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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 8ff42ea85d CI-12: .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (2d026df, goodwe#56 merged)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m42s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-25 18:10:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 841424463a CI-12 review: INFRA_READ_TOKEN via an env-set header, not a remote URL
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m42s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
The long-lived token no longer lands in $WS/goodwe/.git/config (mounted into
the tests' container, left behind by a failed job) or in git's argv. A missing
secret (fork PR) fails with its own message. README: addon-pin is not re-run
after a bump.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-25 18:01:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 c63eda0b0f CI-12: restore .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (56a933e)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m43s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
This reverts commit 54cc5263fb (the proof-2 throwaway).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:45:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 54cc5263fb THROWAWAY (CI-12 proof 2): pin one release/1.0 merge behind (d84ac01); reverted next
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m43s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:36:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 c493a6d67a CI-12: test_tariff.py no longer says CI cannot see the infra repo
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m47s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:27:06 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 d0891a6bca CI-12: .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (56a933e), restoring the proof pin
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 16:10:47 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 fe80047235 CI-12 round 2: INFRA_READ_TOKEN for admin/goodwe; the pin tracks release/1.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
- checks.yml's infra checkout and infra-pin.yml's admin/goodwe ls-remote use
  the INFRA_READ_TOKEN secret; the self fetch keeps GITHUB_TOKEN.
- infra-pin.yml compares against admin/goodwe refs/heads/release/1.0; STALE
  message, comments and README follow.
- test_control.py / test_alloc.py: drop the claim that CI cannot reach
  admin/goodwe.
- .gitea/infra-pin is DELIBERATELY one release/1.0 merge behind (d84ac01) for
  the "infra-pin / fresh goes red" proof; the next commit sets it to HEAD.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 16:08:55 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6e3399322a CI-12: CI grades test_freeze.py against the real hwsim at a pinned admin/goodwe
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 2s
- .gitea/infra-pin: the one place the admin/goodwe commit is pinned.
- checks.yml: checks out admin/goodwe at the pin as the sibling test_freeze.py
  looks for; any failure fails the job. Tests run with GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1,
  and `CI: ` lines are echoed on PASS so the log shows which transport ran.
- test_freeze.py: GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM refuses the stub; a local stub run
  prints a STUB USED line.
- infra-pin.yml: a separate, non-required check that goes red naming both
  SHAs when admin/goodwe master has moved past the pin.
- README: when and how to bump the pin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 01:57:04 +02:00
admin 16c796fa30 Merge pull request 'TEL-14: PV sign declared per entity (pv_invert_entities)' (#124) from TEL-14-pv-sign into release/1.0 2026-09-25 01:30:33 +02:00
admin 20260e86ec Merge pull request 'DOC-5: tell installers to turn on the Supervisor Watchdog' (#123) from DOC-5-watchdog into release/1.0 2026-09-25 01:17:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 7fa045af85 TEL-14 N1: trim DECISIONS (drop probe transcript, §1 to the reason), move the mutation ledger there with M2/M5
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m44s
test_pv.py part 11 now prints a one-line pointer instead of the 12-row table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 01:11:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 93f349a6af TEL-14 B1: pin stray caution on the reported case and whitespace normalisation end to end
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 01:10:13 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 d71f7dbd35 Merge release/1.0 (43b2740) into DOC-5-watchdog to sync base
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m45s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 01:08:15 +02:00
admin 43b274035f Merge pull request 'TEST-26: a missing value in a check is a named FAIL, not a traceback' (#122) from TEST-26 into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:57:20 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 6dbe06e32e DOC-5: add the Watchdog step to README's Install section
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m31s
One line after the install step, linking to the DOCS.md paragraph that
gives the reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:30:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 7559d21eda TEL-14: PV sign declared per entity (pv_invert_entities)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m39s
Some PV entities (kWh meters, ESPHome clamps in the PV circuit) read positive
for consumption and negative for production. `pv_invert_entities` lists the
ones to flip; the flip is applied per member inside pv.total(), before the sum,
so the MQTT `pv` row and the status page carry the corrected figure. Default []
is byte-identical to 0.12.0.

Shape measured in supervisor_shape_probe.py section H (Supervisor 2026.08.0):
a parallel list validates the 0.12.0 blob unchanged and renders as its own
translated repeatable field; dicts on pv_entities refuse 0.12.0's stored
strings; a prefix is invisible syntax; a global bool cannot describe a mixed
roster. Status page marks flipped entities and cautions per entity below
-50 W, saying ADD or REMOVE. Telemetry only: control documents unchanged.

Record: DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md (reverses TEL-11 section 2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:25:24 +02:00
admin 3e38bafcee Merge pull request 'SAFETY-62/SAFETY-60: operator tools refuse input they cannot read' (#120) from SAFETY-62-refuse-unread-input into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:25:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 02a822af98 DOC-5: tell installers to turn on the Supervisor Watchdog
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m41s
Since SAFETY-61 a dead control loop writes 0 W and exits 70. The Supervisor
restarts a stopped add-on only when the per-install Watchdog toggle is on,
and it defaults to off. One step in DOCS.md "Before you start", with a
pointer to the DECISIONS file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:20:52 +02:00
admin 6e6527224a Merge pull request 'SAFETY-61: the control task's death ends the process, after the wind-down' (#121) from safety-61-control-task-death into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:07:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 770988c902 TEST-26: a missing value in a check is a named FAIL, not a traceback
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m44s
Checks and prints that indexed an empty list, exhausted next(), or formatted
None killed the rest of their file (FCST-06). Read them through the new
named_absence.py (nth/first/field/given/present) and conjoin a presence term.

- every site in the brief, plus the family the new scan and a sweep found
- test_named_absence.py: scans every test_*.py for unguarded filtered-list
  indexing, next() without a default and numeric formats on maybe-None
  names; proven to bite; prints what it cannot see, counted
- test_price.py 16a: the `_T17_CAPS is _T17_CAPS` tautology now grades the
  two assemble() calls' arguments
- test_control.py: coverage table re-measured on runs graded to the end

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:06:58 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b06f1fad5f SAFETY-62 review: DOCS exit 3 at the command block (R1); recognise the auto store key (R2)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m35s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:02:33 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 71d2d4a37a SAFETY-61: the control task's death ends the process, after the wind-down
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m22s
A done-callback on run_control()'s task logs the traceback at the death and
sets `stop`; amain() runs the ordinary wind-down (shutdown() ->
command_site_zero()) and main() exits 70 (EX_SOFTWARE). Normal stops and
run_control()'s refusal path are ignored by the callback (still 0 / 78).

hass.py: a malformed JSON body, a JSON non-object, and an undecodable error
body are an absence / a failed write, not an exception into the loop.

checks() gains a first "control loop" row, red past FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S.

Why exit rather than restart in-process, and what the Supervisor actually
does on exit (restarts only with the per-install Watchdog toggle on, default
off): DECISIONS/SAFETY-61-control-task-death.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:52:42 +02:00
admin fa3d237ce1 Merge pull request 'DOC-1: operator docs name the real P1 entity and a roster that starts' (#119) from doc-1-operator-docs into release/1.0 2026-09-24 23:42:13 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 f4f72211a9 SAFETY-60/62: operator tools refuse input they cannot read
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m31s
predeploy_check.py and rehearse_roster.py now assert a positive property of
their input (a JSON object, most of whose top-level keys are known option or
store keys) and refuse anything else with the shape named. The `ha apps info
--raw-json` wrapper, a truncated or list-wrapped state file and a wrapped
config no longer produce "CLEARED" / "NO FINDINGS" with exit 0.

Also: a clean --no-live-entities rehearsal exits 3, not 0; alloc_sim.py
exits 1 when split-invariance FAILS; decode_bus_capture.py takes several
paths and exits 1 on a file that is mostly not frames.

Graded by the new test_tool_inputs.py; DOCS.md says to pass .data.options.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:27:50 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 29ca9b5157 DOC-1: operator docs name the real P1 entity and a roster that starts
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m8s
- DOCS.md / config.yaml: the watchdog's P1 age entity is
  sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age (device "GoodWe" + "P1 sample age", as
  app/mqtt.py announces and the live install recorded), not
  sensor.p1_sample_age_s.
- DOCS.md: the inverters: example and per-entry table carry the required
  bms_soc_floor (and capacity_kwh); config.yaml's schema comment says four
  required keys, not three.
- Field guide: marked v0.1.0/outdated; slew_w row no longer recommends the
  1000 W that SAFETY-39 now refuses. HTML regenerated; the PDF is NOT
  rebuilt (no Chrome here). README/DOCS pointers fixed.
- test_docs.py: the documented roster must pass app/validate.py and the
  schema's per-entry keys; the documented entity id must equal the id
  composed from app/mqtt.py; the wrong id may appear in no shipped doc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:24:50 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 a45ed06c05 PKG-18: cut 0.12.0, so TEL-12's pv_entities can reach an installed 0.11.0 (#117)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Reviewed at head 1ad4d3a. CI run 830 (attempt 1, pull_request, PR 117 -> release/1.0), 31/31 PASS. Review: #issuecomment-1588, #issuecomment-1589.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:09:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 1ad4d3a5bb PKG-18: cut 0.12.0, so TEL-12's pv_entities can reach an installed 0.11.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m5s
One runtime merge since 0.11.0 (cccb2fa): TEL-12 (#116), a new optional
list option `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity`. Option surface 76 -> 77, so
a minor bump. config.yaml version and a closed `## 0.12.0` section only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 22:59:44 +02:00
admin f863ecaa8c TEL-12: several PV inverters, and one absent member is an absent TOTAL (#116)
pv_entity becomes a roster: pv_entities beside it, replacing it, with the SITE total over the roster. One absent member makes the TOTAL absent - never the partial sum of the ones that answered, because a smaller number indistinguishable from a real one reads a week later as 'there was less sun than there was', which is the conclusion OPT-10 exists to test rather than to manufacture. A member honestly reporting 0 W is still summed.

Reviewed on PR 116. Re-run independently: supervisor_shape_probe.py SSG (exit 0, transcript reproduces byte for byte), the owner's real 75-key options blob through Supervisor 2026.08.0's own AppOptions (ACCEPTED, zero drift on any stored value, pv_entities defaulted to []), tel11_pv_trace.py --compare across both trees (every hash reproduces, control 846a10a5b89e unmoved on unset and one), the rejected-design mutant (trace REFUSED 5/5 with the partial sums named), the planted leak N8 (52/26/10 red cells), and eight mutations on fresh purged copies including N5 sum->max at +0 bytes - no survivors. Habit 24's central claim measured: TEL-11's own --compare refuses on every honest run now that release/1.0 is 0.11.0.

Green traced to this PR's own run: 829/1954, attempt 1, event pull_request, path checks.yml@refs/pull/116/head, payload naming PR 116 with base release/1.0 @ cccb2fa, 31 suites PASS in 7m53s - a real execution, not a laundered skip.

Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays 0.11.0 and the CHANGELOG entry is PKG's call.
2026-09-24 22:41:19 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 0ef9565071 TEL-12: several PV inverters, and one absent member is an absent TOTAL
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m59s
0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity` as a single string. The reference site's owner
reported within minutes of it going live that they have several PV inverters
and could configure one - which is ordinary for a multi-string roof, not a
property of one house. `pv_entities` is the roster and the row carries the
SITE total.

⚠️ THE HARD PART IS ABSENCE, NOT THE LIST. Three configured, one `unavailable`,
and the sum of the other two is a SMALLER NUMBER INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM A REAL
ONE. Read back by OPT-10 that says "there was less PV than there was" - the "no
irradiance" conclusion the channel exists to TEST. So `pv.total()` answers
`None` the moment any configured entity is absent: the topic carries HA's own
`None`, the entity goes to `unknown`, the recorder records a GAP. The
alternative (the partial sum beside a contributor count) was implemented and
run as mutation N1b; it loses because the MQTT row is read COLD a week later by
an attribution that would believe it, while the qualifying count would live in a
second entity with its own history. The partial information is not thrown away -
the STATUS PAGE names every entity that reported, with its watts, and every one
that did not, with its reason, because that surface is read LIVE by a human who
wants the diagnostic.

⚠️ AND THE MIRROR: a member honestly reporting 0 W is SUMMED. The test is
`is None`, never falsiness - a roster that blanked the site on a zero would
report an absence on every clear evening.

THE SURFACE IS MEASURED, NOT PREFERRED. `pv_entity` could not become a list:
tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py §G shows Supervisor 2026.08.0 answering an
0.11.0 install's stored string with `Invalid list for option 'pv_entity'`, and
deepmerge's list strategy is `override` so a `[]` default does not rescue it -
the live add-on would not start. `match(.*)?` does accept both shapes and is
rejected for a different, measured reason: it validates nothing (a string, a
list and the integer 417 all pass) and renders as a plain text box. So
`pv_entities` joins `pv_entity` and REPLACES it when set, CFG-04's rule for
`inverters:`, with a status caution saying which key won - a union would
double-count the inverter the old key still names.

STILL NOT A CONTROL INPUT. tools/tel11_pv_trace.py was extended rather than
replaced and now grades five claims over three document sets. The control hash
is UNMOVED - 846a10a5b89e… on `unset` and on `one`, on both trees - and the
roster control document is byte-identical between the two trees. 2/5 is a claim
TEL-11 could not make: with 0.11.0 as the baseline, "one entity behaves exactly
as 0.11.0 does" is a real cross-tree identity over control AND telemetry.

⚠️ TEL-11's OWN `--compare` REFUSAL HAD TO CHANGE, and that is MUTATION.md habit
24: a discriminator defined as "the baseline lacks this feature" dies on the
release that ships the feature, and dies as a false refusal.

Twelve mutations, each on a fresh purged `cp -a`, no survivors. N5 is +0 B
(`sum` -> `max`, the same three characters) and was run on a fresh copy with
`cmp` confirming the edit on disk. The fixture is three distinct NON-ZERO
contributions in two units with absence driven at EVERY position - a member
contributing 0 W could go absent without moving the sum of the rest, which is
habit 23 with a coinciding value in the arithmetic rather than in the plant.

31/31 in the CI image. Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays at 0.11.0,
so predeploy_check.py reports a NO-OP until PKG cuts a version. A CHANGELOG
entry is wanted and deliberately not written - 11b forbids `## Unreleased` and
the bump is PKG's call; DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md is the
material it needs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 22:13:25 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cccb2fa07b PKG-17: cut 0.11.0, so SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's pv_entity can reach an installed 0.10.1 (#114)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m1s
Bumps config.yaml 0.10.1 -> 0.11.0 and adds the `## 0.11.0` section, so the Supervisor offers the update that carries SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's `pv_entity`.

Reviewed at head b11bea7. Green traced to this PR's own run (827, attempt 1, payload names PR 114 base release/1.0, 31/31 real). Version gate 11a-11d, SAFETY-56's behaviour hash and TEL-11's four trace rows all re-measured on this tree and matching. slug unchanged; option surface 75 -> 76 with no validator rule added.

Two non-blocking findings recorded on the PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 19:20:06 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 b11bea70d3 PKG-17: the SAFETY-57 correction pointed at the wrong paragraph
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m13s
Self-review. The note added to `### SAFETY-57` said the reading rule it is
qualifying is "two paragraphs up"; it is in the paragraph directly above - the
same one the note follows. A changelog that misdirects a reader to a paragraph
that is not there is the small end of exactly the defect this cut is fixing
three sentences of elsewhere, so it is corrected rather than left.

Text only, one line pair, still two files in the branch's diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 19:01:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cfafdffaed PKG-17: cut 0.11.0, so SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's pv_entity can reach an installed 0.10.1
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Two files, and no third. config.yaml 0.10.1 -> 0.11.0; CHANGELOG.md gains
`## 0.11.0` and three corrections to sections below it.

A MINOR BUMP, NOT A PATCH. TEL-11 adds an option - `pv_entity`, 75 keys -> 76 in
`options:` and `schema:` together - which is the same test 0.8.0, 0.9.0 and
0.10.0 were cut on. Nothing here can refuse a stored blob: the key is `str?`
with an `options:` default of "", validate.py does not mention it, no default
moved and no enum widened, so a blob that starts the add-on on 0.10.1 starts it
on 0.11.0.

THE TABLE HAS TWO ROWS AND THE WINDOW HAD FOUR MERGES. CI-9's follow-up
(9f6b9f1, `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` only) and SEC-2 (239e120,
`docs/RELEASE.md` + README.md) are excluded under PKG-15's rule - AUDIENCE, NOT
IMPORTANCE. Neither file is under `goodwe_controller/`, neither is in the built
image, neither is in predeploy_check.py's RUNTIME tuple, and there is no version
of this add-on on which an operator can observe either. SEC-2 is the closer call
and the section argues it in full rather than asserting it: it is the more
consequential ticket of the two - it is why this release is a pull request
rather than a push to master - and it is still a procedure for whoever cuts a
release, not something the person deciding whether to press Update can act on.
Both are named in the section with pointers to PR #102 / checks.yml and PR #108
/ docs/RELEASE.md.

WHAT THE ENTRIES LET AN OPERATOR DECIDE. SAFETY-56: behaviour byte-identical
(6030175ed2ab..., reproduced in the CI image over 2390 capture reads, a 66-cell
grid stepped 120 times and six driven worlds), three surfaces named with the old
and new wording side by side - the STALE_READING line quoted onto the action log
and status page, the SAFETY-37 ERROR log line, and the readiness row that
asserted a false fact about a named entity. TEL-11: unset is byte-identical in
BOTH the control and telemetry documents, set is byte-identical in the control
document only; the three TEL-11 rows of that table were re-measured in the CI
image on this tree (control 846a10a5... twice, telemetry a443a6ce... / 4e6d1cb2...).
It is stated plainly that pv_entity is not a control input and does not change
what the loop does, and that absence publishes `unknown` rather than 0.

THREE CORRECTIONS BELOW THE NEW SECTION, WITHOUT REWRITING HISTORY. The 0.10.1
preamble said SAFETY-56 was open; the SAFETY-57 entry said its accusatory
diagnosis half was "deliberately untouched"; the 0.10.0 preamble left SAFETY-56
with no pointer while SAFETY-57 had one. All three quotations are what the
0.10.1 image actually prints and are left standing - a reader on 0.10.1 has to
recognise them - each now scoped to 0.10.1 and pointed at `## 0.11.0`.

VERIFIED. test_version_gate.py part 11 all four: 11a one contents table and the
slicer closed (302 lines under '0.11.0'), 11b 0.11.0 == config.yaml, 11c all
three RETIRED_PROVIDERS ids named - scoped to a pre-0.10.0 crossing and pointing
at `## 0.10.0`, which is where the evidence is - 11d still exactly one
`## Unreleased` below, PKG-08's, untouched. 31/31 in the CI image, checks.yml's
exact command, purged tree, `:ro`.

Not deployed and not installed. Shipping is a separate pull request from
release/1.0 into master, per docs/RELEASE.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 18:50:13 +02:00
admin 94da37fc72 TEL-11: PV production stops being invisible, and stays out of the control law (#113)
Reviewed on the PR. Green traced to run 825 (PRNUM 113, BASEREF release/1.0, attempt 1, real 8m6s execution). Control-path identity independently reproduced on both trees and counter-tested with a planted leak (red on 26/41 cells); all three of the trace tool substituted refusals fire. M7 genuinely red. Three publication states distinct on the wire. 31/31 in the CI image.

Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays at 0.10.1, so predeploy_check.py reports a NO-OP until PKG cuts a version.
2026-09-24 15:55:29 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 07ba3433ed TEL-11: PV production stops being invisible, and stays out of the control law
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m6s
OPT-10 measured that this site's pack reaches 90 % SoC on 2 days of 16 and that
20.5 kWh of surplus left the site while the pack had room - 12.6 kWh of it with
the battery not charging at all - and could not say WHY, because PV production
is recorded NOWHERE. Three causes need three different fixes (no irradiance:
nothing to fix; a charge-power limit; the optimiser declining to charge, which
is the only software defect) and guessing between them is how an optimiser gets
tuned to solve a cloud problem. This card adds the channel. It does not do the
attribution.

AN HA ENTITY, NOT A REGISTER, AND THAT IS A PRODUCT DECISION. This add-on's
RS485 bus carries the BATTERY inverter it drives; a household's PV inverter is
normally a different box from a different vendor reporting into Home Assistant
through its own integration. `pv_entity` takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's
own PV integration provides, any brand HA can read.

POSITIVE IS PRODUCTION, AND THERE IS NO `pv_invert`. The convention is derived
rather than assumed: `meter_entity` is positive when IMPORTING and `batt_entity`
is positive when DISCHARGING (DOCS.md, Sources), both of which are "power
arriving at the house's AC bus", and production arrives there too. Those two
keys carry invert flags because they are BIPOLAR and are READ BY THE CONTROL
PATH - `inv.batt` feeds SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and SAFETY-31's
circulating-power sensor, so a reversed sensor hands the site a plausible number
it acts on. Production is unipolar and is read by nothing: a reversed sensor
announces itself as -4 kW at noon in the very history this card creates, and a
flag would only let an installer hide it. No negative-value alarm either - a PV
inverter's own standby draw makes a small negative reading at night ordinary, so
any threshold would be a number nobody measured.

ABSENCE IS NEVER ZERO, AND "DROPPED" IS NOT ABSENT. `publish()` SKIPS a None,
which is right for `circulation` and exactly wrong here: a skipped row leaves
Home Assistant holding the last number forever and the recorder draws a FLAT
LINE through the outage, which is indistinguishable from a measurement and
manufactures the "there was no surplus" conclusion this card exists to TEST. So
the absence is published, with HA's own payload: `mqtt/const.py` declares
`PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"` and `mqtt/sensor.py` tests it BEFORE the numeric branch,
so the entity's state becomes `unknown` and the recorder stores a GAP. Read out
of home-assistant/core `dev` on 2026-09-24 and quoted at the constant.
`ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is a one-key set and the suite asserts `circulation: None`
is STILL dropped.

THE UNIT IS READ OFF THE ENTITY. `mW`, `W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`, `TW` - HA's own
`UnitOfPower`, every factor an exact power of ten. A sensor with no unit, or a
unit outside that table, is REFUSED by name and the status page says which.
`read_inputs()`'s `abs(raw) < 50` kW-or-W guess is safe for a quarter-hour
demand forecast and is NOT safe here: 30 W of dusk is an ordinary reading and
that heuristic would publish it as 30 kW.

GENUINELY OPTIONAL, AND NOT A SECOND `price_now_entity`. validate.py does not
mention the key - it cannot conflict with anything, because nothing else reads
it. The MQTT row lives in a new `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` list whose `include` argument
DEFAULTS TO EMPTY, so every caller that has never heard of `pv_entity` -
test_mqtt.py's fixtures, tools/rehearse_roster.py, anything written next year -
announces exactly what it announced before. Unset: no state call at all, no
entity, no topic, no status row, no page row. Set and failing: a CAUTION
(`ok=False, warn=True`), never a `bad` row, so a telemetry channel can never put
a battery site into NOT READY.

IT MUST NOT BECOME A CONTROL INPUT, AND THAT IS GRADED TWICE. `test_pv.py`
part 6 drives 40 cycles of the real `cycle()` and asserts the commands are
bit-identical across unset / no reading / 0 W / 8 kW, with a COMPUTED census
(33 modules under app/) showing the material is mentioned in exactly three:
pv.py, main.py, mqtt.py. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is the cross-tree half -
`safety56_behaviour_trace.py`'s pattern with a DIFFERENT control clause, because
this card's claim is that nothing differs rather than that only sentences do: it
REFUSES unless the two `app/` fingerprints differ and unless exactly one side
reacts to the option. Measured on 41 stimulus cells:

    control   release/1.0 unset  846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    control   TEL-11      unset  846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    control   TEL-11      set    846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    telemetry release/1.0 unset  a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
    telemetry TEL-11      unset  a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
    telemetry TEL-11      set    4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f

UNSET is byte-identical in BOTH documents, which is stronger than "the control
path is untouched": an install that does not set the option sees no change of
any kind, announcement and status rows included.

⚠️ AND THE CARD'S CENTRAL MUTATION WAS A SURVIVOR ON THE FIRST BATTERY.
`self.grid -= self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` - +106 B, on disk, purged, genuinely
running - came back GREEN, because the fixture drove a 6 kW export over 12
cycles, which puts the loop AGAINST ITS RAIL: a command moving `slew_w` every
cycle produces the same ramp for -6000 W and for -14 000 W of apparent error.
MUTATION.md habit 23 with a saturated ACTUATOR in place of a coinciding value,
and it is in that file now as the habit's second instance. The fixture now
drives a 600 W import the loop SETTLES on, against a responsive meter, and asks
habit 23's own question as its own check: shift the METER by the same 8 kW and
confirm the commands really would have moved.

Evidence: 31/31 suites green in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged
tree, `:ro`. Ten mutations, NO survivors, each on its own `cp -a` of the tree so
habit 18's revert hazard is closed by construction - table in
`DECISIONS/TEL-11-pv-production.md` §7 with byte deltas and sha256s.

⚠️ THIS IS A RUNTIME CHANGE BEHIND AN UNCHANGED VERSION, AND
`tools/predeploy_check.py` WILL REFUSE IT. `app/`, `config.yaml` and
`translations/` are all in its `RUNTIME` tuple and `config.yaml` still reads
0.10.1, so the gate reports a NO-OP deploy until a version is cut. That is PKG's
call and this card does not take it.

No CHANGELOG section: `test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## ` heading
that is not config.yaml's `version:`, and opening one would mean taking that
same packaging decision. The operator account is in DOCS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 15:35:07 +02:00
admin 9f6b9f14cd CI-9 follow-up: the summary said "mechanically", the blind spots say otherwise (#102)
Corrects the preamble's claim that the `guard the trigger` step keeps checks.yml filter-free "mechanically". It does not, for blind spots 1 and 3: the guard lives inside the workflow a filter makes Gitea skip, so for those the defence is the comment.

Names the filter that would actually get written - `branches: [release/1.0]`, not `[main]` - because it reads as tightening onto the protected branch, leaves every day-to-day pull request green, and switches off the `release/1.0` -> `master` release pull request that SEC-2 made the mandated path to an installed system. Points the forge fix at both protected branches, not just `release/1.0`.

Reviewed on the pull request. Verified from the branch's bytes: the guard's awk is unchanged and still refuses `branches:`, `paths:`, `paths-ignore:`, `branches-ignore:`, `tags-ignore:`, `types:` and the inline-flow form injected into the `on:` block of the edited file; comment-only at 0 non-comment changed lines, non-comment lines identical 139 == 139; the merged tree differs from c9aaf7f in this one file only. Green traced per CI-10 to run 824 / job 1949, payload PRNUM 102 / BASEREF release/1.0, base c9aaf7f, 30 PASS 0 FAIL.
2026-09-24 14:37:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8f9c2cad57 CI-9 follow-up: the skip direction, written the right way round
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m37s
`every subsequent pull request matching it is skipped too` is the inverse of
the behaviour. A pull request that MATCHES a `branches:` filter still RUNS;
the one the filter EXCLUDES is what Gitea sits out, reports `skipped`, and the
rollup launders into `success`.

The error arrived with the generalisation in the previous commit: `33e17db`
said "every subsequent pull request is skipped too", which was unqualified and
true for the `[main]` case it described. Naming the wider hazard made a
qualifier necessary, and the wrong one went in - contradicting the paragraph
directly below it, which describes `[release/1.0]` correctly as leaving every
day-to-day PR running and green.

Corrected, and the direction is now stated explicitly with the failed draft
recorded, because this file already carries one instance of the same shape:
"That was wrong, it contradicted the checkout step's own note a few lines
below, and the error was not cosmetic."

Guard re-verified on the edited bytes: passes here, still refuses
`branches: [release/1.0]` added to the `on:` block. Comment-only, 0
non-comment lines changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 14:27:19 +02:00
admin c9aaf7f04d SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can (#112)
Text only, no behaviour change. Three operator-facing sentences stop asserting a dead register where the gate cannot distinguish a dead register from a pack the BMS is refusing.

Reviewed on the PR: behaviour byte-identical (trace tool sha256 6030175ed2ab reproduced on both trees, plus AST identity with string constants normalised); five mutations re-applied on purged trees, all matching claimed named-red counts; SoC of the live episode independently measured at 11 percent; CI green traced to PRNUM 112 / BASEREF release/1.0.
2026-09-23 21:27:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 8a6acd9fa2 SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Text only. No behaviour change - same conjunction, same limits, same MISSING,
same 0 W, same NOT READY. `tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` says so: 2390
capture reads, a 66-cell swept grid, and six driven controller worlds produce
the byte-identical document `6030175e...` on origin/release/1.0 and on this
branch, while the sentences differ.

THE DEFECT. SAFETY-37's conjunction is satisfied by two disjoint worlds - the
register has stopped reporting reality, or the SOURCE cannot comply with the
command - and nothing `freshness.py` is handed separates them. Three sentences
asserted the first. On the live 2026-09-21 episode it was the second: the pack
read 11 % for the whole 850 s hold, every command in that hold was a discharge,
and the register answered the first CHARGE command three seconds later. The
readiness row was worse still, because it asserted a false fact about a NAMED
entity that was present, numeric and updating - so the operator opened
Developer Tools, found it working, and had every reason to conclude the
diagnostics were broken.

THE FIX. Each message states what was OBSERVED and names BOTH explanations.
Three wordings, no shared helper: two are a log line about a behaviour, the
third is a banner about an entity, and a helper serving both would drop
whichever half the other caller does not need. SoC stays STATED, NOT WIRED -
part 11b drives the two worlds at 50 % and 11 % and the sentence does not move
one byte. The row does not branch on `batt_fresh.stale` either: `stale_note()`
already rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below, so the discriminator is "is
that row there?", and part 11d asserts it is present in one world and absent in
the other.

THE CHECKS. test_freshness.py part 11 builds the pair of worlds with ground
truth written down rather than derived from the published stream, asserts they
are really two (40 of 40 reads differ) while the published stream is
bit-identical, and only then grades the sentences. Eleven mutations, all red:
each of the three sentences reverted (3, 2 and 2 named reds), the two
explanations transposed at ZERO bytes (1), the second explanation deleted (1),
the admission of ambiguity replaced by a ranking (1), all three reverted at
once (5), and two aimed at this card's own check - collapsing the world pair
(2) and emptying the accusation list, which a positive control against the
three sentences as 0.10.1 shipped them catches (1).

AND TWO OF THE ELEVEN FOUND DEFECTS IN THE CHECK RATHER THAN IN THE CODE.
Transposing `label` and `entity` in the row made it unfindable and the run died
on an IndexError - a red with no name and every later check ungraded, FCST-06's
shape exactly; `_s56_row()` returns a named absence now, 0 named reds before, 3
after. And the first invariance run compared a tree with itself, because it
archived a branch whose edits were not committed yet; the tool now REFUSES to
report "behaviour unchanged" unless the sentences halves differ, and both of
its refusals are driven.

SAFETY-57's part 10h check was the handoff and is inverted rather than deleted:
it required the accusation to still be present so that removing it had to be a
deliberate act. This is that act. Its escape clause is untouched.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 21:02:40 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 628279a68a CI-9 follow-up: name the filter that actually gets written, not the one that looks wrong
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
Three sentences in the blind-spot clause went stale between writing and review.

`no pull request in 99 has ever targeted master` is no longer true: SEC-2 made
`release/1.0` -> `master` the mandated release path and protected `master`
with the same required context, and a PR against that base has run for real.
The census it came from also erases its own evidence - PR #102 was itself
opened against `master` before retargeting, which the /pulls listing no longer
shows, exactly as the caveat 25 lines above this clause warns.

The clause also named `branches: [main]` as the hazard. That is the version
that looks wrong. The one someone would actually write is
`branches: [release/1.0]` - it reads as tightening onto the protected branch,
every day-to-day PR keeps running green, and the only thing it switches off is
the release PR whose content reaches an installed system.

And the prescribed fix named only `release/1.0`'s status_check_contexts. Since
SEC-2 `master` carries the same rule, so a reader following it literally would
half-close the hole and believe it shut.

Guard re-verified against the edited bytes: passes on this file (whose new
prose quotes `branches: [release/1.0]` in a comment) and still refuses a real
filter added to the `on:` block. Comment-only: 0 non-comment lines changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 20:18:50 +02:00
admin 239e120bf6 SEC-2: write down the release path, now that master refuses a direct push (#108)
Reviewed on the PR (issuecomments 1480, 1485, 1488, 1489). Documentation only: docs/RELEASE.md (new, 116 lines) plus a 2-line pointer in README.md's file map. No code, no workflow change.

Verified against the forge rather than accepted from the document:
- Both branch_protections rules re-read field-for-field identical (enable_push false, enable_force_push false, status check `checks / unit (pull_request)`, required_approvals 0, block_admin_merge_override true, no whitelists, no file patterns); master's rule created 2026-09-23T03:09:21; default_branch still master. Section 2's After table is exact. No protection was changed by this review - both rules re-read with their original updated_at.
- The empty-PR 405 trap reproduced independently on my own control (throwaway PR #111 between two same-SHA unprotected branches): empty PR -> 405 "Please try again later"; same PR after one commit -> 409 "head out of date". Section 1's "read the message, not the code" is correct and both messages are quoted accurately. PR #111 closed, branches deleted.
- release/1.0 (b0b24e5) is an ancestor of master (0f14c2a), so a literal release PR is empty right now - PR #109 has 0 commits, 0 files, and Gitea opened it anyway. Section 1's closing note is right.
- A master-base PR gets a genuine CI run, not a laundered skip: PR #107 head cb7e45b3 shows Waiting -> In progress -> success, "Successful in 7m56s", run 814. This PR's own head 9d593429 likewise, run 818.
- All five required steps are present and correctly ordered: work merges to release/1.0 with a version bump in goodwe_controller/config.yaml; release via PR release/1.0 -> master; direct push refused; green check before merge; `ha store reload` after, without which the Supervisor keeps serving the cached version. required_approvals: 0 is stated twice, so no reader can believe the dev/review split is enforced.

One non-blocking defect left open (issuecomment 1485): section 1 calls 0f14c2a "the only commit on master that carries no (#NN) merge suffix". 274 of master's 297 commits carry no suffix. The true statement is stronger - no release has ever reached master through a pull request, and 6f5e8e3 (0.10.0) was promoted by the same direct push one release earlier, so 0.10.1 was the second, not a one-off. Background, not procedure; wants a follow-up line change.

A third comment of mine (issuecomment 1488, merge style) is withdrawn in issuecomment 1489 - it rested on a premise I had not checked and which is false.
2026-09-23 04:08:18 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9d593429d3 SEC-2: write down the release path, now that master refuses a direct push
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m56s
master is the default branch, which is what the Home Assistant Supervisor
clones - so whatever sits on it runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Until today it
had no branch protection at all, while every gate this repo built sat on
release/1.0, the branch that does not ship. 0.10.1 went straight onto master
on 2026-09-22 with no PR, no CI and no reviewer, and it succeeded.

master now carries the same rule as release/1.0 - enable_push false,
required context `checks / unit (pull_request)`, block_admin_merge_override,
required_approvals 0. That is a forge setting and cannot live in a commit, so
the part that can is this: the procedure it implies. Without it the next
release is attempted the old way and fails confusingly at the push.

docs/RELEASE.md records the path (merge to release/1.0, bump version, PR
release/1.0 -> master, wait for green, merge, then `ha store reload` before
the Supervisor offers anything), the before/after protection state of both
branches, and how the gate was proven to bite rather than merely badge green.

Documentation only - no code, no workflow change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 03:43:37 +02:00
admin b0b24e5d41 PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0 (#105)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
Reviewed on the PR (issuecomments 1455-1462): identity verified unchanged (slug goodwe_controller, no image: key, installed slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller corroborated from HA backup metadata); version-gate 11a-11d re-implemented and verified independently; the 16-of-93-at-790s pairing re-derived from the committed 16-day capture (>=710: 17, >=790: 16, >=815: 15); the SAFETY-57 entry verified as a faithful move carrying only the three declared #104 documentation fixes; corrected 0.10.0 preamble corroborated to the day against backup metadata; suite 30/30 reproduced with checks.yml's exact command. Two files, no control code. The 710 s/790 s split between test_freshness.py and this file is a known, stated gap and takes its own card.

NOTE: master (the Supervisor's default branch) is still 0.10.0 and still lacks SAFETY-57. This merge does not deliver; bringing master to release/1.0 is a fast-forward and is the remaining step.
2026-09-22 15:52:25 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 eb88646899 PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
The Supervisor decides an update exists by comparing config.yaml's version
string with the one the box reports. master and release/1.0 both said 0.10.0,
so SAFETY-57 - a deadlock that parked the reference battery for ~13 min on
2026-09-21 while the house exported 2.4 kW - had no way of reaching the box
that has it. A patch bump is the delivery mechanism, not bookkeeping.

- config.yaml: 0.10.0 -> 0.10.1. Nothing else in the option surface moves:
  no key added or removed, no default changed, no enum widened, no rule added
  to validate.py, so a blob that starts on 0.10.0 starts on 0.10.1.

- CHANGELOG.md: a new `## 0.10.1` section, holding SAFETY-57's entry moved out
  of `## 0.10.0`. The entry opened by saying it was misfiled and that whoever
  cut the next version owned moving it; this is that cut, so that paragraph is
  replaced by what an operator actually needs in order to decide - what the
  deadlock does (command parked at 0 W, batt reading gated to MISSING, escape
  condition unreachable from inside the state), how to recognise it (setpoint
  stuck at exactly 0 W with the battery register flat, a STALE line and no
  clearing line) and that a restart of the add-on clears it.

- PKG-16 proper: `## 0.10.0`'s preamble still claimed 0.10.0 "has never been
  built or pulled anywhere" and that the reference install was on 0.7.0. Both
  stopped being true on 2026-09-20 ~22:18 CEST, when 0.10.0 was installed as a
  repository add-on (slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller) and began regulating a
  real battery. The section's own bump argument was explicitly conditional on
  that; the condition has fired, so the argument is retold as history and the
  section is closed. This text is what the Supervisor shows beside Update.

Also fixes, in this file only, the three non-blocking documentation defects
raised on PR #104 - issuecomments 1445, 1446 and 1447:

- 1446: the live episode is 790 s, not 710 s. Re-derived rather than rescaled:
  at >= 790 s the committed 16-day replay gives 16 of 93, not 17.
- 1447: the BMS keep-alive pulse was an inference stated as a measurement. No
  committed capture identifies one, and on this episode 0x0518 never moved at
  all. The measured claim replaces the firmware story.
- 1445: "neither consumer can reach a verdict inside one window" is universal
  as written and graded on a fixture that puts the obligation back on every
  release. It now carries the qualifier the reviewer asked for, and names the
  unbounded case and why the shipped one-inverter roster cannot reach it.

The same three defects also sit in app/freshness.py, test_freshness.py,
DOCS.md and the DECISIONS note. They are deliberately NOT touched here: this
PR is config.yaml and CHANGELOG.md only, and none of them is worth delaying a
live safety fix. SAFETY-56 and SAFETY-58 are likewise untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-22 15:22:03 +02:00
admin b9f7bd0506 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested (#104)
Reviewed and merged by the PR review agent. Acceptance criterion re-driven independently off the committed RS-485 capture: the verdict is withdrawn with 0x0518 held constant at -3 W, no external change. Counterfactual release_s=inf verified byte-equivalent to the shipped-before module over 242336 reads, so the SAFETY-37 conjunction is untouched. 30/30 suite green in checks.yml's own image; 11 mutations re-applied on a purged tree; the argued-equivalent M7 proved equivalent over full internal state.

Three non-blocking documentation findings filed on the PR (comments 3/7, 4/7, 5/7) for a follow-up before the next version is cut.
2026-09-21 15:49:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 43c144b8d9 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
SAFETY-37's freshness gate reports a battery-power register as MISSING when it
stops following its own command, and a missing input is "command 0 W and keep
commanding" (§11.1 rule 1). The gate's only exit was "an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number" - and at 0 W nothing is asking the register to be anywhere.
The state had no exit reachable from inside it, and the log line promised the
opposite in the same sentence that announced the 0 W.

REPRODUCED FROM THE WIRE, NOT MODELLED. scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/ is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, read from the passive sniffer, decoded by
tools/decode_bus_capture.py (0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC, 0 unknown shapes; the
mode->sign convention is graded off the capture, not trusted). The box was
running 0.10.0, so the 0 W in the trace IS the add-on's own claim:

  10:51:24.7  0x0518 reaches -3 W. Pack at 11 %, the BMS refuses the discharge,
              the inverter idles. THE REGISTER IS HEALTHY AND TRUTHFUL.
  10:51:29.7  the command reaches +1060 W - 800 W of travel
  10:52:00    the conjunction arms. Inverter.batt becomes None
  10:52:21.7  the site commands 0 W, on the wire
  ...         0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
              change value for 790.0 s. The house exports 2.4 kW throughout
  ~11:04      a human restarts the add-on. That is what ends it

AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
through the shipped conjunction finds 93 trips whose wait for the BMS
keep-alive pulse that cleared them has a median of 143.4 s, a worst case of
21440.1 s, and 17 of 93 at or beyond this episode's 710 s. That distribution
belongs to the battery's firmware, not to this code.

THE CARD'S OPTION 2 ALREADY HELD AND IS NOT THE BUG. _grade() has required
|standing| >= MOVE_W since SAFETY-37. The trip was at +1060 W and the stuck
state is at 0 W; they are different moments, and an entry-side rule cannot
reach a state entered legitimately and then persisted. Nothing in the
conjunction is weakened here.

THE RULE, SAFETY-13's SHAPE ONE MODULE OVER - which latches get an exit, not
how long the block lasts:

  the verdict is withdrawn when the obligation that produced it has been gone
  for RELEASE_S, and the register is then re-graded from scratch.

RELEASE_S is BATT_OBLIGED_S, 17.0 s - the obligation window already derived in
the file (6.0 plant + 10.0 publish + 1.0 read), taken at the FLOOR of its band
for the mirror of MOVE_W's reason. Which half is safe is the opposite of
SAFETY-13's: being wrong long is the failure being fixed, being wrong short
costs one bounded re-grading window. Below 17 s the release pre-empts the
cheaper exit - the register answering by itself - and that is graded
behaviourally, not asserted.

The whole parked interval is now stale_input_s + RELEASE_S = 32 s. On the live
episode: telemetry back at 10:52:39 instead of 11:05:35, with 0x0518 still
answering the same -3 W. RED BEFORE (release_s=inf, a graded counterfactual and
not a second implementation), GREEN AFTER.

WHAT IT COSTS, AND IT IS NOT SMALL. A register dead for good is re-graded for
ever: over 1201 reads the held number reaches a consumer on 630 (52.5 %)
against 35 (2.9 %) before. Payable only because one window is at most 35 s and
the two consumers hold for 75 s and 85 s, so neither can reach a verdict inside
one and the re-trip clears both windows. No detection SAFETY-37 had is given
back - a permanent None clears the same windows for ever too - and the command
is derived from the P1 meter, never from batt.

Two clocks, deliberately: changed_mono/unchanged_s() stay facts about the
REGISTER, graded_from/graded_s() are the VERDICT's window. Collapsing them
either lies to the operator or defeats the re-grading.

main.py's stale line had its ESCAPE CLAUSE corrected - it promised a clearance
the state could not produce - and gained a STALE WITHDRAWN edge that says in
its own words that nothing has been learned about the register. The DIAGNOSIS
half is SAFETY-56's and is deliberately untouched, with a named check asserting
it is still there so that rewrite has to be deliberate.

Battery: 22 mutations, 21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.
Two findings kept in DECISIONS: _release()'s move_w test swapped for
unchanged_s SURVIVED at +5 B because every fixture rested at exactly 0 W (habit
11, closed by a 0/100/300 W fixture); and the code shipped a habit-22 comment
claiming the _release/_grade order was load-bearing, which the battery
falsified - the two act on mutually exclusive predicates, so the order is not
observable. MUTATION.md gains habit 23 for a mutation that ran, fingerprinted
clean, and was a no-op on the fixture because `0.0 or x` is x.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro, one
file at a time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-21 12:33:56 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 6f5e8e378a PKG-15: bring release/1.0 to master at 0.10.0, so the default branch is the add-on
`master` has been `5184a2c` / v0.2.1 since 2026-08-25 - the tree that drives the
house - while every ticket since has landed on `release/1.0`. Three consequences
were live, and all three are what this merge closes:

 * `master` is the DEFAULT branch, so Gitea indexes dispatchable workflows from
   it. `master` had no `.gitea/` at all, which is why `GET /actions/workflows`
   answered empty and the UI's dispatch button was missing.
 * new pull requests default to `master`. #102 was opened against it by
   accident and its first run graded the change merged into a stale `master` -
   an honest-looking green answering the wrong question.
 * AND THE ONE THAT NOW MATTERS MOST: the repository has not yet been added to
   Home Assistant, and adding it is part of this release. `master` is the
   branch the Supervisor will read the moment it is added, so whatever stands
   here is what it shows and offers to install. This merge is what makes that
   0.10.0 rather than 0.2.1.

NO CONFLICT WAS POSSIBLE AND THAT WAS CHECKED, NOT ASSUMED. `master` is a
direct ancestor of `release/1.0` (`git merge-base --is-ancestor` true), the
merge base IS `5184a2c`, and `origin/release/1.0..origin/master` is empty -
`master` carries nothing `release/1.0` lacks. `--no-ff` is used anyway, so the
crossing from 0.2.1 to 0.10.0 is one addressable commit rather than a pointer
move.

WHAT CROSSES: config.yaml 0.2.1 -> 0.10.0. The add-on the Supervisor will build
is a different program from v0.2.1 in the ways `goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md`
sections 0.3.0 through 0.10.0 describe - among them P1 meter ingestion, the
separate integrator the velocity form did not have, shadow mode, the tariff
plan and the multi-inverter roster. The ROLLBACK POINT does not move: tag
`v0.2.1` still names `5184a2c` and still names the tree that ran the house.

NOT A DEPLOY. Nothing is installed, no `ha addons update` is run, `/addons/` is
untouched and neither 192.168.2.158 nor 192.168.2.221 was contacted. Adding the
repository to Home Assistant, and pressing Install, remain the owner's call.

Verified before merging: the full suite in the CI image on `release/1.0`'s tree
- `cp -a`, purged, `:ro` mount, one file at a time, exactly the command in
.gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0; and PR #103's own
`checks / unit (pull_request)` was a real `success` on the merge, not a skip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-20 12:34:30 +02:00
admin 8a5736136a PKG-15: fold TEL-10 and SAFETY-48 into 0.10.0, so the version names its contents (#103)
Reviewed and merged by the PKG-15 review agent.

Verified rather than accepted:
- test_version_gate.py 11d pins `## Unreleased` blocks below the newest section at exactly one; deleting the block goes red (reproduced on a copy of the tree).
- 32 runtime commits since 86bdf49 and 24 accounted by the contents table, re-derived with predeploy_check.py's own RUNTIME rule; PKG-14's superseded 28/21 were correct when taken.
- app/validate.py imports neither main nor mqtt (read by AST), and SLEW_RAIL_FRAC / LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S are byte-identical across cb3f686..HEAD, so PKG-14's CLEARED transcript still holds.
- CI-9 (16b1d6c) touches only .gitea/workflows/checks.yml, outside the built image and outside RUNTIME.
- The SAFETY-48 entry keeps the capacity-tariff misreading out: no worst-quarter row in the A/B table, and the 3739 -> 3434 W figure appears only inside the paragraph that disclaims it.

Three non-blocking defects posted on the PR: the gain:0.3 / slew-rail tie values are swapped against DECISIONS/SAFETY-48; "touch three files between them" should say three runtime files; and the stated reason cb3f686 enters the count ("last..HEAD excluded it") is wrong, though the count is right.
2026-09-19 19:08:05 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 5aba220046 PKG-15: fold TEL-10 and SAFETY-48 into 0.10.0, so the version names its contents
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m53s
0.10.0 was cut by PKG-14 on 2026-09-16 and three tickets have merged into
release/1.0 since. Two of them change the built image - one is a CONTROL LAW
change and one adds three MQTT entities - and neither is described anywhere in
this file. Tagging that tree today would stamp a number on contents the
changelog does not account for.

FOLDED RATHER THAN CUT AS 0.11.0, AND THE ARGUMENT IS CONDITIONAL.
0.10.0 has never been built or pulled anywhere: the reference install is on
0.7.0 (PKG-14's own predeploy run records `deployed on the box : 0.7.0`), the
repository carries exactly one tag, `v0.2.1`, and no release. So the string
`0.10.0` does not yet name a tree anyone is running, and the PKG-06/PKG-07
no-op that forbade re-cutting `0.9.0` does not reach it. Cutting 0.11.0 would
burn a number on a release that never left the repository. The condition is
checkable and the section now says so: run against a box already reporting
0.10.0, `tools/predeploy_check.py` refuses with THE DEPLOY WOULD BE A NO-OP and
names the runtime commits since the bump. `config.yaml` stays at 0.10.0, so
`test_version_gate.py` 11b still finds the two sides equal.

SAFETY-48 IS THE ENTRY THAT MATTERED MOST TO GET RIGHT, AND WHAT IT PROMISES
IS LESS EXPORT - NOT A LOWER BILL. The measured result is export 39.61 -> 34.07
kWh over the committed 16-day replay, 14 % of the replayed figure, falling at
every plant and tuning variant swept (~4 % to ~16 %, median near an eighth).
The section says in its own heading and its first line that the control law
changed, and it says PLAINLY that the billed quarter is not a claim: at every
plant lag <= 5.0 s - including the one that best reproduces the recorded export
- release/1.0's worst quarter is ALREADY 3434 W and this changes it by exactly
zero. The 3739 -> 3434 W headline exists at the single longest fitted lag, and
the lag is not identified by the recording. The costs are in the entry too: the
cap moves a saturation-frozen integrator on 1095 of 79 160 frozen ticks, 679 of
them outward; SAFETY-13's settle values moved; SAFETY-39's "the slew does not
own the over-absorption" is now false.

TEL-10 gets the three site rows, what each one is, and the two things a reader
would otherwise get wrong: the lead is NOT a subtraction of two published rows,
and `Loop reason` is not the `Why` row. It repeats neither of the two sentences
TEL-10's own review retracted - EIGHT messages stay first and the ninth,
`goodwe_ctl/availability`, is byte-identical but deliberately moves to last.

CI-9 IS DELIBERATELY NOT IN THIS FILE, AND THE OMISSION IS WRITTEN DOWN RATHER
THAN SILENT. It changes one file, `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`, outside
`goodwe_controller/` entirely: not in the built image, not in `is_runtime()`'s
list, and not observable on any version of the add-on. This file is the release
note the Supervisor shows beside the version number, and a row here has to be
something the person deciding whether to press Update could act on. The note
above SAFETY-48 says so and says the rule is about audience, not importance.

THE STRAY `## Unreleased` AT LINE 1777 IS NOT TOUCHED, AND THAT IS A DECISION.
It is the 0.8.0-era block PKG-14 annotated: every row in it has shipped, the
annotation says which release each went to, and re-filing it is PKG-08's card.
It is also load-bearing - `test_version_gate.py` 11d pins the count of
`## Unreleased` blocks below the newest section at EXACTLY one, so deleting it
is red on the commit that does it, and so is adding a second.

TWO MEASURED FIGURES IN PKG-14'S PROSE WENT STALE AND ARE RE-DERIVED, NOT
ADJUSTED. The runtime-commit count since `86bdf49` is now 32, not 28, of which
the contents table accounts for 24, not 21; both re-run through
`predeploy_check.is_runtime()` itself. The other eight are the three misfiled
tickets (SAFETY-43 x2, SAFETY-44 x3, TEST-21 x2) and `cb3f686`, PKG-14's own
bump, which edits `config.yaml` and so counts as runtime - it was HEAD when
PKG-14 measured and is inside the range now.

PKG-14's `CLEARED, exit 0` predeploy transcript was NOT re-run and now carries
the check that says why it still holds: `config.yaml` is untouched by both
tickets; `app/validate.py` imports neither `main` nor `mqtt`, and the three
names it takes from `control` - SLEW_RAIL_FRAC, LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S -
are byte-identical across cb3f686..HEAD.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, `cp -a` of the tree, purged, `:ro`
mount, one file at a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml -
30/30, exit 0. No runtime file is in this diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 18:49:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 33e17dba0e CI-9 follow-up: the summary said "mechanically", the blind spots say otherwise
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
The residual-risk paragraph at the top of checks.yml claims the `guard the
trigger` step "keeps it that way mechanically rather than by asking the next
editor to read this comment". For blind spots 1 and 3 that is not true: the
guard lives inside the workflow a filter makes Gitea skip, so for those cases
the defence IS the comment.

That paragraph is the preamble someone reads at the exact moment they are
editing the trigger, so a summary running ahead of its detail is worse here
than elsewhere. It now points at the blind spots and states spot 3 plainly:
a filter naming a branch nothing targets is itself skipped, lands green and
untested, and then skips every subsequent pull request - the gate off for
everything, silently.

Flagged by the reviewer on PR #95 (issuecomment-1424) as non-blocking.

This PR is also the first real test of CI-9's fix on release/1.0 itself. Run
806 was a workflow_dispatch and posts no commit status at all, so it verified
content but never the gate. This one has to post `checks / unit
(pull_request)` as success rather than skipped.

Verified before push: the guard passes against this edited file (whose new
prose quotes `branches: [main]` and `master`) and still refuses a genuine
filter added to the `on:` block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 15:53:01 +02:00
admin 16b1d6c422 CI-9: a stacked PR is skipped, and a skipped check clears the merge gate (#95) 2026-09-19 14:55:12 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 ca8fd01819 CI-9: correct the guard comment's grading claim, and name the third blind spot
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m54s
Documentation only - no change to the guard, the trigger, or any step.

The guard's comment block contradicted itself. It said the pull request that
reintroduces a filter "is still graded by the unfiltered workflow which is on
the base today", while the checkout step's note a few lines below says grading
uses the HEAD's workflow. The head's is correct, and the review measured it on
PR #101: head carrying a filter that excludes the base, base carrying the
unfiltered workflow -> no run, context posted `skipped`, rollup `success`, gate
cleared (409). The wrong version made the step sound like an unconditional
ratchet. What is actually true is narrower: it bites whenever the reintroduced
filter still names the pull request's own base, which is the ordinary case.

That correction exposes a third blind spot, worse than the two already listed.
A reintroduced `branches:` filter that simply does not name the base escapes
the guard entirely, because the pull request carrying it is itself skipped. It
needs no craft - `branches: [main]` from a template, or a tidy-up to `[master]`,
which nothing in this repository's history has ever targeted - and it lands as a
skipped, laundered, untested merge into release/1.0. After that every subsequent
pull request is skipped as well: the gate off completely, not merely the stacked
case leaking.

It is documented, not fixed, and deliberately so. No in-repo guard can close it,
because any such guard lives inside the workflow that gets skipped. Closing it
needs a second permanently unfiltered workflow whose context is added to
release/1.0's `status_check_contexts` - a forge change, the owner's decision,
being put to them separately, and explicitly not a blocker on CI-9.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 14:44:16 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 d2ad080e45 CI-9: guard the trigger mechanically, and re-derive two figures I made up
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m55s
Review findings on PR #95.

1. Two figures in the header were written under the word "measured" and were
   not measured. "of the 50 pull requests in this repository's history, 49..."
   came from a /pulls call I did not notice was truncated at Gitea's 50-item
   page cap; and "#93 was stacked on TEL-10 five days ago" was invented - #93
   was created 2026-09-19T10:05:00 and merged 11:05:26, the same morning, under
   three hours before CI-9 was opened. Both re-derived from a paged API query
   and now stated with their denominator: 93 pull requests predate this ticket
   (#1..#93, excluding CI-9's own #94..#98), 92 against release/1.0, exactly one
   stacked (#2, TEL-01 -> SAFETY-04). The 92 is flagged as an upper bound rather
   than a census, because the API reports a pull request's CURRENT base and so
   hides any that was opened stacked and later retargeted - which is #93 itself.
   The ratio, and so the cost argument, is unchanged.

2. The fix rested on an invariant - checks.yml has no event filter - that was
   defended only by a comment. Prose has already failed in this exact file:
   9c1a23328a shipped "NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING" and
   `branches: [release/1.0, master]` in the same commit, eighteen lines apart,
   and that survived 20 days and 84 merges. Adds a step that reads the `on:`
   block of the MERGED checks.yml and fails if it has regained a `branches:`,
   `paths:`, `tags:`, `types:` or any `-ignore` variant. This is not the card's
   option 3 - it does not try to detect its own skip, which is impossible; it
   bites on the pull request that reintroduces a filter, which the unfiltered
   workflow still grades. Two blind spots are named in the step's comment, both
   needing a protection-rule change that is the owner's call.

Also softens "uncloseable from here", which the review judged overstated:
Gitea's acceptance of a `skipped` context is unreachable from this repository,
but the consequence is substantially closeable, and the guard is what closes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 14:25:22 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 074157c4c2 CI-9: drop the pull_request branches filter, because a skipped check clears the gate
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
`branches: [release/1.0, master]` meant a stacked pull request - one based on
another feature branch - never matched. Gitea does not stay silent about a
workflow it sits out: it posts the required context itself with state
`skipped`, the combined-status rollup reports that as `success`, and the merge
gate accepts it. Retargeting does not repair it, because the skip is a commit
status on the head sha and so survives the base change.

Measured on Gitea 1.27.3 with throwaway PR #94 against a branch carrying a copy
of release/1.0's protection rule:

  only status is `skipped`   ->  POST .../merge  409 head out of date  (CLEARED)
  no status at all           ->  POST .../merge  405 not all required  (refused)
  status `pending`           ->  POST .../merge  405 not all required  (refused)
  status `success`           ->  POST .../merge  409 head out of date  (CLEARED)

The 409s come from a deliberately wrong head_commit_id in the probe, which
Gitea checks only after branch protection - so a 409 means the request had
already cleared the gate, and nothing was ever merged. `skipped` is the only
state that leaks.

Fixing this at the gate is not possible. Gitea branch protection can require
that a context is PRESENT, never that it is SUCCESS: its whole status-check
vocabulary is `enable_status_check` and `status_check_contexts`, per this
server's own /swagger.v1.json. So the fix has to be upstream - never emit a
skip - which means no event filter.

Cost: every pull request now runs the full ~8 minute suite, including the
intermediate steps of a stack. 49 of the 50 pull requests in this repository's
history were opened straight against release/1.0 and would have run anyway.

Also corrects two things CI-01's header stated as fact. A filter miss is
fail-OPEN, not the fail-closed pending-forever it described; and it is a
skip-ci keyword, not a filter miss, that actually withholds the context and
leaves it pending.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 13:58:58 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 186a044a3a Merge pull request 'SAFETY-48: the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD' (#93) from SAFETY-48 into release/1.0
Reviewed on the pull request and merged there. Retargeted from TEL-10 to release/1.0 after #92 merged, and NOT merged on the inherited green: retargeting alone left the old `skipped` conclusion attached to a6af332 and the combined status still read success, so the required context was satisfied by a workflow that had never run. Run 799 is a genuine pull_request execution on the merge into release/1.0 - all five steps, the add-on's own tests occupying 08:56:58 to 09:04:47 UTC.

THE CAP MOVING A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR IS ACCEPTABLE, NOT MERELY DISCLOSED. The disclosed figures reproduce exactly against the committed capture - 79 160 frozen ticks, 1095 moved, 679 further out on the side they were already on, worst 2424 W - and the worked tick in the comment is present with exactly the numbers written down and is the worst of that subset. What decides it is where the integrator lands rather than which way it moves: on the shipped configuration integrator_max_w is unset, so target == i_w after the bounds and the cap holds |i_w - slewed| to one slew step on every slew-limited cycle, frozen ones included. Measured over the whole 256 251-tick recording the carried integrator never stands more than two slew steps from the command on the wire - 800 W against release/1.0's 9200 W. On the frozen path this replaces an integrator bounded only by integrator_max_w with one bounded at two steps, so the loop is less wound up on those ticks and not more. The same-cycle command cannot be affected at all, the cap moving i_w after slewed is decided.

THE ALTERNATIVE IS REFUSED FOR A MEASURED REASON. Gating the cap with `if frozen: _lead_cap = float("inf")` reproduces all four of section 5's corrected figures - export 34.71 kWh, wasted 3.49 kWh, worst quarter 3434 W, worst observed lead 4961 W. The gate does leave the bound with a hole large enough to make the card pointless.

NOTHING FALSE FOUND. Section 3a's lag table reproduces cell for cell, including the rows that say the peak improvement is absent at every lag at or below 5.0 s; the card does not claim a capacity-tariff benefit and says so in four places. Form A is committed nowhere, so it was rebuilt from section 3's prose alone and reproduces all seven figures - 34.43 / 110.62 / 2656 / 2.99 / 3934.59 / +2.73 / +991.53 - which makes section 3 a specification rather than a summary. The one-sided cap was swept against the two-sided band over 136 080 states on an independent grid: 0 differences, corroborating habit 22's retraction.

MUTATION EVIDENCE RE-DRIVEN, EVERY COUNT EXACT, on purged cp -a trees one file at a time: L2 zero bytes 4+3, L4 one red in test_telemetry with test_control GREEN as claimed, L5a zero bytes 5+5, L6 zero bytes 6+3.

SUITE RE-RUN BY THE REVIEWER on the merge rather than the branch tip: release/1.0 29/29, this merge 30/30, exit 0.

One non-blocking note left on the pull request: "worst case 2424 W" is scoped to the 679 further-out ticks, while the largest move over all 1095 is 4220 W. That case is benign - the cap pulling a stale positive integrator down to follow a charging command, magnitude falling - which is why it is a note and not a finding.

Merging is not deploying. The live install still runs release/1.0's control law and slew_w 400 applied by hand; this merge authorises no deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 11:05:25 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 660d079bf3 Merge pull request 'TEL-10: the loop's integrator stops being invisible' (#92) from TEL-10 into release/1.0
Reviewed on the pull request and merged there. `checks / unit (pull_request)` run 798 is a real execution, not a skip: all five steps ran and "the add-on's own tests" occupied 08:04:51 to 08:12:38 UTC.

CONTROL BEHAVIOUR IS UNCHANGED, VERIFIED MECHANICALLY RATHER THAN READ. goodwe_controller/app/control.py is blob 180f58a on release/1.0 and on TEL-10 alike, same sha256 of contents, and release/1.0 is a direct ancestor of TEL-10 so there is no merge-base divergence for a change to hide behind. The only executable edit inside cycle() is prev_w=self.target becoming a named local, loop_prev, passed to the same call. Three write sites for self.i_w exist and only two have a telemetry counterpart; the third is the arbiter re-seed at main.py:3049, inside the same branch and immediately followed by compute(), so it cannot leave loop_i_w stale. app/mqtt.py appends to SENSORS and discovery_payloads() walks it in order, so every existing entity keeps its index.

SUITE RE-RUN BY THE REVIEWER, on the MERGE rather than the branch tip, in the CI image on a purged tree, :ro, one file at a time: release/1.0 29/29, this merge 30/30, and the stacked SAFETY-48 30/30 against both bases. All exit 0.

MUTATION EVIDENCE RE-DRIVEN RATHER THAN READ, because the previous round's counts were irreproducible. M1 is 5 reds on TEL-10's tree and 4 on SAFETY-48's, exactly as the header says and for the reason it gives; M2 is confirmed GREEN and is reported as a survivor; M7 is -96 B and 10 reds in test_mqtt.py plus 1 in test_telemetry.py; M9 is a zero-byte reordering and 7 reds. Every claimed count exact.

R6's correction is true and not merely made: part 1's headline now says EIGHT and the slice under it asserts eight entity configs, part 3's NINE headline is backed by a full missing/changed diff that does cover all nine, and the unasked-for fix two lines down reads eight against the eight-prefix slice.

Merging is not deploying. Nothing here reached the inverter and no deploy is authorised by this merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 10:54:02 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a6af332048 SAFETY-48: what the lead cap actually does to a frozen integrator, and what the peak figure depends on
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m55s
Four review findings, none of them in executable code. The control law, the
tests and the instruments' arithmetic are untouched; every number below was
re-measured against the committed 16-day capture before it was written down.

R1 - app/control.py carried a justification the decision record and MUTATION.md
habit 22 had already retracted, and it was false about the code it sits in. It
said an unconditional placement "would also pull the integrator toward a
command the SATURATION freeze is pinning", priced at 118 of 256 250 ticks. The
118 was measured against a different pair; on the pair the sentence names the
two forms are bit-identical - 0 of 256 246 ticks, re-measured. And the narrow
form that shipped DOES move a saturation-frozen integrator: it runs before the
freeze block and is not gated on `frozen`. Of 79 160 frozen ticks the cap
changes `i_w` on 1095, and on 679 of those it moves it further out on the side
it was already on - putting back magnitude the freeze had just let fall, which
the freeze's own rule forbids. Worst case 2424 W, at prev_w -3400 W, grid
+4697 W, actual -4144 W, sat_count 2 -> 3: the freeze leaves the integrator at
-176 W and the cap drags it to -2600 W. It never overrides a same-cycle refusal
(the freeze clipped on 75 512 ticks, the slew bound on none of them), and that
is stated too. It is also where SAFETY-13's settle values went: gating the cap
on `not frozen` puts test_control.py part 5 back at -1190 W exactly, while part
4(b) does not come back - that one moved for the winding reason.

R3 - the record read its own sensitivity table backwards. `fit_plant()` picks
lag 7.5 s on battery-power RMS, which separates it from 2.5 s by 0.3 %, while
the tool's own printed fidelity measure (export against the recorded 29.43 kWh)
prefers 2.5 s by the whole 35 % gap. Swept properly: at every lag <= 5.0 s
release/1.0's worst quarter is ALREADY 3434 W and this card changes it by
exactly zero. The 3739 -> 3434 W headline exists at one plant. New section 3a
carries the table; the export reduction now leads every summary and the peak is
presented as lag-dependent. The form-A rejection is strengthened rather than
weakened: form A is worse on the billed quarter at every lag where release/1.0
produces a peak at all, and at every top-N cut of the quarters.

R2 - DOCS.md stated modelled watts to the owner as measurement. It now leads
with the export reduction, says the figures are simulated, and says plainly
that no capacity-tariff improvement is promised.

R4 - tools/slew_sim.py --slew narrated "the OVER-ABSORPTION does not move, and
at the slowest slews it is slightly WORSE" while printing a monotonically
falling column. That sentence is TRUE on release/1.0 (reproduced:
958/1107/1133/1058/987/1029/1150/1143/1081) and false under this branch's law
(777/734/663/563/553/507/435/358/321), so SAFETY-39 is not retracted: its
record gets a forward reference, and the script now reads SLEW_LEAD_STEPS out
of the law it imported and narrates from the column it just printed. Both
branches of that narration were driven.

R5 - three counts in the L table were decoration and are re-driven in the CI
image on a `cp -a`, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time: L5 is 5+5 with the
function names exchanged and 5+4 with the branch bodies exchanged (two
mutations wearing one name, now listed separately), L6 is 6+3. The separable-
state count is grid-dependent and three sweeps disagree, so all three are
quoted with their grids and the load-bearing claim is WHERE they separate.

R7 - "a large import answered too weakly" is not what the aggregate shows. Form
A cuts import by 5.45 kWh and export by 5.18 kWh, and paired per tick delivers
8.56 kWh less offtake energy on the ticks release/1.0 was importing. The harm
is a tail redistribution inside quarters that already net to offtake. The
conclusion stands; the sentence is narrowed to it.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, purged tree, `:ro` mount, one file at
a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:37:01 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 03ef61fa3b SAFETY-48: the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD
`compute()` freezes the integrator with an asymmetric rule and the comment
beside it states the requirement outright - "the requirement is that the
INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command" - but `frozen` is computed
from ONE signal, `abs(prev_w - actual_w) > saturation_w`, and slew-limiting
never enters it. The integrator moves `gain * error` a cycle and the command
moves at most `slew_w`, so the integrator outruns the command whenever
`|error| > slew_w / gain`: 667 W at the live shape, against a measured median
grid error of 1114 W at the onset of a recorded episode. SAFETY-39's retune
made it MORE frequent, not less - a smaller step is a lower threshold.

⚠️ THE FORM THE CARD ASKED FOR RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY, WHICH IS WHY IT IS
NOT WHAT SHIPPED. Reusing the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew flag was
built from release/1.0's own source and measured over 16.00 days / 256 252
meter instants of the live install's recorder: export 39.61 -> 34.43 kWh, and
the worst quarter-hour average OFFTAKE 3739 -> 3935 W with the mean quarter
+2.73 W, in five of six plant and tuning variants. A frozen integrator stops at
`prev + gain*error`, which undershoots by (1 - gain); for an export that is
free and for an import it is offtake, for as long as the ramp lasts. The card
said "do not invent a second rule"; the measurement says to, and both sentences
are recorded.

WHAT SHIPS BOUNDS THE LEAD AT ONE SLEW STEP, inside the branch where the slew
actually bound. Same 16 days, same ticks, same disturbance, same plant, same
seed: export 39.61 -> 34.07 kWh, wasted throughput 4.67 -> 3.19 kWh, battery
sign reversals 2992 -> 2770, median recovery 232 -> 199 s, p99 849 -> 850 s,
max 901 -> 898 s, unrecovered 53 -> 31, worst |i_w - prev_w| 9200 -> 800 W -
and the worst 15-minute average offtake 3739 -> 3434 W, i.e. the billed
quantity IMPROVES. `i_w = slewed` (a cap of zero) is better again at 32.02 kWh
and is refused: it is the velocity form this module's docstring says `i_w=None`
collapses to.

TWO COMMITTED NUMBERS MOVED, DELIBERATELY, WITH THE REASON BESIDE THEM.
SAFETY-13's released command settles at -800 W and -1200 W where release/1.0
settled at -1190 W and -2390 W, because there is less wound integrator to
settle onto; AC 4's property - it stops at the frozen integrator, not the rail
- is what is asserted and the second is now graded against `i_w` rather than a
literal. And SAFETY-39's "the slew does not own the over-absorption" is now
FALSE - INVERTED, on the independent first-order plant test_control.py writes
itself: 1005/1109/1285/1330 W rising with a slower slew becomes 729/550/424/326
falling. Two plant models that share nothing agree on the sign.

Evidence: `tools/replay_recorded_loop.py` plus the read-only capture it made
(scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17). The "before" law is the shipped file
with the block removed by a named substitution - never a transcription - and a
missing anchor is a REFUSAL carrying "NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED". The
instrument prints its own fidelity first: it reproduces 39.6 kWh of export
where the install exported 29.4, i.e. it is ~35 % pessimistic about the loop's
tracking, so only the delta is claimed.

30/30 suites green, including test_control.py's exhaustive i_w=None
equivalence sweep against the transcribed release/1.0 law, untouched: the cap
moves `i_w` and not `target`, and that sweep compares (target_w, sat_count,
frozen, reason).

Six law mutations, one instrument battery. L4 - the cap applied
unconditionally, -92 B - was a SURVIVOR of all thirty files: it is
bit-identical on the shipped configuration (0 of 256 246 ticks) and separable
on 2050 of 257 400 swept states, all at `integrator_max_w` above `max_w`, which
part 4 now drives. L5 and L6 are ZERO BYTES.

AND TWO COMMENTS IN THIS CARD WERE INVENTED AND ARE CORRECTED IN PLACE. The
one-sided spelling was justified by a two-sided form that would "drag a
trailing integrator" - it does not, and the two agree on 205 920 of 205 920
swept states; and a "118 of 256 252 ticks" figure had been measured against a
different pair. MUTATION.md gains habits 21 and 22 for both shapes.

NOT DEPLOYED, NOT VERSIONED. The live install still runs release/1.0's law.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:36:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 b6c6da31d8 TEL-10: two sentences that named assertions this file does not make
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
Both are review findings on the merged-in-spirit branch, and neither is in
executable code.

R6 - test_mqtt.py part 1's headline said "every one of release/1.0's NINE
messages is still byte-identical and still first". The assertion under it is
`announce(...)[:len(BASELINE) - 1] == BASELINE[:-1]`, which covers EIGHT: the
ninth, `goodwe_ctl/availability`, is byte-identical but deliberately moves to
last, so a prefix comparison cannot include it. Nothing was unguarded - the
`== SITE_NOW` on the next check pins it in its new position - but the sentence
was not the check. Part 3 carried the same mis-statement two lines from a check
that IS about all nine, and is corrected the same way.

R5 - M7's red count was decoration. Re-driven in the CI image on a `cp -a` of
the tree, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time, it is 10 reds in test_mqtt.py and
not 8, on this tree and on SAFETY-48's alike. The direction was right; the
number was inherited rather than re-measured, which is MUTATION.md's reporting
rule 3. A note beside the table now says that a red count is a property of the
SUITE as much as of the mutation and therefore has to name a tree.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, purged tree, `:ro` mount, one file at
a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:36:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 b548525d10 TEL-10: the loop's integrator stops being invisible
`self.i_w` has been a separate quantity from the command since SAFETY-04 and
has left the process nowhere at all - no entity, no MQTT attribute, no log
line. The investigation behind SAFETY-48 could only RECONSTRUCT it from the
grid trace plus a replay; the reconstruction reproduced about a third of the
engagements it was checked against and was discarded, so the card it was
gathered for had to be argued from a measurement nobody could stand behind.
It could not have been made to work either: `i_w` depends on every cycle
before it, including the ones where the arbiter overrode the loop and
`main.py` re-seeded `self.i_w = self.target`, and that re-seed is invisible in
the grid trace.

THREE SITE ROWS, APPENDED AFTER release/1.0's EIGHT. `loop_i` is
`Decision.i_w` - the accumulator after the cycle, before the output clamp, the
slew limit and quantisation. `loop_lead` is `decision.i_w - prev_w` against the
command `compute()` was HANDED, which is not a subtraction of the other two
published rows: `Setpoint` is the arbiter's output and is this cycle's, so on
any cycle the arbiter overrode the loop the two differ - and that is exactly
the cycle on which the integrator was re-seeded. `loop_reason` is
`compute()`'s own word; the arbiter's `explain()` prints the winning claim's
NAME and has never carried the claim's reason, so `slew-limited` appears in
neither the `Why` row nor `Controller status`. Measured on the same cycle:
arbiter `'loop -> -5000 W'`, loop `'i-clamped'`.

NOTHING IN THE CONTROL PATH MOVED. `app/control.py` is not in this diff.
`compute()`, its returned `Decision` and every constant it reads are identical
to release/1.0, and all nine of release/1.0's retained discovery messages are
byte-identical and still FIRST in the announcement.

Evidence: 30/30 suites green in the CI image. Nine mutations, ONE survivor,
reported as one: `decision.i_w - self.target` for the lead is +2 B and green
because `cycle()` has not reassigned `self.target` at that line - the name is
kept for the coupling, not for a behaviour it buys, and M2b (+8 B) is the
mutation that does change the value and is red.

AND TWO OF THIS CARD'S OWN CHECKS COULD NOT REACH THE FAILURE THEY NAMED.
"the published integrator reaches its bound" was GREEN under the card's named
mutation (publish `prev_w`, -3 B), because the command reaches the bound too -
twelve cycles later. It asserts the LEAD TIME now and is red on 5. "a stopped
controller publishes not-running" was GREEN under deleting that branch's
assignments (-45 B, -67 B), because the fixture STARTED stopped and `__init__`
writes the same values; it stops the controller part-way through a run that
has already wound the integrator to -5000 W. Both are MUTATION.md habit 4,
found by the battery rather than by review.

No CHANGELOG section: `test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## `
heading that is not config.yaml's `version:`, and opening one would mean
taking a packaging decision this card does not get to take. The operator
account is in DOCS.md and the release note belongs to the next PKG ticket.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-18 23:36:23 +02:00
admin 68c5ede7b9 Merge pull request 'PKG-14: cut 0.10.0, so fifteen merged tickets can reach an install' (#91) from PKG-14 into release/1.0
config.yaml said 0.9.0 while the live box runs 0.7.0 with 0.7.0's files, so it has never received 0.8.0 or 0.9.0 either. 28 runtime commits had landed since the 0.9.0 bump at 86bdf49 with no version to carry them.

MINOR, AND NOT BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF TICKETS. A config that is legal on 0.9.0 is REFUSED on 0.10.0: TARIFF-07 retires three price_provider ids and refuses them by name at startup (the ids stay in the schema enum precisely so validate.py's message is reachable rather than an opaque Supervisor rejection); TARIFF-18 moves price_taxes_eur_kwh 0.06 -> 0.11736, and the non-obvious half is the refusal that deliberately does NOT happen, because SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH keeps a taxes period table beside a stored 0.06 from becoming exit 78 on upgrade, with the rung measured un-weakened against a genuinely custom 0.1198; SAFETY-10 adds shadow_mode shipped `auto`, where an existing controlling install does not change by one watt and a fresh install comes up observing.

AND A 0.7.0 INSTALL CROSSES 0.8.0 ON THE WAY. `ha addons update` does not walk versions, so 0.8.0's rule 10 lands at the same moment: an explicit slew_w above SLEW_RAIL_FRAC x rail is refused, and 0.7.0's OWN shipped default of 1000 is refused against a 555.6 W ceiling. Measured red on this tree, with slew_w 400 measured green - which is what the live box carries. Someone reading only the newest section would otherwise miss the one release that can stop the add-on starting.

THE BOUNDARY WAS DRAWN HONESTLY RATHER THAN TIDILY. All 18 table rows in the top block merged after 86bdf49 - verified per row with git merge-base --is-ancestor - so the block is genuinely this run's work and was retitled as-is with its 18 `_this branch_` placeholders resolved to merge shas. But 0.10.0 ships MORE than that table lists: SAFETY-43 and TEST-21 are documented in a SECOND `## Unreleased` block sitting below 0.9.0, and SAFETY-44 - which changed app/main.py and app/store.py - is in CHANGELOG.md NOWHERE AT ALL. All three are named in the 0.10.0 preamble rather than moved, because re-filing is PKG-08. The second block is annotated, not rewritten or emptied: UX-02 in it shipped in 0.9.0 and is already in 0.9.0's own contents table, while the other three shipped here. Verified independently before merge: all 30 changelog deletions fall inside `## Unreleased` blocks and none in a released section.

THE BLOCK'S OWN STATED REASON FOR THE VERSION CHOICE WAS WRONG AND THE SECTION SAYS SO. It said the number depended on whether 0.9.0's image had been built and pulled, and that if it had not, this work belonged inside 0.9.0. That was written before 0.9.0's section was cut. It has been cut since 86bdf49 with 28 runtime commits behind it, so reusing 0.9.0 would make one version string name two different trees - and the Supervisor keys the built image on exactly that string, which is the PKG-06/07 no-op in its worst form.

Evidence: 29/29 green. predeploy_check.py --deployed-version 0.7.0 --options <live blob> clears at exit 0 both before and after, unchanged but for the shipped version line. No default was touched, so test_defaults_pin, test_price's mirror and test_version_gate stay green for the right reason. Eight mutations, no survivors, one at zero bytes. One was a SURVIVOR on the first draft - the slicer control was a sentinel only an EOF-running slicer could reach, so deleting a heading never got there; it asserts an invariant now, exactly one contents table per section.

Card numbers that did not reproduce, corrected in the report: the block is 1541 lines citing 31 ids rather than 5487 citing ~70 (those figures fit the whole file and the Detail notes block, which is PKG-08's subject); 28 runtime commits rather than 30; 18 tickets rather than fifteen. FCST-04 has a table row but no section body - pre-existing, left alone.
2026-09-16 02:58:28 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cb3f686555 PKG-14: cut 0.10.0, and say what an upgrade from 0.7.0 crosses
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m51s
`config.yaml` 0.9.0 -> 0.10.0, and the top `## Unreleased` block is closed
into `## 0.10.0` with a preamble that names the backward-incompatible
changes and who they reach.

MINOR, and NOT because eighteen tickets landed. A stored options blob the
previous version started on is REFUSED on this one:

  * TARIFF-07 retires three `price_provider` ids; a site set to one is
    refused BY NAME at startup. Measured on the reference blob, with a
    control on an accepted id so the refusals are about the ID.
  * TARIFF-18 moves `price_taxes_eur_kwh` 0.06 -> 0.11736. A site that
    STORED 0.06 is untouched, and - the non-obvious half - a taxes period
    table beside that stored 0.06 does NOT become a startup refusal on
    upgrade, because `SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH` reads it as
    untouched. Measured, with the counterfactual that the rung is not
    weakened (ORES's 0.1198 is still refused).
  * SAFETY-10 adds `shadow_mode`, shipped `auto`. An existing CONTROLLING
    install does not change by one watt and a FRESH one comes up observing.
    Measured cross-revision, 8f82dd4 -> e6da478, same stimulus through the
    shipped `Controller.cycle()`: byte-identical write streams, 13/13/25
    writes. Positive control: the same driver at `shadow_mode: on` gets 13
    writes to 5000 W on the older tree and one 0 W write on the newer.

And the one a reader of the newest section alone would miss: `ha addons
update` does not walk the versions, so a 0.7.0 install meets 0.8.0's and
0.9.0's rules at the same moment as 0.10.0's. Of those, SAFETY-39's rule 10
refuses 0.7.0's OWN shipped default `slew_w: 1000` against a 555.6 W
ceiling on a 5000 W rail. Measured red on this tree; the reference
install's `slew_w: 400` is measured green.

SCOPE, and it is drawn honestly rather than tidily. The top block's 18
entries all merged after the 0.9.0 bump `86bdf49`, so the block is closed
as-is and its `_this branch_` placeholders are resolved to merge shas.
⚠️ 0.10.0 SHIPS THREE MORE RUNTIME TICKETS THAT ARE NOT IN THAT TABLE -
SAFETY-43, TEST-21 and SAFETY-44 - and they are NAMED in the preamble
rather than moved, because re-filing this file's misplaced entries is
PKG-08. SAFETY-44 (`app/main.py`, `app/store.py`) is in the changelog
nowhere at all; that is said in both places. The second `## Unreleased`
block below `## 0.9.0` is ANNOTATED, not rewritten or emptied - UX-02 in it
shipped in 0.9.0, the other three in 0.10.0. No released section is
rewritten.

`test_version_gate.py` gains part 11: the bump and the closed section are
one act. PKG-09 refuses a deploy whose version did not move; nothing graded
the mirror failure, in which the version moves and the block is never
closed. Two sides from two files, a slicer with a synthetic positive
control run on every invocation, the retired ids read off `app/price.py` by
AST rather than transcribed, and the count of still-misfiled blocks frozen
so it can only shrink.

Mutations, all purged, tree bind-mounted :ro, backups at mktemp paths and
the revert fingerprinted:

  M1  `## 0.10.0` -> `## Unreleased`       +4 B    RED 2
  M2  version 0.10.0 -> 0.10.1             +0 B    RED 1   (ZERO-BYTE)
  M3  an id stripped from the NEWEST       +10 B   RED 1
      section only, left below
  M4  a 4th retired provider in price.py   +62 B   RED 1 here, 4 in
                                                   test_price.py
  M5  `## 0.9.0` heading lost              -3 B    RED 1
  M6  a 2nd `## Unreleased` left standing  +27 B   RED 1
  M7  the slicer never closes              -32 B   RED 3
  M8  SUPERSEDED_TAXES... emptied          -5 B    RED 2 on the evidence
                                                   instrument, plus
                                                   test_validate/test_price

⚠️ M5 WAS A SURVIVOR ON THE FIRST DRAFT. The slicer control was a sentinel
(`## 0.8.0`) that only a slicer running to EOF could reach, and deleting one
heading never gets there - ARCH-02's fifteenth instance, in a fresh costume.
11a now asserts the invariant instead: exactly one contents table per
section, which is what a lost heading breaks.

29/29 test files green. `tools/predeploy_check.py --deployed-version 0.7.0
--options <live blob>` CLEARED, exit 0, before and after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-16 02:48:27 +02:00
admin 587495e143 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-47: say what a shadow run can and cannot show' (#90) from SAFETY-47 into release/1.0
DOCS.md, app/shadow.py's header and DECISIONS/SAFETY-10 all claimed the strategies ask for a fixed power from inputs that do not depend on what the battery did, so a shadow run shows you the real trades. That was true when shadow mode was designed and false by the time it merged: SAFETY-45 landed hours earlier and made the buy leg min(asked, headroom), where headroom = (900/remaining) x (ceiling - projected) and `projected` reads the open quarter's accumulator - the meter, which is exactly a function of what the battery did. The strategy became closed-loop and the exemption went stale.

Measured at a binding cap, 1500/1200/2000, the same hour twice: live grid 1224-1506 W held at the ceiling against a flat 1200 W in shadow; SoC 50.000019 -> 51.856789 % against 50.000000 -> 50.000000; the two runs differ on 716 of 720 cycles; the final recorded figure is -302.4 W live against -2000.0 W in shadow, 6.61x. On a SAFETY-45-reverted tree the limit cycle is 28 onsets live against 1, guard engaged 410/720 against 0/720. Two of the three defects the card cites as motivation are closed-loop phenomena shadow cannot exhibit; TARIFF-14's half genuinely is visible, hour and price and spread identical 720/720.

THE CAVEAT'S DIRECTION WAS MEASURED RATHER THAN WRITTEN, and the ticket had it wrong. A draft saying a live run reaches a SMALLER number was checked pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five configurations: the shadow record is never below live - zero cycles below and 730 EXACTLY EQUAL, at the start of each quarter where the amplification is 1.0. `Smaller` would have been false on 730 rows. The shipped sentence says UPPER BOUND and the two-point arithmetic behind it is graded.

Caveated rather than re-computed, with the rejections recorded: re-computing would make the recorded decision no longer the decision the shipped path reached while arbiter, clamp, the SAFETY-28 gate, the log and MQTT all ran on the real one - a second controller everywhere except the wire; recording nothing blanks the row exactly when arbitrage trades, and the log's edge key IS the watts; recording the unsized ask beside it adds a second number with no warning, and at the shipped 3500/2000 both read 2000 W. The trap avoided: keying the caveat on `capped` would fire at the quarter's START, where the record is right, and go SILENT at the end, where it is 6.61x out. It keys on the headroom having been MEASURED.

AND THE TICKET'S OWN ANALYSIS WAS INCOMPLETE. I said the committed evidence table could not fail for two reasons. They are independent in the FIX direction too: widening the fixture to a binding cap still leaves the comparison passing, because it reads index zero and the first charging cycle is -300.0000 W in both runs. Fixing only the fixture closes nothing. Recorded in MUTATION.md as a new habit-4 shape - an INDEX, not a fixture - and the agreement at index zero is now graded as an expectation so nobody rebuilds on it.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Fourteen mutations, no survivors. One was a REAL survivor first - deleting the caveat from the action log left all 29 files green, because the sentence was an f-string in _shadow_settle() and the only suite that drives it runs with meter_source: off; it is shadow.log_line() now. One CORRECTLY survived and is reported as such: min -> max makes the record larger, which is still an upper bound, so it is not the inversion that matters. And the new section nearly shipped FCST-06's shape - a mutation made it raise on its first min() and report zero reds - so every check now carries the section's precondition.

Two design limits stated rather than smoothed: the caveat discloses but does not help, since an engineer still cannot obtain the real number without arming the battery - the fix for that is a rig mode replaying the site's own captured meter through the shipped decision path, filed separately and deliberately NOT by giving shadow mode a plant model, which is the one change that would break its safety argument. And SAFETY-10's takeaway still oversells `auto`, which this card did not rewrite.
2026-09-15 01:36:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e3ccd9f6ea SAFETY-47: what a shadow run can show, and the watts on its status row
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m48s
Not a leak and not a write-path defect. Shadow mode's safety is intact -
the substitution, the re-seed, the authorisation gate and the clamp are
untouched. What was wrong is what three merged documents SAY a shadow run
can show you, and a number on the status row that can be 6.61x what a live
controller would command.

SHADOW MODE CANNOT SURFACE A CLOSED-LOOP DEFECT, AND THE DOCUMENTS NOW SAY
SO. The battery is held at 0 W and the carried command is re-seeded to it,
so every measured input - the meter, the billed-quarter accumulator behind
it, the battery power, the SoC - describes a plant that did not respond. A
closed-loop defect is one whose stimulus IS that response. This is the same
property that makes shadow mode safe, so it is not a gap to close later:
the closed-loop answer comes from the closed-loop rig or from a live run.
SAFETY-10 §5 already conceded this for the grid-following loop. It was
never the loop leg's limitation; it is the general case.

THE "STRATEGIES ARE UNAFFECTED" EXEMPTION WAS TRUE UNTIL SAFETY-45 MERGED,
ONE COMMIT EARLIER. That card sizes the buy leg as min(asked, headroom)
with headroom = (900/remaining) x (ceiling - projected), and `projected`
reads the open quarter's accumulator - the meter - which is a function of
what the battery did earlier in that quarter. Measured on TEST-23 stage 3
at peak_cap_w 1500 / house 1200 / max_w 2000, one hour at 5 s:

  SAFETY-45's limit cycle  NOT visible. 28 onsets live vs 1; grid
                           -455.5..+3200.0 W vs flat at the 1200 W house;
                           guard engaged 410/720 cycles vs 0/720.
  SAFETY-46's SoC churn    NOT visible. The SoC moves 0.000000000 pp.
  TARIFF-14's wrong hour   VISIBLE, and it is the only one: which hour, at
                           what price, clearing what spread - identical on
                           720 of 720 charging cycles at a binding cap.

The exemption narrows to exactly what survives: WHICH hour a strategy picks
and WHY are unaffected; HOW HARD it trades is not. The peak guard's ceiling
and reasons are worth reading from a shadow run; its ENGAGEMENTS are not.

THE NUMBER IS CAVEATED, NOT RE-COMPUTED, AND THAT IS THE DECISION. The
arithmetic is not wrong - 900/remaining is correct for a meter genuinely
under the ceiling, and in shadow the meter genuinely is. It is the right
answer to a question nobody asked. Both surfaces now introduce the watts as
what would have been commanded ON THIS CYCLE, in every state, and carry
shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER whenever a measured billed quarter sized them.
Rejected, and recorded in the decision doc: re-computing it (the recorded
decision would no longer be the decision the shipped path reached, while the
arbiter, clamp, SAFETY-28 gate, log and MQTT all ran on the real one - a
second controller everywhere except the wire); recording nothing (blanks the
row exactly when arbitrage is trading, and the log's edge key is the watts);
and recording the unsized ask beside it (a second number, no warning, and at
the shipped 3500/2000 both figures read 2000 W).

"UPPER BOUND" AND NOT "SMALLER", AND THE DIFFERENCE WAS MEASURED. Charging
only adds offtake, so the shadow size is >= the live size with EQUALITY at
the start of every quarter. Pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five
configurations: 0 below, 730 exactly equal. The first draft said "smaller",
which would have been false on every one of those 730.

AND THE PREDICATE IS NOT KEYED ON WHETHER THE TRADE WAS CAPPED. arbitrage's
own sentence says "SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD" only when the
headroom came out below the ask - in a shadow run, the START of the quarter,
where the two runs agree to the float. By the end, 900/remaining has
multiplied the headroom past the ask, the trade is not capped, the sentence
is silent, and the record is at its most wrong. A caveat keyed on it would
be quietest exactly where it is needed loudest.

SAFETY-10 §6's COMMITTED EVIDENCE COULD NEVER HAVE FAILED, FOR TWO
INDEPENDENT REASONS, AND CLOSING EITHER ALONE CLOSES NOTHING. Its fixture is
peak_cap_w 15000 against a 350 W house, so the guard never engages and the
sizing is inert - the harness's own comment says so. AND every identity row
reads the FIRST charging sample, where at elapsed=0 the projection IS the
held level and the two runs agree to the float even at a cap that does bind.
Measured: widening the fixture alone leaves that comparison passing. That
second reason is a new shape for MUTATION.md's habit-4 list - an INDEX, not
a fixture - and it is recorded there as the twelfth instance. §6 is re-taken
at a binding cap across the whole run: 716 of 720 charging cycles differ,
headroom 300.0..54000.0 W in shadow against 299.9..307.8 W live, recorded
-2000.0 W against a live -302.4 W.

THE GRADER IS test_arbitrage.py PART 3d, beside SAFETY-45's own closed-loop
regression and built on the same s45_loop() harness, so the runs differ in
one argument. Three lines stand in for _write_unit()'s substitution and
_shadow_settle()'s record and re-seed, marked as a transcription;
test_clamp.py part 8 remains the check on the shipped placement. The section
carries its own precondition into every check: a mutation that stopped
either run trading made it raise on its first min(), kill the file and
report ZERO reds - FCST-06's shape, driven rather than imagined.

AND THE FIX'S OWN FIRST DRAFT CARRIED THE SAME DEFECT. Deleting the caveat
from the action-log line left all 29 files green, because the sentence was
an f-string inside _shadow_settle() and the only suite that drives it uses a
meter_source:off fixture where no arbitrage decision exists. It is
shadow.log_line() now, for the reason words() is a function.

14 mutations, no survivors; M13 and M14 are +0 B and were confirmed on disk
by sha256 with every run purged. M14's first form was aimed at the wrong
direction and correctly survived - min->max makes the shadow record larger,
which is still an upper bound. All 29 check files green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-15 01:26:57 +02:00
admin e6da478f87 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-10: shadow mode, and 0 W is a number rather than a silence' (#89) from SAFETY-10 into release/1.0
The closed-loop rig made the case for this: with arbitrage armed and a binding cap the loop ran 28 charge onsets an hour (SAFETY-45); the price lookup returned the wrong quarter-hour for 45 minutes in every 60 (TARIFF-14); the SoC ceiling churns 598 Wh to gain 310 (SAFETY-46). Every one was invisible from outside, and there was no way to watch what the optimiser WOULD do without letting it do it.

THE TICKET SAID DEFAULT-ON AND THE AGENT REFUSED IT, correctly. The Supervisor resolves options as {**config.yaml defaults, **stored user options}, so a NEW key with a new default reaches every EXISTING install on the next update - including the one regulating the author's battery. `shadow_mode: true` would have stopped it silently, and the only symptom would be a battery that stopped doing anything. There is no mechanism by which one key defaults differently for a new install and an existing one - `options:` IS the default and there is one of it.

So the default is a value the add-on RESOLVES: shadow_mode: list(auto|on|off), shipped `auto` = shadow while control is STOPPED, live once STARTED. A fresh install ships auto_start: false, so it comes up in shadow and observes before it ever commands - default-on delivered where it is safe. An existing install that is controlling does not change by one watt; verified before merge, `auto` resolves to `not control_started`.

SECOND PUSHBACK, ALSO RIGHT: commands nothing is a NUMBER, not a silence. The inverter holds its last command forever, so a shadow mode that stopped writing would leave whatever was standing STANDING, under a page saying nothing is commanded - the exact looks-healthy-but-is-inert failure this repo keeps finding - and would hold the ESP32's 30 s stale-input watchdog tripped for the whole run, an alarm used as a mode. The actuator is held at 0.0 W, refreshed on the ordinary heartbeat, by the ordinary single writer, as a substitution inside the existing single choke point. Not a second write path. It is the LAST substitution, below SAFETY-28's gate and SAFETY-03's clamp, so both still grade the number the decision produced.

Every failsafe's behaviour is decided and recorded rather than inherited. The sign watchdogs are INERT because they grade standing_w(), held at 0 W - feeding them the decision would have them disagree with a meter that never saw it and LATCH A TRIP SURVIVING INTO LIVE OPERATION AND A RESTART. Clamp, write gate, meter freeze and peak guard OBSERVE the real decision. Circulation and delivery may legitimately latch, because their evidence is measured power. The operator stop is enforced at the wire rather than as a P_SAFETY claim, which would make every recorded decision read `stopped`. A standing latch is named in the shadow banner and turns it red.

Graded on the writes and the rendered surface, never on the flag, with the precondition asserted first: the same stimulus at `off` produces 30 non-zero writes with a largest of 5000 W; at `on`, set(writes) == {0.0} and 26 of them. Closed loop over the same hour twice: live -2000 W throughout, SoC 50.000 -> 62.331 %, grid to 2350 W; shadow 0 W throughout, SoC 50.0 -> 50.0 exactly, grid = the house exactly - with the arbitrage decision identical in action, instant, signed power, reason verbatim and arbiter winner across 3600/3600 samples.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Twenty-two mutations, no survivors, including a write escaping, silence instead of 0 W, observers blinded, default-on-for-everyone, the stop claim refiled, and a re-seed moved one line earlier which blinds SAFETY-18. Two mutation findings recorded: one first read as a survivor and was not, because a TypeError killed the section and reported zero reds - FCST-06's shape; and one had to become a PAIR because two fields both hold the detector at 0 W - TEST-16's shape.

Recorded limitation rather than glossed: the re-seed makes the exit safe by construction, and the price is that the loop leg's shadow decision is one slew step rather than a trajectory. Graded by name. The strategies are unaffected, which is why all three motivating defects remain visible.
2026-09-14 17:44:26 +02:00
Claude 8fa4febfef SAFETY-10: the whole decision path runs and nothing reaches the inverter
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
Every optimiser defect this project has found was invisible from outside
while it was happening, and each was paid for at the meter first: SAFETY-45's
28 charge onsets an hour against a binding peak_cap_w, TARIFF-14's wrong
quarter-hour for 45 minutes in every 60, SAFETY-46's 598 Wh spent to gain
310 Wh. There was no way to watch what the optimiser WOULD do without letting
it do it.

`shadow_mode` runs strategies, arbiter, clamps and guards, records the
decision with its reason, and commands nothing.

⚠️ IT WRITES. It writes 0 W, on the ordinary heartbeat, through the ordinary
single writer. The inverter holds its last command forever - it has no meter
timeout - so "commands nothing" implemented as "stops writing" would leave
whatever was standing when shadow mode came on standing for as long as it was
left on, under a page saying nothing is being commanded. That is the failure
this repository keeps finding. Refreshing 0 W is also what
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml's 30 s stale-input watchdog requires of us; going
quiet would keep that board tripped for the whole run, which is an alarm being
used as a mode.

⚠️ IT IS NOT A SECOND WRITE PATH. No claim, no transport, no arithmetic of its
own. It is a substitution inside Controller._write_unit() - the single choke
point every write already reaches - in the same form as the three above it,
and it is the LAST of them, so SAFETY-28's gate and SAFETY-03's clamp still
grade the number the decision path produced.

⚠️ THE DEFAULT IS `auto`, NOT `true`, AND THAT IS THE CARD'S REAL CONTENT. The
Supervisor composes options as {**config.yaml defaults, **stored user
options}, so a new key with a new default reaches EVERY EXISTING INSTALL on
the next update - including the one regulating a real battery. A boolean
default-on would have stopped it silently. There is no mechanism by which one
key can default differently for a new install and an existing one, so
"default-on for new" is a value the add-on RESOLVES: `auto` is shadow while
control is STOPPED and live once it is STARTED. A fresh install ships
`auto_start: false` and comes up observing; an install that is controlling is
started and does not change by one watt.

THE FAILSAFES. Sign watchdogs (SAFETY-02/30): INERT - they grade
Inverter.standing_w(), which shadow mode holds at 0 W. Fed the shadow decision
they would disagree with a meter that never saw it and LATCH A TRIP THAT
SURVIVES INTO LIVE OPERATION AND A RESTART. Clamp (SAFETY-03), write gate
(SAFETY-28), meter freeze (SAFETY-18), peak guard: OBSERVE. Circulation
(SAFETY-31) and delivery (SAFETY-42): observe and may legitimately latch,
because their evidence is measured power. The operator stop is the one
deliberate change: enforced at the wire rather than as a P_SAFETY claim, which
would otherwise make every recorded decision read "stopped".

⚠️ RECORDED LIMITATION: _shadow_settle() re-seeds the carried command to what
stands on the wire, which makes the exit safe by construction - and therefore
the loop leg's shadow decision is ONE SLEW STEP, not a trajectory. A shadow
run answers "what would it command now", not "what would it have done next".
The strategies are unaffected; all three defects above are visible from one.

Graded on the writes and on the rendered surface, never on the flag: 22
mutations, no survivors, including one that lets a write escape and one that
goes silent instead of commanding 0 W. Closed loop on TEST-23 stage 3's rig,
same hour twice: live drives the pack to -2000 W and SoC 50.000 -> 62.331 %;
shadow commands 0 W throughout, SoC stays 50.0 exactly, and the arbitrage
decision is identical in action, instant, signed power, reason and arbiter
winner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-14 17:25:43 +02:00
admin 8f82dd4e06 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-45: size the trade to the headroom instead of interlocking against it' (#88) from SAFETY-45 into release/1.0
With arbitrage armed and a binding peak_cap_w, the loop did not settle: 28 charge onsets an hour, period 131 s, grid swinging -455 to +3200 W, and a billed quarter 59 W OVER the cap it had just spent fifteen minutes holding. Section 10.2 is explicit that an EMS which oscillates is worse than no EMS, for hardware wear and for the peak it is trying to avoid. Not reachable by any unit test in the repo - it needed the closed loop.

THE TICKET'S MECHANISM WAS WRONG AND THE AGENT DISPROVED IT. I wrote that the quarter boundary drives the cycle. Of the 27 gaps between the 28 onsets, 23 are 90-120 s entirely INSIDE one quarter; the four long gaps are exactly the four that SPAN a boundary, so the boundary lengthens the interval rather than causing it. A fix aimed at boundary handling would have removed 4 of 28.

The real cycle is a binary interlock keyed on a continuous quantity: the trade charges at max_w while `wanted = batt_w + excess` is still negative and the guard files nothing; `wanted` crosses zero; the guard engages on a FIVE WATT floor; that flips guard_state(), which cancels the WHOLE trade; the grid-following loop - which targets grid = 0, not grid = ceiling - takes the actuator, discharges to +1870 W and exports 420 W; the projection collapses; the trade re-arms at max_w.

So the fix sizes the buy leg rather than interlocking it. control.maintenance_charge_floor() already caps MAINTENANCE charging at the headroom under the site's cap, because a maintenance charge was the only thing big enough and long enough to set the peak - and that stopped being true when OPT-04 landed. peakguard.charge_headroom_w() publishes the same quantity off the MEASURED guard rather than the optional forecast entity, arbitrage.decide() takes it keyword-only and sizes the buy, main.py passes it. It is wanted_w read in the other direction: no new arithmetic and no new constant.

THE GUARD'S DECISION FUNCTION IS UNTOUCHED, and that is the proof 2026-08-20's bang-bang did not come back. peakguard.py is +139/-0 - zero deleted lines - and sha256(decide) is identical on both trees at 7252 bytes; replay_ac3.py reproduces 190/190 records, 110 engaged, 878 Wh identically. Verified independently before merge. Reverting that rung is red on eight named checks.

Rejected and recorded: a negative `lo`, because it creates a lo > hi contradiction against main.py's cheap-window maintenance shaping that resolves to 0 W - the battery parked in the billed quarter - and closing that would mean suspending maintenance shaping permanently on every affected site. And a backoff timer in arbitrage, because both modules' notes forbid inventing timers; the trade now re-arms at `ceiling - load`, which IS learning from the refusal.

After, on the same rig and the same command: onsets 28 -> 1, grid swing 3655 -> 282 W, and the billed quarters land at exactly 1500.0 W three times over. At the shipped defaults the two affected rows buy ~2% less energy and the worst quarter goes from 59 W over the cap to zero - which is section 10.1's ordering, since the tariff bills the month's single worst quarter. On an aggressive cap the sized trade buys 58% MORE. The non-binding control row is bit-identical.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Fourteen mutations, all red, two of them zero-byte. The regression closes the loop over the shipped guard, strategy, arbiter, control law and the real QuarterAverager, and asserts BOTH directions from one changed argument plus an inert-where-inert control.

TWO DEFECTS FOUND BY THE DISCIPLINE RATHER THAN BY REVIEW. The agent's own harness restored two edits to one file in list order and left one on disk - caught by the post-revert fingerprint, habit 18 biting a tool written the same afternoon. And test_peakguard.py part 1 formatted floor_w with a bare :.0f one line after the check that reverting the 2026-08-20 rung turns red, so the file ABORTED and parts 2-13 went ungraded: that mutation's coverage was one check and is now eight.
2026-09-14 16:20:39 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e1b9254626 SAFETY-45: a price-driven charge is SIZED by the capacity guard, not switched by it
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m42s
With arbitrage armed at the shipped defaults, arbitrage and the capacity-tariff
guard drove each other in a sustained limit cycle. Re-measured on TEST-23 stage
3's closed rig against 478ba93, metrics recomputed rather than taken from the
card: `peak_cap_w` 1500 / 1200 W house -> 28 charge onsets an hour, mean period
131.1 s, the grid swinging -455.5 to +3200.0 W; at the SHIPPED
`peak_cap_w: 3500` with an 1800 W house -> 8/h, with a 3000 W house -> 32/h.
The bite rule is `load + max_w > peak_cap_w`, i.e. any house over 1500 W in the
cheapest quarter. §10.2: "an EMS that oscillates is worse than no EMS, both for
hardware wear and - per §9.1 - for the peak it is trying to avoid." And it was
losing the argument it was having: EVERY billed quarter in the three affected
configurations finished OVER the cap.

⚠️ THE CARD'S STATED MECHANISM IS WRONG AND THE CORRECTION IS ON THE RECORD.
The card, and .cache/s45.md before it, say the loop is the quarter boundary
resetting the projection and arbitrage re-arming at full power. It is not. Of
the 27 gaps between the 28 onsets, 23 are 90-120 s (mean 111.5 s) and lie
ENTIRELY INSIDE one quarter; the four long gaps - 230, 240, 250, 255 s - are
exactly the four that SPAN a boundary, so the boundary LENGTHENS the interval
rather than causing an onset. The real cycle, off the recorded fields: the trade
charges at max_w while `wanted = batt_w + excess` is negative and the guard
files NOTHING; `wanted` crosses zero; the guard engages on a floor of 5.3 W;
that flips `arbitrage.guard_state()`, which cancels the WHOLE trade; the
grid-following loop - which targets grid = 0, not grid = ceiling - takes the
actuator and discharges to +1870 W, exporting 420 W; the projection collapses;
the guard releases; the trade re-arms at max_w. A binary interlock keyed on a
continuous quantity. A fix aimed at the boundary would have removed four of
twenty-eight onsets.

THE FIX IS A SHAPE THIS ADD-ON ALREADY HAD. `control.maintenance_charge_floor()`
caps a MAINTENANCE charge at "the headroom left under the site's cap", because
"a maintenance charge is the only thing this system does that is big enough and
long enough to set that peak". ⚠️ That sentence stopped being true when OPT-04
landed. `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` publishes the same quantity off the
MEASURED guard rather than off the optional `peak_forecast_entity` - the hole
SAFETY-25 had to close in `shaping_suspended()` - and `arbitrage.decide()` sizes
its BUY leg to it, keyword-only and with no default.

NO NEW ARITHMETIC AND NO NEW CONSTANT. The number is `wanted_w` read in the
other direction: `decide()` already computes the DISCHARGE that lands the
quarter on the ceiling, and a negative one is a permitted CHARGE of `-wanted`.
⚠️ `peakguard.decide()` IS UNCHANGED - sha256(decide) = 200090d0835a3a55, 7252 B
on this branch and on 478ba93 - so 2026-08-20's anti-bang-bang rung is exactly
where it was, and tools/replay_ac3.py reproduces 190/190 guarded quarters, 110
engaged cycles, 5 blind and 878 Wh on both trees.

TWO PROPERTIES MAKE IT SAFE TO HAND A STRATEGY, BOTH SWEPT RATHER THAN ARGUED.
It is INVARIANT IN THE BATTERY - raise the charge by dW, the meter rises by dW,
so `excess` rises by dW while `batt_w` falls by dW and `wanted` does not move:
1350.0 W at every point across batt_w -5000..+2000 W on one banked quarter,
while the `excess` those runs see takes six distinct values. It is feed-forward,
so consuming it adds no feedback path around the plant. And HOLDING IMPLIES ZERO
OR UNKNOWN: across 1080 swept combinations not one ENGAGED decision answers a
positive headroom.

AFTER, same rig, same command. 1500/1200: 28 onsets -> 1, grid swing 3655.5 ->
282.0 W, energy bought 180.0 -> 285.2 Wh (+58%, because a continuous 300 W trade
beats a 2000 W trade cancelled for 57% of the hour), billed quarters
1490/1497/1509 -> 1500.0/1500.0/1500.0. 3500/1800: 8 -> 1, 3511/3536/3559 ->
3500/3500/3500. 3500/3000: 32 -> 1, 3519/3542/3557 -> 3500/3500/3500. The two
shipped-default rows buy 2.2% and 1.6% LESS energy and in exchange the worst
quarter goes from 59 W over the cap to zero - which is the ordering §10.1 asks
for, since the capacity tariff bills the month's single worst quarter.
⚠️ AND THE NEGATIVE CONTROL: at peak_cap_w 5000 with a 1200 W house, where
`load + max_w` never reaches the cap, the two runs are BIT-IDENTICAL.

⚠️ A NEGATIVE `lo` WAS CONSIDERED AND REJECTED, AND THE REASON IS IN THE CODE.
Deleting `decide()`'s `wanted <= 0` gate and filing `lo = wanted` is the tidier
answer arithmetically. It creates a new `lo > hi` CONTRADICTION against
main.py's cheap-window maintenance shaping, which files a NEGATIVE `hi`;
arbiter.py clause 2 has no notion of one limit out-ranking another, so it
resolves to 0 W - the battery PARKED in the quarter that sets the bill - and the
only way to close that suspends the maintenance charge shaping PERMANENTLY on
every site this card is about. A backoff or cooldown in arbitrage was rejected
too: both modules' design notes say no timer is invented, and the trade now
re-arms at `ceiling - load` rather than at max_w, which is what learning from a
refusal means when the refusal is a measurement.

THE REGRESSION IS THE LOOP SETTLING, NOT A UNIT TEST ON decide().
test_arbitrage.py 3c closes the loop over the shipped guard, strategy, arbiter,
control law and QuarterAverager with a modelled plant, and asserts BOTH
directions: unsized it must run away (24 onsets, -414..+3200 W, a quarter over
the cap) and sized it must settle (1 onset, 303 W swing, three quarters at
exactly 1500.0 W). The two runs differ in one argument. A third pair asserts the
card is INERT where the defect is inert.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 14 mutations, every one RED on a named check, no
survivors; two are ZERO BYTES - `min()` -> `max()` on the sizing, and the
sized-trade sentence's two operands transposed - and both are red. M13 reverts
the 2026-08-20 rung and is red on EIGHT named checks in test_peakguard and three
in test_arbitrage. Every revert verified by a tree fingerprint AFTER the revert,
which is how a defect in the battery's own harness was found: two edits to one
file, restored in list order, left the first one on disk (MUTATION.md habit 18).
test_peakguard.py part 1 also gained a None-safe format, because the mutation it
exists to catch made it raise TypeError one line later and ABORT the file -
parts 2-13 were ungraded and M13's recorded coverage was one check instead of
eight.

Not fixed, and named: TEST-23 finding 1's export overshoot at the END of a trade
(356-938 W, ~0.37 x max_w) is a different card; a house whose load ALONE exceeds
the cap still has the trade refused outright and the loop drive to grid = 0
rather than to the ceiling, and no swept pair reaches that regime; the container
leg (hadrive.py) was not re-run because test23s3-addon is deliberately stopped
as a second writer on the setpoint entity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-14 16:10:34 +02:00
admin 478ba93710 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-16: the injection leg gets its own coefficients' (#87) from TARIFF-16 into release/1.0
export_price_eur_kwh() modelled injection as one scalar. Eneco publishes 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 on the same card as its consumption formula, identical on the January and September 2026 cards; ENGIE publishes (B x eSpot_15) - A; Aspiravi uses 0,07 against ~0,10 on its own consumption leg. Reproduced against the shipped readers over one real BELPEX day: the published formula gives 24 distinct prices with a spread of 0.16710 EUR/kWh, the scalar gives 0.00000, and 5 of 24 hours are NEGATIVE - down to -0.03008 EUR/kWh - which are the midday hours a PV household exports in. The 6% VAT asymmetry is not wrong in the scalar, it is unstateable.

THE CARD'S BEFORE-STATE WAS WRONG AND THE AGENT CORRECTED IT. I wrote that this affects what the operator is shown. It did not: export_price_eur_kwh() had ZERO callers under app/ - not arbitrage, not the status page, not MQTT. Verified independently before merge; the only references are its own definition, the defaults entry, FRAMEWORK_KEYS and two comments. So the honest before-state is weaker than the card claimed: the scalar was not a misleading display, it was an UNREAD OPTION. DOCS, CHANGELOG and the startup line say so, and a check grades it. An operator actually seeing their injection price is a separate ticket.

Machinery reused rather than copied, which is TARIFF-17's move applied a second time: parse_export_formula() is parse_price_formula() with ONE argument moved, selecting a row of a _LEGS table, so everything that differs between the legs is a string and the units table, NaN rule, closed enumerations, unknown-key refusal, card comparison and DST handling are one implementation. Pinned by a check that parses every file under app/ and asserts all 32 grammar names are defined in exactly one module, plus an AST pin on the wrapper's body, plus twelve refusal sentences DERIVED from the consumption leg's own.

A NEGATIVE INJECTION PRICE IS ACCEPTED AND AN IMPLAUSIBLE ONE IS STILL REFUSED, and the bound had to move to achieve it: implausible_all_in() floors consumption at +0.02 EUR/kWh of energy, which is fatal on a leg that is legitimately negative. The bound is now off the PRICE and onto the COEFFICIENTS, where it is index-free and sign-free - a pass-through band (0.10-10x; Eneco 1.00x, Aspiravi 0.70x) and an offset-magnitude bound (0.20 against published 0.01188 and 0.02). One spec is put through both bands and the answers printed: the consumption band refuses -0.03008, the injection band accepts it.

The missing printed estimate is stated, not worked around. Eneco's injection line has no worked example beside it, so `card` is optional on this leg and unchanged on the other; where an estimate exists the self-check runs at the same tolerance, and where it does not validate.py logs that the coefficients are UNGRADED and names the two bounds that ran instead. A check MEASURES the resulting gap: a factor of 0.070 where the contract says 0.100 - 30% of every export payment - passes both bounds, because 0.70x is a pass-through somebody really publishes.

The scalar path is genuinely unchanged: the function body is pinned on the AST and seven option dicts are compared against the pre-TARIFF-16 expression with ==.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Twenty mutations, every one red on a named check. Giving the injection band TARIFF-15's floor is red in test_price.py and GREEN IN THE OTHER 28 FILES; so are the second-grammar and ignore-the-formula mutants. One is a single byte, one is ZERO bytes and moves no decision - legs transposed in the VAT banner, caught by an ordered-pair check. One is recorded for its SHAPE rather than its result: rerouting the scalar through the seam recurses, so the suite dies naming nothing, and a second mutation of the same property exists so a check can name it.

Two sharp edges flagged rather than smoothed: `index` and `resolution` on the injection leg name a series nobody fetches, which an operator could misread as a promise to fetch it; and the coefficient bands are materially weaker than a card check, catching the factor-of-10 class and nothing else.
2026-09-13 18:51:25 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 995da777ce TARIFF-16: the injection leg stops being one number
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m42s
`price.py` modelled what a site is PAID for export as ONE scalar. The market
publishes a line, and the cards say so in their own words: Eneco Zon & Wind
Dynamisch `0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188` c EUR/kWh - "het injectietarief is dynamisch
en kan per uur wijzigen", identical on the January and the September 2026 cards;
ENGIE Dynamic `(B x eSpot_15) - A`; Aspiravi `0,07 x Belpex - 2`.
`price_export_formula` carries that line with its OWN coefficients.

⚠️ THIS IS NOT A WRONG-TRADE FIX, AND SAYING SO IS PART OF SHIPPING IT.
`arbitrage.py` does not read `export_price_eur_kwh` at all - its own comment
says so, citing §9.3's near-zero Belgian injection price as the reason the
economically sound trade on this market is charge-cheap-to-displace-expensive-
IMPORT. Both hours it compares are all-in CONSUMPTION prices. No trade this
add-on takes today is decided by an injection price and nothing here changes
one. What it changes is what an operator is told, and what a future
export-aware strategy rests on: OPT-06 and any export logic would otherwise
inherit a scalar that cannot represent the market, and the 6% VAT asymmetry
would be invisible in the arithmetic. test_price.py 17h parses every module
under app/ and goes red the day something calls an injection reader, so that
sentence is graded rather than attested.

FOUR PROPERTIES A SCALAR CANNOT HOLD. Its own factor (Eneco 0,102 consumption
against 0,100 injection; Aspiravi 0,07 against ~0,10 - not the consumption B
with a sign flip). A negative offset, which `price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)`
cannot express at all. VAT-exemption - "injectietarieven zijn vrijgesteld van
btw" - against 6% on consumption, representable only because `vat_pct` is PER
SPEC. And a price that goes below zero with no floor, under 11,88 EUR/MWh of
BELPEX-H, which is the middle of a sunny day.

⚠️ A NEGATIVE INJECTION PRICE IS ACCEPTED, AND THAT NEEDED A DIFFERENT BAND
RATHER THAN A LOWER FLOOR. `implausible_all_in()` floors the consumption leg at
+0.02 EUR/kWh of energy; applied to injection that refuses the real market in
the hours it matters most. Measured rather than argued: 17c puts ONE spec
through BOTH bands and prints that the consumption band refuses -0.03008
EUR/kWh while the injection band accepts it. The floor was not decoration - it
is what catches a card read a hundred times too small, the one unit error the
card self-check cannot see because it cancels out of a comparison between the
two sides - so the bound moves OFF the price and ONTO the coefficients, where
it is index-free and sign-free: a pass-through band (Eneco's injection leg is
1.00x, Aspiravi's 0.70x; the band is 0.10-10x) and an offset magnitude bound
(0.20 EUR/kWh against published 0.01188 and 0.02). Two rungs that can both
answer a hundredfold error, so each is graded on its REASON, each gets a
stimulus the other cannot reach with the precondition asserted as its own
check, and they are mutated TOGETHER (TEST-16).

⚠️ THE CARD SELF-CHECK APPLIES WHERE THERE IS A CARD, AND WHERE THERE IS NOT
THAT IS STATED RATHER THAN WORKED AROUND. `price_formula` can require a `card`
block because a Belgian card prints the consumption formula, the reference
index AND the resulting price. Eneco's INJECTION formula is printed with no
price beside it. Requiring a block would make the published line inexpressible;
inventing the estimate would grade the coefficients against arithmetic done
with the same coefficients. So the block is OPTIONAL on this leg and unchanged
on the other, the self-check runs at the same tolerance wherever a printed
estimate exists, and validate.py says at startup - "its coefficients are
UNGRADED" - when it does not, naming the two bounds that ran instead. This is
TARIFF-15 demonstrating two tariffs end to end rather than three, one card
later. 17e also MEASURES the size of that gap: a factor of 0.070 where the
contract says 0.100 - 30% of every export payment - passes both bounds, because
0.70x is a pass-through somebody really publishes.

ONE PARSER, NOT TWO. `parse_export_formula()` is `parse_price_formula()` with
its OPTION NAME as an argument - TARIFF-17's move on `parse_static_profile()`,
exactly - and everything that differs between the legs is a string in one
`_LEGS` table. A second copy would be a second unit table, a second NaN rule, a
second unknown-key rule and a second `to_resolution()`, diverging first on the
23- and 25-hour days. test_price.py 17b pins it two ways: all 32 grammar names
are defined in exactly ONE module under app/, with the scope COMPUTED by
parsing every file rather than listed; and twelve refusal sentences for the new
option are DERIVED from the old option's own sentence rather than transcribed.
The four sentences that deliberately differ are named, with what differs, and
asserted to differ.

NOTHING CHANGES FOR A SITE THAT DOES NOT SET IT. The option ships "";
`export_price_eur_kwh()`'s body is byte-identical, pinned on the AST rather
than on the source text; `export_price_at()` falls through to it for every
index value. 17f compares seven option dicts x five index values against the
pre-TARIFF-16 expression with `==`.

`price_export_formula` joins FRAMEWORK_KEYS, BANNED_IN_PLUGIN_CODE is derived
from that set, and `code_leaks()` refuses a plugin that names it with nothing
else edited.

ALSO CORRECTED HERE: config.yaml's comment beside `export_price_eur_kwh` still
read "no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve". TARIFF-07
struck that claim from app/price.py and DOCS.md and did not reach config.yaml,
where it has been shipping since.

20 mutations, every one red on a named check, ledger in test_price.py below
section 17 - including a ZERO-byte one (the two legs transposed in the
VAT-asymmetry banner: no decision moves, only the sentence) and a ONE-byte one
(`card_required=True` on the injection leg). Three run over all 29 files and
red on test_price.py alone. 29/29 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 18:41:06 +02:00
admin 4dcd9b0fc6 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-18: the taxes default is half the real Flemish figure' (#86) from TARIFF-18 into release/1.0
price_taxes_eur_kwh shipped at 0.06 against a real Flemish 0.11736 - Fluvius Antwerpen 5,35 + bijzondere accijns 4,876 + groene stroom/WKK 1,51 + energiebijdrage 0, incl. 6% VAT, from the Eneco residential card for September 2026. Across the eight Fluvius DSOs the range is 0.117-0.131, so the shipped default was roughly half. The components ship as rows in the code, and the exact unrounded sum is used so the check asserts an EQUALITY against them rather than a tolerance. The energiebijdrage is a ZERO ROW, not an absence - it went to 0 EUR/MWh on 2026-08-01 and was merged into the excise, so anyone hand-computing this from an older guide double-counts it; deleting the row changes no sum, so its PRESENCE is graded separately.

AN UPGRADE HAZARD THE TICKET DID NOT NAME, found and closed. App.options is a deepmerge of config.yaml's defaults over the stored options, so the moment the default moves, every site STORING 0.06 becomes non-default with nobody having edited anything. Combined with TARIFF-17's new rung - a taxes period table beside a non-default scalar is a startup refusal - a working Walloon or Brussels site with a table would have hit SystemExit(78) on the upgrade, over an inert number the table overrides anyway. Closed with SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH: validate.py reads a superseded default as untouched too. The rung is NOT weakened - a genuinely custom 0.1198 beside a table is still refused by name, and the refusal now names both figures.

AND THE TICKET'S FRAMING WAS WRONG. I wrote that a site which took the default silently gets a different number. That is not what the deepmerge does: an existing install keeps its stored 0.06 and sees nothing change. The new default reaches a FRESH install, and an existing one only when its options are re-saved. Said plainly in the CHANGELOG, flagged as not re-measured on this branch (the 70-of-71-keys figure is 0.9.0's), with predeploy_check.py --options named as what would confirm it.

THE FIGURE IS THE BOTTOM OF THE BAND, DELIBERATELY, and the argument is the agent's rather than the ticket's: the error directions are not symmetric. Set too high, a genuinely negative hour reads positive and the add-on exports into paid disposal - section 17's own regression case. Set too low, it only declines a trade that would have paid. One default standing in for eight DSOs belongs at the bottom, and Antwerpen's 0.11736 is a real card row there rather than a synthesised minimum.

A CHECK HAD TO BE REWRITTEN RATHER THAN RE-POINTED. test_price.py section 0 justified its own constants by '0.06 is exactly twice 0.03'. This card ends that coincidence, so the sentence is false and is gone; it now asserts per figure that neither shipped default equals the fixture, which is stronger than the tuple compare it replaced. Recorded rather than quietly dropped, along with three other now-false claims the change created in test_price.py's docstring, MUTATION.md and DECISIONS/TARIFF-15 - which had predicted this card and is annotated as shipped.

Evidence: baseline 29/29 before any edit, 29/29 on the committed tree. Ten mutations, all red, every revert sha256-verified and every grade taken in a container with the tree :ro so no .pyc can exist. Two are zero-byte. The interesting one moves the component rows AND the default AND config.yaml together into a coherent West-Vlaanderen card - caught only by the literal typed in the test file and the band check, which is why the sum is graded from two independent sides. What the suite cannot see is stated in the PR: it grades the default against the card as a number, never the card against Belgium.
2026-09-13 16:33:37 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9c65ac2cf8 TARIFF-18: price_taxes_eur_kwh stops shipping at half the real figure
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m48s
`price_taxes_eur_kwh` shipped at 0.06 EUR/kWh with no recorded provenance -
no card, no date, no component list - and roughly HALF the true Flemish
all-in non-energy figure. It now ships at 0.11736, and the rows it is made
of are in the code rather than in this message:

  Fluvius distribution (Antwerpen)              5,35   c EUR/kWh
  Bijzondere accijns, "Alle verbruik"           4,876
  Bijdrage groene stroom en WKK Vlaanderen      1,51
  Energiebijdrage (0 EUR/MWh since 2026-08-01)  0
                                               ------
                                               11,736 c EUR/kWh = 0.11736

Eneco residential card for Flanders, September 2026, incl. 6 % VAT.
`app/price.py`'s FLEMISH_TAXES_COMPONENTS_EUR_KWH carries the rows and
test_price.py section 1b re-adds them - and also compares the total against
the card's own figures typed in the test file, so an edit that moved the
rows and the default together is still caught.

WHAT THIS IS NOT. It is not an arbitrage-correctness fix and it cannot be.
This scalar is a LEVEL component: an additive constant cancels exactly in
`max - min` and leaves the argmin where it was. TARIFF-17 shipped that proof
and it is unchanged - test_price.py 16b drives six flat scalars spanning and
exceeding the whole per-DSO range and gets the identical cheapest hour and
the identical spread to the last digit. DOCS and the CHANGELOG say so in
those words.

WHAT IT IS. A display and guard fix:

  * every number an operator reads, which at half the true value made the
    add-on look considerably better than it is; and
  * §17's negative-price guard in arbitrage.py - the one rung that tests an
    ABSOLUTE all-in price rather than a difference. It fires when
    `spot < -(markup + taxes)`, so its boundary moves -0.09 -> -0.14736
    EUR/kWh of spot. test_arbitrage.py section 2c drives both sides through
    the shipped decide() and pins the boundary from below as well.

The default is Antwerpen's real row, near the LOW end of the 0.117-0.131
per-DSO band, and that is deliberate: the error directions are not
symmetric. Too high carries a genuinely negative hour above zero and the
add-on exports into paid-for disposal - §17's own case. Too low only
declines a discharge that would have paid.

TARIFF-17's INTERACTION, WHICH HAD TO BE DECIDED. Nothing in that rung
hardcoded 0.06; it read PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, so moving the default moves
what it refuses. The Supervisor sets `App.options = deepmerge(config.yaml
defaults, stored options)`, so a saved blob carries the key whether it was
typed or not - every stored 0.06 became "non-default" with nobody editing
anything, and a working Walloon or Brussels site with a taxes table would
have met SystemExit(78) on the upgrade over an inert number. price.py now
carries SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH = (0.06,) and validate.py reads a
superseded default as untouched too. The rung is NOT weakened: 0.1198 beside
a table is still refused by name, and the refusal now names both figures.

config.yaml and PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS moved together; CFG-03's tripwire
(test_price.py section 1, test_defaults_pin.py) stayed green by agreeing.
test_price.py section 0's fourth check was REWRITTEN rather than re-pointed:
it used to justify the file's own grading constants by observing that the
shipped pair was degenerate (0.06 is exactly twice 0.03). TARIFF-18 ends
that coincidence, so the sentence is no longer true and is not kept.

29/29 test files green. Mutation ledger on the PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 16:24:56 +02:00
admin 7796f168a9 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-17: a charge that varies by hour gets somewhere to live' (#85) from TARIFF-17 into release/1.0
price.py modelled taxes as one flat scalar. In Flanders that is correct - Fluvius distribution is a single rate - but the Walloon DSOs publish day/night bands on the same card: ORES 13,27 vs 7,39, AIESH 15,17 vs 8,21, ORES IMPACT 16,578 vs 5,090 c EUR/kWh. The bands are ANTI-CORRELATED with what the battery wants to do - cheap network hours coincide with cheap spot hours - so flattening them systematically UNDERSTATES the spread and declines cycles that are genuinely profitable.

The flat scalar was never a wrong number. It sits in the additive bucket and provably cannot change which hour is cheapest; the defect was that a component belonging in the order-changing bucket had nowhere to live. That framing is the ticket, and it is what the regression grades.

Reproduced on one ordinary Belgian winter Thursday, same feed, same markup, taxes the only argument differing: five flat scalars spanning AND exceeding the table's own range - 0.0000 / 0.0739 / 0.1198 / 0.1327 / 1.0000 - all give cheapest hour 13 and spread 0.1500 to the last digit, while the ORES table gives hour 03 and 0.1788. Asserted through the shipped decision, static_tariff.arbitrage().cheapest, not through assemble()'s output. Before this existed the shipped tree answered assemble(..., <table>) -> TypeError.

The fixture differs in exactly ONE way and that is its own precondition - same caps object, same RawPoint list, same markup, by identity - and the flat arm is a FAMILY rather than a single scalar, so what the comparison measures cannot be a level effect. That closes the shape that produced a whole-suite survivor in TARIFF-11, where a fixture varied two things at once.

GRAMMAR REUSED, NOT DUPLICATED. parse_taxes_profile() is parse_static_profile() with option= and means= as default arguments, so every pre-existing call site and sentence is byte-identical. Graded two ways: one check parses every module under app/ and asserts the 14 grammar names are defined in exactly one of them, with an AST pin that the wrapper's whole body is one call; another DERIVES all thirteen refusal sentences for the new option from the old option's own sentence. Copying the tiling check into price.py is red.

A WHOLE CARD TYPED IN CENTS IS ITS OWN RUNG, and not a restatement of the parser's plausibility bound. ORES's 13,27 trips that bound - but SIBELGA'S ENTIRE BRUSSELS CARD (9,39 / 7,10) IS UNDER IT and would have started as a 9.39 EUR/kWh levy. Graded by its own reason, and the mutation is red on the Sibelga line only.

Malformed tables are refused at STARTUP by validate.py across three rungs. If one ever gets past, load_prices() returns a section 11.4 no-data read naming the key and logs an error - no silent fall back to the scalar, no traceback into the tick.

Both plugins that need the framework to add taxes move 13 -> 03 (custom_formula {ENERGY,MARKUP} and generic_dayahead {ENERGY}); manual_csv, which is all-in, stays at 13. Enumerated from PROVIDERS rather than typed.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Thirteen mutations, all red, and no row is an edit-and-revert - each gets a fresh rsync'd copy with no __pycache__, mounted :ro, then deleted, which closes habit 18 structurally rather than by discipline. Hoisting the lookup out of assemble()'s loop (+17 B) keeps the number right while stopping it varying by hour: red on six named checks in test_price.py and GREEN IN THE OTHER 28 FILES.

Three things named rather than rounded off: one mutant is equivalent and unseparable by any fixture, because StaticProfile.at() calls brussels() on whatever instant it is given; DOCS' bucket table is prose that nothing asserts, though the numbers it quotes are printed by the checks on every run; and the card's own 0.2240/0.2422 figures were NOT verified and were not repeated - replaced with a claim that is derivable from the contract price, that the spread is proportional to factor and the offset drops out.

One design point is explicitly the owner's, not the agent's: a table beside a NON-DEFAULT price_taxes_eur_kwh is a refusal, so an operator adopting the table must set that key back to 0.06. The alternative - warn, table wins - is the silent-loser shape this repo refuses everywhere else, so the refusal was taken and flagged rather than quietly chosen.
2026-09-13 15:40:17 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 2fac0aaf06 TARIFF-17: a price component that varies by hour has somewhere to live
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m25s
`price.py` modelled the whole non-energy part of a Belgian bill as ONE flat
scalar. This adds `price_taxes_profile`, which carries the TAXES component as
a period table, and makes `assemble()` evaluate it at each point's own instant.

⚠️ THE FLAT SCALAR WAS NOT A WRONG NUMBER, AND THIS IS NOT A CORRECTION OF ONE.
The optimiser reads exactly two quantities off a series - the spread
`max - min` over the firm points, and which hour is cheapest - and an additive
constant identical in every hour cancels out of the first and leaves the second
where it was. It is provably inert. Measured, and printed by test_price.py 16b
on every run: with a flat taxes figure of 0.00, 0.0739, 0.1198, 0.1327 or 1.00
EUR/kWh the same 24-hour feed is cheapest at 13:00 in all five cases and its
spread is 0.1500 EUR/kWh in all five cases. What was missing is anywhere for an
HOUR-VARYING non-energy component to live. This is a missing capability, not a
bad constant.

Belgium has one. Fluvius distribution is a single rate - its tariff-card row
reads `Normaal | Uitsl. nacht`, where exclusive night is a separate physical
circuit and not a night register - so nothing changes for the reference site in
Flanders. The Walloon DSOs and Sibelga are on the same card with four columns,
`Enkelvoudig | Dag | Nacht | Uitsl. nacht`, and the gap is real money (c/kWh):
ORES 13,27 / 7,39; AIESH 15,17 / 8,21; Tecteo RESA 12,20 / 7,01; Sibelga
9,39 / 7,10; ORES IMPACT 2026 16,578 / 5,090.

⚠️ AND THE BANDS ARE ANTI-CORRELATED WITH WHAT THE BATTERY WANTS TO DO. The
cheap network hours are the cheap spot hours, so flattening them does not shift
the curve - it UNDERSTATES the spread and declines cycles that would have paid.
Same feed, same markup, the only difference being the taxes argument:

    flat 0.0000 / 0.0739 / 0.1198 / 0.1327 / 1.0000
                                       -> cheapest hour 13, spread 0.1500
    ORES dag 0.1327 / nacht 0.0739     -> cheapest hour 03, spread 0.1788

The regression check grades WHICH HOUR IS CHEAPEST, not the spread: an
implementation that reads the table once and adds one number to every point is
the LEVEL bucket wearing a period table - right magnitude, wrong shape - and a
spread assertion passes on it. Measured: hoisting the lookup out of
`assemble()`'s loop (+17 B) is red on six named checks in test_price.py and
GREEN in the other 28 files.

ONE GRAMMAR, NOT TWO. `static_tariff.py` already shipped the periods, the day
selectors, the tiling rule and the DST handling, so `parse_taxes_profile()` is
the same parser with the option name and the "what this number means" clause as
arguments. A second tiling rule would be a second set of 23- and 25-hour-day
bugs. test_static_tariff.py section 10 pins that two ways: by parsing every
module under `app/` and asserting the grammar is defined in exactly one of
them, and by deriving each of thirteen refusal sentences for the new option
from the old option's own sentence rather than transcribing them.

`Component.TAXES` semantics, `code_leaks()` and the double-counting guarantee
are untouched. The new key joins FRAMEWORK_KEYS, BANNED_IN_PLUGIN_CODE is
derived from that set, and a plugin that names it is refused at `register()`.
It reaches both plugins that take taxes - `custom_formula` ({ENERGY, MARKUP})
and `generic_dayahead` ({ENERGY}) - and not `manual_csv`, which is all-in: the
table is routed through `capabilities().adds`, exactly as the scalar is.

⚠️ A MALFORMED TABLE IS REFUSED AT STARTUP, NOT AT THE NEXT FETCH. It is read
on the ~30 s planning path, and a table that first fails at 03:00 is a site
that stops pricing at 03:00, which §11.4 turns into a quiet fallback
indistinguishable from a healthy fixed-tariff day. validate.py refuses three
things: a table that does not tile the day; a table set beside a NON-DEFAULT
`price_taxes_eur_kwh`, because the table wins and the scalar would then be a
number the operator typed that decides nothing; and a whole card typed in
CENTS, which is how these figures are printed. That last rung is not a
restatement of the parser's +-10 EUR/kWh bound - ORES's 13,27 trips the parser,
but Sibelga's entire card, 9,39 and 7,10, is under it and would otherwise have
started as a 9.39 EUR/kWh levy. Both rungs are graded by the REASON each gives,
and mutating them together (TEST-16) moves three rows.

NOTHING CHANGES FOR A SITE THAT DOES NOT SET IT. The option ships "", and the
scalar path is unchanged arithmetically rather than merely in intent:
test_price.py 16f reproduces the pre-TARIFF-17 expression and compares 12
capability/scalar combinations point for point with `==`.

13 mutations, every one red on a named check, ledger in test_price.py below
section 16k with byte deltas and the one equivalent mutant named. 29/29 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 15:31:15 +02:00
admin c518007caf Merge pull request 'TARIFF-11: the add-on stops flattering itself' (#84) from TARIFF-11 into release/1.0
Four places where the add-on's account of itself was wrong, every one in the direction that flatters it, and none of them pinned by any check because nothing graded the strings a human reads.

TariffPlan.words counted points and called them hours - 192 h for 192 quarter-hourly points, which is 48 hours; measured across a 40-hour soak the error ranged 1.79x to 5.33x with the firm/carried mix, and horizon_h was 48.0 at every sample while words never said 48. The section 8.3 refusal did the same and reached the status page through arb.explain(): 'only 1 of 96 hours carry a published price' for 96 points spanning 24. The plan's shape reached no HTTP surface at all - rows['Tariff'] was static_status()'s own sentence and read 'no static profile' at all 802 soak samples, while the plan was provisional for 76% of them and carried mixed 900/3600 s spacing for 70%. And main.py's 'if and only if' comment was false: cycle() returns on missing inputs before self.arb = None, so a site with trading ON rendered 'off (arbitrage_enabled)' - naming an option that was on.

A FIFTH instance was found that the card did not list, in price_forecast.py's '%d of %d hours' - carried hours over points - which DOCS quotes verbatim, so leaving it would have re-broken the doc.

THE CHECK IS THE DELIVERABLE, not the fixes. It renders Controller.status_payload()['rows'], parses each number out of its OWN slot, and compares it against a figure computed from the fixture's two construction parameters - never from the property the row was built out of. The slot parser is calibrated first against a correct row AND against a row wrong exactly as the defect was. Fixtures are a SET of four plan shapes and the check computes and prints the table of field pairs no fixture separates. origin and product are graded by disagreement over identical point lists, the Arbitrage row's states by inequality, the end-to-end row against the captured document's own length.

The two Tariff sources stay distinguishable: one row, two explicitly timestamped halves, with the age taken from tariff_at - which TARIFF-12 deliberately does not move on a kept plan - and measured by the caller rather than by a second clock inside the renderer. The same plan object at 0 s and 4000 s must render differently, and hardcoding the age to 0 is red.

FCST-04's Tariff-to-DOCS pin was honoured rather than routed around: wiring the plan in took test_price_history.py red until DOCS carried the pinned sentence, the row's five facts, the two-clock warning and a four-row table of the Arbitrage renderings. The trap fired exactly as designed.

Evidence: 29/29 green, re-verified after merging TARIFF-13. Sixteen mutations, no survivors; one is a zero-byte edit transposing firm and carried, and it is red.

TWO MUTATIONS BIT THE AGENT'S OWN CHECKS AND BOTH WERE CLOSED. One was a survivor of the whole suite at -190 B: the origin fixture gave the fallback plan a distinct provider string as well as a distinct origin, so the rows differed for two reasons and dropping origin entirely changed nothing observable - habit 4, occurring inside the fix for habit 4. The provider string is now held equal as its own precondition. The other produced a traceback and no named red, because a datetime comparison raised inside an f-string OPERAND rather than inside the condition - FCST-06's finding, one layer over.

Left for its own card, named rather than folded in: TARIFF-09's price_feed_url override warning still predicts the wrong degraded state - on a cold store the unpublished hours are ABSENT, not carried and flagged - and absence is the worse state.
2026-09-13 14:07:07 +02:00
admin a11597e0b3 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/release/1.0' into TARIFF-11
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m20s
# Conflicts:
#	goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md
2026-09-13 13:51:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 610725bed9 TARIFF-11: the plan's account of itself, corrected and put on the page
Four defects of one shape - the add-on's report of its own tariff plan was
wrong, always in the direction that flattered it - and one check, which is
the deliverable.

1. `TariffPlan.words` counted POINTS and called them HOURS. The live add-on
   logged `dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 132 h` for 132
   quarter-hourly points = 33 hours. Belgium moved to a 15-minute MTU on
   2025-10-01, so this was wrong every time it was printed, and NOT by a
   constant factor: a 40-hour soak measured 1.79x .. 5.33x, because §8.3's
   carried points are hourly while the firm ones are quarter-hourly.
   `words` now reports both quantities, plus the firm/carried split and the
   spacing, in FCST-04's *Price history* wording so the two rows can be
   compared.

2. §8.3's firm-pair refusal and the flat-tariff refusal did the same, and
   they reach an operator through `self.arb.explain()`. This is exactly the
   point<->hour conflation TARIFF-14 removed from `at()`, left standing in
   the prose. `price_forecast.py`'s §8.3 carry-forward log line carried the
   third instance - a carried-HOUR count over a POINT count - and DOCS
   quotes it verbatim, so it is corrected here too.

3. The plan reached no HTTP surface at all. `rows["Tariff"]` was
   `static_status()`'s 30 s-tick sentence and never saw the provider plan -
   it read 'no static profile' at all 802 soak samples on a site whose feed
   was answering. It now carries the plan's shape. ⚠️ The two sources are
   kept distinguishable: the plan half is stamped with its own age, measured
   from `tariff_at`, because it can be up to TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S (5400 s) old.
   FCST-04 pins that row to DOCS as a pair; DOCS moves in this commit.

4. `main.py`'s "if and only if" was false. `cycle()` returns at the input
   hold before `self.arb = None`, so an armed site read
   `off (arbitrage_enabled)` - naming an option that is on - and, after one
   completed cycle, showed a decision up to 15 s stale as a current one. The
   row now reads the OPTION and separates three facts; `cycle_at` and
   `arb_at` make "this cycle reached no decision" an observation.

THE DELIVERABLE IS THE CHECK. All four survived 29 green suites because
nothing graded the strings a human is shown. `test_price.py` section 12
renders through the shipped `status_payload()`, parses each number out of
its OWN SLOT and compares it against a figure computed from the fixture's
construction parameters - not from the property the row was built out of
(habit 4), and not as a substring of a sentence the same file wrote (habit
14). The fixture set is four plan shapes and the check computes and prints
the field pairs no fixture separates. The *Arbitrage* row's states are
driven through real cycles with a sensor answering None and graded by
INEQUALITY.

No behaviour changed: no threshold, refusal rung, claim or setpoint moved.

MUTATIONS: 16, no survivors, one at +0 B (the risky delta) and red. Two were
found by the battery INSIDE THIS CARD'S OWN CHECK: a -190 B survivor whose
fixture varied two things at once (habit 4), and a mutation whose red was a
TRACEBACK in an f-string operand and therefore named nothing (FCST-06). Both
closed; the table is on the PR.

All 29 test files green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 13:51:05 +02:00
admin b4a3801f68 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-13: the count of what was measured is as durable as the measurement' (#83) from TARIFF-13 into release/1.0
A 40-hour soak drove a restart and caught the capacity-tariff row asserting '0 quarter(s) banked' for a month in which 120 quarters had been measured. The peak and its attributed quarter persisted; the count did not. It is the count, not the peak, that tells an operator how much of the billing month the measurement actually covers - a peak of 365 W over 120 quarters and the same peak over 0 quarters are very different claims about the same number, and after a restart the page made the weaker claim while displaying the stronger one's value.

Reproduced through a real Controller and P1Ingest with a real restart, never by reading code: 12 -> 0 with the store still holding 12 rows. Fixed durable rather than removed - the count is the useful half of the row. PeakStore.banked_count(month) queries quarter_blocks and `recorded` became a property over it. After the fix the printed count matches the store on both sides, 12 -> 13, and 13 is CORRECT: the restart's restore() banks the stale open block, which the old process-wide counter never saw.

TWO DEFECTS THE TICKET DID NOT NAME, both closed by the same change: the count was never month-scoped, so a fresh October reported a quarter banked from September; and it missed blocks banked by restore(). An unreadable store now returns None and renders 'an unreadable number of quarter(s) banked' - rendering it as 0 was rejected because it reads as a real zero, which is TARIFF-01's own disarming-value argument applied to the coverage figure beside the peak.

THE TICKET'S SECOND FINDING WAS FALSE AND THE AGENT DISPROVED IT. I wrote that ties at the same wattage are re-attributed to the most recent matching quarter. The upsert is strictly '>', so an exact tie never writes at all - six exactly-equal 365.0 W quarters re-attributed zero times. The soak's drift was a real new maximum below the row's whole-watt display resolution: 365.0000001 W is a new peak to the database and the same '365 W' to the reader. A plausible diagnosis, checked rather than implemented.

Tie attribution is nevertheless decided deliberately - EARLIEST wins - on what the row is for rather than on money: wattage is what is billed, and an operator investigating one event needs a stable answer. It is also what recompute_month() already did, and the two readers genuinely diverged: fed newest-first, monthly_peak answered 09:45 and the recompute 09:00, breaking the invariant part 8 exists to prove. peak_w is untouched and SAFETY-07 reads identical watts.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Eleven mutations, all red, purged before each with the fingerprint verified after every revert. One was a REAL SURVIVOR at -3 B: banked_count() has two None paths and the first battery reached only one, because a never-opened handle short-circuits before any SQL. Closed by dropping the table out from under an OPEN store, behind a precondition asserting the same call answered 4 first.

main.py is untouched - the row picks the fix up unedited because `recorded` is now a property. The residual is named rather than hidden: `recorded` answers for now() while the peak follows checks(when=...). Production has exactly one call site, self.checks() with no argument, where both are the same month, so the live page is correct and durable; they part only under the suite's when= affordance, and that mismatch is strictly smaller than the process-wide counter it replaces. recorded_in(when) is shipped and the row's move onto it is one token.
2026-09-13 13:03:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a991438e40 TARIFF-13: the coverage figure beside the peak stops resetting at a restart
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m27s
The capacity-tariff status row printed a peak read from SQLite next to a count
of banked quarters read from PROCESS MEMORY - `PeakTracker.recorded`, an `int`
set to 0 in `__init__` and counted up inside `sync()`. A 40-hour soak caught
what that means at a driven restart, on both instances independently:

  before: 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-11T18:45:00+00:00
          - 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 120 quarter(s) banked
  after : 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-11T18:45:00+00:00
          - 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit;   0 quarter(s) banked

Reproduced here before anything changed, through the real Controller and a real
restart - a second Controller object against the same file on disk - at 12 -> 0
with 12 rows standing in `quarter_blocks`.

The peak is durable and was never wrong. The COUNT is what says how much of the
billing month that peak covers, and 365 W over 120 quarters and 365 W over 0
quarters are different claims about the same number. Mid-month, after every
restart, the page made the weaker claim while displaying the stronger one's
value. That is TARIFF-01's own argument - an unreadable store must not read as a
zero peak, because a zero peak is disarming - one column over.

`PeakStore.banked_count(month)` asks the database, and `recorded` is a property
over it. Two more defects in the same variable fell out once it was driven, and
neither was in the ticket: it was never scoped to a MONTH (on 1 October the row
still showed September's tally beside October's empty month - measured), and it
missed the block `restore()` banks from the checkpoint, which never passes
through `sync()`.

⚠️ NOT 0, AND NOT None, WHEN THE STORE WILL NOT ANSWER. `banked_count()` returns
None and the row renders `an unreadable number of quarter(s) banked`.
`f"{None} quarter(s) banked"` was rejected because it reads as the same zero.
`0 quarter(s) banked` stays true and reachable - it is what a month nothing has
been written to says, and the two are asserted to be different text.

⚠️ THE DEDUPE IS NOT REMOVED WITH THE COUNTER. `_seen` still stops `cycle()`'s
once-a-second `sync()` re-banking a block `P1Ingest.blocks` keeps for a day. The
check that graded it asserted `recorded == 1` - the dedupe and the figure
reporting it were the same variable - and now grades `sync()`'s RETURN, because
counting rows cannot see a re-bank at all (PRIMARY KEY no-op).

THE TIE RULE, DECIDED RATHER THAN EMERGENT: at equal wattage the EARLIEST
quarter keeps the attribution. No bill and no guard moves - `peak_w` is still
only ever raised, the `>` term is untouched, SAFETY-07 reads the same watts.
The two readers DID disagree: the upsert's strict `>` kept whichever tied block
was WRITTEN first while `recompute_month()` has always kept the earliest, the
same only while blocks arrive in time order, and measured to diverge (09:45
against 09:00) fed newest-first.

⚠️ AND THE SOAK'S DRIFTING QUARTER WAS NOT A TIE. Six exactly equal 365.0 W
quarters re-attributed zero times on the shipped tree - `>` is strict. What
moved it was a real new maximum BELOW THE ROW'S OWN RESOLUTION: the row renders
whole watts, so 365.0000001 W is a new peak to the database and the same 365 W
to the reader. Left alone deliberately, and pinned so it is not re-diagnosed.

test_tariff.py parts 11 and 12. 12 mutations, all red, listed on the PR; M2 -
`banked_count()`'s sqlite3.Error arm returning 0 - was a SURVIVOR at -3 B on the
first battery, because a handle that never opened short-circuits before any SQL
runs and nothing reached the except arm. Closed with an open store whose table
is dropped under it, with a precondition that the same call answered 4 first.

main.py is NOT touched - TARIFF-11 holds its status rows. The row picks this up
without editing because `recorded` is an attribute access and is now a property.
The residual is stated in DECISIONS §3: `recorded` answers for now() while the
peak follows `checks(when=...)`, and the shipped install has exactly one call
site - `self.checks()` with no argument, main.py:4359 - where they are the same
month, so the live page is correct and durable. `recorded_in(when)` is shipped
and the row's move onto it is one token, for whoever holds main.py next; part 10
pins the present behaviour against a row count taken from `quarter_blocks` so
the gap cannot be quietly forgotten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 12:54:15 +02:00
admin 068b83f57c Merge pull request 'TARIFF-15: custom_formula, graded against the card it was copied from' (#82) from TARIFF-15 into release/1.0
The owner asked for a custom formula for exotic suppliers. TARIFF-07's research established why it is the only shape that can work: there is no machine-readable source of Belgian tariff coefficients anywhere - CREG's tariff-card pages 404, VREG was unreachable, and every coefficient found came from a supplier's own PDF, one image-only. Coefficients are per-contract and live behind a klantenzone login. So no scraping and no per-supplier plugin can work; the customer is the only party who can see their own numbers, and the card they read them from is the only artefact that can grade them.

The shape is the market's published arithmetic rather than our approximation: both readable cards print the formula, the reference index assumed, AND the resulting price. Through shipped code, Eneco (0.102 x 133.9905 + 1) x 1.06 = 15.54705 against a card printing 15,55; ENGIE (0.1 x 61.96 + 0.9) x 1.06 = 7.52176 against 7,522.

That is also the safety mechanism. validate.py recomputes the card's own worked example at startup and REFUSES TO START unless it matches to 0.01. An offset inflated by network charges cannot pass, because the card's printed estimate is by construction the energy component alone. The refusal names how far out, in which direction, by what ratio, and then names the expensive cause: network charges folded into `offset` bills you for it twice, which is why the check cannot be switched off.

NO EXPRESSION EVALUATION, guaranteed three structural ways - coefficients must be numbers, an unknown field is refused rather than ignored, and there is no evaluator in the module - and checked by an AST walk rather than a grep, because the module's own docstring contains the text eval(s, {"__builtins__": {}}) explaining why that is not a sandbox, and a text scan would fire on the documentation it mandates. That is code_leaks()'s lesson applied to a second file. A mutation plants a real eval in the shipped module and turns it red.

TWO CORRECTIONS TO THE TICKET, both the agent's and both right. The plausibility band's floor was specified on the all-in figure; the shipped 0.06 of taxes is 3x the 0.02 floor, so a hundredfold error (0.0016 -> 0.0616) sails over it. The floor now sits on the ENERGY figure and the ceiling on the all-in. And the ticket claimed the card check catches 10x/100x/1000x errors: it catches a MISMATCH between the two sides, and a unit error applied to both cancels out of a comparison between them. The wording was narrowed everywhere rather than restated, and the band added as a separate refusal on a separate quantity.

Stated limits rather than glossed: the check grades the coefficients against the card, not the card against reality - a consistent-but-wrong pair, both numbers from the wrong product, passes, and DOCS says so in the same sentence as the claim. Only TWO real tariffs could be reproduced end to end, not three: the repo's third real formula (Eneco injection) has no printed price beside it, so there is nothing to grade it against and none was fabricated.

Evidence: 29/29 green, 347 checks in test_price.py. 22 mutations, no survivors. One was a -13 B SURVIVOR on the first attempt - the check graded the preview's heading rather than the row, the third instance this week of a check anchored to something it does not own - and is now graded on a rendered row built from the capture. One mutation passes the all-in check by declaring ALL_IN, exactly as trap 1 says no code can catch; what goes red is the declaration-agreement check plus the card reproductions.

The riskiest edit is flagged rather than buried: test_price.py's summary block had to move, because a section appended after `if fails: sys.exit(1)` would have left every new check's failure unreported with exit 0. Verified on the base that sections 13 and 14 were always before it, so no earlier evidence is affected.
2026-09-13 03:58:46 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 ac9854886b TARIFF-15: your own tariff card, as two coefficients the card itself grades
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m14s
A Belgian dynamic contract prices energy as `B x index + A`, and the two
coefficients exist on exactly one artefact: the customer's own tariff card.
There is no machine-readable source for them anywhere - CREG's consumer
tariff-card pages 404, CREG Scan is a JS wizard, the annual report has the
supplier list without per-product coefficients, VREG was unreachable, and
every coefficient found in research came off a supplier's own PDF, one
image-only. So nothing can be scraped and a per-supplier plugin would have no
source for its numbers, which is why TARIFF-07 withdrew three of them. The
customer is the only party who can see their own coefficients; they type them.

New provider `custom_formula`, one new option `price_formula` (a JSON string,
the `static_profile` precedent exactly), and a new module
`app/custom_formula.py`. The index path is `generic_dayahead`'s, not a second
one: the URL/override decision is now one shared `dayahead_feed_url()` both
plugins call, same feed, same Brussels-calendar range, same columnar parser,
same declared egress hosts.

It declares {ENERGY, MARKUP}, NOT ALL_IN. A card's Tariefformule line is the
energy component alone - Eneco tabulates network tariffs and levies
separately, ENGIE states the formula excludes network, distribution,
transport, levies and excise - so ALL_IN would lie for every operator who
typed what their card says and would drop the taxes from every hour
(0.2125 -> 0.1555 EUR/kWh, measured).

THE CARD IS THE GRADER, and that is why this is safe to ship. The framework
already mechanises that a PLUGIN cannot double-count. This introduces a risk
none of those guards can see because it is config, not code: the OPERATOR
double-counting, by folding network charges into `offset` while
price_taxes_eur_kwh carries them too. So validate.py recomputes the card's own
printed price from the operator's coefficients at startup and refuses to start
unless the two agree to within 0.01, naming the discrepancy. An inflated
offset cannot pass: 15.55 becomes 28.27. The same check catches VAT omitted,
VAT doubled, a transposed digit and a unit mismatch between the two sides.

And the limit, in the same sentence as the claim: it grades the coefficients
against the card, NOT the card against reality. A consistent-but-wrong pair
passes. A second refusal covers the one unit error the first cannot see - the
one applied to both sides at once - by bounding the card's own point to
0.02-1.00 EUR/kWh. Its FLOOR is applied to the energy figure rather than the
all-in one because the shipped 0.06 of taxes is three times that floor and
would carry a hundredfold error over it alone; found by writing the mutation,
not by review (M10, +0 B).

The market's own arithmetic, reproduced through the shipped code:

  Eneco (0.102 x 133.9905 + 1) x 1.06 = 15.5471   card prints 15,55
  ENGIE (0.1   x  61.96   + 0.9) x 1.06 = 7.5218  card prints 7,522

NO EXPRESSION EVALUATION OF ANY KIND. The string is settable over HTTP through
the add-on's own ingress page, so eval on it is RCE in a root container
holding SUPERVISOR_TOKEN and driving an inverter over RS485 - but the deciding
argument is that an expression is UNVERIFIABLE: two coefficients can be graded
against the card, an arbitrary expression cannot be graded against anything,
so it would make the invisible-wrong-coefficient problem strictly worse. An
unknown field is REFUSED rather than ignored, so `"expr"` is told it does not
exist. Future shapes become named fields, never a grammar. test_price.py 15f
walks the module's AST for eval/exec/compile/__import__/literal_eval and
exercises the scanner's red direction on every run.

Refused at startup: card absent or out by >0.01; `units` absent (no default);
factor == 0 (every spread 0, arbitrage silently never fires - the message
points at static_profile); factor < 0 (inverts the market); vat_pct outside
0-30 (0 stays legitimate); non-finite or non-numeric; unknown field, index or
resolution; the plausibility band. A card older than ~6 months WARNS and does
not refuse - ENGIE freezes coefficients for a contract's duration. Negative
output prices are not refused anywhere.

A startup preview logs the next 24 h as `index EUR/MWh -> all-in EUR/kWh` with
min/median/max and the day's spread, through a new default-silent
`PriceProvider.startup_preview()` hook - only the plugin knows what went in to
its own arithmetic. Emitted once per process, and a preview that raises cannot
cost the site its prices.

`custom_formula` joins the config.yaml enum through the DERIVED set
PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {"off"}, not a hardcoded list. Both
translations describe the option and the new id. DOCS.md replaces the
"planned" sentence with the shape, a worked example from a real card, a real
startup transcript and the limit of the check stated beside the claim.

22 mutations, one per check added, no survivors - MUTATION.md carries the
ledger. M13 (the preview's index column) was a -13 B survivor of the whole
suite on the first attempt because the check graded the HEADING and not the
row; it is graded on a rendered row now. All 29 suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 03:49:08 +02:00
admin aade2c79fd Merge pull request 'TARIFF-07: withdraw three plugins that never fetched a price' (#81) from TARIFF-07 into release/1.0
engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic and eneco_eddy had fabricated endpoints. Re-verified before deletion, 2026-09-13: api.engie.be/dynamic/be answers 404 from a Kong gateway with no route; api.totalenergies.be presents a certificate for CN=pge-apigee-dev.direct-energie.com with the host absent from its SAN, so TLS closes before a request is sent; api.eneco.be/eddy/prices answers 404 with a one-byte body. And 'Eddy' is not an Eneco product at all - theirs is 'Zon & Wind Dynamisch', indexed to Belpex/EPEX DAY-AHEAD rather than imbalance.

They are structurally impossible, not merely unfinished: supplier coefficients are per-contract and live behind the customer's klantenzone login, so no public unauthenticated endpoint could ever return a given customer's price. There is no regulator index either - CREG's tariff-card pages 404, VREG was unreachable, and every coefficient found in research came from a supplier's own PDF, one of them image-only. The three invented URLs are the predictable failure mode of a task with no canonical index to fall back on.

THE SCHEMA ENUM KEEPS ALL SIX IDS ON PURPOSE. config.yaml's price_provider is a list(...) enum validated by the Supervisor BEFORE the add-on starts, so removing the three would make an existing config schema-invalid, produce an opaque 'expected one of ...', and validate.py would never run - the refusal would never be seen on exactly the sites it exists for. PROVIDERS is two; the enum stays six; both translations label them withdrawn; the schema check is derived from PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {off}; and register() refuses to re-register a retired id so the registry and the retired table cannot both claim one.

The refusal tells a stranded operator the truth rather than aliasing them somewhere: that this is not a typo - the add-on offered the id, accepted it, and said nothing at every startup since; that it has never fetched a price anywhere, with the endpoint and its observed response named; that section 11.4 turned every failure into a silent fallback, so what the site has actually been running is the static profile, or nothing at all when none is set; and what to do instead, stating plainly that generic_dayahead APPROXIMATES a Belgian dynamic tariff and cannot reproduce a supplier's B x spot + A formula. There is deliberately no alias, because aliasing would require the contract's own two coefficients - which are in no public index, so the add-on would have to invent the numbers it prices a battery against.

False claims corrected across DOCS.md, price_forecast.py, price_history.py, static_tariff.py, DECISIONS/FCST-04 and CHANGELOG.md: eneco_eddy was described as a 'Belgian imbalance product' in all of them and is not. The quarter-hourly examples now cite Belgian day-ahead, which genuinely settles per quarter since the 15-minute MTU of 2025-10-01 - the mechanism was right, only the example was invented. export_price_eur_kwh's docstring claimed no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve; Eneco publishes 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 on the same card as its consumption formula, identical on the January and September 2026 cards, and it is VAT-exempt while consumption is at 6%. _points_from_json() is deleted: it read a shape no reachable feed publishes and was graded only against fixtures built from the same guess.

PriceProduct.REALTIME and the widening machinery are KEPT although eneco_eddy was their sole declarer, with a DECISIONS note recording that no shipped plugin declares it until one does - otherwise a later reviewer finds a mechanism with zero callers and reasonably deletes the AC2 seam.

ONE CHECK HAD QUIETLY STOPPED BEING ONE. test_price.py 4b proved code_leaks()'s docstring strip is load-bearing by using a real shipped docstring that a raw scan false-positives on - and that docstring belonged to engie_dynamic. Deleting the plugin would have left the check PASSING on a tree with the strip removed. The stimulus is rebuilt inside the test file and the shipped set asserted clean separately.

BACKWARD-INCOMPATIBLE: a config legal on the current version is refused on the next. That is the point of the refusal, and the CHANGELOG says so in the shape PKG-07 established for slew_w.

Evidence: 29/29 green, with the baseline established at 8d09b30 before any edit. Nine mutations, nine red, two of them zero-byte edits; two counts are lower bounds because the run hit a traceback mid-suite.
2026-09-13 02:54:59 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 f620f7cf80 TARIFF-07: three plugins that never fetched a price are withdrawn, and a site configured on one is told so
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m12s
engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic and eneco_eddy are removed from PROVIDERS
and from every surface that listed them. They did not stop working - they never
worked. Re-verified by hand on 2026-09-13 before deleting anything: 404 with
Kong's "no Route matched with those values"; a TLS handshake that fails because
api.totalenergies.be is absent from the certificate's SAN list; 404 with an
empty body. All three are also structurally impossible - the coefficients are
per-contract and behind a customer login, there is no regulator index, and
"Eddy" is not an Eneco product at all.

⚠️ BACKWARD-INCOMPATIBLE. A config legal on the current version is refused on
the next. That is the point of the change: §11.4 turned every failed fetch into
a silent fall back, so a site on one of these ids has been running on
static_profile - or on nothing - since the day it was set, with nothing on its
status page ever differing from a working provider that never found a cheap
hour. validate.py now refuses a retired id with a message naming the id, the
endpoint, what that endpoint answers, which tariff has really been in force,
and what to set instead. No version number is picked here; that depends on a
fact about the live box.

⚠️ config.yaml's price_provider enum deliberately KEEPS all three ids. The
Supervisor validates the options file against that enum before the add-on
starts, so removing them would make an existing config schema-invalid and the
refusal above would never be reached on exactly the sites that need it.
PROVIDERS is two; the enum stays six; test_price.py asserts the schema offers
exactly PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {"off"}, derived rather than typed, and
register() refuses to re-register a retired id.

PriceProduct.REALTIME, _WIDE, Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT and WIDEN_FACTOR's
2.5 are KEPT with no shipped declarer - it is the AC2 seam, and a reviewer
finding a mechanism with zero callers would reasonably delete it. Recorded in
DECISIONS/TARIFF-07-withdrawing-three-plugins.md and pinned by a check.

False claims corrected: every "Belgian imbalance product" claim about
eneco_eddy (DOCS.md, price_forecast.py, price_history.py, static_tariff.py,
FCST-04, CHANGELOG - the two released entries annotated in place rather than
rewritten); the quarter-hourly examples now cite Belgian day-ahead, which
really does settle per quarter since the 15-minute MTU; and
export_price_eur_kwh's "no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection
curve", which is false - Eneco publishes 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 and ENGIE
(B x eSpot_15) - A, same two-coefficient shape with its own coefficients and
its own VAT treatment, so the scalar is a simplification and not the market.

DOCS.md's provider table is two rows and now says honestly what a Belgian
dynamic customer should do today, including that generic_dayahead cannot
express B x spot + A and that price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1) could not hold a
negative offset. The formula provider is referenced as planned, not built.

_points_from_json() went with the plugins it served: it read a shape no feed
anybody here has ever reached publishes. The one place it survives is a
negative stimulus, named row_shape_body().

Nine mutations driven, all red; table in the decision record. 29/29 suites
green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 02:46:15 +02:00
admin 8d09b30f16 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-14: the window a point covers is the point's, not an assumed hour' (#80) from TARIFF-14 into release/1.0
_Series.at() hardcoded a one-hour coverage window and returned the FIRST point whose start fell inside it. Belgium moved to a 15-minute MTU on 2025-10-01 and the live feed returns 96 points at 900 s, so on the real series at() answered with the wrong point for 45 of every 60 minutes - and then drifted, because from the second hour on the first match was an earlier point still inside its own one-hour window. Reproduced against shipped code: asking for 03:00 returned the 02:15 point.

It reached the trade decision directly. arbitrage._act() calls _point_at(plan, now) -> series.at(now), then tests here.start == cheapest.start / == dearest.start to decide whether this interval is the buy or the sell one. With a stale and drifting point that identity test almost never matches the extremum, so the strategy idled through exactly the interval it exists to trade. It also tested here.provisional and the section 17 negative-price guard on the wrong point's price.

Nothing caught it because no test drove at() on a sub-hourly series: the DST tests count points on 23- and 25-hour days but never ask for a quarter-hour, and every price fixture before TARIFF-08 was the invented hourly row shape. static_tariff.py emits hourly points, so static sites are immune - the defect was reachable only by the dynamic path TARIFF-08/09 had just made work.

Each point's window now runs to the next point's start, CAPPED AT ONE HOUR. The cap is not cosmetic: uncapped, the rule would have stretched the point before a three-hour FCST-04 hole across the whole hole, introducing hole-filling as a side effect of fixing a lookup. The last point takes the span of the point before it, because a flat one-hour tail answers at(00:30) tomorrow with today's 23:45 price - reaching for a neighbour across a day boundary, which section 11.4 forbids.

That tail choice was independently validated by TARIFF-12, which merged during this work. A served plan can now be up to TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S (5400 s) old, and price_horizon_h permits a 1 h horizon - so now can walk past the end of a short series. Under the shipped rule at() raises Absence and the site falls to the static profile; under the rejected flat tail the same stale plan would have gone on trading against an expired :45 quarter for up to 45 minutes. Re-read the rule if TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S is ever widened.

covers() shared the bug exactly - it has no rule of its own and delegates to at() - so one change fixes both. window() did not: it grades a start against a half-open range and never asks how long a point lasts. at() now depends on sortedness AND ESTABLISHES IT ITSELF, sorting once in _Series.__init__, because nothing else guaranteed it: _validate_raw() covers only the load_prices() path, _parse_points() only the store read, and PriceRead.series() never enforced anything. A series handed its points reversed now answers identically, as a check.

Evidence: 29/29 green on the merged tree. Eight mutations, all red. The killing one restores the shipped rule (+68 B) and is red on 24 named checks across both files, including the one named THE PROPERTY THE DEFECT BROKE - an arbitrage-level check driving the shipped decide() over a 96-point day whose cheapest is a :45 and dearest a :15, asserting as its own check that the old and new rules return different points. The tail mutation is a ZERO-BYTE edit and is caught. It is stated honestly that five of the eight leave test_arbitrage.py green, because those are at()-level properties no arbitrage fixture reaches.

Named and not fixed: price_forecast._walk() steps section 8.3's gate in whole hours, so on a sub-hourly series it reads one point per hour and never sees the :15/:30/:45 flags. Unreachable today - FCST-04 carries whole hours and the feed publishes whole days - but that is an assumption about producers, not a property of the gate.
2026-09-13 01:56:04 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 028c3e53fb Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-12) into TARIFF-14
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m13s
Second base move while this card was open: 559f0eb -> a6e64fb. Only
CHANGELOG.md conflicted; test_arbitrage.py auto-merged (TARIFF-12 used
section 8b, this card uses 10, so the two do not collide).

CHANGELOG: both entries under the single ## Unreleased in MERGE ORDER -
TARIFF-12's row and section precede this branch's, because it landed
first. No version number is picked; PKG-06/07's note stands untouched.

WHAT TARIFF-12 CHANGES FOR THIS CARD - written out in decision note §8
rather than left silent, because the question is a fair one.

A served plan can now be up to TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S = 3 * TARIFF_REFRESH_S
= 5400 s old, where before it was at most one refresh interval, and
at() is what answers "what does it cost right now" out of that older
plan.

* PER-POINT SPAN: unaffected, structurally. Every window is derived
  from the neighbours' ABSOLUTE start instants - datetimes in a frozen
  dataclass in a tuple, which cannot move - and _cover_table() runs
  once at construction over data that cannot change. A plan's AGE is a
  property of fetched_at/tariff_at, never of a window. The index cannot
  go stale, which is a small positive under TARIFF-12: a kept plan now
  lives longer and there is nothing in it that needed recomputing.

* ONE-HOUR CAP: unaffected. It bites only at a hole; walking further
  into a series crosses more windows, each resolved on its own
  neighbours.

* THE TAIL: reachable for the first time, and §2's choice survives it.
  At the shipped 48 h horizon the tail is ~46.5 h beyond anything a
  90-minute-stale plan can be asked about. But price_horizon_h is
  int(1,72), so a 1 h horizon is a SUPPORTED configuration, and a
  90-minute serve-stale window against a 1 h series puts `now` past the
  end. Under the chosen rule a quarter-hourly 1 h series ends at :45,
  its window closes on the hour, at() raises Absence, _act() idles and
  §11.4 sends the site to the static profile. Under the REJECTED flat
  one-hour tail the same stale plan would have traded against the :45
  print for up to 45 minutes after the interval it describes had ended.
  So TARIFF-12 does not weaken the decision - it is the first thing
  that makes it reachable, and it selects the same answer. The rule
  should be re-read if TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S is ever widened again.

* TariffPlan.from_feed is a pure predicate on `origin` and TARIFF-12
  keeps or replaces a WHOLE PLAN OBJECT. It never splices two reads
  into one series, so it cannot hand at() an unsorted or duplicated
  point list.

RE-GRADED ON THIS BASE, not carried over: all 29 test files green;
app/price.py byte-identical to the TARIFF-10 merge (90d8ca31f7c0109d,
85953 B) because TARIFF-12 does not touch it; M1 re-driven at +68 B,
red on the same 24 named checks across both files; M3 re-driven at
ZERO BYTES, red on the same 4. Each purged before the run and reverted
with the fingerprint re-checked, from a card-specific harness at
/home/homelab/.cache/t14-mut/ with a mktemp backup inside it.

This branch contributes zero diff to app/main.py and app/static_tariff.py.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 01:47:17 +02:00
admin a6e64fb66e Merge pull request 'TARIFF-12: a degradation is not a refresh' (#79) from TARIFF-12 into release/1.0
run_tariff_refresh()'s docstring promised 'A FAILURE DOES NOT CLEAR THE PLAN' and guarded the wrong thing. resolve_tariff() deliberately never raises on a feed failure - load_prices() returns no_data rather than letting a traceback into the planning tick - so a dead feed returned a degraded TariffPlan, the try SUCCEEDED, and the good plan was overwritten. The except branch that promised otherwise was reachable only by unexpected exceptions; a supplier outage, the case the docstring names first, never reached it. With static_profile unset - the shipped default for a dynamic site - a complete 48-hour plan was replaced by origin='none', 0 points.

A 40-hour soak drove a 90-minute outage and measured it: the plan was gone at the FIRST failed fetch, ~27 min after the last good one, with TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S (5400 s) governing nothing. There was no serve-stale window; a transient blip had the same effect as a long outage.

The fix keeps a plan that is still fresh, via fresh_tariff_plan() - reused rather than transcribed, and pinned on the AST. The §11.4 static fallback does NOT replace a fresh provider plan: every point _degrade() builds is provisional, so firm_points() is empty and arbitrage and cheap_now are already off, while a day-ahead price for a given hour does not change once published - a 30-minute-old observation is exactly as true about 19:00 as one fetched now. The fallback is strictly less actionable and no more current. Deliberately NOT symmetrical: a standing plan that is itself a degradation IS replaced, or a static site's plan would freeze at the window it was first generated for. tariff_at does not move on a kept plan, so TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S now genuinely governs and a kept plan stays distinguishable from a fresh one.

Rebased onto TARIFF-10 and re-verified rather than assumed. The interaction was confirmed by driving it: nothing on this path reads arbitrage_enabled, and the static-profile case was driven twice consecutively because a guard that latched there would freeze a site's plan for the life of the install. One honesty fix followed from TARIFF-10 - the kept-plan log said 'arbitrage stops with it', which is false on a site that fetches without trading, and now reads 'arbitrage, where it is armed, stops with it'.

Evidence: 29/29 green on the merged tree, including TARIFF-10's new reachability section. Eleven mutations, all re-driven on the merged tree because cached reds from the old base are not evidence about the new one; eleven red, no survivors, every revert fingerprinted after the run as well as before.

Two process findings recorded rather than quietly fixed. Two drafts of one check were red against a CORRECT tree because they substring-matched the docstring that states the property - a text search over a function grades its prose as much as its behaviour, which is habit 4 in a third costume; the check now scans AST symbols and non-docstring constants, with positive controls. And the mutation harness was overwritten mid-session by a concurrent agent's harness sharing the scratchpad, pointing it at a different worktree - MUTATION.md habit 18's second bullet almost verbatim. It surfaced as an error rather than a silent wrong result, and the per-run revert fingerprints are what prove the worktree was never left mutated.
2026-09-12 21:39:24 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 435e1b6f7c Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-10) into TARIFF-14
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
CI on PR #80 was NOT a test failure. The workflow's "grade the merge, not
the branch" step refused the PR because it does not apply, and said so
itself: "REFUSED: refs/pull/80/head does not merge into release/1.0.
NOTHING HAS BEEN TESTED. This is not a test failure - no test ran."
Conflicts were CHANGELOG.md and test_price.py; app/price.py auto-merged.

CONFLICTS RESOLVED

* CHANGELOG.md - both entries belong under ## Unreleased. TARIFF-10's
  table row and section come first because it landed first. No version
  number is picked here; PKG-06/07's note stands untouched.

* test_price.py - BOTH cards appended a section "13". Nothing is
  dropped: TARIFF-10's stays 13, this card's is renumbered 14, and
  TARIFF-10's temp-directory teardown stays at the end of the file. The
  two share no fixture, option dict or helper name.

WHAT TARIFF-10 CHANGES FOR THIS CARD - nothing in the reasoning, and the
check is recorded rather than asserted (decision note §7).

In app/price.py the two do not meet: TARIFF-10 added provider_id() and
provider_configured() beside price_option() and routed load_prices()
through them - the option-reading layer, touching nothing in _Series,
at(), covers(), window() or _cover_table(). The merged at() is
byte-identical to the one the mutations were driven against.

Behaviourally TARIFF-10 makes run_tariff_refresh() run with arbitrage
OFF, so a provider-configured site now has a standing plan - and
therefore a _Series - where before it had none. It does NOT add an at()
consumer to the 30 s tick: static_status() builds a STATIC plan (hourly,
immune), main.py calls only plan.words on the fetched plan, and
price_forecast.price_permits()/begin_phase() have no caller in main.py
at all. So TARIFF-10 neither creates nor closes any exposure this card
is about - it enlarges the defect's reach the moment such a site arms
trading, which strengthens the fix without changing it.

RE-GRADED ON THE MERGED TREE, not carried over

* all 29 test files green;
* all EIGHT mutations re-driven, purged before each run, each reverted
  with the fingerprint re-checked. Same verdicts and same red-check
  counts as before the merge: M1 (the shipped one-hour scan, +68 B) red
  on 24 named checks across both files; M3 (the ZERO-BYTE tail rule) red
  on 4; M2/M4/M6 on 1 each, M5 on 2, M7 on 16, M8 on 14.
* Clean app/price.py on the merged tree: 90d8ca31f7c0109d, 85953 B.
* None of TARIFF-10's 650 new lines of checks moves under any of the
  eight - they grade resolve_tariff()'s reachability from a
  configuration, not the lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 21:38:28 +02:00
Claude f5ea39784d Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-10) into TARIFF-12
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m16s
CHANGELOG.md was the only conflict: both entries belong under the same
`## Unreleased` heading, TARIFF-10's first because it merged first. No
version number picked.

app/main.py auto-merged, and was re-read because of it. TARIFF-10 changed
WHICH installs run `run_tariff_refresh()` (`arbitrage.enabled(opts)` ->
`tariff_refresh_wanted(opts)`); this card changed what that task does on
a failed fetch. Nothing in the keep/replace reasoning changed, and the
two newly reachable configurations are now DRIVEN in test_arbitrage.py
8b rather than reasoned about:

  * a provider configured with trading DISARMED is the case the guard
    was designed for, and needs no second fixture because nothing on
    this path reads `arbitrage_enabled` at all - asserted over the AST's
    symbols and non-docstring constants, after two drafts of that check
    went red on a CORRECT tree for matching the word "arbitrage" in a
    docstring and in a log line;
  * `price_provider: off` + a `static_profile` resolves to the
    CONFIGURED product (`origin: "static"`), so `standing.from_feed` is
    false on every refresh and the guard never latches - driven twice in
    a row, because a guard that latched there would freeze a static
    site's plan at its first window for the life of the install.

Also: the kept-plan log line said "arbitrage stops with it", which after
TARIFF-10 is false on a site that fetches without trading; it now says
"arbitrage, where it is armed, stops with it". The keep decision is
strictly downstream of `resolve_tariff()`, so the §8.3 carry into
price_history - TARIFF-10's whole point - is unaffected either way.

All 29 suites green on the merged tree, including TARIFF-10's new
test_price.py section 13. All eleven mutations RE-DRIVEN on the merged
tree rather than carried over: eleven red, no survivors, every revert
fingerprinted. M11 is new - making the guard conditional on
`arbitrage.enabled(self.o)` (+86 B) is red on five named checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 21:31:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 7f2c4e20e1 TARIFF-14: the point whose own interval covers the instant
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 2s
`_Series.at()` asked `s <= u < s + 1 h` of every point IN LIST ORDER and
returned the FIRST match. On the hourly shape every fixture in this
repository carried before TARIFF-08 that is right by accident. Belgium
moved to a 15-minute MTU on 2025-10-01 and the live day-ahead feed
returns 96 points at 900 s, where it is wrong twice over - measured
against the shipped code at 5059e28:

    series: 02:00=0.10  02:15=0.11  02:30=0.12  02:45=0.13  03:00=0.14

    ask +15min -> 02:00  0.10   <-- WRONG (wanted 02:15)
    ask +60min -> 02:15  0.11   <-- WRONG (wanted 03:00)
    ask +75min -> 02:30  0.12   <-- WRONG (wanted 03:15)

Inside the first hour the :00 point wins because its hour has not run
out. From the second hour on the answer is not even the top of the hour
- the first point still inside its own hour wins - so the error
compounds with depth into the series.

`arbitrage._act()` tests `here.start == v.cheapest.start` /
`== v.dearest.start` to decide whether this interval is the buy one or
the sell one. That identity almost never held, so the strategy idled
through exactly the interval it exists to trade, and read §8.3's
`here.provisional` and §17's `price < 0` off the same wrong point.
`static_tariff.py` emits hourly points, so static sites were never
affected; this is reachable only down the dynamic path TARIFF-08/09
made work.

THE RULE: a point covers from its own start until the next point's
start, and never more than one hour. Quarter-hourly takes 900 s,
hourly is unchanged, and a MIXED series - FCST-04's carry-forward puts
hourly carried points beside quarter-hourly firm ones, spacing
[900, 3600] in 70 % of soak samples - takes each point's OWN gap.

The one-hour cap is load-bearing: FCST-04 leaves an hour OUT when
nothing published it and yesterday has no value, and `at()` raising
Absence for it is what sends the caller to the static profile (§11.4).
Uncapped, "until the next point's start" would stretch the point before
a three-hour hole across the whole hole and answer every instant in it
with a stale price.

THE LAST POINT is given the same span as the point before it (one hour
when it is the only point). A flat one-hour tail would answer 00:30
TOMORROW with today's 23:45 price. The cost - a mixed series ending at
the firm/carried seam loses its last 45 minutes to Absence - is argued
in DECISIONS/TARIFF-14-the-window-a-point-covers.md §2 rather than
buried; the direction is the safe one.

`at()` now reads a point's NEIGHBOURS, so it would depend on
sortedness. It establishes that itself: the lookup index is sorted by
UTC start once, at construction, so no caller's list order reaches it.
A series handed its 96 points in reverse answers identically, and that
is a check. `covers()` shared the defect exactly - it has no rule of
its own, it asks `at()` - and is fixed by the same change; `window()`
did not, and its docstring now says why.

Nothing about §9.3 or a point's `start` changed. PricePoint still has
three fields; the span is derived from the neighbours, never stored.

Graded by test_price.py section 13 (900 s, 3600 s, mixed, holes, the
tail, caller order, duplicate starts, covers()/window(), the no-data
contract) and end to end by test_arbitrage.py section 10, which drives
decide() over a 96-point quarter-hourly day whose cheapest and dearest
quarters are deliberately NOT on a whole hour, plus §17, §8.3 and the
mixed series. Eight mutations, all red, including a ZERO-BYTE one on
the tail rule; byte deltas and what the arbitrage file could not see
are in the decision note §6. All 29 test files green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 21:22:28 +02:00
admin 559f0eb022 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-10: a configured provider fetches prices, whether or not trading is armed' (#78) from TARIFF-10 into release/1.0
run_tariff_refresh() was created only under `if arbitrage.enabled(opts)`, and it is the sole caller of resolve_tariff(), which is the sole caller of price_history.carry(). arbitrage_enabled defaults to false, so on a shipped install with a provider configured nothing was ever fetched, no plan resolved, /data/price_history.json never written, FCST-04's Price history row read `empty` forever, and TARIFF-09's warning never fired. Every price check constructs its own resolve_tariff() call, so the suites exercised a path production never reached.

Measured, not inferred: a 40-hour soak ran two instances side by side - the shipped default made zero feed requests and never created its store across all 802 samples, while an identical instance with arbitrage armed resolved a 132-point plan from the same feed. DOCS.md:1348 has claimed the fixed behaviour all along.

The product owner's decision is Option A: a configured provider fetches. Trading stays separately gated, and that is graded directly rather than inferred - the real control loop is driven on a resolved provider plan with arbitrage_enabled the only option moving: off gives +180 W self-consumption, on gives -5000 W at the cheapest hour and +5000 W elsewhere. The armed rows are what make the unarmed row evidence.

ONE ACCEPTANCE CRITERION WAS DELIBERATELY NOT IMPLEMENTED LITERALLY, and the deviation is right. The criterion said no fetch task at all when price_provider is off, whatever arbitrage_enabled says. That breaks a configuration validate.py explicitly accepts - provider off, static_profile set, arbitrage armed - by leaving tariff_plan at None forever, silently disarming a strategy the UI reports as running. Driven both ways. The guard is therefore `provider_configured(opts) or arbitrage.enabled(opts)`; the criterion's stated harm is still fully met, because with the provider off resolve_tariff() answers out of the static profile and opens no socket, and the true shipped default starts no task at all. DECISIONS section 3 records the trade.

cheap_now() is NOT wired, deliberately. On a provider-only site static_status() returns False on every cycle, so adopting it would take the maintenance cycle's paid grid top-up from never to sometimes - a change to what spends money, and it needs its own decision rather than riding along on this one.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 13 mutations over 14 runs, each on a fresh tree copy, purged, :ro, -B. The shipped defect at -4 B is red on 7 named checks. The reachability check grades reachability from a CONFIGURATION rather than from the `if` statement - the `if` is exactly what someone meant to write. The instrument itself was mutated too, both +0 B, both red. One real survivor was found and closed in the same commit: provider_id() dropping .strip() left four price suites green. And one fixture defect was found and fixed - five minutes of P1 telegrams made the peak guard blind depending on where the wall clock sat in the billing quarter, so the armed baseline failed to trade on some runs.
2026-09-12 21:07:55 +02:00
Claude c81289527f TARIFF-12: a returned degradation is not a refresh
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m12s
`run_tariff_refresh()` promised in its own docstring that "a failure does
not clear the plan", and enforced it with `except Exception` - a branch a
supplier outage never reaches. `load_prices()` states the reason in its
own words: it "RETURNS, NEVER RAISES, for every failure a site can
actually have", because a degradation arriving as a traceback into the
planning tick would stop the controller regulating over an expired
certificate. So a dead feed RETURNS a §11.4 plan, the `try` succeeds, and
the assignment below it overwrote the good plan unconditionally. With
`static_profile` unset - the shipped default, and the normal state of a
dynamic-tariff site - `_degrade()` returns `TariffPlan(no_data, None,
"none")`: a complete 48-hour plan replaced by nothing, at the FIRST
failed fetch, ~27 minutes after the last good one. `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`
(5400 s) never governed anything and there was no serve-stale window at
all.

Fourth card in one family: FCST-04's M4 (`not ok` only), FCST-05's HIGH
(`(JSONDecodeError, OSError)` only), FCST-06 (`not self.ok` only), and
now `except Exception` only, for a path that never raises.

The question is now asked once, after the attempt, from the evidence
that exists - FCST-06's answer, one module over. The evidence is
`TariffPlan.from_feed` (did this resolution observe the configured feed)
and the shipped `fresh_tariff_plan()`, reused rather than transcribed. A
degradation replaces a standing observation only once that observation
has aged out, so `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` is now the serve-stale window it
reads like.

A §11.4 static fallback does not replace a fresh provider plan either,
although it carries real prices: every point `_degrade()` builds is
`provisional=True`, so `firm_points()` is empty, `arbitrage()` refuses
and `cheap_now()` is False - everything a consumer may act on is already
off - while a day-ahead price for a given hour does not change once
published. The rule is deliberately not symmetrical: a standing plan
that is itself a degradation IS replaced, or an outage would freeze the
operator's static profile at the window it was first generated for.

`tariff_at` does not move on a kept plan. It is the moment of the fetch
that produced the plan standing, `fresh_tariff_plan()` judges the age
from it, and an unmoved timestamp is the only thing that tells a kept
plan from a freshly fetched one.

test_arbitrage.py section 8b drives the whole chain with nothing stubbed
but the socket: the transport raises the way aiohttp does, load_prices()
returns no_data, _degrade() builds the §11.4 plan, and the shipped
run_tariff_refresh() decides. A check that patched resolve_tariff to
RAISE would have passed against the defect. Ten mutations, ten reds, no
survivors; 29/29 suites green.

Out of scope and unchanged: the persisted price store still does not
back the plan during an outage (FCST-03), and the status banner and the
Arbitrage row's lag are separately carded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 21:06:45 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 e6c45a61e7 TARIFF-10: configuring a price provider is what fetches prices
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m19s
amain() started the background tariff refresh only when arbitrage_enabled was
on, and that option ships false. run_tariff_refresh is the only caller of
resolve_tariff(), which is the only caller of price_history.carry() - so on a
shipped install with a price provider configured nothing was ever fetched: no
plan resolved, /data/price_history.json never created, the Price history status
row reading `empty` for the life of the install, and TARIFF-09's short-horizon
warning unable to fire because there was no fetch to warn about. Measured over
a 40 h two-instance soak on one feed: 0 requests and `present: false` across all
802 samples, against a resolved 132-point plan on the instance with arbitrage
armed.

git log -S puts the refresh task, its arbitrage.enabled() guard AND the DOCS.md
sentence saying a configured provider still fetches in the same commit - OPT-04,
bdd7f18; config.yaml has carried the claim since TARIFF-02, 852fc7c. The prose
and the code disagreed from the moment both existed and nothing compared them.
config.yaml and both translations additionally carried a claim that had rotted
the other way - "nothing consumes the price series yet", untrue since OPT-04
shipped the consumer. All four surfaces now say what the add-on does, and a
check pairs DOCS against the DRIVEN behaviour so they cannot drift again.

The gate is tariff_refresh_wanted() = provider_configured(opts) or
arbitrage.enabled(opts), and the `or` is a STRICT WIDENING: every configuration
that started the task before still starts it. The second term is not there for
symmetry. price_provider: off + a static_profile + arbitrage_enabled: true is a
configuration validate.py explicitly ACCEPTS and it trades - measured, at
cycle_cost_threshold_eur 0.05 on a 0.20/0.284 day/night profile,
ARBITRAGE_CHARGE -5000 W. Gating on the provider alone would leave that site's
tariff_plan at None forever and answer "no tariff plan has been resolved yet" on
every cycle, silently disarming a strategy the UI says is running.

Nothing acquires a periodic HTTPS call. With price_provider off, resolve_tariff()
answers out of the static profile without opening a socket (driven and counted:
0 requests), and the true shipped default - no provider, no trading - starts no
task at all. What decides whether a request leaves the machine is price_provider
and only that. The literal reading of the ticket's AC2 - drop the `or` - is one
token and is recorded in DECISIONS §3 with what it costs, for the owner.

AND NOTHING TRADES THAT DID NOT TRADE BEFORE. cycle()'s
`if arbitrage.enabled(self.o):` is untouched, and that is graded directly rather
than inferred from the gate having moved: Controller.cycle() is driven on a
resolved provider plan with the peak guard asserted clear, and arbitrage_enabled
is the only option that moves between the rows - false/false give +180 W
("loop -> 180 W") on both the cheap-now and dear-now plans, true/true give
-5000 W and +5000 W ("arbitrage -> ...").

TariffPlan.cheap_now() is deliberately NOT wired, decided rather than inherited
(DECISIONS §4). A provider-backed plan now exists on every configured site, so
Cheap window could read it - and Cheap window feeds the maintenance cycle's grid
top-up, the one place a price moves energy without trading being armed. On a
provider-only site static_status() returns False on every cycle, so adopting it
would take a paid grid top-up from never to sometimes. self.cheap stays on
static_status(); what adoption would take is listed rather than left implied.

THE CHECK THAT WOULD HAVE CAUGHT THIS is test_price.py section 13, and it grades
REACHABILITY FROM A CONFIGURATION rather than the shape of an `if` - the `if` was
exactly what somebody meant to write. amain()'s guards are EVALUATED against real
option dicts, whatever they are spelled as; the call graph under app/ is walked
to see whether the tasks those guards start arrive at resolve_tariff(), wherever
it has moved to; and then the fetch is DRIVEN with a counting transport, because
a graph is an argument and a counted request is an observation. What the
instrument cannot see is printed on every run, largest hole first.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 13 mutations in 14 runs - M10 re-run as M10b once it was
closed - each applied to a fresh cp -a of the clean worktree rather than
reverted (MUTATION.md habit 18), purged, :ro, -B. The
shipped defect - the gate back at arbitrage.enabled(opts), -4 B - is red on
seven named checks. Dropping the `or` (-27 B) is red on the strict-widening row;
removing cycle()'s trading gate (+8 B) is red on both AC3 rows. The instrument
is mutated too (habit 16): _reaches() always True and _task_sites() returning []
are both +0 B and both red.

Two findings are recorded rather than rounded off. provider_id() dropping
.strip() (-8 B) was a real SURVIVOR across four price suites - nothing fed a
padded provider id - and is closed in this commit by the padded-id pair; and the
first draft of the AC3 fixture fed five minutes of P1 telegrams, so whether the
peak guard was blind depended on where the wall clock sat inside the billing
quarter and the armed baseline failed to trade on some runs. It is 900 s now,
and the guard's clear state is a check rather than an assumption.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 20:58:48 +02:00
admin 88c59a9918 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-09: ask the feed for the horizon the operator configured' (#77) from TARIFF-09 into release/1.0
generic_dayahead.fetch() accepted since and until and ignored both, requesting the bare URL - so the feed returned one Brussels day against a 48 h horizon. Everything past today was carry-forward, provisional, and dropped from the trade set by 8.3, which means the optimiser never saw tomorrow as firm at any hour of the day. That is not what FCST-04's fill was built for: it covers the pre-publication window until the ~13-14 h CET auction, after which a healthy feed should hand over tomorrow in full.

Measured before, 2026-09-10T09:00+02:00 on the live feed: 15 firm hours and 33 carried of 48, firm local days = [2026-09-10] only, buy and sell both on the same day. After, against a real two-day body: 39 firm and 9 carried, firm local days = two, buy 13:45 on 09-09 and sell 19:45 on 09-10. At 23:00 the difference is the whole verdict - before, 1/47 and arbitrage REFUSED at spread 0.0464; after, 25/23 and allowed. The 9 hours still carried are the tail running into a third Brussels day, which no day-ahead market publishes.

The range is derived on the BRUSSELS calendar, both ends graded and both driven red by mutation - the API takes dates while since/until are instants, so deriving either end from the UTC date loses the last one or two hours of every day. That is _bdate()'s lesson from FCST-04 one layer up, except that here the hours are never fetched at all rather than misfiled.

price_feed_url is an EXACT URL, used verbatim, nothing appended - and the deciding argument came from the codebase rather than from taste: generic_dayahead declares a second egress host, web-api.tp.entsoe.eu, whose date parameters are not start/end. An override to the other DECLARED host is exactly where merging would append parameters that host ignores and produce the short horizon anyway. The cost is made visible by a fetch-time WARNING naming the consequence and the start..end it would have asked for, with a control asserting the default path stays silent, and dated_feed_url() refuses to append to a base that already carries a query string, so blind appending is structurally unreachable.

The plugin contract is deliberately NOT enforced yet. Obliging the three unverified-endpoint plugins of TARIFF-07 to pass a range would be satisfied by an invented parameter name - TARIFF-08's defect moved from the response to the request and shipped as a guarantee. The roster of plugins that consume the range is pinned as a literal instead, so the next supplier has to decide.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 11 mutations, no survivors, each applied to a fresh copy of the clean tree rather than reverted. Includes the Brussels/UTC boundary pair, one at +1 B, and one at +0 B that changes a single price digit inside the committed capture and is caught by the re-derived sha256. Two live fetches only, 66 s apart, respecting the feed's rate limit; the second returned bytes identical to TARIFF-08's capture, so the pre-publication case is a second recorded URL for the same bytes with the identity re-derived rather than asserted.

MUTATION.md habit 20: a fixture grades the response, and nothing about the REQUEST is reachable from one. canned() had recorded the URL since TARIFF-02 and no check ever asserted on it, which is how a plugin that never asked for a date range went unnoticed for four tickets.
2026-09-10 10:44:15 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 17b7b447c4 TARIFF-09: ask the day-ahead feed for the horizon it was handed
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
`generic_dayahead.fetch()` accepted `since` and `until` and requested the
bare `?bzn=BE`, which answers ONE Brussels day. Everything past today was
then filled from yesterday's profile by FCST-04, flagged provisional, and
§8.3 drops provisional hours from the trade set -- so the optimiser never
saw tomorrow as firm, at any hour of any day, and nothing reported it.

Measured on 4257e38 at 2026-09-10T09:00+02:00, 48 h horizon, live feed,
yesterday seeded through the shipped read path:

    60 firm points (15 whole hours) + 33 carried hours of 48 requested
    carried: 24 h on 2026-09-11, 9 h on 2026-09-12
    arbitrage(0.10): buy 11:45 and sell 19:45 -- BOTH on 2026-09-10
    firm local days = [2026-09-10]

The ceiling was structural: with a one-day window, at hour H a 48 h horizon
is at most 24-H firm and 24+H carried. At 23:00 that is 1 and 47, and the
remaining firm spread (0.0464 EUR/kWh) no longer clears the default 0.10
threshold, so arbitrage is refused outright. FCST-04's fill covers the
window until the ~13:00-14:00 CET auction; it was never meant to cover
every hour of every day.

The data exists and the endpoint serves it: verified 2026-09-10T07:45:49Z,
`?bzn=BE&start=2026-09-09&end=2026-09-10` returns 192 quarter-hours across
two local days. Committed unmodified beside TARIFF-08's captures, with the
URL, retrieval time and sha256 recorded and RE-DERIVED by the replay.

THE RANGE IS DERIVED ON THE BRUSSELS CALENDAR, not the UTC one. 22:30 UTC
in summer is already tomorrow in Belgium, so a UTC-derived start asks for
the day the controller has just left and drops the day it is standing in,
for the last one or two hours of every day. That is `_bdate()`'s lesson one
layer up with a worse consequence: `_bdate()` misfiles an hour, this never
fetches it. `until` is exclusive, so local midnight belongs to the day
before it; an inverted window collapses to one day rather than a backwards
range. Both ends are graded and both are driven red by mutation.

After, same code path and window, a feed serving both days: 39 firm hours
and 9 carried (was 15 and 33), firm across TWO Brussels days, and the
permitted cycle buys on one day and sells on the next.

`price_feed_url` IS THE EXACT URL AND THE PLUGIN APPENDS NOTHING. `start`/
`end` are this feed's spelling and the provider declares a second host
whose parameters are different, so merging would produce a request nobody
typed and the short horizon anyway. The cost is real, so it is not silent:
a WARNING on the shipped logger at fetch time names the consequence and the
start..end that would otherwise have been asked for. `dated_feed_url()`
refuses to append to a base that already carries a query string, so the
blind-append shape cannot come back by edit.
DECISIONS/TARIFF-09-the-range-and-the-override.md argues the alternative.

Before publication nothing regresses and it is graded, not assumed: at
09:46 CEST the two-day request came back byte-identical to the one-day
body, and that stays a `series` of what exists with FCST-04 filling the
rest. A `no_data` there would switch a working site's arbitrage off every
morning -- the mutation that adds that rule is red by name.

The plugin contract is still NOT enforced: three shipped plugins point at
endpoints nobody has verified, and a rule obliging them to pass a range
would be satisfied by an invented parameter name -- TARIFF-08's defect
moved from the response to the request. Which plugins consume the range is
pinned as a literal instead.

11 mutations, all red, no survivors; each applied to a fresh copy of the
tree rather than reverted, through tools/mutation_run.sh. One is +0 B (a
single price digit inside the committed capture) and the re-derived sha256
catches it. MUTATION.md habit 20 records why a fixture could never have
reached this: a captured body is the answer to a URL, and no property of a
body says which URL was asked for. All 29 suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 10:35:12 +02:00
admin 4257e38e5a Merge pull request 'TARIFF-08: read the feed the add-on actually ships pointed at' (#76) from TARIFF-08 into release/1.0
_points_from_json() expected doc['data'] to be a list of {start, price_eur_mwh}. api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE returns a columnar document - parallel unix_seconds and price arrays - so the shipped parser raised SourceUnavailable('the feed carried no data list') against every real response. generic_dayahead had never parsed one. With the three fabricated supplier URLs of TARIFF-07, that left manual_csv as the only working provider in a five-provider table.

It survived to release because every fixture fed the invented shape: test_price.py, test_price_history.py and test_static_tariff.py all built {'data':[{'start':...,'price_eur_mwh':...}]}, so the suite validated the parser against the parser's own assumption - a closed loop that cannot notice the assumption is wrong. Section 11.4 then made the failure silent: a parse error degrades to the static profile, which is correct and says nothing about the cause.

Verified live 2026-09-10, end to end: fetch -> parse -> assemble() -> TariffPlan returns 96 quarter-hourly points at 900 s, origin provider, product DAY_AHEAD, arbitrage allowed with a firm spread of 0.4645 EUR/kWh. First time the pipeline has completed against a real feed. Belgium moved to a 15-minute MTU on 2025-10-01, so FCST-04's H1 fix - the fill was decimating sub-hourly points to one per hour - was never theoretical; it is the shape of the live feed, and it is what makes this deliverable.

The columnar shape is read by a SECOND function, not a sniff, and feeding the row shape to generic_dayahead is now a graded no_data so the sniff cannot return quietly. Equal length refused in both directions with both lengths in the reason; the unit refused if not EUR/MWh, because MAX_PLAUSIBLE_EUR_KWH only bounds prices that are too large and a EUR/kWh switch would otherwise be invisible; nulls dropped with a count, an all-null body named as no_data; a deprecated feed warns while it still works.

Two real bodies captured as fixtures - unmodified bytes, with URL, retrieval time, unit, licence-as-returned and sha256 recorded, and the checksums RE-DERIVED by the replay rather than asserted. The invented fixtures are renamed synthetic_row_feed at every call site so the closed loop cannot re-form. Only one of four network providers has a capture, and a registry-derived check says so in its own sentence: the other three have nothing to capture, which is TARIFF-07.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 12 mutations, no survivors, purged tree and -B per TEST-15. One first-draft line was decoration and the mutation said so - the parser called brussels() per instant while assemble() already renders, so removing it changed nothing. The line was deleted rather than fenced with a check, and the mutation re-aimed at assemble() where the rule lives. MUTATION.md habit 19.

Follow-up filed as TARIFF-09: generic_dayahead ignores the since/until it is handed, so the feed supplies 24 h of a 48 h horizon and tomorrow is never firm.
2026-09-10 09:14:50 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 7a5281e97f Merge release/1.0 (FCST-06) into TARIFF-08
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
One conflict, in CHANGELOG.md's `## Unreleased` block, exactly as expected
from two branches landing beside each other: both `_this branch_` table rows
and both sections are kept, FCST-06's first. Nothing else conflicted -
FCST-06's `test_price_history.py` section 5d and this branch's columnar
`feed_body()` merged cleanly - and all 29 test files are green on the result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 09:06:39 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 6eba18968c TARIFF-08: the day-ahead feed is read in the shape it actually publishes
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
`generic_dayahead` could not read one byte of `api.energy-charts.info`, and
never had been able to. `_points_from_json()` asks for `doc["data"]`, a list of
`{start, price_eur_mwh}` objects; that document does not exist. Fetched live on
2026-09-10 the feed returns COLUMNAR parallel arrays and no `data` key at all -
`unix_seconds` (96 UTC epoch seconds, 900 s apart), `price` (96 floats),
`unit: 'EUR / MWh'`. Driving the shipped parser against that body:
`SourceUnavailable: the feed carried no 'data' list`. It is the only shipped
provider whose endpoint anybody has reached, so dynamic pricing did not work.

AND §11.4 MADE IT SILENT, which is why it survived to release: a parse error
becomes no_data, becomes the static profile, becomes arbitrage off - the
CORRECT degradation, saying nothing about the cause. A site would have sat on
the fallback indefinitely.

AND THE SUITE COULD NOT SEE IT, because every fixture was built from the
parser's own assumption. test_price.py, test_price_history.py and
test_static_tariff.py each built `json.dumps({"data": [...]})`, a shape invented
here and published by nobody, so the checks graded the parser against the
parser's guess - a closed loop no coverage inside it could ever have escaped.
MUTATION.md habit 19 records it as the fourteenth instance of habit 4 and the
first where the fixture and the code under test shared a SHAPE, not a number.

WHAT CHANGED

* `_points_from_columnar_json()` - a SECOND function, not a sniff. A parser that
  decides which document it received is one that can decide wrong, and a
  wrong-but-parseable response then becomes a price. Feeding the row shape to
  `generic_dayahead` is now a graded no_data.
* Unequal arrays are refused in both directions, with the two lengths in the
  reason. `zip()` stops at the shorter list silently, and a truncated `price`
  array would have produced a real series missing the evening peak - traded on
  as complete, where no data at all switches arbitrage off.
* A unit that is not EUR/MWh is refused. The plugin converts with a fixed
  0.001, and `MAX_PLAUSIBLE_EUR_KWH` only bounds prices that are too LARGE.
* `unix_seconds` are read as UTC instants explicitly; §9.3's Brussels rendering
  stays in `assemble()` rather than being copied into the plugin, where a
  mutation could not tell it from a no-op (M4 proved exactly that on a first
  draft, and the line was removed rather than fenced).
* A published null is dropped and logged with a count; an all-null body is
  no_data named by this parser rather than by the boundary validator.

FIXTURES

Two unmodified response bodies under `scenarios/`, captured by hand on
2026-09-10: quarter-hourly (2026-09-10, 96 points at 900 s) and hourly
(2025-09-10, 24 at 3600 s - the same endpoint before Belgium's 15-minute MTU).
`energy-charts-be-price-captures.json` records the URL, retrieval time, unit,
licence-as-returned and a sha256 of each, and the replay RE-DERIVES the
checksums, so a fixture edited to make a check pass stops being a capture. Data
CC BY 4.0, Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de, via Energy-Charts (Fraunhofer ISE),
published without changes - the same BE-zone licence check DATA-02 established.

The surviving invented fixtures are renamed `synthetic_row_feed` at every call
site. `engie_dynamic`, `totalenergies_dynamic` and `eneco_eddy` are untouched
and have no capture: their URLs are unverified and withdrawing them is
TARIFF-07's open decision. Nothing should read their green checks as evidence
that those feeds parse.

MUTATIONS - 12, all red, no survivors. Purged tree, mounted `:ro`, `python3 -B`
(TEST-15). M1 drop the equal-length refusal; M2 make it one-sided; M3 drop the
unit check; M4 `assemble()` stops rendering at the Brussels offset; M5 read
`unix_seconds` as a naive local clock; M6 zero-fill a null instead of dropping
it; M7 drop the all-null refusal; M8 sniff for the row shape; M9 drop the
deprecated warning; M10 drop the dropped-nulls warning; M11 edit one price in
the committed capture; M12 point `generic_dayahead` back at the row parser -
red across all three price suites.

END TO END, LIVE, 2026-09-10: `resolve_tariff()` returns a `TariffPlan`,
`origin='provider'`, 96 quarter-hourly points, spacing [900] s, no decimation,
first point 2026-09-10T00:00:00+02:00 at 0.30608 EUR/kWh all-in. FCST-04's H1
fix was never theoretical. All 29 test files green.

STILL OPEN: `generic_dayahead` asks for no date range, so the default URL
returns one published day - a full 48 h horizon is reached only through §8.3's
carry-forward fill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 08:57:32 +02:00
admin 958f5cd218 Merge pull request 'FCST-06: cannot-persist is one question, asked after the attempt' (#75) from FCST-06 into release/1.0
The module claimed 'a store that cannot persist records nothing' and enforced it against `not self.ok` only. A store with ok=True whose _save() fails - a full volume, a read-only remount - kept answering yesterday() from memory until the next restart, which is the silently-forgetting cache the docstring rejects, reached by the condition the rule did not name.

Reproduced against real volumes rather than a monkeypatch: /data bind-mounted read-only (EROFS) and a full tmpfs (ENOSPC), with a healthy-/data control asserted either side. Before: yesterday() returned a 24-point series while the disk held {}.

Fixed in the code, not the docstring - weakening the doc would have documented a cache that forgets without saying so as intended.

The design answer is the part worth keeping: 'can this store persist' CANNOT be answered before the attempt, because a directory that was writable a moment ago is not a write that completed, so os.access or a probe write is a third symptom test wearing a predicate's name. It is answered after, once: _save() -> bool, true only if the file now holds what memory holds. The `not self.ok` test in _remember() is GONE rather than joined by a second one, and a check asserts its absence from the source. This is the same shape as FCST-04's M4 and FCST-05's HIGH - a rule enforced on the conditions someone thought of - and it is the first of the three to be closed by removing a test rather than adding one.

What is undone is the MERGE, not the store: a volume that fills at 14:00 leaves the yesterday written at 13:30 still answering. The snapshot is a deepcopy - measured, a shallow copy let a store holding 12 persisted points answer 24.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Six mutations, no survivors, purged tree each run with the mutated line greped off disk. One of them exposed an instrument defect now recorded in MUTATION.md: it printed 1 FAIL when the true figure was 3, because an f-string operand called len(read.points) and .points on a no_data raises Absence by design, killing the harness mid-section. One check earlier and it would have read as a survivor. A mutation's red count is a lower bound until the run is seen to reach the end of its section.
2026-09-10 08:52:09 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 c45893ffad FCST-06: "cannot persist" becomes one question, asked once, about the outcome
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m14s
price_history.py's docstring states its rule unconditionally - "A store that
cannot persist now records nothing, and both of its answers say the same
thing" - and FCST-04 enforced it against `not self.ok` only, which is one
SYMPTOM: the durable volume is missing. `ok` is about the DIRECTORY, and a
read-only remount and a full disk both leave it True. Reproduced on 5059e28
against two real volumes, a /data bind-mounted read-only and a full tmpfs:

    last_error = 'could not write ([Errno 30] Read-only file system)'
    words      = '2026-01-14 (24 points over 24 h); 2026-01-15 (24 points
                  over 24 h) [could not write (...)]'
    yesterday()= series, 24 points
    ON DISK    = {}

`words` and `yesterday()` were describing two different stores, and the 24
points were gone on the next restart with nothing saying so - the
silently-forgetting cache that rule exists to refuse, reached by the condition
it did not name. No shipped path reaches it: /data is the Supervisor's durable
volume and this module is its only writer. The defect is that a guarantee the
module states about itself did not hold in one condition.

Route taken: `_remember()` refuses to retain what it could not write, and the
docstring's claim stands as written. It is now ONE derived predicate rather
than two places testing two symptoms. "Can this store persist?" cannot be
answered BEFORE the attempt - a directory that existed and was writable a
moment ago is not a write that completed - so it is answered after it, once,
by the only thing holding the evidence: `_save()` returns whether the file now
holds what memory holds. No volume is one False, an OSError is another.
`_remember()` keeps only what that one answer says was kept, and the
`not self.ok` test in `_remember()` is GONE rather than joined by a second one.
FCST-04's M4 and FCST-05's HIGH were the same shape, so a third cause now needs
no third branch.

What is undone is the MERGE, not the store. The state restored is the last one
that IS on disk, so a site whose volume fills at 14:00 goes on answering the
yesterday it wrote at 13:30 - that record survives a restart, so answering it
is not a promise the store cannot keep. It stops adding to it. The snapshot is
copy.deepcopy: a one-level copy shares the day record the merge rebinds
`points` on, and measured with one, a store holding 12 persisted points
answered 24 after a failed merge.

Not fatal, deliberately: §6 and this module's opening - a broken cache must not
be a broken controller, and an add-on that will not start because /data filled
up is a worse defect than this one. `_save()` reports and returns; the shipped
resolve_tariff() path still gives a provider plan with no §11.4 degradation.
What changed is that the failure is now acted on rather than only logged.

test_price_history.py section 5d drives it on two REAL failures with different
syscalls and different errnos - a directory where the file goes (os.replace,
EISDIR) and a volume moved out from under an open store (mkstemp, ENOENT) -
because the rule is enforced on the outcome and one cause would grade a
coincidence. DOCS.md's "where there is no /data" sentence is widened to the
condition the code now holds to.

MUTATION.md gains what M4 exposed: a mutation whose red is a TRACEBACK reports
however many checks ran before it and grades none after it. M4 first printed
1 FAIL; the true figure is 3. An f-string operand read `len(read.points)`, and
`.points` on a no_data raises `Absence` by design - why()'s rule arriving in
what a check PRINTS rather than in what it asserts. `npts()` is now beside
why(), and a red count is a lower bound until the run is seen to reach the end
of its section.

6 mutations, purged tree, every one RED on named checks, no survivors:
M1 self._days = before -> dict(self._days)          +10 B  9 red
M2 _save() OSError handler returns True             -1 B   9 red
M3 _save() returns True on `not self.ok`            -1 B   3 red
M4 self._days = before -> self._days = {}           -4 B   3 red
M5 copy.deepcopy -> dict                            -9 B   3 red
M6 `if not self.ok: return` back in _remember()     +43 B  1 red

All 29 test files green. Nothing deployed; no option added; config.yaml and
app/ behaviour on a healthy /data untouched. No version number picked - that
is the open decision the Unreleased block names.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 08:43:17 +02:00
admin 5059e28860 Merge pull request 'FCST-05: one byte stops stopping the add-on, and the write path gets the read path's standard' (#74) from FCST-05 into release/1.0
Both defects were found by the QA pass on merged FCST-04, and both are the same shape: a corrupt price cache taking the controller with it.

HIGH: _load() caught (JSONDecodeError, OSError) and UnicodeDecodeError is neither - it is a ValueError. One non-UTF-8 byte in /data/price_history.json escaped to Controller.__init__, which is unguarded, and the add-on did not start. The except is now (ValueError, OSError) - the content family beside the bytes family - rather than the two members known today, because a third ValueError subclass nobody thought of is exactly how this arrived. The new fixture writes real bytes and asserts the old fixture's string IS valid UTF-8, so the pair cannot collapse back into one.

MEDIUM: a malformed `start` under the day the feed was writing raised out of _remember() on every refresh forever - the add-on stayed up while the plan retired after 90 min and arbitrage stayed off, with no self-heal, and `words` reported the store healthy throughout. Read and write paths now share one validator, and the merge key is the validated instant (which also fixes a lexicographic sort putting the 25-hour day's second 02:00 first).

Also: the row counts what it says it counts, and two false claims of strengthening in _audit's docstring are corrected - a differential over the realisable domain returns 0 weaker, 0 stronger, and that differential is now a committed check with FCST-03's audit frozen beside it. PROC-01: a right decision with a fabricated reason is still a defect.

_audit completeness was NOT attempted, and the reason is measured rather than asserted: the rule as stated takes the horizon checks red on the shipped fill and a healthy feed, because `published` is the whole read while the fill emits only [since, until). The rule is wrong, not merely absent; making it right needs the window in the signature. Separate card.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 12 mutations, all red, each on a fresh tree copy fingerprinted against clean. One survivor was found and closed during the work - two rungs reported into one last_error, so a -1 byte deletion on the half of the fix that tells an operator the cache self-healed survived the whole suite. TEST-16's masking pattern, inside a check written to close a false-health defect. Recorded in MUTATION.md.
2026-09-10 01:13:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 375a1e29d2 FCST-05: one byte stops stopping the add-on, and the write path gets the read path's standard
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
HIGH - a non-UTF-8 byte in /data/price_history.json stopped the add-on
from starting. `_load()` caught `(json.JSONDecodeError, OSError)`.
`UnicodeDecodeError` is `ValueError -> UnicodeError -> UnicodeDecodeError`:
neither of those, and `issubclass(UnicodeDecodeError, OSError)` is False. So
it escaped `_load()` -> `_open()` -> `PriceHistory.__init__`, which
`Controller.__init__` does not guard - breaking `_load()`'s own stated
contract, "a corrupt cache must not stop the controller". The handler now
names the ValueError FAMILY (the file's content) beside OSError (its bytes),
because a third subclass nobody has thought of is how this arrived the first
time. The suite could not see it: its "unreadable file" fixture writes
"{ this is not json", which is valid UTF-8 and fails one step later, in
`json`. A fixture holding a genuinely undecodable byte is now beside it,
with the difference between the two asserted as a precondition.

MEDIUM - a malformed `start` under the day the feed is writing to killed the
tariff plan permanently. `_remember()` merged with `{q["start"]: q ...}` and
sorted on `q["start"]`, trusting a value read off /data to be a hashable,
sortable string. An int, null, a dict or a list raised TypeError out of
`carry()` -> `resolve_tariff()` -> `run_tariff_refresh`, which catches
Exception - so the add-on stayed UP while every refresh raised forever, the
plan retiring after TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S with arbitrage and the cheap window off
for good, and no self-heal because `_remember()` raised before `_save()`.
The read path was properly defensive throughout, which is why `yesterday()`
survived and the existing fixture passed - it files its malformed rows under
a day the feed is NOT writing to. Both paths now share one validator,
`_point_of()`. A row that is not a point is dropped, reported, and written
back out clean.

...and the status row said the store was healthy while the plan was dead:
`words` read '2026-01-15 (1 h)'. `_load()` now counts the rows inside a kept
record as well as the record itself, so the store stops reporting plain
health from the moment it is opened; the note names what was FOUND at open
and what was DROPPED by the refresh, and clears once the file is rewritten.

...and the merge key is the validated INSTANT rather than its spelling,
which is what rule 4 already said. The lexicographic sort beside the string
key also put the second 02:00 of the 25-hour October day (+01:00) before the
first (+02:00); stored order only, since `_parse_points()` re-sorts.

LOW - the status row counted POINTS and printed them under the HOUR's name:
'2026-01-13 (96 h)' for a 24-hour day on the quarter-hourly feed this add-on
already supports. It is now '96 points over 24 h' - two facts, each under
its own unit.

LOW - two stated reasons were false. `_audit`'s "WHY IT IS STRICTER" claimed
the rework refused the same published point emitted twice and a carried
point sharing a published hour, "which the old count never looked at". A
differential over the whole domain the audit can express finds ZERO
divergence in both directions: the old `seen` count already refused the
first (one point twice is one hour twice) and the old IDENTITY rule already
refused the second. The reworked audit is EQUAL to FCST-03's, not stronger;
the only behavioural change is the intended relaxation, and it stays. The
differential is committed as a check rather than left as prose.

...and the audit's real limit is named: it does not check COMPLETENESS. Fed
the decimation defect FCST-04 was raised for it ACCEPTS, and it accepts an
empty output. So `_audit` is not what stops that recurring - the count and
identity checks are, and the text now points at them. Not made complete:
`published` is the whole read while the fill emits only [since, until), so
the rule as stated is wrong, and building it takes the 1/12/48 h horizon
checks red on a healthy feed. Measured, not assumed.

12 mutations, purged tree, every one RED, no survivors. All 29 test files
green. Nothing deployed; no option added; config.yaml untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 01:04:30 +02:00
admin c2787da539 Merge pull request 'FCST-04: the carry-forward fill reaches the plan, and the day it carries survives a restart' (#73) from FCST-04 into release/1.0
Review found 2 HIGH, 4 MEDIUM, 12 LOW - all driven to a concrete failure, all fixed on the branch.

H1 was a regression this PR introduced: fill_from_yesterday keyed the published set as {_utc_hour(p): p}, so a sub-hourly feed lost three points in four. eneco_eddy is the Belgian imbalance product and settles per quarter. Measured on 96 quarter-hourly firm points: 96 -> 15 points, spread 0.143 -> 0.014 EUR/kWh. The fix passes every published point through by identity and carries only whole hours with no coverage at all; _audit's one-per-hour rule became two rules that subsume it, so it caught MORE after the change than before - a repeated published point and a carried point sharing an hour with a real print both now raise, and neither was checked before.

H2 falsified the branch's own 'a broken cache is not a broken controller': a day record that parsed but was not a dict raised out of words(), which is unguarded in Controller.__init__, so the add-on did not start and could not self-heal.

Two of the branch's own checks were decoration and are recorded as such in DECISIONS rather than quietly repaired: the prune mutation survived because the fixture seeded one day and never reached the code it graded, and the AST ordering check compared ast.walk BFS depth rather than source order - shipped and reversed scored identically. Both are now driven by behaviour.

Evidence: 29/29 test files green. 20 mutations driven across the rework, fresh tree copy and __pycache__ purge before each per MUTATION.md/TEST-15. No survivors.
2026-09-10 00:03:08 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 b59f5ce31b FCST-04: the carry-forward stops decimating a quarter-hourly feed, and a broken cache stops stopping the add-on
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m22s
Rework of the FCST-04 branch against review. Every finding below was proven by
a runnable script before it was touched and re-run after; every check added or
repaired was driven red by a mutation, `__pycache__` purged first (MUTATION.md,
TEST-15). 29/29 test files green.

⚠️ H1 - A SUB-HOURLY FEED WAS DECIMATED TO ONE POINT AN HOUR, AND THE SPREAD
WENT WITH IT. `fill_from_yesterday()` keyed the published set as
`{_utc_hour(p.start): p for p in r.points}` - LAST POINT OF THE HOUR WINS, the
other three dropped. `eneco_eddy` is the Belgian imbalance product and settles
per QUARTER, and `_validate_raw()` accepts any strictly-increasing spacing, so
this is a shape the product supports today. Measured on a 96-point quarter-hourly
feed - ALL FIRM, FULLY PUBLISHED, nothing to carry: the plan reached the
optimiser as 15 points, the arbitrage spread fell from 0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh,
and the cheapest "hour" became a `:45` point whose `at()` window runs into the
next one. Not the windowing effect this card is about; a feed losing 84 % of its
own prints, with no flag anywhere reporting it. The fill now decides only WHICH
WHOLE HOURS NEED CARRYING: every published point inside the window passes
through BY IDENTITY, and a carried point is added only for a whole hour with no
published coverage at all. Same feed, same fixture: 60 of 60 firm points kept,
spread 0.134 over the hours still ahead.

⚠️ AND `_audit()` GOT STRICTER, NOT LOOSER - that was the condition on doing it
at all. The old post-condition refused any repeated `_utc_hour`, a count that
cannot express four points in one hour. Two rules replace it and SUBSUME it: a
published point must BE one of that hour's published points by identity and may
be emitted only once; a carried point may stand only in an hour absent from the
published set, must be flagged True, and may not repeat. So the duplicated
carried hour it existed to catch still raises, the same published point emitted
twice now raises, and a carried point sharing an hour with a real print now
raises too - which the count never looked at. Three mutations, three reds.

⚠️ H2 - A DAY RECORD THAT WAS NOT A RECORD STOPPED THE ADD-ON FROM STARTING.
`_load()` validated `version` and that `days` is a dict, never that each VALUE
is one. `{"version": 1, "days": {"2026-01-14": "oops"}}` loaded as ok=True,
last_error=None, and then `rec.get(...)` raised AttributeError out of `words`,
`yesterday()` and `resolve_tariff()` alike. `PriceHistory(...)` and `.words` are
both unguarded in `Controller.__init__`, so the controller did not come up - and
it never self-healed, because `_remember()` raised on the same record before it
could reach `_save()`. That falsifies the CHANGELOG's "A BROKEN CACHE IS NOT A
BROKEN CONTROLLER" in the one direction that matters. The asymmetry that
produced it is visible in the file: `_parse_points()` is carefully defensive
about every field of a POINT and `_load()` was not defensive about the record
holding them. Unusable records are now dropped and REPORTED (`words` says how
many and why), and `words` is total by construction as a second line.

M3 - `yesterday()` WAS OFF BY ONE DAY FOR 00:00-00:59 AFTER SPRING-FORWARD.
`brussels()` renders at the FIXED offset for that instant, so `brussels(stamp) -
timedelta(days=1)` subtracts 24 ABSOLUTE hours - and the Brussels day before the
March transition is 23 hours long. At 2026-03-30T00:30+02:00 it returned
2026-03-28's prices as "yesterday", or `no_data` naming a date that is not
yesterday. The arithmetic is now on the local DATE, which has no offset to lose,
and both transitions have a check - the module's headline claim had none.

M4 - WITH NO /data THE STORE STILL FILLED, IN MEMORY. `_save()` short-circuited
on `not ok` while `_remember()` populated `self._days` anyway: `words` said
"unavailable" and `yesterday()` answered A SERIES that is gone on the next
restart. The module docstring rejects exactly that ("a yesterday that silently
forgets") as its reason for not calling makedirs, so the code now matches the
docstring rather than contradicting it.

M5 - THE PRUNE MUTATION SURVIVED BECAUSE THE STIMULUS WAS DEGENERATE. §8's
clock-jump check seeded ONE day, so `if len(self._days) <= KEEP_DAYS: return`
fired and the body it is named after never ran: pruning by arithmetic against
the clock - which empties the store on exactly the morning the fill is for -
passed the whole 29-file suite. The fixture is now written to a file and
reopened (`_load()` does not prune, which is how a store legitimately holds more
than the cap) with KEEP_DAYS + 2 days, and the mutant is red.

M6 - THE AST ORDERING CHECK COULD NOT CATCH A REVERSAL, AND TWO DOCUMENTS CITED
IT AS A GUARANTEE. `_calls.index("_remember") < _calls.index("yesterday")` grades
`ast.walk` BFS DEPTH: `self._remember(...)` is a statement and
`self.yesterday(...)` is an ARGUMENT of the fill, one level deeper, so
`_remember` came out first whichever statement was written first - shipped and
reversed both scored True. It is now line numbers AND, the half that matters,
the behaviour: a feed carrying yesterday alongside today into an EMPTY store
must fill the whole horizon; reversed, the lookup finds nothing and the plan is
only the published hours. Reversing the two statements is red on both.

L14/L9 - KEEP_DAYS = 3 IS THE STEADY STATE EXACTLY, so a newest-N cap has no
slack: a feed publishing to D+2, or ONE stray point in the wrong year - which
sorts LAST and can never age out - pushes yesterday out for good. `_prune()` now
PINS the two days a lookup can actually ask for on top of the cap. Pinning is
additive, so it can only RETAIN and the WITNESS-03 property (nothing is deleted
by clock arithmetic) is preserved by construction; `stamp` stops being a dead
parameter; the store is bounded at KEEP_DAYS + 2.

L8 - the horizon end was not floored while `since` was, so a 48 h request made
at any instant off the hour returned 49 points. §1's count was green only
because its NOW was exactly :00:00, a shape production never has; the fixture
now sits at :17:43. L10 - a failed `_save()` leaked its temp file; at 48 writes
a day a persistent write failure leaked 48 inodes a day onto the volume that was
already the problem. L15 - `{"version": 1.0}` passed, since `1.0 == 1`. L16 -
the `_remember` tree walk scanned `app/*.py` only and matched a bare string; it
now parses `app/`, `tools/`, `scenarios/` and `estop/` and looks for the NAME,
so a comment does not fail it and a call in `tools/` cannot pass unseen.

CLAIM-ACCURACY DEFECTS, WHICH THIS REPO TREATS AS REAL:

* L7. DOCS said "*Tariff* on the status page reads `provisional` through the
  morning". FALSE - `tariff_words` is assigned only from the HA price-entity
  branch and from `static_status()`, both on the 30 s tick, and the plan's own
  sentence reaches `_LOG.info`. The doc now says what an operator can see (the
  Price history row, the Arbitrage row's own refusal sentence, the refresh log
  line) and a check pins the PAIRING - wiring the plan into the row is fine,
  correcting the doc is fine, doing one without the other is red.
* L11. "fills EVERY unpublished hour" is conditional: a partial yesterday leaves
  the local hours it never held out of the series (§11.4 for those hours, and
  `at()` raises rather than answering). Correct behaviour, overclaimed wording,
  and untested - all three fixed.
* L12. DECISIONS §1 leaned on `TariffPlan.cheap_now()`, which has NO PRODUCTION
  CALLER on the provider plan (`self.cheap` comes from `static_status()`, which
  builds its own). The conclusion holds on `arbitrage()`'s firm-pair refusal
  alone, which does reach control; the evidence is now stated at the reach it
  has.
* L13. §1's "passed through by identity" check compared `eur_per_kwh` between
  two SEPARATE `resolve_tariff()` calls, where `is` could never have held. The
  value comparison is kept and now says what it grades; identity is graded on a
  read the file constructs and still holds.
* L17. `PriceHistory.words` and the new status row had no check at all - and
  `words` is one of the two things H2 crashed. Both now have one.
* L18. main.py's inline note carried the "widens what the optimiser can SEE,
  never what it may act on" guarantee without the windowing caveat that the
  CHANGELOG, DOCS and `resolve_tariff()`'s docstring all carry. It is the one
  place a maintainer reads it unqualified.

EVIDENCE. All eight reviewer proofs re-run: p1/p1b return 29 March, p4 keeps
60 of 60 firm points at spread 0.134, p5 starts and reports, p6 D leaves no
temp, p6 E refuses 1.0, p6 F records nothing, p7 returns 48 for 48. p2's script
still scores True/True because it re-implements the OLD algorithm - the
reversal is now driven as a mutation instead, and is red. p3's script always
showed the shipped code correct; what was wrong was the fixture, and its mutant
is now red. Twenty mutations driven, no survivors, tree fingerprinted and
`__pycache__` purged before each: decimation (2 suites red), audit x3, unfloored
`until` (2), unvalidated day records (7 checks), instant-subtraction yesterday,
in-memory fill on a volume-less store, clock-arithmetic prune, cap without the
pin, leaked temp, loose schema type, empty `words` (5), reversed `carry()` (2),
a `_remember` leak in tools/ spelled two ways, a neighbour-filling fallback, a
copy instead of identity (2), the DOCS claim in both directions, and the caveat
removed from main.py. Baseline and the unmutated tree both green.

No option added, config.yaml untouched, and the CHANGELOG entry still picks no
version: PKG-07's rule, and only the deployer knows whether 0.9.0's image has
been pulled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-09 23:54:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0618194d9c FCST-04: the carry-forward fill reaches the plan, and the day it carries survives a restart
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m11s
FCST-03 shipped `fill_from_yesterday()` complete and checked, and shipped the
consumers written for it - `TariffPlan.firm_points()`, `cheap_now()`'s refusal
of a provisional hour, and `arbitrage()`'s refusal 3, which drops provisional
hours from the trade set rather than refusing the whole series. It shipped NO
CALLER. Nothing in `app/` named the fill, so no series ever contained a carried
point and every one of those consumers was exercising its all-firm branch.

⚠️ THE DEFECT THAT PRODUCED WAS NOT AN ERROR ANYWHERE. `load_prices()` returns
what the feed published and nothing widened it to the requested horizon, so on
a dynamic site between midnight and the 14-16 h CET publication the plan
covered the rest of today and nothing more - measured on the fixture here, 24 h
against a 48 h request. `arbitrage()` then took `max - min` over that truncated
window and reported a spread. The number was real, the window was half the one
configured, and nothing said so: tomorrow evening's peak, the hour a morning
charge would be sold into, was not in the series to be compared against
anything. A missing hour is not a wrong price - it is an hour the optimiser
never learns exists.

WHAT THIS ADDS. `app/price_history.py` keeps the PUBLISHED prices of the last
KEEP_DAYS Brussels days in /data/price_history.json; `resolve_tariff()` gains a
required keyword-only `history` and fills every unpublished hour of the horizon
from yesterday's same-wall-clock hour, flagged. Persistence rather than a
variable on the refresh task, because the window the fill exists for is
midnight -> publication and an add-on restarted at 08:00 would otherwise spend
all of it on the truncated series. Not in state.json: the refresh runs every
1800 s and that file holds the maintenance history and SAFETY-02's latch.

⚠️ ONE CHANGE HERE MOVES ENERGY, AND IT IS NOT THE ONE THE CARD IS NAMED FOR.
Carried hours are provisional, so §8.3 keeps them out of the trade set: the
fill widens what the optimiser can SEE, never what it may DO, and
test_price_history.py checks that so it cannot be overclaimed later. What does
change a trade is that the filled series is windowed to [since, until), so
hours that have ALREADY ELAPSED are no longer in the spread. Before, a cheap
night that had gone sat in the series as the day's cheapest hour - and a cycle
cannot buy in an hour that is past, so the trade was quietly never taken.
Section 2 grades this by finding the cheapest firm hour with and without the
fill and showing it MOVES, from 02:00 UTC to 08:00 UTC on the fixture.

⚠️ A DEAD FEED IS STILL §11.4, NOT YESTERDAY. The fill runs only on a `series`
read. The two are indistinguishable to the optimiser - both 100 % provisional,
so arbitrage refuses on the firm-pair rung and `cheap_now()` is False - so
preferring yesterday's feed over the `static_profile` an operator configured
FOR that case would change a documented degradation for a difference only the
status page can see. That, and two more, in
DECISIONS/FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried.md.

⚠️ THE ANTI-DECAY RULE IS AN ORDERING, NOT A VALIDATION, and saying so is more
useful than a guarantee that would not hold. Feeding the filled series back in
is how this rots - day 2 carries day 1's guesses, day 3 carries day 2's carry
of them, behind a `provisional` flag that stays TRUE while the NUMBER decays.
No value-level check can catch it: a carried point and `eneco_eddy`'s
published-provisional quarter are the same three fields with the same flag. So
`carry()` is the only public entry, it records BEFORE it fills, the filled
series exists only as a return value the object never sees again, and
test_price_history.py walks app/ for any other module naming `_remember` and
reads `carry()`'s AST to pin the order.

EVIDENCE. 29/29 test files pass in the CI image. Eight mutations driven against
app/price_history.py and app/static_tariff.py, __pycache__ purged before each
run per MUTATION.md/TEST-15: newest-record lookup (5 red), recording the filled
series (1), replace-instead-of-merge (10), UTC-date keying (10), removing the
fill call entirely (12), a lost price field defaulting to 0.0 (2), prune by
clock arithmetic (1), a degraded reason that stops naming its cause (1). No
survivors; baseline and revert both green. Three of those first crashed the
harness instead of reporting a FAIL - "it was refused" and "it broke on the way
to being refused" must not grade the same - so `why()` and `_priced()` were
added and the run repeated.

No option added, config.yaml untouched, and the CHANGELOG entry deliberately
picks no version: PKG-07's rule, and only the deployer knows whether 0.9.0's
image has been pulled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-09 19:37:45 +02:00
admin 587751b115 Merge pull request 'INSTR-01: grade diff()'s suppression rule at the level it is written at, one case per clause' (#72) from INSTR-01 into release/1.0 2026-09-09 01:05:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 3de4453956 INSTR-01: match the finding KIND, because M12 was not holding this file to its own rule
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m7s
Review APPROVED f6f3f22 plainly. Three LOW notes, all applied - the first is a
real gap and the other two are one line each.

⚠️ M12's ASSERTION WAS KIND-BLIND. It matched on the key and ignored the
finding kind, so renaming `diff()`'s `"VANISHED STORE KEY"` to
`"GONE STORE KEY"` left M12 GREEN - review measured it. A vanished latch
quietly downgraded to a softer heading is exactly what part 3 of this same file
requires every mutation to be graded against ("the SPECIFIC finding it should
produce"), so the file was not holding itself to its own doctrine. Inherited
from SAFETY-44's original M12, not introduced here, and fixed now:

    ("VANISHED STORE KEY", "unit/shed/sign_tripped") in _m12_new

Driven: the kind rename is exit 1 and M12 is among the reds where it was green
before, and C5's removal still turns M12 red, so the strengthening did not cost
the discrimination it exists for.

C4 IS NAMED IN THE CLAUSE MAP. It has no 5e row deliberately - part 3's M9
reaches `vanished_unit is not None` end-to-end and a synthetic row would
duplicate that rather than add separability - but C5 lives in the same `if`,
and listing one guard while omitting the other reads as an oversight rather
than a boundary. Review's own recommendation was not to add the row.

AND THE PRINTED SET SAYS WHAT IT LOSES. The finding regex captures the first
TOKEN of each text, so two findings of one kind collapse into one tuple; the
line now says "first token only" so nobody reads it as an inventory. Harmless
for M12 - the difference is one-directional and the pair it asserts on is exact
- but the display was lossier than it looked. Unused `_m12_out` dropped.

28/28 files pass. `rehearse_roster.py` is untouched by this round; review
confirmed its AST is identical between 91b0d5e and f6f3f22, so every
measurement made against the shipped rule still stands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-09 00:58:03 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 f6f3f227c1 INSTR-01: restore M12 on the leg I generalised past, and measure the clause that had no row
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m6s
Review found two things this PR asserted about itself that were false. Both are
mine and both are worse than the defect the card was filed for.

⚠️ "NO FIXTURE CAN RESTORE IT, MEASURED BOTH WAYS" WAS NOT TRUE, AND TWO
MEASUREMENTS ARE NOT AN IMPOSSIBILITY PROOF. I deleted M12 - SAFETY-44's
working end-to-end control for the off-roster narrowing - on the argument that
the provenance clause made it unrestorable. The structural claim behind it,
that `run()` builds both snapshots from one state file so "already latched" and
"made by this transition" are incompatible, IS TRUE OF SAME-STEP AND FALSE OF
STAGED: `snapshot_over()` starts the after-leg over the file the BEFORE-leg
wrote, so a transition-made destination is available there. Both arrangements I
measured were same-step shaped. Review found the third.

RESTORED, and it discriminates with all six clauses in:

    staged leg, legacy+shed, shipped     _m12_new = VANISHED unit/shed/sign_tripped
    ...C5 narrowing removed              _m12_new = []          ⚠️ suppressed

⚠️ AND MY FIRST RESTORATION DIDN'T DISCRIMINATE EITHER, for a reason worth
recording: `data.pop(k, False)` RETURNS the value, so shed lost the KEY and
kept the LATCH - `_grade_store_migration()` saw `on_roster_latched`, never
re-armed garage, and there was no transition-made destination. The finding was
reported whether or not C5 existed and the control looked restored. `and False`
is the difference between "the key is gone" and "the LATCH is gone", and only
the second reaches the re-arm this arrangement needs.

⚠️ WHAT ACTUALLY BROKE WAS M12's exit-0 PRECONDITION, NOT M12. A legacy-shaped
fixture is never clean. That precondition is the one SAFETY-44's own commit
called "belt-and-braces, load-bearing only if the exit-0 requirement is ever
relaxed", saying what closed the gap is `_m12_new` BEING A SET DIFFERENCE - and
a stable dirty baseline is fine for a set difference. So I deleted a control on
the strength of a precondition the same commit had already called not
load-bearing. That is removing coverage rather than failing to add it, which is
the worse of the two directions.

⭐ AND THE BARE-KEY CLAUSE HAD NO ROW AT ALL. Review deleted
`k.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] == bare` and the whole 28-file suite stayed GREEN. 5e
mutated five clauses; the comprehension carries more, and this one is
load-bearing: a vanished SAFETY-02 `sign_tripped` was suppressed by a SAFETY-42
`delivery_tripped` on a roster unit - a DIFFERENT FAILSAFE's key. The rule's own
comment says "THE TEST IS NOT 'the name appears somewhere'. It is: the SAME bare
key", and nothing measured that sentence. `unit/*/delivery_tripped` is
machine-read, so it is reachable on any real two-latch store. R7 added; C2 now
flips exactly R7.

All six clause-removals now flip exactly their own row:

    C1 machine_read   -> ['R6-machine-read']    C5 off-roster  -> ['R2-narrowing']
    C2 same bare key  -> ['R7-bare-key']        C6 injectivity -> ['R5-injectivity']
    C3 same value     -> ['R4-value']           C7 provenance  -> ['R3-provenance']

THREE DANGLING CITATIONS TO A CONTROL THIS PR HAD DELETED, one of them in the
shipped tool eight lines below the paragraph condemning exactly that ("a
citation is the worst possible carrier, because it reads as having been
checked"). The tool no longer names a check; it states the property - every
clause has a row, and each removal flips its own.

A STALE SAFETY-44 BLOCK saying both fixes were "REVERTED OUT OF THIS CARD,
because THIS SUITE CANNOT MEASURE EITHER ONE" - describing a tree this PR
replaced. Rewritten as a map of where each clause is now measured. A comment
that outlives its subject is the same defect as a citation that outlives its
check.

AND A SELF-CONTRADICTION about the driver, in the file and in the last commit
message: "THE DRIVER IS WRITTEN INTO THE TREE UNDER TEST" eight lines above
"THE DRIVER GOES IN A TEMPDIR, NOT IN THE TREE". The code does the tempdir; the
first sentence stated the read-only-CI bug the same commit says it fixed, as if
it were the design. It now says the driver IMPORTS the tree and is WRITTEN to a
tempdir.

ONE HOLE REMAINS OPEN AND IS STATED AS UNMEASURED: attribution. `sorted()`
decides which vanished key claims a destination, so a deleted key can sort
first and be named as the one that migrated while the key that really moved is
reported VANISHED. Review measured that `sorted(` -> `list(` leaves the suite
green - every 5e case has at most one candidate, so no row can see ordering.
Still exit 1, so a wrong sentence rather than a hidden loss. Recorded rather
than left looking guarded.

28/28 files pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-09 00:29:00 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 91b0d5e4dc INSTR-01: grade the suppression rule at the level it is written at, one case per clause
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m4s
SAFETY-44 produced THREE inert controls for this one rule, each inert
differently, and split the two remaining fixes out rather than ship them
unmeasured. This is that card, and the first thing it did was explain why the
end-to-end route could never have worked.

⚠️ `moved_to` IS ONE COMPREHENSION CARRYING FIVE CONDITIONS WITH FIVE DIFFERENT
REASONS TO EXIST, AND `run()` BUILDS BOTH SNAPSHOTS FROM ONE STATE FILE. So
"the destination was already latched" and "the destination was made by this
transition" are the same file answering two incompatible questions: the
arrangement that reaches one forecloses the other. That is why rebuilding a
fixture to reach clause N kept moving the others, and it is not a fixture
problem.

⭐ SO THE RULE IS GRADED WHERE IT IS WRITTEN - `diff()` on constructed
Snapshots, ONE CASE PER CLAUSE. Six rows, and on the SHIPPED tree before any
fix they already separated the two known defects:

    R1 rename (legitimate)   migrated                      correct
    R2 narrowing             vanished                      correct
    R3 provenance            MIGRATED                      ⚠️ the defect
    R4 same value            vanished                      correct
    R5 injectivity           BOTH migrated                 ⚠️ the defect
    R6 machine_read          vanished                      correct

The two one-line fixes SAFETY-44 reverted are back, and R3/R5 flip while
R1/R2/R4/R6 do not - so the legitimate rename is still suppressed and this is
not an over-correction.

⭐ AND EACH CLAUSE REMOVAL FLIPS **EXACTLY ITS OWN ROW**, which is the
acceptance criterion this card was filed with:

    C1 machine_read  removed -> ['R6-machine-read']
    C3 same value    removed -> ['R4-value']
    C5 off-roster    removed -> ['R2-narrowing']
    C6 injectivity   removed -> ['R5-injectivity']
    C7 provenance    removed -> ['R3-provenance']

A removal that flips nothing is an unmeasured clause; a removal that flips
someone else's row means the cases are not separable after all. Neither
happened.

⚠️ AND M12 IS DELETED, WHICH IS THE MOST USEFUL THING THIS CARD FOUND. M12 was
SAFETY-44's end-to-end control for the narrowing and it was a REAL control -
red when the narrowing was removed. Adding the provenance clause disarmed it,
and NO FIXTURE CAN RESTORE IT, measured both ways: with the sibling latched in
its own right, C7 rejects the destination before C5 is consulted, so the
mutation is reported whether or not C5 exists; making the destination
transition-made means a flat latch, which makes the shipped run dirty and
breaks M12's own precondition. The second half of the card's acceptance
criterion - "M12 still turns red with the new clauses in" - is therefore
UNSATISFIABLE, and the honest answer is to remove the control rather than keep
one that has become inert. R2 measures C5 strictly better. Part 5 keeps the
end-to-end coverage; discrimination lives in 5e.

`state-both-latched.json` goes with it. Nothing referenced it once M12 was
gone, and the first draft of that paragraph said it was "kept, because 5e's
R2/R3 are derived from the arrangements it represents" - a nice sentence and
not a reference. An unused fixture a comment calls load-bearing is an inert
check one directory over.

TWO THINGS THE DRIVER GETS RIGHT ON PURPOSE:
  - it is written to a TEMPDIR, not beside the tool. `checks / unit` mounts the
    checkout READ-ONLY, so writing into the tree works on a dev box and is
    `OSError: Read-only file system` in CI - green for whoever wrote it and red
    on every PR. Caught by running it in the check image before committing.
  - the TABLE stays in the test file and the driver goes into the tree under
    test, so a mutation to the tool cannot also move the answer it is graded
    against.

28/28 files pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 23:51:35 +02:00
admin 806390d8b1 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-44: the latch migration takes the roster, and the guard stops being defeated by the key the defect wrote' (#71) from SAFETY-44 into release/1.0 2026-09-08 19:16:32 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 775f3a2e82 SAFETY-44: keep attribution in-tree, add the third clause, and correct a claim I made for my own precondition
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m56s
Review APPROVED f109153 and the split. Three asks, all applied, plus a
correction it caught in the round-4 commit message.

C STAYS IN-TREE. Attribution is a third property of the same comprehension -
`sorted()` decides which vanished key wins a destination, so a build renaming
`inverter-b` -> `garage` while DELETING `inverter-a` names the deleted key as
migrated and the one that really moved as VANISHED. A reader of the disclosure
paragraph wants it beside the other two rather than only in Trello. One
sentence, same block.

AND A FOURTH CLAUSE REVIEW MEASURED THIS ROUND: `and after.data.get(k) ==
value` survives the suite and is load-bearing. Without it the rule degenerates
to BARE-NAME matching - a deleted `unit/old-x/sign_reason` was reported as
having migrated into a `sign_reason` holding a COMPLETELY DIFFERENT SENTENCE,
and essentially every off-roster vanished `unit/*` key would be suppressed.
Added to the paragraph and to INSTR-01, so all of `moved_to` is covered by one
fixture design rather than two-thirds of one.

⚠️ AND THE POINT IS THAT THEY ARE FOUR CLAUSES OF **ONE COMPREHENSION**, WHICH
IS STRUCTURAL AND NOT A LIST OF CHORES. Four conditions, four different reasons
to exist, one fixture set that can reach only some at a time - so rebuilding a
fixture to reach clause N moves the others. That is exactly how round 4's
disarming happened, and it is what INSTR-01 has to design against rather than
patch around. Review called this the sharpest thing found in four rounds and it
is a fact about the function, not about the two clauses that exposed it.

⚠️ AND I OVERCLAIMED FOR MY OWN PRECONDITION. The round-4 message said the
strengthened M12 precondition was needed because "the exit code alone cannot
say the second thing". Review checked: on a clean run the finding regex matches
nothing, so the second conjunct is IMPLIED by the first today. It is
belt-and-braces, load-bearing only if the exit-0 requirement is ever relaxed.
WHAT ACTUALLY CLOSED THE FIRST DRAFT'S GAP IS `_m12_new` BEING A SET DIFFERENCE
- the mutation must ADD a finding - and that is the check the narrowing's
removal turns red. The wrong half was credited, and the comment now says which
half does the work.

Nit: the fixture's trailing newline and two backticks, lost last round.

`rehearse_roster.py` is still byte-identical to d1b7e3f - this round touches
only the test file's disclosure paragraph and the fixture's comment. 28/28 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 19:02:59 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 f109153216 SAFETY-44: ship only what this suite can measure, and split the two clauses it cannot
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m58s
⚠️ REVIEW FOUND THE INJECTIVITY CHECK INERT IN THE SAME WAY M12's FIRST DRAFT
WAS, three paragraphs below the comment diagnosing it. Removing the whole
mechanism left 28/28 GREEN: part 5's two destinations are `sign_reason` and
`sign_tripped`, DIFFERENT bare keys, which can never contend. The
`len(_dests) >= 2` precondition was true and established nothing - "not
asserting over an empty list" was correct, "this run can exercise injectivity"
was not.

Review also measured a second, narrower silent loss: `moved_to` accepts a
destination regardless of whether the TRANSITION put the value there, so a
roster unit already latched in its own right is a free suppression slot. A build
deleting `old-a` while renaming `old-b` -> `shed` reported exit 0, NO FINDINGS,
with `old-a` "migrated" into a key that already held True.

⚠️ I WROTE BOTH ONE-LINE FIXES AND HAVE REVERTED BOTH, because THIS SUITE
CANNOT MEASURE EITHER. Three attempts, three different ways of proving nothing:

  1. assert injectivity over part 5's real destinations
     -> passes with the entire mechanism deleted (non-contending bare keys)
  2. build a dedicated fixture for the two-claimant case
     -> discriminates NOTHING: both snapshots read one state file, so nothing
        vanishes and there are no migrated lines with the clause or without it
  3. rebuild M12's fixture so the destination is transition-made, to reach the
     provenance case
     -> ⚠️ DISARMED M12 FOR THE NARROWING. All three clause-removals came back
        GREEN at once, and the control I had measured RED last round was gone.

⭐ (3) IS WHY THIS IS A SPLIT AND NOT A JUDGEMENT CALL. A later fix to the same
function silently disarmed the control for an earlier one, and I saw it only
because I re-drove the removal rather than trusting the suite's exit code.
Shipping two more unmeasured clauses into the rehearsal instrument, on a card
whose entire subject is checks that cannot reach what they name, would be the
fourth inert artifact in one PR. They go on their own card, with review's
measurements as the starting evidence and the fixture built BEFORE the fix -
which is the ordering that worked for M12 and failed every time I inverted it.

⚠️ AND THE SPLIT IS SAFE, WHICH IS WHY IT IS AVAILABLE. Both remaining holes are
in the REHEARSAL TOOL, not the controller. The round-2 narrowing guarantees a
suppressed key is always OFF the roster, so no roster unit loses protection;
what is left is rollback-view/history mis-reporting on a tool an operator runs
before commissioning. Nothing here can disarm a latch on a live site, and
inverter B goes in on ~2026-09-12. Review offered this split explicitly.

M12's PRECONDITION IS STRENGTHENED, because the exit code could not carry it.
It now requires the shipped tree to be clean AND to not already report the
finding the mutation exists to produce. The first draft passed on exactly that
gap: the fixture's own litter made the run red and nothing separated the two.

Re-driven after the revert, on the round-3 fixture:

    shipped                                   exit 0
    `vanished_unit not in after.units` gone   ⚠️ exit 1

28/28 files pass. The controller half is unchanged since d1b7e3f and review has
no further concerns about it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 18:44:38 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 f6d7bfcb04 SAFETY-44: give the moved-not-lost branch a control that reaches it, and make the move injective
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m38s
⚠️ THE CONTROL I WROTE LAST ROUND WAS INERT, AND REVIEW MEASURED IT. M12 ran its
mutant over `state-legacy.json` and the findings diff against the UNMUTATED tree
was EMPTY. It "passed" because that fixture's STAGED leg is already exit 1 on
pre-existing litter, and `"migrated  unit/shed/" not in out` was trivially true
because a pre-DEV-02 FLAT store has no shed latch to lose - after migration only
the FIRST roster entry is ever latched.

The decisive measurement is the one it could not make: reverting the
`vanished_unit not in after.units` narrowing - restoring exactly the rule that
hides a real latch loss - left 28/28 GREEN.

⚠️ SO IT WAS HABIT 4 WEARING THE CLOTHES OF ITS OWN FIX, AND WORSE THAN THE
"NO CONTROL" IT REPLACED, because it reads as checked. That is this commit's
own argument about the M3 mis-citation, turned on the thing I wrote to answer it.

⭐ THE FIXTURE CAME FIRST THIS TIME. `state-both-latched.json` is a store at
SCHEMA_VERSION with `unit/garage/*` AND `unit/shed/*` both latched by ONE site
event, so the reasons match too - the arrangement in which same-value
suppression is most dangerous, and the one no existing fixture could produce.
M12's mutant then makes ONE roster unit's latch key VANISH while its sibling's
survives at the same value:

    shipped tree, both-latched fixture      exit 0, no findings
    one unit's latch key deleted            exit 1, ADDS
                                            VANISHED STORE KEY unit/shed/sign_tripped
    narrowing reverted                      ⚠️ RED  (was 28/28 green)

And it asserts the PRECONDITION - the fixture is clean on the shipped tree -
plus that the mutation ADDS findings rather than coinciding with ones the
fixture already had. An empty diff there is exactly what made the last draft
inert, and nothing said so.

⭐ AND THE MOVE IS NOW INJECTIVE, which is the narrower hole review found still
open. `moved_to` is "any machine-read key with the same bare name and the same
value", and `DEFAULTS["sign_tripped"] is False` means `True` is the ONLY
non-default value a latch can hold - so N vanished keys could all claim the SAME
destination, by construction rather than by coincidence. Measured on a rename
carrying `inverter-a` -> `garage` correctly while DROPPING `inverter-b` -> `shed`:

    migrated  unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped = True -> unit/garage/sign_tripped
    migrated  unit/inverter-b/sign_tripped = True -> unit/garage/sign_tripped

Zero store-key findings, on a run where `shed` came up UNLATCHED. Two keys
cannot both have become one key. `diff()` claims each destination once.

⚠️ AND THE CHECK FOR IT IS ANCHORED TO A RUN THAT ACTUALLY PRODUCES MIGRATED
LINES. A dedicated mutant was written first and asserted over an EMPTY list -
vacuous, passing, indistinguishable from working, the same defect twice in one
sitting. These fixtures cannot produce two claimants (`migrate_unit_keys()`
moves FLAT keys only, so one flat latch yields one migration), so rather than
build a fiction to grade, injectivity is asserted over part 5's real migrations,
with a PRECONDITION that there are at least two of them. THE TWO-CLAIMANT
ARRANGEMENT IS A STATED RESIDUAL: bounded in `diff()` by construction, not
measured end-to-end.

Finding 4, and my correction to it was also wrong. The comment cited "line 315"
and "two hundred lines below"; the fix I wrote said "~54 lines down", which was
review's distance to the WRONG line, carried to a new referent without
re-measuring - inside the sentence apologising for a wrong number. Recomputed at
5e382f5: 327-261 = 66, 327-252 = 75, and 54 was neither. There is no distance
now, because a distance is a coordinate and the sentence already names the thing.

And the residual gains its second half, which review noticed and I had not: the
reason re-armed from is the FLAT mirror, carrying whatever tripped LAST, so this
path can print one inverter's evidence under another's name. The latch is right
and the explanation may not be. `test_maintenance.py`'s check that the reason is
not the removed unit's is guaranteed by that fixture's flat string, NOT by the
code, and now says so.

28/28 files pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 18:08:16 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d1b7e3f113 SAFETY-44: decide per key, because one shared flag let an unrelated latch veto the repair
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m58s
⚠️ REVIEW DEFEATED THIS CARD'S OWN FIX WITH ONE ADDED KEY, and the project's own
instrument agreed on the unmodified tree. The guard classified each key and then
wrote ONE site-wide `namespaced_latched` for BOTH "on the roster" and
"off-roster but not UNIT_A", so a single latched key belonging to a unit the
operator had removed from `inverters:` vetoed the repair of the misdirected
`inverter-a` latch beside it. Measured, roster ['garage','shed'], store stamped
so the migration fix cannot reach it:

  sign_tripped + unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped     -> [('garage', True),  ...]
  ...AND unit/old-shed/sign_tripped               -> ⚠️ [('garage', False), ...]

A site DRIVING on a state file that reads `sign_tripped: true` - the sentence in
this card's own first paragraph - and `tools/rehearse_roster.py` printed
`LATCH CAME UP DISARMED` on it, exit 1, against shipped code. It matters more
than a normal hole because this guard is, as main.py says, the ONLY repair path
for an install already stamped by 0.9.0.

⚠️ AND IT IS INSTANCE #17 OF HABIT 4, IN THE EXTENSION MUTATION.md ADDED TWO
DAYS AGO. The two fixtures written for this card each hold ONE arrangement -
`_staged_store` has only `inverter-a`, `_other_store` only `inverter-b` - so the
flag was never written twice with opposite intents in a single store. A per-key
check whose keys have never disagreed WITHIN ONE STORE is a check over whichever
key came last. Three variables now, one per case, and a fixture holding BOTH.
Four cases driven: stranded-only repairs, +1 unrelated repairs, +2 repairs,
off-roster-only does NOT (which is DEV-02's control, still green).

⭐ AND THE MOVED-NOT-LOST RULE HID A GENUINE LATCH LOSS. The match was bare key
plus value over the whole of `machine_read`, with no identity - and
`DEFAULTS["sign_tripped"] is False`, so the ONLY non-default value a latch can
hold is `True`. Any surviving latched roster unit therefore suppressed any other
unit's vanished latch. Review measured a build that drops `unit/shed/sign_*`
while `unit/garage/sign_*` survives, both latched by one site event so the
reasons matched too:

    none in LEG SAME-STEP: nothing vanished, nothing stranded ...
    NO FINDINGS in the rehearsed transitions            exit 0

A roster unit's persisted SAFETY-02 latch deleted, transition reported clean.
The legitimate case is a RENAME - the key left `inverter-a`, which is not on
this roster, and arrived under `garage`, which is - so the vanished key's own
unit must be OFF the roster. A key whose unit is still on the roster has not
been renamed, it has been lost, and no amount of the same value elsewhere makes
that untrue.

⚠️ AND THE BOUND I CITED FOR IT DID NOT EXIST. Both the comment and the last
commit message said "what M3 (delete the flat rollback view) measures". M3 is
not that mutant - it drops `sign_reason` from `LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS` - and the one I
meant, M9, vanishes only FLAT keys, so neither can satisfy the `unit/` gate the
rule sits behind. NEITHER EXERCISED THE BRANCH; it had no negative control at
all, in a card whose subject is checks that cannot reach the failure they name.
A citation is the worst carrier for that, because it reads as having been
checked. M12 is written for it and driven: a roster unit that stops restoring
its latch is exit 1, and the suppression does not swallow it.

`misdirected` IS UNREACHABLE FROM THE CALL SITE, and the claim that it was a
benefit is withdrawn rather than restated. `unit` is `roster_names(opts)[0]` and
`build_roster()` names its first entry from the same list, so `unit` is a member
of `roster` by construction; review measured it - dropping the `roster` argument
inside `migrate_unit_keys()` survives 28/28. The argument stays for the reason
`_verify_moves()` gives for its own `roster=None` branch, it is what a NEW
caller gets - and a guard nothing exercises is a guard nobody knows works, so it
is now exercised at the function's own level: a wrong `unit` comes back
misdirected, the marker is not stamped, and the same call with a roster name
stamps it. Dead `if _roster_names else UNIT_A` removed; `roster_names()` never
returns [].

THE OPERATOR MESSAGE IS ASSERTED. Review deleted it whole (`if stranded:` ->
`if False:`) and 28/28 stayed green - `stranded` had no other consumer, so the
list existed only to print a line nothing checked, and that line is the entire
operator-facing half of the repair. Now: exactly one SAFETY-44 line at ERROR,
naming the stranded key and the roster it was measured against.

A wrong line citation removed: the call-site comment said "line 315's comment"
and "two hundred lines below", and both were wrong (315 is the CFG-03 defaults
note; the comment meant is ~54 lines down). Cite the thing, not its coordinates.

⚠️ AND WHAT 5b/5c ACTUALLY PIN IS RECORDED, because review is owed the
distinction: `mutant_tree()` asserts its target exists, so EDITING the guarded
line makes the file red at the ANCHOR before any behaviour is measured - which
looks identical from the exit code and proves much less. It happened twice while
writing this commit. The behavioural coverage lives in test_maintenance.py
section 13 and test_inverter.py, which build stores rather than strings.

Fixture strings no longer say "measured" - they are synthetic, and the repo's
other fixture carries an explicit SYNTHETIC header.

28/28 files pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 17:08:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 5e382f52f6 SAFETY-44: the latch migration takes the roster, and the guard stops being defeated by the key the defect wrote
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m56s
⚠️ A DISARMED SAFETY-02 GUARD ON AN INSTALL WHOSE STATE FILE SAYS IT IS
PROTECTED. `Controller.__init__` called `migrate_unit_keys(store, UNIT_A)` - a
hardcoded constant - while its sibling `migrate_maint_keys(store, unit, roster)`
takes the roster and refuses a write no machine reads. On a store that ran
pre-DEV-02 flat and declares `inverters: [garage, shed]`, the latch moved to
`unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped`, `_verify_moves()` read it back under the name it
had been HANDED, was satisfied, and stamped the marker. Not one inverter came up
latched, and the next start skipped the migration too.

That is the MAINT-05 defect verbatim, still live in the function whose own
docstring describes it, and `_grade_store_migration()` did not catch it: its
"is anything namespaced latched" test was satisfied BY THE MISDIRECTED VALUE
ITSELF.

⚠️ THE REASON IT WAS LEFT WAS A HALF-TRUTH. "There is no roster yet - the
`Inverter`s restore their latch in their constructors." The KEYS must be written
before the `Inverter`s read them; the NAMES do not come from the `Inverter`s.
`roster_names(opts)` reads them off the options before anything is constructed -
which is exactly what it already existed to do for `MqttPublisher` - and returns
`[UNIT_A]` on the flat shape, so today's upgrade path is byte-identical.

TWO EDITS, AND THEY DO DIFFERENT JOBS. Measured per leg by reverting each one:

                          SAME-STEP leg          STAGED leg
  both edits (shipped)    clean                  latch armed, litter reported
  guard reverted          latch armed            ⚠️ DISARMED
  call site reverted      latch armed, litter    latch armed, litter

So the GUARD carries the safety and the CALL SITE carries the hygiene and the
withheld marker. The table is in test_rehearse.py part 5 because a reader who
assumed the roster-aware migration re-arms the latch would delete the guard as
redundant in a tidy-up and take the STAGED column with it - and STAGED is what
"upgrade now, declare the roster later" produces, which is the path an operator
actually takes. Only the guard reaches an install already stamped by 0.9.0.

⚠️ AND "OFF THE ROSTER" ALONE WAS TOO BLUNT, WHICH test_inverter.py CAUGHT. The
first draft treated every off-roster latch as litter. In DEV-02's restart case
the store carries `unit/inverter-b/sign_tripped = True` from B's own trip while
the roster being graded holds only A - and the blunt rule re-armed a HEALTHY A
off the flat key B's trip had mirrored. DEV-02's defect rebuilt inside its own
guard, which is what the paragraph I was overruling had been right to fear.

Narrowed to `UNIT_A`, which is the only name the broken migration ever wrote -
`roster_names()` falls back to a POSITIONAL `inverter-N`, so `inverter-a` is not
a name this code hands to anyone else. A latch stranded under any other name is
a real unit out of today's config and still counts as protection. Residual,
stated in the code rather than left to be found: a site whose own first unit is
NAMED `inverter-a`, latched, then taken out of the roster gets re-armed on
`inverters[0]` - a healthy unit held at 0 W until an operator clears it. The
conservative direction, against a site DRIVING on a file that says it is latched.

⭐ AND FIXING THE CODE EXPOSED A FALSE POSITIVE IN THE HARNESS. With the latch
now landing under `garage`, `rehearse_roster.py` reported VANISHED STORE KEY for
`unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped` three lines above the same value sitting under
`unit/garage/sign_tripped`. A key that moved to a namespace a machine reads has
not vanished - and an alarm that fires on the harmless case is one an operator
learns to dismiss before the real one arrives, which is CONTROL-C's own
argument. The test is not "the name appears somewhere": same bare key, same
value, under a key in `machine_read`, the set built by driving a real start. A
latch that genuinely went missing has no such key and is still a finding, which
M3 (delete the flat rollback view) still measures red.

Test parts replaced deliberately, as both of them asked to be:
  - test_rehearse.py part 5 asserted the defect "as REQUIREMENTS so that a fix
    turns them red". It now asserts the fix, with 5b and 5c as negative controls
    - one per edit - and 5b doubles as the leg-splitter's positive control,
    since reverting the guard is the build where the two legs DISAGREE.
  - test_maintenance.py section 13 was headed "RECORDED, NOT FIXED" and said the
    fixing card "should expect them to go red and should replace them". Replaced,
    plus two cases it could not have had: the already-stamped store, and the
    `inverter-b` negative control for the narrowing above.

28/28 files pass. Not run: nothing - this is host-side only, no rig, no hardware.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 15:36:37 +02:00
admin 46c022c926 Merge pull request 'ARCH-02: rehearse the flat-to-roster switch - and SAFETY-44 re-confirmed by a second instrument' (#70) from ARCH-02 into release/1.0 2026-09-08 15:09:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 22ca341459 ARCH-02: assert the invariant, because a fixture cannot enumerate arrangements
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m55s
Review approved and then attacked part 5b, the control that stands between B1's
defect and a green suite. It got through in three edits:

    A1  delete `END LEG`                        5b CATCHES it        2 FAIL
    A2  ...and reorder the legs                 5b BLIND             1 FAIL
    A3  ...and reword the closing summary       0 FAIL, "all checks passed"
                                                with a splitter that closed
                                                ZERO legs

⚠️ TWO OF THOSE THREE ARE ORDINARY REFACTORS - reordering report legs, rewording
a summary line - and neither reads as touching a safety check. 5b caught the
unclosed splitter only because the clean leg happened to be printed LAST, and
the backstop that saved A2 was a hardcoded transcription of the tool's own
sentence, so rewording that sentence blinded it too.

FIXED BY ASSERTING THE STRUCTURE RATHER THAN ADDING A FIXTURE: a leg may not
open while one is open, and every leg that opens must be explicitly closed.
Driven - deleting `END LEG` now fails on the FIRST edit, whatever the order or
the wording:

    AssertionError: leg 'SAME-STEP' opened while 'STAGED' was still open - the
    tool stopped closing its legs, and a splitter that never closes swallows the
    closing summary into the last leg.

All three attacks include that edit, so one assertion kills the class. Clean
tree unchanged: 28/28, all checks passed.

⭐ AND THE RULE IN MUTATION.md IS EXTENDED, because review's finding is the
general case of it. It said "a per-thing check that has never seen the things
DISAGREE is a total". Part 5b DOES make them disagree, every run, and was still
blind. So:

    ...AND ONE THAT HAS ONLY SEEN THEM DISAGREE IN ONE ARRANGEMENT IS A TOTAL
    OVER THAT ARRANGEMENT. When a fixture cannot enumerate the arrangements,
    assert the invariant they share.

Also recorded, NOT fixed, with the reason: the reference carries `entity_id
unique_id device` and grades all three, but never the discovery TOPIC. Review
measured `homeassistant/... -> ha/...` exiting 0 with no findings while every
announced entity dies. `discovery_payloads()` already returns the topic and
`announced_rows` discards it, so a fourth column closes it - but the prefix is
HA's fixed contract rather than a name this project chooses, so it is not what a
tidy-up rename reaches. Lower LIKELIHOOD than the N1 gap it resembles, not lower
consequence, and it stops being a note the day the topic becomes configurable.

Two stale figures corrected: the tool claimed five migration mutations where
there are nine, and pointed at a DOCS.md heading that does not exist (the real
one is "Before you commission inverter B", verified present at DOCS.md:1577).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 15:01:55 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 9c1a9e0f17 ARCH-02: M7's evidence was filtered out by its own finding kind
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m56s
The mutation battery prints the distinct findings each mutation caused, matched
on the finding's KIND. The pattern's character class was `[A-Z -]`, which has no
underscore - so `UNIQUE_ID DRIFT:` did not match, and M7, the mutation that
renames `mqtt.BASE`, printed its verdict with no evidence under it at all.

A filter that silently drops the very finding a mutation exists to produce is
the same defect as the rest of this card, at display scale. No behaviour change:
M7 was red before and is red now, and it now shows why.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 14:23:35 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 638c213944 ARCH-02 round 2: the pin could not tell one red leg from two, and the tool went
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m57s
quiet when a flag was forgotten

Both blocking findings were reproduced before anything was changed, and both are
the class this card exists to guard against.

B1. THE PIN WAS A COUNT, AND A COUNT CANNOT SEPARATE TWO ROUTES. The rehearsal
reaches the disarmed latch by two independent paths and prints every finding
TWICE per red leg - once in the leg's block, once in the closing summary - so
ONE red leg satisfied `count(...) >= 2`. Measured: shipped code 4; with
`migrate_unit_keys()` handed the roster's own name (SAME-STEP fixed) 2, PASSES;
with a guard-side fix (both fixed) 0. The check named "NOT THE SAME-STEP PATH
ALONE" reported ok on the build whose only remaining failure IS the staged path.
The tool now prints `LEG <id>` / `END LEG <id>` and the pin requires the finding
in EACH leg by name.

⚠️ AND THE FIRST SPLITTER CARRIED THE SAME DEFECT ONE LEVEL DOWN - it opened on
the marker and never closed, so the last leg absorbed the closing summary and
read red whenever ANY leg was red. Caught by building the one fixture that
separates them. Part 5b is now that fixture, run every time: a tree in which
SAME-STEP is genuinely clean and STAGED is not. A per-thing check that has never
seen the things disagree is a total with extra steps.

⚠️ AND IT CORRECTS A CLAIM THIS CARD MADE. `main.py:250` is NOT the whole fix.
Measured on that exact change: LEG SAME-STEP clean, LEG STAGED still DISARMED -
the staged path stamps `schema_version` on the flat start and the roster start's
migration returns early before the name it is handed matters. DOCS.md now says
so, with the measurement.

B2. A FORGOTTEN FLAG WAS A CLEAN BILL OF HEALTH. Omitting `--live-entities`
printed "nothing orphaned" and exited 0, with `grep -ci` for the words returning
0 - while an UNREADABLE file exited 2. The asymmetry was backwards. Omitting it
now refuses (exit 2); `--no-live-entities` is the deliberate opt-out and carries
a standing banner in the header AND on the exit line, because a report is
skimmed from the bottom.

N1. THE REFERENCE DID NOT CARRY WHAT HA KEYS ON. It held entity_ids only, so
renaming `mqtt.BASE` (every unique_id moves) and changing `DEVICE["identifiers"]`
(HA sees a new device) both came back exit 0 - real orphanings with every
composed id byte-identical. The reference is now three columns
(`entity_id unique_id device`), is loaded on EVERY run including a degraded one,
and M7/M8 pin both. `object_id` is deliberately not a column and its rename is
required to SURVIVE, which is what bounds the four mqtt.py mutations.

Also found while fixing the above, and fixed with its own paired positive: the
VANISHED check did not carry the default/non-default rule the STRANDED check
does, so a pair of migrated DEFAULTS moving namespace read as two findings and
CONTROL-C went red on a CORRECT build. M9 drops non-default keys and must still
be a finding.

N2/N3. DOCS.md withdraws the unmeasured "not recoverable by advancing again" -
its own reasoning cut the other way and nothing here tested a re-advance; the
measured part (eight rows stop updating, history gaps, automations stop firing)
stands. And the byte-identical-input property is `test_rehearse.py`'s assertion,
not the tool's.

FRAMING. SAFETY-44 is ALREADY RECORDED on the merge base - `test_maintenance.py`
section 13, with the "guard is defeated by the very key the defect wrote"
sentence, in a file this card does not touch. DOCS.md now says this is
independent re-confirmation through a second instrument, reachable from an
owner-supplied state file rather than only from a fixture, and not a discovery.

app/ is still untouched. 59 checks in test_rehearse.py, 9 mutations red, 2
required survivors, 3 clean controls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 14:21:34 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 1841416aa4 ARCH-02: put the fresh-install checks in the part they belong to
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m49s
They were printing under "6. THE REVERSE DIRECTION", which is not what they are
about, and part 2's heading still said two controls when there are three.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 13:23:03 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 cb8f800180 ARCH-02: the harness was red on every fresh install, and a third control says so
A store the add-on has never written has no latch and no history. The DEV-02
migration still runs on it - `schema_version` is absent, so `from_version` is 0 -
and it writes `sign_tripped = False` and `sign_reason = ""` under `inverter-a`
before `build_roster()` exists. On a declared roster nothing reads either of
them, so the first draft called both STRANDED and exited 1. Every fresh install
that grows a second inverter would have been reported as a failed transition.

⚠️ THAT IS A DEFECT IN THE ALARM, NOT A CASE TO SUPPRESS, and store.py already
carries the distinction it needed: `MigrationReport.lost` reports a dropped
`sign_tripped=True` and NOT a dropped `sign_tripped=False`, because "absent" and
"never tripped" are the same statement - and because an alarm that fires on the
harmless case is one an operator learns to dismiss before the real one arrives.
The stranded check now makes the same split, on the VALUE and not on the key
name: a key stranded at its default is printed under its own heading, visibly,
and is not a finding; the same key stranded at a non-default still is. SAFETY-44
turns on `sign_tripped = True`, so it is untouched, and a check pins both
halves against each other so the softening cannot widen into a hole.

CONTROL-C is the fresh install, and it is a third clean control rather than a
line in a comment: the shipped code is right about it and the harness must say
nothing. It is the control that found this.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 13:20:49 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 018da00b74 ARCH-02: show the mutation evidence, not the tool's own docstring
The mutation battery printed every line of the harness's output starting with a
warning sign, and the harness's header is four paragraphs of them - so each
mutation's evidence arrived buried under "THIS TOOL RUNS THE REAL Controller"
repeated six times, and each finding appeared once per transition leg plus once
in the summary. The filter now matches a finding's KIND and de-duplicates, so
what part 3 prints is the set of distinct findings the mutation caused.

No behaviour change: the same six mutations go red for the same reasons.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 13:16:47 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 e06906d65f ARCH-02: rehearse the flat-to-roster switch, and it comes up disarmed
Nothing had ever run the real `Controller` through the transition inverter B's
commissioning performs on 2026-09-12. `tools/rehearse_roster.py` does, over a
COPY of a state file given as an input path, and reports the difference: every
store key that moved, appeared, vanished or was STRANDED under a name no
machine reads; every entity id before and after with orphans named; and whether
the maintenance history MAINT-05 moved once survived being moved again.

⭐ WHAT IT FOUND, AND IT IS SAFETY-44's ANSWER. A store that ran pre-DEV-02 flat
and declares a multi-inverter roster comes up with its SAFETY-02 latch DISARMED
unless the first roster entry happens to be called `inverter-a`.
`Controller.__init__` hands `migrate_unit_keys()` the hardcoded `UNIT_A`, so the
latch lands in `unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped`; a roster of ["garage","shed"]
reads `unit/garage/sign_tripped`, which is absent. And `_grade_store_migration()`
- the guard written for exactly this - sees the migration's OWN misdirected key
satisfy its `namespaced_latched` test and returns without re-arming. Measured,
not argued: the file says `sign_tripped: true`, no inverter is latched, nothing
is held at 0 W. The same state file onto a roster whose first entry IS
`inverter-a` comes up latched, so the finding is attributable to the name.

The staged upgrade reaches it too: the flat start stamps `schema_version`, and
the roster start's migration then takes its early return.

⚠️ NO RUNTIME CODE IS CHANGED HERE. The fix to `migrate_unit_keys()` belongs to
SAFETY-44 reopened as a defect, shown red before it; this commit is the
instrument that shows it red.

THE CHECK CAN FAIL, AND WAS SEEN TO. `test_rehearse.py` establishes two CLEAN
CONTROLS first - two transitions the shipped code gets right, on which the
harness must say nothing - and then breaks the shipped migration and the
entity-id composition six ways in a private copy of the tree, requiring each to
turn its control from green to red WITH THE RIGHT FINDING NAMED. One mutation
is required to SURVIVE, with the reason written down. The synthetic state
carries maintenance history and a legacy-shaped latched `sign_tripped` with no
`schema_version` beside it, because state built by the happy path cannot detect
a migration that only mishandles legacy shapes.

⚠️ THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE HARNESS HAD HABIT 4 IN IT and its own battery caught
it - MUTATION.md's thirteenth instance, third in an instrument. The entity diff
composed both sides with the same build, so renaming the MQTT device moved every
id equally and it reported "no orphans" about a change that orphans everything.
`--live-entities` is the fix: a reference that does not move with the code.

THE RETREAT is supported and does not corrupt state - the flat rollback view
keeps the latch and the first pack's history live - but it orphans eight HA
entities, and the ROUND TRIP is not supported: a maintenance cycle completed
while rolled back is discarded on re-advance. Stated in DOCS.md as a decision.

Fetching /data/state.json, the options blob and the entity list are OWNER STEPS
and are written down. ⚠️ Nothing here was run against real state and nothing
here claims to have been.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 13:15:05 +02:00
admin 37dd0f00cc Merge pull request 'SAFETY-43: delinquency measured against the ask, not against a flat 500 W' (#69) from SAFETY-43 into release/1.0 2026-09-08 05:56:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 1448bd909b SAFETY-43: the no_account switch was graded by nothing
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m29s
Review's remaining non-blocking finding, and it is B1's shape one level down -
in the fix for B1.

`wedged_loop`'s `no_account=True` was used in exactly ONE place: the cut-out
fixture, where it PROVABLY cannot change the answer, because a pack at its own
cut-out is never asked and the gate is never reached. Review neutered the switch
so it removed nothing, and the file stayed GREEN while printing

    ...named=(nobody); with account() DELETED: 0/200

with `account()` not deleted. A line asserting a mechanism that did not happen.

⭐ THE SWITCH DOES BITE, ON A FIXTURE THIS HELPER COULD ALREADY REACH. At the
same cut-out with EQUAL weights, `plan()` hands B a 50/50 share, so the account
gate is the only thing keeping it silent. Measured:

    cut-out, OPT-09 weights   gate on   0/200   gate DELETED     0/200
    cut-out, EQUAL weights    gate on   0/200   gate DELETED   200/200

Asserted. Driven: neutering the switch now goes RED on exactly that check, and
nothing else.

Two things this buys beyond closing the finding. It proves the switch removes
the gate, so the printed "with account() DELETED" line is about a run in which
something was. And it gives part 8b the end-to-end account-gate control ON A
POSITIVE SHARE that the block previously had to outsource to test_delivery.py
part 1 - the arm is no longer only true, it is locally demonstrated.

Suite: 27 files, all pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 04:38:18 +02:00
admin a0d981731c Merge pull request 'SAFETY-31 AC 4: the alarm's attribution was graded by nothing, and a mutation proved it' (#68) from SAFETY-31-attribution into release/1.0 2026-09-08 04:27:16 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 b21e229adf SAFETY-43 round 2: the cut-out "positive control" was vacuous, and the record
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m29s
stated the wrong mechanism

⚠️ REVIEW FINDING, BLOCKING, AND IT IS THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS WRONG RATHER THAN
THE BEHAVIOUR. Part 8b's cut-out arm claimed an "identical power trace" to the
wedged arm and that "what separates them is `account()`". EVERY PART OF THAT WAS
FALSE, and the check survived deleting the gate it named. Measured:

    cut-out arm, account() live        named 0/200, distinct B shares: [0]
    cut-out arm, account() FORCED None named 0/200, distinct B shares: [0]
    wedged  arm, account() live        named 200/200, shares 77/125/133/154 W

At its own cut-out the pack's usable energy ABOVE that cut-out is zero, so
`weights()` answers 0.0, `_fill()`'s preferred pass gives it nothing, the healthy
sibling covers the load alone so the last-resort pass never runs, and its share
is 0 W ON ALL 200 CYCLES. A unit with a 0 W share is not in `asked`, so
`len(asked) < 2` returns {} BEFORE EITHER ARM IS EVALUATED and `account()` is
never consulted. Nothing was identical, "100 % of the ask" was 0/0, and the arm
never reached the comparison it was written to grade.

WHAT REPLACES IT IS A BETTER FACT, NOT A WEAKER ONE: at its own cut-out OPT-09
STOPS ASKING THE PACK AT ALL, so SAFETY-43's relative arm is never reached. That
is a SECOND, INDEPENDENT protection sitting UPSTREAM of `account()` - the
allocator declines to ask before the detector has to decline to alarm. So the arm
is kept and re-pointed, not deleted:

  * the 0 W share is now ASSERTED (`_sat_last[1][Bee] == 0`), not inferred from
    the silence - a control that cannot say WHY it is quiet cannot fail;
  * the arm runs a SECOND time with `account()` DELETED (`no_account=True`) and
    must still be silent, which is what proves which mechanism does the work;
  * the account gate's claim is re-pointed at test_delivery.py part 1, where it
    is graded on a REAL positive 125 W share.

⚠️ AND IT WAS INVISIBLE FOR ONE REASON WORTH KEEPING: that was the ONLY line in
part 8b that did not print its shares. `inverter-b+0` would have been on screen
from the first run. Every line in the part prints them now. The derated control's
vacuity guard also now asserts ITS OWN unit is asked, rather than re-asserting a
different run's 200/200 - which is exactly why the old guard could not see this.

ALSO, from the same review:

  N1  app/delivery.py said 0.05 was "twelve times more sensitive" than 0.85.
      0.85/0.05 = 17 and no reading of the pair gives 12. An unsupported number
      in shipped source; replaced with what was actually measured.
  N2  M14's recorded count was 4 named checks in test_delivery.py and it is 5 -
      part 1's pre-existing "a shortfall AT the threshold is not one" also goes
      red. It under-claimed, so it never inflated the evidence, but a recorded
      figure that does not reproduce is still one.
  N3  test_delivery.py part 1 printed the alarm sentence with a bare
      `delinquent(...)["b"]`, which raises KeyError under M12/M13 and ABORTED
      THE FILE AT PART 1, leaving parts 2-8 ungraded. The direction is safe (an
      abort is a red; MUTATION.md's defect fabricates only greens) but the
      recorded coverage read smaller than the truth. It is a `.get` now, and
      M12/M13's counts are re-run: 7 and 7 named checks, not 5 and 6.

CFG-07: the assessment is unchanged (worse by one control cycle, 35.0 -> 40.0 s,
deliberately not fixed here) and now says WHEN it has to close - BEFORE INVERTER
B IS COMMISSIONED (~2026-09-12), because the band is unreachable at N=1 and
commissioning B is when it first becomes reachable - and that CFG-07 HAS NO
DECISION DOCUMENT IN THIS TREE, so whoever takes it writes one first.

No behaviour change. `delinquent()`'s two arms, the fraction, `min_w` and the
N=1 path are all untouched by this commit. 27/27 suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 04:15:07 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 2271e147c6 SAFETY-43: delinquency measured against the ask, not against a flat 500 W
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m20s
`delivery.delinquent()` named a unit whose `short_by()` gap exceeded an
ABSOLUTE `min_w = Tuning.saturation_w = 500 W`. OPT-09's SoC-aware weights
shrink a low-headroom unit's share, and shrinking the share shrinks the gap, so
a unit standing at +125 W and delivering 0 W - 100 % delinquent - was never
named. Measured end to end on the real loop (test_packshare.py part 8b):

    load 1500 W, B wedged at 15 %, equal weights    named on 199/200 cycles
    load 1500 W, B wedged at 15 %, OPT-09 weights   named on   0/200 cycles

⚠️ The suppressed regime is the quiet one: at a load the healthy sibling covers,
the meter is satisfied, `unmet_w` is 0 and no action-log line fires, so this
alarm is the ONLY instrument that would have told the operator.

WHAT CHANGED, in one line:

    named if  short_by() > min_w  OR  short_by() > frac * share

⚠️ `min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED. It exists to stop normal saturation being reported
as delinquency, and lowering it trades a missed alarm for a false one on every
unit at once - SAFETY-41's four-attempt regime. This is a SECOND way to be
named, not a looser first one: all seven of test_delivery.py part 1's existing
fixtures answer identically under both rules, and the absolute arm's suppression
window is still exactly 1000 W / 6500 W, still asserted in part 8b.

THE FRACTION IS DERIVED, 0.85. admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py gained a
`--fractions` axis and grades the constant over the SAME 2640 no-fault runs that
produced `delivery_hold_s`'s 35.0 s floor. Worst continuous legitimate episode,
worst of three families, twenty fractions:

    frac   0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20  0.25  0.30  0.35  0.40  0.45  0.50
    worst  90.0  90.0  70.0  70.0  60.0  55.0  55.0  60.0  45.0  45.0  s
    frac   0.55  0.60  0.65  0.70  0.75  0.80 *0.85  0.90  0.95  0.99
    worst  40.0  40.0  45.0  45.0  45.0  45.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  40.0  s
    absolute arm alone: 35.0 s (SAFETY-42 §3.3, reproduced in the same runs)

⚠️ NO CLIFF ANYWHERE: 0.45-0.99 is flat within one control cycle, and it is not
monotone - §3.3's own mechanism (c). ⚠️ "Zero false namings" is NOT achievable
at any fraction and the record says so; what is zero is false ALARMS - 90.0 s
worst against a 185 s hold, so nothing comes within 95 s of notifying anybody.
N=1 control 0.0 s at every fraction in all 2640 one-inverter runs; flapping
0.0 s in all 840.

DRIVEN. Part 8b pinned the SUPPRESSED behaviour and said "if it ever goes red
because the alarm fired, read the card that made it fire". It now grades BOTH
rules on one run - `share_frac=None` is SAFETY-42's rule exactly:

    OPT-09 weights, absolute arm alone   named on   0/200
    OPT-09 weights, the shipped rule     named on 200/200

POSITIVE CONTROL. Same fixture, same weights, same 125 W share, one legitimate
fact changed: a pack at its own 10 % cut-out is named on 0/200 (account() still
gates it), and a unit delivering HALF its share is named on 0/200.

N=1 BYTE-IDENTICAL, asserted: `plan()` handed a `weights` mapping that raises on
any read still answers identically at a roster of one, and the same mapping
raises at a roster of two; `delinquent()` answers {} on all 84 single-unit
(share, measured, rule) combinations including 0 of 125 W.

MUTATION, run on fresh :ro trees: M12 (drop the relative arm), M13 (frac -> 1.0)
and M14 (frac -> 0.05) are all red on named checks. The constant cannot move in
either direction unseen.

⚠️ CFG-07 gets ONE CONTROL CYCLE WORSE and is deliberately not fixed here: the
worst legitimate episode goes 35.0 -> 40.0 s, so the schema's `int(30,900)`
false-tripping band widens from [30,35] to [30,40]. CFG-07 should be re-derived
against 40.0 s.

No option value, no schema bound and no default changed. 27/27 suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 03:14:16 +02:00
admin 6719bd882f Merge pull request 'TEST-21: delivery_hold_s's floor re-derived — 30.0 s did not reproduce, it is 35.0 s, and 185 still stands' (#67) from TEST-21 into release/1.0 2026-09-07 22:41:35 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9099ceb1af SAFETY-31: the grid is 42, not 90, and the wrong number was in the failure text
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m27s
Review reproduced every figure in both PRs except one, and rejected on it.

⚠️ "0 of 90 GAINS x SPLITS combinations produce opposing shares" - the SUBSTANCE
is right and review re-measured it, but the DENOMINATOR is invented. sitesim.py
declares GAINS with 7 entries and SPLITS with 6: the grid is 42. 90 is not even
divisible by 7, so no reading of "GAINS x SPLITS" reaches it. It is almost
certainly TEST-20`s RUN count (84 + 6), which is a different quantity that
happened to be nearby.

⚠️ AND THE WORST COPY OF IT WAS INSIDE THE `PRECONDITION FAILED` TEXT, so the
next engineer to see this scenario go red would have been handed an
unreproducible measurement as their diagnosis - the exact defect class this
campaign exists to correct, in the failure path where it does the most harm.

Corrected in all seven places. At the failure-text site the denominator is now
`len(GAINS) * len(SPLITS)`, computed rather than typed, so it cannot drift from
the grid again - the same fix test_translations.py already took.

Also N3: a missing blank line was going to render the S3 and M19 paragraphs as
one in DECISIONS.

Re-run after the change: `inject.py two_master_circulation` PASS in 35 s, norig,
no rig lock taken. Add-on suite 26 files, all pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-07 20:13:01 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 295a2aedb6 SAFETY-31 AC 4: the alarm's attribution was graded by nothing, and a mutation proved it
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m27s
`pos, neg = opposing(...)` -> `([], [])` in main.py's `check_circulating()`
(-102 B) deletes the "Right now X is discharging while Y charges" clause from
the operator notification, and SURVIVED ALL 26 FILES. The commit that shipped
this card claimed "18 mutations, all RED"; the ledger has no entry for the
attribution, and this is that entry.

It is not dead code. Ledger M18 - the whole `await check_circulating()` call
removed - is red on four checks, so the function runs. The three checks on the
notification asserted METER CANNOT SEE, CONTROL HAS BEEN STOPPED and `isolator`,
and never an inverter name. `circulation.py`'s own docstring calls that sentence
the first thing somebody woken by this alarm needs and "impossible to
reconstruct from the number alone".

test_watchdog.py section 6a closes it on a fixture that can tell three failures
apart:

  * the roster is ["garage", "shed", "cellar"] - operator names, none of them
    `UNIT_A`, for test_maintenance.py section 11's reason: on a fixture whose
    names are the module's own constants a check cannot tell the roster from
    the constant;
  * the site is run TWICE, MIRRORED, so the sentence is not symmetric and a
    pos/neg swap is a different red from a deletion;
  * a third pack rests at 5 W, so the floor that stops a pack in standby being
    named as a participant in a 6 kW loop is graded too.

Mutations, on a tree with no __pycache__ mounted :ro into the checks image:

  M20  pos, neg = opposing(...) -> ([], [])          -102 B  RED (2 checks)
  M21  pos and neg exchanged                          +0 B   RED (3 checks)
  M22  opposing(..., min_w=cfg.min_w/2.0) -> 0.0      -25 B  RED (3 checks)

26/26 files green with the block in place.

AND A DISCLOSURE, WHICH IS THE UNCOMFORTABLE HALF. DECISIONS section 3 records
that the 924-run campaign behind `circulation_w: 700` and `circulation_hold_s:
75` used a harness that is not committed in either repository. Two further
sweeps have now been run and no two of the three agree: peaks of 1700 W, 2750 W
and 1048 W, and worst-continuous figures above 700 W of 5.0 s, 15.0 s and 5.0 s.

That is NOT evidence of fabrication and is not reported as any. The committed
sweep measures why the spread is that wide: on one grid, changing only the
plant model and the write-stagger set, the worst legitimate peak is 1048 W, or
2250 W, or 0 W. The plant and the stagger are TERMS of the number. What the
spread does establish is that the claim cannot be adjudicated while the
instrument is missing.

The window argument survives and is now committed - all three sweeps trip zero
times, on 924 + 48 + 840 non-faulty runs. The threshold CURVE does not survive
as stated: `505.0 s at 100 W`, which is what the "knee at 400 W" argument rests
on, is 10.0 s on the committed grid. The curve still falls with the threshold,
so the knee is real in direction; its depth is established by nothing anybody
can run, and this commit says so rather than repeating it. The overclaiming
comment at test_watchdog.py's 1700 W fixture ("the worst single transient the
rig can produce") is replaced with what the fixture can support.

The committed, re-runnable half is admin/goodwe's `two_master_circulation`,
opened as a separate PR against that repository.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-07 19:08:33 +02:00
179 changed files with 40598 additions and 1113 deletions
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
# The admin/goodwe commit CI tests against. Bump: set to the full SHA of admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (README.md, "CI and the infra pin").
2d026dfa7c425f462c6969b2f7cdfddc17b17a81
+298 -16
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,35 @@
# of real coverage including a wall-clock cadence test, and not one machine ever
# ran them. Every merge here was a human reading a diff.
#
# ⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on
# release/1.0 requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Gitea leaves a
# required context it never receives PENDING forever, so the moment this workflow
# learns to sit a PR out, that PR becomes unmergeable. Condition a STEP if you
# ⚠️ NO EVENT FILTER OF ANY KIND - NO `paths:`, AND SINCE CI-9 NO `branches:`
# EITHER - AND THAT ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on release/1.0
# requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Condition a STEP if you
# must; never the workflow.
#
# ⚠️ CI-01 WROTE THE REASON DOWN WRONG, AND THE WRONG REASON WAS THE SAFE-
# SOUNDING ONE. It said an unreceived required context sits PENDING forever, so
# a sat-out pull request becomes unmergeable - annoying, but fail-safe. That is
# not what this Gitea does. MEASURED on Gitea 1.27.3, 2026-09-19, throwaway
# PR #94: when a workflow exists but its event filter does not match, Gitea does
# not stay silent. It POSTS the required context itself, with state `skipped`:
#
# GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/commits/<head sha>/statuses
# [{"status":"skipped","context":"checks / unit (pull_request)",
# "description":"Skipped","target_url":""}] <- no run, no job, no url
#
# GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/commits/<head sha>/status
# {"state":"success","total_count":1} <- the rollup LAUNDERS it
#
# and Gitea's merge gate accepts it. Same PR, same head sha, one status on it
# and that status a skip, POST .../pulls/94/merge answered 409 `head out of
# date` - the 409 being a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id` in the probe, i.e.
# the request had ALREADY CLEARED BRANCH PROTECTION. The control, a required
# context with no status at all, answered 405 `Not all required status checks
# successful`. So the true failure mode is the exact inverse of the one written
# here before: sitting a pull request out does not make it unmergeable, it makes
# it MERGEABLE WITHOUT EVER BEING TESTED, and the badge says success while it
# happens. Fail-open, not fail-closed. Do not reintroduce a filter here.
#
# ⚠️ THE RUNNER IS SHARED WITH THE OTHER REPO'S RIG. `goodwe-runner` on
# 192.168.2.147 carries the labels `self-hosted` and `goodwe-rig` and is
# registered `:host`, and it is the only runner there is - so this job wears the
@@ -23,9 +46,116 @@
# that step; a green from this workflow is a claim about content that can land.
name: checks
# ⚠️ CI-9: `pull_request:` TAKES NO `branches:` LIST, ON PURPOSE. It used to
# read `branches: [release/1.0, master]`, which meant a STACKED pull request -
# one whose base is another feature branch rather than a release branch - did
# not match, and so was skipped, laundered to `success`, and mergeable untested
# by the mechanism described at the top of this file.
#
# ⚠️ AND RETARGETING DID NOT REPAIR IT, WHICH IS WHAT MADE THIS P1. The skip is
# a COMMIT STATUS ON THE HEAD SHA, not a property of the pull request, so moving
# the base afterwards leaves it exactly where it was. Observed live on PR #93
# (2026-09-19): retargeted TEL-10 -> release/1.0, and the 10:05:00 `skipped`
# stayed attached to head a6af332 with the rollup still reading success. It was
# caught by a human who forced a real execution by reopening the pull request
# (run 799, 10:56). Reproduced deliberately on throwaway PR #94: retargeted onto
# a branch carrying a byte-identical copy of release/1.0's protection rule, and
# the single `skipped` status survived the retarget unchanged - no new run, no
# new status - and still cleared the gate.
#
# ⚠️ WHY NOT FIX THIS AT THE GATE INSTEAD, which would be the better place. It
# cannot be done. Gitea's branch protection cannot express "this context must be
# SUCCESS" as opposed to "this context must be PRESENT AND NOT FAILING". The
# whole of its status-check vocabulary is two fields - `enable_status_check`
# (bool) and `status_check_contexts` (a list of globs MATCHING CONTEXT NAMES) -
# confirmed against this server's own schema at /swagger.v1.json, definitions
# EditBranchProtectionOption and CreateBranchProtectionOption. There is no field
# for the required STATE anywhere in either. The success/skip comparison lives
# in Gitea's compiled code, so the only lever left is upstream of it: make sure
# the context is never a skip in the first place. Hence this block.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS COSTS, stated honestly, because it is a real trade. Every pull
# request now runs the full suite, including the intermediate steps of a stack
# that nobody intends to merge on its own. A run is ~8 minutes wall clock
# (run 799: 7m55s) on a runner that is `capacity: 1` and shared with the other
# repo's rig, so each extra run is ~8 minutes of slot that a rig campaign then
# queues behind.
#
# SCALE OF THE NEW WORK, re-derived from the API and stated with its denominator,
# because the first version of this paragraph had a made-up one. Counting the 93
# pull requests that predate this ticket (#1..#93; CI-9's own #94..#98 excluded,
# and note /pulls caps a page at 50, so this needs paging to see at all): 92 were
# opened against release/1.0 and would have run anyway, and exactly ONE was
# stacked - #2, TEL-01 -> SAFETY-04, closed unmerged, 2026-08-24. No pull request
# has ever targeted `master`, so half the old filter was dead from the start.
#
# ⚠️ THAT 92 IS AN UPPER BOUND, NOT A CENSUS, and the reason is this very bug.
# The API reports a pull request's CURRENT base, so one that was opened stacked
# and later retargeted is recorded against its final base and is invisible here.
# #93 is precisely that case - opened 2026-09-19T10:05:00 on TEL-10, retargeted,
# merged into release/1.0 at 11:05:26 the same morning, under three hours before
# CI-9 was opened - and it counts in the 92. So the true historical stacking rate
# is somewhere above 1/93, and unmeasurable from here.
#
# The bill is therefore small today and grows with however much stacking the team
# adopts. It is worth paying: the alternative is that the cheap case stays
# untested and indistinguishable from the tested one.
#
# ⚠️ THIS DOES NOT CHANGE GITEA'S ACCEPTANCE OF A `skipped` REQUIRED CONTEXT -
# that half is in its compiled code and is not reachable from this repository.
# The CONSEQUENCE, though, is very largely closeable from here, and is closed:
# after this edit there is nothing in this repository that produces a skip -
# there is exactly one workflow file, it now has no event filter of any kind,
# and the other candidate cause was MEASURED and is not one. The `guard the
# trigger` step below then keeps it that way mechanically rather than by asking
# the next editor to read this comment.
#
# ⚠️ READ THE BLIND SPOTS ON THAT STEP BEFORE TRUSTING THE SENTENCE ABOVE.
# "Mechanically" holds only for a reintroduced filter that still names the
# PR's own base. For blind spots 1 and 3 the defence IS this comment, because
# the guard lives inside the workflow that a filter makes Gitea skip. Blind
# spot 3 is the one that matters: a filter naming a branch THIS pull request
# does not target is itself skipped, lands green and untested, and then every
# subsequent pull request the filter DOES NOT NAME is skipped too. That is the
# gate off, silently.
#
# ⚠️ THAT DIRECTION IS THE WHOLE POINT AND IT IS EASY TO WRITE BACKWARDS. A
# pull request that MATCHES the filter still runs; it is the one the filter
# excludes that Gitea sits out, reports `skipped`, and the rollup launders
# into `success`. An earlier draft of this very clause said "matching it is
# skipped", which is the inverse of the measurement and contradicted the
# paragraph directly below.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE DANGEROUS ONE IS NOT `branches: [main]`, WHICH AT LEAST LOOKS
# WRONG. It is `branches: [release/1.0]`, which looks like tightening onto the
# protected branch and is what a careful person would write. Every day-to-day
# pull request still runs and still goes green, so nothing appears broken -
# and the only thing switched off is the `release/1.0` -> `master` release
# PR, i.e. the one whose content reaches an installed system. SEC-2 made that
# PR the mandated release path (docs/RELEASE.md), so this is now a live route
# rather than a hypothetical one.
#
# Closing it needs a SECOND permanently unfiltered workflow posting its own
# context, with that context added to the `status_check_contexts` of BOTH
# `release/1.0` AND `master` - both carry the rule since SEC-2, and adding it
# to one alone leaves the hole open on the other. A forge change, with the
# owner.
#
# THE MEASUREMENT, because the obvious guess is wrong and was nearly written
# here as fact. A skip-ci keyword in a commit message (`[skip ci]`, `[ci skip]`,
# `[no ci]`, `[skip actions]`, `[actions skip]`) does NOT behave like a filter
# miss. On throwaway PR #94, head b36effb, commit subject ending `[skip ci]`:
#
# .../commits/b36effb/statuses -> [] <- NO status, not a skip
# .../commits/b36effb/status -> {"state":"pending"} <- so the rollup is pending
# POST .../pulls/94/merge -> 405 Not all required status checks successful
#
# i.e. skip-ci is FAIL-CLOSED - it withholds the context entirely, which is the
# pending-forever behaviour CI-01's header wrongly attributed to a filter miss.
# It blocks the merge rather than laundering it, so it needs no fix and no
# app.ini change. Only the filter miss ever posted a `skipped`.
on:
pull_request:
branches: [release/1.0, master]
workflow_dispatch:
# ⚠️ NO `concurrency:` BLOCK, AND ITS ABSENCE IS AS LOAD-BEARING AS THE MISSING
@@ -224,6 +354,164 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
# ⚠️ THE GUARD ON THE TRIGGER. THIS STEP EXISTS BECAUSE PROSE ALREADY
# FAILED IN THIS FILE, ONCE, FOR TWENTY DAYS.
#
# `git show 9c1a23328a` is CI-01's first commit. It shipped the header
# "⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING" and the line
# `branches: [release/1.0, master]` IN THE SAME COMMIT, EIGHTEEN LINES
# APART. The comment forbade one kind of event filter while the code
# directly above the job carried another, and nobody caught it through 84
# merges until the gate let a stacked pull request through. So the whole of
# CI-9's fix rests on an invariant - "checks.yml has no event filter" -
# that has already been silently violated in this exact file by the person
# who wrote the warning against violating it. A louder comment is not a
# remedy for that. A red step is.
#
# WHY THIS CAN WORK AT ALL, given CI-9 rejected the card's option 3 (a step
# that detects its own workflow having been skipped) as impossible. That
# option is impossible because a skipped workflow runs no steps, so there
# is nothing alive to notice. This is the different, tractable case: it
# fires on the pull request that REINTRODUCES a filter, and it does so
# whenever the filter being reintroduced STILL NAMES THAT PULL REQUEST'S
# OWN BASE - the ordinary case, because a filter put back by hand names
# the release branch people are actually targeting. The edit then has to
# get past this step before it can start causing skips. It is a ratchet,
# not a skip detector.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS THE HEAD'S WORKFLOW THAT DECIDES WHETHER ANYTHING RUNS, NOT
# THE BASE'S. An earlier draft of this comment claimed the reintroducing
# pull request "is still graded by the unfiltered workflow which is on the
# base today". That was wrong, it contradicted the checkout step's own note
# a few lines below, and the error was not cosmetic: it made this step
# sound like an unconditional ratchet, which is exactly the false comfort
# CI-9 exists to stamp out. MEASURED on PR #101 - head carrying a filter
# that excludes the base, base carrying the unfiltered workflow - and the
# result was no run at all, the context posted `skipped`, the rollup
# reading `success`, and the gate CLEARED (409). Gitea takes the workflow
# file from refs/pull/<n>/head, so a head that filters itself out is simply
# never graded, and nothing on the base can reach out and stop it. That is
# what blind spot 3 below is made of.
#
# WHAT IT INSPECTS is the MERGED tree in $WS - the content that would
# actually land on the base - not the branch tip and not the copy of this
# file that Gitea used to decide whether to run. Those are three different
# trees here (see the long note on the checkout step) and only the merged
# one is the thing being authorised.
#
# ⚠️ THREE ACKNOWLEDGED BLIND SPOTS. NOT ONE OF THEM IS CLOSEABLE FROM
# INSIDE THIS FILE, and the reason is the same in all three: each is a case
# where THIS WORKFLOW IS ITSELF THE THING THAT GETS SKIPPED, and a guard
# that lives inside a skipped workflow does not run. Closing them needs a
# SECOND, permanently unfiltered workflow whose own context is added to
# release/1.0's `status_check_contexts`, so that something survives to
# report when this file is sat out. That is a forge change and the
# repository owner's decision; it is being put to them separately and is
# deliberately NOT held as a blocker on CI-9.
#
# 1. A reintroduced `paths:` filter crafted to exclude the reintroducing
# pull request's OWN diff would skip that pull request, so this step
# would not run to object to it.
#
# 2. An edit that lands on a feature branch through a stacked pull
# request is graded by the HEAD's workflow, so a filter already
# present in the head hides the edit from this step - until that
# branch is proposed for release/1.0, where (unless it is case 3) the
# base matches the reintroduced filter and this step runs and bites.
# Caught at the release boundary, which is the boundary that matters.
#
# 3. ⚠️ THE WORST OF THE THREE, AND WORSE THAN BOTH OF THE OTHERS PUT
# TOGETHER: a reintroduced `branches:` filter that simply DOES NOT
# NAME THE BASE escapes this step entirely, because the pull request
# carrying it is itself skipped. It takes no craft and no malice to
# write - `branches: [main]` copied out of a GitHub template, or a
# tidy-up to `[master]`, a branch that NO pull request in this
# repository's history has ever targeted - and it arrives as a
# skipped, laundered, untested merge into release/1.0.
#
# What makes it categorically worse is what happens the moment after.
# Once that file is ON release/1.0, every subsequent pull request is
# graded against it and every one of them is skipped too. This is not
# the stacked case leaking through a crack; it is the gate off
# completely, for everything, silently, with every badge green. The
# only thing standing between the repository and that state today is
# a human reading this file - which is precisely the kind of defence
# this step exists because it has already failed once (9c1a23328a).
#
# It is deliberately a FAILURE and not a warning: a warning would leave
# the required context green, which is the precise defect CI-9 is about.
- name: guard the trigger - refuse a checks.yml that has regained an event filter
run: |
set -eu
f="$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/workflows/checks.yml"
test -f "$f" || { echo "checks.yml is missing from the merged tree."; exit 1; }
# Walk the top-level `on:` block of the MERGED file. Full-line comments
# at column 0 are skipped outright - this file's own prose quotes
# `paths:` and `branches:` many times and must not trip its own guard -
# and an inline `#` is trimmed from any line that is kept.
bad=$(awk '
function scan(t) {
sub(/#.*/, "", t)
if (t ~ /(^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])(branches|branches-ignore|paths|paths-ignore|tags|tags-ignore|types)[[:space:]]*:/)
return 1
return 0
}
/^[[:space:]]*#/ { next }
/^("on"|'"'"'on'"'"'|on)[[:space:]]*:/ {
inon = 1
rest = $0; sub(/^[^:]*:/, "", rest)
if (scan(rest)) print NR ": " $0
next
}
inon == 1 {
if ($0 ~ /^[[:space:]]*$/) next
if ($0 ~ /^[[:space:]]/) { if (scan($0)) print NR ": " $0; next }
inon = 0
}
' "$f")
if [ -n "$bad" ]; then
echo "REFUSED: checks.yml has regained an event filter in its \`on:\` block."
echo "$bad"
echo
echo " A filter means some pull request stops matching this workflow. Gitea does"
echo " not stay silent about a workflow it sits out - it posts the required context"
echo " \`checks / unit (pull_request)\` itself with state \`skipped\`, the combined"
echo " status rolls that up as \`success\`, and the merge gate ACCEPTS it. That is"
echo " CI-9: a pull request merged on a workflow that never ran a step. It was"
echo " reproduced by merging PR #96 for real through a protected branch."
echo
echo " Branch protection cannot save you here - it can require that a context is"
echo " PRESENT, never that it is SUCCESS - so the filter is the whole defence."
echo " If you genuinely need to narrow what runs, condition a STEP, never the"
echo " workflow. See the \`on:\` block's comments for the measurements."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: the \`on:\` block of the merged checks.yml carries no event filter."
# CI-12: the infra repo at the ONE pinned commit in .gitea/infra-pin (read
# from the merged tree), as the sibling test_freeze.py looks for. Any
# failure here fails the job; the tests step below refuses the stub.
- name: check out admin/goodwe at the pin in .gitea/infra-pin
env:
URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/admin/goodwe.git
# Read access to admin/goodwe only; this job's own token cannot see it.
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.INFRA_READ_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -eu
PIN=$(grep -v '^#' "$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/infra-pin" | tr -d '[:space:]')
echo "$PIN" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{40}$' || { echo "FAIL: .gitea/infra-pin holds '$PIN', not a full 40-hex SHA."; exit 1; }
test -n "$TOKEN" || { echo "FAIL: secret INFRA_READ_TOKEN is not available to this run (a fork PR?)."; exit 1; }
rm -rf "$WS/goodwe" && mkdir -p "$WS/goodwe" && cd "$WS/goodwe"
git init -q .
# The token goes in a header via env: not in argv, and not in .git/config,
# which is mounted into the tests' container and outlives a failed job.
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
git fetch -q "$URL" "$PIN" || { echo "FAIL: could not fetch admin/goodwe at $PIN."; exit 1; }
git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -qf FETCH_HEAD
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$PIN"
test -f sim/hwsim.py || { echo "FAIL: admin/goodwe@$PIN has no sim/hwsim.py."; exit 1; }
echo "infra: admin/goodwe @ $(git log --oneline -1)"
- name: build the test image (shipped deps, from apk - see .gitea/ci/Dockerfile)
run: |
set -eu
@@ -244,16 +532,9 @@ jobs:
# shorter timeout - a 60 s limit was tried during CI-01 and reported
# exactly the false hang the docstring predicts.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS RUN DOES NOT COVER, stated because a pass here would
# otherwise over-claim. test_freeze.py's third section wants the infra
# repo's `sim/hwsim.py` to drive a real HTTP meter through the real
# transport. admin/goodwe is PRIVATE (checked via the API) and this
# workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN is minted for THIS repository only, so hwsim is
# absent here and `find_hwsim()` returns None. The rest of the file runs
# and passes. It does so SILENTLY - the file prints nothing to say the
# hwsim section was skipped - so "test_freeze.py: PASS" below is a weaker
# claim than it looks. That belongs to whoever owns test_freeze.py next;
# naming it here is the least this gate can do about it.
# test_freeze.py part 3 runs against the real `sim/hwsim.py` from the
# checkout above; GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1 makes it fail rather than use its
# stub (CI-12). Lines a test prints with a `CI: ` prefix are echoed on PASS.
# ⚠️ PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 IS BELT AND BRACES, NOT A FIX FOR A LIVE
# HOLE. TEST-15 measured this runner's actual exposure and found none: the
# checkout below is bind mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter physically
@@ -269,7 +550,7 @@ jobs:
- name: the add-on's own tests
run: |
set -eu
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu -c '
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -e GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1 -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu -c '
cd /w/goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller
set -- test_*.py
if [ "$1" = "test_*.py" ]; then
@@ -282,6 +563,7 @@ jobs:
start=$(date +%s)
if python3 "$f" > /tmp/out 2>&1; then
echo "PASS $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
grep "^CI: " /tmp/out || true
else
echo "FAIL $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
tail -40 /tmp/out
+42
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
# CI-12: goes red when admin/goodwe release/1.0 has moved past .gitea/infra-pin.
# It runs on add-on activity only; admin/goodwe's own `addon-pin` workflow
# covers a move of release/1.0 there. Deliberately NOT a required check: it
# reports; `checks / unit` stays the only gate. How to bump: README.md,
# "CI and the infra pin".
name: infra-pin
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [release/1.0]
jobs:
fresh:
runs-on: [self-hosted, goodwe-rig]
timeout-minutes: 30 # seconds of work; the rest is queueing for the shared slot
steps:
- name: compare .gitea/infra-pin with admin/goodwe release/1.0
env:
SELF: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}.git
INFRA: ${{ github.server_url }}/admin/goodwe.git
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
INFRA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.INFRA_READ_TOKEN }} # admin/goodwe is private
run: |
set -eu
D=$(mktemp -d) && cd "$D"
git init -q . && git remote add origin "$(echo "$SELF" | sed "s#://#://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@#")"
# The pin of the commit this event is about (the PR head, or the push).
git fetch -q --depth 1 origin "$GITHUB_SHA"
PIN=$(git show FETCH_HEAD:.gitea/infra-pin | grep -v '^#' | tr -d '[:space:]')
test -n "$INFRA_TOKEN" || { echo "FAIL: secret INFRA_READ_TOKEN is not available to this run (a fork PR?)."; exit 1; }
# Header via env, as in checks.yml: the token stays out of argv.
HEAD=$(GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $INFRA_TOKEN" \
git ls-remote "$INFRA" refs/heads/release/1.0 | cut -f1)
cd / && rm -rf "$D"
test -n "$HEAD" || { echo "FAIL: could not read admin/goodwe release/1.0."; exit 1; }
if [ "$PIN" != "$HEAD" ]; then
echo "STALE: .gitea/infra-pin is $PIN but admin/goodwe release/1.0 is $HEAD."
echo " Test against $HEAD and bump the pin (README.md, \"CI and the infra pin\")."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: .gitea/infra-pin $PIN is admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD."
+6 -1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ The guide technicians carry is the PDF:
**`docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf`** — 10 pages, A4, print it double-sided.
⚠️ **Outdated: it is v0.1.0.** Its `slew_w` row is corrected in `build_guide.py`
and `field-guide.html`, but the PDF has not been rebuilt (see below). Where the
guide disagrees with `goodwe_controller/DOCS.md`, DOCS.md wins.
It covers, in the order the work is done: pre-visit checks, hardware, firmware,
add-on install and configuration, how to read the Web UI, the six commissioning
gates, the e-stop (and the statement a site without one must sign), proving a
@@ -18,7 +22,8 @@ copy cannot drift from the PDF someone is holding in a cellar.
python3 docs/build_guide.py # regenerates field-guide.html and the PDF
```
Requires Chrome or Chromium (used headless for print-to-PDF). Screenshots live
Requires Chrome or Chromium (used headless for print-to-PDF); `CHROME` in the
script is a Windows path, so edit it on any other machine. Screenshots live
in `docs/img/` and are base64-embedded, so `field-guide.html` is standalone.
⚠️ **Every section must stay under the A4 printable height** (1039 px at 96 dpi
+14 -3
View File
@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ goodwe_controller/ the add-on
returns, run against its own release image
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml ESPHome config for the T-CAN485
estop/rs485_log.py optional RS485 e-stop / bus witness
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4)
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4; outdated)
docs/build_guide.py its single source - rebuilds the HTML and PDF
FIELD-GUIDE.md how to edit and rebuild the guide
docs/RELEASE.md how a change reaches the battery - `master` is
protected, releases go via PR from `release/1.0`
```
**Picking this up after a break? Read `HANDOVER.md` first** — current state,
@@ -48,6 +50,9 @@ https://gittea.kammenstraatha.duckdns.org/admin/goodwe-addon
then install **GoodWe RS485 Controller**.
Then turn on **Watchdog** on the add-on's Info tab — see
[Before you start](goodwe_controller/DOCS.md#before-you-start).
⚠️ **The repository must be PUBLIC for this to work.** Home Assistant clones it
anonymously; against a private repo the store shows nothing and gives no useful
error. If it must stay private, install locally instead: copy
@@ -77,8 +82,8 @@ machine itself dying:
2. **Wind-down before firmware updates** — 0 W written before the update starts.
3. **RS485 e-stop (optional)** — writes 0 W after 30 s of total bus silence.
Sites sold without the e-stop must have the acknowledgement in `FIELD-GUIDE.md`
§10 signed.
Sites sold without the e-stop must have the client acknowledgement in the field
guide (Step 7b) signed.
## Development
@@ -100,6 +105,12 @@ has the mechanism, the measurement, and what the flags do not do. They are not u
each assertion corresponds to a rule whose absence produced an observed failure
on real hardware, and the comments in `control.py` say which.
### CI and the infra pin
CI (`.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`) runs every `test_*.py`, with `admin/goodwe` checked out next to this repo at the commit in `.gitea/infra-pin`, so `test_freeze.py` grades against the real `sim/hwsim.py`. If that checkout fails, the job fails. The local stub is used only in local runs, and it prints `STUB USED` when it is.
The pin tracks `admin/goodwe` **release/1.0**, not master. Two non-required checks go red when release/1.0 has moved past the pin: `infra-pin / fresh` here, on any add-on PR or push to release/1.0, and `addon-pin / fresh` in `admin/goodwe`, on every push to its release/1.0. Nothing re-runs `addon-pin` after a bump, so it stays red on that admin/goodwe commit; `infra-pin / fresh` green on the bump is the all-clear.
**Bump the pin** whenever either is red. Set `.gitea/infra-pin` to the new release/1.0 SHA (`git ls-remote <gitea>/admin/goodwe.git refs/heads/release/1.0`) in a PR, and let `checks / unit` grade the tests against it. CI reads `admin/goodwe` with the Actions secret `INFRA_READ_TOKEN`.
## Compatibility
**Check the serial number, not the model name.** Characters 6-8 of the serial are
+116
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
# Releasing — how a change reaches the battery
`master` is the **default branch**, and the default branch is what the Home
Assistant Supervisor clones when it installs or updates this add-on. Whatever
sits on `master` is what runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Treat a push to `master`
as a deployment, because that is what it is.
---
## 1. `master` is protected — releases go through a pull request
Until 2026-09-23 `master` had **no protection of any kind**. Every gate this
repo built (CI-01, CI-9) sat on `release/1.0`, the branch that does *not* ship.
On 2026-09-22 version 0.10.1 went straight onto `master` — no pull request, no
CI run, no reviewer — and it succeeded (commit `0f14c2a`, the only commit on
`master` that carries no `(#NN)` merge suffix). SEC-2 closed that.
**The release path is now:**
1. Merge the work into `release/1.0` as usual, via a pull request that goes
green. Bump `version:` in `goodwe_controller/config.yaml` on that branch —
the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, so without a bump nothing
is offered and nothing changes.
2. Open a pull request **`release/1.0` → `master`**. Do not push to `master`;
it will be refused by the pre-receive hook:
```
remote: error: Not allowed to push to protected branch master
! [remote rejected] ... (pre-receive hook declined)
```
3. Wait for `checks / unit (pull_request)` to go **green** on that pull request.
The workflow in `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` carries **no `branches:`
filter**, so a `master` base matches and a real run happens — verified on
throwaway PR #107 (base `master`), which queued a genuine run.
⚠️ Green means green. A `skipped` status is laundered into a `success`
rollup by this Gitea and the merge gate accepts it — see the long note at
the top of `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`. Never add an event filter there.
4. Merge the pull request. `required_approvals` is **0**, so a green check is
the whole gate; there is no second pair of eyes unless someone asks for one.
5. **Reload the store.** Merging to `master` does not, by itself, offer the
update. The Supervisor only sees the new version after:
```bash
ssh root@192.168.2.158 "ha store reload && ha addons update local_goodwe_controller"
```
Until `ha store reload` runs, the add-on page still shows the old version
and the release looks like it did nothing.
Note that `release/1.0` is normally an *ancestor* of `master` between releases,
so a `release/1.0 → master` pull request is empty until new commits land on
`release/1.0`. That is expected; it means there is nothing to release yet.
---
## 2. Branch protection — before and after SEC-2
Forge is Gitea at `192.168.2.147:3000`, repo `admin/goodwe-addon`. Read it back
with `GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/branch_protections`.
**Before (2026-09-23):**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | **no rule at all** | — | — | — |
| `release/1.0` | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
**After:**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
| `release/1.0` | yes (unchanged) | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
Both rules are otherwise identical: `enable_push: false`,
`enable_force_push: false`, `block_admin_merge_override: true`, no whitelists,
no file patterns. `required_approvals` stays at **0** on purpose — raising it
would block the review agent from merging, and nobody asked for it.
The default branch was **not** changed. Changing it would change what the
Supervisor clones, which is a different decision from this one.
### How the gate was proven to actually bite
A protection rule on this forge can *appear* satisfied while having checked
nothing, so the rule was tested rather than trusted. The discriminator is a
merge `POST` carrying a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id`: Gitea evaluates
branch protection *before* it checks the head, so
* `409 head out of date` → the request **cleared** protection;
* `405 Not all required status checks successful` → protection **refused** it.
Read the *message*, not just the code: `405` is also returned as
`Please try again later` for a pull request with **no commits**, which has
nothing to do with protection. An empty pull request on an unprotected base
gives that same `405` (verified, throwaway PR #110), so an empty
`release/1.0 → master` reports it too.
Validated against a control on an unprotected base (PR #106), which answered
`409` while its check was still pending — i.e. protection was no obstacle
there. On `master` (PR #107) the same probe answered `405` while pending, and
`409` once the check was genuinely green. A direct `git push` to `master` was
rejected by the pre-receive hook with `master`'s SHA unmoved.
---
## 3. Rolling back
There is no force-push escape hatch: `enable_force_push` is `false` on both
branches. To undo a bad release, land a revert on `release/1.0`, bump the
version again, and take it through §1. The `/addons/` rollback for the
reference install is in `HANDOVER.md`.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="page" id="p1">
<div class="hdr">
<div><h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0</div></div>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0, <b>outdated</b>: where it disagrees with DOCS.md, DOCS.md wins</div></div>
<small>Installer copy</small>
</div>
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table>
<tr><th style="width:30mm">Setting</th><th style="width:16mm">Value</th><th>Reason</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>gain</code></td><td>0.6</td><td>Inverter needs 3–6 s to settle (1.4 s dead time, 94 % by 3.3 s) against a ~5 s cycle. <b>At the limit — do not raise</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>1000</td><td>Most of a correction in the first cycle without running far ahead of the hardware</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>0</td><td>0 follows the rail (<code>max_w</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;9). A faster fixed value is <b>refused at startup</b> (SAFETY-39) — see DOCS.md</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>deadband_w</code></td><td>15</td><td>Measured residual: mean 15.4 W, max 27 W. At 10 W the command never rests</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>saturation_w</code> / <code>cycles</code></td><td>500 / 3</td><td>Divergence = inverter at a limit → magnitude may fall, never rise. <b>The 3-cycle term is essential</b>: tested instantly it fires on every large correction</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>step_w</code></td><td>10</td><td>Register is 1 W but response lands on a ~17.6 W ladder. Finer is meaningless</td></tr>
+2 -2
View File
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="page" id="p1">
<div class="hdr">
<div><h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0</div></div>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0, <b>outdated</b>: where it disagrees with DOCS.md, DOCS.md wins</div></div>
<small>Installer copy</small>
</div>
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table>
<tr><th style="width:30mm">Setting</th><th style="width:16mm">Value</th><th>Reason</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>gain</code></td><td>0.6</td><td>Inverter needs 3–6 s to settle (1.4 s dead time, 94 % by 3.3 s) against a ~5 s cycle. <b>At the limit — do not raise</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>1000</td><td>Most of a correction in the first cycle without running far ahead of the hardware</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>0</td><td>0 follows the rail (<code>max_w</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;9). A faster fixed value is <b>refused at startup</b> (SAFETY-39) — see DOCS.md</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>deadband_w</code></td><td>15</td><td>Measured residual: mean 15.4 W, max 27 W. At 10 W the command never rests</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>saturation_w</code> / <code>cycles</code></td><td>500 / 3</td><td>Divergence = inverter at a limit → magnitude may fall, never rise. <b>The 3-cycle term is essential</b>: tested instantly it fires on every large correction</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>step_w</code></td><td>10</td><td>Register is 1 W but response lands on a ~17.6 W ladder. Finer is meaningless</td></tr>
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
# FCST-04 — what "yesterday" is, and what the fill is allowed to reach
Four decisions, recorded because each had a defensible alternative that a later
reader would otherwise re-open from scratch.
---
## 1. The fill runs on a `series` read only. A dead feed still goes to §11.4.
`fill_from_yesterday()` accepts a `no_data` read and will happily build a
100 %-carried series from yesterday alone. `resolve_tariff()` does not let it:
a feed that published nothing still falls to `_degrade()` and §11.4's own row —
*"No price data → fall back to the static profile, mark the plan provisional,
no arbitrage."*
**Why not prefer yesterday's real prices to a coarse day/night profile?**
Because it buys nothing the optimiser can use, and it silently replaces a
fallback the operator configured.
Measured, not assumed — and stated at the reach it actually has:
- **This one reaches control.** A fully-carried series is 100 % provisional, so
`TariffPlan.arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and refuses on
§8.3's firm-pair rung. That is the verdict the optimiser reads: `arbitrage.py`
calls `plan.arbitrage(...)` on `fresh_tariff_plan()`, and it is the only path
by which a provider plan moves energy. The §11.4 static fallback refuses on
the same rung, for the same reason.
- **This one does not, and saying so is the point.** `TariffPlan.cheap_now()`
also returns False on a fully-carried series, because `firm_points()` is
empty — but it has **no production caller on the provider plan**.
`self.cheap` comes from `static_status()`, which builds its *own* static plan
and calls `cheap_now()` on that. So it is a property of the type, checked in
`test_static_tariff.py`, and it is not evidence about the shipped control
path. The conclusion below holds on the first bullet alone.
The two paths therefore differ only in which numbers the status page shows.
So the choice is between two identical control behaviours, and the tie-breaker
is that `static_profile` is a documented option an operator fills in **for this
case**. Overriding it for a cosmetic difference is a behaviour change nobody
asked for.
⚠️ **The consequence, stated so it is not discovered later as a bug:**
`fill_from_yesterday()`'s `no_data` branch is not reached from production.
It stays checked in `test_price_forecast.py`. Turning it on is a product
decision — it would want a rule about how old a carried profile may be before it
stops being offered at all — and not a wiring one.
---
## 2. "Yesterday" is a date, not the newest record.
`newest()` is the obvious accessor and it is the one that decays. An add-on down
from Friday to Monday would answer Friday's prices to a fill whose only
vocabulary is `provisional: true` — a flag that says "this is a guess", never
"this guess is three days old". Nothing downstream can tell the difference and
nothing reports it.
So `yesterday(stamp)` computes the Brussels date before `stamp`'s Brussels date
and looks up **that** record. Anything else is `no_data` with a reason naming
both the date wanted and the dates held.
The cost is real and accepted: after an outage of more than a day, the first
morning back has no fill. That is the honest state — there is no yesterday —
and the horizon is short for one morning rather than wrong for several.
---
## 3. What is recorded is the provider's read, and the mechanism is ordering.
Feeding the filled series back into the store is how this rots: day 2 carries
day 1's guesses, day 3 carries day 2's carry of them, and after a week of a dead
feed the "yesterday" being carried is a fossil of the last real publication.
Every point still carries `provisional=True`, so the **flag never lies** — what
decays is the number, behind a flag that is telling the truth.
⚠️ **No value-level check can catch that**, and claiming one would be worse than
claiming none. A carried point and a published-provisional point (a real-time
product's current interval, §9.2) are the same three fields carrying the same
flag. The
difference is provenance, and provenance is not in the value.
The defence is therefore an **ordering**, not a validation:
- `carry()` is the only public entry point. It records its argument, then
returns the fill.
- The filled series exists only as that return value. The object never sees it
again.
- `_remember()` is private and called from exactly one place.
- `test_price_history.py` parses every shipped module under `app/`, `tools/`,
`scenarios/` and `estop/` and fails if any of them **uses the name**
`_remember` — an attribute, a bare name, a `def`, or the string constant a
`getattr` would need. By name rather than by substring, so a comment that
merely mentions the rule does not fail it and a call in `tools/` cannot pass
unseen.
- and it pins the order two ways: the **line numbers** of the two calls in
`carry()`, and — the one that matters — the **behaviour**. A feed carrying
yesterday alongside today, into an empty store, must fill the whole horizon;
reversed, the lookup finds nothing and the plan is only the hours the feed
published. Driven, so a reversal is red.
⚠️ **The first version of that ordering check graded nothing, and this file
said it did.** It compared positions in `ast.walk`, which is breadth-first:
`self._remember(...)` is a statement and `self.yesterday(...)` is an *argument*
of `fill_from_yesterday(...)`, one level deeper, so `_remember` came out first
whichever statement was written first. Measured — shipped and reversed both
scored the same. A decorative check that a document cites as a guarantee is
worse than no check, which is why the correction is recorded here rather than
quietly made.
That ordering has a second benefit worth keeping: a feed that returns yesterday
alongside today refreshes yesterday's record from live data *before* it is
consumed as the profile.
---
## What this ticket does not claim
It does not make a trade possible that yesterday's prices justify. Carried hours
are dropped from the trade set by §8.3, and that is not a limitation to be fixed
later — it is the rule.
The one change that **does** move energy came from the windowing, not the
carrying: the filled series covers `[since, until)`, so hours that have already
elapsed are no longer in the spread. A cheap night that has gone used to be the
series' cheapest hour, and a cycle cannot buy in an hour that is past — so the
trade was silently never taken. `test_price_history.py` section 2 grades that by
finding the cheapest firm hour with and without the fill and showing it moves.
⚠️ **And section 1's identity check now grades identity.** It used to compare
`eur_per_kwh` between `_before` and `_after`, which come from two *separate*
`resolve_tariff()` calls — each parsing the feed body into its own objects, so
`is` could never have held between them however the fill were written. FCST-03's
whole anti-copy argument is `filled.points[i] is fetched.points[j]`, and floats
cannot grade it. The value comparison is kept and now says what it is (the fill
moved the window, it did not touch a price); identity is graded on a read the
file constructs and still holds a reference to.
---
## 4. A sub-hourly feed passes through whole; the fill only decides which hours are missing.
⚠️ **This section originally said `eneco_eddy` is "the Belgian imbalance
product". That was false and [[TARIFF-07]] withdrew the plugin: Eneco's dynamic
product is "Zon & Wind Dynamisch" and is indexed to Belpex/EPEX **day-ahead**,
not to imbalance, and `api.eneco.be/eddy/prices` never existed. The mechanism
below is unaffected, because the real quarter-hourly feed is the one still
shipped.**
Belgian **day-ahead** settles per **quarter** — the 15-minute MTU took effect
on 2025-10-01, so `generic_dayahead` reads 96 points a day rather than 24 — and
`price.py`'s `_validate_raw()` accepts any strictly-increasing spacing, so a
published hour may legitimately hold four points.
FCST-04's first caller keyed the published set as `{_utc_hour(p.start): p for p
in r.points}`. It reads perfectly ordinary and it keeps the **last** point of
each hour. Measured on a 96-point quarter-hourly feed — all firm, fully
published, nothing to carry: the plan reached the optimiser as **15 points**,
the arbitrage spread fell from **0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh**, and the cheapest
"hour" became a `:45` point whose `at()` window runs into the next hour. That is
not the windowing effect above; it is a feed losing 84 % of its own prints, and
no `provisional` flag would ever have reported it.
**The alternative was rejected:** refusing sub-hourly feeds at `_validate_raw()`
would have made the count correct by breaking the one supported product that
legitimately publishes per quarter.
**What was done instead** keeps FCST-03's existing contract rather than weakening
it: *every* published point inside the window passes through **by identity**,
and a carried point is added only for a whole hour with **no** published
coverage at all. A carried hour is still a single hourly point whatever the
feed's own spacing is, because yesterday's profile is only known per wall-clock
hour — and carried hours are provisional, so they are out of the trade set
anyway.
⚠️ **`_audit()` got stricter, not looser, and that was the condition on doing
this at all.** The old post-condition refused any repeated `_utc_hour` — a count
that cannot express four points in one hour. It is replaced by two rules that
**subsume** it:
- a **published** point must *be* one of that hour's published points, by
identity, and may be emitted only once;
- a **carried** point may stand only in an hour that does not appear in the
published set at all, must be flagged `True`, and may not repeat.
So a duplicated carried hour — the DST mispricing the count existed to catch —
still raises; so does the same published point emitted twice; and a carried
point sharing an hour with a real print now raises too, which the count never
looked at. Each of those three is driven by its own mutation in
`test_price_forecast.py`.
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
# FCST-06 — "cannot persist" is one question, and it is asked about the outcome
Two decisions. The first is the one the ticket put up for judgement; the second
is the one that decides what a store answers *after* it has failed to write.
---
## 1. One derived predicate, not two places testing two symptoms — yes
`price_history.py`'s module docstring states, unconditionally:
> ⚠️ AND THAT RULE IS CARRIED OUT IN `_remember()`, NOT ONLY IN `_save()`. …
> A store that cannot persist now records nothing, and both of its answers say
> the same thing.
It was enforced against `not self.ok`, and `ok` is **about the directory**: it
says `/data` was there when the store opened. A read-only remount and a full
volume both leave it `True`. So the second way to be a store that cannot
persist — `ok=True`, the directory present, `_save()` failing — was outside the
one condition the rule named, and in that state `words` printed two full days
beside the write error while `yesterday()` answered 24 real points, from memory,
until a restart dropped them without a word.
**The ticket's question was whether "cannot persist" should be one derived
predicate rather than two places each testing a different symptom. It should,
and the reason is not tidiness — it is that the enumeration cannot be
completed.** FCST-04's M4 enforced the rule on the symptom that was in front of
it. FCST-05's HIGH was the same shape — an `except` clause naming the one
content-failure member somebody had met (`json.JSONDecodeError`) instead of the
`ValueError` family — and its fix was to name the family. This is the third instance in
one module, and it is the last place in this file where the rule can be spelt
twice. A fourth cause — an `OSError` subclass, a filesystem that accepts the
`mkstemp` and refuses the `os.replace`, a container whose volume is unmounted
mid-refresh — needs no fourth branch now, because none of them is asked about.
### Where the one question can be asked, which is the whole design
**"Can this store persist?" cannot be answered before the attempt.** A
directory that exists and was writable a moment ago is not a write that
completed; there is no pre-check that is not itself a guess, and adding one
(`os.access`, a probe write) would be a *third* symptom test — precisely what
the ticket rules out. So the predicate is an **outcome**:
_save() -> bool # True only if the file now holds what memory holds
Both ways of not persisting are the same answer from the same call: no durable
volume returns `False` without touching the disk, an `OSError` out of the write
returns `False` after recording why. `_remember()` reads that one answer and
keeps only what it says was kept. **The `not self.ok` test in `_remember()` is
gone** — not moved, gone — because there is nothing left for a second test to
add, and a check in `test_price_history.py` 5d asserts its absence from the
source.
⚠️ **That last check is deliberately a source check, and habit 4 is why it is
allowed to be.** The claim "there are not two places testing two symptoms" is a
claim about the *shape of the code*, not about a behaviour — the behaviour is
identical whether the rule is enforced once or twice. Every other check in 5d
is driven.
### What was NOT done, and why
- **Not a `can_persist()` helper.** It would have to answer before the attempt,
which is the thing that cannot be done honestly, and it would be a second
place to keep in step with the first.
- **Not a probe write at `_open()`.** It would make `ok` mean something new, it
would write to `/data` on every start, and a volume that is writable at 08:00
and full at 14:00 would still defeat it. A predicate that can go stale is a
symptom test wearing a predicate's name.
- **Not making a failed write fatal.** §6, and this module's own opening: a
broken cache must not be a broken controller. An add-on that will not start
because `/data` filled up is a worse defect than the one being fixed. The
store degrades; it does not raise. `_save()` reports and returns.
---
## 2. The MERGE is undone, not the store
When `_save()` answers no, `_remember()` restores the state the read started
from — **not** an empty one.
The alternative considered was to clear `self._days` outright, on the argument
that a store which cannot write is a store that should stop answering. It is
wrong, and measurably so: the state being restored is the last one that **is on
disk**, so answering it is not a promise the store cannot keep. A site whose
volume fills at 14:00 goes on answering the yesterday it wrote at 13:30 —
through the restart, because that record is in the file. What it stops doing is
*adding* to it.
Clearing would throw away a good yesterday that survives a restart in order to
punish a write that failed, and it would make the morning fill worse on exactly
the day the operator is already dealing with a full disk.
That gives the file the invariant its rule was always describing, stated once
in the class docstring:
> `self._days` **never holds a point the file does not.**
⚠️ Not *"mirrors the file"* — `_usable_days()` drops records the file still
holds, and that asymmetry is deliberate. The only direction that can **invent a
yesterday** is the one named.
⚠️ **And the snapshot is `copy.deepcopy`, not `dict(self._days)`.** A one-level
copy shares the day *records*, and the merge rebinds `points` on the ones it
touches — so the "restored" store would answer the merge that never reached the
file. Measured: with a shallow copy, a store holding 12 persisted points
answered **24** after a failed merge. It would also be correct only for as long
as nobody makes the merge mutate a `points` list or a row in place, which is the
same "correct for the conditions someone thought of" this ticket is about. The
store holds at most `KEEP_DAYS + 2` records and writes 48 times a day; a copy
that is right by construction is worth more than the allocations.
---
## What this does not change
- **No shipped path reaches the defect.** `/data` is the Supervisor's durable
volume and this module is its only writer, so on a real install `_save()`
succeeds and nothing above is on the hot path. The fix is that a guarantee the
module states about itself now holds in the condition it did not.
- **The failure was already visible and still is** — `_LOG.error("could not
persist price history: %s")` and `last_error`, reported by both `words` and
`yesterday()`'s reason. What changed is that it is now *acted on*.
- **Nothing about the prices.** The series served is the feed's own, every
carried point is still flagged provisional, and a broken cache is still a
short horizon rather than a §11.4 degradation.
@@ -161,17 +161,18 @@ its floor is `account()`'s explained case, so SAFETY-42 stays silent - and after
this card that ask does not arrive in the first place, which removes the benign
arm from the detector's input rather than teaching it a new discriminator.
⚠️ **BUT THE WEIGHT DOES MOVE, AND IT NARROWS SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW. THIS
IS A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2 AND IT IS NOT FIXED HERE.** An earlier draft of
⚠️ **BUT THE WEIGHT DOES MOVE, AND IT NARROWED SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW.
THAT WAS A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2, IT WAS NOT FIXED HERE, AND SAFETY-43
CLOSED IT - see the block at the end of this section.** An earlier draft of
this section said "no envelope closes and no weight moves - OPT-09 cannot see it
at all". The second clause was **false**, and it was load-bearing for the claim
that the two cards do not overlap. A weight is a function of the pack's ENERGY
HEADROOM, not of what the pack delivers, so a wedged unit's weight moves whenever
its headroom differs from its sibling's - which is the ordinary case this card
exists to exploit. And `delivery.delinquent()` (`app/delivery.py:484`)
names a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeds `min_w =
Tuning.saturation_w` - the comparison is `app/delivery.py:531`, and it is
**500 W in absolute watts**. Shrinking a unit's share shrinks its gap. Shrink the
exists to exploit. And `delivery.delinquent()`
named a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeded `min_w =
Tuning.saturation_w`, and that was **500 W in absolute watts** with nothing
else beside it. Shrinking a unit's share shrinks its gap. Shrink the
share far enough and the gap drops below 500 W while the unit is still delivering
nothing, and the alarm stops firing.
@@ -200,20 +201,47 @@ a 9600 W site; above it - once the healthy pack is at its own rating and
`_fill()`'s last-resort pass hands the wedged unit a big share again - the alarm
returns. ⚠️ BOTH BOUNDS ARE ARITHMETIC ABOUT `_fill()`'s PROPORTIONAL REGIME AND NEITHER IS A REACHABLE STEADY STATE. Swept on this fixture, the healthy pack's own 5000 W rating binds FIRST: suppressed 0/200 up to a 3000 W load, 4/200 at 4000 W, 41/200 at 4900 W (site target 5320 W, the largest reached with the wedged unit still under 500 W), then 195/200 at 5000 W once `_fill()` pins A at its cap and hands B 3000 W. So the alarm returns BELOW the 6500 W formula bound, not above it. The equal-weights 1000 W bound is unreachable for the same reason - the equal arm names the wedged unit 199/200 at every load swept, 1000 W included.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b grades all of it and **pins the current,
unflattering behaviour**, so that the day it changes a named check moves. The
closure - `delinquent()` measured against the ask rather than a flat 500 W - is
card **SAFETY-43**.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b graded all of it and **pinned the unflattering
behaviour**, so that the day it changed a named check would move. It has moved.
So the seam, stated accurately: **OPT-09 stops the ask AND narrows SAFETY-42's
detection window for a low-headroom unit.** The two cards do not merely meet from
opposite sides; this one takes something away from the other one. Closing the gap
means making `delinquent()` relative to the ask rather than absolute, which is
SAFETY-42's code and a design change - it is filed as its own card, deliberately
not done here, and this paragraph is its input. Until then this is a **disclosed
residual**, in the same voice as SAFETY-13's "2 of 272" and SAFETY-42's own "the
discriminator does not exist": at two inverters, a wedged unit with materially
less energy headroom than its sibling can go unreported at ordinary house loads.
### ⚠️ CLOSED BY SAFETY-43 - THIS IS NO LONGER A DISCLOSED RESIDUAL
This section used to end *"until then this is a disclosed residual [...] at two
inverters, a wedged unit with materially less energy headroom than its sibling
can go unreported at ordinary house loads"*. That sentence is **retired, not
softened**, and what replaces it is a measurement rather than an intention.
`delivery.delinquent()` is now relative to the ask **as well as** absolute:
named if short_by() > min_w OR short_by() > frac * share
with `frac = delivery.DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION`. A unit delivering 0 of 125 W is
100 % delinquent and is named; a unit delivering 0 of 1500 W was already named
and still is. On the **same fixture, under the same weights**, part 8b now
grades both rules in one run - `share_frac=None` is SAFETY-42's absolute arm,
exactly:
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights absolute arm alone named on 0/200 cycles
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
⚠️ **`min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED, AND THAT IS THE HALF THAT MATTERS HERE.** The
absolute arm's suppression window is still exactly the arithmetic above - 1000 W
at equal weights, 6500 W at these - and part 8b still asserts both numbers.
Lowering `saturation_w` would have traded a missed alarm for a false one on
every unit at once, which is SAFETY-41's four-attempt regime. SAFETY-43 added a
**second** way to be named and left the first where it was.
⚠️ **AND WHAT OPT-09 STILL DOES NOT DO IS UNCHANGED.** This card stops the site
ASKING a pack whose own SoC says it cannot deliver; it does not re-allocate a
wedged unit's watts, and SAFETY-43 did not make it. The alarm got louder; the
loop did not move. The derivation of `frac` - swept over the same 2640 no-fault
runs that produced `delivery_hold_s`'s floor - is in
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-43-delinquency-relative-to-the-ask.md`.
So the seam, stated accurately **as of SAFETY-43**: OPT-09 stops the ask, and it
still narrows the ABSOLUTE arm's window for a low-headroom unit exactly as
described above - but it no longer narrows the DETECTOR, because the detector no
longer reads only that arm.
⚠️ **And OPT-09 supplies the mechanism SAFETY-42 said was missing, without
connecting it.** That module's rejection of re-allocation rests on *"the only
@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
# SAFETY-10 — shadow mode, and why "default-on" is not `true`
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-10`.
⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47, and three of the claims below were false when this
was merged.** §5's "the strategies are unaffected" exemption, §4's peak-guard
row and §6's evidence table are corrected in place and each correction is
marked. The amendments are marked rather than rewritten silently, because what
this card believed is part of why the defect shipped. See
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-47-what-a-shadow-run-can-show.md`.
**Card:** SAFETY-10 — *"Shadow mode (default-on, log-only decisions)"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No deployment, no `ha addons update`, no
contact with 192.168.2.158 or 192.168.2.221. Everything below was measured in
the CI image and on TEST-23 stage 3's closed-loop rig.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **"Default-on" is delivered as `auto`, not as `true`, and the difference is
an install that is regulating a real battery today.** The Supervisor
composes an add-on's options as *its defaults, overlaid with the stored user
options*, so a new key with a new default reaches **every existing install**
on the next update. A boolean `shadow_mode: true` would silently stop the
reference site. §1.
2. **Shadow mode WRITES. It writes 0 W, on the ordinary heartbeat, through the
ordinary single writer.** "Commands nothing" implemented as "stops writing"
would leave the inverter latched on whatever was standing — it has no meter
timeout — and would put the ESP32 into a tripped stale-input watchdog for
the whole run. §2.
3. **The sign watchdogs are inert, and that was the decision that had to be got
right.** Fed the shadow decision they would trip within `sign_disagree_s`
and **latch a trip that survives into live operation and a restart**. §4.
4. **The loop leg's shadow decision is one slew step, not a trajectory, and
that is a real limitation of this feature.** §5.
5. ⚠️ **SAFETY-47: and neither is anything else that depends on the plant
answering back. A shadow run cannot surface a closed-loop defect at all**,
by the same construction that makes it safe — the battery is held at 0 W, so
every measured input describes a plant that did not respond. Of the three
defects §"WHAT DEFECT THIS PREVENTS" was written for, exactly one —
TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour — is visible from a shadow run. §5, §6.
---
## 1. The default
### The literal reading, and what it costs
`config.yaml`'s `options:` block **is** the default. There is exactly one of it,
and HA's Supervisor resolves an add-on's effective options as
```
{**config.yaml options, **the stored user options}
```
A key that has never been stored therefore takes the file's value — on a fresh
install and on an install that has been running for months, identically. There
is **no mechanism in the add-on options system** by which one key can default
differently for the two. So the card's title, taken at face value, is:
> the next `ha addons update` stops the battery at the reference site, and the
> only symptom is a battery that has stopped doing anything.
That is strictly worse than every defect shadow mode exists to catch. It is
refused.
### What was shipped instead
`shadow_mode` is a three-valued `list(auto|on|off)` defaulting to `"auto"`:
| value | resolves to |
|---|---|
| `off` | live |
| `on` | shadow, always |
| `auto` | shadow **while control is stopped**; live once it is started |
`auto` reads `Controller.auto` — the persisted start/stop state, which a fresh
install takes from `auto_start` and which the *Start / stop control* button
moves. No new persisted state, no migration, no guess:
* a **fresh** install ships `auto_start: false`, has no stored `auto` key, and
therefore comes up **in shadow mode**. It observes a day of decisions before
it is ever allowed to command anything. That is the card's intent, delivered
where it is safe;
* an install that is **controlling** is started, so `auto` resolves to live and
**not one watt changes**;
* an install that is **stopped** keeps its actuator at 0 W exactly as before —
the same number, from the same writer, on the same heartbeat. What changes is
what the status page and the action log **say**, and that the decision path
now runs and is recorded.
⚠️ **Under `auto`, pressing Start leaves shadow mode.** That is the point of
`auto`: the button means "control the battery". An operator who wants the
decisions recorded *while the loop runs* — the configuration this card exists
to make possible — sets `on` explicitly, and cannot reach it by accident.
⚠️ **An unrecognised value resolves to SHADOW, and is REFUSED at startup.**
`shadow.mode()` fails toward inaction; `validate.py` rule 11 refuses the value
by name so the reinterpretation is never silent. A typo is not a decision, and
an install silently left in shadow mode commands nothing indefinitely while its
status page calmly explains that this is intentional.
---
## 2. "Commands nothing" is a number, not a silence
The inverter holds its last command **forever** — `HANDOVER.md` §6 says so, and
`firmware/goodwe-master.yaml`'s header records what it cost when a controller
stopped refreshing: *"Illusmart went silent mid-command and the inverter held
+5000 W for 113 s"*. `firmware/goodwe-master.yaml` states the contract that follows — *"HA
must now REWRITE the setpoint every ~10 s even when the value has not
changed"* — because without a refresh, **"stale" and "steady" are the same
thing on the wire**.
So shadow mode holds the actuator at `shadow.WIRE_W` = **0.0 W**, refreshed on
the ordinary heartbeat. Two consequences were weighed and are recorded:
* **it is not silence.** A shadow mode that stopped writing would leave the
standing command up until the ESP32's 30 s watchdog noticed — and at a site
with no such board, forever;
* **it does not use an alarm as a mode.** Letting that watchdog trip for the
duration of a shadow run teaches the operator that `wd_tripped` is normal,
which is exactly the training that makes it useless when the add-on has
actually died.
### It is not a second writer
SAFETY-28's rule is one actuator, one writer. Shadow mode files **no claim**,
owns **no transport**, and calls nothing in `hass.py`. It is a **substitution**
inside `Controller._write_unit()` — the single choke point every write in this
add-on already reaches, including the heartbeat, the stop button, `shutdown()`
and `maint_abort()` — in exactly the form of the three substitutions above it
(non-finite → 0 W, unauthorised → 0 W, clamped → the rating).
It is the **last** of them. Below SAFETY-28's gate and below SAFETY-03's clamp,
so both still grade the number the decision path actually produced, and a
shadow run can report *"it would have hit the rating here"*.
---
## 3. What the run records
| surface | what it carries |
|---|---|
| status banner | `SHADOW MODE - the battery is NOT being controlled...`, **first in the cascade**, amber — red, with the latch named, if one is standing |
| status row `Shadow mode` | which rung decided, the watts it **would have commanded on this cycle**, where the inverter actually is, and `Resolution.explain()` — plus, when a measured billed quarter sized those watts, SAFETY-47's caveat saying so (`shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER`) |
| status row `Commanded` | `0 W` — the truth, which the row above reconciles with the `Why` row below it |
| action log | one line when shadow mode comes on; one line per **change of decision** (winner, rounded watts, or SAFETY-47's caveat state), carrying the arbiter's own sentence and the same caveat the row carries — `shadow.log_line()` is the one sentence both read |
| MQTT | `status: shadow`, its own value, below `failsafe` |
The action log is **edge**-logged, not level-logged: the log holds 40 rows, and
a line per cycle would flush the context of the run's own findings inside four
minutes at the 15 s cycle floor.
---
## 4. The failsafes, one by one
| failsafe | in shadow mode | why |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-02/30 sign watchdogs | **INERT** | They grade `Inverter.standing_w()` — what this controller has standing on the wire — and shadow mode holds that at 0 W, so they cannot arm. ⚠️ Fed the shadow decision instead they would disagree with a meter that never saw it and **latch a trip that survives into live operation and a restart**: shadow mode would manufacture the failsafe it exists to help debug. ⚠️ **Two rungs hold it there** — `last_write` (the wire gate) and `inv.target` (the re-seed) — which is MUTATION.md's masking shape, so the mutation that reproduces the hazard defeats both as a pair (M6). Driven singly, dropping the re-seed does not reproduce it at all — measured |
| SAFETY-03 clamp | **OBSERVES** | Runs on the decision, sets `clamp_last`, logs every engagement. Changes no command |
| SAFETY-28 write gate | **OBSERVES** | Same placement, same reason: the question is who chose the number |
| SAFETY-18 meter freeze | **OBSERVES**, unchanged | It takes no action live either; both halves of its conjunction are as true in shadow |
| SAFETY-07/24/25 peak guard | **OBSERVES, AND SEES ONLY THE HOUSE** | Level-triggered, unlatched, files its claim as usual, so the recorded decision is the real one *for this meter*. ⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47.** This row used to end "SAFETY-45's limit cycle is visible from a shadow run, which is the point". It is not: every term of `wanted = batt_w + excess` is measured, and in shadow mode the battery contributes nothing to either. Measured on the rig, same hour, same unsized code — **410 of 720 cycles engaged live, 0 of 720 in shadow** |
| SAFETY-31 circulation | **OBSERVES AND MAY LATCH** | Its evidence is *measured* power. Packs pushing against each other while all are told 0 W is a real fault |
| SAFETY-42 delivery | **OBSERVES AND MAY LATCH** | Same, against a share that is 0 W |
| operator stop | **SUPPRESSED AS A CLAIM, ENFORCED AT THE WIRE** | The one deliberate change. Its `P_SAFETY` 0 W claim out-ranks everything, so leaving it in makes the recorded decision `"stopped"` on every cycle and the run answers the wrong question. The actuator ends at the same number either way, and the wire substitution is **strictly stronger**: a claim can be out-ranked, and it cannot |
| inputs missing, non-finite, allocator refusal, arbiter contradiction | **UNCHANGED** | All resolve to 0 W, which is what the wire gets anyway |
⚠️ **A latch that is already up stays up.** Nothing here clears one. The shadow
banner **names** any standing latch and goes red for it, because a latch that is
up while the controller is inert is up the moment it stops being inert.
⚠️ **Maintenance is not in that table because shadow mode does not touch it.**
The state machines are ticked on every cycle whether control is started or not,
so a stopped install already runs them against a battery that does not move.
Shadow mode inherits that, unchanged and unimproved. Recorded here rather than
quietly fixed under another card's name.
---
## 5. The limitation, stated rather than discovered later
`Controller._shadow_settle()` re-seeds the carried command (`self.target` and
each `inv.target`) to `WIRE_W` at the **end** of every shadow cycle — after
every in-cycle guard has read the decision. Three machines read that value as a
statement about the **hardware**: the loop's `prev_w` and integrator,
`standing_w()`, and SAFETY-42's share comparison. Re-seeded, they track reality,
and **the exit is safe by construction** — the carried command already equals
the standing one, so the first live cycle slews from 0 W like any other.
⚠️ **The cost is real.** The loop's `prev_w` is therefore 0 W on every shadow
cycle, so the loop leg's recorded decision is **one slew step from the standing
command** and stays there. A shadow run answers *"what would this controller
command NOW, from where the plant really is"* — a true statement about the
present — and **not** *"what trajectory would it have followed"*. The trajectory
is a closed-loop property, it did not happen, and reporting it would be a
simulation of a plant that does not exist; three cycles in, such a number
describes nothing.
⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47 — THE PARAGRAPH THAT STOOD HERE WAS THE DEFECT.**
It read:
> The strategies are unaffected: arbitrage, the peak guard and maintenance all
> file `SET` claims at a fixed power from level-triggered inputs. That is why
> the three defects this card was written for — SAFETY-45's 28 onsets an hour,
> TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour, SAFETY-46's ceiling churn — are all visible
> from a shadow run, and the loop's ramp is not.
It was true until **SAFETY-45 merged, one commit before this card**. That
change makes the buy leg `min(asked, headroom)` with
```
headroom = (900 / remaining) x (ceiling - projected)
```
and `projected` reads the **open quarter's accumulator** — the meter — which is
a function of what the battery did earlier in that same quarter. The strategy
is closed-loop, and the loop's one-slew-step limitation above is not a special
case of anything: **it is the general case**, and the limitation is the whole
feature's, not the loop leg's.
**The correct statement, and it is now graded rather than asserted:**
> A shadow run cannot surface a **closed-loop** defect — one whose stimulus is
> the plant's response to the controller — because the battery is held at 0 W
> and there is no response to be the stimulus. **Which** hour a strategy picks
> and **why** are unaffected, because the clock and the price series are not
> functions of the battery. **How hard** it trades is not.
Of the three defects this card was written for:
| | visible from a shadow run? | measured |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-45's limit cycle | **no** | 28 charge onsets live, **1** in shadow; grid −455.5 … +3200.0 W live, **flat at the 1200 W house** in shadow; guard engaged 410/720 live, **0/720** in shadow |
| SAFETY-46's SoC churn | **no** | the SoC moves **0.000000000 pp** in a shadow run. No SoC limit can be *reached* in one |
| TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour | **yes**, and it is the one | which hour, at what price, clearing what spread: identical live and shadow on **720 of 720** charging cycles, at a binding cap |
Graded in `test_arbitrage.py` part **3d** — the same closed loop part 3c uses,
run once live and once in shadow — and the loop leg's own limitation stays
named in `test_watchdog.py` part 10 as `RECORDED LIMITATION`.
---
## 6. How "nothing reaches the inverter" is graded
**Not on a flag.** A check that asserted `Controller.shadow` would pass on a
build in which the flag is set and the substitution is deleted — which is
exactly mutation **M1**.
`test_clamp.py` part 8 drives the **shipped** `Controller.cycle()` and the
shipped heartbeat against a recording Home Assistant stub, and asserts on what
reached `set_number()`:
* **the precondition first** — the same stimulus with `shadow_mode: off` puts
30 non-zero writes on the wire, the largest 5000 W. MUTATION.md habit 4: a
check whose data cannot reach the failure it names is decoration;
* then `set(writes) == {0.0}`, **and** that there were 26 of them — a check
that only said "no non-zero write" would pass on the silent build too;
* entry and exit are measured on `inv.last_write` — what the inverter is
latched on, updated only on an **accepted** write — either side of the
boundary, against the same run that never entered shadow mode.
The closed-loop half is `/home/homelab/s10-mut/shadowloop.py` on TEST-23 stage
3's rig: the same hour, twice, against `plantsim.Plant` through the firmware's
own frame encoder.
⚠️ **SUPERSEDED BY SAFETY-47 — THE TABLE THAT STOOD HERE COULD NEVER HAVE GONE
RED, FOR TWO INDEPENDENT REASONS.** It read `arb_power_w` −2000 W *"identical"*,
`arb_reason` *"identical, verbatim"*, arbiter winner *"identical"*, and
concluded *"the decision happened, at the same instant, for the same reason, at
the same signed power — and the battery did not move."* The battery half is
true and is unchanged. The **decision** half was decoration:
1. **the fixture is `peak_cap_w: 15000` against a 350 W house**, so the
capacity guard never engages and SAFETY-45's sizing is in the run and inert.
The harness's own comment says so — *"at this scenario's `peak_cap_w: 15000`
it is not binding anyway"* — which is MUTATION.md habit 4 written down
beside the check it disables;
2. **every identity row reads the FIRST charging sample.** At `elapsed = 0`
the projection *is* the held level, so the two runs agree to the float there
**even at a cap that does bind**. Measured: closing reason (1) alone leaves
that comparison passing.
Both had to be closed. Re-taken below at **`peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 /
`max_w` 2000**, one hour at a 5 s cycle, **across the whole run** — harness
`/home/homelab/s47-mut/shadowloop47.py`, same rig, same three transcribed
lines.
| | live | shadow |
|---|---|---|
| grid | 1224.1 … 1506.0 W — **held up at the ceiling** | **1200.0 W flat = the house, exactly** |
| SoC | 50.000019 → **51.856789 %** | 50.000000 → **50.000000 %** |
| `ARBITRAGE_CHARGE` cycles | 720 / 720 | **720 / 720** |
| first charging cycle, `arb_power_w` | −300.0000 W | **identical — and this is why the old table passed** |
| `arb_power_w`, **whole run** | −307.799 … −299.930 W | **−2000.000 … −300.000 W** |
| …cycles where the two differ | — | **716 of 720** |
| `arb_reason`, whole run | the strategy's own sentence | **differs on 719 of 720** |
| measured charging headroom | 299.93 … 307.80 W | **300.0 … 54 000.0 W** |
| final recorded command | **−302.4 W** | **−2000.0 W — 6.61× the live figure** |
| price / spread / which hour | | **identical on 720 of 720** |
| arbiter winner | `arbitrage` | **identical** |
**What the re-taken table says.** The decision still *happens*, at the same
instant, on the same hour, at the same price, for the same *kind* of reason,
and the battery still does not move — those were the card's real claims and
they hold. What does **not** hold is that the decision is the *same decision*:
its **size** is a function of a meter the battery never moved, and at this cap
the recorded figure is 6.61× what a live controller commands. 54 000 W of
"headroom" under a 1500 W ceiling is `900/remaining` multiplying a gap the
battery never closed.
⚠️ **And the SoC row is the second half of it.** 0.000000000 pp of movement is
not a curiosity: it is the proof that **no SoC-limit behaviour is reachable
from a shadow run at all**, which §5 used to promise.
SAFETY-47 puts the caveat on both surfaces that carry the number and narrows
the three documents' claims; `test_arbitrage.py` part 3d is the CI-side grader
so this class cannot recur.
⚠️ **Three lines of each harness are a TRANSCRIPTION and are marked as one.**
`priceloop.Rig` has no `_write_unit()`, no clamp and no failsafe machine
(divergence 2 of its README), so the substitution's **placement** is
transcribed there. The shipped placement is graded by `test_clamp.py` part 8,
which drives the real `Controller`. ⚠️ **And the rig's transcribed cycle
predates SAFETY-45**: `arbitrage.decide()` gained a required
`charge_headroom_w` after `478ba93`, and the harness supplies it from the
**shipped** `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` reading the **shipped** peak
decision rather than from a constant, so SAFETY-45 stays in the run.
---
## 7. The mutation battery — 22 mutations, no survivors
Harness: `/home/homelab/s10-mut/run.py`, backups beside it. Each run restores
from backup, purges `__pycache__` **on the host**, and grades through the CI
image with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter cannot write a cache
into the tree under test (TEST-15). The full table is in the branch report;
one per new behaviour, including **M1** (the substitution deleted — a write
escapes), **M2** (it returns instead of substituting — the inverter is left
latched), **M3** (it moves above SAFETY-28 and SAFETY-03 — the observers go
blind), **M8** (`auto` resolves to shadow unconditionally — the literal
default-on that stops the live install), **M12** (the stop claim is filed in
shadow — every recorded decision reads `stopped`), **M21** (the substitution
and the re-seed together) and **M22** (the re-seed moved one line earlier —
SAFETY-18 grades a 0 W no decision produced and goes permanently blind).
⚠️ **Two findings from driving it, both of the kind MUTATION.md says to expect.**
* **M2 first came back a SURVIVOR and was not one.** The "stop writing
altogether" build left `inv.last_write` as `None`, the check did `float()` on
it, and the section died with a `TypeError` — grading none of the checks
after it and reporting **zero reds**, which reads exactly like a survivor.
That is FCST-06's shape. The fixture now hands `None` back and names it as
its own check; M2 is red on three.
* **M6 had to become a PAIR, and only the battery said so.** `standing_w()`
prefers `last_write` — the 0.0 W the wire gate accepted — and falls back to
`inv.target`, which the re-seed also holds at 0.0. Either rung alone keeps
the detector inert, so dropping the re-seed **singly** came back red on the
limitation check and on **nothing about the latch**: the hazard it names was
not reproduced. TEST-16's rule with a new name on it.
* **M7/M8/M9/M19 had to MOVE SUITES.** They defeat `shadow.engaged()`, and a
defeated default stops `test_clamp.py` part 3's wired run reaching the wire
at all — aborting the file with an `IndexError` before part 8 is graded. The
red count there was a lower bound naming the saturation freeze. The mode
table now lives in `test_validate.py`, which drives no Controller.
* **`shadow_would_w = float(self.target)` is an EQUIVALENT mutation and was
measured as one.** `_shadow_settle()` runs before the re-seed, so at that
line `self.target` **is** `resolution.target_w`. It is recorded as equivalent
rather than reported as a survivor, and the non-equivalent form of the same
defect — the record becoming the **wire** — is driven instead.
### The table
Each row: the mutation, the file, the byte delta, the suite it was graded in,
and how many **named** checks went red. `⚠️` marks a row whose run did not
reach the end of its file, so its count is a **lower bound** (MUTATION.md).
| # | mutation | file | Δ | suite | reds |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | **a write escapes** — the substitution deleted | `main.py` | −6 B | clamp | 5 |
| M2 | **silence instead of 0 W** — it returns rather than substituting | `main.py` | −15 B | clamp | 3 |
| M3 | **the observers go blind** — it moves above SAFETY-28 and SAFETY-03 | `main.py` | +58 B | clamp | 1 |
| M4 | the site re-seed dropped — the exit resumes from a fiction | `main.py` | −36 B | clamp | 3 |
| M5 | the per-unit re-seed dropped | `main.py` | −22 B | clamp | 1 |
| M6 | **PAIRED**: `standing_w()` reads the target **and** the re-seed dropped — the sign latch that survives into live operation | `inverter.py` + `main.py` | −170 B | watchdog | 3 |
| M7 | `auto` inverted — shadow while started, live while stopped | `shadow.py` | +2 B | validate | 4 |
| M8 | **default-on for everyone** — `auto` always shadow; the literal reading that stops the live install | `shadow.py` | −15 B | validate | 2 |
| M9 | an unreadable value resolves to LIVE instead of shadow | `shadow.py` | +1 B | validate | 1 |
| M10 | `validate.py` stops refusing an unknown value | `shadow.py` | −9 B | validate | 9 |
| M11 | the loop leg gated on `auto` alone again — the decision path stops running | `main.py` | −17 B | clamp | 1 |
| M12 | the stop claim filed in shadow — every decision reads `stopped` | `main.py` | −20 B | clamp | 1 |
| M13 | the banner goes green while nothing is commanded | `shadow.py` | −2 B | clamp | 1 |
| M14 | the banner loses the standing latch | `shadow.py` | −2 B | clamp | 1 |
| M15 | the row renders the standing command instead of the decision | `shadow.py` | −8 B | clamp | 1 |
| M16 ⚠️ | the row disappears when live | `main.py` | +43 B | clamp | 1 |
| M17 | the record becomes the wire | `main.py` | −6 B | clamp | 7 |
| M18 | level-logged — the 40-row action log floods | `main.py` | −23 B | clamp | 1 |
| M19 | the two rungs render identically (masking) | `shadow.py` | +22 B | validate | 1 |
| M20 | the shipped default moves to `off` in `config.yaml` alone | `config.yaml` | −1 B | defaults_pin | 1 |
| M21 | **PAIRED**: the substitution **and** the re-seed deleted together | `main.py` | −103 B | clamp | 10 |
| M22 | the re-seed moved one line earlier — SAFETY-18 grades a 0 W no decision produced and goes permanently blind | `main.py` | +40 B | clamp | 1 |
**Survivors: none.** ⚠️ **M17's `+0 B`-adjacent sibling** —
`shadow_would_w = float(self.target)` — is recorded in §7 as **equivalent**
rather than counted here.
@@ -149,8 +149,70 @@ each swept across the **whole range `config.yaml` accepts** for the two settings
that decide how fast the site can turn around: `gain` `float(0.05,1.0)` and
`slew_w` `int(50,5000)`.
### ⚠️ THE HARNESS BEHIND EVERY FIGURE ABOVE IS NOT COMMITTED, AND UNTIL 2026-09-07 THAT MADE THEM UNCHECKABLE
**Read this before quoting any number in this section.** The paragraph below
said the campaign harness "is not committed here" and treated that as a
packaging detail. It is not: a figure produced by a script that exists in
nobody's tree cannot be re-run, cannot be reviewed, and cannot be defended when
it is contradicted. It has now been contradicted twice.
| sweep | worst peak | worst continuous | trips |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| the 924-run campaign below — **harness uncommitted** | 1700 W | 505.0 s at 100 W; 5.0 s above 700 W | 0 / 924 |
| independent reviewer sweep, 2026-09-07, 48 honest reversals | **2750 W** | **15.0 s above 700 W** | 0 / 48 |
| `admin/goodwe` `two_master_circulation`, 840 runs — **committed** | 1048 W | 10.0 s at 100 W; 5.0 s above 700 W | **0 / 840** |
**This is not proof that anything was fabricated, and it should not be reported
as one.** The three swept different grids. What the third one adds is a
measurement of *why* the spread is that wide — on one grid, changing nothing but
the model:
| plant / stagger | worst legitimate peak |
|---|---:|
| modelled plant (lag 10 s, ramp 800 W/s), staggers up to a whole cycle | 1048 W |
| `INSTANT` (lag 0, unbounded ramp), staggers up to a whole cycle | 2250 W |
| `INSTANT`, staggers strictly under a whole cycle | **0 W** |
A factor of 2.1×, and a factor of infinity, between three defensible
descriptions of the same rig. **The plant model and the write-stagger set are
terms of the number**, and a worst case quoted without them is not a
measurement. That is enough to explain the whole spread above without anybody
having invented anything — and it is exactly what cannot be established when the
instrument is missing.
**What survives, and what does not.**
* **The window argument survives, and is now committed.** The claim that
decides `circulation_hold_s: 75` is *"the worst continuous legitimate episode
above 700 W is about one control cycle"*. All three sweeps agree on the shape
of that (5.0 s, 15.0 s, 5.0 s — one to three cycles against a fifteen-cycle
window), and **all three trip zero times**. `two_master_circulation` re-runs
it on every pull request in `admin/goodwe`.
* **The threshold curve does NOT survive as stated.** `505.0 s at 100 W` is the
number the "knee at 400 W" argument for `circulation_w: 700` rests on, and the
committed sweep measures **10.0 s** at 100 W on its grid — 50× smaller. The
curve still *falls* with the threshold (126 of 840 runs cross 100 W against 1
that crosses 700 W), so the knee is real in direction; its depth is not
established by anything anybody can run. **Do not quote 505.0 s.**
* **Nothing about the guard is compromised.** 0 trips in 924 + 48 + 840
non-faulty runs, from three independent grids.
**What would settle it:** the original harness, committed. Until then the
committed sweep is the only figure in this section anybody can check, and it is
labelled as its own grid's rather than as a reproduction.
### Reproducing it
⚠️ **THE COMMITTED VERSION IS `admin/goodwe`'s `sim/inject.py
two_master_circulation`** (`sim/sitesim.py:circulation_findings`, runnable on its
own as `python3 sim/sitesim.py --circulation`, `norig`, ~36 s, graded by
`checks.yml` on every pull request there). It produces the fault with
`plantsim.Inverter.wedge()` — a unit answering its bus and no longer steering its
power stage, which is HW-01 — and sweeps the legitimate family with the
serialised write path staggered up to a whole control cycle. The paragraph below
describes the ORIGINAL campaign, which is the one that is not committed.
The rig lives in `admin/goodwe` (`sim/`) and was used **read-only**; the harness
is not committed here because it imports that repo's `plantsim`/`frame_check`,
which are not present in this one or in CI. What it does is small enough to
@@ -206,7 +268,11 @@ margin above the knee is what absorbs that without re-opening this card.
**Revisit when SPIKE-04 lands, not before.**
The **schema floor is the knee itself**, 400 W, so a legally configured install
cannot land in the 445–505 s regime. What the threshold costs: a circulating
cannot land in the 445–505 s regime — ⚠️ and those two figures are from the
uncommitted campaign; the committed sweep measures 10.0 s at 100 W on its own
grid. See the disclosure at the head of this section. The floor is still the
right shape (fewer runs cross a higher threshold, measured 126/840 at 100 W
against 1/840 at 700 W); its DEPTH is not established by anything re-runnable. What the threshold costs: a circulating
loop smaller than 350 W per unit is not reported, which is deliberate — at that
scale the round-trip loss is a few watts.
@@ -289,6 +355,32 @@ SAFETY-25 — so no stale `.pyc` could exist to be read. Byte deltas recorded;
| M17 | `circulation.py` | default `700` → `500` | **+0 B** | **RED** — the CFG-03 pin and the not-a-round-number check |
| M18 | `main.py` | `await self.check_circulating()` removed | −39 B | **RED** — all four notification checks |
| M19 | `main.py` | publish `round(x or 0.0)` instead of `None` | −68 B | **survivor on the first battery — GAP CLOSED**, then RED |
| **M20** | `main.py` | **`pos, neg = opposing(...)` → `([], [])`** — the attribution clause deleted from the alarm | −102 B | **SURVIVED ALL 26 FILES on the shipped battery — GAP CLOSED**, then RED on §6a |
| M21 | `main.py` | `pos` and `neg` exchanged — the alarm names both packs, both the wrong way round | **+0 B** | **RED** — §6a ×3 (the mirrored run, and "only its own sentence") |
| M22 | `main.py` | `opposing(..., min_w=cfg.min_w / 2.0)` → `min_w=0.0` | −25 B | **RED** — §6a's resting-pack check |
**And four in `admin/goodwe`**, graded through `python3 sim/sitesim.py
--circulation` rather than through the injector — deliberately, because
`inject.py` is the file that takes the rig lock, and "run the injector to grade a
mutation" is not a sentence anybody should have to type. Byte deltas over
`plantsim.py` + `sitesim.py` together.
| # | file | mutation | Δ | result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | `plantsim.py` | `wedge()` no longer stops the latch reaching the power stage | −20 B | **RED** — the opposing-signs precondition **and** "the watchdog did not trip" |
| S2 | `sitesim.py` | the sensor computed over the **allocation record** instead of register 0x0518 | **+0 B** | **RED** ×3 — this is M10 restated on the rig |
| S3 | `sitesim.py` | the campaign run on `plant=INSTANT` | −51 B | **RED** — the plant is a *term* of the figures; it was a SURVIVOR until that check was added, and finding out why produced §3's 1048/2250/0 W table |
| S4 | `sitesim.py` | the write stagger removed from the legitimate campaign | −19 B | **RED** — "the legitimate campaign produced no opposition at all" |
**S3 is recorded as a survivor because it was one, and it is the most useful
result in this table.** The scenario first shipped with a vacuity check whose
text claimed `plant=INSTANT` would make the sweep measure 0 W. S3 was run and
**passed**: `INSTANT` with a stagger of exactly one control cycle samples the
plant before the second unit has stepped, so it produces opposition anyway — and
a *larger* worst peak (2250 W) than the modelled plant does (1048 W). The claim
in the check's own text was wrong. It was corrected against the measurement, the
plant was pinned as an explicit term, and S3 is red now for a stated reason
rather than by accident. §3's spread table is that measurement.
**M19 is recorded as a survivor because it was one.** The first battery found no
check grading what `publish()` does when a per-unit reading is missing, so
@@ -297,6 +389,30 @@ watches went unnoticed — the sensor's own `None` rule, defeated one layer out.
A check was added and the mutation re-run; it is red now. The run that found it
was purged, so it is a result and not an artefact.
**M20 IS RECORDED AS A SURVIVOR BECAUSE IT WAS ONE, AND IT IS THE MORE
UNCOMFORTABLE OF THE TWO.** The commit message for this card claimed *"18
mutations, all RED"*, and M1–M19 above have no entry for the notification's
attribution clause. Verification on 2026-09-07 ran it and it **survived the
whole 26-file suite**: the alarm still fires, still stops the site, still says
the meter cannot see it — and no longer says *which two packs* or *which way
round*. `circulation.py`'s own docstring calls that sentence the first thing
somebody woken by this alarm needs and *"impossible to reconstruct from the
number alone"*.
It survived for one reason, and it is not reachability: **M18 (the whole call
removed) is red**, so `check_circulating()` is exercised. The three checks on
that notification asserted `METER CANNOT SEE`, `CONTROL HAS BEEN STOPPED` and
`isolator` — and **never an inverter name**. Nothing graded the attribution.
`test_watchdog.py` §6a closes it, and closes it on a fixture that can tell the
three failures apart. It runs a roster of **`["garage", "shed", "cellar"]`** —
operator names, none of them `UNIT_A`, for test_maintenance.py §11's reason:
on a fixture whose names are the module's own constants a check cannot tell the
roster from the constant. It runs the site **twice, mirrored**, so the sentence
is not symmetric and a swap (M21, `+0 B`) is a different red from a deletion.
And it carries a **third pack resting at 5 W**, so the floor that stops a pack
in standby being named as a participant in a 6 kW loop (M22) is graded too.
## 7. What this card does NOT close
* **Inverter B's ramp and lag are placeholders.** Every transient number in §3
@@ -305,7 +421,9 @@ was purged, so it is a result and not an artefact.
margin. **Do not present any figure here as a measurement of inverter B.**
* **A wedged inverter still cannot be stopped by this add-on.** §1 says so; the
notification says so; there is no software fix and this card does not pretend
to one.
to one. It *can* now be produced on demand: `plantsim.Inverter.wedge()`.
* **The depth of the threshold curve is not established by anything committed.**
§3's disclosure. The window is; the knee's magnitude is not.
* **A loop below ~350 W per unit is not reported.** Deliberate, §3.
* **The saturation freeze fires under a wedged unit and leaves a standing grid
error.** Observed on the rig while producing §2's numbers: with B wedged, the
@@ -187,6 +187,23 @@ over-absorption. So the rig does not choose the number — **the constraint
chooses it, and the rig says what the constraint does and does not buy.** That
is the same relationship the 2026-08-22 table had to its own three columns.
⚠️ **FORWARD REFERENCE, ADDED BY SAFETY-48 — THIS TABLE AND THIS SENTENCE ARE
TRUE OF release/1.0's LAW AND FALSE OF THE ONE THAT REPLACED IT.** Nothing above
is retracted: re-run on release/1.0 today the same rig prints the same column
(958 / 1107 / 1133 / 1058 / 987 / 1029 / 1150 / 1143 / 1081 W), flat,
non-monotone, 800 better than 556. Under SAFETY-48's lead cap the **same script
on the same plant** prints 777 / 734 / 663 / 563 / 553 / 507 / 435 / 358 / 321 W
— falling monotonically, so a slower slew is now *better* and the sentence above
inverts. The mechanism SAFETY-39 identified is exactly why: `slew_w` bounds the
OUTPUT while the integrator goes on accumulating `gain · error`, so slowing the
slew used to buy nothing; bound the integrator's lead and it starts to.
`tools/slew_sim.py --slew` now names which of the two laws it is running under
before it narrates the column, and
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-48-bounding-the-integrator-lead.md` §6 carries both tables and
the independent confirmation from `test_control.py`'s own plant model. ⚠️ **This
does NOT re-open the choice of 556**: the constraint picks the number, the rig
does not, and that is unchanged in both laws.
⚠️ **A single step is not evidence here.** The deadband, the 10 W quantisation
and the phase of the step against the tick move the result by hundreds of watts,
non-monotonically. The first cut of this derivation was a single step and ranked
@@ -142,6 +142,16 @@ take the **longest run of consecutive cycles** on which it names anybody — not
count of naming samples, because the window is cleared by any cycle that does
not.
⚠️ **SINCE [[SAFETY-43]] THE ROWS OF §3.3's TABLE ARE GRADED WITH
`share_frac=None`** — `delinquent()`'s ABSOLUTE arm alone, which is this card's
rule exactly. Said here because it is the difference between §3.3 still meaning
what it is labelled as and quietly becoming a table about a different predicate:
SAFETY-43 added a SECOND way to be named, the harness grades it in its own rows
(`--fractions`), and the numbers below are unchanged and were re-measured to
confirm it. `DECISIONS/SAFETY-43-delinquency-relative-to-the-ask.md` §3 carries
those rows and what they cost — the worst legitimate episode goes from 35.0 s to
40.0 s at the shipped fraction, which does not move `delivery_hold_s`.
⚠️ **ONE THING THE RESTATEMENT DID NOT SAY, AND IT IS LOAD-BEARING.** "The
command standing before the write" is the **controller's** standing command —
`Inverter.standing_w()`, i.e. `last_write` — and **not** the far end of the
@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
# SAFETY-43 — delinquency measured against the ask, not against a flat 500 W
**Status: closed.** `delivery.delinquent()` names a unit whose `short_by()` gap
exceeds `min_w` **or** exceeds a fraction of that unit's own share. The fraction
is `delivery.DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION = 0.85`, derived on the campaign in §3.
⚠️ **INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST** (expected ~2026-09-12; NOTES.md
§1.1b). `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is inverter A **copied**, `measured=False`, and
`test_packshare.py`'s plant is modelled in that file. **Every two-inverter
figure in this document is two copies of A.** Nothing here is a measurement of
inverter B.
## 0. The defect, and why it is the quiet regime that matters
[[OPT-09]] passes SoC- and capacity-aware weights to the allocator. A weight is
a function of a pack's **energy headroom**, not of what the pack delivers, so a
**wedged** unit — one that accepts its share and produces nothing — is weighted
down exactly like a legitimately low-headroom one. `delinquent()` read an
**absolute** gap, `min_w = Tuning.saturation_w = 500 W`. Shrinking the share
shrinks the gap. Measured end to end on the real loop (`test_packshare.py`
part 8b: real `compute()`, real `plan()`, real `packshare.weights()`, real
`delivery.account()`, real `delinquent()`; B wedged at a healthy 15 % against its
own 10 % cut-out, so no envelope closes and `account()` explains nothing — a
SAFETY-42 **true positive** by that card's own definition):
load 1500 W equal weights shares {a:1500, b:1500} named on 199/200
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights shares {a:1505, b: 125} named on 0/200
A unit delivering **0 of 125 W** is 100 % delinquent and 125 W short. Only the
absolute threshold disagreed.
⚠️ **THE SUPPRESSED REGIME IS THE DANGEROUS ONE.** At a load the healthy sibling
covers, the meter is satisfied (grid within 5 W of zero on that fixture),
`unmet_w` is 0 because both units *accepted* their shares, no envelope closes and
no action-log line fires. The delinquency alarm is the **only** instrument that
would have told the operator the site was quietly running one inverter.
## 1. What was NOT done, and it is the larger half of this card
⚠️ **`min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED.** It is `Tuning.saturation_w` — the gap at which
the control law itself concludes the inverter is not following — and it exists to
stop **normal saturation** being reported as delinquency. Lowering it trades a
missed alarm for a false one on every unit at once. [[SAFETY-41]] spent **four
attempts** on notification cadence in this system and the owner's words were
*"i'm getting really annoyed by the notifications in my HA"*.
So the change is an **`or`**, never a looser first arm:
named if short_by() > min_w OR short_by() > frac * share
Everything `min_w` named before is still named. Nothing `min_w` refused becomes
noisy **unless the unit is delivering almost none of its ask**, which is not
saturation-shaped at all. `test_delivery.py` part 1 runs all seven of its
existing `delinquent()` fixtures under **both** rules — `share_frac=None` is
SAFETY-42's rule exactly — and requires identical answers on every one.
The absolute arm's suppression window is therefore **unchanged**: still
`site target < 2·min_w` = 1000 W at equal weights, still
`site target < min_w·(w_A+w_B)/w_B` = 6500 W under OPT-09's weights on part 8b's
fixture. Part 8b still asserts both numbers, now as evidence that the first arm
did not move.
## 2. The evidence is a diff between two rules on ONE run
`delinquent()` takes `share_frac`, and **`None` means the absolute arm alone**.
That parameter exists for one reason: so the red and the green come out of one
run over one tree instead of out of two commits that a reader has to trust.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b grades every cycle twice:
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights absolute arm alone named on 0/200 cycles
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
load 1500 W equal weights absolute arm alone named on 199/200 cycles
load 1500 W equal weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
The equal-weights arm gains **exactly one cycle** — the first, where the slew
limit holds the split at 500/500, a 500 W gap is not *over* a 500 W threshold
(the absolute bound is strict) and the relative arm names a box delivering none
of its 500 W. That single cycle is the whole of what this card costs an arm that
was already firing.
⚠️ **THE PIN THAT INVERTED.** Part 8b was written by OPT-09 to pin the
**suppressed** behaviour, and its comment said: *"if it ever goes red because the
alarm fired, read the card that made it fire before 'fixing' this line."* This is
that card. The pin now asserts the opposite answer and keeps the old one beside
it, measured rather than remembered.
## 3. ⭐ Deriving the fraction
⚠️ **DERIVED ON THE SAME CAMPAIGN AS `delivery_hold_s`'s FLOOR**, not chosen.
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py` — the harness [[TEST-21]] committed —
gained a second grading axis: the same **2640 no-fault runs at N=2** (three
families × 6 gains × 5 slews × write staggers; every unit executes the share the
allocator gave it) and the same **2640 N=1 control runs**, graded at the shipped
`min_w = 500 W` for each candidate fraction, on every cycle of every run — so a
pass grades every fraction it is given, and the absolute arm beside them, over
one tree and one set of runs. Every row in a pass is comparable to every other
row in it, run for run.
cd goodwe/sim && GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon \
python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest --campaign --fractions
⚠️ **THE TABLE BELOW WAS PRODUCED BY TWO PASSES; `FRACTIONS` NOW HOLDS ALL
TWENTY SO IT TAKES ONE.** The derivation ran the shipped ten
`(0.25 … 0.99)` and then the ten that resolve the low end
`(0.05 … 0.65)` with only that tuple edited between them. **The absolute-arm
control row came out identical in both** (30.0 / 0.0 / 35.0 / 0.0, same argmax),
which is what says the two passes are one campaign. A table a reviewer cannot
reproduce without knowing to edit a line nobody wrote down is PROC-01's shape in
miniature, so the committed `FRACTIONS` was widened to all twenty in review: the
command above now reproduces every row below.
### 3.1 The curve
Worst **continuous** legitimate episode (the measure `DeliveryWatchdog` actually
sees — its window is cleared by any cycle that does not name), runs naming in
brackets:
| `share_frac` | reversals (of 1050) | flapping (of 840) | weighted (of 750) | **N=1 control (2640)** |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| absolute only | 30.0 s (460) | 0.0 s (0) | 35.0 s (403) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.05 | 85.0 s (826) | 0.0 s (0) | 90.0 s (616) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.10 | 75.0 s (824) | 0.0 s (0) | 90.0 s (607) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.15 | 70.0 s (836) | 0.0 s (0) | 70.0 s (609) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.20 | 70.0 s (839) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (629) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.25 | 55.0 s (832) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (611) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.30 | 55.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 50.0 s (614) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.35 | 55.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 55.0 s (618) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.40 | 50.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (658) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.45 | 45.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (627) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.50 | 45.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (636) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.55 | 40.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (636) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.60 | 40.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (645) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.65 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.70 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.75 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.80 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| **0.85** | **35.0 s (840)** | **0.0 s (0)** | **40.0 s (635)** | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.90 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.95 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.99 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
Worst of the three families, which is what `delivery_hold_s` has to cover:
frac 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
worst 90.0 90.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 55.0 55.0 60.0 45.0 45.0 s
frac 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 *0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99
worst 40.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 s
⚠️ **THE FIRST ROW IS THE CONTROL AND IT REPRODUCED SAFETY-42 §3.3 EXACTLY** —
30.0 s / 0.0 s / 35.0 s, and the same argmax (`gain=0.2 slew_w=1000 stagger=4
split=0.10/0.90`, ±2200 W reversal). It is measured **in the same run** as every
row below it, which is what makes those rows a comparison rather than a claim.
### 3.2 What the curve says
* ⚠️ **THERE IS NO CLIFF ANYWHERE IN THE CURVE, AND THAT IS THE FINDING.** From
**0.45 to 0.99** every figure is 40.0 or 45.0 s — within **one control cycle
(5.0 s)** of every other — and below 0.45 it rises **gradually**: 60.0 s at
0.25, 70.0 s at 0.15, 90.0 s at 0.05. A reviewer asking "why 0.85 and not
0.90?" is asking about a difference this campaign cannot resolve, and the
honest answer is that it cannot.
* ⚠️ **IT IS NOT MONOTONE** — 0.40 reports 60.0 s where 0.35 reports 55.0, and
0.65–0.80 report 45.0 s where 0.55/0.60 and 0.85–0.99 report 40.0 — and that is
SAFETY-42 §3.3's own mechanism (c) rather than noise in the plant: **a more
sensitive rule puts MORE units into the short set, which can turn a proper
subset into the WHOLE roster and END the episode.** The reduction is not
monotone in its own threshold. Do not read this column as a sensitivity curve
in the ordinary sense.
* **The shoulder is at about 0.45**, and it is a shoulder rather than an edge:
the reversal family's naming count saturates at 840 of 1050 runs from 0.30
upward, so below the shoulder what grows is the LENGTH of an episode, not the
number of runs that have one.
* **The N=1 column is 0.0 s at every fraction, in all 2640 one-inverter runs.**
The compatibility promise is measured for the new arm, not argued.
* **The flapping family is 0.0 s at every fraction, in all 840 runs.** A common
stimulus makes both units short at once and the subset stops being proper —
the property that defeated SAFETY-30's site window still holds.
### 3.3 ⚠️ "Zero false namings" is not available at ANY fraction
The card asked for *the largest fraction that yields zero false namings across
the whole no-fault campaign*. **There is none.** Every fraction adds naming
cycles: the reversal family goes from 460 runs naming to 840, the weighted family
from 403 to 635. A relative arm that never fired on a legitimate transient would
be a relative arm that never fired at all — the write stagger lands B's number up
to four cycles late, and a unit whose new command has not arrived is, for those
cycles, delivering a small fraction of what is standing on its wire.
What **is** zero at every fraction is **false alarms**:
> the longest continuous legitimate episode anywhere in the 20-point sweep is
> **90.0 s** — at 0.05, the most sensitive fraction measured — against a
> `delivery_hold_s` of **185 s**. Nothing in 2640 no-fault runs comes within
> **95 s** of notifying an operator, **at any fraction measured**. At the
> shipped 0.85 it is 40.0 s, i.e. 145 s of slack.
That is the quantity SAFETY-41 cares about and it is the one this card had to
protect. Stated as margin, at the shipped fraction: **185 s is 4.62×** the worst
legitimate episode, where the absolute arm alone gave 5.29×.
### 3.4 The bounds 0.85 answers to
* **LOWER, from the campaign** — the shoulder at about **0.45**, below which the
added episode starts to grow (60.0 s at 0.25, 90.0 s at 0.05). 0.85 is 0.40
above it.
* **UPPER, from the card's own case** — strictly **below 1.0**. At 1.0 the arm
can only fire on a unit that is *importing* while asked to discharge, which is
SAFETY-30's fault and not this one, so a unit delivering **none** of its share
(gap/share exactly 1.0) would be missed. The 0.15 below 1.0 is what covers a
wedged box reporting a small standby figure instead of a clean zero.
* **UPPER, from the hold** — every fraction in the flat range leaves
`delivery_hold_s` between **4.11×** (45.0 s) and **4.62×** (40.0 s) the worst
legitimate episode, well inside the four bounds SAFETY-42 §3.3 requires of it.
**`delivery_hold_s` IS NOT CHANGED BY THIS CARD.**
* ⚠️ **NOT DERIVED, AND SAID SO: the exact value inside [0.45, 1.0).** The
campaign cannot separate them. 0.85 is the midpoint of the argument above —
0.40 of margin above the shoulder, 0.15 below the ceiling — and a
re-derivation that moved it to 0.90 would be moving a number this campaign
never resolved. It is not moved for that reason.
## 4. The positive control — what the relative arm must still NOT say
A card that adds a way to raise an alarm has to show what it did **not** add.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b runs the same fixture, the same weights and the same
125 W share with the one fact that makes the shortfall legitimate changed:
| fixture | B's share | named | why it is silent |
|---|---|---|---|
| B wedged at a healthy 15 % (the fault) | 77–154 W | **200 / 200** | — it is the fault |
| B at its own 10 % cut-out | **0 W, all 200 cycles** | **0 / 200** | it is never **asked** |
| B delivering **half** its share | 120 W | **0 / 200** | short by 50 %, inside both arms |
### ⚠️ The cut-out row does NOT grade `account()`, and this record said it did
**Corrected in review.** The first draft of this section claimed the wedged and
cut-out arms had *"identical power traces — 0 W against a positive share, 100 %
of the ask missing"* and that *"what separates them is `account()`"*. **Every
part of that was false**, and the check that carried it was **vacuous**:
* at its own cut-out the pack's usable energy **above that cut-out is zero**, so
`packshare.weights()` answers **0.0** for it, `_fill()`'s preferred pass gives
it nothing, the healthy sibling covers the load alone so the last-resort pass
never runs, and its share is **0 W on all 200 cycles**;
* a unit with a 0 W share is not in `asked`, so `len(asked) < 2` returns `{}`
**before either arm is evaluated** and `account()` is **never consulted**;
* the traces are not identical — the cut-out arm's share is **0 W on every
cycle** (asserted in part 8b and printed on its line) while the wedged arm's
is **125 W** at the last cycle (asserted in the GREEN check) and takes four
distinct values 77/125/133/154 W across the 200, measured by re-running the
same loop with per-cycle recording during review — and "100 % of the ask" is
0/0.
Measured, by deleting the gate the claim rested on:
cut-out arm, account() live named 0/200, distinct B shares: [0]
cut-out arm, account() DELETED named 0/200, distinct B shares: [0]
wedged arm, account() live named 200/200, shares [77,125,133,154]
⚠️ **The fact that replaces it is better, not weaker.** At its own cut-out
**OPT-09 stops asking the pack at all**, so SAFETY-43's relative arm is never
reached — a **second, independent protection sitting upstream of `account()`**:
the allocator declines to ask before the detector has to decline to alarm. Part
8b now asserts the 0 W share and prints it, and runs the arm a second time with
`account()` deleted to show which mechanism is doing the work.
⚠️ **It was invisible for one reason worth keeping**: that line was the only one
in part 8b that did not print its shares. `inverter-b+0` would have been on
screen from the first run. Every line in that part prints them now, and the
derated control's vacuity guard now asserts **its own** unit is asked, rather
than re-asserting a different run's 200/200 — which is exactly why the old guard
could not see this.
**The account gate is graded where it is real**, on a positive 125 W share, in
`test_delivery.py` part 1 (*"THE ACCOUNT GATE IS UNTOUCHED BY IT"* — the same
0 of 125 W with the shortfall explained names nobody). That part also carries
that the relative bound is **strict** (a gap of exactly `frac · share` is not
over it) and that the proper-subset rule still refuses a site-wide cause (both
units delivering none of a 125 W share names nobody).
## 5. N=1 is byte-identical, and it is asserted rather than argued
The live install is **N=1**. Two independent statements, each graded against the
thing that would break it (`test_packshare.py` part 8b):
1. **`allocator.plan()` returns before `weights` is read at all.** Graded by
handing it a `weights` mapping that **raises on any read**: at a roster of one
it answers identically to the same call with no weights; at a roster of two
the same mapping is read and raises, so the tripwire is a real one.
2. **`delinquent()` answers `{}` at a roster of one for every input** — 84
combinations of (share, measured, rule), including **0 of 125 W**, the exact
input this card added an arm for. `len(asked) < 2` returns before either
threshold is compared, so the fraction is never even multiplied.
Nothing in this card is reachable at one inverter. It must land before inverter B
is commissioned (~2026-09-12), not before the next deploy.
## 5b. Mutation — the fraction is pinned from BOTH directions
⚠️ **RUN, NOT REASONED ABOUT.** Each mutation was applied to a tree **copied
fresh** from this branch and mounted `:ro` inside the checks image, so no `.pyc`
could go stale — MUTATION.md's defect, and all three of these are **reds**, the
direction that defect cannot fabricate. Recorded in `test_packshare.py` part 11
as M12–M14.
| mutation | named checks | where |
|---|---:|---|
| **M12** drop the relative arm, keep `gap > min_w` — *the card itself reverted* | **7** | `test_delivery.py` part 1 (3: the 0-of-125 W naming, the proportion in the sentence, the strict relative bound) + `test_packshare.py` 8b (4: GREEN back to 0/200, the equal arm's 200 back to 199, the 6000 W arm back to 195/199, the derated control's guard). `test_alloc.py` / `test_control.py` stay green — nothing outside this check moves. |
| **M13** `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` → **1.0** — *too loose* | **7** | part 1 (2) + 8b (5), including the PRECONDITION that the fraction is strictly below 1.0. At 1.0 the card is a no-op: gap/share of exactly 1.0 is not *over* 1.0. |
| **M14** `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` → **0.05** — *too sensitive* | **6** | part 1 (2: the strict bound, and *"IT TOOK NOTHING AWAY"* stops being true) + part **4b** (3: the `saturation_w` pin goes **vacuous**, the relative arm naming B at every threshold) + 8b's derated control, where a unit delivering half its share starts being named. |
M13 and M14 are the pair that matters: the constant cannot be moved in **either**
direction without a named check moving with it.
### ⚠️ Two of these counts were wrong, and the reason is worth keeping
**Corrected in review.**
* **M12 and M13 read 1 and 1 in `test_delivery.py`, not 3 and 2.** Part 1 printed
the alarm sentence with a bare subscript, `delinquent(_tiny, 500)["b"]`. On any
tree where the relative arm is broken or absent that raises `KeyError` and
**aborts the file at part 1**, leaving parts 2–8 ungraded — so the recorded
coverage of a mutation run read *smaller* than the truth. The direction is safe
(an abort is a red, and MUTATION.md's defect can only fabricate a green), but a
figure that does not reproduce is a figure that does not reproduce. It is a
`.get` now, with the reason written beside it, and the counts above are from
re-runs with the guard in place.
* **M14 was recorded as 4 named checks in `test_delivery.py` and it is 5** — part
1's pre-existing *"a shortfall AT the threshold is not one"* also goes red. That
one under-claimed, so it never inflated the evidence; it is still a recorded
number that did not reproduce.
## 6. ⚠️ [[CFG-07]] is adjacent and is NOT absorbed here
CFG-07 is that `delivery_hold_s` is declared `int(30,900)` in `config.yaml`'s
schema while the measured worst legitimate episode at the shipped threshold is
**35.0 s** — so the schema offers an operator a value (30) that is **below a
measured legitimate episode** and would report on ordinary saturation.
**This card makes it worse, and by exactly one control cycle.** The relative arm
takes the worst legitimate episode from **35.0 s to 40.0 s** at the shipped
fraction, so the band of schema-legal but false-tripping values widens from
`[30, 35]` to `[30, 40]`. The floor the schema should have is now **40 s**, not
35 s. It is not fixed here: raising a schema floor is an option-surface change
with its own compatibility argument (an existing config carrying `35` would start
being refused), and folding it into a safety fix would hide it. **CFG-07 should
be re-derived against 40.0 s, not 35.0 s.**
⚠️ **WHEN IT HAS TO CLOSE: BEFORE INVERTER B IS COMMISSIONED (~2026-09-12).**
Not before the next deploy. The band is **unreachable at N=1** — `delinquent()`
returns `{}` for every input at a roster of one, so no value of
`delivery_hold_s` can false-trip on the install that is running today — and the
live install is N=1 until B exists. Commissioning B is the moment the band
becomes reachable, and that is the deadline this card hands it.
⚠️ **AND CFG-07 HAS NO DECISION DOCUMENT IN THIS TREE.** It exists as a
`[[CFG-07]]` mention in `CHANGELOG.md` and in this section, and nowhere else —
so there is no file for the 40.0 s to be recorded in, and a reader who goes
looking will find a card reference with no record behind it. Whoever takes
CFG-07 writes `DECISIONS/CFG-07-*.md` first; the number it has to answer to is
**40.0 s**, measured here, and the harness that produces it is
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign --fractions`.
## 7. Provenance of every number in this document
| number | where it came from |
|---|---|
| 199/200, 0/200, 200/200, shares 1505/125 | `test_packshare.py` part 8b, run |
| 35.0 s absolute-arm floor, and its argmax | `delivery_window.py --campaign`, re-run here, reproduces SAFETY-42 §3.3 |
| every row of §3.1 | `delivery_window.py --campaign --fractions`, two passes over the same campaign with `FRACTIONS` changed between them |
| 1000 W / 6500 W suppression windows | part 8b's arithmetic, asserted there |
| 185 s, 5.29× | SAFETY-42 §3.3 / TEST-21, unchanged by this card |
| 4.62× | 185 / 40.0, printed by the campaign |
| 0/200 on both positive controls, and B's 0 W share at the cut-out | part 8b, run and asserted |
| 0 W cut-out share / 125 W wedged share | part 8b, asserted and printed |
| 77/125/133/154 W (the wedged arm's four distinct shares) | the same loop re-run in review with per-cycle recording — NOT part 8b's printed line, which shows the last cycle only |
| M12/M13/M14 named-check counts (7 / 7 / 6) | re-run in review on fresh `:ro` trees, after the `KeyError` abort in part 1 was guarded |
| 84 single-unit rosters | part 8b, run |
⚠️ Every two-inverter figure above is **two copies of inverter A**.
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
# SAFETY-45 — the trade is SIZED by the capacity guard, not switched by it
**Status: closed.** `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` publishes the watts the open
billed quarter can still afford; `arbitrage.decide()` takes it as a required
keyword-only argument and sizes the BUY leg to it; `main.py` passes the measured
guard's own number at its one call site. `peakguard.decide()` is **not changed** —
byte-identical to `release/1.0` at `478ba93`, `sha256(decide) = 200090d0835a3a55`,
7252 B on both trees.
⚠️ **THE HOUSE LOAD IN EVERY FIGURE BELOW IS SYNTHETIC.** TEST-23 stage 3's
`priceloop.py` drives a flat modelled house against a modelled pack
(`plantsim.Plant`, 800 W/s ramp into a 10 s lag, 15 360 Wh). The PRICES are real,
the decision code is the shipped code, the billed-quarter accumulator is
`app/p1.py`'s own — the load is not. Nothing here is a measurement of the live
site at 192.168.2.158, which this work did not touch.
## 0. The defect, measured
TEST-23 stage 3 found a sustained limit cycle with arbitrage armed and a charge
decision active. Re-measured here on the same rig against the same checkout,
metrics recomputed rather than copied — a **charge onset** is a cycle at which
`arbitrage.decide()` transitions into `ARBITRAGE_CHARGE`, which is the edge the
rig already logs:
| `peak_cap_w` | house | onsets/h | mean period | grid swing | billed quarters (W) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 | 1200 W | **28** | 131.1 s | **−455.5 … +3200.0 W** | 1490.1 / 1496.5 / **1508.8** |
| 3500 *(shipped)* | 1800 W | 8 | 509.3 s | +127.5 … +3800.0 W | **3511.3 / 3536.0 / 3559.1** |
| 3500 *(shipped)* | 3000 W | 32 | 114.8 s | +1202.0 … +5000.0 W | **3518.9 / 3542.2 / 3556.7** |
| 5000 | 1200 W | 1 | — | +1240.6 … +3200.0 W | 3169.5 / 3200.0 / 3200.0 |
The last row is the **negative control**: `load + max_w = 3200 W` never reaches
the cap, so there is no cycle to remove. The bite rule is `load + max_w >
peak_cap_w`, which at the shipped `peak_cap_w: 3500` / `max_w: 2000` is any house
drawing over 1500 W in the cheapest quarter.
§10.1's ordering did win on the money — the guard kept the quarters within tens
of watts of the cap — but **every billed quarter in the three biting rows
finished OVER it**, which is the thing §9.1 bills. §10.2: *"an EMS that
oscillates is worse than no EMS, both for hardware wear and — per §9.1 — for the
peak it is trying to avoid."*
## 1. ⚠️ The mechanism is NOT mainly the quarter boundary, and the card says it is
The card, and `.cache/s45.md` before it, describe the loop as *"at each quarter
boundary the projection resets to 0, the guard disengages, and arbitrage re-arms
at full power."* **That is not what the 28 onsets are.** Their timestamps, off
the run above:
1, 231, 351, 471, 581, 696, 806, 896, 1136, 1256, 1371, 1486, 1596,
1711, 1811, 2061, 2176, 2296, 2411, 2521, 2626, 2716, 2971, 3091,
3206, 3321, 3431, 3541 (s, quarter boundaries at 900/1800/2700)
**23 of the 27 gaps are 90–120 s, mean 111.5 s, entirely inside one quarter.**
The four long gaps — 230, 240, 250, 255 s — are precisely the four that SPAN a
boundary, so the boundary **lengthens** the interval rather than causing an
onset. Only three onsets land within 15 s of a boundary and one of those is
`t = 1`, the start of the run.
The real cycle, read off the recorded fields at t = 1000…1180 s:
1. the trade charges at `−2000 W`; the meter sits at 3200 W against a 1500 W
ceiling; `wanted = batt_w + excess` is **negative** (−132 → −8 W), so
`decide()` files **nothing** and arbitrage is not constrained at all;
2. `wanted` drifts up as the quarter's own history worsens and the `900 /
remaining` gain grows, and crosses zero at t = 1055 with **`floor_w = 5.3 W`**;
3. that 5 W floor flips `arbitrage.guard_state()` to `True`, which refuses the
**whole trade** — so the setpoint goes from −2000 W to +5 W and the
grid-following loop, which targets grid = 0 and not grid = ceiling, takes the
actuator and discharges to **+1870 W**, exporting 420 W;
4. the projection collapses, `wanted` goes negative, the guard releases, and
arbitrage re-arms at **`max_w`**. 115 s later, again.
So the defect is **a binary interlock keyed on a continuous quantity**, and the
quarter boundary is one of the ways it is crossed rather than the cause. The
card's other claim — *"projection 3092 W against a 1509 W ceiling, `engaged=False`,
for 170 consecutive seconds"* — reproduces, but it is the **first** such window
(`first_engaged_t_s = 151.0`); the steady-state silent window is ~40–65 s.
None of this changes what the fix has to do. It is recorded because a card that
says "the boundary is the trigger" invites a fix in the boundary handling, and
such a fix would have removed four of twenty-eight onsets.
## 2. What was rejected, and why
### 2a. Reverting `decide()`'s `wanted <= 0.0` rung — rejected, and it is a trap
That rung is 2026-08-20's anti-bang-bang. Its own comment records the cost of not
having it: 17 engage/release cycles in 900 s and a quarter finishing 49 W over
the limit it had spent a quarter of an hour holding. It is untouched, pinned on
the AST in `test_peakguard.py` 13g, and `tools/replay_ac3.py` reproduces the same
190/190, 110 engaged cycles, 5 blind, 878 Wh on this branch as on `478ba93`.
### 2b. Filing the affordable charge as a NEGATIVE `lo` — rejected
Arithmetically this is the prettiest answer: `lo = wanted` with no sign gate is
continuous, is exactly the control law `decide()` already computes, and would
have put the constraint on the arbiter where it binds every claimant rather than
only arbitrage. It was rejected on two grounds, in this order:
1. ⚠️ **IT CREATES A NEW `lo > hi` CONTRADICTION CLASS AGAINST THE MAINTENANCE
SHAPING.** `main.py`'s cheap-window maintenance charge files
`Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=-floor)` — a NEGATIVE `hi`.
`arbiter.py` clause 2 applies every limit at or above the winner's priority
and takes the most restrictive, with **no notion of one limit out-ranking
another**; a peak `lo = −300 W` against a shaping `hi = −1000 W` is `lo > hi`,
which resolves to **0 W — the battery parked, in the one quarter of the month
that sets the bill**. That is the exact failure `peakguard.shaping_suspended()`
exists to prevent, and the only way to close it would be to key that
suppression on "a claim exists" — which, on every site this card is about,
means the maintenance charge-only shaping is suspended **permanently**. A
silent, large change to a different subsystem is not a price this card should
pay.
2. It changes the meaning of `PeakDecision.engaged` at five call sites outside
this module — `arbitrage.guard_state()`, `shaping_suspended()`,
`claim()`, `main.py`'s edge-logged action line and `main.py`'s status row —
each of which today means "the guard is HOLDING" and would silently start
meaning "a claim exists".
`test_peakguard.py` part 5's sweep asserts **no negative floor, ever**, and the
reason it gives ("a `lo` limit is incapable of capping discharge or export only
while it is non-negative") is, strictly, not the true reason — a `lo` of any sign
caps neither. The invariant is still right and is still worth holding; §2b above
is the argument that actually supports it, and it is recorded here rather than
left for the next person to re-derive.
### 2c. A backoff, cooldown or hysteresis constant in `arbitrage.py` — rejected
The card asks whether the second half of the fix belongs in arbitrage: *"a trade
refused at 14:59 and re-armed at 15:00 has learned nothing from the refusal."*
It does belong there, but as a **size**, not as a memory. `arbitrage.py`'s
hysteresis note is explicit that the switching decision is "which hour is it" and
that **no timer is needed and none is invented**; `peakguard.py`'s design note
spends a paragraph on why it carries no hysteresis constant. A cooldown would be
a second control loop compensating for a limit the first one declined to file,
and its constant would outlive whatever it was tuned against. The trade now
re-arms at `ceiling − load` instead of at `max_w`, which is what "learning from
the refusal" means when the refusal is a measurement.
## 3. What was done, and the precedent it follows
`control.maintenance_charge_floor()` has capped MAINTENANCE charging at *"the
headroom left under the site's cap"* since the loop was written, and its
docstring says why:
> "A maintenance charge is the only thing this system does that is big enough and
> long enough to set that peak, so it is capped by the headroom left under the
> site's cap."
⚠️ **THAT SENTENCE STOPPED BEING TRUE WHEN OPT-04 LANDED.** Price arbitrage is a
second thing that is big enough and long enough — it commands `max_w` for a whole
tariff interval, deliberately, against the meter — and it was given no such cap.
This card gives it the same shape, with one difference that matters:
`maintenance_charge_floor()` sizes itself from `peak_forecast_entity`, which is
OPTIONAL and empty on a default install — the exact hole SAFETY-25 had to close
in `shaping_suspended()`. `charge_headroom_w()` comes off `decide()`, which runs
wherever P1 does.
**The number is `wanted_w` read in the other direction.** `decide()` already
computes `wanted = batt_w + excess` as the DISCHARGE that lands the quarter on the
ceiling; a negative `wanted` is a permitted CHARGE of `−wanted`. No new
arithmetic, no new constant.
Two properties make it safe to hand a strategy, and both are swept rather than
argued (`test_peakguard.py` part 13):
* ⚠️ **IT IS INVARIANT IN THE BATTERY.** Raise the charge by dW and the meter
rises by dW, so `excess` rises by exactly dW while `batt_w` falls by dW:
`wanted` does not move. Measured across `batt_w` from −5000 W to +2000 W on one
banked quarter — the headroom is 1350.0 W at every one of the six points while
the `excess` those runs see moves through six distinct values. It is a
**feed-forward** number, so consuming it adds no feedback path around the plant.
The fixed point is `charge = ceiling − load`, with the meter ON the ceiling and
`wanted` parked a whole `ceiling − load` clear of the engagement boundary.
* **HOLDING IMPLIES ZERO OR UNKNOWN.** Across 1080 swept combinations, not one
ENGAGED decision answers a positive headroom, so the function can never hand a
caller permission the guard's own `lo` is at that instant refusing.
## 4. After, on the same rig, same command, same checkout
| `peak_cap_w` | house | onsets/h | grid swing | energy bought | billed quarters (W) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 | 1200 W | 28 → **1** | 3655.5 → **282.0 W** | 180.0 → **285.2 Wh** | **1500.0 / 1500.0 / 1500.0** |
| 3500 | 1800 W | 8 → **1** | 3672.5 → 1687.6 W | 1652.9 → 1616.1 Wh | **3500.0 / 3500.0 / 3500.0** |
| 3500 | 3000 W | 32 → **1** | 3798.0 → **474.7 W** | 482.9 → 475.3 Wh | **3500.0 / 3500.0 / 3500.0** |
| 5000 | 1200 W | 1 → 1 | **identical** | **identical** | **identical** |
* **One onset** means the trade starts once and runs for the whole window. The
battery is trading 100 % of the hour where it used to trade 43 %, 92 % and 54 %.
* **Every billed quarter lands exactly on the cap and none over it**, where every
quarter in the three biting rows used to finish over.
* **The money.** At 1500/1200 the site buys **58 % MORE** energy, because a
continuous 300 W trade beats a 2000 W trade that is cancelled for 57 % of the
hour. At the two shipped-default rows it buys **2.2 % and 1.6 % less** — and in
exchange the worst quarter drops from 59 W over the cap to 0 W over it. The
capacity tariff bills the month's single worst quarter with no averaging and no
forgiveness (specs.md:583), so that is not a trade-off, it is the ordering
§10.1 asks for.
* The remaining 1687.6 W at 3500/1800 is the opening **ramp**, not a cycle: the
pack goes from 0 to 1700 W of charge in about ten seconds and the meter with
it. One onset, no export, no reversal.
* The last row is bit-identical before and after. **This card costs nothing on
the installs it is not about.**
## 5. What this does NOT fix, with sizes
* **TEST-23 finding 1 — the export overshoot at the END of a trade** (356–938 W,
≈0.37 × `max_w`) is untouched and is a different card. It happens when the
cheap interval ends and the grid-following loop takes back an actuator that was
holding a charge; nothing here changes the handover.
* **A house whose load ALONE exceeds the cap** (`load > peak_cap_w`) still puts
`wanted > 0`, still engages the guard, and still refuses the trade outright
through the interlock — correctly, since you cannot buy in a quarter you are
already over on. The loop then drives to grid = 0 rather than to grid =
ceiling, which is more discharge than the guard asked for. Not swept here: all
four (cap, load) pairs on the record have `load < cap`.
* **`arbitrage.claim()` still files the SIZED number, but the ARBITER can clamp
it further** and the strategy is not told. The reason line names the guard's
headroom, not the arbiter's `bound_by`. Pre-existing; not widened.
* **The container leg was not re-run.** `hadrive.py` needs `test23s3-addon`
started, and that container is deliberately stopped because it is a second
writer on the setpoint entity under measurement. The in-process rig's twelve
transcribed lines are pinned by `test_arbitrage.py` 3b's AST check on
`main.py`'s call site, which is the line this card adds to them.
@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
# SAFETY-47 — what a shadow run can show, and what it cannot
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-47`.
**Card:** SAFETY-47 — *"shadow mode's claims, and the number on the status
row"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No deployment, no `ha addons update`, no
contact with 192.168.2.158 or 192.168.2.221. Everything below was measured in
the CI image and on TEST-23 stage 3's closed-loop rig.
⚠️ **This is not a write-path defect and nothing in the write path was
touched.** SAFETY-10's substitution, re-seed, authorisation gate and clamp are
unchanged. What was wrong is what three merged documents **say** a shadow run
can show you, and a number on the status row that can be **6.61×** what a live
controller would command.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **Shadow mode cannot surface a closed-loop defect. Not partially — not at
all**, and by the same construction that makes it safe. §1.
2. **The "strategies are unaffected" exemption was true until SAFETY-45 merged,
one commit before SAFETY-10.** Sizing the buy leg to the billed-quarter
headroom made the strategy closed-loop. §2.
3. **The recorded watts are the right answer to a question nobody asked, and
they are CAVEATED rather than re-computed.** Re-computing would mean the
recorded decision was no longer the decision the shipped path reached, which
is the one thing shadow mode has to be able to say. §3 records what was
rejected.
4. **SAFETY-10 §6's committed evidence could never have failed, for two
independent reasons, and closing either one alone closes nothing.** §4.
---
## 1. Why the answer is "not at all", and not "not very well"
Shadow mode holds every actuator at `shadow.WIRE_W` and re-seeds the carried
command to it at the end of each cycle. So every **measured** input — the
meter, the billed-quarter accumulator behind it, the battery power, the state
of charge — describes a plant that **did not respond**.
A closed-loop defect is, by definition, one whose stimulus **is** the plant's
response to the controller. No response, no stimulus, nothing to see. This is
not an implementation gap:
* feeding the guards a **simulated** plant instead is exactly what SAFETY-10 §4
refuses for the sign watchdogs, and the reason generalises — a controller
reacting to a plant that does not exist drifts further from reality every
tick, and three cycles in its numbers describe nothing;
* and SAFETY-10 §5 already conceded the same fact for the grid-following loop
("one slew step, not a trajectory"). That was never a property of the loop.
**It is the general case**, and the loop leg was simply where it had already
been noticed.
**So the closed-loop answer comes from a closed-loop rig (TEST-23 stage 3) or
from a live run. There is no third place, and saying that plainly is worth more
than the three sentences it replaces.**
### Measured, on the rig, at a cap that binds
`peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 / `max_w` 2000, one hour at a 5 s cycle. Of the
three defects SAFETY-10 was written for:
| | visible? | measured |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-45's limit cycle | **no** | 28 charge onsets live, **1** in shadow. Grid −455.5 … +3200.0 W live, **flat at the 1200 W house** in shadow. Guard engaged 410/720 cycles live, **0/720** in shadow. (Taken with SAFETY-45 reverted — that is the defect being looked for.) |
| SAFETY-46's SoC churn | **no** | the SoC moves **0.000000000 pp** in a shadow run. The SoC is the pack's integral of what the pack was commanded, and it was commanded 0 W. No SoC limit can be *reached* in a shadow run at all |
| TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour | **yes**, and it is the only one | the price lookup's inputs are the clock and the price series, neither a function of the battery. Which hour, at what price, clearing what spread: **identical live and shadow on 720 of 720 charging cycles, at a binding cap** |
### What a shadow run genuinely is for
*Which* strategy wins, on *which* hour, at *which* price, for *which* reason,
against which limits — the wrong-quarter-hour class, a trade armed on a day it
should not be, a refusal whose sentence names the wrong subsystem, a clamp that
would have engaged, a standing failsafe latch. That is a real and useful set,
and it is the set the documents now claim.
---
## 2. The exemption, and exactly how much of it survives
All three documents carried a version of:
> The **strategies** are unaffected — price arbitrage, the capacity guard and
> maintenance all ask for a fixed power **from inputs that do not depend on
> what the battery did**.
**True before SAFETY-45, false after it.** SAFETY-45 makes the buy leg
`min(asked, headroom)`, and
```
headroom = (900 / remaining) x (ceiling - projected)
```
where `projected` reads the **open quarter's accumulator** — the meter — which
is a function of what the battery did earlier in that same quarter. SAFETY-45
merged one commit before SAFETY-10, so the exemption was stale on the day it
was written.
**What survives, and it is now graded rather than asserted:**
> **Which** hour a strategy picks, and **why**, are unaffected — the clock and
> the price series are not functions of the battery.
> **How hard** it trades is not.
⚠️ **The peak guard is not in the surviving half either.** Every term of
`wanted = batt_w + excess` is measured, so in a shadow run the guard engages
only if the *house alone* would put the quarter over the ceiling. Its
**ceiling** and its **reasons** are worth reading from a shadow run; its
**engagements** are not evidence of anything.
---
## 3. The number on the status row — decided, and what was rejected
At `peak_cap_w` 1500 under a 1200 W house the status row read **"WOULD HAVE
COMMANDED −2 000 W"**. A live controller commands **−302.4 W**. Measured on the
shipped build:
| cap / house | live commanded | shadow recorded | over by |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 / 1200 | −302.4 W | **−2000.0 W** | **6.61×** |
| 3500 / 3000 | −502.6 W | −2000.0 W | 3.98× |
| 3500 / 2000 *(shipped cap)* | −1502.6 W | −2000.0 W | 1.33× |
| 3500 / 1800 | −1702.6 W | −2000.0 W | 1.17× |
| 15000 / 350 | −2000.0 W | −2000.0 W | 1.00× |
⚠️ **The arithmetic is not wrong.** `900/remaining` is correct for a meter that
is genuinely under the ceiling, and in a shadow run the meter genuinely *is*
under it, because the battery is not charging. **The recorded number is the
right answer to a question nobody asked** — and the last row of that table is
the fixture SAFETY-10's own evidence was taken on, which is why nothing
reported it.
### What shipped
1. **Unconditionally**, the row and the log line stop forecasting: the watts
are introduced as what would have been commanded **ON THIS CYCLE**. No
number a shadow run records is a prediction of a live run, so no state
should read like one.
2. **Conditionally**, whenever a **measured** billed quarter sized the number
being recorded, both surfaces carry `shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER`:
> ⚠️ AND ITS SIZE CAME FROM THE BILLED-QUARTER METER, WHICH HAS ONLY THE
> HOUSE IN IT WHILE THE BATTERY IS HELD AT 0 W. A live run sizes the same
> trade against a meter the battery is moving, so this is an UPPER BOUND and
> not a prediction; how far under it a live run lands is a closed-loop
> question and a shadow run cannot answer it.
⚠️ **"Upper bound", and not "smaller", and the difference was measured.**
Charging only *adds* offtake, so a live `projected` is never below a shadow one
and the headroom never above it — with **equality at the start of every
quarter**, where `900/remaining` is 1.0 and neither plant has moved. Measured
pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five configurations: **0 cycles below,
730 exactly equal.** A sentence reading "smaller" would have been false on
every one of those 730, and the first draft of this card said "smaller".
⚠️ **And it names no factor.** How far under the bound a live run lands is a
property of the site. A number invented for the row would be a second helping
of the defect the sentence exists to disclose.
⚠️ **The predicate is NOT keyed on whether the trade was capped, and that is
the trap this card nearly walked into.** `arbitrage`'s own sentence says *"SIZED
BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD"* only when the headroom came out **below** the
ask — which in a shadow run is the **start** of the quarter, where the two runs
still agree to the float. By the end, `900/remaining` has multiplied the
headroom **past** the ask, the trade is **not** capped, the sentence is silent,
and the recorded number is at its **most** wrong. A caveat keyed on it would be
quietest exactly where it is needed loudest. `arbitrage.sized_from_meter()` is
keyed on the headroom having been **measured**, so it fires on both.
`test_arbitrage.py` part 3d-8 drives the inversion.
### Rejected, and why
* **Re-compute the number so it does not amplify** — e.g. record
`ceiling − projected` (gain 1.0) instead of the sized figure. It matches the
live answer almost exactly at this cap, and it is the **worst** of the
options. It would be a **shadow-only sizing**: the recorded decision would no
longer be the decision the shipped path reached, while the arbiter, the
clamp, SAFETY-28's gate, the action log and MQTT all ran on the real one. A
second copy of the sizing arithmetic living in the display layer is
MUTATION.md's transcribed-predicate defect on an operator-facing surface, and
it generalises to no other strategy. SAFETY-10's whole safety argument is
that shadow mode is a **substitution at the wire**, not a second controller;
this would have made it a second controller everywhere except the wire.
* **Record nothing where the sizing depends on measured state.** Tempting —
"no number beats a number 6.61× out". Rejected on three counts: it blanks the
row exactly when arbitrage is trading, which is when a commissioning engineer
most wants it; the action log's edge key is the rounded watts, so blanking
them either floods or silences the log; and a surface that flickers between a
number and a dash is harder to read than a number with a standing caveat.
The narrow version of this — dropping the watts only — was the closest
runner-up.
* **Record the unsized ask alongside the sized one.** It adds a number without
adding a warning. The unsized ask is `max_w`, a constant the operator
configured; on the shipped 3500/2000 row both figures are 2000 W, so the pair
is exactly as misleading as the single figure was.
* **A caveat on every cycle in every state.** Rejected as the *whole* answer,
accepted as half of it: the unconditional part is a two-word narrowing of the
verb ("on this cycle"), not a warning, and the warning proper is conditional
so that it still means something when it appears.
---
## 4. SAFETY-10 §6's evidence, and why it could not fail
§6 tabulated `arb_power_w` −2000 W *"identical"*, `arb_reason` *"identical,
verbatim"*, arbiter winner *"identical"*. Two independent reasons it could
never have gone red:
1. **the fixture is `peak_cap_w: 15000` against a 350 W house**, so the guard
never engages and SAFETY-45's sizing is in the run and inert. ⚠️ **The
harness's own comment says so** — *"at this scenario's `peak_cap_w: 15000`
it is not binding anyway"* — which is MUTATION.md habit 4 written down
beside the check it disables;
2. **every identity row reads the FIRST charging sample.** At `elapsed = 0` the
projection *is* the held level, so the two runs agree to the float there
**even at a cap that does bind**.
⚠️ **AND THAT SECOND REASON IS THE ONE A REVIEWER CANNOT SEE FROM A DIFF.**
Widening the fixture alone — the obvious fix — leaves the `[0]` comparison
passing. Measured, not reasoned: at 1500/1200 the first charging cycle is
−300.0000 W in **both** runs while 716 of the 720 cycles differ. Part 3d-2
grades that agreement **as an expectation**, so nobody rebuilds a check on
`[0]` believing it covers something.
This is habit 4's **twelfth** instance in this repository, its **second**
inside a committed evidence artifact, and — like the seventh and the eleventh —
it was in a **measuring instrument** rather than in a check.
§6 is re-taken at `peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 / `max_w` 2000, across the
whole run. Harness `/home/homelab/s47-mut/shadowloop47.py`.
---
## 5. The grader, so this class cannot recur
`test_arbitrage.py` part **3d** — placed beside part 3c, which is SAFETY-45's
own closed-loop regression, and built on the **same** `s45_loop()` harness so
the two runs share every line of shipped code and differ in **one argument**:
```
s45_loop(sized=True) the live hour
s45_loop(sized=True, shadow=True) the same hour, battery held at WIRE_W
s45_loop(sized=False, shadow=True) SAFETY-45's own defect, watched from
inside shadow mode
```
Three lines of `s45_loop()` stand in for `Controller._write_unit()`'s
substitution and `_shadow_settle()`'s record and re-seed. They are marked as a
**transcription**; `test_clamp.py` part 8 is the check on the shipped
placement, and it drives the real `Controller`. Everything that produces a
number — the averager, the projection, the guard, the headroom, the strategy,
the arbiter, the row and the log sentence — is the shipped one.
What 3d grades, in order: that the cap **binds** (the precondition the old
evidence lacked); that the first charging cycle agrees **anyway**; that the
whole run diverges, and by how much; that the record is an **upper bound**, and
the two-point arithmetic that makes it one; what survives of the exemption;
that SAFETY-45's limit cycle and the guard's engagements are **not** visible;
the four rungs of `sized_from_meter()`, each reached with the other three clear
(TEST-16); both operator surfaces; the `capped`-keying trap; and main.py's
three call sites, pinned on the AST.
⚠️ **The section carries its own precondition into every check.** A mutation
that stops either run trading left the lists empty, the first `min()` raised,
the file died before part 4 and the run reported **zero reds — which reads
exactly like a survivor**. That is FCST-06's shape and it was **driven**, not
imagined. `s47check()` now fails every check in the section when the stimulus
was not produced, and the one division in it answers `nan` rather than raising.
---
## 6. The mutation battery — 14 mutations, no survivors
Harness `/home/homelab/s47-mut/run.py`, backups inside it. Each run restores
from backup, purges `__pycache__` **on the host**, and grades through the CI
image with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter cannot write a cache
into the tree under test (TEST-15). Fingerprints are printed before the first
run and re-checked after the last restore.
| # | mutation | file | Δ | reds |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | the row drops the caveat branch | `shadow.py` | −63 B | 2 |
| M2 | **the trap**: `sized_from_meter()` keyed on the trade being CAPPED — silent where the record is multiples out | `arbitrage.py` | +33 B | 5 |
| M3 | the CHARGE rung dropped — a sell carries a caveat §9.1 makes false | `arbitrage.py` | −30 B | 1 |
| M4 | the measured-headroom rung dropped | `arbitrage.py` | −18 B | 1 |
| M5 | the arbiter-winner rung dropped — a caveat on somebody else's number | `arbitrage.py` | −33 B | 1 |
| M6 | `main.py` renders the row with `sized_from_meter=False` | `main.py` | −23 B | 1 |
| M7 | `main.py` drops `winner=` — the rung exists and is never reached | `main.py` | −1 B | 1 |
| M8 | `main.py` sizes the trade from a literal — SAFETY-45 out of the shipped path, which the hoist put at risk | `main.py` | −41 B | 2 |
| M9 | the headroom assignment moves out of `cycle()` | `main.py` | −39 B | 1 |
| M10 | `sized_from_meter` gains a `False` default (TEST-14) | `shadow.py` | +8 B | 1 |
| M11 | `ON THIS CYCLE` deleted — the row forecasts again | `shadow.py` | −14 B | 1 |
| M12 | `log_line()` drops the caveat — the page discloses, the record does not | `shadow.py` | −63 B | 2 |
| M13 ⚠️ | `main.py` re-assembles the log sentence at the call site | `main.py` | **+0 B** | 1 |
| M14 ⚠️ | `wanted = batt_w − excess` — the headroom stops being monotone in the battery and the row's UPPER BOUND sentence becomes false | `peakguard.py` | **+0 B** | 38 |
**Survivors: none.**
⚠️ **M13 and M14 are `+0 B`, which MUTATION.md names as the risky delta.** Both
were confirmed on disk by `sha256` before the run started — the harness prints
the fingerprint of every graded file and the hash moved for each — and every
run is purged, so neither is at risk of the stale-`.pyc` failure.
⚠️ **Two findings from driving it, both reported rather than tidied away.**
* **M14's first form was aimed at the wrong direction and correctly survived.**
`min` → `max` in the buy leg's sizing makes the shadow record *larger*, which
is still an upper bound, so 3d-3b was right not to fail. The mutation that
actually inverts the bound is the sign of the excess term in `wanted`. A
survivor that is right is worth more than a red aimed at the wrong claim.
* **M12 was a survivor before the fix it forced.** Deleting the caveat from the
action-log line left **all 29 files green**: the only check that could see
that line drives a fixture with `meter_source: off`, where no arbitrage
decision — and therefore no caveat — is reachable. The sentence was an
f-string inside `Controller._shadow_settle()`, i.e. a surface no check could
grade. It is `shadow.log_line()` now, for the reason `words()` is a function,
and M13 is the mutation that puts it back at the call site.
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
# SAFETY-48 — the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-48`, on top of `TEL-10`.
**Card:** SAFETY-48 — *"the integrator goes on winding while the command is
slew-limited"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** The live install still runs `slew_w: 400`
applied by hand on 2026-09-05 12:00 and `release/1.0`'s control law. This branch
does not deploy and does not bump the version.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **It is a missing case, not a wrong constant, and the arithmetic says so.**
The integrator moves `gain * error` a cycle and the command moves at most
`slew_w`, so the integrator outruns the command whenever
`|error| > slew_w / gain` — 667 W at the live shape. SAFETY-39's retune made
`slew_w` **smaller**, which makes that threshold **lower**. §1.
2. ⚠️ **THE FORM THE CARD ASKED FOR RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY, AND THAT IS WHY
IT IS NOT WHAT SHIPPED.** Reusing the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew
flag cuts export 13 % and moves the worst quarter-hour average **offtake**
from 3739 W to **3935 W**, with the mean quarter +2.7 W — and on the billed
quarter it is worse at **every plant lag where release/1.0 produces a peak
at all** (a tie at lag 0, worse at 2.5 / 5.0 / 7.5 / 10.0 s) and at **every
top-N cut of the quarters**, which makes this the least lag-sensitive result
in the card. The harm is a tail redistribution inside quarters that already
net to offtake, not a weaker answer to import in aggregate. §3, §3a.
3. **What ships bounds the LEAD at one slew step, only where the slew is what
stopped the command, and only in the leading direction.** The robust result
is the **export reduction — 39.6 → 34.1 kWh, and it falls at every plant and
tuning tried** — with wasted throughput 4.67 → 3.19 kWh, sign reversals
2992 → 2770 and median recovery 232 → 199 s. ⚠️ **The billed quarter is not
something this card can claim.** It reads 3739 → **3434 W** at the fitted
plant lag of 7.5 s; at every lag ≤ 5.0 s — including the one that best
reproduces the recorded export — release/1.0 is *already* at 3434 W and this
card moves it by exactly zero. The lag is not identified by the data. §4,
§3a.
4. **Two committed numbers moved and neither is a silent edit.** SAFETY-13's
released command settles lower, because there is less wound integrator to
settle onto; and SAFETY-39's *"the slew does not own the over-absorption"* is
now **false — inverted, on its own independent plant model.** §5, §6.
---
## 1. The defect, in the terms the code uses
`compute()` freezes the integrator with an asymmetric rule, and the comment
beside it states the requirement outright:
> the requirement is that the INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command
But `frozen` is computed from **one** signal:
```python
saturated_now = abs(prev_w - actual_w) > tuning.saturation_w # not tracking
```
Slew-limiting never enters it. When the command hits the step ceiling the
integrator keeps winding at `gain * error` until it reaches `integrator_max_w`,
and the unwind afterwards is `integrator_max_w / slew_w` cycles — 12.5 at the
live shape, about a minute at the meter's measured tick.
⚠️ **AND THE RETUNE MADE IT MORE FREQUENT, NOT LESS.** `|error| > slew_w / gain`
is 1667 W at `slew_w: 1000` and **667 W** at `slew_w: 400`. The measured median
grid error at the onset of a recorded episode is 1114 W — above the second
threshold and below the first. This is why SAFETY-39 did not fix it, and the
mechanism is the same one §6 shows inverting.
## 2. How it was measured, and what the measurement cannot say
`tools/replay_recorded_loop.py`, over **16.00 days / 256 252 meter instants** of
the live install's own recorder, exported read-only.
**Real:** the disturbance (`D = grid + batt` at every recorded meter instant —
the house with this loop's own battery taken back out, which is exogenous and
therefore valid to drive a counterfactual with); the tick (the meter's own
recorded instants, median **5.01 s**); and the control law, imported out of the
checkout. The "before" law is the **same file** with the SAFETY-48 block removed
by a named substitution and exec'd into a fresh namespace — never a
transcription — and a missing or duplicated anchor is a **refusal** with
`NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED` on it, because an instrument that quietly compared
the shipped law with itself would report the card as changing nothing.
**Modelled:** the inverter (pure delay 7.5 s + first-order lag 2.0 s +
`batt = 0.973 × cmd − 22.4 W`, fitted on this same recording above the SoC
floor, residual **375 W RMS**); the pack (SoC integrated, discharge refused at
or below the floor); and **everything else the arbiter does** — the recorded
setpoint is the arbiter's output after the peak guard, the SoC clamps,
maintenance and arbitrage, while the replay runs `compute()` alone.
⚠️ **THE ABSOLUTE FIGURES ARE PESSIMISTIC BY ABOUT A THIRD AND THE TOOL PRINTS
IT ON EVERY RUN.** Replaying the before-law reproduces 39.6 kWh of export where
the install actually exported **29.4 kWh** over the same window. The delta is
what this instrument is for: both laws run on the same ticks, the same
disturbance, the same plant and the same seed.
⚠️ **THE SoC FILTER ON THE PLANT FIT IS THE WHOLE FIT, AND IT IS A FINDING IN
ITS OWN RIGHT.** This install spends **36 % of its ticks at or below a 10 % SoC
with the command standing near 2 kW and the battery delivering nothing.** Fitted
over all ticks the recording says `batt = 0.50 × cmd − 396 W, r = 0.70` — a
plant that follows half the command, which no inverter does. Above the floor the
same data says `batt = 1.00 × cmd − 28 W, r = 0.977`. The floor is the PACK and
is modelled separately.
## 3. The form the card asked for, and the number that refused it
The card asked for the asymmetric rule already in service for saturation, on a
flag carried across cycles the way `sat_count` is. It was built — from
release/1.0's own source, one substitution per change — and measured on the same
16 days through the same pipeline:
| | release/1.0 | **form A** — carried slew flag + the asymmetric freeze | **SAFETY-48** — the lead cap |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| export kWh | 39.61 | 34.43 | **34.07** |
| import kWh | 116.07 | 110.62 | 111.20 |
| battery sign reversals | 2992 | **2656** | 2770 |
| wasted throughput kWh | 4.67 | **2.99** | 3.19 |
| **worst 15-min offtake W** | 3739 | ⚠️ **3935** | **3434** |
| mean quarter-hour offtake delta | — | ⚠️ **+2.73 W** | **−2.39 W** |
| worst quarter-hour delta | — | +992 W | +532 W |
| recovery median s | 232 | **184** | 199 |
| recovery p99 s | 849 | **781** | 850 |
| recovery max s | 901 | 890 | 898 |
| unrecovered (> 900 s) | 53 | **26** | 31 |
| \|i_w − prev_w\| p99 W | 3361 | 1534 | **800** |
| \|i_w − prev_w\| max W | 9200 | 6912 | **800** |
**Form A wins on four rows and loses on the one that is billed.** The capacity
tariff (*capaciteitstarief*) bills the month's worst quarter-hour average
offtake, and form A raises it by **196 W** — and raises the MEAN quarter by
2.7 W, so this is systematic and not one unlucky quarter. It does so in **five
of the six** plant and tuning variants in `--sensitivity`; the sixth is a tie.
The per-cycle mechanism is that a frozen integrator stops at
`prev + gain·error(first cycle)`, which is `(1 − gain)` short of what the site
needs — 40 % short at `gain: 0.6`.
⚠️ **AND THE SENTENCE THAT USED TO FOLLOW THAT ONE WAS TOO BIG FOR THE DATA.**
It read *"for an IMPORT it is offtake, so a large import is answered too weakly
for as long as the ramp lasts"*. The aggregate does not show a weaker answer to
import: form A cuts total import by **5.45 kWh** and export by **5.18 kWh**
against release/1.0, and paired tick by tick it delivers **8.56 kWh LESS**
offtake energy on the ticks release/1.0 spent importing (lower on 38 229 such
ticks, higher on 19 669). What form A moves is the **TAIL, within quarters that
already net to offtake** — the worst quarter goes 3739 → 3935 W, the top five
3260 → 3300 W, the top fifty 1880.0 → 1882.7 W. The capacity tariff bills the
worst quarter and nothing else, so a redistribution that leaves the mean alone
and lifts the maximum is exactly the trade that is refused here. The conclusion
is unchanged; the causal sentence is now the one the data supports.
⚠️ **THE CARD SAID "do not invent a second rule", AND THE MEASUREMENT SAYS TO.**
That instruction is recorded here rather than quietly dropped. What ships is a
different rule; the paragraph above is why.
## 3a. ⚠️ The plant lag is NOT identified by this recording, and the billed quarter is the claim that depends on it
`fit_plant()` picks `lag 7.5 s` because it minimises **battery-power RMS**. That
objective barely distinguishes the candidates — 375.3 W at 7.5 s against 376.4 W
at 2.5 s, **0.3 %** — while the tool's *own* printed fidelity measure, replayed
export against the **29.43 kWh this install actually exported**, prefers 2.5 s by
the whole of the 35 % gap the header warns about. Two measures on the same data
disagree, and nothing here breaks the tie.
So the sweep has to be read as a sensitivity, not as a confirmation:
| plant lag | fit RMS W | replayed export kWh (release/1.0) | **worst 15-min offtake W:** release/1.0 | form A | SAFETY-48 | mean quarter ΔW |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 0.0 | 392.3 | 23.5 | **3434** | 3434 | **3434** | +0.53 |
| 2.5 | **376.4** | **28.9** ← nearest 29.43 | **3434** | ⚠️ 3732 | **3434** | −0.59 |
| 5.0 | 378.0 | 32.1 | **3434** | ⚠️ 3711 | **3434** | −1.02 |
| 7.5 | **375.3** ← chosen | 39.6 | 3739 | ⚠️ 3935 | **3434** | −2.39 |
| 10.0 | 384.2 | 75.4 | 3954 | ⚠️ 4326 | **3434** | −4.65 |
(The RMS column is `fit_plant()`'s own inner sweep pinned to one lag — best `tau`
and a re-fitted gain/offset at that lag. The export and quarter columns follow
`--sensitivity`'s convention instead: only the lag is substituted into the
global fit, everything else held. That is why the lag 5.0 and 10.0 export
figures are the ones already printed in §7b.)
⚠️ **AT EVERY LAG ≤ 5.0 s THE IMPROVEMENT IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT — IT IS AN
ABSENCE.** release/1.0's worst quarter is *already* 3434 W there and SAFETY-48
changes it by **exactly zero**. §7b's paragraph used to read the `3434 → 3434`
rows as "the direction does not move"; that is the wrong reading. The direction
has nothing to move: at those plants release/1.0 never produces a quarter worse
than 3434 W in the first place, and the 3739 → 3434 W headline exists only at
the single longest lag `fit_plant()` happens to select. **The peak claim is a
property of the plant model, not of the card.** What the card can claim on the
billed quantity is that it does not make it worse, at any lag.
⚠️ **AND THE ONE RESULT HERE THAT IS NOT LAG-SENSITIVE IS THE FORM-A
REJECTION.** Form A's worst quarter is the worst of the three at **every lag
where release/1.0 produces a peak at all** — 3732, 3711, 3935, 4326 against
release/1.0's 3434, 3434, 3739, 3954 at lags 2.5 / 5.0 / 7.5 / 10.0, and a tie
at lag 0.0 where both sit at 3434. It is worse at every top-N cut of the
quarters at the fitted plant (top-1 3934.6 against 3738.7, top-5 3299.7 against
3260.5, top-10 2890.6 against 2871.0, top-50 1882.7 against 1880.0, top-100
1481.7 against 1479.0), and it raises the mean quarter. §3 understated this: the rejection does not rest on one unlucky
quarter at one plant, which is exactly the objection a lag-sensitive result
invites.
⚠️ **WHAT WOULD SETTLE IT IS NOT IN THIS RECORDING.** Both objectives above are
computed from the same four recorded entities, and they disagree; nothing else
in the capture breaks the tie, and this card did not go looking for a third
objective after seeing which lag each of the first two preferred. A driven step
response — the command timestamped where it is written rather than where Home
Assistant recorded it — is what identifies a lag. That is a rig measurement and
it is not this card. Until it exists, the export reduction is what this card
delivers and the peak figure is a plant-model artefact.
## 4. What ships
```python
slew = slew_limit_w(tuning)
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
_lead_cap = SLEW_LEAD_STEPS * slew
if target > slewed:
i_w = min(i_w, slewed + _lead_cap)
elif target < slewed:
i_w = max(i_w, slewed - _lead_cap)
target = slewed
```
Four properties, and each of them is a decision:
* **It is inside the branch**, and ⚠️ **that placement was a SURVIVOR of all
thirty files until a check was written for it.** Applying it to every cycle
instead — `i_w = max(target - cap, min(target + cap, i_w))` after
`target = slewed`, −92 B — is **bit-identical on the shipped configuration**:
0 of 256 246 ticks differ over the 16-day recording. The two separate **only**
where `integrator_max_w` is set ABOVE `max_w` — the configuration `control.py`
says is the only way its `clamped` reason is reachable. There the integrator
is *deliberately* allowed above the rail, and an unconditional cap would drag
it back to the command every cycle and make the option inert.
`test_telemetry.py` part 4 drives that configuration, and the unconditional
form is red on it.
⚠️ **THE COUNT OF SEPARABLE STATES IS DECORATION AND THREE SWEEPS DISAGREE
ABOUT IT.** This card's grid gave **2050 of 257 400**; an independent review
measured **1220 of 246 064**; a third, smaller grid (four tunings × 7 `prev_w`
× 9 `grid_w` × 5 `actual_w` × 8 `i_w` including `None` × 4 `sat_count`) gives
**776 of 40 320** — and that third one is spelled out here precisely because
the first two are not, which is the whole reason they cannot be reconciled.
No count here should be read as exact without the grid beside it. All three
agree on the load-bearing part, which is **where**: every separable state sits
in the `integrator_max_w > max_w` tuning and nowhere else.
⚠️ **AND AN EARLIER DRAFT OF THIS BULLET GAVE THE WRONG REASON AND THE WRONG
NUMBER.** It said the two forms differ on 118 ticks because an unconditional
cap would pull the integrator toward a command the SATURATION freeze is
pinning. That 118 was measured against a *different* pair — a band applied
after quantisation, at the very end of `compute()` — and the saturation story
does not apply to the placement actually being compared, which sits before
the freeze. The figures above are the ones that were measured on the pair the
sentence names.
⚠️ **AND THE SATURATION STORY IS NOT MERELY INAPPLICABLE — IT IS BACKWARDS.
THE NARROW CAP THAT SHIPPED *DOES* MOVE A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR.** It
sits before the freeze block and is not gated on `frozen`. Measured on the
same 16 days at the live shape: of **79 160** frozen ticks the cap changed
`i_w` on **1095**, and on **679** of those it moved it further out on the side
it was already on — putting back magnitude the freeze had just let fall, which
is the one direction the freeze's rule ("may fall, never rise") exists to
forbid. Worst case **2424 W**, at
`prev_w −3400 W, grid +4697 W, actual −4144 W, sat_count 2 → 3`: the freeze
leaves the integrator at **−176 W**, the slew binds, and the cap drags it to
**−2600 W**. It never overrides a *same-cycle* refusal — the freeze clipped
`moved` on 75 512 ticks and the slew bound on none of them — but the claim
that this placement leaves the frozen path alone is false, and §5 is where
that shows up in a committed number.
* **It is written one-sided, and that is a CLARITY choice, not a correctness
one.** ⚠️ **An earlier draft of this file and of the comment in `control.py`
said the two-sided band `max(slewed - cap, min(slewed + cap, i_w))` was a bug
that would drag a TRAILING integrator up toward the command. That was
invented, and the sweep said so: the two spellings agree on 205 920 of
205 920 cases** across four tunings, every sign of `prev_w`, `grid_w`,
`actual_w` and `i_w`, and the `i_w=None` path. `target` is monotone in `i_w`,
so when the slew binds `i_w` lies on the same side of `slewed` as `target`
does and the other clamp cannot reach. The one-sided form stays because it
NAMES the side the lead is on; the equivalence is recorded so the next reader
finds a measurement instead of an argument.
* **It moves `i_w` and not `target`.** This cycle's command is already decided;
what is bounded is what gets CARRIED. That is also why the exhaustive
`i_w=None` equivalence sweep in `test_control.py` is untouched — it compares
`(target_w, sat_count, frozen, reason)`, none of which this moves.
* **The cap is in STEPS, not watts**, for SAFETY-39's reason: a watt figure is a
constant that outlives the `slew_w` it was derived against. `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS`
moves with `slew_limit_w()` and therefore with the rail.
⚠️ **ONE STEP, AND NOT ZERO.** `i_w = slewed` is full back-calculation, and
`control.py`'s own docstring says what that costs: passing `i_w=None` *"reduces
this function to the exact velocity form it replaced"*. A zero cap makes `i_w`
identically the command on every cycle, which is that collapse written from the
other end. Measured, it is **better** — export 32.02 kWh against 34.07, mean
quarter −3.69 W against −2.39 — and it is still refused, because it throws away
the reason the accumulator was split out at all. That 2 kWh is the price of
keeping the bounded form, and it is stated rather than hidden.
⚠️ **TWO LEADS, AND CONFUSING THEM IS HOW A CHECK GETS WRITTEN WRONG.** The cap
bounds `i_w − target`, the command this cycle EMITS, at one step — which is what
makes the unwind one cycle. `Decision.i_w − prev_w`, which is what TEL-10's
`loop_lead` publishes, is measured against the command the PREVIOUS cycle left
standing, and the emitted command is itself one step further on: the published
figure is bounded by **two** steps. Both bounds are asserted, each against its
own number.
### The two recorded deadlocks, driven rather than argued
`control.py` names two encodings that produce a permanently stuck loop, and a
gate written on the integrator is exactly the edit that brings them back.
Neither is reachable here and both are test cases in `test_telemetry.py` part 4:
* **the shrink-only encoding** — *"only corrections that shrink |i_w|"* is
unsatisfiable for both signs whenever the correction is larger than twice the
integrator, and the loop then sits at its last value forever (measured before
the fix: 0 W held indefinitely into a 2 kW import). SAFETY-48 is not a shrink
rule; it caps the lead beyond one slew step and only while the slew binds.
* **`i_w == 0.0`** — `main.py` resets the integrator to exactly 0.0 on every
stop and every reseed, and *"may not wind further in the direction it is
already pushing"* has no referent there. SAFETY-48 does not touch that gate;
the first push from zero is driven and asserted to move.
And a third, specific to this card: **the cap cannot latch.** The flag is not
carried, and after the cap `|i_w − slewed| = cap`, so the next cycle's command
covers it in one step and the slew stops binding — after which the integrator
accumulates freely again. The driven check asserts the command still walks all
the way to the rail on a railed export.
## 5. What this card COSTS, stated rather than smoothed
**SAFETY-13's release buys back less.** That card's own scenario — a second
writer holding the pack at +700 W, the command pinned, then released — settles
at **−800 W** where release/1.0 settled at −1190 W against an integrator of
−1194 W; and its sibling run settles at **−1200 W** where release/1.0 settled at
−2390 W. The property AC 4 asserts is unchanged: the released command stops at
the frozen integrator and not at the rail.
⚠️ **AND THE TWO MOVED FOR TWO DIFFERENT REASONS, WHICH THE ONE-LINE EXPLANATION
"how far that integrator had been allowed to wind" COVERS ONLY HALF OF.** Gating
the cap on `not frozen` — one line, `if frozen: _lead_cap = float("inf")`, so
the cap becomes a no-op while frozen — puts **part 5 back at release/1.0's
−1190 W exactly**. That run moved because the cap **fires on frozen cycles**
(§4). **Part 4(b) does not come back**: it is −1200 W gated and −1200 W shipped,
against release/1.0's −2390 W, because *that* one moved for the winding reason.
Both literals in `test_control.py` were re-baselined **with the reason beside
them**, and the second is now asserted against `i_w` rather than against a
number.
**The alternative that avoids it was measured and rejected.** Gating the cap on
`not frozen` as above gives export **34.71 kWh** (against 34.07), worst quarter
**3434 W** (the same as shipped), wasted **3.49 kWh** (against 3.19) — and a
worst observed lead of **4961 W**, i.e. no bound at all on the quantity this
card exists to bound. A bound with an exception large enough to drive a truck
through is not a bound. ⚠️ These four figures replace an earlier set (34.9,
3461 W, 3.5 kWh, 4966 W) that does not reproduce on this tree with the gate
spelled as above; the gate spelling is written out here so the next reader can
re-run it rather than re-derive it.
**One quarter-hour in 1534 is 532 W worse.** The billed figure is a MAXIMUM, and
at the fitted plant lag the maximum improves (3739 → 3434 W); no quarter under
SAFETY-48 reaches release/1.0's own worst. The mean moves the right way. The
tail is reported because a maximum over 1534 quarters is decided by one of them
— and §3a is the reason that improvement is not claimed as a benefit of the
card: at every shorter plant lag release/1.0's own maximum is already 3434 W.
## 6. The independent confirmation, which arrived as a failing check
`test_control.py`'s SAFETY-39 section drives a family of 51 synthetic export
steps through a **first-order plant this file writes itself** — no relation to
the replay, no recorded data in it at all. It carried this assertion:
> ⚠️ THE SLEW DOES NOT OWN THE OVER-ABSORPTION … Quartering the slew from 1000
> to 250 does not reduce the over-absorption at all
and it was right about the mechanism and therefore wrong about the conclusion:
`slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT while the integrator accumulates `gain · error`, so a
slower slew left the integrator winding for longer. Worst case over the family:
| `slew_w` | release/1.0 | this branch |
|---|---:|---:|
| 1000 | 1005 W | **729 W** |
| 0 (the rail, 556) | 1109 W | **550 W** |
| 400 (the live interim) | 1285 W | **424 W** |
| 250 | 1330 W | **326 W** |
**The ranking inverts.** Before: slower is worse, monotonically. After: slower is
better, monotonically. Two plant models that share nothing agree on the sign,
which is worth more than either alone — and it means SAFETY-39's *"gain is the
next constant to re-derive"* is now only half true: with the lead bounded, the
slew owns a share of the over-absorption it did not own before. `gain` is still
not touched here, for SAFETY-39's own reason: two live control-law constants
moving in one release makes the next measurement uninterpretable.
⚠️ **AND THE RIG SAYS THE SAME THING, WHICH MEANS TWO COMMITTED TRANSCRIPTS
CHANGED MEANING UNDER THIS CARD.** `tools/slew_sim.py --slew` runs the same
derivation on admin/goodwe's `plantsim.Plant`, a third model again. Worst-case
over-absorption over its 51-step family, `slew_w` from 1000 down to 250:
| `slew_w` | 1000 | 800 | 700 | 600 | 556 | 500 | 400 | 300 | 250 |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| release/1.0 | 958 | 1107 | 1133 | 1058 | 987 | 1029 | 1150 | 1143 | 1081 |
| **this branch** | 777 | 734 | 663 | 563 | 553 | 507 | 435 | 358 | 321 |
release/1.0's row is flat and non-monotone and **800 really is better than 556**
on that column — SAFETY-39 measured it correctly and its §3 sentence is true of
the law it was written against. This branch's row falls monotonically. So
SAFETY-39's record is not retracted; it is given a **forward reference**, and
`slew_sim.py`'s own narration now reads `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS` out of the control law
it imported and says which of the two tables it is printing. MUTATION.md habit 8
— a committed transcript is a check, and a transcript whose prose contradicts
its own table is a failing one.
## 7. Verified by breaking it
**The law.** `test_telemetry.py` part 4 and `test_control.py`'s SAFETY-39
section. The mutation table is in `test_telemetry.py`'s header.
**The instrument** (MUTATION.md habit 8 — anything under `tools/` that a
document quotes is subject to the battery):
| # | mutation to `app/control.py` | what the instrument did |
|---|---|---|
| I2 | the whole SAFETY-48 block deleted | **REFUSED**, exit 1, `NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED` — not a zero delta |
| I3 | the anchor line itself edited | **REFUSED**, same message |
| I3b | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 1000` — the cap present but inert | **every row +0.00**, which is the honest report that the block is doing nothing |
| I4 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 0` — full back-calculation | every row moves further; this is the rejected form's number in §4 |
I3b is the one that matters: it proves the delta in §3 is caused by the block
and not by the two runs differing for some other reason.
**The law**, driven in the CI image on a purged tree, fingerprinted before,
after and after the revert:
| # | mutation to `app/control.py` | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---:|---|
| L1 | the whole SAFETY-48 block deleted | −195 B | 5 in `test_telemetry.py`, 4 in `test_control.py` |
| L2 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 0` — the velocity form | +0 B | 4 + 3 |
| L3 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 12` — a cap above the rail | +1 B | 4 + 3 |
| L4 | the cap applied unconditionally, outside the slew branch | −92 B | 1 + 0 — **and it was a SURVIVOR of all thirty files before that check existed** |
| L5a | the `min`/`max` FUNCTION names exchanged | +0 B | 5 + 5, one of them `test_control.py`'s own "frozen integrator never deadlocks" over 13 041 states |
| L5b | the two BRANCH BODIES exchanged — the other reading of "the cap on the wrong side" | +0 B | 5 + 4, and it does **not** reach the deadlock sweep |
| L6 | the lead measured against `prev_w` rather than the command emitted | +0 B | 6 + 3 |
⚠️ **L5 AND L6 ARE BOTH ZERO BYTES** — `min`/`max` and `slewed`/`prev_w` are
each the same length — so no fingerprint and no byte delta can see either, and
one of L5a's reds is `test_control.py`'s own *"frozen integrator never
deadlocks"* sweep over 13 041 states, written by SAFETY-13 for a different
reason.
⚠️ **THREE OF THESE COUNTS WERE WRONG AND ARE RE-MEASURED ABOVE, WHICH IS
MUTATION.md's REPORTING RULE 3 APPLIED TO THIS CARD'S OWN TABLE.** The earlier
row gave L5 as 2 + 5 and L6 as 4 + 3; driven again in the CI image on a `cp -a`
of this tree, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time, they are **5 + 5** and
**6 + 3**. ⚠️ **AND "L5" NAMED TWO DIFFERENT MUTATIONS.** "`min`/`max` swapped"
can mean the function names exchanged or the branch bodies exchanged; they are
both red, they are both the cap on the wrong side, and they give different
counts (5 + 5 against 5 + 4) and reach different checks. A row that writes one
number for a mutation a reader cannot re-derive from its own description is a
row that cannot be re-run, so both spellings are listed. The directions in the
original table were all correct; the counts were decoration, and decoration in
a mutation table reads as evidence.
## 7b. The transcript, quoted rather than summarised
`python3 tools/replay_recorded_loop.py --sensitivity`, on this branch, 58 s:
```
THE RECORDING: 256252 meter instants over 16.00 days, loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17
tick p5 4.77 s median 5.01 s p95 7.86 s (control.LOOP_TICK_S says 2.0)
the recorded command: extremes -5000 / +5000 W -> max_w 5000; most common step above 100 W is 400 W, 9924 times -> slew_w 400
the fitted inverter: lag 7.5 s, tau 2.0 s, batt = 0.9731 x cmd -22.4 W, residual 375 W RMS above the SoC floor
FIDELITY - the BEFORE law replayed against the recording it came from
setpoint r=0.887 mean +601 W simulated vs +739 W recorded
grid r=0.682 mean +195 W simulated vs +239 W recorded
export 39.61 kWh simulated vs 29.43 kWh recorded -> the model is +35 % PESSIMISTIC about the loop's tracking
THE A/B, same ticks, same disturbance, same plant, same seed
release/1.0 SAFETY-48 delta
export kWh 39.61 34.07 -5.54 the cost
import kWh 116.07 111.20 -4.86
battery sign reversals 2992.00 2770.00 -222.00
wasted throughput kWh 4.67 3.19 -1.48
worst 15-min offtake W 3738.67 3433.94 -304.74 ⚠️ THE BILLED ONE
recovery events 549.00 612.00 +63.00
recovery median s 232.06 199.04 -33.01
recovery p99 s 849.00 849.94 +0.94
recovery max s 901.06 898.40 -2.66
unrecovered (>900 s) 53.00 31.00 -22.00
|i_w - prev_w| p99 W 3361.12 800.00 -2561.12
|i_w - prev_w| max W 9200.00 800.00 -8400.00
slew-limited ticks 16392.00 11654.00 -4738.00
mean quarter delta W -2.39 over 1534 quarters
worst quarter delta W +532.27
SENSITIVITY - the ranking, not the watts
variant export kWh worst quarter W mean quarter dW
plant lag 5.0 s 32.1 -> 27.2 3434 -> 3434 -1.02
plant lag 10.0 s 75.4 -> 68.3 3954 -> 3434 -4.65
plant tau 8 s 56.5 -> 49.8 3995 -> 3605 -3.30
gain 1.0135, offset -26 46.8 -> 39.3 3713 -> 3434 -3.27
slew_w 555.6 (the rail) 36.5 -> 34.4 3434 -> 3434 -0.17
gain 0.3 28.1 -> 27.0 3434 -> 3434 +0.16
(58 s)
```
⚠️ **`--sensitivity` IS THE RANKING AND NOT THE WATTS.** The export figure moves
by a factor of two across these plants; what does not move is the direction —
**on export**. ⚠️ **THE `worst quarter W` COLUMN IS NOT THE SAME KIND OF
EVIDENCE AND THIS PARAGRAPH USED TO TREAT IT AS IF IT WERE.** Three of its six
rows read `3434 -> 3434`, and that is not "the direction holds": it is
release/1.0 *already sitting at 3434 W* on those plants, with nothing for the
card to improve. §3a sweeps the lag properly and finds the same thing at every
lag ≤ 5.0 s. The billed-quarter improvement in the A/B table above exists at one
plant, the one `fit_plant()` selects by an objective that separates it from its
neighbour by 0.3 %.
Two rows deserve naming rather than rounding: at `slew_w: 555.6` (the rail) and
at `gain: 0.3` the mean quarter-hour delta is −0.17 W and **+0.16 W** — ties,
not improvements. Both are regimes where `|error| > slew_w / gain` is rarely
satisfied (1333 W at `gain: 0.3`, 926 W at the rail against a measured median
onset error of 1114 W), so there is little for the card to bite on. That is the
mechanism agreeing with itself, and it is also the honest answer to "would this
still be worth shipping if the tuning moved": at `gain: 0.3` it would not be.
## 8. What this card does NOT establish
* **Nothing here drives an inverter.** The replay is a model with a 375 W
residual and no arbiter in it. The closed-loop answer comes from the rig or
from a live run — SAFETY-47 records why a shadow run cannot give it.
* **The live tick is 5.0 s, not `LOOP_TICK_S`'s 2.0 s**, measured off 9924
recorded 400 W steps and off the meter's own cadence. It is wrong in the SAFE
direction (a slower meter makes `validate.py` rule 10 conservative) and is NOT
changed here — re-deriving `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is a refusal boundary on a live
install and belongs to its own card. It is recorded in the tool's header and
printed on every run.
* **The brief's plant figure was close but not exact.** It quoted
`delivered = 1.0135 × command − 26 W, r = 0.992` at a 4–6 s publish lag. On
this 16-day window, above the SoC floor, the same relation measures
`1.00 × command − 28 W, r = 0.977` at a best-fit pure delay of **7.5 s**. The
conclusion — the inverter is a pure follower and the plant is not the problem
— survives; the coefficients are the ones in §2.
* **The brief's cost figure is larger than this measurement.** It quoted ~14 kWh
of avoidable export and 65 % of site export inside 7.9 % of the time. Measured
here: **5.5 kWh** avoidable of 39.6 kWh modelled (29.4 kWh recorded), with
42 % of export inside the 6.3 % of ticks that are slew-limited and 69 % within
±60 s of one, over 15.3 % of the time. The concentration claim holds; the
avoidable-kWh figure does not, and the difference is not reconcilable from
here because the reconstruction it came from was discarded.
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
# SAFETY-56 — what the gate cannot tell apart, said in the sentence
**Text only. No behaviour changes in this card**, and §5 is the measurement that
says so: the same stimuli through the tree before and after produce a
**byte-identical** trace of every verdict, every `reading()`, every `inputs_ok`
and every readiness row's `(ok, warn)`.
---
## 1. The defect
0.10.1 is regulating a real GW5000S-BP. Two messages tell the operator that
healthy hardware has failed.
**The log line**, as emitted on the reference site on 2026-09-21:
> SAFETY-37: inverter-a battery-power register **is not following its own
> command** - STALE_READING: -3 unchanged for 36 s while the standing command
> moved 800 W to +1600 W - **the reading is not following**, so it is reported
> as MISSING rather than as a measurement … Treating it as MISSING, which
> commands 0 W.
**The readiness row**, at the same moment:
> NOT READY — battery power: `sensor.kelder_goodwe_master_stage1_goodwe_inverter_ac_power`
> **is missing or not numeric**
That entity was present, numeric and updating.
**SAFETY-37's conjunction is correct and is not touched by this card** —
`unchanged > 35 s AND |command| > 250 W AND |travel| > 250 W`. A register
genuinely stuck against a real command is exactly what it should catch, and a
pack that cannot comply is a state the site must stop in too. What was wrong is
what the sentences **concluded** from it.
## 2. Two worlds satisfy the conjunction
| | the register | the pack |
|---|---|---|
| **DEAD** | has stopped reporting reality | is doing what it was told |
| **REFUSED** | is reporting reality correctly | cannot comply — the BMS is refusing at its floor |
A refused pack holds still under any setpoint, so an honest register publishes
the same unchanged number a dead one does. **Nothing `freshness.py` is handed
separates them.** All three sentences asserted DEAD.
## 3. The live episode was REFUSED, and it is measured, not argued
Off the committed capture `scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz`,
whose bytes and decoder are already graded by `test_freshness.py` part 10a:
| | |
|---|---|
| the register | answered **-3 W for 850 s**, 10:51:24 → 11:05:34 |
| the commands during that hold | **+260, +660, +1060 W** — discharge only, never a charge |
| pack SoC throughout | **11 %** |
| first **charge** command after the restart | 11:05:31 at **-400 W** |
| the register moves | **11:05:34** — **3 s**, inside one 17.0 s obligation window |
**A register that answers a reversed command inside one obligation window had
not stopped reporting.** What would not move was the pack. The sentence the
operator read named the one thing in the loop that was telling the truth.
⚠️ What this does **not** establish: that no register is ever intermittently
wrong. It excludes a register that had simply stopped; it cannot exclude one
that was wrong and then right. That is the point — the new sentence claims
neither.
## 4. The fix, and why it is three sentences and not one helper
Each message states **what was observed** and names **both** explanations.
| where | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| `app/freshness.py` `_grade()` | *"…+1600 W - the reading is not following, so it is reported as MISSING…"* | *"…+1600 W. **TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE CANNOT TELL THEM APART**: the register may have stopped reporting reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command - a pack the BMS is refusing holds still under any setpoint, and an honest register then reads exactly like a frozen one. Either way the number cannot be read as this command's effect, so it is reported as MISSING…"* |
| `app/main.py` `_read_unit()` | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power **register is not following its own command** - %s."* | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power reading **did not move under a command that did, WHICH IS NOT BY ITSELF A VERDICT ON THE REGISTER** - %s."* |
| `app/main.py` `checks()` | *"{label}: {entity} **is missing or not numeric**"* | *"{label}: **no usable value this cycle from** {entity} - **and this row cannot tell which of two things that is**: the entity is missing or not numeric, or it is publishing a number that this controller is withholding (a freshness gate does exactly that, and names itself in a row of its own). Confirm the entity in Developer Tools before replacing it"* |
**Three sentences, three wordings, no shared helper.** The first two are a log
line about a **behaviour**; the third is a banner about a named **entity**, and
the two answer different questions ("what did the register do" against "can I
trust this entity"). A helper serving both would have to drop whichever half
the other caller does not need, and the half it dropped would be the
operator's next step. The log line names the pair **once**, inside the `%s` it
already interpolates, rather than in both of its own halves.
**No new input, and SoC is not wired.** `BOUNDS["soc"]` stays *STATED, NOT
WIRED*; telling the two worlds apart needs the pack floor (SAFETY-32's number)
and SoC (TEL-08's wiring), and a message honest about its own ambiguity needs
neither. Part 11b drives the two worlds at **50 %** and **11 %** SoC and
asserts the sentence does not move one byte.
**The readiness row does not branch.** `inv.batt_fresh.stale` is on the same
object at the same moment, and the row deliberately does not ask it: the same
loop renders the grid and SoC rows, which have no gate, and a branch per row
would be a second place where "why is this None" is decided. The gate already
has a surface — `stale_note()` rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below with
the whole STALE_READING sentence in it — so the operator's discriminator is
*"is that row there?"*, and part 11d asserts that row is **present in REFUSED
and absent in ABSENT**.
## 5. Behaviour is byte-identical, measured
`tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` prints two documents from one stimulus set.
The `behaviour` half contains **no sentence**: only `stale`, `reading()`,
`releases`, `held`, the window bookkeeping, `inputs_ok`, and every readiness
row's `(ok, warn)`. Run in the CI image, purged, `:ro`, against
`origin/release/1.0` **archived out of git** and against this branch:
| | |
|---|---|
| the committed live capture | **2390 reads**, 7 verdict edges |
| a swept grid of command × register schedules | **66 cells × 120 reads** — 1060 stale reads, 1309 `MISSING` readings, 6 releases |
| six driven controller worlds through the shipped read path | DEAD, REFUSED, ABSENT, HEALTHY, RELEASE, RETRIP — every read's `(batt, inputs_ok, stale)` and every `checks()` row's `(ok, warn)` |
| **result** | `6030175ed2ab9a4143e86e89a71d45c8ab041ac1c00121a3e3e023cd2b08996c` **on both trees** |
⚠️ **AND THE CONTROL IS INSIDE THE TOOL, BECAUSE AN IDENTITY BETWEEN TWO TREES
THAT ARE THE SAME TREE IS HABIT 4.** `--compare` refuses to report "behaviour
unchanged" unless the `sentences` halves **differ**. This card's first
invariance run was exactly that mistake — it archived a branch whose edits were
not committed yet, so `before` and `after` were the same code and the identity
was perfect and worthless.
Both of the tool's refusals are **driven**, not asserted:
| | |
|---|---|
| the same file compared with itself | `REFUSED: the sentences halves are IDENTICAL…`, exit **2** |
| `MOVE_W` 250.0 → 240.0 in the after tree | `BEHAVIOUR MOVED at 'sweep_stale_reads' / 'sweep_missing_reads' / 'sweep_trace'`, exit **1** |
| this card | `OK: sentences differ, behaviour is byte-identical.`, exit **0** |
## 6. The mutation battery
Each in its own `mktemp`'d copy (habit 18), purged on the host, mounted `:ro`,
graded by `tools/mutation_run.sh` in the CI image.
| | mutation | Δ bytes | named reds |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `_grade()` reverted to *"the reading is not following"* | -402 | **3** |
| M2 | the log line reverted to *"register is not following its own command"* | -80 | **2** |
| M3 | the row reverted to *"{entity} is missing or not numeric"* | -619 | **2** |
| M4 | *register* and *source* transposed between the two explanations | **0** | **1** |
| M5 | the second explanation deleted, the first kept | -216 | **1** |
| M6 | *"CANNOT TELL THEM APART"* replaced by *"IN ORDER OF LIKELIHOOD"* | -13 | **1** |
| M7 | the REFUSED world's ground truth set to the DEAD world's | 0 | **2** |
| M8 | the row's second cause deleted | -309 | **1** |
| M9 | `label` and `entity` transposed in the row | **0** | **3** |
| M10 | M1 + M2 + M3 together, i.e. exactly what 0.10.1 ships | -1101 | **5** |
| M11 | the accusation literals replaced by one that matches nothing | 0 | **1** |
⚠️ **M9's first run was a defect in this card's own check, and it is the one
worth reading.** The row was fetched with `[...][0]`. Transposing `label` and
`entity` makes the row unfindable, so the run died on an `IndexError` — a red
with **no name attached**, with every check after that line **ungraded**. That
is FCST-06's shape exactly. `_s56_row()` now returns a named absence instead of
raising, and a precondition grades it: **0 named reds before, 3 after.**
⚠️ **M11 is the other one aimed inward.** `not any(...)` over an empty list is
True, and so is one over three mistyped literals. The positive control runs the
same predicate against the three sentences **as 0.10.1 shipped them** and
requires it to find an accusation in every one, and every literal to match at
least one of them (habit 7: vary one thing from an accepted baseline).
## 7. What part 11 does not grade
* It does not show the live episode was a BMS refusal beyond doubt — see §3.
* It does not grade English. A sentence that named both explanations and then
said something useless about them would pass.
* The `no entity configured` branch beside the rewritten row is untouched and
ungraded: a blank entity really is the only thing it can be.
* The **grid-power and battery-SoC rows** go through the same rewritten line and
have no freshness gate today, so for them the second cause is a hypothesis
about this controller rather than a live possibility. That is weaker than the
battery-power case and is the price of not branching per row. A gate on either
signal — TEL-08 would be one — makes it exact.
* **SAFETY-58 is not touched** (the first read after a long rest trips before a
healthy register could answer), and neither is the 710/790 disagreement
between `test_freshness.py` and the changelog. Both are separate cards; the
second has a **fourth site** at
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-57-the-exit-from-a-stale-verdict.md:274` that a fix written
off the PR table alone would miss.
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
# SAFETY-57 — the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-57`, off `origin/master` @ `6f5e8e3`
(content-identical to `release/1.0` @ `8a57361`).
**Card:** SAFETY-57 — *"the freshness gate has no exit reachable from inside the state it creates"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No contact was made with 192.168.2.158 or
192.168.2.221. The one live system touched is `sniffer@192.168.2.167`, a
**passive** RS-485 listener with no address on the bus, and it was read only.
---
## 0. The five things a reader should take away
1. **The live episode is reproduced from the wire, not modelled.** The capture
is committed, the decoder is committed, and the box that produced it was
running the defect — so the `0 W` in the trace *is* the add-on's own
`inputs missing → command 0 W`. §2.
2. **Option 2 from the card — "do not arm the gate when the command is 0 W" —
already holds, and it is not the bug.** `_grade()` has required
`|standing| >= MOVE_W` since SAFETY-37. The trip happened at **+1060 W** and
the stuck state is at **0 W**; they are different moments. §3.
3. **The decision is not "how long", it is "when".** The verdict is withdrawn
when the **obligation that produced it is no longer standing** — SAFETY-13's
shape one module over. The 17.0 s is the obligation window that was already
derived in the file, taken at the **floor** of its band, and which half is
safe is the **opposite** of SAFETY-13's. §4.
4. **It costs 52 % exposure on a permanently dead register, and that number is
in the suite so it cannot be forgotten.** It is payable only because one
re-grading window (35 s) is shorter than both consumer holds (75 s, 85 s).
**No detection SAFETY-37 had is given back.** §5.
5. **The battery had been rescuing this code by accident.** 93 trips in the
committed 16-day capture; median wait for the BMS keep-alive pulse that
cleared them **143 s**, worst **5 h 57 m**. §6.
---
## 1. What was there, in the terms the code uses
`freshness.py`, `Freshness.submit()` and `_grade()`:
```python
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
...
self.stale = False # the only place the latch is cleared
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono):
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
return # sets the latch; never clears it
```
and `main.py:1777`, `inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()`, where `reading()`
answers `None` while `stale`. `inputs_ok` sees the `None`, the site holds for
`stale_input_s`, then files `Claim.set("safety", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "inputs
missing")` and keeps filing it.
The reason the latch exists is written in the class docstring and it is a good
one: without it the verdict oscillates at about 1 Hz, because declaring the
reading stale drops the command below `MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction,
which hands the held number straight back.
**The defect is that the only thing that ends it is an arrival carrying a
different number — and the state's own output is what stops the register being
asked for one.** The log line promised the opposite, in the same sentence that
announced the 0 W:
> *Treating it as MISSING, which commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the
> register reports a different value.*
---
## 2. Reproducing it, from the wire
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz` is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, 10:30–11:10 Europe/Brussels, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`. The decoder reports **0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC,
0 unknown shapes**, and its mode→sign convention is **graded off the capture**
rather than trusted: 298 commands at or under −1000 W are each answered one
obligation window later by a negative register reading, and not one positive.
| capture time | on the wire |
|---|---|
| 10:51:14 | `0x0518` = **−447 W**; the loop is charging |
| 10:51:19 | the command reverses: EMS **mode 3**, 260 W of discharge |
| 10:51:24.7 | `0x0518` = **−3 W**. The pack is at **11 %**, the BMS refuses the discharge, the inverter idles. **The register is healthy and truthful.** |
| 10:51:29.7 | the command reaches **+1060 W**. 800 W of travel |
| 10:52:21.7 | the setpoint is written **0 W** — this is the add-on's own §11.1 rule 1, recorded on the wire |
| …850.0 s | `0x0518` does not change value |
| …790.0 s | the setpoint does not change value |
| ~11:04 | **a person restarts the add-on** — not visible in this file, and the only thing that ends the episode |
| 11:05:31.7 | the restarted loop commands **−400 W of charge**, which the pack accepts at 11 % |
| 11:05:34.7 | `0x0518` = **−137 W** |
⚠️ **THE CAPTURE IS CLOSED-LOOP FOR THE WHOLE PARKED INTERVAL**, which is why
this is a reproduction and not a simulation: the box was running 0.10.0, so
every command in the trace is the shipped code's own. The only event inside the
window the file cannot account for is the human restart.
Replaying the shipped `_read_unit` loop at 1 Hz against those two series
(`test_freshness.py` part 10b):
| | stale at | clear at | parked |
|---|---|---|---|
| **before** (`release_s = inf`) | 10:52:00 | 11:05:35 | **815 s**, and `reading()` is `None` on all **812** reads from the trip to the first command a human put on the wire, with the register at −3.0 W in every one of them |
| **after** | 10:52:00 | **10:52:39** | **39 s**, with `0x0518` still answering the same **−3 W** |
⚠️ **THE COUNTERFACTUAL IS `release_s = inf`, AND IT IS GRADED RATHER THAN
CLAIMED.** With an infinite bound `_release()` never fires, `_open_window()` is
only ever called where the register moves, and the window pair is the
change-stamp pair — byte-for-byte the pre-SAFETY-57 conjunction. Part 10b
asserts that by driving part 1's own fresh/stale pair through both bounds and
comparing the verdict streams.
The replay also found a **one-read trip at 10:48:14** that clears one second
later. That is a pre-existing false positive and it is now recorded as
survivor 5 — §7.
---
## 3. What the card's option 2 actually buys, which is nothing here
The card offered *"do not arm the gate when the command being graded is 0 W"*
and warned that it might hold already. **It does, and it has since SAFETY-37**:
`_grade()` returns at `abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w`, and
`test_freshness.py` part 4 has a named check on that term, added because a
mutation removing it survived.
The warning in the card is the right one and it is worth writing down: **the
trip and the stuck state are different moments.** The gate armed at **+1060 W**,
where the conjunction is entirely correct — a command travelled 800 W and the
register did not move for 35 s. The site then went to **0 W** *because of the
verdict*. An entry-side rule cannot reach a state that is entered legitimately
and then persists. **The defect is the exit, and nothing else in the conjunction
is touched by this card.**
Option 3 — probing with a small non-zero command — was not taken and does not
need to be. It writes to a real actuator to test an assumption, and §4's rule
does not need a probe: the site's *normal* control resuming is the test, and it
is gated behind the same `inputs_ok` everything else is.
---
## 4. The decision: which verdicts get an exit, and what the bound is
> The stale verdict holds as before, **unless** the obligation that produced it
> is no longer standing — `|standing| < MOVE_W` — **and** it has been gone
> longer than the register would have needed to answer it. On a release the
> latch clears and a **new grading window** opens at that instant.
This is [[SAFETY-13]]'s §4 in a different module, and deliberately so: that card
established the house answer to "a latch with no exit" and its answer was *not*
a plain time bound but a **predicate plus a time bound**, where the predicate
says whether the state can end on its own. Here the predicate is that **the
question is no longer being asked.** A register under a 0 W command is obliged
to be nowhere, so a verdict about whether it is following cannot be tested, and
a verdict that cannot be tested may not stand for ever.
### 4.1 Why the window has to re-open, and what happens if it does not
`_grade()` compares the register's unchanged time against `unchanged_s` and the
command's travel against the command standing when the window opened. If a
release cleared the latch **without** re-opening the window, the first read at
which the resumed command travels 250 W would re-trip immediately — the
register would never get the 17 s in which it could answer, and the live
episode's recovery (a charge the pack **accepts**) would be killed inside two
seconds. Mutating exactly that (`graded_from` re-anchored to `changed_mono`,
+82 B) takes four named checks red.
The new window is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` = **35 s**, the same bound as entry,
because it is the same question — *does this register follow the commands issued
from now on?* — and there is no principled shorter answer to it. It is also the
number the exposure argument in §5 rests on, so it is not free to move.
### 4.2 `RELEASE_S` = `BATT_OBLIGED_S` = 17.0 s, and which half is safe
The quantity needed is *has the register had its chance to answer the command
standing now?*, and `freshness.py` already derives it as the floor of
`BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band:
```
6.0 s plant goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22
10.0 s publisher firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181, update_interval: 10s
1.0 s this add-on run_control()'s await asyncio.sleep(1)
```
⚠️ **IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND, NOT A SENSITIVITY PREFERENCE** — the mirror of
`MOVE_W` taking the **ceiling** of its own for the mirrored reason.
| | the question | the safe half | why |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-13's `SETTLE_CYCLES` | may the plant still be the **explanation**? | the **longer** half | a shorter bound stops believing the plant too early, and then it accuses |
| this one | may the verdict still be **tested**? | the **shorter** half | being wrong *long* is the failure being fixed; being wrong *short* costs one re-grading window, and §5 bounds that |
Below 17.0 s the release pre-empts the **cheaper exit** — the register answering
the new 0 W command by itself, which clears the latch on evidence rather than on
a timer. That is graded behaviourally rather than asserted: a register that
answers at +16 s clears by **movement** at `release_s = 17.0` with `releases`
still 0, and by **timer** at `release_s = 5.0`.
The family is computed and printed (habit 10): `5, 16, 17, 18, 35, inf` give
six distinct release instants, so no check in the file can confuse two of them.
### 4.3 Two clocks, and the operator reads the register's
`changed_mono` / `unchanged_s()` remain facts about the **register**: after a
release they go on reporting that it has not moved for 850 s, because it has
not. `graded_from` / `graded_s()` are the **verdict's** window. They coincide
until the first release. Collapsing them either lies to the operator or defeats
the re-grading, and both directions are mutated red.
The stale sentence's `unchanged for N s` slot carries the **register's** number;
a re-trip appends a clause naming the window and the grade count, so the two
durations cannot be read as one number that moved (habit 14).
---
## 5. What it costs, measured
Driven against a register frozen for good, 1201 reads, shipped defaults
(`test_freshness.py` part 10c):
| | parked | the held number reaches a consumer | releases |
|---|---|---|---|
| before | 1166 s | **35 reads (2.9 %)** | 0 |
| after | 571 s | **630 reads (52.5 %)** | 17 |
⚠️ **52 % IS PAID EVERY CYCLE, NOT OCCASIONALLY.** The period is
`stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S` (17 s) parked, then one 35 s window.
It is payable because of one inequality, and it is the inequality
`test_freshness.py` part 6 has graded against the shipped `config.yaml` since
SAFETY-37:
```
35 s (the re-grading window) < 75 s (circulation_hold_s) < 85 s (unit_sign_disagree_s)
```
Every unbroken run of exposure is **exactly one window**, so neither consumer
can reach a verdict inside one, and the re-trip that ends each run hands them a
`None`, which **clears** their windows rather than accumulating into them.
**And nothing SAFETY-37 detects is given back**, which is the half that makes
this a trade rather than a regression: a permanent `None` clears those same two
windows for ever as well, so on the shipped-before module those detectors are
*equally* unable to speak about the unit. What the held number does reach for
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()` — which
answers a large unexplained divergence by **freezing the output**, the
conservative direction and SAFETY-13's business — and the command itself is
derived from the **P1 meter**, never from `batt`.
### 5.1 The narrowing this does NOT take, named so the next card can
The live episode's register refused a **discharge** into an 11 % pack and then
followed a **charge** three seconds later. A refusal in one direction is not
evidence about the other, and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade
on the first command that crosses it instead of on a timer — which would shrink
the 52 % above. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately does not take
(see the `soc` row and TEL-08), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's number.
It is **not needed to give the state an exit**, and folding it in here would
make the exit depend on a second measurement being right.
---
## 6. The measurement that says the old exit was luck
`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/` replayed at 1 Hz through the shipped
conjunction (`test_freshness.py` part 8b): **93 trips in 16 days.** The only
thing that could clear any of them was the register carrying a different number,
and that took:
| | |
|---|---|
| minimum | 0.6 s |
| **median** | **143.4 s** |
| maximum | **21440.1 s** (5 h 57 m) |
| at or over the live episode's 710 s | **17 of 93** |
The short waits are the BMS keep-alive pulse — SAFETY-50 measured its ceiling at
508 W — twitching `0x0518` and satisfying the clearing rule **by accident**.
Over a fifth of the trips are cleared in under 20 s by something nothing in this
add-on asked for.
⚠️ **WHAT THAT REPLAY IS AND IS NOT.** The capture runs 2026-09-02…17 and
0.10.0 — the first version carrying this gate — was cut on 2026-09-16, so the
setpoint column is an **ungated** controller's. That makes each trip an honest
register-versus-command divergence off the real bus, and it makes the post-trip
command column something a gated box would **not** have written. The figure
taken from it is therefore the only one that does not depend on the command at
all — how long this register goes without changing value — and it **under**-states
the wait, because a site parked at 0 W gives the register even less reason to
move than the one recorded here.
---
## 7. Survivors, and the two things the battery found
The battery is 22 mutations over `app/freshness.py`, `app/main.py` and
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`, plus one over the committed capture itself. All
run through `ci_run.sh`, a mirror of `checks.yml`'s own step: a purged copy of
the tree, bind-mounted `:ro`, one file at a time, `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1`.
Per MUTATION.md habit 18 the harness's scratch file is `mktemp`ed per
invocation and the tree is fingerprinted **after the revert** as well as before;
every revert restored the recorded sha256 and byte count.
**21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.** The table is in the
PR body. Two of them are worth keeping here.
### 7.1 The equivalent mutant, argued rather than rounded off
Swapping `_release()` and `_grade()` in `submit()` is a **zero-byte** edit and
survived the whole battery. **It is not a missing fixture and no fixture can
close it**: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()`
only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on any
read, whichever runs first.
⚠️ **THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CODE CLAIMED THE ORDER WAS LOAD-BEARING**, in a
`⚠️` comment, with a reason that sounded right. It was false, and the battery is
what said so — **MUTATION.md habit 22 exactly, one card later: an explanation in
a comment is a claim, and this one had not been run.** The comment now states
the disjointness, and part 10 pins **that** — at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W — instead of pinning an order that is not observable.
### 7.2 The sibling that survived, which is habit 11 earning its place
`_release()`'s obligation test is `abs(standing_w) >= self.bound.move_w`.
Swapping `move_w` for `unchanged_s` — comparing **watts against 35** — survived
the file at **+5 B**, because **every fixture rested at exactly 0 W**, and 0 is
below both 35 and 250. They separate only in the band between them, and a site
can sit there: a peak-guard floor, a shadow substitution, any claim that wins
with a small non-zero number. Closed by a three-point fixture at 0 / 100 / 300 W
that asserts the 100 W case releases and the 300 W case does not.
### 7.3 ⚠️ And the instrument lied once, which is habit 16's second half
The first form of the `graded_from` mutation was
`float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`. It reported a **survivor at +21 B**, and
the tree fingerprint showed the edit really was on disk and really did run.
`changed_mono` is **0.0** in the dead-register fixture, and `0.0 or x` is `x` —
so the mutant was a *no-op on the fixture*, for a Python truthiness reason that
has nothing to do with the property under test. Rewritten as an explicit
`is None` test (+82 B) it is red on four named checks.
**A mutation is subject to every habit in MUTATION.md, including habit 4.** A
purge, a fingerprint and a byte delta all say the edit is present; none of them
says the edit *changed the answer on this stimulus*. MUTATION.md gains habit 19
for it.
---
## 8. What this does NOT fix, said plainly
**It does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register**, and it does not
try to. Both are re-graded on the same timer. §5.1 names what telling them apart
would need.
**It does not make the diagnosis right.** The line the operator reads still says
*"battery-power register is not following its own command"*, which is wrong in a
different way when the pack is simply empty. That wording is **SAFETY-56's**,
together with `main.py`'s NOT READY row, and it is deliberately untouched here —
two cards editing one sentence is how one of them silently loses. Only the
**escape clause** was rewritten, because this card is what made the old one
false, and part 10h has a named check asserting the diagnosis half is still
there so that rewrite has to be a deliberate act.
> ⚠️ **SINCE SUPERSEDED, WHICH IS WHAT THAT CHECK WAS FOR.** [[SAFETY-56]] is
> the deliberate act: all three sentences now name **both** explanations and
> accuse neither, and part 10h's check is inverted — it requires the accusation
> to be **gone**. Nothing else in this section moved; the escape clause above is
> still this card's and is untouched by it. See
> `DECISIONS/SAFETY-56-what-the-gate-cannot-tell-apart.md`, and
> `test_freshness.py` part 11 for the graded pair of worlds.
**Survivor 5 is older than this card and is not closed by it.** After a long
rest the unchanged clock is already past 35 s, so the **first** read carrying a
travelled command trips the gate — before the 17.0 s in which a healthy register
could have answered it. The live capture contains one (10:48:14, cleared one
second later). Its size is one `stale_input_s` hold, during which `cycle()`
returns at `inputs missing {n}s` and commands nothing differently. Fixing it
means measuring the unchanged clock from when the **obligation** appeared rather
than from the register's last move, which re-derives the 35.0 s bound and is a
different card.
**Nothing was measured on two inverters.** Inverter B does not physically exist
(`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b). Every two-unit figure in `test_freshness.py` is two
copies of A's behaviour with different numbers passed in.
**No deploy is proposed.** 0.10.0 is on the reference install and this branch's
CHANGELOG row is filed under it only because `test_version_gate.py` part 11b
requires the newest heading to be a version. Moving it, and deciding whether a
version is cut, is a PKG card's.
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# SAFETY-61 — the control task's death ends the process
## 0. The defect
`amain()` started `run_control()` as a bare task and waited on `stop`. Nothing
watched the task. An uncaught exception in `read_inputs()`, `cycle()` or
`publish()` ended the task silently, and `stop` was never set. The web UI, P1
and tariff tasks kept running, and the Supervisor saw a healthy container. The
traceback appeared only at shutdown. The ESP32's layer-1 veto zeroed the
inverter about 30 s later, so the hardware was safe. The pack then sat at 0 W
indefinitely while the add-on showed green.
`test_control_task.py` reproduces this on the pre-fix tree. The child process
reaches its 40 s deadline, has written no 0 W, and has logged nothing.
## 1. Decision: exit with status 70 after the ordinary wind-down
A done-callback on the control task (`control_task_done()`) handles the death.
It logs the traceback at CRITICAL at the moment of death, then sets `stop`.
`amain()` then runs the same wind-down that SIGTERM runs (`shutdown()` →
`command_site_zero()`, then cancel, then clean up). After that it raises
`ControlTaskDied`, and `main()` turns that into `SystemExit(70)` (sysexits
EX_SOFTWARE). A normal stop and `run_control()`'s own refusal path both set
`stop` before the task ends, so the callback ignores them. The refusal still
exits with 78.
**Why not restart the loop in the same process:**
* `cycle()` writes controller state before its awaits: `cycle_at`,
`peak_guard`, `allocation`, then `target`/`reason`, then the writes. An
exception between those steps leaves the controller half-updated. A loop
restarted in the same process would continue from a state that no boot ever
produces. A process restart rebuilds the controller from the Store, which is
the path every boot already runs.
* An unbounded retry is the invisible spin the card forbids. A bounded retry
would reimplement the Supervisor watchdog's own throttle: 10 restarts per
30 min, and 5 attempts with backoff (`apps/const.py`).
## 2. What happens after the exit, verified rather than assumed
* **Exit status reaches Docker.** The add-on image (s6-overlay, `init: false`,
`CMD /run.sh`) was run with `exec python3 -c 'raise SystemExit(70)'`.
`docker inspect` gave ExitCode 70. The same test with exit 0 gave 0, and an
uncaught exception gave 1.
* **Supervisor 2026.08.0** (`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor`,
source read from the image):
* A non-zero container exit is recorded as `ContainerState.FAILED`
(`docker/monitor.py`). The Supervisor logs *"App … exited with non-zero
exit code 70"* at ERROR (`apps/app.py container_state_changed`).
* The Supervisor restarts the add-on **only if the per-install Watchdog
toggle is on**. `watchdog_container()` returns when `not self.watchdog`.
The toggle defaults to **off** (`apps/validate.py`:
`vol.Optional(ATTR_WATCHDOG, default=False)`).
* Add-on containers get **no Docker restart policy**. The only
`restart_policy=` in the Supervisor belongs to the observer.
* `boot: auto` in `config.yaml` only controls starting at host boot. The
`watchdog:` key in `config.yaml` is a health-check URL, not a restart
policy, and this add-on does not set it.
* **So on a default install the add-on stays stopped after this exit.** The UI
shows it as stopped, its log holds the traceback, and the Supervisor log holds
an ERROR line. The pack is at 0 W, which is the same physical state as before
this card. The difference is that 0 W is written immediately instead of after
the ~30 s veto, and the add-on no longer shows green. With the Watchdog toggle
on, the Supervisor restarts the add-on.
* **Not verified:** an actual restart by a running Supervisor. That would need a
live Supervisor, and the only one available is the live house.
## 3. Left open for the owner
* Whether `DOCS.md` should tell installers to enable Watchdog. DOCS.md is not
this card's file.
* Setting the Watchdog toggle from inside the add-on (`/addons/self/options`)
was rejected here, because it would change a user setting without the user
knowing.
## 4. Scope: the siblings, and why they are not supervised
* `run_tariff_refresh()` and the P1 HTTP and HA transports already catch
`Exception` inside their loops by design, and the values they feed are
age-bounded downstream.
* The P1 MQTT source *returns* on purpose when it is misconfigured. Making every
long-lived task's end exit the process would turn that deliberate fail-safe
into a restart loop.
* Only the control task is supervised.
## 5. `hass.py`: an undecodable body is an absence
A non-JSON `200` served as `text/html` was **already** treated as an absence,
because aiohttp's `ContentTypeError` is a `ClientError`. The reads that actually
escaped were these three:
* a malformed body labelled `application/json`, which raises `JSONDecodeError`
(a `ValueError`);
* a JSON body that is not an object, which raises `AttributeError` in
`number()` and `limits()`;
* an undecodable error body in `call()`, which raises `UnicodeDecodeError`.
All three were measured against aiohttp 3.13.5. The first two now read as
`None`, and the third is now a failed write (`False`).
## 6. Status row
`checks()` now starts with a *control loop* row showing how long ago the loop
last completed a pass. The row turns red once that age exceeds
`FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S`. The heartbeat is sent from this loop, so past that age
layer 1 has zeroed the inverter.
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
# TARIFF-07 — three plugins that never fetched a price, and the one mechanism they leave behind
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-13 — withdraw `engie_dynamic`,
`totalenergies_dynamic` and `eneco_eddy`. Keep `PriceProduct.REALTIME` and the
widening machinery. Refuse a retired id by name rather than aliasing it.**
Filed with TARIFF-07. Follows [[TARIFF-08]], which found the same class of
defect one layer down — a parser graded against its own guess — and left the
question of these three open.
---
## 1. The endpoints, verified rather than taken on report
The card said the three endpoints were dead. They were re-checked by hand on
**2026-09-13** before anything was deleted, because "the endpoint is dead" is
exactly the kind of claim this repository keeps finding to be second-hand:
| id | endpoint | observed |
|---|---|---|
| `engie_dynamic` | `https://api.engie.be/dynamic/be` | **HTTP 404**, body `{"message":"no Route matched with those values","request_id":"..."}` — a Kong gateway with no route configured |
| `totalenergies_dynamic` | `https://api.totalenergies.be/prices/dynamic` | **TLS failure**. The handshake completes and the server presents `CN=pge-apigee-dev.direct-energie.com`; `api.totalenergies.be` is not in the SAN list, so the connection is closed before any request is sent |
| `eneco_eddy` | `https://api.eneco.be/eddy/prices` | **HTTP 404**, `content-length: 1`, `server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0` — an empty body from a live host that does not serve this path |
All three failed. Had any one of them answered, this card would have stopped
and asked, because an endpoint that answers changes the decision from
"withdraw" to "fix the parser".
## 2. Why this is not "unfinished", and why no replacement can be written
An unfinished plugin has a right endpoint and a wrong parser. These have
neither, and the reason is structural:
* **ENGIE's dynamic price is `(B × eSpot_15) − A`, and `B` and `A` are
PER-CONTRACT.** They live behind the customer's klantenzone login. No
unauthenticated public URL can return *a given customer's* price, so the
endpoint this plugin wanted cannot exist for anybody to build.
* **There is no regulator index to read the coefficients from.** CREG's
tariff-card pages 404; VREG was unreachable. Every coefficient found in
research came from a supplier's own PDF, which is a document, not a feed.
* **"Eddy" is not an Eneco product at all.** Eneco's dynamic product is
**"Zon & Wind Dynamisch"**, and it is indexed to **Belpex/EPEX day-ahead** —
not to imbalance. The plugin was wrong about the product, the product type
and the URL simultaneously.
So the three were not withdrawn for being broken. They were withdrawn for
describing tariffs that no public endpoint can serve.
## 3. What a site configured on one of these has actually been running
⚠️ **This is the half that decides what the migration is.** §11.4 turns a
failed fetch into a silent fall back: static profile, plan provisional, no
arbitrage. That is the *correct* degradation, and it says nothing at all about
the cause. Every fetch these three ever made raised `SourceUnavailable`.
Therefore a site configured on one of them has been running on
`static_profile` — **or on nothing at all, where no profile was set** — since
the day the id was entered, and **nothing on its status page has ever differed
from a working provider that simply never found a cheap hour**.
The migration is therefore **not** "keep their prices working". There were no
prices. It is *"tell them their prices never worked"*, which is why the answer
is a refusal and not a fallback.
### Why not a silent alias to `generic_dayahead`
It is the friendlier-looking option and it is wrong. These published **retail**
prices; `generic_dayahead` reads **wholesale**. Aliasing needs the site's own
`B` and `A`, which §2 has just established nobody has. An alias would have to
**invent the numbers a battery is priced against** — the same defect as a
parser graded against its own guess, one layer further from anything that
reports. The scalar `price_markup_eur_kwh` cannot stand in for `B` either: it
is an addend, not a multiplier, and it is `float(0,1)` so it cannot even hold a
negative `A`.
## 4. ⚠️ The `config.yaml` schema is deliberately WIDER than the registry
`price_provider` is a `list(off|…)` enum, and the Supervisor validates the
options file against it **before the add-on starts**.
So the obvious edit — delete the three ids from the enum along with the classes
— has a consequence that runs exactly opposite to this card's purpose:
```
operator's config says price_provider: eneco_eddy
|
+-- id NOT in the schema enum
|
+-- Supervisor rejects the options file
|
+-- add-on never starts
|
+-- validate.py never runs
|
+-- the named refusal is NEVER SEEN
```
The operator gets an opaque `expected one of ...` from a layer they did not
configure, on **exactly the sites the withdrawal exists to inform**.
**Decision: keep all three ids in the schema enum.** `PROVIDERS` shrinks to
two; the enum stays at six. The cost is that the dropdown still offers three
dead ids to a *new* operator — and that is the cheaper failure, because
choosing one is refused at the next startup **by name**, with the endpoint, the
observation and the alternative, which is strictly more than a schema
rejection would say. Both translations label them withdrawn in the option
description.
`app/price.py`'s `RETIRED_PROVIDERS` is the list. `test_price.py` section 1
asserts the schema offers exactly `PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {"off"}` —
derived, not typed — and `register()` refuses to re-register a retired id, so
the registry and the retired table cannot both claim one and the refusal cannot
be taken away by an `@register` somebody adds back.
## 5. ⚠️ `PriceProduct.REALTIME` and the widening path are KEPT with no shipped declarer
`eneco_eddy` was the **sole** declarer of `PriceProduct.REALTIME`. Deleting it
orphans:
* `_WIDE = frozenset({PriceProduct.REALTIME})`
* `Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT`
* `WIDEN_FACTOR[Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT] = 2.5`
**They stay.** The reasoning, stated here so the next reader finds intent
rather than an apparent dead branch:
1. A reviewer finding a mechanism with **zero callers** would reasonably delete
it. That is good instinct applied to a missing fact, and this file is the
fact.
2. It is the **AC2 seam**. The whole point of `capabilities().product` is that
a new supplier is a new class and nothing else: declare `REALTIME`, get the
wide regime, edit no framework code. Deleting the enum member would mean the
first genuine imbalance product has to **rebuild** that seam — and rebuilding
it is precisely the "editing the optimiser to add a supplier" that AC2
forbids.
3. It costs nothing. Two enum members and a dict entry.
**⚠️ NO SHIPPED PLUGIN DECLARES `PriceProduct.REALTIME` UNTIL ONE DOES.** Both
shipped plugins (`generic_dayahead`, `manual_csv`) are day-ahead. §9.2's row 2
is unoccupied. That is not the same as it having no mechanism, and the
difference is what this section exists to record.
It is **pinned, not merely documented**. `test_price.py` section 5 asserts:
* that **no shipped plugin** declares `REALTIME` — so if one ever does, the
check goes red and the right fix is to **edit this record**, not to delete
the seam;
* that the widening still works **from a declaration alone** —
`volatility_regime`, `uncertainty_of` and `widen_factor` are graded on a
`ProviderCapabilities` the test file builds;
* and section 10 registers `_NewSupplier`, a class defined **outside
`price.py`** that declares `REALTIME` and is asserted to land in the wide
regime. That class is now the only live declarer in the tree, which makes the
seam something this suite exercises end to end rather than a constant it
reads.
## 6. What else went, and one thing that did not
`_points_from_json()` went with the three. It read a `{"data": [{...}]}`
row-per-point document that **no feed anybody here has ever reached
publishes** — the shape was invented alongside these plugins, and the only
bodies ever fed to it were fixtures written from the same guess. TARIFF-08
found that loop on the response side for `generic_dayahead`; this is the rest
of it. `needs_credentials` went too: the three were its only setters and
nothing read it.
The shape survives in **one** place and in one direction: `row_shape_body()` in
`test_price.py`, feeding `generic_dayahead` so that section 9 grades a row
document as a **failure** for it rather than a second dialect it might sniff.
It is named for what it is.
⚠️ **One check had to be rebuilt rather than deleted, and saying so matters.**
`test_price.py` section 4b proved that `code_leaks()`'s docstring strip is
load-bearing by finding a shipped docstring that a raw text scan would
false-positive on. The docstring that did that was **`engie_dynamic`'s** — it
spelled `price_markup_eur_kwh` in full. With it gone, no shipped docstring
spells a full framework key, so the check would have **passed on a tree with
the strip deleted**: a check that had quietly stopped being one, which is the
third failure mode in `MUTATION.md`. The stimulus is now constructed in the
test file (`_DocumentedPlugin`), and the shipped set is asserted clean
separately.
## 7. Mutations driven
Every check added or rebuilt here was driven red. Harness:
`/home/homelab/.cache/t07-mut/`, which rebuilds the tree from the worktree and
purges `__pycache__` per `MUTATION.md`'s rule.
| | mutation | Δ | red on |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | delete the retired branch from `_price_problems()` | −2785 B | 7 checks in `test_price.py` |
| M2 | move the retired branch **after** the unknown-id branch | **+0 B** | the same 7 |
| M3 | make `been_running` constant (drop the empty-`static_profile` case) | −212 B | 2 |
| M4 | drop the "WHAT TO DO" half of the refusal | −874 B | 1 |
| M5 | `RETIRED_PROVIDERS = {}` | −1099 B | 5, then a traceback |
| M6 | drop the three ids from `config.yaml`'s enum — §4's trap | −47 B | 2 |
| M7 | delete `register()`'s retired guard | −1101 B | 2, then a traceback |
| M8 | `_WIDE = frozenset()` | −23 B | 3 + 4 across two suites |
| M9 | `WIDEN_FACTOR[REALTIME_PRODUCT]` 2.5 → 1.5 | **+0 B** | 1 + 1 |
⚠️ **M2 and M9 have a byte delta of zero**, which `MUTATION.md` names as the
risky case. The harness rebuilds the tree from source on every run and purges
`__pycache__`, so there is no inherited cache to read; and stale bytecode
manufactures **survivors**, never reds, so a red from a `+0 B` mutation is not
at risk from that defect. M2's grep confirmed the branch had moved on disk.
⚠️ **M5 and M7's red counts are LOWER BOUNDS.** Both runs ended in a traceback
with checks after it ungraded — FCST-06's rule: read the output, not the count.
M7's traceback is itself informative: with the guard gone the re-registration
**succeeds**, `PROVIDERS` is polluted with a class that has no fixture, and the
suite dies downstream. That is the failure the guard prevents, arriving loudly.
## 8. What this card did not do
* **It did not pick a version number.** The change is backward-incompatible — a
config legal on the current version is refused on the next — and the
CHANGELOG says so prominently, in the shape PKG-07 established for `slew_w`.
Which number it belongs to depends on whether the current image has already
been built and pulled, which is a fact about the live box that this branch
cannot observe. Whoever deploys decides.
* **It did not implement the formula provider.** `B × spot + A` with per-site
coefficients is the real answer for a Belgian dynamic customer and is a
separate card. `DOCS.md` references it as planned and is explicit about what
`generic_dayahead` can and cannot express in the meantime — in particular
that it cannot represent a negative offset, and that
`price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)` could not hold one anyway.
* **It did not rewrite released CHANGELOG history.** The two historical entries
that called `eneco_eddy` an imbalance product are annotated in place with a
correction naming this card, rather than silently edited. The record of what
the project believed is part of the record.
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
# TARIFF-09 — asking the feed for the horizon, and what `price_feed_url` means
Two decisions. The first had no defensible alternative once it was measured;
the second did, and the alternative is argued below rather than dismissed.
---
## 0. The measurement this card exists for
`generic_dayahead.fetch()` accepted `since` and `until` and requested the bare
`https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE`. That URL names no range, and the
feed answers **one Brussels day**.
Measured on the merged tree (`4257e38`) at 2026-09-10 09:00 CEST, 48 h horizon,
live feed, yesterday seeded through the shipped read path:
```
60 firm points (15 whole hours) + 33 carried hours of 48 requested
carried: 24 h on 2026-09-11, 9 h on 2026-09-12
arbitrage(0.10): allowed, spread 0.4645, buy 11:45 and sell 19:45 -- BOTH on 2026-09-10
firm local days = [2026-09-10]
```
Everything past today was carry-forward, flagged provisional, and §8.3 drops
provisional hours from the trade set. **The optimiser never saw tomorrow as
firm, at any hour.** The ceiling was structural rather than incidental: with a
one-day window, at hour *H* of the local day a 48 h horizon is at most
**24−H hours firm and 24+H carried** — 15/33 at 09:00, and **1/47 at 23:00**,
where the remaining firm spread (0.0464 EUR/kWh) no longer even clears the
default 0.10 round-trip threshold and arbitrage is refused outright.
That is not what FCST-04's fill was built for. FCST-04 covers the
pre-publication window until the ~13:00–14:00 CET auction, after which a
healthy feed hands over tomorrow in full.
**The data exists and the endpoint serves it.** Verified 2026-09-10T07:45:49Z:
`?bzn=BE&start=2026-09-09&end=2026-09-10` returns **192 quarter-hours across
two local days**, committed unmodified as
`scenarios/energy-charts-be-price-2026-09-09_2026-09-10-twoday.json`. The
plugin simply never asked.
After the change, same code path, same window, a feed serving both days:
**39 firm hours and 9 carried**, firm across **two** Brussels days, and the
permitted cycle buys on one day and sells on the other. Graded in
`test_price_history.py` section 1c against both feed states.
---
## 1. The range is derived on the **Brussels** calendar, from `since`/`until`
`since` and `until` are **instants**; the API takes **dates**. Those are not
the same question, and the conversion is where the day gets lost.
`brussels_date_range()` returns two inclusive `date`s:
* the first is `brussels(since).date()`. **Not `since.date()`, and not the UTC
date.** 22:30 UTC in summer is already tomorrow in Belgium, so a UTC-derived
start asks for the day the controller has just left and drops the day it is
standing in — for the last one or two hours of *every* day. This is
`price_history._bdate()`'s lesson one layer up, with a worse consequence:
`_bdate()` misfiles an hour, this never fetches it.
* the last is `brussels(until).date()`, **stepped back a day when `until`
falls exactly on local midnight**, because `until` is exclusive and that
instant is the first tick of a day nobody asked for. Without it every
whole-hour horizon requests one extra day — harmless on this feed, but it
makes the request a claim the caller never made.
* an empty or inverted window collapses to a single day rather than producing
a backwards range, which no feed has a defined answer for.
Both ends are graded, and both are driven red by mutation — including the two
that swap `brussels()` for the UTC date (`test_price.py` section 2c).
---
## 2. `price_feed_url` is the **exact URL**, used as given. The plugin appends
nothing.
The alternative — merge our `start`/`end` into whatever query string the
operator supplied — was considered and rejected. Three reasons, in the order
they decided it:
1. **`start`/`end` are energy-charts' spelling, and this provider declares a
second host.** `generic_dayahead.capabilities().egress_hosts` is
`("api.energy-charts.info", "web-api.tp.entsoe.eu")`. That second host's
day-ahead date parameters have not been verified by this card and are not
guessed at here — but they are not `start`/`end`. So an override to the
*other declared host* — a case the declaration itself anticipates — is
exactly where merging appends two parameters that host ignores, producing
the short horizon anyway, with a URL nobody typed as the receipt.
2. **Merging means re-serialising a URL somebody else wrote.** Parsing and
rebuilding reorders parameters, collapses duplicates and re-escapes values.
"Override the feed" is what the option already says it means, and an
override that is silently rewritten is not one.
3. **Blind appending is not on the table at all.** `dated_feed_url()` refuses
to add a query string to a base that already has one, so
`?bzn=BE?bzn=BE&start=…` cannot be produced by this module even by a later
edit that folds the parameters back into the constant.
⚠️ **The cost is real and it is therefore NOT a doc footnote.** An overriding
operator gets exactly the short horizon this card exists to fix. So the plugin
emits a `WARNING` on the shipped `goodwe.price` logger at **fetch time**, naming
the consequence — one Brussels day, the rest carried and flagged, §8.3 dropping
them from the trade set — and naming the `start..end` it *would* have asked
for. §11.4 is what makes a price defect quiet; an operator who has taken the
short horizon has to be able to find out from the log that they did.
The warning is graded, with a control that the default path stays silent, and
a mutation that downgrades it to `debug()` takes that check red.
**Fetch time rather than startup**, because that is where the URL actually in
use is known. The trade-off is one line per refresh (the tariff task, not the
30 s control tick). If the status page ever grows a price-source row, this is
the sentence it should carry.
---
## 3. The plugin contract: `fetch(self, opts, since, until, transport)`
The signature promises every plugin the range, and until this card **none of
the four networked plugins used it**. The obvious follow-up is to enforce the
promise. It is **not** enforced, and the reason is TARIFF-08's:
Three of the five shipped plugins point at endpoints nobody has ever verified
(TARIFF-07 is the open decision on withdrawing them). A rule obliging them to
pass a date range would be satisfied by an **invented parameter name** — which
is the parser-graded-against-its-own-guess defect moved from the response to
the request, and it would ship looking like a guarantee.
What exists instead is a **roster pin** in `test_price.py` section 2c: which
plugins reference their `since`/`until` is asserted as a literal, derived from
the registry and the AST. A sixth supplier, or a change to any of the three,
has to edit that line and make the decision rather than inherit the silence.
It is named as a source-shape pin, not as evidence that any feed parses;
`generic_dayahead`'s behaviour is graded separately by the URL it really
requests.
**Recommendation for whoever picks up TARIFF-07:** enforce it at the moment
those three endpoints are either verified or withdrawn, not before. If they are
withdrawn, `generic_dayahead` and `manual_csv` are the whole roster and the
rule is one line — `manual_csv` reads a whole file and is windowed downstream,
so it would be the single documented exemption.
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
# TARIFF-10 — fetching a price and trading on one are two decisions
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-12 — Option A. If a price provider is configured,
prices are fetched. Trading stays a separate switch (`arbitrage_enabled`), and
this card moves nothing that moves energy.**
Filed with TARIFF-10. Follows [[TARIFF-09]] and [[FCST-04]]; §4 settles the
limitation FCST-04 recorded and did not decide.
---
## 1. The defect, and why it was invisible
`app/main.py`'s `amain()` read:
```
if arbitrage.enabled(opts):
tasks.append(asyncio.create_task(controller.run_tariff_refresh()))
```
`run_tariff_refresh` is the **only** caller of `resolve_tariff()`, which is the
**only** caller of `price_history.carry()`. `arbitrage_enabled` ships `false`.
So on a shipped install with a provider configured:
* no HTTPS request was ever made to the feed;
* no plan was ever resolved, so `self.tariff_plan` stayed `None` forever;
* `/data/price_history.json` was never created;
* the *Price history* status row read `empty` for the life of the install;
* TARIFF-09's short-horizon warning could not fire, because it is logged on a
fetch and there was no fetch.
Measured, not inferred — a 40 h soak, two instances, one feed:
| | shipped default + provider | same, arbitrage armed |
|---|---|---|
| feed requests | **0** | fetching |
| `/data/price_history.json` | `present: false`, **802/802 samples** | written |
| resolved plan | none | 132 points |
⚠️ **AND FOUR SURFACES ALREADY DESCRIBED THE FIXED BEHAVIOUR.** `DOCS.md`
§*Energy price providers*: *"With `arbitrage_enabled: false`, which is the
shipped default, turning a provider on still fetches, validates and publishes
prices and changes no charging decision."* `config.yaml` and both translations
said the same, and additionally carried a claim that had gone stale in the other
direction — *"nothing consumes the price series yet"*, untrue since OPT-04
shipped the consumer. The code was the only surface that disagreed with all of
them, and no check compared the two.
The dating is worth being exact about, because it says this was never a
regression. `git log -S` puts the refresh task, its `arbitrage.enabled()` guard
**and** the DOCS sentence in the *same commit* — OPT-04, `bdd7f18`;
`config.yaml`'s version of the claim goes back further, to TARIFF-02,
`852fc7c`. The prose and the code disagreed from the moment both existed.
## 2. Why a check on the `if` would not have caught it
The `if` was exactly what somebody meant to write, and its comment argued for
it honestly:
> ⚠️ STARTED ONLY WHEN ARBITRAGE IS ARMED. Nothing else in the add-on reads the
> resolved plan … so on a default install this task would be network traffic in
> aid of an attribute nobody reads.
That was true when OPT-04 wrote it and stopped being true when FCST-04 gave the
plan a *store* and a *status row*. A pin on the expression would have gone red
on the fix and green on the defect. What was wrong is the **set of
configurations from which a fetch is reachable**, so that is what
`test_price.py` section 13 grades:
1. the guards on every `asyncio.create_task` in `amain()` are **evaluated**
against real option dicts — whatever the guard is spelled as;
2. the call graph under `app/` is walked to see whether the coroutines those
guards start can arrive at `resolve_tariff()` — wherever it has moved to;
3. and then the fetch is **driven**, with a counting transport, a real
`Controller` and a real store path, because a reachability graph is an
argument and a counted request is an observation.
⚠️ **Step 3 grades the gate only because it starts the task the way `amain()`
would.** The driver asks `_fetchers(opts)` — the evaluated guard — before it
calls the coroutine. Measured: with the shipped defect restored **and** that one
line defeated (`if False and "run_tariff_refresh" not in names:`), the four
driven rows go **green** while only the structural rows stay red. Without it
they are decoration, which is MUTATION.md's habit 4 in a harness.
What the instrument **cannot** see is printed on every run: a coroutine started
by anything but `create_task`; a guard that is not an enclosing `if` in
`amain()`; anything outside `app/`; and — because the graph is keyed by **name**
— two same-named functions as one node, which makes every *reachable* answer an
**upper** bound and every *not reachable* answer the strong one.
## 3. The gate, and why it is an `or`
```
def tariff_refresh_wanted(opts: dict) -> bool:
return provider_configured(opts) or arbitrage.enabled(opts)
```
The first term is what this card adds. **The second term is the old gate, kept
verbatim, and it is not there for symmetry.**
`price_provider: off` + a `static_profile` + `arbitrage_enabled: true` is a
configuration `validate.py` explicitly **accepts** (rule 7 refuses only the
no-prices-at-all case), and it **trades**. Measured on this branch:
```
opts: price_provider off, arbitrage_enabled true,
cycle_cost_threshold_eur 0.05,
static_profile 0.20 night / 0.284 day
plan : static_profile from static_profile, 48 h, 48 points
WITH the plan -> ARBITRAGE_CHARGE -5000.0 W
"cheapest firm hour at 0.2000 EUR/kWh, 0.0840 below the
dearest and clear of the 0.0750 this cycle had to cover"
WITHOUT the plan -> None "no tariff plan has been resolved yet"
```
Gating the refresh on the provider **alone** — which is the literal reading of
the ticket's second acceptance criterion — would leave that site's
`tariff_plan` at `None` forever and answer *"no tariff plan has been resolved
yet"* on every cycle. That is a strategy the UI says is running and that cannot
fire: the exact state `validate.py`'s OPT-04 rules exist to refuse, arrived at
from inside the code instead of from the configuration.
So the gate is a **strict widening**: every configuration that started the task
before still starts it, and `test_price.py` grades that as its own row rather
than leaving it to prose.
⚠️ **The AC's stated harm is still fully met, and it is worth being exact about
this rather than quietly declaring victory.** The criterion reads *"with
`price_provider: off`: no fetch task at all, whatever `arbitrage_enabled` says
— an operator with no provider must not acquire a periodic HTTPS call."* The
letter of it is not met in one configuration (provider off, trading armed),
because that configuration keeps the task it already had. The harm it names is:
* with `price_provider` off, `resolve_tariff()` returns `static_plan()` — pure
arithmetic, **no socket**. Driven and counted: **0 requests**.
* the true shipped default — no provider, no trading — starts **no task at
all**.
Nobody *acquires* a periodic HTTPS call from this card, and the only thing that
decides whether a request leaves the machine is `price_provider`. **If the
owner wants the literal reading instead, it is a one-token change** (drop the
`or` term) **and it costs the site in the measurement above its trading.** That
is the trade, stated rather than chosen silently.
## 4. `TariffPlan.cheap_now()` — available, and deliberately NOT consumed
**Decision: do not wire it in this card. `self.cheap` stays on
`static_status()`.**
FCST-04 recorded that `cheap_now()` has no production caller on the provider
plan: `main.read_inputs()` assigns `self.cheap, self.tariff_words =
static_status(o, now)`, which builds its **own** static plan and calls
`cheap_now()` on that. Under Option A a provider-backed plan now exists on every
configured site, so the limitation stops being structural and becomes a choice.
**It is not cosmetic, and that is the whole reason for the decision.**
`self.cheap` is read in `cycle()` by the maintenance cycle's cheap-window grid
top-up — the add-on's one shiftable load, and the one place a *price* reaches
something that **moves energy** on an install that has not armed trading.
⚠️ **And the direction it would move is not "a slightly different window".**
`static_status()` returns `(False, "no static profile")` whenever
`static_profile` is empty, so today a provider-only site — a plausible shape
for a dynamic-tariff install, and the shape this card makes work — has
`self.cheap = False` on **every** cycle and never forces a paid grid top-up at
all. Wiring `cheap_now()` would take that from *never* to *sometimes*. That is
a strictly larger behaviour change than this card's headline, and it belongs to
whoever owns the maintenance cycle rather than to the ticket that made it
reachable.
Three further reasons, in the order they would bite:
1. **Two sources, one attribute, and the loser is silent.** `validate.py`
already refuses `static_profile` alongside the Home Assistant price
entities *because* `read_inputs()` picks one and the other disappears. A
provider plan would be a third writer of the same attribute with no rule
saying which wins.
2. **The freshness question is not answered for this consumer.** The plan
retires after `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` and `fresh_tariff_plan()` returns `None`.
Arbitrage has an answer for that (refuse). The maintenance top-up has none:
"the plan expired" would have to mean *not cheap*, and *not cheap* on this
path means **wait for sun**, which is a real decision nobody has taken.
3. **The comparison basis changes, and so does the answer on a bad feed.**
`cheap_now()` is strictly-below-the-mean-of-the-**firm**-hours, and it is
`False` when THIS hour is provisional or is not in the series at all
(FCST-03's rule: this hour decides, not the whole plan). So a feed that
published nothing, or an hour the §8.3 fill could not cover, reads *not
cheap* where a `static_profile` reads whatever the clock says. Defensible
either way — and it is a change to the shipped maintenance cycle that needs
its own measurement rather than a side effect of this one.
**What adopting it would take**, so the next card does not start from scratch:
* a rule for which source wins when both a provider plan and a
`static_profile` are configured, enforced in `validate.py` the way the
entity/profile conflict already is;
* a decision on what an **expired** or **absent** plan means for the grid
top-up, stated as a default rather than left to `None`;
* `read_inputs()` splitting `self.cheap` from `self.tariff_words`, which are
currently one assignment from one function;
* a check that the maintenance top-up actually fires and does not fire on the
provider plan — driven through `cycle()`, not asserted on the attribute;
* and the *Tariff* status row, which FCST-04 pinned as a **pair** with
`DOCS.md` in `test_price_history.py` §9: it does not report the provider
plan, DOCS does not claim it does, and moving one without the other is
already red.
## 5. The *Arbitrage* status row, re-read and left alone
`main.status_payload()` renders `("Arbitrage", "off (arbitrage_enabled)" if
self.arb is None else self.arb.explain())`. `self.arb` is assigned only inside
`if arbitrage.enabled(self.o):` and `arbitrage.decide()` never returns `None`,
so `self.arb is None` **iff** the option is off. The string still names the
option that is actually off, and under Option A it gains a job it did not have:
on a site with a provider configured it is the row that tells an operator the
prices arriving on the *Price history* row above are moving nothing. Unchanged,
with a note at the call site saying it was checked.
## 6. What this card did not do
* It did not touch `run_tariff_refresh()`'s body (TARIFF-12 is there).
* It did not change `cycle()`'s `if arbitrage.enabled(self.o):`, the sizing,
the thresholds, the SoC bounds or the peak interlock.
* It did not wire the provider plan into the *Tariff* status row or into
`self.cheap` — §4.
* It did not pick a version number (PKG-06).
## 7. Mutation ledger
Every mutation applied to a **fresh `cp -a`** of the clean worktree rather than
reverted (habit 18: there is no revert to verify and no shared scratch path),
`__pycache__` purged, tree mounted `:ro`, run under `python3 -B`.
| id | mutation | Δ bytes | result |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | the shipped defect: gate back to `arbitrage.enabled(opts)` | **-4 B** | **RED**, 7 named checks |
| M2 | drop the `or arbitrage.enabled(opts)` term | -27 B | **RED**, 2 named checks (strict-widening + the static-profile row) |
| M3 | `tariff_refresh_wanted` -> always `True` | +8 B | **RED**, the AC2 reachability row |
| M4 | `provider_configured`: `"off"` counts as configured | -6 B | **RED**, the AC2 reachability row |
| M5 | `cycle()`'s trading gate -> `if True or arbitrage.enabled(self.o)` | +8 B | **RED**, both AC3 rows (`-5000 W` with trading off) |
| M6 | instrument: `_reaches()` always `True` | **+0 B** | **RED**, 4 checks incl. its own calibration row |
| M7 | instrument: `_task_sites()` returns `[]` | **+0 B** | **RED**, 10 checks incl. "it found 0 sites" |
| M8 | fixture: 5 minutes of telegrams instead of a whole quarter | **+0 B** | **RED**, the peak-guard precondition and both armed rows |
| M9 | M1 **plus** the harness's guard-driven start defeated | -4 B | the four DRIVEN rows go **GREEN** — see §2 |
| M10 | `provider_id()` drops `.strip()` | -8 B | **survivor**, then CLOSED — see below |
| M11 | `provider_configured()` -> `return True` | -32 B | **RED**, 4 checks |
| M12 | DOCS.md's sentence reverted to the old, vaguer claim | +0 B (docs) | **RED**, the AC4 pairing row (`fetches = True, DOCS says = False`) |
| M13 | the Dutch translation left behind while English moved | +0 B (docs) | **RED**, the both-languages row |
⚠️ **M10 was a real survivor and is recorded as one.** Dropping `.strip()` left
`test_price.py`, `test_price_history.py`, `test_static_tariff.py` and
`test_validate.py` all green: nothing in the repository fed a `price_provider`
with surrounding whitespace, and the `.strip()` predates this card — it was
carried into `provider_id()` from the three call sites it replaced. The
Supervisor's `list(off|…)` schema cannot produce `" off "`, but
`validate_startup_config()` is also `sim/inject.py`'s entry point and takes any
dict at all. Closed in the same commit by the padded-id pair in section 13;
re-run as **M10b**, red on two named checks.
⚠️ **M8 is the fixture defect this card walked into and then fenced.** The
first draft fed five minutes of telegrams. Whether that **covers** the current
billing quarter depends on where the wall clock sits inside it, so the peak
guard was blind and engaged on some runs and not others — and `decide()` refuses
outright while the guard is holding (§9.1 over §10.1). On those runs the armed
baseline did not trade, and "trading off never trades" would have been graded
on a fixture in which nothing could trade either way. It is now 900 s of
telegrams, and the guard's clear state is a **check** rather than an assumption.
## 8. What is still open
* The literal reading of AC2 (§3). One token, and it costs a measured trading
configuration its plan. **Owner's call.**
* `cheap_now()` (§4). Owner's call, with the adoption list above.
* The *Tariff* status row still shows the static-profile sentence on a
provider-backed site; the provider plan's own line goes to the log. Pinned as
a pair with `DOCS.md` by FCST-04 and untouched here.
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
# TARIFF-12 — a returned degradation is not a refresh
Three decisions. The first is what the ticket put up for judgement; the second
and third are what fall out of it and would otherwise be decided by accident.
---
## 0. What was actually wrong, stated once
`run_tariff_refresh()`'s docstring:
> ⚠️ **AND A FAILURE DOES NOT CLEAR THE PLAN.** … Zeroing the plan here would
> replace a coarse tariff with no tariff, which is the opposite of what §11.4
> asks for.
The guarantee was real. The condition it was enforced on was not:
```python
try:
plan = await resolve_tariff(...)
self.tariff_plan, self.tariff_at = plan, now # unconditional
except Exception as err:
_LOG.warning("tariff refresh failed (%s); keeping the plan ...")
```
`load_prices()` says in its own docstring that it **"RETURNS, NEVER RAISES, for
every failure a site can actually have"**, because a degradation arriving as a
traceback into the planning tick would stop the controller regulating over an
expired certificate. So a supplier outage — the case the docstring names first —
is a **return**: the `try` succeeds, `_degrade()` hands back a §11.4 plan, and
the good plan is overwritten. The `except` is reachable only by something
nobody expected, and nothing in the shipped path produces it.
This is the fourth card in one family: FCST-04's M4 (`not ok` only), FCST-05's
HIGH (`(JSONDecodeError, OSError)` only), FCST-06 (`not self.ok` only), and now
`except Exception` only, for a path that never raises. **A guarantee enforced on
the condition someone thought of, rather than the condition that occurs.**
Reproduced before the fix, driving the shipped chain with nothing stubbed but
the socket — 48 h horizon, `static_profile` empty, one good fetch then a
`ClientConnectorError` 1800 s later, `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` = 5400 s:
```
after a good fetch origin='provider' n_points=48 'dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 48 h'
after the failed fetch origin='none' n_points=0 'no tariff - generic_dayahead: ClientConnectorError: ...'
tariff_at moved: True
```
and after it:
```
after the failed fetch origin='provider' n_points=48 'dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 48 h'
tariff_at moved: False
```
---
## 1. The question is asked ONCE, after the attempt, from the evidence that exists
FCST-06's answer, one module over, and for the same reason: **the enumeration
of failure conditions cannot be completed.** There is no pre-check that a feed
will answer which is not itself a guess, and adding one would be a second
symptom test beside the `except`. So the predicate is an **outcome**, read off
the object the attempt produced:
```python
standing = self.fresh_tariff_plan(now)
keep = (not plan.from_feed
and standing is not None and standing.from_feed)
```
Two facts, both of which exist by the time the question is asked:
* **`plan.from_feed`** — did *this* resolution observe the configured provider?
`TariffPlan.origin` already names the four ways a plan is obtained; this
collapses them to the one question a caller holding a previous plan has to
ask. It lives on `TariffPlan` rather than as an `origin == "provider"` at the
call site for `fresh_tariff_plan()`'s own stated reason — *a check has to be
able to assert on the shipped expression rather than on a transcription that
drifts* — and because `origin`'s vocabulary belongs to `static_tariff.py`.
* **`fresh_tariff_plan(now)`** — is a standing observation still current. It
already existed, it is already the one place the age is judged, and it is
**reused, not transcribed**. `test_arbitrage.py` 8b pins that reuse on the
AST; a copy of the comparison behaves identically until the day the two
drift, which is a claim about the code's shape, so a shape check is what
grades it (FCST-06's precedent for the one source check among driven ones).
### What was NOT done
* **Not `except Exception` widened, or a second `if` beside it.** That is the
defect's own shape — a place where the rule is spelt twice, so a fifth cause
needs a fifth branch. The `except` stays, relabelled *"not the outage path"*,
keeps the plan on the same terms, and is now honestly the
something-nobody-expected branch.
* **Not the persisted price store as a cache.** Out of scope by the product
owner's call, and it is the right call: FCST-03 exists precisely to stop
stale prices being acted on, and "recent" is not "current". Keeping the last
**fetched** plan until it ages out is a different promise from serving the
store, and that one needs its own ticket.
* **Not a `no_data`-only guard.** `not plan.has_prices` is the tempting
spelling and it is wrong — see decision 2. It leaves the §11.4 fallback free
to replace a fresh observation, and it is a 1-byte edit from the shipped
line, which is why it is in the mutation table rather than in a comment.
---
## 2. A §11.4 static fallback does NOT replace a fresh provider plan
The ticket asked this directly, because the fallback is *not* nothing: it is
the operator's own configured profile, with real prices, for the requested
window. The answer is still no, and the reason is not that it is worse data —
it is that **nothing may be acted on it, and it is no more current.**
* Every point `_degrade()` builds carries `provisional=True`. So
`firm_points()` is empty, `arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and
refuses, and `cheap_now()` is False. Both of the two things `TariffPlan`
exposes for a consumer to act on are already off.
* A day-ahead price for a given hour **does not change once published**. A plan
fetched 30 minutes ago is exactly as true about 19:00 as one fetched now; at
most `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` of its horizon has elapsed. The observation is not
stale in any sense the fallback is fresher than.
So replacing the observation with the fallback trades a plan with firm hours
for a plan with none, and buys no currency with it. The fallback takes over
when the observation **retires** — which is exactly the row §11.4 describes,
arrived at when there is no longer an observation to prefer.
### And the rule is deliberately NOT symmetrical
`standing.from_feed` is a term in its own right. A standing plan that is itself
a degradation **is** replaced by the next degradation, and its timestamp moves.
Without that term:
* an outage on a static-profile site would freeze the operator's profile at the
window it was first generated for, and the guard would be *"never overwrite"*
wearing a bound's name;
* and on a `price_provider: off` install — the shipped default — the plan would
flip between kept and re-derived every `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`, for no behavioural
gain, changing which reason the status page prints on a two-hour cycle.
Each of the three terms is the only false one in some check in 8b, which is
MUTATION.md habit 17's test for whether a suite can tell an `AND` from an `OR`.
---
## 3. `tariff_at` does not move on a kept plan
The docstring's other half is that a plan must not *"freeze at its last value
and look current forever"*. `tariff_at` is what makes that work: it is the
moment of the fetch that produced the plan standing, and `fresh_tariff_plan()`
judges the age from it.
Re-stamping it on a kept plan would be this task asserting the feed answered
when it did not. The plan would be re-certified as current at every refresh, an
outage of any length would never retire it, and `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` would be
**exactly as dead as it was before this card** — reachable only by the refresh
task itself dying. Leaving it alone is what makes the bound govern: the plan is
served for the age bound after its own fetch, and no longer.
It is also the whole of **"distinguishable from a freshly-fetched one"**. A
kept plan and a fetched plan are the same object shape; what separates them is
that one's timestamp advanced and the other's did not, and every consumer that
asks how old the plan is already reads that number. The kept case additionally
logs at WARNING, naming the degradation's own reason, the fetch it is keeping,
its age, and the deadline it retires at.
⚠️ **What this does not give the operator, and why it is not here.** The status
page has no row for "the last refresh failed" — the banner/level not moving
when the plan is lost is separately carded, and the ticket rules it out of
scope. This card's change makes that surface *more* truthful, not less: during
the first `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` of an outage there is now a real plan behind the
Arbitrage row instead of a no-plan refusal, so the row says something true for
longer. The no-plan state is entered later by up to 5400 s; it is not removed,
and the 30-minute lag reported on that row is untouched by anything here.
---
## 4. Merged after TARIFF-10 — what the wider gate changed, and what it did not
TARIFF-10 landed on `release/1.0` while this card was open. It changed **which
installs run this task** — `if arbitrage.enabled(opts)` became
`tariff_refresh_wanted(opts)`, i.e. `provider_configured(opts) or
arbitrage.enabled(opts)` — while this card changed **what the task does on a
failed fetch**. Git auto-merged the two hunks, which is exactly when the
interaction needs reading rather than trusting.
**Nothing in the decisions above changed.** Two configurations are newly
reachable, and both are now driven in `test_arbitrage.py` 8b rather than
reasoned about:
* **A provider configured with trading DISARMED** — TARIFF-10's headline case.
This is precisely the configuration the guard was designed for: the plans are
`origin == "provider"`, and a dead feed must not delete one that is still
inside `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`. It needs no second fixture, because **nothing on
this path reads `arbitrage_enabled` at all**, and that is asserted rather
than assumed — over the AST's symbols and the non-docstring string constants,
because two earlier drafts of that check were **red against a correct tree**:
the first matched the docstring paragraph that *says* `arbitrage_enabled` is
not read, the second matched the log line's "arbitrage, where it is armed".
A substring test over a function grades its prose as much as its behaviour,
which is habit 4 in a third costume. A fixture that set the option and
asserted no difference would have been the other defect — comparing a thing
against itself.
* **`price_provider: off` + a `static_profile`** — the configuration TARIFF-10's
`or` exists to protect, and the one where a latching guard would do real harm.
`resolve_tariff()` returns `static_plan(provisional=False)`, whose origin is
`"static"`: the CONFIGURED product, not a §11.4 row. So `standing.from_feed`
is false on every refresh, `keep` is false on every refresh, and the plan is
regenerated for the current window every 30 minutes exactly as before this
card. **Driven, twice in a row**, because a guard that latched here would
freeze a static site's plan at its first window for the life of the install —
and mutation M3, which drops the `standing.from_feed` term, is red on that
check as well as on the fallback one.
Two further facts settle the rest of the interaction:
* **This decision is strictly downstream of every side effect.** The §8.3 carry
into `price_history` happens inside `resolve_tariff()`, on the `series`
branch, before `keep` is computed — so which of two plans is kept can neither
add nor lose a recorded day, and TARIFF-10's *Price history* row is
unaffected either way.
* **The kept-plan log line was reworded.** It said "arbitrage stops with it",
which after TARIFF-10 is false on a site that fetches without trading; it now
says "arbitrage, **where it is armed**, stops with it".
All eleven mutations were **re-driven on the merged tree** rather than carried
over — the surrounding code changed, so a red against the old base is not
evidence about the new one. Eleven red, no survivors, every revert
fingerprinted. The added member is M11: making the guard conditional on
`arbitrage.enabled(self.o)` (+86 B), red on five named checks.
⚠️ **And one process note that belongs in this file.** This card's mutation
harness was written to a shared scratchpad path and was **overwritten mid-run
by another agent's harness for a different card**, pointing at a different
worktree. That is MUTATION.md habit 18's second bullet almost verbatim. It was
caught because the harness fingerprints the tree after every revert and the
runs are what proved this worktree was never left mutated; the harness now
lives at a card-specific path. **A harness that edits source must not share a
name, a directory or a backup path with another one.**
---
## What this does not change
* **Nothing on the 30 s tick.** `cycle()` still reads two attributes and awaits
no fetch; the AST pin in `test_arbitrage.py` section 8 is unchanged and green.
* **Nothing about the prices themselves.** No series is invented, extended,
re-stamped or carried. The only question this card answers is *which of two
plans the controller holds*.
* **A `price_provider: off` install is bit-for-bit unaffected.** Its standing
plan is never `origin == "provider"`, so `keep` is false on every refresh it
will ever run, and the assignment happens exactly as it did before.
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
# TARIFF-13 — the coverage of a peak, and which quarter gets the credit
Two decisions. §1 is the defect the ticket was raised on; §2 is the smaller
question it asked to be settled deliberately rather than left as an accident.
§3 is what this branch deliberately did **not** do, and why.
---
## 0. What was actually wrong, stated once
`main.py`'s capacity-tariff status row prints a peak read from SQLite and a
coverage figure read from **process memory**:
```python
_pk = self.peak.peak(when) # SQLite, durable
...
+ f"; {self.peak.recorded} quarter(s) banked" # an int on the tracker
```
`PeakTracker.recorded` was `self.recorded = 0` in `__init__`, incremented once
per block inside `sync()`. A 40-hour soak caught what that means at a driven
restart, on both instances independently:
```
before: 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-11T18:45:00+00:00
- 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 120 quarter(s) banked
after : 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-11T18:45:00+00:00
- 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 0 quarter(s) banked
```
Reproduced here before anything was changed, through the real `Controller`, the
real `P1Ingest`, and a **real restart** — a second `Controller` object against
the same file on disk, never a re-read of the first:
```
before: 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-10T09:00:00+00:00
- 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 12 quarter(s) banked
after : 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-10T09:00:00+00:00
- 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 0 quarter(s) banked
peak survives the restart: True
count survives the restart: False (12 -> 0, store held 12 rows)
```
**TARIFF-01's argument, one column over.** That module's whole design is that
an unreadable store must not read as a zero peak, *because a zero peak is
disarming*. A coverage figure of zero is disarming in exactly the same way and
about the same number: the count is what says how much of the billing month the
watt figure actually covers, and 365 W over 120 quarters and 365 W over 0
quarters are different claims about the same 365 W. After a restart the page
made the weaker claim while displaying the stronger one's value. It did not
under-report the peak — it under-reported **its own evidence**.
Two further defects fell out of the same variable once it was driven, neither
of them in the ticket:
* **it was never scoped to a month.** It counted every block the *process* had
banked, so on 1 October the row read September's tally beside October's "no
completed quarter recorded yet". Measured, on the shipped tree:
`2026-10: no completed quarter recorded yet - 0 % of the 3500 W soft limit;
1 quarter(s) banked`.
* **it missed the block `restore()` banks.** A stale block closed from the
checkpoint goes into `quarter_blocks` without passing through `sync()`, so
the counter never saw it.
---
## 1. Decision: the count is READ FROM THE TIER THE PEAK IS READ FROM
The acceptance criterion allowed either route — make the count durable, or stop
printing a number that silently resets. **Durable**, because the count is the
useful half of the row and removing it would have cost the operator the one
thing that says whether the peak means anything yet.
`PeakStore.banked_count(month)` asks the database `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM
quarter_blocks WHERE month=?`, and `PeakTracker.recorded` is a property over it
rather than an attribute. Three consequences, and all three are the defects
above:
* a restart re-reads the same rows, so the figure survives it;
* the count is per **month**, so it agrees with the peak it is printed beside;
* a block banked by `restore()` is a row like any other and is counted.
Three things this route deliberately does **not** do:
* **it does not count `len(blocks_in(month))`.** `blocks_in()` returns `[]` on a
read error — safe there only because no caller reads its emptiness as a peak,
which its own docstring says — so taking its length would rebuild the
disarming zero one call further out. `banked_count()` returns **`None`** when
the database will not answer.
* **it does not count `monthly_peak`.** That tier holds one row per *month* and
would answer `1` for every month ever measured — wrong by exactly the amount
that makes it look plausible. The two tables are proven equal on the **peak**
by `recompute_month()`; they were never equal on the **count**.
* **it does not remove the dedupe.** `_seen` is still what stops `cycle()`'s
once-a-second `sync()` re-banking a block that `P1Ingest.blocks` keeps for a
day, and `sync()`'s return value is still the number newly banked. What moved
is only where the *status page* reads its figure. ⚠️ The check that graded the
dedupe used to assert `recorded == 1` — the dedupe and the figure reporting it
were the same variable. Counting rows in `quarter_blocks` cannot see a
re-bank at all (it is a PRIMARY KEY no-op), so that check is now graded on
`sync()`'s **return**, with the store's tally as the second half.
### ⚠️ The unreadable case renders a WORD, not a number
`banked_count()` returns `int | None`; `recorded_in()` renders the `None` as
the module constant `COUNT_UNREADABLE = "an unreadable number of"`, so the
sentence reads
```
... ; an unreadable number of quarter(s) banked
```
`0` was never available. `None` was rejected too: `f"{None} quarter(s) banked"`
renders **"None quarter(s) banked"**, which an operator reads as the same zero.
This is the `PeakReading` trade — no `peak_w_or(default)`, ever — applied to the
coverage figure: a caller that formats it gets a true sentence in both states,
and a caller that does arithmetic on it gets a `TypeError`, which is loud.
"0 quarter(s) banked" remains a **true and reachable** sentence: it is what a
month nothing has been written to says, and part 11 asserts that the two states
are spelled differently.
---
## 2. Decision: at EQUAL wattage, the EARLIEST quarter keeps the attribution
**First, not most recent.** The reasoning, in the order it matters:
1. **It is not a money question.** The utility bills the wattage; the timestamp
is not part of the bill. So the decision is settled entirely on what the
status row is *for*.
2. **The row answers "when did my monthly peak happen".** An operator reading it
goes and looks at one event — what was running, what the weather was. A
stable answer is the one that can be investigated; "most recent wins"
guarantees the answer moves every time the wattage recurs, and an operator
who looked yesterday is sent somewhere else today for no reason.
3. **It is what one reader already did unconditionally.** `recompute_month()`
is `ORDER BY offtake_avg_w DESC, quarter_start ASC LIMIT 1` — earliest wins.
Choosing "most recent" would have meant changing both readers; choosing
"earliest" meant making the other one say out loud what it was already doing
by accident.
### ⚠️ And the two readers DID diverge, which is why this is a code change
The `monthly_peak` upsert was `WHERE excluded.peak_w > monthly_peak.peak_w` —
strictly greater, so an exact tie never wrote and the row kept whichever tied
block was **written first**. That coincides with *earliest* only while blocks
arrive in time order. Fed four equal 365 W blocks newest-first, measured on the
shipped tree:
```
ascending arrival monthly_peak -> 09:00:00 recompute_month -> 09:00:00 agree=True
DESCENDING arrival monthly_peak -> 09:45:00 recompute_month -> 09:00:00 agree=False
```
That is a divergence in the derived record that part 8 of `test_tariff.py`
exists to prove cannot happen — latent, because nothing in the shipped path
banks out of order today. The upsert now carries the tie term explicitly:
```sql
WHERE excluded.peak_w > monthly_peak.peak_w
OR (excluded.peak_w = monthly_peak.peak_w
AND excluded.quarter_start < monthly_peak.quarter_start)
```
**`peak_w` is untouched.** The `>` term is exactly as it was, no tie can move
the billed number, and SAFETY-07's guard reads the same watt figure it read
before. The second term moves only the timestamp.
### ⚠️ AND THE SOAK'S DRIFT WAS NOT A TIE AT ALL
The ticket's reading — "ties at the same wattage are re-attributed to the most
recent matching quarter" — is **false**, and driving it is what showed that.
Six exactly-equal 365.0 W quarters on the shipped tree moved the attribution
**zero** times, because `>` is strict.
What the soak saw was a genuine new maximum **smaller than the row's own
resolution**. The row renders `{peak_w:.0f}` — whole watts — so 365.0000001 W is
a new peak to the database and the same `365 W` to the reader:
```
q0 fed 365.0 -> renders 365 W, attributed 09:00:00
q1 fed 365.0000001 -> renders 365 W, attributed 09:15:00
q2 fed 365.0000002 -> renders 365 W, attributed 09:30:00
```
**Decision: left alone, deliberately.** It is the instrument behaving correctly
— the peak really did rise — and the alternative, printing more decimal places,
puts noise in the one row an operator reads at the moment the guard engages, to
explain a movement that is real. Both cases are pinned in part 12 so that
neither can be changed by accident, and the distinction is recorded here so the
next reader does not re-diagnose it as a tie.
---
## 3. What this branch did NOT do, and who owns it
**`main.py`'s status row was not touched.** TARIFF-11 holds `main.py`'s status
rows on a concurrent branch, and the standing instruction is to stop rather than
race there. Everything above is in `app/tariff.py`, and the row picks the fix up
without editing, because `self.peak.recorded` is an attribute access and is now
a property.
**The residual, stated with its scope.** `recorded` answers for
`datetime.now()`. The peak beside it follows `checks(when=...)`. The shipped
install has **exactly one** call site — `self.checks()` with no argument, at
`main.py:4359` — where the two are the same month, so **the live page is correct
and durable**. They part company only under the `when=` affordance TEST-17 added
for the suite, and the mismatch there is strictly smaller than the one it
replaces (this month's tally, rather than a process-wide total across all
months).
`PeakTracker.recorded_in(when)` is the scoped form and is shipped. Moving the
row onto it is:
```python
- + f"; {self.peak.recorded} quarter(s) banked"
+ + f"; {self.peak.recorded_in(when)} quarter(s) banked"
```
one token, on one line, inside the block TARIFF-11 owns. `test_tariff.py`
part 10 **pins the present behaviour** — graded against a row count taken
straight from `quarter_blocks`, not against the property that produces it — so
the gap goes red if it changes and cannot be quietly forgotten.
@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
# TARIFF-14 — how long one price point covers, and what the last one does
One defect and one genuinely open decision. The defect had no defensible
alternative once it was measured; the decision — the **last** point's window —
did, and the alternative is argued below rather than dismissed.
---
## 0. The measurement this card exists for
`_Series.at()` asked `s <= u < s + 1 h` of every point **in list order** and
returned the **first** match. Run against the shipped code at `5059e28` on a
quarter-hourly series:
```
series: 02:00=0.10 02:15=0.11 02:30=0.12 02:45=0.13 03:00=0.14 ...
ask + 0min -> 02:00 0.10
ask +15min -> 02:00 0.10 <-- WRONG (wanted 02:15)
ask +30min -> 02:00 0.10 <-- WRONG
ask +45min -> 02:00 0.10 <-- WRONG
ask +60min -> 02:15 0.11 <-- WRONG (wanted 03:00)
ask +75min -> 02:30 0.12 <-- WRONG (wanted 03:15)
```
**Two failure modes, not one.** Inside the first hour the `:00` point wins
because its hour has not run out. From the second hour on the answer is not
even the top of the hour — the first point still inside its own hour wins — so
**the error compounds with depth into the series**.
Same code, same run, after the fix:
```
ask + 0min -> 02:00 0.10 ask +60min -> 03:00 0.14
ask +15min -> 02:15 0.11 ask +75min -> 03:15 0.15
ask +30min -> 02:30 0.12 ask +90min -> 03:30 0.16
ask +45min -> 02:45 0.13 ask+120min -> 04:00 0.18
```
An hourly series is **unchanged at every instant**, before and after — which is
the whole reason nothing caught this. Every price fixture in this repository
before TARIFF-08 was the invented hourly row shape, `static_tariff.py` emits
hourly points, and the DST checks count points on the 23- and 25-hour days
without ever asking `at()` for a quarter-hour. **The suite had been exercising
the one resolution on which the broken rule and the right one agree.**
Belgium moved to a 15-minute MTU on 2025-10-01 and the live day-ahead feed
returns **96 points at 900 s**, so this is reachable only down the dynamic path
TARIFF-08/09 just made work. Static sites are immune.
## 0.1 What it cost, which is not "a slightly wrong price"
`arbitrage._act()` calls `_point_at(plan, now)` → `series.at(now)` and then
tests `here.start == v.cheapest.start` / `== v.dearest.start` to decide whether
this interval is the buy one or the sell one. That is an **identity test
between the matched point and the point the verdict was built from**, and on a
quarter-hourly series it almost never matched — so the strategy idled through
exactly the interval it exists to trade, reporting *"this hour is neither the
buy hour nor the sell hour"*. It also read `here.provisional` (§8.3) and §17's
`price < 0` off that same wrong point.
---
## 1. The rule
> **A point covers from its own start until the next point's start, and never
> more than one hour.**
* **900 s** → each point covers its own quarter.
* **3600 s** → each point covers its own hour. Identical to what shipped.
* **MIXED** → **each point takes its own gap.** FCST-04's carry-forward emits
hourly carried points beside quarter-hourly firm ones, and the soak measured
spacing `[900, 3600]` in **70 % of samples** — so a window derived from one
global spacing would be wrong in the **normal steady state**, not in an edge
case.
### 1.1 Why the one-hour cap is not decoration
FCST-04 **leaves holes on purpose**: an hour with no published price and no
yesterday value is left *out* of the series, and `price_forecast.py`'s module
note names `at()` raising `Absence` for it as the behaviour that sends the
caller to the static profile (§11.4 for that hour).
Uncapped, "until the next point's start" stretches the point **before** a
three-hour hole across the whole hole and answers every instant in it with a
stale price. Filling holes is the defect this module exists to refuse, and it
would have been introduced **by the fix for a different one**. Graded in
`test_price.py` 14d; the mutation that removes the cap is red there.
---
## 2. The decision: what the **last** point covers
There is no next start, and §9.3 says nothing about how wide the final interval
is — a `PricePoint` has **three fields** and must not learn a fourth, because
that is the wire format every store, replay, fixture and captured body in this
repository is written against. So the tail is a **choice**, and both candidates
are defensible.
**Chosen: the last point is given the same span as the point before it** (one
hour when it is the only point).
| | flat one hour | the span in front of it (**chosen**) |
|---|---|---|
| 96-point 900 s day, `at(23:50)` | answers 23:45 | answers 23:45 |
| the same day, `at(00:30)` **tomorrow** | **answers with today's 23:45 price** | `Absence` |
| 24-point hourly day, `at(23:50)` | answers 23:00 | answers 23:00 |
| mixed series ending at the firm/carried seam | answers for an hour | `Absence` after 15 min |
**The second row is why.** A flat one-hour tail reaches across a day boundary
and prices tomorrow morning with yesterday's last print — which is
"reaching for a neighbouring one", the single thing the `Absence` message has
always refused to do. The chosen rule never extends a point past a span the
series itself demonstrates.
### 2.1 The cost of the choice, stated rather than buried
On a **mixed** series whose last point is a carried **hourly** one sitting
behind quarter-hourly firm ones, the tail is **900 s**, and the last 45 minutes
of the horizon raise `Absence` for an hour something did carry a value for.
That is accepted, not tolerated, and the direction is the safe one:
* the caller falls back to the static profile (§11.4) instead of trading on a
span the series never demonstrated;
* the point is **carried**, so §8.3 forbids any irreversible action resting on
it regardless;
* it is at the far end of a 48 h horizon, where nothing is decided at 30 s.
Under-covering costs a missed decision. Over-covering prices a real interval
with a number that does not describe it. Those are not symmetric.
### 2.2 The degenerate case
A series of **one** point has no gap in front of it to copy and gets **one
hour** — the shipped behaviour, kept deliberately. `test_price.py` 14e states
it as its own check so it cannot decay into an accident.
---
## 3. Does `at()` now depend on sortedness? Yes — and it establishes it itself
The old rule read one point at a time and did not care about order. The new one
reads a point's **neighbours**, so it *would* depend on the series being
ascending.
It does not, because **the lookup index is sorted by UTC start at construction**
(`_cover_table()`, called once from `_Series.__init__`). No caller's list order
can reach `at()`.
That matters because the three things that "guarantee" order today each
guarantee it somewhere else:
| | what it guarantees | where |
|---|---|---|
| `_validate_raw()` | strictly increasing starts | the `load_prices()` path only |
| `price_history._parse_points()` | re-sorts by instant | the store read path only |
| FCST-04's fill | emits ascending | that one producer only |
| `PriceRead.series()` | **nothing** | every other caller, including tests |
Three producers agreeing today is not an invariant; it is a coincidence with
good references. `test_price.py` 14f drives a series handed its 96 points in
**reverse** order and asserts `at()` answers identically at every one of them —
red the moment the sort is removed.
**Duplicated starts** (refused by `_validate_raw()`, constructible by hand) give
the earlier list entry a zero-width window and the later one the real span. One
of the pair becomes unreachable through `at()`; **nothing raises**, at
construction or on the 30 s control path. Stated as a check rather than left to
be discovered.
---
## 4. `covers()` shared it. `window()` did not
* **`covers()`** has no window rule of its own — it calls `at()` — so it shared
the defect exactly and the same change fixes it. It is kept as a delegation
for that reason: a second copy of the rule is a second place for it to be
wrong.
* **`window(since, until)`** grades a point's **start** against a half-open
range and never asks how long a point lasts, so it carries no resolution
assumption at all. It is **not** a coverage query — a point that starts before
`since` and runs into it is absent from its result by design. That is now
said in its docstring and pinned by a check, because the next reader will ask.
It has **no callers** in `app/`.
---
## 5. What this card does NOT fix, with its shape
`price_forecast._walk()` — §8.3's irreversible-action gate — iterates
`committed_hours()`, which steps in **whole hours**, and asks `series.at(u)` at
each. On a quarter-hourly series that now reliably returns the hour's `:00`
point (it previously returned something earlier and arbitrary), so the gate
reads **one point per hour** and never looks at the `:15`/`:30`/`:45` flags.
A partially-provisional hour would therefore be gated on its first quarter
alone. **Two things keep it off every shipped install, and both are
circumstantial rather than structural:** `price_permits()`/`begin_phase()` have
**no caller in `app/main.py`** — the §12 price-justified entry point is built
and not yet wired — and FCST-04 carries **whole** hours while
`generic_dayahead` publishes whole days, so the four quarters of an hour are
firm or carried together anyway. Both are facts about the *callers and
producers*, not properties of the *gate*, so this is written down here rather
than left for the first sub-hourly feed or the first wiring-up to find. Fixing it means teaching
`committed_hours()` about resolution, which is a data-model question this card
deliberately does not open.
---
## 6. Mutations
Eight, each purged before the run (TEST-15), each reverted with the tree
fingerprint checked afterwards (MUTATION.md habit 18), backup at a `mktemp`
path per invocation.
⚠️ **Re-driven in full on the MERGED tree** after TARIFF-10 landed on
`release/1.0` (base `88c59a9` -> `559f0eb`). All eight give the same verdicts
and the same red-check counts as before the merge, which is the answer that
matters: TARIFF-10 added 650 lines of checks to `test_price.py` and none of
them moves under any of these edits, because they grade `resolve_tariff()`'s
*reachability from a configuration* and not the lookup. Clean `app/price.py` on
the merged tree = **`90d8ca31f7c0109d`, 85953 B** (pre-merge it was
`30d1a56f0117e571`, 83742 B; the difference is TARIFF-10's `provider_id()` /
`provider_configured()`, which this card does not touch).
| | mutation | Δ | red in |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `at()` back to the shipped fixed one-hour scan over `self.points` | +68 B | **24 named checks**: `test_price.py` 14b ×4, 14c ×3, 14d, 14e ×3, 14f, 14g; `test_arbitrage.py` 10b ×6, 10c ×3, 10d ×2 |
| M2 | drop the one-hour cap | −68 B | `test_price.py` 14d |
| M3 | flat one-hour tail instead of the span in front | **+0 B** | `test_price.py` 14e ×3, 14g — 4 checks |
| M4 | trust the caller's list order — drop the sort | −61 B | `test_price.py` 14f |
| M5 | `covers()` grows its own hour-wide rule | +95 B | `test_price.py` 14e, 14g |
| M6 | `window()` becomes a coverage query | −37 B | `test_price.py` 14g |
| M7 | the window's end becomes inclusive | +1 B | `test_price.py` 14b ×4, 14c ×4, 14d, 14e ×4, 14f ×2, 14g — 16 checks |
| M8 | the window's start becomes exclusive | −1 B | `test_price.py` 14b ×4, 14c ×4, 14d, 14f ×2, 14g, 14h, plus the pre-existing section 6 check — 14 checks |
**M3 is the zero-byte one and it is the tail decision itself** — the case
MUTATION.md names as the risky size, caught by the check written for it.
**What the arbitrage file does NOT see, with sizes.** M2, M4, M5, M6 and M8
leave `test_arbitrage.py` green, and that is honest rather than a gap to round
off: they are `at()`-level properties (holes, caller order, `covers()`,
`window()`, the start boundary) that no arbitrage fixture reaches, because the
probes are seven minutes into a slot and the plans have no holes. The one that
matters end to end — M1, the shipped rule — is red in **both** files, on the
named check `THE PROPERTY THE DEFECT BROKE`.
---
## 7. TARIFF-10 landed on the base while this was open — what it changes here
Base moved `88c59a9` → `559f0eb` mid-card. The question is not whether the
branches merge; it is whether TARIFF-10 makes any sentence above **false**.
**In `app/price.py` the two do not meet.** TARIFF-10 added `provider_id()` and
`provider_configured()` beside `price_option()` and routed `load_prices()`
through them. That is the option-reading layer; it touches nothing in
`_Series`, `at()`, `covers()`, `window()` or `_cover_table()`. Git merged the
file without a conflict, and the merged `at()` is byte-identical to the one the
mutations above were driven against.
**Behaviourally it widens who has a series at all, and that cuts one way only.**
`run_tariff_refresh()` now runs on installs with `arbitrage_enabled` **off**, so
a provider-configured site has a standing plan — and therefore a `_Series` —
where before it had none. **It does not add a new `at()` consumer to the 30 s
tick**, which is the claim worth checking rather than assuming:
| caller of `at()`/`covers()` | reached by a non-trading install? |
|---|---|
| `arbitrage._point_at()` (`arbitrage.py:300`) | no — trading only |
| `static_tariff.TariffPlan.price_at()` / `.words` `here` (`:750`, `:819`) | on the tick these are reached through `static_status()`, which builds a **`static_plan`** — hourly points, immune. `main.py` calls only `plan.words` on the fetched plan, which counts points and never looks one up |
| `price_forecast._walk()` (`:562`, `:568`) | **`price_permits()` and `begin_phase()` have no caller in `app/main.py` at all** — §12's price-justified entry point is built and not yet wired |
So TARIFF-10 neither creates nor closes any exposure this card is about. What it
does do is make the defect's reach larger the moment such a site arms trading,
because the series it would trade against now exists on every configured
install rather than only on armed ones. That strengthens the case for the fix
and changes nothing in its reasoning.
**In `test_price.py` both cards appended a section 13.** Nothing is dropped:
TARIFF-10's stays **13**, this card's is renumbered **14** (which is also this
card's number), and the temp-directory teardown TARIFF-10 put at the end of the
file stays at the end of the file. The two sections share no fixture, no option
dict and no helper name; TARIFF-10's grades `resolve_tariff()`'s *reachability
from a configuration* and drives real fetches with a counting transport, and
**none of its checks moves under any of the eight mutations above** — measured,
not assumed.
---
## 8. TARIFF-12 landed too — a plan may now be 90 minutes old when it is asked
Base moved `559f0eb` → `a6e64fb` while this was open. TARIFF-12 stops a
returned §11.4 degradation from overwriting a standing plan that is still
inside `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`, so **a served plan can now be up to
`3 × TARIFF_REFRESH_S = 5400 s` old** where before it was at most one refresh
interval. `at()` is what answers *"what does it cost right now"* out of that
older plan, so the question is fair and the answer is written out rather than
assumed.
**Per-point span: unaffected, structurally.** Every window is derived from the
neighbouring points' **absolute `start` instants**. Those are `datetime`s inside
a frozen dataclass inside a tuple — they cannot move, and `_cover_table()` runs
once at construction over data that cannot change afterwards. A plan's *age* is
a property of `fetched_at` / `tariff_at`, never of a window. **The index cannot
go stale**, which is a small positive under TARIFF-12 rather than a risk: a kept
plan now lives longer, and there is nothing in it that needed recomputing.
**The one-hour cap: unaffected.** It bites only where a gap exceeds an hour,
i.e. at a hole FCST-04 left. Walking further into a series crosses more windows;
each is still resolved on its own neighbours.
**The tail: reachable for the first time, and the choice made in §2 is the one
that survives it.** This is the half worth spelling out.
* At the **shipped 48 h horizon** the tail is unreachable by staleness. A plan
is served for at most 90 minutes, so `now` is at most 90 minutes into a
~48 h series — the last point is still about 46½ hours away.
* But `price_horizon_h` is `int(1,72)` in `config.yaml`, so an operator **can**
configure a **1 h** horizon. A 90-minute serve-stale window against a 1 h
series puts `now` genuinely past the end. That is not hypothetical; it is a
supported configuration meeting a supported outage.
* Under the **chosen** rule a quarter-hourly 1 h series ends at `:45` and that
point's window closes at the top of the next hour: `at()` raises `Absence`,
`_point_at()` returns None, `_act()` idles with its "no price for this
instant" reason, and §11.4 sends the site to the static profile.
* Under the **rejected** flat one-hour tail the same stale plan would have gone
on trading against the `:45` print for **up to 45 minutes after the interval
it describes had ended** — pricing an outage with a number for a quarter that
is over.
So TARIFF-12 does not weaken the tail decision. It is the first thing that makes
it reachable on a shipped configuration, and it independently selects the same
answer. ⚠️ **Note which direction that runs**: the more stale a plan is allowed
to be, the more the tail rule is doing real work, so it should be re-read if
`TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` is ever widened again.
**`TariffPlan.from_feed` cannot produce a series this code has not seen.** It is
a pure predicate on `origin` (`== "provider"`), and TARIFF-12's decision keeps or
replaces a **whole plan object**. It never splices two reads into one series, so
it cannot hand `at()` an unsorted or duplicated point list — the case §3 covers
defensively and that nothing shipped produces.
**Re-graded on this base.** All 29 files green. `app/price.py` is byte-identical
to the TARIFF-10 merge (`90d8ca31f7c0109d`, 85953 B) because TARIFF-12 does not
touch it. **M1** re-driven: +68 B, red on the same **24 named checks** across
both files. **M3** re-driven: **+0 B**, red on the same 4. This branch
contributes **zero diff** to `app/main.py` and `app/static_tariff.py`.
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
# TARIFF-15 — the operator's own tariff card, and why the card has to grade it
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-13 — ship `custom_formula` with FIXED coefficients and
a REQUIRED `card` block whose printed price the add-on reproduces at startup or
refuses to run. No expression evaluation, ever. Declare `{ENERGY, MARKUP}`,
never `ALL_IN`.**
Filed with TARIFF-15. Follows [[TARIFF-07]], which withdrew three per-supplier
plugins and named a formula provider as the answer it could not give.
---
## 1. Why a formula rather than more plugins
TARIFF-07 established the negative half: a per-supplier plugin has no source
for its numbers. This card establishes the positive one.
* **There is no machine-readable source of Belgian tariff coefficients
anywhere.** CREG's consumer tariff-card pages 404. CREG Scan is a
JavaScript-only wizard. The annual report carries the supplier list and no
per-product coefficients. VREG was unreachable. Every coefficient found in
research came from a supplier's **own PDF**, one of them image-only.
* So there is nothing to scrape, and fourteen plugins would still have no
source for their numbers — they would be fourteen copies of the invention
TARIFF-07 deleted three of.
* **The customer is the only party who can see their own coefficients**, and
the card they read them from **is the only artefact that can grade them**.
That second clause is the whole design; everything below follows from it.
## 2. The shape is the market's published arithmetic
Both suppliers whose 2026 cards were readable print three things on one line:
the formula, the reference index it assumes, **and the resulting price**.
| | computed | the card prints |
|---|---|---|
| Eneco `(0.102 × 133.9905 + 1) × 1.06` | **15.5471** | **15,55** |
| ENGIE `(0.1 × 61.96 + 0.9) × 1.06` | **7.5218** | **7,522** |
Two independent suppliers, reproduced to the last printed digit, through the
shipped code (`test_price.py` 15a runs both, and then runs both again end to
end through `load_prices()`).
That third column is not a nicety. It is the only externally-published number
in this whole feature, and it is what makes the design safe.
## 3. The double-counting risk, and which half of it is new
`price.py`'s trap 1 already mechanises that a **plugin** cannot double-count:
`PluginOptions` refuses the framework keys, `code_leaks()` refuses a plugin
whose *code* mentions them, `assemble()` adds the complement exactly once.
`custom_formula` introduces a risk none of those can see, **because it is not
in code**: the **operator** double-counting, by folding their network charges
into `offset` while `price_taxes_eur_kwh` also carries them. `code_leaks()`
scans code. This is config, typed by a person reading a PDF.
It is a real reading of a real card, not a hypothetical. A Belgian card's
`Tariefformule` line is the **energy component alone** — Eneco tabulates
network tariffs in one table and levies in a second; ENGIE states in so many
words that the formula excludes network, distribution, transport, grid levies
and excise. An operator who wants "the price I actually pay" and adds ~12
c€/kWh to `offset` has done something entirely reasonable and is now billed for
network charges twice, on every hour, with §11.4 making the whole class of
price defect invisible.
**Decision: the card grades it.** At startup `validate.py` recomputes the
card's own printed price from the operator's coefficients and refuses to start
unless the two agree to within `0.01` — which is the last digit a card prints.
An inflated `offset` cannot pass, because the printed estimate is by
construction the energy component: 15.55 becomes 28.27 and the add-on stops and
says why.
**And the limit, stated in the same sentence as the claim**, exactly as
`price.py` states trap 1's: *it grades the coefficients against the card, not
the card against reality.* A consistent-but-wrong pair — both numbers off the
wrong product, or off a card the contract has since rolled over from — agrees
with itself perfectly and passes. Nothing here or anywhere else can catch that.
### 3b. The one unit error the card check cannot see
A factor applied to **both** sides — coefficients *and* printed price — cancels
out of a comparison between them. That is a second quantity, so it is a second
refusal: the card's own point must land inside 0.02–1.00 EUR/kWh.
⚠️ **Its floor is applied to the ENERGY figure and not to the all-in one, and
that asymmetry was found by a mutation rather than by reasoning.** The shipped
`price_taxes_eur_kwh` was 0.06 — three times the floor — so a card read a
hundred times too small comes out at 0.0016 EUR/kWh of energy, is carried over
0.02 by the flat tax addend alone, and passes a band applied to the total. The
hundredfold error is exactly what the band exists for. Graded from both
directions in `test_price.py` 15e/15i and driven red as M10. *(Annotated
2026-09-13: TARIFF-18 raised the default to 0.11736, nearly six times the
floor. The asymmetry is unchanged in kind and larger in degree — the flat
addend that carries a hundredfold-small card over 0.02 got bigger.)*
## 4. Fixed coefficients. No expression evaluation of any kind
**Decided: never a grammar.** Two arguments, and the second is the one that
decides it.
* **Security.** The add-on serves `POST config/save` → `POST
/addons/self/options` on its own ingress page, so `price_formula` is
**settable over HTTP**. `eval` on it is remote code execution in a root
container holding `SUPERVISOR_TOKEN`, with `homeassistant_api` and
`hassio_api`, driving an inverter over RS485. `eval(s, {"__builtins__": {}})`
is not a sandbox and this repository is not going to pretend otherwise.
* **⚠️ AND THE DECIDING ARGUMENT IS NOT SECURITY: AN EXPRESSION IS
UNVERIFIABLE.** Two coefficients can be graded against the card's printed
estimate. An arbitrary expression cannot be graded against **anything** — so
it makes the invisible-wrong-coefficient problem *strictly worse*, which is
the exact failure this provider exists to prevent. An expression would buy
the operator freedom to be wrong in a way nothing could report.
All 24 surveyed Belgian products, both injection legs and aWATTar AT fit
`B × index + A`, so an expression buys nothing the market needs either.
**Future shapes become NAMED FIELDS** — `clamp_lo`, `factor_negative`,
`offset_bands` — each individually refusable and each individually gradeable
against a card. `parse_price_formula()` therefore **refuses an unknown key**
rather than ignoring it: an operator who types `"expr"` is told it does not
exist, instead of being priced on the fields they also typed with the one they
believed in dropped in silence.
`test_price.py` 15f walks the module's AST for `eval`, `exec`, `compile`,
`__import__` and `literal_eval`, and exercises the scanner's **red** direction
on every run so it cannot become a scanner that scans nothing.
## 5. `{ENERGY, MARKUP}`, not `ALL_IN`
The contract's formula **is** the supplier's markup — that is what `B` and `A`
are — but it is not the levies. Declaring `ALL_IN` would lie on behalf of every
operator who typed exactly what their card says and would drop
`price_taxes_eur_kwh` from every hour: measured at 0.2125 → 0.1555 EUR/kWh.
`price_markup_eur_kwh` is therefore **ignored** under this provider, and logged
as ignored, which is the framework's existing rule rather than a new one.
## 6. What was reused rather than rebuilt
The index path is `generic_dayahead`'s: same EPEX BE feed, same
Brussels-calendar range, same columnar parser, same declared egress hosts. The
override/range decision moved into one shared `dayahead_feed_url()` that both
plugins call, because two copies of that rule would be two places for the
short-horizon defect TARIFF-09 fixed to come back in only one of them.
`resolution: hourly` averages each hour's members. ⚠️ **That is not
`_Series.at()`'s hourly assumption returning (TARIFF-14):** it decides how many
points are *emitted*; the window each point covers is still derived from its
neighbours in `_cover_table()`. A feed that is already hourly averages one
member per hour — the identity — so the option cannot silently assume the
granularity it was handed. Graded.
## 7. What this card did NOT do
* **The injection leg.** Eneco uses `0,102` on consumption and `0,100` on
injection, and injection is VAT-exempt where consumption is at 6 % — a second
per-contract formula, not a second copy of this one. Separate card.
* **The hour-varying network charge that bites Wallonia.** Separate card.
* **Raising `price_taxes_eur_kwh` from 0.06 to ~0.12.** Separate card, and an
owner's decision. Note §3b: the band's floor is deliberately insensitive to
whatever that number becomes. *(Annotated 2026-09-13: that card is
**TARIFF-18** and it shipped on this branch at **0.11736** — the Eneco
residential card for Flanders, September 2026, incl. 6 % VAT, summed from
Fluvius Antwerpen distribution 5,35 + bijzondere accijns 4,876 + bijdrage
groene stroom en WKK 1,51 c€/kWh. §3b held: the floor is still on the energy
figure and nothing in this module needed a new number.)*
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
# TEL-10 — the loop's integrator is published, as three site rows
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `TEL-10`.
**Card:** TEL-10 — *"`self.i_w` is carried between cycles and published nowhere"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter, and nothing here can.** `app/control.py`
is not touched by this branch; `compute()`, its returned `Decision` and every
constant it reads are byte-identical to `release/1.0`. The diff is a controller
recording three values it already had, and a publisher announcing three rows.
---
## 0. The three things a reader should take away
1. **The row that matters is the one that is usually indistinguishable from
`Setpoint`.** With nothing binding, the command *is* the integrator rounded
to 10 W, so on a quiet day publishing the wrong one looks correct. §2 is
the fixture that separates them by kilowatts, and §4 is the mutation that
proves the separation is what the check reads.
2. **`Loop reason` is a genuinely new sentence, not a second copy of one.** The
status page's `Why` row and `sensor.goodwe_controller_status` both carry the
*arbiter's* line (`loop -> -5000 W`), which prints the winning claim's NAME.
`compute()`'s own reason has never left the process, and `slew-limited` — the
value SAFETY-48 is about — appears in neither of the other two. §3.
3. ⚠️ **Three entities are three entities.** This is an addition to a live
install's entity list, which TEL-07 refused to make for four per-unit rows
at a roster of one. The argument for making it here is in §5, and so is the
argument that keeps it to three rather than to one per inverter.
---
## 1. Why this is a card at all
`self.i_w` has been a separate quantity from the command since SAFETY-04, which
split the accumulator out of the velocity form precisely so the two could be
bounded apart. Since then it has been:
* carried between cycles by `Controller.cycle()`,
* read by nothing outside `compute()`,
* and written to no entity, no MQTT topic, no attribute and no log line.
The consequence is not theoretical. The investigation behind SAFETY-48 needed to
know what the integrator was doing during the export episodes and could only
**reconstruct** it, from the grid trace plus a replay of the real `compute()`.
The reconstruction reproduced about a third of the engagements it was checked
against and was **discarded entirely** — so the card it was gathered for had to
be argued from a measurement nobody could stand behind.
⚠️ **And the reconstruction could not have been made to work.** `i_w` at a given
instant depends on every cycle before it, including every one in which the
arbiter overrode the loop and `main.py` re-seeded `self.i_w = self.target`. That
re-seed is invisible in the grid trace. A replay can only recover the integrator
on a run where the loop won every arbitration, which is not the run anybody is
investigating.
## 2. What is published, and against what
Three rows, on the SITE device, appended after `release/1.0`'s eight sensors:
| key | entity | what it is |
|---|---|---|
| `loop_i` | `sensor.goodwe_loop_integrator` | `Decision.i_w` — the accumulator AFTER this cycle, BEFORE the output clamp, the slew limit and quantisation, which is what its own docstring says it is |
| `loop_lead` | `sensor.goodwe_loop_integrator_lead` | `decision.i_w - prev_w`, where `prev_w` is the command `compute()` was handed |
| `loop_reason` | `sensor.goodwe_loop_reason` | `Decision.reason`, unmodified |
⚠️ **`loop_lead` IS NOT A SUBTRACTION OF THE OTHER TWO ROWS, WHICH IS WHY IT IS
A ROW.** `Setpoint` is the ARBITER's output, after every other strategy has had
its say, and it is THIS cycle's; the lead is measured against the command the
PREVIOUS cycle left standing. On any cycle where the arbiter overrode the loop,
subtracting the two published rows gives a different number — and that is
exactly the cycle on which `main.py` re-seeds the integrator, i.e. the cycle a
reader most needs the real figure for.
`cycle()` therefore records all three from the one `compute()` call, and names
the command it passes (`loop_prev`) rather than re-reading `self.target` at
publish time. `self.target` is reassigned later in the same method, so a lead
computed at publish time would subtract a different cycle's command and call the
answer a lead. ⚠️ **At the line as written the two expressions are the same
value, and the mutation that swaps them is a recorded SURVIVOR** — see §4 M2.
The name is kept for the coupling, not for a behaviour it currently buys.
### The not-running branch
`cycle()`'s `else` arm — stopped AND shadow mode off — already zeroes
`self.i_w`, because no accumulation may survive the outage. The three rows are
zeroed and `loop_reason` becomes `not-running` on the same branch. A row that
kept repeating the last integrator there would say the loop was winding while
nothing is being controlled.
⚠️ **`auto: false` ALONE IS NOT THAT BRANCH.** The shipped `shadow_mode: auto`
means a stopped controller still runs the whole decision path and records it
(SAFETY-10), so the loop is live and the integrator is real. The first draft of
the check asserted `not-running` about a loop that was running; it reads the
shadow case as its own claim now.
## 3. Why `loop_reason` is not the row that already exists
`self.reason` is `Resolution.explain()`:
```
"loop -> -5000 W" # winner, watts
"loop -> -5000 W, limited by soc" # ...and which limit bit
"CONTRADICTION between limits - commanding 0 W (loop)"
```
`Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, decision.target_w, decision.reason, ...)` does carry
the loop's reason INTO the arbiter — and `explain()` prints the winner's
**source name**, never the claim's reason. So the loop's own word has always
been built, handed over, and dropped one line later.
Measured on the fixture in `test_telemetry.py` part 2, same cycle:
```
the arbiter's sentence: 'loop -> -5000 W'
the loop's own word : 'i-clamped'
```
## 4. Verified by breaking it
Nine mutations, run in the CI image on a purged tree, each fingerprinted before,
after, and again after the revert. The table with byte deltas and red counts is
in `test_telemetry.py`'s header; two entries are worth repeating here.
**M1 — `self.loop_i_w = loop_prev` (−3 B), the card's own named mutation:
publish the COMMAND under the integrator's name.** The first draft of the
acceptance check was *"the published integrator reaches its bound"*, and that
check was **GREEN** under M1 — because the command reaches the bound too, twelve
cycles later. MUTATION.md habit 4 in the check written to close the card. It
asserts the **lead time** now (the integrator is at the bound at least ten
cycles before the command is), and is red on 5 named checks.
**M2 — `decision.i_w - self.target` (+2 B) is a SURVIVOR, and is reported as
one.** At that line `cycle()` has not yet executed `self.target =
resolution.target_w`, so the two expressions denote the same value and the
mutation changes nothing that runs. The run was purged, which is not the
direction stale bytecode fabricates. M2b (`decision.i_w - decision.target_w`,
+8 B) is the mutation that does change the value and is red.
## 5. What was rejected
**Publishing as an MQTT attribute on an existing entity.** There is no
`json_attributes_topic` anywhere in this add-on; adding one would be a second
convention for one card, and HA's recorder keeps long-term statistics for a
state with `state_class`, not for an attribute. The reason this card exists is
that nobody had history to read.
**A status-page row instead.** The page is not recorded. `Why` already carries
the arbiter's sentence and stays that way; DOCS.md gains the section that says
how to read the three entities.
**One integrator row per inverter.** §6.2's architecture is ONE integrator on
the P1 meter whose output is then SPLIT. A per-unit copy would invent N of a
thing there is one of, and the two copies would disagree the moment the
allocator gave the units different shares. `test_mqtt.py` part 5 grades this at
every roster length from 1 to 6, and the mutation that moves `loop_i` into
`UNIT_SENSORS` is red on 8 named checks.
**Adding the rows at N≥2 only, the way TEL-07 gates its per-unit rows.**
TEL-07's gate exists because at a roster of one its four rows carry information
the site rows already carry exactly. These three carry information NOTHING
carries, at every roster length, including one.
**A `## Unreleased` block in `CHANGELOG.md`.** `test_version_gate.py` part 11b
refuses a changelog whose newest `## ` heading is not `config.yaml`'s
`version:` — PKG-14's rule that the bump and the closed section are one act.
Opening a section here would mean bumping the version, which is a packaging
decision this card does not get to take. The operator-facing account is in
DOCS.md; the release note belongs to whichever PKG ticket cuts the next
version, and this file is what it should be written from.
## 6. What this card does NOT establish
* **It says nothing about whether the integrator's behaviour is right.** That is
SAFETY-48. This branch adds an observable and changes no decision; the
15.7-day replay that grades the behaviour is in that card.
* **The three rows do not exist on the live install until the add-on is
updated**, and this branch does not update it. `tools/rehearsal/announced-
reference.txt` (what the BUILD announces) records them; `live-entities-
recorded.txt` (what the INSTALL has) deliberately does not, because an id the
build announces and the install lacks is a new entity, not an orphan.
* **`loop_lead` is signed and is not a distance.** Where the integrator and the
command have opposite signs it is the sum of two magnitudes. A reader wanting
"how far behind is the command" should take the magnitude and say so.
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
# TEL-11 — the PV production channel
*What was decided, what it was decided against, and what the evidence was.*
## 0. The problem, in OPT-10's numbers
Over sixteen days at the reference site the pack reached 90 % SoC on **two** of
them, and **20.5 kWh of surplus left the site while the pack still had room** —
**12.6 kWh** of it with the battery **not charging at all**. That single
measurement is upstream of most of what else was found that week: the nightly
floor, SAFETY-37's misdiagnosis, the SAFETY-57 deadlock, a 2 h 47 min saturation
freeze.
It cannot be **attributed**, because **PV production is recorded nowhere in this
system**. Three causes need three different fixes:
| cause | fix |
|---|---|
| there was no irradiance | none — the site behaved correctly |
| production was there, charge power was limited | a limit, somewhere |
| production was there, the pack had room, the optimiser declined | **the only software defect** |
Guessing between them is how an optimiser gets tuned to solve a cloud problem.
**This card adds the channel and does not do the attribution.** Ship it, let it
record a week, OPT-10 picks it up with data.
## 1. It is an HA entity, not a register — and that is a product decision
The RS485 bus this add-on speaks carries the **battery** inverter it drives. On
nearly every site the PV inverter is a different box from a different vendor,
reporting into Home Assistant through its own integration; it is **not** on this
bus and there is no reason it would be. So the signal comes from an entity:
`pv_entity` takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's PV integration provides, any
brand HA can read.
Reading a register would have been cheaper on one house and wrong for a fleet —
the trade [[product-not-one-house]] names.
## 2. The sign convention: **positive is production**, and there is no `pv_invert`
> Reversed by TEL-14 (flag and negative caution): `DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md`.
### The convention is derived, not assumed
Two sign rules already ship, and both are recorded in `DOCS.md`'s *Sources*
table rather than inferred here:
* `meter_entity` — **positive must mean importing** (`meter_invert` flips it);
* `batt_entity` — **`+` = discharging** (`batt_invert` flips it).
Both are *"positive = power arriving at the house's AC bus"*. Production arrives
there too, so **positive = producing** is the continuation of the shipped
convention rather than a fresh choice.
### Why an invert flag would be over-building
The question is not "could a sensor be reversed" — it could. It is what a flag
would **buy**, and the answer is nothing, for two reasons that do not apply to
the two keys it would sit beside:
1. **Those two quantities are read by the control path; this one is read by
nothing.** `inv.batt` feeds SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and SAFETY-31's
circulating-power sensor (`_read_unit()`'s own docstring says so), so a
reversed battery sensor hands the site a plausible number it then **acts**
on — a latch that trips when it should not, or does not trip when it should.
`pv_w` reaches no decision at all (§4), so a reversed PV sensor cannot
mislead one.
2. **Production is unipolar, so the error is self-announcing.** Battery power
and grid power are legitimately negative half the time, which is exactly why
a flipped sign is invisible in them. A PV array does not consume: a reversed
sensor reads **−4 kW at noon**, in the first day of the very history this card
exists to create. An invert flag would let an installer *hide* that by
flipping it to something that looks right, and a second place for the sign to
be wrong is a second thing to get wrong.
So: the convention is documented in `config.yaml`, both translations, `DOCS.md`
and `app/pv.py`, the value is published **exactly as the sensor reports it**,
and there is no flag. `test_pv.py` part 1 pins `-8 W` through unchanged.
### And no negative-value alarm either
The tempting middle path — warn when the reading is negative — needs a
threshold, because a PV inverter's own standby draw makes a small negative
reading at night entirely ordinary. Any threshold here would be a number nobody
measured, in a card whose whole subject is not fabricating numbers. The
published row is the detector.
## 3. Absence is never zero, and it is not "dropped" either
This is the constraint that shaped the publication, and the obvious
implementation fails it.
`MqttPublisher.publish()` **skips** a `None` value. That is right for
`circulation` — its note in `main.py` says a missing per-unit reading should
leave the last figure standing rather than publish a zero that reads as health —
and it is **exactly wrong here**: a skipped row leaves Home Assistant holding
the last number it was told, *forever*, and the recorder then draws a **flat
line at that value through the outage**. Read back a week later that is
indistinguishable from a real measurement, and if the last value happened to be
small it manufactures precisely the *"there was no surplus to store"* conclusion
the card exists to **test**.
So TEL-11 publishes the absence, using Home Assistant's own mechanism:
> `homeassistant/components/mqtt/const.py`: `PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"`.
> `homeassistant/components/mqtt/sensor.py`, in the state-message handler:
> `if payload == PAYLOAD_NONE: self._attr_native_value = None; return` — and it
> is tested **before** the numeric branch, so it holds for a row carrying
> `device_class: power`.
> (github.com/home-assistant/core, branch `dev`, retrieved 2026-09-24. The
> shipped MQTT-sensor documentation says the same thing in its `state_topic`
> entry: *"a 'None' value will set the sensor to an unknown state"*.)
The entity therefore goes to **`unknown`** and the recorder stores a **gap**.
`mqtt.ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is a one-key set and `test_pv.py` part 3 asserts both
that the pv row gets this treatment **and that `circulation` still does not** —
widening the rule silently would be a behaviour change to another card's row.
⚠️ **What was NOT built, and why.** A per-entity `availability` block
(`availability_mode: all`, an extra retained topic) would also produce a
distinguishable state — `unavailable` rather than `unknown` — but it needs a
second topic, a second retained message, a change to `_payload()`'s
byte-order-sensitive key construction, and it survives restarts only if the
retention is right. The payload route is one branch in `publish()` and one
constant, and it is graded as **bytes on the topic** rather than as a claim
about HA's availability handling.
### Three states, not two
| state | frame | wire | page |
|---|---|---|---|
| no source (`pv_entity` unset) | no `pv` key | no topic, no entity | no row |
| no reading | `pv: None` | `goodwe_ctl/pv` = `None` | `PV —` + a caution naming the reason |
| zero watts | `pv: 0.0` | `goodwe_ctl/pv` = `0.0` | `PV 0 W` |
A failed read also **clears** the last good value (`_read_pv()` assigns on every
call), so a reading never outlives its own sensor. `test_pv.py` part 2 drives a
good read followed by a dead one, because a fixture that answers the same thing
forever cannot reach that failure — MUTATION.md habit 9's shape.
## 4. It must not become a control input, and that is graded twice
### In the suite
`test_pv.py` part 6 drives twelve cycles of the real `Controller.cycle()`
against a 6 kW export and asserts the commands written to the inverter are
**bit-identical** across `unset` / `no reading` / `0 W` / `8 kW` of production,
with a precondition check that the stimulus commands something at all (habit 1).
`inputs_ok` is asserted not to move either: a broken PV integration is **not** a
missing input, because nothing computes with it.
A computed census (habit 12 — the scope is derived from the tree, not typed)
then reports which of the 33 modules under `app/` mention the material in any
spelling, comments included. It is **three**: `pv.py`, `main.py`, `mqtt.py`. The
scanner's own red direction is exercised on every run.
### Across trees, by hash
`tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` is the pattern; `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is
this card's version of it, and **its control clause had to be different**, which
is worth stating because the difference is the interesting part.
SAFETY-56 changed wording and had to show behaviour did not move, so its
`--compare` **refuses** unless the `sentences` halves **differ** — otherwise the
two runs might be one tree twice. TEL-11's headline claim is the opposite shape:
with the option unset, **nothing** differs. "The documents are identical" is the
*result*, so it cannot also be the control. The two things proved instead are:
* the two runs came from **different trees** (`app/*.py` sha256 + byte count,
compared, and an identity is **refused**);
* **exactly one** side reacts to `pv_entity` — that side is the HEAD, the other
is a tree that does not have the option. Neither, or both, is refused.
It drives 41 stimulus cells (5 grid worlds × 8 PV schedules, plus a run stopped
part-way) and prints two documents per setting: `control` — every command
written, every `self.target`, `inputs_ok`, the loop's three fields, the
arbiter's resolution, the maintenance phase, tick by tick, **with no TEL-11
material in it** — and `telemetry`, which is everything the card is allowed to
move.
Measured, in the CI image, on purged trees:
```
HEAD is B; baseline is A (it does not react to `pv_entity`).
tree A 73296909170ec789237d6e704cce9ab0d9f83b3df1495a14d2497285c3041a12
tree B d5011b6a18e2e3803dc09cac0214b0378fa4c7388fc0ad8ad89b832a5c92af48
control A unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B set 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
telemetry A unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B set 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
OK 1/3 UNSET: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to the baseline tree.
OK 2/3 SET: the control document is byte-identical with the channel switched on.
OK 3/3 CONTROL OF THE CONTROL: the telemetry document DOES move when the
option is set (42 stimulus cells differ).
```
Note what clause 1 claims and clause 2 does not: **unset** is identical in
`control` *and* `telemetry`, which is stronger than "the control path is
untouched" — an install that does not set the option sees no change of any kind,
including its announcement and its status rows. **Set** is identical in
`control` only, which is the whole of "instrumentation, not an input".
## 5. Genuinely optional — and not a second `price_now_entity`
`price_now_entity` / `price_avg_entity` are legal **only** while
`price_provider` is `off`, and the add-on **refuses to start** otherwise. That
is the trap this card was told not to rebuild, and it is avoided structurally
rather than by intention:
* `validate.py` does not mention `pv_entity` at all. It cannot conflict with
anything, because nothing else reads it.
* the MQTT row lives in `OPTIONAL_SENSORS`, not `SENSORS`, and
`discovery_payloads()`'s new `include` argument **defaults to empty**. So a
caller that has never heard of `pv_entity` — every fixture in `test_mqtt.py`,
`tools/rehearse_roster.py`, anything written next year — announces exactly
what it announced before. `p1_age` solves the same problem the other way
round, with `omit`, because it is announced by default and withdrawn when the
meter is off; getting that direction wrong here would have left most installs
with an entity nothing feeds, which is the hazard `omit`'s own note names.
* the read is gated on the option, so an unset install makes **no state call at
all** — not a read that fails quietly.
* there is **no status row** when it is unset. `peak_forecast_entity` nags when
it is unset because an unset forecast leaves a money guard without an input;
this is instrumentation, and a permanent caution on every install that never
asked for a PV channel is the warning spam the card forbids.
* when it **is** set and the read fails, the row is `ok=False, warn=True` — a
**caution**. `status_payload()` builds `NOT READY` out of rows that are
neither `ok` nor `warn`, so a telemetry channel can never put a battery site
into `NOT READY`.
## 6. The unit is read off the entity, and an unreadable one is refused
`read_inputs()` guesses kW-or-W for `peak_forecast_entity` with
`abs(raw) < 50`, and that is safe there: nobody's quarter-hour demand forecast
is 50 W. It is **not** safe here — 30 W of real production at dusk is an
ordinary reading, and that heuristic would publish it as 30 kW.
So `pv.watts()` reads the entity's own `unit_of_measurement` and converts
against Home Assistant's own `UnitOfPower` table (`mW`, `W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`,
`TW`; every factor an exact power of ten). A sensor with **no** unit, or a unit
outside that table, is **refused by name** and the status page says which. The
refusal is loud; a guess would be silent, and a factor of 1000 in the one
channel that exists to be believed a week later is the worse failure.
⚠️ `BTU/h` is in HA's enum and is deliberately **not** in the table: its factor
is a measured conversion rather than a decimal shift, no PV integration
publishes in it, and a fabricated constant is what this repository's whole
process exists to prevent. It lands in the refusal, by name, and `test_pv.py`
part 1 pins that.
## 7. The mutation battery
Every check this card adds was driven by the mutation that defeats the claim it
names. Method: `cp -a` of the tree per mutation into a **unique** directory,
the edit applied there, `__pycache__` purged, the suites run in the CI image
with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, one file at a time. **The shipped tree is
never edited**, so habit 18's revert hazard — SAFETY-37's harness killed between
the edit and the `cp` that put the file back, and two harnesses sharing one
backup path — is closed by construction rather than by a verified revert. Each
row below records the byte delta, the file's sha256 before and after, and that
the mutated line was **read back off disk** before the run started.
| # | mutation | file | bytes | sha256 (first 16) before → after | red on |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | the `pv` row moved into `SENSORS`, i.e. announced on every install | `mqtt.py` | −79 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `532d3954c023bf3d` | 3 named in `test_mqtt.py`, 1 in `test_pv.py` |
| M2 | `publish()` drops a `None` `pv` row again, so HA keeps the last number | `mqtt.py` | −98 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `dd54be458f446475` | 1 named (the acceptance criterion itself) |
| M3 | `ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` widened past the one key it was written for | `mqtt.py` | +23 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `8fe571ebff3dacf4` | 1 named (`circulation` must still be dropped) |
| M4 | a dead sensor reported as **0 W** instead of an absence | `pv.py` | −1 B | `55ba7471e9995436` → `9eecc34152b7ac12` | 4 named |
| M5 | `_read_pv()` assigns only on a good read — a value outlives its sensor | `main.py` | +46 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `189802aa69ce166d` | 2 named |
| M6 | the unit is read and then ignored — a kW sensor published as watts | `pv.py` | −18 B | `55ba7471e9995436` → `ab19ef66c52f9379` | 2 named |
| **M7** | **`self.grid = self.grid − self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` — PV wired into the control path** | `main.py` | +106 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `c38216edb7c5c8db` | **2 named, plus `tel11_pv_trace.py` clause 2/3 on 26 of the 41 stimulus cells** |
| M8 | `optional_keys()` returns `("pv",)` unconditionally | `mqtt.py` | −52 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `86ff23efe3088ad8` | 3 named |
| M9 | the PV caution made a `bad` row, i.e. a dead sensor is a `NOT READY` | `main.py` | +1 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `45c74cab89943564` | 1 named |
| M10 | the read gate removed — an unset option is read once a second forever | `main.py` | −10 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `b67baa8aba3019e8` | 2 named, **plus two crashes** |
`on_disk = True` for all ten: the mutated line was grepped back out of the file
after the edit and before the run (MUTATION.md reporting rule 2), and no
mutation is size-preserving, so rule 1's `+0 B` caveat does not arise.
⚠️ **M10's two extra reds are CRASHES, not named checks, and that is recorded
rather than tidied away.** Every `Hass` double in `test_inverter.py` and
`test_telemetry.py` predates this read and has no `state()` method, so an
unconditional PV read is an `AttributeError` rather than a failed assertion —
habit 20's shape, a red with no name attached. Fixing those fixtures would be a
change to what *their* checks report and belongs to whoever next touches them;
this card's own fixture has `state()` and grades the property by name.
⚠️ **M7's trace limb is where the two halves meet.** The mutant moves the
control document on 26 of 41 cells — every cell whose PV schedule produces a
READING. The five `none` cells and the five `zero` cells do **not** move, which
is correct and is worth seeing: subtracting nothing, and subtracting zero,
change nothing. A battery that only drove a dead sensor would have reported this
mutation as a survivor for the third time.
The clean tree those `before` hashes belong to: `app/main.py`
`c4d2cab34e50b5fd`, `app/mqtt.py` `328d249b9d698ef6`, `app/pv.py`
`55ba7471e9995436`.
### ⚠️ M7 was a SURVIVOR on the first battery, and the fixture was the reason
The card's **central** mutation — `self.grid = self.grid - self.pv_w` in
`read_inputs()`, i.e. exactly the defect the whole card forbids — came back
**green** on a six-file run at **+106 B**, on disk, purged, genuinely running.
The property did not hold; the fixture could not reach it. `test_pv.py` part 6
drove a **6 kW export over 12 cycles**, which puts the loop **against its
rail**: the command moves `slew_w` every cycle and −6000 W and −14 000 W of
apparent error produce the **same ramp, tick for tick**. MUTATION.md habit 23,
with a saturated actuator in place of a coinciding value — and the habit's list
of no-op-prone constructs is all *expressions*, so this is worth its own entry,
which it now has.
The fixture now drives a **600 W import the loop settles on**, with a
responsive meter (`grid = base − batt`) so the error actually closes, asserts
the resting target is well inside the rail, and asks habit 23's own question as
its own check: **shift the meter by the same 8 kW and confirm the commands
really would have moved.** On the first fixture that question answers *no*, in
one line. Every number in the table above is from the battery re-run against
the fixed tree.
⚠️ **A red count is a property of the suite as much as of the mutation.** These
name **this** tree at this commit; a later card that adds or re-bases a check
moves the number with the mutation untouched. Re-measure rather than inherit.
## 8. What none of this covers, with shapes
* **Home Assistant itself.** That `None` renders as `unknown` and that the
recorder keeps a gap is read out of HA's source and quoted in §3; no HA runs
in this suite. What is graded here is the bytes this add-on publishes.
* **Whether the operator's sensor tells the truth.** A sensor wired backwards,
or reporting DC where AC was meant, or a string instead of the array, is
published faithfully. §2 is the argument for why that is the right failure
mode; it is not a claim that it cannot happen.
* **A roster of more than one.** The row is a **site** row — there is one PV
array as far as this add-on is concerned — so nothing per-unit exists to
separate, and every fixture is the shipped roster of one.
* **The attribution.** This card records production. Whether the 20.5 kWh was
cloud, a limit or the optimiser is OPT-10's, and it needs a week of this
channel's history before it can be asked.
* **`tools/`, the firmware and the ingress HTML** are outside part 6's census.
* **The identity is only as wide as the stimulus.** `tel11_pv_trace.py` prints
its 41 cells with the documents for exactly that reason.
## 9. No `CHANGELOG.md` entry
`test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## ` heading that is not
`config.yaml`'s `version:`, and opening an `## Unreleased` section would mean
taking a packaging decision this card does not get to take. The operator account
is in `DOCS.md`; the release note belongs to the next PKG ticket, which should
say that **0.10.1 → next** adds one optional key, announces no new entity on an
install that does not set it, and changes no control behaviour.
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
# TEL-12 — several PV inverters, and why a partial total is worse than none
TEL-11 shipped `pv_entity` as a single `str?` in 0.11.0. The owner of the
reference site reported **within minutes of it going live** that they have
several PV inverters and could configure one.
That is not a property of one house. A multi-string or multi-orientation roof
routinely carries two or three inverters, each publishing its own power sensor
into Home Assistant, and the add-on is sold to clients. So the channel had to
become a roster.
**OPT-10 is blocked on this and cannot start recording until it lands.** Which
sets the bar: the number this channel publishes has to be one an attribution can
believe, or the week of history OPT-10 is waiting for is worse than no history.
---
## 1. The surface: `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity`, and the measurement that
decided it
Two candidates, and they differ on exactly one question nobody in this
repository could answer by reading: **does Supervisor accept a stored STRING for
a key whose schema has become a LIST?** 0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity: str?`; the
live install *has* a string persisted in it; and an upgrade that refuses that
string leaves an add-on which will not start — CFG-04 §B's trap, in the other
direction, with the schema needed to fix it pinned to the version that cannot be
installed.
It was measured, against the release image, by a new **§G** of
`tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` — the instrument CFG-04 built for exactly this
kind of question:
```
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/w:ro" -v "$PWD/tools:/probe:ro" --entrypoint python3 \
ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 \
/probe/supervisor_shape_probe.py
```
```
== G. TEL-12: the SHAPE of a several-inverter PV option ==
PASS the shipped defaults with a 0.11.0 `pv_entity` STRING on top are ACCEPTED - the baseline every refusal below is varied from
pv_entity='sensor.pv_power' pv_entities=[]
PASS ⭐ THE MEASUREMENT THAT DECIDED THE SURFACE: with `pv_entity` declared as a LIST, the string an 0.11.0 install has persisted is REFUSED, and the refusal names the key - so that shape would leave the live add-on unable to start on upgrade
Invalid list for option 'pv_entity' in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...and a shipped `pv_entity: []` DEFAULT does not rescue it: deepmerge's list strategy is `override`, so the operator's string survives the merge and is refused anyway
Invalid list for option 'pv_entity' in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...(the list shape itself is fine - it is only the STORED STRING it refuses, which is what makes this a migration and not a schema question)
a list value validates
PASS ⚠️ ONE SPELLING DOES ACCEPT BOTH - `match(.*)?` - AND IT IS REJECTED FOR A DIFFERENT REASON, MEASURED HERE: it validates NOTHING. A string passes, a list passes, and so does the integer 417; and the Configuration tab renders it as a plain text box rather than a repeatable field, so an operator cannot enter a second inverter in the UI at all
string=True list=True integer-417=True ui=[{"name": "pv_entity", "optional": true, "type": "string"}]
PASS ⭐ THE SHIPPED SHAPE: an 0.11.0 blob - `pv_entity` a string, no `pv_entities` key at all, because it did not exist when that blob was written - validates against THIS manifest, with the new key defaulted to the empty list. The live install upgrades without touching its options
PASS ...and a three-entity roster validates, per-entry, with both keys set - which the add-on resolves by REPLACEMENT and says so on its status page
["sensor.pv_east", "sensor.pv_west", "sensor.pv_garage"]
PASS ⭐ ...and the shipped `options:` block with ONLY `pv_entities` removed is REFUSED, BY NAME - `Missing option 'pv_entities' in root`. That is why the `pv_entities: []` default is load-bearing, exactly as `inverters: []` is: Supervisor treats a nested list as required unless its element is an OPTIONAL scalar, and `- str` is not one
Missing option 'pv_entities' in root in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...and the Configuration tab renders it as a REPEATABLE string field (`multiple: true`), so an operator adds their second and third inverter in the UI rather than in YAML
[{"name": "pv_entity", "optional": true, "type": "string"}, {"name": "pv_entities", "multiple": true, "required": true, "type": "string"}]
PASS a DOWNGRADE to a schema without `pv_entities` drops the key with a warning rather than refusing, and leaves `pv_entity` standing - so rolling back to 0.11.0 returns the install to its single entity rather than bricking it
== all cases passed ==
```
| Claim | Evidence |
|---|---|
| **Option 1 — `pv_entity` becomes a list — cannot ship** | §G: `Invalid list for option 'pv_entity'` on the string an 0.11.0 install has stored |
| …and a `[]` default does not rescue it | §G: `_OPTIONS_MERGER`'s list strategy is `override`, so the operator's string survives the merge and is refused anyway |
| …and it is not a *schema* problem | §G: a list **value** validates fine against a list schema. It is a **migration**, and a migration is a bigger ticket than this |
| **One key CAN carry both shapes** — `match(.*)?` | §G, and reported even though it *passes*, because "no spelling accepts both" would have been a **false reason** to reject option 1 |
| …and it loses anyway, for a measured reason | §G: it validates nothing at all — a string, a list, and the integer `417` all pass — and the Configuration tab renders it as a plain text box, so an operator cannot add a second inverter in the UI |
| **Option 2 — `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity` — ships** | §G: the 0.11.0 blob validates untouched, the new key defaults to `[]`, three entities validate, the UI renders `multiple: true` |
| `pv_entities: []` in `options:` is load-bearing | §G: the shipped defaults **minus only that key** are refused with `Missing option 'pv_entities' in root` — CFG-04 §B's isolated counterfactual, for this key |
| A downgrade is not the trap in reverse | §G: a schema without the key **drops** it and leaves `pv_entity` standing |
`p1_phase_import_entities` (`options: []` + `schema: - str`) is the shipped
precedent for the pair; nothing new was invented.
**So the surface is uglier than option 1 and that is the correct trade.** The
cleanest surface that breaks the one install this card exists to fix is not the
cleanest surface.
### And `pv_entities` REPLACES `pv_entity` rather than extending it
CFG-04's rule for `inverters:` ("declared, it REPLACES those six keys"), applied
to the only upgrade path that matters. The install being upgraded **has**
`pv_entity` set, to inverter A. Opening the Configuration tab, the natural action
is to put *all* the inverters in the new repeatable field — and under a union
rule that **double-counts A** unless the operator also remembers to clear the old
key. A doubled total is the same defect as a partial one pointing the other way,
in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later.
Under replacement the effective roster is exactly what one key says, and no
arithmetic depends on a de-duplication rule the operator has to know about. It
de-duplicates *within* the list (a site cannot have two sensors with one
entity_id, so a repeated id is a typo that would double that inverter), and
`Controller.checks()` prints a **caution** whenever both keys are set saying
which one won — a replacement nobody is told about is the "one of which silently
wins" `config.yaml` refuses elsewhere.
⚠️ It is a **caution and never a refusal to start**. `validate.py` still does not
mention either key. A telemetry channel that could stop a battery site from
starting would be observability with a foot in the control path.
---
## 2. ⚠️⚠️ The decision the card turns on: absence of ONE is absence of the TOTAL
Three inverters configured, one `unavailable`. The sum of the other two is **a
smaller number indistinguishable from a real one.** Fed into OPT-10's
attribution it reads as *"there was less PV than there was"* — which is the "no
irradiance" conclusion the channel exists to **test** rather than to manufacture.
Two designs were genuinely available:
**(a) publish the total as absent** — `pv.total()` answers `None`, the topic
carries HA's own `None`, the entity goes to `unknown`, the recorder stores a gap.
**(b) publish the partial sum alongside a count of how many contributed.**
**(a) shipped.** It wins on the one question that matters, which is *who reads
the number and when*:
* The **MQTT row** is read back **cold**, a week later, by OPT-10 and by anything
that plots `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` over that week. A partial sum there is a
smaller number indistinguishable from a real one, and the count that would
have qualified it lives in a **second entity with its own history** — so
believing the total requires joining two recorder series by timestamp to find
out which samples to distrust. Nobody re-derives that. And it is worse than a
gap in exactly the direction that matters: **a gap makes the attribution say
"I do not know"; a partial makes it say something false.**
* The **status page** is read **live**, by a human who wants the diagnostic. So
the partial information is *not* thrown away — the row names every entity that
did report, with its watts, and every one that did not, with its reason, and
states plainly that there is no site total. Different reader, different
instant, different rule.
A count published beside the total would also carry **no information** in the
state (a) admits: the total is published *only* when every entity contributed, so
the count would be the constant `len(roster)`.
And this **extends** TEL-11's rule rather than weakening it. `mqtt.py`'s
`ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is still exactly one key and `publish()`'s `None` handling is
untouched: the line that turns an absence into HA's `unknown` did not have to
change, because "absence is never zero" already covered this one layer up.
### The mirror, which matters just as much
A member honestly reporting **0 W** is **summed**, not treated as absent. The
test is `watts is None`, never falsiness. Shading, a tripped string and
nightfall are all real zeros, and a roster that blanked the site whenever one
member read zero would report an absence **on every clear evening** and defeat
the channel from the other end.
### ⚠️ And the answer is NOT "document a template sensor that adds them up"
An operator may legitimately prefer one, and `pv_entity` will happily point at
it. Shipping it as *the* answer pushes the absence problem onto them unseen: a
template sensor summing an `unavailable` source silently yields the partial
total — the same defect one layer down, in a place this add-on cannot see or
report. DOCS.md says so in those terms.
### The three published states, side by side
| what happened | frame | `goodwe_ctl/pv` | status page |
|---|---|---|---|
| no roster at all | no `pv` key | no topic, no entity | no row |
| 1200 / 2100 / 450 W, all three | `pv: 3750.0` | `3750.0` | `PV 3 750 W` + one ok row naming all three |
| all three answer, one of them `0 W` | `pv: 1650.0` | `1650.0` | `PV 1 650 W` |
| one of the three `unavailable` | `pv: None` | `None` → `unknown`, recorder **gap** | `PV —` + a caution naming the missing entity, its reason, and what the others reported |
| all three gone | `pv: None` | as above | as above |
---
## 3. Still not a control input
Unchanged, and re-proved at the new roster size.
`tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` was **extended rather than replaced** — the file name
still says TEL-11 because `DECISIONS/TEL-11-pv-production.md` §5 and
`test_pv.py`'s mutation table quote it, and a renamed instrument makes both
references dangle for no gain.
It now produces **three** document sets per tree — `unset`, `one`, `multi` — and
grades five claims. The roster cells live in their own document precisely so
`unset` and `one` keep the `control` hashes TEL-11 recorded; appending cells to
an existing document would have moved a hash whose stability is itself the
evidence.
```
$ python3 tools/tel11_pv_trace.py --compare base.json head.json
HEAD is B; baseline is A - its roster cells ARE its unset cells, which is what a tree that has never heard of `pv_entities` does with them.
supports_roster A False / B True (self-reported; the verdict above is MEASURED)
tree A fa92ba6a6fc6d49c0f87a494e03b530a8575212a0b2c3046629cb400ef2ae0d4
tree B 0b39198015b6a5a3f7538d4157d77ecadc89311daef18fce883762d94d8351eb
control A unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control A one 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B one 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control A multi 2aafbfedfb9cc939082b36eeb7493289808fb21cd41113322d4817de0e414a30
control B multi 2aafbfedfb9cc939082b36eeb7493289808fb21cd41113322d4817de0e414a30
telemetry A unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry A one 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
telemetry B one 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
telemetry A multi d269168ffece375027c2c18ea33631a961ff92775781884a0592d6a37d78845c
telemetry B multi 550a49a73f39267ba28b1e78cd12b8f5c71ef7269bbbd2e12112696be0fef1ff
OK 1/5 UNSET: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to the baseline tree. …
OK 2/5 ONE ENTITY: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to 0.11.0's single-entity path - the same commands, the same payloads, the same status rows, the same announcement.
OK 3/5 CONTROL, ONE ENTITY: the control document is byte-identical with the channel switched on - PV reaches no decision.
OK 4/5 CONTROL, THREE ENTITIES: every roster cell's control document equals its grid world's `unset` one - 30 cells over 5 grid worlds, covering three healthy entities, one dead at EVERY position, all three dead and one honestly reporting 0 W. Neither the total nor any PARTIAL total reaches a decision, and the document is byte-identical to the BASELINE tree's for the same cells.
OK 5/5 CONTROL OF THE CONTROL: the telemetry document DOES move under a roster (30 stimulus cells differ from their grid world's unset telemetry), so 1/5-4/5 are identities this instrument could have broken. AND in no cell with a dead member does the PV row carry the partial sum of the survivors, while every cell whose members all ANSWER publishes its total - including the one where a member honestly reports 0 W.
$ echo $?
0
```
**The control hash is unmoved: `846a10a5b89e…` on `unset` and on `one`, on both
trees.** The roster control document `2aafbfedfb9c…` is byte-identical between
the two trees, which is the strongest available form of the claim — the baseline
runs those cells with a key it has never heard of, so its control document for
them *is* 0.11.0's.
⚠️ **2/5 is a claim TEL-11 could not make.** TEL-11's baseline had no channel at
all to be identical to; TEL-12's baseline is 0.11.0, so "one entity behaves
exactly as 0.11.0 does" is a real cross-tree identity over **both** documents.
`pv.total()` passes a single entity's `(watts, why)` through verbatim for exactly
this reason, and `Controller.checks()` keeps 0.11.0's two f-strings in a
`len(...) == 1` branch rather than generalising them.
### ⚠️ TEL-11's `--compare` refusal had to change, and that is a finding
TEL-11's rule was *"exactly ONE side's `set` document may differ from its own
`unset` — that side is the HEAD"*. It was correct evidence when written, because
`release/1.0` predated `pv_entity` entirely. `release/1.0` is 0.11.0 now, **both**
sides react to `pv_entity`, and that refusal fires on **every honest run**. The
discriminator is the roster instead: only the HEAD has heard of `pv_entities`, so
only the HEAD's `multi` document fails to reduce to its own `unset` one.
It is asserted from the **documents**, not from `tree.supports_roster` — a
self-report is the tree describing itself, whereas "this side's behaviour did not
move when `pv_entities` was set" is the tree being measured. `supports_roster` is
printed beside the verdict so a disagreement between the two is visible.
See MUTATION.md habit 24.
---
## 4. Mutation battery
Twelve mutations, each on a **fresh `cp -a`** of the clean worktree (never
reverted — habit 18 / TARIFF-09's method), `__pycache__` purged before the run
and the tree checked for one afterwards, byte delta from `stat` and the edit
confirmed on disk with `cmp`, suites run in the CI image with `checks.yml`'s own
command one file at a time under a `:ro` mount.
| mutation | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---|
| N1 `total()` returns the partial sum, not an absence | +42 B | 6 named in `test_pv.py` + 1 crash |
| **N1b ⭐ THE REJECTED DESIGN: the partial sum with a contributor count** | −282 B | **10 named + the trace `REFUSED 5/5`** |
| N2 absence tested by falsiness (`not w`) | −4 B | 2 named |
| N3 `pv_entities` UNIONS with `pv_entity` | −27 B | 3 named |
| N4 the de-duplication dropped | −15 B | 1 named |
| N5 `sum` → `max` over the roster | **+0 B** | 6 named |
| N6 the roster-of-one stops passing `why` through | +13 B | 8 named |
| N7 `optional_keys()` back to reading `pv_entity` | −6 B | 1 named + 1 crash |
| N8 `self.grid -= self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` | +106 B | 3 named + the trace (52 cells on 2/5, 26 on 3/5, 10 on 4/5) |
| N9 the roster caution made a `bad` row (NOT READY) | +1 B | 1 named |
| N10 `entity_is_ignored()` always False | +10 B | 2 named |
| N11 `pv_entities: []` deleted from `options:` | −18 B | 2 named in `test_translations.py` + `11 CASE(S) FAILED` in the probe |
**No survivors.**
⚠️ **N5 is `+0 B` — the risky delta.** `sum` and `max` are the same three
characters, so neither the file size nor its mtime moved, and TEST-15's
stale-bytecode defect is exactly what manufactures a survivor there. The run was
on a fresh purged copy and `cmp` confirmed the edit on disk before it started.
⚠️ **N1b is the row that matters, and it is not a defect.** It is the *other*
defensible design, implemented and run. The point is that the checks and the
instrument can **tell the two apart** — an unexamined partial sum is what the
card forbids, so a check that could not see one would be decoration:
```
REFUSED 5/5: THE PARTIAL SUM IS ON THE WIRE at [('EXPORT-6K/EAST-DEAD', '2550.0'),
('EXPORT-6K/GARAGE-DEAD', '3300.0'), ('EXPORT-6K/WEST-DEAD', '1650.0'),
('IMPORT-3K/EAST-DEAD', '2550.0'), ('IMPORT-3K/GARAGE-DEAD', '3300.0'),
('IMPORT-3K/WEST-DEAD', '1650.0')] … - a smaller number indistinguishable from a
real one, which is the defect this card exists to prevent.
```
⚠️ **N8's 1/5 stays GREEN and that is correct rather than a miss.** With no PV
entity configured `pv_w` is `None` and the leak cannot fire — which is what makes
1/5 a claim about the **default** and 2/5–4/5 the claims about the channel.
### The fixture values are the design (habit 10 and habit 23)
`test_pv.py` carries **two** rosters over the same three entities, because the
two claims need different magnitudes and one fixture cannot serve both.
* **Parts 8–10: 1200 W + 2.1 kW + 450 W = 3750 W.** The sum is separable from
max (2100), min (450), first (1200), last (450), mean (1250), count (3) and
every partial of itself (2550 / 1650 / 3300) — the family is computed, printed
and asserted non-colliding as its own precondition. One member is in **kW** so
"correct against their own units" is exercised. **Not one member is zero**: a
member contributing 0 W could go absent without moving the sum of the rest, and
a fixture like that cannot tell "published the absence" from "published the
partial sum" — habit 23 with a coinciding value in the *fixture* rather than in
the plant, which is precisely the trap the brief named. Absence is driven at
**every position** of the roster, not at one (habit 10's fixture-as-a-SET), and
each position's partial is **derived from the fixture** rather than typed
beside it.
* **Part 6: 1500 W + 4.5 kW + 2000 W = 8000 W.** Sized so every *partial*
(6500 / 3500 / 6000) would still **move** a loop settling on a 600 W import.
Habit 23's own question is asked twice — shift the meter by 8000 W, and again
by 3500 W, the smallest partial any single dead member could produce — because
a leak of the partial is a different mutation leaking a smaller number.
### Two false results this card produced, and what they were
Both were in the **instrument**, and both are recorded rather than tidied away.
1. `partial_w`/`partial_wire` were first written **inside** each telemetry cell.
They are a fact about the *stimulus*, produced by the tool and identical on
both trees — so every roster cell differed from its unset reference for a
reason that was not behaviour, and the HEAD/baseline discriminator fired on
*both* sides. They live in a separate top-level `partials` map now.
2. The `WEST-ZERO` cell (all three answer, one honestly reporting 0 W) had its
**true total** labelled as its "partial". 5/5 then refused the *shipped* tree
for publishing 1650 W, which it is required to publish. A cell with no dead
member has no partial to leak, and `never` is `None` there.
---
## 5. What none of this can see
* **Home Assistant itself.** That `None` on the state topic renders as state
`unknown` and that the recorder keeps a gap is read out of HA's source and
quoted in `app/mqtt.py`; whether the long-term statistics table then
interpolates across the gap is HA's behaviour, and OPT-10 will be reading it.
* **Whether the operator's sensors are telling the truth.** A sensor wired
backwards reads −4 kW at noon and is summed as −4 kW. There is deliberately no
`pv_invert` — §2 of the TEL-11 record is the argument, and it holds at a roster.
* **A roster larger than three.** Three is the smallest size at which the sum
separates from the reduction family *and* absence can be driven at every
position. Nothing here says what twenty entities do to a cycle's latency — the
read is `asyncio.gather`ed across the roster for exactly that reason, so a slow
sensor costs what one costs, but that is an argument rather than a measurement.
* **A PV roster combined with a two-inverter battery roster.** No fixture
crosses CFG-04's `inverters:` with `pv_entities`.
* **The real MQTT transport, and wall-clock behaviour.** As TEL-11.
---
## 6. Not deployable as merged
`config.yaml` stays at `0.11.0`, so `tools/predeploy_check.py` reports a NO-OP
until PKG cuts a version. A CHANGELOG entry is **wanted** and was deliberately
not written: `test_version_gate.py` 11b forbids an `## Unreleased` heading and
the bump is PKG's call. The material an entry needs is this file.
The option surface moves **76 keys → 77**, one new optional key, `pv_entities`,
empty on every install that does not set it.
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# TEL-14 — the PV sign, declared per entity
Owner report on 0.12.0: `sensor.espressif_vermogen` (ESPHome clamp) and
`sensor.kwh_meter_actueel_vermogen` (kWh meter in the PV circuit) read
**positive for consumption, negative for production**. At night the page said
"✓ PV production: 13 W" — standby draw. By day production would publish negative.
## 1. This reverses TEL-11 §2, and why
TEL-11 §2 refused a `pv_invert` on two grounds. "PV is read by nothing in the
control path" still holds: the flip lives in `pv.total()`, and `test_pv.py`
part 12 re-runs part 6's 40-cycle identity with a flip set. "A reversed sensor
announces itself" did not survive a real site: these sensors follow a different
convention, read a plausible small positive number at night, and the only other
fix is a template sensor, the place TEL-12 §2 says goes quietly wrong.
## 2. The shape: a parallel list, `pv_invert_entities`
Measured by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §H (Supervisor 2026.08.0, against
a 0.12.0 blob); re-run it for the transcript.
| shape | schema | why it lost / won |
|---|---|---|
| (a) `-sensor.x` prefix | accepted | invisible: the sign is a syntax only the description explains, in a field an installer fills with the entity picker's text |
| (b) parallel list | accepted, 0.12.0 blob unchanged | **ships**: its own labelled, translated field ("PV entities whose sign is reversed"); an installer lists the odd ones out |
| (c) dicts on `pv_entities` | **refuses 0.12.0's stored strings** | bricks the upgrade — TEL-12's trap again |
| (c2) dicts as a third key | accepted | per-entry labels render raw (`entity`, `invert`) — probe §F; and a third PV surface |
| (d) global bool | accepted | one sign cannot describe inverter + meter in one roster |
(b)'s known cost is a typo in the second list: `pv.stray_inverts()` turns it into
a named caution. `[]` in `options:` is load-bearing (§H, isolated counterfactual).
Default `[]` flips nothing, so every 0.12.0 install is byte-identical (part 12).
## 3. The negative caution: per entity, below −50 W
The owner's two meters draw ~13 W at night, so a *correctly* signed meter reads
about −13 W then. −50 W clears that with room for a few such devices behind one
entity; a reversed sensor by day reads hundreds to thousands of watts below
zero. It is tested **per entity, not on the total** (a deviation from the brief):
three correct meters at −20 W sum to −60 W and must stay quiet, while a reversed
−1500 W hidden inside a positive total must not. It is a caution, never `bad`;
a wrong threshold costs a spurious or missed caution, never data. The text says
ADD (unflipped) or REMOVE (already flipped).
## 4. Mutations
Fresh `cp -a` each, `__pycache__` purged, CI image, `:ro`, `--network none`;
`test_pv.py` only unless stated. T1-T12 at 7559d21; M2/M5 are review #1628's,
red since B1 (merged into release/1.0 @ 43b2740).
| # | mutation | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | flip ignored in `total()` | −45 | 9 |
| T2 | flip applied to every member | −7 | 6 |
| T3 | `0.0 - w` → `-w` | −5 | 1 |
| T4 | flip written as `abs()` | −1 | 2 |
| T5 | `_read_pv()` stops passing the flip | −26 | 7 |
| T6 | caution threshold −50 → 0 W | −17 | 3 |
| T7 | `[sign inverted]` marker dropped | −39 | 3 |
| T8 | negative caution made `bad` | +1 | 1 |
| T9 | `stray_inverts()` always empty | −50 | 1 |
| T10 | `inverted()` stops stripping | −8 | 1 |
| T11 | ADD/REMOVE advice swapped | +4 | 2 |
| T12 | `pv_invert_entities: []` deleted from `options:` | −25 | 2 test_translations + 17 probe |
| M2 | `stray_inverts()` roster ignores `pv_entity` | +15 | 2 (REPORTED CASE, PADDING) |
| M5 | `_read_pv()` flip set not stripped | +25 | 1 (PADDING) |
## 5. History
OPT-10's `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` recorded since 2026-09-24 on an install with
such sensors carries the old sign; nothing rewrites it.
## 6. CHANGELOG entry for the next PKG cut
Not written into `CHANGELOG.md`: `test_version_gate.py` 11b/11d refuse an
`## Unreleased` heading (measured on this branch: 4 reds). For PKG to paste:
> **`pv_invert_entities` (TEL-14).** A PV sensor that reads negative while
> producing — typically a kWh meter or power clamp in the PV circuit — can now
> be listed under *PV entities whose sign is reversed* in the Configuration tab;
> its sign is flipped before the sum and the status page marks it. Empty (the
> default) changes nothing. ⚠️ PV history recorded before you set it keeps the
> old sign.
+1450 -34
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+484 -1
View File
@@ -127,6 +127,43 @@ Two rules come out of it, and both are cheap:
function, that pair is the first thing to try — TEST-16's two survivors were
adjacent lines in one function and neither was individually live.
⚠️ **AND FCST-05 WALKED INTO IT AGAIN, IN ITS OWN NEW CHECK, WHICH IS WHY THE
RULE IS “mutate every check you add”.** `price_history.py` reports a malformed
point row from **two** places into **one** field: `_usable_days()` records what
it FOUND when the file was opened, and `_remember()` records what it DROPPED on
the next refresh. Both land in `last_error`, and `words` prints `last_error`.
The first draft of the new check asked `"malformed point row" in words` — which
whichever rung is still standing satisfies — so deleting `_remember()`'s note
entirely was a **−1 B SURVIVOR of the whole suite**, on the half of the fix that
tells an operator the cache **self-healed**. It is graded on the TENSE now
(`… in <day>` at open, `… dropped from <day>` after the refresh), the two are
asserted to DIFFER, and the paired mutation — both notes deleted, −91 B — is
red on 15 named checks. Same shape as TEST-16 and the same fix: **grade the
reason, not the verdict**, and when two rungs answer one stimulus, mutate them
together.
⚠️ **AND FCST-06 FOUND THE COUNT ITSELF LYING — LOW, NOT SILENT.** A mutation
whose red is a **traceback** does not report one red; it reports however many
checks ran before the traceback, and grades **none** of the ones after it. The
new section drove M4 (`self._days = before` → `self._days = {}`) and the run
printed **1 FAIL**. The true figure is **3**: an f-string in the next check read
`len(read.points)`, and `.points` on a `no_data` **raises `Absence` by design**,
so the harness died mid-section with the remaining checks ungraded. That is
`why()`'s and `derived()`'s rule — *"it answered nothing" and "it broke on the
way to answering" must not grade the same* — arriving in the **printed operand**
of a check rather than in its condition, which is the half that is easy to miss
because it looks like formatting. Two things follow:
* **a mutation report's red COUNT is only a lower bound until the run is seen to
have reached the end of its section.** Read the output, not the count;
* **the total accessor has to cover what a check PRINTS, not only what it
asserts.** `test_price_history.py` 5d added `npts()` beside `why()` for
exactly this, and re-driving M4 against it moved 1 FAIL to 3.
Worse, had the traceback landed one check earlier the mutation would have
produced **no named red at all** — a result that reads like a broken harness and
gets retried rather than read.
## The third way a check lies: its DATA cannot reach the failure it names
Stale bytecode manufactures survivors from a mutation that never ran. Masking
@@ -135,7 +172,7 @@ manufactures them from a **fixture**: the check runs, the assertion is
evaluated, the sentence above it is true — and the numbers it compares are
arranged so that the failure it describes could not have changed the answer.
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. ELEVEN instances in two weeks; four
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. TWELVE instances in two weeks; four
were found by review, two - CFG-04's fixture pair - by an author's own mutation
battery, which is the cheaper place, one by review again, in the one
place nobody had thought to point the rule at: not a check in the suite, but a
@@ -225,6 +262,78 @@ same place twice, the check is decoration.
forever, *including after the call site is fixed*. The check was true and
passed for the wrong reason. Habit **9** below is what falls out of it.
* ⚠️ **ARCH-02's OWN REHEARSAL HARNESS, CAUGHT BY ITS OWN MUTATION BATTERY —
the THIRTEENTH instance, and the third in an INSTRUMENT rather than in a
check.** `tools/rehearse_roster.py` reports orphaned Home Assistant entities
by composing the ids the add-on announces **before** the roster switch and
**after** it, and diffing. Both sides are composed by the same build. So the
two mutations that change the id composition itself — renaming the MQTT device
(`"GoodWe"` -> `"GoodWe Controller"`), renaming one site sensor (`"Grid power"`
-> `"Grid power W"`) — moved **every id on both sides equally**, and the
harness reported *"no orphans"* about a change that orphans the entire live
entity list. It read exactly like a clean transition. The first draft's
M5/M6 came back `exit 0` and `exit 2`, and neither was the failure they name.
The fix is habit 2 with a filename: **the reference has to be data that does
not move with the code.** `--live-entities` takes a list of the ids the
install actually has, `tools/rehearsal/live-entities-recorded.txt` is the
recorded stand-in that keeps it live in CI, and a build that announces an id
the list does not carry is now a `COMPOSITION DRIFT` finding rather than a
silence. ⚠️ **The anchor moved for the same reason**: it had been
`compose(mqtt.DEVICE["name"], p1["name"]) == "sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age"`,
which any renaming of the device satisfies by moving both operands, and it is
now composed from two recorded **literals**.
Ask of an instrument what habit 4 asks of a check: *where did each side of
this comparison come from* — and if a mutation of the subject moves both
sides, the instrument is decoration.
⚠️ **AND REVIEW FOUND TWO MORE IN THE SAME CARD, ONE OF THEM INSIDE THE FIX
FOR THE OTHER — the FOURTEENTH and FIFTEENTH.** Both are the pin, not the
tool, and both are the same sentence in a new costume: *a check whose data
cannot reach the failure it names.*
* **Fourteenth — a COUNT cannot tell one red leg from two.** The rehearsal
reports two independent routes to the disarmed latch (`SAME-STEP` and
`STAGED`) and prints every finding **twice per red leg**: once in that
leg's own block and once in the closing summary. The check named *"NOT THE
SAME-STEP PATH ALONE"* was written `out.count("LATCH CAME UP DISARMED")
>= 2`, so **one** red leg always satisfied it. Measured on three builds:
shipped code (both legs red) → 4; `migrate_unit_keys()` handed the roster
name (SAME-STEP fixed) → 2, **passes**; a guard-side fix (both fixed) → 0.
The check reported `ok` on the build whose only remaining failure *is* the
path it says is not the only one. The fix is to parse the legs and require
the finding in **each**, which is habit 2 again: grade the thing, not a
total over the thing.
* **Fifteenth — and it is INSIDE THAT FIX, which is the third time this file
has had to write that sentence.** The first leg-splitter opened on a
`LEG <id>` marker and never closed, so every line after the *last* marker
was attributed to that leg — including the closing summary, which repeats
every finding from every leg. The last leg therefore read red whenever
**any** leg was red, and the new per-leg check was the old count with extra
steps. It was caught by building the one fixture that separates them: a
tree in which `SAME-STEP` is genuinely clean and `STAGED` is not. The tool
now prints `END LEG <id>` and the splitter closes on it.
The rule that falls out, and it is the cheap one: **a per-thing check that
has never seen the things DISAGREE is a total.** Part 5b exists to make
them disagree on every run.
⚠️ **AND ONE THAT HAS ONLY SEEN THEM DISAGREE IN ONE ARRANGEMENT IS A TOTAL
OVER THAT ARRANGEMENT.** Review found this by attacking the fix itself. Part
5b does make the legs disagree, on every run - and was still blind to a build
that merely REORDERS them, because it had only ever seen the clean leg
printed LAST. Three edits, two of them ordinary refactors (reorder the report
legs, reword a summary line), produced `all checks passed` from a splitter
that closed ZERO legs.
A fixture cannot enumerate the arrangements, so the STRUCTURE is asserted
instead: a leg may not open while one is open, and every leg that opens must
be explicitly closed. That fires on the FIRST edit of all three attacks,
whatever the order or the wording. **When a fixture cannot enumerate the
arrangements, assert the invariant they share.**
* **CFG-04's `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §B** — and this one is the rule
reaching outside the suite. The probe is the committed evidence that
`config.yaml`'s `inverters: []` default is load-bearing, and four documents
@@ -305,6 +414,44 @@ same place twice, the check is decoration.
The general habits are **14** and **15** below.
* ⚠️ **SAFETY-47 IS THE TWELFTH, AND IT IS THE SECOND INSIDE A COMMITTED
EVIDENCE ARTIFACT.** `DECISIONS/SAFETY-10-shadow-mode.md` §6 tabulated a live
run and a shadow run agreeing on `arb_power_w`, on the reason **verbatim**
and on the arbiter's winner, and concluded that shadow mode reaches the same
decision. **Two independent reasons it could not have gone red, and closing
either one alone closes nothing:**
* its fixture is `peak_cap_w: 15000` against a 350 W house, so the capacity
guard never engages and the thing whose invariance is being claimed —
SAFETY-45's sizing of the buy leg from the billed-quarter meter — is in the
run and **inert**. ⚠️ **The harness's own comment says so**: *"at this
scenario's `peak_cap_w: 15000` it is not binding anyway"*. The rule was
written down beside the check it disabled and nobody read it as a
disclosure;
* and every identity row reads `_sa[0]`/`_la[0]` — **the first charging
sample**. At `elapsed = 0` the projection **is** the held level, so the two
runs agree **to the float even at a cap that does bind**. Measured:
widening the fixture alone — the obvious fix — leaves that comparison
passing.
⚠️ **THE SECOND REASON IS A NEW SHAPE FOR THIS LIST: AN INDEX, NOT A
FIXTURE.** Ask of every identity claim not only *"could this data differ"*
but *"**at the point I sampled it**, could it differ yet"*. A comparison
taken at `t = 0` between two runs that diverge **because one of them acts**
is a comparison of a plant with itself, and no amount of widening the fixture
changes that. The replacement, `test_arbitrage.py` part 3d, grades the whole
run — 716 of 720 charging cycles differ — and grades the `[0]` agreement **as
an expectation**, so nobody rebuilds a check on it believing it covers
something.
⚠️ **AND THE FIX'S OWN FIRST DRAFT CARRIED A THIRTEENTH.** The new part's
action-log check could not reach the log line at all: the sentence was an
f-string inside `Controller._shadow_settle()`, and the only suite that drives
that method uses a `meter_source: off` fixture where no arbitrage decision —
and therefore no caveat — exists. Deleting the caveat from it left **all 29
files green**. It is `shadow.log_line()` now. *A sentence assembled at a call
site is a sentence no check can grade*, which is CFG-04's substring lesson
arriving from the other direction.
Note what these have in common with a masked rung: the mutation *runs*, and the
suite is *honestly* green. Nothing in a purge, a fingerprint or a disassembly
can see it, because the code under test really did behave identically on the
@@ -586,6 +733,255 @@ Cheap habits fall out of it, and all of them are now used in this repository:
that two of it cannot silently overwrite each other's work. A fixed path
in a tool that edits source is a shared mutable global with a filename.
19. ⚠️ **A FIXTURE IN A SHAPE NOBODY PUBLISHES GRADES THE PARSER AGAINST THE
PARSER — FOURTEENTH INSTANCE OF HABIT 4, AND THE FIRST WHERE THE FIXTURE
AND THE CODE UNDER TEST SHARED A *SHAPE* RATHER THAN A NUMBER.** TARIFF-08.
`price.py`'s `_points_from_json()` read `doc["data"]` as a list of
`{start, price_eur_mwh}` objects. `api.energy-charts.info` publishes
parallel `unix_seconds` / `price` arrays and has no `data` key at all, so
`generic_dayahead` raised `SourceUnavailable` on **every live fetch it ever
made** — and the suite was green, because all three price suites built
their bodies with `json.dumps({"data": [...]})`. The fixture was derived
from the parser's guess, so no mutation of the parser and no amount of
coverage inside that loop could ever have reached the failure. §11.4 then
turned it into a *correct* silent degradation: parse error -> `no_data` ->
static profile -> arbitrage off, with nothing naming the cause.
Habit 2 with a network on the end of it: **the reference has to be data the
code under test did not shape.** For a parser that means BYTES, captured
from the source and committed unmodified, with the URL, the retrieval time
and a checksum beside them - `scenarios/energy-charts-be-price-*.json` and
its `-captures.json` provenance, re-derived by the replay so an edited
fixture stops being a capture. Two granularities, because the same endpoint
answers hourly before 2025-10-01 and quarter-hourly after it and a fixture
at one spacing cannot grade an assumption about the other.
⚠️ **AND THE SURVIVING SYNTHETIC FIXTURES ARE NAMED FOR WHAT THEY ARE.**
Three shipped plugins point at endpoints nobody has verified (TARIFF-07),
so no capture exists for them; their fixture builder is called
`synthetic_row_feed` at every call site, because the next reader's default
assumption will otherwise be that a green check means the feed parses.
⚠️ **ONE OF THIS CARD'S OWN NEW LINES WAS DECORATION AND THE BATTERY SAID
SO.** The columnar parser first rendered its instants with `brussels()`
before returning them. `assemble()` already renders every plugin's points,
so removing the parser's call changed nothing observable - **M4 came back a
survivor on a `:ro`, purged tree**, which is not the direction stale
bytecode fabricates. The line was removed rather than fenced with a check:
a second copy of a rule that already has an owner is indistinguishable from
a no-op, and the mutation that proves the rendering is real belongs on
`assemble()`, where it is now aimed.
20. ⚠️ **A FIXTURE GRADES THE RESPONSE. NOTHING ABOUT THE REQUEST IS REACHABLE
FROM ONE, AND THE TRANSPORT HAD BEEN RECORDING IT ALL ALONG.** TARIFF-09,
and it is habit 19's closed loop with the other half still shut.
`generic_dayahead.fetch()` took `since` and `until` and asked for the bare
`?bzn=BE`, which answers ONE Brussels day - so §8.3 dropped every hour past
today from the trade set as provisional and the optimiser never saw
tomorrow as firm, at any hour of any day. Measured at 09:00: **15 firm
hours and 33 carried of 48**, both ends of the permitted cycle inside one
calendar day; at 23:00, **1 and 47**, with the firm spread no longer
clearing the round-trip cost.
TARIFF-08 had just fixed the RESPONSE side of this same plugin by
committing real bytes. It could not have caught this: a captured body is
the answer to a URL, and **no property of any body says which URL was
asked for**. `canned()` in `test_price.py` had recorded `(url, timeout_s)`
on every call since TARIFF-02 and not one check had ever asserted on the
first element - so the harness *knew* the plugin was ignoring its arguments
and nothing asked it. The fix is one line of habit: **where a plugin takes
arguments that shape a request, assert on the REQUEST off the injected
transport, not only on what comes back.** Section 2c does, and the
shipped-defect mutation (restore the bare URL, `-173 B`) is red on six
named checks in `test_price.py` and two in `test_price_history.py`.
⚠️ **AND A MUTATION THAT TURNS A READ INTO `no_data` CRASHES A SUITE
INSTEAD OF NAMING A CHECK, UNLESS THE CHECK EXPECTS IT.** `_NoData.points`
raises `Absence` by design, so `derived(...) < derived(...)` over two
absent reads is a `TypeError` and `[p for p in plan.read.points]` is a
traceback - habit 5's shape with an exception in place of a hang. The
mutation that matters here is the "defensive" one somebody writes after
reading this card: *refuse when the feed returned fewer days than we asked
for*. It is exactly what a healthy feed does every morning before the
~13:00-14:00 CET auction, and switching arbitrage off for it would be a
worse defect than the one being fixed. It is red BY NAME in
`test_price.py` (33 checks, the AC's own line among them) and takes
`test_price_history.py` down at **FCST-04's section 1**, whose `_before`
read is unguarded - a red, but an unnamed one. That is recorded rather than
retrofitted: guarding another card's section is a change to what its
checks report, and it belongs to whoever next touches it.
21. ⚠️ **A CHECK CAN BE GREEN UNDER ITS OWN CARD'S NAMED MUTATION, AND TWICE
IN ONE FILE THE REASON WAS THAT THE WRONG QUANTITY EVENTUALLY REACHES THE
RIGHT VALUE.** TEL-10's acceptance was *"a run that winds the integrator
into the bound must show the published number reaching the bound"*, and its
named mutation was *"publish `prev_w` instead of `i_w`"*. The check was
**GREEN** on the mutant: the command reaches the same bound too, twelve
cycles later, and a check that only reads the VALUE cannot tell the two
apart. The same file's *"a stopped controller publishes `not-running`"* was
green under deleting that branch's assignments outright (−45 B and −67 B),
because the fixture STARTED stopped and `__init__` writes the same values.
Both are habit 4 - the data could not reach the failure - and both were
found by the card's own battery. The fixes are the shape to copy:
* where two quantities CONVERGE, grade the **order or the interval**, not
the value: "the integrator reaches the bound BEFORE the command does",
and a PLATEAU (the lead sits at exactly −800 W for eight consecutive
cycles) rather than a maximum, because a maximum is one tick and a
plateau is the shape;
* where a branch WRITES a value the constructor also writes, the fixture
has to pass THROUGH the other state first. Stop the controller part-way
through a run that has already wound the integrator to −5000 W, so a row
left standing is a WRONG row and not merely an unset one.
22. ⚠️ **AN EXPLANATION IN A COMMENT IS A CLAIM, AND SAFETY-48 SHIPPED TWO THAT
WERE INVENTED.** A gate was written one-sided (`if target > slewed: min(...)
elif target < slewed: max(...)`) under a comment saying the two-sided band
`max(lo, min(hi, i_w))` was a BUG that would drag a trailing integrator
toward the command, with a worked example. It is not a bug and the example
was wrong: `target` is monotone in `i_w`, so the other clamp cannot reach,
and the two spellings agree on **205 920 of 205 920** swept states. A second
bullet said two placements of the same cap *"differ on 118 of 256 252
ticks"*; that 118 had been measured against a **different pair** and the
placement actually being compared is bit-identical on the shipped
configuration - 0 of 256 246 ticks. Both sentences were plausible, both were
load-bearing for a design choice, and neither had been run.
**The rule: a comment that says "X would be wrong" is subject to the same
battery as a check - BUILD X AND MEASURE IT.** Where the answer is
"equivalent", say so with the sweep size and keep the spelling for what it
NAMES; where the answer is a number, quote the run it came from. An
invented justification for a correct decision is still a defect, and it is
the kind a reviewer cannot see because the code is right.
23. ⚠️ **THE MUTATION IS SUBJECT TO EVERY HABIT ABOVE, HABIT 4 INCLUDED - AND
THE PURGE, THE FINGERPRINT AND THE BYTE DELTA ALL SAY IT TOOK.** SAFETY-57's
battery reported a **survivor at +21 B** for a mutation of
`Freshness._open_window()`: `self.graded_from = float(now_mono)` rewritten
as `float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`, which is meant to re-anchor the
verdict's window to the register's own history and so delete the card's
whole exit. The harness purged, the tree fingerprint showed the edit on
disk, the delta was non-zero, and the mutant really did run. It was still a
survivor for a reason that has nothing to do with the property: in the
fixture the register never moves after `t = 0`, so `changed_mono` is
**`0.0`** - and `0.0 or x` is `x`. **The mutant was a no-op on that
stimulus.** Rewritten with an explicit `is None` test (+82 B) it is red on
four named checks.
Stale bytecode is a mutation that never *ran*. This is a mutation that ran
and could not *change the answer* on the data it was given, which is habit 4
exactly, one level up - and none of the three things a mutation report is
required to state (MUTATION.md's own list) can see it, because all three are
about the file rather than about the stimulus. Two rules:
* **Ask of every survivor what it would have had to change, and check that
the fixture reaches that value.** Here: "does any fixture have a non-zero
`changed_mono` at the moment `_open_window()` is called?" The answer was
no, and it is one line to ask.
* **Prefer a mutation that CANNOT be a no-op.** `or`, `and`, truthiness on
a numeric, a default argument and a `getattr` fallback all have a value at
which the mutant and the shipped tree coincide. An explicit comparison,
a constant swap or a deleted statement does not.
⚠️ Note where this one was found: in the battery of a card whose whole
subject is a check that cannot reach the failure it names. **Second
instance in an instrument rather than in a check since habit 16, and the
third overall.**
⚠️ **AND THE SAME CARD'S BATTERY CAUGHT A HABIT-22 COMMENT IN THE FIX
ITSELF, WHICH IS WHY THESE TWO BELONG NEXT TO EACH OTHER.**
`freshness.py` shipped `⚠️ RELEASE BEFORE GRADE, AND THE ORDER IS
LOAD-BEARING` with a worked reason. Swapping the two calls is **zero bytes**
and survived the battery: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w`
and `_release()` only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one can act on
any read and the order is **not observable**. Habit 22 says build X and
measure it; the battery is what builds X. The comment now states the
disjointness and the suite pins **that** - at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W - rather than an order nothing depends on.
⚠️ **SECOND INSTANCE, TEL-11, AND THE NO-OP WAS A SATURATED RAIL RATHER
THAN A VALUE.** The card's whole subject is that a PV reading must never
reach the control law, so its central mutation is
`self.grid = self.grid - self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` - **+106 B**, on
disk, purged, genuinely running - and it came back a **SURVIVOR** of a
six-file battery. The property held in no sense: the fixture drove a 6 kW
export over 12 cycles, which puts the loop **against its rail**, and a
command moving `slew_w` every cycle produces the SAME ramp for -6000 W and
for -14000 W of apparent error. The mutant ran and could not change the
answer.
Two things generalise past PV:
* **A SATURATED ACTUATOR IS A VALUE AT WHICH EVERY INPUT COINCIDES.** The
habit-23 list above names `or`, `and`, truthiness, default arguments and
`getattr` fallbacks - all *expressions* with a coinciding value. A rail,
a clamp, a slew limit, a deadband and a latched alarm are the same hazard
in the **plant**: they are where a controller's output stops being a
function of its input. A fixture that parks there cannot separate any two
inputs, and this repository's control fixtures park there by default,
because the dramatic stimulus is the saturating one.
* **SO THE PRECONDITION IS NOT "DOES IT COMMAND SOMETHING", IT IS "DOES IT
REST SOMEWHERE THE MUTATION COULD MOVE IT FROM".** `test_pv.py` part 6
now drives a 600 W import the loop SETTLES on, asserts the resting target
is well inside the rail, and asks habit 23's own question as a check:
shift the METER by the same 8 kW and confirm the commands really would
have moved. On the first fixture that question answers NO, in one line,
and it is the line that turns the identity into evidence.
24. **A REFUSAL DEFINED RELATIVE TO "THE BASELINE LACKS THIS FEATURE" DIES ON
THE RELEASE THAT SHIPS THE FEATURE — AND IT DIES AS A FALSE REFUSAL, WHICH
IS THE LOUD DIRECTION.** TEL-11 built `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` to grade a
cross-tree identity, and because "the documents are identical" was its
*result* rather than its warning sign, it had to prove instead that the two
runs came from different trees and that **exactly one side reacts to
`pv_entity`**. That was correct evidence: `release/1.0` predated the option
entirely, so a side that reacted to it was the HEAD by construction.
TEL-11 then **merged**, `release/1.0` became 0.11.0, and the baseline for
the next card reacts to `pv_entity` too. `--compare` now answers
`REFUSED: set differs from unset on ['A', 'B']` on every honest run — the
instrument refuses its own shipped tree. TEL-12 found it on the first
comparison it ran.
* **A discriminator is a fact about a MOMENT, not about a card.** "The
baseline does not have X" is true until X ships and then false forever.
Write the discriminator against something the NEXT baseline still will not
have — TEL-12's is the roster key, not the channel — and say in the tool
which fact it rests on, so the next card can see what it has to replace.
* **Prefer a discriminator that is MEASURED over one the tree REPORTS.**
`tree.supports_roster` is the tree describing itself and would have been
one line; the shipped test is "this side's roster cells ARE its unset
cells", which is the tree being measured. Both are printed, side by side,
so a disagreement between the self-report and the measurement is visible
rather than silently trusted.
* ⚠️ **And this is the SAFE direction of the same defect, which is why it
was found in ten minutes rather than in a review.** A stale refusal is a
developer chasing a failure they cannot explain (the false-red case at the
top of this file). A stale *identity* — an instrument that goes on printing
OK because its reference drifted into agreement — is the survivor-
manufacturing direction, and nothing announces it. Ask of every cross-tree
instrument: *what does this print when the feature it is about has been in
the baseline for a year?*
TEL-12's own battery produced two more instrument defects of the ordinary
kind, both recorded in `DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md` §4: a
stimulus annotation written into the document being compared (so every cell
differed for a reason that was not behaviour, and the discriminator fired on
both sides), and a fixture cell whose TRUE total was labelled as its
"partial" (so the check refused the shipped tree for publishing a number it
is required to publish). ⚠️ **Both were caught by running the instrument
against the shipped tree BEFORE running it against a mutant** — which is the
one ordering rule that separates "the instrument is wrong" from "the tree is
wrong", and `test_mqtt.py` part 8's first line ("the shipped module satisfies
every property this instrument grades") is the same rule as a check.
⚠️ **AND TEL-12's SUBJECT WAS HABIT 23 IN THE FIXTURE ITSELF.** The card adds
a SUM over a roster, and the defect it exists to prevent is publishing the
partial sum when a member is absent. A fixture whose absent member
contributes **0 W** cannot see that defect at all: the partial and the full
total are **the same number**, so "published the absence" and "published the
partial" produce identical output. That is a rail in the *arithmetic* rather
than in the plant — the same hazard as TEL-11's saturated actuator, one
domain over. `test_pv.py`'s roster is three distinct non-zero contributions
in two different units, absence is driven at **every position** rather than
at one (habit 10), and each position's partial is **computed from the
fixture** and asserted to differ from the true total as its own precondition.
And the mutation-table consequence: **a variant is not covered because a
near-miss of it is.** DEV-02's table listed the *actuator* variant of the
per-unit claim defect (`device`/`supervised` filed without `inv`), which the
@@ -593,6 +989,92 @@ static routing pin catches. The *bound* variant — right actuator, wrong
numbers — is a different defect with a different fix, and it was absent. Both
are in the table now.
## TARIFF-15 — the card-graded formula, mutation by mutation
Twenty-two mutations, one per check the card added, **run** rather than
reasoned about. Harness: `/home/homelab/.cache/t15-mut/run.py`, backups beside
it rather than in a shared scratchpad — two agents' harnesses collided in one
this week. Each run restores from backup, purges `__pycache__` **on the host**
first, and grades through the CI image with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, so the
interpreter cannot write a cache into the tree under test at all (TEST-15's
structural immunity, borrowed).
**No survivors.** Two entries are `+0 B` and are called out as such, per the
reporting rule.
| | mutation | file | Δ | red |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `CARD_TOLERANCE` widened to 100 — the self-check stops checking | `custom_formula.py` | +1 B | **8** |
| M2 | `CARD_TOLERANCE` tightened to 0 — the other direction, so the tolerance is a number and not a shape | `custom_formula.py` | −1 B | **16** |
| M3 | `units` becomes optional | `custom_formula.py` | +10 B | 1 |
| M4 | the `factor == 0` rung removed | `custom_formula.py` | −8 B | 1 |
| M5 | the `factor < 0` rung removed | `custom_formula.py` | −7 B | 1 |
| M6 | the `vat_pct` band widened to ±1000 | `custom_formula.py` | +6 B | 2 |
| M7 | the non-finite rung removed from `_finite()` | `custom_formula.py` | −26 B | 2 |
| M8 | the non-numeric rung removed from `_finite()` | `custom_formula.py` | −16 B | 4 |
| M9 | an unknown top-level field ignored instead of refused | `custom_formula.py` | −2 B | 1 |
| M10 | the plausibility **floor** applied to the all-in figure instead of the energy one | `custom_formula.py` | **+0 B** | 2 |
| M11 | `hourly` stops averaging and emits the feed's own points | `custom_formula.py` | +12 B | 3 |
| M12 | the hourly bucket takes the FIRST quarter instead of the mean | `custom_formula.py` | −11 B | 1 |
| M13 | the preview drops the index column from each row | `custom_formula.py` | −13 B | 1 |
| M14 | the preview is emitted on every refresh rather than once | `price.py` | −8 B | 1 |
| M15 | `custom_formula` declares `ALL_IN` — the double-counting lie | `price.py` | −41 B | **10** |
| M16 | a stale card never warns | `custom_formula.py` | −8 B | 1 |
| M17 | a stale card REFUSES instead of warning | `validate.py` | −3 B | 1 |
| M18 | the empty-formula refusal removed from the startup gate | `validate.py` | −38 B | 1 |
| M19 | the index scaled to EUR/kWh before the formula — the factor-1000 | `price.py` | +2 B | **7** |
| M20 | an `eval` call planted in `app/custom_formula.py` | `custom_formula.py` | +14 B | 1 |
| M21 | `custom_formula` stops passing the caller's range to the feed | `price.py` | **+0 B** | 1 |
| M22 | **PAIRED**: M1 *and* the plausibility band removed, together | `custom_formula.py` | −60 B | **12** |
### The four that are worth reading rather than counting
**M13 was a SURVIVOR of the whole suite on the first attempt, at −13 B.** The
check read `"index EUR/MWh -> all-in EUR/kWh" in log` — which is the preview's
**heading**. Deleting the index column from every **row** left the heading
saying it prints something it no longer printed, and nothing went red. That is
this file's third failure mode arriving in the check written to close it: the
assertion ran, the sentence was true, and the data could not reach the failure
it named. It is graded on a rendered ROW now, built here from the captured
document (`' 216.080 -> 0.30123'`), and M13 is red.
**M10 is `+0 B` and it is a real defect, not a synthetic one.** It came out of
writing the mutation rather than out of review: `implausible_all_in()`'s floor
was applied to the all-in figure, and `price_taxes_eur_kwh` shipped at 0.06 —
**three times the 0.02 floor** — so a card read a hundred times too small
(0.0016 EUR/kWh of energy) is carried over the floor by the flat tax addend
alone and passes. The hundredfold error is exactly what that band exists for.
The floor is applied to the **energy** figure now and the ceiling to the all-in
one, both directions are graded, and the trap is stated as a check in its own
right so the asymmetry cannot be "tidied up" later. *(Annotated 2026-09-13:
TARIFF-18 raised that default to 0.11736, **nearly six times** the floor. The
addend that does the carrying got BIGGER, so the trap is wider than when M10
was measured and the asymmetry is more load-bearing rather than less.)*
**M15 is the one the framework CANNOT catch, and the reds say which half does.**
Declaring `ALL_IN` makes `assemble()` add nothing, and section 3's all-in check
is *derived from the declaration* — so it passes on the lie, exactly as
`price.py`'s trap 1 says no code can catch a misdeclaration. What goes red is
the **docstring/declaration agreement** check, the card reproductions, and the
`sources` pin: ten reds, none of them from the arithmetic. That is the
guarantee at its true size — the two claims are held to agree, and whether
either is true about somebody else's tariff remains human.
**M22 is the paired run (TEST-16).** The card self-check and the plausibility
band both answer a unit error, so each could be masking the other. Weakened
**together** they produce twelve reds rather than the eight M1 alone produces,
and the band's own checks stay red — so neither rung is doing the other's work.
### What this battery does NOT establish
It does not establish that a card is the right card. Every mutation above moves
the relationship between the coefficients and the printed price; **none of them
can move the relationship between the printed price and the operator's actual
contract**, because nothing in this repository observes that. A
consistent-but-wrong pair passes every one of these checks, by construction,
and `DECISIONS/TARIFF-15-the-card-is-the-grader.md` §3 says so in the same
sentence as the claim.
## Where each surface stands
* **Local and dev-harness runs — the exposed one.** This is where FCST-03 hit
@@ -643,6 +1125,7 @@ commit and PR bodies.
| **SAFETY-03** reviewer survivor: `abs()` dropped from `clamp_to_rating`'s limit (6aabb83) | **re-verified — still a survivor** | re-run the same way, all 15 green. Also as recorded: unreachable under the `int(100, 5000)` schema. |
| **MAINT-05 round 3**, `migrate_maint_keys()` marker gate `if rep.ok:` → `if rep.ok or rep.kept:` (`+12 B`) | **was a survivor — now CLOSED** | measured against head `65cddf3` under the purge, tree mounted `:ro`, `19/19 PASS`. It stamps the schema marker on a migration that LOST state, defeating the older `lost` guard as well as the new `misdirected` one, because every check that reached the marker did so on a store whose `kept` list was empty. Closed by `test_maintenance.py` **9d**; the mutation is now red on three named checks. |
| **MAINT-05 round 3**, `migrate_unit_keys()` marker gate `if rep.ok:` → `if rep.ok or rep.kept:` (`+12 B`) | **found here — SAFETY-02's half, now CLOSED** | the SAME mutation one function up, on the LATCH migration rather than the history one. Measured a survivor against this branch under the purge, `:ro`, `19/19 PASS`, then closed by `test_inverter.py` part 10's new fixture — a store with `unit/inverter-a/sign_reason` already present (so `kept` is non-empty) whose `sign_tripped: true` write is dropped. Shipped: marker withheld. Mutant: marker stamped on a **disarmed latch**, and the next start skips the migration that would have re-armed it. |
| **TARIFF-09** 11 mutations over `app/price.py` and the two-day capture, all red, no survivors | **not at risk** | direction, and method: every mutation was applied to a FRESH `cp -a` of the clean worktree rather than reverted, so there is no revert to verify (habit 18) and no shared scratch path two runs could collide on. Each ran through `tools/mutation_run.sh`, which purges and fingerprints. Byte deltas recorded on the PR; one is **+0 B** - a single price digit edited inside the committed capture, the risky delta - and the re-derived sha256 catches it. |
| **TARIFF-01**'s other three survivors, **SAFETY-03**'s `describe()` survivor, **TARIFF-02**'s M3/M5/M7, **SAFETY-18**'s three | **still unverified** | recorded before the purge discipline, with no byte delta on the record, so a `+0 B` same-second revert cannot be excluded. All are survivors, which is the direction this defect fabricates. TARIFF-02's and SAFETY-18's were **closed by later commits whose claims are reds**, so what is unverified is the *diagnosis*, not the current state of the code. |
**Nothing here says a past result is wrong.** The two survivors re-run above
+123 -6
View File
@@ -184,6 +184,17 @@ IDLE_OFF_PEAK_HOUR = "this hour is neither the buy hour nor the sell hour"
IDLE_NO_SIZE = (
"no pack's state of charge permits this side of the trade, so it is sized "
"at 0 W - and a 0 W arbitrage claim is a park order, not a trade")
# SAFETY-45. THE BUY LEG'S SIZE, AND ONLY THE BUY LEG'S - §9.1: "Discharge and
# export are never capped by the peak guard; only charging and import are."
IDLE_NO_HEADROOM = (
"the capacity-tariff guard has measured this billed quarter and it can "
"afford no charging at all, so a trade of any size would push it over the "
"ceiling - and a 0 W arbitrage claim is a park order, not a trade")
IDLE_HEADROOM_UNMEASURED = (
"the capacity-tariff guard did not size this quarter's charging headroom "
"this cycle, and an UNMEASURED headroom is not an unlimited one - charging "
"creates the billed quantity (§9.1) and nothing is measuring the quarter "
"this one would land in")
NEGATIVE_PRICE = (
"§17: the sell hour is priced BELOW ZERO, so discharging into it would give "
"energy away and pay for the privilege. Arbitrage must not export at a "
@@ -303,7 +314,7 @@ def _point_at(plan, when: datetime):
return None
def decide(plan, now: datetime, *, peak_guard_active, soc,
def decide(plan, now: datetime, *, peak_guard_active, charge_headroom_w, soc,
min_spread_eur_kwh, uncertainty, charge_w, discharge_w,
soc_floor_pct, soc_ceiling_pct) -> ArbitrageDecision:
"""Should the battery trade this cycle, and how hard.
@@ -314,6 +325,18 @@ def decide(plan, now: datetime, *, peak_guard_active, soc,
None refuses, because the alternative is a strategy that creates the billed
quantity while the thing that would have limited it is switched off.
⚠️ `charge_headroom_w` IS SAFETY-45's SECOND, CONTINUOUS ANSWER FROM THE
SAME GUARD, AND IT IS NOT A DUPLICATE OF THE FIRST. `peak_guard_active` is a
SWITCH - it says whether the guard is holding - and a switch keyed on a
continuous quantity is what made the loop oscillate: the guard engaged at a
5 W floor, this module refused the whole trade, the loop took the actuator,
the meter fell, the guard released and the trade re-armed AT FULL POWER
130 s later. 28 times an hour, measured. `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` is
the watts the billed quarter can still afford; sizing the buy leg to it means
the trade is CLAMPED rather than switched, which is the same shape
`control.maintenance_charge_floor()` has always given a maintenance charge.
⚠️ None IS NOT UNLIMITED here either - see IDLE_HEADROOM_UNMEASURED.
⚠️ EVERY OTHER ARGUMENT IS KEYWORD-ONLY AND HAS NO DEFAULT, for
`TariffPlan.arbitrage()`'s reason. A defaulted `soc_floor_pct` is a reserve
floor this module asserted rather than one the operator configured, and the
@@ -330,10 +353,12 @@ def decide(plan, now: datetime, *, peak_guard_active, soc,
return verdict.match(
refused=lambda v: _idle(v.reason),
allowed=lambda v: _act(plan, now, v, soc, charge_w, discharge_w,
soc_floor_pct, soc_ceiling_pct))
soc_floor_pct, soc_ceiling_pct,
charge_headroom_w))
def _act(plan, now, v, soc, charge_w, discharge_w, floor_pct, ceiling_pct):
def _act(plan, now, v, soc, charge_w, discharge_w, floor_pct, ceiling_pct,
headroom_w):
"""The permitted case: which hour is this, and may the pack do it."""
here = _point_at(plan, now)
if here is None:
@@ -403,18 +428,110 @@ def _act(plan, now, v, soc, charge_w, discharge_w, floor_pct, ceiling_pct):
f"nowhere to put the cheap energy", **common)
if not abs(float(charge_w)) > 0.0:
return _idle(IDLE_NO_SIZE, **common)
# SAFETY-45. THE BILLED QUARTER IS ASKED LAST, AND THE PLACEMENT IS
# DELIBERATE: every refusal that existed before this card keeps the
# precedence it had, so no sentence an operator already reads changes when
# it fires, and the two added here are placed where they cannot displace
# one. The pack's reasons come first because they are properties of the
# hardware in the cupboard; this one is a property of the fifteen minutes
# the trade would land in.
if headroom_w is None:
# ⚠️ NOT "the guard is clear". This is `guard_state()`'s None argument
# one layer down: a headroom nothing measured is not an unlimited one,
# and charging at max_w creates the billed quantity (§9.1).
return _idle(IDLE_HEADROOM_UNMEASURED, **common)
asked_w = abs(float(charge_w))
size_w = min(asked_w, max(0.0, float(headroom_w)))
if not size_w > 0.0:
# ⚠️ NOT IDLE_NO_SIZE, WHICH IS THE LINE ABOVE AND BLAMES THE PACKS.
# `asked_w > 0` is already established here, so the pack may be empty
# and willing and it is the billed quarter that has run out. A refusal
# naming the wrong subsystem sends an operator to the wrong page
# (§10.2), and these two are a whole quarter-hour apart in what they
# ask a human to do about them.
return _idle(IDLE_NO_HEADROOM, **common)
# ⚠️ THE SENTENCE CARRIES BOTH NUMBERS IN THEIR OWN SLOTS, not one figure
# twice. MUTATION.md habit 14: two values in one sentence can be transposed
# by a ZERO-BYTE edit that no byte delta and no shape pin can see, so the
# trade's own size and the guard's headroom are each named by the literal
# text around them.
capped = size_w < asked_w
return ArbitrageDecision(
action=CHARGE, power_w=-abs(float(charge_w)),
action=CHARGE, power_w=-size_w,
reason=(f"{CHARGE}: this is the cheapest firm hour at "
f"{price:.4f} EUR/kWh, {v.spread_eur_kwh:.4f} below the dearest "
f"and clear of the {v.required_spread_eur_kwh:.4f} this cycle "
f"had to cover; charging {abs(float(charge_w)):.0f} W from "
f"{soc:g} %"),
f"had to cover; charging {size_w:.0f} W from {soc:g} %"
+ (f" - SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD: the trade asked for "
f"{asked_w:.0f} W and this billed quarter can afford "
f"{float(headroom_w):.0f} W (§9.1, §10.1 priority 2)"
if capped else "")),
spread_eur_kwh=v.spread_eur_kwh,
required_eur_kwh=v.required_spread_eur_kwh,
price_now_eur_kwh=price)
def sized_from_meter(decision: ArbitrageDecision, headroom_w, *,
winner: str | None) -> bool:
"""SAFETY-47. Was the number a shadow run just recorded SIZED FROM THE
BILLED QUARTER - i.e. from a measurement of what the battery itself did?
THE ONE PLACE THIS QUESTION IS ANSWERED, and it is public for the reason
`peakguard.charge_headroom_w()`, `discharge_permitted()` and
`freeze.looks_frozen()` are: the check that grades it has to assert on THE
SHIPPED EXPRESSION. A predicate transcribed into its own test is one copy
plus a future disagreement about what the check means.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DEFECT IT PREVENTS
`shadow.words()` and the action log carry "would have commanded N W". In
SHADOW MODE the battery is held at `shadow.WIRE_W`, so the billed quarter
the buy leg was sized against contains THE HOUSE AND NOTHING ELSE - while
a live run's meter rises as the trade charges. The same code, the same
hour, `peak_cap_w` 1500 under a 1200 W house: live commands -302.4 W and a
shadow run records -2000.0 W. 6.61x, on the status row, with no caveat.
This is the flag that puts the caveat there.
⚠️ IT IS TRUE WHENEVER A MEASURED HEADROOM ENTERED THE ARITHMETIC, NOT
ONLY WHEN IT BOUND. `_act()` sizes the buy leg as `min(asked, headroom)`,
and "the headroom did not bind" is ITSELF a measured fact about a quarter
the battery never entered. Keying this on `capped` - on whether the
shipped sentence says "SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD" - would answer
True at the START of the quarter, where a shadow run and a live run still
agree to the watt, and False at the END, where `(900/remaining)` has
multiplied the headroom past the ask and the recorded number is at its
most wrong. The quietest caveat exactly where it is needed loudest.
⚠️ THE BUY LEG ONLY. §9.1: "Discharge and export are never capped by the
peak guard; only charging and import are." A sell is sized from
`discharge_w`, which is the roster's own rating and not a measurement of
the quarter, so a sell's recorded watts are NOT subject to this and must
not carry a caveat that would then be false.
⚠️ AND THE ARBITER'S WINNER IS THE THIRD RUNG, NOT AN AFTERTHOUGHT. A trade
that was sized from the meter and then OUT-RANKED is not the number being
recorded - `Resolution.target_w` belongs to somebody else - and a caveat
filed against somebody else's number is a false sentence on the status row,
which is the defect class this whole card is about. It is in HERE and not
in `main.py` for the reason the two rungs above are: all three answer one
question, a check has to be able to reach each of them with the other two
clear (TEST-16), and a rung that lives at a call site is a rung no check
can drive.
`headroom_w` is whatever `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` answered for the
cycle this decision was taken on. ⚠️ None IS "NOTHING MEASURED IT", and
`decide()` REFUSES the trade there (IDLE_HEADROOM_UNMEASURED), so a None
can only ever arrive here beside a non-trading decision - but it is tested
rather than assumed, because the caller is `main.py` and not this module.
`winner` is `Resolution.winner`: the source that actually set the watts.
"""
return (winner == SOURCE
and decision is not None and decision.action == CHARGE
and headroom_w is not None)
def claim(decision: ArbitrageDecision) -> Claim | None:
"""The decision as one arbiter claim, or None when nothing is to be traded.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ since the status page shipped; this file has five more chances to get it wrong.
⚠️ AND IT IS BUILT FOR A PHONE FIRST. This is the screen someone stands in
front of the inverter with: one column, big touch targets, sections that start
collapsed so 71 options do not arrive as one wall, and the refusal block pinned
collapsed so 72 options do not arrive as one wall, and the refusal block pinned
where it cannot be scrolled past.
"""
+151
View File
@@ -191,6 +191,80 @@ SETTLE_CYCLES = math.ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) # 12
# edge rather than in prose, because it is a property of two files agreeing.
_SAT_COUNT_CAP = SETTLE_CYCLES + 1 # 13
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-48. HOW FAR THE INTEGRATOR MAY STAND AHEAD OF THE COMMAND.
#
# ⚠️ THE MISSING CASE, AND IT IS A CASE AND NOT A CONSTANT. The freeze below
# stops the integrator accumulating, and the comment beside it says what the
# requirement is: "the INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command". But
# `frozen` is computed from ONE signal - `abs(prev_w - actual_w) >
# saturation_w`, the inverter not tracking - and SLEW-LIMITING NEVER ENTERS IT.
# When the command hits the step ceiling, the integrator goes on winding at
# `gain * error` until it reaches `integrator_max_w`.
#
# The arithmetic, and it is the whole card:
#
# the integrator moves gain * error per cycle
# the command moves at most slew per cycle
# so the integrator outruns the command whenever
#
# |error| > slew / gain
#
# At the live install's shape (gain 0.6, slew_w 400) that is 667 W. The median
# grid error at the onset of a recorded episode is 1114 W. This is why
# SAFETY-39's `slew_w` retune did not fix it: a smaller step makes the
# threshold LOWER, so the case fires more often, not less.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT IS BOUNDED IS THE LEAD, NOT THE INTEGRATOR. Two forms were measured
# over 16.0 days of the live install's own recorded disturbances
# (`tools/replay_recorded_loop.py`, and DECISIONS/SAFETY-48 has the table):
#
# (a) reuse the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew flag - "may not wind
# further in the direction it is already pushing", exactly as saturation
# does. It cuts export 13 % AND RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY: the worst
# quarter-hour average OFFTAKE goes 3739 -> 3935 W and the mean quarter
# moves +2.7 W, in five of six plant and tuning variants, and on the
# billed quarter it is worse at every plant lag where release/1.0
# produces a peak at all (a tie at lag 0, worse at 2.5/5/7.5/10 s)
# and at every top-N cut of the quarters.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE MECHANISM IS A REDISTRIBUTION, NOT A WEAKER ANSWER. An
# earlier draft of this line said a frozen integrator undershoots by
# (1 - gain) "so a large import is answered too weakly". The aggregate
# does not show that: form A cuts total import by 5.45 kWh, and paired
# tick by tick against release/1.0 it delivers 8.56 kWh LESS offtake
# energy on the ticks release/1.0 was importing. What it moves is the
# TAIL - within quarters that already net to offtake, the worst of them
# gets worse - and the capacity tariff bills the worst quarter and
# nothing else. That is the wrong trade here and the reason this is not
# the fix that ships.
#
# (b) cap how far the integrator may LEAD the command, one slew step. Export
# 39.6 -> 34.1 kWh, wasted throughput 4.7 -> 3.2 kWh, sign reversals
# 2992 -> 2770, worst quarter-hour offtake 3739 -> 3434 W at the fitted
# plant lag (⚠️ AND AT NO SHORTER ONE: at every lag <= 5.0 s release/1.0
# is already at 3434 W and this changes it by zero - DECISIONS/SAFETY-48
# §3a), median recovery 232 -> 199 s. It is what ships.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE CAP IS NOT ZERO. `i_w = slewed` is full back-calculation, and this
# module's own docstring says what that costs: passing `i_w=None` "reduces this
# function to the exact velocity form it replaced". A zero cap makes `i_w`
# identically the command on every cycle, which is that same collapse written
# from the other end - it measures 32.0 kWh, better than (b) by 2 kWh, and it
# throws away the reason the accumulator was split out at all. One step is the
# smallest cap that is not that.
#
# WHAT THE NUMBER MEANS: the command can cover a one-step lead in ONE cycle, so
# the worst-case unwind after a reversal is one cycle instead of
# `integrator_max_w / slew_w` - 12.5 cycles at the live shape, ~60 s at the
# meter's measured 5.0 s tick.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS IN STEPS RATHER THAN IN WATTS FOR SAFETY-39's REASON, WHICH IS THE
# REASON THIS FILE KEEPS RE-LEARNING. A watt figure is a constant that outlives
# the `slew_w` it was derived against; expressed in steps it moves with
# `slew_limit_w()` and therefore with the rail.
SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 1
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Tuning:
@@ -507,6 +581,83 @@ def compute(
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
# --- SAFETY-48: the step ceiling reaches the integrator too ---------
# ⚠️ INSIDE THIS BRANCH AND NOWHERE ELSE - AND THE REASON IS NOT THE
# SATURATION FREEZE. An earlier draft of this comment said that applied
# unconditionally the cap "would also pull the integrator toward a
# command the SATURATION freeze is pinning", and priced that at 118 of
# 256 250 ticks. Both halves were invented, and MUTATION.md habit 22 is
# what fell out of it. The 118 had been measured against a DIFFERENT
# pair - a band applied after quantisation, at the very end of
# `compute()`. On the pair the sentence actually names - this same cap
# moved out of this branch to just after `target = slewed` - the two
# forms are BIT-IDENTICAL on the shipped configuration: 0 of 256 246
# ticks differ over the 16-day recording. They separate only where
# `integrator_max_w` is deliberately set ABOVE `max_w`, the one
# configuration this file says can reach its `clamped` reason; there
# the integrator is meant to run above the rail and an unconditional
# cap would drag it back to the command every cycle and make the option
# inert. THAT is why the cap stays in the branch, and
# `test_telemetry.py` part 4 drives it. (The separable-state COUNT is a
# property of whatever grid was swept - 2050 of 257 400 on this card's,
# 1220 of 246 064 on the review's, 776 of 40 320 on a third - so the
# claim to carry forward is WHERE they separate, not how many.)
#
# ⚠️ AND THE HALF A READER WILL OTHERWISE ASSUME AWAY: THIS CAP DOES
# MOVE A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR. It runs BEFORE the freeze block
# below and is not gated on `frozen`. Measured over the same recording
# at the live shape: of 79 160 frozen ticks the cap changed `i_w` on
# 1095 of them, and on 679 of those it moved it FURTHER OUT on the side
# it was already on - putting back magnitude the freeze had just let
# fall, which is the one direction the freeze's own rule ("may fall,
# never rise") exists to forbid. Worst case 2424 W, and the worked tick
# is `prev_w -3400 W, grid +4697 W, actual -4144 W, sat_count 2 -> 3`:
# the freeze leaves the integrator at -176 W, the slew binds, and the
# cap drags it to -2600 W. It never overrides a SAME-CYCLE refusal -
# the freeze clipped `moved` on 75 512 ticks and the slew bound on none
# of them - but it does not leave the frozen path alone either.
#
# ⚠️ AND THAT IS WHERE SAFETY-13's SETTLE VALUES WENT. Gating this cap
# on `not frozen` puts `test_control.py` part 5 back at release/1.0's
# -1190 W exactly; part 4(b)'s -2390 -> -1200 W does NOT come back,
# because that one moved for the other reason - the winding BEFORE the
# freeze is bounded now. The gate is refused anyway: measured the same
# way it leaves a worst observed lead of 4961 W, i.e. no bound at all
# on the quantity this card exists to bound. DECISIONS/SAFETY-48 §5
# carries the rest of the price.
#
# ⚠️ WRITTEN ONE-SIDED, AND IT IS **EQUIVALENT** TO THE TWO-SIDED BAND
# `max(slewed - cap, min(slewed + cap, i_w))` - MEASURED, NOT REASONED.
# An earlier draft of this comment claimed the two-sided spelling was a
# bug that would drag a TRAILING integrator up toward the command. That
# is false and the sweep said so: `target` is monotone in `i_w`
# (`target = clamp(clamp(i_w, +-limit), +-max_w)`) and `slewed` is
# `target` pulled toward `prev_w`, so whenever the slew binds, `i_w`
# lies on the same side of `slewed` as `target` does and the other
# clamp cannot reach. The two spellings agree on **205 920 of 205 920**
# cases across four tunings, every sign of `prev_w`, `grid_w`,
# `actual_w` and `i_w`, and the `i_w=None` path.
#
# It stays one-sided because it SAYS which side the lead is on - the
# side the command wanted to move and could not - and because a reader
# reaching for the band spelling should find the sweep rather than an
# argument. ⚠️ The "descending" case is NOT an exception to the rule: a
# command falling from +2400 W toward an integrator at +100 W has an
# integrator 2300 W ahead of it IN THE DIRECTION OF TRAVEL, and it is
# pulled back to one step beyond the emitted command exactly as a
# rising one is.
#
# ⚠️ `i_w` IS CHANGED AND `target` IS NOT. This cycle's command is
# already decided; what is bounded is what gets CARRIED. That is also
# why the exhaustive `i_w=None` equivalence sweep in test_control.py is
# untouched by this card: it compares `(target_w, sat_count, frozen,
# reason)`, none of which this moves, and the seeded path re-seeds from
# `prev_w` next cycle anyway.
_lead_cap = SLEW_LEAD_STEPS * slew
if target > slewed:
i_w = min(i_w, slewed + _lead_cap)
elif target < slewed:
i_w = max(i_w, slewed - _lead_cap)
target = slewed
if frozen:
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+124 -6
View File
@@ -414,6 +414,94 @@ DELIVERY_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
MIN_W_IS_SATURATION_W = "control.Tuning.saturation_w"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-43. THE SECOND WAY TO BE NAMED, AND WHY IT IS A FRACTION OF THE ASK.
#
# `min_w` above is an ABSOLUTE gap, and OPT-09 made that a hole. `weights()`
# shrinks a low-headroom unit's share, and shrinking the share shrinks the gap:
# a unit standing at +125 W and delivering 0 W is 100 % delinquent and 125 W
# short, so an absolute 500 W never names it. Measured end to end
# (`test_packshare.py` part 8b, real `compute()`, real `plan()`, real
# `delinquent()`, B wedged at a healthy 15 % against its own 10 % cut-out):
#
# load 1500 W, equal weights the wedged unit named on 199/200 cycles
# load 1500 W, OPT-09 weights named on 0/200 cycles
#
# ⚠️ AND THE SUPPRESSED REGIME IS THE QUIET ONE. At a load the healthy sibling
# covers, the meter is satisfied, `unmet_w` is 0 and no action-log line fires,
# so this alarm is the ONLY instrument that would have told the operator.
#
# ⚠️ THE FIX IS NOT A SMALLER `min_w`, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE SHAPE OF THIS
# CARD. `min_w` is `Tuning.saturation_w` and it exists to stop NORMAL
# SATURATION being reported as delinquency - the crying-wolf failure the whole
# module is written against, and the one SAFETY-41 spent four attempts on
# ("i'm getting really annoyed by the notifications in my HA"). Lowering it
# trades a missed alarm for a false one on every unit at once. A fraction of
# the unit's OWN SHARE is a SECOND way to be named that leaves the first
# exactly where it was: `gap > min_w OR gap > frac * share`. Nothing that was
# silent before this card becomes noisy unless the unit is delivering almost
# none of what it was asked for, which is not saturation-shaped at all.
#
# WHERE 0.85 COMES FROM - MEASURED ON THE SAME CAMPAIGN AS `delivery_hold_s`.
# `admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign --fractions` grades this
# constant over the SAME 2640 no-fault runs (three families x 6 gains x 5 slews
# x the write staggers, every unit executing the share it was given) that
# produced the 35.0 s worst legitimate episode, at the shipped `min_w`, and
# reports what the relative arm ADDS. Worst continuous legitimate episode,
# worst of the three families:
#
# frac 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
# worst 90.0 90.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 55.0 55.0 60.0 45.0 45.0 s
#
# frac 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 *0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99
# worst 40.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 s
#
# absolute arm alone: 35.0 s - SAFETY-42 §3.3's figure, re-measured in the
# SAME runs, which is what makes every row above a comparison and not a claim.
# N=1 control: 0.0 s at EVERY fraction, in all 2640 one-inverter runs.
# Flapping family: 0.0 s at EVERY fraction, in all 840 runs.
#
# ⚠️ READ THE CURVE, NOT THE ROW. THERE IS NO CLIFF ANYWHERE IN IT. From 0.45
# to 0.99 every figure is 40.0 or 45.0 s - within ONE CONTROL CYCLE (5.0 s) of
# every other - and below 0.45 it rises gradually to 90.0 s at 0.05. It is not
# monotone either (0.40 reports 60.0 s where 0.35 reports 55.0), which is
# §3.3's own mechanism (c) rather than noise in the plant: a more sensitive rule
# puts MORE units into the short set, which can turn a proper subset into the
# WHOLE roster and END the episode. So this constant is INSENSITIVE over the
# whole usable range, and that is the finding rather than a caveat on it. 0.85
# sits in the flat part, 0.40 above the shoulder at ~0.45 and 0.15 below 1.0.
#
# ⚠️ AND "ZERO FALSE NAMINGS" IS NOT AVAILABLE AT ANY FRACTION - said here
# because the card asked for exactly that. Every fraction adds naming CYCLES to
# the no-fault campaign; a relative arm that never fired on a legitimate
# transient would be one that never fired at all, because the modelled write
# stagger lands B's number up to four cycles late and a unit whose new command
# has not arrived IS delivering a small fraction of what is standing on its
# wire. What is zero at every fraction is false ALARMS: the longest legitimate
# episode anywhere in the 20-point sweep is 90.0 s - at 0.05, the most sensitive
# fraction measured and far below anything this card would ship - against a
# `delivery_hold_s` of 185 s, so NOTHING in 2640 no-fault runs comes within 95 s
# of notifying an operator at any fraction measured. At 0.85 the hold is 4.62x
# the worst legitimate episode where the absolute arm alone gave 5.29x. That is
# the price, in full.
#
# ⚠️ THE DIRECTION IS THE OPPOSITE OF `min_w`'s AND IT IS EASY TO GET BACKWARDS.
# A SMALLER fraction names MORE units - it is the more sensitive setting and the
# more dangerous one - so the campaign puts a LOWER bound on this number, not an
# upper one. It is bounded ABOVE by the card's own case: at 1.0 the arm can only
# fire on a unit that is IMPORTING while asked to discharge, which is
# SAFETY-30's fault and not this one, so a unit delivering NONE of its share
# (gap/share exactly 1.0) would be missed. The 0.15 below 1.0 is what covers a
# wedged box reporting a small standby figure rather than a clean zero.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NOT AN OPTION, FOR `delivery_w`'s REASON ONE PARAGRAPH UP. An
# operator has no instrument to derive it with, a knob here is a knob on how
# loud this add-on is, and SAFETY-41 is the record of what that costs. It is a
# derived constant with a committed harness behind it, and the way to move it
# is to re-run the campaign.
DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION = 0.85
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DeliveryConfig:
"""Defaults, not constants - config.yaml carries both. See CFG-03 above."""
@@ -532,12 +620,30 @@ def account(*, live: bool, parked: bool, soc, bms_floor) -> str | None:
return None
def delinquent(units, min_w: float) -> dict:
def delinquent(units, min_w: float,
share_frac: float = DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION) -> dict:
"""Which units are short with NO ACCOUNT, when the roster disagrees with them.
`units` one `UnitDelivery` per inverter, in roster order.
`min_w` the shortfall that counts - `control.Tuning.saturation_w`. See
`MIN_W_IS_SATURATION_W`.
`units` one `UnitDelivery` per inverter, in roster order.
`min_w` the ABSOLUTE shortfall that counts - `control.Tuning.
saturation_w`. See `MIN_W_IS_SATURATION_W`.
`share_frac` SAFETY-43. The RELATIVE shortfall that counts, as a fraction
of that unit's own share. See `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION`; it
is a parameter rather than a read of the constant so the
campaign that derived it can sweep it over the shipped code.
⚠️ `None` MEANS THE ABSOLUTE ARM ALONE - SAFETY-42's rule,
exactly - and it exists for ONE caller: the campaign in
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py`, which has to be able
to measure what this card ADDS against what it replaced, run
for run, over ONE tree. Nothing in the add-on passes it, and
`main.py` passes nothing at all.
⚠️ THE TWO ARMS ARE AN `or` AND THE ORDER OF THAT SENTENCE MATTERS. The
absolute arm is untouched by SAFETY-43: everything `min_w` named before it
is still named, and nothing `min_w` refused becomes noisy unless the unit
is delivering almost NONE of its ask. Lowering `min_w` would have been the
other change - the one that reports normal saturation on every unit at once
- and `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` says at length why it was refused.
Returns `{name: sentence}`, empty when there is nothing to say. The sentence
is the operator's first line and it carries the peer clause, because "B is
@@ -579,7 +685,13 @@ def delinquent(units, min_w: float) -> dict:
gaps = {}
for u in asked:
gap = short_by(u.share_w, u.measured_w)
if gap is not None and gap > float(min_w):
if gap is None:
continue
# SAFETY-43: absolute OR relative. `share_w` is > 0 for every member
# of `asked`, so the second comparison is always well formed.
if gap > float(min_w) or (share_frac is not None
and gap > float(share_frac)
* float(u.share_w)):
gaps[u.name] = gap
unaccounted = {u.name: gaps[u.name] for u in asked
@@ -595,7 +707,13 @@ def delinquent(units, min_w: float) -> dict:
out[u.name] = (
f"{REASON_CODE}: {u.name} is standing at {float(u.share_w):+.0f} W "
f"and delivering {float(u.measured_w):+.0f} W - "
f"{unaccounted[u.name]:.0f} W of its share is not arriving - while "
f"{unaccounted[u.name]:.0f} W of its share "
# SAFETY-43. The PROPORTION is in the sentence because the watts
# alone stopped being the whole story the moment a unit could be
# named on the relative arm: "125 W is not arriving" reads like a
# rounding error, and "125 W (100 % of its share)" is the fault.
f"({100.0 * unaccounted[u.name] / float(u.share_w):.0f} % of it) "
f"is not arriving - while "
f"{', '.join(peers)} {'is' if len(peers) == 1 else 'are'} not in "
f"that state. Nothing this add-on reads explains it")
return out
+333 -20
View File
@@ -175,6 +175,124 @@ only one of them is WIRED - see `BOUNDS` below and the note on SoC.
integrator, and K. It does NOT owe a second freshness mechanism - `Freshness`
below takes its obligation term from the caller precisely so that an energy
integral can be handed in where command travel is handed in here.
THE EXIT, AND WHY THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS MODULE DID NOT HAVE ONE (SAFETY-57)
==============================================================================
⚠️ THE VERDICT ABOVE IS ABOUT AN OBLIGATION, AND ITS OWN CONSEQUENCE REMOVES
THE OBLIGATION. Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False,
which commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1). At 0 W nothing is asking the register to be
anywhere - `|standing| >= MOVE_W` is false, so the conjunction cannot arm - and
the class docstring's clearing rule, "an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number",
asks the register for evidence that only a command could have produced. A pack
sitting at its BMS floor answers the same integer watt for hours. **The state
had no exit reachable from inside it**, and the operator-facing line said the
opposite: *"It clears itself the moment the register reports a different
value."*
MEASURED ON THE LIVE SITE, 2026-09-21, and committed as
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/` - a passive RS-485 capture, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`:
10:51:24.7 0x0518 reaches -3 W. The pack is at 11 % and the loop has just
reversed from -447 W of charge into discharge; the BMS refuses
and the inverter idles. The register is HEALTHY and TRUTHFUL.
10:51:29.7 the standing command reaches +1060 W. 800 W of travel, and the
register is obliged to follow it.
10:52:00 the conjunction arms. `Inverter.batt` becomes None.
10:52:21.7 the site commands 0 W - on the wire, in the capture.
... 0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
change value for 790.0 s. Nothing in this add-on can end it.
11:04 a human restarts the add-on.
11:05:31.7 the restarted loop commands -400 W of charge, which the pack
ACCEPTS at 11 %, and the register moves 3 s later.
⚠️ AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. This BMS emits a keep-alive pulse of a few
hundred watts, which twitches 0x0518 and satisfies the clearing rule by
accident. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
(`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/`) through the shipped conjunction at
1 Hz gives **93 trips**, and the time from each trip to the register's next
change - which was the ONLY exit - has a median of 143 s, 17 episodes at or
over the live one's 710 s, and a worst case of 21440 s. That distribution is a
property of this battery's firmware. It is not a property of this code, and the
add-on must not depend on it.
THE RULE, and it is SAFETY-13's shape one module over - "which latches get an
exit, not how long the block lasts":
RELEASE <=> the verdict is standing
AND |standing command| < MOVE_W has held continuously for
>= RELEASE_S
On a release the latch clears and a NEW grading window opens at that instant:
the register is re-graded, from scratch, against the commands issued AFTER it.
Nothing about the register's own history is rewritten - `changed_mono`,
`held` and `unchanged_s()` go on reporting that the register has not moved for
850 s, because it has not.
⚠️ `RELEASE_S` IS `BATT_OBLIGED_S`, 17.0 s, AND IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND
RATHER THAN A PREFERENCE - the mirror of `MOVE_W` taking the ceiling of its
own. The question the bound answers is *has the register had its chance to
answer the command that is now standing?*, and that is exactly the 17.0 s
already derived above: 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s publish, one 1 s read. Below it
the release happens before the cheaper exit - the register moving by itself -
could have occurred. Which half is safe is the opposite of SAFETY-13's, and for
the reason that card states in its §4.2 table: being wrong LONG here is the
failure being fixed (a site parked while it exports), and being wrong SHORT
costs one re-grading window, which is bounded below.
WHAT A RELEASE COSTS, MEASURED AND NOT ABSORBED - AND IT IS NOT SMALL. For the
duration of the new window the consumers get the held number again, which is
the exposure this module was written to close. Driven at the live install's
shape against a register frozen for good (`test_freshness.py` part 10c), over
1200 s:
shipped parked 1166 s, the held number reaches a consumer 35 s 2.9 %
SAFETY-57 parked 571 s, the held number reaches a consumer 630 s 52.5 %
⚠️ **52 % IS THE PRICE OF THE EXIT AND IT IS PAID EVERY CYCLE**, not an
occasional slip. The period is the whole of `stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S`
(17 s) parked, then one `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` (35 s) window of re-grading. It is
bounded by construction, and that bound is the one thing that makes it payable:
the new window is AT MOST BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35 s, and 35 < 75 < 85 - the
circulation hold and the per-unit sign hold. NEITHER CONSUMER CAN REACH A
VERDICT INSIDE ONE WINDOW, and a re-trip returns them a None, which CLEARS
both windows rather than accumulating into them.
That inequality is the same one part 6 already grades, and it is why the window
is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` rather than a number chosen to make the table above look
better. Neither detector can be made to say anything by a held number under
this scheme - which is exactly the state the shipped code leaves them in as
well, since a permanent None clears both windows for ever. **So nothing that
SAFETY-37 detects is given back.** What the held number does reach for those
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()`, which
responds to a large unexplained divergence by FREEZING the output - the
conservative direction, and SAFETY-13's business. And the command itself is
derived from the P1 meter, never from `batt`, so a site regulating through a
re-grading window is regulating on the signal it always regulates on.
**A register frozen under a command that never travels 250 W is still not
detected at all** (survivor 2, unchanged), and a dead publisher whose value
alternates is still invisible (survivor 3).
⚠️ AND THE NARROWING THIS DOES NOT TAKE, named so the next card can. The live
episode's register refused a DISCHARGE into an 11 % pack and then followed a
CHARGE immediately; a refusal in one direction is not evidence about the other,
and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade on the first command that
crosses it instead of on a timer. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately
does not take (see the `soc` row), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's
number. It would shrink the 52 % above; it is not needed to give the state an
exit, and mixing it in here would make the exit depend on a second measurement
being right.
⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO, because the temptation is to call it a fix for the
whole episode: it does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register. The
site above was parked for 790 s by a register that was working perfectly, and
after this change it is parked for `stale_input_s + RELEASE_S` instead - about
32 s on the shipped default - and then regrades. Telling the two apart needs
the pack's own floor, which is SAFETY-32's number and not this module's input;
the wording the operator reads about it is SAFETY-56's.
"""
import time
@@ -211,6 +329,19 @@ BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35.0
# and goes red if the two drift.
MOVE_W = 250.0
# SAFETY-57. How long the obligation must have been ABSENT before a standing
# verdict is withdrawn and the register re-graded. See the module docstring's
# last section for the live episode this exists for and for which half of the
# band is the safe one.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS `BATT_OBLIGED_S` AND NOT A NEW NUMBER, and that identity is the
# derivation rather than a convenience. The question is "has the register had
# its chance to answer the command standing NOW?", which is the same physical
# quantity the floor of `BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band is: 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s
# ESPHome publish, one 1 s add-on read. Releasing sooner would throw away the
# cheaper exit - the register moving by itself - before it could have happened.
RELEASE_S = BATT_OBLIGED_S # 17.0
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Bound:
@@ -219,6 +350,7 @@ class Bound:
signal: str
unchanged_s: float
move_w: float
release_s: float
wired: bool
derivation: str
@@ -233,13 +365,19 @@ BOUNDS = {
signal="batt (0x0518, AC power, S16, 1 W, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=BATT_UNCHANGED_S,
move_w=MOVE_W,
release_s=RELEASE_S,
wired=True,
derivation="settle 6.0 + publish 10.0 + read 1.0 = 17.0 s floor; "
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]"),
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]. "
"SAFETY-57: the verdict is withdrawn after 17.0 s of the "
"standing command below 250 W, because at 0 W the register "
"is obliged to nothing and the verdict cannot be tested "
"again from inside the state it creates"),
"soc": Bound(
signal="soc (0x050E, pack SoC, U16, 1 %, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=float("inf"),
move_w=float("inf"),
release_s=float("inf"),
wired=False,
derivation="TEL-08. Command travel is the WRONG obligation term for "
"SoC - a rested pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W "
@@ -263,10 +401,33 @@ class Freshness:
Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False, which
commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1), which drops the standing command below
`MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction, which would return the held number
to the consumers - and round again every read. So the ONLY thing that clears
the latch is an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number, which is exactly the
evidence the verdict was about. A register that is working clears it on its
next 10 s publish; a register that is not, does not.
to the consumers - and round again every read. So an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number clears the latch, which is exactly the evidence the verdict
was about. A register that is working clears it on its next 10 s publish; a
register that is not, does not.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT THE ONLY THING THAT CLEARS IT ANY MORE (SAFETY-57), BECAUSE
THAT MADE THE STATE INESCAPABLE FROM INSIDE. The command the verdict itself
produces is 0 W, and at 0 W the register is obliged to be nowhere - so
"report a different value" is evidence a parked site cannot ask for. The
live site sat at 0 W for 790 s on 2026-09-21 with a register that was
working correctly, and was freed by a human. `_release()` below withdraws a
verdict whose obligation has been gone for `bound.release_s`, and opens a
new grading window at that instant. The 1 Hz oscillation the latch exists to
prevent is still prevented: the new window is `bound.unchanged_s` wide, so
no re-trip can land sooner than 35 s after a release, rather than on the
next read. ⚠️ MEASURED FROM THE RELEASE, NOT FROM THE COMMAND RESUMING - if
the site rests for longer than the window before it asks for anything, the
window is already old and the re-trip lands on the first read at which the
command travels 250 W again. That is survivor 5's shape, it predates this
card, and its cost is one `stale_input_s` hold.
⚠️ TWO CLOCKS, AND THE DISTINCTION IS THE WHOLE OF SAFETY-57'S HONESTY.
`changed_mono` / `held` are facts about the REGISTER: when it last carried a
different number. `graded_from` / `standing_at_grade` are the window the
VERDICT is computed over, which a release re-opens. They are the same thing
until the first release and diverge afterwards, and `unchanged_s()` - the
number an operator reads - is always the register's.
"""
def __init__(self, bound: Bound):
@@ -281,10 +442,20 @@ class Freshness:
# ability to fetch it.
self.held = None
self.changed_mono = None
# The standing command at that same instant. The conjunction compares
# against THIS, not against the previous cycle's command: what matters
# is whether the register has followed anything since it last moved.
self.standing_at_change = None
# SAFETY-57. The window the VERDICT is graded over, as opposed to the
# register's own history above, and the standing command at the instant
# it opened. The conjunction compares against THIS, not against the
# previous cycle's command: what matters is whether the register has
# followed anything since the current question was put to it. A register
# that moves opens a window, so until the first release these two are
# the change-stamps; `_release()` is where they diverge.
self.graded_from = None
self.standing_at_grade = None
# The instant the standing command last FELL below `move_w`, or None
# while an obligation is standing. The release timer runs off this.
self.rested_since = None
self.released_at = None
self.releases = 0
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.arrivals = 0
@@ -311,20 +482,67 @@ class Freshness:
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
self.held = value
self.changed_mono = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_change = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
# Movement is the ONLY thing that clears the latch. See the class
# docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation this prevents.
self._open_window(standing_w, now_mono)
# Movement clears the latch, because it is exactly the evidence the
# verdict was about. See the class docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation
# the latch prevents, and `_release()` for the other way out.
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.last = value
# ⚠️ THE ORDER OF THESE TWO IS NOT OBSERVABLE, AND THIS COMMENT SAYS SO
# BECAUSE THE FIRST VERSION OF IT CLAIMED THE OPPOSITE. Swapping them is
# a ZERO-BYTE edit and it SURVIVED the battery; the reason is structural
# rather than a missing fixture, so no fixture could have closed it:
# `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()` only
# when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on
# any given read, whichever runs first. Release is written first because
# it reads in the order the state machine moves - withdraw, then
# re-grade - not because the code depends on it.
self._release(standing_w, now_mono)
self._grade(standing_w, now_mono)
def _open_window(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""Start grading the register again, from this instant (SAFETY-57).
Called when the register moves - the window and the register's history
coincide there - and when a verdict is withdrawn, where they do not.
"""
self.graded_from = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_grade = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
def _release(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""SAFETY-57. Withdraw a verdict whose obligation is no longer standing.
⚠️ THE TIMER RUNS ON THE COMMAND, NOT ON THE VERDICT. `rested_since` is
maintained on every arrival, latched or not, so the elapsed rest is the
real one and not "time since we last looked". An obligation reappearing
resets it to None, which is the whole point: a site that goes back to
asking the register for 250 W of movement has put the question back, and
the verdict stands until the question is withdrawn again.
"""
obliged = (standing_w is not None
and abs(float(standing_w)) >= self.bound.move_w)
if obliged:
self.rested_since = None
return
if self.rested_since is None:
self.rested_since = float(now_mono)
if not self.stale:
return
if float(now_mono) - self.rested_since < self.bound.release_s:
return
self.released_at = float(now_mono)
self.releases += 1
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self._open_window(standing_w, now_mono)
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""The conjunction. Sets the latch; never clears it."""
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
if self.stale or self.graded_from is None:
return
held_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
held_s = self.graded_s(now_mono)
if held_s < self.bound.unchanged_s:
return
# ⚠️ BOTH None GUARDS ARE FOR A CALLER THAT DOES NOT KNOW ITS OWN
@@ -333,30 +551,98 @@ class Freshness:
# consumer today. They are here for TEL-08, whose obligation term is an
# energy integral that has nothing to say until it has a window - and
# "nothing to say" must withhold the verdict, not manufacture one.
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_change is None:
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_grade is None:
return
standing_w = float(standing_w)
if abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w:
return
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_change)
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_grade)
if moved_w < self.bound.move_w:
return
self.stale = True
# ⚠️ THE SENTENCE SAYS "unchanged", SO IT GETS THE REGISTER'S OWN
# NUMBER, NOT THE WINDOW'S. They are the same until the first release
# and different afterwards, and an operator comparing this line against
# a history graph is reading the register.
shown_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
# ⚠️ SAFETY-56. THE OBSERVATION IS A FACT, THE DIAGNOSIS WAS NOT, AND
# THE SENTENCE NOW STOPS WHERE THE EVIDENCE DOES. The conjunction above
# is satisfied by TWO disjoint worlds, and nothing this object is handed
# separates them:
# (1) the register has stopped reporting reality - what the gate was
# built for - or
# (2) reality is not moving, because the SOURCE cannot comply with
# the command. A pack the BMS is refusing at its floor holds
# still under any setpoint, and a register reporting that
# truthfully publishes the same unchanged number a dead one does.
# The live 2026-09-21 episode was (2) - the pack read 11 % for the
# whole 850 s hold, the commands were discharge-only, and the register
# answered the first CHARGE command within one obligation window
# (test_freshness.py 11a measures all three off the committed capture)
# - and this sentence asserted (1), which sent the operator to look at
# healthy hardware.
# Naming both is what the module can honestly say. Naming WHICH would
# need SoC and the pack floor - deliberately not this module's inputs
# (see the `soc` row in BOUNDS and the docstring's last section), and
# TEL-08's and SAFETY-32's numbers rather than this sentence's.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NOT SHARED WITH `main.py`'s NOT READY ROW, WHICH SAYS
# THE SAME AMBIGUITY IN DIFFERENT WORDS ON PURPOSE. This sentence is a
# LOG LINE about a behaviour, quoted verbatim by `note()` onto the
# status page and by `_read_unit()` into the action log; that one is a
# BANNER about a named ENTITY, and the two answer different questions
# ("what did the register do" against "can I trust this entity"). One
# helper serving both would have to drop whichever half the other does
# not need, and the half it dropped would be the operator's next step.
self.reason = (
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {held_s:.0f} s "
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {shown_s:.0f} s "
f"while the standing command moved {moved_w:.0f} W to "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W - the reading is not following, so it is "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W. TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE "
f"CANNOT TELL THEM APART: the register may have stopped reporting "
f"reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command "
f"- a pack the BMS is refusing holds still under any setpoint, and "
f"an honest register then reads exactly like a frozen one. Either "
f"way the number cannot be read as this command's effect, so it is "
f"reported as MISSING rather than as a measurement (limits: "
f"unchanged over {self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s, command over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W and moved by over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W)")
# ⚠️ SAFETY-57, AND THE THREE DURATIONS ARE THREE DIFFERENT FACTS, each
# in its own slot: the register's unchanged time is in the sentence
# above, the WINDOW this verdict actually rests on is here, and so is
# how many times this unit has been round the loop. Without the second
# one the sentence reads as though 92 s of unchanged register were what
# was compared against the 35 s limit, and it was not.
if self.releases:
self.reason += (
f" [re-graded: the {held_s:.0f} s window this verdict rests on "
f"opened when the previous one was withdrawn, not when the "
f"register last moved - this unit has now been graded "
f"{self.releases + 1} times]")
def unchanged_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page."""
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page.
⚠️ THE REGISTER'S CLOCK, NEVER THE VERDICT'S (SAFETY-57). A release
re-opens the grading window; it does not make the register younger, and
an operator reading "unchanged for 12 s" off a register that has held
one value for 850 s would be reading this module's bookkeeping back as a
measurement. `graded_s()` is the other one and is named differently for
that reason.
"""
if self.changed_mono is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.changed_mono)
def graded_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds the CURRENT verdict window has been open (SAFETY-57).
Equal to `unchanged_s()` until the first release, and shorter after one.
"""
if self.graded_from is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.graded_from)
def reading(self):
"""What the consumers get: the value, or None when it cannot be trusted.
@@ -366,6 +652,13 @@ class Freshness:
rather than accumulating it, and `circulation.circulating_w` returns None
for a roster with a missing term, which clears the circulation window
too. This module is the thing that was missing between them.
⚠️ AND IT CAN GO BACK TO BEING A NUMBER WITHOUT THE REGISTER MOVING
(SAFETY-57). That is the exit, and it is bounded rather than free: the
window a release opens is `bound.unchanged_s` = 35 s, shorter than both
consumer holds (75 s and 85 s), so neither can reach a verdict inside
one - and a re-trip hands them a None, which CLEARS their windows. See
the module docstring's last section.
"""
return None if self.stale else self.last
@@ -373,6 +666,26 @@ class Freshness:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
return f"{unit_name}: {self.reason}" if self.stale else ""
def release_note(self, unit_name: str) -> str:
"""SAFETY-57's release, for the log. Empty when nothing was withdrawn.
⚠️ IT NAMES WHAT IS AND IS NOT BEING CLAIMED, because a line reading
"recovered" would be a lie: nothing has been learned about the register.
The verdict was withdrawn because it can no longer be tested, and the
next 35 s are the test.
"""
if self.released_at is None:
return ""
return (f"{unit_name}: STALE_WITHDRAWN after the standing command sat "
f"below {self.bound.move_w:.0f} W for "
f"{self.bound.release_s:.0f} s. NOTHING HAS BEEN LEARNED ABOUT "
f"THE REGISTER - it is still holding {self.held:+.0f} - but a "
f"verdict about a command that is no longer standing cannot be "
f"tested, and the 0 W this one produces is what stopped it "
f"being tested. The register is now re-graded over a fresh "
f"{self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s window; if it still does not "
f"follow, this returns")
def monotonic() -> float:
"""The clock this module's callers use, in one place so tests can find it.
+11 -3
View File
@@ -61,10 +61,17 @@ class HomeAssistant:
if resp.status == 404:
return None
resp.raise_for_status()
return await resp.json()
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError) as err:
obj = await resp.json()
# SAFETY-61: an undecodable body is an absence like any other failed
# read, never an exception into the control loop.
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError, ValueError) as err:
self._moan(f"read:{entity_id}", "read %s failed: %s", entity_id, err)
return None
if not isinstance(obj, dict):
self._moan(f"shape:{entity_id}", "read %s: not a state object: %.80r",
entity_id, obj)
return None
return obj
async def number(self, entity_id: str, invert: bool = False) -> float | None:
"""Numeric state, or None. Never substitutes a default."""
@@ -117,7 +124,8 @@ class HomeAssistant:
domain, service, resp.status, body[:200])
return False
return True
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError) as err:
# ValueError: an undecodable error body (SAFETY-61) is a failed write.
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError, ValueError) as err:
self._moan(f"svcerr:{domain}.{service}", "service %s.%s failed: %s",
domain, service, err)
return False
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+139 -4
View File
@@ -85,8 +85,114 @@ SENSORS = [
# sensor's VALUE rather than its arrival, so a dead publisher freezes the
# number and reads permanently fresh. Filed as TEL-06.
("p1_age", "p1_sample_age_s", "P1 sample age", "s", "duration", "measurement", None),
# --- TEL-10: the loop's integrator, published for the first time ---------
#
# ⚠️ APPENDED, AND THE POSITION IS THE POINT. `discovery_payloads()` walks
# this list in order and `_announce()` publishes what it returns, so a row
# inserted ABOVE would move every later entity's place in the announcement.
# Nothing existing is renamed, re-typed or re-ordered by these three; they
# are three NEW retained topics after the nine that are already there, and
# test_mqtt.py part 1 grades exactly that claim.
#
# ⚠️ AND THEY ARE SITE ROWS, NOT PER-UNIT ONES. There is one integrator -
# §6.2's architecture is ONE integrator on the P1 meter whose output is then
# SPLIT - so a per-unit copy would invent N of a thing there is one of, the
# same argument `grid` and `p1_age` are site rows for.
#
# `state_class: measurement` on the two numbers is what puts them in the
# recorder's statistics, which is the whole point: the reason this card
# exists is that the last investigation had no history to read.
("loop_i", "goodwe_loop_integrator", "Loop integrator", "W", "power", "measurement", None),
# ⚠️ NOT DERIVABLE FROM THE TWO ROWS EITHER SIDE OF IT, which is why it is
# its own row rather than a subtraction a dashboard could do. `setpoint` is
# the ARBITER's output after every other strategy has had its say, and it is
# also THIS cycle's; the lead is measured against the command `compute()`
# was handed, which is the PREVIOUS one. Subtracting the published rows
# gives a different number on every cycle the arbiter overrode the loop.
("loop_lead", "goodwe_loop_integrator_lead", "Loop integrator lead", "W", "power", "measurement", None),
# ⚠️ NOT `sensor.goodwe_controller_status` AND NOT THE "Why" ROW. Both of
# those carry the ARBITER's sentence; this is `compute()`'s own word for
# what the control law did with this cycle - `slew-limited` is the value
# SAFETY-48 is about and it appears in neither of the other two.
("loop_reason", "goodwe_loop_reason", "Loop reason", None, None, None, "mdi:sigma"),
]
# --- TEL-11: rows that exist ONLY when the operator configured a source ------
#
# ⚠️ A SECOND LIST RATHER THAN A TENTH ENTRY IN `SENSORS`, AND THE DEFAULT IS
# WHAT MAKES IT ONE. `SENSORS` is announced by every caller of
# `discovery_payloads()`; `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` is announced only by a caller that
# ASKS, so a caller that has not been taught about `pv_entity` - `test_mqtt.py`'s
# fixtures, `tools/rehearse_roster.py`, anything written next year - announces
# exactly what it announced before. `p1_age` solves the same problem the other
# way round, with `omit`, because `p1_age` is announced by DEFAULT and withdrawn
# when the meter is off; this one does not exist by default and appears when a
# source for it does. Getting that direction wrong is the hazard `omit`'s own
# note names: an entity that exists and is never fed is a worse signal than one
# that does not exist at all, and MOST installs will never set `pv_entity`.
#
# ⚠️ `state_class: measurement` IS THE WHOLE POINT OF THE ROW. It is what puts
# the number into the recorder's long-term statistics, and a week of statistics
# is what OPT-10 needs to say whether the surplus that left this site was cloud,
# a charge-power limit, or the optimiser declining to charge.
OPTIONAL_SENSORS = [
("pv", "goodwe_pv_power", "PV power", "W", "power", "measurement", None),
]
# ⚠️ HA's OWN "this sensor has no value" PAYLOAD, and the one place this add-on
# spells it. `homeassistant/components/mqtt/const.py` declares
# `PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"` and `mqtt/sensor.py` tests it BEFORE the numeric
# branch - `if payload == PAYLOAD_NONE: self._attr_native_value = None` - so the
# entity's state becomes `unknown` rather than a number. (Read out of
# github.com/home-assistant/core `dev` on 2026-09-24; the shipped MQTT-sensor
# documentation says the same thing in its `state_topic` entry: "a 'None' value
# will set the sensor to an unknown state".)
PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"
# The keys whose ABSENCE MUST BE PUBLISHED rather than skipped. ⚠️ THIS IS THE
# DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "no PV reported" AND "PV reported 0 W" IN A WEEK OF
# HISTORY, AND WITHOUT IT THE CHANNEL LIES IN THE WORSE DIRECTION. `publish()`
# below drops a `None` - which is right for `circulation`, where the last figure
# standing is better than a zero that reads as health - but a DROPPED pv row
# leaves Home Assistant holding the last number it was told, forever, and the
# recorder then draws a flat line at that value through an outage. Someone
# reading it back would conclude the sun was not shining, which is precisely the
# conclusion this card exists to TEST rather than to manufacture.
ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN = frozenset({"pv"})
def optional_keys(opts: dict) -> tuple:
"""Which `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` rows this configuration has a source for.
⚠️ ONE ANSWER TO "IS THE PV ROW LIVE", read by the ANNOUNCEMENT (through
`MqttPublisher`) and by `Controller.publish()`. `announced_units()` above
exists for exactly this reason and says it in full: two spellings of one
predicate is how an entity gets announced that nothing feeds, or fed on a
topic nothing announced.
⚠️ AND SINCE TEL-12 IT IS `pv.entities()` RATHER THAN A SECOND READING OF
THE OPTION - `Controller.pv_roster` is the SAME call. TEL-11 got away with
two spellings because both were `bool()` of one string; with `pv_entities`
beside `pv_entity`, and `pv_entities` REPLACING it, a second spelling is how
the row gets announced off one key and summed off the other. ⚠️ THE ROW IS
ONE SITE TOTAL AT EVERY ROSTER SIZE: there is deliberately no per-entity
topic, because the recorder statistic OPT-10 reads back is the site figure
and a per-inverter breakdown is a dashboard question the operator's own PV
integration already answers.
"""
# ⚠️ THE IMPORT IS FUNCTION-LOCAL AND THAT IS NOT A STYLE CHOICE. This
# module is EXEC'D STANDALONE, outside its package, by `test_mqtt.py`
# part 8's mutation harness - which says so in its own comment, and whose
# honesty depends on it ("`app/mqtt.py` imports nothing from this package,
# which is what makes exec'ing it standalone honest rather than a stub").
# A module-scope `from . import pv` turns that whole instrument into an
# `ImportError` before it grades anything. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py`'s
# `_load()` is the same decision for the same kind of reason. Measured, not
# assumed: move this line to module scope and test_mqtt.py part 8 dies.
from . import pv as _pv
return ("pv",) if _pv.entities(opts) else ()
BASE = "goodwe_ctl"
AVAILABILITY = f"{BASE}/availability"
@@ -269,15 +375,23 @@ def _payload(name, object_id, unique_id, state_topic, device,
return cfg
def discovery_payloads(units=(), omit=()) -> list:
def discovery_payloads(units=(), omit=(), include=()) -> list:
"""Every `(topic, payload)` this add-on announces, in announcement order.
Split out of `_announce()` so that the acceptance criterion can be graded as
a DIFF OF THE ANNOUNCED PAYLOADS against `release/1.0`, rather than as a
reading of the code. `_announce()` publishes exactly this list and nothing
else, which is itself checked.
`include` names `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` keys to announce. ⚠️ IT DEFAULTS TO
NOTHING AND THE ROWS GO LAST, so no existing row's POSITION moves under any
configuration - not the site rows, not the per-unit ones. Order is part of
the output here (`_payload()`'s note, and test_mqtt.py part 1 asserts an
ordered LIST precisely because a re-order is a zero-byte edit that
re-announces every entity on a live install).
"""
omit = set(omit)
include = [k for k in include if k not in omit]
out = []
for key, object_id, name, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in SENSORS:
if key in omit:
@@ -306,12 +420,19 @@ def discovery_payloads(units=(), omit=()) -> list:
unique_id,
f"{BASE}/{unit_state_key(slug, key)}",
device, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon)))
for key, object_id, name, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in OPTIONAL_SENSORS:
if key not in include:
continue
out.append((
f"homeassistant/sensor/{BASE}_{key}/config",
_payload(name, object_id, f"{BASE}_{key}", f"{BASE}/{key}",
DEVICE, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon)))
return out
class MqttPublisher:
def __init__(self, host, port, username=None, password=None, omit=(),
units=()):
units=(), include=()):
# `omit` drops sensor keys from discovery entirely. ⚠️ Announcing a
# sensor that nothing will ever publish to is not harmless here:
# p1_sample_age_s is a watchdog input, and an entity that exists but is
@@ -323,6 +444,10 @@ class MqttPublisher:
# per-unit is announced, so every caller that has not been taught about
# the roster keeps publishing what it published before.
self.units = [str(u) for u in units]
# TEL-11. `mqtt.optional_keys(opts)` - the shipped predicate, not a
# second reading of the option. Defaults to empty, so a caller that has
# not been taught about it announces exactly what it announced before.
self.include = [str(k) for k in include]
self.enabled = mqtt is not None and bool(host)
self.client = None
if not self.enabled:
@@ -359,7 +484,8 @@ class MqttPublisher:
# announcement, so the check that diffs it against `release/1.0` is
# diffing what actually goes on the wire - and a payload built here
# instead would be one this add-on publishes and no check has ever seen.
for topic, cfg in discovery_payloads(self.units, self.omit):
for topic, cfg in discovery_payloads(self.units, self.omit,
self.include):
self.client.publish(topic, json.dumps(cfg), retain=True)
self.client.publish(AVAILABILITY, "online", retain=True)
@@ -369,7 +495,16 @@ class MqttPublisher:
try:
for key, value in values.items():
if value is None:
continue
# ⚠️ TEL-11. A DROPPED ROW IS NOT AN ABSENT ROW. Skipping
# leaves Home Assistant holding the last value it was told,
# which is what `circulation` wants (its note in main.py
# says why) and is exactly wrong for a measurement somebody
# will read back as history: a flat line at the last number
# is indistinguishable from a real one. See
# `ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN`.
if key not in ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN:
continue
value = PAYLOAD_NONE
self.client.publish(f"{BASE}/{key}", str(value))
except OSError as err: # pragma: no cover
_LOG.debug("MQTT publish failed: %s", err)
+30 -17
View File
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ deliver DOES NOT SHIFT TO ITS SIBLING by any mechanism in this add-on.
never rises. That module DETECTS it; this one cannot fix it, and saying so
is worth more than a weighting scheme that looks like it might.
⚠️ AND IT IS WORSE THAN "CANNOT FIX IT": THESE WEIGHTS NARROW SAFETY-42's
DETECTION WINDOW, WHICH IS A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2
⚠️ AND IT WAS WORSE THAN "CANNOT FIX IT": THESE WEIGHTS NARROWED SAFETY-42's
DETECTION WINDOW - A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2, NOW CLOSED BY SAFETY-43
=======================================================================
This module used to say - and `DECISIONS/OPT-09-soc-aware-weights.md` §5 said
with it - that a wedged unit's weight does not move, so OPT-09 cannot see the
@@ -68,27 +68,40 @@ pack's ENERGY HEADROOM, not of what the pack delivers, so a wedged unit's weight
moves whenever its headroom differs from its sibling's - the ordinary case this
module exists to exploit.
`delivery.delinquent()` names a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeds
`delivery.delinquent()` named a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeded
`min_w` (`Tuning.saturation_w`, 500 W) in ABSOLUTE WATTS. Shrinking a unit's
share shrinks its gap. Measured end to end (`test_packshare.py` part 8b: real
`compute()`, real `plan()`, real `delinquent()`, B wedged at 15 % against its
own 10 % floor, so `envelope()` does not close and `account()` explains
nothing): at a 1500 W load the healthy pack can carry alone, equal weights name
the wedged unit on 199 of 200 cycles and these weights name it on NONE. The
suppression window widens from `site target < 2 * min_w` = 1000 W to
`site target < min_w * (w_A + w_B) / w_B` = 6500 W on that fixture - and it has
own 10 % cut-out, so `envelope()` does not close and `account()` explains
nothing): at a 1500 W load the healthy pack can carry alone, equal weights named
the wedged unit on 199 of 200 cycles and these weights named it on NONE. The
suppression window widened from `site target < 2 * min_w` = 1000 W to
`site target < min_w * (w_A + w_B) / w_B` = 6500 W on that fixture - and it had
an upper edge: past the healthy pack's own rating, `_fill()`'s last-resort pass
hands the wedged unit a big share again and the alarm returns.
hands the wedged unit a big share again and the absolute arm names it.
⚠️ BOTH BOUNDS ARE ARITHMETIC ABOUT `_fill()`'s PROPORTIONAL REGIME AND NEITHER IS A REACHABLE STEADY STATE. Swept on this fixture, the healthy pack's own 5000 W rating binds FIRST: suppressed 0/200 up to a 3000 W load, 4/200 at 4000 W, 41/200 at 4900 W (site target 5320 W, the largest reached with the wedged unit still under 500 W), then 195/200 at 5000 W once `_fill()` pins A at its cap and hands B 3000 W. So the alarm returns BELOW the 6500 W formula bound, not above it. The equal-weights 1000 W bound is unreachable for the same reason - the equal arm names the wedged unit 199/200 at every load swept, 1000 W included.
⚠️ BOTH BOUNDS ARE ARITHMETIC ABOUT `_fill()`'s PROPORTIONAL REGIME AND NEITHER IS A REACHABLE STEADY STATE - KEPT HERE BECAUSE IT IS A MEASUREMENT, EVEN THOUGH SAFETY-43 HAS SINCE MADE THE WINDOW IRRELEVANT TO THE DETECTOR. Swept on this fixture with the ABSOLUTE arm alone, the healthy pack's own 5000 W rating binds FIRST: suppressed 0/200 up to a 3000 W load, 4/200 at 4000 W, 41/200 at 4900 W (site target 5320 W, the largest reached with the wedged unit still under 500 W), then 195/200 at 5000 W once `_fill()` pins A at its cap and hands B 3000 W. So the alarm returned BELOW the 6500 W formula bound, not above it. The equal-weights 1000 W bound is unreachable for the same reason - the equal arm named the wedged unit 199/200 at every load swept, 1000 W included.
⚠️ SO THE SEAM IS NOT "OPT-09 CANNOT SEE IT". IT IS: OPT-09 STOPS THE ASK
**AND** NARROWS SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW FOR A LOW-HEADROOM UNIT. That
is a disclosed residual, not a fixed thing. Closing it means making
`delinquent()` relative to the ask rather than absolute - SAFETY-42's code
and a design change, filed as its own card and deliberately NOT done here.
Do not "fix" part 8b by making it assert the alarm still fires; it does not,
and a green check that says otherwise would be worse than the gap.
⚠️ THAT IS NO LONGER A RESIDUAL. SAFETY-43 made `delinquent()` relative to
the ask AS WELL AS absolute - `gap > min_w OR gap > frac * share`, and a
unit delivering 0 of 125 W is as delinquent as one delivering 0 of 1500 W.
On the SAME fixture, under the SAME weights, the wedged unit is now named
on 200 of 200 cycles. Part 8b grades both rules on one run:
`share_frac=None` is SAFETY-42's absolute arm alone and still says nothing,
which is what keeps the paragraph above honest rather than nostalgic.
⚠️ AND `min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED. The absolute arm's suppression window is
still exactly the arithmetic above - 1000 W at equal weights, 6500 W at
these - because a lower `saturation_w` would report NORMAL SATURATION as
delinquency on every unit at once, which is the false-trip regime SAFETY-41
spent four attempts in. What changed is that there is a SECOND way to be
named; nothing that was quiet before became noisy.
⚠️ WHAT THIS MODULE STILL CANNOT DO IS UNCHANGED. OPT-09 stops the site
ASKING a pack whose own SoC says it cannot deliver; it does not, and will
not, re-allocate a wedged unit's watts to its sibling - `delivery.py`'s
"IT REPORTS. IT DOES NOT ACT" block is the measurement behind that, and
SAFETY-43 did not touch it. The alarm is louder; the loop is identical.
WHY ENERGY AND NOT POWER
========================
+139
View File
@@ -822,6 +822,145 @@ def decide(projection, *, batt_w, cap_w, reading, achievable_w, soc, soc_floor,
f"only give {ceil_top:.0f} W" if saturated else "")))
def charge_headroom_w(decision) -> float | None:
"""SAFETY-45. The hardest this SITE may charge without putting the billed
quarter over the ceiling, in W, positive - or None when nothing measured it.
THE ONE PLACE THIS QUESTION IS ANSWERED, and it is public for the reason
`discharge_permitted()`, `shaping_suspended()`, `guard_state()` and
`looks_frozen()` are: the check that grades it has to assert on THE SHIPPED
EXPRESSION, and a predicate transcribed into its own test is one copy plus a
future disagreement about what the check means.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DEFECT IT PREVENTS, AND IT IS NOT A NEW IDEA IN THIS REPOSITORY
`control.maintenance_charge_floor()` already caps MAINTENANCE charging at
"the headroom left under the site's cap", and its docstring says why in
words this card only has to widen:
"A maintenance charge is the only thing this system does that is big
enough and long enough to set that peak, so it is capped by the
headroom left under the site's cap."
⚠️ THAT SENTENCE STOPPED BEING TRUE WHEN OPT-04 LANDED. Price arbitrage is a
SECOND thing that is big enough and long enough - it commands `max_w` for a
whole tariff interval, deliberately, against the meter - and it was given no
such cap. Measured on TEST-23 stage 3's closed rig at the shipped
`peak_cap_w: 3500` / `max_w: 2000`: 28 charge onsets in one hour, mean period
131 s, grid swinging -456 <-> +3200 W, on any house drawing over 1500 W in
the cheapest quarter. §10.2: "an EMS that oscillates is worse than no EMS,
both for hardware wear and - per §9.1 - for the peak it is trying to avoid."
⚠️ AND IT IS THE **MEASURED** GUARD, NOT `peak_forecast_entity`.
`maintenance_charge_floor()` sizes itself from the forecast sensor, which is
OPTIONAL and empty on a default install - the exact hole SAFETY-25 had to
close in `shaping_suspended()`, where a suspension gated on the forecast
alone could not fire on the very site that needed it. This number comes off
`decide()`, which runs wherever P1 does.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHERE THE NUMBER COMES FROM: IT IS `wanted_w`, READ IN THE OTHER DIRECTION
`decide()` already computes
wanted = batt_w + excess = (the offtake there would be with the battery
at zero) - (the level this quarter can still afford)
as the battery DISCHARGE that would land the quarter exactly on the ceiling.
A negative `wanted` is not "nothing to say" - it is a permitted CHARGE of
`-wanted` watts, and throwing it away is SAFETY-45's whole defect. So this
function invents no arithmetic; it reads the sign the guard already had.
⚠️ AND THE QUANTITY IS INVARIANT IN THE BATTERY, WHICH IS WHY SIZING A TRADE
TO IT CANNOT OSCILLATE. Raise the charge by dW and the meter rises by dW, so
`excess` rises by exactly dW while `batt_w` falls by dW: `wanted` does not
move. It is a FEED-FORWARD number - a function of the house, the ceiling and
the seconds already banked - so consuming it adds no feedback path around the
plant. The fixed point is `charge = ceiling - load`, with the meter sitting
ON the ceiling and `wanted` parked at `load - ceiling`, a whole `ceiling -
load` clear of the engagement boundary rather than chattering across it.
⚠️ AND A QUARTER BOUNDARY DOES NOT HAND IT BACK AT FULL POWER, WHICH IS THE
OTHER HALF OF SAFETY-45 AND IS NOT THE SAME CLAIM AS "IT DOES NOT CHANGE".
It DOES change - it is `(900 / remaining) * (ceiling - projected)`, so it is
largest in the last seconds of a block and collapses at the boundary. What
matters is WHAT IT COLLAPSES TO: at `elapsed = 0` the projection IS the held
level, so the answer is `ceiling - (load - pv)` - the house and the cap, and
nothing else. A trade refused at 14:59 therefore resumes at 15:00 at the rate
the new quarter can afford, not at `max_w`, and §10.1's answer survives the
boundary because the arithmetic does: no timer, no backoff constant, no state
carried between calls.
⚠️ AND THE AMPLIFICATION IS BOUNDED IN ITS EFFECT, NOT MERELY LARGE. Hold a
charge of exactly this size for the rest of the block and the block's average
lands on `ceiling` EXACTLY, wherever in the block it started:
(acc + (held + headroom) * remaining) / 900
= projected + (900/remaining) * (ceiling - projected) * remaining/900
= ceiling
so 162 kW of headroom with 5 s left and 900 W of it with the whole quarter to
go are the same statement about the bill. `test_peakguard.py` part 13 sweeps
that identity across the block rather than arguing it here.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE THREE ANSWERS
`None` nothing measured it: the guard never ran (`meter_source: off`), or
it ran with no battery reading to size a floor from, or the block
had no seconds left to influence. ⚠️ None IS NOT UNLIMITED. A caller
that treats it as "charge away" is `arbitrage.guard_state()`'s
collapse of None into False, one layer down - a strategy creating
the billed quantity while nothing measures the quarter it lands in.
`0.0` measured, and the answer is no charging: the guard is BLIND (its
claim already says so at `floor 0 W` and this agrees with it rather
than restating it), or it is holding and `wanted >= 0`.
`> 0` the watts a charge may pull this cycle.
⚠️ HOLDING IMPLIES ZERO, BY CONSTRUCTION AND NOT BY COINCIDENCE. Every state
that files a claim with `engaged=True` has `wanted > 0`, `wanted is None` or
`blind`, so this answers 0.0 or None there and can never hand a strategy
permission the guard's own `lo` is at that instant refusing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
⚠️ WHY THIS IS A SIZING AND NOT A CLAIM, AND DO NOT "SIMPLIFY" IT INTO ONE
The obvious tidier answer is to delete `decide()`'s `wanted <= 0` gate and
let it file `lo = wanted` unconditionally - a NEGATIVE floor, meaning "you
may charge, but no harder than this". The arithmetic is identical, it is
continuous, and it would bind every claimant rather than only arbitrage. It
was measured, considered and REJECTED, and the reason is not style:
* `main.py`'s cheap-window maintenance charge files
`Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=-floor)` - a NEGATIVE `hi`.
arbiter.py clause 2 applies EVERY limit at or above the winner's priority
and takes the most restrictive, with no notion of one limit out-ranking
another. A peak `lo = -300 W` against a shaping `hi = -1000 W` is
`lo > hi`: a CONTRADICTION, which resolves to 0 W - the battery PARKED,
in the one quarter of the month that sets the bill. That is the exact
failure `shaping_suspended()` exists to prevent, and the only way to
close it would be to key that suppression on "a claim exists", which on
every site this card is about suspends the maintenance charge-only
shaping PERMANENTLY.
* and it would change what `engaged` MEANS at five call sites outside this
module - `arbitrage.guard_state()`, `shaping_suspended()`, `claim()`,
main.py's edge-logged action line and main.py's status row - each of
which today reads it as "the guard is HOLDING".
`control.maintenance_charge_floor()` is a sizing and not a limit for the same
reason, which is why this is the shape that already fits.
DECISIONS/SAFETY-45-sizing-the-trade.md §2b carries the full argument.
"""
if decision is None:
return None
if decision.blind:
return 0.0
if decision.wanted_w is None:
return None
return max(0.0, -float(decision.wanted_w))
def shaping_suspended(decision, peak_forecast_w, cap_w) -> bool:
"""Must the maintenance charge-only shaping stand down this cycle?
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+197 -36
View File
@@ -48,23 +48,42 @@ So the flag is not passed through anywhere in this file:
the object the provider produced is the object in the output series - so
there is no copy that could lose or gain a flag. `filled.points[i] is
fetched.points[j]` is a checkable property, and test_price_forecast.py
checks it.
checks it. EVERY published point in the window is passed through, not one
per hour: see the sub-hourly note below.
* `_audit()` RE-DERIVES the expected flag for every output point from the set
of hours the feed actually published, and RAISES if any point disagrees.
It is a post-condition, not a filter: it never fixes a flag, because a
module that quietly corrects its own provenance is one whose provenance
cannot be trusted.
⚠️ IT GRADES THE POINTS THAT ARE EMITTED AND NOTHING ABOUT THE ONES THAT
ARE NOT (FCST-05). `_audit()` is a provenance check, NOT a completeness
check: fed FCST-04's own decimation defect - four published points in an
hour, only the last emitted - it ACCEPTS, and it accepts an empty output
too. Measured, and the FCST-03 audit it replaced was equally blind, so
this is a limit rather than a regression. What actually guards against a
decimated series is the point COUNT and the pass-through IDENTITY checks
in `test_price_forecast.py` (section on the quarter-hourly feed) and
`test_price_history.py`; see `_audit()`'s own docstring for why the
completeness rule is not expressible from its two arguments.
* and test_price_forecast.py walks THIS FILE'S AST and fails if any
`PricePoint(...)` in it passes anything but a literal for `provisional`, so
the pass-through idiom cannot come back in a later edit and pass review by
looking ordinary.
⚠️ "PUBLISHED" DOES NOT MEAN "FIRM". `eneco_eddy` is an imbalance product whose
current-quarter print is genuinely provisional and says so per point (§9.2,
TARIFF-02). Such a point is published AND provisional, and the audit's rule for
a published point is "the flag is whatever the feed said", never "False". A
provenance check that forced published points to False would be a bug that
looks like a guarantee.
⚠️ "PUBLISHED" DOES NOT MEAN "FIRM". §9.3's canonical format carries
`provisional` PER POINT, not per series, precisely because a real-time /
imbalance product's current-interval print is settled after the fact and is
genuinely provisional while it is published. Such a point is published AND
provisional, and the audit's rule for a published point is "the flag is
whatever the feed said", never "False". A provenance check that forced
published points to False would be a bug that looks like a guarantee.
⚠️ NO SHIPPED PLUGIN EMITS ONE TODAY (TARIFF-07 withdrew the only declarer of
`PriceProduct.REALTIME`), and that is exactly why this paragraph stays. The
rule is a property of the FORMAT, not of any supplier; weakening it to
"published implies False" while nothing exercises it is how the first real
imbalance feed would arrive mispriced and flagged firm.
THE FILL, AND WHY IT KEYS ON THE WALL CLOCK
@@ -90,6 +109,25 @@ which is the row the spec actually writes for "no price data". If NOTHING can
be produced, the result is `PriceRead.no_data(reason)` and not an empty series,
because an empty series is not constructible on purpose (price.py trap 3).
⚠️ A SUB-HOURLY FEED IS NOT DECIMATED TO ONE POINT AN HOUR, and the hourly walk
below is about WHICH HOURS NEED FILLING - never about what a published hour is
allowed to contain. BELGIAN DAY-AHEAD ITSELF SETTLES PER QUARTER since the
15-minute MTU took effect on 2025-10-01 - `generic_dayahead` reads 96 points a
day, not 24 - `_validate_raw()` accepts any strictly-increasing spacing, and a
published hour may therefore hold four points. So EVERY published point inside
the window is passed through, in order, and a carried point is added only for a
whole hour with NO published coverage at all.
The alternative was measured rather than reasoned about, because FCST-04's
first caller shipped it: keying the published set as `{_utc_hour(p.start): p
for p in r.points}` reads perfectly ordinary and keeps the LAST point of each
hour, dropping the other three. On a 96-point quarter-hourly feed - all firm,
fully published, nothing to carry - the series came out 15 points long, the
arbitrage spread collapsed from 0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh, and the cheapest
"hour" became a `:45` point whose `at()` window runs into the next hour. A feed
losing 84 % of its own prints is not a windowing effect and is not something a
provisional flag would ever have reported.
AC2: THE IRREVERSIBLE-ACTION GATE
=================================
@@ -141,7 +179,7 @@ class Provenance(Enum):
flag" and "the others".
"""
PUBLISHED = "published" # the provider printed this hour. Flag: the
# feed's own - an imbalance print may be
# feed's own - a real-time print may be
# published AND provisional (§9.2).
CARRIED = "carried" # yesterday's same-wall-clock hour (§8.3).
# Flag: ALWAYS True, by construction.
@@ -156,6 +194,25 @@ def _utc_hour(instant: datetime) -> datetime:
return u.replace(minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0)
def _published_by_hour(read: PriceRead) -> dict:
"""UTC hour -> the provider's OWN points that start inside it, in order.
⚠️ A TUPLE PER HOUR, NOT A POINT, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE OF THE SUB-HOURLY
RULE. `{_utc_hour(p.start): p for p in r.points}` reads identically, is one
character shorter, and silently keeps one point per hour - the last one
written. The mapping answers two DIFFERENT questions here: "does this hour
need filling at all?" is `u in published`, and "what does the output carry
for it?" is all of `published[u]`. Collapsing them is how a quarter-hourly
feed loses three quarters of its prints.
"""
out: dict = {}
read.match(
series=lambda r: [out.setdefault(_utc_hour(p.start), []).append(p)
for p in r.points],
no_data=lambda _r: [])
return {u: tuple(ps) for u, ps in out.items()}
def _carried(start_utc: datetime, eur_per_kwh: float) -> PricePoint:
"""A point filled from yesterday's profile. §8.3: ALWAYS provisional.
@@ -172,37 +229,122 @@ def _carried(start_utc: datetime, eur_per_kwh: float) -> PricePoint:
def _audit(points, published) -> None:
"""Post-condition: every flag matches the point's TRUE provenance (AC1).
`published` maps a UTC hour to the point the provider produced for it.
`published` maps a UTC hour to the TUPLE of points the provider produced
for it (`_published_by_hour()`). An hour ABSENT from that mapping is an hour
the feed did not print, and a carried point is the only thing that may
stand in it.
The rule, in the two forms an output point can take:
* PUBLISHED - the point must BE one of `published[u]`, by identity, and
may be emitted only once. Its flag is whatever the feed said, never
forced to False: an imbalance print is published AND provisional (§9.2,
TARIFF-02), and a check that "corrected" it would be a bug wearing a
guarantee.
* CARRIED - the hour must not appear in `published` AT ALL, the flag must
be exactly True, and that hour may hold no second point.
⚠️ WHAT REPLACED "AT MOST ONE POINT PER HOUR", AND WHAT THAT DID AND DID
NOT CHANGE. This audit began as FCST-03's `seen` set: any repeated
`_utc_hour` raised, beside an identity rule `p is not src`. A bare hour
count cannot express a quarter-hourly feed, where four distinct published
points share one hour legitimately - so the count was replaced by the two
rules above, which subsume it.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT STRICTER. FCST-04's version of this paragraph claimed two
strengthenings and BOTH WERE FALSE; FCST-05 measured it. A differential
over the whole domain this audit can express - every published mask over 3
hours crossed with every output series of length 0-3 drawn from
{published, published-provisional, carried, carried-unflagged,
copy-of-published} - found ZERO divergence in EITHER direction:
OLD raised, NEW accepted (WEAKER): 0
OLD accepted, NEW raised (STRONGER): 0
The two specific claims, one at a time:
* "so does the same published point emitted twice" - the OLD `seen`
count already raised on that, because emitting one point twice is one
HOUR twice. Preserved by the identity/`emitted` rules, not added.
* "a carried point may no longer share an hour with a published one,
which the count never checked at all" - true of the COUNT, and the old
IDENTITY rule raised on it anyway: a carried point in a published hour
took the `else` branch and failed `p is not src`. The message was about
a copy rather than about a carry, which is the only thing that moved.
The one real behavioural change is the intended RELAXATION - several
distinct published points in one hour, which the old audit could not
express at all and refused. That relaxation is why this was rewritten, and
it stays. A right decision with a fabricated reason is still a defect here.
⚠️ AND THE REAL LIMIT, WHICH IS NOT A REGRESSION AND IS NOT SMALL: THIS
AUDIT DOES NOT CHECK COMPLETENESS. It grades every point that IS emitted
and says nothing about the ones that are not. Fed the H1 decimation
directly - four published points in an hour, output emitting only the last
- it ACCEPTS; so does two of four, and so does an EMPTY output. So `_audit`
is NOT what stops H1 recurring. What stops it is the point COUNT and the
IDENTITY checks in `test_price_history.py` and `test_price_forecast.py`,
which compare the emitted series against the feed's own prints.
It is not made complete here, and the reason is structural rather than
effort: `published` is `_published_by_hour(read)` over the WHOLE read,
unwindowed, while `fill_from_yesterday()` emits only [since, until). A
published point outside the window is legitimately absent, so "every
published point appears" is not a true post-condition of these two
arguments - it would need the window passed in, which is a different
signature and a different check.
⚠️ AND THAT IS MEASURED, NOT ASSUMED. FCST-05 built the rule - raise unless
every point of every `published[u]` is emitted, +162 B - and ran it. It
takes the 1 h, 12 h and 48 h HORIZON checks in test_price_forecast.py RED,
on the shipped fill and a healthy feed: at an off-the-hour instant the
feed's already-elapsed prints are outside [since, until) and are correctly
dropped, and the rule calls that a provenance failure. (The differential
beside those checks scores the same rule as 49 STRONGER cases, so it is a
real change of behaviour and not a no-op.) The rule as stated is therefore
not merely unimplemented, it is WRONG - and stating a false post-condition
is MUTATION.md habit 16's defect: an instrument that asserts a completeness
it does not have is worse than no instrument.
⚠️ RAISES, NEVER REPAIRS. A module that silently corrects its own
provenance is one whose provenance means nothing; the only safe response to
"this point's flag disagrees with where it came from" is to refuse to emit
the series at all.
"""
seen = set()
carried_hours = set()
emitted = set()
for p in points:
u = _utc_hour(p.start)
if u in seen:
raise ValueError(f"the filled series repeats {u.isoformat()}; a "
f"duplicated hour is how a DST day gets mispriced")
seen.add(u)
src = published.get(u)
prov = Provenance.CARRIED if src is None else Provenance.PUBLISHED
if src is None:
if u in carried_hours:
raise ValueError(
f"the filled series repeats the carried hour "
f"{u.isoformat()}; a duplicated hour is how a DST day gets "
f"mispriced")
carried_hours.add(u)
if p.provisional is not True:
raise ValueError(
f"{u.isoformat()} is {prov.value} and is flagged "
f"provisional={p.provisional!r}. §8.3: an hour filled from "
f"yesterday's profile is provisional whether or not the "
f"number turns out to be right - the flag is a claim about "
f"PROVENANCE, not about accuracy.")
f"{u.isoformat()} is {Provenance.CARRIED.value} and is "
f"flagged provisional={p.provisional!r}. §8.3: an hour "
f"filled from yesterday's profile is provisional whether "
f"or not the number turns out to be right - the flag is a "
f"claim about PROVENANCE, not about accuracy.")
else:
if p is not src:
if not any(p is q for q in src):
raise ValueError(
f"{u.isoformat()} is {prov.value} but the series carries a "
f"COPY of that point rather than the point itself. A copy "
f"is where the provisional flag gets lost; published points "
f"pass through by identity.")
f"{u.isoformat()} is {Provenance.PUBLISHED.value} but the "
f"series carries a COPY of that point rather than the "
f"point itself. A copy is where the provisional flag gets "
f"lost; published points pass through by identity.")
if id(p) in emitted:
raise ValueError(
f"the filled series emits the published point at "
f"{p.start.isoformat()} TWICE. The provider's own points "
f"are strictly increasing (`_validate_raw`), so a repeat "
f"is never a second print - it is a duplicated hour, which "
f"is how a DST day gets mispriced")
emitted.add(id(p))
def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
@@ -217,11 +359,21 @@ def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
Returns a `PriceRead`:
* a series, whose points are the provider's own objects for the hours it
published and `_carried()` points for the rest, ordered by instant;
* a series, carrying the provider's own objects - ALL of them, which on
a quarter-hourly feed is four inside one hour - for the hours it
published, and one `_carried()` point for each remaining whole hour,
ordered by instant;
* `no_data` when neither source can produce a single hour - never an
empty series, which is not constructible (price.py trap 3).
⚠️ THE WINDOW IS WHOLE HOURS AT BOTH ENDS. `since` is floored to the hour
that CONTAINS it, because the current hour is still a tradeable hour; and
so is `until`, which is the half FCST-04's first draft left out. With
`since` floored and `until` compared raw, a 48 h horizon asked for at 08:17
emitted 49 hours - the hour of `until` was still `< until` - and the count
was one too many for every `now` that is not exactly on the hour, which is
every `now` a running controller has.
⚠️ IDEMPOTENT AND RE-RUNNABLE, WHICH IS THE §5.4 LATE-PUBLICATION CONTRACT.
Day-ahead publication at 14-16 h CET can be late or fail, so the fetcher
retries and this runs again against the fresher read. Published hours always
@@ -234,9 +386,7 @@ def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
raise ValueError(f"{name} must be tz-aware; a naive instant is "
f"ambiguous for one hour every October")
published = read.match(
series=lambda r: {_utc_hour(p.start): p for p in r.points},
no_data=lambda _r: {})
published = _published_by_hour(read)
# Yesterday's profile, keyed by BRUSSELS WALL-CLOCK HOUR. First point wins
# when yesterday itself was a 25-hour day and printed local hour 2 twice.
@@ -248,11 +398,12 @@ def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
out = []
u = _utc_hour(since)
end = until.astimezone(timezone.utc)
end = _utc_hour(until)
while u < end:
if u in published:
out.append(published[u]) # BY IDENTITY. No copy.
else:
got = published.get(u)
if got:
out.extend(got) # BY IDENTITY, and ALL of them. No copy,
else: # and no decimation to one an hour.
src = by_local_hour.get(brussels(u).hour)
if src is not None:
out.append(_carried(u, src.eur_per_kwh))
@@ -271,9 +422,19 @@ def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
_audit(out, published)
carried = sum(1 for p in out if _utc_hour(p.start) not in published)
if carried:
# ⚠️ THREE QUANTITIES, THREE NAMES (TARIFF-11). This line read
# "%d of %d hours ... ; %d published" with `carried` (a count of
# carried HOURS - the fill emits exactly one point per unpublished
# hour) over `len(out)` (a count of POINTS, four per hour wherever the
# feed printed) and `len(out) - carried` (POINTS again) under the same
# noun. On the Belgian quarter-hourly feed that reads "33 of 141
# hours" about a 48-hour horizon. The fill's unit is the HOUR and the
# feed's is the POINT; nothing derived from one answers for the other.
total_h = len({_utc_hour(p.start) for p in out})
_LOG.info("§8.3: %d of %d hours carried forward from yesterday's "
"profile and flagged provisional; %d published",
carried, len(out), len(out) - carried)
"profile and flagged provisional; the feed published %d "
"points over the other %d hours",
carried, total_h, len(out) - carried, total_h - carried)
product = read.match(series=lambda r: r.product,
no_data=lambda _r: yesterday.product)
+865
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,865 @@
"""FCST-04 - the day the carry-forward carries, kept somewhere a restart cannot reach.
WHAT WAS MISSING, AND WHY IT WAS INVISIBLE. FCST-03 shipped
`price_forecast.fill_from_yesterday()` complete and checked, and shipped the
consumers that were written to expect it - `TariffPlan.firm_points()`,
`cheap_now()`'s refusal of a provisional hour, and `arbitrage()`'s refusal 3,
which drops provisional hours from the trade set instead of refusing the whole
series. Every one of those was live. The FILL ITSELF HAD NO CALLER: nothing in
`app/` referenced `fill_from_yesterday`, so no series ever contained a carried
point and every one of those consumers was exercising its all-firm branch.
The defect that produced is not an error anywhere. `load_prices()` returns
whatever the feed published and nothing widens it to the requested horizon, so
on a dynamic site between midnight and the 14-16 h CET day-ahead publication
the series covers the rest of TODAY and nothing more - typically 10-24 of the
48 hours `price_horizon_h` asked for. `TariffPlan.arbitrage()` then computes
`max - min` over that truncated window and reports a spread. The number is
real, the window is half the one the operator configured, and NOTHING SAYS SO:
tomorrow evening's peak - the hour a morning charge would be sold into - is
simply not in the series, so the spread it would have created cannot clear a
threshold it was never compared against. A missing hour is not a wrong price;
it is an hour the optimiser never learns exists.
So this module is the half FCST-03 left out, and it is deliberately the SMALL
half: the fill's arithmetic, its DST rule and its provenance audit all stay in
`price_forecast.py`, untouched. What lives here is the one thing that
arithmetic needs and could not have: A YESTERDAY THAT SURVIVES A RESTART.
WHY PERSISTENCE, AND NOT A VARIABLE ON THE REFRESH TASK
======================================================
An in-memory "the last full day I saw" costs nothing and is wrong exactly when
it matters. The window the fill exists for is midnight -> publication; an
add-on restarted at 08:00 - a config change, an HA update, a power cut - would
come up with no yesterday at all and spend that whole window on the truncated
series, which is the pre-FCST-03 behaviour arriving silently on the mornings
after an operator touched something. The fill's own value is a function of
surviving a restart, so the day it carries has to.
⚠️ AND NOT IN `/data/state.json`. That file holds the maintenance history and
SAFETY-02's sign latch, and `Store.set()` rewrites the whole of it on every
write. The tariff refresh runs every `TARIFF_REFRESH_S` (1800 s), so folding a
price cache into it would put 48 extra whole-file rewrites a day through the
file whose corruption reads as "no maintenance ever ran" and "never tripped".
The cache is worth having; it is not worth putting anywhere near that. Separate
file, separate blast radius.
⚠️ AND THE DIRECTORY IS NOT CREATED, which is `tariff.PeakStore`'s rule and its
reason applies unchanged: `/data` is mounted by the Supervisor and always
exists on a real install, so `makedirs` here could only ever succeed where the
durable volume is MISSING - manufacturing a cache on the container's ephemeral
layer that writes fine, reads fine, and is thrown away on the next restart.
That is a yesterday that silently forgets, which is worse than one that says it
cannot answer.
⚠️ AND THAT RULE IS CARRIED OUT IN `_remember()`, NOT ONLY IN `_save()`. FCST-04
first shipped it half-done: `_save()` short-circuited on `not self.ok` while
`_remember()` filled `self._days` anyway, so a store with no durable volume
answered `words` = "unavailable" and `yesterday()` = A SERIES - an in-memory
yesterday that works all day and is gone on the next restart, which is exactly
the silently-forgetting cache this rule exists to refuse. A store that cannot
persist now records nothing, and both of its answers say the same thing.
⚠️ AND "CANNOT PERSIST" IS ONE QUESTION, ASKED ONCE, ABOUT THE OUTCOME -
FCST-06. The paragraph above enforced that rule against `not self.ok`, which is
one SYMPTOM of not persisting: the durable volume is missing. There is a second,
and FCST-06 measured it. With `ok=True` and the directory present, `_save()` can
still fail - a read-only remount (`[Errno 30] Read-only file system`), a full
volume (`[Errno 28] No space left on device`) - and it logs, records
`last_error` and returns. `_remember()` had already populated `self._days`, so
`words` read `'2026-01-14 (24 points over 24 h); 2026-01-15 (24 points over
24 h) [could not write (...)]'` while the file on disk held `{}`, and
`yesterday()` answered 24 REAL POINTS for the rest of the process's life. Gone
on the next restart, and nothing said it would be - the same silently-forgetting
cache, reached by the condition the rule did not name.
⚠️ SO IT IS NOT TWO RULES, AND IT IS DELIBERATELY NOT TWO TESTS. "Can this
store persist?" CANNOT BE ANSWERED BEFORE THE ATTEMPT - a directory that existed
and was writable a moment ago is not a write that completed - so it is answered
AFTER it, once, by the only thing holding the evidence: `_save()` returns
whether the file now holds what memory holds. A missing volume is one of its
False cases and an `OSError` from the write is another, and `_remember()` KEEPS
ONLY WHAT THAT ONE ANSWER SAYS WAS KEPT. There is no `not self.ok` test in
`_remember()` any more, because there is nothing left for a second test to add -
and a third symptom nobody has thought of is how this defect arrived both times.
⚠️ AND WHAT IS KEPT IS THE LAST STATE THAT IS ON DISK, NOT AN EMPTY ONE. The
MERGE is undone, not the store. A site whose volume fills at 14:00 goes on
answering the yesterday it wrote at 13:30 - that record survives a restart, so
answering it is not a promise the store cannot keep. What it stops doing is
adding to it. The invariant the rule was always describing, stated once:
`self._days` NEVER HOLDS A POINT THE FILE DOES NOT. (Not "mirrors the file" -
`_usable_days()` drops records the file still holds. The only direction that can
invent a yesterday is the one named.)
THE FOUR RULES THIS FILE IS SHAPED BY
=====================================
1. IT RECORDS WHAT THE PROVIDER PUBLISHED, NEVER WHAT THE FILL PRODUCED.
Feeding a filled series back in is the defect that makes the whole mechanism
rot: day 2 carries day 1's guesses, day 3 carries day 2's carry of them, and
after a week of a dead feed the "yesterday" being carried forward is a
fossil of the last real publication with nothing anywhere reporting its age.
Every point still carries `provisional=True`, so the flag never lies - what
decays is the NUMBER, silently, behind a flag that is telling the truth.
⚠️ NO VALUE-LEVEL CHECK CAN CATCH THAT, and saying so is more useful than a
guarantee that would not hold. A carried point and a published-provisional
point (a real-time product's current interval, §9.2) are the same three
fields with
the same flag; the difference is provenance, and provenance is not in the
value. So the mechanism is ORDERING, not validation: `carry()` is the only
public entry point, it remembers the argument and returns the fill, and the
filled series exists only as a return value that `carry()` itself never
sees again. `_remember()` is private, is called from exactly one place, and
`test_price_history.py` PARSES every shipped module under `app/`, `tools/`,
`scenarios/` and `estop/` and fails if any of them uses the NAME - an
attribute, a bare name, a def, or the string constant a `getattr` needs. By
name rather than by substring, so a comment about the rule does not fail it
and a call from `tools/` cannot pass unseen.
⚠️ AND THE ORDER IS GRADED BY DRIVING IT, NOT BY READING THE SOURCE. The
first version of that check compared positions in `ast.walk`, which is
breadth-first: `self._remember(...)` is a statement and `self.yesterday(...)`
is an ARGUMENT of the fill, one level deeper, so `_remember` came out first
whichever statement was written first - shipped and reversed scored the
same. What grades it now is the behaviour: a feed carrying yesterday
alongside today, into an EMPTY store, must fill the whole horizon, and
reversed it fills nothing.
2. "YESTERDAY" MEANS YESTERDAY, NOT "THE NEWEST DAY I HAVE".
`newest()` is the natural accessor and it is the one that decays: an add-on
down from Friday to Monday would answer Friday's prices to a fill that flags
them as one day old. The lookup is BY DATE - the Brussels day before the
Brussels day of the instant asked about - and a record for any other date is
NO_RECORD with a reason naming both dates. A three-day-old profile is not a
worse yesterday; it is not a yesterday.
3. A STORE THAT CANNOT ANSWER SAYS SO, IN THE TYPE.
`yesterday()` returns a `PriceRead`: a `series` when a full record exists,
`no_data(reason)` for every other outcome - no file, no record for that
date, an unreadable file, a record that parses to nothing. There is no
empty-series answer and no `.get(..., [])`-shaped accessor, for
`price.py`'s reason: an empty series is how "the cache is broken" gets to
wear the shape of "yesterday was free". `fill_from_yesterday()` takes a
`PriceRead` and handles `no_data` on its own, so the degraded case needs no
branch at the call site - it fills nothing and the horizon stays short,
which is exactly the behaviour that shipped before this ticket.
4. HOURS ACCUMULATE WITHIN A DAY; THEY DO NOT REPLACE IT.
A feed that serves only the REMAINING hours of the day (a legitimate shape -
nothing in the plugin contract promises a whole day) would, under
replace-the-record, overwrite a complete 24-hour profile with the two points
left at 22:00 and hand the next morning a yesterday with two hours in it. So
a record is MERGED by instant: a later read updates the hours it carries and
leaves the rest, and a revised price for an hour already held wins because
it is the newer statement about the same hour.
⚠️ KEYED BY INSTANT, NOT BY LOCAL HOUR, AND THAT IS THE DST DECISION. Storing
`hour -> price` would collapse the two 02:00s of a 25-hour October day into
one, inventing a second and different collapsing rule beside the one
`fill_from_yesterday()` already documents ("the first of its two 02:00 points
is the one used, deterministically"). Storing the instants keeps both, in
order, and lets the fill's own rule be the only one in the system.
WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO, ON PURPOSE
=================================
It does not extend the fill to a feed that published NOTHING. `resolve_tariff()`
applies `carry()` only on a `series` read; a `no_data` read still falls to
`_degrade()` and §11.4's row - "No price data -> fall back to the static
profile, mark the plan provisional, no arbitrage" - which is the fallback the
operator configured `static_profile` FOR. Preferring yesterday's feed over it
would change a documented degradation without being asked, and it would buy
nothing measurable: a fully-carried series is 100 % provisional, so
`arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and refuses, and `cheap_now()` is
False, exactly as on the §11.4 fallback. The two differ only in which numbers
the status page shows. `fill_from_yesterday()` handles a `no_data` read anyway,
and that branch is therefore not reached from production - it stays checked,
and turning it on is a product decision, not a wiring one. See
DECISIONS/FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried.md.
"""
import copy
import json
import logging
import os
import tempfile
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from .price import PricePoint, PriceProduct, PriceRead, brussels
from .price_forecast import fill_from_yesterday
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.price.history")
# How many Brussels days of published prices the SORT-ORDER cap keeps. The fill
# needs exactly one - yesterday - and rule 2 refuses anything older, so this is
# not a horizon: it is the number of days a record may sit unused before
# pruning removes it, and it is small because a bigger cache would only hold
# days no lookup can ask for. Three covers today, yesterday, and the day a
# fetch spanning midnight writes ahead of itself.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS A CAP, NOT THE RETENTION RULE, AND THREE HAS NO SLACK. The steady
# state is already {yesterday, today, tomorrow}; a feed that publishes to D+2,
# or ONE stray point in the wrong year - which sorts LAST and is therefore
# immortal under a newest-N cap - pushes yesterday out of a three-slot store
# and keeps it out, permanently and silently. So `_prune()` PINS the two days a
# lookup can actually ask for on top of the cap; see its docstring. The store
# is then bounded at KEEP_DAYS + 2 records rather than at KEEP_DAYS.
KEEP_DAYS = 3
SCHEMA = 1
def _bdate(instant: datetime) -> str:
"""The Brussels calendar date of an instant, as `YYYY-MM-DD`.
⚠️ BRUSSELS, NOT UTC. 23:30 UTC in July is already tomorrow in Belgium, and
a cache keyed on the UTC date would file the last 90-120 minutes of every
day under the wrong one - so a lookup on the following morning would find a
"yesterday" missing its own evening hours, which are the expensive ones.
"""
return brussels(instant).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
def _yesterday_of(instant: datetime) -> str:
"""The Brussels date of the day BEFORE `instant`'s Brussels day.
⚠️ THE ARITHMETIC IS ON THE LOCAL DATE, NOT ON THE INSTANT, AND THAT IS A
DST DEFECT THIS FILE SHIPPED. `brussels()` renders at the FIXED offset in
force at that instant, so `brussels(stamp) - timedelta(days=1)` subtracts 24
ABSOLUTE hours from a wall clock - and the Brussels day before a
spring-forward is 23 hours long. Measured at 2026-03-30T00:30+02:00, the
first hour of the morning after the March transition: it returned
2026-03-28, so the fill carried a TWO-DAY-OLD profile flagged as yesterday's
(or, with only the last three days held, answered `no_data` naming a date
that is not yesterday).
A calendar day minus one day is `date` arithmetic, and a `date` has no
offset to lose. The 25-hour October day is right for the same reason.
"""
return (brussels(instant).date() - timedelta(days=1)).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
def _point_of(row):
"""One stored row -> a `PricePoint`, or `None` if the row is not one.
THE ONE VALIDATOR, AND THE ASYMMETRY IT CLOSES (FCST-05's MEDIUM). This
file used to hold TWO standards for what a stored point is. The READ path
(`_parse_points()`) was properly defensive - every field checked, a
malformed row dropped and reported. The WRITE path was
`{q["start"]: q for q in raw if isinstance(q, dict) and "start" in q}`
followed by `sorted(..., key=lambda q: q["start"])`, which trusts
`q["start"]` to be a hashable, sortable string it never checked. Measured,
with the malformed row under the day the feed is currently writing to:
start is an int -> TypeError: '<' not supported between instances
of 'str' and 'int'
start is a dict -> TypeError: cannot use 'dict' as a dict key
start is null -> TypeError: '<' not supported between 'str' and
'NoneType'
start is a list -> TypeError: cannot use 'list' as a dict key
⚠️ AND THE BLAST RADIUS IS PERMANENT, WHICH IS WHY IT IS NOT MERELY UNTIDY.
`_remember()` is reached through `carry()` -> `resolve_tariff()` ->
`run_tariff_refresh`, which catches `Exception` - so the add-on stays UP
and EVERY refresh raises forever. The plan retires after
`TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`, and arbitrage and the cheap window are off from then
on. There is no self-heal, because `_remember()` raises before it reaches
`_save()`. `_usable_days()` only required `rec["points"]` to be a LIST; the
elements were unchecked on the write path, and the existing fixture put its
malformed row under a day the feed was NOT writing to, so `_remember()`
never touched it.
So both paths call this, and neither of them has a standard of its own.
Returning `None` rather than raising is the contract: a caller decides
whether a bad row is dropped (both of them do) and how it is reported.
"""
if not isinstance(row, dict):
return None
try:
start = datetime.fromisoformat(row["start"])
value = float(row["eur_per_kwh"])
flag = row["provisional"]
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
return None
if start.tzinfo is None or start.utcoffset() is None \
or not isinstance(flag, bool):
return None
return PricePoint(start=start, eur_per_kwh=value, provisional=flag)
def _held(rec) -> tuple:
"""`(points, whole hours they cover)` for a day record. `(0, 0)` otherwise.
⚠️ POINTS AND HOURS ARE TWO NUMBERS, AND FCST-04's STATUS ROW PRINTED THE
FIRST UNDER THE SECOND'S NAME. The row was `f"{d} ({_n_points(rec)} h)"`,
which counts POINTS: on the quarter-hourly feed this add-on already
supports it read `'2026-01-13 (96 h)'` - 96 "h" for a 24-hour day. That is
the points/hours conflation H1 was raised for, on the row H1's own ticket
shipped. Both numbers are reported now, so an operator can see a day that
is 24 points over 24 h and a day that is 96 points over 24 h and tell them
apart, and neither number is wearing the other's unit.
⚠️ TOLERANT, AND IT IS THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE, NOT THE FIRST. `_load()`
drops a malformed day record and says so, so this should never see one. It
is written this way because `words` is read from `Controller.__init__` and
from every status render: a status LINE that raises takes the add-on down,
and "the cache is broken" must never be able to mean "the controller does
not start". That is exactly what FCST-04 shipped - `{"days": {"2026-01-14":
"oops"}}` gave `ok=True`, `last_error=None`, and an `AttributeError` out of
`words`, `yesterday()` and `resolve_tariff()` alike, with no self-heal
because `_remember()` raised before it could rewrite the file.
⚠️ AND IT COUNTS ONLY ROWS THAT ARE POINTS. A row `_point_of()` refuses is
not held prices, and a row count that included it would report a store as
healthier than it is - which is the second half of FCST-05's MEDIUM: the
status row said `'2026-01-15 (1 h)'` about a record whose single row was
killing every tariff refresh. What is dropped is named in `last_error`, and
`words` prints that beside the counts.
"""
if not isinstance(rec, dict):
return (0, 0)
raw = rec.get("points")
if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
return (0, 0)
n, hours = 0, set()
for row in raw:
pt = _point_of(row)
if pt is None:
continue
n += 1
hours.add(pt.start.astimezone(timezone.utc)
.replace(minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0))
return (n, len(hours))
def _row_of(day: str, points: int, hours: int) -> str:
"""One day's cell of the status row: what is held, in BOTH of its units.
⚠️ THE UNIT IS SPELT OUT ON EACH NUMBER. FCST-04's cell was
`f"{day} ({points} h)"` - the point count wearing the hour's name, which on
a quarter-hourly feed reads `'2026-01-13 (96 h)'` for a 24-hour day. What
an operator needs from this row is whether tomorrow morning's fill has a
whole day to carry, and that is the HOUR figure; the point count says how
finely it is priced. Neither answers for the other.
"""
return (f"{day} ({points} point{'' if points == 1 else 's'} "
f"over {hours} h)")
def _bad_rows(rec) -> int:
"""How many rows of a day record are not points. Total; never raises."""
if not isinstance(rec, dict):
return 0
raw = rec.get("points")
if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
return 0
return sum(1 for row in raw if _point_of(row) is None)
class PriceHistory:
"""The published price series of the last few Brussels days, in /data.
⚠️ `ok` IS ABOUT THE FILE, NOT ABOUT THE DATA. A healthy store with no
record for yesterday is `ok` and answers `no_data` - a normal state on a
site's first day, and a different thing from a store that could not be
opened. Both are visible: `ok`/`last_error` describe the file, and
`yesterday()`'s reason describes the answer.
⚠️ AND `ok` IS NOT "CAN PERSIST" (FCST-06). It says the directory was
there when the store opened, which a full volume and a read-only remount
both leave true. The one thing that answers "can this store persist" is
`_save()`'s return value, and `self._days` NEVER HOLDS A POINT THE FILE DOES
NOT, because `_remember()` undoes a merge that answer refused. That is what
makes `words` and `yesterday()` describe the same store in EVERY degraded
state rather than only in the ones somebody enumerated.
"""
def __init__(self, path: str = "/data/price_history.json"):
self.path = path
self.ok = False
self.last_error: str | None = None
self._days: dict = {}
self._open()
# -- the file ------------------------------------------------------------
def _open(self) -> None:
parent = os.path.dirname(self.path)
# See the module note: NOT created. A cache on the ephemeral layer is
# one that forgets without saying so.
if parent and not os.path.isdir(parent):
self.last_error = f"no durable volume at {parent}"
# INFO, not ERROR: on a dev host or in a test container there is no
# /data and nothing is wrong.
_LOG.info("no price history: %s - §8.3 carry-forward has nothing "
"to carry and the horizon stays as short as the feed",
self.last_error)
return
self.ok = True
self._load()
def _load(self) -> None:
try:
with open(self.path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
blob = json.load(fh)
except FileNotFoundError:
_LOG.info("no price history yet at %s - the first refresh writes "
"one, and the fill has nothing to carry until the day "
"after that", self.path)
return
except (ValueError, OSError) as err:
# A corrupt cache must not stop the controller, and must not be
# silently re-created either: the record is discarded, the reason
# is kept, and `yesterday()` reports it rather than answering
# "no record", which would read as a normal first day.
#
# ⚠️ `ValueError`, NOT `json.JSONDecodeError`, AND THAT IS
# FCST-05's HIGH. Reading this file has two failure families: the
# BYTES (`OSError`) and the CONTENT - and the content family has at
# least two members, because `open(..., encoding="utf-8")` decodes
# before `json` ever sees a character. `UnicodeDecodeError` is
# `ValueError -> UnicodeError -> UnicodeDecodeError`; it is NOT a
# `json.JSONDecodeError` and it is NOT an `OSError`
# (`issubclass(UnicodeDecodeError, OSError)` is False). So ONE
# non-UTF-8 byte in /data/price_history.json escaped `_load()` ->
# `_open()` -> `PriceHistory.__init__`, which is unguarded at
# main.py's `Controller.__init__`, AND THE ADD-ON DID NOT START.
# Measured: `UnicodeDecodeError: 'utf-8' codec can't decode byte
# 0xff in position 39`. Valid-UTF-8-invalid-JSON, a UTF-8 BOM and a
# non-dict day record all degraded correctly - it was the one byte
# class left uncovered, which is the same class as the defect the
# `_usable_days()` rework was raised for.
#
# The tuple names the FAMILY rather than the two members known
# today, because "the file's content is not readable as JSON" is
# exactly what this handler says, and a third `ValueError` subclass
# nobody has thought of is how this defect arrived the first time.
self.last_error = f"unreadable ({err})"
_LOG.warning("price history at %s is %s - starting from empty. "
"§8.3 carry-forward has nothing to carry until the "
"next refresh has written a full day",
self.path, self.last_error)
return
found = blob.get("version") if isinstance(blob, dict) else None
# ⚠️ THE TYPE IS PART OF THE VERSION. `1.0 == 1` in Python, so a float
# written by some other tool would pass a bare `!=` and be read as
# schema 1 - a version check that cannot tell 1 from 1.0 is one that
# would not notice a writer this build has never met.
if not isinstance(blob, dict) or isinstance(found, bool) \
or not isinstance(found, int) or found != SCHEMA:
self.last_error = f"schema {found!r}, not {SCHEMA}"
_LOG.warning("price history at %s has %s - discarding it rather "
"than guessing what its points mean",
self.path, self.last_error)
return
days = blob.get("days")
if not isinstance(days, dict):
self.last_error = "no `days` object"
_LOG.warning("price history at %s has %s", self.path, self.last_error)
return
self._days = self._usable_days(days)
def _usable_days(self, days: dict) -> dict:
"""The day records that are shaped like day records. The rest are dropped.
⚠️ THE ASYMMETRY THAT PRODUCED THE DEFECT: `_parse_points()` below is
carefully defensive about every field of a POINT, and `_load()` was not
defensive about the record holding them at all. `{"version": 1, "days":
{"2026-01-14": "oops"}}` therefore loaded as `ok=True`,
`last_error=None` - and then `rec.get(...)` raised `AttributeError` out
of `words`, `yesterday()` and `resolve_tariff()`. `PriceHistory(...)`
and `.words` are both unguarded in `Controller.__init__`, so THE ADD-ON
DID NOT START; and it never self-healed, because `_remember()` raised on
the same record before it could reach `_save()`.
A broken cache is a short horizon. It is not a controller that will not
regulate a battery, and §6's rule - absent machinery must not disable
the loop - does not stop applying because the machinery is a JSON file.
Dropped, not repaired: an unusable record has nothing in it to keep, and
the next `_remember()` writes a fresh one under that date.
⚠️ AND THE ROWS INSIDE A KEPT RECORD ARE COUNTED, NOT ONLY THE RECORD
(FCST-05). This checked that `rec["points"]` is a LIST and stopped
there, so a record holding one row with a `start` of `7` loaded as
healthy: `last_error=None`, and `words` said `'2026-01-15 (1 h)'` about
a store whose next `_remember()` would raise on that row and go on
raising forever. The rows are NOT dropped here - `_parse_points()` is
the read path's one filter and stays so - but they are COUNTED, so the
store stops reporting health it does not have from the moment it is
opened. `_remember()` drops them on the next refresh and `_save()`
rewrites the file, after which a restart clears the note.
"""
kept, dropped, malformed = {}, [], {}
for key, rec in days.items():
if not isinstance(key, str) or not isinstance(rec, dict) \
or not isinstance(rec.get("points"), list):
dropped.append(str(key))
continue
bad = _bad_rows(rec)
if bad:
malformed[key] = bad
kept[key] = rec
notes = []
if dropped:
notes.append(f"{len(dropped)} unusable day record(s) dropped "
f"({', '.join(sorted(dropped))})")
if malformed:
notes.append(
f"{sum(malformed.values())} malformed point row(s) in "
+ ", ".join(f"{d} ({n})" for d, n in sorted(malformed.items())))
if notes:
# Recorded, not silent: `yesterday()` and `words` both report
# `last_error`, and a cache that quietly discards half a file reads
# to an operator exactly like a normal first day.
self.last_error = "; ".join(notes)
_LOG.warning("price history at %s: %s - the controller starts "
"anyway and the horizon is as short as the feed makes "
"it", self.path, self.last_error)
return kept
def _save(self) -> bool:
"""Write `self._days` out. True only if the file now holds it.
⚠️ THE RETURN VALUE IS THE "CAN THIS STORE PERSIST?" PREDICATE, AND
IT IS THE ONLY ONE (FCST-06). Both ways of not persisting end here and
are the same answer: no durable volume returns False without touching
the disk, an `OSError` out of the write returns False after recording
why. `_remember()` acts on that one answer, so the second place that
used to test the first symptom on its own - and missed the second - has
nothing left to test. See the module docstring's fifth warning.
⚠️ AND IT REPORTS, IT DOES NOT RAISE. §6 and this module's opening: a
broken cache must not be a broken controller. An add-on that will not
start because /data filled up is a worse defect than the one FCST-06
fixed, so a failed write is logged, kept in `last_error` - where `words`
and `yesterday()` both read it - and RETURNED, never thrown.
⚠️ THE TEMP FILE IS REMOVED ON EVERY FAILING PATH. A write that dies
between `mkstemp` and `os.replace` used to leave its temp behind, and
the refresh task runs 48 times a day: a persistent write failure - a
full volume being the likeliest cause - leaked 48 inodes a day onto the
volume that was already the problem.
"""
if not self.ok:
return False
tmp = None
try:
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=os.path.dirname(self.path))
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
json.dump({"version": SCHEMA, "days": self._days}, fh, indent=1)
# Atomic: a power cut mid-write must not leave a truncated file
# that parses as an empty day.
os.replace(tmp, self.path)
tmp = None # it IS the file now; do not unlink
except OSError as err:
self.last_error = f"could not write ({err})"
_LOG.error("could not persist price history: %s", err)
return False
finally:
if tmp is not None:
try:
os.unlink(tmp)
except OSError: # nothing further to try, and a
pass # failed cleanup is not a fault
return True
# -- the one public entry point -----------------------------------------
def carry(self, read: PriceRead, *, since: datetime, until: datetime,
stamp: datetime) -> PriceRead:
"""Remember what this read published, then §8.3-fill the missing hours.
THE ORDER IS DELIBERATE AND IS THE POINT OF THE METHOD. The read is
recorded FIRST, so a feed that hands back yesterday alongside today
refreshes yesterday's record from live data before it is consumed as
the profile; and the filled series - the one thing that must never be
recorded - exists only as this method's return value, which this object
never sees again. See rule 1, including how that order is graded.
Returns whatever `fill_from_yesterday()` returns: a series over the
whole hours of [since, until), carrying EVERY point the provider
published inside it - by identity, and four of them in one hour on a
quarter-hourly feed - plus one carried point for each remaining whole
hour FOR WHICH YESTERDAY HELD THAT WALL-CLOCK HOUR. An hour neither
source can price is left out (§11.4 for that hour), and `no_data` comes
back when that is every hour.
"""
self._remember(read, stamp)
return fill_from_yesterday(read, yesterday=self.yesterday(stamp),
since=since, until=until, stamp=stamp)
# -- the halves, private because rule 1 is an ordering ------------------
def _remember(self, read: PriceRead, stamp: datetime) -> None:
"""File a provider read's points under their own Brussels days.
⚠️ PRIVATE, AND CALLED FROM EXACTLY ONE PLACE. A caller that can reach
this can record a filled series, which is the decay in rule 1. There is
no value-level defence against that - a carried point and a published
provisional point are the same three fields - so the defence is that
nothing outside this file names it, and `test_price_history.py` checks
the tree for that rather than trusting the underscore.
"""
points = read.match(series=lambda r: r.points, no_data=lambda _r: ())
if not points:
return
product = read.match(series=lambda r: r.product.value,
no_data=lambda _r: None)
provider = read.match(series=lambda r: r.provider,
no_data=lambda _r: None)
# ⚠️ THE STATE THIS READ STARTED FROM, KEPT SO IT CAN BE PUT BACK
# (FCST-06). Everything below merges into `self._days` IN PLACE, and
# whether any of it may be KEPT is not knowable until `_save()` has
# tried - so the merge runs, and it is undone if the file did not take
# it. There is no `not self.ok` branch above any more: a store with no
# durable volume is one of the answers `_save()` gives, not a separate
# symptom with a test of its own. Module docstring, fifth warning.
#
# ⚠️ DEEP, NOT `dict(self._days)`. A one-level copy shares the day
# RECORDS, and the loop below rebinds keys on the ones it touches - so
# the "previous" state would hand back records the merge had already
# edited, and a store with a good yesterday on disk would go on
# answering the merge of it that never reached the file. It would also
# be right only for as long as nobody makes this loop mutate a `points`
# list or a row in place. A copy that is right by construction outlives
# that, and the store holds at most KEEP_DAYS + 2 records, 48 times a
# day.
before = copy.deepcopy(self._days)
touched = set()
junked = {}
for p in points:
day = _bdate(p.start)
rec = self._days.setdefault(
day, {"product": product, "provider": provider, "points": []})
# Rule 4: MERGE by instant. A later read updates the hours it
# carries and leaves the rest; a revised price for an hour already
# held wins, because it is the newer statement about that hour.
#
# ⚠️ EVERY HELD ROW GOES THROUGH `_point_of()` (FCST-05's MEDIUM).
# This was `{q["start"]: q for q in raw if isinstance(q, dict) and
# "start" in q}` sorted by `q["start"]` - a key and a sort key that
# trusted a value read off disk to be a hashable, sortable string.
# An `int`, `null`, a `dict` or a `list` there raised `TypeError`
# out of `carry()` on the day the feed was writing to, and
# `run_tariff_refresh` caught it, so the add-on stayed up while
# EVERY refresh failed for good. A row that is not a point is now
# dropped and reported here, exactly as the read path drops it, and
# `_save()` below writes the record back clean - which is the
# self-heal the raising version could never reach.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE MERGE KEY IS THE VALIDATED INSTANT, NOT ITS SPELLING.
# Aware datetimes hash and compare by instant, so this is rule 4 as
# rule 4 is written. The old string key merged by SPELLING, and the
# old lexicographic sort put the second 02:00 of the 25-hour
# October day (`+01:00`) BEFORE the first (`+02:00`). Only the
# stored order was affected - `_parse_points()` re-sorts by instant
# on the way out - but the store now holds what it says it holds.
raw = rec.get("points")
held = {}
for q in (raw if isinstance(raw, list) else ()):
kept = _point_of(q)
if kept is None:
junked[day] = junked.get(day, 0) + 1
continue
held[kept.start] = q
held[p.start] = p.canonical()
order = sorted(held, key=lambda t: t.astimezone(timezone.utc))
rec["points"] = [held[t] for t in order]
rec["product"], rec["provider"] = product, provider
touched.add(day)
if junked:
# Said, not swallowed. `words` prints `last_error`, so a store that
# has just discarded rows off disk stops reporting plain health -
# and after `_save()` below the file is clean, so a restart clears
# this. `_save()` overwrites it if the write itself fails, which is
# the more urgent fact of the two - and on that path the drop is
# undone with the rest of the merge, so those rows are still in the
# file and the next write that completes drops them again.
self.last_error = (
f"{sum(junked.values())} malformed point row(s) dropped from "
+ ", ".join(f"{d} ({n})" for d, n in sorted(junked.items())))
_LOG.warning("price history at %s: %s - the record is rewritten "
"without them and the refresh continues",
self.path, self.last_error)
self._prune(stamp)
if not self._save():
# ⚠️ A STORE THAT CANNOT PERSIST RECORDS NOTHING - the rule, asked
# ONCE as a question about the outcome instead of tested twice
# against two symptoms of it. Keeping the merge here is exactly the
# cache the module docstring refuses: `yesterday()` would answer a
# series the file does not contain, all day, until a restart
# dropped it without a word - and `words` and `yesterday()` would
# be describing two different stores. The reason is already in
# `last_error` (from `_save()`, or from `_open()` when there is no
# volume at all), so both answers now describe what is on disk.
#
# It does NOT raise, and §6 is why: a broken cache must not be a
# broken controller. `carry()` still returns the fill, the horizon
# is as short as the feed makes it, and the add-on regulates.
self._days = before
return
_LOG.debug("price history: %d point(s) filed under %s; %d day(s) held",
len(points), ", ".join(sorted(touched)), len(self._days))
def _prune(self, stamp: datetime) -> None:
"""Drop records no lookup can reach. A sort-order cap, plus two pins.
⚠️ NOTHING IS DELETED BY ARITHMETIC AGAINST THE CLOCK. A clock that
jumped - the failure mode WITNESS-03 spent a session on - would
otherwise delete every record in one pass and leave the fill with
nothing on the morning after, which is the one morning it is for.
Deleting on a bad clock is unrecoverable; holding a few days too many
is not, so the cap is `sorted(...)[-KEEP_DAYS:]` and stays that way.
⚠️ AND A CAP ALONE IS DEFEATED BY ONE POINT IN THE WRONG YEAR. Sorting
is lexicographic on the date string, so a stray far-future record sorts
LAST and is immortal - it consumes a slot for good, and with the steady
state already {yesterday, today, tomorrow} filling all three, yesterday
is what falls out. A feed that publishes to D+2 does the same thing
without any stray at all. So the two days `yesterday()` can ACTUALLY be
asked for are pinned on top of the cap.
`stamp` is READ here, which it was not before: the pin is the only use
of it, and it is additive. Pinning can only RETAIN a record, never
delete one, so a jumped `stamp` pins two dates that are not held and
changes nothing - the WITNESS-03 property is preserved by construction
rather than by remembering to check it.
"""
if len(self._days) <= KEEP_DAYS:
return
keep = set(sorted(self._days)[-KEEP_DAYS:])
keep |= {_bdate(stamp), _yesterday_of(stamp)}
for day in [d for d in self._days if d not in keep]:
del self._days[day]
def yesterday(self, stamp: datetime) -> PriceRead:
"""The published series of the Brussels day BEFORE `stamp`'s, or no_data.
⚠️ THE DATE IS COMPUTED, NOT LOOKED UP. See rule 2: `newest()` would
answer Friday's prices to a Monday fill, and the fill would flag them as
one day old because that is the only thing its flag can say.
"""
if stamp.tzinfo is None or stamp.utcoffset() is None:
raise ValueError(
f"yesterday({stamp!r}): a naive datetime is not an instant, "
f"and 'which Brussels day was yesterday' is exactly the "
f"question a wall-clock reading cannot answer.")
want = _yesterday_of(stamp)
if self.last_error and not self._days:
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"the price history at {self.path} is {self.last_error}, so "
f"§8.3 has no profile to carry forward for {want}; the plan "
f"covers only the hours the feed published")
rec = self._days.get(want)
if rec is None:
have = ", ".join(sorted(self._days)) or "no days at all"
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"no published prices recorded for {want} (held: {have}), so "
f"§8.3 has no profile to carry forward. A record for another "
f"day is not a yesterday")
points, bad = _parse_points(rec.get("points"))
if not points:
why = bad or "it is empty"
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"the {want} record holds no usable point ({why}), and an "
f"empty series is not a free day")
try:
product = PriceProduct(rec.get("product"))
except ValueError:
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"the {want} record names product {rec.get('product')!r}, "
f"which is not a PriceProduct. The optimiser switches on that "
f"enum, so a record that cannot name one cannot be a series")
if bad:
_LOG.warning("price history: %s in the %s record were dropped; "
"%d point(s) carried forward", bad, want, len(points))
return PriceRead.series(points, product,
str(rec.get("provider") or "price_history"),
stamp)
# -- observability -------------------------------------------------------
@property
def words(self) -> str:
"""One line for the status page. Says what is held, or why nothing is.
⚠️ THIS MUST NOT RAISE, EVER. It is read once from `Controller.__init__`
and again on every status render, and neither call site guards it - so
an exception here is an add-on that does not start. It went out that
way: a day record that was a string instead of a dict raised
`AttributeError` from the `len(...)` below. `_load()` now drops such a
record and `_held()` is total, so this has two independent reasons not
to fail on a broken file.
⚠️ AND IT COUNTED POINTS AND CALLED THEM HOURS (FCST-05's LOW). The row
was `f"{d} ({_n_points(rec)} h)"`; on the quarter-hourly feed this
add-on already supports that reads `'2026-01-13 (96 h)'` for a 24-hour
day. Both numbers are printed now - see `_held()` - because they are
two different facts and only one of them was ever being shown.
"""
if not self.ok:
return f"unavailable - {self.last_error}"
if not self._days:
why = f" - {self.last_error}" if self.last_error else ""
return f"empty{why} - nothing to carry forward yet"
held = "; ".join(_row_of(d, *_held(self._days[d]))
for d in sorted(self._days, key=str))
# A file that PARTLY loaded says so, or the dropped days read as days
# that were simply never written.
return held + (f" [{self.last_error}]" if self.last_error else "")
def _parse_points(raw) -> tuple:
"""Canonical dicts -> PricePoints, and a phrase naming what was dropped.
⚠️ A MALFORMED POINT IS DROPPED, NOT DEFAULTED, and the drop is reported.
`float(row.get("eur_per_kwh", 0))` is the shape of the whole family of
defects this repo has been removing: a cache that lost a field would answer
"that hour was free" to a fill that flags it as an ordinary guess.
"""
if not isinstance(raw, list):
return (), "the `points` field is not a list"
out, dropped = [], 0
for row in raw:
# ⚠️ `_point_of()` IS THE ONE VALIDATOR, and this loop used to BE it.
# The write path had its own, weaker standard; see `_point_of()` for
# what that cost. One standard, two callers, no asymmetry to re-open.
pt = _point_of(row)
if pt is None:
dropped += 1
continue
out.append(pt)
out.sort(key=lambda p: p.start.astimezone(timezone.utc))
return tuple(out), (f"{dropped} malformed point(s)" if dropped else "")
class NoHistory:
"""The explicit "this caller keeps no history" - a NAME, not a `None`.
⚠️ IT EXISTS SO THE PARAMETER CAN BE REQUIRED. `history=None` meaning "skip
the fill" is the shape this repo keeps removing: a caller who forgets the
argument gets the truncated-horizon behaviour of the bug this ticket is
about, silently, and the code reads as though the fill is happening. With
no default there is nothing to forget, and a caller with no durable volume
- a check, a replay harness - has to say `NoHistory()` and be visible in
the diff.
It carries out the ordering faithfully: it records nothing and carries
nothing, so `carry()` returns the provider's read unchanged and the plan is
exactly what it was before FCST-04.
"""
ok = False
last_error = "no history is kept by this caller"
words = "not kept"
def carry(self, read: PriceRead, *, since, until, stamp) -> PriceRead:
return read
def yesterday(self, stamp: datetime) -> PriceRead:
return PriceRead.no_data(
"this caller keeps no price history (NoHistory), so §8.3 has no "
"profile to carry forward")
+274
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@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
"""TEL-11/TEL-12 - the site's PV production, read from Home Assistant entities.
WHY THIS IS AN ENTITY AND NOT A REGISTER. This add-on's RS485 bus carries the
BATTERY inverter it drives. A household's PV inverter is, on nearly every site,
a different box from a different vendor that reports into Home Assistant
through its own integration - so the only place a product can read production
for an arbitrary install is an HA entity. `pv_entities` therefore takes whatever
`sensor.*` the site's own PV integration provides.
⚠️ AND THERE IS USUALLY MORE THAN ONE OF THEM, WHICH IS TEL-12. TEL-11 shipped
`pv_entity` as a single string and the owner of the reference site reported
within minutes of 0.11.0 going live that they have SEVERAL PV inverters and
could configure one. That is not a property of one house: a multi-string or
multi-orientation roof routinely carries two or three inverters, each
publishing its own power sensor. `entities()` below is the roster and `total()`
is the site figure over it.
⚠️ AND A PARTIAL TOTAL IS WORSE THAN NO TOTAL, WHICH IS THE WHOLE OF TEL-12.
Three inverters configured, one `unavailable`, and the sum of the other two is A
SMALLER NUMBER INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM A REAL ONE. Fed into OPT-10's attribution
that reads as "there was less PV than there was" - which is the "no irradiance"
conclusion the card exists to TEST rather than to manufacture. So `total()`
answers `None` the moment ANY configured entity is absent. See the note on
`total()` for the alternative that was weighed and why it lost.
WHY THE CHANNEL EXISTS AT ALL. OPT-10 measured that 20.5 kWh of surplus left the
site in 16 days while the pack had room, 12.6 kWh of it with the battery not
charging at all - and could not say WHY, because PV production is recorded
NOWHERE. Three causes need three different fixes (no irradiance: nothing to fix;
a charge-power limit; the optimiser declining to charge - the only software
defect), and guessing between them is how an optimiser gets tuned to solve a
cloud problem. This module is the missing measurement and NOTHING ELSE.
⚠️ NOTHING HERE MAY EVER REACH A CONTROL DECISION, AND THAT IS THE CARD'S FIRST
CONSTRAINT RATHER THAN A STYLE NOTE. The add-on regulates a real battery; adding
production as a term of the control law would be an unrequested behaviour change
AND it would destroy the measurement, because the loop would then be reacting to
the quantity being measured. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is what says the path is
untouched: it grades a control document that contains none of this material on
both trees and with `pv_entity` set and unset.
⚠️ ABSENCE IS NEVER ZERO, AND THAT IS THE SECOND CONSTRAINT. Every refusal below
returns `None` with a REASON, never `0.0`. A PV channel that reported 0 W for a
dead sensor would manufacture exactly the "there was no surplus to store"
conclusion the card exists to TEST - and it would do it silently, in a week of
recorder history nobody would re-derive. `app/hass.py`'s own note on `state()`
is the same rule one layer down. ⚠️ TEL-12 EXTENDS THAT RULE RATHER THAN
WEAKENING IT: at a roster of three, "one of them is absent" is an absence of the
SITE figure, and it publishes as an absence. A partial sum is a second way of
reporting 0-where-there-was-production, one layer up, and it is refused for the
same reason.
THE SIGN CONVENTION: POSITIVE IS PRODUCTION, as for `meter_entity` and
`batt_entity` ("power arriving at the house's AC bus"). TEL-14: a kWh meter or
power clamp in the PV circuit reads the other way, so `pv_invert_entities`
flips the sign per entity. See `DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md`.
"""
from .hass import BAD_STATES
# Home Assistant's OWN power units, each as the number of watts one of it is.
# ⚠️ READ OUT OF HA, NOT LISTED FROM MEMORY: `UnitOfPower` in
# `homeassistant/const.py` (github.com/home-assistant/core, `dev`, retrieved
# 2026-09-24) declares mW, W, kW, MW, GW, TW and BTU/h. Every factor here is an
# exact power of ten, so none of them is a number anybody chose.
#
# ⚠️ BTU/h IS IN HA's ENUM AND DELIBERATELY NOT HERE. Its factor (0.293071…)
# is a measured conversion rather than a decimal shift, no PV integration
# publishes in it, and a wrong constant in the one channel that exists to
# attribute a 20.5 kWh shortfall is worse than a refusal an operator can read.
# It lands in the "not a power unit" refusal below, BY NAME.
WATTS_PER = {
"mW": 0.001,
"W": 1.0,
"kW": 1000.0,
"MW": 1000000.0,
"GW": 1000000000.0,
"TW": 1000000000000.0,
}
# What `watts()` answers when there is nothing to report. ⚠️ THE REASON IS PART
# OF THE RETURN VALUE, not a log line: it is what the status page prints, and an
# absence whose cause is invisible sends an operator to look at the wrong box.
UNIT_KEY = "unit_of_measurement"
def watts(state: dict | None) -> tuple:
"""`(watts, why)` from a Home Assistant state object.
`watts` is `None` whenever there is no reading - and `why` then says which
of the five refusals it was, in words an operator can act on. On a good read
`why` is the unit the value was read in, because "1234 W" and "1234, unit
unknown" are different claims and the page has to be able to make the first.
⚠️ THE UNIT IS READ OFF THE ENTITY AND NOT ASSUMED, AND THERE IS NO
MAGNITUDE HEURISTIC. `read_inputs()` guesses kW-or-W for
`peak_forecast_entity` with `abs(raw) < 50`, which is safe there because
nobody's quarter-hour demand forecast is 50 W. It is NOT safe here: 30 W of
real production at dusk is an ordinary reading, and that heuristic would
publish it as 30 kW - a fabricated number, in the channel whose entire
purpose is to be believed a week later. A sensor whose unit this cannot read
is REFUSED rather than guessed at.
"""
if state is None:
# `hass.state()` answers None for a non-existent entity, a 404 and a
# transport failure alike. All three are "no reading", and HA does not
# consider a non-existent entity an error - see `hass.state()`.
return None, "no state (entity missing, or the read failed)"
raw = str(state.get("state", "")).strip()
if raw.lower() in BAD_STATES:
# ⚠️ THE SAME LIST `hass.number()` REFUSES ON, IMPORTED RATHER THAN
# RESPELLED. A second copy of it is how one path starts treating
# `unavailable` as a number the other one rejects.
return None, f"entity is {raw or 'empty'}"
try:
value = float(raw)
except ValueError:
return None, f"state {raw!r} is not numeric"
unit = str((state.get("attributes") or {}).get(UNIT_KEY) or "").strip()
if not unit:
return None, ("no unit_of_measurement on the entity - it cannot be "
"read in watts")
if unit not in WATTS_PER:
return None, (f"unit {unit!r} is not one of "
f"{', '.join(WATTS_PER)} - it cannot be read in watts")
return value * WATTS_PER[unit], unit
# --- TEL-12: the ROSTER, and the SITE figure over it --------------------------
def entities(opts: dict) -> tuple:
"""Every PV entity this configuration names, in configured order. TEL-12.
⚠️ ONE ANSWER TO "WHICH ENTITIES ARE THE PV CHANNEL", and it is the answer
BOTH sides read. `Controller.pv_roster` is this call and
`mqtt.optional_keys()` is `bool()` of this call, so the thing that decides
whether the row is ANNOUNCED, the thing that decides whether it is READ and
the thing that decides HOW MANY entities are summed cannot disagree. TEL-11
already had that discipline for one entity and spelled the predicate TWICE
- `str(opts.get("pv_entity") or "").strip()` in `main.py` and again in
`mqtt.py`. Two spellings of one predicate is how an entity gets announced
that nothing feeds; a roster makes it how a SUM gets taken over a different
list from the one that was announced. It is one function now.
⚠️ `pv_entities` REPLACES `pv_entity` RATHER THAN EXTENDING IT, and that is
CFG-04's shipped precedent (`inverters:` replaces the six flat keys) applied
to the only upgrade path that matters. The install this card exists for HAS
`pv_entity` set, to inverter A. Opening the Configuration tab, the natural
action is to put ALL the inverters in the new repeatable field - and under a
UNION rule that double-counts A unless the operator also remembers to clear
the old key. A doubled total is the same defect as a partial one in the
other direction, in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later.
Under REPLACE the effective roster is exactly what one key says, and no
arithmetic depends on a de-duplication rule the operator has to know about.
⚠️ `Controller.checks()` says WHICH key is in use whenever both are set, so
the replacement is stated on the page rather than being silent.
⚠️ AND IT DE-DUPLICATES WITHIN THE LIST, ORDER PRESERVED. A site cannot have
two sensors with one entity_id, so a repeated id in the list is never a
second inverter - it is a typo that would DOUBLE that inverter's production
in the total. `dict.fromkeys` is the order-preserving spelling.
"""
listed = [e for e in (str(x or "").strip()
for x in (opts.get("pv_entities") or [])) if e]
if listed:
return tuple(dict.fromkeys(listed))
one = str(opts.get("pv_entity") or "").strip()
return (one,) if one else ()
def entity_is_ignored(opts: dict) -> bool:
"""Is a set `pv_entity` being REPLACED by a set `pv_entities`? TEL-12.
⚠️ HERE RATHER THAN IN `Controller.checks()`, for the reason `entities()`
exists: the rule and the sentence that reports the rule must not be two
readings of the options. This is the negative half of `entities()`' first
branch and it is spelled once, beside it, where an edit to one is in front
of whoever is editing the other.
"""
return bool(str(opts.get("pv_entity") or "").strip()
and [x for x in (opts.get("pv_entities") or [])
if str(x or "").strip()])
def inverted(opts: dict) -> frozenset:
"""The entity ids `pv_invert_entities` flips. TEL-14."""
return frozenset(e for e in (str(x or "").strip()
for x in (opts.get("pv_invert_entities") or []))
if e)
def stray_inverts(opts: dict) -> list:
"""`pv_invert_entities` entries naming no entity in the roster - a typo
that would otherwise leave a sign unflipped with nothing said. TEL-14."""
roster = set(entities(opts))
return sorted(e for e in inverted(opts) if e not in roster)
# TEL-14: a reading below this is not standby draw. A correctly signed meter in
# the PV circuit reads a few watts NEGATIVE at night (the owner's: 13 W); -50 W
# clears that with room for a couple of such devices on one entity, while a
# reversed sensor in daylight reads hundreds to thousands of watts below zero.
NEGATIVE_W = -50.0
def total(readings, flip=frozenset()) -> tuple:
"""`(watts, why, parts)` - the SITE's production, or an ABSENCE. TEL-12.
`readings` is `[(entity_id, state), ...]` in `entities()` order, one entry
per configured entity, each `state` shaped as `hass.state()` returns.
`parts` is `[(entity_id, watts, why), ...]` - EVERY entity's own answer from
`watts()`, kept because the operator surfaces have to be able to name which
sensor is missing. `watts` is the sum when every entity answered, and `None`
otherwise; `why` always says which of those it was, in words a status page
can print.
⚠️ ONE OR MORE ABSENT -> THE TOTAL IS ABSENT. NOT THE PARTIAL SUM. This is
the decision the card turns on and it was taken deliberately against the
alternative, which was to publish the partial sum ALONGSIDE a count of how
many entities contributed. Both are defensible; this one wins on the ONE
question that matters, which is who reads the number and when:
* the MQTT row is read back COLD, a week later, by OPT-10's attribution
and by whatever plots `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` over that week. A partial
sum there is a smaller number indistinguishable from a real one, and the
count that would have qualified it lives in a SECOND entity with its own
history - so believing the total requires joining two recorder series by
timestamp to find out which samples to distrust. Nobody re-derives that,
which is the same "nobody will re-derive it" TEL-11's note names. And it
is worse than a gap in exactly the direction that matters: a gap makes
the attribution say "I do not know", a partial sum makes it say "there
was less sun than there was".
* the STATUS PAGE is read LIVE, by a human, who wants the diagnostic. So
the partial information is not thrown away - `Controller.checks()` names
every entity that DID report, with its watts, and every one that did
not, with its reason, in a row that states plainly that there is no site
total. Different reader, different instant, different rule.
A count published beside the total would also carry no information in the
state this function actually admits: the total is published ONLY when every
entity contributed, so the count would be the constant `len(parts)`.
⚠️ AND `0 W` IS STILL A READING AT EVERY ROSTER SIZE - the test is
`watts is None`, never falsiness. An inverter honestly reporting 0 W at dusk
beside two that are producing must give the SUM of the three, not blank the
site: shading, a tripped string and nightfall are all real 0s, and a roster
that went to `unknown` whenever one member read zero would report an absence
on every clear evening and defeat the channel from the other end.
⚠️ TEL-14: `flip` is `inverted(opts)`; each member's sign is applied HERE,
before the sum, so every surface reads the corrected figure. `0.0 - w`
rather than `-w`, so a flipped 0 W is `0.0` and never `-0.0` on the wire.
"""
parts = [(ent, w if w is None or ent not in flip else 0.0 - w, why)
for ent, (w, why) in ((e, watts(st)) for e, st in readings)]
if not parts:
# No roster. `Controller` does not call this in that state - the gate is
# `pv_roster` - but a reader of `parts` should never have to wonder.
return None, "not configured", parts
if len(parts) == 1:
# ⚠️ AT ONE ENTITY THIS IS `watts()` AND NOTHING ELSE: the same value
# and the SAME `why` string, passed through rather than re-composed, so
# 0.11.0's single-entity surfaces are byte-identical rather than
# similar. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` grades that identity across trees.
return parts[0][1], parts[0][2], parts
missing = [(ent, why) for ent, w, why in parts if w is None]
if missing:
return None, (
f"only {len(parts) - len(missing)} of {len(parts)} entities are "
f"reporting and a partial sum would understate production: "
+ "; ".join(f"{ent} - {why}" for ent, why in missing)), parts
return (sum(w for _e, w, _y in parts),
f"{len(parts)} entities", parts)
+518
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@@ -0,0 +1,518 @@
"""SAFETY-10 - shadow mode: the whole decision path, and no command.
WHAT DEFECT THIS PREVENTS
=========================
Not one defect - the CLASS of them. Every optimiser fault this repository has
found was invisible from outside while it was happening, and each one was paid
for at the meter before anybody could see it:
* SAFETY-45 arbitrage against a binding `peak_cap_w` ran 28 charge onsets an
hour, the grid swinging -455 .. +3200 W, and put a billed
quarter 59 W over the cap;
* TARIFF-14 the price lookup answered for the wrong quarter-hour 45 minutes
in every 60, and traded on it;
* SAFETY-46 the SoC ceiling churns 598 Wh to gain 310 Wh, no hysteresis.
There was no way to WATCH what the optimiser would do without letting it do it.
A commissioning engineer could arm arbitrage and find out, or not arm it and
learn nothing. Shadow mode is the third option: strategies, arbiter, clamps and
guards all run, the decision is recorded with its reason, and NOTHING THE
CONTROLLER DECIDES REACHES THE INVERTER.
⚠️ AND OF THOSE THREE, A SHADOW RUN CAN SHOW YOU EXACTLY ONE - SEE THE NEXT
SECTION. This header used to name SAFETY-45's limit cycle as the example
of what shadow mode surfaces. That was false, and SAFETY-47 measured it.
⚠️ WHAT A SHADOW RUN CAN AND CANNOT SHOW (SAFETY-47)
=====================================================
SHADOW MODE CANNOT SURFACE A CLOSED-LOOP DEFECT. Not badly, not partially -
NOT AT ALL, and by the same construction that makes it safe. The actuator is
held at WIRE_W and the carried command is re-seeded to WIRE_W, so every
MEASURED input - the meter, the quarter accumulator behind it, the battery
power, the state of charge - describes a plant that DID NOT RESPOND. A
closed-loop defect is by definition one whose stimulus is the plant's response
to the controller. No response, no stimulus, no defect to see.
That is not a gap to be closed later. Feeding the guards a simulated plant
instead is what SAFETY-10 §4 refuses for the sign watchdogs, for a reason that
applies to all of this: a controller reacting to a plant that does not exist
drifts further from reality every tick, and three cycles in its numbers
describe nothing. THE CLOSED-LOOP ANSWER COMES FROM A CLOSED-LOOP RIG
(TEST-23 stage 3) OR FROM A LIVE RUN. There is no third place.
So, of the three defects above, measured on that rig at `peak_cap_w` 1500 /
house 1200 / `max_w` 2000, one hour at a 5 s cycle:
* SAFETY-45's limit cycle NOT VISIBLE. Live: 28 charge onsets, the grid
swinging -455.5 .. +3200.0 W, the guard engaged
on 410 of 720 cycles. Shadow, same hour, same
code: 1 onset, the grid flat at the 1200 W
house, the guard engaged on 0 of 720. Every
term of `wanted = batt_w + excess` is measured.
* SAFETY-46's SoC churn NOT VISIBLE. The SoC moves 0.000000000 pp in a
shadow run, because it is the pack's integral of
what the pack was commanded and the pack was
commanded 0 W. No SoC limit can be REACHED in a
shadow run; the ones already crossed when it
started are reported, and that is all.
* TARIFF-14's wrong quarter VISIBLE, and it is the one. The price lookup's
inputs are the CLOCK and the PRICE SERIES, and
neither is a function of what the battery did.
Measured: which hour the strategy picked, its
price and the spread it cleared are identical
live and shadow on 720 of 720 charging cycles,
AT A BINDING CAP.
⚠️ THE EXEMPTION THAT USED TO BE HERE WAS TRUE UNTIL SAFETY-45 MERGED. This
module, DOCS.md and DECISIONS/SAFETY-10-shadow-mode.md all said "the strategies
are unaffected - they ask for a fixed power from inputs that do not depend on
what the battery did". SAFETY-45 made the buy leg `min(asked, headroom)` with
headroom = (900 / remaining) x (ceiling - projected)
and `projected` reads the OPEN QUARTER'S ACCUMULATOR - the meter - which is a
function of what the battery did earlier in that same quarter. The strategy
became closed-loop the day that landed. What survives of the exemption, and
only this:
WHICH hour a strategy picks, and WHY, are unaffected.
HOW HARD it trades is not.
⚠️ AND THE SIZE A SHADOW RUN RECORDS IS THE RIGHT ANSWER TO A QUESTION NOBODY
ASKED. `900/remaining` is correct arithmetic for a meter that is genuinely
under the ceiling - and in shadow the meter genuinely IS under it, because the
battery is not charging. So the number is not a bug; it is an answer computed
for a plant that did not exist. Measured on the same rig, shipped code:
cap / house live commanded shadow recorded over
1500 / 1200 -302.4 W -2000.0 W 6.61x
3500 / 3000 -502.6 W -2000.0 W 3.98x
3500 / 2000 -1502.6 W -2000.0 W 1.33x
3500 / 1800 -1702.6 W -2000.0 W 1.17x
15000 / 350 -2000.0 W -2000.0 W 1.00x
The last row is the fixture SAFETY-10's own evidence was taken on, which is why
nothing reported this. `words()` carries the caveat rather than a re-computed
number, and `DECISIONS/SAFETY-47-what-a-shadow-run-can-show.md` §3 records the
three alternatives that were rejected and why.
⚠️ "REACHES NOTHING" IS NOT "WRITES NOTHING", AND THE DIFFERENCE IS THE WHOLE
SAFETY ARGUMENT
=======================================================================
The inverter holds its last command FOREVER - it has no meter timeout
(HANDOVER.md §6), and firmware/goodwe-master.yaml's header records what that
cost when a controller stopped refreshing: Illusmart went silent mid-command
and the inverter held +5000 W for 113 s. main.py's own header carries the same
measurement. So a shadow mode that
simply stopped writing would leave whatever was standing when it was switched
on standing for as long as it was left on. That is the exact failure this
repository keeps finding - LOOKS HEALTHY BUT IS INERT - with the status page
calmly reporting that nothing is being commanded.
So shadow mode does write, and it writes ONE number:
the actuator is held at WIRE_W (0.0 W), refreshed on the ordinary
heartbeat, by the ordinary single writer.
That is a DEFINED, SAFE actuator state, it is the same state the operator's
stop button reaches, and it honours the contract firmware/goodwe-master.yaml
§"CONTRACT CHANGE" imposes on us - HA must rewrite the setpoint every ~10 s or
the ESP32's 30 s stale-input watchdog cannot tell "steady" from "dead". Going
silent would put that board into a tripped-watchdog state for the whole shadow
run, which is an ALARM being used as a MODE: the operator who learns that
`wd_tripped` is normal during shadow runs is the operator who ignores it when
the add-on has actually died.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT A SECOND WRITE PATH. SAFETY-28's rule is one actuator, one
writer. Shadow mode files no claim, owns no transport and calls nothing in
hass.py. It is a SUBSTITUTION inside `Controller._write_unit()` - the single
choke point every write in this add-on already goes through - in exactly the
form the three substitutions above it take (non-finite -> 0 W, unauthorised ->
0 W, clamped -> the rating). It is the LAST of them, so SAFETY-28's
authorisation gate and SAFETY-03's clamp still grade the number the decision
path actually produced, and a shadow run therefore records that the clamp WOULD
have engaged.
THE DEFAULT, AND WHY IT IS NOT A PLAIN `true` (§ the ticket's own warning)
==========================================================================
The card is titled "default-on". Taken literally - `shadow_mode: true` in
`config.yaml`'s `options:` block - it is the worst change in this repository's
history. Home Assistant's Supervisor composes an add-on's effective options as
`{**config.yaml defaults, **the stored user options}`, so a NEW key with a new
default reaches EVERY install on the next update, including the one regulating
a real battery in the author's house today. Literal default-on silently stops
an existing install from controlling, and the only symptom is a battery that
has stopped doing anything.
There is no mechanism in the add-on options system that lets one key default
differently for a new install and an existing one: `options:` IS the default,
and there is exactly one of it. So "default-on for new" has to be expressed as
a value the add-on RESOLVES, not as a constant the Supervisor merges.
Hence three values rather than two, defaulting to `auto`:
off never shadow. The controller commands the battery.
on always shadow, whatever the start/stop button says.
auto shadow WHILE CONTROL IS STOPPED; live once it is started.
`auto` is default-on for a new install and a no-op for an existing one, and it
is that without any persisted marker, any migration, and any guess:
* a FRESH install ships `auto_start: false` and has no stored `auto` key, so
it comes up stopped -> shadow. It observes a day of decisions before it is
ever allowed to command anything. That is the card's intent, delivered.
* an install that is CONTROLLING - `auto_start: true`, or the operator has
pressed *Start / stop control* and the store carries `auto: true` - is
started, so `auto` resolves to LIVE and its behaviour does not change by
one watt.
* an install that is STOPPED keeps its actuator at 0 W exactly as before -
the same number, from the same writer, on the same heartbeat - and gains
the recording. The only thing that changes for it is what the status page
and the action log SAY.
⚠️ AND `auto` MEANS THE START BUTTON LEAVES SHADOW MODE. That is deliberate:
under `auto` the button reads "Start / stop control" and pressing Start is the
operator saying "control the battery". An operator who wants the decisions
recorded WHILE the loop runs sets `shadow_mode: on` explicitly - that is the
configuration this card exists to make possible, and it is the one that cannot
be reached by accident.
⚠️ AN UNRECOGNISED VALUE RESOLVES TO SHADOW, NOT TO LIVE. `validate.py` refuses
it at startup so this is not meant to be reachable, but the fail-safe direction
for "the operator's intent is unreadable" is the one that does not move energy.
THE FAILSAFES, ONE BY ONE (the card asks for each to be decided and recorded)
============================================================================
| failsafe | in shadow mode |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| SAFETY-02/30 sign watchdogs | INERT, and by construction rather than by |
| (per-unit and site) | a special case. They grade |
| | `Inverter.standing_w()` - what this |
| | controller has standing on the wire - and |
| | shadow mode holds that at 0 W. A 0 W |
| | command cannot oppose a meter, so the |
| | detector never arms. ⚠️ THIS IS THE ONE |
| | THAT HAD TO BE GOT RIGHT: fed the SHADOW |
| | decision instead, every shadow run would |
| | latch a trip within `sign_disagree_s` - |
| | the decision opposes a meter that never |
| | saw it - and that latch SURVIVES INTO |
| | LIVE OPERATION and a restart. Shadow mode |
| | would manufacture the failsafe it is |
| | meant to help debug. |
| SAFETY-03 clamp | OBSERVES. It runs on the number the |
| | decision path produced, `clamp_last` is |
| | set and every engagement goes to the |
| | action log, because "it would have hit |
| | the rating" is part of what a shadow run |
| | is for. It changes no command: the value |
| | it narrows is replaced by 0 W below it. |
| SAFETY-28 write authorisation | OBSERVES, for the same reason and in the |
| | same place - above the substitution, so |
| | it still asks who chose the number. |
| SAFETY-18 meter freeze | OBSERVES, unchanged. It takes no action |
| | in live operation either; it grades the |
| | resolved intent against a meter that has |
| | stopped moving, and both halves are as |
| | true in shadow as out of it. |
| SAFETY-07/24/25 peak guard | OBSERVES, AND SEES ONLY THE HOUSE. It is |
| | level-triggered and unlatched and it files|
| | its claim as usual, so the recorded |
| | decision is the real one FOR THIS METER - |
| | but every term of `wanted = batt_w + |
| | excess` is measured, and in shadow mode |
| | the battery contributes nothing to either.|
| | ⚠️ SAFETY-47: this row used to claim |
| | SAFETY-45's limit cycle was visible from a|
| | shadow run. It is not - 410/720 engaged |
| | cycles live against 0/720 in shadow, on |
| | the same hour and the same code. |
| SAFETY-31 circulation | OBSERVES AND MAY LATCH, legitimately. Its |
| SAFETY-42 delivery | evidence is MEASURED power, not a |
| | command: packs pushing against each other |
| | while every one of them is told 0 W is a |
| | real fault and a latch is the right |
| | answer to it. |
| operator stop (`auto` False) | SUPPRESSED AS A CLAIM, ENFORCED AT THE |
| | WIRE. It is the one deliberate change. |
| | Its `P_SAFETY` 0 W claim out-ranks |
| | everything, so leaving it in would make |
| | the recorded decision "stopped" on every |
| | cycle - the shadow run would answer the |
| | wrong question. The actuator state is |
| | identical either way, and the wire |
| | substitution is STRICTLY STRONGER than |
| | the claim: a claim can be out-ranked, and |
| | this cannot. |
| inputs missing, non-finite, | UNCHANGED. All of them resolve to 0 W, |
| allocator refusal, arbiter | which is what the wire gets in shadow |
| contradiction | mode anyway, so they act redundantly and |
| | are recorded as they always were. |
⚠️ MAINTENANCE IS NOT IN THAT TABLE BECAUSE SHADOW MODE DOES NOT TOUCH IT. The
state machines are ticked on every cycle today whether control is started or
not, so a stopped install already runs them against a battery that does not
move. Shadow mode inherits that, unchanged and unimproved; it is a pre-existing
property of `auto_start: false` and it is recorded here rather than quietly
fixed under another card's name.
LEAVING SHADOW MODE
===================
`Controller.cycle()` re-seeds its carried command (`self.target` and each
`inv.target`) to WIRE_W at the END of every shadow cycle, AFTER every in-cycle
guard has read the decision. Two things follow, and both are safety properties:
* the loop's `prev_w` and its integrator track WHAT IS ACTUALLY STANDING ON
THE WIRE, so every shadow cycle answers "from where the plant really is,
what would this controller do NOW" - a true statement about the present,
rather than a simulation of a counterfactual plant that drifts further from
reality every tick;
* the exit is safe BY CONSTRUCTION. The carried command already equals the
standing command, so the first live cycle slews from 0 W like any other
cycle. Carrying the shadow decision instead would let the slew limiter
depart from a base that never existed - up to a full `slew_w` step onto a
battery sitting at zero.
The entry is safe for the ordinary reason: the substitution happens on the very
first write of the very first shadow cycle, and `last_write` was not 0 W, so
that write is issued rather than skipped as unchanged.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
# ⚠️ CFG-03's mirror. `test_defaults_pin.py` part 2 discovers every
# module-level name ending in OPTION_DEFAULTS and asserts each value
# reproduces config.yaml EXACTLY, so this table cannot drift from the shipped
# default. Nothing in the add-on may carry a literal fallback for a key a
# mirror answers for - part 3 scans for that - which is why `main.py` asks the
# functions below and never reads `shadow_mode` itself.
SHADOW_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
"shadow_mode": "auto",
}
#: The three values `shadow_mode` may take, in the order config.yaml's schema
#: lists them. `validate.py` refuses anything else by name.
MODES = ("auto", "on", "off")
#: What stands on the wire while shadow mode is engaged. ⚠️ A NUMBER, NOT A
#: SILENCE - see this module's header. It is 0.0 W for the same reason every
#: other refusal in this add-on is 0.0 W: fail toward inaction, and keep
#: commanding it so the inverter cannot be left latched on anything else.
WIRE_W = 0.0
#: SAFETY-47. What the recorded watts mean when a MEASURED billed quarter sized
#: them.
#:
#: ⚠️ "UPPER BOUND" AND NOT "SMALLER", AND THE DIFFERENCE WAS MEASURED RATHER
#: THAN ARGUED. Charging only ADDS offtake, so a live meter's `projected` is
#: never below a shadow meter's and the headroom is never above it: the shadow
#: size is >= the live size, with EQUALITY at the start of every quarter, where
#: `900/remaining` is 1.0 and neither plant has moved. Measured pairwise over
#: 3600 charging cycles in five configurations - 0 cycles below, 730 exactly
#: equal. A sentence reading "smaller" would have been false on every one of
#: those 730.
#:
#: ⚠️ AND IT NAMES NO FACTOR. How far under the bound a live run lands is a
#: property of the site - 6.61x at a 1500 W cap under a 1200 W house, 1.00x at
#: a cap that does not bind - and a number invented for the row would be a
#: second helping of the defect this constant exists to disclose.
SIZED_FROM_METER = (
"⚠️ AND ITS SIZE CAME FROM THE BILLED-QUARTER METER, WHICH HAS ONLY THE "
"HOUSE IN IT WHILE THE BATTERY IS HELD AT 0 W. A live run sizes the same "
"trade against a meter the battery is moving, so this is an UPPER BOUND "
"and not a prediction; how far under it a live run lands is a closed-loop "
"question and a shadow run cannot answer it")
def mode(opts: dict) -> str:
"""The configured `shadow_mode`, normalised to one of `MODES`.
⚠️ AN UNRECOGNISED VALUE ANSWERS `"on"`, NOT `"auto"` AND NOT `"off"`.
`validate.py` refuses such a value at startup, so this branch is not meant
to be reachable at all; it exists because the fail-safe direction for "the
operator's intent cannot be read" is the one that does not move energy. A
typo that silently resolved to `off` would put a battery under a controller
whose configuration nobody could parse.
"""
raw = opts.get("shadow_mode", SHADOW_OPTION_DEFAULTS["shadow_mode"])
text = str("" if raw is None else raw).strip().lower()
if text in MODES:
return text
return "on"
def engaged(opts: dict, *, control_started: bool) -> bool:
"""Is the battery being left alone right now?
`control_started` is `Controller.auto` - the persisted start/stop state,
which a fresh install gets from `auto_start` and an operator moves with the
*Start / stop control* button. See the header on why `auto` reads it.
"""
m = mode(opts)
if m == "off":
return False
if m == "on":
return True
return not control_started
def why(opts: dict, *, control_started: bool) -> str:
"""Which rung decided, in the words an operator can act on.
⚠️ THE REASON, NOT ONLY THE VERDICT - MUTATION.md's masking rule. `on` and
`auto`-while-stopped produce the same boolean and want different operator
actions: one is turned off by editing an option, the other by pressing a
button. A surface that showed only "shadow" would make a mutation that
swapped the two rungs invisible.
"""
# ⚠️ THE LIVE SENTENCES SAY "NOT IN SHADOW MODE", NOT "THE BATTERY IS
# BEING CONTROLLED". The second is FALSE on a stopped install with
# `shadow_mode: off` - nothing is regulating there either - and a row that
# is false in one of the four live states is a row an operator learns to
# discount. What is true in every live state is that what this add-on
# decides reaches the inverter; whether control is RUNNING is the
# `Stopped` banner's question and it is answered there.
m = mode(opts)
if m == "off":
return ("off (shadow_mode: off) - NOT in shadow mode: what this "
"add-on decides DOES reach the inverter")
if m == "on":
return ("on (shadow_mode: on) - decisions are recorded and nothing "
"is commanded")
if control_started:
return ("off (shadow_mode: auto, control is started) - NOT in shadow "
"mode: what this add-on decides DOES reach the inverter")
return ("on (shadow_mode: auto, control is stopped) - decisions are "
"recorded and nothing is commanded")
def words(opts: dict, *, control_started: bool, would_w: float | None,
sized_from_meter: bool, reason: str = "") -> str:
"""The status page's `Shadow mode` row.
⚠️ THE ROW IS RENDERED IN EVERY STATE, INCLUDING `off`. A surface whose
ABSENCE is how you learn which mode you are in is a surface an operator
has to already know about; TARIFF-11's rule is that the rendered text is
what gets graded, so there has to be text in both states.
`would_w` is the decision the path reached this cycle - what a live
controller would have put on the wire GIVEN THIS METER AND A BATTERY AT
0 W - and `reason` is `Resolution.explain()`, the same sentence the `Why`
row carries. Together they are the whole of "what would it have done, and
why"; without them the row would say a shadow run happened and nothing
about what it found.
⚠️ `sized_from_meter` HAS NO DEFAULT, AND THAT IS SAFETY-47's WHOLE POINT.
It is True when a MEASURED billed-quarter headroom sized the number being
recorded - `arbitrage.sized_from_meter()` answers it, and it is the one
place the question is asked. A default of False here would be a caller
that forgot the caveat rendering a row that reads exactly like a caller
that decided it did not apply, which is the shape of defect this card is
about. TEST-14's rule with a new name on it.
⚠️ AND THE PHRASE IS "ON THIS CYCLE", UNCONDITIONALLY, NOT ONLY WHEN THE
CAVEAT FIRES. Every number a shadow run records was reached from a plant
that did not respond; "WOULD HAVE COMMANDED -2 000 W" reads as a forecast
of a live run and no number here is one. The ⚠️ below is the STRONGER,
conditional statement about the cycles where the answer can be multiples
out - see this module's header for the measured table.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT KEYED ON WHETHER THE TRADE WAS CAPPED. `arbitrage`'s own
sentence says "SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD" only when the headroom
came out BELOW the ask - which in a shadow run is the START of the
quarter, where the two runs still agree. By the end of the quarter
`900/remaining` has multiplied the headroom past the ask, the trade is
NOT capped, the sentence is silent and the recorded number is at its most
wrong. A caveat keyed on that sentence would be quietest exactly where it
is needed loudest. `test_arbitrage.py` part 3d-8 drives that.
"""
head = why(opts, control_started=control_started)
if not engaged(opts, control_started=control_started):
return head
if would_w is None:
return (f"{head}; no decision has been reached yet - the inverter is "
f"held at {WIRE_W:.0f} W")
# ⚠️ THE THOUSANDS SEPARATOR IS SWAPPED ON THE NUMBER ALONE. Applied to
# the whole sentence it ate the comma out of `head` - and `head` is the
# half that says WHICH RUNG decided, which is the claim MUTATION.md's
# masking rule says must survive.
num = f"{float(would_w):+,.0f}".replace(",", " ")
out = (f"{head}; ON THIS CYCLE WOULD HAVE COMMANDED {num} W, inverter "
f"held at {WIRE_W:.0f} W")
if sized_from_meter:
out += f" {SIZED_FROM_METER}"
if reason:
out += f" - {reason}"
return out
def log_line(*, would_w: float, reason: str, sized_from_meter: bool) -> str:
"""The action-log line for one change of shadow decision.
⚠️ IT IS A FUNCTION FOR THE REASON `words()` IS ONE, AND SAFETY-47 LEARNED
IT THE EXPENSIVE WAY. This sentence used to be an f-string inside
`Controller._shadow_settle()`. Deleting the caveat from it there left all
29 files GREEN - the only check that could see the line drove a fixture
with `meter_source: off`, where no arbitrage decision and therefore no
caveat can ever be reached. A sentence assembled at a call site is a
sentence no check can grade, and the page would have said one thing while
the record a later analysis reads said another.
⚠️ AND IT IS THE SAME `SIZED_FROM_METER` CONSTANT THE ROW CARRIES, not a
second wording of it. Two sentences meaning one thing is how the two
surfaces start disagreeing about which cycles are caveated.
"""
out = (f"SHADOW: would have commanded {float(would_w):+.0f} W ON THIS "
f"CYCLE - {reason}")
if sized_from_meter:
out += f" {SIZED_FROM_METER}"
return out
def banner(opts: dict, *, control_started: bool, latched: tuple = ()) -> tuple:
"""`(level, text)` for the top of the status page, or `None` when live.
⚠️ IT NAMES A STANDING LATCH AND GOES RED FOR ONE. The shadow banner sits
ABOVE every other branch of the cascade, because "the battery is not being
controlled" is the one sentence that may never be displaced - but a
failsafe latch that is up while the controller is inert is up when it
stops being inert, and an operator who turns shadow mode off without
clearing it gets a battery that will not move and a green page that
never mentioned why. So the latch is carried INTO the shadow banner
rather than losing its own.
"""
if not engaged(opts, control_started=control_started):
return None
text = ("SHADOW MODE - the battery is NOT being controlled. Every "
f"inverter is held at {WIRE_W:.0f} W and nothing this add-on "
"decides reaches the inverter.")
if latched:
return ("bad", text + " ⚠️ A FAILSAFE LATCH IS STILL UP ("
+ ", ".join(latched) + ") and it will still be up when shadow "
"mode is turned off.")
return ("warn", text)
def problems(opts: dict) -> list:
"""`validate.py`'s rule: `shadow_mode` must be one of the three values.
⚠️ THE SENTENCE SPELLS `shadow_mode`. `configui.problems_by_field()` files
a refusal under the field whose key its text contains; a rule that never
names a key lands in the page's top-level block instead, where the operator
cannot see which control is wrong. UX-02's whole point is that the shipped
validator is the only rule surface, so the rule has to be readable there.
⚠️ AND IT IS A REFUSAL RATHER THAN A COERCION. `mode()` resolves an
unreadable value to shadow, which is the safe direction but is also a
SILENT reinterpretation of what the operator wrote - and an install left in
shadow mode by a typo commands nothing at all, indefinitely.
"""
raw = opts.get("shadow_mode", SHADOW_OPTION_DEFAULTS["shadow_mode"])
text = str("" if raw is None else raw).strip().lower()
if text in MODES:
return []
return [f"shadow_mode is {raw!r}, which is not one of "
+ ", ".join(f"'{m}'" for m in MODES)
+ ". 'auto' leaves the battery alone while control is stopped and "
"commands it once control is started; 'on' records every "
"decision and commands nothing at all; 'off' is ordinary "
"control."]
+335 -47
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ is an EMS for a minority." The §9.2 product table maps four products onto four
EMS behaviours, and TARIFF-02 shipped the machinery for the top two only:
Dynamic day-ahead hourly EPEX BE + markup full arbitrage
Real-time/imbalance e.g. Eneco Eddy Flex arbitrage, wider thresholds
Real-time/imbalance no shipped plugin (TARIFF-07) arbitrage, wider thresh.
Static day/night two-period tariff TIME-WINDOW SHIFTING <- here
Fully fixed single price SELF-CONSUMPTION ONLY <- here
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from .price import (
MAX_PLAUSIBLE_EUR_KWH, Absence, PricePoint, PriceProduct, PriceRead,
Uncertainty, _Outcome, brussels, load_prices, price_option,
required_spread, uncertainty_of, widen_factor,
provider_configured, required_spread, uncertainty_of, widen_factor,
)
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.tariff.static")
@@ -222,6 +222,12 @@ _DAY_ALIASES = {
MINUTES_PER_DAY = 1440
# TARIFF-17. The option key whose value is a period table of the TAXES
# component. One spelling, here, because price.py, validate.py and config.yaml
# all name it and `provider_id()`'s note says what three spellings of one
# decision cost.
TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION = "price_taxes_profile"
# The mean that `cheap_now()` grades against is taken over this many local days.
# Seven, so each weekday appears exactly once - see the module docstring. It is
# a MODULE CONSTANT and not an option on purpose: CFG-03 already tracks three
@@ -320,13 +326,37 @@ def _days(value, field: str) -> frozenset:
return frozenset(out)
def _price(value, field: str) -> float:
"""The all-in EUR/kWh for a period, bounded exactly as price.py bounds a feed."""
# What a period's `eur_per_kwh` MEANS, per option. The grammar is one grammar
# (TARIFF-17); the quantity it carries is not, so the "you left this out"
# sentence is the one thing the two tables do not share.
_PERIOD_MEANS = {
"static_profile":
"an all-in eur_per_kwh (energy + supplier markup + taxes, §9.3) - the "
"same basis the dynamic providers are assembled onto, so the two are "
"comparable",
}
_TAXES_MEANS = (
"the TAXES component alone in eur_per_kwh - the non-energy part of the "
"bill for that band (distribution, levies, VAT), NOT an all-in price. The "
"framework adds it to what the feed publishes, exactly as the scalar "
"price_taxes_eur_kwh is added"
)
_PERIOD_MEANS[TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION] = _TAXES_MEANS
def _price(value, field: str, means: str = None) -> float:
"""One period's EUR/kWh, bounded exactly as price.py bounds a feed.
`means` names the quantity for the error sentence only. TARIFF-17: the same
grammar carries an ALL-IN price under `static_profile` and a TAXES-ONLY
component under `price_taxes_profile`, and an operator who confuses the two
is out by an energy price - so the refusal says which one is wanted.
"""
if means is None:
means = _PERIOD_MEANS["static_profile"]
if value is None:
raise ProfileInvalid(
f"{field} is missing. Every period needs an all-in eur_per_kwh "
f"(energy + supplier markup + taxes, §9.3) - the same basis the "
f"dynamic providers are assembled onto, so the two are comparable.")
f"{field} is missing. Every period needs {means}.")
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, (int, float, str)):
raise ProfileInvalid(f"{field} is {value!r}, which is not a number")
try:
@@ -383,14 +413,19 @@ class Period:
class StaticProfile:
"""A validated two-or-more-period tariff. Immutable, pure, I/O-free."""
def __init__(self, periods):
def __init__(self, periods, *, option: str = "static_profile"):
self.periods = tuple(periods)
# ⚠️ TARIFF-17: the OPTION NAME travels with the profile so that every
# refusal names the key the operator actually typed. It is a default
# argument on purpose - every pre-existing call site and every
# pre-existing sentence is byte-identical without it.
self.option = option
if not self.periods:
raise ProfileInvalid(
"static_profile has no periods. A profile with no periods is "
"not a fixed tariff, it is an absent one - leave the option "
"empty to say that on purpose (§11.4 then applies).")
_check_tiling(self.periods)
f"{option} has no periods. A profile with no periods is "
f"not a fixed tariff, it is an absent one - leave the option "
f"empty to say that on purpose (§11.4 then applies).")
_check_tiling(self.periods, option=option)
# -- what kind of tariff this is, DERIVED --------------------------------
@property
@@ -477,7 +512,7 @@ class StaticProfile:
u += timedelta(hours=1)
if not out:
raise ProfileInvalid(
f"static_profile.series({since.isoformat()}, "
f"{self.option}.series({since.isoformat()}, "
f"{until.isoformat()}) spans no whole hour. An empty series is "
f"not constructible downstream on purpose (price.py trap 3).")
return out
@@ -489,7 +524,7 @@ class StaticProfile:
return f"{kind}: " + "; ".join(p.words for p in self.periods)
def _check_tiling(periods) -> None:
def _check_tiling(periods, *, option: str = "static_profile") -> None:
"""Every day type must be covered by EXACTLY ONE period, every minute.
⚠️ REFUSES BOTH DIRECTIONS. A gap means an hour with no price, and the only
@@ -506,22 +541,22 @@ def _check_tiling(periods) -> None:
if n > 1 and over_from is None:
over_from = (minute, n)
if n != 0 and gap_from is not None:
_raise_gap(weekday, gap_from, minute)
_raise_gap(weekday, gap_from, minute, option)
if n <= 1 and over_from is not None:
_raise_overlap(weekday, over_from, minute, periods)
_raise_overlap(weekday, over_from, minute, periods, option)
if gap_from is not None:
_raise_gap(weekday, gap_from, MINUTES_PER_DAY)
_raise_gap(weekday, gap_from, MINUTES_PER_DAY, option)
if over_from is not None:
_raise_overlap(weekday, over_from, MINUTES_PER_DAY, periods)
_raise_overlap(weekday, over_from, MINUTES_PER_DAY, periods, option)
def _hhmm(m):
return f"{m // 60:02d}:{m % 60:02d}"
def _raise_gap(weekday, start, end):
def _raise_gap(weekday, start, end, option="static_profile"):
raise ProfileInvalid(
f"static_profile leaves {DAY_NAMES[weekday]} "
f"{option} leaves {DAY_NAMES[weekday]} "
f"{_hhmm(start)}-{_hhmm(end)} with no period, so those hours have no "
f"price. Refused rather than defaulted: an invented price is one an "
f"optimiser would trade on, and §11.4 already says what a missing price "
@@ -529,19 +564,28 @@ def _raise_gap(weekday, start, end):
f"\"22:00-07:00 mon-fri\" does NOT cover Saturday morning.")
def _raise_overlap(weekday, over, end, periods):
def _raise_overlap(weekday, over, end, periods, option="static_profile"):
start, n = over
names = [p.name for p in periods if p.covers(weekday, start)]
raise ProfileInvalid(
f"static_profile gives {DAY_NAMES[weekday]} {_hhmm(start)}-"
f"{option} gives {DAY_NAMES[weekday]} {_hhmm(start)}-"
f"{_hhmm(end)} {n} prices at once ({', '.join(names)}). Two prices for "
f"one hour means one of them silently wins on list order. Narrow one of "
f"the windows or split the day selector.")
def parse_static_profile(value):
def parse_static_profile(value, *, option: str = "static_profile",
means: str = None):
"""`static_profile` -> a `StaticProfile`, or None when unset.
⚠️ TARIFF-17 MADE `option`/`means` PARAMETERS RATHER THAN FORKING THIS
FUNCTION, and that is the whole of the reuse. A second period parser would
be a second tiling rule, a second day-type rule and a second set of DST
bugs, diverging first on the 23- and 25-hour days where nobody looks. The
two arguments move only the OPTION NAME and the "what this number is"
clause through the refusals; the grammar, the tiling check and the wrapping
rule are one implementation with one set of checks over it.
Accepts what the option can actually arrive as:
* `None` / `""` / `"null"` - unset. §14 ships `static_profile: null`.
* a JSON string - what config.yaml's flat `str?` option
@@ -555,6 +599,8 @@ def parse_static_profile(value):
"""
if value is None:
return None
if means is None:
means = _PERIOD_MEANS.get(option, _PERIOD_MEANS["static_profile"])
if isinstance(value, str):
text = value.strip()
if not text or text.lower() in ("null", "none", "off"):
@@ -563,7 +609,7 @@ def parse_static_profile(value):
value = json.loads(text)
except ValueError as e:
raise ProfileInvalid(
f"static_profile is not valid JSON ({e}). It is a JSON object "
f"{option} is not valid JSON ({e}). It is a JSON object "
f"with a \"periods\" list, on one line, e.g.\n"
f' {{"periods": [{{"name":"day","from":"07:00","to":"22:00",'
f'"days":"mon-fri","eur_per_kwh":0.34}}, ...]}}\n'
@@ -573,7 +619,7 @@ def parse_static_profile(value):
tz = str(value.get("timezone", "") or "").strip().lower()
if tz not in SUPPORTED_TZ:
raise ProfileInvalid(
f"static_profile.timezone is {value.get('timezone')!r}. Only "
f"{option}.timezone is {value.get('timezone')!r}. Only "
f"Europe/Brussels is supported: the shipped image carries no tz "
f"database (see app/price.py), so any other zone could not be "
f"honoured and would be silently treated as Brussels - which is "
@@ -581,24 +627,24 @@ def parse_static_profile(value):
rows = value.get("periods")
if rows is None:
raise ProfileInvalid(
"static_profile has no \"periods\" list. Even a fully-fixed "
"tariff is written as one period covering 00:00-24:00 all days "
"- one shape for both products, so nothing downstream branches "
"on which kind of site this is.")
f"{option} has no \"periods\" list. Even a fully-fixed "
f"tariff is written as one period covering 00:00-24:00 all days "
f"- one shape for both products, so nothing downstream branches "
f"on which kind of site this is.")
else:
rows = value
if not isinstance(rows, (list, tuple)):
raise ProfileInvalid(
f"static_profile.periods is {type(rows).__name__}, not a list")
f"{option}.periods is {type(rows).__name__}, not a list")
periods = []
for i, row in enumerate(rows, start=1):
if not isinstance(row, dict):
raise ProfileInvalid(
f"static_profile.periods[{i}] is {type(row).__name__}, not an "
f"{option}.periods[{i}] is {type(row).__name__}, not an "
f"object with from/to/days/eur_per_kwh")
where = f"static_profile.periods[{i}]"
where = f"{option}.periods[{i}]"
name = str(row.get("name", "") or f"period{i}").strip() or f"period{i}"
start = _minutes(row.get("from", row.get("start")), f"{where}.from")
end = _minutes(row.get("to", row.get("end")), f"{where}.to")
@@ -617,8 +663,47 @@ def parse_static_profile(value):
end_min=end,
days=_days(row.get("days"), f"{where}.days"),
eur_per_kwh=_price(row.get("eur_per_kwh"),
f"{where}.eur_per_kwh")))
return StaticProfile(periods)
f"{where}.eur_per_kwh",
means)))
return StaticProfile(periods, option=option)
def parse_taxes_profile(value):
"""`price_taxes_profile` -> a `StaticProfile` of TAX values, or None.
TARIFF-17. THE DEFECT THIS EXISTS TO CLOSE: `price.py` modelled the whole
non-energy part of a Belgian bill as ONE scalar. In Flanders that is
correct - Fluvius distribution is a single rate and its tariff card offers
only `Normaal | Uitsl. nacht`, where *exclusive night* is a separate
physical circuit rather than a night register. The Walloon and Brussels
DSOs are on the same card with four columns - `Enkelvoudig | Dag | Nacht |
Uitsl. nacht` - and the day/night gap is real money:
ORES dag 13,27 nacht 7,39 -> 5,88 c EUR/kWh
AIESH dag 15,17 nacht 8,21 -> 6,96
Tecteo RESA dag 12,20 nacht 7,01 -> 5,19
Sibelga (BXL) dag 9,39 nacht 7,10 -> 2,29
ORES IMPACT dag 16,578 nacht 5,090 -> 11,49 (2026)
⚠️ AND THE BANDS ARE ANTI-CORRELATED WITH WHAT THE BATTERY WANTS TO DO.
The cheap network hours are the cheap spot hours, so flattening them does
not merely shift the curve - it SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERSTATES the true spread
and makes the add-on decline cycles that are genuinely profitable. See
DOCS.md "The three buckets" for why the flat scalar could never have done
this: an additive constant, identical every hour, cancels exactly in
`max - min` and cannot move `min(firm, key=...)` either.
⚠️ THE VALUE IS THE TAXES COMPONENT, NOT AN ALL-IN PRICE. `static_profile`
uses the same grammar for an all-in figure; the two are one parser and two
meanings, and `_price()`'s refusal names which one it wanted.
⚠️ NOT PARSED ON THE FETCH PATH. validate.py refuses a malformed table at
STARTUP, by the rule `price.py` trap 3 states for `static_profile`: a table
that cannot be parsed at 03:00 is a site that stops pricing at 03:00, and
§11.4 makes that quiet.
"""
return parse_static_profile(value, option=TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION,
means=_TAXES_MEANS)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@@ -728,6 +813,33 @@ class TariffPlan:
self.origin = origin
# -- derived facts -------------------------------------------------------
@property
def from_feed(self) -> bool:
"""Is this series an OBSERVATION of the configured provider's feed?
TARIFF-12. `origin` names four ways a plan is obtained; this collapses
them to the one question a caller holding a PREVIOUS plan has to ask
about a new one - did this resolution see the feed, or is it standing
in for one that did not? Only `"provider"` saw it. `"fallback"` and
`"none"` are the two §11.4 rows, and `"static"` is a site with no
feed to observe at all, where the question does not arise.
⚠️ IT IS NOT `has_prices`, AND THE DIFFERENCE IS THE WHOLE POINT. A
§11.4 fallback HAS prices - the operator's own static profile - but
every point `_degrade()` builds carries `provisional=True`, so
`firm_points()` is empty, `arbitrage()` refuses and `cheap_now()` is
False. It is a real tariff and it is not an observation, and a caller
deciding whether to REPLACE an observation with it needs the second
fact, not the first.
⚠️ AND IT IS A PROPERTY HERE RATHER THAN AN `origin == "provider"` AT
THE CALL SITE, for `main.fresh_tariff_plan()`'s stated reason: a check
has to be able to assert on the shipped expression rather than on a
transcription that drifts, and `origin`'s vocabulary belongs to this
module.
"""
return self.origin == "provider"
@property
def has_prices(self) -> bool:
return self.read.match(series=lambda _r: True, no_data=lambda _r: False)
@@ -744,6 +856,63 @@ class TariffPlan:
series=lambda r: any(p.provisional for p in r.points),
no_data=lambda _r: True)
# -- the plan's SHAPE, in the two units it actually has (TARIFF-11) ------
# ⚠️ POINTS AND HOURS ARE TWO NUMBERS AND THIS PLAN HAD ONLY EVER
# REPORTED ONE OF THEM, UNDER THE OTHER'S NAME. `words` read
# `f"... {len(self.read.points)} h"`, which counts POINTS: on the
# quarter-hourly Belgian feed (15-minute MTU, 2025-10-01) a 33-hour plan
# logged `dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 132 h`. It is the same
# conflation TARIFF-14 removed from `at()` and FCST-04 removed from the
# *Price history* row, left standing in the prose. ⚠️ AND THE ERROR IS
# NOT A FLAT 4x: a 40 h soak measured 1.79x .. 5.33x, because §8.3's
# carried points are HOURLY while the firm ones are quarter-hourly, so
# the ratio moves with the firm/carried mix as the day goes on. Nothing
# derived from ONE of these numbers can answer for the other.
@property
def n_points(self) -> int:
"""How many points the series carries. A `no_data` read carries none."""
return self.read.match(series=lambda r: len(r.points),
no_data=lambda _r: 0)
@property
def hours(self) -> int:
"""How many distinct WHOLE CLOCK HOURS those points touch.
Same rule as `price_history._held()`, deliberately - the *Tariff* and
*Price history* rows describe the same feed and an operator reading
`132 points over 33 h` beside `96 points over 24 h` must be able to
compare them. A point is attributed to the UTC hour its own start
falls in; hours the feed never printed are simply not in the set, so
this counts what is PRICED rather than what was asked for.
"""
return self.read.match(series=lambda r: _whole_hours(r.points),
no_data=lambda _r: 0)
@property
def n_firm(self) -> int:
"""Points carrying a published price for their own interval (§8.3)."""
return len(self.firm_points())
@property
def n_carried(self) -> int:
"""Points filled from yesterday's profile, or from §11.4's fallback."""
return self.n_points - self.n_firm
@property
def spacings_s(self) -> tuple:
"""The distinct gaps between consecutive points, ascending, in seconds.
⚠️ MIXED IS THE NORMAL STEADY STATE, NOT AN EDGE CASE. FCST-04's
carry-forward emits HOURLY carried points beside QUARTER-HOURLY firm
ones and the soak measured `[900, 3600]` in 70 % of samples - so a
surface reporting one global spacing would be wrong about the usual
case. `price._cover_table()` is where that rule is enforced; this
only reports it.
"""
return self.read.match(
series=lambda r: _spacings(r.points), no_data=lambda _r: ())
def price_at(self, instant: datetime) -> float:
"""EUR/kWh now. Raises `Absence` when there is no price - never 0.0."""
return self.read.match(
@@ -899,20 +1068,30 @@ class TariffPlan:
pts = self.read.points
firm = tuple(p for p in pts if not p.provisional)
if len(firm) < 2:
# ⚠️ POINTS, AND THE HOUR FIGURE BESIDE IT RATHER THAN INSTEAD OF
# IT (TARIFF-11). This sentence read "only 1 of 96 hours carry a
# published price" about 96 quarter-hourly points, which are 24
# hours - the point<->hour conflation TARIFF-14 removed from
# `at()`, still standing here, and this one reaches an OPERATOR
# through main.py's *Arbitrage* row and not only the log.
return Arbitrage.refuse(
f"§8.3: only {len(firm)} of {len(pts)} hours carry a published "
f"price - the rest are provisional (origin {self.origin!r}), "
f"and no irreversible action may be taken on a provisional "
f"price. A buy hour and a sell hour must BOTH be firm before a "
f"cycle can be committed. Load shifting, self-consumption and "
f"peak shaving continue")
f"§8.3: only {len(firm)} of {len(pts)} points carry a "
f"published price - {_whole_hours(firm)} of "
f"{_whole_hours(pts)} hours - and the rest are provisional "
f"(origin {self.origin!r}), so no irreversible action may be "
f"taken on them. A buy interval and a sell interval must BOTH "
f"be firm before a cycle can be committed. Load shifting, "
f"self-consumption and peak shaving continue")
spread = round(max(p.eur_per_kwh for p in firm)
- min(p.eur_per_kwh for p in firm), 6)
if spread == 0.0:
# ⚠️ POINTS AND HOURS, SEPARATELY, for the §8.3 rung's reason -
# this sentence counted points and called them "firm hours" too.
return Arbitrage.refuse(
f"the tariff is flat - every one of the {len(firm)} firm hours "
f"costs {firm[0].eur_per_kwh:.4f} EUR/kWh, so buying low and "
f"the tariff is flat - every one of the {len(firm)} firm "
f"points, spanning {_whole_hours(firm)} hours, costs "
f"{firm[0].eur_per_kwh:.4f} EUR/kWh, so buying low and "
f"selling high is arithmetically impossible. §9.2: a fully "
f"fixed product is self-consumption only")
@@ -942,15 +1121,77 @@ class TariffPlan:
@property
def words(self) -> str:
"""The plan's whole shape in one sentence - LOG *AND* STATUS PAGE.
⚠️ THIS STRING IS OPERATOR-FACING SINCE TARIFF-11, which is a reason
for its wording to matter MORE rather than less. It used to reach only
`_LOG.info("tariff refreshed: %s")`; main.py's *Tariff* row now carries
it, age-stamped, so every number in it is read by somebody who cannot
see the object.
⚠️ EVERY QUANTITY IS NAMED IN ITS OWN UNIT. `{n} points over {h} h` is
FCST-04's *Price history* wording on purpose - the two rows describe
the same feed and have to be comparable - and the firm/carried split
and the spacing are here because they were the two facts the soak
found an operator could not learn at all: the plan was `provisional`
for 76 % of a 40-hour soak and mixed 900/3600 s for 70 %, and no HTTP
surface said either.
"""
if not self.has_prices:
return f"no tariff - {self.read.reason}"
tag = {"provider": self.read.provider, "static": "static_profile",
"fallback": "static_profile (feed down)"}.get(self.origin,
self.origin)
return (f"{self.product.value} from {tag}, {len(self.read.points)} h"
gaps = self.spacings_s
return (f"{self.product.value} from {tag}, "
f"{self.n_points} points over {self.hours} h, "
f"{self.n_firm} firm / {self.n_carried} carried"
+ (f", {'+'.join(str(g) for g in gaps)} s spacing"
if gaps else "")
+ (", provisional" if self.provisional else ""))
def _whole_hours(points) -> int:
"""How many distinct whole CLOCK HOURS a point list touches. Never raises.
THE DEFECT THIS PREVENTS (TARIFF-11). Three sentences in this module
reported `len(points)` under the name "hours": `TariffPlan.words`, §8.3's
firm-pair refusal and the flat-tariff refusal. On the hourly series that
was the only resolution any fixture carried before TARIFF-08 the two
numbers are identical, which is why it shipped; on the Belgian
quarter-hourly feed (15-minute MTU, 2025-10-01) `words` read
`dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 132 h` for 33 hours and the
refusal read `only 1 of 96 hours` for 24.
⚠️ IT IS NOT `n / 4`, AND A CONSTANT FACTOR IS THE WRONG FIX. §8.3's
carry-forward emits ONE HOURLY point per unpublished hour beside the
feed's four-per-hour firm ones, so the measured overstatement over a
40-hour soak ranged 1.79x .. 5.33x as the mix moved. The hour count has
to be COUNTED.
⚠️ IT COUNTS PRICED HOURS, NOT THE HORIZON. FCST-04 leaves an hour out
of the series when neither the feed nor yesterday can price it, so this
is at most the horizon and is smaller whenever the plan has holes - which
is the honest direction for a figure an operator reads as "how far ahead
do I have prices".
"""
return len({p.start.astimezone(timezone.utc)
.replace(minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0) for p in points})
def _spacings(points) -> tuple:
"""Distinct gaps between consecutive points, ascending, in whole seconds.
Sorted by START, not by list order: `price._cover_table()` establishes
that order for `at()` rather than assuming it, and a surface that reported
the gaps of an unsorted list would print negative spacings about a series
that answers correctly.
"""
starts = sorted(p.start.astimezone(timezone.utc) for p in points)
return tuple(sorted({int((b - a).total_seconds())
for a, b in zip(starts, starts[1:])}))
def _absent(reason):
raise Absence(
f"this plan observed no prices ({reason}). A number invented here is "
@@ -1019,7 +1260,7 @@ def static_status(opts: dict, now: datetime):
async def resolve_tariff(opts: dict, since: datetime, until: datetime,
transport=None, now=None) -> TariffPlan:
transport=None, now=None, *, history) -> TariffPlan:
"""The full §9.2 + §11.4 resolution. MAY PERFORM I/O - see `static_plan`.
⚠️ NOT ON THE 30 s TICK, and that is a deliberate boundary rather than an
@@ -1033,17 +1274,64 @@ async def resolve_tariff(opts: dict, since: datetime, until: datetime,
price_provider off + profile -> the CONFIGURED product (§9.2 rows 3-4)
price_provider off + none -> no prices at all (§11.4, nothing to
fall back to)
provider series -> the feed (§9.2 rows 1-2)
provider series -> the feed, §8.3-FILLED (§9.2 rows 1-2)
provider no_data + profile -> §11.4 FALLBACK, provisional, no arbitrage
provider no_data + none -> no prices at all
⚠️ `history` IS REQUIRED, KEYWORD-ONLY, AND HAS NO DEFAULT (FCST-04). It is
the §8.3 carry-forward store - `price_history.PriceHistory`, or the explicit
`price_history.NoHistory()` for a caller that keeps none. A default of
`None` meaning "skip the fill" would give a caller who forgot the argument
the TRUNCATED HORIZON this ticket exists to remove, silently, while the code
read as though the fill were happening. There is nothing to forget now.
⚠️ AND THE FILL RUNS ONLY ON A `series` READ. A feed that published nothing
still falls to `_degrade()` and §11.4's own row - the static profile the
operator configured FOR that case - rather than to yesterday's feed. The two
are indistinguishable to the optimiser (both are 100 % provisional, so
`arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and refuses, and `cheap_now()`
is False), so preferring yesterday would change a documented degradation for
a difference only the status page can see. See price_history.py's closing
note and DECISIONS/FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried.md.
⚠️ THE FILL IS PER WHOLE HOUR AND ITS COVERAGE IS CONDITIONAL. Every point
the provider published inside the window passes through BY IDENTITY - four
of them in one hour on the quarter-hourly day-ahead feed `generic_dayahead`
reads (Belgium's 15-minute MTU, 2025-10-01) - and a
carried point is added only for a whole hour the feed did not print at all
AND yesterday did. An hour neither source can price is left out, which is
§11.4 for that hour: `plan.price_at()` raises rather than answering, and an
hour with no price is not a free one.
⚠️ THE FILLED SERIES IS WINDOWED TO [since, until), AND THAT IS A CHANGE.
`load_prices()` returns whatever the feed sent, past hours included, and
`TariffPlan.arbitrage()` took its spread over all of it - so an hour that
had already gone could be the cheapest hour of a cycle nothing can now buy
in. `fill_from_yesterday()` walks the requested horizon and emits exactly
that, so the spread is over hours that are still ahead. Both directions of
the difference are real: the window gains the unpublished hours it was
missing and loses the elapsed ones it should never have had.
"""
stamp = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
pid = str(price_option(opts, "price_provider") or "off").strip()
if pid in ("", "off"):
if not provider_configured(opts):
return static_plan(opts, since, until, provisional=False, now=stamp)
read = await load_prices(opts, since, until, transport)
return read.match(
series=lambda r: _provider_plan(opts, r, since, until, stamp, history),
no_data=lambda r: _degrade(opts, r, since, until, stamp))
def _provider_plan(opts, read, since, until, stamp, history) -> TariffPlan:
"""§8.3: record what the feed published, carry yesterday into the gaps.
The fill can itself return `no_data` - a feed whose points all fall outside
the horizon, with nothing in the history to fill it from - and that is the
§11.4 row arrived at one step later, so it degrades exactly as a failed
fetch does rather than being special-cased here.
"""
filled = history.carry(read, since=since, until=until, stamp=stamp)
return filled.match(
series=lambda r: TariffPlan(r, _quiet_profile(opts), "provider"),
no_data=lambda r: _degrade(opts, r, since, until, stamp))
+40 -8
View File
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ class MigrationReport:
return out
def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str, roster=None) -> MigrationReport:
"""Move the pre-DEV-02 flat per-inverter keys into `unit`'s namespace.
`unit` is the FIRST inverter in the roster, which on every install that can
@@ -261,6 +261,24 @@ def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
version that knew about more than one inverter is already at
SCHEMA_VERSION and is not touched.
⚠️ `roster` IS THE NAMES THE MACHINES READ, AND IT IS SAFETY-44. This
function shipped WITHOUT it, taking a hardcoded `inverter.UNIT_A` at its one
call site - which is, exactly, the MAINT-05 defect `_verify_moves()` spends
a paragraph describing, still live in the sibling that paragraph was written
beside. On a store that ran pre-DEV-02 flat and declares
`inverters: [garage, shed]`, the latch moved to `unit/inverter-a/
sign_tripped`, was read back under that same name, was SATISFIED, and
stamped the marker - so the next start skipped the migration too and NO
inverter came up latched on an install whose state file says `sign_tripped:
true`. A disarmed SAFETY-02 guard, every symptom of a clean migration.
`roster_names(opts)` answers this BEFORE any `Inverter` exists - it is
defined to, for `MqttPublisher`, which is constructed before the roster for
the same reason - so the "there is no roster yet" that kept this argument
out was never true. On the flat shape it returns `[UNIT_A]`, so the upgrade
every install runs today passes `unit == roster[0] == UNIT_A` and is
byte-identical.
THE THREE RULES, each one a case that would otherwise be a wrong answer:
1. IT NEVER OVERWRITES AN EXISTING NAMESPACED VALUE. A store that has both
@@ -302,7 +320,7 @@ def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
rep.ran = True
_move_flat_keys(store, unit, LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS, rep)
_verify_moves(store, rep)
_verify_moves(store, rep, roster)
if rep.ok:
store.set(SCHEMA_KEY, SCHEMA_VERSION)
@@ -383,12 +401,26 @@ def _verify_moves(store, rep: MigrationReport, roster=None) -> None:
itself. `test_maintenance.py` section 9c calls this twice with the SAME
wrong `unit` over one store, which is the shape nothing in the suite had.
`roster=None` means "not graded", and the one caller that passes it is
`migrate_unit_keys()`, which runs BEFORE `build_roster()` for the reason its
own docstring gives - the `Inverter` objects restore their latch in their
constructors, so the keys have to be in place before there is a roster to
check against. That gap is real and is recorded as a running check rather
than left to a comment: see test_maintenance.py section 13.
`roster=None` still means "not graded", and SAFETY-44 is what it cost. This
paragraph used to end here, saying that the one caller passing it was
`migrate_unit_keys()`, "which runs BEFORE `build_roster()` ... so the keys
have to be in place before there is a roster to check against", and calling
that gap real. THE FIRST HALF IS TRUE AND THE CONCLUSION IS NOT. The keys do
have to be written before the `Inverter`s restore from them - but the NAMES
do not come from the `Inverter`s. `roster_names(opts)` reads them straight
off the options, before anything is constructed, which is the whole reason
it exists (`MqttPublisher` is built before the roster too). So the argument
that could have graded that write was available at the call site the entire
time, and the sibling function three screens down had already been fixed by
passing it.
⚠️ SO NO CALLER PASSES `None` TODAY, and this branch is kept for one reason:
it is what a NEW caller gets by DEFAULT. A future migration that forgets the
roster gets the ungraded read-back and stamps its marker over a namespace no
machine reads - silently, exactly as this one did. That is the shape of both
defects, and the gap is recorded as a running check rather than left to a
comment: test_maintenance.py section 13, and test_rehearse.py part 5, which
drives it end-to-end through the harness an operator actually runs.
"""
for target, value in rep.moved.items():
got = getattr(store, "data", {}).get(target, "<<missing>>")
+124 -3
View File
@@ -132,6 +132,18 @@ OBSERVED = "observed" # the store answered and there is a peak
NO_RECORD = "no_record" # the store answered and this month has none yet
NOT_OBSERVED = "not_observed" # the store did not answer. NOT a zero peak.
# TARIFF-13. What the COVERAGE figure reads when the store cannot count.
#
# ⚠️ NOT 0, AND NOT `None`. This is the reading-state argument of TARIFF-01
# applied to the number printed BESIDE the peak rather than to the peak. A
# coverage figure of 0 says "this month has been measured over no quarters at
# all", which is the strongest possible claim that the peak next to it means
# nothing - and `f"{None} quarter(s) banked"` renders "None quarter(s) banked",
# which an operator reads as that same zero. The one honest answer to "how many
# quarters have I banked" when the table will not answer is that it is not
# known, and it has to SAY so in the sentence the operator reads.
COUNT_UNREADABLE = "an unreadable number of"
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# local time, without a hard dependency on the tz database
@@ -388,6 +400,23 @@ class PeakStore:
" per_phase_json=excluded.per_phase_json"
" WHERE excluded.offtake_avg_w > quarter_blocks.offtake_avg_w",
(start, month, w, pp_json))
# TARIFF-13. THE TIE RULE, DECIDED RATHER THAN EMERGENT:
# at EQUAL wattage the EARLIEST quarter keeps the attribution.
# See DECISIONS/TARIFF-13-the-coverage-of-a-peak.md §2.
#
# `peak_w` itself is still only ever RAISED - the `>` term is
# untouched and no tie can move the billed number - so SAFETY-07
# reads exactly the watt figure it read before. The second term
# moves only the TIMESTAMP the status page attributes it to.
#
# ⚠️ WITHOUT THE SECOND TERM THE TWO READERS DISAGREE, measured:
# `>` alone keeps whichever tied block was WRITTEN FIRST, while
# `recompute_month()`'s `ORDER BY offtake_avg_w DESC,
# quarter_start ASC` keeps the EARLIEST. Those coincide only
# while blocks arrive in time order. Fed four equal 365 W blocks
# newest-first, `monthly_peak` answered 09:45 and the recompute
# answered 09:00 - a divergence in the derived record part 8 of
# test_tariff.py exists to prove cannot happen.
self._db.execute(
"INSERT INTO monthly_peak(month, peak_w, quarter_start, per_phase_json)"
" VALUES(?,?,?,?)"
@@ -395,7 +424,9 @@ class PeakStore:
" peak_w=excluded.peak_w,"
" quarter_start=excluded.quarter_start,"
" per_phase_json=excluded.per_phase_json"
" WHERE excluded.peak_w > monthly_peak.peak_w",
" WHERE excluded.peak_w > monthly_peak.peak_w"
" OR (excluded.peak_w = monthly_peak.peak_w"
" AND excluded.quarter_start < monthly_peak.quarter_start)",
(month, w, start, pp_json))
return True
except sqlite3.Error as err:
@@ -449,6 +480,49 @@ class PeakStore:
quarter_start=datetime.fromisoformat(row[1]),
per_phase_w=pp)
def banked_count(self, month: str) -> int | None:
"""How many quarters this month has banked. `None` when unknowable.
TARIFF-13. THE DEFECT THIS PREVENTS: the status page printed a coverage
figure held in PROCESS MEMORY - `PeakTracker.recorded`, incremented once
per block banked by THIS process - beside a peak read from SQLite. The
peak outlives a restart and the counter does not, so a driven restart
mid-month took a real reading of
2026-09: peak 365 W ... ; 120 quarter(s) banked
to the same peak, the same attributed quarter and `0 quarter(s) banked`,
on both instances independently. The count is what tells an operator how
much of the billing month the number beside it actually covers: 365 W
over 120 quarters and 365 W over 0 quarters are different claims about
the same watt figure, and after a restart the page made the weaker claim
while displaying the stronger one's value. Reading the count from the
same durable tier the peak comes from is what makes the two agree.
⚠️ `None`, NOT 0, and NOT `len(blocks_in(month))`. `blocks_in()` returns
`[]` on a read error - safe there only because no caller reads its
emptiness as a peak (§ its own docstring) - so counting its length would
rebuild the disarming zero one call further out. This asks the database
for a COUNT and refuses to answer when the database refuses.
⚠️ Counts `quarter_blocks`, the tier with one row per closed block, and
NOT `monthly_peak`, which has one row per MONTH and would answer 1 for
every month that has ever been measured. The two tables are proven equal
on the PEAK by `recompute_month()`; they were never equal on the COUNT
and are not meant to be.
"""
if self._db is None:
return None
try:
row = self._db.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM quarter_blocks WHERE month=?",
(month,)).fetchone()
except sqlite3.Error as err:
self.last_error = str(err)
_LOG.error("could not count quarters for %s (%s)", month, err)
return None
return int(row[0])
def blocks_in(self, month: str) -> list:
"""(quarter_start, offtake_avg_w) for a month, oldest first. [] on error
is safe here ONLY because no caller reads emptiness as a peak - AC 3's
@@ -539,11 +613,59 @@ class PeakTracker:
self.cap_w = float(cap_w)
self.policy = policy
self.checkpoint_s = float(checkpoint_s)
self.recorded = 0
self.restore_state = "not attempted"
self._seen: set = set()
self._last_ckpt = 0.0
# -- coverage -----------------------------------------------------------
#
# TARIFF-13. `recorded` USED TO BE AN `int` ATTRIBUTE ON THIS OBJECT,
# starting at 0 and incremented in `sync()`. It is a property over the store
# now, and the three things that changes are all defects it was carrying:
#
# * it RESET TO 0 ON EVERY RESTART, beside a peak that did not - see
# `PeakStore.banked_count()` for the driven reading;
# * it was NOT SCOPED TO A MONTH. It counted every block this process had
# banked, so on 1 October the row still read September's tally beside
# October's "no completed quarter recorded yet";
# * it MISSED the block `restore()` banks. A stale block closed from the
# checkpoint goes into `quarter_blocks` and never went through `sync()`,
# so the counter never saw it. Counting the table cannot miss it.
#
# ⚠️ REMOVING THE COUNTER DOES NOT REMOVE THE DEDUPE. `_seen` is still what
# stops `cycle()`'s once-a-second `sync()` re-banking a closed quarter that
# `P1Ingest.blocks` keeps for a DAY, and `sync()`'s RETURN value is still
# the count of blocks newly banked on that call. What changed is only where
# the STATUS PAGE's figure is read from. The check that grades the dedupe
# must therefore grade `sync()`'s return, not this property, which now
# answers 1 from the database however many times the block was offered.
def recorded_in(self, when: datetime | None = None):
"""Quarters banked in `when`'s billing month - `int`, or the sentinel.
⚠️ The return type is `int | str` on purpose, and the `str` is
`COUNT_UNREADABLE`. A caller that formats this into a sentence gets a
true sentence in both cases; a caller that wants to do arithmetic on it
gets a TypeError, which is loud. That is the same trade `PeakReading`
makes by having no `peak_w_or(default)`.
"""
n = self.store.banked_count(month_key(when or datetime.now(timezone.utc)))
return COUNT_UNREADABLE if n is None else n
@property
def recorded(self):
"""Quarters banked in the month being billed TODAY.
⚠️ This is the live status page's reading, where the peak beside it is
also read for `datetime.now()`. `checks(when=X)` for an X in another
month is a test affordance (TEST-17); the row scoped that way gets this
month's count beside that month's peak, which is strictly better than
the process-wide counter it replaces but is still a mismatch.
`recorded_in(when)` is the scoped form the row should read once
`main.py`'s status rows are free to change - TARIFF-11 holds them.
"""
return self.recorded_in()
# -- startup ------------------------------------------------------------
def restore(self, averager, now: datetime | None = None) -> str:
"""Put the open block back. Returns which of the three cases happened."""
@@ -600,7 +722,6 @@ class PeakTracker:
continue
if self.store.record_block(block, self.policy):
self._seen.add(key)
self.recorded += 1
n += 1
if n:
# A block just closed, so the checkpoint's block is gone: clearing it
+362 -11
View File
@@ -118,8 +118,14 @@ NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
It is warned about below, not refused.
7. A price configuration that cannot mean what it says. [(a)]
Three cases, all in `_price_problems()`: an unknown `price_provider` id
(refused rather than defaulted to 'off', per the §14 warning box);
Four cases, all in `_price_problems()`: an unknown `price_provider` id
(refused rather than defaulted to 'off', per the §14 warning box); a
RETIRED id - one this add-on really did ship and has been accepting ever
since, whose plugin never once fetched a price because its endpoint does
not exist (TARIFF-07), which is case (a) in its purest form: §11.4's
silent fall back to the static profile IS the layer the operator cannot
see, and it has been overriding their chosen source since the day they
set it;
`price_provider` set alongside `price_now_entity`/`price_avg_entity`,
which is TWO PRICE SOURCES ON ONE SITE where the Home Assistant pair
silently wins; and `manual_csv` with no `price_csv_path`, which turns the
@@ -318,12 +324,20 @@ import logging
from .arbitrage import enabled as arbitrage_on
from .control import SLEW_RAIL_FRAC, LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S
from .custom_formula import (
EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION, FormulaInvalid, implausible_all_in,
parse_export_formula, parse_price_formula, stale_card)
from .inverter import roster_entries
from .maintenance import MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS
from .p1 import is_enabled, validate_meter_options
from .peakguard import PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS
from .price import PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, PROVIDERS
from .static_tariff import ProfileInvalid, parse_static_profile
from .price import (
PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, PROVIDERS, RETIRED_PROVIDERS,
SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH)
from .shadow import problems as shadow_problems
from .static_tariff import (
ProfileInvalid, TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION, parse_static_profile,
parse_taxes_profile)
from .watchdog import SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.config")
@@ -827,6 +841,18 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
# missing rating one line up.
problems.extend(_roster_problems(opts))
# --- 11. SAFETY-10's shadow mode, and it is a REFUSAL ---------------------
# `shadow_mode` decides whether this controller commands the battery at all,
# so an unreadable value is not a detail to log and carry on past.
# `shadow.mode()` resolves an unrecognised one to SHADOW - the direction
# that does not move energy - and an install silently reinterpreted that way
# commands nothing, indefinitely, while its status page calmly explains
# that this is intentional. UX-02 made this validator the ONE rule surface
# both editors read, so the refusal belongs here rather than in a coercion
# nobody can see. The sentence spells `shadow_mode` so
# `configui.problems_by_field()` can file it under the field.
problems.extend(shadow_problems(opts))
# --- 2. the configured ceiling against the device's own rating -----------
# ⚠️ THE FLAT `max_w`, AND ONLY THE FLAT ONE. `dev_min`/`dev_max` are ONE
# device's range - the flat `setpoint_entity`'s - so this rule can only ever
@@ -1242,17 +1268,74 @@ def _price_problems(opts: dict) -> list[str]:
without a price feed is an add-on that a Belgian fixed-tariff site - a large
share of the installed base, per §9.2 - cannot run at all.
Four refusals and two log lines (TARIFF-03 added one refusal, one parse and
two notices), and every refusal is still case (a) from this module's
docstring: a source the operator SET being overridden by a layer they cannot
see. The additions are `static_profile` alongside the Home Assistant price
pair - the same silent-loser shape as provider-plus-pair, and a LIVE one -
and a `static_profile` that does not tile the day, which would leave hours
with no price at all.
Five refusals and two log lines (TARIFF-03 added one refusal, one parse and
two notices; TARIFF-07 added the retired-id one; TARIFF-15 added three -
a `custom_formula` with no formula, a formula that does not parse or does
not reproduce its own card, and one whose card lands outside the plausible
band - plus two notices, a formula nothing reads and a stale card), and
every refusal is still case (a) from this module's docstring: a source the
operator SET being overridden by a layer they cannot see. The additions are `static_profile`
alongside the Home Assistant price pair - the same silent-loser shape as
provider-plus-pair, and a LIVE one - and a `static_profile` that does not
tile the day, which would leave hours with no price at all.
⚠️ THE RETIRED-ID BRANCH IS NOT A FRIENDLIER SPELLING OF THE UNKNOWN-ID
ONE, AND MUST NOT COLLAPSE INTO IT. They answer different questions. An
unknown id is a TYPO: the operator meant something else and the fix is to
spell it right. A retired id is a CHOICE THE ADD-ON ACCEPTED - it was in
the schema, it was in the dropdown, it resolved to a class, and every
startup since said nothing. What that operator needs is not "this id is
wrong" but "this id has never once returned a price, and here is what your
site has actually been running instead" - because §11.4 made the failure
silent and NOTHING on their status page has ever distinguished it from a
working provider that never finds a cheap hour. The retired branch is
therefore FIRST, and it names the id, the endpoint, the observation, the
tariff that has really been in force, and the move to make.
"""
problems: list[str] = []
pid = str(opts.get("price_provider", "") or "off").strip() or "off"
if pid in RETIRED_PROVIDERS:
# ⚠️ BEFORE the unknown-id branch, and the order is load-bearing: a
# retired id is ALSO not in PROVIDERS, so the generic message would
# win on a reordering and the operator would be told they mistyped
# something they chose on purpose.
# ⚠️ AND THE SECOND SENTENCE CHANGES WITH `static_profile`, because
# "you have been on the static profile" is FALSE on a site that never
# set one. §11.4 falls back to the static profile; with no profile to
# fall back to, the site has had no tariff at all - a worse state, and
# one this message must not paper over.
been_running = (
f"the static day/night tariff in static_profile"
if str(opts.get("static_profile", "") or "").strip()
else "NOTHING AT ALL - static_profile is empty too, so there was "
"no tariff to fall back to either")
problems.append(
f"price_provider is {pid!r}, which WAS a shipped plugin and has "
f"been WITHDRAWN (TARIFF-07). This is not a typo and you did not "
f"mistype it - the add-on offered this id, accepted it, and has "
f"said nothing at every startup since. "
f"⚠️ IT HAS NEVER FETCHED A PRICE, HERE OR ANYWHERE: "
f"{RETIRED_PROVIDERS[pid]}. Every fetch it ever made ended in "
f"SourceUnavailable, and §11.4 turns that into a SILENT fall back "
f"- so what this site has actually been running since the day the "
f"id was set is {been_running}. Nothing you could see would have "
f"differed from a working provider that simply never found a cheap "
f"hour, which is why you are being told now rather than left on "
f"it. WHAT TO DO: set price_provider to 'generic_dayahead' for the "
f"wholesale EPEX BE day-ahead curve, to which the add-on adds your "
f"price_markup_eur_kwh and price_taxes_eur_kwh - that APPROXIMATES "
f"a Belgian dynamic tariff and cannot reproduce your supplier's "
f"B x spot + A formula, so the level will be off even when the "
f"shape is right; or 'manual_csv' to enter all-in prices you "
f"compute yourself; or 'off' to run on static_profile "
f"deliberately. There is deliberately NO alias to your old "
f"supplier: aliasing would need your contract's own two "
f"coefficients, which live behind your klantenzone login and are "
f"in no public index, so the add-on would have to invent the "
f"numbers it prices your battery against.")
return problems # nothing below can be judged against a dead id
if pid != "off" and pid not in PROVIDERS:
problems.append(
f"price_provider is {pid!r}, which is not a shipped plugin. The "
@@ -1355,6 +1438,274 @@ def _price_problems(opts: dict) -> list[str]:
"for this product. Peak shaving, reserve management and the "
"maintenance cycle are unaffected.", profile.prices[0])
# ⚠️ TARIFF-17: THE TAXES PERIOD TABLE, PARSED AT STARTUP RATHER THAN AT
# 03:00, FOR `static_profile`'s REASON ONE OPTION OVER. This table is read
# by `price.assemble()` on the ~30 s planning path; a table that only fails
# when a fetch happens is a site that stops pricing mid-afternoon, and
# §11.4 turns that into a quiet fallback that looks exactly like a healthy
# fixed-tariff day. So the parse happens here, once, where a refusal is a
# banner naming the key.
raw_taxes_profile = opts.get(TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION, "")
taxes_table = None
if str(raw_taxes_profile or "").strip() \
or isinstance(raw_taxes_profile, (list, dict)):
try:
taxes_table = parse_taxes_profile(raw_taxes_profile)
except ProfileInvalid as e:
problems.append(f"{TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION} cannot be used: {e}")
if taxes_table is not None:
# ⚠️ TWO WRITERS OF ONE QUANTITY, ONE OF WHICH SILENTLY LOSES - the
# exact case (a) this module exists for, and the same refusal shape as
# the price-entity/static_profile pair above. The table decides when it
# is set, so a non-default scalar left beside it is a number the
# operator typed that changes nothing, on the quantity §11.4 makes
# hardest to notice. It is compared against the SHIPPED DEFAULTS rather
# than against presence, because the Supervisor writes every schema key
# into the options file whether the operator touched it or not - so
# "the operator did not type this" has to be read off the VALUE.
#
# ⚠️ TARIFF-18: "UNTOUCHED" IS A SET, NOT ONE NUMBER, AND THE DEFECT
# THAT MAKES IT ONE IS AN UPGRADE THAT STOPS A BATTERY CONTROLLER
# STARTING. The Supervisor sets `App.options = deepmerge(config.yaml
# defaults, stored options)`, so a saved blob carries every schema key
# whether the operator typed it or not - the reference install's export
# is 70 of 71. When TARIFF-18 moved this default 0.06 -> 0.11736, every
# such blob went from "equal to the shipped default" to "not equal to
# it" without anybody editing anything, and a site that also carries a
# taxes table would have met `SystemExit(78)` on the upgrade. The
# sentence below is about a number the OPERATOR TYPED; a superseded
# shipped default is not one, so it still reads as untouched. The set
# is in price.py beside the default it supersedes, because the two only
# ever move together.
scalar = _number(opts, "price_taxes_eur_kwh",
PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS["price_taxes_eur_kwh"])
shipped = PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS["price_taxes_eur_kwh"]
untouched = (shipped,) + tuple(SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH)
superseded = ", ".join(
str(u) for u in SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH)
if scalar is not None \
and not any(abs(scalar - u) <= 1e-12 for u in untouched):
problems.append(
f"{TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION} is set AND price_taxes_eur_kwh is "
f"{scalar} rather than its shipped {shipped}. THE TABLE WINS: "
f"the add-on reads the per-period figures and never looks at "
f"the scalar, so the number you typed there would decide "
f"nothing and nothing would say so. Set price_taxes_eur_kwh "
f"back to {shipped}, or clear {TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION} to keep "
f"the flat figure. (A scalar still sitting on a SUPERSEDED "
f"default - {superseded} - is accepted and NOT refused: "
f"that is a number this add-on wrote into your options "
f"blob, not one you typed.)")
# ⚠️ THE UNITS RUNG, AND IT IS A SECOND QUANTITY RATHER THAN A
# RESTATEMENT. Every Belgian DSO prints these bands in c EUR/kWh
# (ORES `13,27`), and the whole table is copied off one card - so the
# factor-100 error arrives on EVERY row at once and nothing internal to
# the table disagrees with itself. The parser's own +-10 EUR/kWh bound
# catches a 13,27 typed raw, but NOT ORES IMPACT's night band of 5,090,
# which would be a 5.09 EUR/kWh levy sailing through. Belgian
# non-energy components run roughly 0.05-0.25 EUR/kWh, so anything at
# or above 1.0 is the wrong unit and not a tariff.
steep = sorted({p.eur_per_kwh for p in taxes_table.periods
if abs(p.eur_per_kwh) >= 1.0})
if steep:
problems.append(
f"{TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION} carries {steep} EUR/kWh. Belgian "
f"levies and distribution run about 0.05-0.25 EUR/kWh, so "
f"these are almost certainly the CENT figures off the tariff "
f"card (ORES prints `13,27`, which is 0.1327 EUR/kWh) typed "
f"without the conversion - a factor of 100 that would make "
f"every hour look like an emergency. Divide by 100, or clear "
f"the option.")
negative = sorted({p.eur_per_kwh for p in taxes_table.periods
if p.eur_per_kwh < 0})
if negative:
# ⚠️ A WARNING, NOT A REFUSAL. A negative non-energy component is
# implausible rather than impossible - a prosumer rebate is
# expressible this way - and refusing a site over it would be this
# module asserting a fact about Belgian tariff design it cannot
# observe. §14's warning box governs CONTRADICTIONS, and this is
# not one.
_LOG.warning(
"%s carries negative levies %s EUR/kWh. That is accepted, but "
"a tax component below zero is usually a sign error: the "
"add-on will SUBTRACT it from the published price in those "
"hours.", TAXES_PROFILE_OPTION, negative)
# ⚠️ TARIFF-15: THE FORMULA, GRADED AGAINST THE OPERATOR'S OWN CARD, AT
# STARTUP RATHER THAN AT 03:00.
#
# THE DEFECT THIS EXISTS TO PREVENT, and it is not one `code_leaks()` can
# see because it is not in code: an operator folds their NETWORK CHARGES
# into `offset` while `price_taxes_eur_kwh` carries them as well, and the
# site is billed against a price ~12 c EUR/kWh high on every hour for as
# long as nobody re-reads the configuration. §11.4 makes every price
# defect quiet, so nothing on the status page would ever differ.
#
# The card is what grades it. A Belgian tariff card prints the formula,
# the reference index it assumed AND the resulting price, so the add-on
# recomputes that printed price from the numbers the operator typed and
# refuses to start unless the two agree to within CARD_TOLERANCE. An
# inflated `offset` cannot pass - the printed estimate is the energy
# component alone, so ~12 c EUR/kWh moves 15.55 to ~27. The same check
# catches VAT omitted, VAT applied twice, a transposed digit, and a unit
# MISMATCH between the coefficients and the printed estimate. The one unit
# error it cannot see is the one applied to BOTH sides at once, because
# that cancels out of a comparison between them - which is why
# `implausible_all_in()` below is a second refusal on a second quantity
# rather than a restatement of this one.
#
# ⚠️ AND ITS LIMIT, IN THE SAME SENTENCE AS THE CLAIM, exactly as price.py
# states trap 1's: IT GRADES THE COEFFICIENTS AGAINST THE CARD, NOT THE
# CARD AGAINST REALITY. A consistent-but-wrong pair - both numbers off the
# wrong product - reproduces its own printed price and passes. Nothing can
# catch that.
spec = None # TARIFF-16 reads this back, below
raw_formula = opts.get("price_formula", "")
has_formula = bool(str(raw_formula or "").strip()) \
or isinstance(raw_formula, dict)
if pid == "custom_formula" and not has_formula:
problems.append(
"price_provider is 'custom_formula' but price_formula is empty, "
"so the add-on has no coefficients to price anything with. Every "
"fetch would return no-price-data and §11.4 would fall back "
"silently - which is the shape of defect this provider exists to "
"remove, arrived at by leaving one field blank. Copy the "
"Tariefformule line off your supplier's tariff card, e.g. "
"{\"index\":\"epex_be\",\"resolution\":\"hourly\","
"\"factor\":0.102,\"offset\":1.00,"
"\"units\":\"c_eur_per_kwh\",\"vat_pct\":6,"
"\"card\":{\"month\":\"2026-09\","
"\"index_eur_per_mwh\":133.9905,\"expect_incl_vat\":15.55}} "
"- see DOCS.md. Or set price_provider to 'generic_dayahead' for "
"the wholesale curve with a flat markup.")
elif has_formula:
try:
spec = parse_price_formula(raw_formula)
except FormulaInvalid as e:
spec = None
problems.append(f"price_formula cannot be used: {e}")
if spec is not None and pid != "custom_formula":
# ⚠️ A WARNING AND NOT A REFUSAL. This is not two price sources
# fighting over one flag - it is one that is simply not wired to
# anything - so the §14 warning box does not apply. But an option
# an operator filled in and that decides nothing is exactly the
# silent loser this module's case (a) is about, so it is said out
# loud rather than left to be discovered from a bill.
_LOG.warning(
"price_formula is filled in but price_provider is %r, so the "
"coefficients decide NOTHING - only 'custom_formula' reads "
"them. Set price_provider to 'custom_formula' to use them, or "
"clear price_formula so the configuration says what the "
"add-on is doing.", pid)
if spec is not None and pid == "custom_formula":
taxes = _number(opts, "price_taxes_eur_kwh",
PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS["price_taxes_eur_kwh"])
band = implausible_all_in(spec, taxes if taxes is not None else 0.0)
if band:
problems.append(band)
aged = stale_card(spec)
if aged:
# ⚠️ WARN, NEVER REFUSE. ENGIE freezes a contract's
# coefficients for its duration, so a two-year-old card can be
# exactly right and a site refused over one is a site that
# cannot start.
_LOG.warning("%s", aged)
# ⚠️ TARIFF-16: THE INJECTION LEG, REFUSED AT STARTUP ON THE SAME RULE.
#
# THE DEFECT THIS EXISTS TO PREVENT: `export_price_eur_kwh` models
# injection as ONE scalar, and the published market is a line -
# Eneco `0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188` c EUR/kWh, "het injectietarief is
# dynamisch en kan per uur wijzigen", identical on the January and the
# September 2026 cards. A scalar cannot hold its own factor (0,100 against
# 0,102 on the same supplier's consumption leg), cannot hold a negative
# offset, cannot state that injection is VAT-EXEMPT while consumption is
# at 6%, and cannot go below zero in the midday hours a PV household
# actually exports in.
#
# ⚠️ AND WHAT IT DOES NOT AFFECT TODAY, said here rather than left to be
# inferred: `arbitrage.py` does not read the injection price at all. Both
# hours it compares are all-in CONSUMPTION prices, by its own
# accounting-basis comment. No trade turns on this option. What it changes
# is what the operator is told and what a future export-aware strategy
# rests on - which is why it is validated here rather than trusted.
raw_export = opts.get(EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION, "")
has_export = bool(str(raw_export or "").strip()) \
or isinstance(raw_export, dict)
if has_export:
try:
xspec = parse_export_formula(raw_export)
except FormulaInvalid as e:
xspec = None
problems.append(f"{EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION} cannot be used: {e}")
if xspec is not None:
# ⚠️ THE 6% ASYMMETRY, PRINTED RATHER THAN ASSUMED. The two legs
# carry INDEPENDENT `vat_pct` values and a Belgian site's are 6 and
# 0. Printing both beside each other is the only place an operator
# can see that the add-on knows it - a status page shows one price
# and no arithmetic.
_LOG.info(
"%s is set: injection priced as (%g x index %+g) x "
"(1 + %g/100) %s, i.e. %.4g x the wholesale price with a "
"%+.5f EUR/kWh offset. ⚠️ NO STRATEGY IN THIS ADD-ON READS "
"IT: arbitrage.py prices the sell side as displaced IMPORT "
"and compares two all-in CONSUMPTION prices, so this option "
"changes no decision the add-on takes today. It is what you "
"are shown, and the shape a future export-aware strategy "
"would read.",
EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION, xspec.factor, xspec.offset,
xspec.vat_pct, xspec.units, xspec.passthrough,
xspec.offset_eur_kwh)
if spec is not None:
# ⚠️ THE ASYMMETRY, AS AN ORDERED PAIR RATHER THAN TWO NUMBERS
# IN ONE SENTENCE (MUTATION.md habit 14). "6 and 0 appear
# somewhere" is satisfied by the two legs transposed, which is
# the sentence telling an operator that the add-on has their
# VAT treatment exactly backwards.
_LOG.info(
"the two legs are priced independently: consumption "
"factor %g at vat_pct %g, injection factor %g at vat_pct "
"%g. In Belgium those differ - \"injectietarieven zijn "
"vrijgesteld van btw\" while consumption is at 6%% - and "
"%s is the option that makes the difference "
"expressible; a single scalar could not state it.",
spec.factor, spec.vat_pct, xspec.factor, xspec.vat_pct,
EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION)
if not xspec.card_graded:
# ⚠️ A WARNING AND NEVER A REFUSAL, AND THE GAP IS NAMED
# RATHER THAN WORKED AROUND. `price_formula`'s card block is
# required because a Belgian card prints the consumption
# formula, the reference index AND the resulting price. Eneco's
# INJECTION formula is printed with no price beside it, so on
# that card there is nothing to reproduce. Requiring a block
# here would make the market's own published line
# inexpressible; inventing the estimate would grade the
# coefficients against arithmetic done with the same
# coefficients. So the leg is accepted, the two coefficient
# bounds in `implausible_injection()` are applied, and the
# operator is told which of the two checks did NOT run.
_LOG.warning(
"%s has no \"card\" block, so its coefficients are "
"UNGRADED: nothing recomputed a printed price from them. "
"That is accepted because it is the real market - Eneco "
"prints its injection formula with no price beside it, so "
"there is nothing to grade against on that card - and "
"refusing would make the published line inexpressible. "
"What IS checked is the shape of the coefficients: the "
"pass-through (%.4g x the wholesale price) and the offset "
"(%+.5f EUR/kWh). If YOUR card prints an injection "
"estimate, add {\"month\": ..., \"index_eur_per_mwh\": "
"..., \"expect_incl_vat\": ...} and the add-on will "
"refuse to start unless your numbers reproduce it.",
EXPORT_FORMULA_OPTION, xspec.passthrough,
xspec.offset_eur_kwh)
else:
xaged = stale_card(xspec)
if xaged:
_LOG.warning("%s", xaged)
# ⚠️ A WARNING, NOT A REFUSAL, AND THE ASYMMETRY IS DELIBERATE. §11.4 says a
# site with no price data falls back to the static profile; a dynamic site
# with none configured has nothing to fall back to when its feed dies. That
+364 -20
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: GoodWe RS485 Controller
version: "0.9.0"
version: "0.12.0"
slug: goodwe_controller
description: >-
Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over RS485 by emulating its smart
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ options:
# against a sibling's numbers; an entry silently inheriting `soc_entity` would
# rebuild that defect in YAML. `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and
# `bms_soc_floor` are therefore REQUIRED of every entry (the schema below enforces it, and
# validate.py rule 9 enforces it again for the callers the Supervisor never
# validate.py rules 8 and 9 enforce it again for the callers the Supervisor never
# sees). An omitted `soc_entity`/`batt_entity` means THIS UNIT HAS NO SUCH
# SENSOR - `inputs_ok` already stops the site for that - and never means
# "use the other one's".
@@ -147,6 +147,76 @@ options:
inverters: []
estop_fitted: false
# TEL-11 - THE SITE'S PV PRODUCTION, IN WATTS, AND IT IS READ BY NOTHING THAT
# DECIDES ANYTHING. Optional, empty on every install that does not set it, and
# when it is empty the add-on reads no entity, announces no entity, publishes
# no topic and shows no status row.
#
# ⚠️ AN HA ENTITY AND NOT A REGISTER, BECAUSE MOST SOLAR INVERTERS ARE NOT ON
# THIS BUS. The RS485 bus this add-on speaks carries the BATTERY inverter it
# drives; a household's PV inverter is normally a different box from a
# different vendor, reporting into Home Assistant through its own integration.
# So this takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's PV integration provides, any
# brand Home Assistant can read.
#
# POSITIVE IS PRODUCTION. An entity that reads the other way round goes in
# `pv_invert_entities` below - see DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md.
#
# ⚠️ THE ENTITY'S OWN `unit_of_measurement` IS WHAT IS BELIEVED - W, kW, MW
# and the rest of Home Assistant's power units. A sensor with no unit, or with
# a unit that is not power, is REFUSED and the status page says which: there
# is no magnitude heuristic that can tell 30 W of dusk from 30 kW of noon, and
# a factor of 1000 in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later
# is worse than a refusal an operator can read.
pv_entity: ""
# TEL-12 - THE SAME CHANNEL WHEN THE ROOF HAS SEVERAL INVERTERS, WHICH IS THE
# ORDINARY CASE AND NOT AN EDGE ONE. A multi-string or multi-orientation roof
# routinely carries two or three PV inverters, each publishing its own power
# sensor; 0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity` as a single string and the reference
# site's owner reported within minutes that they could configure one of
# theirs. List them all here and the row carries the SITE total.
#
# ⚠️ DECLARED, THIS REPLACES `pv_entity` - it does not extend it. Set both and
# ONLY this list is read, and the status page says so. That is CFG-04's rule
# for `inverters:` applied to the upgrade path this key exists for: the
# install being upgraded HAS `pv_entity` set, and an operator who adds all
# their inverters to this list while the old key still names one of them would
# DOUBLE that inverter under a union rule. Clear `pv_entity` when you fill
# this in.
#
# ⚠️ AND IF ANY ONE OF THEM IS NOT REPORTING, THERE IS NO SITE TOTAL - the row
# publishes `unknown` and the recorder records a GAP. It does NOT publish the
# sum of the ones that answered: two of three inverters add up to a smaller
# number that is indistinguishable from a real one, and a week later that
# reads as "there was less sun than there was" - the exact conclusion this
# channel exists to TEST rather than to manufacture. The status page names
# which entity is missing and why, and lists what the others reported, because
# a human reading it live wants the diagnostic; the recorded number does not,
# because nobody re-derives a week of history. See
# DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md.
#
# ⚠️ THE FIX IS NOT A TEMPLATE SENSOR THAT SUMS THEM. You may legitimately
# prefer one, but a template sensor summing an `unavailable` source yields the
# partial total silently - the same defect one layer down, in a place this
# add-on cannot see or report.
#
# pv_entities:
# - sensor.pv_east_power
# - sensor.pv_west_power
# - sensor.pv_garage_power
#
# Each entity's OWN `unit_of_measurement` is read, so a kW inverter beside a W
# one sums correctly. Empty is the shipped default and means "use `pv_entity`,
# which is also empty" - i.e. no PV channel at all, which is every install.
pv_entities: []
# TEL-14. Every PV entity listed here (in `pv_entity` or `pv_entities`) has
# its sign flipped, for a kWh meter or power clamp that reads production as
# negative. Per entity, because one roster can mix both conventions. `[]` is
# load-bearing like `pv_entities: []`; see DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md.
pv_invert_entities: []
# ==========================================================================
# METER - where the grid reading comes from
# ==========================================================================
@@ -156,7 +226,7 @@ options:
# ha_signed reads ONE signed HA entity (+ import / - export), which is what a
# HomeWizard P1 publishes and what ha_dsmr cannot consume.
# homewizard_local skips Home Assistant entirely and polls the meter's own
# local API. ⚠️ It is the ONLY mode whose sensor.p1_sample_age_s measures when
# local API. ⚠️ It is the ONLY mode whose sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age measures when
# the meter REPORTED rather than when the value last CHANGED - HA emits
# nothing at all for a repeated reading - so it is the only mode a firmware
# watchdog may threshold. See DOCS.md.
@@ -265,9 +335,17 @@ options:
# TARIFF - what energy costs, and whether to trade on it
# ==========================================================================
# `off` is the shipped default and means the §11.4 no-price-data row applies:
# static profile, plan provisional, NO ARBITRAGE. Nothing in 0.5.x consumes
# the series yet - OPT-04 is the consumer - so turning this on today fetches,
# validates and publishes prices and changes no energy decision.
# static profile, plan provisional, NO ARBITRAGE.
#
# ⚠️ SELECTING A PROVIDER IS WHAT STARTS THE FETCH, AND IT IS NOT
# `arbitrage_enabled` (TARIFF-10). With a provider set and trading off - the
# shipped default - the add-on fetches the feed every 30 minutes, validates
# it, records the day in /data/price_history.json and reports what it holds
# on the *Price history* status row. It changes NO energy decision: the cheap
# window the maintenance cycle reads still comes from `static_profile`, and
# §10.1's arbitrage is gated on `arbitrage_enabled` alone. Until TARIFF-10
# the fetch was gated on `arbitrage_enabled` too, so this option did nothing
# whatsoever on a shipped install - the store was never even created.
#
# ⚠️ THESE DEFAULTS ARE MIRRORED ONCE, IN app/price.py's
# PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, and test_price.py reads THIS FILE and asserts the two
@@ -276,18 +354,65 @@ options:
#
# markup/taxes are the §14 `tariffs.energy_price.*` figures and are added by
# the FRAMEWORK, only for the components the chosen plugin declares its feed
# does not already contain. engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic, eneco_eddy
# and manual_csv publish a figure that already carries the markup, so setting
# it under those is ignored - and logged as ignored, never applied twice.
# does not already contain. manual_csv carries an all-in figure, so setting
# either under it is ignored - and logged as ignored, never applied twice.
# `custom_formula` (TARIFF-15) carries energy AND markup - your contract's
# formula IS the markup - so it takes price_taxes_eur_kwh only, and your
# price_markup_eur_kwh is ignored under it, with a line in the log saying so.
price_provider: "off"
price_markup_eur_kwh: 0.03
price_taxes_eur_kwh: 0.06
# TARIFF-18. The all-in Flemish non-energy figure, EUR/kWh, incl. 6 % VAT.
# Its components are named in app/price.py's FLEMISH_TAXES_COMPONENTS_EUR_KWH
# and test_price.py section 1b re-adds them:
#
# Fluvius distribution (Antwerpen) 5,35 c EUR/kWh
# Bijzondere accijns, "Alle verbruik" 4,876
# Bijdrage groene stroom en WKK Vlaanderen 1,51
# Energiebijdrage (0 EUR/MWh since 2026-08-01) 0
# ------
# 11,736 c EUR/kWh = 0.11736
#
# ⚠️ THIS IS PER-DSO AND YOURS IS PROBABLY DIFFERENT. Only the distribution
# row moves: across the eight Fluvius DSOs it runs 5,28 c EUR/kWh
# (Midden-Vlaanderen) to 6,70 (West), so the Flemish total runs about 0.117
# to 0.131. Antwerpen is near the LOW end, which is the direction this
# default should err in - it is inert on which hour is cheapest, but §17's
# negative-price guard reads the ABSOLUTE all-in price, and a figure set too
# high would carry a genuinely negative hour above zero.
#
# ⚠️ WALLONIA AND BRUSSELS DO NOT BELONG IN THIS SCALAR AT ALL. Their
# distribution tariff has a day and a night band; use price_taxes_profile.
price_taxes_eur_kwh: 0.11736
# §9.3: injection is priced SEPARATELY, and in Belgium it is often near zero -
# which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export. A scalar, not
# a second series: no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve.
# which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export. This is the
# FLAT injection price, for a site paid the same for every exported kWh.
#
# ⚠️ THE REASON THIS COMMENT USED TO GIVE - "no shipped supplier publishes a
# dynamic injection curve" - WAS FALSE, and TARIFF-07 struck the same
# sentence from app/price.py and DOCS.md without reaching this file. Eneco
# publishes `0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188` c EUR/kWh on the same card as its
# consumption formula, ENGIE publishes `(B x eSpot_15) - A`, and Aspiravi
# `0,07 x Belpex - 2`. A site on one of those sets price_export_formula
# below; this scalar stays the fixed-product default and is what every site
# uses today.
export_price_eur_kwh: 0.04
# TARIFF-16. The INJECTION leg as a formula, in price_formula's own grammar
# and with its OWN coefficients: Eneco uses 0,102 on consumption and 0,100 on
# injection, and injection is VAT-EXEMPT where consumption is at 6%, so
# `vat_pct` here is normally 0. A negative `offset` is expected - it is what
# the published lines carry - and the resulting price legitimately goes below
# zero in the midday hours a PV household exports in.
#
# ⚠️ NO STRATEGY IN THIS ADD-ON READS IT. arbitrage.py prices the sell side
# as displaced IMPORT and compares two all-in CONSUMPTION prices; it does not
# read the injection price at all. This option is what the operator is shown
# and the shape a future export-aware strategy would rest on. Empty by
# default, which leaves every existing site on the scalar above.
price_export_formula: ""
# §14's `tariffs.static_profile`, and "" is its `null`. §9.2: "a large share
# of the installed base is on [a static profile]" - this is what makes those
# sites first-class rather than "price_provider: off, good luck".
@@ -317,7 +442,100 @@ options:
# to fall back to and a dead feed leaves the site with no tariff at all.
# validate.py warns about exactly that.
static_profile: ""
# TARIFF-17. THE TAXES COMPONENT AS A DAY/NIGHT TABLE, for the sites whose
# network tariff actually has one. "" means the flat price_taxes_eur_kwh
# above decides, which is what every install has had until now and is CORRECT
# IN FLANDERS: Fluvius distribution is a single rate, and its row on the
# tariff card offers only `Normaal | Uitsl. nacht` - exclusive night being a
# separate physical circuit, not the night register of a dual-rate meter.
#
# The Walloon and Brussels DSOs are on the same card with FOUR columns -
# `Enkelvoudig | Dag | Nacht | Uitsl. nacht` - and the gap is real money
# (c EUR/kWh): ORES dag 13,27 / nacht 7,39; AIESH 15,17 / 8,21; Tecteo RESA
# 12,20 / 7,01; Sibelga 9,39 / 7,10; ORES IMPACT 2026 16,578 / 5,090.
#
# ⚠️ WHY THIS IS NOT COSMETIC. The optimiser reads the SPREAD (max - min) and
# which hour is cheapest. A flat number is additive and identical every hour,
# so it cancels out of both - it cannot distort anything, and it also cannot
# express this. These bands are ANTI-CORRELATED with what the battery wants
# to do (cheap network hours are cheap spot hours), so flattening them
# UNDERSTATES the true spread and declines cycles that would have paid. See
# DOCS.md, "The three buckets".
#
# Same JSON grammar as static_profile above - the same tiling rule, the same
# day selectors, the same DST handling, because it is literally the same
# parser. ⚠️ THE VALUE IS THE TAXES COMPONENT ALONE, NOT AN ALL-IN PRICE:
#
# {"periods": [
# {"name":"dag", "from":"07:00","to":"22:00","days":"mon-fri","eur_per_kwh":0.1327},
# {"name":"nacht","from":"22:00","to":"07:00","days":"mon-fri","eur_per_kwh":0.0739},
# {"name":"nacht","from":"00:00","to":"24:00","days":"sat,sun", "eur_per_kwh":0.0739}]}
#
# ⚠️ SET THIS *OR* price_taxes_eur_kwh, NOT BOTH. Two writers of one quantity,
# one of which silently wins, is refused at startup: leave the scalar at its
# shipped default when you fill this in. A scalar still sitting on the
# SUPERSEDED 0.06 is accepted too (TARIFF-18 moved that default, and your
# stored options carry the old number whether you typed it or not) - the
# refusal is about a figure you chose, not about one this add-on wrote.
price_taxes_profile: ""
# TARIFF-15. YOUR OWN TARIFF CARD, as two fixed coefficients. Used only when
# `price_provider: custom_formula`; "" is unset.
#
# A Belgian dynamic contract prices energy as `B x index + A`, and the two
# coefficients exist in exactly ONE place - the tariff card in your
# klantenzone. There is no machine-readable source for them anywhere (CREG's
# tariff-card pages 404, CREG Scan is a JS wizard, VREG was unreachable), so
# no plugin and no scraper can ever know YOUR numbers. You are the only party
# who can see them.
#
# A JSON object, on one line. You type what your card prints, IN THE CARD'S
# OWN UNITS; every unit conversion and the VAT multiplication are the
# add-on's job, because those are exactly the two steps that silently cost a
# factor of 10, 100 or 1.06.
#
# {"index":"epex_be","resolution":"hourly","factor":0.102,"offset":1.00,
# "units":"c_eur_per_kwh","vat_pct":6,
# "card":{"month":"2026-09","index_eur_per_mwh":133.9905,
# "expect_incl_vat":15.55}}
#
# price = (factor x index_eur_per_mwh + offset) x (1 + vat_pct/100), in
# `units`, converted to EUR/kWh by the add-on.
#
# ⚠️ THE `card` BLOCK IS REQUIRED AND IT IS THE SAFETY MECHANISM. Your card
# prints the formula, the reference index it assumed AND the resulting price.
# At startup the add-on recomputes that printed price from the numbers you
# typed and REFUSES TO START unless the two agree to within 0.01 - naming the
# discrepancy. That catches VAT left out or applied twice, a transposed
# digit, a unit MISMATCH between the coefficients and the printed price
# (10x/100x/1000x), and the expensive one: NETWORK CHARGES FOLDED INTO
# `offset`. A unit error applied to BOTH sides at once cancels out of that
# comparison; the add-on refuses that separately, by checking the card's own
# point against the band a Belgian retail tariff can occupy. Your card's formula line is the ENERGY component
# alone; the add-on adds price_taxes_eur_kwh on top, so folding ~12 c/kWh of
# network charge into `offset` would bill you for it twice - and it cannot
# pass, because it moves the computed 15.55 to about 27.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE LIMIT OF THAT CHECK, IN THE SAME BREATH: it grades your
# COEFFICIENTS AGAINST YOUR CARD, not your card against reality. Two numbers
# copied off the wrong product agree with each other perfectly and pass.
#
# ⚠️ FIXED COEFFICIENTS ONLY - the add-on evaluates NO expression of any kind
# and there is no field that takes one. An unknown key is refused rather than
# ignored. See DOCS.md for why (it is not only security: two coefficients can
# be graded against your card and an arbitrary expression cannot be graded
# against anything).
price_formula: ""
price_csv_path: "/share/goodwe_prices.csv"
# ⚠️ AN OVERRIDE IS THE EXACT URL (TARIFF-09). The plugin sends it verbatim
# and appends nothing - including the `start`/`end` date range it derives from
# the horizon for its own feed - so an override gets whatever range that URL
# answers, which for a bare day-ahead endpoint is ONE Brussels day. Every hour
# past it is then carried from yesterday and flagged provisional, and §8.3
# keeps provisional hours out of the trade set. The plugin logs a WARNING
# naming that consequence on every fetch that uses an override; clearing this
# option is what restores the full horizon.
price_feed_url: ""
price_horizon_h: 48
price_timeout_s: 10
@@ -344,6 +562,12 @@ options:
# configuration: this is the first strategy in the add-on that moves energy
# against the meter on purpose, so it is armed deliberately or not at all.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS NOT WHAT TURNS THE PRICE FEED ON (TARIFF-10). `price_provider`
# above decides whether prices are FETCHED; this decides whether they move
# energy. Leaving this off on a site with a provider configured is a
# supported, documented state: prices are fetched, validated and recorded,
# and nothing trades.
#
# ⚠️ IT NEEDS A PRICE SOURCE AND A P1 METER, and validate.py refuses the
# combinations that cannot work rather than letting them look armed. With
# `price_provider: off` and no `static_profile` there is no series to trade
@@ -548,8 +772,10 @@ options:
# only ever ran at 500 could not tell this wiring from a hard-coded number.
#
# How long ONE inverter may stand at a discharge share it is not producing -
# short by more than `saturation_w` - while at least one sibling is NOT in
# that state, before the add-on names it. It REPORTS: nothing is commanded
# short by more than `saturation_w`, OR short by more than a fixed FRACTION
# of its own share (SAFETY-43; the fraction is derived and is not an option,
# see app/delivery.py) - while at least one sibling is NOT in that state,
# before the add-on names it. It REPORTS: nothing is commanded
# differently, the loop is untouched, and the site goes on running short by
# that unit's share until somebody looks. app/delivery.py carries why, with
# the rig measurements on both sides of the decision.
@@ -590,6 +816,38 @@ options:
# and not 150 or 200. 37 control cycles.
delivery_hold_s: 185
# SAFETY-10. Run the whole decision path and command NOTHING - strategies,
# arbiter, clamps and guards all run, the decision and its reason are
# recorded, and every inverter is held at 0 W. `app/shadow.py` carries the
# argument; the three things to know before changing this line are:
#
# auto shadow WHILE CONTROL IS STOPPED, live once it is started. This is
# the shipped value and it is what "default-on" means here.
# on always shadow, whatever the Start / stop button says. This is the
# one an operator picks to watch a day of decisions on an armed site
# before letting it trade.
# off ordinary control.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS NOT A BOOLEAN DEFAULTING TO `true`, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE CARD.
# The Supervisor composes an add-on's options as `{**these defaults, **the
# stored user options}`, so a NEW key with a new default reaches every
# EXISTING install on the next update - including one regulating a real
# battery. `shadow_mode: true` would silently stop it, and the only symptom
# would be a battery that has stopped doing anything. There is no mechanism
# in this options system that lets one key default differently for a new
# install and an existing one, so "default-on for new" has to be a value the
# add-on RESOLVES. `auto` is that value: a fresh install ships
# `auto_start: false` and therefore comes up in shadow mode; an install that
# is controlling is started, so `auto` resolves to live and NOTHING about it
# changes.
#
# ⚠️ AND UNDER `auto` THE START BUTTON LEAVES SHADOW MODE. Pressing *Start /
# stop control* is the operator saying "control the battery". Somebody who
# wants the decisions recorded WHILE the loop runs sets `on` explicitly -
# which is the configuration this option exists for, and the one that cannot
# be reached by accident.
shadow_mode: "auto"
# ==========================================================================
# ADVANCED - the control law and diagnostics
# ==========================================================================
@@ -660,12 +918,13 @@ schema:
# batteries, whereas an absent capacity has an honest answer - no opinion
# about the split, every unit weighs 1.0, which is what shipped.
#
# ⚠️ THREE KEYS ARE REQUIRED PER ENTRY AND THAT IS DELIBERATE. An entry with
# ⚠️ FOUR KEYS ARE REQUIRED PER ENTRY AND THAT IS DELIBERATE. An entry with
# no `name` has no Store namespace and would share another unit's SAFETY-02
# latch; one with no `setpoint_entity` is a unit nothing can command; one with
# no `max_w` would have to borrow a rating, which is the sibling-grading
# defect DEV-02 removed. The optional pair is the sensors, whose absence
# honestly means "this unit reports none".
# defect DEV-02 removed; `bms_soc_floor` is SAFETY-32's (options block above).
# The optional keys are the sensors, whose absence honestly means "this unit
# reports none", and `capacity_kwh`.
#
# ⚠️ THIS BLOCK IS DECLARED BEFORE `max_w:` ON PURPOSE. `max_w` now appears
# TWICE under `schema:` - once nested here, once flat below - and a reader
@@ -684,6 +943,41 @@ schema:
capacity_kwh: float(0.1,200)?
estop_fitted: bool
# TEL-11. Optional, and OPTIONAL WITHOUT A COMPANION RULE - unlike
# `price_now_entity`/`price_avg_entity`, which are legal only while
# `price_provider` is `off` and make the add-on REFUSE TO START otherwise.
# Nothing in validate.py mentions this key: it cannot conflict with anything,
# because nothing else reads it.
pv_entity: str?
# TEL-12. ⚠️ A SECOND KEY RATHER THAN A LIST SHAPE ON `pv_entity`, AND THAT IS
# A MEASUREMENT AND NOT A PREFERENCE. `pv_entity` shipped in 0.11.0 as `str?`
# and the reference site has a string persisted in it. Declared as a list,
# Supervisor 2026.08.0 answers that stored string with
#
# Invalid list for option 'pv_entity' in GoodWe RS485 Controller
#
# and `deepmerge`'s list strategy is `override`, so a shipped `[]` default does
# NOT rescue it - the operator's string stands and is refused. That is CFG-04
# §B's trap in the other direction: an add-on that will not start, and the
# schema needed to fix it pinned to the version that cannot be installed. The
# only single-key spelling Supervisor accepts for BOTH shapes is `match(.*)?`,
# which validates nothing at all (it admits a number, a dict, any list of
# anything) and renders as a plain text box. Measured, both of them, by
# `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §G - the transcript is in
# DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md §1.
#
# ⚠️ AND `pv_entities: []` IN THE `options:` BLOCK IS LOAD-BEARING, exactly as
# `inverters: []` is. §G measures the same isolated counterfactual: the
# shipped defaults MINUS only this key are refused with `Missing option
# 'pv_entities' in root`, which is every options blob written before 0.12.
# `p1_phase_import_entities` is the shipped precedent for the pair.
pv_entities:
- str
# TEL-14. A parallel list, not a prefix or a dict: measured by
# tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section H, DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md.
pv_invert_entities:
- str
# ==========================================================================
# METER - where the grid reading comes from
@@ -734,9 +1028,32 @@ schema:
# Supervisor rejects a typo in the UI. validate.py ALSO refuses an unknown id
# against app/price.py's PROVIDERS registry, because sim/inject.py and the
# checks reach validate_startup_config() with a dict the Supervisor never saw.
# Adding a sixth plugin means adding it here and to PROVIDERS - and nowhere
# else, which is AC2.
price_provider: list(off|generic_dayahead|engie_dynamic|totalenergies_dynamic|eneco_eddy|manual_csv)
# Adding a plugin means adding it here and to PROVIDERS - and nowhere else,
# which is AC2.
#
# ⚠️ THREE OF THESE FIVE IDS NO LONGER RESOLVE TO A PLUGIN, AND LEAVING THEM
# HERE IS A DECISION (TARIFF-07). engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic and
# eneco_eddy were withdrawn - their endpoints do not exist and never did - and
# the obvious edit is to delete them from this line too. DO NOT. The Supervisor
# validates the options file against this schema BEFORE the add-on starts, so
# an id that is not listed here makes an EXISTING config schema-invalid: the
# operator gets an opaque "expected one of ..." from the Supervisor, the add-on
# never runs, and validate.py's retired-id refusal - the message that tells
# them their prices never worked and what to do instead - IS NEVER REACHED, on
# exactly the sites that need it. Schema tightness would cost the only thing
# this withdrawal is FOR.
#
# The cost of keeping them is that the dropdown still offers three dead ids to
# a NEW operator. That is the cheaper failure: choosing one is refused at the
# next startup by name, with the endpoint, the observation and the alternative
# - which is strictly more than a typo-shaped schema rejection would say. Both
# translations label them withdrawn in the option description as well.
#
# app/price.py's RETIRED_PROVIDERS is the list, test_price.py section 1 asserts
# this line offers exactly PROVIDERS + RETIRED_PROVIDERS + 'off' - derived, not
# typed - and register() refuses to re-register a retired id, so the two
# cannot both claim one.
price_provider: list(off|generic_dayahead|custom_formula|engie_dynamic|totalenergies_dynamic|eneco_eddy|manual_csv)
price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_taxes_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
@@ -745,11 +1062,29 @@ schema:
# bottoms out at 0 would make that site inexpressible.
export_price_eur_kwh: float(-1,1)
# TARIFF-16. A JSON string in `price_formula`'s grammar, parsed by
# `custom_formula.parse_export_formula()` - the SAME parser with its option
# name as an argument, so a second unit table and a second card rule do not
# exist to diverge. The `card` block is OPTIONAL on this leg and required on
# the other: Eneco prints its injection formula with no price beside it, so
# on that card there is nothing to grade against, and the add-on says at
# startup that the leg is ungraded rather than inventing an estimate.
price_export_formula: str?
# A JSON string rather than a nested schema, deliberately: it is ONE option
# key (§14 has one), it survives config.yaml's flat options block, and
# parse_static_profile() accepts an already-parsed dict too, so a future
# nested schema is a config.yaml change and no code change at all.
static_profile: str?
# TARIFF-17. A JSON string for `static_profile`'s reason, and parsed by
# `static_tariff.parse_taxes_profile()` - the SAME period grammar, so a
# second tiling rule and a second set of DST bugs do not exist to diverge.
price_taxes_profile: str?
# TARIFF-15. A JSON string for the same reason `static_profile` is one: it is
# ONE option key, it survives config.yaml's flat options block, and
# parse_price_formula() accepts an already-parsed dict too, so a future
# nested schema is a config.yaml change and no code change at all.
price_formula: str?
price_csv_path: str?
price_feed_url: str?
price_horizon_h: int(1,72)
@@ -868,6 +1203,15 @@ schema:
# running short of one unit's share must be reported well inside one.
delivery_hold_s: int(30,900)
# SAFETY-10. ⚠️ A THREE-VALUED LIST AND NOT A `bool`, for the reason written
# against the default in the options block above: a boolean has one default
# and the Supervisor gives it to every install, new and existing alike.
# `app/shadow.MODES` is this tuple and `validate.py` rule 11 refuses anything
# else BY NAME, because `shadow.mode()` resolves an unreadable value to
# SHADOW - safe, but a silent reinterpretation that commands nothing for as
# long as nobody notices.
shadow_mode: list(auto|on|off)
# ==========================================================================
# ADVANCED - the control law and diagnostics
# ==========================================================================
+99
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
"""Read a value a check prints or grades without raising (TEST-26).
Each test file is one script, so an IndexError in a print or a check name
kills every check after it (MUTATION.md, FCST-06). Read through these instead,
and conjoin `present(x)` in the check so the absence grades as a named FAIL.
`ABSENT` values never raise: they format as `<ABSENT ...>` under any spec,
index and attribute to themselves, compare unequal AND not-unequal, and are
falsy. `not x`, `"a" not in x` and `all(... for _ in x)` are therefore TRUE of
one, which is why the check needs the `present()` term. `int()`, `range()` and
use as a list index still raise: guard those with `present()`.
"""
_NAN = float("nan")
class Absent:
__slots__ = ("what",)
def __init__(self, what):
object.__setattr__(self, "what", what)
def __repr__(self):
return f"<ABSENT {self.what}>"
__str__ = __repr__
def __format__(self, spec):
return repr(self)
def __bool__(self):
return False
def __eq__(self, other):
return False
__ne__ = __lt__ = __le__ = __gt__ = __ge__ = __eq__
def __hash__(self):
return id(self)
def __getitem__(self, _):
return self
def __getattr__(self, _):
return self
def __call__(self, *_a, **_k):
return self
def __len__(self):
return 0
def __iter__(self):
return iter(())
def __contains__(self, _):
return False
def __float__(self):
return _NAN
def _same(self, *_):
return self
__add__ = __radd__ = __sub__ = __rsub__ = __mul__ = __rmul__ = _same
__truediv__ = __rtruediv__ = __floordiv__ = __rfloordiv__ = _same
__mod__ = __rmod__ = __neg__ = __pos__ = __abs__ = __round__ = _same
def present(*xs):
"""True when none of `xs` is an ABSENT stand-in."""
return not any(isinstance(x, Absent) for x in xs)
def nth(seq, i=0, what=None):
"""`seq[i]`, or an ABSENT saying how many items there were."""
n = 0 if seq is None else len(seq)
if -n <= i < n:
return seq[i]
return Absent(what or f"[{i}] of {n} item(s)")
def first(it, what="no match"):
"""`next(it)`, or ABSENT when it is exhausted."""
return next(iter(it), Absent(what))
def field(mapping, key, what=None):
"""`mapping[key]`, or ABSENT when the key (or the mapping) is missing."""
try:
return mapping[key]
except (KeyError, IndexError, TypeError):
return Absent(what or f"key {key!r}")
def given(x, what="None"):
"""`x`, or ABSENT when it is None - so `:.2f` and arithmetic cannot raise."""
return Absent(what) if x is None else x
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"license_info":"CC BY 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0) from Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de","unix_seconds":[1757455200,1757458800,1757462400,1757466000,1757469600,1757473200,1757476800,1757480400,1757484000,1757487600,1757491200,1757494800,1757498400,1757502000,1757505600,1757509200,1757512800,1757516400,1757520000,1757523600,1757527200,1757530800,1757534400,1757538000],"price":[73.0,61.31,64.32,62.49,67.0,64.48,94.52,149.26,132.43,91.61,84.8,79.61,69.23,66.75,68.91,69.31,80.29,66.91,105.2,161.05,116.73,84.2,64.1,42.41],"unit":"EUR / MWh","deprecated":false}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"license_info":"CC BY 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0) from Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de","unix_seconds":[1788904800,1788905700,1788906600,1788907500,1788908400,1788909300,1788910200,1788911100,1788912000,1788912900,1788913800,1788914700,1788915600,1788916500,1788917400,1788918300,1788919200,1788920100,1788921000,1788921900,1788922800,1788923700,1788924600,1788925500,1788926400,1788927300,1788928200,1788929100,1788930000,1788930900,1788931800,1788932700,1788933600,1788934500,1788935400,1788936300,1788937200,1788938100,1788939000,1788939900,1788940800,1788941700,1788942600,1788943500,1788944400,1788945300,1788946200,1788947100,1788948000,1788948900,1788949800,1788950700,1788951600,1788952500,1788953400,1788954300,1788955200,1788956100,1788957000,1788957900,1788958800,1788959700,1788960600,1788961500,1788962400,1788963300,1788964200,1788965100,1788966000,1788966900,1788967800,1788968700,1788969600,1788970500,1788971400,1788972300,1788973200,1788974100,1788975000,1788975900,1788976800,1788977700,1788978600,1788979500,1788980400,1788981300,1788982200,1788983100,1788984000,1788984900,1788985800,1788986700,1788987600,1788988500,1788989400,1788990300,1788991200,1788992100,1788993000,1788993900,1788994800,1788995700,1788996600,1788997500,1788998400,1788999300,1789000200,1789001100,1789002000,1789002900,1789003800,1789004700,1789005600,1789006500,1789007400,1789008300,1789009200,1789010100,1789011000,1789011900,1789012800,1789013700,1789014600,1789015500,1789016400,1789017300,1789018200,1789019100,1789020000,1789020900,1789021800,1789022700,1789023600,1789024500,1789025400,1789026300,1789027200,1789028100,1789029000,1789029900,1789030800,1789031700,1789032600,1789033500,1789034400,1789035300,1789036200,1789037100,1789038000,1789038900,1789039800,1789040700,1789041600,1789042500,1789043400,1789044300,1789045200,1789046100,1789047000,1789047900,1789048800,1789049700,1789050600,1789051500,1789052400,1789053300,1789054200,1789055100,1789056000,1789056900,1789057800,1789058700,1789059600,1789060500,1789061400,1789062300,1789063200,1789064100,1789065000,1789065900,1789066800,1789067700,1789068600,1789069500,1789070400,1789071300,1789072200,1789073100,1789074000,1789074900,1789075800,1789076700],"price":[150.93,151.41,150.99,147.59,153.25,147.26,144.04,141.53,147.79,146.53,143.55,139.93,145.58,139.56,139.11,138.06,138.92,138.52,138.04,138.65,137.29,139.03,144.59,150.34,154.12,174.5,178.43,186.62,199.35,200.21,200.11,197.43,220.07,202.0,196.01,174.03,198.32,167.49,152.54,142.05,161.5,145.45,128.61,100.85,139.18,115.83,94.41,80.39,111.25,89.61,84.99,74.38,80.53,70.58,62.27,57.1,62.24,64.95,68.99,71.19,66.9,87.32,109.0,123.12,68.48,125.53,155.99,161.9,138.77,160.57,167.35,173.0,142.2,172.83,196.19,211.26,205.85,218.77,217.08,222.0,210.98,208.46,208.88,210.02,209.77,202.61,200.27,191.49,194.39,195.04,197.26,190.92,188.39,198.05,203.05,191.84,216.08,216.08,214.92,200.0,223.37,201.43,196.32,190.0,199.53,194.83,180.53,172.23,179.88,175.77,167.1,173.89,163.29,165.99,171.41,178.73,170.27,177.37,187.71,201.07,193.62,207.61,218.27,226.77,227.17,234.05,236.99,229.94,248.93,227.5,216.08,195.67,215.99,195.01,177.1,155.09,174.91,152.71,139.59,123.83,140.77,123.19,114.96,94.5,102.77,96.63,94.57,116.34,114.63,126.82,129.89,123.95,105.0,119.11,121.0,136.79,123.41,135.01,135.0,156.68,146.88,152.16,162.02,181.78,154.76,184.28,194.3,215.76,197.23,234.15,253.03,296.58,345.32,389.16,482.99,559.0,551.11,446.41,358.97,295.9,271.39,268.06,241.43,238.01,239.7,226.41,223.05,211.56,218.21,210.61,197.78,171.79],"unit":"EUR / MWh","deprecated":false}
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
{"license_info":"CC BY 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0) from Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de","unix_seconds":[1788991200,1788992100,1788993000,1788993900,1788994800,1788995700,1788996600,1788997500,1788998400,1788999300,1789000200,1789001100,1789002000,1789002900,1789003800,1789004700,1789005600,1789006500,1789007400,1789008300,1789009200,1789010100,1789011000,1789011900,1789012800,1789013700,1789014600,1789015500,1789016400,1789017300,1789018200,1789019100,1789020000,1789020900,1789021800,1789022700,1789023600,1789024500,1789025400,1789026300,1789027200,1789028100,1789029000,1789029900,1789030800,1789031700,1789032600,1789033500,1789034400,1789035300,1789036200,1789037100,1789038000,1789038900,1789039800,1789040700,1789041600,1789042500,1789043400,1789044300,1789045200,1789046100,1789047000,1789047900,1789048800,1789049700,1789050600,1789051500,1789052400,1789053300,1789054200,1789055100,1789056000,1789056900,1789057800,1789058700,1789059600,1789060500,1789061400,1789062300,1789063200,1789064100,1789065000,1789065900,1789066800,1789067700,1789068600,1789069500,1789070400,1789071300,1789072200,1789073100,1789074000,1789074900,1789075800,1789076700],"price":[216.08,216.08,214.92,200.0,223.37,201.43,196.32,190.0,199.53,194.83,180.53,172.23,179.88,175.77,167.1,173.89,163.29,165.99,171.41,178.73,170.27,177.37,187.71,201.07,193.62,207.61,218.27,226.77,227.17,234.05,236.99,229.94,248.93,227.5,216.08,195.67,215.99,195.01,177.1,155.09,174.91,152.71,139.59,123.83,140.77,123.19,114.96,94.5,102.77,96.63,94.57,116.34,114.63,126.82,129.89,123.95,105.0,119.11,121.0,136.79,123.41,135.01,135.0,156.68,146.88,152.16,162.02,181.78,154.76,184.28,194.3,215.76,197.23,234.15,253.03,296.58,345.32,389.16,482.99,559.0,551.11,446.41,358.97,295.9,271.39,268.06,241.43,238.01,239.7,226.41,223.05,211.56,218.21,210.61,197.78,171.79],"unit":"EUR / MWh","deprecated":false}
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
{
"card": "TARIFF-08, extended by TARIFF-09",
"what": "UNMODIFIED response bodies from the public EPEX BE day-ahead feed, captured so the SHIPPED parser can be replayed against what the source really publishes",
"why": "every price fixture in the suite was built from a `{\"data\": [{\"start\": ..., \"price_eur_mwh\": ...}]}` document that this feed has never published. The suite therefore graded `_points_from_json` against its own assumption - a closed loop that could not notice the assumption was wrong - and §11.4 turned the resulting failure into a silent fall back to the static profile. A captured real body is what breaks that loop, so these files are bytes, not a reconstruction: nothing here is pretty-printed, re-keyed or trimmed. TARIFF-09 adds a body from a request that names a DATE RANGE, for the same reason one layer out: the shipped plugin took `since`/`until` and asked for the bare default URL, so the feed answered ONE Brussels day and every hour past today was carried forward and dropped from the trade set as provisional. A two-day body captured from the range request is what makes \"asking for the range gets the range\" checkable against something the plugin did not shape.",
"source": "Energy-Charts API (Fraunhofer ISE), api.energy-charts.info",
"upstream": "Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de",
"licence": "CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)",
"licence_note": "the BE bidding zone is in the API's CC BY 4.0 list, so redistribution is permitted with attribution. DATA-02 established this against the API's own OpenAPI document before committing `epex-be-dayahead-2025-09-01_2026-09-01.json`; both bodies below carry the same `license_info` string, recorded per file and asserted by the replay test.",
"attribution": "Data licensed CC BY 4.0 by Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de, retrieved via the Energy-Charts API (Fraunhofer ISE), https://energy-charts.info. Published without changes.",
"retrieved_utc": "2026-09-10T06:35:00+00:00 (TARIFF-08's two), 2026-09-10T07:45:49+00:00 (TARIFF-09's)",
"retrieved_with": "curl, by hand; no code in `app/` fetches these",
"shape": "COLUMNAR: parallel `unix_seconds` (UTC epoch seconds) and `price` arrays, plus `unit`, `license_info` and `deprecated`. There is no `data` key and no per-point object.",
"replayed_by": "test_price.py sections 2b (TARIFF-08) and 2c (TARIFF-09)",
"files": {
"energy-charts-be-price-2026-09-10-quarterhourly.json": {
"url": "https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE",
"note": "the SHIPPED default URL of `generic_dayahead`, verbatim and with no parameters, so the replay drives the bytes the add-on's own request produces",
"covers_local_day": "2026-09-10 (Europe/Brussels)",
"granularity_s": 900,
"intervals": 96,
"bytes": 1877,
"sha256": "176309d0020ad208320797385ef68b6a98ac248218539416cddf6579dd060487",
"unit_as_returned": "EUR / MWh",
"licence_as_returned": "CC BY 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0) from Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de",
"deprecated_as_returned": false,
"top_level_keys": [
"deprecated",
"license_info",
"price",
"unit",
"unix_seconds"
],
"also_returned_verbatim_by": {
"url": "https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE&start=2026-09-10&end=2026-09-11",
"retrieved_utc": "2026-09-10T07:46:55+00:00",
"note": "TARIFF-09's PRE-PUBLICATION case, and it needed no second file because the answer was BYTE-IDENTICAL to the bare-URL capture above - the same 1877 bytes and the same sha256. Asked for two days at 09:46 CEST, before the ~13:00-14:00 CET auction publishes 2026-09-11, the feed returned the ONE day that exists. That is the short answer this card requires to stay a `series` of what exists rather than becoming `no_data`, and the replay re-derives the identity from the bytes rather than restating it."
}
},
"energy-charts-be-price-2025-09-10-hourly.json": {
"url": "https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE&start=2025-09-10&end=2025-09-10",
"note": "a day BEFORE Belgium's 15-minute MTU (2025-10-01), so the same endpoint answers HOURLY. Kept because the parser must not assume either spacing, and a fixture at only one granularity cannot grade that",
"covers_local_day": "2025-09-10 (Europe/Brussels)",
"granularity_s": 3600,
"intervals": 24,
"bytes": 572,
"sha256": "03fe41690810df224611f4016899f856457f67a3c12c7654da17b1331ff2eff4",
"unit_as_returned": "EUR / MWh",
"licence_as_returned": "CC BY 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0) from Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de",
"deprecated_as_returned": false,
"top_level_keys": [
"deprecated",
"license_info",
"price",
"unit",
"unix_seconds"
]
},
"energy-charts-be-price-2026-09-09_2026-09-10-twoday.json": {
"url": "https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE&start=2026-09-09&end=2026-09-10",
"retrieved_utc": "2026-09-10T07:45:49+00:00",
"note": "TARIFF-09. A RANGE request, and the counterfactual the ticket is built on: `start`/`end` are INCLUSIVE Brussels calendar dates and this one answers 192 quarter-hours across TWO local days, where the bare `?bzn=BE` of the same endpoint answers 96 across one. The shipped `generic_dayahead` now derives these two dates from the `since`/`until` it is handed.",
"covers_local_days": [
"2026-09-09",
"2026-09-10"
],
"granularity_s": 900,
"intervals": 192,
"bytes": 3579,
"sha256": "4d83f5efb4294a4a682562eac619bf35e45c95edde957bfa94c402e1777cc9b3",
"unit_as_returned": "EUR / MWh",
"licence_as_returned": "CC BY 4.0 (creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0) from Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de",
"deprecated_as_returned": false,
"top_level_keys": [
"deprecated",
"license_info",
"price",
"unit",
"unix_seconds"
]
}
}
}

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