanged.

test_refusal_units.py: cases a/b/c on flat and jitter registers against
the old behaviour, probes, recovery, exits; mutations U1-U13 all red.
TEST-19 no-fault campaign: 0 engagements in 5280 runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 00:13:26 +02:00
admin afd6af068d UX-13 P0: layout table, page<->options derivation, warning tier, entity list (#142)
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2026-09-27 23:49:32 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 badea3cb2d UX-13 P0 review: keep unread keys, back off a failed entity read
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- uimodel: editing a listed inverter keeps the stored flat keys, and a
  region of "own" keeps a stored price_taxes_profile (both were dropped).
- haentities: a failed read also waits CACHE_S, so polls while Home
  Assistant is down do not queue one 10 s read each.
- ui_text: the Flanders preset names its DSO, and the help says
  Wallonia and Brussels have no figures yet. REGION_PRESETS cites the card.
- tests: decode of a reversed solar row, both kept keys, the backoff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 23:39:43 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 15627c38a6 UX-13 P0: layout table, page<->options derivation, warning tier, entity list
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The foundation for the new settings page. No visible UI change.

- app/uilayout.py: screen -> group -> part -> field for every option in
  config.yaml (67 fields, 11 derived, 0 hidden), with control, unit, display
  scale, step, entity kind, show conditions, Simple/wizard placement and
  "applies after a restart". Ranges stay in the schema, words in
  translations and the new app/ui_text/en.json.
- app/uimodel.py: options_to_ui()/ui_to_options() for the derived keys (one
  inverter vs the list, solar rows, static_profile from simple prices, a
  year-stamped region preset for the levies figure, and an OPT-11 hook for
  arbitrage_enabled that changes nothing yet). Unchanged derivations write
  the stored values back, so the round trip is exact.
- validate.py: validate.Note, a warn/info tier. Each logged warning is also
  a note when a list is passed; config_notes() adds checks that need live
  data (missing entity, a kW sensor read as W, a limit below this month's
  peak). /config/validate returns them as "notes". No refusal changed: 261
  recorded validator calls, 0 differ (tools/ux13_validator_calls.py).
- GET ha/entities: Home Assistant's entity list for the picker, read through
  hass.states(), cached 30 s, 10 s timeout. When HA is down it answers 200
  with the old list marked old, or an empty list that says why.
- DECISIONS/UX-13-one-layout-table.md amends UX-02's "no option key in UI
  code": keys may appear in uilayout.py and uimodel.py only, both tested.
- Tests: test_uilayout, test_uimodel (round trip over the recorded calls,
  the TEST-23 option files and config.yaml defaults), test_haentities, a
  warning-tier part in test_validate; test_messages scans notes and
  ui_text; test_pv and test_selfconfig part 7 widened on purpose.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 23:11:31 +02:00
admin 652097abde Merge pull request 'SAFETY-52: a battery that refuses is asked for 0 W, with a 200 W probe every 15 min' (#141) from SAFETY-52-refused-hold into release/1.0
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2026-09-27 18:21:21 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 3c0f2b9669 SAFETY-52 review: a refusal is under 100 W, and any delivery ends it
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- Engage (and seed from a stale stop) below REFUSED_BELOW_W, the probe's
  own 100 W answer, not below saturation_w: a battery derated to 100-499 W
  was held at 0 W ~93 % of the time.
- A reading of 100 W or more in the held direction ends the refusal, probe
  or not: at a 1 s meter SETTLE_CYCLES is 12 s, shorter than a healthy
  reading's lag, and that held a healthy step at 0 W until the next probe.
- test_refusal part 5b and a seed test; DOCS states the N>1 limit; the
  DECISIONS record carries the traced cause of the replay's extra trips.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 18:11:42 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 1d33265aac test_price: grade the Why row of the same render, not a second read of why_words
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Since UX-10 the waiting sentence counts its seconds when it is read, so the
second read could cross a second boundary on a loaded runner ("1 second" in
the row, "2 seconds" in the check). CI run 953 on this PR failed that way;
test_price.py passes locally on the same tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 17:04:55 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 1f97c7652f SAFETY-52: a battery that refuses is asked for 0 W, with a 200 W probe every 15 min
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checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 9m32s
At the BMS cut-out the saturation freeze held the last request for hours
(+5000 W for 11.87 h on 09-06, +1940 W for 3 h 55 m on 09-19) until the grid
error changed sign. compute() now carries a refused direction: after
SETTLE_CYCLES of a ~0 W reading against a larger ask it holds that direction
at 0 W, probes 200 W (below the gate's 250 W) every 15 minutes, and lets go
on charge, an answered probe, stop/start or another writer. A stale-reading
trip on a frozen ~0 W reading seeds the same hold, which ends SAFETY-59's
~70 s cycle. One inverter only; no SoC in the loop (SAFETY-25 Option A).

test_refusal.py drives the real Controller and gate; tools/replay_refusal.py
replays the 16-day capture. test_clamp.py and test_delivery.py re-baselined
where they asserted the old hold. DECISIONS/SAFETY-52 has the record and what
SAFETY-58/59 must take into account.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 16:43:27 +02:00
admin d1f7e3336e Merge pull request 'UX-11: safety log lines give one plain sentence and the code, the figures go to DEBUG' (#140) from UX-11-short-safety-lines into release/1.0
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Merge UX-11: short safety log lines, figures to DEBUG and events (#140)
2026-09-27 14:31:05 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 3c298af3d8 UX-11 review: restored stops log their figures to events, the quiet-meter WARNING is rate-limited
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- After a restart, each restored stop (direction per inverter and site,
  delivery, circulation) also writes its saved reason to the action log.
  log_level defaults to info and events starts empty, so the DEBUG
  evidence alone left the figures only in state.json.
- A flapping meter (ha_signed under a flat load, 42-97 s between changes)
  logs at most one WARNING/INFO pair per 10 minutes, with the episodes in
  between at DEBUG.
- LONG_LINE_OK refuses any key whose text is a safety reason.
- test_watchdog keeps the byte pin beside the meaning pin, since the text
  did not change.
- DOCS says the DEBUG line needs log_level debug.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 14:21:05 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 c628099e69 UX-11: the meter WARNING names the limit only, as 'over 30 seconds'
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TEST-23 showed 'No meter reading for 30 seconds, over the limit of 30
seconds': the age is 30.4 s, which rounds to the limit. The limit alone is
always true at the moment the line is logged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 13:49:17 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 29837dfaa7 UX-11: safety log lines give one plain sentence and the code, the figures go to DEBUG
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- Every WARNING/ERROR line that reported a safety reason (direction, delivery,
  stuck meter, stale reading, peak guard, circulation, over-rating) now ends in
  the reason's code (messages.reason_code()). The reason itself, figures and
  limits included, is on a DEBUG line right after it and in the action log.
- The reasons and state.json are unchanged, so an old state file loads and
  shows the same way: every saved reason opens with its code.
- test_messages part 6 checks every WARNING+ line at 25 words as logged; nine
  non-safety families are listed with a reason and capped. The byte pin in
  test_watchdog now pins the meaning, in order.
- The meter logs one WARNING per quiet episode, and INFO when back, so the red
  row's "the add-on log shows why" holds. The Why line past the hold names
  the missing reading. Action log: "25 engagements", "Shadow mode off: ...".

No trigger, latch, threshold, log level, notification id, cadence, row colour
or banner order changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 13:34:30 +02:00
admin c4032ebc21 Merge pull request 'CI: bump infra pin to d637d0b (admin/goodwe#61, UX-10)' (#139) from pin-bump-d637d0b into release/1.0
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2026-09-27 12:30:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 2f1627e287 CI: bump infra pin to d637d0b (admin/goodwe#61, UX-10)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:19:51 +02:00
admin 2b14b88cb4 Merge pull request 'UX-10: the last plain-language leftovers (log lines, two table rows, 'Why: Other', red at 0 s)' (#138) from UX-10-plain-leftovers into release/1.0
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2026-09-27 12:18:22 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 e0b578756f UX-10 review: the line as logged gets the red-alarm shape, clamp lines at 30 words, plain HA 400
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Part 6 checked the quoted reason alone, so title + reason + tails logged
as 4+ sentences. It now also checks the whole line (at most 3 sentences,
none over 30 words); 25 lines failed and are rewritten (one-sentence
wrappers, two-sentence circulation and peak reasons, STALE_READING's
fixed limits on a DEBUG line). The clamp lines for one inverter are
pinned at 30 words with OUTPUT_CLAMP and the numbers kept. Home
Assistant's bare '400: Bad Request' while it loads becomes one plain
line; still WARNING, throttled, a failed write.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 12:08:38 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 f1a660881c UX-10: two INFO lines read better on TEST-23 (hours count, maintenance history)
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"11 of 48 hours use yesterday's prices", and the maintenance-history line no
longer says "maintenance history" twice.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 11:03:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 23a3a3f5b5 UX-10: the last plain-language leftovers: log lines, two table rows, 'Why: Other', red at 0 s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 9m3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
- test_messages.py part 6: every dynamic part of a WARNING+ line is classified
  as data or as a built text, and every built text is produced by the real
  code and checked. This is the gap the 2d scan had: it counted `%s` as one
  word, so reasons built by loop_clamp_note() and friends were never seen.
- Quoted reasons rewritten to STYLE.md (red-alarm shape, codes kept):
  OUTPUT_CLAMP, METER_FROZEN, CIRCULATING_POWER, STALE_READING, the peak
  guard (codes now PEAK_GUARD*), the migration report, price feed, price
  history and gate reasons. Plurals via messages.times()/count().
- Top table: Price history "96 prices over 24 hours for 26 Sep", Tariff
  "one every 15 minutes or every hour", "not final yet" dropped.
- Levels and noise: per-cycle shadow line DEBUG, shadow on/off INFO,
  aiohttp access log only at log level debug, settings warnings once per
  start, one plain line per Home Assistant outage (hass.Outage).
- INFO jargon and error texts: no "§8.3", ISO times, "banked", "keys ARE",
  "NOT_OBSERVED", "did NOT land", "AND".
- Display bugs: WHY_WINNER covers every winner and safety reason
  (main.why_key(), part 7 finds them in the code); the meter row is amber
  "waiting for the first reading" inside its limit after a start; the
  missing-reading age is counted when the page asks.
- STYLE.md and DECISIONS/UX-08-short-notifications.md (UX-10 section).

No change to safety behaviour, alarm levels, notification ids, triggers,
cadence or the banner cascade. One row colour changes (meter at start),
justified in DECISIONS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 10:58:43 +02:00
admin 125b0702a2 Merge pull request 'CI: bump infra pin to ecd3864 (admin/goodwe#60, UX-08)' (#137) from pin-bump-ecd3864 into release/1.0
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2026-09-27 08:52:21 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b878663b2d CI: bump infra pin to ecd3864 (admin/goodwe#60, UX-08)
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checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m55s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 08:42:01 +02:00
admin 32b9e56357 Merge pull request 'UX-08 2d: plain log lines, the rest of the status page, and DOCS' (#136) from UX-08-2d-logs-docs into release/1.0
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2026-09-27 08:40:33 +02:00
Claude review 569f16aa91 UX-08 2d review: action log reachable in status JSON, engaged peak row pinned, imported keys expanded
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- status_payload() also returns the action log as `events`. The page
  does not render it. Some entries (a dropped inverter's reason, the peak
  guard's projection, unplaced watts) are written nowhere else, and DOCS
  still points installers at the action log.
- test_peakguard pins the engaged row's ordered pair (the battery's share,
  then the limit).
- test_messages expands setting keys named by constants imported from
  another app module, so the shown-text 30-word scan counts them.
- p1.py: 'A meter message could not be read'. DOCS glossary: control
  board in plain words, with the hardware in an installer note.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 08:29:14 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6a95447248 UX-08 2d: plain log lines, the rest of the status page, and DOCS
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Every WARNING and ERROR line is one plain line of at most 25 words, with
no card ids, capitals or semicolons; the reasoning of the ten longest is
on a DEBUG line. The ux08 allowlist is empty and its cap is 0 (43 -> 0).

The status page: the month-peak and peak-guard rows, the stale-reading
row, the top table (Why, Tariff, Arbitrage, Shadow mode, labels), the
Stopped banner and the line under the buttons, which now shows the plain
hint of each event instead of the raw action log. The Supervisor question
at start logs one line with a real reason.

Refusals are counted as shown (labels expanded, long cases driven), seven
were shortened, the card and parse errors lost their internals, a blank
value reads "empty", and the panel no longer files inverters.max_w under
the flat max_w. Option names lose "(JSON)", the NL texts are checked too.

DOCS gets a glossary (control board, isolator, Developer Tools) and card
ids move from headings to a "For installers" line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 08:01:16 +02:00
admin a02cd4b713 Merge pull request 'UX-08 2c: short refusals, error texts and option texts' (#135) from UX-08-2c-refusals into release/1.0
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2026-09-27 07:01:25 +02:00
goodwe-review c84d5fd14f UX-08 2c review: unit settings anchor to inverters, plainer texts
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- messages.setting() for one inverter in the list reads
  “Inverter rating” for inverter-b (inverters.max_w), so the config panel
  files per-unit reasons under `inverters`, where the value is changed.
- The tariff card and plausibility reasons name
  “Distribution, levies and VAT” (price_taxes_eur_kwh) again.
- The wrong-direction reasons say "safety stop", the sign_disagree_w
  option says what it protects, and the roster, price-entity,
  integrator_max_w and capacity_kwh texts read more plainly.
- NL: stuurprint -> stuurmodule, "De piekbeperking".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 06:51:57 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 2c516a032c UX-08 2c: short refusals, error texts and option texts
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Validator refusals name the setting by its label and key, say what is
wrong and what to change, and keep the rejected value and limit. Option
names and descriptions are short in en and nl; citations moved to DOCS
"For installers" and the test_translations citation check now pins the
instruction on the tab and the record in DOCS. No rule, key, schema,
default or exit code changed. Allowlist 167 -> 43 (log lines only).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 05:55:45 +02:00
admin e1d0970b23 Merge pull request 'UX-09: Details link for current HA, shadow wording, plain terms' (#134) from UX-09-2a-fixes into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-09-27 04:54:42 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 63dee6db1e UX-09 review: short start-up timeout, latch rows pinned in shadow, plainer rows
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m50s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
The Supervisor questions for the Details link are asked together with a
3 s budget instead of one after the other at 10 s each, so a hung
Supervisor cannot hold control start for 20 s. In shadow mode the
circulating and site-direction latches are pinned to keep their own red
row that says how they clear. Plainer inverter and battery wording.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 04:45:06 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 00e3ee9de8 UX-09: Details link for current HA, "would" in shadow mode, plain terms
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- Details link: /config/app/<slug>/documentation on HA 2026.2+ (the old
  /hassio/addon path is a 404 from 2026.5), /hassio/addon on 2026.1 and
  older. Slug from GET /addons/self/info, version from GET /info, hostname
  as fallback.
- Shadow mode: the over-rating alarm and row say what would have been sent,
  the peak alarm no longer says the battery is giving all it can.
- "controller" -> "the add-on" / "control". Settings named by their labels;
  four labels changed to match (Peak reserve, Battery level entity, Solar
  production ..., Reversed-sign solar entities).
- Shadow banner and inverter link notes moved to messages.py and checked.
- DOCS Notifications and Status page rewritten for home owners, with a
  "For installers" part each. Allowlist 168 -> 167.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 04:10:39 +02:00
admin d57767fe38 Merge pull request 'UX-08 phase 2b: short, plain status rows and page banners' (#133) from UX-08-status-rows into release/1.0
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2026-09-27 03:19:54 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 571b884315 UX-08 phase 2b review: keep over-rating evidence, pin latch clearing, plainer rows
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- During a bound episode an earlier over-rating count stays on the page (amber,
  under its own title); test_clamp pins it.
- test_messages pins that every latch row says how it clears.
- pv_entities description no longer claims the page names the entity (en, nl);
  allowlist hash updated for that option-desc line.
- Plainer texts: multi-inverter direction banner, "fine now" after an episode,
  and the e-stop, peak-forecast and peak-guard-waiting rows move to messages.py.
- TEL-12 DECISIONS points to UX-08 item 3 for the retired row rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 03:10:25 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 696142bccc Merge branch 'release/1.0' into UX-08-status-rows
Brings in the infra pin bump (#132) so infra-pin / fresh runs against it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 02:41:05 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 d017fc67bf UX-08 phase 2b: short, plain status rows and page banners
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infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Every Commissioning row and every page banner is now worded in
app/messages.py (row_*, banner_*): one sentence of at most 15 words, a red
row up to three sentences so a latch still says how it clears, banners at
most 12 words. No row names a Home Assistant entity: sensors by their
setting, solar sources by their place in the list. Reason codes and limits
stay on the log line and event list; rows keep the numbers a reader acts on.

UX-07 item 1: ClampWatchdog counts over-rating and integrator-bound
engagements separately, and after an episode each count shows under its own
alarm's title instead of both under "output clamp".

No row colour, visibility or banner order changed. Rows carry an "id" so the
tests pin meaning rather than wording. The row and banner kinds leave the
allowlist (200 -> 168, cap equal). DOCS.md gains "Status page"; choices are in
DECISIONS/UX-08-short-notifications.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 02:12:10 +02:00
admin 5c151a3458 Merge pull request 'CI: bump infra pin to 7081df4 (admin/goodwe#59, UX-08)' (#132) from pin-bump-7081df4 into release/1.0
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2026-09-27 01:41:37 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 24f955cb26 CI: bump infra pin to 7081df4 (admin/goodwe#59, UX-08)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 01:31:35 +02:00
admin 48ef06ac1f Merge pull request 'UX-08 phase 2a: short, plain notifications, and a ratchet for the rest' (#131) from UX-08-plain-notifications into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-09-27 01:29:46 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 7b65a3e69a UX-08 review: tighter notification texts, and two meaning fixes
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- not delivering: the body said control keeps running and then "start
  control"; clearing it takes stop then start, and it now says so.
- peak reserve: the "reserve not set" branch is really soc_floor None,
  i.e. an inverter's cut-out level missing; it now names that. The title
  is true on all three branches ("Battery stopped limiting the peak").
- no semicolon run-ons in bodies (STYLE.md + test); loop-bound, circulating,
  meter-frozen and multi-unit over-rating bodies rewritten to match.
- allowlist cap is now exact, so a shrink cannot leave room to regrow.
- DOCS names the settings behind "peak reserve" and "cut-out level";
  DECISIONS no longer states the HA anchor behaviour as fact.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 01:18:55 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 50ccea3dd7 UX-08 phase 2a: short, plain notifications, and a ratchet for the rest
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Every HA notification the add-on raises now has a title of at most 5
everyday words and a one-sentence body; a red alarm may use three so no
action is lost. The texts live in app/messages.py, the rule in STYLE.md,
and the detail that moved out in DOCS.md "Notifications", which each body
links to. No notification_id, trigger or cadence changed.

test_messages.py enforces the rule on every notification, fails any
notification worded outside app/messages.py, and ratchets the kinds not yet
rewritten (rows, banners, refusals, logs, options) through a shrinking
allowlist of 200. Six tests re-pinned from prose to meaning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 01:00:54 +02:00
admin 2503de124e Merge pull request 'SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is not a BUG SIGNAL; alarm numbers from the clamp tick' (#130) from SAFETY-40-clamp-alarm into release/1.0
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2026-09-26 23:19:11 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 55a6d5dcdb SAFETY-40 review: integrator-bound WARNING gets its own notification id
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A later anti-windup notice could replace a write-path BUG SIGNAL notice
under the shared goodwe_output_clamp id (escalation ignores the budget).
The WARNING now uses goodwe_integrator_bound and points to DOCS; the
cadence sentence in DOCS is corrected. Tests pin both ids (red on fd14569).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 23:08:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 fd14569a71 SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is not a BUG SIGNAL; numbers from the clamp tick
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The clamp alarm gave `i_clamped` (normal anti-windup) the over-rating BUG
SIGNAL text, printed `Decision.i_w` as "the loop asked for", and printed
`self.target` (after slew/freeze) as "was clamped to".

- clamp.loop_clamp_note(): i_clamped says "the loop's integrator reached its
  N W anti-windup bound" with this tick's command; clamped keeps BUG SIGNAL
  with the requested command and the clamp's own result.
- Decision carries i_bound_w / requested_w / clamped_w, set at the clamp.
- i_clamped still counts and notifies (same id, cadence, SAFETY-41
  escalation) but as a WARNING, amber row, plain title. A bug has its own
  notification budget and its text is not overwritten within an episode.
- test_clamp.py part 9: red on the old code per defect; 5 mutations killed.
- DOCS.md alarm section (and its stale 30 s cadence), DECISIONS/SAFETY-40.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-26 22:37:01 +02:00
admin 59415ea83f Merge pull request 'CI: bump infra pin to 7689816 (admin/goodwe#58, SAFETY-34)' (#129) from pin-bump-7689816 into release/1.0
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2026-09-26 16:15:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 f37268f3e4 CI: bump infra pin to 7689816 (admin/goodwe#58, SAFETY-34)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 16:05:02 +02:00
admin 397dd15dba SAFETY-34: re-assert latched alarms after a Core-only restart (#128)
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2026-09-26 16:03:16 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 6028e21298 SAFETY-34: re-assert latched alarms, because a Core restart keeps the add-on
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A Core-only restart wipes persistent_notification and does NOT restart the
add-on (measured on TEST-23: the add-on's SAFETY-31 card was gone 4 min after
`docker restart test23-ha`, add-on StartedAt unchanged). The latched SAFETY-31
and SAFETY-42 cards were re-raised only on add-on start, so they stayed gone.

They are now re-asserted every REANNOUNCE_S = 300 s while tripped (same
notification_id, so it replaces). test_watchdog part 6 and test_delivery part
8b grade it with the same process across the "restart"; red on the old code.
The docstrings that said the add-on restarts with HA are corrected.
Record: goodwe docs/DECISIONS.md, SAFETY-34 D4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-26 12:37:47 +02:00
admin fe132515fe Merge pull request 'CI: bump infra pin to a1d0618 (admin/goodwe#57, TOOL-9)' (#127) from pin-bump-a1d0618 into release/1.0
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2026-09-25 20:52:59 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 00e9a7b4e1 CI: bump infra pin to a1d0618 (admin/goodwe#57, TOOL-9)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 20:42:44 +02:00
admin 82f032e8cf Merge pull request 'TOOL-9: pin checks print FAIL under pipefail; job tokens via header' (#126) from TOOL-9 into release/1.0
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2026-09-25 20:39:47 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b963153de6 Restore .gitea/infra-pin (revert the TOOL-9 proof throwaway)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 19:20:19 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 a2c571b20e THROWAWAY (TOOL-9 proof, reverted next): remove .gitea/infra-pin
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 19:08:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 550bd6fa52 TOOL-9: pin checks print their FAIL line under pipefail; job tokens via header
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
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A missing or comment-only .gitea/infra-pin now ends on the workflow's own
FAIL line instead of git's `fatal: path ... does not exist` (still red). Every
x-access-token remote URL becomes an env-set Authorization header, so no
token lands in .git/config or argv; the pin workflows' temp dir is removed
by an EXIT trap, also on failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 19:07:34 +02:00
admin 6a8a5ffa27 Merge pull request 'CI-12: CI grades test_freeze.py against the real hwsim at a pinned admin/goodwe' (#125) from CI-12 into release/1.0
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2026-09-25 18:19:43 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 8ff42ea85d CI-12: .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (2d026df, goodwe#56 merged)
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-25 18:10:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 841424463a CI-12 review: INFRA_READ_TOKEN via an env-set header, not a remote URL
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The long-lived token no longer lands in $WS/goodwe/.git/config (mounted into
the tests' container, left behind by a failed job) or in git's argv. A missing
secret (fork PR) fails with its own message. README: addon-pin is not re-run
after a bump.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-25 18:01:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 c63eda0b0f CI-12: restore .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (56a933e)
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This reverts commit 54cc5263fb (the proof-2 throwaway).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:45:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 54cc5263fb THROWAWAY (CI-12 proof 2): pin one release/1.0 merge behind (d84ac01); reverted next
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infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:36:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 c493a6d67a CI-12: test_tariff.py no longer says CI cannot see the infra repo
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:27:06 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 d0891a6bca CI-12: .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (56a933e), restoring the proof pin
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 16:10:47 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 fe80047235 CI-12 round 2: INFRA_READ_TOKEN for admin/goodwe; the pin tracks release/1.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
- checks.yml's infra checkout and infra-pin.yml's admin/goodwe ls-remote use
  the INFRA_READ_TOKEN secret; the self fetch keeps GITHUB_TOKEN.
- infra-pin.yml compares against admin/goodwe refs/heads/release/1.0; STALE
  message, comments and README follow.
- test_control.py / test_alloc.py: drop the claim that CI cannot reach
  admin/goodwe.
- .gitea/infra-pin is DELIBERATELY one release/1.0 merge behind (d84ac01) for
  the "infra-pin / fresh goes red" proof; the next commit sets it to HEAD.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 16:08:55 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6e3399322a CI-12: CI grades test_freeze.py against the real hwsim at a pinned admin/goodwe
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 2s
- .gitea/infra-pin: the one place the admin/goodwe commit is pinned.
- checks.yml: checks out admin/goodwe at the pin as the sibling test_freeze.py
  looks for; any failure fails the job. Tests run with GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1,
  and `CI: ` lines are echoed on PASS so the log shows which transport ran.
- test_freeze.py: GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM refuses the stub; a local stub run
  prints a STUB USED line.
- infra-pin.yml: a separate, non-required check that goes red naming both
  SHAs when admin/goodwe master has moved past the pin.
- README: when and how to bump the pin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 01:57:04 +02:00
admin 16c796fa30 Merge pull request 'TEL-14: PV sign declared per entity (pv_invert_entities)' (#124) from TEL-14-pv-sign into release/1.0 2026-09-25 01:30:33 +02:00
admin 20260e86ec Merge pull request 'DOC-5: tell installers to turn on the Supervisor Watchdog' (#123) from DOC-5-watchdog into release/1.0 2026-09-25 01:17:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 7fa045af85 TEL-14 N1: trim DECISIONS (drop probe transcript, §1 to the reason), move the mutation ledger there with M2/M5
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m44s
test_pv.py part 11 now prints a one-line pointer instead of the 12-row table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 01:11:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 93f349a6af TEL-14 B1: pin stray caution on the reported case and whitespace normalisation end to end
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 01:10:13 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 d71f7dbd35 Merge release/1.0 (43b2740) into DOC-5-watchdog to sync base
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m45s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 01:08:15 +02:00
admin 43b274035f Merge pull request 'TEST-26: a missing value in a check is a named FAIL, not a traceback' (#122) from TEST-26 into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:57:20 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 6dbe06e32e DOC-5: add the Watchdog step to README's Install section
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m31s
One line after the install step, linking to the DOCS.md paragraph that
gives the reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:30:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 7559d21eda TEL-14: PV sign declared per entity (pv_invert_entities)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m39s
Some PV entities (kWh meters, ESPHome clamps in the PV circuit) read positive
for consumption and negative for production. `pv_invert_entities` lists the
ones to flip; the flip is applied per member inside pv.total(), before the sum,
so the MQTT `pv` row and the status page carry the corrected figure. Default []
is byte-identical to 0.12.0.

Shape measured in supervisor_shape_probe.py section H (Supervisor 2026.08.0):
a parallel list validates the 0.12.0 blob unchanged and renders as its own
translated repeatable field; dicts on pv_entities refuse 0.12.0's stored
strings; a prefix is invisible syntax; a global bool cannot describe a mixed
roster. Status page marks flipped entities and cautions per entity below
-50 W, saying ADD or REMOVE. Telemetry only: control documents unchanged.

Record: DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md (reverses TEL-11 section 2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:25:24 +02:00
admin 3e38bafcee Merge pull request 'SAFETY-62/SAFETY-60: operator tools refuse input they cannot read' (#120) from SAFETY-62-refuse-unread-input into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:25:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 02a822af98 DOC-5: tell installers to turn on the Supervisor Watchdog
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m41s
Since SAFETY-61 a dead control loop writes 0 W and exits 70. The Supervisor
restarts a stopped add-on only when the per-install Watchdog toggle is on,
and it defaults to off. One step in DOCS.md "Before you start", with a
pointer to the DECISIONS file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:20:52 +02:00
admin 6e6527224a Merge pull request 'SAFETY-61: the control task's death ends the process, after the wind-down' (#121) from safety-61-control-task-death into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:07:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 770988c902 TEST-26: a missing value in a check is a named FAIL, not a traceback
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m44s
Checks and prints that indexed an empty list, exhausted next(), or formatted
None killed the rest of their file (FCST-06). Read them through the new
named_absence.py (nth/first/field/given/present) and conjoin a presence term.

- every site in the brief, plus the family the new scan and a sweep found
- test_named_absence.py: scans every test_*.py for unguarded filtered-list
  indexing, next() without a default and numeric formats on maybe-None
  names; proven to bite; prints what it cannot see, counted
- test_price.py 16a: the `_T17_CAPS is _T17_CAPS` tautology now grades the
  two assemble() calls' arguments
- test_control.py: coverage table re-measured on runs graded to the end

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:06:58 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b06f1fad5f SAFETY-62 review: DOCS exit 3 at the command block (R1); recognise the auto store key (R2)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m35s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:02:33 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 71d2d4a37a SAFETY-61: the control task's death ends the process, after the wind-down
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m22s
A done-callback on run_control()'s task logs the traceback at the death and
sets `stop`; amain() runs the ordinary wind-down (shutdown() ->
command_site_zero()) and main() exits 70 (EX_SOFTWARE). Normal stops and
run_control()'s refusal path are ignored by the callback (still 0 / 78).

hass.py: a malformed JSON body, a JSON non-object, and an undecodable error
body are an absence / a failed write, not an exception into the loop.

checks() gains a first "control loop" row, red past FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S.

Why exit rather than restart in-process, and what the Supervisor actually
does on exit (restarts only with the per-install Watchdog toggle on, default
off): DECISIONS/SAFETY-61-control-task-death.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:52:42 +02:00
admin fa3d237ce1 Merge pull request 'DOC-1: operator docs name the real P1 entity and a roster that starts' (#119) from doc-1-operator-docs into release/1.0 2026-09-24 23:42:13 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 f4f72211a9 SAFETY-60/62: operator tools refuse input they cannot read
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m31s
predeploy_check.py and rehearse_roster.py now assert a positive property of
their input (a JSON object, most of whose top-level keys are known option or
store keys) and refuse anything else with the shape named. The `ha apps info
--raw-json` wrapper, a truncated or list-wrapped state file and a wrapped
config no longer produce "CLEARED" / "NO FINDINGS" with exit 0.

Also: a clean --no-live-entities rehearsal exits 3, not 0; alloc_sim.py
exits 1 when split-invariance FAILS; decode_bus_capture.py takes several
paths and exits 1 on a file that is mostly not frames.

Graded by the new test_tool_inputs.py; DOCS.md says to pass .data.options.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:27:50 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 29ca9b5157 DOC-1: operator docs name the real P1 entity and a roster that starts
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m8s
- DOCS.md / config.yaml: the watchdog's P1 age entity is
  sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age (device "GoodWe" + "P1 sample age", as
  app/mqtt.py announces and the live install recorded), not
  sensor.p1_sample_age_s.
- DOCS.md: the inverters: example and per-entry table carry the required
  bms_soc_floor (and capacity_kwh); config.yaml's schema comment says four
  required keys, not three.
- Field guide: marked v0.1.0/outdated; slew_w row no longer recommends the
  1000 W that SAFETY-39 now refuses. HTML regenerated; the PDF is NOT
  rebuilt (no Chrome here). README/DOCS pointers fixed.
- test_docs.py: the documented roster must pass app/validate.py and the
  schema's per-entry keys; the documented entity id must equal the id
  composed from app/mqtt.py; the wrong id may appear in no shipped doc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:24:50 +02:00
admin 3ce18708b6 PKG-18: ship 0.12.0 to master, so TEL-12's pv_entities can reach an installed 0.11.0 (#118) 2026-09-24 23:22:34 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 a45ed06c05 PKG-18: cut 0.12.0, so TEL-12's pv_entities can reach an installed 0.11.0 (#117)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Reviewed at head 1ad4d3a. CI run 830 (attempt 1, pull_request, PR 117 -> release/1.0), 31/31 PASS. Review: #issuecomment-1588, #issuecomment-1589.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:09:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 1ad4d3a5bb PKG-18: cut 0.12.0, so TEL-12's pv_entities can reach an installed 0.11.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m5s
One runtime merge since 0.11.0 (cccb2fa): TEL-12 (#116), a new optional
list option `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity`. Option surface 76 -> 77, so
a minor bump. config.yaml version and a closed `## 0.12.0` section only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 22:59:44 +02:00
admin f863ecaa8c TEL-12: several PV inverters, and one absent member is an absent TOTAL (#116)
pv_entity becomes a roster: pv_entities beside it, replacing it, with the SITE total over the roster. One absent member makes the TOTAL absent - never the partial sum of the ones that answered, because a smaller number indistinguishable from a real one reads a week later as 'there was less sun than there was', which is the conclusion OPT-10 exists to test rather than to manufacture. A member honestly reporting 0 W is still summed.

Reviewed on PR 116. Re-run independently: supervisor_shape_probe.py SSG (exit 0, transcript reproduces byte for byte), the owner's real 75-key options blob through Supervisor 2026.08.0's own AppOptions (ACCEPTED, zero drift on any stored value, pv_entities defaulted to []), tel11_pv_trace.py --compare across both trees (every hash reproduces, control 846a10a5b89e unmoved on unset and one), the rejected-design mutant (trace REFUSED 5/5 with the partial sums named), the planted leak N8 (52/26/10 red cells), and eight mutations on fresh purged copies including N5 sum->max at +0 bytes - no survivors. Habit 24's central claim measured: TEL-11's own --compare refuses on every honest run now that release/1.0 is 0.11.0.

Green traced to this PR's own run: 829/1954, attempt 1, event pull_request, path checks.yml@refs/pull/116/head, payload naming PR 116 with base release/1.0 @ cccb2fa, 31 suites PASS in 7m53s - a real execution, not a laundered skip.

Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays 0.11.0 and the CHANGELOG entry is PKG's call.
2026-09-24 22:41:19 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 0ef9565071 TEL-12: several PV inverters, and one absent member is an absent TOTAL
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m59s
0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity` as a single string. The reference site's owner
reported within minutes of it going live that they have several PV inverters
and could configure one - which is ordinary for a multi-string roof, not a
property of one house. `pv_entities` is the roster and the row carries the
SITE total.

⚠️ THE HARD PART IS ABSENCE, NOT THE LIST. Three configured, one `unavailable`,
and the sum of the other two is a SMALLER NUMBER INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM A REAL
ONE. Read back by OPT-10 that says "there was less PV than there was" - the "no
irradiance" conclusion the channel exists to TEST. So `pv.total()` answers
`None` the moment any configured entity is absent: the topic carries HA's own
`None`, the entity goes to `unknown`, the recorder records a GAP. The
alternative (the partial sum beside a contributor count) was implemented and
run as mutation N1b; it loses because the MQTT row is read COLD a week later by
an attribution that would believe it, while the qualifying count would live in a
second entity with its own history. The partial information is not thrown away -
the STATUS PAGE names every entity that reported, with its watts, and every one
that did not, with its reason, because that surface is read LIVE by a human who
wants the diagnostic.

⚠️ AND THE MIRROR: a member honestly reporting 0 W is SUMMED. The test is
`is None`, never falsiness - a roster that blanked the site on a zero would
report an absence on every clear evening.

THE SURFACE IS MEASURED, NOT PREFERRED. `pv_entity` could not become a list:
tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py §G shows Supervisor 2026.08.0 answering an
0.11.0 install's stored string with `Invalid list for option 'pv_entity'`, and
deepmerge's list strategy is `override` so a `[]` default does not rescue it -
the live add-on would not start. `match(.*)?` does accept both shapes and is
rejected for a different, measured reason: it validates nothing (a string, a
list and the integer 417 all pass) and renders as a plain text box. So
`pv_entities` joins `pv_entity` and REPLACES it when set, CFG-04's rule for
`inverters:`, with a status caution saying which key won - a union would
double-count the inverter the old key still names.

STILL NOT A CONTROL INPUT. tools/tel11_pv_trace.py was extended rather than
replaced and now grades five claims over three document sets. The control hash
is UNMOVED - 846a10a5b89e… on `unset` and on `one`, on both trees - and the
roster control document is byte-identical between the two trees. 2/5 is a claim
TEL-11 could not make: with 0.11.0 as the baseline, "one entity behaves exactly
as 0.11.0 does" is a real cross-tree identity over control AND telemetry.

⚠️ TEL-11's OWN `--compare` REFUSAL HAD TO CHANGE, and that is MUTATION.md habit
24: a discriminator defined as "the baseline lacks this feature" dies on the
release that ships the feature, and dies as a false refusal.

Twelve mutations, each on a fresh purged `cp -a`, no survivors. N5 is +0 B
(`sum` -> `max`, the same three characters) and was run on a fresh copy with
`cmp` confirming the edit on disk. The fixture is three distinct NON-ZERO
contributions in two units with absence driven at EVERY position - a member
contributing 0 W could go absent without moving the sum of the rest, which is
habit 23 with a coinciding value in the arithmetic rather than in the plant.

31/31 in the CI image. Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays at 0.11.0,
so predeploy_check.py reports a NO-OP until PKG cuts a version. A CHANGELOG
entry is wanted and deliberately not written - 11b forbids `## Unreleased` and
the bump is PKG's call; DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md is the
material it needs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 22:13:25 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 78acb558ff PKG-17: ship 0.11.0 to master, so SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's pv_entity can reach an installed 0.10.1 (#115)
master is what the Home Assistant Supervisor clones, and the Supervisor
compares config.yaml version strings - so 0.11.0 could not be offered to an
installed 0.10.1 without this bump reaching master.

Carries SAFETY-56 (#112), TEL-11 (#113), the CI-9 follow-up (#102) and SEC-2's
docs/RELEASE.md (#108), by way of the 0.11.0 cut (#114).

NOT A FAST-FORWARD. master was not an ancestor of release/1.0: 0f14c2a, the
pre-SEC-2 direct push, exists only on master. Its tree is the same object as
the merge base b0b24e5 (c1fef26), so it carries no content delta, and
`git merge-tree --write-tree` over the two branches returns a tree bit-identical
to cccb2fa's own (6670502). This merge commit therefore contributes exactly
release/1.0's tree - master synthesises nothing.

Reviewed as the release decision, not a re-review of content. Verified from the
remote: slug goodwe_controller and every identity key unchanged (cross-checked
against the live box's Supervisor export), version 0.10.1 -> 0.11.0, and the
green is this PR's own - run 828 / job 1953, path checks.yml@refs/pull/115/head,
PRNUM 115, GRADED refs/pull/115/head merged into master, run_attempt 1, 31 test
files all passing in 8m01s of real work.

predeploy_check.py re-run against the owner's current options (exported
2026-09-24 20:02, 75 keys, pv_entity unset): CLEARED, exit 0. That retires the
stale-2026-09-07-export warning in the pull request body. Option surface
75 -> 76 with only pv_entity added, str? defaulting to "", no key removed, no
default moved, no rule added to validate.py - no SystemExit(78) on this hop.

Merging is not installing. No tag is cut here and `ha store reload` /
`ha addons update` have not been run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 20:28:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cccb2fa07b PKG-17: cut 0.11.0, so SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's pv_entity can reach an installed 0.10.1 (#114)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m1s
Bumps config.yaml 0.10.1 -> 0.11.0 and adds the `## 0.11.0` section, so the Supervisor offers the update that carries SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's `pv_entity`.

Reviewed at head b11bea7. Green traced to this PR's own run (827, attempt 1, payload names PR 114 base release/1.0, 31/31 real). Version gate 11a-11d, SAFETY-56's behaviour hash and TEL-11's four trace rows all re-measured on this tree and matching. slug unchanged; option surface 75 -> 76 with no validator rule added.

Two non-blocking findings recorded on the PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 19:20:06 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 b11bea70d3 PKG-17: the SAFETY-57 correction pointed at the wrong paragraph
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m13s
Self-review. The note added to `### SAFETY-57` said the reading rule it is
qualifying is "two paragraphs up"; it is in the paragraph directly above - the
same one the note follows. A changelog that misdirects a reader to a paragraph
that is not there is the small end of exactly the defect this cut is fixing
three sentences of elsewhere, so it is corrected rather than left.

Text only, one line pair, still two files in the branch's diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 19:01:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cfafdffaed PKG-17: cut 0.11.0, so SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's pv_entity can reach an installed 0.10.1
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Two files, and no third. config.yaml 0.10.1 -> 0.11.0; CHANGELOG.md gains
`## 0.11.0` and three corrections to sections below it.

A MINOR BUMP, NOT A PATCH. TEL-11 adds an option - `pv_entity`, 75 keys -> 76 in
`options:` and `schema:` together - which is the same test 0.8.0, 0.9.0 and
0.10.0 were cut on. Nothing here can refuse a stored blob: the key is `str?`
with an `options:` default of "", validate.py does not mention it, no default
moved and no enum widened, so a blob that starts the add-on on 0.10.1 starts it
on 0.11.0.

THE TABLE HAS TWO ROWS AND THE WINDOW HAD FOUR MERGES. CI-9's follow-up
(9f6b9f1, `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` only) and SEC-2 (239e120,
`docs/RELEASE.md` + README.md) are excluded under PKG-15's rule - AUDIENCE, NOT
IMPORTANCE. Neither file is under `goodwe_controller/`, neither is in the built
image, neither is in predeploy_check.py's RUNTIME tuple, and there is no version
of this add-on on which an operator can observe either. SEC-2 is the closer call
and the section argues it in full rather than asserting it: it is the more
consequential ticket of the two - it is why this release is a pull request
rather than a push to master - and it is still a procedure for whoever cuts a
release, not something the person deciding whether to press Update can act on.
Both are named in the section with pointers to PR #102 / checks.yml and PR #108
/ docs/RELEASE.md.

WHAT THE ENTRIES LET AN OPERATOR DECIDE. SAFETY-56: behaviour byte-identical
(6030175ed2ab..., reproduced in the CI image over 2390 capture reads, a 66-cell
grid stepped 120 times and six driven worlds), three surfaces named with the old
and new wording side by side - the STALE_READING line quoted onto the action log
and status page, the SAFETY-37 ERROR log line, and the readiness row that
asserted a false fact about a named entity. TEL-11: unset is byte-identical in
BOTH the control and telemetry documents, set is byte-identical in the control
document only; the three TEL-11 rows of that table were re-measured in the CI
image on this tree (control 846a10a5... twice, telemetry a443a6ce... / 4e6d1cb2...).
It is stated plainly that pv_entity is not a control input and does not change
what the loop does, and that absence publishes `unknown` rather than 0.

THREE CORRECTIONS BELOW THE NEW SECTION, WITHOUT REWRITING HISTORY. The 0.10.1
preamble said SAFETY-56 was open; the SAFETY-57 entry said its accusatory
diagnosis half was "deliberately untouched"; the 0.10.0 preamble left SAFETY-56
with no pointer while SAFETY-57 had one. All three quotations are what the
0.10.1 image actually prints and are left standing - a reader on 0.10.1 has to
recognise them - each now scoped to 0.10.1 and pointed at `## 0.11.0`.

VERIFIED. test_version_gate.py part 11 all four: 11a one contents table and the
slicer closed (302 lines under '0.11.0'), 11b 0.11.0 == config.yaml, 11c all
three RETIRED_PROVIDERS ids named - scoped to a pre-0.10.0 crossing and pointing
at `## 0.10.0`, which is where the evidence is - 11d still exactly one
`## Unreleased` below, PKG-08's, untouched. 31/31 in the CI image, checks.yml's
exact command, purged tree, `:ro`.

Not deployed and not installed. Shipping is a separate pull request from
release/1.0 into master, per docs/RELEASE.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 18:50:13 +02:00
admin 94da37fc72 TEL-11: PV production stops being invisible, and stays out of the control law (#113)
Reviewed on the PR. Green traced to run 825 (PRNUM 113, BASEREF release/1.0, attempt 1, real 8m6s execution). Control-path identity independently reproduced on both trees and counter-tested with a planted leak (red on 26/41 cells); all three of the trace tool substituted refusals fire. M7 genuinely red. Three publication states distinct on the wire. 31/31 in the CI image.

Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays at 0.10.1, so predeploy_check.py reports a NO-OP until PKG cuts a version.
2026-09-24 15:55:29 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 07ba3433ed TEL-11: PV production stops being invisible, and stays out of the control law
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m6s
OPT-10 measured that this site's pack reaches 90 % SoC on 2 days of 16 and that
20.5 kWh of surplus left the site while the pack had room - 12.6 kWh of it with
the battery not charging at all - and could not say WHY, because PV production
is recorded NOWHERE. Three causes need three different fixes (no irradiance:
nothing to fix; a charge-power limit; the optimiser declining to charge, which
is the only software defect) and guessing between them is how an optimiser gets
tuned to solve a cloud problem. This card adds the channel. It does not do the
attribution.

AN HA ENTITY, NOT A REGISTER, AND THAT IS A PRODUCT DECISION. This add-on's
RS485 bus carries the BATTERY inverter it drives; a household's PV inverter is
normally a different box from a different vendor reporting into Home Assistant
through its own integration. `pv_entity` takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's
own PV integration provides, any brand HA can read.

POSITIVE IS PRODUCTION, AND THERE IS NO `pv_invert`. The convention is derived
rather than assumed: `meter_entity` is positive when IMPORTING and `batt_entity`
is positive when DISCHARGING (DOCS.md, Sources), both of which are "power
arriving at the house's AC bus", and production arrives there too. Those two
keys carry invert flags because they are BIPOLAR and are READ BY THE CONTROL
PATH - `inv.batt` feeds SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and SAFETY-31's
circulating-power sensor, so a reversed sensor hands the site a plausible number
it acts on. Production is unipolar and is read by nothing: a reversed sensor
announces itself as -4 kW at noon in the very history this card creates, and a
flag would only let an installer hide it. No negative-value alarm either - a PV
inverter's own standby draw makes a small negative reading at night ordinary, so
any threshold would be a number nobody measured.

ABSENCE IS NEVER ZERO, AND "DROPPED" IS NOT ABSENT. `publish()` SKIPS a None,
which is right for `circulation` and exactly wrong here: a skipped row leaves
Home Assistant holding the last number forever and the recorder draws a FLAT
LINE through the outage, which is indistinguishable from a measurement and
manufactures the "there was no surplus" conclusion this card exists to TEST. So
the absence is published, with HA's own payload: `mqtt/const.py` declares
`PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"` and `mqtt/sensor.py` tests it BEFORE the numeric branch,
so the entity's state becomes `unknown` and the recorder stores a GAP. Read out
of home-assistant/core `dev` on 2026-09-24 and quoted at the constant.
`ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is a one-key set and the suite asserts `circulation: None`
is STILL dropped.

THE UNIT IS READ OFF THE ENTITY. `mW`, `W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`, `TW` - HA's own
`UnitOfPower`, every factor an exact power of ten. A sensor with no unit, or a
unit outside that table, is REFUSED by name and the status page says which.
`read_inputs()`'s `abs(raw) < 50` kW-or-W guess is safe for a quarter-hour
demand forecast and is NOT safe here: 30 W of dusk is an ordinary reading and
that heuristic would publish it as 30 kW.

GENUINELY OPTIONAL, AND NOT A SECOND `price_now_entity`. validate.py does not
mention the key - it cannot conflict with anything, because nothing else reads
it. The MQTT row lives in a new `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` list whose `include` argument
DEFAULTS TO EMPTY, so every caller that has never heard of `pv_entity` -
test_mqtt.py's fixtures, tools/rehearse_roster.py, anything written next year -
announces exactly what it announced before. Unset: no state call at all, no
entity, no topic, no status row, no page row. Set and failing: a CAUTION
(`ok=False, warn=True`), never a `bad` row, so a telemetry channel can never put
a battery site into NOT READY.

IT MUST NOT BECOME A CONTROL INPUT, AND THAT IS GRADED TWICE. `test_pv.py`
part 6 drives 40 cycles of the real `cycle()` and asserts the commands are
bit-identical across unset / no reading / 0 W / 8 kW, with a COMPUTED census
(33 modules under app/) showing the material is mentioned in exactly three:
pv.py, main.py, mqtt.py. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is the cross-tree half -
`safety56_behaviour_trace.py`'s pattern with a DIFFERENT control clause, because
this card's claim is that nothing differs rather than that only sentences do: it
REFUSES unless the two `app/` fingerprints differ and unless exactly one side
reacts to the option. Measured on 41 stimulus cells:

    control   release/1.0 unset  846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    control   TEL-11      unset  846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    control   TEL-11      set    846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    telemetry release/1.0 unset  a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
    telemetry TEL-11      unset  a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
    telemetry TEL-11      set    4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f

UNSET is byte-identical in BOTH documents, which is stronger than "the control
path is untouched": an install that does not set the option sees no change of
any kind, announcement and status rows included.

⚠️ AND THE CARD'S CENTRAL MUTATION WAS A SURVIVOR ON THE FIRST BATTERY.
`self.grid -= self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` - +106 B, on disk, purged, genuinely
running - came back GREEN, because the fixture drove a 6 kW export over 12
cycles, which puts the loop AGAINST ITS RAIL: a command moving `slew_w` every
cycle produces the same ramp for -6000 W and for -14 000 W of apparent error.
MUTATION.md habit 23 with a saturated ACTUATOR in place of a coinciding value,
and it is in that file now as the habit's second instance. The fixture now
drives a 600 W import the loop SETTLES on, against a responsive meter, and asks
habit 23's own question as its own check: shift the METER by the same 8 kW and
confirm the commands really would have moved.

Evidence: 31/31 suites green in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged
tree, `:ro`. Ten mutations, NO survivors, each on its own `cp -a` of the tree so
habit 18's revert hazard is closed by construction - table in
`DECISIONS/TEL-11-pv-production.md` §7 with byte deltas and sha256s.

⚠️ THIS IS A RUNTIME CHANGE BEHIND AN UNCHANGED VERSION, AND
`tools/predeploy_check.py` WILL REFUSE IT. `app/`, `config.yaml` and
`translations/` are all in its `RUNTIME` tuple and `config.yaml` still reads
0.10.1, so the gate reports a NO-OP deploy until a version is cut. That is PKG's
call and this card does not take it.

No CHANGELOG section: `test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## ` heading
that is not config.yaml's `version:`, and opening one would mean taking that
same packaging decision. The operator account is in DOCS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 15:35:07 +02:00
admin 9f6b9f14cd CI-9 follow-up: the summary said "mechanically", the blind spots say otherwise (#102)
Corrects the preamble's claim that the `guard the trigger` step keeps checks.yml filter-free "mechanically". It does not, for blind spots 1 and 3: the guard lives inside the workflow a filter makes Gitea skip, so for those the defence is the comment.

Names the filter that would actually get written - `branches: [release/1.0]`, not `[main]` - because it reads as tightening onto the protected branch, leaves every day-to-day pull request green, and switches off the `release/1.0` -> `master` release pull request that SEC-2 made the mandated path to an installed system. Points the forge fix at both protected branches, not just `release/1.0`.

Reviewed on the pull request. Verified from the branch's bytes: the guard's awk is unchanged and still refuses `branches:`, `paths:`, `paths-ignore:`, `branches-ignore:`, `tags-ignore:`, `types:` and the inline-flow form injected into the `on:` block of the edited file; comment-only at 0 non-comment changed lines, non-comment lines identical 139 == 139; the merged tree differs from c9aaf7f in this one file only. Green traced per CI-10 to run 824 / job 1949, payload PRNUM 102 / BASEREF release/1.0, base c9aaf7f, 30 PASS 0 FAIL.
2026-09-24 14:37:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8f9c2cad57 CI-9 follow-up: the skip direction, written the right way round
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m37s
`every subsequent pull request matching it is skipped too` is the inverse of
the behaviour. A pull request that MATCHES a `branches:` filter still RUNS;
the one the filter EXCLUDES is what Gitea sits out, reports `skipped`, and the
rollup launders into `success`.

The error arrived with the generalisation in the previous commit: `33e17db`
said "every subsequent pull request is skipped too", which was unqualified and
true for the `[main]` case it described. Naming the wider hazard made a
qualifier necessary, and the wrong one went in - contradicting the paragraph
directly below it, which describes `[release/1.0]` correctly as leaving every
day-to-day PR running and green.

Corrected, and the direction is now stated explicitly with the failed draft
recorded, because this file already carries one instance of the same shape:
"That was wrong, it contradicted the checkout step's own note a few lines
below, and the error was not cosmetic."

Guard re-verified on the edited bytes: passes here, still refuses
`branches: [release/1.0]` added to the `on:` block. Comment-only, 0
non-comment lines changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 14:27:19 +02:00
admin c9aaf7f04d SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can (#112)
Text only, no behaviour change. Three operator-facing sentences stop asserting a dead register where the gate cannot distinguish a dead register from a pack the BMS is refusing.

Reviewed on the PR: behaviour byte-identical (trace tool sha256 6030175ed2ab reproduced on both trees, plus AST identity with string constants normalised); five mutations re-applied on purged trees, all matching claimed named-red counts; SoC of the live episode independently measured at 11 percent; CI green traced to PRNUM 112 / BASEREF release/1.0.
2026-09-23 21:27:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 8a6acd9fa2 SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Text only. No behaviour change - same conjunction, same limits, same MISSING,
same 0 W, same NOT READY. `tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` says so: 2390
capture reads, a 66-cell swept grid, and six driven controller worlds produce
the byte-identical document `6030175e...` on origin/release/1.0 and on this
branch, while the sentences differ.

THE DEFECT. SAFETY-37's conjunction is satisfied by two disjoint worlds - the
register has stopped reporting reality, or the SOURCE cannot comply with the
command - and nothing `freshness.py` is handed separates them. Three sentences
asserted the first. On the live 2026-09-21 episode it was the second: the pack
read 11 % for the whole 850 s hold, every command in that hold was a discharge,
and the register answered the first CHARGE command three seconds later. The
readiness row was worse still, because it asserted a false fact about a NAMED
entity that was present, numeric and updating - so the operator opened
Developer Tools, found it working, and had every reason to conclude the
diagnostics were broken.

THE FIX. Each message states what was OBSERVED and names BOTH explanations.
Three wordings, no shared helper: two are a log line about a behaviour, the
third is a banner about an entity, and a helper serving both would drop
whichever half the other caller does not need. SoC stays STATED, NOT WIRED -
part 11b drives the two worlds at 50 % and 11 % and the sentence does not move
one byte. The row does not branch on `batt_fresh.stale` either: `stale_note()`
already rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below, so the discriminator is "is
that row there?", and part 11d asserts it is present in one world and absent in
the other.

THE CHECKS. test_freshness.py part 11 builds the pair of worlds with ground
truth written down rather than derived from the published stream, asserts they
are really two (40 of 40 reads differ) while the published stream is
bit-identical, and only then grades the sentences. Eleven mutations, all red:
each of the three sentences reverted (3, 2 and 2 named reds), the two
explanations transposed at ZERO bytes (1), the second explanation deleted (1),
the admission of ambiguity replaced by a ranking (1), all three reverted at
once (5), and two aimed at this card's own check - collapsing the world pair
(2) and emptying the accusation list, which a positive control against the
three sentences as 0.10.1 shipped them catches (1).

AND TWO OF THE ELEVEN FOUND DEFECTS IN THE CHECK RATHER THAN IN THE CODE.
Transposing `label` and `entity` in the row made it unfindable and the run died
on an IndexError - a red with no name and every later check ungraded, FCST-06's
shape exactly; `_s56_row()` returns a named absence now, 0 named reds before, 3
after. And the first invariance run compared a tree with itself, because it
archived a branch whose edits were not committed yet; the tool now REFUSES to
report "behaviour unchanged" unless the sentences halves differ, and both of
its refusals are driven.

SAFETY-57's part 10h check was the handoff and is inverted rather than deleted:
it required the accusation to still be present so that removing it had to be a
deliberate act. This is that act. Its escape clause is untouched.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 21:02:40 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 628279a68a CI-9 follow-up: name the filter that actually gets written, not the one that looks wrong
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
Three sentences in the blind-spot clause went stale between writing and review.

`no pull request in 99 has ever targeted master` is no longer true: SEC-2 made
`release/1.0` -> `master` the mandated release path and protected `master`
with the same required context, and a PR against that base has run for real.
The census it came from also erases its own evidence - PR #102 was itself
opened against `master` before retargeting, which the /pulls listing no longer
shows, exactly as the caveat 25 lines above this clause warns.

The clause also named `branches: [main]` as the hazard. That is the version
that looks wrong. The one someone would actually write is
`branches: [release/1.0]` - it reads as tightening onto the protected branch,
every day-to-day PR keeps running green, and the only thing it switches off is
the release PR whose content reaches an installed system.

And the prescribed fix named only `release/1.0`'s status_check_contexts. Since
SEC-2 `master` carries the same rule, so a reader following it literally would
half-close the hole and believe it shut.

Guard re-verified against the edited bytes: passes on this file (whose new
prose quotes `branches: [release/1.0]` in a comment) and still refuses a real
filter added to the `on:` block. Comment-only: 0 non-comment lines changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 20:18:50 +02:00
admin 239e120bf6 SEC-2: write down the release path, now that master refuses a direct push (#108)
Reviewed on the PR (issuecomments 1480, 1485, 1488, 1489). Documentation only: docs/RELEASE.md (new, 116 lines) plus a 2-line pointer in README.md's file map. No code, no workflow change.

Verified against the forge rather than accepted from the document:
- Both branch_protections rules re-read field-for-field identical (enable_push false, enable_force_push false, status check `checks / unit (pull_request)`, required_approvals 0, block_admin_merge_override true, no whitelists, no file patterns); master's rule created 2026-09-23T03:09:21; default_branch still master. Section 2's After table is exact. No protection was changed by this review - both rules re-read with their original updated_at.
- The empty-PR 405 trap reproduced independently on my own control (throwaway PR #111 between two same-SHA unprotected branches): empty PR -> 405 "Please try again later"; same PR after one commit -> 409 "head out of date". Section 1's "read the message, not the code" is correct and both messages are quoted accurately. PR #111 closed, branches deleted.
- release/1.0 (b0b24e5) is an ancestor of master (0f14c2a), so a literal release PR is empty right now - PR #109 has 0 commits, 0 files, and Gitea opened it anyway. Section 1's closing note is right.
- A master-base PR gets a genuine CI run, not a laundered skip: PR #107 head cb7e45b3 shows Waiting -> In progress -> success, "Successful in 7m56s", run 814. This PR's own head 9d593429 likewise, run 818.
- All five required steps are present and correctly ordered: work merges to release/1.0 with a version bump in goodwe_controller/config.yaml; release via PR release/1.0 -> master; direct push refused; green check before merge; `ha store reload` after, without which the Supervisor keeps serving the cached version. required_approvals: 0 is stated twice, so no reader can believe the dev/review split is enforced.

One non-blocking defect left open (issuecomment 1485): section 1 calls 0f14c2a "the only commit on master that carries no (#NN) merge suffix". 274 of master's 297 commits carry no suffix. The true statement is stronger - no release has ever reached master through a pull request, and 6f5e8e3 (0.10.0) was promoted by the same direct push one release earlier, so 0.10.1 was the second, not a one-off. Background, not procedure; wants a follow-up line change.

A third comment of mine (issuecomment 1488, merge style) is withdrawn in issuecomment 1489 - it rested on a premise I had not checked and which is false.
2026-09-23 04:08:18 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9d593429d3 SEC-2: write down the release path, now that master refuses a direct push
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m56s
master is the default branch, which is what the Home Assistant Supervisor
clones - so whatever sits on it runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Until today it
had no branch protection at all, while every gate this repo built sat on
release/1.0, the branch that does not ship. 0.10.1 went straight onto master
on 2026-09-22 with no PR, no CI and no reviewer, and it succeeded.

master now carries the same rule as release/1.0 - enable_push false,
required context `checks / unit (pull_request)`, block_admin_merge_override,
required_approvals 0. That is a forge setting and cannot live in a commit, so
the part that can is this: the procedure it implies. Without it the next
release is attempted the old way and fails confusingly at the push.

docs/RELEASE.md records the path (merge to release/1.0, bump version, PR
release/1.0 -> master, wait for green, merge, then `ha store reload` before
the Supervisor offers anything), the before/after protection state of both
branches, and how the gate was proven to bite rather than merely badge green.

Documentation only - no code, no workflow change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 03:43:37 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0f14c2a5de PKG-16: ship 0.10.1 to master, so the Supervisor can offer SAFETY-57's fix
master is what Home Assistant clones. SAFETY-57 fixed a deadlock that parked
the reference install's battery for ~13 minutes while the site exported
2.4 kW, and the Supervisor compares config.yaml version strings - so the fix
could not reach an installed 0.10.0 without this bump reaching master.

Brings SAFETY-57 (#104) and the 0.10.1 cut (#105). master was a strict
ancestor; no conflict was possible.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-22 15:54:29 +02:00
admin b0b24e5d41 PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0 (#105)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
Reviewed on the PR (issuecomments 1455-1462): identity verified unchanged (slug goodwe_controller, no image: key, installed slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller corroborated from HA backup metadata); version-gate 11a-11d re-implemented and verified independently; the 16-of-93-at-790s pairing re-derived from the committed 16-day capture (>=710: 17, >=790: 16, >=815: 15); the SAFETY-57 entry verified as a faithful move carrying only the three declared #104 documentation fixes; corrected 0.10.0 preamble corroborated to the day against backup metadata; suite 30/30 reproduced with checks.yml's exact command. Two files, no control code. The 710 s/790 s split between test_freshness.py and this file is a known, stated gap and takes its own card.

NOTE: master (the Supervisor's default branch) is still 0.10.0 and still lacks SAFETY-57. This merge does not deliver; bringing master to release/1.0 is a fast-forward and is the remaining step.
2026-09-22 15:52:25 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 eb88646899 PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
The Supervisor decides an update exists by comparing config.yaml's version
string with the one the box reports. master and release/1.0 both said 0.10.0,
so SAFETY-57 - a deadlock that parked the reference battery for ~13 min on
2026-09-21 while the house exported 2.4 kW - had no way of reaching the box
that has it. A patch bump is the delivery mechanism, not bookkeeping.

- config.yaml: 0.10.0 -> 0.10.1. Nothing else in the option surface moves:
  no key added or removed, no default changed, no enum widened, no rule added
  to validate.py, so a blob that starts on 0.10.0 starts on 0.10.1.

- CHANGELOG.md: a new `## 0.10.1` section, holding SAFETY-57's entry moved out
  of `## 0.10.0`. The entry opened by saying it was misfiled and that whoever
  cut the next version owned moving it; this is that cut, so that paragraph is
  replaced by what an operator actually needs in order to decide - what the
  deadlock does (command parked at 0 W, batt reading gated to MISSING, escape
  condition unreachable from inside the state), how to recognise it (setpoint
  stuck at exactly 0 W with the battery register flat, a STALE line and no
  clearing line) and that a restart of the add-on clears it.

- PKG-16 proper: `## 0.10.0`'s preamble still claimed 0.10.0 "has never been
  built or pulled anywhere" and that the reference install was on 0.7.0. Both
  stopped being true on 2026-09-20 ~22:18 CEST, when 0.10.0 was installed as a
  repository add-on (slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller) and began regulating a
  real battery. The section's own bump argument was explicitly conditional on
  that; the condition has fired, so the argument is retold as history and the
  section is closed. This text is what the Supervisor shows beside Update.

Also fixes, in this file only, the three non-blocking documentation defects
raised on PR #104 - issuecomments 1445, 1446 and 1447:

- 1446: the live episode is 790 s, not 710 s. Re-derived rather than rescaled:
  at >= 790 s the committed 16-day replay gives 16 of 93, not 17.
- 1447: the BMS keep-alive pulse was an inference stated as a measurement. No
  committed capture identifies one, and on this episode 0x0518 never moved at
  all. The measured claim replaces the firmware story.
- 1445: "neither consumer can reach a verdict inside one window" is universal
  as written and graded on a fixture that puts the obligation back on every
  release. It now carries the qualifier the reviewer asked for, and names the
  unbounded case and why the shipped one-inverter roster cannot reach it.

The same three defects also sit in app/freshness.py, test_freshness.py,
DOCS.md and the DECISIONS note. They are deliberately NOT touched here: this
PR is config.yaml and CHANGELOG.md only, and none of them is worth delaying a
live safety fix. SAFETY-56 and SAFETY-58 are likewise untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-22 15:22:03 +02:00
admin b9f7bd0506 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested (#104)
Reviewed and merged by the PR review agent. Acceptance criterion re-driven independently off the committed RS-485 capture: the verdict is withdrawn with 0x0518 held constant at -3 W, no external change. Counterfactual release_s=inf verified byte-equivalent to the shipped-before module over 242336 reads, so the SAFETY-37 conjunction is untouched. 30/30 suite green in checks.yml's own image; 11 mutations re-applied on a purged tree; the argued-equivalent M7 proved equivalent over full internal state.

Three non-blocking documentation findings filed on the PR (comments 3/7, 4/7, 5/7) for a follow-up before the next version is cut.
2026-09-21 15:49:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 43c144b8d9 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
SAFETY-37's freshness gate reports a battery-power register as MISSING when it
stops following its own command, and a missing input is "command 0 W and keep
commanding" (§11.1 rule 1). The gate's only exit was "an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number" - and at 0 W nothing is asking the register to be anywhere.
The state had no exit reachable from inside it, and the log line promised the
opposite in the same sentence that announced the 0 W.

REPRODUCED FROM THE WIRE, NOT MODELLED. scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/ is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, read from the passive sniffer, decoded by
tools/decode_bus_capture.py (0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC, 0 unknown shapes; the
mode->sign convention is graded off the capture, not trusted). The box was
running 0.10.0, so the 0 W in the trace IS the add-on's own claim:

  10:51:24.7  0x0518 reaches -3 W. Pack at 11 %, the BMS refuses the discharge,
              the inverter idles. THE REGISTER IS HEALTHY AND TRUTHFUL.
  10:51:29.7  the command reaches +1060 W - 800 W of travel
  10:52:00    the conjunction arms. Inverter.batt becomes None
  10:52:21.7  the site commands 0 W, on the wire
  ...         0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
              change value for 790.0 s. The house exports 2.4 kW throughout
  ~11:04      a human restarts the add-on. That is what ends it

AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
through the shipped conjunction finds 93 trips whose wait for the BMS
keep-alive pulse that cleared them has a median of 143.4 s, a worst case of
21440.1 s, and 17 of 93 at or beyond this episode's 710 s. That distribution
belongs to the battery's firmware, not to this code.

THE CARD'S OPTION 2 ALREADY HELD AND IS NOT THE BUG. _grade() has required
|standing| >= MOVE_W since SAFETY-37. The trip was at +1060 W and the stuck
state is at 0 W; they are different moments, and an entry-side rule cannot
reach a state entered legitimately and then persisted. Nothing in the
conjunction is weakened here.

THE RULE, SAFETY-13's SHAPE ONE MODULE OVER - which latches get an exit, not
how long the block lasts:

  the verdict is withdrawn when the obligation that produced it has been gone
  for RELEASE_S, and the register is then re-graded from scratch.

RELEASE_S is BATT_OBLIGED_S, 17.0 s - the obligation window already derived in
the file (6.0 plant + 10.0 publish + 1.0 read), taken at the FLOOR of its band
for the mirror of MOVE_W's reason. Which half is safe is the opposite of
SAFETY-13's: being wrong long is the failure being fixed, being wrong short
costs one bounded re-grading window. Below 17 s the release pre-empts the
cheaper exit - the register answering by itself - and that is graded
behaviourally, not asserted.

The whole parked interval is now stale_input_s + RELEASE_S = 32 s. On the live
episode: telemetry back at 10:52:39 instead of 11:05:35, with 0x0518 still
answering the same -3 W. RED BEFORE (release_s=inf, a graded counterfactual and
not a second implementation), GREEN AFTER.

WHAT IT COSTS, AND IT IS NOT SMALL. A register dead for good is re-graded for
ever: over 1201 reads the held number reaches a consumer on 630 (52.5 %)
against 35 (2.9 %) before. Payable only because one window is at most 35 s and
the two consumers hold for 75 s and 85 s, so neither can reach a verdict inside
one and the re-trip clears both windows. No detection SAFETY-37 had is given
back - a permanent None clears the same windows for ever too - and the command
is derived from the P1 meter, never from batt.

Two clocks, deliberately: changed_mono/unchanged_s() stay facts about the
REGISTER, graded_from/graded_s() are the VERDICT's window. Collapsing them
either lies to the operator or defeats the re-grading.

main.py's stale line had its ESCAPE CLAUSE corrected - it promised a clearance
the state could not produce - and gained a STALE WITHDRAWN edge that says in
its own words that nothing has been learned about the register. The DIAGNOSIS
half is SAFETY-56's and is deliberately untouched, with a named check asserting
it is still there so that rewrite has to be deliberate.

Battery: 22 mutations, 21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.
Two findings kept in DECISIONS: _release()'s move_w test swapped for
unchanged_s SURVIVED at +5 B because every fixture rested at exactly 0 W (habit
11, closed by a 0/100/300 W fixture); and the code shipped a habit-22 comment
claiming the _release/_grade order was load-bearing, which the battery
falsified - the two act on mutually exclusive predicates, so the order is not
observable. MUTATION.md gains habit 23 for a mutation that ran, fingerprinted
clean, and was a no-op on the fixture because `0.0 or x` is x.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro, one
file at a time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-21 12:33:56 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 6f5e8e378a PKG-15: bring release/1.0 to master at 0.10.0, so the default branch is the add-on
`master` has been `5184a2c` / v0.2.1 since 2026-08-25 - the tree that drives the
house - while every ticket since has landed on `release/1.0`. Three consequences
were live, and all three are what this merge closes:

 * `master` is the DEFAULT branch, so Gitea indexes dispatchable workflows from
   it. `master` had no `.gitea/` at all, which is why `GET /actions/workflows`
   answered empty and the UI's dispatch button was missing.
 * new pull requests default to `master`. #102 was opened against it by
   accident and its first run graded the change merged into a stale `master` -
   an honest-looking green answering the wrong question.
 * AND THE ONE THAT NOW MATTERS MOST: the repository has not yet been added to
   Home Assistant, and adding it is part of this release. `master` is the
   branch the Supervisor will read the moment it is added, so whatever stands
   here is what it shows and offers to install. This merge is what makes that
   0.10.0 rather than 0.2.1.

NO CONFLICT WAS POSSIBLE AND THAT WAS CHECKED, NOT ASSUMED. `master` is a
direct ancestor of `release/1.0` (`git merge-base --is-ancestor` true), the
merge base IS `5184a2c`, and `origin/release/1.0..origin/master` is empty -
`master` carries nothing `release/1.0` lacks. `--no-ff` is used anyway, so the
crossing from 0.2.1 to 0.10.0 is one addressable commit rather than a pointer
move.

WHAT CROSSES: config.yaml 0.2.1 -> 0.10.0. The add-on the Supervisor will build
is a different program from v0.2.1 in the ways `goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md`
sections 0.3.0 through 0.10.0 describe - among them P1 meter ingestion, the
separate integrator the velocity form did not have, shadow mode, the tariff
plan and the multi-inverter roster. The ROLLBACK POINT does not move: tag
`v0.2.1` still names `5184a2c` and still names the tree that ran the house.

NOT A DEPLOY. Nothing is installed, no `ha addons update` is run, `/addons/` is
untouched and neither 192.168.2.158 nor 192.168.2.221 was contacted. Adding the
repository to Home Assistant, and pressing Install, remain the owner's call.

Verified before merging: the full suite in the CI image on `release/1.0`'s tree
- `cp -a`, purged, `:ro` mount, one file at a time, exactly the command in
.gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0; and PR #103's own
`checks / unit (pull_request)` was a real `success` on the merge, not a skip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-20 12:34:30 +02:00
admin 8a5736136a PKG-15: fold TEL-10 and SAFETY-48 into 0.10.0, so the version names its contents (#103)
Reviewed and merged by the PKG-15 review agent.

Verified rather than accepted:
- test_version_gate.py 11d pins `## Unreleased` blocks below the newest section at exactly one; deleting the block goes red (reproduced on a copy of the tree).
- 32 runtime commits since 86bdf49 and 24 accounted by the contents table, re-derived with predeploy_check.py's own RUNTIME rule; PKG-14's superseded 28/21 were correct when taken.
- app/validate.py imports neither main nor mqtt (read by AST), and SLEW_RAIL_FRAC / LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S are byte-identical across cb3f686..HEAD, so PKG-14's CLEARED transcript still holds.
- CI-9 (16b1d6c) touches only .gitea/workflows/checks.yml, outside the built image and outside RUNTIME.
- The SAFETY-48 entry keeps the capacity-tariff misreading out: no worst-quarter row in the A/B table, and the 3739 -> 3434 W figure appears only inside the paragraph that disclaims it.

Three non-blocking defects posted on the PR: the gain:0.3 / slew-rail tie values are swapped against DECISIONS/SAFETY-48; "touch three files between them" should say three runtime files; and the stated reason cb3f686 enters the count ("last..HEAD excluded it") is wrong, though the count is right.
2026-09-19 19:08:05 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 5aba220046 PKG-15: fold TEL-10 and SAFETY-48 into 0.10.0, so the version names its contents
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m53s
0.10.0 was cut by PKG-14 on 2026-09-16 and three tickets have merged into
release/1.0 since. Two of them change the built image - one is a CONTROL LAW
change and one adds three MQTT entities - and neither is described anywhere in
this file. Tagging that tree today would stamp a number on contents the
changelog does not account for.

FOLDED RATHER THAN CUT AS 0.11.0, AND THE ARGUMENT IS CONDITIONAL.
0.10.0 has never been built or pulled anywhere: the reference install is on
0.7.0 (PKG-14's own predeploy run records `deployed on the box : 0.7.0`), the
repository carries exactly one tag, `v0.2.1`, and no release. So the string
`0.10.0` does not yet name a tree anyone is running, and the PKG-06/PKG-07
no-op that forbade re-cutting `0.9.0` does not reach it. Cutting 0.11.0 would
burn a number on a release that never left the repository. The condition is
checkable and the section now says so: run against a box already reporting
0.10.0, `tools/predeploy_check.py` refuses with THE DEPLOY WOULD BE A NO-OP and
names the runtime commits since the bump. `config.yaml` stays at 0.10.0, so
`test_version_gate.py` 11b still finds the two sides equal.

SAFETY-48 IS THE ENTRY THAT MATTERED MOST TO GET RIGHT, AND WHAT IT PROMISES
IS LESS EXPORT - NOT A LOWER BILL. The measured result is export 39.61 -> 34.07
kWh over the committed 16-day replay, 14 % of the replayed figure, falling at
every plant and tuning variant swept (~4 % to ~16 %, median near an eighth).
The section says in its own heading and its first line that the control law
changed, and it says PLAINLY that the billed quarter is not a claim: at every
plant lag <= 5.0 s - including the one that best reproduces the recorded export
- release/1.0's worst quarter is ALREADY 3434 W and this changes it by exactly
zero. The 3739 -> 3434 W headline exists at the single longest fitted lag, and
the lag is not identified by the recording. The costs are in the entry too: the
cap moves a saturation-frozen integrator on 1095 of 79 160 frozen ticks, 679 of
them outward; SAFETY-13's settle values moved; SAFETY-39's "the slew does not
own the over-absorption" is now false.

TEL-10 gets the three site rows, what each one is, and the two things a reader
would otherwise get wrong: the lead is NOT a subtraction of two published rows,
and `Loop reason` is not the `Why` row. It repeats neither of the two sentences
TEL-10's own review retracted - EIGHT messages stay first and the ninth,
`goodwe_ctl/availability`, is byte-identical but deliberately moves to last.

CI-9 IS DELIBERATELY NOT IN THIS FILE, AND THE OMISSION IS WRITTEN DOWN RATHER
THAN SILENT. It changes one file, `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`, outside
`goodwe_controller/` entirely: not in the built image, not in `is_runtime()`'s
list, and not observable on any version of the add-on. This file is the release
note the Supervisor shows beside the version number, and a row here has to be
something the person deciding whether to press Update could act on. The note
above SAFETY-48 says so and says the rule is about audience, not importance.

THE STRAY `## Unreleased` AT LINE 1777 IS NOT TOUCHED, AND THAT IS A DECISION.
It is the 0.8.0-era block PKG-14 annotated: every row in it has shipped, the
annotation says which release each went to, and re-filing it is PKG-08's card.
It is also load-bearing - `test_version_gate.py` 11d pins the count of
`## Unreleased` blocks below the newest section at EXACTLY one, so deleting it
is red on the commit that does it, and so is adding a second.

TWO MEASURED FIGURES IN PKG-14'S PROSE WENT STALE AND ARE RE-DERIVED, NOT
ADJUSTED. The runtime-commit count since `86bdf49` is now 32, not 28, of which
the contents table accounts for 24, not 21; both re-run through
`predeploy_check.is_runtime()` itself. The other eight are the three misfiled
tickets (SAFETY-43 x2, SAFETY-44 x3, TEST-21 x2) and `cb3f686`, PKG-14's own
bump, which edits `config.yaml` and so counts as runtime - it was HEAD when
PKG-14 measured and is inside the range now.

PKG-14's `CLEARED, exit 0` predeploy transcript was NOT re-run and now carries
the check that says why it still holds: `config.yaml` is untouched by both
tickets; `app/validate.py` imports neither `main` nor `mqtt`, and the three
names it takes from `control` - SLEW_RAIL_FRAC, LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S -
are byte-identical across cb3f686..HEAD.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, `cp -a` of the tree, purged, `:ro`
mount, one file at a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml -
30/30, exit 0. No runtime file is in this diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 18:49:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 33e17dba0e CI-9 follow-up: the summary said "mechanically", the blind spots say otherwise
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
The residual-risk paragraph at the top of checks.yml claims the `guard the
trigger` step "keeps it that way mechanically rather than by asking the next
editor to read this comment". For blind spots 1 and 3 that is not true: the
guard lives inside the workflow a filter makes Gitea skip, so for those cases
the defence IS the comment.

That paragraph is the preamble someone reads at the exact moment they are
editing the trigger, so a summary running ahead of its detail is worse here
than elsewhere. It now points at the blind spots and states spot 3 plainly:
a filter naming a branch nothing targets is itself skipped, lands green and
untested, and then skips every subsequent pull request - the gate off for
everything, silently.

Flagged by the reviewer on PR #95 (issuecomment-1424) as non-blocking.

This PR is also the first real test of CI-9's fix on release/1.0 itself. Run
806 was a workflow_dispatch and posts no commit status at all, so it verified
content but never the gate. This one has to post `checks / unit
(pull_request)` as success rather than skipped.

Verified before push: the guard passes against this edited file (whose new
prose quotes `branches: [main]` and `master`) and still refuses a genuine
filter added to the `on:` block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 15:53:01 +02:00
admin 16b1d6c422 CI-9: a stacked PR is skipped, and a skipped check clears the merge gate (#95) 2026-09-19 14:55:12 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 ca8fd01819 CI-9: correct the guard comment's grading claim, and name the third blind spot
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m54s
Documentation only - no change to the guard, the trigger, or any step.

The guard's comment block contradicted itself. It said the pull request that
reintroduces a filter "is still graded by the unfiltered workflow which is on
the base today", while the checkout step's note a few lines below says grading
uses the HEAD's workflow. The head's is correct, and the review measured it on
PR #101: head carrying a filter that excludes the base, base carrying the
unfiltered workflow -> no run, context posted `skipped`, rollup `success`, gate
cleared (409). The wrong version made the step sound like an unconditional
ratchet. What is actually true is narrower: it bites whenever the reintroduced
filter still names the pull request's own base, which is the ordinary case.

That correction exposes a third blind spot, worse than the two already listed.
A reintroduced `branches:` filter that simply does not name the base escapes
the guard entirely, because the pull request carrying it is itself skipped. It
needs no craft - `branches: [main]` from a template, or a tidy-up to `[master]`,
which nothing in this repository's history has ever targeted - and it lands as a
skipped, laundered, untested merge into release/1.0. After that every subsequent
pull request is skipped as well: the gate off completely, not merely the stacked
case leaking.

It is documented, not fixed, and deliberately so. No in-repo guard can close it,
because any such guard lives inside the workflow that gets skipped. Closing it
needs a second permanently unfiltered workflow whose context is added to
release/1.0's `status_check_contexts` - a forge change, the owner's decision,
being put to them separately, and explicitly not a blocker on CI-9.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 14:44:16 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 d2ad080e45 CI-9: guard the trigger mechanically, and re-derive two figures I made up
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m55s
Review findings on PR #95.

1. Two figures in the header were written under the word "measured" and were
   not measured. "of the 50 pull requests in this repository's history, 49..."
   came from a /pulls call I did not notice was truncated at Gitea's 50-item
   page cap; and "#93 was stacked on TEL-10 five days ago" was invented - #93
   was created 2026-09-19T10:05:00 and merged 11:05:26, the same morning, under
   three hours before CI-9 was opened. Both re-derived from a paged API query
   and now stated with their denominator: 93 pull requests predate this ticket
   (#1..#93, excluding CI-9's own #94..#98), 92 against release/1.0, exactly one
   stacked (#2, TEL-01 -> SAFETY-04). The 92 is flagged as an upper bound rather
   than a census, because the API reports a pull request's CURRENT base and so
   hides any that was opened stacked and later retargeted - which is #93 itself.
   The ratio, and so the cost argument, is unchanged.

2. The fix rested on an invariant - checks.yml has no event filter - that was
   defended only by a comment. Prose has already failed in this exact file:
   9c1a23328a shipped "NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING" and
   `branches: [release/1.0, master]` in the same commit, eighteen lines apart,
   and that survived 20 days and 84 merges. Adds a step that reads the `on:`
   block of the MERGED checks.yml and fails if it has regained a `branches:`,
   `paths:`, `tags:`, `types:` or any `-ignore` variant. This is not the card's
   option 3 - it does not try to detect its own skip, which is impossible; it
   bites on the pull request that reintroduces a filter, which the unfiltered
   workflow still grades. Two blind spots are named in the step's comment, both
   needing a protection-rule change that is the owner's call.

Also softens "uncloseable from here", which the review judged overstated:
Gitea's acceptance of a `skipped` context is unreachable from this repository,
but the consequence is substantially closeable, and the guard is what closes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 14:25:22 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 074157c4c2 CI-9: drop the pull_request branches filter, because a skipped check clears the gate
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
`branches: [release/1.0, master]` meant a stacked pull request - one based on
another feature branch - never matched. Gitea does not stay silent about a
workflow it sits out: it posts the required context itself with state
`skipped`, the combined-status rollup reports that as `success`, and the merge
gate accepts it. Retargeting does not repair it, because the skip is a commit
status on the head sha and so survives the base change.

Measured on Gitea 1.27.3 with throwaway PR #94 against a branch carrying a copy
of release/1.0's protection rule:

  only status is `skipped`   ->  POST .../merge  409 head out of date  (CLEARED)
  no status at all           ->  POST .../merge  405 not all required  (refused)
  status `pending`           ->  POST .../merge  405 not all required  (refused)
  status `success`           ->  POST .../merge  409 head out of date  (CLEARED)

The 409s come from a deliberately wrong head_commit_id in the probe, which
Gitea checks only after branch protection - so a 409 means the request had
already cleared the gate, and nothing was ever merged. `skipped` is the only
state that leaks.

Fixing this at the gate is not possible. Gitea branch protection can require
that a context is PRESENT, never that it is SUCCESS: its whole status-check
vocabulary is `enable_status_check` and `status_check_contexts`, per this
server's own /swagger.v1.json. So the fix has to be upstream - never emit a
skip - which means no event filter.

Cost: every pull request now runs the full ~8 minute suite, including the
intermediate steps of a stack. 49 of the 50 pull requests in this repository's
history were opened straight against release/1.0 and would have run anyway.

Also corrects two things CI-01's header stated as fact. A filter miss is
fail-OPEN, not the fail-closed pending-forever it described; and it is a
skip-ci keyword, not a filter miss, that actually withholds the context and
leaves it pending.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 13:58:58 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 186a044a3a Merge pull request 'SAFETY-48: the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD' (#93) from SAFETY-48 into release/1.0
Reviewed on the pull request and merged there. Retargeted from TEL-10 to release/1.0 after #92 merged, and NOT merged on the inherited green: retargeting alone left the old `skipped` conclusion attached to a6af332 and the combined status still read success, so the required context was satisfied by a workflow that had never run. Run 799 is a genuine pull_request execution on the merge into release/1.0 - all five steps, the add-on's own tests occupying 08:56:58 to 09:04:47 UTC.

THE CAP MOVING A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR IS ACCEPTABLE, NOT MERELY DISCLOSED. The disclosed figures reproduce exactly against the committed capture - 79 160 frozen ticks, 1095 moved, 679 further out on the side they were already on, worst 2424 W - and the worked tick in the comment is present with exactly the numbers written down and is the worst of that subset. What decides it is where the integrator lands rather than which way it moves: on the shipped configuration integrator_max_w is unset, so target == i_w after the bounds and the cap holds |i_w - slewed| to one slew step on every slew-limited cycle, frozen ones included. Measured over the whole 256 251-tick recording the carried integrator never stands more than two slew steps from the command on the wire - 800 W against release/1.0's 9200 W. On the frozen path this replaces an integrator bounded only by integrator_max_w with one bounded at two steps, so the loop is less wound up on those ticks and not more. The same-cycle command cannot be affected at all, the cap moving i_w after slewed is decided.

THE ALTERNATIVE IS REFUSED FOR A MEASURED REASON. Gating the cap with `if frozen: _lead_cap = float("inf")` reproduces all four of section 5's corrected figures - export 34.71 kWh, wasted 3.49 kWh, worst quarter 3434 W, worst observed lead 4961 W. The gate does leave the bound with a hole large enough to make the card pointless.

NOTHING FALSE FOUND. Section 3a's lag table reproduces cell for cell, including the rows that say the peak improvement is absent at every lag at or below 5.0 s; the card does not claim a capacity-tariff benefit and says so in four places. Form A is committed nowhere, so it was rebuilt from section 3's prose alone and reproduces all seven figures - 34.43 / 110.62 / 2656 / 2.99 / 3934.59 / +2.73 / +991.53 - which makes section 3 a specification rather than a summary. The one-sided cap was swept against the two-sided band over 136 080 states on an independent grid: 0 differences, corroborating habit 22's retraction.

MUTATION EVIDENCE RE-DRIVEN, EVERY COUNT EXACT, on purged cp -a trees one file at a time: L2 zero bytes 4+3, L4 one red in test_telemetry with test_control GREEN as claimed, L5a zero bytes 5+5, L6 zero bytes 6+3.

SUITE RE-RUN BY THE REVIEWER on the merge rather than the branch tip: release/1.0 29/29, this merge 30/30, exit 0.

One non-blocking note left on the pull request: "worst case 2424 W" is scoped to the 679 further-out ticks, while the largest move over all 1095 is 4220 W. That case is benign - the cap pulling a stale positive integrator down to follow a charging command, magnitude falling - which is why it is a note and not a finding.

Merging is not deploying. The live install still runs release/1.0's control law and slew_w 400 applied by hand; this merge authorises no deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 11:05:25 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 660d079bf3 Merge pull request 'TEL-10: the loop's integrator stops being invisible' (#92) from TEL-10 into release/1.0
Reviewed on the pull request and merged there. `checks / unit (pull_request)` run 798 is a real execution, not a skip: all five steps ran and "the add-on's own tests" occupied 08:04:51 to 08:12:38 UTC.

CONTROL BEHAVIOUR IS UNCHANGED, VERIFIED MECHANICALLY RATHER THAN READ. goodwe_controller/app/control.py is blob 180f58a on release/1.0 and on TEL-10 alike, same sha256 of contents, and release/1.0 is a direct ancestor of TEL-10 so there is no merge-base divergence for a change to hide behind. The only executable edit inside cycle() is prev_w=self.target becoming a named local, loop_prev, passed to the same call. Three write sites for self.i_w exist and only two have a telemetry counterpart; the third is the arbiter re-seed at main.py:3049, inside the same branch and immediately followed by compute(), so it cannot leave loop_i_w stale. app/mqtt.py appends to SENSORS and discovery_payloads() walks it in order, so every existing entity keeps its index.

SUITE RE-RUN BY THE REVIEWER, on the MERGE rather than the branch tip, in the CI image on a purged tree, :ro, one file at a time: release/1.0 29/29, this merge 30/30, and the stacked SAFETY-48 30/30 against both bases. All exit 0.

MUTATION EVIDENCE RE-DRIVEN RATHER THAN READ, because the previous round's counts were irreproducible. M1 is 5 reds on TEL-10's tree and 4 on SAFETY-48's, exactly as the header says and for the reason it gives; M2 is confirmed GREEN and is reported as a survivor; M7 is -96 B and 10 reds in test_mqtt.py plus 1 in test_telemetry.py; M9 is a zero-byte reordering and 7 reds. Every claimed count exact.

R6's correction is true and not merely made: part 1's headline now says EIGHT and the slice under it asserts eight entity configs, part 3's NINE headline is backed by a full missing/changed diff that does cover all nine, and the unasked-for fix two lines down reads eight against the eight-prefix slice.

Merging is not deploying. Nothing here reached the inverter and no deploy is authorised by this merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 10:54:02 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a6af332048 SAFETY-48: what the lead cap actually does to a frozen integrator, and what the peak figure depends on
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m55s
Four review findings, none of them in executable code. The control law, the
tests and the instruments' arithmetic are untouched; every number below was
re-measured against the committed 16-day capture before it was written down.

R1 - app/control.py carried a justification the decision record and MUTATION.md
habit 22 had already retracted, and it was false about the code it sits in. It
said an unconditional placement "would also pull the integrator toward a
command the SATURATION freeze is pinning", priced at 118 of 256 250 ticks. The
118 was measured against a different pair; on the pair the sentence names the
two forms are bit-identical - 0 of 256 246 ticks, re-measured. And the narrow
form that shipped DOES move a saturation-frozen integrator: it runs before the
freeze block and is not gated on `frozen`. Of 79 160 frozen ticks the cap
changes `i_w` on 1095, and on 679 of those it moves it further out on the side
it was already on - putting back magnitude the freeze had just let fall, which
the freeze's own rule forbids. Worst case 2424 W, at prev_w -3400 W, grid
+4697 W, actual -4144 W, sat_count 2 -> 3: the freeze leaves the integrator at
-176 W and the cap drags it to -2600 W. It never overrides a same-cycle refusal
(the freeze clipped on 75 512 ticks, the slew bound on none of them), and that
is stated too. It is also where SAFETY-13's settle values went: gating the cap
on `not frozen` puts test_control.py part 5 back at -1190 W exactly, while part
4(b) does not come back - that one moved for the winding reason.

R3 - the record read its own sensitivity table backwards. `fit_plant()` picks
lag 7.5 s on battery-power RMS, which separates it from 2.5 s by 0.3 %, while
the tool's own printed fidelity measure (export against the recorded 29.43 kWh)
prefers 2.5 s by the whole 35 % gap. Swept properly: at every lag <= 5.0 s
release/1.0's worst quarter is ALREADY 3434 W and this card changes it by
exactly zero. The 3739 -> 3434 W headline exists at one plant. New section 3a
carries the table; the export reduction now leads every summary and the peak is
presented as lag-dependent. The form-A rejection is strengthened rather than
weakened: form A is worse on the billed quarter at every lag where release/1.0
produces a peak at all, and at every top-N cut of the quarters.

R2 - DOCS.md stated modelled watts to the owner as measurement. It now leads
with the export reduction, says the figures are simulated, and says plainly
that no capacity-tariff improvement is promised.

R4 - tools/slew_sim.py --slew narrated "the OVER-ABSORPTION does not move, and
at the slowest slews it is slightly WORSE" while printing a monotonically
falling column. That sentence is TRUE on release/1.0 (reproduced:
958/1107/1133/1058/987/1029/1150/1143/1081) and false under this branch's law
(777/734/663/563/553/507/435/358/321), so SAFETY-39 is not retracted: its
record gets a forward reference, and the script now reads SLEW_LEAD_STEPS out
of the law it imported and narrates from the column it just printed. Both
branches of that narration were driven.

R5 - three counts in the L table were decoration and are re-driven in the CI
image on a `cp -a`, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time: L5 is 5+5 with the
function names exchanged and 5+4 with the branch bodies exchanged (two
mutations wearing one name, now listed separately), L6 is 6+3. The separable-
state count is grid-dependent and three sweeps disagree, so all three are
quoted with their grids and the load-bearing claim is WHERE they separate.

R7 - "a large import answered too weakly" is not what the aggregate shows. Form
A cuts import by 5.45 kWh and export by 5.18 kWh, and paired per tick delivers
8.56 kWh less offtake energy on the ticks release/1.0 was importing. The harm
is a tail redistribution inside quarters that already net to offtake. The
conclusion stands; the sentence is narrowed to it.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, purged tree, `:ro` mount, one file at
a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:37:01 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 03ef61fa3b SAFETY-48: the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD
`compute()` freezes the integrator with an asymmetric rule and the comment
beside it states the requirement outright - "the requirement is that the
INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command" - but `frozen` is computed
from ONE signal, `abs(prev_w - actual_w) > saturation_w`, and slew-limiting
never enters it. The integrator moves `gain * error` a cycle and the command
moves at most `slew_w`, so the integrator outruns the command whenever
`|error| > slew_w / gain`: 667 W at the live shape, against a measured median
grid error of 1114 W at the onset of a recorded episode. SAFETY-39's retune
made it MORE frequent, not less - a smaller step is a lower threshold.

⚠️ THE FORM THE CARD ASKED FOR RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY, WHICH IS WHY IT IS
NOT WHAT SHIPPED. Reusing the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew flag was
built from release/1.0's own source and measured over 16.00 days / 256 252
meter instants of the live install's recorder: export 39.61 -> 34.43 kWh, and
the worst quarter-hour average OFFTAKE 3739 -> 3935 W with the mean quarter
+2.73 W, in five of six plant and tuning variants. A frozen integrator stops at
`prev + gain*error`, which undershoots by (1 - gain); for an export that is
free and for an import it is offtake, for as long as the ramp lasts. The card
said "do not invent a second rule"; the measurement says to, and both sentences
are recorded.

WHAT SHIPS BOUNDS THE LEAD AT ONE SLEW STEP, inside the branch where the slew
actually bound. Same 16 days, same ticks, same disturbance, same plant, same
seed: export 39.61 -> 34.07 kWh, wasted throughput 4.67 -> 3.19 kWh, battery
sign reversals 2992 -> 2770, median recovery 232 -> 199 s, p99 849 -> 850 s,
max 901 -> 898 s, unrecovered 53 -> 31, worst |i_w - prev_w| 9200 -> 800 W -
and the worst 15-minute average offtake 3739 -> 3434 W, i.e. the billed
quantity IMPROVES. `i_w = slewed` (a cap of zero) is better again at 32.02 kWh
and is refused: it is the velocity form this module's docstring says `i_w=None`
collapses to.

TWO COMMITTED NUMBERS MOVED, DELIBERATELY, WITH THE REASON BESIDE THEM.
SAFETY-13's released command settles at -800 W and -1200 W where release/1.0
settled at -1190 W and -2390 W, because there is less wound integrator to
settle onto; AC 4's property - it stops at the frozen integrator, not the rail
- is what is asserted and the second is now graded against `i_w` rather than a
literal. And SAFETY-39's "the slew does not own the over-absorption" is now
FALSE - INVERTED, on the independent first-order plant test_control.py writes
itself: 1005/1109/1285/1330 W rising with a slower slew becomes 729/550/424/326
falling. Two plant models that share nothing agree on the sign.

Evidence: `tools/replay_recorded_loop.py` plus the read-only capture it made
(scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17). The "before" law is the shipped file
with the block removed by a named substitution - never a transcription - and a
missing anchor is a REFUSAL carrying "NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED". The
instrument prints its own fidelity first: it reproduces 39.6 kWh of export
where the install exported 29.4, i.e. it is ~35 % pessimistic about the loop's
tracking, so only the delta is claimed.

30/30 suites green, including test_control.py's exhaustive i_w=None
equivalence sweep against the transcribed release/1.0 law, untouched: the cap
moves `i_w` and not `target`, and that sweep compares (target_w, sat_count,
frozen, reason).

Six law mutations, one instrument battery. L4 - the cap applied
unconditionally, -92 B - was a SURVIVOR of all thirty files: it is
bit-identical on the shipped configuration (0 of 256 246 ticks) and separable
on 2050 of 257 400 swept states, all at `integrator_max_w` above `max_w`, which
part 4 now drives. L5 and L6 are ZERO BYTES.

AND TWO COMMENTS IN THIS CARD WERE INVENTED AND ARE CORRECTED IN PLACE. The
one-sided spelling was justified by a two-sided form that would "drag a
trailing integrator" - it does not, and the two agree on 205 920 of 205 920
swept states; and a "118 of 256 252 ticks" figure had been measured against a
different pair. MUTATION.md gains habits 21 and 22 for both shapes.

NOT DEPLOYED, NOT VERSIONED. The live install still runs release/1.0's law.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:36:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 b6c6da31d8 TEL-10: two sentences that named assertions this file does not make
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
Both are review findings on the merged-in-spirit branch, and neither is in
executable code.

R6 - test_mqtt.py part 1's headline said "every one of release/1.0's NINE
messages is still byte-identical and still first". The assertion under it is
`announce(...)[:len(BASELINE) - 1] == BASELINE[:-1]`, which covers EIGHT: the
ninth, `goodwe_ctl/availability`, is byte-identical but deliberately moves to
last, so a prefix comparison cannot include it. Nothing was unguarded - the
`== SITE_NOW` on the next check pins it in its new position - but the sentence
was not the check. Part 3 carried the same mis-statement two lines from a check
that IS about all nine, and is corrected the same way.

R5 - M7's red count was decoration. Re-driven in the CI image on a `cp -a` of
the tree, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time, it is 10 reds in test_mqtt.py and
not 8, on this tree and on SAFETY-48's alike. The direction was right; the
number was inherited rather than re-measured, which is MUTATION.md's reporting
rule 3. A note beside the table now says that a red count is a property of the
SUITE as much as of the mutation and therefore has to name a tree.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, purged tree, `:ro` mount, one file at
a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:36:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 b548525d10 TEL-10: the loop's integrator stops being invisible
`self.i_w` has been a separate quantity from the command since SAFETY-04 and
has left the process nowhere at all - no entity, no MQTT attribute, no log
line. The investigation behind SAFETY-48 could only RECONSTRUCT it from the
grid trace plus a replay; the reconstruction reproduced about a third of the
engagements it was checked against and was discarded, so the card it was
gathered for had to be argued from a measurement nobody could stand behind.
It could not have been made to work either: `i_w` depends on every cycle
before it, including the ones where the arbiter overrode the loop and
`main.py` re-seeded `self.i_w = self.target`, and that re-seed is invisible in
the grid trace.

THREE SITE ROWS, APPENDED AFTER release/1.0's EIGHT. `loop_i` is
`Decision.i_w` - the accumulator after the cycle, before the output clamp, the
slew limit and quantisation. `loop_lead` is `decision.i_w - prev_w` against the
command `compute()` was HANDED, which is not a subtraction of the other two
published rows: `Setpoint` is the arbiter's output and is this cycle's, so on
any cycle the arbiter overrode the loop the two differ - and that is exactly
the cycle on which the integrator was re-seeded. `loop_reason` is
`compute()`'s own word; the arbiter's `explain()` prints the winning claim's
NAME and has never carried the claim's reason, so `slew-limited` appears in
neither the `Why` row nor `Controller status`. Measured on the same cycle:
arbiter `'loop -> -5000 W'`, loop `'i-clamped'`.

NOTHING IN THE CONTROL PATH MOVED. `app/control.py` is not in this diff.
`compute()`, its returned `Decision` and every constant it reads are identical
to release/1.0, and all nine of release/1.0's retained discovery messages are
byte-identical and still FIRST in the announcement.

Evidence: 30/30 suites green in the CI image. Nine mutations, ONE survivor,
reported as one: `decision.i_w - self.target` for the lead is +2 B and green
because `cycle()` has not reassigned `self.target` at that line - the name is
kept for the coupling, not for a behaviour it buys, and M2b (+8 B) is the
mutation that does change the value and is red.

AND TWO OF THIS CARD'S OWN CHECKS COULD NOT REACH THE FAILURE THEY NAMED.
"the published integrator reaches its bound" was GREEN under the card's named
mutation (publish `prev_w`, -3 B), because the command reaches the bound too -
twelve cycles later. It asserts the LEAD TIME now and is red on 5. "a stopped
controller publishes not-running" was GREEN under deleting that branch's
assignments (-45 B, -67 B), because the fixture STARTED stopped and `__init__`
writes the same values; it stops the controller part-way through a run that
has already wound the integrator to -5000 W. Both are MUTATION.md habit 4,
found by the battery rather than by review.

No CHANGELOG section: `test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## `
heading that is not config.yaml's `version:`, and opening one would mean
taking a packaging decision this card does not get to take. The operator
account is in DOCS.md and the release note belongs to the next PKG ticket.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-18 23:36:23 +02:00
admin 68c5ede7b9 Merge pull request 'PKG-14: cut 0.10.0, so fifteen merged tickets can reach an install' (#91) from PKG-14 into release/1.0
config.yaml said 0.9.0 while the live box runs 0.7.0 with 0.7.0's files, so it has never received 0.8.0 or 0.9.0 either. 28 runtime commits had landed since the 0.9.0 bump at 86bdf49 with no version to carry them.

MINOR, AND NOT BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF TICKETS. A config that is legal on 0.9.0 is REFUSED on 0.10.0: TARIFF-07 retires three price_provider ids and refuses them by name at startup (the ids stay in the schema enum precisely so validate.py's message is reachable rather than an opaque Supervisor rejection); TARIFF-18 moves price_taxes_eur_kwh 0.06 -> 0.11736, and the non-obvious half is the refusal that deliberately does NOT happen, because SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH keeps a taxes period table beside a stored 0.06 from becoming exit 78 on upgrade, with the rung measured un-weakened against a genuinely custom 0.1198; SAFETY-10 adds shadow_mode shipped `auto`, where an existing controlling install does not change by one watt and a fresh install comes up observing.

AND A 0.7.0 INSTALL CROSSES 0.8.0 ON THE WAY. `ha addons update` does not walk versions, so 0.8.0's rule 10 lands at the same moment: an explicit slew_w above SLEW_RAIL_FRAC x rail is refused, and 0.7.0's OWN shipped default of 1000 is refused against a 555.6 W ceiling. Measured red on this tree, with slew_w 400 measured green - which is what the live box carries. Someone reading only the newest section would otherwise miss the one release that can stop the add-on starting.

THE BOUNDARY WAS DRAWN HONESTLY RATHER THAN TIDILY. All 18 table rows in the top block merged after 86bdf49 - verified per row with git merge-base --is-ancestor - so the block is genuinely this run's work and was retitled as-is with its 18 `_this branch_` placeholders resolved to merge shas. But 0.10.0 ships MORE than that table lists: SAFETY-43 and TEST-21 are documented in a SECOND `## Unreleased` block sitting below 0.9.0, and SAFETY-44 - which changed app/main.py and app/store.py - is in CHANGELOG.md NOWHERE AT ALL. All three are named in the 0.10.0 preamble rather than moved, because re-filing is PKG-08. The second block is annotated, not rewritten or emptied: UX-02 in it shipped in 0.9.0 and is already in 0.9.0's own contents table, while the other three shipped here. Verified independently before merge: all 30 changelog deletions fall inside `## Unreleased` blocks and none in a released section.

THE BLOCK'S OWN STATED REASON FOR THE VERSION CHOICE WAS WRONG AND THE SECTION SAYS SO. It said the number depended on whether 0.9.0's image had been built and pulled, and that if it had not, this work belonged inside 0.9.0. That was written before 0.9.0's section was cut. It has been cut since 86bdf49 with 28 runtime commits behind it, so reusing 0.9.0 would make one version string name two different trees - and the Supervisor keys the built image on exactly that string, which is the PKG-06/07 no-op in its worst form.

Evidence: 29/29 green. predeploy_check.py --deployed-version 0.7.0 --options <live blob> clears at exit 0 both before and after, unchanged but for the shipped version line. No default was touched, so test_defaults_pin, test_price's mirror and test_version_gate stay green for the right reason. Eight mutations, no survivors, one at zero bytes. One was a SURVIVOR on the first draft - the slicer control was a sentinel only an EOF-running slicer could reach, so deleting a heading never got there; it asserts an invariant now, exactly one contents table per section.

Card numbers that did not reproduce, corrected in the report: the block is 1541 lines citing 31 ids rather than 5487 citing ~70 (those figures fit the whole file and the Detail notes block, which is PKG-08's subject); 28 runtime commits rather than 30; 18 tickets rather than fifteen. FCST-04 has a table row but no section body - pre-existing, left alone.
2026-09-16 02:58:28 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cb3f686555 PKG-14: cut 0.10.0, and say what an upgrade from 0.7.0 crosses
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m51s
`config.yaml` 0.9.0 -> 0.10.0, and the top `## Unreleased` block is closed
into `## 0.10.0` with a preamble that names the backward-incompatible
changes and who they reach.

MINOR, and NOT because eighteen tickets landed. A stored options blob the
previous version started on is REFUSED on this one:

  * TARIFF-07 retires three `price_provider` ids; a site set to one is
    refused BY NAME at startup. Measured on the reference blob, with a
    control on an accepted id so the refusals are about the ID.
  * TARIFF-18 moves `price_taxes_eur_kwh` 0.06 -> 0.11736. A site that
    STORED 0.06 is untouched, and - the non-obvious half - a taxes period
    table beside that stored 0.06 does NOT become a startup refusal on
    upgrade, because `SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH` reads it as
    untouched. Measured, with the counterfactual that the rung is not
    weakened (ORES's 0.1198 is still refused).
  * SAFETY-10 adds `shadow_mode`, shipped `auto`. An existing CONTROLLING
    install does not change by one watt and a FRESH one comes up observing.
    Measured cross-revision, 8f82dd4 -> e6da478, same stimulus through the
    shipped `Controller.cycle()`: byte-identical write streams, 13/13/25
    writes. Positive control: the same driver at `shadow_mode: on` gets 13
    writes to 5000 W on the older tree and one 0 W write on the newer.

And the one a reader of the newest section alone would miss: `ha addons
update` does not walk the versions, so a 0.7.0 install meets 0.8.0's and
0.9.0's rules at the same moment as 0.10.0's. Of those, SAFETY-39's rule 10
refuses 0.7.0's OWN shipped default `slew_w: 1000` against a 555.6 W
ceiling on a 5000 W rail. Measured red on this tree; the reference
install's `slew_w: 400` is measured green.

SCOPE, and it is drawn honestly rather than tidily. The top block's 18
entries all merged after the 0.9.0 bump `86bdf49`, so the block is closed
as-is and its `_this branch_` placeholders are resolved to merge shas.
⚠️ 0.10.0 SHIPS THREE MORE RUNTIME TICKETS THAT ARE NOT IN THAT TABLE -
SAFETY-43, TEST-21 and SAFETY-44 - and they are NAMED in the preamble
rather than moved, because re-filing this file's misplaced entries is
PKG-08. SAFETY-44 (`app/main.py`, `app/store.py`) is in the changelog
nowhere at all; that is said in both places. The second `## Unreleased`
block below `## 0.9.0` is ANNOTATED, not rewritten or emptied - UX-02 in it
shipped in 0.9.0, the other three in 0.10.0. No released section is
rewritten.

`test_version_gate.py` gains part 11: the bump and the closed section are
one act. PKG-09 refuses a deploy whose version did not move; nothing graded
the mirror failure, in which the version moves and the block is never
closed. Two sides from two files, a slicer with a synthetic positive
control run on every invocation, the retired ids read off `app/price.py` by
AST rather than transcribed, and the count of still-misfiled blocks frozen
so it can only shrink.

Mutations, all purged, tree bind-mounted :ro, backups at mktemp paths and
the revert fingerprinted:

  M1  `## 0.10.0` -> `## Unreleased`       +4 B    RED 2
  M2  version 0.10.0 -> 0.10.1             +0 B    RED 1   (ZERO-BYTE)
  M3  an id stripped from the NEWEST       +10 B   RED 1
      section only, left below
  M4  a 4th retired provider in price.py   +62 B   RED 1 here, 4 in
                                                   test_price.py
  M5  `## 0.9.0` heading lost              -3 B    RED 1
  M6  a 2nd `## Unreleased` left standing  +27 B   RED 1
  M7  the slicer never closes              -32 B   RED 3
  M8  SUPERSEDED_TAXES... emptied          -5 B    RED 2 on the evidence
                                                   instrument, plus
                                                   test_validate/test_price

⚠️ M5 WAS A SURVIVOR ON THE FIRST DRAFT. The slicer control was a sentinel
(`## 0.8.0`) that only a slicer running to EOF could reach, and deleting one
heading never gets there - ARCH-02's fifteenth instance, in a fresh costume.
11a now asserts the invariant instead: exactly one contents table per
section, which is what a lost heading breaks.

29/29 test files green. `tools/predeploy_check.py --deployed-version 0.7.0
--options <live blob>` CLEARED, exit 0, before and after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-16 02:48:27 +02:00
admin 587495e143 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-47: say what a shadow run can and cannot show' (#90) from SAFETY-47 into release/1.0
DOCS.md, app/shadow.py's header and DECISIONS/SAFETY-10 all claimed the strategies ask for a fixed power from inputs that do not depend on what the battery did, so a shadow run shows you the real trades. That was true when shadow mode was designed and false by the time it merged: SAFETY-45 landed hours earlier and made the buy leg min(asked, headroom), where headroom = (900/remaining) x (ceiling - projected) and `projected` reads the open quarter's accumulator - the meter, which is exactly a function of what the battery did. The strategy became closed-loop and the exemption went stale.

Measured at a binding cap, 1500/1200/2000, the same hour twice: live grid 1224-1506 W held at the ceiling against a flat 1200 W in shadow; SoC 50.000019 -> 51.856789 % against 50.000000 -> 50.000000; the two runs differ on 716 of 720 cycles; the final recorded figure is -302.4 W live against -2000.0 W in shadow, 6.61x. On a SAFETY-45-reverted tree the limit cycle is 28 onsets live against 1, guard engaged 410/720 against 0/720. Two of the three defects the card cites as motivation are closed-loop phenomena shadow cannot exhibit; TARIFF-14's half genuinely is visible, hour and price and spread identical 720/720.

THE CAVEAT'S DIRECTION WAS MEASURED RATHER THAN WRITTEN, and the ticket had it wrong. A draft saying a live run reaches a SMALLER number was checked pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five configurations: the shadow record is never below live - zero cycles below and 730 EXACTLY EQUAL, at the start of each quarter where the amplification is 1.0. `Smaller` would have been false on 730 rows. The shipped sentence says UPPER BOUND and the two-point arithmetic behind it is graded.

Caveated rather than re-computed, with the rejections recorded: re-computing would make the recorded decision no longer the decision the shipped path reached while arbiter, clamp, the SAFETY-28 gate, the log and MQTT all ran on the real one - a second controller everywhere except the wire; recording nothing blanks the row exactly when arbitrage trades, and the log's edge key IS the watts; recording the unsized ask beside it adds a second number with no warning, and at the shipped 3500/2000 both read 2000 W. The trap avoided: keying the caveat on `capped` would fire at the quarter's START, where the record is right, and go SILENT at the end, where it is 6.61x out. It keys on the headroom having been MEASURED.

AND THE TICKET'S OWN ANALYSIS WAS INCOMPLETE. I said the committed evidence table could not fail for two reasons. They are independent in the FIX direction too: widening the fixture to a binding cap still leaves the comparison passing, because it reads index zero and the first charging cycle is -300.0000 W in both runs. Fixing only the fixture closes nothing. Recorded in MUTATION.md as a new habit-4 shape - an INDEX, not a fixture - and the agreement at index zero is now graded as an expectation so nobody rebuilds on it.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Fourteen mutations, no survivors. One was a REAL survivor first - deleting the caveat from the action log left all 29 files green, because the sentence was an f-string in _shadow_settle() and the only suite that drives it runs with meter_source: off; it is shadow.log_line() now. One CORRECTLY survived and is reported as such: min -> max makes the record larger, which is still an upper bound, so it is not the inversion that matters. And the new section nearly shipped FCST-06's shape - a mutation made it raise on its first min() and report zero reds - so every check now carries the section's precondition.

Two design limits stated rather than smoothed: the caveat discloses but does not help, since an engineer still cannot obtain the real number without arming the battery - the fix for that is a rig mode replaying the site's own captured meter through the shipped decision path, filed separately and deliberately NOT by giving shadow mode a plant model, which is the one change that would break its safety argument. And SAFETY-10's takeaway still oversells `auto`, which this card did not rewrite.
2026-09-15 01:36:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e3ccd9f6ea SAFETY-47: what a shadow run can show, and the watts on its status row
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m48s
Not a leak and not a write-path defect. Shadow mode's safety is intact -
the substitution, the re-seed, the authorisation gate and the clamp are
untouched. What was wrong is what three merged documents SAY a shadow run
can show you, and a number on the status row that can be 6.61x what a live
controller would command.

SHADOW MODE CANNOT SURFACE A CLOSED-LOOP DEFECT, AND THE DOCUMENTS NOW SAY
SO. The battery is held at 0 W and the carried command is re-seeded to it,
so every measured input - the meter, the billed-quarter accumulator behind
it, the battery power, the SoC - describes a plant that did not respond. A
closed-loop defect is one whose stimulus IS that response. This is the same
property that makes shadow mode safe, so it is not a gap to close later:
the closed-loop answer comes from the closed-loop rig or from a live run.
SAFETY-10 §5 already conceded this for the grid-following loop. It was
never the loop leg's limitation; it is the general case.

THE "STRATEGIES ARE UNAFFECTED" EXEMPTION WAS TRUE UNTIL SAFETY-45 MERGED,
ONE COMMIT EARLIER. That card sizes the buy leg as min(asked, headroom)
with headroom = (900/remaining) x (ceiling - projected), and `projected`
reads the open quarter's accumulator - the meter - which is a function of
what the battery did earlier in that quarter. Measured on TEST-23 stage 3
at peak_cap_w 1500 / house 1200 / max_w 2000, one hour at 5 s:

  SAFETY-45's limit cycle  NOT visible. 28 onsets live vs 1; grid
                           -455.5..+3200.0 W vs flat at the 1200 W house;
                           guard engaged 410/720 cycles vs 0/720.
  SAFETY-46's SoC churn    NOT visible. The SoC moves 0.000000000 pp.
  TARIFF-14's wrong hour   VISIBLE, and it is the only one: which hour, at
                           what price, clearing what spread - identical on
                           720 of 720 charging cycles at a binding cap.

The exemption narrows to exactly what survives: WHICH hour a strategy picks
and WHY are unaffected; HOW HARD it trades is not. The peak guard's ceiling
and reasons are worth reading from a shadow run; its ENGAGEMENTS are not.

THE NUMBER IS CAVEATED, NOT RE-COMPUTED, AND THAT IS THE DECISION. The
arithmetic is not wrong - 900/remaining is correct for a meter genuinely
under the ceiling, and in shadow the meter genuinely is. It is the right
answer to a question nobody asked. Both surfaces now introduce the watts as
what would have been commanded ON THIS CYCLE, in every state, and carry
shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER whenever a measured billed quarter sized them.
Rejected, and recorded in the decision doc: re-computing it (the recorded
decision would no longer be the decision the shipped path reached, while the
arbiter, clamp, SAFETY-28 gate, log and MQTT all ran on the real one - a
second controller everywhere except the wire); recording nothing (blanks the
row exactly when arbitrage is trading, and the log's edge key is the watts);
and recording the unsized ask beside it (a second number, no warning, and at
the shipped 3500/2000 both figures read 2000 W).

"UPPER BOUND" AND NOT "SMALLER", AND THE DIFFERENCE WAS MEASURED. Charging
only adds offtake, so the shadow size is >= the live size with EQUALITY at
the start of every quarter. Pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five
configurations: 0 below, 730 exactly equal. The first draft said "smaller",
which would have been false on every one of those 730.

AND THE PREDICATE IS NOT KEYED ON WHETHER THE TRADE WAS CAPPED. arbitrage's
own sentence says "SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD" only when the
headroom came out below the ask - in a shadow run, the START of the quarter,
where the two runs agree to the float. By the end, 900/remaining has
multiplied the headroom past the ask, the trade is not capped, the sentence
is silent, and the record is at its most wrong. A caveat keyed on it would
be quietest exactly where it is needed loudest.

SAFETY-10 §6's COMMITTED EVIDENCE COULD NEVER HAVE FAILED, FOR TWO
INDEPENDENT REASONS, AND CLOSING EITHER ALONE CLOSES NOTHING. Its fixture is
peak_cap_w 15000 against a 350 W house, so the guard never engages and the
sizing is inert - the harness's own comment says so. AND every identity row
reads the FIRST charging sample, where at elapsed=0 the projection IS the
held level and the two runs agree to the float even at a cap that does bind.
Measured: widening the fixture alone leaves that comparison passing. That
second reason is a new shape for MUTATION.md's habit-4 list - an INDEX, not
a fixture - and it is recorded there as the twelfth instance. §6 is re-taken
at a binding cap across the whole run: 716 of 720 charging cycles differ,
headroom 300.0..54000.0 W in shadow against 299.9..307.8 W live, recorded
-2000.0 W against a live -302.4 W.

THE GRADER IS test_arbitrage.py PART 3d, beside SAFETY-45's own closed-loop
regression and built on the same s45_loop() harness, so the runs differ in
one argument. Three lines stand in for _write_unit()'s substitution and
_shadow_settle()'s record and re-seed, marked as a transcription;
test_clamp.py part 8 remains the check on the shipped placement. The section
carries its own precondition into every check: a mutation that stopped
either run trading made it raise on its first min(), kill the file and
report ZERO reds - FCST-06's shape, driven rather than imagined.

AND THE FIX'S OWN FIRST DRAFT CARRIED THE SAME DEFECT. Deleting the caveat
from the action-log line left all 29 files green, because the sentence was
an f-string inside _shadow_settle() and the only suite that drives it uses a
meter_source:off fixture where no arbitrage decision exists. It is
shadow.log_line() now, for the reason words() is a function.

14 mutations, no survivors; M13 and M14 are +0 B and were confirmed on disk
by sha256 with every run purged. M14's first form was aimed at the wrong
direction and correctly survived - min->max makes the shadow record larger,
which is still an upper bound. All 29 check files green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-15 01:26:57 +02:00
admin e6da478f87 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-10: shadow mode, and 0 W is a number rather than a silence' (#89) from SAFETY-10 into release/1.0
The closed-loop rig made the case for this: with arbitrage armed and a binding cap the loop ran 28 charge onsets an hour (SAFETY-45); the price lookup returned the wrong quarter-hour for 45 minutes in every 60 (TARIFF-14); the SoC ceiling churns 598 Wh to gain 310 (SAFETY-46). Every one was invisible from outside, and there was no way to watch what the optimiser WOULD do without letting it do it.

THE TICKET SAID DEFAULT-ON AND THE AGENT REFUSED IT, correctly. The Supervisor resolves options as {**config.yaml defaults, **stored user options}, so a NEW key with a new default reaches every EXISTING install on the next update - including the one regulating the author's battery. `shadow_mode: true` would have stopped it silently, and the only symptom would be a battery that stopped doing anything. There is no mechanism by which one key defaults differently for a new install and an existing one - `options:` IS the default and there is one of it.

So the default is a value the add-on RESOLVES: shadow_mode: list(auto|on|off), shipped `auto` = shadow while control is STOPPED, live once STARTED. A fresh install ships auto_start: false, so it comes up in shadow and observes before it ever commands - default-on delivered where it is safe. An existing install that is controlling does not change by one watt; verified before merge, `auto` resolves to `not control_started`.

SECOND PUSHBACK, ALSO RIGHT: commands nothing is a NUMBER, not a silence. The inverter holds its last command forever, so a shadow mode that stopped writing would leave whatever was standing STANDING, under a page saying nothing is commanded - the exact looks-healthy-but-is-inert failure this repo keeps finding - and would hold the ESP32's 30 s stale-input watchdog tripped for the whole run, an alarm used as a mode. The actuator is held at 0.0 W, refreshed on the ordinary heartbeat, by the ordinary single writer, as a substitution inside the existing single choke point. Not a second write path. It is the LAST substitution, below SAFETY-28's gate and SAFETY-03's clamp, so both still grade the number the decision produced.

Every failsafe's behaviour is decided and recorded rather than inherited. The sign watchdogs are INERT because they grade standing_w(), held at 0 W - feeding them the decision would have them disagree with a meter that never saw it and LATCH A TRIP SURVIVING INTO LIVE OPERATION AND A RESTART. Clamp, write gate, meter freeze and peak guard OBSERVE the real decision. Circulation and delivery may legitimately latch, because their evidence is measured power. The operator stop is enforced at the wire rather than as a P_SAFETY claim, which would make every recorded decision read `stopped`. A standing latch is named in the shadow banner and turns it red.

Graded on the writes and the rendered surface, never on the flag, with the precondition asserted first: the same stimulus at `off` produces 30 non-zero writes with a largest of 5000 W; at `on`, set(writes) == {0.0} and 26 of them. Closed loop over the same hour twice: live -2000 W throughout, SoC 50.000 -> 62.331 %, grid to 2350 W; shadow 0 W throughout, SoC 50.0 -> 50.0 exactly, grid = the house exactly - with the arbitrage decision identical in action, instant, signed power, reason verbatim and arbiter winner across 3600/3600 samples.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Twenty-two mutations, no survivors, including a write escaping, silence instead of 0 W, observers blinded, default-on-for-everyone, the stop claim refiled, and a re-seed moved one line earlier which blinds SAFETY-18. Two mutation findings recorded: one first read as a survivor and was not, because a TypeError killed the section and reported zero reds - FCST-06's shape; and one had to become a PAIR because two fields both hold the detector at 0 W - TEST-16's shape.

Recorded limitation rather than glossed: the re-seed makes the exit safe by construction, and the price is that the loop leg's shadow decision is one slew step rather than a trajectory. Graded by name. The strategies are unaffected, which is why all three motivating defects remain visible.
2026-09-14 17:44:26 +02:00
Claude 8fa4febfef SAFETY-10: the whole decision path runs and nothing reaches the inverter
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
Every optimiser defect this project has found was invisible from outside
while it was happening, and each was paid for at the meter first: SAFETY-45's
28 charge onsets an hour against a binding peak_cap_w, TARIFF-14's wrong
quarter-hour for 45 minutes in every 60, SAFETY-46's 598 Wh spent to gain
310 Wh. There was no way to watch what the optimiser WOULD do without letting
it do it.

`shadow_mode` runs strategies, arbiter, clamps and guards, records the
decision with its reason, and commands nothing.

⚠️ IT WRITES. It writes 0 W, on the ordinary heartbeat, through the ordinary
single writer. The inverter holds its last command forever - it has no meter
timeout - so "commands nothing" implemented as "stops writing" would leave
whatever was standing when shadow mode came on standing for as long as it was
left on, under a page saying nothing is being commanded. That is the failure
this repository keeps finding. Refreshing 0 W is also what
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml's 30 s stale-input watchdog requires of us; going
quiet would keep that board tripped for the whole run, which is an alarm being
used as a mode.

⚠️ IT IS NOT A SECOND WRITE PATH. No claim, no transport, no arithmetic of its
own. It is a substitution inside Controller._write_unit() - the single choke
point every write already reaches - in the same form as the three above it,
and it is the LAST of them, so SAFETY-28's gate and SAFETY-03's clamp still
grade the number the decision path produced.

⚠️ THE DEFAULT IS `auto`, NOT `true`, AND THAT IS THE CARD'S REAL CONTENT. The
Supervisor composes options as {**config.yaml defaults, **stored user
options}, so a new key with a new default reaches EVERY EXISTING INSTALL on
the next update - including the one regulating a real battery. A boolean
default-on would have stopped it silently. There is no mechanism by which one
key can default differently for a new install and an existing one, so
"default-on for new" is a value the add-on RESOLVES: `auto` is shadow while
control is STOPPED and live once it is STARTED. A fresh install ships
`auto_start: false` and comes up observing; an install that is controlling is
started and does not change by one watt.

THE FAILSAFES. Sign watchdogs (SAFETY-02/30): INERT - they grade
Inverter.standing_w(), which shadow mode holds at 0 W. Fed the shadow decision
they would disagree with a meter that never saw it and LATCH A TRIP THAT
SURVIVES INTO LIVE OPERATION AND A RESTART. Clamp (SAFETY-03), write gate
(SAFETY-28), meter freeze (SAFETY-18), peak guard: OBSERVE. Circulation
(SAFETY-31) and delivery (SAFETY-42): observe and may legitimately latch,
because their evidence is measured power. The operator stop is the one
deliberate change: enforced at the wire rather than as a P_SAFETY claim, which
would otherwise make every recorded decision read "stopped".

⚠️ RECORDED LIMITATION: _shadow_settle() re-seeds the carried command to what
stands on the wire, which makes the exit safe by construction - and therefore
the loop leg's shadow decision is ONE SLEW STEP, not a trajectory. A shadow
run answers "what would it command now", not "what would it have done next".
The strategies are unaffected; all three defects above are visible from one.

Graded on the writes and on the rendered surface, never on the flag: 22
mutations, no survivors, including one that lets a write escape and one that
goes silent instead of commanding 0 W. Closed loop on TEST-23 stage 3's rig,
same hour twice: live drives the pack to -2000 W and SoC 50.000 -> 62.331 %;
shadow commands 0 W throughout, SoC stays 50.0 exactly, and the arbitrage
decision is identical in action, instant, signed power, reason and arbiter
winner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-14 17:25:43 +02:00
admin 8f82dd4e06 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-45: size the trade to the headroom instead of interlocking against it' (#88) from SAFETY-45 into release/1.0
With arbitrage armed and a binding peak_cap_w, the loop did not settle: 28 charge onsets an hour, period 131 s, grid swinging -455 to +3200 W, and a billed quarter 59 W OVER the cap it had just spent fifteen minutes holding. Section 10.2 is explicit that an EMS which oscillates is worse than no EMS, for hardware wear and for the peak it is trying to avoid. Not reachable by any unit test in the repo - it needed the closed loop.

THE TICKET'S MECHANISM WAS WRONG AND THE AGENT DISPROVED IT. I wrote that the quarter boundary drives the cycle. Of the 27 gaps between the 28 onsets, 23 are 90-120 s entirely INSIDE one quarter; the four long gaps are exactly the four that SPAN a boundary, so the boundary lengthens the interval rather than causing it. A fix aimed at boundary handling would have removed 4 of 28.

The real cycle is a binary interlock keyed on a continuous quantity: the trade charges at max_w while `wanted = batt_w + excess` is still negative and the guard files nothing; `wanted` crosses zero; the guard engages on a FIVE WATT floor; that flips guard_state(), which cancels the WHOLE trade; the grid-following loop - which targets grid = 0, not grid = ceiling - takes the actuator, discharges to +1870 W and exports 420 W; the projection collapses; the trade re-arms at max_w.

So the fix sizes the buy leg rather than interlocking it. control.maintenance_charge_floor() already caps MAINTENANCE charging at the headroom under the site's cap, because a maintenance charge was the only thing big enough and long enough to set the peak - and that stopped being true when OPT-04 landed. peakguard.charge_headroom_w() publishes the same quantity off the MEASURED guard rather than the optional forecast entity, arbitrage.decide() takes it keyword-only and sizes the buy, main.py passes it. It is wanted_w read in the other direction: no new arithmetic and no new constant.

THE GUARD'S DECISION FUNCTION IS UNTOUCHED, and that is the proof 2026-08-20's bang-bang did not come back. peakguard.py is +139/-0 - zero deleted lines - and sha256(decide) is identical on both trees at 7252 bytes; replay_ac3.py reproduces 190/190 records, 110 engaged, 878 Wh identically. Verified independently before merge. Reverting that rung is red on eight named checks.

Rejected and recorded: a negative `lo`, because it creates a lo > hi contradiction against main.py's cheap-window maintenance shaping that resolves to 0 W - the battery parked in the billed quarter - and closing that would mean suspending maintenance shaping permanently on every affected site. And a backoff timer in arbitrage, because both modules' notes forbid inventing timers; the trade now re-arms at `ceiling - load`, which IS learning from the refusal.

After, on the same rig and the same command: onsets 28 -> 1, grid swing 3655 -> 282 W, and the billed quarters land at exactly 1500.0 W three times over. At the shipped defaults the two affected rows buy ~2% less energy and the worst quarter goes from 59 W over the cap to zero - which is section 10.1's ordering, since the tariff bills the month's single worst quarter. On an aggressive cap the sized trade buys 58% MORE. The non-binding control row is bit-identical.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Fourteen mutations, all red, two of them zero-byte. The regression closes the loop over the shipped guard, strategy, arbiter, control law and the real QuarterAverager, and asserts BOTH directions from one changed argument plus an inert-where-inert control.

TWO DEFECTS FOUND BY THE DISCIPLINE RATHER THAN BY REVIEW. The agent's own harness restored two edits to one file in list order and left one on disk - caught by the post-revert fingerprint, habit 18 biting a tool written the same afternoon. And test_peakguard.py part 1 formatted floor_w with a bare :.0f one line after the check that reverting the 2026-08-20 rung turns red, so the file ABORTED and parts 2-13 went ungraded: that mutation's coverage was one check and is now eight.
2026-09-14 16:20:39 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e1b9254626 SAFETY-45: a price-driven charge is SIZED by the capacity guard, not switched by it
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m42s
With arbitrage armed at the shipped defaults, arbitrage and the capacity-tariff
guard drove each other in a sustained limit cycle. Re-measured on TEST-23 stage
3's closed rig against 478ba93, metrics recomputed rather than taken from the
card: `peak_cap_w` 1500 / 1200 W house -> 28 charge onsets an hour, mean period
131.1 s, the grid swinging -455.5 to +3200.0 W; at the SHIPPED
`peak_cap_w: 3500` with an 1800 W house -> 8/h, with a 3000 W house -> 32/h.
The bite rule is `load + max_w > peak_cap_w`, i.e. any house over 1500 W in the
cheapest quarter. §10.2: "an EMS that oscillates is worse than no EMS, both for
hardware wear and - per §9.1 - for the peak it is trying to avoid." And it was
losing the argument it was having: EVERY billed quarter in the three affected
configurations finished OVER the cap.

⚠️ THE CARD'S STATED MECHANISM IS WRONG AND THE CORRECTION IS ON THE RECORD.
The card, and .cache/s45.md before it, say the loop is the quarter boundary
resetting the projection and arbitrage re-arming at full power. It is not. Of
the 27 gaps between the 28 onsets, 23 are 90-120 s (mean 111.5 s) and lie
ENTIRELY INSIDE one quarter; the four long gaps - 230, 240, 250, 255 s - are
exactly the four that SPAN a boundary, so the boundary LENGTHENS the interval
rather than causing an onset. The real cycle, off the recorded fields: the trade
charges at max_w while `wanted = batt_w + excess` is negative and the guard
files NOTHING; `wanted` crosses zero; the guard engages on a floor of 5.3 W;
that flips `arbitrage.guard_state()`, which cancels the WHOLE trade; the
grid-following loop - which targets grid = 0, not grid = ceiling - takes the
actuator and discharges to +1870 W, exporting 420 W; the projection collapses;
the guard releases; the trade re-arms at max_w. A binary interlock keyed on a
continuous quantity. A fix aimed at the boundary would have removed four of
twenty-eight onsets.

THE FIX IS A SHAPE THIS ADD-ON ALREADY HAD. `control.maintenance_charge_floor()`
caps a MAINTENANCE charge at "the headroom left under the site's cap", because
"a maintenance charge is the only thing this system does that is big enough and
long enough to set that peak". ⚠️ That sentence stopped being true when OPT-04
landed. `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` publishes the same quantity off the
MEASURED guard rather than off the optional `peak_forecast_entity` - the hole
SAFETY-25 had to close in `shaping_suspended()` - and `arbitrage.decide()` sizes
its BUY leg to it, keyword-only and with no default.

NO NEW ARITHMETIC AND NO NEW CONSTANT. The number is `wanted_w` read in the
other direction: `decide()` already computes the DISCHARGE that lands the
quarter on the ceiling, and a negative one is a permitted CHARGE of `-wanted`.
⚠️ `peakguard.decide()` IS UNCHANGED - sha256(decide) = 200090d0835a3a55, 7252 B
on this branch and on 478ba93 - so 2026-08-20's anti-bang-bang rung is exactly
where it was, and tools/replay_ac3.py reproduces 190/190 guarded quarters, 110
engaged cycles, 5 blind and 878 Wh on both trees.

TWO PROPERTIES MAKE IT SAFE TO HAND A STRATEGY, BOTH SWEPT RATHER THAN ARGUED.
It is INVARIANT IN THE BATTERY - raise the charge by dW, the meter rises by dW,
so `excess` rises by dW while `batt_w` falls by dW and `wanted` does not move:
1350.0 W at every point across batt_w -5000..+2000 W on one banked quarter,
while the `excess` those runs see takes six distinct values. It is feed-forward,
so consuming it adds no feedback path around the plant. And HOLDING IMPLIES ZERO
OR UNKNOWN: across 1080 swept combinations not one ENGAGED decision answers a
positive headroom.

AFTER, same rig, same command. 1500/1200: 28 onsets -> 1, grid swing 3655.5 ->
282.0 W, energy bought 180.0 -> 285.2 Wh (+58%, because a continuous 300 W trade
beats a 2000 W trade cancelled for 57% of the hour), billed quarters
1490/1497/1509 -> 1500.0/1500.0/1500.0. 3500/1800: 8 -> 1, 3511/3536/3559 ->
3500/3500/3500. 3500/3000: 32 -> 1, 3519/3542/3557 -> 3500/3500/3500. The two
shipped-default rows buy 2.2% and 1.6% LESS energy and in exchange the worst
quarter goes from 59 W over the cap to zero - which is the ordering §10.1 asks
for, since the capacity tariff bills the month's single worst quarter.
⚠️ AND THE NEGATIVE CONTROL: at peak_cap_w 5000 with a 1200 W house, where
`load + max_w` never reaches the cap, the two runs are BIT-IDENTICAL.

⚠️ A NEGATIVE `lo` WAS CONSIDERED AND REJECTED, AND THE REASON IS IN THE CODE.
Deleting `decide()`'s `wanted <= 0` gate and filing `lo = wanted` is the tidier
answer arithmetically. It creates a new `lo > hi` CONTRADICTION against
main.py's cheap-window maintenance shaping, which files a NEGATIVE `hi`;
arbiter.py clause 2 has no notion of one limit out-ranking another, so it
resolves to 0 W - the battery PARKED in the quarter that sets the bill - and the
only way to close that suspends the maintenance charge shaping PERMANENTLY on
every site this card is about. A backoff or cooldown in arbitrage was rejected
too: both modules' design notes say no timer is invented, and the trade now
re-arms at `ceiling - load` rather than at max_w, which is what learning from a
refusal means when the refusal is a measurement.

THE REGRESSION IS THE LOOP SETTLING, NOT A UNIT TEST ON decide().
test_arbitrage.py 3c closes the loop over the shipped guard, strategy, arbiter,
control law and QuarterAverager with a modelled plant, and asserts BOTH
directions: unsized it must run away (24 onsets, -414..+3200 W, a quarter over
the cap) and sized it must settle (1 onset, 303 W swing, three quarters at
exactly 1500.0 W). The two runs differ in one argument. A third pair asserts the
card is INERT where the defect is inert.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 14 mutations, every one RED on a named check, no
survivors; two are ZERO BYTES - `min()` -> `max()` on the sizing, and the
sized-trade sentence's two operands transposed - and both are red. M13 reverts
the 2026-08-20 rung and is red on EIGHT named checks in test_peakguard and three
in test_arbitrage. Every revert verified by a tree fingerprint AFTER the revert,
which is how a defect in the battery's own harness was found: two edits to one
file, restored in list order, left the first one on disk (MUTATION.md habit 18).
test_peakguard.py part 1 also gained a None-safe format, because the mutation it
exists to catch made it raise TypeError one line later and ABORT the file -
parts 2-13 were ungraded and M13's recorded coverage was one check instead of
eight.

Not fixed, and named: TEST-23 finding 1's export overshoot at the END of a trade
(356-938 W, ~0.37 x max_w) is a different card; a house whose load ALONE exceeds
the cap still has the trade refused outright and the loop drive to grid = 0
rather than to the ceiling, and no swept pair reaches that regime; the container
leg (hadrive.py) was not re-run because test23s3-addon is deliberately stopped
as a second writer on the setpoint entity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-14 16:10:34 +02:00
admin 478ba93710 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-16: the injection leg gets its own coefficients' (#87) from TARIFF-16 into release/1.0
export_price_eur_kwh() modelled injection as one scalar. Eneco publishes 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 on the same card as its consumption formula, identical on the January and September 2026 cards; ENGIE publishes (B x eSpot_15) - A; Aspiravi uses 0,07 against ~0,10 on its own consumption leg. Reproduced against the shipped readers over one real BELPEX day: the published formula gives 24 distinct prices with a spread of 0.16710 EUR/kWh, the scalar gives 0.00000, and 5 of 24 hours are NEGATIVE - down to -0.03008 EUR/kWh - which are the midday hours a PV household exports in. The 6% VAT asymmetry is not wrong in the scalar, it is unstateable.

THE CARD'S BEFORE-STATE WAS WRONG AND THE AGENT CORRECTED IT. I wrote that this affects what the operator is shown. It did not: export_price_eur_kwh() had ZERO callers under app/ - not arbitrage, not the status page, not MQTT. Verified independently before merge; the only references are its own definition, the defaults entry, FRAMEWORK_KEYS and two comments. So the honest before-state is weaker than the card claimed: the scalar was not a misleading display, it was an UNREAD OPTION. DOCS, CHANGELOG and the startup line say so, and a check grades it. An operator actually seeing their injection price is a separate ticket.

Machinery reused rather than copied, which is TARIFF-17's move applied a second time: parse_export_formula() is parse_price_formula() with ONE argument moved, selecting a row of a _LEGS table, so everything that differs between the legs is a string and the units table, NaN rule, closed enumerations, unknown-key refusal, card comparison and DST handling are one implementation. Pinned by a check that parses every file under app/ and asserts all 32 grammar names are defined in exactly one module, plus an AST pin on the wrapper's body, plus twelve refusal sentences DERIVED from the consumption leg's own.

A NEGATIVE INJECTION PRICE IS ACCEPTED AND AN IMPLAUSIBLE ONE IS STILL REFUSED, and the bound had to move to achieve it: implausible_all_in() floors consumption at +0.02 EUR/kWh of energy, which is fatal on a leg that is legitimately negative. The bound is now off the PRICE and onto the COEFFICIENTS, where it is index-free and sign-free - a pass-through band (0.10-10x; Eneco 1.00x, Aspiravi 0.70x) and an offset-magnitude bound (0.20 against published 0.01188 and 0.02). One spec is put through both bands and the answers printed: the consumption band refuses -0.03008, the injection band accepts it.

The missing printed estimate is stated, not worked around. Eneco's injection line has no worked example beside it, so `card` is optional on this leg and unchanged on the other; where an estimate exists the self-check runs at the same tolerance, and where it does not validate.py logs that the coefficients are UNGRADED and names the two bounds that ran instead. A check MEASURES the resulting gap: a factor of 0.070 where the contract says 0.100 - 30% of every export payment - passes both bounds, because 0.70x is a pass-through somebody really publishes.

The scalar path is genuinely unchanged: the function body is pinned on the AST and seven option dicts are compared against the pre-TARIFF-16 expression with ==.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Twenty mutations, every one red on a named check. Giving the injection band TARIFF-15's floor is red in test_price.py and GREEN IN THE OTHER 28 FILES; so are the second-grammar and ignore-the-formula mutants. One is a single byte, one is ZERO bytes and moves no decision - legs transposed in the VAT banner, caught by an ordered-pair check. One is recorded for its SHAPE rather than its result: rerouting the scalar through the seam recurses, so the suite dies naming nothing, and a second mutation of the same property exists so a check can name it.

Two sharp edges flagged rather than smoothed: `index` and `resolution` on the injection leg name a series nobody fetches, which an operator could misread as a promise to fetch it; and the coefficient bands are materially weaker than a card check, catching the factor-of-10 class and nothing else.
2026-09-13 18:51:25 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 995da777ce TARIFF-16: the injection leg stops being one number
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m42s
`price.py` modelled what a site is PAID for export as ONE scalar. The market
publishes a line, and the cards say so in their own words: Eneco Zon & Wind
Dynamisch `0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188` c EUR/kWh - "het injectietarief is dynamisch
en kan per uur wijzigen", identical on the January and the September 2026 cards;
ENGIE Dynamic `(B x eSpot_15) - A`; Aspiravi `0,07 x Belpex - 2`.
`price_export_formula` carries that line with its OWN coefficients.

⚠️ THIS IS NOT A WRONG-TRADE FIX, AND SAYING SO IS PART OF SHIPPING IT.
`arbitrage.py` does not read `export_price_eur_kwh` at all - its own comment
says so, citing §9.3's near-zero Belgian injection price as the reason the
economically sound trade on this market is charge-cheap-to-displace-expensive-
IMPORT. Both hours it compares are all-in CONSUMPTION prices. No trade this
add-on takes today is decided by an injection price and nothing here changes
one. What it changes is what an operator is told, and what a future
export-aware strategy rests on: OPT-06 and any export logic would otherwise
inherit a scalar that cannot represent the market, and the 6% VAT asymmetry
would be invisible in the arithmetic. test_price.py 17h parses every module
under app/ and goes red the day something calls an injection reader, so that
sentence is graded rather than attested.

FOUR PROPERTIES A SCALAR CANNOT HOLD. Its own factor (Eneco 0,102 consumption
against 0,100 injection; Aspiravi 0,07 against ~0,10 - not the consumption B
with a sign flip). A negative offset, which `price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)`
cannot express at all. VAT-exemption - "injectietarieven zijn vrijgesteld van
btw" - against 6% on consumption, representable only because `vat_pct` is PER
SPEC. And a price that goes below zero with no floor, under 11,88 EUR/MWh of
BELPEX-H, which is the middle of a sunny day.

⚠️ A NEGATIVE INJECTION PRICE IS ACCEPTED, AND THAT NEEDED A DIFFERENT BAND
RATHER THAN A LOWER FLOOR. `implausible_all_in()` floors the consumption leg at
+0.02 EUR/kWh of energy; applied to injection that refuses the real market in
the hours it matters most. Measured rather than argued: 17c puts ONE spec
through BOTH bands and prints that the consumption band refuses -0.03008
EUR/kWh while the injection band accepts it. The floor was not decoration - it
is what catches a card read a hundred times too small, the one unit error the
card self-check cannot see because it cancels out of a comparison between the
two sides - so the bound moves OFF the price and ONTO the coefficients, where
it is index-free and sign-free: a pass-through band (Eneco's injection leg is
1.00x, Aspiravi's 0.70x; the band is 0.10-10x) and an offset magnitude bound
(0.20 EUR/kWh against published 0.01188 and 0.02). Two rungs that can both
answer a hundredfold error, so each is graded on its REASON, each gets a
stimulus the other cannot reach with the precondition asserted as its own
check, and they are mutated TOGETHER (TEST-16).

⚠️ THE CARD SELF-CHECK APPLIES WHERE THERE IS A CARD, AND WHERE THERE IS NOT
THAT IS STATED RATHER THAN WORKED AROUND. `price_formula` can require a `card`
block because a Belgian card prints the consumption formula, the reference
index AND the resulting price. Eneco's INJECTION formula is printed with no
price beside it. Requiring a block would make the published line inexpressible;
inventing the estimate would grade the coefficients against arithmetic done
with the same coefficients. So the block is OPTIONAL on this leg and unchanged
on the other, the self-check runs at the same tolerance wherever a printed
estimate exists, and validate.py says at startup - "its coefficients are
UNGRADED" - when it does not, naming the two bounds that ran instead. This is
TARIFF-15 demonstrating two tariffs end to end rather than three, one card
later. 17e also MEASURES the size of that gap: a factor of 0.070 where the
contract says 0.100 - 30% of every export payment - passes both bounds, because
0.70x is a pass-through somebody really publishes.

ONE PARSER, NOT TWO. `parse_export_formula()` is `parse_price_formula()` with
its OPTION NAME as an argument - TARIFF-17's move on `parse_static_profile()`,
exactly - and everything that differs between the legs is a string in one
`_LEGS` table. A second copy would be a second unit table, a second NaN rule, a
second unknown-key rule and a second `to_resolution()`, diverging first on the
23- and 25-hour days. test_price.py 17b pins it two ways: all 32 grammar names
are defined in exactly ONE module under app/, with the scope COMPUTED by
parsing every file rather than listed; and twelve refusal sentences for the new
option are DERIVED from the old option's own sentence rather than transcribed.
The four sentences that deliberately differ are named, with what differs, and
asserted to differ.

NOTHING CHANGES FOR A SITE THAT DOES NOT SET IT. The option ships "";
`export_price_eur_kwh()`'s body is byte-identical, pinned on the AST rather
than on the source text; `export_price_at()` falls through to it for every
index value. 17f compares seven option dicts x five index values against the
pre-TARIFF-16 expression with `==`.

`price_export_formula` joins FRAMEWORK_KEYS, BANNED_IN_PLUGIN_CODE is derived
from that set, and `code_leaks()` refuses a plugin that names it with nothing
else edited.

ALSO CORRECTED HERE: config.yaml's comment beside `export_price_eur_kwh` still
read "no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve". TARIFF-07
struck that claim from app/price.py and DOCS.md and did not reach config.yaml,
where it has been shipping since.

20 mutations, every one red on a named check, ledger in test_price.py below
section 17 - including a ZERO-byte one (the two legs transposed in the
VAT-asymmetry banner: no decision moves, only the sentence) and a ONE-byte one
(`card_required=True` on the injection leg). Three run over all 29 files and
red on test_price.py alone. 29/29 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 18:41:06 +02:00
admin 4dcd9b0fc6 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-18: the taxes default is half the real Flemish figure' (#86) from TARIFF-18 into release/1.0
price_taxes_eur_kwh shipped at 0.06 against a real Flemish 0.11736 - Fluvius Antwerpen 5,35 + bijzondere accijns 4,876 + groene stroom/WKK 1,51 + energiebijdrage 0, incl. 6% VAT, from the Eneco residential card for September 2026. Across the eight Fluvius DSOs the range is 0.117-0.131, so the shipped default was roughly half. The components ship as rows in the code, and the exact unrounded sum is used so the check asserts an EQUALITY against them rather than a tolerance. The energiebijdrage is a ZERO ROW, not an absence - it went to 0 EUR/MWh on 2026-08-01 and was merged into the excise, so anyone hand-computing this from an older guide double-counts it; deleting the row changes no sum, so its PRESENCE is graded separately.

AN UPGRADE HAZARD THE TICKET DID NOT NAME, found and closed. App.options is a deepmerge of config.yaml's defaults over the stored options, so the moment the default moves, every site STORING 0.06 becomes non-default with nobody having edited anything. Combined with TARIFF-17's new rung - a taxes period table beside a non-default scalar is a startup refusal - a working Walloon or Brussels site with a table would have hit SystemExit(78) on the upgrade, over an inert number the table overrides anyway. Closed with SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH: validate.py reads a superseded default as untouched too. The rung is NOT weakened - a genuinely custom 0.1198 beside a table is still refused by name, and the refusal now names both figures.

AND THE TICKET'S FRAMING WAS WRONG. I wrote that a site which took the default silently gets a different number. That is not what the deepmerge does: an existing install keeps its stored 0.06 and sees nothing change. The new default reaches a FRESH install, and an existing one only when its options are re-saved. Said plainly in the CHANGELOG, flagged as not re-measured on this branch (the 70-of-71-keys figure is 0.9.0's), with predeploy_check.py --options named as what would confirm it.

THE FIGURE IS THE BOTTOM OF THE BAND, DELIBERATELY, and the argument is the agent's rather than the ticket's: the error directions are not symmetric. Set too high, a genuinely negative hour reads positive and the add-on exports into paid disposal - section 17's own regression case. Set too low, it only declines a trade that would have paid. One default standing in for eight DSOs belongs at the bottom, and Antwerpen's 0.11736 is a real card row there rather than a synthesised minimum.

A CHECK HAD TO BE REWRITTEN RATHER THAN RE-POINTED. test_price.py section 0 justified its own constants by '0.06 is exactly twice 0.03'. This card ends that coincidence, so the sentence is false and is gone; it now asserts per figure that neither shipped default equals the fixture, which is stronger than the tuple compare it replaced. Recorded rather than quietly dropped, along with three other now-false claims the change created in test_price.py's docstring, MUTATION.md and DECISIONS/TARIFF-15 - which had predicted this card and is annotated as shipped.

Evidence: baseline 29/29 before any edit, 29/29 on the committed tree. Ten mutations, all red, every revert sha256-verified and every grade taken in a container with the tree :ro so no .pyc can exist. Two are zero-byte. The interesting one moves the component rows AND the default AND config.yaml together into a coherent West-Vlaanderen card - caught only by the literal typed in the test file and the band check, which is why the sum is graded from two independent sides. What the suite cannot see is stated in the PR: it grades the default against the card as a number, never the card against Belgium.
2026-09-13 16:33:37 +02:00
318 changed files with 69527 additions and 3200 deletions
+2
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
# The admin/goodwe commit CI tests against. Bump: set to the full SHA of admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (README.md, "CI and the infra pin").
3b4ff84757f9c2c5b63a4b4a53e593ccaeafb847
+302 -18
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,35 @@
# of real coverage including a wall-clock cadence test, and not one machine ever
# ran them. Every merge here was a human reading a diff.
#
# ⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on
# release/1.0 requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Gitea leaves a
# required context it never receives PENDING forever, so the moment this workflow
# learns to sit a PR out, that PR becomes unmergeable. Condition a STEP if you
# ⚠️ NO EVENT FILTER OF ANY KIND - NO `paths:`, AND SINCE CI-9 NO `branches:`
# EITHER - AND THAT ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on release/1.0
# requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Condition a STEP if you
# must; never the workflow.
#
# ⚠️ CI-01 WROTE THE REASON DOWN WRONG, AND THE WRONG REASON WAS THE SAFE-
# SOUNDING ONE. It said an unreceived required context sits PENDING forever, so
# a sat-out pull request becomes unmergeable - annoying, but fail-safe. That is
# not what this Gitea does. MEASURED on Gitea 1.27.3, 2026-09-19, throwaway
# PR #94: when a workflow exists but its event filter does not match, Gitea does
# not stay silent. It POSTS the required context itself, with state `skipped`:
#
# GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/commits/<head sha>/statuses
# [{"status":"skipped","context":"checks / unit (pull_request)",
# "description":"Skipped","target_url":""}] <- no run, no job, no url
#
# GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/commits/<head sha>/status
# {"state":"success","total_count":1} <- the rollup LAUNDERS it
#
# and Gitea's merge gate accepts it. Same PR, same head sha, one status on it
# and that status a skip, POST .../pulls/94/merge answered 409 `head out of
# date` - the 409 being a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id` in the probe, i.e.
# the request had ALREADY CLEARED BRANCH PROTECTION. The control, a required
# context with no status at all, answered 405 `Not all required status checks
# successful`. So the true failure mode is the exact inverse of the one written
# here before: sitting a pull request out does not make it unmergeable, it makes
# it MERGEABLE WITHOUT EVER BEING TESTED, and the badge says success while it
# happens. Fail-open, not fail-closed. Do not reintroduce a filter here.
#
# ⚠️ THE RUNNER IS SHARED WITH THE OTHER REPO'S RIG. `goodwe-runner` on
# 192.168.2.147 carries the labels `self-hosted` and `goodwe-rig` and is
# registered `:host`, and it is the only runner there is - so this job wears the
@@ -23,9 +46,116 @@
# that step; a green from this workflow is a claim about content that can land.
name: checks
# ⚠️ CI-9: `pull_request:` TAKES NO `branches:` LIST, ON PURPOSE. It used to
# read `branches: [release/1.0, master]`, which meant a STACKED pull request -
# one whose base is another feature branch rather than a release branch - did
# not match, and so was skipped, laundered to `success`, and mergeable untested
# by the mechanism described at the top of this file.
#
# ⚠️ AND RETARGETING DID NOT REPAIR IT, WHICH IS WHAT MADE THIS P1. The skip is
# a COMMIT STATUS ON THE HEAD SHA, not a property of the pull request, so moving
# the base afterwards leaves it exactly where it was. Observed live on PR #93
# (2026-09-19): retargeted TEL-10 -> release/1.0, and the 10:05:00 `skipped`
# stayed attached to head a6af332 with the rollup still reading success. It was
# caught by a human who forced a real execution by reopening the pull request
# (run 799, 10:56). Reproduced deliberately on throwaway PR #94: retargeted onto
# a branch carrying a byte-identical copy of release/1.0's protection rule, and
# the single `skipped` status survived the retarget unchanged - no new run, no
# new status - and still cleared the gate.
#
# ⚠️ WHY NOT FIX THIS AT THE GATE INSTEAD, which would be the better place. It
# cannot be done. Gitea's branch protection cannot express "this context must be
# SUCCESS" as opposed to "this context must be PRESENT AND NOT FAILING". The
# whole of its status-check vocabulary is two fields - `enable_status_check`
# (bool) and `status_check_contexts` (a list of globs MATCHING CONTEXT NAMES) -
# confirmed against this server's own schema at /swagger.v1.json, definitions
# EditBranchProtectionOption and CreateBranchProtectionOption. There is no field
# for the required STATE anywhere in either. The success/skip comparison lives
# in Gitea's compiled code, so the only lever left is upstream of it: make sure
# the context is never a skip in the first place. Hence this block.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS COSTS, stated honestly, because it is a real trade. Every pull
# request now runs the full suite, including the intermediate steps of a stack
# that nobody intends to merge on its own. A run is ~8 minutes wall clock
# (run 799: 7m55s) on a runner that is `capacity: 1` and shared with the other
# repo's rig, so each extra run is ~8 minutes of slot that a rig campaign then
# queues behind.
#
# SCALE OF THE NEW WORK, re-derived from the API and stated with its denominator,
# because the first version of this paragraph had a made-up one. Counting the 93
# pull requests that predate this ticket (#1..#93; CI-9's own #94..#98 excluded,
# and note /pulls caps a page at 50, so this needs paging to see at all): 92 were
# opened against release/1.0 and would have run anyway, and exactly ONE was
# stacked - #2, TEL-01 -> SAFETY-04, closed unmerged, 2026-08-24. No pull request
# has ever targeted `master`, so half the old filter was dead from the start.
#
# ⚠️ THAT 92 IS AN UPPER BOUND, NOT A CENSUS, and the reason is this very bug.
# The API reports a pull request's CURRENT base, so one that was opened stacked
# and later retargeted is recorded against its final base and is invisible here.
# #93 is precisely that case - opened 2026-09-19T10:05:00 on TEL-10, retargeted,
# merged into release/1.0 at 11:05:26 the same morning, under three hours before
# CI-9 was opened - and it counts in the 92. So the true historical stacking rate
# is somewhere above 1/93, and unmeasurable from here.
#
# The bill is therefore small today and grows with however much stacking the team
# adopts. It is worth paying: the alternative is that the cheap case stays
# untested and indistinguishable from the tested one.
#
# ⚠️ THIS DOES NOT CHANGE GITEA'S ACCEPTANCE OF A `skipped` REQUIRED CONTEXT -
# that half is in its compiled code and is not reachable from this repository.
# The CONSEQUENCE, though, is very largely closeable from here, and is closed:
# after this edit there is nothing in this repository that produces a skip -
# there is exactly one workflow file, it now has no event filter of any kind,
# and the other candidate cause was MEASURED and is not one. The `guard the
# trigger` step below then keeps it that way mechanically rather than by asking
# the next editor to read this comment.
#
# ⚠️ READ THE BLIND SPOTS ON THAT STEP BEFORE TRUSTING THE SENTENCE ABOVE.
# "Mechanically" holds only for a reintroduced filter that still names the
# PR's own base. For blind spots 1 and 3 the defence IS this comment, because
# the guard lives inside the workflow that a filter makes Gitea skip. Blind
# spot 3 is the one that matters: a filter naming a branch THIS pull request
# does not target is itself skipped, lands green and untested, and then every
# subsequent pull request the filter DOES NOT NAME is skipped too. That is the
# gate off, silently.
#
# ⚠️ THAT DIRECTION IS THE WHOLE POINT AND IT IS EASY TO WRITE BACKWARDS. A
# pull request that MATCHES the filter still runs; it is the one the filter
# excludes that Gitea sits out, reports `skipped`, and the rollup launders
# into `success`. An earlier draft of this very clause said "matching it is
# skipped", which is the inverse of the measurement and contradicted the
# paragraph directly below.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE DANGEROUS ONE IS NOT `branches: [main]`, WHICH AT LEAST LOOKS
# WRONG. It is `branches: [release/1.0]`, which looks like tightening onto the
# protected branch and is what a careful person would write. Every day-to-day
# pull request still runs and still goes green, so nothing appears broken -
# and the only thing switched off is the `release/1.0` -> `master` release
# PR, i.e. the one whose content reaches an installed system. SEC-2 made that
# PR the mandated release path (docs/RELEASE.md), so this is now a live route
# rather than a hypothetical one.
#
# Closing it needs a SECOND permanently unfiltered workflow posting its own
# context, with that context added to the `status_check_contexts` of BOTH
# `release/1.0` AND `master` - both carry the rule since SEC-2, and adding it
# to one alone leaves the hole open on the other. A forge change, with the
# owner.
#
# THE MEASUREMENT, because the obvious guess is wrong and was nearly written
# here as fact. A skip-ci keyword in a commit message (`[skip ci]`, `[ci skip]`,
# `[no ci]`, `[skip actions]`, `[actions skip]`) does NOT behave like a filter
# miss. On throwaway PR #94, head b36effb, commit subject ending `[skip ci]`:
#
# .../commits/b36effb/statuses -> [] <- NO status, not a skip
# .../commits/b36effb/status -> {"state":"pending"} <- so the rollup is pending
# POST .../pulls/94/merge -> 405 Not all required status checks successful
#
# i.e. skip-ci is FAIL-CLOSED - it withholds the context entirely, which is the
# pending-forever behaviour CI-01's header wrongly attributed to a filter miss.
# It blocks the merge rather than laundering it, so it needs no fix and no
# app.ini change. Only the filter miss ever posted a `skipped`.
on:
pull_request:
branches: [release/1.0, master]
workflow_dispatch:
# ⚠️ NO `concurrency:` BLOCK, AND ITS ABSENCE IS AS LOAD-BEARING AS THE MISSING
@@ -156,8 +286,9 @@ jobs:
run: |
set -eu
rm -rf "$WS" && mkdir -p "$WS/goodwe-addon" && cd "$WS/goodwe-addon"
git init -q .
git remote add origin "$(echo "$URL" | sed "s#://#://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@#")"
git init -q . && git remote add origin "$URL"
# Token as an env-set header: not in argv or .git/config (TOOL-9).
export GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN"
if [ -n "$PRNUM" ]; then
# Two fetches, not one, so that a failure to reach either ref fails
# HERE with the ref in the message, rather than inside the merge
@@ -224,6 +355,165 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
# ⚠️ THE GUARD ON THE TRIGGER. THIS STEP EXISTS BECAUSE PROSE ALREADY
# FAILED IN THIS FILE, ONCE, FOR TWENTY DAYS.
#
# `git show 9c1a23328a` is CI-01's first commit. It shipped the header
# "⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING" and the line
# `branches: [release/1.0, master]` IN THE SAME COMMIT, EIGHTEEN LINES
# APART. The comment forbade one kind of event filter while the code
# directly above the job carried another, and nobody caught it through 84
# merges until the gate let a stacked pull request through. So the whole of
# CI-9's fix rests on an invariant - "checks.yml has no event filter" -
# that has already been silently violated in this exact file by the person
# who wrote the warning against violating it. A louder comment is not a
# remedy for that. A red step is.
#
# WHY THIS CAN WORK AT ALL, given CI-9 rejected the card's option 3 (a step
# that detects its own workflow having been skipped) as impossible. That
# option is impossible because a skipped workflow runs no steps, so there
# is nothing alive to notice. This is the different, tractable case: it
# fires on the pull request that REINTRODUCES a filter, and it does so
# whenever the filter being reintroduced STILL NAMES THAT PULL REQUEST'S
# OWN BASE - the ordinary case, because a filter put back by hand names
# the release branch people are actually targeting. The edit then has to
# get past this step before it can start causing skips. It is a ratchet,
# not a skip detector.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS THE HEAD'S WORKFLOW THAT DECIDES WHETHER ANYTHING RUNS, NOT
# THE BASE'S. An earlier draft of this comment claimed the reintroducing
# pull request "is still graded by the unfiltered workflow which is on the
# base today". That was wrong, it contradicted the checkout step's own note
# a few lines below, and the error was not cosmetic: it made this step
# sound like an unconditional ratchet, which is exactly the false comfort
# CI-9 exists to stamp out. MEASURED on PR #101 - head carrying a filter
# that excludes the base, base carrying the unfiltered workflow - and the
# result was no run at all, the context posted `skipped`, the rollup
# reading `success`, and the gate CLEARED (409). Gitea takes the workflow
# file from refs/pull/<n>/head, so a head that filters itself out is simply
# never graded, and nothing on the base can reach out and stop it. That is
# what blind spot 3 below is made of.
#
# WHAT IT INSPECTS is the MERGED tree in $WS - the content that would
# actually land on the base - not the branch tip and not the copy of this
# file that Gitea used to decide whether to run. Those are three different
# trees here (see the long note on the checkout step) and only the merged
# one is the thing being authorised.
#
# ⚠️ THREE ACKNOWLEDGED BLIND SPOTS. NOT ONE OF THEM IS CLOSEABLE FROM
# INSIDE THIS FILE, and the reason is the same in all three: each is a case
# where THIS WORKFLOW IS ITSELF THE THING THAT GETS SKIPPED, and a guard
# that lives inside a skipped workflow does not run. Closing them needs a
# SECOND, permanently unfiltered workflow whose own context is added to
# release/1.0's `status_check_contexts`, so that something survives to
# report when this file is sat out. That is a forge change and the
# repository owner's decision; it is being put to them separately and is
# deliberately NOT held as a blocker on CI-9.
#
# 1. A reintroduced `paths:` filter crafted to exclude the reintroducing
# pull request's OWN diff would skip that pull request, so this step
# would not run to object to it.
#
# 2. An edit that lands on a feature branch through a stacked pull
# request is graded by the HEAD's workflow, so a filter already
# present in the head hides the edit from this step - until that
# branch is proposed for release/1.0, where (unless it is case 3) the
# base matches the reintroduced filter and this step runs and bites.
# Caught at the release boundary, which is the boundary that matters.
#
# 3. ⚠️ THE WORST OF THE THREE, AND WORSE THAN BOTH OF THE OTHERS PUT
# TOGETHER: a reintroduced `branches:` filter that simply DOES NOT
# NAME THE BASE escapes this step entirely, because the pull request
# carrying it is itself skipped. It takes no craft and no malice to
# write - `branches: [main]` copied out of a GitHub template, or a
# tidy-up to `[master]`, a branch that NO pull request in this
# repository's history has ever targeted - and it arrives as a
# skipped, laundered, untested merge into release/1.0.
#
# What makes it categorically worse is what happens the moment after.
# Once that file is ON release/1.0, every subsequent pull request is
# graded against it and every one of them is skipped too. This is not
# the stacked case leaking through a crack; it is the gate off
# completely, for everything, silently, with every badge green. The
# only thing standing between the repository and that state today is
# a human reading this file - which is precisely the kind of defence
# this step exists because it has already failed once (9c1a23328a).
#
# It is deliberately a FAILURE and not a warning: a warning would leave
# the required context green, which is the precise defect CI-9 is about.
- name: guard the trigger - refuse a checks.yml that has regained an event filter
run: |
set -eu
f="$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/workflows/checks.yml"
test -f "$f" || { echo "checks.yml is missing from the merged tree."; exit 1; }
# Walk the top-level `on:` block of the MERGED file. Full-line comments
# at column 0 are skipped outright - this file's own prose quotes
# `paths:` and `branches:` many times and must not trip its own guard -
# and an inline `#` is trimmed from any line that is kept.
bad=$(awk '
function scan(t) {
sub(/#.*/, "", t)
if (t ~ /(^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])(branches|branches-ignore|paths|paths-ignore|tags|tags-ignore|types)[[:space:]]*:/)
return 1
return 0
}
/^[[:space:]]*#/ { next }
/^("on"|'"'"'on'"'"'|on)[[:space:]]*:/ {
inon = 1
rest = $0; sub(/^[^:]*:/, "", rest)
if (scan(rest)) print NR ": " $0
next
}
inon == 1 {
if ($0 ~ /^[[:space:]]*$/) next
if ($0 ~ /^[[:space:]]/) { if (scan($0)) print NR ": " $0; next }
inon = 0
}
' "$f")
if [ -n "$bad" ]; then
echo "REFUSED: checks.yml has regained an event filter in its \`on:\` block."
echo "$bad"
echo
echo " A filter means some pull request stops matching this workflow. Gitea does"
echo " not stay silent about a workflow it sits out - it posts the required context"
echo " \`checks / unit (pull_request)\` itself with state \`skipped\`, the combined"
echo " status rolls that up as \`success\`, and the merge gate ACCEPTS it. That is"
echo " CI-9: a pull request merged on a workflow that never ran a step. It was"
echo " reproduced by merging PR #96 for real through a protected branch."
echo
echo " Branch protection cannot save you here - it can require that a context is"
echo " PRESENT, never that it is SUCCESS - so the filter is the whole defence."
echo " If you genuinely need to narrow what runs, condition a STEP, never the"
echo " workflow. See the \`on:\` block's comments for the measurements."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: the \`on:\` block of the merged checks.yml carries no event filter."
# CI-12: the infra repo at the ONE pinned commit in .gitea/infra-pin (read
# from the merged tree), as the sibling test_freeze.py looks for. Any
# failure here fails the job; the tests step below refuses the stub.
- name: check out admin/goodwe at the pin in .gitea/infra-pin
env:
URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/admin/goodwe.git
# Read access to admin/goodwe only; this job's own token cannot see it.
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.INFRA_READ_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -eu
# `|| true`: under pipefail a missing or comment-only pin would skip the FAIL line (TOOL-9).
PIN=$(grep -v '^#' "$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/infra-pin" | tr -d '[:space:]') || true
echo "$PIN" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{40}$' || { echo "FAIL: .gitea/infra-pin holds '$PIN', not a full 40-hex SHA."; exit 1; }
test -n "$TOKEN" || { echo "FAIL: secret INFRA_READ_TOKEN is not available to this run (a fork PR?)."; exit 1; }
rm -rf "$WS/goodwe" && mkdir -p "$WS/goodwe" && cd "$WS/goodwe"
git init -q .
# The token goes in a header via env: not in argv, and not in .git/config,
# which is mounted into the tests' container and outlives a failed job.
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
git fetch -q "$URL" "$PIN" || { echo "FAIL: could not fetch admin/goodwe at $PIN."; exit 1; }
git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -qf FETCH_HEAD
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$PIN"
test -f sim/hwsim.py || { echo "FAIL: admin/goodwe@$PIN has no sim/hwsim.py."; exit 1; }
echo "infra: admin/goodwe @ $(git log --oneline -1)"
- name: build the test image (shipped deps, from apk - see .gitea/ci/Dockerfile)
run: |
set -eu
@@ -244,16 +534,9 @@ jobs:
# shorter timeout - a 60 s limit was tried during CI-01 and reported
# exactly the false hang the docstring predicts.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS RUN DOES NOT COVER, stated because a pass here would
# otherwise over-claim. test_freeze.py's third section wants the infra
# repo's `sim/hwsim.py` to drive a real HTTP meter through the real
# transport. admin/goodwe is PRIVATE (checked via the API) and this
# workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN is minted for THIS repository only, so hwsim is
# absent here and `find_hwsim()` returns None. The rest of the file runs
# and passes. It does so SILENTLY - the file prints nothing to say the
# hwsim section was skipped - so "test_freeze.py: PASS" below is a weaker
# claim than it looks. That belongs to whoever owns test_freeze.py next;
# naming it here is the least this gate can do about it.
# test_freeze.py part 3 runs against the real `sim/hwsim.py` from the
# checkout above; GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1 makes it fail rather than use its
# stub (CI-12). Lines a test prints with a `CI: ` prefix are echoed on PASS.
# ⚠️ PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 IS BELT AND BRACES, NOT A FIX FOR A LIVE
# HOLE. TEST-15 measured this runner's actual exposure and found none: the
# checkout below is bind mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter physically
@@ -269,7 +552,7 @@ jobs:
- name: the add-on's own tests
run: |
set -eu
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu -c '
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -e GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1 -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu -c '
cd /w/goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller
set -- test_*.py
if [ "$1" = "test_*.py" ]; then
@@ -282,6 +565,7 @@ jobs:
start=$(date +%s)
if python3 "$f" > /tmp/out 2>&1; then
echo "PASS $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
grep "^CI: " /tmp/out || true
else
echo "FAIL $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
tail -40 /tmp/out
+46
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# CI-12: goes red when admin/goodwe release/1.0 has moved past .gitea/infra-pin.
# It runs on add-on activity only; admin/goodwe's own `addon-pin` workflow
# covers a move of release/1.0 there. Deliberately NOT a required check: it
# reports; `checks / unit` stays the only gate. How to bump: README.md,
# "CI and the infra pin".
name: infra-pin
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [release/1.0]
jobs:
fresh:
runs-on: [self-hosted, goodwe-rig]
timeout-minutes: 30 # seconds of work; the rest is queueing for the shared slot
steps:
- name: compare .gitea/infra-pin with admin/goodwe release/1.0
env:
SELF: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}.git
INFRA: ${{ github.server_url }}/admin/goodwe.git
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
INFRA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.INFRA_READ_TOKEN }} # admin/goodwe is private
run: |
set -eu
D=$(mktemp -d) && trap 'cd / && rm -rf "$D"' EXIT && cd "$D"
git init -q .
# The pin of the commit this event is about (the PR head, or the push).
# Token as an env-set header: not in argv or .git/config (TOOL-9).
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
git fetch -q --depth 1 "$SELF" "$GITHUB_SHA" || { echo "FAIL: could not fetch $GITHUB_SHA here."; exit 1; }
# `|| true`: under the runner's pipefail a missing or comment-only pin
# would stop here on git's error instead of the FAIL line below (TOOL-9).
PIN=$(git show FETCH_HEAD:.gitea/infra-pin | grep -v '^#' | tr -d '[:space:]') || true
test -n "$PIN" || { echo "FAIL: .gitea/infra-pin is missing at $GITHUB_SHA, or holds only comments."; exit 1; }
test -n "$INFRA_TOKEN" || { echo "FAIL: secret INFRA_READ_TOKEN is not available to this run (a fork PR?)."; exit 1; }
# Header via env, as in checks.yml: the token stays out of argv.
HEAD=$(GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $INFRA_TOKEN" \
git ls-remote "$INFRA" refs/heads/release/1.0 | cut -f1) || true
test -n "$HEAD" || { echo "FAIL: could not read admin/goodwe release/1.0."; exit 1; }
if [ "$PIN" != "$HEAD" ]; then
echo "STALE: .gitea/infra-pin is $PIN but admin/goodwe release/1.0 is $HEAD."
echo " Test against $HEAD and bump the pin (README.md, \"CI and the infra pin\")."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: .gitea/infra-pin $PIN is admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD."
+6 -1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ The guide technicians carry is the PDF:
**`docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf`** — 10 pages, A4, print it double-sided.
⚠️ **Outdated: it is v0.1.0.** Its `slew_w` row is corrected in `build_guide.py`
and `field-guide.html`, but the PDF has not been rebuilt (see below). Where the
guide disagrees with `goodwe_controller/DOCS.md`, DOCS.md wins.
It covers, in the order the work is done: pre-visit checks, hardware, firmware,
add-on install and configuration, how to read the Web UI, the six commissioning
gates, the e-stop (and the statement a site without one must sign), proving a
@@ -18,7 +22,8 @@ copy cannot drift from the PDF someone is holding in a cellar.
python3 docs/build_guide.py # regenerates field-guide.html and the PDF
```
Requires Chrome or Chromium (used headless for print-to-PDF). Screenshots live
Requires Chrome or Chromium (used headless for print-to-PDF); `CHROME` in the
script is a Windows path, so edit it on any other machine. Screenshots live
in `docs/img/` and are base64-embedded, so `field-guide.html` is standalone.
⚠️ **Every section must stay under the A4 printable height** (1039 px at 96 dpi
+14 -3
View File
@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ goodwe_controller/ the add-on
returns, run against its own release image
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml ESPHome config for the T-CAN485
estop/rs485_log.py optional RS485 e-stop / bus witness
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4)
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4; outdated)
docs/build_guide.py its single source - rebuilds the HTML and PDF
FIELD-GUIDE.md how to edit and rebuild the guide
docs/RELEASE.md how a change reaches the battery - `master` is
protected, releases go via PR from `release/1.0`
```
**Picking this up after a break? Read `HANDOVER.md` first** — current state,
@@ -48,6 +50,9 @@ https://gittea.kammenstraatha.duckdns.org/admin/goodwe-addon
then install **GoodWe RS485 Controller**.
Then turn on **Watchdog** on the add-on's Info tab — see
[Before you start](goodwe_controller/DOCS.md#before-you-start).
⚠️ **The repository must be PUBLIC for this to work.** Home Assistant clones it
anonymously; against a private repo the store shows nothing and gives no useful
error. If it must stay private, install locally instead: copy
@@ -77,8 +82,8 @@ machine itself dying:
2. **Wind-down before firmware updates** — 0 W written before the update starts.
3. **RS485 e-stop (optional)** — writes 0 W after 30 s of total bus silence.
Sites sold without the e-stop must have the acknowledgement in `FIELD-GUIDE.md`
§10 signed.
Sites sold without the e-stop must have the client acknowledgement in the field
guide (Step 7b) signed.
## Development
@@ -100,6 +105,12 @@ has the mechanism, the measurement, and what the flags do not do. They are not u
each assertion corresponds to a rule whose absence produced an observed failure
on real hardware, and the comments in `control.py` say which.
### CI and the infra pin
CI (`.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`) runs every `test_*.py`, with `admin/goodwe` checked out next to this repo at the commit in `.gitea/infra-pin`, so `test_freeze.py` grades against the real `sim/hwsim.py`. If that checkout fails, the job fails. The local stub is used only in local runs, and it prints `STUB USED` when it is.
The pin tracks `admin/goodwe` **release/1.0**, not master. Two non-required checks go red when release/1.0 has moved past the pin: `infra-pin / fresh` here, on any add-on PR or push to release/1.0, and `addon-pin / fresh` in `admin/goodwe`, on every push to its release/1.0. Nothing re-runs `addon-pin` after a bump, so it stays red on that admin/goodwe commit; `infra-pin / fresh` green on the bump is the all-clear.
**Bump the pin** whenever either is red. Set `.gitea/infra-pin` to the new release/1.0 SHA (`git ls-remote <gitea>/admin/goodwe.git refs/heads/release/1.0`) in a PR, and let `checks / unit` grade the tests against it. CI reads `admin/goodwe` with the Actions secret `INFRA_READ_TOKEN`.
## Compatibility
**Check the serial number, not the model name.** Characters 6-8 of the serial are
+64
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@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
# STYLE.md - how user-facing text is written (UX-08)
This applies to everything a home owner or installer reads: notifications, phone pushes, the add-on page, refusals, add-on log lines at WARNING and above, and the names and descriptions of options. It is enforced by `goodwe_controller/test_messages.py`. Its allowlist is empty since phase 2d and its cap is 0: a new string that breaks the rule fails the test.
## 1. Shape
- **Title**: at most 5 everyday words. It says what is wrong ("Meter reading may be stuck"). No "GoodWe:" prefix, no full stop.
- **Body**: **one sentence** of at most 25 words, saying what happened and what to do. A **red alarm** may use up to **3 sentences** (70 words, each sentence at most 30 words), so that no action a person must take is lost.
- **Details**: the last line links to the add-on documentation and names the section with the rest: `Details: add-on documentation, section "<title>" under Notifications.` Background, figures, reason codes and history go there or into the log, never into the body.
- **Status row**: one sentence of at most 15 words. A **red** row may use up to 3 sentences (30 words), like a red alarm. It shows the live numbers the reader acts on and never an HA entity id. **Banner**: at most 12 words. **Refusal**: at most 30 words, naming the setting by its label and then its key, as `messages.setting()` writes it: “Inverter rating” (max_w), or “Inverter rating” for inverter-b (inverters.max_w) for one inverter in the list. **Option name**: at most 6 words, not counting the group prefix. **Option description**: at most 30 words. Where a value comes from belongs in DOCS.md.
- **Plan line** (UX-13 Home screen: the plan, tooltips, a battery's "now" line): at most 2 sentences, each at most 12 words. Words in `app/ui_text/<lang>.json` under `home_words`, built by `app/homeview.py`, checked by `test_messages.py` part 8. The page's own words, English and Dutch, are checked by `test_ui_text.py`.
- **Log line** (WARNING/ERROR): one line of at most 25 words **as logged**, with any built text filled in. Log lines stay in English and are not translated. A line that reports a safety reason gives one plain sentence and the reason's code (`STALE_READING`, `OUTPUT_CLAMP`), the evidence an installer searches for. The reason itself, with its figures and limits, goes on a DEBUG line right after it and into the action log, never onto the WARNING/ERROR line. It keeps the shape of a red alarm: at most 3 sentences of at most 30 words. The line as logged has no semicolon, banned word, capitals, "1 times" or "(s)". `test_messages.py` part 6 builds every such text with the real code and checks it, and lists the few non-safety families still over 25 words. A line that repeats every cycle is DEBUG. INFO lines carry no section numbers, ISO timestamps or capitals.
- **Refusal length is counted as shown**: a setting placeholder counts as its label and key, and the long cases are driven through the validator (`test_messages.py` part 3).
- **Event line** under the buttons: the plain words of `messages.hint()`, like a green row. The add-on's own action log stays technical and is not shown on the page. Installers read it as `events` in the `status` JSON.
- **Sentences**: one idea each, active voice, present tense, with nothing nested in brackets and no semicolons (a semicolon is a second sentence in disguise). These translate well into Dutch and French.
## 2. Numbers
Use a number only if it helps the reader act, for example the peak limit, or what was asked and what was sent in a fault report. Write it the way `app/messages.py` does: `5 000 W`, `20 %`, `10 minutes`, `14:05`.
## 3. Severity
Severity is shown by the title and the colour, never by CAPITALS or by words like "BUG SIGNAL".
| Level | Colour | When |
|---|---|---|
| alarm | red | Control stopped, money or energy lost now, a fault, or a person must act now. Up to 3 sentences. |
| warning | orange | Control is still running, but something needs a look. 1 sentence. |
| info | grey | No action needed. 1 sentence. |
| resolved | green | An earlier alarm or warning has cleared. 1 sentence. |
A rewrite never changes an alarm's severity, `notification_id` or cadence.
## 4. Words - the same word for the same thing everywhere
A setting is named by its label in `translations/en.yaml`, in quotes when it sits mid-sentence (“Inverter rating”). The words below match those labels. If a label changes, change it here and in `app/messages.py` in the same change.
| Say | Not |
|---|---|
| the add-on (who decides), control (what it does: "start control", "Control: last ran …") | controller, loop, planner |
| battery | pack, BMS pack |
| inverter, or its name | unit, device, actuator |
| meter | P1 feed, telegram |
| peak limit / this month's peak | ceiling, capaciteitstarief, billed quarter |
| 15-minute period | quarter |
| battery level (setting: “Battery level entity”) | SoC, state of charge, charge level |
| battery cut-out level, or cut-out level next to "battery" (setting: “Battery cut-out level”) | BMS floor, `bms_soc_floor` |
| peak reserve (setting: “Peak reserve”) | `peak_soc_floor`, EMS floor, "peak guard will not discharge below" |
| “Inverter rating” (the setting) | `max_w`, rail, inverter rating as a fact about the hardware |
| solar production, solar entity (settings: “Solar production entity”, “Solar production entities, per inverter”, “Reversed-sign solar entities”) | PV, reversed-sign list, single sensor setting |
| “Where the meter reading comes from” | meter source |
| “Grid power entity”; entity for any Home Assistant sensor a setting points at | grid power sensor, sensor setting |
| draw the battery down, give power | discharge, discharging |
| control is stopped / every inverter is set to 0 W | failsafe, trip, latch, parked |
| safety stop (a stop that only starting control clears) | failsafe latch |
| software fault | BUG SIGNAL |
| control board | master, ESP32 |
| power request, what the add-on asks | command, setpoint (on the page) |
| the power went the wrong way | sign disagreement, command and meter point opposite ways |
| check for inverters working against each other | circulating power check |
| month peak, 15-minute periods measured | billed quarter, banked, soft limit, open block |
| shadow mode | a mode that makes every decision but commands 0 W. The name is kept. In shadow mode a text says what the add-on **would** send, never that it sent it. |
**Banned in titles and bodies** (the test fails on them): SAFETY-/TARIFF-/TEL-/CFG-/FW-/HW-nn and other card ids, integrator, anti-windup, windup, clamp, clamped, saturated, BUG SIGNAL, latch, latched, arbiter, allocator, register, `0x…`, layer 1/2/3, heartbeat, watchdog, telegram, ACK, CRC, OTA, Modbus, planner, `§n`, file names, IP addresses, option keys in snake_case, **HA entity ids**, and runs of 2 or more CAPITALISED words.
HA entity ids are allowed only in refusals and validator messages, where the installer has to find that entity. They are never allowed in alarms or status rows.
**Glossary.** DOCS.md "Words used on this page" explains, once, the words a home owner meets without context: control board, isolator, Developer Tools, shadow mode, safety stop, peak limit, peak guard, peak reserve and cut-out level. A home-owner text may use them without explaining them again. Card ids stay out of DOCS.md headings: they go on a *For installers* line under the heading.
+116
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@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
# Releasing — how a change reaches the battery
`master` is the **default branch**, and the default branch is what the Home
Assistant Supervisor clones when it installs or updates this add-on. Whatever
sits on `master` is what runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Treat a push to `master`
as a deployment, because that is what it is.
---
## 1. `master` is protected — releases go through a pull request
Until 2026-09-23 `master` had **no protection of any kind**. Every gate this
repo built (CI-01, CI-9) sat on `release/1.0`, the branch that does *not* ship.
On 2026-09-22 version 0.10.1 went straight onto `master` — no pull request, no
CI run, no reviewer — and it succeeded (commit `0f14c2a`, the only commit on
`master` that carries no `(#NN)` merge suffix). SEC-2 closed that.
**The release path is now:**
1. Merge the work into `release/1.0` as usual, via a pull request that goes
green. Bump `version:` in `goodwe_controller/config.yaml` on that branch —
the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, so without a bump nothing
is offered and nothing changes.
2. Open a pull request **`release/1.0` → `master`**. Do not push to `master`;
it will be refused by the pre-receive hook:
```
remote: error: Not allowed to push to protected branch master
! [remote rejected] ... (pre-receive hook declined)
```
3. Wait for `checks / unit (pull_request)` to go **green** on that pull request.
The workflow in `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` carries **no `branches:`
filter**, so a `master` base matches and a real run happens — verified on
throwaway PR #107 (base `master`), which queued a genuine run.
⚠️ Green means green. A `skipped` status is laundered into a `success`
rollup by this Gitea and the merge gate accepts it — see the long note at
the top of `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`. Never add an event filter there.
4. Merge the pull request. `required_approvals` is **0**, so a green check is
the whole gate; there is no second pair of eyes unless someone asks for one.
5. **Reload the store.** Merging to `master` does not, by itself, offer the
update. The Supervisor only sees the new version after:
```bash
ssh root@192.168.2.158 "ha store reload && ha addons update local_goodwe_controller"
```
Until `ha store reload` runs, the add-on page still shows the old version
and the release looks like it did nothing.
Note that `release/1.0` is normally an *ancestor* of `master` between releases,
so a `release/1.0 → master` pull request is empty until new commits land on
`release/1.0`. That is expected; it means there is nothing to release yet.
---
## 2. Branch protection — before and after SEC-2
Forge is Gitea at `192.168.2.147:3000`, repo `admin/goodwe-addon`. Read it back
with `GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/branch_protections`.
**Before (2026-09-23):**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | **no rule at all** | — | — | — |
| `release/1.0` | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
**After:**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
| `release/1.0` | yes (unchanged) | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
Both rules are otherwise identical: `enable_push: false`,
`enable_force_push: false`, `block_admin_merge_override: true`, no whitelists,
no file patterns. `required_approvals` stays at **0** on purpose — raising it
would block the review agent from merging, and nobody asked for it.
The default branch was **not** changed. Changing it would change what the
Supervisor clones, which is a different decision from this one.
### How the gate was proven to actually bite
A protection rule on this forge can *appear* satisfied while having checked
nothing, so the rule was tested rather than trusted. The discriminator is a
merge `POST` carrying a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id`: Gitea evaluates
branch protection *before* it checks the head, so
* `409 head out of date` → the request **cleared** protection;
* `405 Not all required status checks successful` → protection **refused** it.
Read the *message*, not just the code: `405` is also returned as
`Please try again later` for a pull request with **no commits**, which has
nothing to do with protection. An empty pull request on an unprotected base
gives that same `405` (verified, throwaway PR #110), so an empty
`release/1.0 → master` reports it too.
Validated against a control on an unprotected base (PR #106), which answered
`409` while its check was still pending — i.e. protection was no obstacle
there. On `master` (PR #107) the same probe answered `405` while pending, and
`409` once the check was genuinely green. A direct `git push` to `master` was
rejected by the pre-receive hook with `master`'s SHA unmoved.
---
## 3. Rolling back
There is no force-push escape hatch: `enable_force_push` is `false` on both
branches. To undo a bad release, land a revert on `release/1.0`, bump the
version again, and take it through §1. The `/addons/` rollback for the
reference install is in `HANDOVER.md`.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="page" id="p1">
<div class="hdr">
<div><h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0</div></div>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0, <b>outdated</b>: where it disagrees with DOCS.md, DOCS.md wins</div></div>
<small>Installer copy</small>
</div>
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table>
<tr><th style="width:30mm">Setting</th><th style="width:16mm">Value</th><th>Reason</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>gain</code></td><td>0.6</td><td>Inverter needs 3–6 s to settle (1.4 s dead time, 94 % by 3.3 s) against a ~5 s cycle. <b>At the limit — do not raise</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>1000</td><td>Most of a correction in the first cycle without running far ahead of the hardware</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>0</td><td>0 follows the rail (<code>max_w</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;9). A faster fixed value is <b>refused at startup</b> (SAFETY-39) — see DOCS.md</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>deadband_w</code></td><td>15</td><td>Measured residual: mean 15.4 W, max 27 W. At 10 W the command never rests</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>saturation_w</code> / <code>cycles</code></td><td>500 / 3</td><td>Divergence = inverter at a limit → magnitude may fall, never rise. <b>The 3-cycle term is essential</b>: tested instantly it fires on every large correction</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>step_w</code></td><td>10</td><td>Register is 1 W but response lands on a ~17.6 W ladder. Finer is meaningless</td></tr>
+2 -2
View File
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="page" id="p1">
<div class="hdr">
<div><h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0</div></div>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0, <b>outdated</b>: where it disagrees with DOCS.md, DOCS.md wins</div></div>
<small>Installer copy</small>
</div>
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table>
<tr><th style="width:30mm">Setting</th><th style="width:16mm">Value</th><th>Reason</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>gain</code></td><td>0.6</td><td>Inverter needs 3–6 s to settle (1.4 s dead time, 94 % by 3.3 s) against a ~5 s cycle. <b>At the limit — do not raise</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>1000</td><td>Most of a correction in the first cycle without running far ahead of the hardware</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>0</td><td>0 follows the rail (<code>max_w</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;9). A faster fixed value is <b>refused at startup</b> (SAFETY-39) — see DOCS.md</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>deadband_w</code></td><td>15</td><td>Measured residual: mean 15.4 W, max 27 W. At 10 W the command never rests</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>saturation_w</code> / <code>cycles</code></td><td>500 / 3</td><td>Divergence = inverter at a limit → magnitude may fall, never rise. <b>The 3-cycle term is essential</b>: tested instantly it fires on every large correction</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>step_w</code></td><td>10</td><td>Register is 1 W but response lands on a ~17.6 W ladder. Finer is meaningless</td></tr>
+9
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
# UX-13 screenshots
Made from the real page by `goodwe_controller/tools/ux13_screenshots.sh`. Do not
edit them by hand: run the script again.
- `home-*.png`: Home, running, in Dutch, in shadow mode, at phone width, and in setup.
- `settings-*.png`: Settings, Simple and Installer, and the time-window editor with an overlap.
- `batteries*.png`: the Batteries screen with modes on, in Dutch, an Off battery helping the peak limit, a refusal at phone width, and modes off.
- `setup-step-1*.png`: Setup, step 1.
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -285,32 +285,11 @@ cross-inverter `lo > hi` contradiction at `arbiter.py:114`. The only line this
card changed there is **which** roster entry the claim is filed on: the one whose
state machine produced the result, rather than `inverters[0]`.
## 6. FOUND AND NOT FIXED: the site loop still contradicts a drain at N>=2
## 6. FIXED BY SAFETY-78: the site loop contradicted a drain at N>=2
Measured while wiring this card, and **pre-existing on `release/1.0` at
`2d025ee`** — the same drain filed on `inverters[0]` produces the identical
refusal with the two unit names swapped.
The maintenance SET **pins** its pack. The loop's target is a **site** claim.
When the site target is *below* the pin — a 2000 W drain while the house imports
less than that, which is most of a night — the only split that sums to the site
target asks the sibling to **charge** while the maintained pack **discharges**,
and `allocator.plan()` refuses it by name as circulating power. The refusal is
correct and fails safe: the whole site goes to 0 W with an `ARBITER: REFUSED`
line in the action log.
**The consequence an operator would see is a misdiagnosis.** The pack is held at
0 W while its state machine believes it is draining, so after 12 h the DRAIN
timeout fires and reports *"drain stuck"* — §12's words for a battery that is not
following commands. The battery is fine; the site refused to allocate.
**Why it is not fixed here.** The fix is to change what the site loop's target
*means* while a unit is pinned — regulate the meter using only the unpinned
packs — which is loop and allocator territory and changes the integrator's
subject. MAINT-05 moves which pack is pinned and nothing else about it. It is
pinned as a running check (`test_maintenance.py` part 12) rather than left as a
comment, so it cannot be forgotten or quietly tuned away, and it wants a card of
its own.
Found here and pre-existing: below the pin the other pack had to charge, the
allocator refused it and the site sat at 0 W. Fixed by a site `drain` floor;
see [[SAFETY-78]] (`DECISIONS/SAFETY-78-drain-at-two.md`).
## 7. FOUND AND NOT FIXED: `migrate_unit_keys()` has the same hole, and it is a LATCH
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
# MAINT-10 — the maintenance start hour is local time, default 19:00
Owner decision 2026-09-29 (option A). `maintenance_start_hour` was compared
with the UTC hour, so the shipped 10 started at 12:00 in a Belgian summer and
11:00 in winter. It is now read on the site's local clock, and the default moves
to 19 so the drain runs into the evening and night rather than the solar day.
Evening drains meet higher house loads; SAFETY-83 (merged first) lets the
peak guard outrank the drain.
## 1. Which zone
Home Assistant's `time_zone` (`GET /core/api/config`, 3 s budget) at startup,
else the container's `TZ`, else UTC. One log line says which (WARNING only for
UTC). Resolved once per start: a zone change in HA takes effect on the next
add-on restart. HA can still be starting when the add-on starts (502 from the
proxy, 2026-10-05); then `TZ` holds. HA pushes its zone to the Supervisor
(hassio `push_config`), which stores it and sets it as the add-on's `TZ`
(`docker/app.py`, Supervisor 2026.08.0), so the hour stays right. Only a `TZ` of
UTC there logs a WARNING asking for a restart. No later re-resolve: the fallback
already is HA's zone, so the rare UTC case gets a warning rather than more code.
The add-on image has tzdata (checked in `amd64-base:3.20`); the CI image does
not, so the tests grade DST on `tariff._EUTimezone` too.
## 2. DST
`maintenance.in_start_slot()` works from UTC instants only, so it does not
depend on how a tzinfo resolves a missing or doubled wall time:
- normally the slot is the local hour `start_hour`;
- clocks forward and the hour does not exist: the first hour after the jump;
- clocks back and the hour happens twice: the first pass only. Without this an
aborted start (90 min cooldown) would start again in the 120 min repeated hour.
Every day has exactly one 60 min slot for every hour 0-23: checked against
zoneinfo for Europe/Brussels, America/New_York, America/Santiago (midnight
transitions), Asia/Kathmandu (+05:45) and Australia/Lord_Howe (30 min DST)
over all of 2026.
## 3. Existing installs
The Supervisor merges the shipped defaults under the STORED options, and saving
the settings stores every key (the reference install's blob has all 76). So
almost every existing install keeps its stored 10, which now means 10:00 local
instead of 12:00 (summer) or 11:00 (winter). Only a blob without the key gets 19.
The add-on does not rewrite a stored option: a silent migration would override
an operator's choice with no way to tell it apart from the old default. A site
that set an earlier hour to make up for UTC (17 for 19:00 summer) must set it
back to 19 after the upgrade, or it starts two hours early. DOCS and the release
note (drafted on the PR, for the version bump) say this.
`tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §I measures this on Supervisor 2026.08.0.
## 4. Two inverters
`Controller` hands the same zone to every pack's `Maintenance`, so every pack's
`wants_start()` reads the local hour. `arbitrate()` is unchanged: one pack
cycles at a time, and the one that lost the slot starts in the first start
slot after the other is done (a later day: a cycle outlasts its start hour). On the day the clocks go back, a pack freed during the second pass of
a repeated hour does not start there. `test_maint10.py` part 10.
## 5. What does not change
Only the start decision (`Maintenance.wants_start`) and the Home screen's shown
start time read the zone. `test_maint10.py` parts 9 and 10 run the real
Controller at N=1 and N=2 with start hour 11 UTC against 13 Europe/Brussels (the
same instant): every command, claim, reason and log line is identical. A
`Maintenance` built without a zone reads UTC, as before.
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
# MAINT-11 - start or stop the maintenance cycle per battery
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_maint11.py`. No option added.
**The fault.** At two or more batteries the page had one "start a battery cycle"
button, and `_maint_button()` chose the battery. An operator could not cycle a
chosen one (inverter B, new after storage, needed its first cycle).
## Rule
1. `maint_start` and `maint_abort` take an optional `unit`. With no unit they
run the old code unchanged. The Batteries screen sends the unit from a
per-battery Start cycle and Stop cycle button, at two or more batteries only.
2. **A start while any battery holds the maintenance slot is refused, not
queued.** The message names the battery that is cycling. One slot per site
stays the rule, and the scheduler is untouched.
3. Also refused, with a plain message: an unknown unit, a start on a battery
that is switched off (battery modes on), and a stop on a battery that is not
cycling. Nothing changes on a refusal.
4. A stop on the cycling battery is today's abort: the cycle ends, then every
inverter goes to 0 W.
## Why refuse and not queue
A queued start is a cycle that begins hours later, unseen, after the operator
has moved on. A refusal is immediate and says why. The scheduler already
queues by waiting time, so nothing is lost.
## What this does not cover
- Today's bare button never refused a battery that is refusing to give power
(SAFETY-73); its drain waits. The per-battery start does the same.
- A start on the battery that is already cycling is refused as "busy", where
the bare button restarts its drain. The bare button is unchanged.
- At one battery, a request that names the battery uses the new path, so a
second start is refused instead of restarting the drain. Nothing sends a name
at one battery, and the bare request is unchanged.
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
# MAINT-13 - a full pack that stops at 98-99 % is not a failed charge
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_maint13.py`. No option added; every number
is a constant in `app/maintenance.py`.
**What happened (live, B).** The drain ended 2026-10-04 18:24 UTC and the charge
began. It ran in pieces behind the price gate, reached 99 % at 2026-10-06 04:00,
fell back to 98 % at 04:15 while the loop still asked about -1370 W, and never
reached `maintenance_soc_target` 100. At 06:24 (2160 min = 36 h of wall clock
after the charge began) it aborted "charge stuck at 98 %". `last_completed` was
not set, so B was still due and would have drained again from 98 % to 11 % at the
next start hour, with no notice. Three faults: a pack may never report 100 %
while the BMS balances; a failed cycle came back the next day; and the 36 h
counted hours the price gate kept the pack waiting.
## 1. The charge is complete when
1. SoC >= target (as before), or
2. SoC >= target - 3 (`CHARGE_NEAR_FULL_PCT`) and the SoC has not beaten its
best for 60 min (`CHARGE_STALL_MIN`) of allowed charging, or
3. the charging time (`CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN`, 2160 min) runs out at SoC >= target - 3.
Then the usual HOLD follows and `last_completed` is set after it. Each of 2 and
3 logs one plain line ("the battery takes no more charge at 98 %, so the charge
counts as done", "charge time is up at 98 %, close enough to full ...").
**Why "SoC has not beaten its best", and not asked/delivered watts.** SoC is the
one signal the live record gives us (99 at 04:00, 98 at 04:15); the asked power
was -1370 W but no delivered figure was kept, so a watt threshold (X, Y) would be
invented. SoC also covers the case where power flows but nothing is stored.
**Why 3 points.** The card's band; at target 100 it is 97, and the live pack sat
at 98-99. **Why 60 min.** A judgement, not a measurement: we have no per-minute record of
the pack taking charge near full. The one live fact is 2 h 24 min (04:00 to
06:24) without a new high, so 60 min is well inside it and long enough that a
pack still creeping up (one new high within the hour) keeps resetting the wait.
On the live run the rule fires after 60 gate-open minutes past the 99 %: 05:00
UTC at the earliest, before 06:24 if the gate was open. If the pack turns out to
step up more slowly than that, raise the constant. Falling back by one point
does not reset the wait; only a new best does.
## 2. A failed cycle backs off 7 days
A drain stuck 12 h or a charge that times out below target - 3 is a failure
(`FAIL_BACKOFF_DAYS` = 7). The machine goes IDLE as before, `last_failed` is
stored, and `wants_start()` is false until 7 days later. The operator's forced
start ignores it; a cycle that completes after the failure ends it. An operator
abort, an interlock stop and a switched-off pack are not failures.
**Why 7 days, not the 28 day interval.** A judgement: a failure may have a
short cause (several dull days with no cheap hours, a pack switched off), and
waiting the full interval leaves the coulomb counter uncalibrated for a month
more. A week is long enough that a bad pack costs one drain a week, with one
notice a week, not one a day. **Cost.** A truly faulty pack still drains once a week until someone looks;
the notice says so each time.
**Notice, once.** The tick that fails carries `failed`; the Controller sends one
persistent notification "Battery cycle did not finish" (EN, with the Dutch
below it; per pack at N=2). It is not repeated, and Home Assistant restarts
wipe it, so the status page shows a "Maintenance paused" row with the date for
as long as the wait lasts. The operator may also see the log lines.
## 3. The timeout counts only allowed time
`Controller._charge_gate_open()` says whether the pack may charge now. It is
true when no price gate is set up (no price entities, no fixed tariff: nothing
holds the charge back, and `cheap` is always false there), in a cheap window, or
while the pack is really taking charge (battery power at or below -50 W, which is
sun outside cheap hours). It is false only when a gate exists, is shut, and the
pack is not charging; a pack asked for charge that delivers nothing then does not
count, which is the case the clock cannot judge. A site with a price provider
(TARIFF-11) and no fixed tariff counts as having no gate: the provider's plan
reaches only the Tariff row, never `cheap`, so no cheap window ever opens a grid
top-up there and only the sun charges the pack, as on a site with no tariff. Its
time counts in full. When a provider plan starts to drive `cheap`,
`_price_gated` must become true for it. Whether a fixed tariff is set up is
worked out once an hour, not on every tick. Only open ticks add to `open_min`; one tick
adds at most 5 min, so a gap (add-on down) adds nothing. The stall wait pauses
while the gate is closed. The accounting is written to the state file at most
every 5 min (`charge_track`); a restart loses at most that. A state file from
before this change, or with no record for the current charge, starts from the
wall-clock minutes so far, which is the old behaviour.
**Backstop.** A gated site whose gate never opens (no cheap hours, no sun) would never time
out, so a charge also ends after 7 days of wall clock (`CHARGE_WALL_TIMEOUT_MIN`):
complete at >= target - 3, a failure below.
**MAINT-12.** This is the smallest change that makes the timeout honest: one
boolean in, one counter. MAINT-12's block plan can replace the boolean (the
minutes it plans are the allowed ones) without touching the rest. Two things it
must keep: the back-off is in `wants_start()`, so any new entry point (such as
`price_forecast.begin_phase`, which is not wired today) must go through it or
check `backoff_until()`; and `gate_open` must stay "the pack is allowed to
charge now". The peak guard pausing the charge shaping is not seen as a closed
gate: that time still counts.
## 4. What does not change, and what this does not cover
- The drain, the HOLD, the held-battery rules and `arbitrate()` are unchanged. A
backed-off pack does not want a start, so at N=2 the other pack may take the
slot. One pack at a time at N=1 and N=2.
- `last_failed` is a maintenance key and moves with the others when a second
inverter is added (`MAINT_UNIT_KEYS`). The charge record is not moved; it
restarts from the wall-clock minutes.
- It does not find out why a pack stopped. A pack that stops at 96 % and never
gets near is still a failure.
- The Dutch text is only in the notification. The status row and the log lines
are English, like the rest of the status page.
- It does not change the target: a site that wants a different stop point sets
`maintenance_soc_target`.
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
# MAINT-14 - no SoC reading in a maintenance cycle
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_maint14.py`. No option added; the one new
number is a constant in `app/maintenance.py`.
**The fault.** `Maintenance.tick()` returned early when the SoC was `None`,
before any timeout check. (1) A charge on a pack whose SoC reading was lost
never ended: no timeout, no back-off, no notice, and the 7-day backstop of
MAINT-13 sat behind the same return. (2) A drain kept commanding `discharge_w`
with an unknown level, which breaks the TEL-08 rule that an unknown level never
allows discharge.
## Rules
1. **Charge, no SoC.** The charge timeout (`CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN`, gate-open
minutes) and the 7-day wall backstop still run. When one fires: if the last
SoC seen was >= target - 3 the charge counts as done (the MAINT-13 "close
enough to full" rule, HOLD follows); otherwise it fails: MAINT-13 back-off
and its one notification. If no SoC was ever seen, it fails.
2. **Drain, no SoC.** DRAIN holds at 0 W and owns the setpoint, exactly as HOLD
does. The 12 h drain timeout still runs and fails as before.
3. **SoC comes back.** Nothing is recorded; the drain continues at the drain
rate, the charge carries on, and the stall wait of MAINT-13 restarts from
what it was: it paused while the reading was missing, so a gap never counts
as "no more charge".
4. **HOLD** is unchanged (0 W).
5. **Log.** One line when a drain starts holding for this reason ("the battery
level is unknown, so the drain holds at 0 W until it is back"), and one line
when the level has been missing for `NOSOC_NOTE_MIN` = 15 min. Both are said
once per episode; the old line that repeated every tick is gone.
## Why
- **"Last seen", not "best seen".** A pack that was at 99 and then dropped to 50
before the reading went is not close to full. Only the last reading counts.
It is saved with the charge record (`charge_track.last`), and saved at once
when the reading first goes missing, so a restart mid-gap still knows it
(within the usual 5 min save interval otherwise).
- **Failure when nothing was seen.** With no level we cannot call a pack full.
The failure costs a 7-day wait and one notice; calling it done costs a
missed balance and a month-long false "complete". The first is the honest one.
- **Timeouts count the same minutes as with a reading.** Gate-open charging
minutes only; the wall backstop for a gate that never opens.
- **15 min.** A judgement. A poll glitch of a few minutes should not write a
line; a reading lost for a quarter of an hour is worth one. Raise it if the
action log shows noise.
- **0 W, not "stop the phase".** Aborting a drain on a short gap would throw
away the part already drained. Holding at 0 W loses nothing and the 12 h
timeout is the limit.
## Cost
- A drain that loses its reading stops draining, and the 12 h clock keeps
running. A gap of many hours can therefore fail a drain that was working. The
back-off then applies (7 days).
- A charge whose reading is lost early (last SoC below target - 3) fails at the
timeout, even if the pack was in fact filling. The same 7-day wait applies.
## What this does not cover
- **HOLD with no SoC**: closed by MAINT-15 (`MAINT-15-hold-ends-without-soc.md`).
- It does not tell the operator why the reading is missing (sensor, register,
link). It does not reuse the stale-input gate; it is the cycle's own rule.
- The charge itself is still driven by the control loop, which has its own
handling of a missing SoC (TEL-08 for the loop is a separate card).
- A restart loses at most 5 min of accounting, as in MAINT-13. The "unknown for
long" line may be said again after a restart: the episode start is in memory.
- Text added is two log lines, English only, like the other log lines.
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# MAINT-15 - the balancing hold ends on time with no SoC reading
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_maint15.py`. No option added.
**The fault.** `step()` sent every tick with no SoC to `_no_soc()`, and for
HOLD that returned 0 W without the time check. A hold that lost its reading
never ended: `last_completed` was never written and the next due date never
moved. Harmless for power (0 W), but the cycle was stuck. This was left open
in MAINT-14.
## Rule
1. **HOLD ends at `hold_min` whether or not there is a reading.** One helper,
`Maintenance._hold()`, holds the time check and is used by both paths. When
the time is up it writes `last_completed`, goes IDLE and logs the same
"cycle COMPLETE" line. Before the time is up it commands 0 W as before.
2. **Text.** The 15-min "no battery level" line in HOLD now reads "The hold
still ends at its normal time." Still once per episode.
## Why
HOLD is reached only after the charge counted as done. Every entry into HOLD
is in `step()` or `_no_soc()` and follows a charge that reached the target,
stalled near full (MAINT-13) or timed out near full (MAINT-13/14). Nothing else
sets the phase to HOLD (`_enter(HOLD` has four call sites, all after a done
charge). The hold is a wait for the BMS to balance; it never needed the level.
So a hold that ends with no reading is a completed cycle. The "cycle COMPLETE"
line is true without a reading: it names minutes of hold, not a level.
## Cost
- If the level was lost during the hold, the cycle is recorded as complete
without anyone seeing the final level. The charge had counted as done, so this
is the same trust MAINT-14 already gives a charge that ends with no reading.
## What this does not cover
- It does not check that the pack is still full at the end of the hold.
- It does not say why the reading was lost.
- With a reading, nothing changes. `test_maint15.py` section 7 compares the new
HOLD tick by tick with a frozen copy of the release/1.0 HOLD branch (phase,
setpoint, owner, events, `last_completed`) at four `hold_min` values. A wider
trace of the whole cycle (800 seeded runs against db9e231) was run outside the
repo; its script and log are kept under `scratch/MAINT-15/` of the dev
workspace, not in this repository.
- A state file written by an older version with `phase: hold` loads and ends on
time; the file is not changed in format.
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
# OPT-11 - battery modes, per battery
A battery's mode (on/off, Solar first, Leftover solar) is a soft unit limit at
`P_MODE` = 35 that always holds 0 W. A SET above 35 (a safety stop) overrides
it; a limit above 35 (the peak guard) makes it give way only as far as that
limit needs, and a battery its mode holds back then carries only what the
others cannot (`arbiter._unit_modes()`, `_site_mode()`). Design and owner answers: `goodwe-session/OPT-11-design.md` (2026-09-27);
P1 is its section 6 P1, and the pull request lists what was measured.
- Off by default (`battery_modes_enabled`); off, commands are byte-identical to
a5dddad (`test_modes.py` part 1).
- Off is a mode range, so the peak guard can still use an Off battery when the
others cannot cover the floor (design sections 2-3). Whether Off should be
absolute is an open owner question.
- Review (PR #149): releasing only when the peak floor bound S let a trade won
above the floor keep the modes and place less than the floor, and let a
capped grid charge release an Off battery. Both are graded in
`test_arbiter.py` part 11. The loop bound leaves a side that reaches the
rail to the rail, so SAFETY-03 still flags a loop winding into it.
- P2 (HA entities): a select and a switch per battery, only while modes are
on; commands go through `handle_action()`, the page's path. A retained
command is dropped, not applied: the store already holds the last choice,
and a replay after a restart could otherwise undo a newer one. The config
topics announced are kept in the store (`mqtt_mode_configs`), so turning
modes off removes exactly those, and an install that never turned them on
publishes what ed739d4 did (`test_mqtt.py` part 10). A removed topic stays
in that list and its empty config is re-sent on each start, so a start with
no broker cannot lose it; re-sending is harmless. The HA options are the
page's English names, pinned by a test, and are not renamed with the page:
automations send them.
- In P1 only Off closes a direction; Leftover solar differs by charging last.
- P3 (price runs, `priceruns.py`, `modetrade.py`): each battery's range is
narrowed by its role this tick (hold, give, charge, rest, sell); main.py
files the intersection with the switch, so it still holds 0 W. With modes on
the site trade is filed by the modes, sized from the loop bound (so no
battery a mode or a refusal holds is asked for watts, P1's unmet share) and
the guard's headroom; `arbitrage.decide()` runs only with modes off, which
stays byte-identical to 7a00f12 (`test_modes_p3.py` part 1).
- SAFETY-46 item 2 is decided as the owner answered (2026-09-25): a trade is
a run of consecutive firm slots. It applies with battery modes on; the
modes-off trade keeps its one-period shape, because that path must not move.
- Choices that were measured, not assumed (tools/opt11p3_replay.py):
- a sale needs the guard to have measured the quarter, not to be clear: a
5 kW discharge alone reads "engaged" on export and flipped the sale every
5 s;
- a grid charge makes the others rest, so it starts only at 500 W and, once
the guard or the headroom stops it, stays off for that 15-minute period
(without: 13 flips in 4 minutes under a 3.5 kW house);
- stored energy is valued at the last cheap run for 12 h, and a charge
needs its own run to clear the spread (without: a night charge was spent
on flat morning prices, then charging went on at them);
- a run edge reseeds the loop at the house's level (a 3 kW import spike
removed) and, since OPT-15, holds it there until the meter shows the step.
- Replay (tools/opt11p3_replay.py, 16 recorded days, EPEX hourly prices a
year earlier, modelled batteries), net EUR, lower is better: P2 19.33, P3
Solar first + Leftover solar 19.57, with a sale 19.60, the old one-period
trade 18.14. Review of #153 (same model, with a per-action split):
- the cheapest hours were at midday on 15 of 16 days, so Leftover solar (acting
as Cheap hours until P4) bought 12.2 kWh there that the sun would have
given: 7 kWh more exported, 12 kWh less solar stored. Holding for the
expensive hours saved 4 kWh of import, not enough. With no grid charge on
Leftover solar: 19.44;
- the old trade charged one hour, so the afternoon sun still fit;
- a sale earned the wholesale price (2.27 EUR for 11.4 kWh) and the house
then bought the same energy back (2.29 EUR): a wash before wear. It pays
only when the sale hour's wholesale price beats the later import price,
levies included (about 0.13 EUR/kWh above that hour's wholesale here);
- valuing the charge left at the end, wear and real Flemish levies make
selling worse and do not change the order.
- Owner decision 2026-09-29 (option A): selling is off until it can be judged
on the price the grid pays (`packmode.SELLING_ENABLED`, code kept), and
Leftover solar takes solar only until P4's forecast
(`packmode.GRID_CHARGE_MODES`); Cheap hours only still charges from the grid. Replayed
(16 days, as above): Solar first + Leftover solar 19.44 EUR net against
P2's 19.33; Solar first + Cheap hours only 19.57.
- Not done in P3: the forecast (P4), and a headroom too short for the run
moving the rest to the next cheap periods.
- OPT-15 (TEST-23 findings on 5a4cdc2, merged up to e3e4ba6,
`test_price_run_fixes.py`):
- F1, a charge stopped at a quarter edge and latched for the quarter. The
P1 averager opens a quarter only when a sample arrives, and the HA source
builds one 0.35 s after the reading, so the cycle on the boundary still
saw the old block: "no seconds left", headroom None, "no trade
(headroom)", latched for the new quarter. With modes on the guard now
projects the quarter `now` is in (`PeakTracker.project(roll=True)`,
crediting the held sample as the averager will), and only a measured
stop latches. Modes off still reads the old block (identity).
Since SAFETY-91, `next_quarter()` does the same for the guard at two
inverters (no stop there without the roll, same banked quarters); the
roll is what covers one inverter, where the old projection stops the
charge at every edge. With modes on at one inverter the roll also removes
the 1 s 0 W command at each quarter edge that SAFETY-81's sim showed, so
its modes-on digests are re-pinned (modes off equal to e3e4ba6). A
rolled projection is not graded by SAFETY-81's alarm (the old edge tick
read "no seconds left"), so a standing overload is still notified once
per quarter.
- F2, -1120 W export at a charge end against -257 W modelled. The replay
acted every 5 s on readings of that instant, and by then the lagged
battery had nearly arrived, so it never acted on a reading that still
showed the trade. The add-on cycles on each meter update (1 s on the rig)
on readings 1-2 s old: the two cycles after the reseed saw the trade's
+3300 W and slewed E up 555 W each. The loop now holds E until the meter
reaches the target (or `EDGE_HOLD_S`, 18 s; to 36 s while the battery
still moves). The replay gained `Lag` (dead time, reading age, the P1
debounce, 1 s cycles). Charge end, 800 W house: -10 to -51 W over eight
lag variants; without the hold -1370 W (meter 2 s). On e3e4ba6 the same
numbers hold. The hold gives the loop the target as its grid, so it
yields to SAFETY-95's drain tail, and any other claim that moves the
command ends it.
- F3, a charge refusal in a cheap run was never probed: the SAFETY-73 pin
stands only while the site asks that way, and nothing asked to charge.
Probing was chosen over changing the card: the probe is 200 W for 34 s
each 15 min under the same peak gates, and it wins back the run. In its
probe window the refusing battery is a charger, pinned at 200 W by its
own claim, and the others rest. A monthly drain (SAFETY-78) still comes
first, and with a day plan a probing Leftover solar battery goes only to
its planned level. At one inverter SAFETY-52 already ends a charge
refusal as soon as the house asks for power.
- Not fixed, same on e3e4ba6: with lagged readings a headroom-sized quarter
banks up to 1.4 W over the aim (48.6 W under the cap), and a battery
reading older than the meter can make a charge start look like a house
over the aim, a real guard stop.
- Review: an unmeasured stop that never latched let a headroom missing
every other cycle flip the charge 1799 times in 30 min, so the second one
in a quarter latches (at most 4 changes a quarter). A house that rises
1, 2 or 3 kW as the charge ends, from 30 s into the quarter to 15 s
before its end (two inverters, lagged readings): the hold adds at most
+33 W to that quarter against the loop without it, and the most any
quarter banks is 3431 W with the charge sized to the aim (3450 W; the cap
is 3500 W), 3456 W with a slow 8 s battery (the lag's own, the same on
e3e4ba6). The import during the hold is the rise, below the charge's
own, and a rise past that is the peak floor's, which ends the hold.
A maintenance drain, hold or charge that starts during the hold ends it
on that tick (replayed at edge + 3 s).
- OPT-20 (TEST-23 OPT-15 g7, `test_opt20.py`): a probe asks only PROBE_W.
The trade was sized at the probing battery's rating (2500 W), B's pin held
200 W of it, and the allocator put the other 2300 W on A, in its
maintenance charge phase (no mode range there, so nothing kept it out):
grid 3100 W for 34 s. Now the ask is PROBE_W for the probing battery plus
what the other chargers would have had without the probe (none: 200 W
alone), and it carries the pin only on the ticks the pin is filed (the
window's first and last cycle moved another battery's share by 200 W).
- Chosen: the probe sits on top of a headroom-sized charge, so beside a
normal charger its command is the same and the grid rises 200 W (about
7 W on the quarter) rather than that charger giving 200 W up. A probe
that the headroom or the bound cannot hold at 200 W is not filed.
- Unchanged, same on bf9019e: with a charge ask the other batteries cannot
give (one sign), so an idle-looking A that gives the house stops for the
window and the grid rises by what it gave. The trade line now says 200 W
for a probe alone; its words are UX-38's. The base P4 F4 path (a normal
trade on a battery in maintenance charge) is not touched.
## P4: the solar forecast and the day plan (2026-09-29)
- Input: a Home Assistant forecast sensor (`pv_forecast_entity`, kWh left
today; `pv_forecast_tomorrow_entity` optional), read by `app/solarfc.py`.
Supported shapes: Forecast.Solar (state only), Solcast (`detailedForecast`)
and Open-Meteo Solar Forecast (`wh_period`). The unit is read, not guessed;
older than 3 h is stale (one missed hourly poll must not flag it).
- Trust: `solar_trust_pct`, default 70 (owner answer 5).
- House use: nothing the add-on recorded fitted. `tariff.db` holds grid
import per quarter, which the batteries shape. So `dayplan.HouseProfile`
keeps grid + battery per local hour for 7 days in the store
(`house_profile`), median per hour. It is net of the solar the house used,
so the solar sum never takes it below the night median. Solar readings are
not used (TEL-11). The first plan needs one day of it.
- Verdict (`dayplan.plan()`): trust x sum max(0, forecast - house) x 0.95
until the expensive run the cheap run is for. Solar first takes it first.
- Leftover solar may then charge from the grid up to min(ceiling, floor +
the house's use in the expensive runs / 0.95), less its sun share: only
the shortfall.
- Cheap hours only ignores the plan and fills to the ceiling (design
section 1; review of #156, see the replay below).
- Solar first never charges from the grid (owner, 2026-09-29).
- The level is kept unless it moves by min(1 kWh, 10 %). With no plan
(no, stale or failed forecast, no house profile, no capacity) every mode
is P3 option A exactly: `test_modes_p4.py` part 1 pins 12 digests from
5a4cdc2 (modes on, with and without an unavailable forecast).
- The plan is made with the runs (every 15 min, or at once when the forecast
comes or goes). A lost forecast drops the levels at the next cycle.
- Not done: the design's scaling by measured solar from 10:00 (it needs the
solar readings TEL-11 keeps out), the HA `goodwe_<inv>_plan` sensor, and
FCST-01.
- Replay (`tools/opt11p4_replay.py`, 16 recorded days, Solar first + Leftover
solar, net EUR, lower is better; site solar rebuilt from the recording,
forecast errors from Elia's day-ahead Belgian solar forecast):
- year-earlier hourly prices: P2 19.33, P3 option A 19.44, old one-period
trade 18.14, P4 19.15 (perfect forecast 19.14, 1.5 x too high 19.16,
missing 19.44);
- the days' real 2026 quarter-hourly prices (held out): P2 32.26, option A
32.01, old trade 31.40, P4 29.19 (perfect 29.21, too high 29.28, missing
32.01).
- Solar first + Cheap hours only, skipping its sun share (the first
build): 19.57 (same as P3) and 29.72 against P3's 29.41. The shorter,
moved runs left B lower, so later midday top-ups rested A while the sun
shone. Cheap hours now ignores the plan, which is P3 exactly.
- A forecast of no sun at all gives 19.14 and 29.33. So nearly all of the
gain is Leftover solar buying the evening's shortfall in the cheap run;
the forecast itself was worth 0.14 EUR in 16 September days.
- Bias: the site's solar is rebuilt from the same net use the replay
plays, and "recorded" keeps its hourly shape and adds only the national
daily error. Both favour P4; "national" (no house leakage) gives 29.25.
No threshold was tuned to these days. The 2026-09-24 PV recording could not
be replayed: it is only in the live Home Assistant.
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
# OPT-17 - the solar forecast from several entities, summed
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_opt17.py`. Two options added.
A site whose forecast comes as several Home Assistant sensors (one per
inverter or roof side) had to build a template sensor to sum them. Now each
day can list them.
## Options
- `pv_forecast_entities` and `pv_forecast_tomorrow_entities`: lists of
sensors, default `[]`, the same shape as `pv_entities`.
- `pv_forecast_entity` and `pv_forecast_tomorrow_entity` are unchanged. An
install that uses them needs no edit.
- **Why new keys, not "string or list" in the old ones.** Measured on
Supervisor 2026.08.0 by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §J, as TEL-12's
§G did for `pv_entity`. Declared as a list, each forecast key refuses the
string an install already stores (`Invalid list for option
'pv_forecast_entity'`), and a `[]` default does not rescue it. The one
spelling that takes both, `match(.*)?`, also takes the integer 417 and
shows a plain text box, so a second sensor cannot be added in the UI.
- §J also shows: a 0.17.0 blob validates unchanged with the lists at `[]`;
the lists render as repeatable fields; a downgrade drops them and keeps
the single keys.
- `[]` in `options:` is load-bearing, as for `pv_entities`.
## Rules
1. **One key per day.** Setting the single key and the list for the same day
is refused at start, with one message: keep the list, clear the single one.
The list can hold that entity too. (TEL-12 lets `pv_entities` replace
`pv_entity` with a caution row. Here the brief asked for a refusal: a
doubled or dropped forecast changes what a battery buys, and no install
has both keys yet, so the refusal breaks nothing.)
2. **Each member in its own unit.** Every member is read as one forecast
sensor is today (`solarfc._day()`): Wh, kWh or MWh, never guessed. Then the
day's kWh are added up. A repeated id counts once.
3. **One member not usable means the day is not usable.** Missing,
unavailable, unknown, stale, not an energy unit, or a bad number: that
day's sum is not used, exactly as when the single sensor reads that way.
No today means no forecast (P3 option A). No tomorrow means today only.
4. **Hourly split.** If every member has a split, the splits are joined
(overlapping periods add up). If any member has none, the sum is spread
over the bell, as for a state-only sensor.
5. **Time.** The forecast is as old as its oldest member.
6. **One read.** All members of both days are read in one gather, inside the
gather that reads the inverters, so a slow sensor does not delay control.
7. **Shown and logged once.** With two or more members, each one not usable
is named on the status page by its place in the list (STYLE.md: no entity
ids on the page), as a caution row titled "Solar forecast" on Home. The
action log names the entity id, once when the set of failing members
changes.
8. **One member is the single key.** A one-member list reads, plans, shows
and logs exactly as the single key with that entity.
## Why
- A partial sum is a smaller number that looks real. Two of three inverters'
forecasts read as a duller day, and Leftover solar would then buy grid
energy the sun was going to give. TEL-12 took the same rule for the same
reason. No forecast is a known state with a tested fallback.
- The bell for a mixed list: joining one member's hours with another's total
has no honest shape, and the bell is the existing state-only rule.
## Cost
- One flaky member costs the whole day's forecast. A site with three
sensors loses the plan more often than one with a template sum that hides
gaps.
- Two more options (85).
## What this does not cover
- No weighting or calibration per member; FCST-01 is still the own forecast.
- Members on different integrations with different refresh times: each must
be fresh (3 h) on its own; there is no wait for a lagging one.
- The day plan itself, the trust and the house profile are unchanged.
- The Batteries screen still says only "no solar forecast now". The member
is named on the status page.
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
# PRICE-01 - the owner's price server as the price source, with fallbacks
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_price_service.py`. One option added,
`price_service_token` (password). Follows [[TARIFF-10]], whose section 4 this
card answers for one provider. Design: the owner's price service note of
2026-10-05. Owner go 2026-10-05 and 2026-10-14.
## What it is
`price_provider: price_service` reads `GET https://prices.kammenstraatha.duckdns.org/v1/dayahead/BE`
with `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. The answer is the energy-charts layout
plus `covers`, so the existing columnar parser reads it. The price is wholesale
energy only; the framework adds markup and taxes, as for `generic_dayahead`.
## Rules
1. **The host is a constant in the plugin**, declared as its only egress host,
HTTPS only. The operator's `price_feed_url` is not read by this provider.
*Cost:* every client talks to the one host, and moving the server is a new
add-on version. *What replaces the per-site setting:* the egress allow-list,
TLS, and a token per client that the server can revoke.
2. **The chain is server, then energy-charts, then the saved prices**
(`app/price_chain.py`). A step counts only if it has a price for *now*: a
server that answers with old prices is skipped like one that is down. A step
down and a step up are each one log line, written when the step changes. The
operator's `price_feed_url` is cleared for the energy-charts step, which is
asked for its own feed.
3. **The saved prices are `/data/price_history.json`**, the file `PriceHistory`
already keeps (the last three Brussels days of what was published). They are
the all-in prices as stored; a change of markup shows from the next fetch
that works. A read from the store is not filed again.
4. **No price for now** means no published price covers the present moment. Not
"none for the coming hours": before about 13:00 tomorrow's prices are not
published on any healthy day, and carried hours are already marked estimated.
It sets one status row (*Prices*), one Home plan line (English and Dutch),
and one notification (*No prices*, English and Dutch), taken down when a
price returns. A start-up before the first refresh finished is not a gap.
The notification is not re-asserted after a Home Assistant core restart
(SAFETY-34 does that for latched safety alarms); the status row stays.
*Open for the owner:* if "coming hours" should mean a look-ahead of N hours,
that is a change to `gate_for()` and `PriceWatch`, not to the chain.
5. **The maintenance charge gate** (owner's decision, 2026-10-14): the charge may
run when the *current 15-minute price is at or below today's average*, today
being the Brussels day, computed from the provider's prices. This is the rule
the Home Assistant pair gave (`price_service.yaml`), so a site that moves from
the pair to the provider does not change when the maintenance charge runs.
It is not `TariffPlan.cheap_now()` (strictly below the mean of the firm
hours of the whole plan). This replaces, for this provider only,
TARIFF-10 section 4: its three reasons are answered as follows. (1) Two
writers: the pair beside a provider stays refused; `static_profile` beside
`price_service` is accepted and no longer writes `cheap`. (2) An expired or
absent plan shuts the gate (the charge waits), as an unavailable HA sensor
did. (3) The basis is the one above, not `cheap_now()`.
6. **The token is a secret.** `password?` in the schema; hidden on the settings
page (`uilayout.HIDDEN`), which can keep `price_service` but not choose it;
never put in a message by the plugin; taken out of any reason text by
`price.scrub()`; the real transport reports only a status or an exception's
name. validate.py refuses `price_service` with no token, a token with a
space or line break, and one under 16 characters (so `scrub()`, which skips
values under 4 characters, always has something to take out). Round 2: the
token is in no page and no JSON answer of the web app. Every `password`
option of the schema is shown as `********` (set) or empty, in
`/config/model` (`options`, `running`, `ui`) and in a stale refusal; the
classic page draws it as a password field; a save or a validate that sends
`********` or nothing keeps the stored value, any other value replaces it.
A token can therefore be changed but not cleared from the page.
7. **A fixed tariff beside `price_service` is allowed and quietly noted.** It is
still the plan's last fallback (`resolve_tariff` -> `_degrade`); only the
cheap window and the gate ignore it, because they read the provider's
prices. Keeping it set is the recommended setup, and clearing it triggers the
"static_profile is empty" warning, so no notification (round 2's *Fixed
tariff not used* was false and fired on every sound start; round 3 removed
it). Instead one INFO line at start (English, as every log line) and an info
note beside the setting (EN and NL, "With the price service, the fixed
tariff is only used if no prices are available."), both
only with a non-blank `static_profile` (whitespace counts as blank). At
start the add-on dismisses the old notification id, in case a pre-release
build raised it.
8. **The no-price words show only with the maintenance charge on** (owner,
2026-10-14): the status row, the Home line and the notification say
'maintenance waits', so with `maintenance_enabled` off none is shown.
## Where the gate equals the Home Assistant pair, and where it does not
Equal: `test_price_service.py` section 8 feeds the same day both ways, to the
rules in `price_service.yaml` (price at the quarter, average of today's
quarters rounded to 0.00001 EUR/kWh, `<=`), over 6 days including both
clock-change days, at three instants in every period, and through a real
`Controller` for a whole day. Every answer is the same.
Not equal, by design or by arithmetic:
- The comparison is made on all-in prices. With a flat taxes figure and a
markup and taxes of at most five decimals the offset cancels and the answer
is the same. With `price_taxes_profile` (an hour-varying levy) the all-in
prices differ by hour, so the answer can differ from the wholesale comparison
the HA sensors made. A site on that profile should check before moving.
- A quarter within 0.00001 EUR/kWh of the average can differ if markup or taxes
have more than five decimals.
- The plan is retired when no refresh has succeeded for 90 minutes
(`TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`) and the gate shuts then. How long the HA pair kept an
answer after its REST sensor stopped updating was not measured here.
- The average is over the firm prices the provider holds for today. After a
restart in the middle of a day with only the saved part of today, it is the
average of that part.
## Not covered
- **No real answer of the server was seen.** No token was available. The
layout is the design's; `test_price_service.py` uses a mock and, for the
parser, the real energy-charts capture reshaped with the design's extra keys.
The first capture from the live server (rig test) should replace the mock.
- The 429 limit (about 60 calls an hour) is not approached: one fetch per
30 minutes, and at most two requests when the server fails.
- Battery modes read the plan as for `generic_dayahead` and were not changed.
- The `price_service` REST and template sensors in Home Assistant are not
touched; they stop being read when the pair is cleared.
@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
# SAFETY-10 — shadow mode, and why "default-on" is not `true`
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-10`.
⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47, and three of the claims below were false when this
was merged.** §5's "the strategies are unaffected" exemption, §4's peak-guard
row and §6's evidence table are corrected in place and each correction is
marked. The amendments are marked rather than rewritten silently, because what
this card believed is part of why the defect shipped. See
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-47-what-a-shadow-run-can-show.md`.
**Card:** SAFETY-10 — *"Shadow mode (default-on, log-only decisions)"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No deployment, no `ha addons update`, no
contact with 192.168.2.158 or 192.168.2.221. Everything below was measured in
the CI image and on TEST-23 stage 3's closed-loop rig.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **"Default-on" is delivered as `auto`, not as `true`, and the difference is
an install that is regulating a real battery today.** The Supervisor
composes an add-on's options as *its defaults, overlaid with the stored user
options*, so a new key with a new default reaches **every existing install**
on the next update. A boolean `shadow_mode: true` would silently stop the
reference site. §1.
2. **Shadow mode WRITES. It writes 0 W, on the ordinary heartbeat, through the
ordinary single writer.** "Commands nothing" implemented as "stops writing"
would leave the inverter latched on whatever was standing — it has no meter
timeout — and would put the ESP32 into a tripped stale-input watchdog for
the whole run. §2.
3. **The sign watchdogs are inert, and that was the decision that had to be got
right.** Fed the shadow decision they would trip within `sign_disagree_s`
and **latch a trip that survives into live operation and a restart**. §4.
4. **The loop leg's shadow decision is one slew step, not a trajectory, and
that is a real limitation of this feature.** §5.
5. ⚠️ **SAFETY-47: and neither is anything else that depends on the plant
answering back. A shadow run cannot surface a closed-loop defect at all**,
by the same construction that makes it safe — the battery is held at 0 W, so
every measured input describes a plant that did not respond. Of the three
defects §"WHAT DEFECT THIS PREVENTS" was written for, exactly one —
TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour — is visible from a shadow run. §5, §6.
---
## 1. The default
### The literal reading, and what it costs
`config.yaml`'s `options:` block **is** the default. There is exactly one of it,
and HA's Supervisor resolves an add-on's effective options as
```
{**config.yaml options, **the stored user options}
```
A key that has never been stored therefore takes the file's value — on a fresh
install and on an install that has been running for months, identically. There
is **no mechanism in the add-on options system** by which one key can default
differently for the two. So the card's title, taken at face value, is:
> the next `ha addons update` stops the battery at the reference site, and the
> only symptom is a battery that has stopped doing anything.
That is strictly worse than every defect shadow mode exists to catch. It is
refused.
### What was shipped instead
`shadow_mode` is a three-valued `list(auto|on|off)` defaulting to `"auto"`:
| value | resolves to |
|---|---|
| `off` | live |
| `on` | shadow, always |
| `auto` | shadow **while control is stopped**; live once it is started |
`auto` reads `Controller.auto` — the persisted start/stop state, which a fresh
install takes from `auto_start` and which the *Start / stop control* button
moves. No new persisted state, no migration, no guess:
* a **fresh** install ships `auto_start: false`, has no stored `auto` key, and
therefore comes up **in shadow mode**. It observes a day of decisions before
it is ever allowed to command anything. That is the card's intent, delivered
where it is safe;
* an install that is **controlling** is started, so `auto` resolves to live and
**not one watt changes**;
* an install that is **stopped** keeps its actuator at 0 W exactly as before —
the same number, from the same writer, on the same heartbeat. What changes is
what the status page and the action log **say**, and that the decision path
now runs and is recorded.
⚠️ **Under `auto`, pressing Start leaves shadow mode.** That is the point of
`auto`: the button means "control the battery". An operator who wants the
decisions recorded *while the loop runs* — the configuration this card exists
to make possible — sets `on` explicitly, and cannot reach it by accident.
⚠️ **An unrecognised value resolves to SHADOW, and is REFUSED at startup.**
`shadow.mode()` fails toward inaction; `validate.py` rule 11 refuses the value
by name so the reinterpretation is never silent. A typo is not a decision, and
an install silently left in shadow mode commands nothing indefinitely while its
status page calmly explains that this is intentional.
---
## 2. "Commands nothing" is a number, not a silence
The inverter holds its last command **forever** — `HANDOVER.md` §6 says so, and
`firmware/goodwe-master.yaml`'s header records what it cost when a controller
stopped refreshing: *"Illusmart went silent mid-command and the inverter held
+5000 W for 113 s"*. `firmware/goodwe-master.yaml` states the contract that follows — *"HA
must now REWRITE the setpoint every ~10 s even when the value has not
changed"* — because without a refresh, **"stale" and "steady" are the same
thing on the wire**.
So shadow mode holds the actuator at `shadow.WIRE_W` = **0.0 W**, refreshed on
the ordinary heartbeat. Two consequences were weighed and are recorded:
* **it is not silence.** A shadow mode that stopped writing would leave the
standing command up until the ESP32's 30 s watchdog noticed — and at a site
with no such board, forever;
* **it does not use an alarm as a mode.** Letting that watchdog trip for the
duration of a shadow run teaches the operator that `wd_tripped` is normal,
which is exactly the training that makes it useless when the add-on has
actually died.
### It is not a second writer
SAFETY-28's rule is one actuator, one writer. Shadow mode files **no claim**,
owns **no transport**, and calls nothing in `hass.py`. It is a **substitution**
inside `Controller._write_unit()` — the single choke point every write in this
add-on already reaches, including the heartbeat, the stop button, `shutdown()`
and `maint_abort()` — in exactly the form of the three substitutions above it
(non-finite → 0 W, unauthorised → 0 W, clamped → the rating).
It is the **last** of them. Below SAFETY-28's gate and below SAFETY-03's clamp,
so both still grade the number the decision path actually produced, and a
shadow run can report *"it would have hit the rating here"*.
---
## 3. What the run records
| surface | what it carries |
|---|---|
| status banner | `SHADOW MODE - the battery is NOT being controlled...`, **first in the cascade**, amber — red, with the latch named, if one is standing |
| status row `Shadow mode` | which rung decided, the watts it **would have commanded on this cycle**, where the inverter actually is, and `Resolution.explain()` — plus, when a measured billed quarter sized those watts, SAFETY-47's caveat saying so (`shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER`) |
| status row `Commanded` | `0 W` — the truth, which the row above reconciles with the `Why` row below it |
| action log | one line when shadow mode comes on; one line per **change of decision** (winner, rounded watts, or SAFETY-47's caveat state), carrying the arbiter's own sentence and the same caveat the row carries — `shadow.log_line()` is the one sentence both read |
| MQTT | `status: shadow`, its own value, below `failsafe` |
The action log is **edge**-logged, not level-logged: the log holds 40 rows, and
a line per cycle would flush the context of the run's own findings inside four
minutes at the 15 s cycle floor.
---
## 4. The failsafes, one by one
| failsafe | in shadow mode | why |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-02/30 sign watchdogs | **INERT** | They grade `Inverter.standing_w()` — what this controller has standing on the wire — and shadow mode holds that at 0 W, so they cannot arm. ⚠️ Fed the shadow decision instead they would disagree with a meter that never saw it and **latch a trip that survives into live operation and a restart**: shadow mode would manufacture the failsafe it exists to help debug. ⚠️ **Two rungs hold it there** — `last_write` (the wire gate) and `inv.target` (the re-seed) — which is MUTATION.md's masking shape, so the mutation that reproduces the hazard defeats both as a pair (M6). Driven singly, dropping the re-seed does not reproduce it at all — measured |
| SAFETY-03 clamp | **OBSERVES** | Runs on the decision, sets `clamp_last`, logs every engagement. Changes no command |
| SAFETY-28 write gate | **OBSERVES** | Same placement, same reason: the question is who chose the number |
| SAFETY-18 meter freeze | **OBSERVES**, unchanged | It takes no action live either; both halves of its conjunction are as true in shadow |
| SAFETY-07/24/25 peak guard | **OBSERVES, AND SEES ONLY THE HOUSE** | Level-triggered, unlatched, files its claim as usual, so the recorded decision is the real one *for this meter*. ⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47.** This row used to end "SAFETY-45's limit cycle is visible from a shadow run, which is the point". It is not: every term of `wanted = batt_w + excess` is measured, and in shadow mode the battery contributes nothing to either. Measured on the rig, same hour, same unsized code — **410 of 720 cycles engaged live, 0 of 720 in shadow** |
| SAFETY-31 circulation | **OBSERVES AND MAY LATCH** | Its evidence is *measured* power. Packs pushing against each other while all are told 0 W is a real fault |
| SAFETY-42 delivery | **OBSERVES AND MAY LATCH** | Same, against a share that is 0 W |
| operator stop | **SUPPRESSED AS A CLAIM, ENFORCED AT THE WIRE** | The one deliberate change. Its `P_SAFETY` 0 W claim out-ranks everything, so leaving it in makes the recorded decision `"stopped"` on every cycle and the run answers the wrong question. The actuator ends at the same number either way, and the wire substitution is **strictly stronger**: a claim can be out-ranked, and it cannot |
| inputs missing, non-finite, allocator refusal, arbiter contradiction | **UNCHANGED** | All resolve to 0 W, which is what the wire gets anyway |
⚠️ **A latch that is already up stays up.** Nothing here clears one. The shadow
banner **names** any standing latch and goes red for it, because a latch that is
up while the controller is inert is up the moment it stops being inert.
⚠️ **Maintenance is not in that table because shadow mode does not touch it.**
The state machines are ticked on every cycle whether control is started or not,
so a stopped install already runs them against a battery that does not move.
Shadow mode inherits that, unchanged and unimproved. Recorded here rather than
quietly fixed under another card's name.
---
## 5. The limitation, stated rather than discovered later
`Controller._shadow_settle()` re-seeds the carried command (`self.target` and
each `inv.target`) to `WIRE_W` at the **end** of every shadow cycle — after
every in-cycle guard has read the decision. Three machines read that value as a
statement about the **hardware**: the loop's `prev_w` and integrator,
`standing_w()`, and SAFETY-42's share comparison. Re-seeded, they track reality,
and **the exit is safe by construction** — the carried command already equals
the standing one, so the first live cycle slews from 0 W like any other.
⚠️ **The cost is real.** The loop's `prev_w` is therefore 0 W on every shadow
cycle, so the loop leg's recorded decision is **one slew step from the standing
command** and stays there. A shadow run answers *"what would this controller
command NOW, from where the plant really is"* — a true statement about the
present — and **not** *"what trajectory would it have followed"*. The trajectory
is a closed-loop property, it did not happen, and reporting it would be a
simulation of a plant that does not exist; three cycles in, such a number
describes nothing.
⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47 — THE PARAGRAPH THAT STOOD HERE WAS THE DEFECT.**
It read:
> The strategies are unaffected: arbitrage, the peak guard and maintenance all
> file `SET` claims at a fixed power from level-triggered inputs. That is why
> the three defects this card was written for — SAFETY-45's 28 onsets an hour,
> TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour, SAFETY-46's ceiling churn — are all visible
> from a shadow run, and the loop's ramp is not.
It was true until **SAFETY-45 merged, one commit before this card**. That
change makes the buy leg `min(asked, headroom)` with
```
headroom = (900 / remaining) x (ceiling - projected)
```
and `projected` reads the **open quarter's accumulator** — the meter — which is
a function of what the battery did earlier in that same quarter. The strategy
is closed-loop, and the loop's one-slew-step limitation above is not a special
case of anything: **it is the general case**, and the limitation is the whole
feature's, not the loop leg's.
**The correct statement, and it is now graded rather than asserted:**
> A shadow run cannot surface a **closed-loop** defect — one whose stimulus is
> the plant's response to the controller — because the battery is held at 0 W
> and there is no response to be the stimulus. **Which** hour a strategy picks
> and **why** are unaffected, because the clock and the price series are not
> functions of the battery. **How hard** it trades is not.
Of the three defects this card was written for:
| | visible from a shadow run? | measured |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-45's limit cycle | **no** | 28 charge onsets live, **1** in shadow; grid −455.5 … +3200.0 W live, **flat at the 1200 W house** in shadow; guard engaged 410/720 live, **0/720** in shadow |
| SAFETY-46's SoC churn | **no** | the SoC moves **0.000000000 pp** in a shadow run. No SoC limit can be *reached* in one |
| TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour | **yes**, and it is the one | which hour, at what price, clearing what spread: identical live and shadow on **720 of 720** charging cycles, at a binding cap |
Graded in `test_arbitrage.py` part **3d** — the same closed loop part 3c uses,
run once live and once in shadow — and the loop leg's own limitation stays
named in `test_watchdog.py` part 10 as `RECORDED LIMITATION`.
---
## 6. How "nothing reaches the inverter" is graded
**Not on a flag.** A check that asserted `Controller.shadow` would pass on a
build in which the flag is set and the substitution is deleted — which is
exactly mutation **M1**.
`test_clamp.py` part 8 drives the **shipped** `Controller.cycle()` and the
shipped heartbeat against a recording Home Assistant stub, and asserts on what
reached `set_number()`:
* **the precondition first** — the same stimulus with `shadow_mode: off` puts
30 non-zero writes on the wire, the largest 5000 W. MUTATION.md habit 4: a
check whose data cannot reach the failure it names is decoration;
* then `set(writes) == {0.0}`, **and** that there were 26 of them — a check
that only said "no non-zero write" would pass on the silent build too;
* entry and exit are measured on `inv.last_write` — what the inverter is
latched on, updated only on an **accepted** write — either side of the
boundary, against the same run that never entered shadow mode.
The closed-loop half is `/home/homelab/s10-mut/shadowloop.py` on TEST-23 stage
3's rig: the same hour, twice, against `plantsim.Plant` through the firmware's
own frame encoder.
⚠️ **SUPERSEDED BY SAFETY-47 — THE TABLE THAT STOOD HERE COULD NEVER HAVE GONE
RED, FOR TWO INDEPENDENT REASONS.** It read `arb_power_w` −2000 W *"identical"*,
`arb_reason` *"identical, verbatim"*, arbiter winner *"identical"*, and
concluded *"the decision happened, at the same instant, for the same reason, at
the same signed power — and the battery did not move."* The battery half is
true and is unchanged. The **decision** half was decoration:
1. **the fixture is `peak_cap_w: 15000` against a 350 W house**, so the
capacity guard never engages and SAFETY-45's sizing is in the run and inert.
The harness's own comment says so — *"at this scenario's `peak_cap_w: 15000`
it is not binding anyway"* — which is MUTATION.md habit 4 written down
beside the check it disables;
2. **every identity row reads the FIRST charging sample.** At `elapsed = 0`
the projection *is* the held level, so the two runs agree to the float there
**even at a cap that does bind**. Measured: closing reason (1) alone leaves
that comparison passing.
Both had to be closed. Re-taken below at **`peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 /
`max_w` 2000**, one hour at a 5 s cycle, **across the whole run** — harness
`/home/homelab/s47-mut/shadowloop47.py`, same rig, same three transcribed
lines.
| | live | shadow |
|---|---|---|
| grid | 1224.1 … 1506.0 W — **held up at the ceiling** | **1200.0 W flat = the house, exactly** |
| SoC | 50.000019 → **51.856789 %** | 50.000000 → **50.000000 %** |
| `ARBITRAGE_CHARGE` cycles | 720 / 720 | **720 / 720** |
| first charging cycle, `arb_power_w` | −300.0000 W | **identical — and this is why the old table passed** |
| `arb_power_w`, **whole run** | −307.799 … −299.930 W | **−2000.000 … −300.000 W** |
| …cycles where the two differ | — | **716 of 720** |
| `arb_reason`, whole run | the strategy's own sentence | **differs on 719 of 720** |
| measured charging headroom | 299.93 … 307.80 W | **300.0 … 54 000.0 W** |
| final recorded command | **−302.4 W** | **−2000.0 W — 6.61× the live figure** |
| price / spread / which hour | | **identical on 720 of 720** |
| arbiter winner | `arbitrage` | **identical** |
**What the re-taken table says.** The decision still *happens*, at the same
instant, on the same hour, at the same price, for the same *kind* of reason,
and the battery still does not move — those were the card's real claims and
they hold. What does **not** hold is that the decision is the *same decision*:
its **size** is a function of a meter the battery never moved, and at this cap
the recorded figure is 6.61× what a live controller commands. 54 000 W of
"headroom" under a 1500 W ceiling is `900/remaining` multiplying a gap the
battery never closed.
⚠️ **And the SoC row is the second half of it.** 0.000000000 pp of movement is
not a curiosity: it is the proof that **no SoC-limit behaviour is reachable
from a shadow run at all**, which §5 used to promise.
SAFETY-47 puts the caveat on both surfaces that carry the number and narrows
the three documents' claims; `test_arbitrage.py` part 3d is the CI-side grader
so this class cannot recur.
⚠️ **Three lines of each harness are a TRANSCRIPTION and are marked as one.**
`priceloop.Rig` has no `_write_unit()`, no clamp and no failsafe machine
(divergence 2 of its README), so the substitution's **placement** is
transcribed there. The shipped placement is graded by `test_clamp.py` part 8,
which drives the real `Controller`. ⚠️ **And the rig's transcribed cycle
predates SAFETY-45**: `arbitrage.decide()` gained a required
`charge_headroom_w` after `478ba93`, and the harness supplies it from the
**shipped** `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` reading the **shipped** peak
decision rather than from a constant, so SAFETY-45 stays in the run.
---
## 7. The mutation battery — 22 mutations, no survivors
Harness: `/home/homelab/s10-mut/run.py`, backups beside it. Each run restores
from backup, purges `__pycache__` **on the host**, and grades through the CI
image with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter cannot write a cache
into the tree under test (TEST-15). The full table is in the branch report;
one per new behaviour, including **M1** (the substitution deleted — a write
escapes), **M2** (it returns instead of substituting — the inverter is left
latched), **M3** (it moves above SAFETY-28 and SAFETY-03 — the observers go
blind), **M8** (`auto` resolves to shadow unconditionally — the literal
default-on that stops the live install), **M12** (the stop claim is filed in
shadow — every recorded decision reads `stopped`), **M21** (the substitution
and the re-seed together) and **M22** (the re-seed moved one line earlier —
SAFETY-18 grades a 0 W no decision produced and goes permanently blind).
⚠️ **Two findings from driving it, both of the kind MUTATION.md says to expect.**
* **M2 first came back a SURVIVOR and was not one.** The "stop writing
altogether" build left `inv.last_write` as `None`, the check did `float()` on
it, and the section died with a `TypeError` — grading none of the checks
after it and reporting **zero reds**, which reads exactly like a survivor.
That is FCST-06's shape. The fixture now hands `None` back and names it as
its own check; M2 is red on three.
* **M6 had to become a PAIR, and only the battery said so.** `standing_w()`
prefers `last_write` — the 0.0 W the wire gate accepted — and falls back to
`inv.target`, which the re-seed also holds at 0.0. Either rung alone keeps
the detector inert, so dropping the re-seed **singly** came back red on the
limitation check and on **nothing about the latch**: the hazard it names was
not reproduced. TEST-16's rule with a new name on it.
* **M7/M8/M9/M19 had to MOVE SUITES.** They defeat `shadow.engaged()`, and a
defeated default stops `test_clamp.py` part 3's wired run reaching the wire
at all — aborting the file with an `IndexError` before part 8 is graded. The
red count there was a lower bound naming the saturation freeze. The mode
table now lives in `test_validate.py`, which drives no Controller.
* **`shadow_would_w = float(self.target)` is an EQUIVALENT mutation and was
measured as one.** `_shadow_settle()` runs before the re-seed, so at that
line `self.target` **is** `resolution.target_w`. It is recorded as equivalent
rather than reported as a survivor, and the non-equivalent form of the same
defect — the record becoming the **wire** — is driven instead.
### The table
Each row: the mutation, the file, the byte delta, the suite it was graded in,
and how many **named** checks went red. `⚠️` marks a row whose run did not
reach the end of its file, so its count is a **lower bound** (MUTATION.md).
| # | mutation | file | Δ | suite | reds |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | **a write escapes** — the substitution deleted | `main.py` | −6 B | clamp | 5 |
| M2 | **silence instead of 0 W** — it returns rather than substituting | `main.py` | −15 B | clamp | 3 |
| M3 | **the observers go blind** — it moves above SAFETY-28 and SAFETY-03 | `main.py` | +58 B | clamp | 1 |
| M4 | the site re-seed dropped — the exit resumes from a fiction | `main.py` | −36 B | clamp | 3 |
| M5 | the per-unit re-seed dropped | `main.py` | −22 B | clamp | 1 |
| M6 | **PAIRED**: `standing_w()` reads the target **and** the re-seed dropped — the sign latch that survives into live operation | `inverter.py` + `main.py` | −170 B | watchdog | 3 |
| M7 | `auto` inverted — shadow while started, live while stopped | `shadow.py` | +2 B | validate | 4 |
| M8 | **default-on for everyone** — `auto` always shadow; the literal reading that stops the live install | `shadow.py` | −15 B | validate | 2 |
| M9 | an unreadable value resolves to LIVE instead of shadow | `shadow.py` | +1 B | validate | 1 |
| M10 | `validate.py` stops refusing an unknown value | `shadow.py` | −9 B | validate | 9 |
| M11 | the loop leg gated on `auto` alone again — the decision path stops running | `main.py` | −17 B | clamp | 1 |
| M12 | the stop claim filed in shadow — every decision reads `stopped` | `main.py` | −20 B | clamp | 1 |
| M13 | the banner goes green while nothing is commanded | `shadow.py` | −2 B | clamp | 1 |
| M14 | the banner loses the standing latch | `shadow.py` | −2 B | clamp | 1 |
| M15 | the row renders the standing command instead of the decision | `shadow.py` | −8 B | clamp | 1 |
| M16 ⚠️ | the row disappears when live | `main.py` | +43 B | clamp | 1 |
| M17 | the record becomes the wire | `main.py` | −6 B | clamp | 7 |
| M18 | level-logged — the 40-row action log floods | `main.py` | −23 B | clamp | 1 |
| M19 | the two rungs render identically (masking) | `shadow.py` | +22 B | validate | 1 |
| M20 | the shipped default moves to `off` in `config.yaml` alone | `config.yaml` | −1 B | defaults_pin | 1 |
| M21 | **PAIRED**: the substitution **and** the re-seed deleted together | `main.py` | −103 B | clamp | 10 |
| M22 | the re-seed moved one line earlier — SAFETY-18 grades a 0 W no decision produced and goes permanently blind | `main.py` | +40 B | clamp | 1 |
**Survivors: none.** ⚠️ **M17's `+0 B`-adjacent sibling** —
`shadow_would_w = float(self.target)` — is recorded in §7 as **equivalent**
rather than counted here.
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
# SAFETY-103 - no swing on old battery readings after a drain ends
**Status: implemented 2026-10-08, for review.** Tests: `test_safety103.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-95 rig test, check 5, F1). While a battery settles
from its ended drain, SAFETY-95 steers on the house's point: grid + every
battery's reading - aim. The meter is 1 s old; a battery register can be
10 s old (the SAFETY-90 register model). At E+13 A's reading said 1238 W
(6.8 s old) while A was at 616 W, so the house looked ~620 W bigger: B went
860 -> 1650 -> 870 W. B's own old reading does the same the other way.
**The rule** (`main.py`, `_track_reads()`, `_drain_grid_w()`, N>=2, only
while a drain's tail settles):
1. Each cycle, per battery: the range its power can be in. That is its last
changed reading, widened by every command on its wire since (a lagging
battery moves from one toward the others, never beyond). A new reading
starts the range again.
2. A reading that changed this cycle is taken as it reads. So is the side a
battery refuses (SAFETY-73): it is not heading that way.
3. The house point is held (first cycle: the loop's start from SAFETY-95).
It moves only as far as the meter proves: to the nearest value of grid +
the batteries' ranges - aim.
So the loop no longer moves on a reading that has not caught up. A real
house step still moves it, as soon as the meter shows more than the
batteries can explain.
**Why not the tester's rule** ("a battery whose reading is older than its
last command counts at its command"). B's command changes almost every
cycle, so B is almost always at its command. That is the plain meter, which
chases A's tail: B swings 1420 W. A lag model needs the plant's time
constant, which is not known for a client's inverter. Measured on the plant
below (N=2, 1200 W, A Off; swing = a move of the others later undone):
| rule | 10 s lag | 5 s lag | 20 s lag | surplus, 5 s lag |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| release/1.0 (readings) | 760 | 840 | 150 | 800 |
| tester's: at the command | 1420 | 1020 | 1600 | 800 |
| lag model, tau 10 s | 70 | 140 | 80 | 580 |
| lag model, tau 5 s, plant 20 s | | | 600 | |
| hold all window | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **this rule** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **130** |
Holding all window ignores a house step: a 2 kW kettle at E+5 s imported
14.4 Wh over the next 30 s (release 11.5, this rule 11.3); 2 kW more sun
exported 16.9 Wh (release 8.5, this rule 8.9).
**Before -> after** (`test_safety103.py`, `tools/safety103_plant.py`: 800
W/s ramp, 10 s lag, meter 1 s, registers 10 s at the rig's phases, B idles
at -100 W; summed swing of the others in the 23 s after the end):
| case | release/1.0 | after |
|---|---|---|
| rig check 5: N=2, 1200 W, A Off | B 1140 -> 850 -> 1630 -> 870, swing 760 W | B holds 1140 W |
| N=3, 1200 W / 4000 W, A Off | 680 / 630 W | 0 / 0 W |
| solar surplus, N=2 / N=3 | 890 / 740 W | 130 / 130 W |
| lag 5 or 20 s, registers 5 or 10 s, N=2 and N=3 | | at most 10 W |
| registers as fresh as the meter (1 s) | | rows byte-identical |
| refusal end | | rows byte-identical |
| N=1, every end | | rows byte-identical (also against the release/1.0 tree) |
**Cost.** In the window, a house change smaller than what the batteries
could still be doing is not followed until a reading catches up (at most a
register period) or the window ends (23 s). Under a surplus the others
still swing up to 130 W, a third of a slew step.
**Not covered.**
- Outside the drain tail the loop steers on the meter; readings only reach
the saturation freeze (SAFETY-96), unchanged.
- A lost link or a refusal ends the tail at once (A is out of the split, or
reads ~0 W). The swing after them is the loop's own on a lagging plant,
the same with 1 s registers and on release/1.0: under a surplus up to
1.5 kW at N=2 and 3.9 kW summed at N=3; after a lost link about 1 kW
even without one. Not this card.
- A battery that overshoots its command, or a reading offset beyond the
range, can put the true power outside the range; the meter then moves the
point, as before.
- The end cycle's start (SAFETY-95 step 2) still uses the readings; the
batteries were steady during the drain, so they are current there.
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
# SAFETY-107 - a refusal held under another writer is learned once
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_safety107.py`. One inverter only; nothing
changes at N>1 (SAFETY-73's unit refusal has no "another writer" end).
**The defect** (MAINT-13 F5, MAINT-14 "seen again"). A full pack under a
maintenance charge in a cheap window takes no charge. At N=1 the action log then
showed "BATTERY REFUSES asked -2500 W ..." and "BATTERY REFUSES ENDED: another
writer" every cycle: 548 + 548 lines in 15 min on the MAINT-13 rig head,
652 + 651 in 12 min on its base, 33 + 32 in 60 s in MAINT-14's c2b. The 40-line
log flooded and the hint under the buttons changed every second, so the
MAINT-13 notice was gone at once.
**Cause** (`main.py`, the SAFETY-52 block before `compute()`). The end tested
`self.target != self.loop_w`: the wire differs from the loop's ask. A held
refusal makes the loop ask 0 W, so any claim that binds (the maintenance
charge's `hi`, the peak guard's `lo`, a trade's SET) differs from it on every
cycle. The refusal was ended against the same writer it had been learned
against. `sat_count` is not reset by that end, so `compute()` learned the same
refusal again in the same cycle. Nothing about the battery or the wire had
changed; only the log and the hint did.
**Other writers.** The same flap comes from any writer that holds the wire
while the loop is refused, as long as the evidence lasts: a trade (a SET at
P_ARBITRAGE) into a full pack, and the peak guard over an empty pack: 335
refusal lines in 15 min each at a 5 s meter (`test_safety107.py` part 2, run on
release/1.0).
A maintenance drain or hold does not flap: its SET resets `sat_count` each cycle.
**The rule** (`_refusal_update()`, `rejudged`). When another writer held the
wire, the held refusal is judged afresh: `compute()` gets `refused=0` and no
probe, exactly as before the change. Then:
1. it finds the same refusal against that writer's ask: the same episode
continues, with no line and no hint. The probe clock restarts, as it did on
the old end and start: a probe is the loop's ask, and it is not on the wire
while another writer is;
2. it does not: the refusal ends, logged "another writer", or "the battery
gives power" when the reading shows it (it was "another writer" before);
3. it finds the other direction: end, then a new start, as before. In
practice 2 comes first: SAFETY-94's evidence restarts when the ask changes
sign, so a writer that turns round ends the refusal at once and the other
way is learned ~12 cycles later (`test_safety107.py` part 3e).
**Why this rule.** The end now means what SAFETY-52 meant by it: the refusal no
longer describes what is on the wire, judged by the same test that learns it.
`compute()` sees the same inputs as before and the state after each cycle is
the same (`batt_refused`, `batt_refused_at`), so every command is unchanged.
Keeping the held refusal into `compute()` instead (mutation M5) would also
stop the lines, but it holds the loop at 0 W where the old law let it ask past
a writer's limit, which changes commands; it also removes SAFETY-52's
owner-decided "another writer" exit.
**Evidence.**
- Differential trace (`goodwe/scratch/SAFETY-107/probe/trace.py`, not in this
repo; the real Controller in the CI image, release/1.0 bf3ac79 against this
tree): 300 seeds, N=1 (153) and
N=2 (147), 1/2/5 s meter, full/empty/dead/healthy battery windows, a stepping
house, maintenance charge with the cheap window opening and closing, P1 and
the peak guard, trade windows, stop/start; 427 680 cycles, 294 seeds with a
refusal held. Every command, site target, integrator, `sat_count`, refusal
state and reason is identical. Refusal lines: 100 748 before, 2 188 after.
- The card's case: 1 line in 15 min at N=1 and N=2, 1/2/5 s meter, house
importing or exporting (release/1.0: 335-1 753 at N=1; N=2 was already 1).
**Mutations** (`tools/mutation_run.sh` on purged copies; reds in
test_safety107 / test_refusal / test_refusal_units; trace = seeds of 300 whose
commands differ from release/1.0):
| | mutation | reds | trace |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `now == rejudged` -> `False` (every such cycle ends: the old flap) | 26 / 0 / 0 | 0 |
| M2 | `rejudged` always 0 (another writer never ends it) | 5 / 1 / 2 | 29 |
| M3 | the probe clock is not restarted on a continued episode | 1 / 0 / 0 | 2 |
| M4 | a probe may open while rejudged | 0 / 0 / 0 | 0 |
| M5 | the held refusal goes into `compute()` while rejudged | 2 / 1 / 2 | 27 |
| M6 | an end while rejudged always says "another writer" | 1 / 0 / 0 | 0 |
M4 is equivalent: a probe matters only if `compute()` engages in that call,
which needs `SETTLE_CYCLES` saturated against the writer, and each of those
cycles restarted the clock. The line stays because it states the rule.
**Cost.** None in power. A takeover by a different writer while the battery
still refuses is logged as an end and, ~12 cycles later, a new start against
that writer (3 lines for the episode, `test_safety107.py` part 3a).
**Not covered.**
- A perfectly flat reading under a writer. The stale-reading gate trips, stops
the site and seeds the refusal (SAFETY-52 decision 3). After the stop the
writer's ask returns fresh, `compute()` has no saturation history against it,
so the refusal ends at the first cycle and the next trip seeds it again: 2
lines per gate cycle (29 in 15 min, house exporting), the same as release/1.0.
The gate cycle itself (0 W, then the writer's ask) is the cause; stopping it
changes commands. None of the rig runs showed it: real readings move.
- At N=1 a refusal shapes only the loop. A writer above it still asks the
battery; at N>1 SAFETY-73's P_SAFETY claim binds every writer.
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
# SAFETY-112 - control waits for Home Assistant to finish starting
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_safety112.py`, `test_messages.py`.
Control is unchanged. The add-on now says plainly that it is waiting.
## Cause
The Supervisor's proxy refuses every add-on request with 502 until Core's
state is `RUNNING`. The add-on reads every battery reading and writes every
power request through that proxy, so it cannot control until then. Readings
that are already live inside Home Assistant do not help.
Source, Supervisor 2026.08.0 (the image the live site ran at CFG-04):
- `supervisor/api/proxy.py`, `APIProxy.api()` (REST, used for reads and
`number.set_value`) and `APIProxy.websocket()` both start with
`if not await self.sys_homeassistant.api.check_api_state(): raise HTTPBadGateway`.
- `supervisor/homeassistant/api.py`, `check_api_state()` returns
`state.core_state == "RUNNING" or state.offline_db_migration`. The state
comes from Core's `/api/core/state`.
- Upstream `main` has the same gate in both handlers (read 2026-10-13).
- A Core restart restarts only the Core container
(`homeassistant/core.py`, `restart()`). The add-on keeps running.
The add-on itself has no wait. Nothing in `app/` reads Core's state or waits
for an event. The loop reads its inputs every second, a 502 gives `None`,
and missing inputs give 0 W. P1 backoff is not involved: the live site reads
the meter straight from the HomeWizard (`homewizard_local`), not through Home
Assistant.
## Measured
Repro stack `safety112-*`, all removed afterwards:
- Home Assistant 2026.9.4, as live.
- A test integration whose `async_setup` sleeps, so Core stays `NOT_RUNNING`.
- A fake meter and two fake inverters that update every 2 s from load.
- The Supervisor's own `APIProxy` and `HomeAssistantAPI` from the 2026.08.0
image. Only the add-on token lookup, Core's access token and the container
check are stubbed.
- The add-on on `meter_source: homewizard_local` against a fake HomeWizard.
Times are seconds after `docker restart` of Home Assistant:
| run | Core `NOT_RUNNING` | entities live in HA | Core `RUNNING` | proxy 502 | first write | wait from live readings |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| base 3050fa5, N=2 | 13.1 | 17.1 | 253.1 | 0.9-252.7 (1 132 requests) | 254.7 | 237.6 |
| base 3050fa5, N=1 | 13.1 | 18.1 | 256.1 | 1.5-255.1 (573 requests) | 257.2 | 239.1 |
| this change, N=2 | 12.2 | 17.2 | 313.2 | 1.4-312.5 (1 406 requests) | 317.6 | 300.4 |
| this change, N=1 | 12.2 | 17.2 | 255.2 | 1.2-254.1 (571 requests) | 257.1 | 240.0 |
The first write comes 1.0-4.4 s after `RUNNING`, so the whole wait is the
proxy's. With a 400 s sleep Core moved on at 300.88 s on its own (bootstrap's
stage timeout), so one slow integration holds a start stage for about 5
minutes. The whole start can take longer: the live one took 414 s.
Before this change the page said "Not ready — Battery level: no usable
reading", which sends the reader to Developer Tools for an entity that is
fine.
## Rule
1. No way around the Supervisor. The add-on still talks to Home Assistant
only through the proxy.
2. While the proxy does not answer on the API (`hass.OUTAGE.waiting()`), the
first status row is red: "Home Assistant is not answering, perhaps it is
still starting. Control resumes by itself when it answers." The banner
reads "Not ready — Waiting for Home Assistant to finish starting". The Home
pill reads "Waiting for Home Assistant", in English and Dutch.
3. A safety stop, a stalled control loop or shadow mode keeps its own banner
and state over the wait, because none of them clears by itself.
4. The log has one WARNING when Home Assistant stops answering, an INFO line
every 5 minutes while it is down, and an INFO line with the length of the
wait when it answers again.
5. Only the API counts. The meter websocket alone does not, because the meter
has its own row.
## Why it is safe
The change is text only. `cycle()`, the writes, the heartbeat, the stand-down
on shutdown and every watchdog are untouched. `test_safety112.py` part 3 shows
the same targets and writes with the flag on and off, for N=1 and N=2.
## Open, for the owner
The add-on cannot control while Home Assistant starts. These ways around it
were not taken:
- **Talk to Core directly with a long-lived token** (`http://homeassistant:8123`).
Core's own API answers while `NOT_RUNNING`. In the repro `/api/core/state`
answered from 12-13 s, and a direct `number.set_value` 10 s into
`NOT_RUNNING` returned 200 and set the value. The cost is a secret stored
at every client site, which `hass.py` exists to avoid.
- **Talk to the control board directly** (ESPHome native API), so control
does not need Home Assistant at all. This is a large change.
- **Remove the slow start at the site.** On 2026-10-12 the Solis
integration's discovery held the start. Fixing or disabling it shortens the
wait there, but not on a client site with another slow integration.
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
# SAFETY-118 - the peak forecast is read in its own unit
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_safety118.py`.
`peak_forecast_entity` was read as a bare number, and anything under 50 was
multiplied by 1000 ("accept kW or W"). A W sensor reading 17 to 45 W, which a
real site did 430 times in one morning, would be taken as 17 to 45 kW. The
validator also called a kW sensor wrong, which was false for this entity.
Decision: the size rule is gone. The entity is read through `pv.watts()`, the
same unit table and reader as the solar entities, so W, kW, MW and the rest
convert by the sensor's own `unit_of_measurement`. No unit, or a unit that is
not power (kWh), means the forecast is not used, exactly as if the option were
empty: the loop cap and every non-forecast peak step still apply. One WARNING
per cause, and a status row and a settings note say the same.
No size rule can be right in both units: 30 W and 30 kW are both ordinary.
The read is still one `GET /api/states/<id>` per cycle, as `hass.number()` made.
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ which does not run the startup gate) the absence costs a shave and never a pack.
## 3. DECISION 2 — the site verdict is the MAXIMUM of the packs' own floors
*At N>=2 one pack at its floor no longer stops the others: [[SAFETY-87]].*
`Controller.pack_floor_soc` — the **minimum** measured SoC, the emptiest pack —
**is unchanged**, exactly as the card instructed. What changed is the floor it is
graded against. `peakguard.binding_soc_floor()` reduces the roster's per-pack
@@ -187,6 +187,23 @@ over-absorption. So the rig does not choose the number — **the constraint
chooses it, and the rig says what the constraint does and does not buy.** That
is the same relationship the 2026-08-22 table had to its own three columns.
⚠️ **FORWARD REFERENCE, ADDED BY SAFETY-48 — THIS TABLE AND THIS SENTENCE ARE
TRUE OF release/1.0's LAW AND FALSE OF THE ONE THAT REPLACED IT.** Nothing above
is retracted: re-run on release/1.0 today the same rig prints the same column
(958 / 1107 / 1133 / 1058 / 987 / 1029 / 1150 / 1143 / 1081 W), flat,
non-monotone, 800 better than 556. Under SAFETY-48's lead cap the **same script
on the same plant** prints 777 / 734 / 663 / 563 / 553 / 507 / 435 / 358 / 321 W
— falling monotonically, so a slower slew is now *better* and the sentence above
inverts. The mechanism SAFETY-39 identified is exactly why: `slew_w` bounds the
OUTPUT while the integrator goes on accumulating `gain · error`, so slowing the
slew used to buy nothing; bound the integrator's lead and it starts to.
`tools/slew_sim.py --slew` now names which of the two laws it is running under
before it narrates the column, and
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-48-bounding-the-integrator-lead.md` §6 carries both tables and
the independent confirmation from `test_control.py`'s own plant model. ⚠️ **This
does NOT re-open the choice of 556**: the constraint picks the number, the rig
does not, and that is unchanged in both laws.
⚠️ **A single step is not evidence here.** The deadband, the 10 W quantisation
and the phase of the step against the tick move the result by hundreds of watts,
non-monotonically. The first cut of this derivation was a single step and ranked
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
# SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is not a bug
**Decision.** `i_clamped` (the integrator reaching `integrator_max_w`, i.e.
anti-windup) keeps alarming through the same `ClampWatchdog`: it is counted,
notified on the same cadence, and escalates on a sustained run
(SAFETY-41). It gets its own text, a `WARNING` and an amber status row. Only
`clamped` (a command over `max_w`) and write-path clamps keep the BUG SIGNAL,
the `ERROR` and the red row.
**Why it still notifies.** On a default install `clamped` is unreachable
(`control.py`, at the integrator bound), so the integrator bound is the only
loop-side signal of a runaway such as the 14 768 W one. Silencing it would
remove that. The card says the same: "the fix is to say the true thing, not to
say less."
**Why a bug has its own budget.** A genuine over-rating must not wait up to
`REASSERT_S` behind anti-windup notices. `ClampWatchdog` tracks a separate
`last_bug_alarm`, and a bug's text is never overwritten by later anti-windup
text within an episode. Across episodes the WARNING uses its own
notification id (`goodwe_integrator_bound`), so it cannot replace a BUG SIGNAL
notice still on screen (review of #130). With only bug engagements, the cadence is the same as
before (`test_clamp.py` part 9).
**Numbers.** They come from the `Decision` of the clamping tick (`i_bound_w`,
`requested_w`, `clamped_w`, `target_w`), not from `i_w` or `self.target`.
**Open for the owner.** Whether scattered one-cycle anti-windup episodes should
notify at all, or only log and count. They notify now, as before.
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
# SAFETY-45 — the trade is SIZED by the capacity guard, not switched by it
**Status: closed.** `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` publishes the watts the open
billed quarter can still afford; `arbitrage.decide()` takes it as a required
keyword-only argument and sizes the BUY leg to it; `main.py` passes the measured
guard's own number at its one call site. `peakguard.decide()` is **not changed** —
byte-identical to `release/1.0` at `478ba93`, `sha256(decide) = 200090d0835a3a55`,
7252 B on both trees.
⚠️ **THE HOUSE LOAD IN EVERY FIGURE BELOW IS SYNTHETIC.** TEST-23 stage 3's
`priceloop.py` drives a flat modelled house against a modelled pack
(`plantsim.Plant`, 800 W/s ramp into a 10 s lag, 15 360 Wh). The PRICES are real,
the decision code is the shipped code, the billed-quarter accumulator is
`app/p1.py`'s own — the load is not. Nothing here is a measurement of the live
site at 192.168.2.158, which this work did not touch.
## 0. The defect, measured
TEST-23 stage 3 found a sustained limit cycle with arbitrage armed and a charge
decision active. Re-measured here on the same rig against the same checkout,
metrics recomputed rather than copied — a **charge onset** is a cycle at which
`arbitrage.decide()` transitions into `ARBITRAGE_CHARGE`, which is the edge the
rig already logs:
| `peak_cap_w` | house | onsets/h | mean period | grid swing | billed quarters (W) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 | 1200 W | **28** | 131.1 s | **−455.5 … +3200.0 W** | 1490.1 / 1496.5 / **1508.8** |
| 3500 *(shipped)* | 1800 W | 8 | 509.3 s | +127.5 … +3800.0 W | **3511.3 / 3536.0 / 3559.1** |
| 3500 *(shipped)* | 3000 W | 32 | 114.8 s | +1202.0 … +5000.0 W | **3518.9 / 3542.2 / 3556.7** |
| 5000 | 1200 W | 1 | — | +1240.6 … +3200.0 W | 3169.5 / 3200.0 / 3200.0 |
The last row is the **negative control**: `load + max_w = 3200 W` never reaches
the cap, so there is no cycle to remove. The bite rule is `load + max_w >
peak_cap_w`, which at the shipped `peak_cap_w: 3500` / `max_w: 2000` is any house
drawing over 1500 W in the cheapest quarter.
§10.1's ordering did win on the money — the guard kept the quarters within tens
of watts of the cap — but **every billed quarter in the three biting rows
finished OVER it**, which is the thing §9.1 bills. §10.2: *"an EMS that
oscillates is worse than no EMS, both for hardware wear and — per §9.1 — for the
peak it is trying to avoid."*
## 1. ⚠️ The mechanism is NOT mainly the quarter boundary, and the card says it is
The card, and `.cache/s45.md` before it, describe the loop as *"at each quarter
boundary the projection resets to 0, the guard disengages, and arbitrage re-arms
at full power."* **That is not what the 28 onsets are.** Their timestamps, off
the run above:
1, 231, 351, 471, 581, 696, 806, 896, 1136, 1256, 1371, 1486, 1596,
1711, 1811, 2061, 2176, 2296, 2411, 2521, 2626, 2716, 2971, 3091,
3206, 3321, 3431, 3541 (s, quarter boundaries at 900/1800/2700)
**23 of the 27 gaps are 90–120 s, mean 111.5 s, entirely inside one quarter.**
The four long gaps — 230, 240, 250, 255 s — are precisely the four that SPAN a
boundary, so the boundary **lengthens** the interval rather than causing an
onset. Only three onsets land within 15 s of a boundary and one of those is
`t = 1`, the start of the run.
The real cycle, read off the recorded fields at t = 1000…1180 s:
1. the trade charges at `−2000 W`; the meter sits at 3200 W against a 1500 W
ceiling; `wanted = batt_w + excess` is **negative** (−132 → −8 W), so
`decide()` files **nothing** and arbitrage is not constrained at all;
2. `wanted` drifts up as the quarter's own history worsens and the `900 /
remaining` gain grows, and crosses zero at t = 1055 with **`floor_w = 5.3 W`**;
3. that 5 W floor flips `arbitrage.guard_state()` to `True`, which refuses the
**whole trade** — so the setpoint goes from −2000 W to +5 W and the
grid-following loop, which targets grid = 0 and not grid = ceiling, takes the
actuator and discharges to **+1870 W**, exporting 420 W;
4. the projection collapses, `wanted` goes negative, the guard releases, and
arbitrage re-arms at **`max_w`**. 115 s later, again.
So the defect is **a binary interlock keyed on a continuous quantity**, and the
quarter boundary is one of the ways it is crossed rather than the cause. The
card's other claim — *"projection 3092 W against a 1509 W ceiling, `engaged=False`,
for 170 consecutive seconds"* — reproduces, but it is the **first** such window
(`first_engaged_t_s = 151.0`); the steady-state silent window is ~40–65 s.
None of this changes what the fix has to do. It is recorded because a card that
says "the boundary is the trigger" invites a fix in the boundary handling, and
such a fix would have removed four of twenty-eight onsets.
## 2. What was rejected, and why
### 2a. Reverting `decide()`'s `wanted <= 0.0` rung — rejected, and it is a trap
That rung is 2026-08-20's anti-bang-bang. Its own comment records the cost of not
having it: 17 engage/release cycles in 900 s and a quarter finishing 49 W over
the limit it had spent a quarter of an hour holding. It is untouched, pinned on
the AST in `test_peakguard.py` 13g, and `tools/replay_ac3.py` reproduces the same
190/190, 110 engaged cycles, 5 blind, 878 Wh on this branch as on `478ba93`.
### 2b. Filing the affordable charge as a NEGATIVE `lo` — rejected
Arithmetically this is the prettiest answer: `lo = wanted` with no sign gate is
continuous, is exactly the control law `decide()` already computes, and would
have put the constraint on the arbiter where it binds every claimant rather than
only arbitrage. It was rejected on two grounds, in this order:
1. ⚠️ **IT CREATES A NEW `lo > hi` CONTRADICTION CLASS AGAINST THE MAINTENANCE
SHAPING.** `main.py`'s cheap-window maintenance charge files
`Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=-floor)` — a NEGATIVE `hi`.
`arbiter.py` clause 2 applies every limit at or above the winner's priority
and takes the most restrictive, with **no notion of one limit out-ranking
another**; a peak `lo = −300 W` against a shaping `hi = −1000 W` is `lo > hi`,
which resolves to **0 W — the battery parked, in the one quarter of the month
that sets the bill**. That is the exact failure `peakguard.shaping_suspended()`
exists to prevent, and the only way to close it would be to key that
suppression on "a claim exists" — which, on every site this card is about,
means the maintenance charge-only shaping is suspended **permanently**. A
silent, large change to a different subsystem is not a price this card should
pay.
2. It changes the meaning of `PeakDecision.engaged` at five call sites outside
this module — `arbitrage.guard_state()`, `shaping_suspended()`,
`claim()`, `main.py`'s edge-logged action line and `main.py`'s status row —
each of which today means "the guard is HOLDING" and would silently start
meaning "a claim exists".
`test_peakguard.py` part 5's sweep asserts **no negative floor, ever**, and the
reason it gives ("a `lo` limit is incapable of capping discharge or export only
while it is non-negative") is, strictly, not the true reason — a `lo` of any sign
caps neither. The invariant is still right and is still worth holding; §2b above
is the argument that actually supports it, and it is recorded here rather than
left for the next person to re-derive.
### 2c. A backoff, cooldown or hysteresis constant in `arbitrage.py` — rejected
The card asks whether the second half of the fix belongs in arbitrage: *"a trade
refused at 14:59 and re-armed at 15:00 has learned nothing from the refusal."*
It does belong there, but as a **size**, not as a memory. `arbitrage.py`'s
hysteresis note is explicit that the switching decision is "which hour is it" and
that **no timer is needed and none is invented**; `peakguard.py`'s design note
spends a paragraph on why it carries no hysteresis constant. A cooldown would be
a second control loop compensating for a limit the first one declined to file,
and its constant would outlive whatever it was tuned against. The trade now
re-arms at `ceiling − load` instead of at `max_w`, which is what "learning from
the refusal" means when the refusal is a measurement.
## 3. What was done, and the precedent it follows
`control.maintenance_charge_floor()` has capped MAINTENANCE charging at *"the
headroom left under the site's cap"* since the loop was written, and its
docstring says why:
> "A maintenance charge is the only thing this system does that is big enough and
> long enough to set that peak, so it is capped by the headroom left under the
> site's cap."
⚠️ **THAT SENTENCE STOPPED BEING TRUE WHEN OPT-04 LANDED.** Price arbitrage is a
second thing that is big enough and long enough — it commands `max_w` for a whole
tariff interval, deliberately, against the meter — and it was given no such cap.
This card gives it the same shape, with one difference that matters:
`maintenance_charge_floor()` sizes itself from `peak_forecast_entity`, which is
OPTIONAL and empty on a default install — the exact hole SAFETY-25 had to close
in `shaping_suspended()`. `charge_headroom_w()` comes off `decide()`, which runs
wherever P1 does.
**The number is `wanted_w` read in the other direction.** `decide()` already
computes `wanted = batt_w + excess` as the DISCHARGE that lands the quarter on the
ceiling; a negative `wanted` is a permitted CHARGE of `−wanted`. No new
arithmetic, no new constant.
Two properties make it safe to hand a strategy, and both are swept rather than
argued (`test_peakguard.py` part 13):
* ⚠️ **IT IS INVARIANT IN THE BATTERY.** Raise the charge by dW and the meter
rises by dW, so `excess` rises by exactly dW while `batt_w` falls by dW:
`wanted` does not move. Measured across `batt_w` from −5000 W to +2000 W on one
banked quarter — the headroom is 1350.0 W at every one of the six points while
the `excess` those runs see moves through six distinct values. It is a
**feed-forward** number, so consuming it adds no feedback path around the plant.
The fixed point is `charge = ceiling − load`, with the meter ON the ceiling and
`wanted` parked a whole `ceiling − load` clear of the engagement boundary.
* **HOLDING IMPLIES ZERO OR UNKNOWN.** Across 1080 swept combinations, not one
ENGAGED decision answers a positive headroom, so the function can never hand a
caller permission the guard's own `lo` is at that instant refusing.
## 4. After, on the same rig, same command, same checkout
| `peak_cap_w` | house | onsets/h | grid swing | energy bought | billed quarters (W) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 | 1200 W | 28 → **1** | 3655.5 → **282.0 W** | 180.0 → **285.2 Wh** | **1500.0 / 1500.0 / 1500.0** |
| 3500 | 1800 W | 8 → **1** | 3672.5 → 1687.6 W | 1652.9 → 1616.1 Wh | **3500.0 / 3500.0 / 3500.0** |
| 3500 | 3000 W | 32 → **1** | 3798.0 → **474.7 W** | 482.9 → 475.3 Wh | **3500.0 / 3500.0 / 3500.0** |
| 5000 | 1200 W | 1 → 1 | **identical** | **identical** | **identical** |
* **One onset** means the trade starts once and runs for the whole window. The
battery is trading 100 % of the hour where it used to trade 43 %, 92 % and 54 %.
* **Every billed quarter lands exactly on the cap and none over it**, where every
quarter in the three biting rows used to finish over.
* **The money.** At 1500/1200 the site buys **58 % MORE** energy, because a
continuous 300 W trade beats a 2000 W trade that is cancelled for 57 % of the
hour. At the two shipped-default rows it buys **2.2 % and 1.6 % less** — and in
exchange the worst quarter drops from 59 W over the cap to 0 W over it. The
capacity tariff bills the month's single worst quarter with no averaging and no
forgiveness (specs.md:583), so that is not a trade-off, it is the ordering
§10.1 asks for.
* The remaining 1687.6 W at 3500/1800 is the opening **ramp**, not a cycle: the
pack goes from 0 to 1700 W of charge in about ten seconds and the meter with
it. One onset, no export, no reversal.
* The last row is bit-identical before and after. **This card costs nothing on
the installs it is not about.**
## 5. What this does NOT fix, with sizes
* **TEST-23 finding 1 — the export overshoot at the END of a trade** (356–938 W,
≈0.37 × `max_w`) is untouched and is a different card. It happens when the
cheap interval ends and the grid-following loop takes back an actuator that was
holding a charge; nothing here changes the handover.
* **A house whose load ALONE exceeds the cap** (`load > peak_cap_w`) still puts
`wanted > 0`, still engages the guard, and still refuses the trade outright
through the interlock — correctly, since you cannot buy in a quarter you are
already over on. The loop then drives to grid = 0 rather than to grid =
ceiling, which is more discharge than the guard asked for. Not swept here: all
four (cap, load) pairs on the record have `load < cap`.
* **`arbitrage.claim()` still files the SIZED number, but the ARBITER can clamp
it further** and the strategy is not told. The reason line names the guard's
headroom, not the arbiter's `bound_by`. Pre-existing; not widened.
* **The container leg was not re-run.** `hadrive.py` needs `test23s3-addon`
started, and that container is deliberately stopped because it is a second
writer on the setpoint entity under measurement. The in-process rig's twelve
transcribed lines are pinned by `test_arbitrage.py` 3b's AST check on
`main.py`'s call site, which is the line this card adds to them.
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
# SAFETY-47 — what a shadow run can show, and what it cannot
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-47`.
**Card:** SAFETY-47 — *"shadow mode's claims, and the number on the status
row"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No deployment, no `ha addons update`, no
contact with 192.168.2.158 or 192.168.2.221. Everything below was measured in
the CI image and on TEST-23 stage 3's closed-loop rig.
⚠️ **This is not a write-path defect and nothing in the write path was
touched.** SAFETY-10's substitution, re-seed, authorisation gate and clamp are
unchanged. What was wrong is what three merged documents **say** a shadow run
can show you, and a number on the status row that can be **6.61×** what a live
controller would command.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **Shadow mode cannot surface a closed-loop defect. Not partially — not at
all**, and by the same construction that makes it safe. §1.
2. **The "strategies are unaffected" exemption was true until SAFETY-45 merged,
one commit before SAFETY-10.** Sizing the buy leg to the billed-quarter
headroom made the strategy closed-loop. §2.
3. **The recorded watts are the right answer to a question nobody asked, and
they are CAVEATED rather than re-computed.** Re-computing would mean the
recorded decision was no longer the decision the shipped path reached, which
is the one thing shadow mode has to be able to say. §3 records what was
rejected.
4. **SAFETY-10 §6's committed evidence could never have failed, for two
independent reasons, and closing either one alone closes nothing.** §4.
---
## 1. Why the answer is "not at all", and not "not very well"
Shadow mode holds every actuator at `shadow.WIRE_W` and re-seeds the carried
command to it at the end of each cycle. So every **measured** input — the
meter, the billed-quarter accumulator behind it, the battery power, the state
of charge — describes a plant that **did not respond**.
A closed-loop defect is, by definition, one whose stimulus **is** the plant's
response to the controller. No response, no stimulus, nothing to see. This is
not an implementation gap:
* feeding the guards a **simulated** plant instead is exactly what SAFETY-10 §4
refuses for the sign watchdogs, and the reason generalises — a controller
reacting to a plant that does not exist drifts further from reality every
tick, and three cycles in its numbers describe nothing;
* and SAFETY-10 §5 already conceded the same fact for the grid-following loop
("one slew step, not a trajectory"). That was never a property of the loop.
**It is the general case**, and the loop leg was simply where it had already
been noticed.
**So the closed-loop answer comes from a closed-loop rig (TEST-23 stage 3) or
from a live run. There is no third place, and saying that plainly is worth more
than the three sentences it replaces.**
### Measured, on the rig, at a cap that binds
`peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 / `max_w` 2000, one hour at a 5 s cycle. Of the
three defects SAFETY-10 was written for:
| | visible? | measured |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-45's limit cycle | **no** | 28 charge onsets live, **1** in shadow. Grid −455.5 … +3200.0 W live, **flat at the 1200 W house** in shadow. Guard engaged 410/720 cycles live, **0/720** in shadow. (Taken with SAFETY-45 reverted — that is the defect being looked for.) |
| SAFETY-46's SoC churn | **no** | the SoC moves **0.000000000 pp** in a shadow run. The SoC is the pack's integral of what the pack was commanded, and it was commanded 0 W. No SoC limit can be *reached* in a shadow run at all |
| TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour | **yes**, and it is the only one | the price lookup's inputs are the clock and the price series, neither a function of the battery. Which hour, at what price, clearing what spread: **identical live and shadow on 720 of 720 charging cycles, at a binding cap** |
### What a shadow run genuinely is for
*Which* strategy wins, on *which* hour, at *which* price, for *which* reason,
against which limits — the wrong-quarter-hour class, a trade armed on a day it
should not be, a refusal whose sentence names the wrong subsystem, a clamp that
would have engaged, a standing failsafe latch. That is a real and useful set,
and it is the set the documents now claim.
---
## 2. The exemption, and exactly how much of it survives
All three documents carried a version of:
> The **strategies** are unaffected — price arbitrage, the capacity guard and
> maintenance all ask for a fixed power **from inputs that do not depend on
> what the battery did**.
**True before SAFETY-45, false after it.** SAFETY-45 makes the buy leg
`min(asked, headroom)`, and
```
headroom = (900 / remaining) x (ceiling - projected)
```
where `projected` reads the **open quarter's accumulator** — the meter — which
is a function of what the battery did earlier in that same quarter. SAFETY-45
merged one commit before SAFETY-10, so the exemption was stale on the day it
was written.
**What survives, and it is now graded rather than asserted:**
> **Which** hour a strategy picks, and **why**, are unaffected — the clock and
> the price series are not functions of the battery.
> **How hard** it trades is not.
⚠️ **The peak guard is not in the surviving half either.** Every term of
`wanted = batt_w + excess` is measured, so in a shadow run the guard engages
only if the *house alone* would put the quarter over the ceiling. Its
**ceiling** and its **reasons** are worth reading from a shadow run; its
**engagements** are not evidence of anything.
---
## 3. The number on the status row — decided, and what was rejected
At `peak_cap_w` 1500 under a 1200 W house the status row read **"WOULD HAVE
COMMANDED −2 000 W"**. A live controller commands **−302.4 W**. Measured on the
shipped build:
| cap / house | live commanded | shadow recorded | over by |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 / 1200 | −302.4 W | **−2000.0 W** | **6.61×** |
| 3500 / 3000 | −502.6 W | −2000.0 W | 3.98× |
| 3500 / 2000 *(shipped cap)* | −1502.6 W | −2000.0 W | 1.33× |
| 3500 / 1800 | −1702.6 W | −2000.0 W | 1.17× |
| 15000 / 350 | −2000.0 W | −2000.0 W | 1.00× |
⚠️ **The arithmetic is not wrong.** `900/remaining` is correct for a meter that
is genuinely under the ceiling, and in a shadow run the meter genuinely *is*
under it, because the battery is not charging. **The recorded number is the
right answer to a question nobody asked** — and the last row of that table is
the fixture SAFETY-10's own evidence was taken on, which is why nothing
reported it.
### What shipped
1. **Unconditionally**, the row and the log line stop forecasting: the watts
are introduced as what would have been commanded **ON THIS CYCLE**. No
number a shadow run records is a prediction of a live run, so no state
should read like one.
2. **Conditionally**, whenever a **measured** billed quarter sized the number
being recorded, both surfaces carry `shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER`:
> ⚠️ AND ITS SIZE CAME FROM THE BILLED-QUARTER METER, WHICH HAS ONLY THE
> HOUSE IN IT WHILE THE BATTERY IS HELD AT 0 W. A live run sizes the same
> trade against a meter the battery is moving, so this is an UPPER BOUND and
> not a prediction; how far under it a live run lands is a closed-loop
> question and a shadow run cannot answer it.
⚠️ **"Upper bound", and not "smaller", and the difference was measured.**
Charging only *adds* offtake, so a live `projected` is never below a shadow one
and the headroom never above it — with **equality at the start of every
quarter**, where `900/remaining` is 1.0 and neither plant has moved. Measured
pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five configurations: **0 cycles below,
730 exactly equal.** A sentence reading "smaller" would have been false on
every one of those 730, and the first draft of this card said "smaller".
⚠️ **And it names no factor.** How far under the bound a live run lands is a
property of the site. A number invented for the row would be a second helping
of the defect the sentence exists to disclose.
⚠️ **The predicate is NOT keyed on whether the trade was capped, and that is
the trap this card nearly walked into.** `arbitrage`'s own sentence says *"SIZED
BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD"* only when the headroom came out **below** the
ask — which in a shadow run is the **start** of the quarter, where the two runs
still agree to the float. By the end, `900/remaining` has multiplied the
headroom **past** the ask, the trade is **not** capped, the sentence is silent,
and the recorded number is at its **most** wrong. A caveat keyed on it would be
quietest exactly where it is needed loudest. `arbitrage.sized_from_meter()` is
keyed on the headroom having been **measured**, so it fires on both.
`test_arbitrage.py` part 3d-8 drives the inversion.
### Rejected, and why
* **Re-compute the number so it does not amplify** — e.g. record
`ceiling − projected` (gain 1.0) instead of the sized figure. It matches the
live answer almost exactly at this cap, and it is the **worst** of the
options. It would be a **shadow-only sizing**: the recorded decision would no
longer be the decision the shipped path reached, while the arbiter, the
clamp, SAFETY-28's gate, the action log and MQTT all ran on the real one. A
second copy of the sizing arithmetic living in the display layer is
MUTATION.md's transcribed-predicate defect on an operator-facing surface, and
it generalises to no other strategy. SAFETY-10's whole safety argument is
that shadow mode is a **substitution at the wire**, not a second controller;
this would have made it a second controller everywhere except the wire.
* **Record nothing where the sizing depends on measured state.** Tempting —
"no number beats a number 6.61× out". Rejected on three counts: it blanks the
row exactly when arbitrage is trading, which is when a commissioning engineer
most wants it; the action log's edge key is the rounded watts, so blanking
them either floods or silences the log; and a surface that flickers between a
number and a dash is harder to read than a number with a standing caveat.
The narrow version of this — dropping the watts only — was the closest
runner-up.
* **Record the unsized ask alongside the sized one.** It adds a number without
adding a warning. The unsized ask is `max_w`, a constant the operator
configured; on the shipped 3500/2000 row both figures are 2000 W, so the pair
is exactly as misleading as the single figure was.
* **A caveat on every cycle in every state.** Rejected as the *whole* answer,
accepted as half of it: the unconditional part is a two-word narrowing of the
verb ("on this cycle"), not a warning, and the warning proper is conditional
so that it still means something when it appears.
---
## 4. SAFETY-10 §6's evidence, and why it could not fail
§6 tabulated `arb_power_w` −2000 W *"identical"*, `arb_reason` *"identical,
verbatim"*, arbiter winner *"identical"*. Two independent reasons it could
never have gone red:
1. **the fixture is `peak_cap_w: 15000` against a 350 W house**, so the guard
never engages and SAFETY-45's sizing is in the run and inert. ⚠️ **The
harness's own comment says so** — *"at this scenario's `peak_cap_w: 15000`
it is not binding anyway"* — which is MUTATION.md habit 4 written down
beside the check it disables;
2. **every identity row reads the FIRST charging sample.** At `elapsed = 0` the
projection *is* the held level, so the two runs agree to the float there
**even at a cap that does bind**.
⚠️ **AND THAT SECOND REASON IS THE ONE A REVIEWER CANNOT SEE FROM A DIFF.**
Widening the fixture alone — the obvious fix — leaves the `[0]` comparison
passing. Measured, not reasoned: at 1500/1200 the first charging cycle is
−300.0000 W in **both** runs while 716 of the 720 cycles differ. Part 3d-2
grades that agreement **as an expectation**, so nobody rebuilds a check on
`[0]` believing it covers something.
This is habit 4's **twelfth** instance in this repository, its **second**
inside a committed evidence artifact, and — like the seventh and the eleventh —
it was in a **measuring instrument** rather than in a check.
§6 is re-taken at `peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 / `max_w` 2000, across the
whole run. Harness `/home/homelab/s47-mut/shadowloop47.py`.
---
## 5. The grader, so this class cannot recur
`test_arbitrage.py` part **3d** — placed beside part 3c, which is SAFETY-45's
own closed-loop regression, and built on the **same** `s45_loop()` harness so
the two runs share every line of shipped code and differ in **one argument**:
```
s45_loop(sized=True) the live hour
s45_loop(sized=True, shadow=True) the same hour, battery held at WIRE_W
s45_loop(sized=False, shadow=True) SAFETY-45's own defect, watched from
inside shadow mode
```
Three lines of `s45_loop()` stand in for `Controller._write_unit()`'s
substitution and `_shadow_settle()`'s record and re-seed. They are marked as a
**transcription**; `test_clamp.py` part 8 is the check on the shipped
placement, and it drives the real `Controller`. Everything that produces a
number — the averager, the projection, the guard, the headroom, the strategy,
the arbiter, the row and the log sentence — is the shipped one.
What 3d grades, in order: that the cap **binds** (the precondition the old
evidence lacked); that the first charging cycle agrees **anyway**; that the
whole run diverges, and by how much; that the record is an **upper bound**, and
the two-point arithmetic that makes it one; what survives of the exemption;
that SAFETY-45's limit cycle and the guard's engagements are **not** visible;
the four rungs of `sized_from_meter()`, each reached with the other three clear
(TEST-16); both operator surfaces; the `capped`-keying trap; and main.py's
three call sites, pinned on the AST.
⚠️ **The section carries its own precondition into every check.** A mutation
that stops either run trading left the lists empty, the first `min()` raised,
the file died before part 4 and the run reported **zero reds — which reads
exactly like a survivor**. That is FCST-06's shape and it was **driven**, not
imagined. `s47check()` now fails every check in the section when the stimulus
was not produced, and the one division in it answers `nan` rather than raising.
---
## 6. The mutation battery — 14 mutations, no survivors
Harness `/home/homelab/s47-mut/run.py`, backups inside it. Each run restores
from backup, purges `__pycache__` **on the host**, and grades through the CI
image with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter cannot write a cache
into the tree under test (TEST-15). Fingerprints are printed before the first
run and re-checked after the last restore.
| # | mutation | file | Δ | reds |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | the row drops the caveat branch | `shadow.py` | −63 B | 2 |
| M2 | **the trap**: `sized_from_meter()` keyed on the trade being CAPPED — silent where the record is multiples out | `arbitrage.py` | +33 B | 5 |
| M3 | the CHARGE rung dropped — a sell carries a caveat §9.1 makes false | `arbitrage.py` | −30 B | 1 |
| M4 | the measured-headroom rung dropped | `arbitrage.py` | −18 B | 1 |
| M5 | the arbiter-winner rung dropped — a caveat on somebody else's number | `arbitrage.py` | −33 B | 1 |
| M6 | `main.py` renders the row with `sized_from_meter=False` | `main.py` | −23 B | 1 |
| M7 | `main.py` drops `winner=` — the rung exists and is never reached | `main.py` | −1 B | 1 |
| M8 | `main.py` sizes the trade from a literal — SAFETY-45 out of the shipped path, which the hoist put at risk | `main.py` | −41 B | 2 |
| M9 | the headroom assignment moves out of `cycle()` | `main.py` | −39 B | 1 |
| M10 | `sized_from_meter` gains a `False` default (TEST-14) | `shadow.py` | +8 B | 1 |
| M11 | `ON THIS CYCLE` deleted — the row forecasts again | `shadow.py` | −14 B | 1 |
| M12 | `log_line()` drops the caveat — the page discloses, the record does not | `shadow.py` | −63 B | 2 |
| M13 ⚠️ | `main.py` re-assembles the log sentence at the call site | `main.py` | **+0 B** | 1 |
| M14 ⚠️ | `wanted = batt_w − excess` — the headroom stops being monotone in the battery and the row's UPPER BOUND sentence becomes false | `peakguard.py` | **+0 B** | 38 |
**Survivors: none.**
⚠️ **M13 and M14 are `+0 B`, which MUTATION.md names as the risky delta.** Both
were confirmed on disk by `sha256` before the run started — the harness prints
the fingerprint of every graded file and the hash moved for each — and every
run is purged, so neither is at risk of the stale-`.pyc` failure.
⚠️ **Two findings from driving it, both reported rather than tidied away.**
* **M14's first form was aimed at the wrong direction and correctly survived.**
`min` → `max` in the buy leg's sizing makes the shadow record *larger*, which
is still an upper bound, so 3d-3b was right not to fail. The mutation that
actually inverts the bound is the sign of the excess term in `wanted`. A
survivor that is right is worth more than a red aimed at the wrong claim.
* **M12 was a survivor before the fix it forced.** Deleting the caveat from the
action-log line left **all 29 files green**: the only check that could see
that line drives a fixture with `meter_source: off`, where no arbitrage
decision — and therefore no caveat — is reachable. The sentence was an
f-string inside `Controller._shadow_settle()`, i.e. a surface no check could
grade. It is `shadow.log_line()` now, for the reason `words()` is a function,
and M13 is the mutation that puts it back at the call site.
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
# SAFETY-48 — the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-48`, on top of `TEL-10`.
**Card:** SAFETY-48 — *"the integrator goes on winding while the command is
slew-limited"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** The live install still runs `slew_w: 400`
applied by hand on 2026-09-05 12:00 and `release/1.0`'s control law. This branch
does not deploy and does not bump the version.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **It is a missing case, not a wrong constant, and the arithmetic says so.**
The integrator moves `gain * error` a cycle and the command moves at most
`slew_w`, so the integrator outruns the command whenever
`|error| > slew_w / gain` — 667 W at the live shape. SAFETY-39's retune made
`slew_w` **smaller**, which makes that threshold **lower**. §1.
2. ⚠️ **THE FORM THE CARD ASKED FOR RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY, AND THAT IS WHY
IT IS NOT WHAT SHIPPED.** Reusing the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew
flag cuts export 13 % and moves the worst quarter-hour average **offtake**
from 3739 W to **3935 W**, with the mean quarter +2.7 W — and on the billed
quarter it is worse at **every plant lag where release/1.0 produces a peak
at all** (a tie at lag 0, worse at 2.5 / 5.0 / 7.5 / 10.0 s) and at **every
top-N cut of the quarters**, which makes this the least lag-sensitive result
in the card. The harm is a tail redistribution inside quarters that already
net to offtake, not a weaker answer to import in aggregate. §3, §3a.
3. **What ships bounds the LEAD at one slew step, only where the slew is what
stopped the command, and only in the leading direction.** The robust result
is the **export reduction — 39.6 → 34.1 kWh, and it falls at every plant and
tuning tried** — with wasted throughput 4.67 → 3.19 kWh, sign reversals
2992 → 2770 and median recovery 232 → 199 s. ⚠️ **The billed quarter is not
something this card can claim.** It reads 3739 → **3434 W** at the fitted
plant lag of 7.5 s; at every lag ≤ 5.0 s — including the one that best
reproduces the recorded export — release/1.0 is *already* at 3434 W and this
card moves it by exactly zero. The lag is not identified by the data. §4,
§3a.
4. **Two committed numbers moved and neither is a silent edit.** SAFETY-13's
released command settles lower, because there is less wound integrator to
settle onto; and SAFETY-39's *"the slew does not own the over-absorption"* is
now **false — inverted, on its own independent plant model.** §5, §6.
---
## 1. The defect, in the terms the code uses
`compute()` freezes the integrator with an asymmetric rule, and the comment
beside it states the requirement outright:
> the requirement is that the INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command
But `frozen` is computed from **one** signal:
```python
saturated_now = abs(prev_w - actual_w) > tuning.saturation_w # not tracking
```
Slew-limiting never enters it. When the command hits the step ceiling the
integrator keeps winding at `gain * error` until it reaches `integrator_max_w`,
and the unwind afterwards is `integrator_max_w / slew_w` cycles — 12.5 at the
live shape, about a minute at the meter's measured tick.
⚠️ **AND THE RETUNE MADE IT MORE FREQUENT, NOT LESS.** `|error| > slew_w / gain`
is 1667 W at `slew_w: 1000` and **667 W** at `slew_w: 400`. The measured median
grid error at the onset of a recorded episode is 1114 W — above the second
threshold and below the first. This is why SAFETY-39 did not fix it, and the
mechanism is the same one §6 shows inverting.
## 2. How it was measured, and what the measurement cannot say
`tools/replay_recorded_loop.py`, over **16.00 days / 256 252 meter instants** of
the live install's own recorder, exported read-only.
**Real:** the disturbance (`D = grid + batt` at every recorded meter instant —
the house with this loop's own battery taken back out, which is exogenous and
therefore valid to drive a counterfactual with); the tick (the meter's own
recorded instants, median **5.01 s**); and the control law, imported out of the
checkout. The "before" law is the **same file** with the SAFETY-48 block removed
by a named substitution and exec'd into a fresh namespace — never a
transcription — and a missing or duplicated anchor is a **refusal** with
`NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED` on it, because an instrument that quietly compared
the shipped law with itself would report the card as changing nothing.
**Modelled:** the inverter (pure delay 7.5 s + first-order lag 2.0 s +
`batt = 0.973 × cmd − 22.4 W`, fitted on this same recording above the SoC
floor, residual **375 W RMS**); the pack (SoC integrated, discharge refused at
or below the floor); and **everything else the arbiter does** — the recorded
setpoint is the arbiter's output after the peak guard, the SoC clamps,
maintenance and arbitrage, while the replay runs `compute()` alone.
⚠️ **THE ABSOLUTE FIGURES ARE PESSIMISTIC BY ABOUT A THIRD AND THE TOOL PRINTS
IT ON EVERY RUN.** Replaying the before-law reproduces 39.6 kWh of export where
the install actually exported **29.4 kWh** over the same window. The delta is
what this instrument is for: both laws run on the same ticks, the same
disturbance, the same plant and the same seed.
⚠️ **THE SoC FILTER ON THE PLANT FIT IS THE WHOLE FIT, AND IT IS A FINDING IN
ITS OWN RIGHT.** This install spends **36 % of its ticks at or below a 10 % SoC
with the command standing near 2 kW and the battery delivering nothing.** Fitted
over all ticks the recording says `batt = 0.50 × cmd − 396 W, r = 0.70` — a
plant that follows half the command, which no inverter does. Above the floor the
same data says `batt = 1.00 × cmd − 28 W, r = 0.977`. The floor is the PACK and
is modelled separately.
## 3. The form the card asked for, and the number that refused it
The card asked for the asymmetric rule already in service for saturation, on a
flag carried across cycles the way `sat_count` is. It was built — from
release/1.0's own source, one substitution per change — and measured on the same
16 days through the same pipeline:
| | release/1.0 | **form A** — carried slew flag + the asymmetric freeze | **SAFETY-48** — the lead cap |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| export kWh | 39.61 | 34.43 | **34.07** |
| import kWh | 116.07 | 110.62 | 111.20 |
| battery sign reversals | 2992 | **2656** | 2770 |
| wasted throughput kWh | 4.67 | **2.99** | 3.19 |
| **worst 15-min offtake W** | 3739 | ⚠️ **3935** | **3434** |
| mean quarter-hour offtake delta | — | ⚠️ **+2.73 W** | **−2.39 W** |
| worst quarter-hour delta | — | +992 W | +532 W |
| recovery median s | 232 | **184** | 199 |
| recovery p99 s | 849 | **781** | 850 |
| recovery max s | 901 | 890 | 898 |
| unrecovered (> 900 s) | 53 | **26** | 31 |
| \|i_w − prev_w\| p99 W | 3361 | 1534 | **800** |
| \|i_w − prev_w\| max W | 9200 | 6912 | **800** |
**Form A wins on four rows and loses on the one that is billed.** The capacity
tariff (*capaciteitstarief*) bills the month's worst quarter-hour average
offtake, and form A raises it by **196 W** — and raises the MEAN quarter by
2.7 W, so this is systematic and not one unlucky quarter. It does so in **five
of the six** plant and tuning variants in `--sensitivity`; the sixth is a tie.
The per-cycle mechanism is that a frozen integrator stops at
`prev + gain·error(first cycle)`, which is `(1 − gain)` short of what the site
needs — 40 % short at `gain: 0.6`.
⚠️ **AND THE SENTENCE THAT USED TO FOLLOW THAT ONE WAS TOO BIG FOR THE DATA.**
It read *"for an IMPORT it is offtake, so a large import is answered too weakly
for as long as the ramp lasts"*. The aggregate does not show a weaker answer to
import: form A cuts total import by **5.45 kWh** and export by **5.18 kWh**
against release/1.0, and paired tick by tick it delivers **8.56 kWh LESS**
offtake energy on the ticks release/1.0 spent importing (lower on 38 229 such
ticks, higher on 19 669). What form A moves is the **TAIL, within quarters that
already net to offtake** — the worst quarter goes 3739 → 3935 W, the top five
3260 → 3300 W, the top fifty 1880.0 → 1882.7 W. The capacity tariff bills the
worst quarter and nothing else, so a redistribution that leaves the mean alone
and lifts the maximum is exactly the trade that is refused here. The conclusion
is unchanged; the causal sentence is now the one the data supports.
⚠️ **THE CARD SAID "do not invent a second rule", AND THE MEASUREMENT SAYS TO.**
That instruction is recorded here rather than quietly dropped. What ships is a
different rule; the paragraph above is why.
## 3a. ⚠️ The plant lag is NOT identified by this recording, and the billed quarter is the claim that depends on it
`fit_plant()` picks `lag 7.5 s` because it minimises **battery-power RMS**. That
objective barely distinguishes the candidates — 375.3 W at 7.5 s against 376.4 W
at 2.5 s, **0.3 %** — while the tool's *own* printed fidelity measure, replayed
export against the **29.43 kWh this install actually exported**, prefers 2.5 s by
the whole of the 35 % gap the header warns about. Two measures on the same data
disagree, and nothing here breaks the tie.
So the sweep has to be read as a sensitivity, not as a confirmation:
| plant lag | fit RMS W | replayed export kWh (release/1.0) | **worst 15-min offtake W:** release/1.0 | form A | SAFETY-48 | mean quarter ΔW |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 0.0 | 392.3 | 23.5 | **3434** | 3434 | **3434** | +0.53 |
| 2.5 | **376.4** | **28.9** ← nearest 29.43 | **3434** | ⚠️ 3732 | **3434** | −0.59 |
| 5.0 | 378.0 | 32.1 | **3434** | ⚠️ 3711 | **3434** | −1.02 |
| 7.5 | **375.3** ← chosen | 39.6 | 3739 | ⚠️ 3935 | **3434** | −2.39 |
| 10.0 | 384.2 | 75.4 | 3954 | ⚠️ 4326 | **3434** | −4.65 |
(The RMS column is `fit_plant()`'s own inner sweep pinned to one lag — best `tau`
and a re-fitted gain/offset at that lag. The export and quarter columns follow
`--sensitivity`'s convention instead: only the lag is substituted into the
global fit, everything else held. That is why the lag 5.0 and 10.0 export
figures are the ones already printed in §7b.)
⚠️ **AT EVERY LAG ≤ 5.0 s THE IMPROVEMENT IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT — IT IS AN
ABSENCE.** release/1.0's worst quarter is *already* 3434 W there and SAFETY-48
changes it by **exactly zero**. §7b's paragraph used to read the `3434 → 3434`
rows as "the direction does not move"; that is the wrong reading. The direction
has nothing to move: at those plants release/1.0 never produces a quarter worse
than 3434 W in the first place, and the 3739 → 3434 W headline exists only at
the single longest lag `fit_plant()` happens to select. **The peak claim is a
property of the plant model, not of the card.** What the card can claim on the
billed quantity is that it does not make it worse, at any lag.
⚠️ **AND THE ONE RESULT HERE THAT IS NOT LAG-SENSITIVE IS THE FORM-A
REJECTION.** Form A's worst quarter is the worst of the three at **every lag
where release/1.0 produces a peak at all** — 3732, 3711, 3935, 4326 against
release/1.0's 3434, 3434, 3739, 3954 at lags 2.5 / 5.0 / 7.5 / 10.0, and a tie
at lag 0.0 where both sit at 3434. It is worse at every top-N cut of the
quarters at the fitted plant (top-1 3934.6 against 3738.7, top-5 3299.7 against
3260.5, top-10 2890.6 against 2871.0, top-50 1882.7 against 1880.0, top-100
1481.7 against 1479.0), and it raises the mean quarter. §3 understated this: the rejection does not rest on one unlucky
quarter at one plant, which is exactly the objection a lag-sensitive result
invites.
⚠️ **WHAT WOULD SETTLE IT IS NOT IN THIS RECORDING.** Both objectives above are
computed from the same four recorded entities, and they disagree; nothing else
in the capture breaks the tie, and this card did not go looking for a third
objective after seeing which lag each of the first two preferred. A driven step
response — the command timestamped where it is written rather than where Home
Assistant recorded it — is what identifies a lag. That is a rig measurement and
it is not this card. Until it exists, the export reduction is what this card
delivers and the peak figure is a plant-model artefact.
## 4. What ships
```python
slew = slew_limit_w(tuning)
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
_lead_cap = SLEW_LEAD_STEPS * slew
if target > slewed:
i_w = min(i_w, slewed + _lead_cap)
elif target < slewed:
i_w = max(i_w, slewed - _lead_cap)
target = slewed
```
Four properties, and each of them is a decision:
* **It is inside the branch**, and ⚠️ **that placement was a SURVIVOR of all
thirty files until a check was written for it.** Applying it to every cycle
instead — `i_w = max(target - cap, min(target + cap, i_w))` after
`target = slewed`, −92 B — is **bit-identical on the shipped configuration**:
0 of 256 246 ticks differ over the 16-day recording. The two separate **only**
where `integrator_max_w` is set ABOVE `max_w` — the configuration `control.py`
says is the only way its `clamped` reason is reachable. There the integrator
is *deliberately* allowed above the rail, and an unconditional cap would drag
it back to the command every cycle and make the option inert.
`test_telemetry.py` part 4 drives that configuration, and the unconditional
form is red on it.
⚠️ **THE COUNT OF SEPARABLE STATES IS DECORATION AND THREE SWEEPS DISAGREE
ABOUT IT.** This card's grid gave **2050 of 257 400**; an independent review
measured **1220 of 246 064**; a third, smaller grid (four tunings × 7 `prev_w`
× 9 `grid_w` × 5 `actual_w` × 8 `i_w` including `None` × 4 `sat_count`) gives
**776 of 40 320** — and that third one is spelled out here precisely because
the first two are not, which is the whole reason they cannot be reconciled.
No count here should be read as exact without the grid beside it. All three
agree on the load-bearing part, which is **where**: every separable state sits
in the `integrator_max_w > max_w` tuning and nowhere else.
⚠️ **AND AN EARLIER DRAFT OF THIS BULLET GAVE THE WRONG REASON AND THE WRONG
NUMBER.** It said the two forms differ on 118 ticks because an unconditional
cap would pull the integrator toward a command the SATURATION freeze is
pinning. That 118 was measured against a *different* pair — a band applied
after quantisation, at the very end of `compute()` — and the saturation story
does not apply to the placement actually being compared, which sits before
the freeze. The figures above are the ones that were measured on the pair the
sentence names.
⚠️ **AND THE SATURATION STORY IS NOT MERELY INAPPLICABLE — IT IS BACKWARDS.
THE NARROW CAP THAT SHIPPED *DOES* MOVE A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR.** It
sits before the freeze block and is not gated on `frozen`. Measured on the
same 16 days at the live shape: of **79 160** frozen ticks the cap changed
`i_w` on **1095**, and on **679** of those it moved it further out on the side
it was already on — putting back magnitude the freeze had just let fall, which
is the one direction the freeze's rule ("may fall, never rise") exists to
forbid. Worst case **2424 W**, at
`prev_w −3400 W, grid +4697 W, actual −4144 W, sat_count 2 → 3`: the freeze
leaves the integrator at **−176 W**, the slew binds, and the cap drags it to
**−2600 W**. It never overrides a *same-cycle* refusal — the freeze clipped
`moved` on 75 512 ticks and the slew bound on none of them — but the claim
that this placement leaves the frozen path alone is false, and §5 is where
that shows up in a committed number.
* **It is written one-sided, and that is a CLARITY choice, not a correctness
one.** ⚠️ **An earlier draft of this file and of the comment in `control.py`
said the two-sided band `max(slewed - cap, min(slewed + cap, i_w))` was a bug
that would drag a TRAILING integrator up toward the command. That was
invented, and the sweep said so: the two spellings agree on 205 920 of
205 920 cases** across four tunings, every sign of `prev_w`, `grid_w`,
`actual_w` and `i_w`, and the `i_w=None` path. `target` is monotone in `i_w`,
so when the slew binds `i_w` lies on the same side of `slewed` as `target`
does and the other clamp cannot reach. The one-sided form stays because it
NAMES the side the lead is on; the equivalence is recorded so the next reader
finds a measurement instead of an argument.
* **It moves `i_w` and not `target`.** This cycle's command is already decided;
what is bounded is what gets CARRIED. That is also why the exhaustive
`i_w=None` equivalence sweep in `test_control.py` is untouched — it compares
`(target_w, sat_count, frozen, reason)`, none of which this moves.
* **The cap is in STEPS, not watts**, for SAFETY-39's reason: a watt figure is a
constant that outlives the `slew_w` it was derived against. `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS`
moves with `slew_limit_w()` and therefore with the rail.
⚠️ **ONE STEP, AND NOT ZERO.** `i_w = slewed` is full back-calculation, and
`control.py`'s own docstring says what that costs: passing `i_w=None` *"reduces
this function to the exact velocity form it replaced"*. A zero cap makes `i_w`
identically the command on every cycle, which is that collapse written from the
other end. Measured, it is **better** — export 32.02 kWh against 34.07, mean
quarter −3.69 W against −2.39 — and it is still refused, because it throws away
the reason the accumulator was split out at all. That 2 kWh is the price of
keeping the bounded form, and it is stated rather than hidden.
⚠️ **TWO LEADS, AND CONFUSING THEM IS HOW A CHECK GETS WRITTEN WRONG.** The cap
bounds `i_w − target`, the command this cycle EMITS, at one step — which is what
makes the unwind one cycle. `Decision.i_w − prev_w`, which is what TEL-10's
`loop_lead` publishes, is measured against the command the PREVIOUS cycle left
standing, and the emitted command is itself one step further on: the published
figure is bounded by **two** steps. Both bounds are asserted, each against its
own number.
### The two recorded deadlocks, driven rather than argued
`control.py` names two encodings that produce a permanently stuck loop, and a
gate written on the integrator is exactly the edit that brings them back.
Neither is reachable here and both are test cases in `test_telemetry.py` part 4:
* **the shrink-only encoding** — *"only corrections that shrink |i_w|"* is
unsatisfiable for both signs whenever the correction is larger than twice the
integrator, and the loop then sits at its last value forever (measured before
the fix: 0 W held indefinitely into a 2 kW import). SAFETY-48 is not a shrink
rule; it caps the lead beyond one slew step and only while the slew binds.
* **`i_w == 0.0`** — `main.py` resets the integrator to exactly 0.0 on every
stop and every reseed, and *"may not wind further in the direction it is
already pushing"* has no referent there. SAFETY-48 does not touch that gate;
the first push from zero is driven and asserted to move.
And a third, specific to this card: **the cap cannot latch.** The flag is not
carried, and after the cap `|i_w − slewed| = cap`, so the next cycle's command
covers it in one step and the slew stops binding — after which the integrator
accumulates freely again. The driven check asserts the command still walks all
the way to the rail on a railed export.
## 5. What this card COSTS, stated rather than smoothed
**SAFETY-13's release buys back less.** That card's own scenario — a second
writer holding the pack at +700 W, the command pinned, then released — settles
at **−800 W** where release/1.0 settled at −1190 W against an integrator of
−1194 W; and its sibling run settles at **−1200 W** where release/1.0 settled at
−2390 W. The property AC 4 asserts is unchanged: the released command stops at
the frozen integrator and not at the rail.
⚠️ **AND THE TWO MOVED FOR TWO DIFFERENT REASONS, WHICH THE ONE-LINE EXPLANATION
"how far that integrator had been allowed to wind" COVERS ONLY HALF OF.** Gating
the cap on `not frozen` — one line, `if frozen: _lead_cap = float("inf")`, so
the cap becomes a no-op while frozen — puts **part 5 back at release/1.0's
−1190 W exactly**. That run moved because the cap **fires on frozen cycles**
(§4). **Part 4(b) does not come back**: it is −1200 W gated and −1200 W shipped,
against release/1.0's −2390 W, because *that* one moved for the winding reason.
Both literals in `test_control.py` were re-baselined **with the reason beside
them**, and the second is now asserted against `i_w` rather than against a
number.
**The alternative that avoids it was measured and rejected.** Gating the cap on
`not frozen` as above gives export **34.71 kWh** (against 34.07), worst quarter
**3434 W** (the same as shipped), wasted **3.49 kWh** (against 3.19) — and a
worst observed lead of **4961 W**, i.e. no bound at all on the quantity this
card exists to bound. A bound with an exception large enough to drive a truck
through is not a bound. ⚠️ These four figures replace an earlier set (34.9,
3461 W, 3.5 kWh, 4966 W) that does not reproduce on this tree with the gate
spelled as above; the gate spelling is written out here so the next reader can
re-run it rather than re-derive it.
**One quarter-hour in 1534 is 532 W worse.** The billed figure is a MAXIMUM, and
at the fitted plant lag the maximum improves (3739 → 3434 W); no quarter under
SAFETY-48 reaches release/1.0's own worst. The mean moves the right way. The
tail is reported because a maximum over 1534 quarters is decided by one of them
— and §3a is the reason that improvement is not claimed as a benefit of the
card: at every shorter plant lag release/1.0's own maximum is already 3434 W.
## 6. The independent confirmation, which arrived as a failing check
`test_control.py`'s SAFETY-39 section drives a family of 51 synthetic export
steps through a **first-order plant this file writes itself** — no relation to
the replay, no recorded data in it at all. It carried this assertion:
> ⚠️ THE SLEW DOES NOT OWN THE OVER-ABSORPTION … Quartering the slew from 1000
> to 250 does not reduce the over-absorption at all
and it was right about the mechanism and therefore wrong about the conclusion:
`slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT while the integrator accumulates `gain · error`, so a
slower slew left the integrator winding for longer. Worst case over the family:
| `slew_w` | release/1.0 | this branch |
|---|---:|---:|
| 1000 | 1005 W | **729 W** |
| 0 (the rail, 556) | 1109 W | **550 W** |
| 400 (the live interim) | 1285 W | **424 W** |
| 250 | 1330 W | **326 W** |
**The ranking inverts.** Before: slower is worse, monotonically. After: slower is
better, monotonically. Two plant models that share nothing agree on the sign,
which is worth more than either alone — and it means SAFETY-39's *"gain is the
next constant to re-derive"* is now only half true: with the lead bounded, the
slew owns a share of the over-absorption it did not own before. `gain` is still
not touched here, for SAFETY-39's own reason: two live control-law constants
moving in one release makes the next measurement uninterpretable.
⚠️ **AND THE RIG SAYS THE SAME THING, WHICH MEANS TWO COMMITTED TRANSCRIPTS
CHANGED MEANING UNDER THIS CARD.** `tools/slew_sim.py --slew` runs the same
derivation on admin/goodwe's `plantsim.Plant`, a third model again. Worst-case
over-absorption over its 51-step family, `slew_w` from 1000 down to 250:
| `slew_w` | 1000 | 800 | 700 | 600 | 556 | 500 | 400 | 300 | 250 |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| release/1.0 | 958 | 1107 | 1133 | 1058 | 987 | 1029 | 1150 | 1143 | 1081 |
| **this branch** | 777 | 734 | 663 | 563 | 553 | 507 | 435 | 358 | 321 |
release/1.0's row is flat and non-monotone and **800 really is better than 556**
on that column — SAFETY-39 measured it correctly and its §3 sentence is true of
the law it was written against. This branch's row falls monotonically. So
SAFETY-39's record is not retracted; it is given a **forward reference**, and
`slew_sim.py`'s own narration now reads `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS` out of the control law
it imported and says which of the two tables it is printing. MUTATION.md habit 8
— a committed transcript is a check, and a transcript whose prose contradicts
its own table is a failing one.
## 7. Verified by breaking it
**The law.** `test_telemetry.py` part 4 and `test_control.py`'s SAFETY-39
section. The mutation table is in `test_telemetry.py`'s header.
**The instrument** (MUTATION.md habit 8 — anything under `tools/` that a
document quotes is subject to the battery):
| # | mutation to `app/control.py` | what the instrument did |
|---|---|---|
| I2 | the whole SAFETY-48 block deleted | **REFUSED**, exit 1, `NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED` — not a zero delta |
| I3 | the anchor line itself edited | **REFUSED**, same message |
| I3b | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 1000` — the cap present but inert | **every row +0.00**, which is the honest report that the block is doing nothing |
| I4 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 0` — full back-calculation | every row moves further; this is the rejected form's number in §4 |
I3b is the one that matters: it proves the delta in §3 is caused by the block
and not by the two runs differing for some other reason.
**The law**, driven in the CI image on a purged tree, fingerprinted before,
after and after the revert:
| # | mutation to `app/control.py` | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---:|---|
| L1 | the whole SAFETY-48 block deleted | −195 B | 5 in `test_telemetry.py`, 4 in `test_control.py` |
| L2 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 0` — the velocity form | +0 B | 4 + 3 |
| L3 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 12` — a cap above the rail | +1 B | 4 + 3 |
| L4 | the cap applied unconditionally, outside the slew branch | −92 B | 1 + 0 — **and it was a SURVIVOR of all thirty files before that check existed** |
| L5a | the `min`/`max` FUNCTION names exchanged | +0 B | 5 + 5, one of them `test_control.py`'s own "frozen integrator never deadlocks" over 13 041 states |
| L5b | the two BRANCH BODIES exchanged — the other reading of "the cap on the wrong side" | +0 B | 5 + 4, and it does **not** reach the deadlock sweep |
| L6 | the lead measured against `prev_w` rather than the command emitted | +0 B | 6 + 3 |
⚠️ **L5 AND L6 ARE BOTH ZERO BYTES** — `min`/`max` and `slewed`/`prev_w` are
each the same length — so no fingerprint and no byte delta can see either, and
one of L5a's reds is `test_control.py`'s own *"frozen integrator never
deadlocks"* sweep over 13 041 states, written by SAFETY-13 for a different
reason.
⚠️ **THREE OF THESE COUNTS WERE WRONG AND ARE RE-MEASURED ABOVE, WHICH IS
MUTATION.md's REPORTING RULE 3 APPLIED TO THIS CARD'S OWN TABLE.** The earlier
row gave L5 as 2 + 5 and L6 as 4 + 3; driven again in the CI image on a `cp -a`
of this tree, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time, they are **5 + 5** and
**6 + 3**. ⚠️ **AND "L5" NAMED TWO DIFFERENT MUTATIONS.** "`min`/`max` swapped"
can mean the function names exchanged or the branch bodies exchanged; they are
both red, they are both the cap on the wrong side, and they give different
counts (5 + 5 against 5 + 4) and reach different checks. A row that writes one
number for a mutation a reader cannot re-derive from its own description is a
row that cannot be re-run, so both spellings are listed. The directions in the
original table were all correct; the counts were decoration, and decoration in
a mutation table reads as evidence.
## 7b. The transcript, quoted rather than summarised
`python3 tools/replay_recorded_loop.py --sensitivity`, on this branch, 58 s:
```
THE RECORDING: 256252 meter instants over 16.00 days, loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17
tick p5 4.77 s median 5.01 s p95 7.86 s (control.LOOP_TICK_S says 2.0)
the recorded command: extremes -5000 / +5000 W -> max_w 5000; most common step above 100 W is 400 W, 9924 times -> slew_w 400
the fitted inverter: lag 7.5 s, tau 2.0 s, batt = 0.9731 x cmd -22.4 W, residual 375 W RMS above the SoC floor
FIDELITY - the BEFORE law replayed against the recording it came from
setpoint r=0.887 mean +601 W simulated vs +739 W recorded
grid r=0.682 mean +195 W simulated vs +239 W recorded
export 39.61 kWh simulated vs 29.43 kWh recorded -> the model is +35 % PESSIMISTIC about the loop's tracking
THE A/B, same ticks, same disturbance, same plant, same seed
release/1.0 SAFETY-48 delta
export kWh 39.61 34.07 -5.54 the cost
import kWh 116.07 111.20 -4.86
battery sign reversals 2992.00 2770.00 -222.00
wasted throughput kWh 4.67 3.19 -1.48
worst 15-min offtake W 3738.67 3433.94 -304.74 ⚠️ THE BILLED ONE
recovery events 549.00 612.00 +63.00
recovery median s 232.06 199.04 -33.01
recovery p99 s 849.00 849.94 +0.94
recovery max s 901.06 898.40 -2.66
unrecovered (>900 s) 53.00 31.00 -22.00
|i_w - prev_w| p99 W 3361.12 800.00 -2561.12
|i_w - prev_w| max W 9200.00 800.00 -8400.00
slew-limited ticks 16392.00 11654.00 -4738.00
mean quarter delta W -2.39 over 1534 quarters
worst quarter delta W +532.27
SENSITIVITY - the ranking, not the watts
variant export kWh worst quarter W mean quarter dW
plant lag 5.0 s 32.1 -> 27.2 3434 -> 3434 -1.02
plant lag 10.0 s 75.4 -> 68.3 3954 -> 3434 -4.65
plant tau 8 s 56.5 -> 49.8 3995 -> 3605 -3.30
gain 1.0135, offset -26 46.8 -> 39.3 3713 -> 3434 -3.27
slew_w 555.6 (the rail) 36.5 -> 34.4 3434 -> 3434 -0.17
gain 0.3 28.1 -> 27.0 3434 -> 3434 +0.16
(58 s)
```
⚠️ **`--sensitivity` IS THE RANKING AND NOT THE WATTS.** The export figure moves
by a factor of two across these plants; what does not move is the direction —
**on export**. ⚠️ **THE `worst quarter W` COLUMN IS NOT THE SAME KIND OF
EVIDENCE AND THIS PARAGRAPH USED TO TREAT IT AS IF IT WERE.** Three of its six
rows read `3434 -> 3434`, and that is not "the direction holds": it is
release/1.0 *already sitting at 3434 W* on those plants, with nothing for the
card to improve. §3a sweeps the lag properly and finds the same thing at every
lag ≤ 5.0 s. The billed-quarter improvement in the A/B table above exists at one
plant, the one `fit_plant()` selects by an objective that separates it from its
neighbour by 0.3 %.
Two rows deserve naming rather than rounding: at `slew_w: 555.6` (the rail) and
at `gain: 0.3` the mean quarter-hour delta is −0.17 W and **+0.16 W** — ties,
not improvements. Both are regimes where `|error| > slew_w / gain` is rarely
satisfied (1333 W at `gain: 0.3`, 926 W at the rail against a measured median
onset error of 1114 W), so there is little for the card to bite on. That is the
mechanism agreeing with itself, and it is also the honest answer to "would this
still be worth shipping if the tuning moved": at `gain: 0.3` it would not be.
## 8. What this card does NOT establish
* **Nothing here drives an inverter.** The replay is a model with a 375 W
residual and no arbiter in it. The closed-loop answer comes from the rig or
from a live run — SAFETY-47 records why a shadow run cannot give it.
* **The live tick is 5.0 s, not `LOOP_TICK_S`'s 2.0 s**, measured off 9924
recorded 400 W steps and off the meter's own cadence. It is wrong in the SAFE
direction (a slower meter makes `validate.py` rule 10 conservative) and is NOT
changed here — re-deriving `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is a refusal boundary on a live
install and belongs to its own card. It is recorded in the tool's header and
printed on every run.
* **The brief's plant figure was close but not exact.** It quoted
`delivered = 1.0135 × command − 26 W, r = 0.992` at a 4–6 s publish lag. On
this 16-day window, above the SoC floor, the same relation measures
`1.00 × command − 28 W, r = 0.977` at a best-fit pure delay of **7.5 s**. The
conclusion — the inverter is a pure follower and the plant is not the problem
— survives; the coefficients are the ones in §2.
* **The brief's cost figure is larger than this measurement.** It quoted ~14 kWh
of avoidable export and 65 % of site export inside 7.9 % of the time. Measured
here: **5.5 kWh** avoidable of 39.6 kWh modelled (29.4 kWh recorded), with
42 % of export inside the 6.3 % of ticks that are slew-limited and 69 % within
±60 s of one, over 15.3 % of the time. The concentration claim holds; the
avoidable-kWh figure does not, and the difference is not reconcilable from
here because the reconstruction it came from was discarded.
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
# SAFETY-52 - a battery that refuses is asked for 0 W
**Decided 2026-09-27 by the owner, on the phase A plan (option D3). All four
questions answered yes.**
## The defect
At the BMS cut-out the battery gives ~0 W whatever it is asked. The saturation
freeze (`control.py`, `frozen`) then holds the request where it stood, and its
SAFETY-13 exit cannot fire, because a reading of ~0 against a large ask lies
inside the interval a limit can produce. The request stood at +5000 W for
11.87 h on 2026-09-06 and at +1940 W for 3 h 55 m on the bus on 2026-09-19. It
moved again only when the grid error changed sign. SAFETY-48's lead cap only
changes where `i_w` parks (one slew step ahead instead of at the rail). When
the request moved after the reading went flat, the stale-reading gate won
instead and ran SAFETY-59's ~70 s trip cycle.
## What was decided
1. **A refused direction is held at 0 W**, reason `battery refuses`. It engages
in `compute()` when the freeze has held `SETTLE_CYCLES` and the reading is
below `REFUSED_BELOW_W` (100 W, the probe's own answer) against an ask beyond
`saturation_w`. The drop to 0 skips
the slew limit (it only removes an ask nobody meets). The direction is
carried like `sat_count` (`refused=`, `Decision.refused`).
2. **A 200 W probe every 15 minutes, 34 s long** (`PROBE_W`, `PROBE_EVERY_S`,
`PROBE_S`; twice `BATT_OBLIGED_S`). A reading of at least 100 W in the held
direction ends the refusal, during a probe or not. 200 W is below `freshness.MOVE_W` (250 W), so a probe cannot arm
the gate. The clock is main.py's `now_mono`; `compute()` stays clockless.
3. **A gate trip while the loop is frozen on a ~0 W reading is a refusal** for
control (`Controller._refusal_from_stale`). This is what stops the ~70 s
cycle. The log keeps SAFETY-56's two-explanation wording.
4. **No SoC in the loop.** SAFETY-25 Option A stands. Nothing reads SoC.
Other exits: the loop wants the other direction (charge is accepted at the
floor), control stopped or started, another writer on the wire (the arbiter
reseed). A gap in the readings keeps the refusal, because the gate's own stop is
what seeds it.
**One inverter only.** At N>1, OPT-09's `pack` limit already closes an empty
battery's discharge end and moves its share. There, a one-unit gate trip must
not refuse the site. `compute()` is passed `refused=None` there, and that path
is release/1.0's law unchanged (the `i_w=None` equivalence sweep in
`test_control.py` still holds).
## Evidence
`test_refusal.py` drives the real Controller and gate (the 09-06 and 09-19
shapes, recovery with no sign change, the probe cadence, every exit).
`tools/replay_refusal.py` replays the 16-day capture, same model as
`replay_recorded_loop.py`, and should be read for deltas:
| plant | law | gate trips | request >1 kW above delivery | longest held | import / export kWh | worst 15-min |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| fitted | old | 85 | 113.3 h | 16.57 h | 112.0 / 35.2 | 3434 W |
| fitted | new | 130 (133 after review) | 11.4 h | 0.21 h | 112.3 / 35.4 | 3456 W |
| offset 0 W | old | 1010 | 102.2 h | 16.58 h | 112.0 / 35.2 | 3434 W |
| offset 0 W | new | 85 | 6.1 h | 0.33 h | 111.9 / 35.1 | 3434 W |
**Traced in review (#141).** The +22 W worst quarter is the old law's worst
quarter too. There the old law stands at +2060 W on a pack giving 0 W, and the
new law asks 0 W, which the fitted plant answers with its -22 W offset: 22 W
charged from the grid. The fit above the floor reads `batt = cmd - 28 W`, so a
real inverter asked 0 W may do the same. Of the 71 new-law trips with no
old-law trip within 2 min, 59 come 85-97 s after an answered probe. The offset has lifted the modelled pack
just above its floor, the probe is answered, control ramps, the pack empties
again mid-ramp, and the gate trips, which re-seeds the hold. The other 12
follow an other-direction exit the same way. On a site this is one
`STALE_READING` ERROR line per answered probe at most, and only on a battery
that answers a probe and then cuts out again. Catching the re-cut before the
gate needs a faster engage than `SETTLE_CYCLES`, which accuses a healthy slow
battery, so it is left to SAFETY-58/59. After the review changes below the
fitted-plant row reads 133 trips (the delivery exit now also catches answers
that arrive after the probe window); the other figures are unchanged. Rejected alternatives and their figures are in
the phase A plan: bounding the integrator by demand made the worst quarter
+541 W worse or cycled the gate 3368 times, and an SoC envelope needs the
configured floor to be right and needs SoC.
## Review changes (#141)
- **"Gives nothing" is below 100 W, not below 500 W.** At `saturation_w` a
battery derated to 100-499 W (cold, a tapering battery) was held at 0 W for
~93 % of the time: 300 W derated gave 86 Wh in 4 h against 1 200 Wh on the
old law. The capture has 0.11 h in that band, so the replay does not move.
- **Any delivery ends the hold, not only an answered probe.** With
`meter_poll_s: 1` the 12 cycles last 12 s, less than a healthy battery's
reading lag (up to `BATT_OBLIGED_S`, 17 s). That engaged on a healthy step and
held it for 15 min. Now the late reading ends it within seconds (2 s held in
`test_refusal.py` part 5b).
- **N>1 is stated as a limit in DOCS.** The pack limit there covers an empty
battery only when its cut-out level is configured right.
## Not covered
A battery that gives a steady part of the ask (e.g. a 500 W keep-alive) is a
genuine limit (SAFETY-13 case a) and still holds its request.
## What SAFETY-58 and SAFETY-59 must take into account
- **SAFETY-58** (the first read after a rest trips at once): a probe never arms
the gate (200 < 250 W), but the refusal seeding reads the trip. If 58 delays
the first verdict, the seed arrives later. The 09-19 shape then needs the
compute-side engagement (12 cycles) to win, which it does only while the
request stands still. Keep `test_refusal.py` part 4 green.
- **SAFETY-59** (DOCS says a ~70 s pattern proves a failed register): with this
change a refusing battery no longer produces the pattern at one inverter. The
DOCS text should say so, and that the `battery refuses` reason is the
discriminator the add-on now has. At N>1 the old pattern can still occur.
- If either changes `MOVE_W`, `PROBE_W` must stay below it.
`test_refusal.py` part 2 checks the inequality.
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
# SAFETY-56 — what the gate cannot tell apart, said in the sentence
**Text only. No behaviour changes in this card**, and §5 is the measurement that
says so: the same stimuli through the tree before and after produce a
**byte-identical** trace of every verdict, every `reading()`, every `inputs_ok`
and every readiness row's `(ok, warn)`.
---
## 1. The defect
0.10.1 is regulating a real GW5000S-BP. Two messages tell the operator that
healthy hardware has failed.
**The log line**, as emitted on the reference site on 2026-09-21:
> SAFETY-37: inverter-a battery-power register **is not following its own
> command** - STALE_READING: -3 unchanged for 36 s while the standing command
> moved 800 W to +1600 W - **the reading is not following**, so it is reported
> as MISSING rather than as a measurement … Treating it as MISSING, which
> commands 0 W.
**The readiness row**, at the same moment:
> NOT READY — battery power: `sensor.kelder_goodwe_master_stage1_goodwe_inverter_ac_power`
> **is missing or not numeric**
That entity was present, numeric and updating.
**SAFETY-37's conjunction is correct and is not touched by this card** —
`unchanged > 35 s AND |command| > 250 W AND |travel| > 250 W`. A register
genuinely stuck against a real command is exactly what it should catch, and a
pack that cannot comply is a state the site must stop in too. What was wrong is
what the sentences **concluded** from it.
## 2. Two worlds satisfy the conjunction
| | the register | the pack |
|---|---|---|
| **DEAD** | has stopped reporting reality | is doing what it was told |
| **REFUSED** | is reporting reality correctly | cannot comply — the BMS is refusing at its floor |
A refused pack holds still under any setpoint, so an honest register publishes
the same unchanged number a dead one does. **Nothing `freshness.py` is handed
separates them.** All three sentences asserted DEAD.
## 3. The live episode was REFUSED, and it is measured, not argued
Off the committed capture `scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz`,
whose bytes and decoder are already graded by `test_freshness.py` part 10a:
| | |
|---|---|
| the register | answered **-3 W for 850 s**, 10:51:24 → 11:05:34 |
| the commands during that hold | **+260, +660, +1060 W** — discharge only, never a charge |
| pack SoC throughout | **11 %** |
| first **charge** command after the restart | 11:05:31 at **-400 W** |
| the register moves | **11:05:34** — **3 s**, inside one 17.0 s obligation window |
**A register that answers a reversed command inside one obligation window had
not stopped reporting.** What would not move was the pack. The sentence the
operator read named the one thing in the loop that was telling the truth.
⚠️ What this does **not** establish: that no register is ever intermittently
wrong. It excludes a register that had simply stopped; it cannot exclude one
that was wrong and then right. That is the point — the new sentence claims
neither.
## 4. The fix, and why it is three sentences and not one helper
Each message states **what was observed** and names **both** explanations.
| where | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| `app/freshness.py` `_grade()` | *"…+1600 W - the reading is not following, so it is reported as MISSING…"* | *"…+1600 W. **TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE CANNOT TELL THEM APART**: the register may have stopped reporting reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command - a pack the BMS is refusing holds still under any setpoint, and an honest register then reads exactly like a frozen one. Either way the number cannot be read as this command's effect, so it is reported as MISSING…"* |
| `app/main.py` `_read_unit()` | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power **register is not following its own command** - %s."* | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power reading **did not move under a command that did, WHICH IS NOT BY ITSELF A VERDICT ON THE REGISTER** - %s."* |
| `app/main.py` `checks()` | *"{label}: {entity} **is missing or not numeric**"* | *"{label}: **no usable value this cycle from** {entity} - **and this row cannot tell which of two things that is**: the entity is missing or not numeric, or it is publishing a number that this controller is withholding (a freshness gate does exactly that, and names itself in a row of its own). Confirm the entity in Developer Tools before replacing it"* |
**Three sentences, three wordings, no shared helper.** The first two are a log
line about a **behaviour**; the third is a banner about a named **entity**, and
the two answer different questions ("what did the register do" against "can I
trust this entity"). A helper serving both would have to drop whichever half
the other caller does not need, and the half it dropped would be the
operator's next step. The log line names the pair **once**, inside the `%s` it
already interpolates, rather than in both of its own halves.
**No new input, and SoC is not wired.** `BOUNDS["soc"]` stays *STATED, NOT
WIRED*; telling the two worlds apart needs the pack floor (SAFETY-32's number)
and SoC (TEL-08's wiring), and a message honest about its own ambiguity needs
neither. Part 11b drives the two worlds at **50 %** and **11 %** SoC and
asserts the sentence does not move one byte.
**The readiness row does not branch.** `inv.batt_fresh.stale` is on the same
object at the same moment, and the row deliberately does not ask it: the same
loop renders the grid and SoC rows, which have no gate, and a branch per row
would be a second place where "why is this None" is decided. The gate already
has a surface — `stale_note()` rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below with
the whole STALE_READING sentence in it — so the operator's discriminator is
*"is that row there?"*, and part 11d asserts that row is **present in REFUSED
and absent in ABSENT**.
## 5. Behaviour is byte-identical, measured
`tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` prints two documents from one stimulus set.
The `behaviour` half contains **no sentence**: only `stale`, `reading()`,
`releases`, `held`, the window bookkeeping, `inputs_ok`, and every readiness
row's `(ok, warn)`. Run in the CI image, purged, `:ro`, against
`origin/release/1.0` **archived out of git** and against this branch:
| | |
|---|---|
| the committed live capture | **2390 reads**, 7 verdict edges |
| a swept grid of command × register schedules | **66 cells × 120 reads** — 1060 stale reads, 1309 `MISSING` readings, 6 releases |
| six driven controller worlds through the shipped read path | DEAD, REFUSED, ABSENT, HEALTHY, RELEASE, RETRIP — every read's `(batt, inputs_ok, stale)` and every `checks()` row's `(ok, warn)` |
| **result** | `6030175ed2ab9a4143e86e89a71d45c8ab041ac1c00121a3e3e023cd2b08996c` **on both trees** |
⚠️ **AND THE CONTROL IS INSIDE THE TOOL, BECAUSE AN IDENTITY BETWEEN TWO TREES
THAT ARE THE SAME TREE IS HABIT 4.** `--compare` refuses to report "behaviour
unchanged" unless the `sentences` halves **differ**. This card's first
invariance run was exactly that mistake — it archived a branch whose edits were
not committed yet, so `before` and `after` were the same code and the identity
was perfect and worthless.
Both of the tool's refusals are **driven**, not asserted:
| | |
|---|---|
| the same file compared with itself | `REFUSED: the sentences halves are IDENTICAL…`, exit **2** |
| `MOVE_W` 250.0 → 240.0 in the after tree | `BEHAVIOUR MOVED at 'sweep_stale_reads' / 'sweep_missing_reads' / 'sweep_trace'`, exit **1** |
| this card | `OK: sentences differ, behaviour is byte-identical.`, exit **0** |
## 6. The mutation battery
Each in its own `mktemp`'d copy (habit 18), purged on the host, mounted `:ro`,
graded by `tools/mutation_run.sh` in the CI image.
| | mutation | Δ bytes | named reds |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `_grade()` reverted to *"the reading is not following"* | -402 | **3** |
| M2 | the log line reverted to *"register is not following its own command"* | -80 | **2** |
| M3 | the row reverted to *"{entity} is missing or not numeric"* | -619 | **2** |
| M4 | *register* and *source* transposed between the two explanations | **0** | **1** |
| M5 | the second explanation deleted, the first kept | -216 | **1** |
| M6 | *"CANNOT TELL THEM APART"* replaced by *"IN ORDER OF LIKELIHOOD"* | -13 | **1** |
| M7 | the REFUSED world's ground truth set to the DEAD world's | 0 | **2** |
| M8 | the row's second cause deleted | -309 | **1** |
| M9 | `label` and `entity` transposed in the row | **0** | **3** |
| M10 | M1 + M2 + M3 together, i.e. exactly what 0.10.1 ships | -1101 | **5** |
| M11 | the accusation literals replaced by one that matches nothing | 0 | **1** |
⚠️ **M9's first run was a defect in this card's own check, and it is the one
worth reading.** The row was fetched with `[...][0]`. Transposing `label` and
`entity` makes the row unfindable, so the run died on an `IndexError` — a red
with **no name attached**, with every check after that line **ungraded**. That
is FCST-06's shape exactly. `_s56_row()` now returns a named absence instead of
raising, and a precondition grades it: **0 named reds before, 3 after.**
⚠️ **M11 is the other one aimed inward.** `not any(...)` over an empty list is
True, and so is one over three mistyped literals. The positive control runs the
same predicate against the three sentences **as 0.10.1 shipped them** and
requires it to find an accusation in every one, and every literal to match at
least one of them (habit 7: vary one thing from an accepted baseline).
## 7. What part 11 does not grade
* It does not show the live episode was a BMS refusal beyond doubt — see §3.
* It does not grade English. A sentence that named both explanations and then
said something useless about them would pass.
* The `no entity configured` branch beside the rewritten row is untouched and
ungraded: a blank entity really is the only thing it can be.
* The **grid-power and battery-SoC rows** go through the same rewritten line and
have no freshness gate today, so for them the second cause is a hypothesis
about this controller rather than a live possibility. That is weaker than the
battery-power case and is the price of not branching per row. A gate on either
signal — TEL-08 would be one — makes it exact.
* **SAFETY-58 is not touched** (the first read after a long rest trips before a
healthy register could answer), and neither is the 710/790 disagreement
between `test_freshness.py` and the changelog. Both are separate cards; the
second has a **fourth site** at
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-57-the-exit-from-a-stale-verdict.md:274` that a fix written
off the PR table alone would miss.
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
# SAFETY-57 — the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-57`, off `origin/master` @ `6f5e8e3`
(content-identical to `release/1.0` @ `8a57361`).
**Card:** SAFETY-57 — *"the freshness gate has no exit reachable from inside the state it creates"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No contact was made with 192.168.2.158 or
192.168.2.221. The one live system touched is `sniffer@192.168.2.167`, a
**passive** RS-485 listener with no address on the bus, and it was read only.
---
## 0. The five things a reader should take away
1. **The live episode is reproduced from the wire, not modelled.** The capture
is committed, the decoder is committed, and the box that produced it was
running the defect — so the `0 W` in the trace *is* the add-on's own
`inputs missing → command 0 W`. §2.
2. **Option 2 from the card — "do not arm the gate when the command is 0 W" —
already holds, and it is not the bug.** `_grade()` has required
`|standing| >= MOVE_W` since SAFETY-37. The trip happened at **+1060 W** and
the stuck state is at **0 W**; they are different moments. §3.
3. **The decision is not "how long", it is "when".** The verdict is withdrawn
when the **obligation that produced it is no longer standing** — SAFETY-13's
shape one module over. The 17.0 s is the obligation window that was already
derived in the file, taken at the **floor** of its band, and which half is
safe is the **opposite** of SAFETY-13's. §4.
4. **It costs 52 % exposure on a permanently dead register, and that number is
in the suite so it cannot be forgotten.** It is payable only because one
re-grading window (35 s) is shorter than both consumer holds (75 s, 85 s).
**No detection SAFETY-37 had is given back.** §5.
5. **The battery had been rescuing this code by accident.** 93 trips in the
committed 16-day capture; median wait for the BMS keep-alive pulse that
cleared them **143 s**, worst **5 h 57 m**. §6.
---
## 1. What was there, in the terms the code uses
`freshness.py`, `Freshness.submit()` and `_grade()`:
```python
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
...
self.stale = False # the only place the latch is cleared
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono):
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
return # sets the latch; never clears it
```
and `main.py:1777`, `inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()`, where `reading()`
answers `None` while `stale`. `inputs_ok` sees the `None`, the site holds for
`stale_input_s`, then files `Claim.set("safety", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "inputs
missing")` and keeps filing it.
The reason the latch exists is written in the class docstring and it is a good
one: without it the verdict oscillates at about 1 Hz, because declaring the
reading stale drops the command below `MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction,
which hands the held number straight back.
**The defect is that the only thing that ends it is an arrival carrying a
different number — and the state's own output is what stops the register being
asked for one.** The log line promised the opposite, in the same sentence that
announced the 0 W:
> *Treating it as MISSING, which commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the
> register reports a different value.*
---
## 2. Reproducing it, from the wire
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz` is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, 10:30–11:10 Europe/Brussels, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`. The decoder reports **0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC,
0 unknown shapes**, and its mode→sign convention is **graded off the capture**
rather than trusted: 298 commands at or under −1000 W are each answered one
obligation window later by a negative register reading, and not one positive.
| capture time | on the wire |
|---|---|
| 10:51:14 | `0x0518` = **−447 W**; the loop is charging |
| 10:51:19 | the command reverses: EMS **mode 3**, 260 W of discharge |
| 10:51:24.7 | `0x0518` = **−3 W**. The pack is at **11 %**, the BMS refuses the discharge, the inverter idles. **The register is healthy and truthful.** |
| 10:51:29.7 | the command reaches **+1060 W**. 800 W of travel |
| 10:52:21.7 | the setpoint is written **0 W** — this is the add-on's own §11.1 rule 1, recorded on the wire |
| …850.0 s | `0x0518` does not change value |
| …790.0 s | the setpoint does not change value |
| ~11:04 | **a person restarts the add-on** — not visible in this file, and the only thing that ends the episode |
| 11:05:31.7 | the restarted loop commands **−400 W of charge**, which the pack accepts at 11 % |
| 11:05:34.7 | `0x0518` = **−137 W** |
⚠️ **THE CAPTURE IS CLOSED-LOOP FOR THE WHOLE PARKED INTERVAL**, which is why
this is a reproduction and not a simulation: the box was running 0.10.0, so
every command in the trace is the shipped code's own. The only event inside the
window the file cannot account for is the human restart.
Replaying the shipped `_read_unit` loop at 1 Hz against those two series
(`test_freshness.py` part 10b):
| | stale at | clear at | parked |
|---|---|---|---|
| **before** (`release_s = inf`) | 10:52:00 | 11:05:35 | **815 s**, and `reading()` is `None` on all **812** reads from the trip to the first command a human put on the wire, with the register at −3.0 W in every one of them |
| **after** | 10:52:00 | **10:52:39** | **39 s**, with `0x0518` still answering the same **−3 W** |
⚠️ **THE COUNTERFACTUAL IS `release_s = inf`, AND IT IS GRADED RATHER THAN
CLAIMED.** With an infinite bound `_release()` never fires, `_open_window()` is
only ever called where the register moves, and the window pair is the
change-stamp pair — byte-for-byte the pre-SAFETY-57 conjunction. Part 10b
asserts that by driving part 1's own fresh/stale pair through both bounds and
comparing the verdict streams.
The replay also found a **one-read trip at 10:48:14** that clears one second
later. That is a pre-existing false positive and it is now recorded as
survivor 5 — §7.
---
## 3. What the card's option 2 actually buys, which is nothing here
The card offered *"do not arm the gate when the command being graded is 0 W"*
and warned that it might hold already. **It does, and it has since SAFETY-37**:
`_grade()` returns at `abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w`, and
`test_freshness.py` part 4 has a named check on that term, added because a
mutation removing it survived.
The warning in the card is the right one and it is worth writing down: **the
trip and the stuck state are different moments.** The gate armed at **+1060 W**,
where the conjunction is entirely correct — a command travelled 800 W and the
register did not move for 35 s. The site then went to **0 W** *because of the
verdict*. An entry-side rule cannot reach a state that is entered legitimately
and then persists. **The defect is the exit, and nothing else in the conjunction
is touched by this card.**
Option 3 — probing with a small non-zero command — was not taken and does not
need to be. It writes to a real actuator to test an assumption, and §4's rule
does not need a probe: the site's *normal* control resuming is the test, and it
is gated behind the same `inputs_ok` everything else is.
---
## 4. The decision: which verdicts get an exit, and what the bound is
> The stale verdict holds as before, **unless** the obligation that produced it
> is no longer standing — `|standing| < MOVE_W` — **and** it has been gone
> longer than the register would have needed to answer it. On a release the
> latch clears and a **new grading window** opens at that instant.
This is [[SAFETY-13]]'s §4 in a different module, and deliberately so: that card
established the house answer to "a latch with no exit" and its answer was *not*
a plain time bound but a **predicate plus a time bound**, where the predicate
says whether the state can end on its own. Here the predicate is that **the
question is no longer being asked.** A register under a 0 W command is obliged
to be nowhere, so a verdict about whether it is following cannot be tested, and
a verdict that cannot be tested may not stand for ever.
### 4.1 Why the window has to re-open, and what happens if it does not
`_grade()` compares the register's unchanged time against `unchanged_s` and the
command's travel against the command standing when the window opened. If a
release cleared the latch **without** re-opening the window, the first read at
which the resumed command travels 250 W would re-trip immediately — the
register would never get the 17 s in which it could answer, and the live
episode's recovery (a charge the pack **accepts**) would be killed inside two
seconds. Mutating exactly that (`graded_from` re-anchored to `changed_mono`,
+82 B) takes four named checks red.
The new window is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` = **35 s**, the same bound as entry,
because it is the same question — *does this register follow the commands issued
from now on?* — and there is no principled shorter answer to it. It is also the
number the exposure argument in §5 rests on, so it is not free to move.
### 4.2 `RELEASE_S` = `BATT_OBLIGED_S` = 17.0 s, and which half is safe
The quantity needed is *has the register had its chance to answer the command
standing now?*, and `freshness.py` already derives it as the floor of
`BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band:
```
6.0 s plant goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22
10.0 s publisher firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181, update_interval: 10s
1.0 s this add-on run_control()'s await asyncio.sleep(1)
```
⚠️ **IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND, NOT A SENSITIVITY PREFERENCE** — the mirror of
`MOVE_W` taking the **ceiling** of its own for the mirrored reason.
| | the question | the safe half | why |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-13's `SETTLE_CYCLES` | may the plant still be the **explanation**? | the **longer** half | a shorter bound stops believing the plant too early, and then it accuses |
| this one | may the verdict still be **tested**? | the **shorter** half | being wrong *long* is the failure being fixed; being wrong *short* costs one re-grading window, and §5 bounds that |
Below 17.0 s the release pre-empts the **cheaper exit** — the register answering
the new 0 W command by itself, which clears the latch on evidence rather than on
a timer. That is graded behaviourally rather than asserted: a register that
answers at +16 s clears by **movement** at `release_s = 17.0` with `releases`
still 0, and by **timer** at `release_s = 5.0`.
The family is computed and printed (habit 10): `5, 16, 17, 18, 35, inf` give
six distinct release instants, so no check in the file can confuse two of them.
### 4.3 Two clocks, and the operator reads the register's
`changed_mono` / `unchanged_s()` remain facts about the **register**: after a
release they go on reporting that it has not moved for 850 s, because it has
not. `graded_from` / `graded_s()` are the **verdict's** window. They coincide
until the first release. Collapsing them either lies to the operator or defeats
the re-grading, and both directions are mutated red.
The stale sentence's `unchanged for N s` slot carries the **register's** number;
a re-trip appends a clause naming the window and the grade count, so the two
durations cannot be read as one number that moved (habit 14).
---
## 5. What it costs, measured
Driven against a register frozen for good, 1201 reads, shipped defaults
(`test_freshness.py` part 10c):
| | parked | the held number reaches a consumer | releases |
|---|---|---|---|
| before | 1166 s | **35 reads (2.9 %)** | 0 |
| after | 571 s | **630 reads (52.5 %)** | 17 |
⚠️ **52 % IS PAID EVERY CYCLE, NOT OCCASIONALLY.** The period is
`stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S` (17 s) parked, then one 35 s window.
It is payable because of one inequality, and it is the inequality
`test_freshness.py` part 6 has graded against the shipped `config.yaml` since
SAFETY-37:
```
35 s (the re-grading window) < 75 s (circulation_hold_s) < 85 s (unit_sign_disagree_s)
```
Every unbroken run of exposure is **exactly one window**, so neither consumer
can reach a verdict inside one, and the re-trip that ends each run hands them a
`None`, which **clears** their windows rather than accumulating into them.
**And nothing SAFETY-37 detects is given back**, which is the half that makes
this a trade rather than a regression: a permanent `None` clears those same two
windows for ever as well, so on the shipped-before module those detectors are
*equally* unable to speak about the unit. What the held number does reach for
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()` — which
answers a large unexplained divergence by **freezing the output**, the
conservative direction and SAFETY-13's business — and the command itself is
derived from the **P1 meter**, never from `batt`.
### 5.1 The narrowing this does NOT take, named so the next card can
The live episode's register refused a **discharge** into an 11 % pack and then
followed a **charge** three seconds later. A refusal in one direction is not
evidence about the other, and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade
on the first command that crosses it instead of on a timer — which would shrink
the 52 % above. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately does not take
(see the `soc` row and TEL-08), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's number.
It is **not needed to give the state an exit**, and folding it in here would
make the exit depend on a second measurement being right.
---
## 6. The measurement that says the old exit was luck
`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/` replayed at 1 Hz through the shipped
conjunction (`test_freshness.py` part 8b): **93 trips in 16 days.** The only
thing that could clear any of them was the register carrying a different number,
and that took:
| | |
|---|---|
| minimum | 0.6 s |
| **median** | **143.4 s** |
| maximum | **21440.1 s** (5 h 57 m) |
| at or over the live episode's 710 s | **17 of 93** |
The short waits are the BMS keep-alive pulse — SAFETY-50 measured its ceiling at
508 W — twitching `0x0518` and satisfying the clearing rule **by accident**.
Over a fifth of the trips are cleared in under 20 s by something nothing in this
add-on asked for.
⚠️ **WHAT THAT REPLAY IS AND IS NOT.** The capture runs 2026-09-02…17 and
0.10.0 — the first version carrying this gate — was cut on 2026-09-16, so the
setpoint column is an **ungated** controller's. That makes each trip an honest
register-versus-command divergence off the real bus, and it makes the post-trip
command column something a gated box would **not** have written. The figure
taken from it is therefore the only one that does not depend on the command at
all — how long this register goes without changing value — and it **under**-states
the wait, because a site parked at 0 W gives the register even less reason to
move than the one recorded here.
---
## 7. Survivors, and the two things the battery found
The battery is 22 mutations over `app/freshness.py`, `app/main.py` and
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`, plus one over the committed capture itself. All
run through `ci_run.sh`, a mirror of `checks.yml`'s own step: a purged copy of
the tree, bind-mounted `:ro`, one file at a time, `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1`.
Per MUTATION.md habit 18 the harness's scratch file is `mktemp`ed per
invocation and the tree is fingerprinted **after the revert** as well as before;
every revert restored the recorded sha256 and byte count.
**21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.** The table is in the
PR body. Two of them are worth keeping here.
### 7.1 The equivalent mutant, argued rather than rounded off
Swapping `_release()` and `_grade()` in `submit()` is a **zero-byte** edit and
survived the whole battery. **It is not a missing fixture and no fixture can
close it**: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()`
only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on any
read, whichever runs first.
⚠️ **THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CODE CLAIMED THE ORDER WAS LOAD-BEARING**, in a
`⚠️` comment, with a reason that sounded right. It was false, and the battery is
what said so — **MUTATION.md habit 22 exactly, one card later: an explanation in
a comment is a claim, and this one had not been run.** The comment now states
the disjointness, and part 10 pins **that** — at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W — instead of pinning an order that is not observable.
### 7.2 The sibling that survived, which is habit 11 earning its place
`_release()`'s obligation test is `abs(standing_w) >= self.bound.move_w`.
Swapping `move_w` for `unchanged_s` — comparing **watts against 35** — survived
the file at **+5 B**, because **every fixture rested at exactly 0 W**, and 0 is
below both 35 and 250. They separate only in the band between them, and a site
can sit there: a peak-guard floor, a shadow substitution, any claim that wins
with a small non-zero number. Closed by a three-point fixture at 0 / 100 / 300 W
that asserts the 100 W case releases and the 300 W case does not.
### 7.3 ⚠️ And the instrument lied once, which is habit 16's second half
The first form of the `graded_from` mutation was
`float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`. It reported a **survivor at +21 B**, and
the tree fingerprint showed the edit really was on disk and really did run.
`changed_mono` is **0.0** in the dead-register fixture, and `0.0 or x` is `x` —
so the mutant was a *no-op on the fixture*, for a Python truthiness reason that
has nothing to do with the property under test. Rewritten as an explicit
`is None` test (+82 B) it is red on four named checks.
**A mutation is subject to every habit in MUTATION.md, including habit 4.** A
purge, a fingerprint and a byte delta all say the edit is present; none of them
says the edit *changed the answer on this stimulus*. MUTATION.md gains habit 19
for it.
---
## 8. What this does NOT fix, said plainly
**It does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register**, and it does not
try to. Both are re-graded on the same timer. §5.1 names what telling them apart
would need.
**It does not make the diagnosis right.** The line the operator reads still says
*"battery-power register is not following its own command"*, which is wrong in a
different way when the pack is simply empty. That wording is **SAFETY-56's**,
together with `main.py`'s NOT READY row, and it is deliberately untouched here —
two cards editing one sentence is how one of them silently loses. Only the
**escape clause** was rewritten, because this card is what made the old one
false, and part 10h has a named check asserting the diagnosis half is still
there so that rewrite has to be a deliberate act.
> ⚠️ **SINCE SUPERSEDED, WHICH IS WHAT THAT CHECK WAS FOR.** [[SAFETY-56]] is
> the deliberate act: all three sentences now name **both** explanations and
> accuse neither, and part 10h's check is inverted — it requires the accusation
> to be **gone**. Nothing else in this section moved; the escape clause above is
> still this card's and is untouched by it. See
> `DECISIONS/SAFETY-56-what-the-gate-cannot-tell-apart.md`, and
> `test_freshness.py` part 11 for the graded pair of worlds.
**Survivor 5 is older than this card and is not closed by it.** After a long
rest the unchanged clock is already past 35 s, so the **first** read carrying a
travelled command trips the gate — before the 17.0 s in which a healthy register
could have answered it. The live capture contains one (10:48:14, cleared one
second later). Its size is one `stale_input_s` hold, during which `cycle()`
returns at `inputs missing {n}s` and commands nothing differently. Fixing it
means measuring the unchanged clock from when the **obligation** appeared rather
than from the register's last move, which re-derives the 35.0 s bound and is a
different card.
**Nothing was measured on two inverters.** Inverter B does not physically exist
(`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b). Every two-unit figure in `test_freshness.py` is two
copies of A's behaviour with different numbers passed in.
**No deploy is proposed.** 0.10.0 is on the reference install and this branch's
CHANGELOG row is filed under it only because `test_version_gate.py` part 11b
requires the newest heading to be a version. Moving it, and deciding whether a
version is cut, is a PKG card's.
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# SAFETY-61 — the control task's death ends the process
## 0. The defect
`amain()` started `run_control()` as a bare task and waited on `stop`. Nothing
watched the task. An uncaught exception in `read_inputs()`, `cycle()` or
`publish()` ended the task silently, and `stop` was never set. The web UI, P1
and tariff tasks kept running, and the Supervisor saw a healthy container. The
traceback appeared only at shutdown. The ESP32's layer-1 veto zeroed the
inverter about 30 s later, so the hardware was safe. The pack then sat at 0 W
indefinitely while the add-on showed green.
`test_control_task.py` reproduces this on the pre-fix tree. The child process
reaches its 40 s deadline, has written no 0 W, and has logged nothing.
## 1. Decision: exit with status 70 after the ordinary wind-down
A done-callback on the control task (`control_task_done()`) handles the death.
It logs the traceback at CRITICAL at the moment of death, then sets `stop`.
`amain()` then runs the same wind-down that SIGTERM runs (`shutdown()` →
`command_site_zero()`, then cancel, then clean up). After that it raises
`ControlTaskDied`, and `main()` turns that into `SystemExit(70)` (sysexits
EX_SOFTWARE). A normal stop and `run_control()`'s own refusal path both set
`stop` before the task ends, so the callback ignores them. The refusal still
exits with 78.
**Why not restart the loop in the same process:**
* `cycle()` writes controller state before its awaits: `cycle_at`,
`peak_guard`, `allocation`, then `target`/`reason`, then the writes. An
exception between those steps leaves the controller half-updated. A loop
restarted in the same process would continue from a state that no boot ever
produces. A process restart rebuilds the controller from the Store, which is
the path every boot already runs.
* An unbounded retry is the invisible spin the card forbids. A bounded retry
would reimplement the Supervisor watchdog's own throttle: 10 restarts per
30 min, and 5 attempts with backoff (`apps/const.py`).
## 2. What happens after the exit, verified rather than assumed
* **Exit status reaches Docker.** The add-on image (s6-overlay, `init: false`,
`CMD /run.sh`) was run with `exec python3 -c 'raise SystemExit(70)'`.
`docker inspect` gave ExitCode 70. The same test with exit 0 gave 0, and an
uncaught exception gave 1.
* **Supervisor 2026.08.0** (`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor`,
source read from the image):
* A non-zero container exit is recorded as `ContainerState.FAILED`
(`docker/monitor.py`). The Supervisor logs *"App … exited with non-zero
exit code 70"* at ERROR (`apps/app.py container_state_changed`).
* The Supervisor restarts the add-on **only if the per-install Watchdog
toggle is on**. `watchdog_container()` returns when `not self.watchdog`.
The toggle defaults to **off** (`apps/validate.py`:
`vol.Optional(ATTR_WATCHDOG, default=False)`).
* Add-on containers get **no Docker restart policy**. The only
`restart_policy=` in the Supervisor belongs to the observer.
* `boot: auto` in `config.yaml` only controls starting at host boot. The
`watchdog:` key in `config.yaml` is a health-check URL, not a restart
policy, and this add-on does not set it.
* **So on a default install the add-on stays stopped after this exit.** The UI
shows it as stopped, its log holds the traceback, and the Supervisor log holds
an ERROR line. The pack is at 0 W, which is the same physical state as before
this card. The difference is that 0 W is written immediately instead of after
the ~30 s veto, and the add-on no longer shows green. With the Watchdog toggle
on, the Supervisor restarts the add-on.
* **Not verified:** an actual restart by a running Supervisor. That would need a
live Supervisor, and the only one available is the live house.
## 3. Left open for the owner
* Whether `DOCS.md` should tell installers to enable Watchdog. DOCS.md is not
this card's file.
* Setting the Watchdog toggle from inside the add-on (`/addons/self/options`)
was rejected here, because it would change a user setting without the user
knowing.
## 4. Scope: the siblings, and why they are not supervised
* `run_tariff_refresh()` and the P1 HTTP and HA transports already catch
`Exception` inside their loops by design, and the values they feed are
age-bounded downstream.
* The P1 MQTT source *returns* on purpose when it is misconfigured. Making every
long-lived task's end exit the process would turn that deliberate fail-safe
into a restart loop.
* Only the control task is supervised.
## 5. `hass.py`: an undecodable body is an absence
A non-JSON `200` served as `text/html` was **already** treated as an absence,
because aiohttp's `ContentTypeError` is a `ClientError`. The reads that actually
escaped were these three:
* a malformed body labelled `application/json`, which raises `JSONDecodeError`
(a `ValueError`);
* a JSON body that is not an object, which raises `AttributeError` in
`number()` and `limits()`;
* an undecodable error body in `call()`, which raises `UnicodeDecodeError`.
All three were measured against aiohttp 3.13.5. The first two now read as
`None`, and the third is now a failed write (`False`).
## 6. Status row
`checks()` now starts with a *control loop* row showing how long ago the loop
last completed a pass. The row turns red once that age exceeds
`FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S`. The heartbeat is sent from this loop, so past that age
layer 1 has zeroed the inverter.
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
# SAFETY-73 - a battery that refuses, with two or more inverters
**Decided 2026-09-27 by the owner, on the phase A plan (option R). All four
new questions answered yes. SAFETY-52's four decisions carry over.**
## The defect
SAFETY-52 held a refusing battery at 0 W at one inverter only. At N>1
(`main.py` passed `refused=None`) nothing closed a unit that gives ~0 W while
its state of charge reads above its configured cut-out, so the allocator kept
handing it its weighted half. Measured on the real `Controller`, two units,
house 3000 W, A cut out:
| register | law | B gives | grid | A's gate trips / h |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| flat -4 W | old | 533 W | +2471 W | 46 (each stops the whole site) |
| flat -4 W | new | 2000 W (its rating) | +1004 W | 1 |
| jitter | old | 1910 W | +1094 W | 0 |
| jitter | new | 2000 W | +1004 W | 0 |
House 1200 W, which B alone carries: old +671 W (flat) and +284 W (jitter)
standing import, new -16 W. Both cut out: old keeps asking two empty batteries
(+1910 W each on the jitter shape), new holds the site at 0 W.
## What was decided
1. **A refusing unit is closed in that direction** by its own P_SAFETY unit
claim, source `refused`. It engages when the unit gives under
`REFUSED_BELOW_W` (100 W) for `SETTLE_CYCLES` (12) cycles, spanning at least
`REFUSED_SPAN_S` (22 s), in one direction while asked more than `PROBE_W`
(200 W), or when its stale-reading gate
trips on a held reading under 100 W. The allocator then hands its share to
the others within their own limits (owner decision 1). It is a hard unit
limit that always intersects, so OPT-11's P_MODE layer fits inside it.
2. **It binds every strategy's ask on that unit** (decision 2): peak guard,
arbitrage and maintenance are placed around it like the loop.
3. **A refusal to give power above the configured cut-out** logs INFO plus one WARNING ending
in `REFUSES_ABOVE_CUT_OUT` (decision 3). SAFETY-42/43 no longer report such a
unit: its share is 0 W, and `account()` treats it as parked.
4. **All units refusing the same way** pass that sign to `compute()`, so the
site holds 0 W with SAFETY-52's law (decision 4). Probes go one unit at a
time.
5. **Probe:** every 15 min for 34 s the claim becomes a pin at +-200 W and the
others carry the rest. The pin stands only while the resolved site target
asks at least 200 W its way; otherwise it would make a sibling take the
opposite direction, so it falls back to the closed limit for that cycle.
6. **Exits:** a reading of 100 W or more in the held direction (probe or not);
100 W or more taken the other way for 12 cycles (charge at the floor; one
cycle of the loop overshooting through zero is not enough); stop or start.
On every exit the site target and integrator restart from the watts on the
wire, or the reopened unit is handed a parked remainder at once.
**Why 200 W and not `saturation_w`.** A unit's share is often small: a 400 W
night load split two ways asks 200 W of each. With 500 W the empty battery
kept a phantom share that SAFETY-43's relative arm then reported as not
delivering, the ERROR decision 3 replaces. Shares of 200 W or less that give
under 100 W are "too small to call" in `account()`: the sibling covers the
meter and nothing is asked of the empty battery that matters.
**Why one direction throughout.** On TEST-19's flapping family a command that
swaps sign each cycle reads ~0 through the plant's lag: 42 engagements in 21
no-fault runs without the rule, 0 with it.
**N=1 is unchanged.** Every SAFETY-73 path is gated on `len(inverters) > 1`.
`test_refusal_units.py` part 6 runs SAFETY-52's whole suite with every
SAFETY-73 method made to raise.
## Evidence
- `test_refusal_units.py`: cases a, b and c on both register shapes against
the old behaviour, probes and their spacing, one-at-a-time probing, the
recovery reseed, each exit, the small-ask and small-site-target cases, the
WARNING, the status row and shadow mode. Mutations U1-U13 in its docstring.
- **No false engagements.** TEST-19's no-fault campaign (admin/goodwe
`sim/delivery_window.py` families, 2640 runs at N=2 and 2640 at N=1, every
unit executing its share) graded with the engage clause: 0 engagements, the
longest qualifying streak 5 cycles against 12. The grader is
`goodwe-session/scratch_s73/s73_nofault.py`.
- **Recovery.** Case a, A recovering into a house that fell below the parked
target: worst grid +0 W with the reseed. Phase A measured -1059 W without the
reseed and the site hold.
## Review changes
- **The evidence must span 22 s, not only 12 cycles.** At a 1 s meter the 12
cycles were 11 s, shorter than a healthy reading's lag (dead time plus a
10-17 s publish). The reviewer's harness (real `Controller`, both units with
6 s dead time and a 13-17 s publish, load steps 300/3000 W every 2 min) then
refused both healthy units 10-16 times an hour, and each time the site held
0 W: +50-85 Wh import an hour and a +4.6 kW grid peak against +3.7 kW without
the refusal. At a 2 s tick there were none. `REFUSED_SPAN_S` is
`(SETTLE_CYCLES - 1) * LOOP_TICK_S`, so 2 s and slower ticks are unchanged.
- **The cut-out WARNING is for a refusal to give power only.** A full battery
that stops taking charge is always above its cut-out level, and the WARNING
told the installer to check a setting that has nothing to do with it.
## Not covered
- A unit that gives a steady part of its ask (100 W or more) is a limit, as at
N=1. SAFETY-42/43 still report it.
- `pack_permissions` stays SoC-based, so the peak guard may size a shave with a
refusing battery counted. The shortfall shows as `unmet_w`.
- A wedged unit (HW-01) reading ~0 W is now shown as a refusal, not reported as
not delivering. Its share still moves, which is the gain SAFETY-42 measured.
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
# SAFETY-78 - a maintenance drain at two inverters
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-29.** Fixes MAINT-05 §6 (OPT-11 P1 F1, UX-13 P3
check 5, OPT-11 P3 F4). Tests: `test_safety78.py`.
**The defect.** At N>=2 the drain pins its pack (a unit SET at
`P_MAINTENANCE`) and the site target is split around the pin. Whenever the
site target was below the pin, the other pack had to charge. The allocator
refuses opposite directions (SAFETY-25 §0a, SAFETY-31), so the site went to
0 W and logged `ARBITER: REFUSED` every cycle. That covers a house below the
drain rate, a grid-charge trade, and a house above it too: after a refusal the
loop restarts from 0 W and its 400 W slew step is below the pin again.
**The fix.** While a pack drains at N>=2, main.py files a site limit
`drain`, `lo` = what the pin really places (`allocator.pin_w()`: the drain
rate inside that pack's own hard limits), at `P_MAINTENANCE`. So the site
target is never below the pin and the other pack only adds power in the same
direction. Opposite splits stay forbidden.
- The order is the arbiter's own: a safety SET (100) outranks the limit and
the pin, so everything parks; the peak floor (50) and the drain floor are
both applied, so the higher wins; a trade or the loop below the drain is
lifted to it.
- Below the drain rate the drained pack exports the rest, as the drain does at
N=1 (`maintenance.py`: "forced discharge, exports the surplus"). Holding it
to the house load would make N=2 drain differently from N=1; that is an
owner question, not this fix.
- A draining pack that can place nothing (a refusal, a stale link) adds no
floor, and the wait is logged once per episode.
- With battery modes on, no pack is a grid charger while another drains
(`modetrade.decide(draining=)`, why `cycle`), and the other battery's card
says why (`other_cycle`). Not while the drain waits: no floor is filed
then, so the other battery may charge from solar.
- Not filed at N=1, where the drain is the site SET itself: byte-identical
(`tools/safety78_identity.py`, which hashes the claims too).
**Not changed (measured in the PR #154 review, follow-ups).**
- At N=1 a drain (60) outranked the peak floor (50): a 5000 W house imported
3000 W against a 2500 W limit. Fixed by [[SAFETY-83]].
- At N=2 a maintenance CHARGE in a cheap window has the same stall: the
charging pack's `hi = -floor` against the loop asking the other to give is
refused on 141 of 261 cycles. The mirror fix is a site `hi`, which can meet
the peak floor's `lo` (0 W), so it is not this card. Fixed by [[SAFETY-84]].
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# SAFETY-79 — the peak guard keeps a margin below the peak limit
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-28 (owner decision).**
## Decision
The peak guard aims `peak_margin_w` under the limit it holds: under
`peak_cap_w`, or under a month peak already banked above it
(`quarter_target_w()`). `peak_margin_w` is a setting: default 50 W, range
0-500 W, whole watts. An install without the key gets 50.
**Why (owner):** the guard aimed exactly at the cap, and in the OPT-11 P1 test
a quarter banked 3501.9 W against a 3500 W limit (OPT-11-P1-test-report.md,
check 4). A peak even 1 W over still sets the billed peak. It is a setting and
not a constant because the add-on is sold to several sites.
**Banked peak (review, 2026-09-29):** the PR first aimed at a banked month
peak as it stood. That can bank a few W over it, which raises the bill the
same way; and a peak banked between cap - margin and the cap (common in the
month an install upgrades, since the old guard held quarters at the cap) was
aimed at exactly, so one overshoot went over the cap. The margin now applies
under it too. Cost: up to `peak_margin_w` of a peak already paid for goes
unused (more discharge, less charge headroom); no bill cost. Undo is one line
in `quarter_target_w()`.
## What uses which number
- **the aim:** `peakguard.decide()` (the claim's floor, and so arbitrage's
`charge_headroom_w()` and OPT-11's give-way, which read it), and, as cap -
margin, `shaping_suspended()` and `maintenance_charge_floor()` (the forecast
checks, via `Controller.peak_aim_w()`).
- **the real cap (reporting and billing):** `PeakTracker` (month peak,
headroom, 80 % warning), the decision's `ceiling_w` and every notice and
status row built from it, Home's limit, and `validate.config_notes()`.
## Checks
`peak_margin_w: 0` is byte-identical to ed739d4 (test_peak_margin.py part 1,
digests from tools/safety79_identity.py, which also runs a maintenance charge
with a forecast). validate.py rule 12 refuses a value outside 0-500, not
whole, or not below `peak_cap_w`.
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
# SAFETY-81 — no false "Load too high for battery" alarms
**Status: 2026-09-29, owner go for the card. Review kept the 10 W tolerance
as a constant and added the 10 s hold.**
## Defect
The SAFETY-79 test (SAFETY-79-test-report.md, F1/F2) saw 6 false alarms in 7.
The alarm fired whenever `decide()` clamped its floor to the rating
(`saturated`). Three things set that while the quarter landed on target:
- **Double count.** `decide()` sizes from the held meter reading plus the
battery reading. When the meter sample predates the battery's last increase,
the increase is counted twice. It happens under noise, and at each quarter
start, where the battery is back while the held sample is still the spike.
- **The aim, not the cap.** `saturated` is graded against cap − margin, so at
margin 50 noise needs 50 W less to trip it (F2).
- **Last seconds.** The gain 900 / remaining turns a few W over the aim into
thousands of W wanted, with the battery far from its rating.
## Decision
The alarm needs `saturated` and `peakguard.load_too_high()`: with the battery
at full power from now on, the quarter still ends more than `ALARM_MISS_W`
(10 W) over the real limit (`ceiling_w`). That is the miss itself, without the
gain. The battery reading it uses is the lower of this cycle's and the last
one's. It must hold for `ALARM_HOLD_S` (10 s). At most one notification per
quarter, because near the threshold the test flickers with the meter; the
ERROR log line is written for every episode.
**Why 10 W:** at margin 0 the guard itself lands up to +5.7 W over (SAFETY-79
test, check 5), and those misses are real but tiny; the alarm would fire in
the last second of most guarded quarters. The margin (default 50) is the fix
for them. Cost: a real miss of 10 W or less is not alarmed; at a capacity
tariff of the order of EUR 50 per kW a year, 10 W in one month is cents.
Review measured +13 W on a 10 kW two-unit site at margin 0, not saturated, so
no alarm: the tolerance only matters when the battery is at its rating. A
constant, not an option: `peak_margin_w` is the owner's knob.
**Why the hold (review):** the test assumes the load now lasts the rest of
the quarter. A load over cap + battery for ~5 s every 30 s (`sine4500_fast`,
a cycling hob or heater) alarmed at each quarter start while the quarter
landed under the aim. The hold stops that.
**Cost:** a real alarm comes 10-12 s later than on 5a4cdc2 (`step6500` at
1211 s, not 1201 s); a slow ramp 20 s later (`ramp6500`), as it waits for the
real cap. While the battery refuses or its reading is lost, the alarm waits
until the quarter is lost even at full battery (27-60 s later in review runs);
those faults have their own alarms. A load over cap + battery for more than
10 s still alarms even if the quarter later lands under. `ALARM_HOLD_S = 0`
removes the hold.
## Not changed: the 1 s spike itself
The cycle after a quarter boundary and before the new quarter's first meter
sample still sees 0 s left, files no claim, and an Off battery drops to 0 W for
one cycle. That is the same edge tick as OPT-15 F1, so it is left to OPT-15.
Control is unchanged here: every command in `tools/safety81_sim.py` is
byte-identical to 5a4cdc2 (test_safety81.py part 1).
The double count also moves control, not only the alarm: on a late sample the
guard asks for the full rating for one cycle (edge4600 at 902 s: 2000 W where
1150 W holds the aim). Left to a follow-up card.
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
# SAFETY-83 - the peak guard outranks the maintenance drain at N=1
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-29 (owner go, P1).** Follows SAFETY-78's "Not
changed" list. Tests: `test_safety83.py`.
**The defect.** At N=1 the drain is the site SET at `P_MAINTENANCE` (60). The
peak floor is a limit at `P_PEAK` (50), and clause 2 applies only limits at or
above the winner, so the floor was ignored and the house imported what the
drain left. A 5000 W house under a 2500 W limit and a 2000 W drain banked
3000 W quarters; on the owner's settings (limit 3500, drain 2500, margin 50) a
breach starts at about 5950 W.
**The fix.** While a drain owns the setpoint at N=1 and the peak floor asks
for more than the drain rate, `main.py` (`_peak_over_drain()`) refiles that
peak claim at `P_MAINTENANCE`. The arbiter then applies it: the target is the
floor, still inside the safety limits, and a safety SET (100) still parks
everything. Where the floor is at or below the drain rate nothing changes.
- The order in effect is now the same at N=1 and N=2: safety limits and the
SAFETY-73 refusal > peak guard (with the SAFETY-79 margin) > maintenance >
modes > trade > loop (`arbiter.py`, beside the priorities).
- The drain keeps counting: the battery discharges at least the drain rate on
every cycle, so the cycle is not reset or stalled; it only ends sooner.
- Below the drain rate the rest is still exported (owner, 2026-09-29).
- Identity: `tools/safety78_identity.py --diff` against 35cdffe changes only
cycles where the guard asked for more than the drain; after such an episode
the commands are identical again and only the log and the idle loop's
integrator differ. N=2 is unchanged.
**Not changed.**
- Between the drain rate and the peak aim, the house still imports what the
drain leaves (N=1 behaviour kept by the identity). At N=2 the loop covers it.
- A maintenance HOLD (0 W, 120 min, battery full) still outranked the peak
guard at N=1. Fixed by [[SAFETY-86]].
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# SAFETY-84 - a maintenance charge at two inverters
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-30.** Follows SAFETY-78's "Not changed" list.
Tests: `test_safety84.py`; identity: `tools/safety84_identity.py`.
**The defect.** In a cheap window the charging pack files its own
`hi = -charge` (P_MAINT_SHAPE). At N>=2 the loop's site target sat above it
(a house to cover, or its 400 W slew step from 0 W), so the other pack had to
give while this one charged. The allocator refuses opposite directions
(SAFETY-31), so the site sat at 0 W whatever the house
(`tools/safety84_identity.py` on 9d5b7d1: 436 of 480 cycles refused). N=1
was fine.
**The fix.**
- While a pack's own limits make it charge at N>=2, `main.py` files a site
limit `charge`, `hi` = what that pack's own `hi` places
(`allocator.hi_w()`, whole W as the allocator rounds). The site target is
never above it, so the other pack only adds power in the same direction.
Opposite splits stay forbidden. Mirror of SAFETY-78's `drain` floor.
- Peak guard first (owner order, SAFETY-83). The charge is sized to the
quarter's headroom under the aim (`charge_headroom_w()`, cap or banked peak
minus `peak_margin_w`), so it charges less instead of stopping: the meter
sits on the aim and the guard does not need to step in. Where the house
alone is over the aim the guard engages, the shaping is suspended as before
(`shaping_suspended()`) and no `charge` is filed, so the guard's `lo` and
this `hi` never meet in one cycle (no `lo > hi`, no park at 0 W).
Without the headroom sizing the aim still held (the suspension did it), but
a battery gave power back on 285 of 540 cycles at a 3000 W house
(test_safety84.py part 2).
- A site stop (a safety SET above P_MAINT_SHAPE) sizes the charge to 0 W:
the unit `hi` is a hard limit, so a charge under a 0 W stop needs the other
pack to give. It was refused, with an ARBITER line, on most cycles of the
stop (test_safety84.py part 4). The stop still parked the site at 0 W.
- A pack that cannot take the charge (a refusal, a full pack, a stale link)
files no ceiling; the other pack follows the loop.
- Not filed at N=1: byte-identical (`tools/safety84_identity.py`, which hashes
every claim, in and out of a cheap window and under a banked peak).
**Not changed.**
- At N=1 the charge is not sized to the headroom: the guard still suspends it
and the battery gives until the quarter is safe. The same sizing would fit
there; that is an owner question, not this fix.
- Outside a cheap window (`hi = 0`, solar only) nothing is filed, at any N.
- A HOLD (later fixed by [[SAFETY-86]]) and the "Battery is not keeping up"
alarm (SAFETY-85) are untouched. In the identity runs that alarm's log line
comes as often at N=2 as at N=1 (2 in 480 cycles).
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
# SAFETY-85 - no false "not keeping up" while another owner sets the battery
**Status: implemented 2026-10-01, for review.** Tests: `test_safety85.py`.
**The defect.** "Battery is not keeping up" (SAFETY-40, `goodwe_integrator_bound`)
fired about every 2.5 min during maintenance (drain, charge, HOLD) and under the
peak guard, while the battery gave exactly what it was told. Each warning
re-created the HA notification. Rig counts: 24 in an hour (SAFETY-83 F1), 43 in
7 episodes (SAFETY-86), 35 in 16 (SAFETY-87), 12 in 6 (SAFETY-84). The page
counter counted cycles (861), not episodes.
**Cause, measured on the real Controller.**
- N=1: when a higher claim decides, `cycle()` re-seeds the integrator from the
target each cycle, then `compute()` adds `gain * error` for a grid error the
loop does not own. Target + kick crosses the rail and sets `i_clamped`. The
carried integrator is not wound (SAFETY-48 caps the lead at one slew step),
so control comes back one slew step at a time.
- N>=2: a maintenance pin is a unit claim. The loop stays the site winner and
winds to its rail for watts the pinned battery may not give. When the pin
lifts, the site jumps: 2500 W in one cycle when a HOLD ends under a 4500 W
house, 1390 W when a charge pin lifts (`s84 n2_charge_dear`, t=1800 s).
**Decision.** Three rules; the alarm, its text and its id are unchanged.
1. **The loop's clamp counts only on a cycle the loop decided.** The winner is
the loop. Its number is on the wire, or only a rating (`device`,
`supervised`) cut it. No bound held it, and nothing was unmet.
(`Controller._loop_alarm_input`.)
2. **A battery another owner set to discharge alarms when it gives less than
it was told.** This covers every battery on a cycle the loop did not
decide, and a battery with its own pin otherwise. The test is more than
`saturation_w` short of the least it stood at over `SHORT_CYCLES` cycles
and `SHORT_SPAN_S` (the plant's measured settle, SAFETY-13/73), for
`saturation_cycles` cycles in a row (`clamp.delivery_short`). It covers a
real shortfall during maintenance or under the peak guard. Before, that
shortfall was silent unless the kick happened to reach the rail (house
1000 W, drain 2000 W, battery gives nothing: 0 warnings before, 4 in 10 min
now).
3. **At N>=2, while maintenance holds a battery, the loop is bounded** by
OPT-11's `loop_bound()` (what the batteries may place). It does not wind,
and control comes back one slew step a cycle. Why maintenance only: that is
where the jump was measured and where the owner order puts maintenance
above the loop. Other N>=2 limits (pack cut-out, SAFETY-73 refusal) keep
the old law. Rule 1 still silences them (the target is unmet), so they no
longer warn either.
Fixing the windup was chosen over only ignoring the wound part, because at
N>=2 the wound integrator moves real watts at hand-back. At N=1 there was
nothing to fix: re-seeding already prevents windup.
**What SAFETY-03/40 protect is kept.** With the loop in charge, the integrator
bound still warns (a runaway, a house above the rating), and a saturated
inverter under the loop's own command still does not alarm (SAFETY-03 AC 2):
rule 2 grades only batteries another owner set.
**The counter.** `ClampWatchdog.bound_episodes` counts episodes that had a
bound engagement. The status row shows it ("N times since start").
`bound` (cycles) stays for the log and the tests.
**Re-pinned digests.** Every change is intended; nothing at N=1 moves a watt.
| digest | what changed |
|---|---|
| s78 `n1_drain_owner` | the false clamp rows are gone from the log; commands identical |
| s78 `n2_drain`, s84 `n2_charge`, `n2_charge_banked`, s79 `n2_maint` (test_peak_margin) | loop reason (`mode-bound`), integrator and loop claim while bounded; commands identical |
| opt11 `n2_maint` (test_modes) | A drops out at t=1655 s: B follows the house at once, 8 cycles differ (max 920 W) |
| s84 `n2_charge_dear` | A's pin lifts at t=1800 s: 400 W a cycle, not a 1390 W jump; the surplus step after it; 98 cycles |
test_safety86's "without the ceiling the log floods" now needs the ceiling
and the bound both removed: either one alone keeps the loop inside what the
batteries can give. The `alarmed()` helpers in test_safety84/86 also read
SAFETY-81's quarter stamp, because ALLOCATOR rows can push its row out of
the 40-row log.
**Review (PR #163).** The first draft graded each battery against last
cycle's command and graded charges too. On plantsim's battery (10 s lag) at
the live 2 s meter, every drain or charge start warned once, and an N=2 drain
or HOLD under the peak guard with a stepping house warned 15 times an hour. A
maintenance charge tapering near full warned 11 times in 50 min, which
SAFETY-42 section 7 had ruled out. With the settle window and discharge only:
0 in all of those cases. A battery that gives nothing still warns, lagging
or not. At a hypothetical 20 s lag, it warns at most twice an hour. The cost:
a battery that does not take a charge another owner set is not named by this
alarm (the same gap SAFETY-42 states; the charge has its 36 h timeout).
`test_safety85.py` part 7.
**Not changed, open for the owner.**
- With the loop in charge and the house above the batteries' total rating,
it still warns (SAFETY-40). On the rig's 2 x 2000 W N=2, most of SAFETY-84's
count came from houses of 4500 and 6500 W.
- TEL-10's `Loop reason` reads `mode-bound` while the maintenance bound holds
the loop, with modes off. DOCS lists the value with both meanings.
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
# SAFETY-86 - the peak guard outranks the maintenance HOLD
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-30 (owner).** Follows SAFETY-83's "Not changed"
list. Tests: `test_safety86.py`.
**The defect.** The HOLD (battery resting full after the maintenance charge)
is a SET of 0 W at `P_MAINTENANCE` (60), above the peak floor (`P_PEAK`, 50),
so the floor did not bind. At N=1 a 6500 W house banked 6500 W quarters and
'Load too high' fired (SAFETY-83 rig test, check 4). At N=2 only the other
battery gave: 4500 W against a 3950 W aim (SAFETY-84 rig test, check 6).
**The fix** (`main.py`, `_peak_over_hold()`).
- N=1: during a HOLD a peak floor above 0 W is refiled at `P_MAINTENANCE`, as
for a drain (SAFETY-83). The battery gives the floor; the Why reads "raised
for the peak limit".
- N>=2: the holding battery's pin is raised to the floor minus what the other
live batteries may place (their hard `hi`, or their pin). The others give
first, the holding one only the shortfall. Why this split and not the
allocator's shares: the hold is maintenance and outranks the others' use
(owner order), and the owner rule for an Off battery is the same, "give way
only for the shortfall". A battery Off by its mode (P_MODE, below
maintenance) therefore still gives before the holding one.
- N>=2, while the holding battery gives: a site `hold` ceiling at the floor
(P_MAINTENANCE), so the loop does not ask for watts the hold keeps back.
Without it the moving pin re-logged the ALLOCATOR "could not be placed"
row each cycle and filled the action log (review, PR #161).
- Below the aim nothing changes: the floor is 0 W, the hold is 0 W, the rows
are identical to before (test_safety86.py part 2).
- A site stop (a SET above `P_PEAK`) decides alone: nothing is raised at N>=2,
and the refiled floor at N=1 stays under `P_SAFETY`. If another battery is
pinned to charge (a SAFETY-73 probe) the pin is not raised, so the site is
never split both ways.
- The hold resumes by itself: the rule is evaluated each cycle, so when the
guard lets go the command is 0 W again.
**The level dips below the target: the hold finishes anyway.** Owner
decision 2026-10-01: the HOLD ends on its clock (`maintenance_hold_min`) even
when the peak guard pulls the level down; no top-up. A top-up would re-enter
CHARGE (up to 36 h, `CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN`) and keep the site's one maintenance
slot meanwhile.
**Not changed.**
- The peak guard still grades the emptiest battery (SAFETY-32): at N=2 with
B under `peak_soc_floor` the floor is limited and A holds even when it is
full (SAFETY-87).
- "Battery is not keeping up" during maintenance (SAFETY-85), the N=2 charge
flapping (SAFETY-88) and the N=1 charge headroom sizing are untouched.
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# SAFETY-87 - the peak guard uses every battery that can still give
**Status: DECIDED 2026-10-01 (owner card).** Follows SAFETY-86's "Not
changed" list. Tests: `test_safety87.py`; identity:
`tools/safety87_identity.py`.
**The defect.** At N>=2 the guard graded the emptiest battery against the
highest floor ([[SAFETY-32]] §3). One battery under `peak_soc_floor` made the
whole site floor-limited: the claim asked for 0 W and the reserve alarm fired,
even with the other battery full. Measured: a maintenance charge (A at 11 %)
raised the alarm 10 times while both batteries gave 2000 W and the quarter
landed on the aim (SAFETY-84 rig test, check 3); a HOLD (A at 99 %, B at
15 %) left A at 0 W and banked 4051 W, raising the month peak (SAFETY-86
review; rig case 7a: 4563.8 W).
**The fix.**
- `decide()` and its call are unchanged. At N>=2 `Controller._peak_on_able()`
then grades each battery on its own floor (`peakguard.reserve_split()`).
One at or under it is *held*. The others that are live and not refusing
(SAFETY-73) are *able*.
- A floor-limited decision is re-taken on the able batteries
(`peakguard.place_on_able()`): their own permission (min SoC against max
floor, among them), and a floor of `min(need, able_w)`. `able_w` is their
rating plus the drain a held battery gives anyway (its maintenance pin).
- The held batteries weigh 0 in the split while the site gives
(`arbiter.resolve(reserve=)`), so the floor lands on the able ones. During a
HOLD, a held battery is not counted among the "others" (`_peak_over_hold()`),
so the holding battery covers the need.
- Floor-limited now means: some battery is held and the able ones cannot hold
the aim. The claim still asks them for `able_w`. The alarm fires only if
they miss the real limit at full power for `ALARM_HOLD_S`, the same test as
'Load too high' (`_reserve_short()`), so a one-cycle miss at a quarter's end
is not an alarm. With nothing able (all held, or the rest refusing or
dropped) it is the old state: 0 W, immediate alarm.
- The alarm and the row name `held`, each battery graded on its own floor. The
old code named batteries against the site's highest floor.
- Page: the two peak rows carry `runs`. A red `runs` row gives the banner its
title without "Not ready", and the Home page is not shown as held at 0 W.
Rows that do stop control still outrank it.
**How SAFETY-32's concern is still covered.** SAFETY-32 took min(SoC) against
max(floor) so the guard never sizes a forced discharge a battery's own BMS
stops. Now no battery at or under its own floor is asked for the peak: it is
graded on its own floor, and an unread SoC or unknown cut-out counts as held.
The min/max pairing still decides permission, over the able batteries. The
roster verdict `decide()` echoes (`soc`, `soc_floor`) is kept, so SAFETY-32's
call-site and reduction checks still bite. What changed is only that one held
battery no longer stops the others. One exception, with battery modes on: see
Open.
**Maintenance pins beside a held battery** (review). A draining battery that
may still give is raised from its drain rate towards its rating for the peak
floor, after the others (`_drain_over_reserve()`; peak > drain), else the
floor's rest landed on the held battery. In a HOLD, a held battery counts its
own pin (a drain) among the others, and a held battery pinned to charge stops
the raise (never split both ways).
**Before -> after** (test_safety87.py, rig of 2 x 2500 W, aim 3450 W):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| charge, A 11 %, house 4500 | 3 reserve alarms, quarter 3450 | 0 alarms, 3450 |
| HOLD, A 99 % / B 15 %, house 5500 | A 0 W, B 2488 W, 3 alarms | A 2054 W, B 0 W, 0 alarms, 3450 |
| HOLD, house 6500 | A 0 W, B 2488 W, 4051 W | A 2500 W, B 0 W, 4014 W, 1 alarm (A alone is short) |
| HOLD, month peak 4000, house 6000 | A 0 W, B 2488 W, 3551 W, alarms | A 2054 W, B 0 W, 3950 (peak - margin), 0 alarms |
| both under the reserve | alarm | alarm (unchanged) |
| N=1, every scenario | | byte-identical |
**Open, for the owner.**
- The loop still draws a held battery (SAFETY-25 option A: the reserve binds
the peak guard only). It gives last, after the able ones. So with house 6500
in the charge case, B alone cannot hold the aim, the alarm fires as
specified, and the loop then lands the quarter on the aim from A. The text
says "cannot keep … alone", not "will go over", so it stays true.
- Battery modes on, A Off and B held: when B alone can place the floor, OPT-11
keeps A resting and B gives it. When B cannot, A gives first. Making Off give
before a held battery in the first case needs a third allocator tier. The
same at N=3: A Off, B held, C able, floor 4000 W gives C 2500, B 1500, A 0.
Until then, with modes on, a held battery can give for the peak.
- The notification and row text live in `messages.py`, which has no NL layer
yet (UX-19). The Home page text, which has NL, is unchanged.
**Not changed.** N=1. 'Load too high' (SAFETY-81). SAFETY-85, -88, -89, -90.
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
# SAFETY-90 - the peak guard goes on after a P1 meter gap
**Status: DEV 2026-10-05, for review.** Tests: `test_safety90.py`.
**The defect.** A meter gap longer than `meter_max_age_s` leaves seconds the
quarter average does not count (`p1.QuarterAverager`, on purpose: a guess must
not reach the bill record). `peakguard.blindness()` then called the projection
blind for the rest of the quarter, so the floor was 0 W. During a HOLD the
battery gave nothing and the quarter went over: SAFETY-86 rig case 7b, N=2,
3964.8 W against a 3450 W aim, the month peak raised; N=1, 3701 W (review).
The page still read "Keeping the grid near zero". At start-up mid-quarter the
same rule left the start-up quarter blind, and a held battery was drawn as last
resort (SAFETY-91 test, O2).
**The fix** (`peakguard.fill_gaps()`, `peakguard.gap_w()`,
`Controller._fill_peak_gaps()`).
- Once readings are back, every second of a silence longer than
`meter_max_age_s` counts at `gap_w = max(the limit, the import just before
the gap, the import just after it)`, where "import" is the grid plus the
batteries' discharge, i.e. with the batteries at 0 W. The gap's first
`meter_max_age_s`, which the averager credits at the last reading, is topped
up to `gap_w` too. The guard then grades the quarter as usual, so it is not
blind and gives what keeps the quarter at the aim.
- **The bound.** The count is at or above the true import as long as, during
the gap, the house load (less solar) stayed at or under the higher of the loads seen just
before and just after it, or under the limit, and the batteries did not
start charging (during a gap they hold their last command, then go to 0 W).
It never counts the gap below the limit. A load that rises above all three
only inside the gap is the one case it can miss.
- **Cost of the bound.** It is conservative: with the house at 6500 W, a 30 s
to 5 min gap lands the quarter 100-180 W under the aim (table below), paid in
battery energy.
- **While the gap lasts** nothing changes: the reading is too old to steer by,
the guard is blind (floor 0 W) and the "inputs missing" stop sets 0 W, as
before.
- **Before the first reading** (start-up or restart mid-quarter) the
add-on was down, so the batteries were at 0 W (it sets 0 W when it stops,
the ESP32 watchdog after 30 s). Those seconds count like a gap, at
`gap_w(the limit, the import seen first)`; after a restart the restored
reading's held `meter_max_age_s` is topped up the same way. The bound is
the gap's, with only the "after" side known. A load the batteries cannot
make up then raises "Load too high", which is true: that quarter is going
over. The page says so: the status row "Peak guard: part of this
15-minute period was not measured, counted as high use" and the home line
"Part of this 15-minute period was not measured." / "Een deel van dit
kwartier is niet gemeten." until the quarter ends.
*Review:* the first version counted them at the aim, with "nothing is
known" as the reason. The first reading does show the load, and with the
batteries at 0 W the import was that load, not the aim: a 60 s restart
during a 6500 W HOLD landed 3653 W against 3450 W.
- The bill record (`quarter_blocks`) is unchanged: it still banks only what
was measured. The estimate steers the guard and is never banked.
- The action log gets one `PEAK_GUARD_GAP` row per gap, with the seconds and
the watts it was counted at.
- No option. The threshold is `meter_max_age_s`, the limit and the aim are
`peak_cap_w` and `peak_margin_w`.
**Before -> after** (`test_safety90.py`, quarter as the meter really averages
it, gap starting 300 s in; 10 s battery lag; aim 3450 W):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| N=1 HOLD 6500 W, gap 30 s / 60 s | 3456.6 / 5329.2 | 3346.2 / 3272.2 |
| N=1 HOLD 5500 W, gap 5 min | 4717.9 | 3330.6 |
| N=2 HOLD, B able, 6500 W, gap 30 s / 60 s | 3456.6 / 3865.6 | 3346.3 / 3272.7 |
| N=2 HOLD, B able, 5500 W, gap 5 min | 3745.4 | 3288.9 |
| N=2 HOLD, B held, 5500 W, gap 60 s | 3254.9, B drawn 2500 W | 3335.4, B 0 W |
| gap across the edge, next quarter, N=1 / N=2 | 4100.0 / 3621.2 | 3446.3 / 3382.2 |
| house 3000 -> 6500 W inside a 60 s gap, N=1 | 5255.6 | 3368.3 |
| house 6500 -> 2000 W late in a 5 min gap, N=1 | 3629.2 | 3145.1 |
| start-up 450 s in, N=1, house 5000 W (batteries at 0 W before it) | 5000.0 | 3450.0 |
| restart, down 60 s / 150 s, N=1, house 6500 W | 4039.1 / 5483.3 | 3450.0 / 3450.0 |
| meter never drops, N=1 and N=2 | | rows identical |
**Not changed.** The late-reading edge (SAFETY-91 test, O1): a reading late by
less than `meter_max_age_s` is not a gap, and the seconds since it are not
counted in the projection (on any quarter, not only after a gap). Near a
quarter's end the 900/remaining gain turns that into a large negative excess
and the floor drops for a cycle or more. Counting those seconds at the held
reading would fix it, but it changes every quarter's last seconds on a
healthy meter; it is handed back as its own card.
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
# SAFETY-91 - a held battery is drawn only after the others are full
**Status: DECIDED 2026-10-01 (owner: held battery last, SAFETY-25 option A
kept).** Follows SAFETY-87. Tests: `test_safety91.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-87 rig test, F1 and F2). At N>=2 a battery at or under
its own peak reserve was held back (weight 0) only on cycles where the peak
guard asked for power.
- F1: B draining at 1000 W, A held at 15 %, house 5500. Once the grid was
near zero the loop set the target, A had its normal weight and B's drain
pin bound, so the loop drew A at 2500 W for the whole quarter (15.0 ->
10.7 %) while B stayed at 1000 W. In the next quarter A reached its
cut-out, and B stayed pinned at the peak floor (~2422 W), not its 2500 W.
- F2: in a HOLD (A holding, B held), at a quarter's edge the guard saw a block
with no seconds left and asked for nothing for one cycle. The HOLD's
ceiling lapsed, A went back to 0 W and the loop's target went to B: 2500 W
for 1 s.
**The fix** (`main.py`, N>=2 only).
- `_held_back()`: the batteries at or under their own reserve while another
can still give (live, not refusing), graded as in `_peak_on_able()`. They
weigh 0 in every split where the site gives, not only for the peak. With
nobody able (all held, or the rest refusing or dropped) nobody is held back
and the split is as before.
Review: once held back, a battery stays so until its SoC reads more than 1
point above its reserve. A reading flipping 20/21 % otherwise swapped
~1000 W between the batteries on each flip (grid +-500 W with A 10 s and
B 3 s lag). The guard's own permission (SAFETY-87) is unchanged.
- `_drain_rise()`: while a battery is held back, a draining battery's pin
becomes a floor at its drain rate (`lo`), so it rises towards its rating
before the held one gives. Not for a held battery's own drain, not under a
site stop, not for a battery that is not live.
- `tariff.next_quarter()`: past a block's end, before the next block's first
telegram, the guard grades the next quarter, projected from the held
reading (the averager credits it there). Not when that reading is too old
to be credited (`max_hold_s`).
**What stays.** SAFETY-25 option A: once every able or draining battery is
at full power, the loop still draws a held battery (`allocator._fill()`'s
last-resort pass). With house 5500 and 2 x 2500 W, A still gives 2500 W
after B is full. Nothing is placed on a battery at its cut-out: OPT-09's
pack limit closes it (`hi = 0`), and the drain rise lets B take the rest.
**Before -> after** (`test_safety91.py`, 2 x 2500 W, lagging battery 10 s):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| B drain 1000, A held, house 4000 | A 2500, B 1000 | A 1500, B 2500 |
| same, house 5500 | A 2500, B 1000 | A 2500, B 2500 (option A) |
| cycles A asked while B not full | 612 of 900 | 0 |
| A at its cut-out, house 5500: B | 1572 W mean | 2500 W, A 0 W |
| HOLD, late telegram at the edge | A 0, B 2470 for 1 cycle | A 2050, B 0 |
| idle, A held, house 2000 | A 1005, B 1005 | A 0, B 2020 |
| N=1, every scenario | | byte-identical |
**Why N>=2 only.** At N=1 there is no other battery to give first. The edge
roll would also fix the N=1 one-cycle dip at a quarter's edge (SAFETY-86
rig, "A dropped to 0 W for 1 s"), but this ticket keeps N=1 byte-identical;
extending it is a one-line change for a later ticket.
**Re-pinned.** `test_modes.py` `n2` and `n2_off`: from t=1600 battery A is
at its 20 % reserve, so B carries the house and A gives last (100 of 540
cycles differ). With SAFETY-87's held rule both are a5dddad's again, and the
test grades that.
Two fixtures changed with it: `test_safety87.py` part 10's "without the
raise" run also turns off `_drain_rise()` (else B rises anyway), and
`test_peakguard.py` 10g and `test_watchdog.py`'s two-inverter rig give
their second battery a cut-out, as rule 8 requires (an unknown cut-out is held, so A alone would carry the cycle).
**Not changed.** The peak guard's own rules (SAFETY-87). A drain with
nobody held stays a pin (SAFETY-78). An Off battery beside a held one
(SAFETY-87 Open). The first cycle after start, before any quarter is
measured, can still put the loop's first step on a held battery in a HOLD.
SAFETY-88, -89, -90, -92, -93, -94.
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
# SAFETY-93 - the maintenance charge end hands back smoothly
**Status: implemented 2026-10-02, for review.** Tests: `test_safety93.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-85 rig test, check 4; also on 9358781). At N=2, when
A's maintenance charge ended, B went 0 -> -1600 W in one cycle and charged
from the grid with the house at 6000 W. The HOLD end was already smooth
(SAFETY-85).
**Cause.** During the charge the site target holds A's charge (SAFETY-84's
`charge` ceiling, -2000 W). At the end A gets its HOLD pin (0 W), but the
loop starts its next step from last cycle's site target. The slew limit
moves the site total by 400 W (-2000 -> -1600), and the only battery left
to place it on is B. The same happens when the charge times out or the
battery is switched Off (A free, its -2000 W shared out). With the charge
suspended by the guard and A giving under the loop, B took A's share in
one step (675 W).
**The fix** (`main.py`, `_reseed_charge_end()`, N>=2 only). On the cycle a
battery leaves CHARGE, the loop's start point (`self.target`, and the
integrator with it) is what the other batteries stood at plus that
battery's new command: its pin (HOLD or abort, 0 W), or, if it is free, its
last discharge (a charge stops). The loop then moves from there one slew
step a cycle. The ending battery's own step (-2000 -> 0 W) is maintenance's
pin, as before; it lowers the grid import. The end is kept until the loop
next runs, so a missed poll on that cycle (the input hold) does not lose it.
Review: a charge also ends, for the site, when the battery is still in
CHARGE but can no longer be placed: a stale link or a refusal (SAFETY-73)
drops it, and its -2000 W landed on B the same way (B 0 -> -1600 W at a
1200 W house). So the end is noted after the unit claims are filed: a
battery leaves the charge when it leaves CHARGE, is not live, or its own
claims contradict. The guard suspending the charge (SAFETY-84) is no end.
Why a start-point reseed, and not a per-battery slew in the allocator: the
jump comes from one stale number at one edge, the kind of edge SAFETY-73
(`_unit_refusal_end`) and OPT-11 P3 (`_reseed_run_edge`) already reseed.
The change stays at that edge; nothing else at N>=2 moves.
**Before -> after** (`test_safety93.py`, 2 x 2500 W, 10 s lag, 2 s meter):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| rig case: house 6000, A charges 2000 to the end | B 0 -> -1600, charges 4 cycles | B 0 -> 400 -> 800 ..., never charges |
| house 1200 | B 0 -> -1600 (2800 W from the grid) | B steps of 400, never charges |
| charge times out / A switched Off | B 0 -> -1600 | B 0 -> 400 |
| guard suspended the charge, A gives 1825 | B step 675 W | B step 395 W |
| missed poll on the end cycle | B 0 -> -1600 a cycle later | B 0 -> 400 |
| A dropped mid-charge (stale link, refusal), house 1200 | B 0 -> -1600 | B 0 -> 400 |
| N=1, both charge ends above | | byte-identical |
No pinned digest moved: the 46 digests of `tools/*identity*.py` (N=1 and
N=2) are byte-identical to f3e409c; none of their scenarios reaches a
charge end.
**Not changed.** The peak guard's floor still moves the site in one step
when it engages (a house step, a quarter edge): the guard outranks the slew
(owner order). A HOLD pin still drops the holding battery to 0 W at once
and SAFETY-86 gives way to the others first. SAFETY-88 (charge flapping
above the aim) is untouched.
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
# SAFETY-94 - a battery that lags or reverses is not frozen or refusing
**Status: implemented 2026-10-03, for review.** Tests: `test_safety94.py`
(rig: `tools/safety94_rig.py`). Also closes SAFETY-58. SAFETY-74 stays open.
## The defects
1. **Stale-reading gate (SAFETY-37).** Its 35 s ran from the register's last
change. After a rest that clock was already past 35 s, so the first read
after a new command tripped it, before the register could answer. Live
2026-10-03 (0.14.0, N=2): 17:39:16 B and 17:39:25 A (load ramp after a
rest), 19:00:04 A (drain start), 21:21:22 B (drain -> charge). Each was
1 s after its command; each register answered within 11 s. This is
SAFETY-58's shape.
2. **Refusal at N=1 (SAFETY-52).** `compute()` engaged after `SETTLE_CYCLES`
frozen cycles if the reading was under 100 W at that moment. The frozen
cycles include a reversal through the battery's lag. At a 1 s meter the
12th cycle comes as a battery reversing out of a charge passes 0 W
(SAFETY-85 rig, O1: "gave -20 W for 13 cycles"). The refusal then held
0 W, the battery settled at 0 W, never gave 100 W, and waited for the
15-minute probe. N>1 already required 22 s in the band, so it was safe
at a 10 s lag but not at 20 s.
## What changed
- **The gate counts only time the register was asked to move**
(`freshness.Freshness._oblige`). A read counts the time since the last
read when, at that read, the command is 250 W or more and has moved 250 W
from where it stood at the register's last change. A register change
(or a SAFETY-57 release) restarts the count. A command flapping in and
out of the ask still adds up (frozen register, 0/1500 W every 5 s: trip
at 69 s). The conjunction, `MOVE_W` and `RELEASE_S` are unchanged.
- **The bound is unchanged at 35 s and now means what its derivation
says.** The floor was always "how long a healthy register takes to answer
a command": 6 s plant + 10 s publish + 1 s read = 17 s. The band
`[2 x 17, 0.5 x 75] = [34, 37.5]` holds. Live answers measured: 1.4, 3,
6 and 11 s after the command.
- **Refusal evidence is the same at every roster size**
(`main.Controller._gave_nothing`, SAFETY-73's count moved into a method).
The reading must stay under 100 W, one way, while asked over 200 W, for 12
cycles spanning 22 s. At N=1 `compute()` gets this as `gave_nothing` and
needs it on top of its own freeze test. `None` (compute alone) keeps the
old law.
- **The evidence restarts when the reading moves 50 W towards the ask**
(`REFUSED_PROGRESS_W`). A refusing battery reads flat (-3/-4 W live). Live
readings wander by under 25 W at rest. A first-order lag crossing the band
gains 50 W in at most 0.4 tau, so it cannot fill 22 s unless tau > 54 s.
This also covers B, whose reading is 100 W below its power.
## Bounds and worst-case catch
| fault | before | after | budget |
|---|---|---|---|
| register frozen, then asked to move | 0-35 s after the ask (often 1 s) | 35 s after the ask (+1 read) | SAFETY-37: 35 s, under the 75/85 s consumer holds |
| register frozen at rest reading ~0 W | stale 1 s after the ask | refused or stale, 0 W within 23-35 s | the same |
| refusing battery, 1 s meter, N=1 | 11-16 s | 22-28 s | SAFETY-73's 22 s span (+ one 10 s publish) |
| refusing battery, 2 s meter | 22-28 s | 22-28 s | unchanged |
| refusing battery, 5 s meter | N=1 35-41 s, N=2 41-55 s | N=1 40-45 s, N=2 50-55 s | 12 cycles = 55-60 s |
Rig: `test_safety94.py` part 3. A release after SAFETY-57 still exposes
the held number for one 35 s window of asking, so 35 < 75 < 85 still holds.
## Before -> after
- Live replay (part 1): 4 trips -> 0.
- Refusing B (its -100 W idle reading): see SAFETY-97.
- Rig, 10 s lag, N=1 and N=2, 1/2/5 s meters, two register shapes, 48 runs
(part 2): before 27 stale trips and 1 refusal, after 0 and 0.
- Reversals, lag 10 and 20 s, 1 s meter (part 2): before N=1 6 stale / 3
refused, N=2 6 / 1; after 0 / 0.
- 16-day loop capture (`test_freshness.py` part 8): 93 trips -> 59. Trips
answered within 20 s: 21 -> 1. Two of the removed trips were not quick:
a register held 351 s under a command hovering at the 250 W travel edge
(under 35 s of asking before it moved; survivor 2's shape), and a
refusing battery the gate had caught only on a passing ramp (SAFETY-52's
refusal covers it).
## SAFETY-58 and SAFETY-74
- **SAFETY-58 is fixed** by this change: its card asks for the clock to
start with the obligation and for the bound to be re-derived. Both are
done above. `test_freshness.py` survivor 5 is now graded as closed.
- **SAFETY-74 is not fixed.** A battery capped at 300 W with a perfectly
flat reading, 5 s meter, house stepping: 50 trips/h at N=1 and 80 at N=2
before, 37 and 60 after. With +-1 W dither: 0. A flat reading under a
command that moved is exactly what the gate is for; telling "limited"
from "frozen" needs a second signal (the meter, or SoC).
## Known gaps
- ~~B's standby offset (-95 to -118 W at idle) puts a refusing B outside the
100 W band, so a refusing B never latched (review F1: at N=1 new, at N=2
as before).~~ **Fixed by SAFETY-97 in the same PR:** the band is centred
on each unit's learned idle reading. `SAFETY-97-idle-offset.md`.
- A command that asks only part of the time (a fraction d) is caught after
35 s of asking, which is 35/d s of wall time (0/1500 W every 5 s: 69 s).
SAFETY-30's per-unit check restarts when its command stops opposing the
held reading, which a lapsing ask normally does, so 35 < 85 holds there.
SAFETY-31's circulation check (75 s) ignores the command, so its margin
holds only while d >= 0.47.
- A register frozen under a command that stays near the 250 W travel edge
is caught late or not at all (survivor 2).
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
# SAFETY-95 - a maintenance drain that ends hands back smoothly
**Status: implemented 2026-10-06, for review.** Tests: `test_safety95.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-93 review, O1). At N=2, when A's drain ended (A
switched Off, say) with the house at 1200 W, B went 0 -> +1600 W in one
cycle and exported. It is the mirror of SAFETY-93 on the drain end.
**Cause.** During a drain the site target carries A's drain floor
(SAFETY-78, `drain`, 2000 W) above what the house needs. At the end A's
command drops (pin, Off, abort, stale link, refusal), but the loop slews
from last cycle's target (2000 -> 1600) and only B is left to place it.
Under a solar surplus B gave 1600 W into the export.
**The rule** (`main.py`, `_reseed_drain_end()`, `_drain_grid_w()`, N>=2
only). On the cycle a drain ends:
1. The start point is what the others stood at plus A's new command (its
pin, else 0 W; a dropped battery is sent 0 W), as SAFETY-93 does.
2. If the house needs more, the start is raised to the house's own point
(live batteries' readings + grid - target, as `_reseed_run_edge()`),
but never above last cycle's start. So the others cover the house at
once and never take over the drain's export.
3. While A settles (SAFETY-96's window: within the deadband, at most
`PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S`), the loop's error is the house's point minus its
start, not the meter. The meter still shows A's tail and the others'
climb; chasing it sent B down and then up again.
4. Then the loop moves one slew step a cycle.
A drain ends when its battery leaves DRAIN, is not live, its claims
contradict, or it will not give (SAFETY-73's limit outranks the pin
without a contradiction, so the refusal is read from the battery; +1 only,
as `_held_back()`). Today a contradiction on a drain only arises through
a refusal; the clause stays because a contradiction sends A 0 W, which is
an end (tested directly). The end is kept
until the loop runs (a missed poll). A dropped draining battery is this
rule's, not `_reseed_drop()`'s. Order in one cycle: drop/rejoin
(SAFETY-96), charge end (SAFETY-93), drain end (this) last; each moves the
start by its own battery, and the drain end's raise reads the start the
others left.
**Why not SAFETY-93's rule alone** (step 1, then slew). Measured on the
same plant: at 1200 W the grid imports 849 W and B goes to -465 W
(charging) while the loop chases A's tail; at N=3 and 4000 W it imports
784 W where base imports 42 W, as the others give up A's share of the house.
The house point keeps the grid at its aim; the cap at last cycle's start
keeps it from exporting.
**Before -> after** (`test_safety95.py`, 2500 W batteries, 10 s lag, 2 s
meter; base = the same tree with the change taken out):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| drain done / Off / timeout, N=2, 1200 W | B 0 -> 1600, +390 W commanded export, grid then +559 W | B 0 -> 1210, grid within 40 W of its aim |
| the same, N=3, 1200 W | B, C 0 -> 800, grid +695 W | 0 -> 605, grid +39 W |
| the same, solar surplus | B gives 1600 W into the surplus | B never gives; site moves 400 W a cycle |
| refusal, N=3, 1200 W | B, C step 1020 W, +2000 W commanded export | step 20 W, +70 W |
| N=3, 4000 W | others take A's share at once | the same (grid +1 W, base +42 W) |
| abort (site zeroed by the operator) | climbs from 0, grid +669 W | climbs from 0, grid +16 W |
| stale link (board watchdog 25 s) | | as base, but N=3 4000 W: grid +676 W (base +786) |
| N=1, every drain end | | byte-identical |
`tools/opt11_identity.py` n2_maint moved on purpose (A's drain refused at
1655 s; B stays at the house's 1420 W instead of 2500 W). Re-pinned in
`test_modes.py`. The other 45 digests are byte-identical.
**Not changed.** The peak guard's floor still binds (arbiter, after the
loop). Held batteries still give last; the idle clamp and the freeze test
are as they were. A charge end (SAFETY-93) and a trade end are unchanged.
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
# SAFETY-96 - a battery the loop cannot move does not freeze it
**Status: implemented 2026-10-06, for review.** Tests: `test_safety96.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-93 rig test). At N=2 the saturation freeze compares
the site target with the site sum of the readings. After A's link went
stale, A was out of the split but its reading (-2000 W, still charging) was
in the sum: "saturation freeze (800 W vs -1903 W)", B held at 1200 W for
~236 cycles until the circulation trip. After a charge timeout or Off at
6000 W the loop froze ~14 s at 800 W while A came out of its charge. At a
drop, B also took A's whole share in one step.
**The rule** (`main.py`, `_held_out_w()`, `_reseed_drop()`, N>=2 only).
A battery is held out of the freeze test, counted at its command instead of
its reading, while:
- it is out of the split (writes refused for `LINK_STALE_S`);
- its last write was refused (its board may have gone to 0 W on its own
watchdog);
- it settles after a step the loop did not make: a charge end (SAFETY-93:
HOLD, timeout, Off, refusal, stale link) or a rejoin (then every battery,
as the split is made again). Settling ends when its reading is within the
deadband of its command, or after `PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S` (23 s, the
measured plant settle).
Its real power is not lost and not counted twice: the meter sees it, and
the loop follows the meter. Only the freeze stops reading it as the loop's.
The freeze still fires on the other batteries' own lag and on unplaced
watts.
At a drop the battery's share leaves the loop's start point, so the others
take over one slew step a cycle. At a rejoin it enters at its reading.
**Not a drop.** A missing reading or a stale register stops the site
(`inputs_ok`), as before. A refused battery (SAFETY-73) stays in the sum:
it is asked ~0 W and reads ~0 W. A watchdog-stopped battery (SAFETY-02/30)
is pinned at 0 W and stays in the sum. New: no refusal is learned on a
battery whose writes are refused; its board going to 0 W is no refusal. Its
count is kept, not reset, so a link that refuses 1 write in 3 does not hide
a battery that really refuses (review).
**Before -> after** (2 x 2500 W, 10 s lag, 2 s meter; freeze cycles not
about the remaining battery's own lag):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| A drops while giving, A holds 1200 W | 128, B steps 1210 W | 0, B stays |
| A drops while charging, A holds -2000 W | 78 | 0 (circulation trip stays: 4 kW goes round) |
| A drops while charging, board to 0 W | 5 | 0 |
| A drops then comes back, A holds 1200 W | 46, grid +1.1 kW | 0, grid within 250 W |
| charge timeout at 6000 W | 7, B held at 400 W | 0, B climbs |
| A switched Off at 6000 W | 6, B held at 800 W | 0, B climbs |
| N=1, N=2 with no drop | | byte-identical |
**Not changed.** At a rejoin the allocator splits again at once (A 0 ->
1205, B 2410 -> 1205 W); the site total does not step. A battery that keeps
charging on its own after its link drops still trips the circulation check
(it is real circulation). A trade end (`_reseed_run_edge`) still starts
from the full site sum.
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
# SAFETY-97 - "gives nothing" is graded against each battery's idle reading
**Status: implemented 2026-10-04, folded into PR #171 (SAFETY-94), for
review.** Owner decision 2026-10-04: the band's centre is clamped to
+-75 W (see Bounds). Tests: `test_safety97.py` (rig: `tools/safety94_rig.py`).
Closes SAFETY-94 review finding F1.
## The defect
B's power reading (board B's `inverter_ac_power`, 0x0518) shows -95 to -118 W
at idle: its standby draw (the GoodWe app shows 0 W). A's shows -2 to -4 W.
Every "the battery gives nothing" test was `|reading| < 100 W`, so a refusing
B sat on the band's edge and never latched:
- N=2: never caught, before or after SAFETY-94.
- N=1: the old one-instant check caught it in 17-105 s; SAFETY-94's shared
rule (12 cycles in the band in a row) never did (review probe, 1200 s).
## Design
- **Offset source: learned per unit** (`app/idle.py`, `Inverter.idle`). No
new option: a required one is a setup step every client gets wrong, and an
optional one is a second source to reconcile. An override can be added
later if a site needs one.
- **When it learns:** control runs; the unit is not refused (unit or site),
stale or sign-tripped; its command has been within 50 W (`IDLE_ASK_W`) for
120 s (`IDLE_QUIET_S`, 6 lags of 20 s). A refusing battery is asked more
than 50 W, and while refused it does not learn, so its refusal cannot be
learned as idle. A capped battery under a big ask is not sampled either.
- **How:** the first value is the mean of 120 s of samples; then it follows
drift with a 30 min time constant. A sample beyond 250 W (`IDLE_SAMPLE_W`)
is dropped (a register held at a giving value). The band is centred on
the value clamped to 75 W (`IDLE_MAX_W`; owner decision below).
- **Restart:** saved per unit (`unit/<name>/idle_w`, on first learn and each
5 W move) and restored, clamped to 250 W. Without it a battery refusing from the
start is never quiet, so never learned, so never caught.
- **Until learned the idle reading is 0 W**: the rule as it was.
## Not chosen: the GoodWe LAN integration's DC battery power
Both inverters also appear through HA's GoodWe integration (B:
`sensor.kelder_dyness_battery_power`, 0 W at idle; found read-only on the
live HA 2026-10-04). Pointing `batt_entity` at it removes B's offset by
configuration, but:
- the band must be safe without it: other installs may not have it;
- it is polled over UDP on the inverter's Wi-Fi, a second channel that can
drop while the board keeps reading (HW-01 lost both once); a missing
reading stops the site;
- SAFETY-37's 35 s bound is derived from the board's 10 s publish; the
integration's poll interval (believed 10 s, not checked here) and latency
are not measured;
- DC power is not 0x0518, which SAFETY-30/31/42 were measured against.
It stays an install choice to test on the rig, not a code change here. With
it, the learned idle reading is simply ~0 W.
## Where it applies
Every test of "gives nothing / gives / takes" now uses `reading - idle`:
| check | change |
|---|---|
| shared refusal evidence `_gave_nothing` (N=1 and N>=2) | centred |
| N=1 engage and end in `compute()` (`idle_w`, the site sum) | centred |
| N=1 end in `_refusal_update` | centred |
| N>1 unit end (probe answered, takes the other way) | centred; uncentred, B's idle -100 W read as "takes 100 W" and ended a charge refusal at once |
| stale-path refusal (`_refusal_from_stale`, N=1 and N>1) | centred |
| SAFETY-42 "parked" (small ask, gives nothing) | centred |
| SAFETY-37 stale gate | unchanged: it grades register changes against command travel, not a level |
| SAFETY-57 release | unchanged: it reads the command only |
| SAFETY-30 per-unit sign | unchanged: opposition needs both over 250 W; B's 100 W idle cannot make or hide one alone |
| SAFETY-42 shortfall | unchanged: B reads ~100 W short at every power, which errs towards reporting (report only) |
## Bounds: owner decision 2026-10-04 (review R1)
Band: `|reading - centre| < 100 W`, centre = idle clamped to +-75 W.
- **Why a clamp under the band.** A wrong idle reading (taught during a
rest while the reading shows something else, e.g. a grid top-up of a unit
held at 0 W, or restored onto a swapped inverter) more than about 100 W off
hid every refusal on that battery, at N=1 and N=2; with the first +-250 W
clamp the rig missed a refusing A whenever the error was 110-250 W. At
+-75 W the band always keeps 0 W +-25 W, so a battery reading about 0 W
while refusing is caught whatever was learned or restored, and a wrong idle
cannot refuse a healthy 0 W battery (its ask is over 200 W).
- **The trade-off.** Options: keep +-250 W (covers idle readings to about
+-350 W, any 100 W mis-learn hides refusals); clamp to +-75 W (chosen);
"old band or centred band" (rejected: a correct B would need to give 200 W
to answer its 200 W probe).
- **Cost.** A battery whose idle reading is beyond about +-170 W is centred
at most 75 W out, so its refusal falls outside the band: it behaves as in
0.14.0 (not caught by this rule). B (-95 to -118 W) reads 20-43 W from its
clamped centre. B is caught across -150..+90 W of error in its idle
reading; learned 110 W or more too high it is missed, as in 0.14.0 at N=2.
- A frozen register is still caught by the stale gate at 35 s of asking.
- Recovery from a wrong value needs quiet time: tau 30 min.
## Catch times (rig, refusing from 200 s after a 400 s rest, +-4 W)
| refusing | meter 1 s | 2 s | 5 s |
|---|---|---|---|
| A, N=1 | 28 s (before 28) | 28 (28) | 65 (65) |
| A, N=2 | 28 (28) | 28 (28) | 110 (110) |
| B, N=1 | 28 (never) | 28 (never) | 65 (never) |
| B, N=2 | 24 (never) | 24 (never) | 60 (never) |
A at N=2 on a 5 s meter is 110 s here because the rig's grid goes flat once
A is cut, so the loop cycles on the 15 s floor; the same run on the PR before
SAFETY-97 gives 110 s. B restored after a restart, refusing from the start:
24 s; with nothing saved: never.
## Before -> after
- Healthy B with its offset, SAFETY-94's four scenarios, N=1 and N=2, 1/2/5 s
meters, both register shapes, idle learned or restored (96 runs): 0 stale,
0 refused. Reversals, lag 10/20 s, idle restored: 0.
- Live replay (SAFETY-94 part 1): 0 trips (the gate is untouched).
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
# TEL-10 — the loop's integrator is published, as three site rows
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `TEL-10`.
**Card:** TEL-10 — *"`self.i_w` is carried between cycles and published nowhere"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter, and nothing here can.** `app/control.py`
is not touched by this branch; `compute()`, its returned `Decision` and every
constant it reads are byte-identical to `release/1.0`. The diff is a controller
recording three values it already had, and a publisher announcing three rows.
---
## 0. The three things a reader should take away
1. **The row that matters is the one that is usually indistinguishable from
`Setpoint`.** With nothing binding, the command *is* the integrator rounded
to 10 W, so on a quiet day publishing the wrong one looks correct. §2 is
the fixture that separates them by kilowatts, and §4 is the mutation that
proves the separation is what the check reads.
2. **`Loop reason` is a genuinely new sentence, not a second copy of one.** The
status page's `Why` row and `sensor.goodwe_controller_status` both carry the
*arbiter's* line (`loop -> -5000 W`), which prints the winning claim's NAME.
`compute()`'s own reason has never left the process, and `slew-limited` — the
value SAFETY-48 is about — appears in neither of the other two. §3.
3. ⚠️ **Three entities are three entities.** This is an addition to a live
install's entity list, which TEL-07 refused to make for four per-unit rows
at a roster of one. The argument for making it here is in §5, and so is the
argument that keeps it to three rather than to one per inverter.
---
## 1. Why this is a card at all
`self.i_w` has been a separate quantity from the command since SAFETY-04, which
split the accumulator out of the velocity form precisely so the two could be
bounded apart. Since then it has been:
* carried between cycles by `Controller.cycle()`,
* read by nothing outside `compute()`,
* and written to no entity, no MQTT topic, no attribute and no log line.
The consequence is not theoretical. The investigation behind SAFETY-48 needed to
know what the integrator was doing during the export episodes and could only
**reconstruct** it, from the grid trace plus a replay of the real `compute()`.
The reconstruction reproduced about a third of the engagements it was checked
against and was **discarded entirely** — so the card it was gathered for had to
be argued from a measurement nobody could stand behind.
⚠️ **And the reconstruction could not have been made to work.** `i_w` at a given
instant depends on every cycle before it, including every one in which the
arbiter overrode the loop and `main.py` re-seeded `self.i_w = self.target`. That
re-seed is invisible in the grid trace. A replay can only recover the integrator
on a run where the loop won every arbitration, which is not the run anybody is
investigating.
## 2. What is published, and against what
Three rows, on the SITE device, appended after `release/1.0`'s eight sensors:
| key | entity | what it is |
|---|---|---|
| `loop_i` | `sensor.goodwe_loop_integrator` | `Decision.i_w` — the accumulator AFTER this cycle, BEFORE the output clamp, the slew limit and quantisation, which is what its own docstring says it is |
| `loop_lead` | `sensor.goodwe_loop_integrator_lead` | `decision.i_w - prev_w`, where `prev_w` is the command `compute()` was handed |
| `loop_reason` | `sensor.goodwe_loop_reason` | `Decision.reason`, unmodified |
⚠️ **`loop_lead` IS NOT A SUBTRACTION OF THE OTHER TWO ROWS, WHICH IS WHY IT IS
A ROW.** `Setpoint` is the ARBITER's output, after every other strategy has had
its say, and it is THIS cycle's; the lead is measured against the command the
PREVIOUS cycle left standing. On any cycle where the arbiter overrode the loop,
subtracting the two published rows gives a different number — and that is
exactly the cycle on which `main.py` re-seeds the integrator, i.e. the cycle a
reader most needs the real figure for.
`cycle()` therefore records all three from the one `compute()` call, and names
the command it passes (`loop_prev`) rather than re-reading `self.target` at
publish time. `self.target` is reassigned later in the same method, so a lead
computed at publish time would subtract a different cycle's command and call the
answer a lead. ⚠️ **At the line as written the two expressions are the same
value, and the mutation that swaps them is a recorded SURVIVOR** — see §4 M2.
The name is kept for the coupling, not for a behaviour it currently buys.
### The not-running branch
`cycle()`'s `else` arm — stopped AND shadow mode off — already zeroes
`self.i_w`, because no accumulation may survive the outage. The three rows are
zeroed and `loop_reason` becomes `not-running` on the same branch. A row that
kept repeating the last integrator there would say the loop was winding while
nothing is being controlled.
⚠️ **`auto: false` ALONE IS NOT THAT BRANCH.** The shipped `shadow_mode: auto`
means a stopped controller still runs the whole decision path and records it
(SAFETY-10), so the loop is live and the integrator is real. The first draft of
the check asserted `not-running` about a loop that was running; it reads the
shadow case as its own claim now.
## 3. Why `loop_reason` is not the row that already exists
`self.reason` is `Resolution.explain()`:
```
"loop -> -5000 W" # winner, watts
"loop -> -5000 W, limited by soc" # ...and which limit bit
"CONTRADICTION between limits - commanding 0 W (loop)"
```
`Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, decision.target_w, decision.reason, ...)` does carry
the loop's reason INTO the arbiter — and `explain()` prints the winner's
**source name**, never the claim's reason. So the loop's own word has always
been built, handed over, and dropped one line later.
Measured on the fixture in `test_telemetry.py` part 2, same cycle:
```
the arbiter's sentence: 'loop -> -5000 W'
the loop's own word : 'i-clamped'
```
## 4. Verified by breaking it
Nine mutations, run in the CI image on a purged tree, each fingerprinted before,
after, and again after the revert. The table with byte deltas and red counts is
in `test_telemetry.py`'s header; two entries are worth repeating here.
**M1 — `self.loop_i_w = loop_prev` (−3 B), the card's own named mutation:
publish the COMMAND under the integrator's name.** The first draft of the
acceptance check was *"the published integrator reaches its bound"*, and that
check was **GREEN** under M1 — because the command reaches the bound too, twelve
cycles later. MUTATION.md habit 4 in the check written to close the card. It
asserts the **lead time** now (the integrator is at the bound at least ten
cycles before the command is), and is red on 5 named checks.
**M2 — `decision.i_w - self.target` (+2 B) is a SURVIVOR, and is reported as
one.** At that line `cycle()` has not yet executed `self.target =
resolution.target_w`, so the two expressions denote the same value and the
mutation changes nothing that runs. The run was purged, which is not the
direction stale bytecode fabricates. M2b (`decision.i_w - decision.target_w`,
+8 B) is the mutation that does change the value and is red.
## 5. What was rejected
**Publishing as an MQTT attribute on an existing entity.** There is no
`json_attributes_topic` anywhere in this add-on; adding one would be a second
convention for one card, and HA's recorder keeps long-term statistics for a
state with `state_class`, not for an attribute. The reason this card exists is
that nobody had history to read.
**A status-page row instead.** The page is not recorded. `Why` already carries
the arbiter's sentence and stays that way; DOCS.md gains the section that says
how to read the three entities.
**One integrator row per inverter.** §6.2's architecture is ONE integrator on
the P1 meter whose output is then SPLIT. A per-unit copy would invent N of a
thing there is one of, and the two copies would disagree the moment the
allocator gave the units different shares. `test_mqtt.py` part 5 grades this at
every roster length from 1 to 6, and the mutation that moves `loop_i` into
`UNIT_SENSORS` is red on 8 named checks.
**Adding the rows at N≥2 only, the way TEL-07 gates its per-unit rows.**
TEL-07's gate exists because at a roster of one its four rows carry information
the site rows already carry exactly. These three carry information NOTHING
carries, at every roster length, including one.
**A `## Unreleased` block in `CHANGELOG.md`.** `test_version_gate.py` part 11b
refuses a changelog whose newest `## ` heading is not `config.yaml`'s
`version:` — PKG-14's rule that the bump and the closed section are one act.
Opening a section here would mean bumping the version, which is a packaging
decision this card does not get to take. The operator-facing account is in
DOCS.md; the release note belongs to whichever PKG ticket cuts the next
version, and this file is what it should be written from.
## 6. What this card does NOT establish
* **It says nothing about whether the integrator's behaviour is right.** That is
SAFETY-48. This branch adds an observable and changes no decision; the
15.7-day replay that grades the behaviour is in that card.
* **The three rows do not exist on the live install until the add-on is
updated**, and this branch does not update it. `tools/rehearsal/announced-
reference.txt` (what the BUILD announces) records them; `live-entities-
recorded.txt` (what the INSTALL has) deliberately does not, because an id the
build announces and the install lacks is a new entity, not an orphan.
* **`loop_lead` is signed and is not a distance.** Where the integrator and the
command have opposite signs it is the sum of two magnitudes. A reader wanting
"how far behind is the command" should take the magnitude and say so.
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
# TEL-11 — the PV production channel
*What was decided, what it was decided against, and what the evidence was.*
## 0. The problem, in OPT-10's numbers
Over sixteen days at the reference site the pack reached 90 % SoC on **two** of
them, and **20.5 kWh of surplus left the site while the pack still had room** —
**12.6 kWh** of it with the battery **not charging at all**. That single
measurement is upstream of most of what else was found that week: the nightly
floor, SAFETY-37's misdiagnosis, the SAFETY-57 deadlock, a 2 h 47 min saturation
freeze.
It cannot be **attributed**, because **PV production is recorded nowhere in this
system**. Three causes need three different fixes:
| cause | fix |
|---|---|
| there was no irradiance | none — the site behaved correctly |
| production was there, charge power was limited | a limit, somewhere |
| production was there, the pack had room, the optimiser declined | **the only software defect** |
Guessing between them is how an optimiser gets tuned to solve a cloud problem.
**This card adds the channel and does not do the attribution.** Ship it, let it
record a week, OPT-10 picks it up with data.
## 1. It is an HA entity, not a register — and that is a product decision
The RS485 bus this add-on speaks carries the **battery** inverter it drives. On
nearly every site the PV inverter is a different box from a different vendor,
reporting into Home Assistant through its own integration; it is **not** on this
bus and there is no reason it would be. So the signal comes from an entity:
`pv_entity` takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's PV integration provides, any
brand HA can read.
Reading a register would have been cheaper on one house and wrong for a fleet —
the trade [[product-not-one-house]] names.
## 2. The sign convention: **positive is production**, and there is no `pv_invert`
> Reversed by TEL-14 (flag and negative caution): `DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md`.
### The convention is derived, not assumed
Two sign rules already ship, and both are recorded in `DOCS.md`'s *Sources*
table rather than inferred here:
* `meter_entity` — **positive must mean importing** (`meter_invert` flips it);
* `batt_entity` — **`+` = discharging** (`batt_invert` flips it).
Both are *"positive = power arriving at the house's AC bus"*. Production arrives
there too, so **positive = producing** is the continuation of the shipped
convention rather than a fresh choice.
### Why an invert flag would be over-building
The question is not "could a sensor be reversed" — it could. It is what a flag
would **buy**, and the answer is nothing, for two reasons that do not apply to
the two keys it would sit beside:
1. **Those two quantities are read by the control path; this one is read by
nothing.** `inv.batt` feeds SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and SAFETY-31's
circulating-power sensor (`_read_unit()`'s own docstring says so), so a
reversed battery sensor hands the site a plausible number it then **acts**
on — a latch that trips when it should not, or does not trip when it should.
`pv_w` reaches no decision at all (§4), so a reversed PV sensor cannot
mislead one.
2. **Production is unipolar, so the error is self-announcing.** Battery power
and grid power are legitimately negative half the time, which is exactly why
a flipped sign is invisible in them. A PV array does not consume: a reversed
sensor reads **−4 kW at noon**, in the first day of the very history this card
exists to create. An invert flag would let an installer *hide* that by
flipping it to something that looks right, and a second place for the sign to
be wrong is a second thing to get wrong.
So: the convention is documented in `config.yaml`, both translations, `DOCS.md`
and `app/pv.py`, the value is published **exactly as the sensor reports it**,
and there is no flag. `test_pv.py` part 1 pins `-8 W` through unchanged.
### And no negative-value alarm either
The tempting middle path — warn when the reading is negative — needs a
threshold, because a PV inverter's own standby draw makes a small negative
reading at night entirely ordinary. Any threshold here would be a number nobody
measured, in a card whose whole subject is not fabricating numbers. The
published row is the detector.
## 3. Absence is never zero, and it is not "dropped" either
This is the constraint that shaped the publication, and the obvious
implementation fails it.
`MqttPublisher.publish()` **skips** a `None` value. That is right for
`circulation` — its note in `main.py` says a missing per-unit reading should
leave the last figure standing rather than publish a zero that reads as health —
and it is **exactly wrong here**: a skipped row leaves Home Assistant holding
the last number it was told, *forever*, and the recorder then draws a **flat
line at that value through the outage**. Read back a week later that is
indistinguishable from a real measurement, and if the last value happened to be
small it manufactures precisely the *"there was no surplus to store"* conclusion
the card exists to **test**.
So TEL-11 publishes the absence, using Home Assistant's own mechanism:
> `homeassistant/components/mqtt/const.py`: `PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"`.
> `homeassistant/components/mqtt/sensor.py`, in the state-message handler:
> `if payload == PAYLOAD_NONE: self._attr_native_value = None; return` — and it
> is tested **before** the numeric branch, so it holds for a row carrying
> `device_class: power`.
> (github.com/home-assistant/core, branch `dev`, retrieved 2026-09-24. The
> shipped MQTT-sensor documentation says the same thing in its `state_topic`
> entry: *"a 'None' value will set the sensor to an unknown state"*.)
The entity therefore goes to **`unknown`** and the recorder stores a **gap**.
`mqtt.ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is a one-key set and `test_pv.py` part 3 asserts both
that the pv row gets this treatment **and that `circulation` still does not** —
widening the rule silently would be a behaviour change to another card's row.
⚠️ **What was NOT built, and why.** A per-entity `availability` block
(`availability_mode: all`, an extra retained topic) would also produce a
distinguishable state — `unavailable` rather than `unknown` — but it needs a
second topic, a second retained message, a change to `_payload()`'s
byte-order-sensitive key construction, and it survives restarts only if the
retention is right. The payload route is one branch in `publish()` and one
constant, and it is graded as **bytes on the topic** rather than as a claim
about HA's availability handling.
### Three states, not two
| state | frame | wire | page |
|---|---|---|---|
| no source (`pv_entity` unset) | no `pv` key | no topic, no entity | no row |
| no reading | `pv: None` | `goodwe_ctl/pv` = `None` | `PV —` + a caution naming the reason |
| zero watts | `pv: 0.0` | `goodwe_ctl/pv` = `0.0` | `PV 0 W` |
A failed read also **clears** the last good value (`_read_pv()` assigns on every
call), so a reading never outlives its own sensor. `test_pv.py` part 2 drives a
good read followed by a dead one, because a fixture that answers the same thing
forever cannot reach that failure — MUTATION.md habit 9's shape.
## 4. It must not become a control input, and that is graded twice
### In the suite
`test_pv.py` part 6 drives twelve cycles of the real `Controller.cycle()`
against a 6 kW export and asserts the commands written to the inverter are
**bit-identical** across `unset` / `no reading` / `0 W` / `8 kW` of production,
with a precondition check that the stimulus commands something at all (habit 1).
`inputs_ok` is asserted not to move either: a broken PV integration is **not** a
missing input, because nothing computes with it.
A computed census (habit 12 — the scope is derived from the tree, not typed)
then reports which of the 33 modules under `app/` mention the material in any
spelling, comments included. It is **three**: `pv.py`, `main.py`, `mqtt.py`. The
scanner's own red direction is exercised on every run.
### Across trees, by hash
`tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` is the pattern; `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is
this card's version of it, and **its control clause had to be different**, which
is worth stating because the difference is the interesting part.
SAFETY-56 changed wording and had to show behaviour did not move, so its
`--compare` **refuses** unless the `sentences` halves **differ** — otherwise the
two runs might be one tree twice. TEL-11's headline claim is the opposite shape:
with the option unset, **nothing** differs. "The documents are identical" is the
*result*, so it cannot also be the control. The two things proved instead are:
* the two runs came from **different trees** (`app/*.py` sha256 + byte count,
compared, and an identity is **refused**);
* **exactly one** side reacts to `pv_entity` — that side is the HEAD, the other
is a tree that does not have the option. Neither, or both, is refused.
It drives 41 stimulus cells (5 grid worlds × 8 PV schedules, plus a run stopped
part-way) and prints two documents per setting: `control` — every command
written, every `self.target`, `inputs_ok`, the loop's three fields, the
arbiter's resolution, the maintenance phase, tick by tick, **with no TEL-11
material in it** — and `telemetry`, which is everything the card is allowed to
move.
Measured, in the CI image, on purged trees:
```
HEAD is B; baseline is A (it does not react to `pv_entity`).
tree A 73296909170ec789237d6e704cce9ab0d9f83b3df1495a14d2497285c3041a12
tree B d5011b6a18e2e3803dc09cac0214b0378fa4c7388fc0ad8ad89b832a5c92af48
control A unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B set 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
telemetry A unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B set 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
OK 1/3 UNSET: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to the baseline tree.
OK 2/3 SET: the control document is byte-identical with the channel switched on.
OK 3/3 CONTROL OF THE CONTROL: the telemetry document DOES move when the
option is set (42 stimulus cells differ).
```
Note what clause 1 claims and clause 2 does not: **unset** is identical in
`control` *and* `telemetry`, which is stronger than "the control path is
untouched" — an install that does not set the option sees no change of any kind,
including its announcement and its status rows. **Set** is identical in
`control` only, which is the whole of "instrumentation, not an input".
## 5. Genuinely optional — and not a second `price_now_entity`
`price_now_entity` / `price_avg_entity` are legal **only** while
`price_provider` is `off`, and the add-on **refuses to start** otherwise. That
is the trap this card was told not to rebuild, and it is avoided structurally
rather than by intention:
* `validate.py` does not mention `pv_entity` at all. It cannot conflict with
anything, because nothing else reads it.
* the MQTT row lives in `OPTIONAL_SENSORS`, not `SENSORS`, and
`discovery_payloads()`'s new `include` argument **defaults to empty**. So a
caller that has never heard of `pv_entity` — every fixture in `test_mqtt.py`,
`tools/rehearse_roster.py`, anything written next year — announces exactly
what it announced before. `p1_age` solves the same problem the other way
round, with `omit`, because it is announced by default and withdrawn when the
meter is off; getting that direction wrong here would have left most installs
with an entity nothing feeds, which is the hazard `omit`'s own note names.
* the read is gated on the option, so an unset install makes **no state call at
all** — not a read that fails quietly.
* there is **no status row** when it is unset. `peak_forecast_entity` nags when
it is unset because an unset forecast leaves a money guard without an input;
this is instrumentation, and a permanent caution on every install that never
asked for a PV channel is the warning spam the card forbids.
* when it **is** set and the read fails, the row is `ok=False, warn=True` — a
**caution**. `status_payload()` builds `NOT READY` out of rows that are
neither `ok` nor `warn`, so a telemetry channel can never put a battery site
into `NOT READY`.
## 6. The unit is read off the entity, and an unreadable one is refused
`read_inputs()` guesses kW-or-W for `peak_forecast_entity` with
`abs(raw) < 50`, and that is safe there: nobody's quarter-hour demand forecast
is 50 W. It is **not** safe here — 30 W of real production at dusk is an
ordinary reading, and that heuristic would publish it as 30 kW.
So `pv.watts()` reads the entity's own `unit_of_measurement` and converts
against Home Assistant's own `UnitOfPower` table (`mW`, `W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`,
`TW`; every factor an exact power of ten). A sensor with **no** unit, or a unit
outside that table, is **refused by name** and the status page says which. The
refusal is loud; a guess would be silent, and a factor of 1000 in the one
channel that exists to be believed a week later is the worse failure.
⚠️ `BTU/h` is in HA's enum and is deliberately **not** in the table: its factor
is a measured conversion rather than a decimal shift, no PV integration
publishes in it, and a fabricated constant is what this repository's whole
process exists to prevent. It lands in the refusal, by name, and `test_pv.py`
part 1 pins that.
## 7. The mutation battery
Every check this card adds was driven by the mutation that defeats the claim it
names. Method: `cp -a` of the tree per mutation into a **unique** directory,
the edit applied there, `__pycache__` purged, the suites run in the CI image
with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, one file at a time. **The shipped tree is
never edited**, so habit 18's revert hazard — SAFETY-37's harness killed between
the edit and the `cp` that put the file back, and two harnesses sharing one
backup path — is closed by construction rather than by a verified revert. Each
row below records the byte delta, the file's sha256 before and after, and that
the mutated line was **read back off disk** before the run started.
| # | mutation | file | bytes | sha256 (first 16) before → after | red on |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | the `pv` row moved into `SENSORS`, i.e. announced on every install | `mqtt.py` | −79 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `532d3954c023bf3d` | 3 named in `test_mqtt.py`, 1 in `test_pv.py` |
| M2 | `publish()` drops a `None` `pv` row again, so HA keeps the last number | `mqtt.py` | −98 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `dd54be458f446475` | 1 named (the acceptance criterion itself) |
| M3 | `ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` widened past the one key it was written for | `mqtt.py` | +23 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `8fe571ebff3dacf4` | 1 named (`circulation` must still be dropped) |
| M4 | a dead sensor reported as **0 W** instead of an absence | `pv.py` | −1 B | `55ba7471e9995436` → `9eecc34152b7ac12` | 4 named |
| M5 | `_read_pv()` assigns only on a good read — a value outlives its sensor | `main.py` | +46 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `189802aa69ce166d` | 2 named |
| M6 | the unit is read and then ignored — a kW sensor published as watts | `pv.py` | −18 B | `55ba7471e9995436` → `ab19ef66c52f9379` | 2 named |
| **M7** | **`self.grid = self.grid − self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` — PV wired into the control path** | `main.py` | +106 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `c38216edb7c5c8db` | **2 named, plus `tel11_pv_trace.py` clause 2/3 on 26 of the 41 stimulus cells** |
| M8 | `optional_keys()` returns `("pv",)` unconditionally | `mqtt.py` | −52 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `86ff23efe3088ad8` | 3 named |
| M9 | the PV caution made a `bad` row, i.e. a dead sensor is a `NOT READY` | `main.py` | +1 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `45c74cab89943564` | 1 named |
| M10 | the read gate removed — an unset option is read once a second forever | `main.py` | −10 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `b67baa8aba3019e8` | 2 named, **plus two crashes** |
`on_disk = True` for all ten: the mutated line was grepped back out of the file
after the edit and before the run (MUTATION.md reporting rule 2), and no
mutation is size-preserving, so rule 1's `+0 B` caveat does not arise.
⚠️ **M10's two extra reds are CRASHES, not named checks, and that is recorded
rather than tidied away.** Every `Hass` double in `test_inverter.py` and
`test_telemetry.py` predates this read and has no `state()` method, so an
unconditional PV read is an `AttributeError` rather than a failed assertion —
habit 20's shape, a red with no name attached. Fixing those fixtures would be a
change to what *their* checks report and belongs to whoever next touches them;
this card's own fixture has `state()` and grades the property by name.
⚠️ **M7's trace limb is where the two halves meet.** The mutant moves the
control document on 26 of 41 cells — every cell whose PV schedule produces a
READING. The five `none` cells and the five `zero` cells do **not** move, which
is correct and is worth seeing: subtracting nothing, and subtracting zero,
change nothing. A battery that only drove a dead sensor would have reported this
mutation as a survivor for the third time.
The clean tree those `before` hashes belong to: `app/main.py`
`c4d2cab34e50b5fd`, `app/mqtt.py` `328d249b9d698ef6`, `app/pv.py`
`55ba7471e9995436`.
### ⚠️ M7 was a SURVIVOR on the first battery, and the fixture was the reason
The card's **central** mutation — `self.grid = self.grid - self.pv_w` in
`read_inputs()`, i.e. exactly the defect the whole card forbids — came back
**green** on a six-file run at **+106 B**, on disk, purged, genuinely running.
The property did not hold; the fixture could not reach it. `test_pv.py` part 6
drove a **6 kW export over 12 cycles**, which puts the loop **against its
rail**: the command moves `slew_w` every cycle and −6000 W and −14 000 W of
apparent error produce the **same ramp, tick for tick**. MUTATION.md habit 23,
with a saturated actuator in place of a coinciding value — and the habit's list
of no-op-prone constructs is all *expressions*, so this is worth its own entry,
which it now has.
The fixture now drives a **600 W import the loop settles on**, with a
responsive meter (`grid = base − batt`) so the error actually closes, asserts
the resting target is well inside the rail, and asks habit 23's own question as
its own check: **shift the meter by the same 8 kW and confirm the commands
really would have moved.** On the first fixture that question answers *no*, in
one line. Every number in the table above is from the battery re-run against
the fixed tree.
⚠️ **A red count is a property of the suite as much as of the mutation.** These
name **this** tree at this commit; a later card that adds or re-bases a check
moves the number with the mutation untouched. Re-measure rather than inherit.
## 8. What none of this covers, with shapes
* **Home Assistant itself.** That `None` renders as `unknown` and that the
recorder keeps a gap is read out of HA's source and quoted in §3; no HA runs
in this suite. What is graded here is the bytes this add-on publishes.
* **Whether the operator's sensor tells the truth.** A sensor wired backwards,
or reporting DC where AC was meant, or a string instead of the array, is
published faithfully. §2 is the argument for why that is the right failure
mode; it is not a claim that it cannot happen.
* **A roster of more than one.** The row is a **site** row — there is one PV
array as far as this add-on is concerned — so nothing per-unit exists to
separate, and every fixture is the shipped roster of one.
* **The attribution.** This card records production. Whether the 20.5 kWh was
cloud, a limit or the optimiser is OPT-10's, and it needs a week of this
channel's history before it can be asked.
* **`tools/`, the firmware and the ingress HTML** are outside part 6's census.
* **The identity is only as wide as the stimulus.** `tel11_pv_trace.py` prints
its 41 cells with the documents for exactly that reason.
## 9. No `CHANGELOG.md` entry
`test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## ` heading that is not
`config.yaml`'s `version:`, and opening an `## Unreleased` section would mean
taking a packaging decision this card does not get to take. The operator account
is in `DOCS.md`; the release note belongs to the next PKG ticket, which should
say that **0.10.1 → next** adds one optional key, announces no new entity on an
install that does not set it, and changes no control behaviour.
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
# TEL-12 — several PV inverters, and why a partial total is worse than none
TEL-11 shipped `pv_entity` as a single `str?` in 0.11.0. The owner of the
reference site reported **within minutes of it going live** that they have
several PV inverters and could configure one.
That is not a property of one house. A multi-string or multi-orientation roof
routinely carries two or three inverters, each publishing its own power sensor
into Home Assistant, and the add-on is sold to clients. So the channel had to
become a roster.
**OPT-10 is blocked on this and cannot start recording until it lands.** Which
sets the bar: the number this channel publishes has to be one an attribution can
believe, or the week of history OPT-10 is waiting for is worse than no history.
---
## 1. The surface: `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity`, and the measurement that
decided it
Two candidates, and they differ on exactly one question nobody in this
repository could answer by reading: **does Supervisor accept a stored STRING for
a key whose schema has become a LIST?** 0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity: str?`; the
live install *has* a string persisted in it; and an upgrade that refuses that
string leaves an add-on which will not start — CFG-04 §B's trap, in the other
direction, with the schema needed to fix it pinned to the version that cannot be
installed.
It was measured, against the release image, by a new **§G** of
`tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` — the instrument CFG-04 built for exactly this
kind of question:
```
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/w:ro" -v "$PWD/tools:/probe:ro" --entrypoint python3 \
ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 \
/probe/supervisor_shape_probe.py
```
```
== G. TEL-12: the SHAPE of a several-inverter PV option ==
PASS the shipped defaults with a 0.11.0 `pv_entity` STRING on top are ACCEPTED - the baseline every refusal below is varied from
pv_entity='sensor.pv_power' pv_entities=[]
PASS ⭐ THE MEASUREMENT THAT DECIDED THE SURFACE: with `pv_entity` declared as a LIST, the string an 0.11.0 install has persisted is REFUSED, and the refusal names the key - so that shape would leave the live add-on unable to start on upgrade
Invalid list for option 'pv_entity' in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...and a shipped `pv_entity: []` DEFAULT does not rescue it: deepmerge's list strategy is `override`, so the operator's string survives the merge and is refused anyway
Invalid list for option 'pv_entity' in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...(the list shape itself is fine - it is only the STORED STRING it refuses, which is what makes this a migration and not a schema question)
a list value validates
PASS ⚠️ ONE SPELLING DOES ACCEPT BOTH - `match(.*)?` - AND IT IS REJECTED FOR A DIFFERENT REASON, MEASURED HERE: it validates NOTHING. A string passes, a list passes, and so does the integer 417; and the Configuration tab renders it as a plain text box rather than a repeatable field, so an operator cannot enter a second inverter in the UI at all
string=True list=True integer-417=True ui=[{"name": "pv_entity", "optional": true, "type": "string"}]
PASS ⭐ THE SHIPPED SHAPE: an 0.11.0 blob - `pv_entity` a string, no `pv_entities` key at all, because it did not exist when that blob was written - validates against THIS manifest, with the new key defaulted to the empty list. The live install upgrades without touching its options
PASS ...and a three-entity roster validates, per-entry, with both keys set - which the add-on resolves by REPLACEMENT and says so on its status page
["sensor.pv_east", "sensor.pv_west", "sensor.pv_garage"]
PASS ⭐ ...and the shipped `options:` block with ONLY `pv_entities` removed is REFUSED, BY NAME - `Missing option 'pv_entities' in root`. That is why the `pv_entities: []` default is load-bearing, exactly as `inverters: []` is: Supervisor treats a nested list as required unless its element is an OPTIONAL scalar, and `- str` is not one
Missing option 'pv_entities' in root in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...and the Configuration tab renders it as a REPEATABLE string field (`multiple: true`), so an operator adds their second and third inverter in the UI rather than in YAML
[{"name": "pv_entity", "optional": true, "type": "string"}, {"name": "pv_entities", "multiple": true, "required": true, "type": "string"}]
PASS a DOWNGRADE to a schema without `pv_entities` drops the key with a warning rather than refusing, and leaves `pv_entity` standing - so rolling back to 0.11.0 returns the install to its single entity rather than bricking it
== all cases passed ==
```
| Claim | Evidence |
|---|---|
| **Option 1 — `pv_entity` becomes a list — cannot ship** | §G: `Invalid list for option 'pv_entity'` on the string an 0.11.0 install has stored |
| …and a `[]` default does not rescue it | §G: `_OPTIONS_MERGER`'s list strategy is `override`, so the operator's string survives the merge and is refused anyway |
| …and it is not a *schema* problem | §G: a list **value** validates fine against a list schema. It is a **migration**, and a migration is a bigger ticket than this |
| **One key CAN carry both shapes** — `match(.*)?` | §G, and reported even though it *passes*, because "no spelling accepts both" would have been a **false reason** to reject option 1 |
| …and it loses anyway, for a measured reason | §G: it validates nothing at all — a string, a list, and the integer `417` all pass — and the Configuration tab renders it as a plain text box, so an operator cannot add a second inverter in the UI |
| **Option 2 — `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity` — ships** | §G: the 0.11.0 blob validates untouched, the new key defaults to `[]`, three entities validate, the UI renders `multiple: true` |
| `pv_entities: []` in `options:` is load-bearing | §G: the shipped defaults **minus only that key** are refused with `Missing option 'pv_entities' in root` — CFG-04 §B's isolated counterfactual, for this key |
| A downgrade is not the trap in reverse | §G: a schema without the key **drops** it and leaves `pv_entity` standing |
`p1_phase_import_entities` (`options: []` + `schema: - str`) is the shipped
precedent for the pair; nothing new was invented.
**So the surface is uglier than option 1 and that is the correct trade.** The
cleanest surface that breaks the one install this card exists to fix is not the
cleanest surface.
### And `pv_entities` REPLACES `pv_entity` rather than extending it
CFG-04's rule for `inverters:` ("declared, it REPLACES those six keys"), applied
to the only upgrade path that matters. The install being upgraded **has**
`pv_entity` set, to inverter A. Opening the Configuration tab, the natural action
is to put *all* the inverters in the new repeatable field — and under a union
rule that **double-counts A** unless the operator also remembers to clear the old
key. A doubled total is the same defect as a partial one pointing the other way,
in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later.
Under replacement the effective roster is exactly what one key says, and no
arithmetic depends on a de-duplication rule the operator has to know about. It
de-duplicates *within* the list (a site cannot have two sensors with one
entity_id, so a repeated id is a typo that would double that inverter), and
`Controller.checks()` prints a **caution** whenever both keys are set saying
which one won — a replacement nobody is told about is the "one of which silently
wins" `config.yaml` refuses elsewhere.
⚠️ It is a **caution and never a refusal to start**. `validate.py` still does not
mention either key. A telemetry channel that could stop a battery site from
starting would be observability with a foot in the control path.
---
## 2. ⚠️⚠️ The decision the card turns on: absence of ONE is absence of the TOTAL
Three inverters configured, one `unavailable`. The sum of the other two is **a
smaller number indistinguishable from a real one.** Fed into OPT-10's
attribution it reads as *"there was less PV than there was"* — which is the "no
irradiance" conclusion the channel exists to **test** rather than to manufacture.
Two designs were genuinely available:
**(a) publish the total as absent** — `pv.total()` answers `None`, the topic
carries HA's own `None`, the entity goes to `unknown`, the recorder stores a gap.
**(b) publish the partial sum alongside a count of how many contributed.**
**(a) shipped.** It wins on the one question that matters, which is *who reads
the number and when*:
* The **MQTT row** is read back **cold**, a week later, by OPT-10 and by anything
that plots `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` over that week. A partial sum there is a
smaller number indistinguishable from a real one, and the count that would
have qualified it lives in a **second entity with its own history** — so
believing the total requires joining two recorder series by timestamp to find
out which samples to distrust. Nobody re-derives that. And it is worse than a
gap in exactly the direction that matters: **a gap makes the attribution say
"I do not know"; a partial makes it say something false.**
* The **status page** is read **live**, by a human who wants the diagnostic. So
the partial information is *not* thrown away — the row names every entity that
did report, with its watts, and every one that did not, with its reason, and
states plainly that there is no site total. Different reader, different
instant, different rule.
A count published beside the total would also carry **no information** in the
state (a) admits: the total is published *only* when every entity contributed, so
the count would be the constant `len(roster)`.
And this **extends** TEL-11's rule rather than weakening it. `mqtt.py`'s
`ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is still exactly one key and `publish()`'s `None` handling is
untouched: the line that turns an absence into HA's `unknown` did not have to
change, because "absence is never zero" already covered this one layer up.
### The mirror, which matters just as much
A member honestly reporting **0 W** is **summed**, not treated as absent. The
test is `watts is None`, never falsiness. Shading, a tripped string and
nightfall are all real zeros, and a roster that blanked the site whenever one
member read zero would report an absence **on every clear evening** and defeat
the channel from the other end.
### ⚠️ And the answer is NOT "document a template sensor that adds them up"
An operator may legitimately prefer one, and `pv_entity` will happily point at
it. Shipping it as *the* answer pushes the absence problem onto them unseen: a
template sensor summing an `unavailable` source silently yields the partial
total — the same defect one layer down, in a place this add-on cannot see or
report. DOCS.md says so in those terms.
### The three published states, side by side
| what happened | frame | `goodwe_ctl/pv` | status page |
|---|---|---|---|
| no roster at all | no `pv` key | no topic, no entity | no row |
| 1200 / 2100 / 450 W, all three | `pv: 3750.0` | `3750.0` | `PV 3 750 W` + one ok row naming all three |
| all three answer, one of them `0 W` | `pv: 1650.0` | `1650.0` | `PV 1 650 W` |
| one of the three `unavailable` | `pv: None` | `None` → `unknown`, recorder **gap** | `PV —` + a caution naming the missing entity, its reason, and what the others reported |
| all three gone | `pv: None` | as above | as above |
---
## 3. Still not a control input
Unchanged, and re-proved at the new roster size.
`tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` was **extended rather than replaced** — the file name
still says TEL-11 because `DECISIONS/TEL-11-pv-production.md` §5 and
`test_pv.py`'s mutation table quote it, and a renamed instrument makes both
references dangle for no gain.
It now produces **three** document sets per tree — `unset`, `one`, `multi` — and
grades five claims. The roster cells live in their own document precisely so
`unset` and `one` keep the `control` hashes TEL-11 recorded; appending cells to
an existing document would have moved a hash whose stability is itself the
evidence.
```
$ python3 tools/tel11_pv_trace.py --compare base.json head.json
HEAD is B; baseline is A - its roster cells ARE its unset cells, which is what a tree that has never heard of `pv_entities` does with them.
supports_roster A False / B True (self-reported; the verdict above is MEASURED)
tree A fa92ba6a6fc6d49c0f87a494e03b530a8575212a0b2c3046629cb400ef2ae0d4
tree B 0b39198015b6a5a3f7538d4157d77ecadc89311daef18fce883762d94d8351eb
control A unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control A one 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B one 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control A multi 2aafbfedfb9cc939082b36eeb7493289808fb21cd41113322d4817de0e414a30
control B multi 2aafbfedfb9cc939082b36eeb7493289808fb21cd41113322d4817de0e414a30
telemetry A unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry A one 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
telemetry B one 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
telemetry A multi d269168ffece375027c2c18ea33631a961ff92775781884a0592d6a37d78845c
telemetry B multi 550a49a73f39267ba28b1e78cd12b8f5c71ef7269bbbd2e12112696be0fef1ff
OK 1/5 UNSET: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to the baseline tree. …
OK 2/5 ONE ENTITY: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to 0.11.0's single-entity path - the same commands, the same payloads, the same status rows, the same announcement.
OK 3/5 CONTROL, ONE ENTITY: the control document is byte-identical with the channel switched on - PV reaches no decision.
OK 4/5 CONTROL, THREE ENTITIES: every roster cell's control document equals its grid world's `unset` one - 30 cells over 5 grid worlds, covering three healthy entities, one dead at EVERY position, all three dead and one honestly reporting 0 W. Neither the total nor any PARTIAL total reaches a decision, and the document is byte-identical to the BASELINE tree's for the same cells.
OK 5/5 CONTROL OF THE CONTROL: the telemetry document DOES move under a roster (30 stimulus cells differ from their grid world's unset telemetry), so 1/5-4/5 are identities this instrument could have broken. AND in no cell with a dead member does the PV row carry the partial sum of the survivors, while every cell whose members all ANSWER publishes its total - including the one where a member honestly reports 0 W.
$ echo $?
0
```
**The control hash is unmoved: `846a10a5b89e…` on `unset` and on `one`, on both
trees.** The roster control document `2aafbfedfb9c…` is byte-identical between
the two trees, which is the strongest available form of the claim — the baseline
runs those cells with a key it has never heard of, so its control document for
them *is* 0.11.0's.
⚠️ **2/5 is a claim TEL-11 could not make.** TEL-11's baseline had no channel at
all to be identical to; TEL-12's baseline is 0.11.0, so "one entity behaves
exactly as 0.11.0 does" is a real cross-tree identity over **both** documents.
`pv.total()` passes a single entity's `(watts, why)` through verbatim for exactly
this reason, and `Controller.checks()` keeps 0.11.0's two f-strings in a
`len(...) == 1` branch rather than generalising them.
### ⚠️ TEL-11's `--compare` refusal had to change, and that is a finding
TEL-11's rule was *"exactly ONE side's `set` document may differ from its own
`unset` — that side is the HEAD"*. It was correct evidence when written, because
`release/1.0` predated `pv_entity` entirely. `release/1.0` is 0.11.0 now, **both**
sides react to `pv_entity`, and that refusal fires on **every honest run**. The
discriminator is the roster instead: only the HEAD has heard of `pv_entities`, so
only the HEAD's `multi` document fails to reduce to its own `unset` one.
It is asserted from the **documents**, not from `tree.supports_roster` — a
self-report is the tree describing itself, whereas "this side's behaviour did not
move when `pv_entities` was set" is the tree being measured. `supports_roster` is
printed beside the verdict so a disagreement between the two is visible.
See MUTATION.md habit 24.
---
## 4. Mutation battery
Twelve mutations, each on a **fresh `cp -a`** of the clean worktree (never
reverted — habit 18 / TARIFF-09's method), `__pycache__` purged before the run
and the tree checked for one afterwards, byte delta from `stat` and the edit
confirmed on disk with `cmp`, suites run in the CI image with `checks.yml`'s own
command one file at a time under a `:ro` mount.
| mutation | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---|
| N1 `total()` returns the partial sum, not an absence | +42 B | 6 named in `test_pv.py` + 1 crash |
| **N1b ⭐ THE REJECTED DESIGN: the partial sum with a contributor count** | −282 B | **10 named + the trace `REFUSED 5/5`** |
| N2 absence tested by falsiness (`not w`) | −4 B | 2 named |
| N3 `pv_entities` UNIONS with `pv_entity` | −27 B | 3 named |
| N4 the de-duplication dropped | −15 B | 1 named |
| N5 `sum` → `max` over the roster | **+0 B** | 6 named |
| N6 the roster-of-one stops passing `why` through | +13 B | 8 named |
| N7 `optional_keys()` back to reading `pv_entity` | −6 B | 1 named + 1 crash |
| N8 `self.grid -= self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` | +106 B | 3 named + the trace (52 cells on 2/5, 26 on 3/5, 10 on 4/5) |
| N9 the roster caution made a `bad` row (NOT READY) | +1 B | 1 named |
| N10 `entity_is_ignored()` always False | +10 B | 2 named |
| N11 `pv_entities: []` deleted from `options:` | −18 B | 2 named in `test_translations.py` + `11 CASE(S) FAILED` in the probe |
**No survivors.**
⚠️ **N5 is `+0 B` — the risky delta.** `sum` and `max` are the same three
characters, so neither the file size nor its mtime moved, and TEST-15's
stale-bytecode defect is exactly what manufactures a survivor there. The run was
on a fresh purged copy and `cmp` confirmed the edit on disk before it started.
⚠️ **N1b is the row that matters, and it is not a defect.** It is the *other*
defensible design, implemented and run. The point is that the checks and the
instrument can **tell the two apart** — an unexamined partial sum is what the
card forbids, so a check that could not see one would be decoration:
```
REFUSED 5/5: THE PARTIAL SUM IS ON THE WIRE at [('EXPORT-6K/EAST-DEAD', '2550.0'),
('EXPORT-6K/GARAGE-DEAD', '3300.0'), ('EXPORT-6K/WEST-DEAD', '1650.0'),
('IMPORT-3K/EAST-DEAD', '2550.0'), ('IMPORT-3K/GARAGE-DEAD', '3300.0'),
('IMPORT-3K/WEST-DEAD', '1650.0')] … - a smaller number indistinguishable from a
real one, which is the defect this card exists to prevent.
```
⚠️ **N8's 1/5 stays GREEN and that is correct rather than a miss.** With no PV
entity configured `pv_w` is `None` and the leak cannot fire — which is what makes
1/5 a claim about the **default** and 2/5–4/5 the claims about the channel.
### The fixture values are the design (habit 10 and habit 23)
`test_pv.py` carries **two** rosters over the same three entities, because the
two claims need different magnitudes and one fixture cannot serve both.
* **Parts 8–10: 1200 W + 2.1 kW + 450 W = 3750 W.** The sum is separable from
max (2100), min (450), first (1200), last (450), mean (1250), count (3) and
every partial of itself (2550 / 1650 / 3300) — the family is computed, printed
and asserted non-colliding as its own precondition. One member is in **kW** so
"correct against their own units" is exercised. **Not one member is zero**: a
member contributing 0 W could go absent without moving the sum of the rest, and
a fixture like that cannot tell "published the absence" from "published the
partial sum" — habit 23 with a coinciding value in the *fixture* rather than in
the plant, which is precisely the trap the brief named. Absence is driven at
**every position** of the roster, not at one (habit 10's fixture-as-a-SET), and
each position's partial is **derived from the fixture** rather than typed
beside it.
* **Part 6: 1500 W + 4.5 kW + 2000 W = 8000 W.** Sized so every *partial*
(6500 / 3500 / 6000) would still **move** a loop settling on a 600 W import.
Habit 23's own question is asked twice — shift the meter by 8000 W, and again
by 3500 W, the smallest partial any single dead member could produce — because
a leak of the partial is a different mutation leaking a smaller number.
### Two false results this card produced, and what they were
Both were in the **instrument**, and both are recorded rather than tidied away.
1. `partial_w`/`partial_wire` were first written **inside** each telemetry cell.
They are a fact about the *stimulus*, produced by the tool and identical on
both trees — so every roster cell differed from its unset reference for a
reason that was not behaviour, and the HEAD/baseline discriminator fired on
*both* sides. They live in a separate top-level `partials` map now.
2. The `WEST-ZERO` cell (all three answer, one honestly reporting 0 W) had its
**true total** labelled as its "partial". 5/5 then refused the *shipped* tree
for publishing 1650 W, which it is required to publish. A cell with no dead
member has no partial to leak, and `never` is `None` there.
---
## 5. What none of this can see
* **Home Assistant itself.** That `None` on the state topic renders as state
`unknown` and that the recorder keeps a gap is read out of HA's source and
quoted in `app/mqtt.py`; whether the long-term statistics table then
interpolates across the gap is HA's behaviour, and OPT-10 will be reading it.
* **Whether the operator's sensors are telling the truth.** A sensor wired
backwards reads −4 kW at noon and is summed as −4 kW. There is deliberately no
`pv_invert` — §2 of the TEL-11 record is the argument, and it holds at a roster.
* **A roster larger than three.** Three is the smallest size at which the sum
separates from the reduction family *and* absence can be driven at every
position. Nothing here says what twenty entities do to a cycle's latency — the
read is `asyncio.gather`ed across the roster for exactly that reason, so a slow
sensor costs what one costs, but that is an argument rather than a measurement.
* **A PV roster combined with a two-inverter battery roster.** No fixture
crosses CFG-04's `inverters:` with `pv_entities`.
* **The real MQTT transport, and wall-clock behaviour.** As TEL-11.
---
## 6. Not deployable as merged
`config.yaml` stays at `0.11.0`, so `tools/predeploy_check.py` reports a NO-OP
until PKG cuts a version. A CHANGELOG entry is **wanted** and was deliberately
not written: `test_version_gate.py` 11b forbids an `## Unreleased` heading and
the bump is PKG's call. The material an entry needs is this file.
The option surface moves **76 keys → 77**, one new optional key, `pv_entities`,
empty on every install that does not set it.
**Superseded in part (UX-08, 2026-09-27):** the PV status rows no longer read 0.11.0's sentences at one entity. The owner ruled out entity ids on status rows, so 2/5 now holds for the control document only. See `UX-08-short-notifications.md`, phase 2b item 3.
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# TEL-14 — the PV sign, declared per entity
Owner report on 0.12.0: `sensor.espressif_vermogen` (ESPHome clamp) and
`sensor.kwh_meter_actueel_vermogen` (kWh meter in the PV circuit) read
**positive for consumption, negative for production**. At night the page said
"✓ PV production: 13 W" — standby draw. By day production would publish negative.
## 1. This reverses TEL-11 §2, and why
TEL-11 §2 refused a `pv_invert` on two grounds. "PV is read by nothing in the
control path" still holds: the flip lives in `pv.total()`, and `test_pv.py`
part 12 re-runs part 6's 40-cycle identity with a flip set. "A reversed sensor
announces itself" did not survive a real site: these sensors follow a different
convention, read a plausible small positive number at night, and the only other
fix is a template sensor, the place TEL-12 §2 says goes quietly wrong.
## 2. The shape: a parallel list, `pv_invert_entities`
Measured by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §H (Supervisor 2026.08.0, against
a 0.12.0 blob); re-run it for the transcript.
| shape | schema | why it lost / won |
|---|---|---|
| (a) `-sensor.x` prefix | accepted | invisible: the sign is a syntax only the description explains, in a field an installer fills with the entity picker's text |
| (b) parallel list | accepted, 0.12.0 blob unchanged | **ships**: its own labelled, translated field ("PV entities whose sign is reversed"); an installer lists the odd ones out |
| (c) dicts on `pv_entities` | **refuses 0.12.0's stored strings** | bricks the upgrade — TEL-12's trap again |
| (c2) dicts as a third key | accepted | per-entry labels render raw (`entity`, `invert`) — probe §F; and a third PV surface |
| (d) global bool | accepted | one sign cannot describe inverter + meter in one roster |
(b)'s known cost is a typo in the second list: `pv.stray_inverts()` turns it into
a named caution. `[]` in `options:` is load-bearing (§H, isolated counterfactual).
Default `[]` flips nothing, so every 0.12.0 install is byte-identical (part 12).
## 3. The negative caution: per entity, below −50 W
The owner's two meters draw ~13 W at night, so a *correctly* signed meter reads
about −13 W then. −50 W clears that with room for a few such devices behind one
entity; a reversed sensor by day reads hundreds to thousands of watts below
zero. It is tested **per entity, not on the total** (a deviation from the brief):
three correct meters at −20 W sum to −60 W and must stay quiet, while a reversed
−1500 W hidden inside a positive total must not. It is a caution, never `bad`;
a wrong threshold costs a spurious or missed caution, never data. The text says
ADD (unflipped) or REMOVE (already flipped).
## 4. Mutations
Fresh `cp -a` each, `__pycache__` purged, CI image, `:ro`, `--network none`;
`test_pv.py` only unless stated. T1-T12 at 7559d21; M2/M5 are review #1628's,
red since B1 (merged into release/1.0 @ 43b2740).
| # | mutation | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | flip ignored in `total()` | −45 | 9 |
| T2 | flip applied to every member | −7 | 6 |
| T3 | `0.0 - w` → `-w` | −5 | 1 |
| T4 | flip written as `abs()` | −1 | 2 |
| T5 | `_read_pv()` stops passing the flip | −26 | 7 |
| T6 | caution threshold −50 → 0 W | −17 | 3 |
| T7 | `[sign inverted]` marker dropped | −39 | 3 |
| T8 | negative caution made `bad` | +1 | 1 |
| T9 | `stray_inverts()` always empty | −50 | 1 |
| T10 | `inverted()` stops stripping | −8 | 1 |
| T11 | ADD/REMOVE advice swapped | +4 | 2 |
| T12 | `pv_invert_entities: []` deleted from `options:` | −25 | 2 test_translations + 17 probe |
| M2 | `stray_inverts()` roster ignores `pv_entity` | +15 | 2 (REPORTED CASE, PADDING) |
| M5 | `_read_pv()` flip set not stripped | +25 | 1 (PADDING) |
## 5. History
OPT-10's `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` recorded since 2026-09-24 on an install with
such sensors carries the old sign; nothing rewrites it.
## 6. CHANGELOG entry for the next PKG cut
Not written into `CHANGELOG.md`: `test_version_gate.py` 11b/11d refuse an
`## Unreleased` heading (measured on this branch: 4 reds). For PKG to paste:
> **`pv_invert_entities` (TEL-14).** A PV sensor that reads negative while
> producing — typically a kWh meter or power clamp in the PV circuit — can now
> be listed under *PV entities whose sign is reversed* in the Configuration tab;
> its sign is flipped before the sum and the status page marks it. Empty (the
> default) changes nothing. ⚠️ PV history recorded before you set it keeps the
> old sign.
@@ -148,6 +148,11 @@ exits 78 and the panel goes with it. Recovery is the Configuration tab. That is
the reason it stays, and the reason the panel refuses to write a blob the
validator rejected: this surface must never be the thing that removes itself.
*Amended by [[UX-15-setup-only-mode]] (2026-09-28):* one refused configuration
keeps the panel: options that name no inverter at all and have no other
refusal, which is what a new install ships. The add-on then serves the page in
setup-only mode and commands nothing. Every other refusal still exits 78.
**The panel shows fewer refusals than the startup gate can, never more.** Two
of `validate.py`'s rules compare a configured ceiling against the setpoint
device's *own* reported range, which is only knowable by asking Home Assistant.
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
# UX-08 phase 2a: short notifications, and what moved out of them
The owner decided on 2026-09-27: a title of at most about 5 everyday words and a one-sentence body. A red safety alarm may use up to 3 sentences, so no action-relevant information is lost. Titles are neutral, with no "GoodWe:" prefix. HA entity ids appear only in refusals. The rule is `STYLE.md` at the repository root, the texts are in `app/messages.py`, and `test_messages.py` enforces both. The detail each notification used to carry is in DOCS.md under "Notifications", and the body links to it.
**Unchanged:** every `notification_id`, every trigger and cadence (edges, SAFETY-34 re-announce, per-unit ids), every log line and every status row. The status banner and rows are phase 2b, refusals and option texts 2c, logs 2d; `ux08_allowlist.txt` lists them until then.
## Where a choice was made
1. **Severity of "not delivering" (SAFETY-42).** The notification is an *alarm*, so it may use 3 sentences. Its log line is ERROR and the alarm is latched. The page banner stays amber, as SAFETY-42 decided, because control keeps running; the two answer different questions (is control running / must a person act) and HA shows no colour on a notification. The three checks stay in their original order. Clearing it takes stop then start, and the body says so.
2. **Figures left the bodies** of the frozen-meter card (the rail and the command), the circulating-power card (the watts and the time window) and the peak cards (the projection). None of them is needed to act, and all of them are still in the reason text that the log line and the status row carry. `test_freeze.py` and `test_watchdog.py` now pin that. The frozen-meter card can therefore no longer quote a wrong rail (SAFETY-20), because it quotes none.
3. **The over-rating alarm keeps its numbers** (asked, sent, and which limit cut it), because they are what a fault report needs. `ClampWatchdog.facts` carries them under the same keep-the-bug rule as `reason`, so the words and the numbers always describe the same tick, with asked before sent (SAFETY-40, `test_clamp.py` part 6).
4. **SAFETY-25 stays in the peak-reserve alarm** as its last sentence ("the reserve only limits peak shaving … down to its cut-out level"). The alarm now gives each branch its own action: at the reserve, lower it; battery level unread, check the sensor; floor unknown, set the cut-out level. That last branch is `soc_floor is None`, which happens when an inverter's cut-out level is missing, not the peak reserve (that option always has a value). Before, every branch said "lower peak_soc_floor". The title, "Battery stopped limiting the peak", is true on all three branches.
5. **SAFETY-32 at a roster of one.** The body no longer ends in a separate "WHICH PACK" paragraph. The pack's name is part of the first sentence ("The battery of inverter-b …"), and at a roster of one that is the only difference.
6. **Dropped as background, now in DOCS:** "charging stays blocked" (peak reserve), "why no other guard fired" (circulating power, not delivering), and the saturation-freeze distinction (over-rating). "The meter cannot see this" stays in the circulating-power card, as the owner asked.
7. **The Details link** opens the add-on's documentation page (`/hassio/addon/<slug>/documentation`, with the slug taken from the container hostname) and names the section. A `#heading` anchor was not used because nobody has checked that Home Assistant's documentation tab renders heading ids; if it does, adding one is a one-line change. Outside an add-on container it names the section without a link.
# Phase 2b: status rows and page banners
Every row of the Commissioning list and every banner is now in `app/messages.py` (`row_*`, `banner_*`), and `test_messages.py` checks a rendering of each. The row and banner kinds are gone from `ux08_allowlist.txt` (200 → 168 entries). DOCS.md "Status page" explains the rows. **Unchanged:** every row's colour (ok / warn / bad), which rows show when, and the banner cascade order.
## Where a choice was made
1. **A red row may use 3 sentences (30 words).** STYLE.md gave rows 15 words; the owner allows red safety states 3 sentences. A red row needs room for what happened, the state (0 W) and how it clears. STYLE.md now says so, and the test applies it by colour.
2. **Figures left the rows, not the product.** The reason texts (freeze, sign, circulating, delivery, peak guard) carry reason codes and limits; they stay on the ERROR/WARNING log line and the event list, as before. Rows keep the numbers a reader acts on: the stall age and the 0 W deadline, the meter age and limit, asked and sent for an over-rating, the peak limit, and "opposite for 12 of 60 seconds" while a check counts. So 2a item 2 ("also on the status row") no longer holds, and DOCS.md says "in the add-on log".
3. **No entity id on any row**, even the green ones that used to print `sensor.x = 54`. The sensor rows name the setting (*Battery power for inverter-b*). Solar sources are numbered in the order of the settings list (*source 2 of 3*, *entry 1 of the reversed-sign list*). This retires TEL-12's rule that a one-entity site reads 0.11.0's sentence byte for byte. A `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py --compare` against a pre-UX-08 tree therefore shows the PV rows as changed telemetry, and the control documents stay equal. The per-source watts and units left the multi-source row. The total, the count and which source is missing remain.
4. **UX-07 item 1.** `ClampWatchdog` now also counts `over_rating` and `bound` separately. After an episode, each count shows under its own alarm's title ("Power request too high: 2 times since start, not now", "Battery is not keeping up: …"). A site with both gets two amber rows where it had one.
5. **The "Not ready" banner** is the first red row's own `banner`, or else its first sentence. The peak-reserve and over-rating rows set `banner` to their notification title. The three trips keep their own banner branches, reworded (e.g. "Inverters worked against each other. Every inverter is set to 0 W.").
6. **How a latch clears stays on the row**, shortened: "Only starting control clears this", "A restart does not clear this", "only stopping and starting control clears this" (not delivering). SAFETY-25's sentence stays on the peak-reserve row.
7. **Rows got an `id`** (`meter_frozen`, `direction`, `pv`, …), so tests find a row by what it is, not by its words. The page ignores it.
8. **Left for later:** texts that rows embed from other modules and that were not flagged as rows (the month-peak line, `peakguard.explain()`, the liveness and stale notes, `shadow.banner()`). The month-peak row only lost its semicolons.
# UX-09: fixes after the phase 2a test
1. **The Details link follows the Home Assistant version.** HA 2026.2 added the built-in `app` panel (core #157554, frontend #28245), whose add-on pages are `/config/app/<slug>/documentation`. 2026.5 stopped registering the `hassio` panel, so `/hassio/addon/<slug>/documentation` is a 404 there (TEST-23, HA 2026.9.1). 2026.1 and older have only the old path. The one path valid on both, `/_my_redirect/supervisor_addon?addon=<slug>`, opens the Info tab, not Documentation. So the add-on reads its slug (`GET /addons/self/info`) and the HA version (`GET /info`) at start, and picks the path. An unknown version gets the current path. The hostname stays as a fallback for the slug. Phase 2a item 7 is replaced by this.
2. **Shadow mode says "would".** The over-rating alarm and row said "sent X W" while 0 W was on the wire, and the peak alarm said "the battery is giving all it can". Both now take `shadow=`, and in shadow mode say what would have been sent and that the inverters stay at 0 W. Severity, id and cadence do not change with the mode.
3. **"Controller" is gone from texts.** "The add-on" names who decides, and "control" names what it does, as in the existing "start control". The add-on is what the reader sees in Home Assistant, and "controller" was easy to confuse with the control board.
4. **One term per setting, matching its label.** Four labels changed instead of the texts, because the texts' words were plainer: “Peak reserve (%)” (was "Peak guard will not discharge below"), “Battery level entity (%)” (was "Battery charge level"), and “Solar production entity / entities, per inverter / Reversed-sign solar entities” (was "PV …"). The Dutch labels already said "Zonneproductie". Option descriptions are phase 2c and were not changed, so some still say "PV".
5. **The shadow banner and the inverter notes** are now `messages.banner_shadow()` and `row_no_setpoint` / `row_not_controllable` / `row_commands_refused`, so `test_messages.py` checks them. The red shadow banner no longer lists the latches, because 12 words cannot carry them. It says a safety stop stays on, and each latch keeps its own red row, which names it and says how it clears. The colour of a liveness row now comes from `is_live()`, not from matching "NOT COMMANDABLE" in the text.
6. **DOCS "Notifications" and "Status page"** are written for a home owner, and the card ids, keys and log detail moved to a "For installers" part of each.
# UX-08 phase 2c: refusals, error texts and option texts
Validator refusals, the parse errors they carry, and every option name and description are now short. No rule, key, schema, default or exit code changed. Over 36 spoiled configurations the old and new validators refuse the same number of times. The allowlist went from 167 entries to 43, and only log lines (phase 2d) remain on it.
1. **A refusal names the setting by its label and then its key**, as `messages.setting()` writes it: “Inverter rating” (max_w). The key has to stay, because `configui.problems_by_field()` shows a reason beside every key its text names. A test checks each label against en.yaml. A few reasons no longer mention keys they only named in passing, such as `price_markup_eur_kwh` in the withdrawn-provider reason, so the panel shows those reasons beside fewer settings. Each reason still names the setting that fixes it. A setting of one inverter in the list is written “Inverter rating” for inverter-b (inverters.max_w), so the panel shows it beside `inverters`, where that value is changed, and not only beside the flat `max_w` that a list does not read.
2. **Citations moved to DOCS.** Option descriptions say "Measured value, leave it unchanged" or similar, and the record behind the value is under "For installers: where the numbers come from". The UX-01 citation check in `test_translations.py` now checks the tab for that instruction and DOCS for the record.
3. **What left the refusals:** the shipped default in the peak-reserve reason, the superseded-default note in the levy-table reason (DOCS already covers it), the endpoints of the withdrawn providers (DOCS "Energy price providers"), the plant measurement behind `slew_w` (DOCS, beside the setting), and the leg-specific paragraphs of the tariff-formula errors. Each reason keeps the rejected value, the limit and what to change.
4. **Not rewritten:** errors that only a code defect can raise, such as plugin-contract and argument-type checks in `price.py`, `price_forecast.py`, `static_tariff.py`, `arbitrage.py` and `main.py`, which a home owner never reads. INFO lines such as the tariff-formula preview were also left.
# UX-08 phase 2d: log lines, the rest of the status page, and DOCS
The allowlist is empty and its cap is 0 (43 → 0). Every WARNING and ERROR line is one plain line of at most 25 words, with no card ids, capitals or semicolons (the semicolon rule now covers log lines too). **Unchanged:** every log level, every trigger and cadence, every notification id, every row's colour and when it shows, the banner cascade, and every refusal count.
1. **No code prefixes on log lines.** Nothing outside the repositories greps them, except `/home/homelab/clampwatch.sh`, a one-off site watch from 2026-09-05 that greps `OUTPUT_CLAMP` and `Engagements so far`. `OUTPUT_CLAMP` is still in the reason the line quotes; "Engagements so far" is now "Cut back N times so far". The tests that found a line by its card id (`SAFETY-37`, `SAFETY-44`, `CONTROL LOOP DIED`, `UNGRADED`) now find it by its words.
2. **Reason texts keep their codes.** A line quotes a watchdog's reason (`%s`), such as `STALE_READING: …` or `OUTPUT_CLAMP: …`. Those are the evidence an installer searches for and many tests pin them, so they were not rewritten. The line around them is plain.
3. **Reasoning moved to DEBUG, not deleted,** for the 10 lines marked DROP-to-DEBUG (for example the 14 768 W history behind the over-rating alarm, why SAFETY-42 reports and does not act, and the Eneco card advice). The 25-word line keeps the action and the numbers. SAFETY-57's promise stays on the ERROR line, as an ordered pair: "until it changes, or 17 s after the command drops below 250 W".
4. **The line under the buttons** showed the newest raw action-log entry (`OUTPUT_CLAMP …`, `FAILSAFE …: SIGN_DISAGREEMENT`, `ALLOCATOR …`). Each `log_event()` call now also names a plain hint from `messages.HINTS`, and the page shows that. The action log itself is unchanged, because tests and later analysis read it, and the page no longer shows it. It stays reachable as `events` in the `status` JSON (review of #136), because some entries are written nowhere else: a dropped inverter's reason, the unplaced watts, the peak guard's projection and the shadow decision.
5. **The top table.** *Why* is `messages.why()`: the arbiter's winner and limit in words ("Keeping the grid near zero: 440 W, held back by the peak limit"). `self.reason` keeps `Resolution.explain()` for the log and the checks. *Tariff*, *Price history*, *Arbitrage* and *Shadow mode* keep every figure TARIFF-11 and SAFETY-47 put there, each in its own slot, in words. Labels: *Battery level*, *Solar production*, *Power request*.
6. **The month-peak row became two rows**, because one sentence of 15 words cannot hold the peak, its time, its share of the limit and TARIFF-13's coverage figure. The store's state at start (`restore_state`) left the row: it is the INFO line at start.
7. **The peak guard rows** name the projection first and the limit second, as before (SAFETY-38). The blind row says what it means for the owner: the battery does not charge until the period can be measured again.
8. **Wording that changed meaning-carrying words**: "command and meter point opposite ways" is now "the power went the wrong way" (banner) and "…went against what the add-on asked" (row). The N=1 banner still names the meter, the N≥2 texts still say "own power". The inverter range reads "up to 5 000 W each way" instead of "-5 000 W to 5 000 W".
9. **Refusals are counted as shown.** Setting placeholders are expanded to label and key, and the long cases the 2c test found are driven through the validator. Seven refusals were shortened. The card refusals no longer show `c_eur_per_kwh`, `vat_pct` or "its own card", and a text that does not parse says "not valid near character N" instead of the parser's words. A missing value shows as *empty*, not `None`.
10. **The panel's key match** no longer files `inverters.max_w` under the flat `max_w`.
11. **The Supervisor question at start** is one INFO line with a real reason (a timeout's own text is empty, so the error type is named).
12. **DOCS**: a glossary ("Words used on this page") explains control board, isolator and Developer Tools once. Card ids left the headings and sit on a *For installers* line under each. The links to the renamed headings were updated.
# UX-10: the last plain-language leftovers (after the 2d test)
**Unchanged:** every safety behaviour, every alarm's log level (WARNING and ERROR stay), every notification id, trigger and cadence, the banner cascade, and every row colour except the meter row right after a start (item 6).
1. **Why the 2d scan missed the clamp lines.** Part 3 reads a log call's own literal and counts `%s` as one word. The clamp lines are `"…software fault: %s …"`, and the text in `%s` was built elsewhere, by `loop_clamp_note()` and `ClampResult.describe()`. So the scan passed a line whose logged text had a semicolon, "BUG SIGNAL", "clamped" and "1 times". The same was true of every quoted reason. Part 6 closes the gap. It lists every dynamic part of every WARNING+ line as data (a number, a name, a path, a library's own error text) or as a built text, and a new part in neither list fails. Each built text is produced by the real code (the watchdogs, `decide()`, `loop_clamp_note()`, `MigrationReport.explain()`) or, for a family of builders, by every template of it (`PriceRead.no_data`, `Gate.block`). The text and the line as logged are then checked. A mutation shows the 2d clamp text is caught on both clamp lines.
2. **A quoted reason gets the red-alarm shape**, 3 sentences of at most 30 words, and not the 25-word line limit. It is the evidence behind an alarm, and it keeps its code and its limits, which the owner asked to keep. The alarm shape is STYLE.md's existing rule for the texts behind a safety stop, so no new limit was made up. Rewritten: `OUTPUT_CLAMP` (both kinds), `METER_FROZEN`, `CIRCULATING_POWER`, `STALE_READING` (SAFETY-56's two explanations and "cannot tell which" kept, in order), the peak guard's reasons, the state-migration report, the price feed and price history reasons, and the maintenance and trading gate reasons. "Software fault" left the clamp reason, because the ERROR line around it already says it.
3. **Codes are one token.** `PEAK GUARD`, `PEAK GUARD FLOOR-LIMITED` and `PEAK GUARD BLIND` read as capitals, so they are now `PEAK_GUARD`, `PEAK_GUARD_FLOOR_LIMITED` and `PEAK_GUARD_BLIND`, like `OUTPUT_CLAMP`. Nothing in admin/goodwe or in the scripts under `/home/homelab` greps them (checked). `/home/homelab/clampwatch.sh` greps `OUTPUT_CLAMP`, which stays.
4. **Top table.** *Price history* writes "96 prices over 24 hours for 26 Sep", joined by commas. *Tariff* writes the spacing as "one every 15 minutes or every hour". "Not final yet" was dropped, because a plan is provisional exactly when it holds an estimated price (`n_carried` counts the provisional points), so the estimated count already says it.
5. **Levels and noise.** The shadow line of every cycle is DEBUG, and "Shadow mode is on/off" is INFO: it follows a setting or a button, and the banner, hint and event are unchanged. aiohttp's access log is on only at log level debug. A settings warning is logged once per start (a filter on `goodwe.config`, WARNING only, so refusals are untouched), because the validator runs twice at start. When Home Assistant restarts, `hass.Outage` says so in one WARNING line for the REST API and the meter websocket together, puts the library's text on DEBUG, and says at INFO when both answer again. INFO lines lost "§8.3", ISO timestamps, "banked" and "keys ARE", and error texts lost "NOT_OBSERVED", "did NOT land" and "AND".
6. **Display bugs.**
- "Why: Other" during a latched per-inverter stop: `main.py` turns a safety winner into its claim's reason, and "sign disagreement" (and "unsplit", main.py's own refusal to split) had no entry in `WHY_WINNER`. The mapping is now `main.why_key()`, and part 7 finds every `Claim.set()` in the code and checks that every key it can produce has words.
- Red "Meter: no reading for 0 seconds" after a restart: until the first reading arrives, `P1Ingest.stale` is true, and the age is the time since start. The row now reads amber "waiting for the first reading" while that age is inside the limit. **Colour change, justified:** red at 0 s contradicted the limit the same row prints, and once readings exist the row is red only past that limit. Amber, not green, because control waits for the reading. Past the limit it is red as before. `stale` itself, which gates control, is unchanged.
- "A reading is missing for 0 seconds" stuck at 0: with the meter reading gone, the grid value stops changing, so the loop runs a cycle only every `cycle_floor_s`, and the line was computed once per cycle. The age is now counted when the page asks. The hold and its 15 s escalation are unchanged.
7. **Review: the line as logged gets the shape too.** Part 6 first checked the quoted reason alone, so a title, a 2-sentence reason and two tails still logged as 4 sentences ("Power request too high …: OUTPUT_CLAMP: … +5000 W. The command this cycle was +1000 W. Control is still running. Cut back 1 time so far."). Part 6 now also checks the whole line: at most 3 sentences, none over 30 words. The wrappers became one sentence each, the circulation and peak guard reasons two, and `STALE_READING`'s fixed limits moved from the reason to a DEBUG line beside the ERROR (its release clause stays, pinned by test_freshness). The clamp lines for one inverter are pinned at 30 words at most: `OUTPUT_CLAMP: computed +9000 W, cut to the +5000 W rating, command now +2000 W`. Several clamped inverters read as one sentence of asked/sent pairs; which limit bound each is on its own action-log row and in the notification. Totals above 30 words remain on the direction, delivery, frozen-meter and stale lines (up to 74 words). Shortening them is a follow-up: the direction and delivery reasons are also persisted in state.json, and the direction one is pinned byte-for-byte in test_watchdog.
8. **Home Assistant 400 while it loads** now reads "Home Assistant refused number.set_value for number.x (error 400, no details). The entity may still be loading, or the value is out of range." A body with more than "400: Bad Request" is still quoted. Still WARNING, still once a minute, still a failed write.
9. **Witness** (admin/goodwe): the resolved push says "after no answers from … to …", as the resolved card does. The YAML with every title and message stripped is identical.
# UX-11: safety log lines give the code, the figures go to DEBUG
**Unchanged:** every trigger, latch, threshold and alarm log level (the WARNING and ERROR lines stay), every notification id and cadence, every row colour and the banner cascade. No notification is added.
1. **One plain sentence and the code.** A WARNING/ERROR line that reports a safety reason (direction, delivery, stuck meter, stale reading, peak guard, circulation, over-rating) now ends in the reason's code, taken by `messages.reason_code()`. The reason itself, figures and limits included, is on a DEBUG line logged right after it ("Evidence for inverter-a: …"), and the action log entry carries it as before. Part 6 checks that pairing in the code. Circulation and the clamp lines were not among the five named, but they break the same 25-word rule, so they follow the same pattern. The clamp numbers stay in the notification (phase 2a item 3).
2. **The reasons and `state.json` are unchanged.** `reason` stays the evidence text, so what is saved has the same format as before. An old state file therefore loads and displays like a new one: every saved reason has opened with its code since it was first written (checked in the git history), and that code is all the ERROR line reads. The saved text goes on the DEBUG line. A stop saved without a reason shows `REASON_NOT_SAVED`. `test_messages.py` part 7 restarts from a state file holding the old long texts. `test_watchdog.py` pins the meaning (the code first, then command, reading, time and both limits, in that order) and, since the text did not change, still the bytes.
3. **The 25-word rule is checked as logged.** Part 6 fails any WARNING+ line over 25 words with its built text filled in. Nine non-safety families still run long (tariff plan words, price feed reasons, the state migration report, write refusals and claim scope errors that only a software fault raises, maintenance, trading gate and price history reasons). They are listed with a reason in `LONG_LINE_OK`, capped at 9, and a listed family that gets shorter fails until it is removed. Shortening them is a follow-up.
4. **The meter row's "the add-on log shows why" is now true.** When the meter goes quiet past its limit, the add-on logs one WARNING per episode, not one per cycle, and an INFO line when readings return. A meter that flaps (on `ha_signed` a healthy meter under a flat load can go 42–97 s between changes) logs at most one such pair per 10 minutes, and the episodes in between go to DEBUG. This is a new log line, not a new alarm: it has no notification and changes no decision.
5. **The Why line past the 15 s hold** names the missing reading ("No usable meter reading for over 15 seconds: 0 W", or the battery power or level of an inverter), instead of "A reading is missing: 0 W".
6. **Action log:** "25 engagement(s)" is "25 engagements", and "SHADOW MODE OFF - …" is "Shadow mode off: …". "SHADOW MODE ON" was not named in the card and is left as it is.
7. **Review: after a restart the figures go on the action log too.** `log_level` defaults to `info`, so the DEBUG evidence line is not seen by default, and `events` starts empty. Each restored stop (direction per inverter and site, delivery, circulation) now also writes its saved reason to the action log ("FAILSAFE inverter-a, saved before the restart: …"), and the page's event line gets the same plain words the live stop gives. `LONG_LINE_OK` also refuses a key whose text is a safety reason, not only a `reason_code` key.
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
# UX-13 — one layout table, and why UI code may now name an option key
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-27 (owner approved the UX-13 design and mockup).**
Card 6ab979852f3eca02fb40f69e. Amends [[UX-02]] §3.1. Design note and
mockup: `goodwe-session/UX-13-design.md`, `UX-13-mockup.html`.
## 1. What UX-02 said, and why it no longer fits
UX-02 built the configuration panel from the Supervisor's schema, so
`app/configui.py` contains "no option key, no label and no rule", and
test_selfconfig.py part 5 checks that the page script names no key. That kept
a second copy of the option surface from drifting, and it is why the panel is
a flat list of fields in schema order.
UX-13 needs things a schema cannot say: groups and sub-groups, a slider in kW
for a value stored in W, a picker for an entity, a field shown only for one
meter source, locked measured values, a Simple view and a setup wizard. It
also needs page fields that are not options at all: one inverter card that is
stored as six flat keys, solar rows that become `pv_entity` or `pv_entities`,
a contract and two prices that become `static_profile` JSON, and a region
that becomes the levies figure. None of that can be read off the schema, so
some code has to name option keys.
## 2. The decision
Option keys may appear in UI code in exactly two files:
- **`app/uilayout.py`**, the layout table: screen → group → part → field, with
control, unit, display scale, step, entity kind, when it is shown, whether it
is on the Simple view or a wizard step, and whether it applies now or after a
restart. Every option in `config.yaml` is a field, `DERIVED` or `HIDDEN`,
exactly once.
- **`app/uimodel.py`**, the derivations the table names: `options_to_ui()` and
`ui_to_options()`. It may name only the keys it writes.
What UX-02 made authoritative stays authoritative:
- **Ranges** come from the schema (`uilayout.range_of()`); the table writes
none. A unit holds no digit.
- **Labels and help** come from `translations/*.yaml` by key. Page-only fields,
group titles and choices are in `app/ui_text/*.json`, held to STYLE by
test_messages.py.
- **Rules** stay in `validate.py`. It gains a warning tier (`validate.Note`,
"warn" or "info") for the page. A note never blocks a save, and passing the
notes list does not change the refusals returned.
- **The stored blob** is still the one truth. The page model carries the stored
values of every derived key (`keep`). A derivation whose page fields are
unchanged writes those values back untouched, so a blob the page cannot
express survives a save of another field.
## 3. How it is held
- test_uilayout.py fails when `config.yaml` gains an option, or an inverter
field, that the table does not place. It also checks that uimodel.py names
only the keys it writes and that web.py and haentities.py name none.
- test_uimodel.py round-trips options → page model → JSON → options for every
validator call the suite made at 652097a (`scenarios/ux13/`), the TEST-23
option files and config.yaml's defaults. All must be identical.
- `tools/ux13_validator_calls.py compare` runs those calls through the old and
new validator. At P0: 261 calls, 158 refused, no refusal changed.
- test_selfconfig.py part 5 still checks the old page script; P1 moves the page
into `app/static/` and the same check applies there.
- P2: the Installer view (`app/static/settings.js`) draws from
`app/uipage.py`, which serialises the table and names no key itself
(test_uilayout part 5, test_settings part 2). The view posts its page model
to the existing `/config/validate` and `/config/save`, which turn it into
options with `ui_to_options()` before the shipped validator runs. No route
was added.
- P4: the setup wizard draws the same model by each field's `wizard` step.
Its tables (`KETTLE`, `SHADOW`) are in `uilayout.py`, and its live checks
are rules, so they are in `validate.py` (`setup_checks`). settings.js still
names no key. See [[UX-13-setup-wizard]].
- P5: the page words are in `app/ui_text/en.json` and `nl.json`, one key set,
loaded by `app/uitext.py` with an English fallback per key. The page picks
Dutch when the browser's language is `nl`, as the classic page does. Home's
sentences moved from `homeview.py` into `home_words`, so `/status?lang=nl`
builds them in Dutch. Status rows, banners, hints and validator sentences
(`messages.py`, `validate.py`) stay English: they are shared with
notifications, the log and the start refusal. `test_ui_text.py` checks both
files against STYLE.md and each other, using the rules in
`tools/style_rules.py`, which it shares with test_messages.py.
- P5: "Other time windows" is a list editor (`ui.periods`, control
`period_list`). `uimodel._periods_json()` builds `static_profile` and names
the first bad time, empty price, overlap or gap. Its tiling rule matches
`static_tariff._check_tiling`. A stored profile whose days the editor has no
choice for (for example "mon,wed") is still kept as stored and edited in the
Configuration tab. Supervisor 2026.08.0's `AppOptions` accepted all 133
wizard blobs, 17 of them with time windows
(`tools/ux13_wizard_blobs.py --supervisor`, run offline on 2026-09-28).
- P3: Settings, Simple draws the fields the table marks `simple`, with an
optional `note` under each (words in `settings.simple.note`), plus the
batteries' switches and modes. Those are store state set through the
existing `/action` values, not options, so the table places no key for
them. The Batteries screen's Now, Today and Why lines are built in
`homeview.py` from what the add-on knows this cycle; the plan per mode is
OPT-11 P3/P4, so until then Today says "Not planned yet" when no block
is planned for the battery (`test_batteries_screen.py`).
## 4. What this costs
The table is a second place that knows the option surface, which UX-02 set
out to avoid. The cost is bounded by the coverage test: an option added to
config.yaml and not placed here fails CI, rather than silently missing from
the page. Changing a key's type or range needs no change here.
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
# UX-13 P4 — the setup wizard, and when it opens by itself
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-28 (P4 dev; the design and mockup were approved
2026-09-27).** Card 6ab979852f3eca02fb40f69e. Builds on
[[UX-13-one-layout-table]]. Design note: `goodwe-session/UX-13-design.md` §1, §3.6.
## 1. What the wizard is
The Setup tab draws the Installer view's page model one step at a time: a
field is on step *n* when its `uilayout.Field` says `wizard=n`. It uses P2's
controls, `/config/validate` and `/config/save`. No route was added.
`uilayout.py` holds what a field cannot say: the kettle table (`KETTLE`), the
optional step and the shadow switch (`SHADOW`). Step 5 has no battery modes
yet (OPT-11); it says they come later.
A step moves on when no refusal is anchored to one of its shown fields
(`uipage.step_problems`). A refusal on a hidden field, a field on no step or
no field at all blocks the last step, which lists every refusal.
## 2. When it opens by itself (`uipage.setup_needed`)
The page opens `#setup` only when it is opened with no route, and only when
`/config/model` gives a reason:
- **`no_power_request`**: the stored options name no inverter to control.
- **`first_start`**: this boot found no `/data/state.json` (`Store.fresh`), the
Store has no `setup_done` and no `auto` key, and control is not started.
`auto` is the key Start/Stop writes. Neither the startup gate's exit 78 nor
setup-only mode (UX-15) writes the Store, so a new install's first good boot
is fresh.
"Never started" alone is not enough: both TEST-23 add-ons have `auto_start`
off and no `auto` key, and one has run in shadow for weeks (review of PR #146,
R1). So a Store read from a file is an old site, and it is never sent to the
wizard. A new install that restarts before the page is opened is not sent
either, and its Setup tab still works. A site that runs control, or ever
started or stopped it, is never sent. Without a Store the answer is no. The wizard's save writes
`setup_done` (an ISO time) to the Store. A save from the Installer view does
not.
**Decided since, in [[UX-15-setup-only-mode]] (owner, 2026-09-28):** a
brand-new install ships `setpoint_entity: ""`, and it no longer exits 78. When
naming no inverter is the gate's only refusal, the add-on serves the page in
setup-only mode, which commands nothing, and the wizard opens with
`no_power_request`. Setup-only mode writes no Store file, so the first-run
rule above still holds for an install set up on the Configuration tab.
## 3. The kettle test and the sign checks
Step 1 reads the meter's entities now (`GET ha/entities?entity=`, one
`hass.state()` read, in W) before and after a kettle is switched on. The
change, not the sign, decides: a rise of at least 500 W keeps `meter_invert`
off, a fall turns it on. For a net entity or import and export, a fall cannot
be fixed by an option, so the step is not passed and the page says what to
check. A meter the add-on reads itself (HomeWizard, MQTT) cannot be read by
the page, so the test is skipped and Home shows the direction after the
restart. The installer may skip the test, because a cloud can fake a fall;
the last step then warns, and after a fall it says the reading went down.
The battery and solar signs cannot be forced from the page, which never
commands an inverter. The last step reports each battery's reading with its
direction ("reads 800 W charging now, so check the inverter shows the same")
and warns when a solar entity reads below zero without its "reads negative"
switch. It also warns when meter + solar + battery, all known, add up to a
house using less than -300 W: a battery sensor reversed while giving power.
An idle or charging battery cannot be judged that way.
## 4. The last step
`validate.setup_checks()` sits beside the rules because it names option keys.
It reads nothing itself: `web.py` passes a Home Assistant entity list at most
5 s old, the running options, the running meter reading and today's price
count. Tiers are ok, info, warn and bad. A power request entity missing from
Home Assistant is **bad**, because a write to it is answered 200 (SAFETY-77)
and only the entity list can tell. So is Home Assistant not answering, since
the list is then unknown. The wizard does not save while anything is
bad. It then saves through P2's path (`setup: "done"`) and asks for the
restart as the second, confirmed request, with a dialog that names the 0 W.
The shadow switch is on by default and writes `shadow_mode: on`, which holds
every inverter at 0 W after a restart even if control is started. Off keeps the
stored value, or `auto` if that was `on`. The switch goes only on the model the
wizard posts, never into the page model the Installer view also saves.
## 5. The stale save lists only what moved (P2 test, finding a)
`/config/model` remembers the last 16 blobs it handed out, by fingerprint. On a
stale save the add-on compares that blob with what is stored now, so the banner
lists only the other surface's changes. `changed` (stored against the posted
blob) is unchanged for the classic page's "theirs → mine" list. When the
fingerprint was not handed out by this process, it falls back to `changed`.
## 6. How it is held
- test_setup.py: the steps and tables, the kettle logic (and the page's copy of
it), step blocking, the first-run rule on new and TEST-23 sites, the live
checks, the save through the P2 path, the stale fix, and the words.
- tools/ux13_wizard_blobs.py produces every blob the wizard can save from a new
install and three TEST-23 sites (88 accepted by the shipped validator).
UX-15 added the shipped defaults as a start (setup-only mode). At P4
all 88 were accepted by Supervisor 2026.08.0's `AppOptions`, offline, 78
keys each.
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
# UX-15 — setup-only mode: a new install serves the wizard
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-28 (owner decision; UX-15 dev).** Card
6aba0053d27a32cb3f210dcc. Changes the CFG-01 startup gate and closes the open
question in [[UX-13-setup-wizard]] §2. Amends [[UX-02-two-config-surfaces]] §4.
## 1. The rule
`config.yaml` ships `setpoint_entity: ""`, so a new install's options are
refused by rule 1 of `validate_startup_config()`: no inverter to control.
Until now that was exit 78 before any page was served, and the installer had
to fill in the entity on the Configuration tab before the wizard could open.
The add-on now starts in **setup-only mode** when, and only when
(`setuponly.applies()`):
- the options name no inverter at all: no flat `setpoint_entity` and no
`inverters` entry, and
- rule 1's refusal (`no_power_request_problem()`) is the gate's **only**
refusal.
In setup-only mode it serves the page, says it is in setup (banner, `/status`
`setup_only: true`, a WARNING log line) and opens the wizard when the page is
opened with no route (`setup_needed` is `no_power_request`). After the
wizard's save and restart the normal gate applies to the saved options.
## 2. What still exits 78, and why
Everything else the gate refuses, including:
- a complete configuration that is refused, e.g. `maintenance_charge_w` above
`max_w`;
- no power request entity **and** any other refusal;
- an `inverters` list whose entry has a blank power request entity.
These are configurations somebody edited. The Configuration tab stored them,
the log's refusal banner names each problem, and the tab is where they are
fixed (UX-02 §4). Serving the wizard there would put a six-step setup in
front of someone who needs to change one field. A narrow rule also keeps the
setup-only decision to one comparison against one known sentence, so a new
validator rule cannot widen it by accident: any other refusal fails the
equality and exits 78.
The cost: an installer who first sets, say, a DSMR meter with no entities on
the Configuration tab and leaves the power request entity empty gets exit 78,
not the wizard. The log then names both fields.
## 3. Why it cannot command
Setup-only mode builds nothing that commands. `amain()` branches to
`setuponly.serve()` before the MQTT broker, the controller, the meter task and
the tariff task are built, and it returns from there when the Supervisor
stops it. What serves the page is `SetupOnly`, which holds no inverter.
Three checks make it structural rather than a convention:
1. **The HomeAssistant is read-only** (`HomeAssistant(read_only=True)`).
`call()` refuses before it sends anything, and every service call goes
through it: `number.set_value` (`set_number()`), notifications, all of
them. The flag is fixed at construction, and there is no setter.
2. **`SetupOnly` refuses a HomeAssistant that can write, and `Controller`
refuses one that cannot.** So neither can be built on the wrong one.
3. **`/action` answers 409** in setup-only mode, before
`handle_action()`. Start, Stop and the battery cycle do nothing.
No MQTT client is created, so nothing is published. The page's other routes
already read only, or write the add-on's own options (UX-02 §6).
Setup-only mode writes no Store file. The wizard's save writes `setup_done`,
as in any mode. So a new install that is set up on the Configuration tab
instead still has a fresh Store on its first normal boot, and the first-run
rule (UX-13 §2) sends it to the wizard as before.
## 4. How it is held
- `test_setup_only.py` part 1: when it applies, including the three exit-78
cases above. Part 2: the read-only write path refuses with nothing sent,
and the two constructors refuse. Part 3 boots the real `main()` on the
shipped defaults against a fake Supervisor and Home Assistant over HTTP and
logs every request: the page is served, `/status` says setup-only, Start
and the cycle get 409, and there are 0 service calls and no MQTT request,
also with `auto_start` on and a Store that says control was started. The
wizard's save is then booted: it passes the normal gate, does not open the
wizard again, and every write is 0 W (shadow). Part 4: the refused
configurations exit 78 and serve nothing.
- Mutations, each red: `applies()` always false or always true, the
read-only refusal removed, the Controller's check removed, `amain()` giving
setup-only mode a writable HomeAssistant, `/action`'s 409 removed, and the
`return` after `serve()` removed.
- TEST-23 (PR #147 review, 2026-09-28): the add-on image on the shipped
defaults and an empty `/data` made 0 service calls and no MQTT request in
3.5 minutes of setup-only mode, counted in both the stand-in and the rig
shim logs. The wizard save then passed Supervisor 2026.08.0's `AppOptions`,
and after the restart it ran in shadow: 11 of 11 writes were
`set_value 0.0`.
## 5. The wizard fixes in the same card
- **F1.** `/config/validate` converts what it can of a page model
(`uimodel.ui_to_options_partial()`), so a conversion error blocks its own
step beside its field and the live checks still run on the rest. A refusal
about a key the failed conversion writes is left out, because it would
judge the stored value. The save still refuses such a model (422, with
`steps`).
- **F2.** A save from the page model sends `base`, the model it opened. The
add-on writes only the keys whose value differs from `base`, onto the blob
stored now (`uipage.only_edits()`). So "save again to keep yours" after a
409 keeps the other surface's changes. A key both surfaces changed takes
this page's value, which is what the second press after the banner means.
- **Meter entity.** On the last step a meter entity Home Assistant does not
have is red, like a missing power request entity, so a skipped kettle test
cannot let it through. In the Installer view it stays a warning.
- **Step 1 after a skip.** When the kettle test saw the reading fall and was
then skipped, step 1 says the reading went down. The skip stays (UX-13 §3).
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@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ manufactures them from a **fixture**: the check runs, the assertion is
evaluated, the sentence above it is true — and the numbers it compares are
arranged so that the failure it describes could not have changed the answer.
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. ELEVEN instances in two weeks; four
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. TWELVE instances in two weeks; four
were found by review, two - CFG-04's fixture pair - by an author's own mutation
battery, which is the cheaper place, one by review again, in the one
place nobody had thought to point the rule at: not a check in the suite, but a
@@ -414,6 +414,44 @@ same place twice, the check is decoration.
The general habits are **14** and **15** below.
* ⚠️ **SAFETY-47 IS THE TWELFTH, AND IT IS THE SECOND INSIDE A COMMITTED
EVIDENCE ARTIFACT.** `DECISIONS/SAFETY-10-shadow-mode.md` §6 tabulated a live
run and a shadow run agreeing on `arb_power_w`, on the reason **verbatim**
and on the arbiter's winner, and concluded that shadow mode reaches the same
decision. **Two independent reasons it could not have gone red, and closing
either one alone closes nothing:**
* its fixture is `peak_cap_w: 15000` against a 350 W house, so the capacity
guard never engages and the thing whose invariance is being claimed —
SAFETY-45's sizing of the buy leg from the billed-quarter meter — is in the
run and **inert**. ⚠️ **The harness's own comment says so**: *"at this
scenario's `peak_cap_w: 15000` it is not binding anyway"*. The rule was
written down beside the check it disabled and nobody read it as a
disclosure;
* and every identity row reads `_sa[0]`/`_la[0]` — **the first charging
sample**. At `elapsed = 0` the projection **is** the held level, so the two
runs agree **to the float even at a cap that does bind**. Measured:
widening the fixture alone — the obvious fix — leaves that comparison
passing.
⚠️ **THE SECOND REASON IS A NEW SHAPE FOR THIS LIST: AN INDEX, NOT A
FIXTURE.** Ask of every identity claim not only *"could this data differ"*
but *"**at the point I sampled it**, could it differ yet"*. A comparison
taken at `t = 0` between two runs that diverge **because one of them acts**
is a comparison of a plant with itself, and no amount of widening the fixture
changes that. The replacement, `test_arbitrage.py` part 3d, grades the whole
run — 716 of 720 charging cycles differ — and grades the `[0]` agreement **as
an expectation**, so nobody rebuilds a check on it believing it covers
something.
⚠️ **AND THE FIX'S OWN FIRST DRAFT CARRIED A THIRTEENTH.** The new part's
action-log check could not reach the log line at all: the sentence was an
f-string inside `Controller._shadow_settle()`, and the only suite that drives
that method uses a `meter_source: off` fixture where no arbitrage decision —
and therefore no caveat — exists. Deleting the caveat from it left **all 29
files green**. It is `shadow.log_line()` now. *A sentence assembled at a call
site is a sentence no check can grade*, which is CFG-04's substring lesson
arriving from the other direction.
Note what these have in common with a masked rung: the mutation *runs*, and the
suite is *honestly* green. Nothing in a purge, a fingerprint or a disassembly
can see it, because the code under test really did behave identically on the
@@ -773,6 +811,177 @@ Cheap habits fall out of it, and all of them are now used in this repository:
retrofitted: guarding another card's section is a change to what its
checks report, and it belongs to whoever next touches it.
21. ⚠️ **A CHECK CAN BE GREEN UNDER ITS OWN CARD'S NAMED MUTATION, AND TWICE
IN ONE FILE THE REASON WAS THAT THE WRONG QUANTITY EVENTUALLY REACHES THE
RIGHT VALUE.** TEL-10's acceptance was *"a run that winds the integrator
into the bound must show the published number reaching the bound"*, and its
named mutation was *"publish `prev_w` instead of `i_w`"*. The check was
**GREEN** on the mutant: the command reaches the same bound too, twelve
cycles later, and a check that only reads the VALUE cannot tell the two
apart. The same file's *"a stopped controller publishes `not-running`"* was
green under deleting that branch's assignments outright (−45 B and −67 B),
because the fixture STARTED stopped and `__init__` writes the same values.
Both are habit 4 - the data could not reach the failure - and both were
found by the card's own battery. The fixes are the shape to copy:
* where two quantities CONVERGE, grade the **order or the interval**, not
the value: "the integrator reaches the bound BEFORE the command does",
and a PLATEAU (the lead sits at exactly −800 W for eight consecutive
cycles) rather than a maximum, because a maximum is one tick and a
plateau is the shape;
* where a branch WRITES a value the constructor also writes, the fixture
has to pass THROUGH the other state first. Stop the controller part-way
through a run that has already wound the integrator to −5000 W, so a row
left standing is a WRONG row and not merely an unset one.
22. ⚠️ **AN EXPLANATION IN A COMMENT IS A CLAIM, AND SAFETY-48 SHIPPED TWO THAT
WERE INVENTED.** A gate was written one-sided (`if target > slewed: min(...)
elif target < slewed: max(...)`) under a comment saying the two-sided band
`max(lo, min(hi, i_w))` was a BUG that would drag a trailing integrator
toward the command, with a worked example. It is not a bug and the example
was wrong: `target` is monotone in `i_w`, so the other clamp cannot reach,
and the two spellings agree on **205 920 of 205 920** swept states. A second
bullet said two placements of the same cap *"differ on 118 of 256 252
ticks"*; that 118 had been measured against a **different pair** and the
placement actually being compared is bit-identical on the shipped
configuration - 0 of 256 246 ticks. Both sentences were plausible, both were
load-bearing for a design choice, and neither had been run.
**The rule: a comment that says "X would be wrong" is subject to the same
battery as a check - BUILD X AND MEASURE IT.** Where the answer is
"equivalent", say so with the sweep size and keep the spelling for what it
NAMES; where the answer is a number, quote the run it came from. An
invented justification for a correct decision is still a defect, and it is
the kind a reviewer cannot see because the code is right.
23. ⚠️ **THE MUTATION IS SUBJECT TO EVERY HABIT ABOVE, HABIT 4 INCLUDED - AND
THE PURGE, THE FINGERPRINT AND THE BYTE DELTA ALL SAY IT TOOK.** SAFETY-57's
battery reported a **survivor at +21 B** for a mutation of
`Freshness._open_window()`: `self.graded_from = float(now_mono)` rewritten
as `float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`, which is meant to re-anchor the
verdict's window to the register's own history and so delete the card's
whole exit. The harness purged, the tree fingerprint showed the edit on
disk, the delta was non-zero, and the mutant really did run. It was still a
survivor for a reason that has nothing to do with the property: in the
fixture the register never moves after `t = 0`, so `changed_mono` is
**`0.0`** - and `0.0 or x` is `x`. **The mutant was a no-op on that
stimulus.** Rewritten with an explicit `is None` test (+82 B) it is red on
four named checks.
Stale bytecode is a mutation that never *ran*. This is a mutation that ran
and could not *change the answer* on the data it was given, which is habit 4
exactly, one level up - and none of the three things a mutation report is
required to state (MUTATION.md's own list) can see it, because all three are
about the file rather than about the stimulus. Two rules:
* **Ask of every survivor what it would have had to change, and check that
the fixture reaches that value.** Here: "does any fixture have a non-zero
`changed_mono` at the moment `_open_window()` is called?" The answer was
no, and it is one line to ask.
* **Prefer a mutation that CANNOT be a no-op.** `or`, `and`, truthiness on
a numeric, a default argument and a `getattr` fallback all have a value at
which the mutant and the shipped tree coincide. An explicit comparison,
a constant swap or a deleted statement does not.
⚠️ Note where this one was found: in the battery of a card whose whole
subject is a check that cannot reach the failure it names. **Second
instance in an instrument rather than in a check since habit 16, and the
third overall.**
⚠️ **AND THE SAME CARD'S BATTERY CAUGHT A HABIT-22 COMMENT IN THE FIX
ITSELF, WHICH IS WHY THESE TWO BELONG NEXT TO EACH OTHER.**
`freshness.py` shipped `⚠️ RELEASE BEFORE GRADE, AND THE ORDER IS
LOAD-BEARING` with a worked reason. Swapping the two calls is **zero bytes**
and survived the battery: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w`
and `_release()` only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one can act on
any read and the order is **not observable**. Habit 22 says build X and
measure it; the battery is what builds X. The comment now states the
disjointness and the suite pins **that** - at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W - rather than an order nothing depends on.
⚠️ **SECOND INSTANCE, TEL-11, AND THE NO-OP WAS A SATURATED RAIL RATHER
THAN A VALUE.** The card's whole subject is that a PV reading must never
reach the control law, so its central mutation is
`self.grid = self.grid - self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` - **+106 B**, on
disk, purged, genuinely running - and it came back a **SURVIVOR** of a
six-file battery. The property held in no sense: the fixture drove a 6 kW
export over 12 cycles, which puts the loop **against its rail**, and a
command moving `slew_w` every cycle produces the SAME ramp for -6000 W and
for -14000 W of apparent error. The mutant ran and could not change the
answer.
Two things generalise past PV:
* **A SATURATED ACTUATOR IS A VALUE AT WHICH EVERY INPUT COINCIDES.** The
habit-23 list above names `or`, `and`, truthiness, default arguments and
`getattr` fallbacks - all *expressions* with a coinciding value. A rail,
a clamp, a slew limit, a deadband and a latched alarm are the same hazard
in the **plant**: they are where a controller's output stops being a
function of its input. A fixture that parks there cannot separate any two
inputs, and this repository's control fixtures park there by default,
because the dramatic stimulus is the saturating one.
* **SO THE PRECONDITION IS NOT "DOES IT COMMAND SOMETHING", IT IS "DOES IT
REST SOMEWHERE THE MUTATION COULD MOVE IT FROM".** `test_pv.py` part 6
now drives a 600 W import the loop SETTLES on, asserts the resting target
is well inside the rail, and asks habit 23's own question as a check:
shift the METER by the same 8 kW and confirm the commands really would
have moved. On the first fixture that question answers NO, in one line,
and it is the line that turns the identity into evidence.
24. **A REFUSAL DEFINED RELATIVE TO "THE BASELINE LACKS THIS FEATURE" DIES ON
THE RELEASE THAT SHIPS THE FEATURE — AND IT DIES AS A FALSE REFUSAL, WHICH
IS THE LOUD DIRECTION.** TEL-11 built `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` to grade a
cross-tree identity, and because "the documents are identical" was its
*result* rather than its warning sign, it had to prove instead that the two
runs came from different trees and that **exactly one side reacts to
`pv_entity`**. That was correct evidence: `release/1.0` predated the option
entirely, so a side that reacted to it was the HEAD by construction.
TEL-11 then **merged**, `release/1.0` became 0.11.0, and the baseline for
the next card reacts to `pv_entity` too. `--compare` now answers
`REFUSED: set differs from unset on ['A', 'B']` on every honest run — the
instrument refuses its own shipped tree. TEL-12 found it on the first
comparison it ran.
* **A discriminator is a fact about a MOMENT, not about a card.** "The
baseline does not have X" is true until X ships and then false forever.
Write the discriminator against something the NEXT baseline still will not
have — TEL-12's is the roster key, not the channel — and say in the tool
which fact it rests on, so the next card can see what it has to replace.
* **Prefer a discriminator that is MEASURED over one the tree REPORTS.**
`tree.supports_roster` is the tree describing itself and would have been
one line; the shipped test is "this side's roster cells ARE its unset
cells", which is the tree being measured. Both are printed, side by side,
so a disagreement between the self-report and the measurement is visible
rather than silently trusted.
* ⚠️ **And this is the SAFE direction of the same defect, which is why it
was found in ten minutes rather than in a review.** A stale refusal is a
developer chasing a failure they cannot explain (the false-red case at the
top of this file). A stale *identity* — an instrument that goes on printing
OK because its reference drifted into agreement — is the survivor-
manufacturing direction, and nothing announces it. Ask of every cross-tree
instrument: *what does this print when the feature it is about has been in
the baseline for a year?*
TEL-12's own battery produced two more instrument defects of the ordinary
kind, both recorded in `DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md` §4: a
stimulus annotation written into the document being compared (so every cell
differed for a reason that was not behaviour, and the discriminator fired on
both sides), and a fixture cell whose TRUE total was labelled as its
"partial" (so the check refused the shipped tree for publishing a number it
is required to publish). ⚠️ **Both were caught by running the instrument
against the shipped tree BEFORE running it against a mutant** — which is the
one ordering rule that separates "the instrument is wrong" from "the tree is
wrong", and `test_mqtt.py` part 8's first line ("the shipped module satisfies
every property this instrument grades") is the same rule as a check.
⚠️ **AND TEL-12's SUBJECT WAS HABIT 23 IN THE FIXTURE ITSELF.** The card adds
a SUM over a roster, and the defect it exists to prevent is publishing the
partial sum when a member is absent. A fixture whose absent member
contributes **0 W** cannot see that defect at all: the partial and the full
total are **the same number**, so "published the absence" and "published the
partial" produce identical output. That is a rail in the *arithmetic* rather
than in the plant — the same hazard as TEL-11's saturated actuator, one
domain over. `test_pv.py`'s roster is three distinct non-zero contributions
in two different units, absence is driven at **every position** rather than
at one (habit 10), and each position's partial is **computed from the
fixture** and asserted to differ from the true total as its own precondition.
And the mutation-table consequence: **a variant is not covered because a
near-miss of it is.** DEV-02's table listed the *actuator* variant of the
per-unit claim defect (`device`/`supervised` filed without `inv`), which the
+122 -8
View File
@@ -98,6 +98,12 @@ DROP_STALE = "stale link"
DROP_CONTRADICTION = "contradicts itself"
DROP_NO_INTEGER = "no integer setpoint in its interval"
# OPT-11: why a unit's MODE layer was not applied this tick. Only the first is
# a fault; the other two are the rule working.
MODE_FAULT = "mode range leaves out 0 W"
MODE_RELEASED = "mode released by a higher claim"
MODE_OUTRANKED = "hard limit leaves no room for the mode"
REFUSE_SCOPE = "mis-routed claim"
REFUSE_EMPTY = "no unit available"
REFUSE_SIGN = "opposite directions"
@@ -213,6 +219,10 @@ class Allocation:
# that calls `plan()` for its arithmetic gets None and does not care;
# main.py stamps every record it puts on the write path.
tick: int | None = None
# OPT-11: ((unit, why), ...) for each unit whose mode range left out 0 W
# this tick. That mode was dropped (see `unit_interval()`); main.py logs it
# as a software fault. Empty on every tick without a mode.
mode_faults: tuple = ()
@property
def ok(self) -> bool:
@@ -246,11 +256,11 @@ class Allocation:
block the failsafe is worse than the hole it closes.
"""
if tick is None or self.tick is None or self.tick != tick:
return (f"the allocation record on hand was made on tick "
f"{self.tick!r} and this is tick {tick!r} - a record whose "
f"envelopes have moved cannot authorise a write")
return (f"the power split on hand is from tick {self.tick!r}, "
f"not this tick {tick!r}, and an old split cannot allow a "
f"write")
if not self.ok:
return f"the allocator refused this tick ({self.explain()})"
return f"no power split was possible this tick ({self.explain()})"
if unit not in self.shares:
return (f"{unit} has no share in this tick's allocation "
f"({self.explain()})")
@@ -290,6 +300,99 @@ class Allocation:
return out
def unit_interval(b, deciding_priority=None):
"""OPT-11. `(lo, hi, note)`: the interval a unit is allocated into.
The hard limits (`b.lo`, `b.hi`) always apply. The unit's MODE range
(`b.mode_lo`, `b.mode_hi`) narrows them unless `deciding_priority` is
above the mode's own priority (arbiter._unit_modes() passes None when the
modes hold, and the yielding limit's priority when they give way). `note` says why the
mode did not apply, or is None when it did or there is none:
* MODE_FAULT: the mode range leaves out 0 W. A mode may forbid a direction
and never force one, so this is a software fault and the mode is dropped.
It is what keeps REFUSE_SIGN unreachable from a mode: the fill below
moves every free unit away from 0 in ONE direction, and it starts from 0
only while every interval holds 0.
* MODE_RELEASED: a higher claim (the peak floor) decided the target.
* MODE_OUTRANKED: the hard limits and the mode do not overlap. The hard
limits win, as they always do.
A unit without mode fields (`mode_priority` absent or None) gets its hard
limits, unchanged: that is every unit when battery modes are off.
"""
lo, hi = b.lo, b.hi
prio = getattr(b, "mode_priority", None)
if prio is None:
return lo, hi, None
mlo, mhi = b.mode_lo, b.mode_hi
if not (mlo <= 0.0 <= mhi):
return lo, hi, MODE_FAULT
if deciding_priority is not None and deciding_priority > prio:
return lo, hi, MODE_RELEASED
nlo, nhi = max(lo, mlo), min(hi, mhi)
if nlo > nhi:
return lo, hi, MODE_OUTRANKED
return nlo, nhi, None
class _Narrowed:
"""A unit's bounds with its interval replaced by `unit_interval()`'s."""
__slots__ = ("lo", "hi")
def __init__(self, lo, hi):
self.lo, self.hi = lo, hi
def pin_w(b):
"""The watts a unit's own SET places once held inside its hard limits,
as `plan()` places a standing pin, or None when the unit has no SET."""
pv = getattr(b, "pinned_w", None)
if getattr(b, "gate", None) is None or pv is None:
return None
lo, hi = _int_envelope(b)
return float(pv) if lo > hi else float(_clamp_int(round(float(pv)), lo, hi))
def hi_w(b):
"""A unit's upper hard limit as `plan()` narrows it to whole W (SAFETY-84)."""
return float(_int_envelope(b)[1])
def loop_bound(bounds, live=None):
"""OPT-11. `(lo, hi)`: what the units can place when the LOOP decides.
The sum, over live units that do not contradict themselves, of each unit's
interval with its mode applied (`unit_interval()` with no higher claim). A
pinned unit adds the span from 0 to its pin, so a probe or a maintenance
pin stays reachable. Every term holds 0, so the sum does too.
`compute()` keeps the site target inside this, so the loop never asks for
watts no battery may give: the allocator would report them as unmet and the
saturation freeze would park the target on them (SAFETY-73 section 1).
Pure, like `plan()`: it reads numbers and intervals and nothing else.
"""
lo_sum, hi_sum = 0.0, 0.0
for u in sorted(bounds):
b = bounds[u]
if live is not None and u not in live:
continue
if getattr(b, "contradiction", False):
continue
p = pin_w(b)
if p is not None:
lo_sum += min(0.0, p)
hi_sum += max(0.0, p)
continue
lo, hi, _ = unit_interval(b)
lo, hi = _int_envelope(_Narrowed(lo, hi))
if lo > hi:
continue
lo_sum += min(0.0, lo)
hi_sum += max(0.0, hi)
return lo_sum, hi_sum
def _int_envelope(b):
"""A unit's interval, narrowed to the integers a 1 W register can hold.
@@ -385,7 +488,8 @@ def _fill(order, weights, cap, amount):
def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
site_priority=None, site_key="site", tick=None) -> Allocation:
site_priority=None, site_key="site", tick=None,
deciding_priority=None) -> Allocation:
"""Divide the site grid target `target_w` across the units in `bounds`.
`bounds` unit name -> that unit's interval for THIS TICK (arbiter stage 1,
@@ -411,6 +515,9 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
`site_priority` the priority of the SITE claim that chose `target_w`. It is
what a unit's own winning SET is weighed against - see PINS.
`site_key` the name to use when there are no units at all.
`deciding_priority` OPT-11: the priority that decided `target_w`
(`Resolution.deciding_priority`). Each unit's mode range applies
only at or below it - see `unit_interval()`. None applies them.
`tick` an opaque token identifying the tick this record is FOR, handed
straight back on the record. SAFETY-28's write gate compares it
against the tick it is writing on, so that a record cannot be
@@ -497,6 +604,7 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
dropped = []
ilo, ihi = {}, {}
considered = []
mode_faults = []
for u in units:
b = bounds[u]
if live is not None and u not in live:
@@ -512,7 +620,12 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
# has no interval to allocate into.
dropped.append((u, DROP_CONTRADICTION))
continue
lo, hi = _int_envelope(b)
# OPT-11: the mode layer, when it applies, narrows the hard limits.
# A unit with no mode gets exactly its hard limits, as before.
nlo, nhi, note = unit_interval(b, deciding_priority)
if note == MODE_FAULT:
mode_faults.append((u, MODE_FAULT))
lo, hi = _int_envelope(_Narrowed(nlo, nhi))
if lo > hi:
# An interval that contains no integer. The register is 1 W, so
# there is no number this unit could be commanded that both bounds
@@ -526,7 +639,7 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
return Allocation(
target_w=float(target_w), sum_w=sum_w, shares={}, plans=(),
dropped=tuple(dropped), unmet_w=sum_w, quantisation_w=quant,
refused=why, tick=tick)
refused=why, tick=tick, mode_faults=tuple(mode_faults))
# --- REFUSAL 2: nobody is available ------------------------------------
if not considered:
@@ -659,4 +772,5 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
return Allocation(target_w=float(target_w), sum_w=sum_w, shares=shares,
plans=tuple(plans), dropped=tuple(dropped),
unmet_w=int(unmet), quantisation_w=quant, tick=tick)
unmet_w=int(unmet), quantisation_w=quant, tick=tick,
mode_faults=tuple(mode_faults))
+221 -10
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,12 @@ from . import allocator
P_SAFETY = 100 # stopped, inputs missing, shutting down, device limits
P_MAINTENANCE = 60 # maintenance owns the actuator outright (drain, hold)
P_PEAK = 50 # capacity-tariff peak shaving - costs real money
# The order in effect: safety limits and the SAFETY-73 refusal > the peak
# guard > maintenance > modes > trade > loop. A peak floor above a drain still
# binds: the `drain` site floor at N>=2 (SAFETY-78), refiled at P_MAINTENANCE
# at N=1 (SAFETY-83); over a HOLD, `_peak_over_hold()` (SAFETY-86).
# A cheap-window charge is suspended while the peak guard holds and, at N>=2,
# sized to the quarter's headroom (SAFETY-84).
P_MAINT_SHAPE = 40 # maintenance shaping the loop (charge-only)
# OPT-04. §10.1 priority 3 - price arbitrage. ⚠️ ITS POSITION IS THE SPEC, NOT A
# preference: P_PEAK (50) is ABOVE it so clause 2 lets the capacity-tariff floor
@@ -86,8 +92,17 @@ P_MAINT_SHAPE = 40 # maintenance shaping the loop (charge-only)
# because trading against the meter is the entire point - the grid-following
# loop would otherwise cancel every charge the moment it created import.
P_ARBITRAGE = 30 # price arbitrage - trades against the meter on purpose
# OPT-11. A battery's mode (Solar first, Leftover solar, Off): a SOFT unit
# limit, kept apart from the hard ones. Above arbitrage, so a trade stays inside
# each battery's mode; below the peak guard, to which a mode gives way only as
# far as the floor needs (`_unit_modes()`, `_site_mode()`).
# DECISIONS/OPT-11-battery-modes.md.
P_MODE = 35
P_LOOP = 10 # ordinary grid-following
# The one source filed at P_MODE. pre_resolve() keeps it out of the hard limits.
MODE_SOURCE = "mode"
SET = "set"
LIMIT = "limit"
@@ -175,6 +190,22 @@ CLAIM_SCOPE = {
# the banner and the claim an install has had since SAFETY-02 shipped.
# `Controller.cycle()` does not even arm the site detector there.
"sign_site": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `Claim.limit("drain", P_MAINTENANCE, lo=...)`, SAFETY-78. At
# N>=2, while a pack's maintenance drain is pinned, the site target may
# not go below what that pin places: below it a sibling would have to
# charge against the drain (circulation, refused, 0 W). A site `lo`,
# never filed at N=1. DECISIONS/SAFETY-78-drain-at-two.md.
"drain": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `Claim.limit("charge", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=...)`, SAFETY-84. The
# mirror of `drain` for a cheap-window maintenance charge at N>=2: the site
# target may not go above what the charging pack's own `hi` asks, or a
# sibling would have to give against it. Never filed at N=1.
# DECISIONS/SAFETY-84-charge-at-two.md.
"charge": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `Claim.limit("hold", P_MAINTENANCE, hi=...)`, SAFETY-86. While a
# holding pack gives the peak shortfall at N>=2, the site target stays at
# the peak floor, what the pin and the others place. Never filed at N=1.
"hold": SCOPE_SITE,
# --- UNIT: about one pack, one inverter, one device -------------------
# main.py: `Claim.limit("device", P_SAFETY, self.dev_min, self.dev_max,
@@ -226,12 +257,25 @@ CLAIM_SCOPE = {
# reaches the allocator, so a unit-scoped claim is the shape that sentence
# asks for rather than an evasion of it.
"pack": SCOPE_UNIT,
# main.py: `Claim.limit("refused", P_SAFETY, ...)` and, during a probe,
# `Claim.set("refused", P_SAFETY, +-PROBE_W)`. SAFETY-73: THIS battery gives
# nothing in one direction, measured on THIS unit's own reading. A hard unit
# limit that always intersects, so the share goes to the siblings. Filed at
# N>1 only; at N=1 SAFETY-52's law in compute() does the same job.
"refused": SCOPE_UNIT,
# main.py: `Claim.set("maintenance", P_MAINTENANCE, ...)` when the cycle owns
# the setpoint, and `Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=...)` when
# it only shapes. §12's monthly recalibration is a PACK procedure - drain
# this pack to its floor, charge this pack to full, recalibrate this pack's
# coulomb counter. Two packs recalibrate on their own schedules.
"maintenance": SCOPE_UNIT,
# main.py: `Claim.limit("mode", P_MODE, lo, hi, ...)`, OPT-11. THIS
# battery's mode, chosen per battery by its owner. A unit claim that never
# enters a `lo > hi` test with a site limit: stage 1 keeps it apart from the
# hard limits, and it gives way to a site limit above P_MODE only as far as
# that limit needs (`_unit_modes()`). At N=1 it routes to the site, and
# `resolve()` takes it out of stage 2 for the same reason.
"mode": SCOPE_UNIT,
}
@@ -359,6 +403,13 @@ class UnitBounds:
pinned_w: float | None = None
pinned_by: str | None = None
contradiction: bool = False
# OPT-11: the mode layer, APART from `lo`/`hi` above, which stay the hard
# limits. `mode_priority` is None when no mode claim applies. Whether the
# mode binds is decided at stage 3 (`allocator.unit_interval()`), because it
# depends on the priority that decided the SITE target.
mode_lo: float = -inf
mode_hi: float = inf
mode_priority: int | None = None
def explain(self) -> str:
if self.contradiction:
@@ -404,6 +455,15 @@ class Resolution:
# rules drifting apart: this is set by the same line that picks the winner
# `explain()` names.
winner_priority: int | None = None
# OPT-11. The higher of the winning set's priority and the priority of the
# limit that bound `target_w`. Whether the modes hold is decided from the
# limits themselves (`_site_mode()`, `_unit_modes()`): a mode gives way
# only as far as a limit above it (the peak floor) needs, so a mode `hi`
# never meets a site `lo`.
deciding_priority: int | None = None
# OPT-11 at N=1: why the site's mode layer was dropped this tick, or None.
# At N>1 the same fact is on `allocation.mode_faults`, per unit.
mode_fault: str | None = None
def explain(self) -> str:
"""One line an operator can act on - this is the point of the module."""
@@ -427,7 +487,8 @@ def pre_resolve(unit_claims: list) -> UnitBounds:
of the fault this card removes, and the reason `resolve()` partitions rather
than filters twice.
"""
sets = sorted((c for c in unit_claims if c.kind == SET),
sets = sorted((c for c in unit_claims
if c.kind == SET and c.source != MODE_SOURCE),
key=lambda c: c.priority, reverse=True)
gate = pinned_w = pinned_by = None
if sets:
@@ -435,19 +496,30 @@ def pre_resolve(unit_claims: list) -> UnitBounds:
lo, hi = -inf, inf
lo_src = hi_src = None
# OPT-11: a mode claim never joins the hard limits, so a mode cannot make a
# unit contradict itself or narrow a pin. A mode SET is not a thing: only
# limits are read. The lowest mode priority is kept (the first to release).
mode_lo, mode_hi, mode_priority = -inf, inf, None
for c in unit_claims:
if c.kind != LIMIT or (gate is not None and c.priority < gate):
continue
if c.source == MODE_SOURCE:
mode_lo, mode_hi = max(mode_lo, c.lo), min(mode_hi, c.hi)
mode_priority = (c.priority if mode_priority is None
else min(mode_priority, c.priority))
continue
if c.lo > lo:
lo, lo_src = c.lo, c.source
if c.hi < hi:
hi, hi_src = c.hi, c.source
return UnitBounds(lo, hi, lo_src, hi_src, gate, pinned_w, pinned_by,
contradiction=lo > hi)
contradiction=lo > hi, mode_lo=mode_lo, mode_hi=mode_hi,
mode_priority=mode_priority)
def allocate(target_w: float, bounds: dict, *, weights=None, live=None,
scope_errors=(), site_priority=None) -> tuple:
scope_errors=(), site_priority=None,
deciding_priority=None) -> tuple:
"""STAGE 3. THE SEAM, AND SINCE ALLOC-01 IT IS OCCUPIED. `(shares, allocated)`.
⚠️ THE ALLOCATOR ITSELF IS `app/allocator.py` AND THE REASONING LIVES THERE.
@@ -485,11 +557,13 @@ def allocate(target_w: float, bounds: dict, *, weights=None, live=None,
"""
return allocate_record(target_w, bounds, weights=weights, live=live,
scope_errors=scope_errors,
site_priority=site_priority)[:2]
site_priority=site_priority,
deciding_priority=deciding_priority)[:2]
def allocate_record(target_w: float, bounds: dict, *, weights=None, live=None,
scope_errors=(), site_priority=None, tick=None) -> tuple:
scope_errors=(), site_priority=None, tick=None,
deciding_priority=None) -> tuple:
"""`allocate()` plus the record - `(shares, allocated, allocation)`.
`tick` is SAFETY-28's freshness token: it identifies the tick the record is
@@ -501,7 +575,7 @@ def allocate_record(target_w: float, bounds: dict, *, weights=None, live=None,
rec = allocator.plan(target_w, bounds, weights=weights, live=live,
scope_errors=scope_errors,
site_priority=site_priority, site_key=ACTUATOR_SITE,
tick=tick)
tick=tick, deciding_priority=deciding_priority)
return rec.shares, rec.ok, rec
@@ -538,23 +612,30 @@ def site_resolve(claims: list) -> Resolution:
considered = [f"{c.source}:{c.kind}" for c in claims]
if lo > hi:
# OPT-11: 0 W here, and every limit that took part counts as deciding.
return Resolution(0.0, winner.source, bound_by=None,
contradiction=True, considered=considered,
winner_priority=winner.priority)
winner_priority=winner.priority,
deciding_priority=max(winner.priority,
lo_src.priority,
hi_src.priority))
target = max(lo, min(hi, winner.value))
bound_by = None
deciding = winner.priority
if target != winner.value:
binder = lo_src if target == lo else hi_src
if binder is not None:
bound_by = f"{binder.source}({binder.reason})" if binder.reason else binder.source
deciding = max(deciding, binder.priority)
return Resolution(float(target), winner.source, bound_by, False, considered,
winner_priority=winner.priority)
winner_priority=winner.priority,
deciding_priority=deciding)
def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None,
tick=None) -> Resolution:
tick=None, reserve=()) -> Resolution:
"""The three stages, in order, over one cycle's claims.
`units` is the site's roster of inverters. Left None it is derived from the
@@ -600,6 +681,12 @@ def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None,
written down.
"""
site_claims = [c for c in claims if c.actuator == ACTUATOR_SITE]
# OPT-11: a mode claim on the site (N=1, where every source routes there)
# never enters stage 2's `lo > hi` test. It is applied after it, below, by
# the same release rule stage 3 uses.
site_modes = [c for c in site_claims if c.source == MODE_SOURCE]
if site_modes:
site_claims = [c for c in site_claims if c.source != MODE_SOURCE]
if units is None:
units = {c.actuator for c in claims if c.actuator != ACTUATOR_SITE}
units = tuple(sorted(units))
@@ -611,6 +698,8 @@ def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None,
# STAGE 2 - the site claims become the grid target. At N=1 `site_claims` IS
# `claims`, so this is the shipped arbiter on the shipped list.
out = site_resolve(site_claims)
if site_modes:
_site_mode(out, site_modes, site_claims)
# STAGE 3 - the seam, and since ALLOC-01 the allocator behind it.
#
@@ -643,10 +732,132 @@ def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None,
# nothing. See `packshare.weights()` on the residual this leaves (the fill's
# own direction can differ from the target's sign under a pin, in which case
# the weighting is a worse preference and still cannot be unsafe).
# OPT-11: whether each unit's mode holds this tick (`_unit_modes()`).
# Before the weights, because a limit above the modes may move the target.
gate, held = _unit_modes(out, site_claims, bounds, live)
if callable(weights):
weights = weights(out.target_w)
# SAFETY-87/91: units under their peak reserve weigh 0 while the site
# gives, so the others carry the target first. An Off battery gives the
# peak's shortfall, so it goes before them when no other unit is left.
reserve = set(reserve) if out.target_w > 0.0 else set()
if held and reserve and not set(bounds) - held - reserve:
held = set()
held = held | reserve
if held:
weights = {u: (0.0 if u in held else
(1.0 if weights is None else weights.get(u, 1.0)))
for u in bounds}
out.shares, out.allocated, out.allocation = allocate_record(
out.target_w, bounds, weights=weights, live=live,
scope_errors=out.scope_errors, site_priority=out.winner_priority,
tick=tick)
tick=tick, deciding_priority=gate)
return out
def _limits_above(site_claims: list, prio: int) -> tuple:
"""OPT-11: `(lo, lo_src, hi, hi_src)` over the site LIMITs above `prio`.
These are what a mode may never take the site target outside of: the peak
guard (P_PEAK), maintenance shaping (P_MAINT_SHAPE) and the hard limits.
"""
lo, hi = -inf, inf
lo_src = hi_src = None
for c in site_claims:
if c.kind != LIMIT or c.priority <= prio:
continue
if c.lo > lo:
lo, lo_src = c.lo, c
if c.hi < hi:
hi, hi_src = c.hi, c
return lo, lo_src, hi, hi_src
def _yield_to(out: Resolution, t1: float, above: tuple):
"""OPT-11: the target `t1` the modes allow, moved only as far as the limits
above the mode need (`_limits_above()`). Returns the claim that moved it,
or None when `t1` already satisfies them, and sets `out.target_w`."""
lo, lo_src, hi, hi_src = above
t2 = max(lo, min(hi, t1))
out.target_w = float(t2)
if t2 == t1:
return None
binder = lo_src if t2 == lo else hi_src
out.bound_by = (f"{binder.source}({binder.reason})" if binder.reason
else binder.source)
out.deciding_priority = max(out.deciding_priority or binder.priority,
binder.priority)
return binder
def _site_mode(out: Resolution, modes: list, site_claims: list) -> None:
"""OPT-11 at N=1: the one battery's mode bounds the SITE target, after stage 2.
A SET above the mode (a safety stop) decides alone. Otherwise the target is
clamped into the mode range and then back into the site limits above the
mode, so the mode gives way only as far as those limits need: a peak floor
of 2000 W over an Off battery asks it for 2000 W, whether a trade or the
loop won stage 2, and a charge the peak guard merely caps stays at 0 W. A
range without 0 W is a software fault that drops the mode
(`out.mode_fault`). Clamping one number cannot contradict anything.
"""
out.considered = out.considered + [f"{c.source}:{c.kind}" for c in modes]
lims = [c for c in modes if c.kind == LIMIT]
if not lims or out.contradiction:
return
lo = max(c.lo for c in lims)
hi = min(c.hi for c in lims)
prio = min(c.priority for c in lims)
if not (lo <= 0.0 <= hi):
out.mode_fault = f"mode range [{lo:.0f}, {hi:.0f}] leaves out 0 W"
return
if out.winner_priority is not None and out.winner_priority > prio:
return
before = out.target_w
t1 = max(lo, min(hi, before))
if _yield_to(out, t1, _limits_above(site_claims, prio)) is None \
and t1 != before:
c = lims[0]
out.bound_by = f"{c.source}({c.reason})" if c.reason else c.source
def _unit_modes(out: Resolution, site_claims: list, bounds: dict, live):
"""OPT-11 at N>1: `(gate, held)` for stage 3.
`gate` is the `deciding_priority` handed to the allocator: None applies
every unit's mode, a number above P_MODE releases them. `held` is the set
of units whose mode holds them back in the target's direction; while the
modes are released they weigh 0, so they carry only what the other units
cannot (the allocator's last-resort pass).
The rule matches N=1: a SET above the mode decides alone. Otherwise the
target is clamped into what the units can place with their modes
(`allocator.loop_bound()`) and back into the site limits above the mode.
If that point is still placeable with the modes, they hold and the target
is unchanged (what they cannot place is reported unmet, as before). If a
limit above the mode needs more, the target moves only that far, and the
modes are released for it.
"""
mode_units = [u for u, b in bounds.items()
if getattr(b, "mode_priority", None) is not None]
if not mode_units or out.contradiction:
return out.deciding_priority, set()
prio = min(bounds[u].mode_priority for u in mode_units)
if out.winner_priority is not None and out.winner_priority > prio:
return out.deciding_priority, set()
clo, chi = allocator.loop_bound(bounds, live)
t1 = max(clo, min(chi, out.target_w))
before = out.target_w
binder = _yield_to(out, t1, _limits_above(site_claims, prio))
if binder is None:
out.target_w = float(before)
return None, set()
held = set()
for u in mode_units:
b = bounds[u]
nlo, nhi, note = allocator.unit_interval(b)
if note is not None:
continue
if (nhi < b.hi) if out.target_w > 0 else (nlo > b.lo):
held.add(u)
return binder.priority, held
+125 -10
View File
@@ -184,6 +184,17 @@ IDLE_OFF_PEAK_HOUR = "this hour is neither the buy hour nor the sell hour"
IDLE_NO_SIZE = (
"no pack's state of charge permits this side of the trade, so it is sized "
"at 0 W - and a 0 W arbitrage claim is a park order, not a trade")
# SAFETY-45. THE BUY LEG'S SIZE, AND ONLY THE BUY LEG'S - §9.1: "Discharge and
# export are never capped by the peak guard; only charging and import are."
IDLE_NO_HEADROOM = (
"the capacity-tariff guard has measured this billed quarter and it can "
"afford no charging at all, so a trade of any size would push it over the "
"ceiling - and a 0 W arbitrage claim is a park order, not a trade")
IDLE_HEADROOM_UNMEASURED = (
"the capacity-tariff guard did not size this quarter's charging headroom "
"this cycle, and an UNMEASURED headroom is not an unlimited one - charging "
"creates the billed quantity (§9.1) and nothing is measuring the quarter "
"this one would land in")
NEGATIVE_PRICE = (
"§17: the sell hour is priced BELOW ZERO, so discharging into it would give "
"energy away and pay for the privilege. Arbitrage must not export at a "
@@ -251,10 +262,8 @@ def threshold_eur_kwh(opts: dict) -> float:
v = float(price_option(opts, "cycle_cost_threshold_eur"))
if not math.isfinite(v) or v < 0:
raise ValueError(
f"cycle_cost_threshold_eur is {v!r}. It is what a round trip COSTS, "
f"in EUR/kWh, so it is non-negative and finite - a negative "
f"threshold is one every spread clears, which is arbitrage with the "
f"brake removed.")
f"“Battery cycle cost” (cycle_cost_threshold_eur) is {v!r}. Set "
f"it to 0 or more, in EUR/kWh.")
return v
@@ -303,7 +312,7 @@ def _point_at(plan, when: datetime):
return None
def decide(plan, now: datetime, *, peak_guard_active, soc,
def decide(plan, now: datetime, *, peak_guard_active, charge_headroom_w, soc,
min_spread_eur_kwh, uncertainty, charge_w, discharge_w,
soc_floor_pct, soc_ceiling_pct) -> ArbitrageDecision:
"""Should the battery trade this cycle, and how hard.
@@ -314,6 +323,18 @@ def decide(plan, now: datetime, *, peak_guard_active, soc,
None refuses, because the alternative is a strategy that creates the billed
quantity while the thing that would have limited it is switched off.
⚠️ `charge_headroom_w` IS SAFETY-45's SECOND, CONTINUOUS ANSWER FROM THE
SAME GUARD, AND IT IS NOT A DUPLICATE OF THE FIRST. `peak_guard_active` is a
SWITCH - it says whether the guard is holding - and a switch keyed on a
continuous quantity is what made the loop oscillate: the guard engaged at a
5 W floor, this module refused the whole trade, the loop took the actuator,
the meter fell, the guard released and the trade re-armed AT FULL POWER
130 s later. 28 times an hour, measured. `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` is
the watts the billed quarter can still afford; sizing the buy leg to it means
the trade is CLAMPED rather than switched, which is the same shape
`control.maintenance_charge_floor()` has always given a maintenance charge.
⚠️ None IS NOT UNLIMITED here either - see IDLE_HEADROOM_UNMEASURED.
⚠️ EVERY OTHER ARGUMENT IS KEYWORD-ONLY AND HAS NO DEFAULT, for
`TariffPlan.arbitrage()`'s reason. A defaulted `soc_floor_pct` is a reserve
floor this module asserted rather than one the operator configured, and the
@@ -330,10 +351,12 @@ def decide(plan, now: datetime, *, peak_guard_active, soc,
return verdict.match(
refused=lambda v: _idle(v.reason),
allowed=lambda v: _act(plan, now, v, soc, charge_w, discharge_w,
soc_floor_pct, soc_ceiling_pct))
soc_floor_pct, soc_ceiling_pct,
charge_headroom_w))
def _act(plan, now, v, soc, charge_w, discharge_w, floor_pct, ceiling_pct):
def _act(plan, now, v, soc, charge_w, discharge_w, floor_pct, ceiling_pct,
headroom_w):
"""The permitted case: which hour is this, and may the pack do it."""
here = _point_at(plan, now)
if here is None:
@@ -403,18 +426,110 @@ def _act(plan, now, v, soc, charge_w, discharge_w, floor_pct, ceiling_pct):
f"nowhere to put the cheap energy", **common)
if not abs(float(charge_w)) > 0.0:
return _idle(IDLE_NO_SIZE, **common)
# SAFETY-45. THE BILLED QUARTER IS ASKED LAST, AND THE PLACEMENT IS
# DELIBERATE: every refusal that existed before this card keeps the
# precedence it had, so no sentence an operator already reads changes when
# it fires, and the two added here are placed where they cannot displace
# one. The pack's reasons come first because they are properties of the
# hardware in the cupboard; this one is a property of the fifteen minutes
# the trade would land in.
if headroom_w is None:
# ⚠️ NOT "the guard is clear". This is `guard_state()`'s None argument
# one layer down: a headroom nothing measured is not an unlimited one,
# and charging at max_w creates the billed quantity (§9.1).
return _idle(IDLE_HEADROOM_UNMEASURED, **common)
asked_w = abs(float(charge_w))
size_w = min(asked_w, max(0.0, float(headroom_w)))
if not size_w > 0.0:
# ⚠️ NOT IDLE_NO_SIZE, WHICH IS THE LINE ABOVE AND BLAMES THE PACKS.
# `asked_w > 0` is already established here, so the pack may be empty
# and willing and it is the billed quarter that has run out. A refusal
# naming the wrong subsystem sends an operator to the wrong page
# (§10.2), and these two are a whole quarter-hour apart in what they
# ask a human to do about them.
return _idle(IDLE_NO_HEADROOM, **common)
# ⚠️ THE SENTENCE CARRIES BOTH NUMBERS IN THEIR OWN SLOTS, not one figure
# twice. MUTATION.md habit 14: two values in one sentence can be transposed
# by a ZERO-BYTE edit that no byte delta and no shape pin can see, so the
# trade's own size and the guard's headroom are each named by the literal
# text around them.
capped = size_w < asked_w
return ArbitrageDecision(
action=CHARGE, power_w=-abs(float(charge_w)),
action=CHARGE, power_w=-size_w,
reason=(f"{CHARGE}: this is the cheapest firm hour at "
f"{price:.4f} EUR/kWh, {v.spread_eur_kwh:.4f} below the dearest "
f"and clear of the {v.required_spread_eur_kwh:.4f} this cycle "
f"had to cover; charging {abs(float(charge_w)):.0f} W from "
f"{soc:g} %"),
f"had to cover; charging {size_w:.0f} W from {soc:g} %"
+ (f" - SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD: the trade asked for "
f"{asked_w:.0f} W and this billed quarter can afford "
f"{float(headroom_w):.0f} W (§9.1, §10.1 priority 2)"
if capped else "")),
spread_eur_kwh=v.spread_eur_kwh,
required_eur_kwh=v.required_spread_eur_kwh,
price_now_eur_kwh=price)
def sized_from_meter(decision: ArbitrageDecision, headroom_w, *,
winner: str | None) -> bool:
"""SAFETY-47. Was the number a shadow run just recorded SIZED FROM THE
BILLED QUARTER - i.e. from a measurement of what the battery itself did?
THE ONE PLACE THIS QUESTION IS ANSWERED, and it is public for the reason
`peakguard.charge_headroom_w()`, `discharge_permitted()` and
`freeze.looks_frozen()` are: the check that grades it has to assert on THE
SHIPPED EXPRESSION. A predicate transcribed into its own test is one copy
plus a future disagreement about what the check means.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DEFECT IT PREVENTS
`shadow.words()` and the action log carry "would have commanded N W". In
SHADOW MODE the battery is held at `shadow.WIRE_W`, so the billed quarter
the buy leg was sized against contains THE HOUSE AND NOTHING ELSE - while
a live run's meter rises as the trade charges. The same code, the same
hour, `peak_cap_w` 1500 under a 1200 W house: live commands -302.4 W and a
shadow run records -2000.0 W. 6.61x, on the status row, with no caveat.
This is the flag that puts the caveat there.
⚠️ IT IS TRUE WHENEVER A MEASURED HEADROOM ENTERED THE ARITHMETIC, NOT
ONLY WHEN IT BOUND. `_act()` sizes the buy leg as `min(asked, headroom)`,
and "the headroom did not bind" is ITSELF a measured fact about a quarter
the battery never entered. Keying this on `capped` - on whether the
shipped sentence says "SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD" - would answer
True at the START of the quarter, where a shadow run and a live run still
agree to the watt, and False at the END, where `(900/remaining)` has
multiplied the headroom past the ask and the recorded number is at its
most wrong. The quietest caveat exactly where it is needed loudest.
⚠️ THE BUY LEG ONLY. §9.1: "Discharge and export are never capped by the
peak guard; only charging and import are." A sell is sized from
`discharge_w`, which is the roster's own rating and not a measurement of
the quarter, so a sell's recorded watts are NOT subject to this and must
not carry a caveat that would then be false.
⚠️ AND THE ARBITER'S WINNER IS THE THIRD RUNG, NOT AN AFTERTHOUGHT. A trade
that was sized from the meter and then OUT-RANKED is not the number being
recorded - `Resolution.target_w` belongs to somebody else - and a caveat
filed against somebody else's number is a false sentence on the status row,
which is the defect class this whole card is about. It is in HERE and not
in `main.py` for the reason the two rungs above are: all three answer one
question, a check has to be able to reach each of them with the other two
clear (TEST-16), and a rung that lives at a call site is a rung no check
can drive.
`headroom_w` is whatever `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` answered for the
cycle this decision was taken on. ⚠️ None IS "NOTHING MEASURED IT", and
`decide()` REFUSES the trade there (IDLE_HEADROOM_UNMEASURED), so a None
can only ever arrive here beside a non-trading decision - but it is tested
rather than assumed, because the caller is `main.py` and not this module.
`winner` is `Resolution.winner`: the source that actually set the watts.
"""
return (winner == SOURCE
and decision is not None and decision.action == CHARGE
and headroom_w is not None)
def claim(decision: ArbitrageDecision) -> Claim | None:
"""The decision as one arbiter claim, or None when nothing is to be traded.
+5 -4
View File
@@ -325,12 +325,13 @@ class CirculationWatchdog:
return False
self.tripped = True
# UX-10: plain sentences, every figure kept (test_messages.py part 6).
self.reason = (
f"CIRCULATING_POWER: {circ_w:.0f} W measured going round between "
f"the inverters (peak {self.peak_w:.0f} W) for {held:.0f} s "
f"continuously - the meter cannot see it, because it nets to zero "
f"there (limits: over {self.cfg.min_w:.0f} W, held over "
f"{self.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s)")
f"the inverters for {held:.0f} s, peaking at {self.peak_w:.0f} W, "
f"over the limits of {self.cfg.min_w:.0f} W and "
f"{self.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s. The meter cannot see it, because it "
f"nets to zero there")
return True
def held_s(self, now: datetime) -> float:
+126 -24
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ An alarm wired only to this module's `ClampResult.engaged` would therefore be
silent on the exact configuration the whole ticket is about. The winding is
visible one layer up, at the integrator bound, and that is why `Decision` now
carries `i_clamped` / `clamped` BOOLEANS and the caller ORs them in here.
They alarm in different words: see `loop_clamp_note()` (SAFETY-40).
AND WHY BOOLEANS RATHER THAN `Decision.reason`. `reason` is a single string that
later stages overwrite: a cycle that clamps the integrator and is then slew
@@ -141,6 +142,8 @@ import math
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime
from . import messages
# The reason code, distinct from any saturation-freeze code by construction:
# nothing else in this add-on uses it. See "DISTINCT FROM SATURATION".
REASON_CODE = "OUTPUT_CLAMP"
@@ -200,9 +203,8 @@ REASON_CODE = "OUTPUT_CLAMP"
# ceiling rests on one number a test author chose; if that number is ever
# revisited, this constant moves with it.
#
# ⚠️ THIS IS A STOP-GAP AND DOES NOT MAKE THE ALARM CORRECT. The message still
# calls the integrator bound a BUG SIGNAL and still pairs a request from one
# moment with a `self.target` read at another - SAFETY-40. Nothing here is
# ⚠️ THIS WAS A STOP-GAP; the wording and the numbers were SAFETY-40's, fixed
# in `loop_clamp_note()` below. Nothing here is
# suppressed: every engagement is still counted, the action-log row is written on
# every engaged cycle regardless, and the rising edge of every episode alarms
# unconditionally, so no alarm is DROPPED - only delayed.
@@ -234,6 +236,62 @@ CLEAR_CYCLES = 3
SUSTAINED_CYCLES = 3
# UX-10: the reasons below are quoted by a WARNING or ERROR line, so they
# follow STYLE.md's rule for a quoted reason (test_messages.py part 6): no
# final full stop, the line adds it. The line around them says "software
# fault" for an over-rating, so the reason does not. Each is one sentence, so
# the logged line stays within 3 sentences and about 30 words.
def loop_clamp_note(d) -> str:
"""The loop-side alarm text for one `control.Decision`, or "".
SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is anti-windup doing its job and says so;
only a command over the rating is a software fault. Every number is the
decision's own, i.e. from the tick that clamped.
"""
if d.clamped:
return (f"{REASON_CODE}: computed {d.requested_w:+.0f} W, cut to the "
f"{d.clamped_w:+.0f} W rating, command now {d.target_w:+.0f} W")
if d.i_clamped:
return (f"{REASON_CODE}: the correction the add-on builds up reached "
f"its {d.i_bound_w:+.0f} W limit, command now "
f"{d.target_w:+.0f} W")
return ""
def shortfall_note(named) -> str:
"""SAFETY-85: the alarm text while another owner sets the batteries.
`named` is `[(inverter name or None, asked W, given W)]`, one per battery
that gave less than asked."""
return f"{REASON_CODE}: " + ", ".join(
f"{name or 'the battery'} gives {given:+.0f} W of the {asked:+.0f} W "
f"asked" for name, asked, given in named)
def delivery_short(asked_w, given_w, margin_w) -> bool:
"""SAFETY-85: did a battery asked to discharge give more than `margin_w`
less? A charge is never short: a full pack tapers (SAFETY-42 section 7)."""
asked, given = float(asked_w), float(given_w)
return asked > 0.0 and asked - given > abs(float(margin_w))
def write_clamp_note(named) -> str:
"""The write-side alarm text: `named` is `[(inverter name or None,
ClampResult)]` for every inverter whose write was cut back this cycle.
One inverter reads as `describe()`. Several read as one sentence of
asked/sent pairs, so the line stays one sentence however many inverters
there are. Which limit cut each one back is on its own action-log row
(`describe()`) and in the notification."""
if len(named) == 1:
name, r = named[0]
return f"{name}: {r.describe()}" if name else r.describe()
return f"{REASON_CODE}: " + ", ".join(
f"{name} asked {r.requested_w:+.0f} W and sent {r.applied_w:+.0f} W"
for name, r in named)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ClampResult:
"""What the guard did, with the RAW value preserved.
@@ -250,10 +308,12 @@ class ClampResult:
bound: str = "" # "" | "max_w" | "device" - which stage bit
def describe(self) -> str:
return (f"{REASON_CODE}: the computed setpoint {self.requested_w:+.0f} W "
f"was clamped to {self.applied_w:+.0f} W by the {self.bound} "
f"bound (rating {self.limit_w:.0f} W) - something upstream is "
f"winding")
# The sent value IS the limit that bound, so the rating is not
# repeated: on "max_w" it equals the rating, and on "device" the
# rating was not what cut it back.
return (f"{REASON_CODE}: asked {self.requested_w:+.0f} W and sent "
f"{self.applied_w:+.0f} W, "
f"{messages.LIMIT_WORDS.get(self.bound, self.bound)}")
def is_commandable(value) -> bool:
@@ -333,32 +393,80 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
def __init__(self):
self.active = False
self.engagements = 0 # every engagement, never deduplicated
# UX-08: the same count split by alarm type, so the status page names
# each with its own alarm's title after the episode clears.
self.over_rating = 0 # bug=True: "Power request too high"
self.bound = 0 # bug=False: "Battery is not keeping up"
self.episodes = 0 # rising edges
# SAFETY-85: episodes with a bug=False engagement. The status row
# counts these; counting cycles read 861 on one rig run.
self.bound_episodes = 0
self._bound_counted = False
self.since: datetime | None = None
self.last_alarm: datetime | None = None
self.reason = ""
# UX-08: the numbers behind `reason`, for the notification - set under
# the same rule as `reason`, so both always describe the same tick.
self.facts = ()
self.clean_cycles = 0
# SAFETY-41. Consecutive engaged cycles, and whether THIS episode has
# spoken yet - the two the escalation clause needs.
self.run_len = 0
self.spoken = False
# SAFETY-40. Did this episode include a genuine over-rating (`bug`), and
# has THAT spoken? A bug has its own budget, so anti-windup notices can
# never delay it; with bug=True throughout, cadence is as before.
self.bug = False
self.bug_spoken = False
self.last_bug_alarm: datetime | None = None
def note(self, engaged: bool, reason: str, now: datetime) -> bool:
def _due(self, last, now) -> bool:
return last is None or (now - last).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S
def _speak(self, now, bug) -> bool:
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
if bug:
self.last_bug_alarm = now
self.bug_spoken = True
return True
def note(self, engaged: bool, reason: str, now: datetime,
bug: bool = True, facts=()) -> bool:
"""Advance one cycle. True when the caller should raise the alarm.
`now` is the caller's clock, the same discipline as
`SignWatchdog.evaluate()` and `FreezeWatchdog.evaluate()`.
`SignWatchdog.evaluate()` and `FreezeWatchdog.evaluate()`. `bug` False
is the integrator bound (SAFETY-40): counted and notified like the
rest, but it never replaces a bug's text within an episode.
"""
if engaged:
self.engagements += 1
if bug:
self.over_rating += 1
else:
self.bound += 1
self.clean_cycles = 0
self.reason = reason
self.run_len += 1
if not self.active:
rising = not self.active
if rising:
self.active = True
self.since = now
self.episodes += 1
self.spoken = False
self.bug = False
self.bug_spoken = False
self._bound_counted = False
if not bug and not self._bound_counted:
self._bound_counted = True
self.bound_episodes += 1
if bug or not self.bug:
self.reason = reason
self.facts = tuple(facts)
self.bug = self.bug or bug
if bug and not self.bug_spoken and self._due(self.last_bug_alarm, now):
return self._speak(now, True)
if rising:
# ⚠️ SAFETY-41. THE RISING EDGE IS RATE-LIMITED TOO, and it did
# not used to be. It fired unconditionally, so a condition that
# engages and clears repeatedly raised one notification PER
@@ -384,11 +492,8 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
# still written on every engaged cycle, and a genuine runaway -
# which by definition keeps engaging - is picked up by the
# re-assert path within REASSERT_S. Delay, not loss.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
if self._due(self.last_alarm, now):
return self._speak(now, self.bug)
return False
# ⚠️ THE ESCALATION. An episode that has not yet spoken because the
# budget was spent by an EARLIER, unrelated episode speaks anyway
@@ -396,15 +501,10 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
# engages every cycle and reaches it; the scattered one-cycle
# railing that produced the live flood never does.
if not self.spoken and self.run_len >= SUSTAINED_CYCLES:
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
return self._speak(now, self.bug)
# Still engaged: re-assert on the slow cadence, not every cycle.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
if self._due(self.last_alarm, now):
return self._speak(now, self.bug)
return False
self.run_len = 0
@@ -420,5 +520,7 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
# above. The episode ends; the notification budget does not reset
# with it.
self.reason = ""
self.facts = ()
self.bug = False
self.clean_cycles = 0
return False
+8 -4
View File
@@ -221,6 +221,11 @@ function makeInput(field, value, onchange){
input.step = field.type === 'integer' ? '1' : 'any';
if(field.min !== undefined) input.min = field.min;
if(field.max !== undefined) input.max = field.max;
} else if(field.type === 'password'){
input.type = 'password';
input.autocomplete = 'new-password';
input.autocapitalize = 'none';
input.spellcheck = false;
} else {
input.type = 'text';
input.autocapitalize = 'none';
@@ -413,10 +418,9 @@ function showProblems(payload){
save.disabled = total > 0;
if(total){
note(banner, 'bad', 'This configuration would not start.',
'The add-on refuses to run on it and would stop with exit 78. '
+ 'Saving is blocked until these are fixed; nothing has been written. '
+ 'Each message below is the add-on\\u2019s own words, from the same '
+ 'check that runs at startup.');
'The add-on would refuse to start on it. Saving is blocked until these '
+ 'are fixed, and nothing has been written. Each message below comes '
+ 'from the same check that runs at start.');
banner.insertBefore(banner.lastChild, banner.firstChild);
msg(total + (total === 1 ? ' problem' : ' problems')
+ ' - saving is blocked', 'bad');
+52 -1
View File
@@ -206,6 +206,8 @@ def _one_field(node, translations, lang, path=()):
"multiple": bool(node.get("multiple")),
"unit": unit_of(key),
}
if node.get("format") == "password":
field["type"] = "password"
if node.get("lengthMin") is not None:
field["min"] = node["lengthMin"]
if node.get("lengthMax") is not None:
@@ -289,7 +291,10 @@ def problems_by_field(problems, keys):
cross-field rule is about all of its fields, and hiding it from one of them
would be this card's own defect in miniature.
"""
patterns = [(key, re.compile(r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])" + re.escape(key)
# ⚠️ `.` BEFORE THE KEY DOES NOT COUNT (UX-08 2d): `inverters.max_w`
# names a setting of one inverter in the list, which is changed under
# `inverters`, and it must not also land beside the flat `max_w`.
patterns = [(key, re.compile(r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_.])" + re.escape(key)
+ r"(?![A-Za-z0-9_])")) for key in keys]
by_key, unanchored = {}, []
for problem in problems:
@@ -303,6 +308,52 @@ def problems_by_field(problems, keys):
return by_key, unanchored
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# SECRETS (PRICE-01 F1). A `password` option never leaves this process in a page
# or a JSON answer. The pages get SECRET_SHOWN when one is set and "" when not.
# A save that sends SECRET_SHOWN or nothing keeps the stored value; any other
# value replaces it. The names come from the Supervisor's own schema, so a
# password option added later is covered without an edit here.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
SECRET_SHOWN = "********"
def secret_keys(schema, extra=()):
"""Names of the options whose schema type is `password`, plus `extra`."""
# The Supervisor may spell it `type: password` or `type: string` with
# `format: password`; both count.
return frozenset(str(n.get("name")) for n in schema or ()
if isinstance(n, dict) and (
n.get("type") == "password"
or n.get("format") == "password")
) | frozenset(extra)
def hide_secrets(value, keys):
"""A copy of `value` with every secret key's value replaced by
SECRET_SHOWN (set) or "" (empty), at any depth."""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {k: ((SECRET_SHOWN if v else "") if k in keys
else hide_secrets(v, keys))
for k, v in value.items()}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [hide_secrets(v, keys) for v in value]
return value
def keep_secrets(proposed, stored, keys):
"""`proposed` with each secret the page did not change put back from
`stored`: absent, empty or SECRET_SHOWN means 'leave it'."""
out = dict(proposed)
for key in keys:
if out.get(key) in (None, "", SECRET_SHOWN):
if isinstance(stored, dict) and key in stored:
out[key] = stored[key]
elif key in out and out[key] == SECRET_SHOWN:
out[key] = ""
return out
def changed_keys(left, right):
"""Sorted keys whose values differ between two option blobs.
+292 -1
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ exists because its absence produced a specific, observed failure.
"""
import math
from math import inf
from dataclasses import dataclass
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -191,6 +192,112 @@ SETTLE_CYCLES = math.ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) # 12
# edge rather than in prose, because it is a property of two files agreeing.
_SAT_COUNT_CAP = SETTLE_CYCLES + 1 # 13
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-48. HOW FAR THE INTEGRATOR MAY STAND AHEAD OF THE COMMAND.
#
# ⚠️ THE MISSING CASE, AND IT IS A CASE AND NOT A CONSTANT. The freeze below
# stops the integrator accumulating, and the comment beside it says what the
# requirement is: "the INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command". But
# `frozen` is computed from ONE signal - `abs(prev_w - actual_w) >
# saturation_w`, the inverter not tracking - and SLEW-LIMITING NEVER ENTERS IT.
# When the command hits the step ceiling, the integrator goes on winding at
# `gain * error` until it reaches `integrator_max_w`.
#
# The arithmetic, and it is the whole card:
#
# the integrator moves gain * error per cycle
# the command moves at most slew per cycle
# so the integrator outruns the command whenever
#
# |error| > slew / gain
#
# At the live install's shape (gain 0.6, slew_w 400) that is 667 W. The median
# grid error at the onset of a recorded episode is 1114 W. This is why
# SAFETY-39's `slew_w` retune did not fix it: a smaller step makes the
# threshold LOWER, so the case fires more often, not less.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT IS BOUNDED IS THE LEAD, NOT THE INTEGRATOR. Two forms were measured
# over 16.0 days of the live install's own recorded disturbances
# (`tools/replay_recorded_loop.py`, and DECISIONS/SAFETY-48 has the table):
#
# (a) reuse the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew flag - "may not wind
# further in the direction it is already pushing", exactly as saturation
# does. It cuts export 13 % AND RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY: the worst
# quarter-hour average OFFTAKE goes 3739 -> 3935 W and the mean quarter
# moves +2.7 W, in five of six plant and tuning variants, and on the
# billed quarter it is worse at every plant lag where release/1.0
# produces a peak at all (a tie at lag 0, worse at 2.5/5/7.5/10 s)
# and at every top-N cut of the quarters.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE MECHANISM IS A REDISTRIBUTION, NOT A WEAKER ANSWER. An
# earlier draft of this line said a frozen integrator undershoots by
# (1 - gain) "so a large import is answered too weakly". The aggregate
# does not show that: form A cuts total import by 5.45 kWh, and paired
# tick by tick against release/1.0 it delivers 8.56 kWh LESS offtake
# energy on the ticks release/1.0 was importing. What it moves is the
# TAIL - within quarters that already net to offtake, the worst of them
# gets worse - and the capacity tariff bills the worst quarter and
# nothing else. That is the wrong trade here and the reason this is not
# the fix that ships.
#
# (b) cap how far the integrator may LEAD the command, one slew step. Export
# 39.6 -> 34.1 kWh, wasted throughput 4.7 -> 3.2 kWh, sign reversals
# 2992 -> 2770, worst quarter-hour offtake 3739 -> 3434 W at the fitted
# plant lag (⚠️ AND AT NO SHORTER ONE: at every lag <= 5.0 s release/1.0
# is already at 3434 W and this changes it by zero - DECISIONS/SAFETY-48
# §3a), median recovery 232 -> 199 s. It is what ships.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE CAP IS NOT ZERO. `i_w = slewed` is full back-calculation, and this
# module's own docstring says what that costs: passing `i_w=None` "reduces this
# function to the exact velocity form it replaced". A zero cap makes `i_w`
# identically the command on every cycle, which is that same collapse written
# from the other end - it measures 32.0 kWh, better than (b) by 2 kWh, and it
# throws away the reason the accumulator was split out at all. One step is the
# smallest cap that is not that.
#
# WHAT THE NUMBER MEANS: the command can cover a one-step lead in ONE cycle, so
# the worst-case unwind after a reversal is one cycle instead of
# `integrator_max_w / slew_w` - 12.5 cycles at the live shape, ~60 s at the
# meter's measured 5.0 s tick.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS IN STEPS RATHER THAN IN WATTS FOR SAFETY-39's REASON, WHICH IS THE
# REASON THIS FILE KEEPS RE-LEARNING. A watt figure is a constant that outlives
# the `slew_w` it was derived against; expressed in steps it moves with
# `slew_limit_w()` and therefore with the rail.
SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 1
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-52. A BATTERY THAT REFUSES IS ASKED FOR 0 W, NOT HELD AT ITS LAST ASK.
#
# At the BMS cut-out the pack delivers ~0 W whatever it is asked, so the
# saturation freeze below holds the command where it stood (the recorded
# 09-06 case: +5000 W for 11.87 h) until the grid error changes sign. The
# freeze's own exit cannot help: a reading of ~0 against a large ask is inside
# the interval a limit can produce. So a refused DIRECTION is held at 0 W,
# carried between cycles like `sat_count`, and left again when the loop wants
# the other direction, when a small probe is answered, or when the caller
# resets it (stop, start, another writer). The record is DECISIONS/SAFETY-52.
#
# PROBE_W is below freshness.MOVE_W (250 W) on purpose: a probe that small can
# never arm the stale-reading gate, so it cannot start the gate's ~70 s cycle.
# test_refusal.py pins the inequality. The cadence and length are the owner's
# 2026-09-27 answer (every 15 minutes) and freshness.BATT_OBLIGED_S twice over
# (17 s is how long a healthy reading needs to show a command).
REFUSED = "battery refuses"
PROBING = "battery probe"
PROBE_W = 200.0
PROBE_ANSWER_W = PROBE_W / 2
# "Gives nothing" is below the probe's own answer, not below `saturation_w`: a
# pack derated to 100-499 W is a limit, and at 500 W it kept ~7 % of its power
# (review of #141). The capture's refusals read -4 W.
REFUSED_BELOW_W = PROBE_ANSWER_W
PROBE_EVERY_S = 900.0
PROBE_S = 34.0
# OPT-11. The loop's reason when the battery modes, not the meter, set the
# command: every battery that may move this way is at its mode's limit.
MODE_BOUND = "mode-bound"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Tuning:
@@ -266,6 +373,18 @@ class Decision:
# the comment at the bound below, and clamp.py.
i_clamped: bool = False
clamped: bool = False
# SAFETY-40. The alarm's numbers, taken at the clamp so they are one tick's:
# the bound the integrator reached, and the command before/after the
# rating clamp. `target_w` is this tick's emitted command.
i_bound_w: float = 0.0
requested_w: float = 0.0
clamped_w: float = 0.0
# SAFETY-52. The refused direction to carry back in (+1 discharge, -1
# charge, 0 none), or None when the caller does not carry it.
refused: int | None = None
# SAFETY-85. The `bound` held the integrator or the command this cycle,
# so the batteries' limits, not the loop, decided it.
held: bool = False
def slew_limit_w(tuning: Tuning) -> float:
@@ -362,6 +481,11 @@ def compute(
tuning: Tuning,
sat_count: int = 0,
i_w: float | None = None,
refused: int | None = None,
probe: bool = False,
bound: tuple | None = None,
gave_nothing: bool | None = None,
idle_w: float = 0.0,
) -> Decision:
"""One control cycle. A cycle is one meter update (~5 s on a HomeWizard P1).
@@ -369,8 +493,34 @@ def compute(
`grid_w` net grid power, + = importing
`actual_w` what the inverter reports it is doing, + = discharging
`i_w` the carried integrator, or None to seed it from `prev_w`
`refused` SAFETY-52's carried refused direction, or None to leave it out
(the `i_w=None` equivalence path does)
`probe` the caller's clock says a refused direction may try PROBE_W now
`bound` OPT-11: `(lo, hi)`, what the batteries may place this tick with
their modes applied (`allocator.loop_bound()`), or None. See
MODE_BOUND below. None is the law as it was.
`gave_nothing` SAFETY-94: the caller's span check - the reading stayed
under REFUSED_BELOW_W, one way, for SETTLE_CYCLES spanning
REFUSED_SPAN_S. A refusal engages only with it. None leaves it
out (compute() alone, as before).
`idle_w` SAFETY-97: what `actual_w` reads while the batteries give
nothing (app/idle.py). The refusal's band and its end are
centred on it. 0 is the law as it was.
"""
reason = "tracking"
# OPT-11: a bound that leaves out 0 W would FORCE a direction, which no
# mode may do. It is dropped rather than obeyed (a software fault, and
# main.py never builds one: every term of `loop_bound()` holds 0).
if bound is not None and not (bound[0] <= 0.0 <= bound[1]):
bound = None
# ...and a side of it that reaches the rail is left to the rail, so that
# SAFETY-03's `i_clamped` still fires when the loop winds into it. With
# every battery on, the bound IS the rail, and the law is exactly as it was.
if bound is not None:
_rail = min(tuning.max_w, tuning.max_w if tuning.integrator_max_w is None
else tuning.integrator_max_w)
bound = (float(bound[0]) if bound[0] > -_rail else -inf,
float(bound[1]) if bound[1] < _rail else inf)
# --- saturation, WITH the duration term -------------------------------
# Command and actual diverging means the inverter cannot follow - it is at
@@ -473,6 +623,17 @@ def compute(
else:
i_w = max(moved, i_w)
# OPT-11: the integrator does not wind past what the modes let the
# batteries place. Only a side tighter than the rail is left in `bound`
# (above), so this never takes SAFETY-03's `i_clamped` away from the rail.
held_by_bound = False
if bound is not None:
held = max(float(bound[0]), min(float(bound[1]), i_w))
if held != i_w:
i_w = held
reason = MODE_BOUND
held_by_bound = True
# ⚠️ Applied EVERY cycle, frozen or not: the freeze is conditional, this
# bound is not. It is what makes the worst-case unwind time finite and
# knowable instead of a function of how long the error happened to stand.
@@ -489,6 +650,7 @@ def compute(
# winding, "clamped" is a command that came out over the rating anyway.
reason = "i-clamped"
i_w = bounded
i_bound_w = bounded if i_clamped else 0.0
want = i_w
# ⚠️ Maintenance shaping (charge-only, cheap-window floor) used to live
@@ -500,6 +662,7 @@ def compute(
# An early draft applied a floor after the clamp and let demand escape it.
target = max(-tuning.max_w, min(tuning.max_w, want))
clamped = target != want
clamped_w = target
if clamped:
reason = "clamped"
@@ -507,6 +670,83 @@ def compute(
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
# --- SAFETY-48: the step ceiling reaches the integrator too ---------
# ⚠️ INSIDE THIS BRANCH AND NOWHERE ELSE - AND THE REASON IS NOT THE
# SATURATION FREEZE. An earlier draft of this comment said that applied
# unconditionally the cap "would also pull the integrator toward a
# command the SATURATION freeze is pinning", and priced that at 118 of
# 256 250 ticks. Both halves were invented, and MUTATION.md habit 22 is
# what fell out of it. The 118 had been measured against a DIFFERENT
# pair - a band applied after quantisation, at the very end of
# `compute()`. On the pair the sentence actually names - this same cap
# moved out of this branch to just after `target = slewed` - the two
# forms are BIT-IDENTICAL on the shipped configuration: 0 of 256 246
# ticks differ over the 16-day recording. They separate only where
# `integrator_max_w` is deliberately set ABOVE `max_w`, the one
# configuration this file says can reach its `clamped` reason; there
# the integrator is meant to run above the rail and an unconditional
# cap would drag it back to the command every cycle and make the option
# inert. THAT is why the cap stays in the branch, and
# `test_telemetry.py` part 4 drives it. (The separable-state COUNT is a
# property of whatever grid was swept - 2050 of 257 400 on this card's,
# 1220 of 246 064 on the review's, 776 of 40 320 on a third - so the
# claim to carry forward is WHERE they separate, not how many.)
#
# ⚠️ AND THE HALF A READER WILL OTHERWISE ASSUME AWAY: THIS CAP DOES
# MOVE A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR. It runs BEFORE the freeze block
# below and is not gated on `frozen`. Measured over the same recording
# at the live shape: of 79 160 frozen ticks the cap changed `i_w` on
# 1095 of them, and on 679 of those it moved it FURTHER OUT on the side
# it was already on - putting back magnitude the freeze had just let
# fall, which is the one direction the freeze's own rule ("may fall,
# never rise") exists to forbid. Worst case 2424 W, and the worked tick
# is `prev_w -3400 W, grid +4697 W, actual -4144 W, sat_count 2 -> 3`:
# the freeze leaves the integrator at -176 W, the slew binds, and the
# cap drags it to -2600 W. It never overrides a SAME-CYCLE refusal -
# the freeze clipped `moved` on 75 512 ticks and the slew bound on none
# of them - but it does not leave the frozen path alone either.
#
# ⚠️ AND THAT IS WHERE SAFETY-13's SETTLE VALUES WENT. Gating this cap
# on `not frozen` puts `test_control.py` part 5 back at release/1.0's
# -1190 W exactly; part 4(b)'s -2390 -> -1200 W does NOT come back,
# because that one moved for the other reason - the winding BEFORE the
# freeze is bounded now. The gate is refused anyway: measured the same
# way it leaves a worst observed lead of 4961 W, i.e. no bound at all
# on the quantity this card exists to bound. DECISIONS/SAFETY-48 §5
# carries the rest of the price.
#
# ⚠️ WRITTEN ONE-SIDED, AND IT IS **EQUIVALENT** TO THE TWO-SIDED BAND
# `max(slewed - cap, min(slewed + cap, i_w))` - MEASURED, NOT REASONED.
# An earlier draft of this comment claimed the two-sided spelling was a
# bug that would drag a TRAILING integrator up toward the command. That
# is false and the sweep said so: `target` is monotone in `i_w`
# (`target = clamp(clamp(i_w, +-limit), +-max_w)`) and `slewed` is
# `target` pulled toward `prev_w`, so whenever the slew binds, `i_w`
# lies on the same side of `slewed` as `target` does and the other
# clamp cannot reach. The two spellings agree on **205 920 of 205 920**
# cases across four tunings, every sign of `prev_w`, `grid_w`,
# `actual_w` and `i_w`, and the `i_w=None` path.
#
# It stays one-sided because it SAYS which side the lead is on - the
# side the command wanted to move and could not - and because a reader
# reaching for the band spelling should find the sweep rather than an
# argument. ⚠️ The "descending" case is NOT an exception to the rule: a
# command falling from +2400 W toward an integrator at +100 W has an
# integrator 2300 W ahead of it IN THE DIRECTION OF TRAVEL, and it is
# pulled back to one step beyond the emitted command exactly as a
# rising one is.
#
# ⚠️ `i_w` IS CHANGED AND `target` IS NOT. This cycle's command is
# already decided; what is bounded is what gets CARRIED. That is also
# why the exhaustive `i_w=None` equivalence sweep in test_control.py is
# untouched by this card: it compares `(target_w, sat_count, frozen,
# reason)`, none of which this moves, and the seeded path re-seeds from
# `prev_w` next cycle anyway.
_lead_cap = SLEW_LEAD_STEPS * slew
if target > slewed:
i_w = min(i_w, slewed + _lead_cap)
elif target < slewed:
i_w = max(i_w, slewed - _lead_cap)
target = slewed
if frozen:
@@ -580,6 +820,49 @@ def compute(
target = min(target, prev_w) if prev_w > 0 else max(target, prev_w)
reason = "saturated-freeze"
# --- SAFETY-52: a refused direction is held at 0 W ----------------------
# Engages only where the freeze has held for SETTLE_CYCLES and the unit
# delivers ~nothing: a reading below REFUSED_BELOW_W against an ask beyond
# `saturation_w` is a refusal, not a slow plant. The drop to 0 skips the slew
# limit because it only removes an ask the battery is not meeting.
if refused is not None:
# SAFETY-94: and only when the reading has given nothing for the
# whole span, not just now. `sat_count` also counts the cycles a
# healthy battery spends reversing through its lag (-2000 W towards
# +800 W): at a 1 s meter its 12 cycles end as the reading passes 0.
if (refused == 0 and frozen and sat_count >= SETTLE_CYCLES
and abs(prev_w) > tuning.saturation_w
and abs(actual_w - idle_w) < REFUSED_BELOW_W
and gave_nothing is not False):
refused = 1 if prev_w > 0 else -1
if refused and refused * i_w < 0:
refused = 0 # the loop wants the other way
elif refused and refused * (actual_w - idle_w) >= PROBE_ANSWER_W:
refused = 0 # it delivers: a probe answered,
# or a slow reading arriving
elif refused:
wants = refused * i_w > 0
i_w = 0.0
target = refused * PROBE_W if probe and wants else 0.0
reason = PROBING if probe and wants else REFUSED
# --- OPT-11: the command stays inside what the modes allow -------------
# Applied after the slew limit and the freeze, so a mode that closes drops
# the ask at once rather than one slew step per cycle. That moves no
# battery further than the allocator would: it places at most this bound
# when the loop decides. What it removes is the unmet part, which would
# otherwise hold `prev_w` away from `actual_w` and trip the saturation
# freeze on watts no battery was allowed to give.
if bound is not None:
inside = max(float(bound[0]), min(float(bound[1]), target))
if inside != target:
target = inside
reason = MODE_BOUND
held_by_bound = True
# SAFETY-48's lead cap above may pull the integrator back toward the
# slewed command; what is CARRIED stays inside the bound too.
i_w = max(float(bound[0]), min(float(bound[1]), i_w))
# --- quantise ----------------------------------------------------------
# 10 W. The register is 1 W and the inverter reports at 1 W, but its
# response lands on a coarser ladder (~17.6 W measured at ~900 W, consistent
@@ -587,9 +870,17 @@ def compute(
# 10 W simply avoids a visible staircase on dashboards.
step = max(1, int(tuning.step_w))
target = round(target / step) * step
if bound is not None:
# OPT-11: rounding must not step outside the bound. The bound holds
# 0 W, so one step toward 0 is always inside it.
if target > bound[1]:
target -= step
elif target < bound[0]:
target += step
return Decision(float(target), sat_count, frozen, reason, float(i_w),
i_clamped, clamped)
i_clamped, clamped, float(i_bound_w), float(want),
float(clamped_w), refused, held_by_bound)
def maintenance_charge_floor(
+387 -149
View File
@@ -125,6 +125,49 @@ units and the market aggregator prints both conventions in one column, so the
add-on has to be told which one the card is in - and the unit conversion is the
add-on's job precisely because it is one of the two steps that silently costs a
factor of 10, 100 or 1000. The other is VAT, which is also the add-on's.
TARIFF-16 - THE SECOND LEG, AND WHY IT IS THIS PARSER AND NOT A SECOND ONE
==========================================================================
A Belgian dynamic contract has TWO published lines, not one, and the second is
what the site is PAID for export:
Eneco Zon & Wind Dynamisch 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 c EUR/kWh
ENGIE Dynamic (B x eSpot_15) - A
Aspiravi (non-dynamic) 0,07 x Belpex - 2
Same `B x index + A` shape - which is why `price_export_formula` is this
module's parser with ONE argument moved (`option`), exactly as TARIFF-17 made
`parse_static_profile()`'s option name a parameter rather than forking the
period grammar. What differs between the two legs is FOUR numbers and a
handful of sentences, and all of them are rows of `_LEGS`:
* its OWN factor - Eneco 0,102 on consumption against 0,100 on injection,
Aspiravi 0,07 against ~0,10. NOT the consumption `B` with a sign flip;
* a NEGATIVE offset, which `factor`/`offset` already allow and which
`price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)` cannot express at all;
* `vat_pct: 0` - "Injectietarieven zijn vrijgesteld van btw" - against 6 on
consumption, which is a SIX PERCENT ASYMMETRY between the buy leg and the
sell leg and is representable only because `vat_pct` is PER SPEC;
* a price that goes BELOW ZERO with no floor, in the hours a PV household
exports. `implausible_injection()` is the band that accepts that and still
refuses an implausible one; `implausible_all_in()` is NOT it, and its
docstring says why.
⚠️ AND THE CARD CANNOT ALWAYS GRADE IT. Eneco's injection formula is printed
with NO price beside it, so on that card there is nothing to reproduce. The
`card` block is therefore OPTIONAL on this leg and REQUIRED on the other, the
self-check runs wherever there is a printed estimate, and validate.py says at
startup when a leg is ungraded. Inventing an estimate to grade against would
be grading arithmetic against itself, which is the defect MUTATION.md habit 4
is about; TARIFF-15 demonstrated two tariffs end to end rather than three for
the same reason.
⚠️ NOTHING TRADES ON THIS TODAY, AND SAYING SO IS PART OF SHIPPING IT.
`arbitrage.py` does not read `export_price_eur_kwh` at all - its own comment
says so, citing §9.3's near-zero Belgian injection price - and both hours it
compares are all-in CONSUMPTION prices. So this is not a wrong-trade defect
and must not be described as one. What it changes is what an operator is told,
and what a future export-aware strategy would rest on.
"""
import json
@@ -132,6 +175,8 @@ import math
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import date, datetime, timezone
from . import messages
class FormulaInvalid(Exception):
"""`price_formula` cannot be used. Raised by the parser, refused by
@@ -156,7 +201,7 @@ RESOLUTIONS: tuple = ("hourly", "quarter_hourly")
# index id -> the human name of the series it refers to. One entry today; a
# second index is a new row here plus a fetch path, not a new grammar.
INDEXES: dict = {
"epex_be": "EPEX BE day-ahead, EUR/MWh",
"epex_be": "Belgian day-ahead price, EUR/MWh",
}
# ⚠️ 0.01 IN THE CARD'S OWN UNITS, WHICH IS THE LAST DIGIT BOTH REAL CARDS
@@ -183,6 +228,91 @@ _CARD_KEYS = ("month", "index_eur_per_mwh", "expect_incl_vat")
_TOP_KEYS = ("index", "resolution", "factor", "offset", "units", "vat_pct",
"card")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# TARIFF-16 - the SECOND leg, and the one parameter that carries it
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION = "price_export_formula"
# ⚠️ THE PASS-THROUGH FRACTION, WHICH IS WHY THE NEXT TWO BOUNDS CAN BE
# INDEX-FREE. One EUR/MWh IS 0.001 EUR/kWh, so `factor x UNITS[units] / 0.001`
# is the dimensionless share of the wholesale price the contract passes
# through - 1.00 for Eneco's injection leg (0,100 c EUR/kWh per EUR/MWh), 0.70
# for Aspiravi's (0,07). A coefficient typed a hundred times too small or too
# large moves this by a hundred, whatever the index and whatever the sign of
# the price.
EUR_KWH_PER_EUR_MWH = 0.001
# The two plausibility bounds for an INJECTION leg. ⚠️ NEITHER LOOKS AT THE
# SIGN OF THE PRICE, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE POINT - see
# `implausible_injection()`.
PASSTHROUGH_LO = 0.10 # 10% of the wholesale price
PASSTHROUGH_HI = 10.0 # 1000% of it
INJECTION_OFFSET_MAX_EUR_KWH = 0.20
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class _Leg:
"""What ONE option's coefficients price, as sentences its refusals read.
⚠️ TARIFF-16 MADE `option` A PARAMETER RATHER THAN FORKING THE PARSER,
exactly as TARIFF-17 made `option`/`means` parameters of
`parse_static_profile()` rather than forking the period grammar. A second
copy of this parser would be a second `_finite()`, a second unknown-key
rule, a second unit table and a second `to_resolution()` - and the two
would diverge first on the 23- and 25-hour days, where nobody looks.
Everything that differs between the consumption leg and the injection leg
is a STRING in this table; the arithmetic, the enumerations, the card
comparison and the resolution rule are ONE implementation with one set of
checks over it.
"""
option: str
what: str # "consumption" / "injection", for a sentence
example: str # a VALID blob for this leg, in the JSON-error hint
when: str # when this option is read at all
flat: str # where a FLAT price of this kind already lives
zero_factor: str # what a factor of 0 actually costs on this leg
neg_factor: str # why a negative FACTOR is wrong on this leg
card_required: bool
card_note: str # why it is required, or what is lost without it
card_causes: str # the leg-specific tail of `card_refusal()`
_LEGS = {
"price_formula": _Leg(
option="price_formula",
what="consumption",
example=('{"index":"epex_be","resolution":"hourly","factor":0.102,'
'"offset":1.00,"units":"c_eur_per_kwh","vat_pct":6,'
'"card":{"month":"2026-09","index_eur_per_mwh":133.9905,'
'"expect_incl_vat":15.55}}'),
when="Leave it empty unless “Dynamic price source” is 'custom_formula'.",
zero_factor=" and trading never finds a price difference",
flat="use “Fixed or day/night tariff” (static_profile) instead",
neg_factor="Put the minus sign on the offset, not on the factor",
card_required=True,
card_note="The add-on needs it to check your two numbers",
card_causes=("the units, the VAT, and that network charges are not "
"in the offset"),
),
EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION: _Leg(
option=EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION,
what="injection",
example=('{"index":"epex_be","resolution":"hourly","factor":0.1,'
'"offset":-1.188,"units":"c_eur_per_kwh","vat_pct":0}'),
when="Fill it in only if your injection price follows the market.",
zero_factor="",
flat="use “Injection price” (export_price_eur_kwh) instead",
neg_factor="Put the minus sign on the offset, not on the factor",
card_required=False,
card_note=("It is optional here. Without it the add-on only checks "
"the size of your two numbers"),
card_causes="the units, and that the VAT is 0 for injection",
),
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class FormulaSpec:
@@ -199,14 +329,44 @@ class FormulaSpec:
offset: float
units: str
vat_pct: float
card_month: str # "YYYY-MM", as the card is dated
card_index_eur_per_mwh: float
card_expect_incl_vat: float # in `units`, as the card prints it
card_month: str = "" # "YYYY-MM", as the card is dated
card_index_eur_per_mwh: float = None
card_expect_incl_vat: float = None # in `units`, as the card prints it
# TARIFF-16. Which OPTION this spec was read from, so a refusal, a log line
# and `card_graded` name the leg the operator actually typed.
option: str = "price_formula"
@property
def unit_to_eur_kwh(self) -> float:
return UNITS[self.units]
@property
def card_graded(self) -> bool:
"""Is there a printed estimate to grade these coefficients against?
⚠️ FALSE IS A REAL, SHIPPED STATE ON THE INJECTION LEG and is reported
rather than defaulted: Eneco's injection formula is printed with no
price beside it. Never False on `price_formula`, where `_card()`
refuses an absent block.
"""
return self.card_expect_incl_vat is not None
@property
def passthrough(self) -> float:
"""The dimensionless share of the wholesale price this passes through.
`factor x UNITS[units] / 0.001`. 1.00 for Eneco's injection leg, 0.70
for Aspiravi's. ⚠️ INDEX-FREE AND SIGN-FREE, which is what lets
`implausible_injection()` bound a leg whose price legitimately goes
below zero.
"""
return self.factor * self.unit_to_eur_kwh / EUR_KWH_PER_EUR_MWH
@property
def offset_eur_kwh(self) -> float:
"""The offset in EUR/kWh, whatever units the card printed it in."""
return self.offset * self.unit_to_eur_kwh
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# The arithmetic. Two functions, and the SECOND one is the contract.
@@ -241,7 +401,18 @@ def card_discrepancy(spec: FormulaSpec) -> float:
In the card's units, signed: positive means the formula computes MORE than
the card prints, which is the direction an `offset` carrying network
charges moves it.
⚠️ RAISES ON A SPEC WITH NO CARD RATHER THAN RETURNING 0.0 (TARIFF-16). An
ungraded injection leg has no printed estimate, and a discrepancy of zero
is exactly what "the coefficients reproduce the card" looks like - so a
silent zero here would report the strongest possible result for the one
state in which nothing was compared at all.
"""
if not spec.card_graded:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"{spec.option} has no card block, so there is no printed "
f"estimate to measure a discrepancy against. Ask "
f"`spec.card_graded` before calling this.")
return in_card_units(spec, spec.card_index_eur_per_mwh) \
- spec.card_expect_incl_vat
@@ -250,7 +421,7 @@ def card_discrepancy(spec: FormulaSpec) -> float:
# Reading the option
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def _finite(value, field: str) -> float:
def _finite(value, field: str, option: str = "price_formula") -> float:
"""A real, finite number - or a refusal naming the field.
⚠️ SAME CLASS AS `_validate_raw()`'s NaN RULE, one layer earlier. A NaN
@@ -260,51 +431,54 @@ def _finite(value, field: str) -> float:
"""
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (int, float)):
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.{field} is {value!r}, which is not a number. "
f"Write the coefficient as a bare JSON number - 0.102, not "
f"\"0.102\" and not an expression: this provider takes FIXED "
f"coefficients and evaluates nothing.")
f"{option}.{field} is {value!r}, which is not a number. Write a "
f"plain number, for example 0.102.")
if not math.isfinite(float(value)):
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.{field} is {value!r}, which is not finite. A NaN "
f"or an infinity here makes every price NaN, every price "
f"comparison False, and an arbitrage strategy that never fires "
f"while reporting that it is armed.")
f"{option}.{field} is {value!r}, which is not finite. Write a "
f"plain number, for example 0.102.")
return float(value)
def _card(raw) -> tuple:
"""The `card` block: the estimate the coefficients are graded against."""
def _card(raw, leg: _Leg = None) -> tuple:
"""The `card` block: the estimate the coefficients are graded against.
⚠️ REQUIRED ON THE CONSUMPTION LEG AND OPTIONAL ON THE INJECTION ONE, and
the asymmetry is a fact about the CARDS rather than a relaxed rule. See
`_LEGS[EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION].card_note`: Eneco's injection formula is
printed with no price beside it, so on that card there is nothing to grade
against. `("", None, None)` is the ungraded answer and
`FormulaSpec.card_graded` is how every caller asks.
"""
if leg is None:
leg = _LEGS["price_formula"]
if raw is None:
if not leg.card_required:
return ("", None, None)
raise FormulaInvalid(
"price_formula has no \"card\" block, and it is REQUIRED. It is "
"the only thing that can tell a correct pair of coefficients from "
"a plausible-looking wrong one: the add-on recomputes your "
"supplier's own printed example from the numbers you typed and "
"refuses to start if it does not come out. Copy the three figures "
"off the same tariff card as the coefficients: "
f"{leg.option} has no \"card\" block. {leg.card_note}. Copy "
"the three figures from your tariff card, for example "
"{\"month\": \"2026-09\", \"index_eur_per_mwh\": 133.9905, "
"\"expect_incl_vat\": 15.55}.")
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.card is {type(raw).__name__}, not an object with "
f"{leg.option}.card is {type(raw).__name__}, not an object with "
f"{', '.join(_CARD_KEYS)}.")
unknown = sorted(set(raw) - set(_CARD_KEYS))
if unknown:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.card has no field(s) {unknown}. The fields it "
f"takes are {list(_CARD_KEYS)}; a key that is merely ignored is a "
f"number the operator believes took effect.")
f"{leg.option}.card has unknown field(s) {unknown}. It takes "
f"only {list(_CARD_KEYS)}.")
month = str(raw.get("month", "") or "").strip()
if not _month_date(month):
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.card.month is {raw.get('month')!r}; write the "
f"month the card is dated as \"YYYY-MM\", e.g. \"2026-09\". It is "
f"not used in any price - it is what lets the add-on tell you "
f"your card has gone stale.")
f"{leg.option}.card.month is {raw.get('month')!r}. Write the "
f"month of the card as \"YYYY-MM\", for example \"2026-09\".")
return (month,
_finite(raw.get("index_eur_per_mwh"), "card.index_eur_per_mwh"),
_finite(raw.get("expect_incl_vat"), "card.expect_incl_vat"))
_finite(raw.get("index_eur_per_mwh"), "card.index_eur_per_mwh",
leg.option),
_finite(raw.get("expect_incl_vat"), "card.expect_incl_vat",
leg.option))
def _month_date(month: str):
@@ -316,9 +490,16 @@ def _month_date(month: str):
return None
def parse_price_formula(value):
def parse_price_formula(value, *, option: str = "price_formula"):
"""`price_formula` -> a `FormulaSpec`, or None when unset.
⚠️ `option` IS TARIFF-16'S WHOLE REUSE, and it is TARIFF-17's move. It
selects a row of `_LEGS` and nothing else: the enumerations, the
arithmetic, `to_resolution()`, the unknown-key rule and the card
comparison are shared, and every pre-existing call site - which passes no
`option` at all - lands on the consumption row and reads byte-identical
sentences. `parse_export_formula()` is a two-line wrapper, not a fork.
Accepts what the option can actually arrive as, exactly as
`parse_static_profile()` does:
@@ -335,6 +516,7 @@ def parse_price_formula(value):
fetch - go through this one function, so there is no route to a price that
has not been graded against the card.
"""
leg = _LEGS[option]
if value is None:
return None
if isinstance(value, str):
@@ -345,16 +527,11 @@ def parse_price_formula(value):
value = json.loads(text)
except ValueError as e:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula is not valid JSON ({e}). It is a JSON object "
f"on one line, e.g.\n"
f' {{"index":"epex_be","resolution":"hourly","factor":0.102,'
f'"offset":1.00,"units":"c_eur_per_kwh","vat_pct":6,'
f'"card":{{"month":"2026-09","index_eur_per_mwh":133.9905,'
f'"expect_incl_vat":15.55}}}}\n'
f"Leave it empty unless price_provider is 'custom_formula'.")
f"{messages.not_valid(option, e)}. Copy the example from the "
f"documentation. {leg.when}")
if not isinstance(value, dict):
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula is {type(value).__name__}, not a JSON object with "
f"{option} is {type(value).__name__}, not a JSON object with "
f"{', '.join(_TOP_KEYS)}.")
# ⚠️ AN UNKNOWN KEY IS REFUSED, NOT IGNORED, AND THIS IS THE HALF THAT
@@ -366,34 +543,21 @@ def parse_price_formula(value):
unknown = sorted(set(value) - set(_TOP_KEYS))
if unknown:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula has no field(s) {unknown}. The fields it takes "
f"are {list(_TOP_KEYS)}. ⚠️ There is deliberately NO field that "
f"takes an expression: this provider multiplies and adds two "
f"FIXED coefficients and evaluates nothing, because two "
f"coefficients can be graded against your card's printed price "
f"and an arbitrary expression cannot be graded against anything. "
f"If your contract needs a shape this cannot express, it needs a "
f"new named field here - say which shape.")
f"{option} has unknown field(s) {unknown}. It takes only "
f"{list(_TOP_KEYS)}.")
index = str(value.get("index", "") or "").strip()
if index not in INDEXES:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.index is {value.get('index')!r}. The reference "
f"series this add-on can fetch are "
f"{', '.join(f'{k!r} ({v})' for k, v in sorted(INDEXES.items()))}. "
f"If your card names a different index, the add-on cannot get it "
f"and guessing which series your supplier meant would price your "
f"battery against the wrong curve.")
f"{option}.index is {value.get('index')!r}. The add-on can only "
f"fetch "
f"{', '.join(f'{k!r} ({v})' for k, v in sorted(INDEXES.items()))}.")
resolution = str(value.get("resolution", "") or "").strip()
if resolution not in RESOLUTIONS:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.resolution is {value.get('resolution')!r}; it "
f"must be one of {list(RESOLUTIONS)}. Belgium has been on a "
f"15-minute MTU since 2025-10-01 and the feed publishes 96 points "
f"a day; a contract written against the HOURLY series is priced "
f"on the mean of each hour's quarters. Which one your contract "
f"uses is on your card and cannot be inferred from the feed.")
f"{option}.resolution is {value.get('resolution')!r}. Choose one "
f"of {list(RESOLUTIONS)}, as your tariff card says.")
# ⚠️ `units` IS REQUIRED AND HAS NO DEFAULT. A default here would be the
# factor-1000 class with a friendly face: the add-on would silently assume
@@ -402,16 +566,12 @@ def parse_price_formula(value):
units = str(value.get("units", "") or "").strip()
if units not in UNITS:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.units is {value.get('units')!r} and is REQUIRED - "
f"there is no default, on purpose. It must be one of "
f"{sorted(UNITS)}. Your card prints the formula in ONE of these "
f"and two suppliers use two different conventions for the same "
f"shape, so assuming one would be a factor of 100 or 1000 on "
f"every hour with nothing able to notice.")
f"{option}.units is {value.get('units')!r}. Choose one of "
f"{sorted(UNITS)}, as printed beside the formula on your card.")
factor = _finite(value.get("factor"), "factor")
offset = _finite(value.get("offset"), "offset")
vat_pct = _finite(value.get("vat_pct"), "vat_pct")
factor = _finite(value.get("factor"), "factor", option)
offset = _finite(value.get("offset"), "offset", option)
vat_pct = _finite(value.get("vat_pct"), "vat_pct", option)
# ⚠️ ZERO IS NOT "NO INDEXATION", IT IS A FIXED TARIFF WEARING A DYNAMIC
# ONE'S CLOTHES. Every hour comes out at the same price, so every spread is
@@ -421,15 +581,8 @@ def parse_price_formula(value):
# the operator at it rather than let them build it by accident.
if factor == 0.0:
raise FormulaInvalid(
"price_formula.factor is 0, so the index would not enter the "
"price at all: every hour of every day comes out at "
f"{offset:g} x (1 + {vat_pct:g}/100), every spread is exactly 0, "
"and arbitrage can never clear any threshold - a strategy that "
"silently never fires rather than one that is off. If your tariff "
"really is one flat price, that is `static_profile` with a single "
"period covering 00:00-24:00 on all days and price_provider "
"'off'; the add-on then says so at startup instead of leaving you "
"to find out from a year of unchanged bills.")
f"{option}.factor is 0, so every hour gets the same {leg.what} "
f"price{leg.zero_factor}. For one flat price, {leg.flat}.")
# ⚠️ A NEGATIVE FACTOR INVERTS THE MARKET, and the direction is the danger:
# the dearest hour becomes the cheapest one, so the battery is told to
@@ -437,74 +590,102 @@ def parse_price_formula(value):
# mispriced site, it is a site actively trading against itself.
if factor < 0.0:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.factor is {factor:g}, which is NEGATIVE. That "
f"inverts the market: the dearest hour of the day comes out as "
f"the cheapest one, so the battery would charge at the evening "
f"peak and discharge at 03:00 - trading against itself on every "
f"cycle. No consumption tariff is indexed negatively; if your "
f"card shows a minus sign it is on the OFFSET (`A`), which is "
f"allowed here and common on injection.")
f"{option}.factor is {factor:g}, which turns the market upside "
f"down. {leg.neg_factor}.")
# ⚠️ 0 IS LEGITIMATE AND MUST STAY SO: injection is VAT-exempt in Belgium,
# and some cards are already quoted VAT-inclusive. The bound exists for the
# 106 / 1.06 / 6 confusion, not to make VAT compulsory.
if not 0.0 <= vat_pct <= 30.0:
raise FormulaInvalid(
f"price_formula.vat_pct is {vat_pct:g} and must be between 0 and "
f"30. It is a PERCENTAGE, so Belgian residential electricity is "
f"6, not 0.06 and not 106. Zero is legitimate and is not refused: "
f"injection is VAT-exempt, and a card that already quotes "
f"VAT-inclusive coefficients needs no second multiplication.")
f"{option}.vat_pct is {vat_pct:g}. Write a percentage between 0 "
f"and 30, for example 6.")
month, card_index, card_expect = _card(value.get("card"))
month, card_index, card_expect = _card(value.get("card"), leg)
spec = FormulaSpec(index=index, resolution=resolution, factor=factor,
offset=offset, units=units, vat_pct=vat_pct,
card_month=month, card_index_eur_per_mwh=card_index,
card_expect_incl_vat=card_expect)
card_expect_incl_vat=card_expect, option=option)
delta = card_discrepancy(spec)
if abs(delta) > CARD_TOLERANCE:
raise FormulaInvalid(card_refusal(spec, delta))
# ⚠️ THE CARD SELF-CHECK STILL RUNS WHEREVER THERE IS A CARD TO RUN IT
# AGAINST, on either leg, with the same tolerance. What TARIFF-16 adds is
# the honest answer for the leg where the card prints no estimate: NOT a
# weakened comparison and NOT an estimate computed here, but two bounds on
# the COEFFICIENTS that need no printed price - see
# `implausible_injection()` - and a startup line saying the leg is
# ungraded.
if spec.card_graded:
delta = card_discrepancy(spec)
if abs(delta) > CARD_TOLERANCE:
raise FormulaInvalid(card_refusal(spec, delta))
if option == EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION:
band = implausible_injection(spec)
if band:
raise FormulaInvalid(band)
return spec
def parse_export_formula(value):
"""`price_export_formula` -> the INJECTION leg's `FormulaSpec`, or None.
TARIFF-16. THE DEFECT THIS EXISTS TO CLOSE: `price.py` modelled injection
as ONE scalar, and the market publishes a line with four properties a
scalar cannot hold. Verbatim off the cards:
Eneco Zon & Wind Dynamisch 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 c EUR/kWh
"Het injectietarief is dynamisch en kan per uur wijzigen"
- identical on the January and the September 2026 cards
ENGIE Dynamic (B x eSpot_15) - A c EUR/kWh
Aspiravi (non-dynamic) 0,07 x Belpex - 2
1. ITS OWN FACTOR. Eneco uses 0,102 on consumption and 0,100 on
injection; Aspiravi 0,07 against ~0,10 on its consumption leg. It is
NOT the consumption `B` with a sign flip.
2. A NEGATIVE OFFSET - `- 1,188`, `- 2`. Note that
`price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)` cannot express a negative markup
at all, so the offset has no home on the consumption side either.
3. VAT-EXEMPT. "Injectietarieven zijn vrijgesteld van btw", while
consumption is at 6% - a SIX PERCENT ASYMMETRY between the buy leg
and the sell leg, which a single scalar cannot even state.
4. IT GOES NEGATIVE, WITH NO FLOOR. Eneco's injection price is negative
for any BELPEX-H below 11,88 EUR/MWh, and a PV household exports
precisely in the hours most likely to be negative. You can be charged
to export.
⚠️ AND WHAT THIS DOES **NOT** AFFECT TODAY, SAID HERE SO NOBODY READS THE
ABOVE AS A TRADING BUG. `arbitrage.py` does not read
`export_price_eur_kwh` at all - its own comment says so, and gives §9.3's
near-zero Belgian injection price as the reason the economically sound
trade on this market is charge-cheap-to-displace-expensive-IMPORT. Both
hours it compares are all-in CONSUMPTION prices. So no trade the add-on
takes today is decided by this number, and this card is not a correction
of a wrong trade. What it changes is what an operator is told, and what
any future export-aware strategy would rest on: OPT-06 and any export
logic would otherwise inherit a scalar that cannot represent the market,
and the 6% VAT asymmetry would be invisible in the arithmetic.
⚠️ THE SCALAR IS NOT REPLACED. `export_price_eur_kwh()` is untouched and
still answers for every site with a flat injection price, which is every
site that exists today; this option ships "". That is `price.py`'s own
prediction coming true rather than a new design - "when it does land, an
injection curve gets a `PriceProvider` of its own and this scalar becomes
its FIXED-product default; the seam is already the right shape for that."
"""
return parse_price_formula(value, option=EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION)
def card_refusal(spec: FormulaSpec, delta: float) -> str:
"""The sentence an operator reads when their formula misses its own card.
⚠️ IT NAMES THE DISCREPANCY AND THE SIX WAYS IT HAPPENS. "Invalid
configuration" would be true and useless: every one of these errors looks
exactly like a working tariff from the status page, which is why the check
exists at all.
It names both numbers and what to check. The usual causes are in DOCS.md,
because each of these errors looks like a working tariff on the status page.
"""
got = in_card_units(spec, spec.card_index_eur_per_mwh)
ratio = (got / spec.card_expect_incl_vat
if spec.card_expect_incl_vat else float("inf"))
leg = _LEGS[spec.option]
return (
f"price_formula does not reproduce its own card, so the add-on will "
f"NOT start on it. Your contract's arithmetic is "
f"price = (factor x index_eur_per_mwh + offset) x (1 + vat_pct/100); "
f"on the card's own index that is "
f"({spec.factor:g} x {spec.card_index_eur_per_mwh:g} + "
f"{spec.offset:g}) x (1 + {spec.vat_pct:g}/100) = {got:.4f} "
f"{spec.units}, but card.expect_incl_vat says "
f"{spec.card_expect_incl_vat:g} - OUT BY {delta:+.4f} {spec.units} "
f"(ratio {ratio:.4g}; the tolerance is {CARD_TOLERANCE}, which is the "
f"last digit a card prints). One of the two sides is wrong and the "
f"add-on cannot tell which, so it refuses rather than price a battery "
f"on it. The usual causes, in the order they happen: the coefficients "
f"and the expected price are in DIFFERENT units (ratio 10, 100 or "
f"1000 - `units` must be the one the formula line is printed in); VAT "
f"left out or applied twice (ratio 1.06 or 1/1.06); a transposed "
f"digit; the two sides copied off DIFFERENT cards or different "
f"months; or - the expensive one - network charges, levies or excise "
f"folded into `offset`. ⚠️ THEY DO NOT BELONG THERE: a Belgian card's "
f"Tariefformule line is the ENERGY component alone (Eneco tabulates "
f"network tariffs and levies separately; ENGIE says in so many words "
f"that the formula excludes network, distribution, transport, levies "
f"and excise), the add-on adds price_taxes_eur_kwh on top of it, and "
f"folding ~12 c EUR/kWh of network charge into `offset` bills you for "
f"it twice. That is the error this check exists to catch, and it is "
f"why it cannot be switched off.")
f"{spec.option} gives {got:.4f} "
f"{messages.UNIT_WORDS.get(spec.units, spec.units)}, the card says "
f"{spec.card_expect_incl_vat:g}. Check {leg.card_causes}.")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@@ -539,26 +720,89 @@ def implausible_all_in(spec: FormulaSpec, taxes_eur_kwh: float):
fetched series. What it catches is a formula whose whole LEVEL is wrong,
which is the factor-of-1000 class arriving from the end
`MAX_PLAUSIBLE_EUR_KWH` does not bound.
⚠️ AND IT IS THE CONSUMPTION LEG'S BAND ONLY - TARIFF-16 DELIBERATELY DID
NOT POINT IT AT THE INJECTION LEG. Two reasons, and the second is an
acceptance criterion rather than a preference:
* it adds `taxes_eur_kwh`, and `price_taxes_eur_kwh` is a CONSUMPTION
component. Nothing is added to what a site is PAID for export, so the
`all_in` half would be adding a number the injection leg never carries;
* its floor is `energy >= 0.02 EUR/kWh`, and a REAL Eneco injection price
is negative for any BELPEX-H below 11,88 EUR/MWh - the hours a PV
household actually exports in. Applied to injection this floor would
refuse the market, and refuse it hardest in the hours where knowing the
number matters most. `implausible_injection()` is the injection band
and it is deliberately NOT this function with a lower floor.
"""
energy = price_eur_kwh(spec, spec.card_index_eur_per_mwh)
all_in = energy + float(taxes_eur_kwh)
if energy >= PLAUSIBLE_LO_EUR_KWH and all_in <= PLAUSIBLE_HI_EUR_KWH:
return None
return (
f"price_formula's own card works out at {energy:.5f} EUR/kWh of "
f"energy ({spec.card_expect_incl_vat:g} {spec.units} as the card "
f"prints it) and {all_in:.5f} EUR/kWh all-in once "
f"price_taxes_eur_kwh is added, which is outside the plausible band "
f"{PLAUSIBLE_LO_EUR_KWH}-{PLAUSIBLE_HI_EUR_KWH} EUR/kWh for a Belgian "
f"retail tariff. The card self-check passed, so the coefficients and "
f"the printed price AGREE - they simply agree on a number no Belgian "
f"bill carries, which is what a whole card read in the wrong units "
f"looks like (a factor of 10, 100 or 1000 applied to BOTH sides at "
f"once cancels out of that check and cannot cancel out of this one). "
f"Check `units` against the unit printed beside your formula. "
f"⚠️ This bounds the CARD'S OWN POINT, not every hour: a live hour may "
f"legitimately fall outside the band, and a negative day-ahead hour - "
f"the best charging opportunity of the year - is never refused.")
f"{spec.option} gives {energy:.5f} EUR/kWh for energy and "
f"{all_in:.5f} EUR/kWh with “Distribution, levies and VAT” "
f"(price_taxes_eur_kwh), outside the plausible band of "
f"{PLAUSIBLE_LO_EUR_KWH}-{PLAUSIBLE_HI_EUR_KWH} EUR/kWh. Check \"units\" against the unit beside your formula.")
def implausible_injection(spec: FormulaSpec):
"""The INJECTION leg's plausibility band. Returns a refusal or None.
⚠️ A NEGATIVE INJECTION PRICE IS ACCEPTED, NOT REFUSED, AND NEITHER RUNG
BELOW LOOKS AT THE SIGN OR THE LEVEL OF A PRICE. Eneco's published line
`0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188` is negative for any BELPEX-H under 11,88 EUR/MWh;
those are the midday hours a PV household exports in, so a band with a
floor above zero - which is what `implausible_all_in()` has, for the
consumption leg's own good reasons - would refuse the real market and
would hide it in exactly the hours it costs money. You CAN be charged to
export. The add-on says so rather than declining to represent it.
THE PROBLEM THAT LEAVES, STATED BEFORE THE SOLUTION. The consumption
floor was not decoration: it is what catches a whole card read a hundred
times too small, the one unit error the card self-check cannot see because
it cancels out of a comparison between the two sides. A band that spans
zero cannot catch it - 0.00132 EUR/kWh is inside any interval that
contains -0.03. So the bound moves OFF the price and ONTO the
coefficients, where it is index-free and sign-free:
* PASS-THROUGH. `factor x UNITS[units] / 0.001` is the dimensionless
share of the wholesale price the contract passes through, because one
EUR/MWh IS 0.001 EUR/kWh. Eneco's injection leg is 1.00 and Aspiravi's
is 0.70. A factor typed 100x too small reads 0.01 and 100x too large
reads 100, whatever the index and whatever the sign of the result.
* OFFSET MAGNITUDE. Eneco's is 1,188 c EUR/kWh = 0.01188 EUR/kWh and
Aspiravi's is 2 c = 0.02. A hundredfold error is 1.188 EUR/kWh, which
is not an injection tariff in any direction. The bound is on the
ABSOLUTE value, so a negative offset of a believable size passes and
that is the normal case on this leg.
⚠️ TWO RUNGS THAT CAN BOTH ANSWER ONE STIMULUS, SO THEY ARE GRADED ON
THEIR REASONS AND MUTATED TOGETHER (MUTATION.md, TEST-16). A whole card
read 100x too large trips both. The fixtures in test_price.py 17d are
built so that each rung is the ONLY one that fires on its own stimulus.
⚠️ AND WHAT THIS CANNOT SEE, WITH THE CLAIM (habit 13). It bounds the
SHAPE of the coefficients, never their truth: a contract really written
against a different index, or last year's coefficients, passes both rungs
and reproduces any card typed beside them. Where a card DOES print an
estimate the self-check grades the pair against it; where it does not -
which is Eneco's injection line - these two bounds are the whole of what
is mechanised, and validate.py says so at startup.
"""
if not PASSTHROUGH_LO <= spec.passthrough <= PASSTHROUGH_HI:
return (
f"{spec.option}.factor passes through {spec.passthrough:.4g}x the "
f"market price, outside {PASSTHROUGH_LO}-{PASSTHROUGH_HI}x. Check "
f"\"units\" ({spec.units!r}) against the unit beside your "
f"formula.")
if abs(spec.offset_eur_kwh) > INJECTION_OFFSET_MAX_EUR_KWH:
return (
f"{spec.option}.offset is {spec.offset:g} {spec.units}, which is "
f"{spec.offset_eur_kwh:+.5f} EUR/kWh and larger than "
f"{INJECTION_OFFSET_MAX_EUR_KWH} EUR/kWh either way. Check its "
f"unit.")
return None
def stale_card(spec: FormulaSpec, today=None):
@@ -571,15 +815,9 @@ def stale_card(spec: FormulaSpec, today=None):
if dated is None or (now - dated).days <= CARD_STALE_DAYS:
return None
return (
f"price_formula's card is dated {spec.card_month}, which is "
f"{(now - dated).days} days ago. Suppliers reprice: if your contract "
f"has been renewed or rolled over since then, the coefficients here "
f"are last year's and every price this add-on computes is wrong by "
f"however far they moved - and the card self-check cannot see it, "
f"because it grades your coefficients against the card you typed, not "
f"the card against your current contract. Not refused: ENGIE freezes "
f"coefficients for the contract's duration, so an old card is often "
f"exactly right. Worth re-reading your klantenzone once.")
f"{spec.option}'s card is dated {spec.card_month}, "
f"{(now - dated).days} days ago. The add-on still starts, but if your "
f"contract changed since, copy the new figures from your supplier.")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+262
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
"""OPT-11 P4: the day plan. Will the sun fill each battery before the
expensive hours? If not, how much should it take from the grid?
Pure: the forecast (`solarfc`), the house profile, the price runs and the
batteries in; a level per battery (`Plan.targets`) out. `modetrade.charge_to()`
turns the level into permission to charge from the grid; main.py rebuilds the
plan with the price runs (at most every 15 minutes) and keeps a level unless
it moves by `HYST_KWH` or `HYST_FRAC` (`hold()`).
The sums (OPT-11-design section 1, "Excess solar", with the owner's answers):
* `sun`: trust x the solar the house will not use, between now and the
expensive run the cheap run is for, x the charge efficiency:
`trust x sum_h max(0, forecast_h - house_h) x EFF`.
* Solar first batteries take it first, up to the ceiling. What is left is
shared by the Leftover solar batteries by their room.
* Cheap hours only ignores the plan and fills to the ceiling, as in P3 and
the design (section 1). Skipping the sun's share cost money in the replay
(PR #156 review: 29.72 against 29.41 EUR on real 2026 prices).
* A Leftover solar battery charges only up to what the house will draw from
it in the expensive runs before the next cheap run, less its share:
`min(ceiling, floor + house use / EFF) - share`. So it buys only the
shortfall, not up to the ceiling.
* Solar first never charges from the grid (owner, 2026-09-29).
The house profile is the add-on's own measurement, grid + battery power, per
local hour, over the last `PROFILE_DAYS` days; the estimate for an hour is the
median of that hour. It is net of the solar the house used itself, so for
the solar sum it is never taken below the night-time median (`base()`).
The site's own solar readings are not used: TEL-11 keeps them out of every
control decision.
"""
import statistics
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from .packmode import LEFTOVER_SOLAR, SOLAR_FIRST
from .tariff import BILLING_TZ
EFF = 0.95 # charge (and discharge) efficiency
HYST_KWH = 1.0 # a kept level moves only by this much...
HYST_FRAC = 0.10 # ...or this share of the battery's shortfall
PROFILE_DAYS = 7
MIN_HOURS = 20 # hours of a day recorded before it counts
NIGHT_HOURS = (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 22, 23)
DEFAULT_TRUST_PCT = 70
# Site verdicts (the page's forecast line).
SUNNY, PARTLY, DARK = "sunny", "partly", "dark"
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# The house profile
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def _local(t: datetime):
return t.astimezone(BILLING_TZ)
class HouseProfile:
"""Hourly means of the house's net use (grid + battery power), kept per
local day and hour: `{"YYYY-MM-DD": {hour: [mean_w, samples]}}`. The
store holds `dump()`; `load()` takes it back and drops what is bad."""
def __init__(self, data=None):
self.days = {}
self._cur = None # (day, hour, sum, n)
if isinstance(data, dict):
self.load(data)
def load(self, data):
for day, hours in data.items():
try:
datetime.strptime(str(day), "%Y-%m-%d")
except ValueError:
continue
if not isinstance(hours, dict):
continue
row = {}
for h, v in hours.items():
try:
hi, w = int(h), float(v)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
continue
if 0 <= hi < 24 and abs(w) < 1e6:
row[hi] = w
if row:
self.days[str(day)] = row
def dump(self) -> dict:
return {d: {str(h): round(w, 1) for h, w in sorted(r.items())}
for d, r in sorted(self.days.items())}
def add(self, now: datetime, house_w) -> bool:
"""One reading. Returns True when an hour closed (then store it)."""
lt = _local(now)
key = (lt.strftime("%Y-%m-%d"), lt.hour)
closed = False
if self._cur is not None and self._cur[:2] != key:
day, hour, s, n = self._cur
if n >= 60: # about 5 minutes of readings
self.days.setdefault(day, {})[hour] = s / n
closed = True
self._cur = None
self._prune(lt)
if house_w is None:
return closed
if self._cur is None:
self._cur = (key[0], key[1], 0.0, 0)
d, h, s, n = self._cur
self._cur = (d, h, s + float(house_w), n + 1)
return closed
def _prune(self, lt):
"""Keep the last `PROFILE_DAYS` days; a day after today (the clock
was wrong once) would never age out, so it goes too."""
keep = (lt.date() - timedelta(days=PROFILE_DAYS)).isoformat()
today = lt.date().isoformat()
for d in [d for d in self.days if d < keep or d > today]:
del self.days[d]
def ready(self) -> bool:
"""At least one day with `MIN_HOURS` hours recorded."""
return any(len(r) >= MIN_HOURS for r in self.days.values())
def hour_w(self, hour: int):
vals = [r[hour] for r in self.days.values() if hour in r]
return statistics.median(vals) if vals else None
def base(self):
vals = [w for h in NIGHT_HOURS if (w := self.hour_w(h)) is not None]
return statistics.median(vals) if vals else None
def estimator(self):
"""`f(hour) -> W`, or None when not ready. Fixed at call time."""
if not self.ready():
return None
base = self.base() or 0.0
table = {}
for h in range(24):
w = self.hour_w(h)
table[h] = base if w is None else w
return lambda h: table[h], max(0.0, base)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# The plan
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Plan:
verdict: str # SUNNY / PARTLY / DARK
sun_kwh: float # solar the batteries can count on
fc_kwh: float # the forecast over the same span
until: datetime # the expensive run the plan is for
targets: dict # name -> level % (Leftover solar only)
need_kwh: dict # name -> kWh from the grid (0: none)
share_kwh: dict # name -> kWh of solar counted for it
def _hour_slices(t0, t1):
"""Local-hour slices of [t0, t1): (start, end, local hour)."""
out, t = [], t0
while t < t1:
lt = _local(t)
nxt = (lt.replace(minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0)
+ timedelta(hours=1)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
e = min(nxt, t1)
out.append((t, e, lt.hour))
t = e
return out
def _room(p, to_pct):
if p.capacity_kwh is None or p.soc is None:
return 0.0
return max(0.0, float(to_pct) - float(p.soc)) / 100.0 * float(
p.capacity_kwh)
def plan(forecast, house, runs, now, packs, *, trust_pct, floor_pct,
ceiling_pct):
"""The day plan, or None when there is none to make: no forecast, no
house profile yet, no price plan, or no expensive run after the cheap
run. `house` is `HouseProfile.estimator()`'s answer. `packs` are
`modetrade.Pack`s."""
if forecast is None or house is None or runs is None or not runs.on \
or runs.cheap is None:
return None
house_w, base_w = house
until = next((g for g in runs.give if g.start >= runs.cheap.end), None)
if until is None:
return None
trust = max(0.0, min(1.0, float(trust_pct) / 100.0))
sun = fc_sum = 0.0
for s, e, h in _hour_slices(now, until.start):
pv = forecast.between(s, e)
if pv is None:
return None # the span reaches a day with no forecast
hrs = (e - s).total_seconds() / 3600.0
use = max(house_w(h), base_w) * hrs / 1000.0
sun += max(0.0, pv - use)
fc_sum += pv
sun *= trust * EFF
usable = [p for p in packs if p.use and p.live and p.idle
and p.soc is not None and p.capacity_kwh]
sf = [p for p in usable if p.mode == SOLAR_FIRST]
price = [p for p in usable if p.mode == LEFTOVER_SOLAR]
sf_room = sum(_room(p, ceiling_pct) for p in sf)
excess = max(0.0, sun - sf_room)
rooms = {p.name: _room(p, ceiling_pct) for p in price}
total_room = sum(rooms.values())
# What the house draws in the expensive runs from the one this plan is
# for until the next cheap run (or a day), from the profile.
horizon = until.start + timedelta(hours=24)
use_kwh = 0.0
for g in runs.give:
if g.start < until.start or g.start >= horizon:
continue
for s, e, h in _hour_slices(g.start, g.end):
use_kwh += max(0.0, house_w(h)) * (
e - s).total_seconds() / 3600.0 / 1000.0
caps = {p.name: float(p.capacity_kwh) for p in price}
cap_sum = sum(caps.values()) or 1.0
targets, need, share = {}, {}, {}
for p in price:
sh = excess * rooms[p.name] / total_room if total_room > 0 else 0.0
sh_pct = sh / caps[p.name] * 100.0
want = use_kwh * caps[p.name] / cap_sum / EFF
top = min(float(ceiling_pct),
float(floor_pct) + want / caps[p.name] * 100.0)
level = max(0.0, top - sh_pct)
targets[p.name] = round(level, 2)
need[p.name] = round(_room(p, level), 3)
share[p.name] = round(sh, 3)
if sun < sf_room:
verdict = DARK
elif any(v > 0.05 for v in need.values()):
verdict = PARTLY
else:
verdict = SUNNY
return Plan(verdict, round(sun, 3), round(fc_sum, 3), until.start,
targets, need, share)
def hold(old: dict | None, new: dict, capacity: dict) -> dict:
"""Hysteresis: a battery keeps its old level unless the new one differs
by at least `HYST_KWH`, or by `HYST_FRAC` of the larger level's energy
(whichever is less). A battery new to the plan takes its level at once;
one that left the plan is dropped at once."""
out = {}
for name, level in new.items():
was = (old or {}).get(name)
cap = float(capacity.get(name) or 0.0)
if was is None or cap <= 0:
out[name] = level
continue
moved = abs(level - was) / 100.0 * cap
step = min(HYST_KWH, HYST_FRAC * max(was, level) / 100.0 * cap)
out[name] = level if moved >= step else was
return out
+8 -6
View File
@@ -424,15 +424,17 @@ class FreezeWatchdog:
# page was telling, printed into the log and the HA notification where
# it would outlive the page.
ceiling = rail_ceiling_w(max_w, dev_min=dev_min, dev_max=dev_max)
# UX-10: plain sentences, every figure kept (test_messages.py part 6).
capped = ("" if ceiling >= abs(float(max_w))
else f", capped from max_w {float(max_w):.0f} W by the "
f"setpoint device's own rating")
f"inverter's own rating")
self.reason = (
f"METER_FROZEN: the meter has answered {float(unchanged_s):.0f} s "
f"without its measurement changing while the command stands at "
f"{float(commanded_w):+.0f} W, at the {ceiling:.0f} W rail{capped} "
f"(limits: unchanged over {self.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s, command over "
f"{rail_w(max_w, dev_min=dev_min, dev_max=dev_max):.0f} W)")
f"METER_FROZEN: the meter has not changed for "
f"{float(unchanged_s):.0f} s while the command is "
f"{float(commanded_w):+.0f} W, at the {ceiling:.0f} W limit"
f"{capped}. Limits: unchanged over {self.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s, "
f"command over "
f"{rail_w(max_w, dev_min=dev_min, dev_max=dev_max):.0f} W")
if self.active:
return False
self.active = True
+380 -26
View File
@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ when it has not moved THROUGH A CHANGE IT WAS OBLIGED TO FOLLOW:
AND |standing command now - standing command when the reading
last changed| >= MOVE_W
SAFETY-94: "unchanged for" counts only the reads at which both command terms
held, so a register that rested is not judged before it could answer.
DECISIONS/SAFETY-94-lagging-battery.md.
0x0518 is the inverter reporting ITSELF and it tracks its own command: r = 0.998
with battery power against r = 0.09 with the real meter (goodwe/NOTES.md §3.3),
command and actual agreeing within 4 W once settled (§5.10, 2026-08-22), and the
@@ -175,6 +179,126 @@ only one of them is WIRED - see `BOUNDS` below and the note on SoC.
integrator, and K. It does NOT owe a second freshness mechanism - `Freshness`
below takes its obligation term from the caller precisely so that an energy
integral can be handed in where command travel is handed in here.
THE EXIT, AND WHY THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS MODULE DID NOT HAVE ONE (SAFETY-57)
==============================================================================
⚠️ THE VERDICT ABOVE IS ABOUT AN OBLIGATION, AND ITS OWN CONSEQUENCE REMOVES
THE OBLIGATION. Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False,
which commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1). At 0 W nothing is asking the register to be
anywhere - `|standing| >= MOVE_W` is false, so the conjunction cannot arm - and
the class docstring's clearing rule, "an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number",
asks the register for evidence that only a command could have produced. A pack
sitting at its BMS floor answers the same integer watt for hours. **The state
had no exit reachable from inside it**, and the operator-facing line said the
opposite: *"It clears itself the moment the register reports a different
value."*
MEASURED ON THE LIVE SITE, 2026-09-21, and committed as
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/` - a passive RS-485 capture, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`:
10:51:24.7 0x0518 reaches -3 W. The pack is at 11 % and the loop has just
reversed from -447 W of charge into discharge; the BMS refuses
and the inverter idles. The register is HEALTHY and TRUTHFUL.
10:51:29.7 the standing command reaches +1060 W. 800 W of travel, and the
register is obliged to follow it.
10:52:00 the conjunction arms. `Inverter.batt` becomes None.
10:52:21.7 the site commands 0 W - on the wire, in the capture.
... 0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
change value for 790.0 s. Nothing in this add-on can end it.
11:04 a human restarts the add-on.
11:05:31.7 the restarted loop commands -400 W of charge, which the pack
ACCEPTS at 11 %, and the register moves 3 s later.
⚠️ AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. This BMS emits a keep-alive pulse of a few
hundred watts, which twitches 0x0518 and satisfies the clearing rule by
accident. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
(`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/`) through the shipped conjunction at
1 Hz gives **93 trips**, and the time from each trip to the register's next
change - which was the ONLY exit - has a median of 143 s, 17 episodes at or
over the live one's 710 s, and a worst case of 21440 s. That distribution is a
property of this battery's firmware. It is not a property of this code, and the
add-on must not depend on it.
SAFETY-94: many were the gate judging a rested register on its first read
(SAFETY-58). Counted from the ask, the same days give 59 trips.
THE RULE, and it is SAFETY-13's shape one module over - "which latches get an
exit, not how long the block lasts":
RELEASE <=> the verdict is standing
AND |standing command| < MOVE_W has held continuously for
>= RELEASE_S
On a release the latch clears and a NEW grading window opens at that instant:
the register is re-graded, from scratch, against the commands issued AFTER it.
Nothing about the register's own history is rewritten - `changed_mono`,
`held` and `unchanged_s()` go on reporting that the register has not moved for
850 s, because it has not.
⚠️ `RELEASE_S` IS `BATT_OBLIGED_S`, 17.0 s, AND IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND
RATHER THAN A PREFERENCE - the mirror of `MOVE_W` taking the ceiling of its
own. The question the bound answers is *has the register had its chance to
answer the command that is now standing?*, and that is exactly the 17.0 s
already derived above: 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s publish, one 1 s read. Below it
the release happens before the cheaper exit - the register moving by itself -
could have occurred. Which half is safe is the opposite of SAFETY-13's, and for
the reason that card states in its §4.2 table: being wrong LONG here is the
failure being fixed (a site parked while it exports), and being wrong SHORT
costs one re-grading window, which is bounded below.
WHAT A RELEASE COSTS, MEASURED AND NOT ABSORBED - AND IT IS NOT SMALL. For the
duration of the new window the consumers get the held number again, which is
the exposure this module was written to close. Driven at the live install's
shape against a register frozen for good (`test_freshness.py` part 10c), over
1200 s:
shipped parked 1166 s, the held number reaches a consumer 35 s 2.9 %
SAFETY-57 parked 571 s, the held number reaches a consumer 630 s 52.5 %
⚠️ **52 % IS THE PRICE OF THE EXIT AND IT IS PAID EVERY CYCLE**, not an
occasional slip. The period is the whole of `stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S`
(17 s) parked, then one `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` (35 s) window of re-grading. It is
bounded by construction, and that bound is the one thing that makes it payable:
the new window is AT MOST BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35 s, and 35 < 75 < 85 - the
circulation hold and the per-unit sign hold. NEITHER CONSUMER CAN REACH A
VERDICT INSIDE ONE WINDOW, and a re-trip returns them a None, which CLEARS
both windows rather than accumulating into them.
That inequality is the same one part 6 already grades, and it is why the window
is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` rather than a number chosen to make the table above look
better. Neither detector can be made to say anything by a held number under
this scheme - which is exactly the state the shipped code leaves them in as
well, since a permanent None clears both windows for ever. **So nothing that
SAFETY-37 detects is given back.** What the held number does reach for those
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()`, which
responds to a large unexplained divergence by FREEZING the output - the
conservative direction, and SAFETY-13's business. And the command itself is
derived from the P1 meter, never from `batt`, so a site regulating through a
re-grading window is regulating on the signal it always regulates on.
**A register frozen under a command that never travels 250 W is still not
detected at all** (survivor 2, unchanged), and a dead publisher whose value
alternates is still invisible (survivor 3).
⚠️ AND THE NARROWING THIS DOES NOT TAKE, named so the next card can. The live
episode's register refused a DISCHARGE into an 11 % pack and then followed a
CHARGE immediately; a refusal in one direction is not evidence about the other,
and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade on the first command that
crosses it instead of on a timer. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately
does not take (see the `soc` row), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's
number. It would shrink the 52 % above; it is not needed to give the state an
exit, and mixing it in here would make the exit depend on a second measurement
being right.
⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO, because the temptation is to call it a fix for the
whole episode: it does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register. The
site above was parked for 790 s by a register that was working perfectly, and
after this change it is parked for `stale_input_s + RELEASE_S` instead - about
32 s on the shipped default - and then regrades. Telling the two apart needs
the pack's own floor, which is SAFETY-32's number and not this module's input;
the wording the operator reads about it is SAFETY-56's.
"""
import time
@@ -211,6 +335,19 @@ BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35.0
# and goes red if the two drift.
MOVE_W = 250.0
# SAFETY-57. How long the obligation must have been ABSENT before a standing
# verdict is withdrawn and the register re-graded. See the module docstring's
# last section for the live episode this exists for and for which half of the
# band is the safe one.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS `BATT_OBLIGED_S` AND NOT A NEW NUMBER, and that identity is the
# derivation rather than a convenience. The question is "has the register had
# its chance to answer the command standing NOW?", which is the same physical
# quantity the floor of `BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band is: 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s
# ESPHome publish, one 1 s add-on read. Releasing sooner would throw away the
# cheaper exit - the register moving by itself - before it could have happened.
RELEASE_S = BATT_OBLIGED_S # 17.0
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Bound:
@@ -219,6 +356,7 @@ class Bound:
signal: str
unchanged_s: float
move_w: float
release_s: float
wired: bool
derivation: str
@@ -233,13 +371,21 @@ BOUNDS = {
signal="batt (0x0518, AC power, S16, 1 W, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=BATT_UNCHANGED_S,
move_w=MOVE_W,
release_s=RELEASE_S,
wired=True,
derivation="settle 6.0 + publish 10.0 + read 1.0 = 17.0 s floor; "
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]"),
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]. "
"SAFETY-57: the verdict is withdrawn after 17.0 s of the "
"standing command below 250 W, because at 0 W the register "
"is obliged to nothing and the verdict cannot be tested "
"again from inside the state it creates. SAFETY-94: the "
"35 s counts only reads at which the command asks the "
"register to move"),
"soc": Bound(
signal="soc (0x050E, pack SoC, U16, 1 %, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=float("inf"),
move_w=float("inf"),
release_s=float("inf"),
wired=False,
derivation="TEL-08. Command travel is the WRONG obligation term for "
"SoC - a rested pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W "
@@ -263,10 +409,31 @@ class Freshness:
Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False, which
commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1), which drops the standing command below
`MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction, which would return the held number
to the consumers - and round again every read. So the ONLY thing that clears
the latch is an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number, which is exactly the
evidence the verdict was about. A register that is working clears it on its
next 10 s publish; a register that is not, does not.
to the consumers - and round again every read. So an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number clears the latch, which is exactly the evidence the verdict
was about. A register that is working clears it on its next 10 s publish; a
register that is not, does not.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT THE ONLY THING THAT CLEARS IT ANY MORE (SAFETY-57), BECAUSE
THAT MADE THE STATE INESCAPABLE FROM INSIDE. The command the verdict itself
produces is 0 W, and at 0 W the register is obliged to be nowhere - so
"report a different value" is evidence a parked site cannot ask for. The
live site sat at 0 W for 790 s on 2026-09-21 with a register that was
working correctly, and was freed by a human. `_release()` below withdraws a
verdict whose obligation has been gone for `bound.release_s`, and opens a
new grading window at that instant. The 1 Hz oscillation the latch exists to
prevent is still prevented: the new window is `bound.unchanged_s` wide, so
no re-trip can land sooner than 35 s after a release, rather than on the
next read. SAFETY-94: the 35 s counts only while the command asks the
register to move, so a site that rests after a release is not re-tripped
on its first ask.
⚠️ TWO CLOCKS, AND THE DISTINCTION IS THE WHOLE OF SAFETY-57'S HONESTY.
`changed_mono` / `held` are facts about the REGISTER: when it last carried a
different number. `graded_from` / `standing_at_grade` are the window the
VERDICT is computed over, which a release re-opens. They are the same thing
until the first release and diverge afterwards, and `unchanged_s()` - the
number an operator reads - is always the register's.
"""
def __init__(self, bound: Bound):
@@ -281,10 +448,25 @@ class Freshness:
# ability to fetch it.
self.held = None
self.changed_mono = None
# The standing command at that same instant. The conjunction compares
# against THIS, not against the previous cycle's command: what matters
# is whether the register has followed anything since it last moved.
self.standing_at_change = None
# SAFETY-57. The window the VERDICT is graded over, as opposed to the
# register's own history above, and the standing command at the instant
# it opened. The conjunction compares against THIS, not against the
# previous cycle's command: what matters is whether the register has
# followed anything since the current question was put to it. A register
# that moves opens a window, so until the first release these two are
# the change-stamps; `_release()` is where they diverge.
self.graded_from = None
self.standing_at_grade = None
# SAFETY-94. Seconds of this window during which the register was
# obliged to move (the command at least `move_w` and `move_w` away
# from `standing_at_grade`), and the instant of the last read.
self.obliged_acc = 0.0
self.last_read = None
# The instant the standing command last FELL below `move_w`, or None
# while an obligation is standing. The release timer runs off this.
self.rested_since = None
self.released_at = None
self.releases = 0
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.arrivals = 0
@@ -311,21 +493,103 @@ class Freshness:
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
self.held = value
self.changed_mono = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_change = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
# Movement is the ONLY thing that clears the latch. See the class
# docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation this prevents.
self._open_window(standing_w, now_mono)
# Movement clears the latch, because it is exactly the evidence the
# verdict was about. See the class docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation
# the latch prevents, and `_release()` for the other way out.
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.last = value
# ⚠️ THE ORDER OF THESE TWO IS NOT OBSERVABLE, AND THIS COMMENT SAYS SO
# BECAUSE THE FIRST VERSION OF IT CLAIMED THE OPPOSITE. Swapping them is
# a ZERO-BYTE edit and it SURVIVED the battery; the reason is structural
# rather than a missing fixture, so no fixture could have closed it:
# `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()` only
# when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on
# any given read, whichever runs first. Release is written first because
# it reads in the order the state machine moves - withdraw, then
# re-grade - not because the code depends on it.
self._release(standing_w, now_mono)
self._oblige(standing_w, now_mono)
self._grade(standing_w, now_mono)
def _open_window(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""Start grading the register again, from this instant (SAFETY-57).
Called when the register moves - the window and the register's history
coincide there - and when a verdict is withdrawn, where they do not.
"""
self.graded_from = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_grade = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
# The read that opens a window is never an ask (no travel yet).
self.obliged_acc = 0.0
def _obliged(self, standing_w) -> bool:
"""Is the register asked to move: the command is at least `move_w` and
has travelled `move_w` since the window opened?"""
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_grade is None:
return False
standing_w = float(standing_w)
return (abs(standing_w) >= self.bound.move_w
and abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_grade)
>= self.bound.move_w)
def _oblige(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""SAFETY-94. Count only the time the register was asked to move.
A register that held still while nothing asked it to move has not
failed, so time before the command moved is not evidence. The time
since the previous read counts when the obligation stands at this
read; a command flapping in and out of the obligation still adds up.
"""
now_mono = float(now_mono)
if self.last_read is not None and self._obliged(standing_w):
self.obliged_acc += max(0.0, now_mono - self.last_read)
self.last_read = now_mono
def obliged_s(self) -> float:
"""Seconds of the current window the register was obliged to move."""
return self.obliged_acc
def _release(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""SAFETY-57. Withdraw a verdict whose obligation is no longer standing.
⚠️ THE TIMER RUNS ON THE COMMAND, NOT ON THE VERDICT. `rested_since` is
maintained on every arrival, latched or not, so the elapsed rest is the
real one and not "time since we last looked". An obligation reappearing
resets it to None, which is the whole point: a site that goes back to
asking the register for 250 W of movement has put the question back, and
the verdict stands until the question is withdrawn again.
"""
obliged = (standing_w is not None
and abs(float(standing_w)) >= self.bound.move_w)
if obliged:
self.rested_since = None
return
if self.rested_since is None:
self.rested_since = float(now_mono)
if not self.stale:
return
if float(now_mono) - self.rested_since < self.bound.release_s:
return
self.released_at = float(now_mono)
self.releases += 1
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self._open_window(standing_w, now_mono)
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""The conjunction. Sets the latch; never clears it."""
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
if self.stale or self.graded_from is None:
return
held_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
if held_s < self.bound.unchanged_s:
held_s = self.graded_s(now_mono)
# SAFETY-94 (closes SAFETY-58): the bound counts only the time the
# command asked the register to move, not the time since it last
# changed. A register that rested for minutes was otherwise judged on
# the first read after a new command, before it could answer (live,
# 2026-10-03: 1 s after the command).
if self.obliged_s() < self.bound.unchanged_s:
return
# ⚠️ BOTH None GUARDS ARE FOR A CALLER THAT DOES NOT KNOW ITS OWN
# OBLIGATION YET, WHICH IS NOT `_read_unit`. `Inverter.standing_w()`
@@ -333,30 +597,93 @@ class Freshness:
# consumer today. They are here for TEL-08, whose obligation term is an
# energy integral that has nothing to say until it has a window - and
# "nothing to say" must withhold the verdict, not manufacture one.
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_change is None:
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_grade is None:
return
standing_w = float(standing_w)
if abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w:
return
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_change)
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_grade)
if moved_w < self.bound.move_w:
return
self.stale = True
# ⚠️ THE SENTENCE SAYS "unchanged", SO IT GETS THE REGISTER'S OWN
# NUMBER, NOT THE WINDOW'S. They are the same until the first release
# and different afterwards, and an operator comparing this line against
# a history graph is reading the register.
shown_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
# ⚠️ SAFETY-56. THE OBSERVATION IS A FACT, THE DIAGNOSIS WAS NOT, AND
# THE SENTENCE NOW STOPS WHERE THE EVIDENCE DOES. The conjunction above
# is satisfied by TWO disjoint worlds, and nothing this object is handed
# separates them:
# (1) the register has stopped reporting reality - what the gate was
# built for - or
# (2) reality is not moving, because the SOURCE cannot comply with
# the command. A pack the BMS is refusing at its floor holds
# still under any setpoint, and a register reporting that
# truthfully publishes the same unchanged number a dead one does.
# The live 2026-09-21 episode was (2) - the pack read 11 % for the
# whole 850 s hold, the commands were discharge-only, and the register
# answered the first CHARGE command within one obligation window
# (test_freshness.py 11a measures all three off the committed capture)
# - and this sentence asserted (1), which sent the operator to look at
# healthy hardware.
# Naming both is what the module can honestly say. Naming WHICH would
# need SoC and the pack floor - deliberately not this module's inputs
# (see the `soc` row in BOUNDS and the docstring's last section), and
# TEL-08's and SAFETY-32's numbers rather than this sentence's.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NOT SHARED WITH `main.py`'s NOT READY ROW, WHICH SAYS
# THE SAME AMBIGUITY IN DIFFERENT WORDS ON PURPOSE. This sentence is a
# LOG LINE about a behaviour, quoted verbatim by `note()` onto the
# status page and by `_read_unit()` into the action log; that one is a
# BANNER about a named ENTITY, and the two answer different questions
# ("what did the register do" against "can I trust this entity"). One
# helper serving both would have to drop whichever half the other does
# not need, and the half it dropped would be the operator's next step.
# UX-10: two plain sentences (test_messages.py part 6). SAFETY-56's
# two explanations stay, in this order, and so does the admission
# that this check cannot tell them apart. The reading is treated as
# missing either way, which the log line around this says. The
# limits (`self.bound`) are on main.py's DEBUG line beside it, so the
# logged line stays within 3 sentences.
# ⚠️ SAFETY-57, AND THE THREE DURATIONS ARE THREE DIFFERENT FACTS, each
# in its own slot: the register's unchanged time, the WINDOW this
# verdict actually rests on after a release (`regraded`), and how many
# times this unit has been round the loop. Without the second one the
# sentence reads as though 92 s of unchanged register were what was
# compared against the 35 s limit, and it was not.
regraded = (f", checked {self.releases + 1} times over a {held_s:.0f} s "
f"window since the last stop was withdrawn"
if self.releases else "")
self.reason = (
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {held_s:.0f} s "
f"while the standing command moved {moved_w:.0f} W to "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W - the reading is not following, so it is "
f"reported as MISSING rather than as a measurement (limits: "
f"unchanged over {self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s, command over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W and moved by over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W)")
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} W unchanged for {shown_s:.0f} s "
f"while the command moved {moved_w:.0f} W to {standing_w:+.0f} W"
f"{regraded}. The reading may have stopped, or the battery may be "
f"unable to follow the command, and this check cannot tell which")
def unchanged_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page."""
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page.
⚠️ THE REGISTER'S CLOCK, NEVER THE VERDICT'S (SAFETY-57). A release
re-opens the grading window; it does not make the register younger, and
an operator reading "unchanged for 12 s" off a register that has held
one value for 850 s would be reading this module's bookkeeping back as a
measurement. `graded_s()` is the other one and is named differently for
that reason.
"""
if self.changed_mono is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.changed_mono)
def graded_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds the CURRENT verdict window has been open (SAFETY-57).
Equal to `unchanged_s()` until the first release, and shorter after one.
"""
if self.graded_from is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.graded_from)
def reading(self):
"""What the consumers get: the value, or None when it cannot be trusted.
@@ -366,6 +693,13 @@ class Freshness:
rather than accumulating it, and `circulation.circulating_w` returns None
for a roster with a missing term, which clears the circulation window
too. This module is the thing that was missing between them.
⚠️ AND IT CAN GO BACK TO BEING A NUMBER WITHOUT THE REGISTER MOVING
(SAFETY-57). That is the exit, and it is bounded rather than free: the
window a release opens is `bound.unchanged_s` = 35 s, shorter than both
consumer holds (75 s and 85 s), so neither can reach a verdict inside
one - and a re-trip hands them a None, which CLEARS their windows. See
the module docstring's last section.
"""
return None if self.stale else self.last
@@ -373,6 +707,26 @@ class Freshness:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
return f"{unit_name}: {self.reason}" if self.stale else ""
def release_note(self, unit_name: str) -> str:
"""SAFETY-57's release, for the log. Empty when nothing was withdrawn.
⚠️ IT NAMES WHAT IS AND IS NOT BEING CLAIMED, because a line reading
"recovered" would be a lie: nothing has been learned about the register.
The verdict was withdrawn because it can no longer be tested, and the
next 35 s are the test.
"""
if self.released_at is None:
return ""
return (f"{unit_name}: STALE_WITHDRAWN after the standing command sat "
f"below {self.bound.move_w:.0f} W for "
f"{self.bound.release_s:.0f} s. NOTHING HAS BEEN LEARNED ABOUT "
f"THE REGISTER - it is still holding {self.held:+.0f} - but a "
f"verdict about a command that is no longer standing cannot be "
f"tested, and the 0 W this one produces is what stopped it "
f"being tested. The register is now re-graded over a fresh "
f"{self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s window; if it still does not "
f"follow, this returns")
def monotonic() -> float:
"""The clock this module's callers use, in one place so tests can find it.
+115
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
"""UX-13: Home Assistant's entities, for the settings page's entity picker.
A read of `GET /api/states` through the add-on's own session (hass.states()),
cached for 30 s and trimmed to what a picker shows. Nothing here writes, so
UX-02 §6 holds. When Home Assistant does not answer, the last good list is
served with its age, or an empty one that says why: the route never fails.
"""
import asyncio
import time
CACHE_S = 30.0
DOWN_TEXT = "Home Assistant is not answering, so the entity list is empty."
STALE_TEXT = "Home Assistant is not answering, so this list may be old."
_POWER_UNITS = ("mW", "W", "kW", "MW", "GW", "TW")
_TO_W = {"mW": 0.001, "W": 1.0, "kW": 1000.0, "MW": 1e6}
_ENERGY_UNITS = ("Wh", "kWh", "MWh", "GWh")
def row(state: dict) -> dict | None:
"""One state object -> {entity_id, name, state, unit, device_class}."""
if not isinstance(state, dict) or not isinstance(state.get("entity_id"), str):
return None
attrs = state.get("attributes") if isinstance(state.get("attributes"), dict) else {}
return {"entity_id": state["entity_id"],
"name": str(attrs.get("friendly_name") or state["entity_id"]),
"state": state.get("state"),
"unit": attrs.get("unit_of_measurement"),
"device_class": attrs.get("device_class")}
def watts(r: dict | None):
"""A power entity's reading in W, or None when it is not a number in a
power unit (the setup wizard's kettle test)."""
if not r or r.get("unit") not in _TO_W:
return None
try:
value = float(r.get("state"))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
return value * _TO_W[r["unit"]] if value == value else None
def matches(r: dict, kind: str) -> bool:
"""Is `r` what a picker of this kind offers first? `kind` is one of
uilayout.ENTITY_KINDS; "" or "any" offers everything."""
unit, cls = r.get("unit"), r.get("device_class")
if kind in ("power", "power_w"):
return cls == "power" or unit in _POWER_UNITS
if kind == "energy":
return cls == "energy" or unit in _ENERGY_UNITS
if kind == "pct":
return unit == "%"
if kind == "number":
return r["entity_id"].startswith(("number.", "input_number."))
return True
class EntityCache:
"""The last entity list read from Home Assistant, at most CACHE_S old."""
def __init__(self, hass, clock=time.monotonic):
self.hass = hass
self.clock = clock
self.rows: dict | None = None
self.read_at: float | None = None
self.tried_at: float | None = None
self._lock = asyncio.Lock()
async def get(self, max_age: float = CACHE_S
) -> tuple[dict | None, float | None]:
"""(rows by entity id, age in s), or (None, None) if never read.
`max_age` is how old a try may be before HA is asked again: the setup
wizard's last step asks for a list at most a few seconds old."""
async with self._lock: # one HA read however many pickers ask
now = self.clock()
# A failed read also waits CACHE_S, so polls while HA is down do
# not queue one 10 s read each behind this lock.
if self.tried_at is None or now - self.tried_at >= max_age:
self.tried_at = now
states = await self.hass.states()
if states is not None:
rows = (row(s) for s in states)
self.rows = {r["entity_id"]: r for r in rows if r}
self.read_at = now
if self.read_at is None:
return None, None
return self.rows, now - self.read_at
async def reading(self, entity_id: str) -> dict:
"""One entity read now, not from the list: the kettle test compares
two readings seconds apart, which a 30 s list cannot. A read only."""
r = row(await self.hass.state(entity_id)) if entity_id else None
return {"entity_id": entity_id, "found": r is not None,
"state": r and r["state"], "unit": r and r["unit"],
"watts": watts(r)}
def peek(self) -> dict | None:
"""The cached rows if they are fresh, without asking Home Assistant."""
if self.read_at is None or self.clock() - self.read_at >= CACHE_S:
return None
return self.rows
async def payload(self, kind: str = "") -> dict:
"""The route's JSON: matching entities first, then the rest."""
rows, age = await self.get()
if rows is None:
return {"available": False, "text": DOWN_TEXT, "entities": []}
ordered = sorted(rows.values(), key=lambda r: r["entity_id"])
first = [dict(r, match=True) for r in ordered if matches(r, kind)]
rest = [dict(r, match=False) for r in ordered if not matches(r, kind)]
out = {"available": True, "age_s": round(age, 1), "entities": first + rest}
if age >= CACHE_S:
out["text"] = STALE_TEXT
return out
+150 -6
View File
@@ -11,17 +11,82 @@ import time
import aiohttp
from . import messages
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.hass")
CORE_API = "http://supervisor/core/api"
SUPERVISOR_API = "http://supervisor"
BAD_STATES = ("unknown", "unavailable", "none", "")
# What the Supervisor's proxy answers while Home Assistant restarts.
UNAVAILABLE = (502, 503, 504)
STATES_TIMEOUT_S = 10 # UX-13's entity list, like every other read here
STILL_WAITING_S = 300 # SAFETY-112: one reminder line per 5 minutes down
class Outage:
"""UX-10: Home Assistant not answering, said in one plain line per outage.
A restart takes the REST API and the meter websocket down together, and
each used to log the library's own text for every entity and service
("502, message='Bad Gateway', url=URL(...)", "Received message 8:1000 is
not str"). Now the first channel to fail says it once at WARNING, the raw
text goes to DEBUG, and the last channel to recover says so at INFO.
SAFETY-112: the Supervisor answers 502 for every read, write and
websocket until Home Assistant has finished starting, however live its
entities already are (DECISIONS/SAFETY-112-waiting-for-home-assistant.md).
So an outage also says, every STILL_WAITING_S, that it is still on, and
`waiting()` puts it on the status page.
"""
def __init__(self):
self.down_on = set()
self.since = None # monotonic start of this outage
self._told = None # when the last "still waiting" line went
def down(self, channel: str, what: str, detail) -> None:
now = time.monotonic()
if not self.down_on:
_LOG.warning("Home Assistant is not answering (%s), perhaps it is "
"still starting. Control waits and resumes by itself.",
what)
self.since = self._told = now
elif now - self._told >= STILL_WAITING_S:
self._told = now
_LOG.info("Still waiting for Home Assistant to finish starting, "
"%s so far.", messages.duration(now - self.since))
self.down_on.add(channel)
_LOG.debug("Home Assistant not answering on %s: %s", channel, detail)
def up(self, channel: str) -> None:
if channel in self.down_on:
self.down_on.discard(channel)
if not self.down_on:
_LOG.info("Home Assistant answers again after %s.",
messages.duration(time.monotonic() - self.since))
def waiting(self) -> bool:
"""True while Home Assistant's API does not answer. The API, not the
meter websocket: every battery reading and every write rides on it."""
return "api" in self.down_on
OUTAGE = Outage()
class ReadOnly(RuntimeError):
"""A service call on a read-only HomeAssistant (UX-15 setup-only mode)."""
class HomeAssistant:
def __init__(self, session: aiohttp.ClientSession, token: str | None = None):
def __init__(self, session: aiohttp.ClientSession, token: str | None = None,
*, read_only: bool = False):
self.session = session
self.token = token or os.environ.get("SUPERVISOR_TOKEN", "")
# UX-15: setup-only mode reads Home Assistant and calls no service.
# Fixed at construction; `call()` refuses before it sends anything.
self._read_only = bool(read_only)
self._last_moan: dict[str, float] = {}
if not self.token:
_LOG.error("SUPERVISOR_TOKEN missing - is this running as an add-on?")
@@ -58,13 +123,61 @@ class HomeAssistant:
async with self.session.get(
f"{CORE_API}/states/{entity_id}", headers=self._headers, timeout=10
) as resp:
if resp.status in UNAVAILABLE:
OUTAGE.down("api", f"error {resp.status}",
f"read {entity_id}: {resp.status}")
return None
OUTAGE.up("api")
if resp.status == 404:
return None
resp.raise_for_status()
return await resp.json()
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError) as err:
obj = await resp.json()
except aiohttp.ClientConnectionError as err:
OUTAGE.down("api", "no connection", f"read {entity_id}: {err}")
return None
# SAFETY-61: an undecodable body is an absence like any other failed
# read, never an exception into the control loop.
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError, ValueError) as err:
self._moan(f"read:{entity_id}", "read %s failed: %s", entity_id, err)
return None
if not isinstance(obj, dict):
self._moan(f"shape:{entity_id}", "read %s: not a state object: %.80r",
entity_id, obj)
return None
return obj
async def states(self) -> list | None:
"""Every entity's state object (`GET /api/states`), or None when Home
Assistant does not answer. A read only (UX-13 entity picker)."""
try:
async with self.session.get(
f"{CORE_API}/states", headers=self._headers,
timeout=STATES_TIMEOUT_S
) as resp:
if resp.status in UNAVAILABLE:
OUTAGE.down("api", f"error {resp.status}",
f"read all states: {resp.status}")
return None
OUTAGE.up("api")
resp.raise_for_status()
obj = await resp.json()
except aiohttp.ClientConnectionError as err:
OUTAGE.down("api", "no connection", f"read all states: {err}")
return None
# A timeout's own text is empty, so the line names the wait instead
# (UX-13 P1 test, c).
except TimeoutError:
self._moan("read:*", "Reading the entity list failed: no answer "
"within %s seconds.", STATES_TIMEOUT_S)
return None
except (aiohttp.ClientError, ValueError) as err:
self._moan("read:*", "Reading the entity list failed: %s",
str(err) or type(err).__name__)
return None
if not isinstance(obj, list):
self._moan("shape:*", "The entity list is not a list: %.80r", obj)
return None
return obj
async def number(self, entity_id: str, invert: bool = False) -> float | None:
"""Numeric state, or None. Never substitutes a default."""
@@ -100,24 +213,55 @@ class HomeAssistant:
return None
return (_f("min"), _f("max"), _f("step"))
@property
def read_only(self) -> bool:
return self._read_only
async def call(self, domain: str, service: str, data: dict) -> bool:
if self._read_only:
# Every service call, `number.set_value` included, goes through
# here, so setup-only mode has no way to command (DECISIONS UX-15).
_LOG.error("Setup-only mode called no service, because it may not "
"command anything.")
raise ReadOnly(f"{domain}.{service} refused: setup-only mode")
try:
async with self.session.post(
f"{CORE_API}/services/{domain}/{service}",
headers=self._headers, json=data, timeout=10,
) as resp:
if resp.status in UNAVAILABLE:
OUTAGE.down("api", f"error {resp.status}",
f"service {domain}.{service}: {resp.status}")
return False
OUTAGE.up("api")
if resp.status >= 400:
body = await resp.text()
# 400 here usually means out-of-range for the entity - the
# value is rejected outright, not clamped. Always log it:
# silently dropped commands are how a controller ends up
# believing something the hardware never did.
# UX-10: plain words. While Home Assistant loads its
# entities it answers 400 with only "400: Bad Request",
# which says nothing, so only a body with more is quoted.
said = body.strip()[:200]
if said.lower() in (f"{resp.status}: {resp.reason}".lower(),
""):
said = "no details"
entity = (data.get("entity_id", "no entity")
if isinstance(data, dict) else "no entity")
self._moan(f"svc:{domain}.{service}",
"service %s.%s rejected (%s): %s",
domain, service, resp.status, body[:200])
"Home Assistant refused %s.%s for %s (error %s, "
"%s). The entity may still be loading, or the "
"value is out of range.", domain, service,
entity, resp.status, said)
return False
return True
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError) as err:
except aiohttp.ClientConnectionError as err:
OUTAGE.down("api", "no connection",
f"service {domain}.{service}: {err}")
return False
# ValueError: an undecodable error body (SAFETY-61) is a failed write.
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError, ValueError) as err:
self._moan(f"svcerr:{domain}.{service}", "service %s.%s failed: %s",
domain, service, err)
return False
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+87
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
"""SAFETY-97: what a battery's power reading shows while it gives nothing.
B's reading (0x0518) shows -95 to -118 W at idle (standby draw, live
2026-10-03); A's shows -2 to -4 W. "The battery gives nothing" is graded
against this idle reading, not against 0 W, or a refusing B never latches.
DECISIONS/SAFETY-97-idle-offset.md.
Learned per unit, never configured:
- only while control runs, the unit is not refused, stale or tripped, and
its command has been within IDLE_ASK_W for IDLE_QUIET_S (a refusing battery
is asked more than that, so it cannot teach its refusal as idle);
- a reading beyond IDLE_SAMPLE_W is not a sample;
- first value: the mean of IDLE_FIRST_S of samples; then a slow follow
(IDLE_TAU_S);
- persisted per unit and restored, clamped to IDLE_SAMPLE_W, at start.
The band is centred on it clamped to IDLE_MAX_W (owner, 2026-10-04). Until
learned the idle reading is 0 W, the rule as it was.
"""
import math
IDLE_MAX_W = 75.0 # |idle| used: under the 100 W band, so it keeps 0 W +-25 W
IDLE_SAMPLE_W = 250.0 # a reading beyond this is not a sample
IDLE_ASK_W = 50.0 # a command this small counts as "asked ~0"
IDLE_QUIET_S = 120.0 # 6 lags of 20 s: a 2500 W step has decayed to 6 W
IDLE_FIRST_S = 120.0 # seconds of samples averaged for the first value
IDLE_TAU_S = 1800.0 # then follow drift this slowly
IDLE_SAVE_W = 5.0 # persist when the value moved this far
IDLE_GAP_S = 10.0 # a longer gap between reads counts as this
def _num(v):
try:
v = float(v)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
return v if math.isfinite(v) else None
class IdleReading:
"""One unit's idle reading. `w` is what "gives nothing" is centred on."""
def __init__(self, saved=None):
v = _num(saved)
self.value = (None if v is None
else max(-IDLE_SAMPLE_W, min(IDLE_SAMPLE_W, v)))
self.saved = self.value
self.quiet_since = None
self.last = None
self.acc_w = 0.0
self.acc_s = 0.0
@property
def w(self) -> float:
"""The centre used: the learned value clamped to IDLE_MAX_W."""
if self.value is None:
return 0.0
return max(-IDLE_MAX_W, min(IDLE_MAX_W, self.value))
def observe(self, reading, standing_w, now_mono, may_learn) -> bool:
"""One read. Returns True when the value should be persisted."""
now = float(now_mono)
dt = (0.0 if self.last is None
else max(0.0, min(IDLE_GAP_S, now - self.last)))
self.last = now
standing = _num(standing_w)
if not may_learn or standing is None or abs(standing) > IDLE_ASK_W:
self.quiet_since = None
return False
if self.quiet_since is None:
self.quiet_since = now
b = _num(reading)
if (now - self.quiet_since < IDLE_QUIET_S or b is None
or abs(b) > IDLE_SAMPLE_W or dt <= 0.0):
return False
if self.value is None:
self.acc_w += b * dt
self.acc_s += dt
if self.acc_s < IDLE_FIRST_S:
return False
self.value = self.acc_w / self.acc_s
else:
self.value += (b - self.value) * min(1.0, dt / IDLE_TAU_S)
if self.saved is None or abs(self.value - self.saved) >= IDLE_SAVE_W:
self.saved = self.value
return True
return False
+42 -10
View File
@@ -123,9 +123,11 @@ from datetime import datetime
from .clamp import ClampResult
from .delivery import DeliveryConfig, DeliveryWatchdog
from . import messages
# SAFETY-37. The freshness policy, and the ONE place its bounds are written.
# freshness.py imports nothing from this package, so the direction is one-way.
from .freshness import BOUNDS, Freshness
from .idle import IdleReading
# CFG-03's ONE in-code mirror of config.yaml's SAFETY-24 defaults. Imported
# rather than retyped: the flat-keys path below needs `bms_soc_floor`'s
# shipped default and a literal here would be the fourth defaults site that
@@ -316,6 +318,26 @@ class Inverter:
tripped=bool(data.get(self.key("delivery_tripped"), False)),
reason=str(data.get(self.key("delivery_reason"), "") or ""))
# SAFETY-73. The direction this unit's battery refuses (+1 give, -1
# take, 0 none), when that refusal or its last probe started, the
# current probe's start, and the cycles of evidence so far and when
# they began. Memory only, like SAFETY-52's: stop and start end it.
# The evidence count is also used at N=1 (SAFETY-94); the rest at N>1.
self.refused = 0
self.refused_at = None
self.probe_from = None
self.ref_count = 0
self.ref_since = None
self.ref_sign = 0
self.ref_from = None
# SAFETY-97: what this unit's reading shows at idle; "gives nothing"
# is centred on it. Learned, persisted, restored (app/idle.py).
self.idle = IdleReading(data.get(self.key("idle_w")))
@property
def idle_w(self) -> float:
return self.idle.w
# -- store ---------------------------------------------------------------
def key(self, name: str) -> str:
"""This unit's namespaced Store key for `name`. See store.unit_key()."""
@@ -407,21 +429,31 @@ class Inverter:
stop the site (`inputs_ok`). Folding one into the other is how a
measurement fault ends up handing a sibling extra power.
"""
return self.batt_fresh.note(self.name)
return (messages.row_battery_stuck(self.name) if self.batt_fresh.stale
else "")
def refusal_note(self) -> str:
"""SAFETY-73's status row while this unit's battery refuses."""
if not self.refused:
return ""
return messages.row_battery_refuses(self.name, self.refused,
self.probe_from is not None)
def link_note(self, now: datetime) -> str:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say.
The words are `app/messages.py`'s (UX-09). main.py colours the row red
exactly when `is_live()` is False.
"""
if not self.has_writer():
return (f"{self.name}: NO SETPOINT ENTITY - this controller cannot "
f"command it, and the site refuses rather than running at "
f"part strength")
live, why = self.is_live(now)
return messages.row_no_setpoint(self.name)
live, _why = self.is_live(now)
held = (0.0 if self.rejected_since is None
else (now - self.rejected_since).total_seconds())
if not live:
return f"{self.name}: NOT COMMANDABLE - {why}"
return messages.row_not_controllable(self.name, held, LINK_STALE_S)
if self.rejected_since is not None:
held = (now - self.rejected_since).total_seconds()
return (f"{self.name}: writes rejected for {held:.0f} s - still "
f"commandable until {LINK_STALE_S:.0f} s")
return messages.row_commands_refused(self.name, held, LINK_STALE_S)
return ""
def __repr__(self) -> str:
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+299 -32
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ simply not do.
import logging
import math
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone, tzinfo
from .store import MAINT_UNIT_KEYS, unit_key
@@ -65,10 +65,30 @@ POWER_MOVING = (DRAIN, CHARGE, HOLD)
# 12 h means the battery is not following commands - a fault, not a slow day. The charge phase deliberately waits for sun and for cheap hours, so
# it is expected to span a night; 36 h still bounds it.
DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN = 720
# MAINT-13: minutes the pack was ALLOWED to charge (the price gate open), not
# wall-clock minutes since the charge began. See CHARGE_WALL_TIMEOUT_MIN.
CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN = 2160
# After an abort, do not immediately re-trigger in the same start hour.
RESTART_COOLDOWN_MIN = 90
# MAINT-13 (DECISIONS/MAINT-13-full-pack-is-complete.md). Constants, not options.
# A pack that reaches target - 3 and then takes no more charge for this many
# minutes of allowed charging counts as full.
CHARGE_NEAR_FULL_PCT = 3
CHARGE_STALL_MIN = 60
# Wall-clock backstop for a charge whose gate never opens (no cheap hours, no sun).
CHARGE_WALL_TIMEOUT_MIN = 10080
# A failed cycle (stuck drain or charge) is not retried before this many days.
FAIL_BACKOFF_DAYS = 7
# One tick counts at most this many minutes: a gap means the add-on was down.
CHARGE_TICK_MAX_MIN = 5
# The charge accounting is written to the state file at most this often.
CHARGE_SAVE_MIN = 5
# MAINT-14 (DECISIONS/MAINT-14-no-soc-in-maintenance.md): with no SoC reading
# the timeouts still run, a drain holds at 0 W, and the log says once, after this
# many minutes, that the level has been unknown for long.
NOSOC_NOTE_MIN = 15
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THE ONE IN-CODE MIRROR OF config.yaml FOR EVERY `maintenance_*`
# OPTION, and the only place in the add-on where one of these numbers is typed.
#
@@ -112,7 +132,9 @@ RESTART_COOLDOWN_MIN = 90
MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
"maintenance_enabled": False,
"maintenance_interval_days": 28,
"maintenance_start_hour": 10,
# MAINT-10: a LOCAL hour (site_zone() below), 19:00 so the drain runs
# into the night rather than through the solar day.
"maintenance_start_hour": 19,
# ⚠️ 2000, NOT THE 2500 THIS SHIPPED AS, and config.yaml carries the
# argument: both rates must stay at or below `max_w` (2000) or the
# cheap-window charge shaping asks the arbiter for `hi = -charge_w` against
@@ -177,6 +199,69 @@ class MaintConfig:
)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# MAINT-10: the start hour is local time. See DECISIONS/MAINT-10-local-start-hour.md.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def _load_zone(name):
"""A tzinfo for an IANA name, or `(None, why)`."""
if not name or not isinstance(name, str):
return None, "none given"
try:
from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo
return ZoneInfo(name.strip()), ""
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - any failure
return None, f"{name!r} is not a known zone ({type(err).__name__})"
def site_zone(ha_zone, ha_why: str, env_tz) -> tuple:
"""`(tzinfo, name, source, why)`: Home Assistant's zone (source "ha"), else
the container's TZ ("tz"), else UTC ("utc"). `why` says what was missing."""
tz, why = _load_zone(ha_zone)
if tz is not None:
return tz, ha_zone, "ha", ""
ha_why = ha_why or why
tz, env_why = _load_zone(env_tz)
if tz is not None:
return tz, env_tz, "tz", ha_why
return timezone.utc, "UTC", "utc", f"Home Assistant: {ha_why}, TZ: {env_why}"
def in_start_slot(now: datetime, start_hour: int, tz: tzinfo) -> bool:
"""Is `now` inside today's one-hour start slot, read on the local clock?
Normally the slot is the local hour `start_hour`. On the day the clocks go
forward and that hour does not exist, it is the first hour after the jump.
On the day they go back and it happens twice, only the first one counts.
Worked from UTC instants only (`astimezone`), so it does not depend on how
a tzinfo resolves a wall time that is missing or doubled.
"""
if now.tzinfo is None:
now = now.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
here = now.astimezone(tz).replace(tzinfo=None)
before = (now - timedelta(hours=1)).astimezone(tz).replace(tzinfo=None)
if here.hour == start_hour:
# the second pass through a repeated hour: an hour ago read the same
return not (before.date() == here.date() and before.hour == start_hour)
slot = here.replace(hour=start_hour, minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0)
# the clock jumped over the start of the slot within the last hour
return before < slot and here >= slot + timedelta(hours=1)
def next_slot_start(now: datetime, start_hour: int, tz: tzinfo):
"""The start of the slot `now` is in, or else of the next one; None if
there is none within 50 h (no real zone does that)."""
step = timedelta(minutes=15)
t = now.replace(minute=now.minute - now.minute % 15, second=0,
microsecond=0) - timedelta(hours=1)
for _ in range(4 * 50):
if (in_start_slot(t, start_hour, tz)
and not in_start_slot(t - step, start_hour, tz)
and t + timedelta(hours=1) > now):
return t
t += step
return None
@dataclass
class MaintResult:
phase: str
@@ -192,6 +277,9 @@ class MaintResult:
# showing an idle machine and a due date in the past. Empty on every path
# that is not deferring, so a roster of one never sees it.
deferred: str = ""
# MAINT-13: "drain" or "charge" on the one tick where a cycle FAILED, so
# the Controller can tell the operator once. Empty on every other tick.
failed: str = ""
class UnitHistory:
@@ -256,8 +344,12 @@ class Maintenance:
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: MaintConfig, store, unit: str | None = None,
name: str = "", mirror_flat: bool = False):
name: str = "", mirror_flat: bool = False,
tz: tzinfo | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg
# MAINT-10: the zone `cfg.start_hour` is read in - main.py resolves it
# once at startup (`site_zone()`). UTC when nobody says, as before.
self.tz = tz or timezone.utc
# ⚠️ `self.store` IS THE VIEW, NOT THE Store. Everything in this class
# names an UNQUALIFIED key - "phase", "last_completed" - and the view is
# the one place that turns it into the key this pack owns. A raw
@@ -275,6 +367,14 @@ class Maintenance:
# per cycle would flush the very context that explains it. Same pattern
# as `Controller._arb_action` and `_maint_shape_suspended`.
self._deferred = ""
# MAINT-13: the charge accounting (see _charge_account), in memory and
# written to the state file every CHARGE_SAVE_MIN minutes.
self._trk = None
self._trk_saved = None
# MAINT-14: when the SoC reading went missing (None while it is there),
# and whether the "unknown for long" line was said in this episode.
self._nosoc_since = None
self._nosoc_said = False
# -- state ---------------------------------------------------------------
@property
@@ -282,6 +382,11 @@ class Maintenance:
return self.store.get("phase", IDLE)
def _enter(self, phase: str, now: datetime, events: list, msg: str) -> None:
self._nosoc_since = None
self._trk = None
self._trk_saved = None
if self.store.get("charge_track") is not None:
self.store.set("charge_track", None)
self.store.set("phase", phase)
self.store.set_time("phase_started", now)
_LOG.info("%s", msg)
@@ -322,6 +427,21 @@ class Maintenance:
return (last_try is None
or (now - last_try) >= timedelta(minutes=RESTART_COOLDOWN_MIN))
def backoff_until(self, now: datetime):
"""MAINT-13: when a failed cycle may be tried again, or None.
None when nothing failed, when the back-off is over, or when a cycle
completed after the failure (a forced start that worked ends it).
"""
failed = self.store.get_time("last_failed")
if failed is None:
return None
done = self.store.get_time("last_completed")
if done is not None and done >= failed:
return None
until = failed + timedelta(days=FAIL_BACKOFF_DAYS)
return until if now < until else None
def wants_start(self, now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Would this pack begin a cycle on this tick if the site let it?
@@ -331,8 +451,10 @@ class Maintenance:
about who was asking - so the IDLE branch of `tick()` calls this one.
"""
return (self.phase == IDLE and self.cfg.enabled
and now.hour == self.cfg.start_hour and self.due(now)
and self._cooled(now))
and in_start_slot(now, self.cfg.start_hour, self.tz)
and self.due(now)
and self._cooled(now)
and self.backoff_until(now) is None)
# -- operations ----------------------------------------------------------
def force_start(self, now: datetime, blocked_by: str = "") -> list:
@@ -351,7 +473,7 @@ class Maintenance:
the action log rather than watching nothing happen.
"""
if blocked_by:
msg = (f"maintenance: forced start REFUSED on {self.name} - "
msg = (f"maintenance: {self.name} cannot start now, because "
f"{blocked_by}")
_LOG.warning("%s", msg)
return [msg]
@@ -360,6 +482,140 @@ class Maintenance:
self._enter(DRAIN, now, events, "maintenance: forced start -> drain")
return events
def _charge_account(self, now: datetime, soc: float | None,
gate_open: bool) -> dict:
"""MAINT-13: what this charge has used so far, as minutes of ALLOWED time.
`open_min` counts only ticks with the price gate open; `flat_min` counts
gate-open minutes since the SoC last beat its best; a closed gate pauses
both. One tick adds at most CHARGE_TICK_MAX_MIN, so a gap (add-on down)
counts for nothing. A state file from before MAINT-13, or from another
charge, starts from the wall-clock minutes so far: the old behaviour.
MAINT-14: `soc` may be None (no reading). Time still counts, the stall
wait pauses, and `last` keeps the last SoC seen (saved with the rest).
"""
since = self.store.get("phase_started")
trk = self._trk
if trk is None:
raw = self.store.get("charge_track")
if isinstance(raw, dict) and raw.get("since") == since:
trk = dict(raw)
else:
trk = {"since": since, "open_min": self._elapsed_min(now),
"flat_min": 0.0,
"best": None if soc is None else float(soc),
"last": None if soc is None else float(soc), "at": None}
self._trk = trk
at = trk.get("at")
try:
last = datetime.fromisoformat(at) if at else None
except (TypeError, ValueError):
last = None
dt = 0.0 if last is None else min(
CHARGE_TICK_MAX_MIN, max(0.0, (now - last).total_seconds() / 60.0))
trk["at"] = now.isoformat()
if soc is None:
pass
elif trk.get("best") is None or soc > trk["best"]:
trk["best"], trk["flat_min"] = float(soc), 0.0
elif gate_open:
trk["flat_min"] += dt
if soc is not None:
trk["last"] = float(soc)
if gate_open:
trk["open_min"] += dt
saved = self._trk_saved
if saved is None or (now - saved).total_seconds() >= CHARGE_SAVE_MIN * 60:
self.store.set("charge_track", dict(trk))
self._trk_saved = now
return trk
def _fail(self, now: datetime, kind: str, why: str) -> MaintResult:
"""MAINT-13: stand down, remember the failure, and tell the Controller."""
events = self.abort(now, why)
self.store.set_time("last_failed", now)
msg = (f"maintenance: the cycle did not finish. It waits "
f"{FAIL_BACKOFF_DAYS} days before it tries again.")
_LOG.warning("%s", msg)
events.append(msg)
return MaintResult(IDLE, True, 0.0, False, events, failed=kind)
def _hold(self, now: datetime, events: list) -> MaintResult:
"""HOLD for one tick, with or without a SoC reading (MAINT-15).
HOLD needs no level to end: it is reached only after the charge counted
as done (MAINT-13/14), so its end is a time check and nothing else.
"""
elapsed = self._elapsed_min(now)
if elapsed >= self.cfg.hold_min:
self.store.set_time("last_completed", now)
self._enter(IDLE, now, events,
f"maintenance: cycle COMPLETE ({elapsed:.0f} min hold) "
"- handing back to the loop")
return MaintResult(IDLE, False, None, False, events)
# 0 W, not "do nothing": commanding zero is what stops the loop
# pulling the pack straight back down the moment it is full, which
# is exactly when the BMS needs it parked at the top.
return MaintResult(HOLD, True, 0.0, False, events)
def _no_soc(self, now: datetime, phase: str, gate_open: bool,
events: list) -> MaintResult:
"""MAINT-14: one tick of a pack in a moving phase with no SoC reading.
HOLD stays at 0 W and ends at its normal time (MAINT-15). DRAIN holds at 0 W, like HOLD, and its 12 h
timeout still runs. CHARGE keeps its timeout and wall backstop: out of
time is a failure, except when the last SoC seen was within
CHARGE_NEAR_FULL_PCT of the target, which counts as done (MAINT-13).
Nothing here may start a phase change that needs the level.
"""
if self._nosoc_since is None:
self._nosoc_since = now
self._nosoc_said = False
self._trk_saved = None # save the last SoC seen, now
if phase == DRAIN:
msg = ("maintenance: the battery level is unknown, so the "
"drain holds at 0 W until it is back.")
_LOG.warning("%s", msg)
events.append(msg)
if (not self._nosoc_said and (now - self._nosoc_since).total_seconds()
>= NOSOC_NOTE_MIN * 60):
self._nosoc_said = True
tail = ("The hold still ends at its normal time."
if phase == HOLD else
f"The time limit of the {phase} still applies.")
msg = (f"maintenance: no battery level for {NOSOC_NOTE_MIN} min. "
f"{tail}")
_LOG.warning("%s", msg)
events.append(msg)
if phase == HOLD:
return self._hold(now, events)
elapsed = self._elapsed_min(now)
if phase == DRAIN:
if elapsed > DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN:
return self._fail(now, "drain",
f"drain stuck, battery level unknown, after "
f"{elapsed / 60:.0f} h")
return MaintResult(DRAIN, True, 0.0, False, events)
trk = self._charge_account(now, None, gate_open)
if (trk["open_min"] > CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN
or elapsed > CHARGE_WALL_TIMEOUT_MIN):
last = trk.get("last")
if last is not None and last >= self.cfg.soc_target - CHARGE_NEAR_FULL_PCT:
self._enter(HOLD, now, events,
f"maintenance: charge time is up and the last level "
f"seen was {last:.0f} %, close enough to full, so the "
f"charge counts as done -> holding "
f"{self.cfg.hold_min} min to balance")
return MaintResult(HOLD, True, 0.0, False, events)
if elapsed > CHARGE_WALL_TIMEOUT_MIN:
lim = f"the {CHARGE_WALL_TIMEOUT_MIN // 1440}-day limit"
else:
lim = f"{trk['open_min'] / 60:.0f} h of charging time"
return self._fail(now, "charge",
f"charge stuck, battery level unknown, after {lim}")
return MaintResult(CHARGE, False, None, True, events)
def abort(self, now: datetime, why: str) -> list:
events = []
self._enter(IDLE, now, events, f"maintenance: ABORT ({why})")
@@ -378,23 +634,25 @@ class Maintenance:
"""
if self._deferred != why:
self._deferred = why
msg = (f"maintenance: {self.name} is due and is WAITING its turn - "
f"{why}. It is idle under the control loop and will "
f"recalibrate at the next start hour once the slot is free; "
f"this is not a stalled phase.")
msg = (f"maintenance: {self.name} is due and waits its turn, "
f"because {why}. It starts at the next start hour once the "
f"other battery is done. This is not a stalled phase.")
_LOG.info("%s", msg)
events.append(msg)
return events
# -- the machine ---------------------------------------------------------
def tick(self, now: datetime, soc: float | None,
blocked_by: str = "") -> MaintResult:
blocked_by: str = "", gate_open: bool = True) -> MaintResult:
"""One cycle of this pack's state machine.
`blocked_by` is `arbitrate()`'s answer for THIS pack: empty when the
site's one maintenance slot is available to it, otherwise the reason it
is not. It gates two things and nothing else - a start, and a phase that
is already moving power on a pack that does not hold the slot.
`gate_open` (MAINT-13) is whether the pack may charge now (the price
gate); only those minutes count towards the charge timeout.
"""
events: list = []
phase = self.phase
@@ -445,13 +703,13 @@ class Maintenance:
# transitions below mean anything, and a stale "100 %" would end the
# charge phase having charged nothing. Hold the current phase's command
# and wait; the phase timeout is the backstop.
#
# MAINT-14: "hold and wait" is not "wait for ever". The timeouts run
# here too, and a drain holds at 0 W (an unknown level never allows
# discharge, TEL-08). See `_no_soc`.
if soc is None:
_LOG.warning("maintenance: no SoC reading, holding phase %s", phase)
if phase == DRAIN:
return MaintResult(DRAIN, True, self.cfg.discharge_w, False, events)
if phase == HOLD:
return MaintResult(HOLD, True, 0.0, False, events)
return MaintResult(CHARGE, False, None, True, events)
return self._no_soc(now, phase, gate_open, events)
self._nosoc_since = None
elapsed = self._elapsed_min(now)
@@ -462,8 +720,8 @@ class Maintenance:
f"after {elapsed:.0f} min -> charge")
return MaintResult(CHARGE, False, None, True, events)
if elapsed > DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN:
events += self.abort(now, f"drain stuck at {soc:.0f} % after {elapsed:.0f} min")
return MaintResult(IDLE, True, 0.0, False, events)
return self._fail(now, "drain", f"drain stuck at {soc:.0f} % "
f"after {elapsed:.0f} min")
return MaintResult(DRAIN, True, self.cfg.discharge_w, False, events)
if phase == CHARGE:
@@ -472,22 +730,31 @@ class Maintenance:
f"maintenance: charge complete at {soc:.0f} % after "
f"{elapsed:.0f} min -> holding {self.cfg.hold_min} min to balance")
return MaintResult(HOLD, True, 0.0, False, events)
if elapsed > CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN:
events += self.abort(now, f"charge stuck at {soc:.0f} % after {elapsed:.0f} min")
return MaintResult(IDLE, True, 0.0, False, events)
trk = self._charge_account(now, soc, gate_open)
near = soc >= self.cfg.soc_target - CHARGE_NEAR_FULL_PCT
# MAINT-13 rule 1: close to full and no longer taking charge.
if near and trk["flat_min"] >= CHARGE_STALL_MIN:
self._enter(HOLD, now, events,
f"maintenance: the battery takes no more charge at "
f"{soc:.0f} %, so the charge counts as done -> holding "
f"{self.cfg.hold_min} min to balance")
return MaintResult(HOLD, True, 0.0, False, events)
if (trk["open_min"] > CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN
or elapsed > CHARGE_WALL_TIMEOUT_MIN):
# MAINT-13 rule 2: out of time close to full is complete.
if near:
self._enter(HOLD, now, events,
f"maintenance: charge time is up at {soc:.0f} %, "
f"close enough to full, so the charge counts as "
f"done -> holding {self.cfg.hold_min} min to balance")
return MaintResult(HOLD, True, 0.0, False, events)
return self._fail(now, "charge",
f"charge stuck at {soc:.0f} % after "
f"{trk['open_min']:.0f} min of charging time")
return MaintResult(CHARGE, False, None, True, events)
if phase == HOLD:
if elapsed >= self.cfg.hold_min:
self.store.set_time("last_completed", now)
self._enter(IDLE, now, events,
f"maintenance: cycle COMPLETE ({elapsed:.0f} min hold) "
"- handing back to the loop")
return MaintResult(IDLE, False, None, False, events)
# 0 W, not "do nothing": commanding zero is what stops the loop
# pulling the pack straight back down the moment it is full, which
# is exactly when the BMS needs it parked at the top.
return MaintResult(HOLD, True, 0.0, False, events)
return self._hold(now, events)
_LOG.error("maintenance: unknown phase %r, forcing idle", phase)
events += self.abort(now, f"unknown phase {phase!r}")
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