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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 71cd7849e4 Merge release/1.0 (SAFETY-07) into FCST-03, and close two degenerate stimuli
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m13s
CHANGELOG.md was the entire collision - SAFETY-07 lands in peakguard.py, main.py
and the arbiter, none of which this branch touches. Both entries kept.

X1. `_firm_or_die` guarding only `cheapest` survived, because the check passed
the SAME provisional point as both cheapest and dearest: a guard on either role
alone raises, so the stimulus could not tell "the buy hour is guarded" from
"both are". Now one call per role with a firm point in the other seat, plus the
positive arm so the two refusals are discriminating.

X6. `firm_points()` returning the carried hours too survived, because its two
consumers - the §11.4 refusal and cheap_now - guard provenance independently and
both keep answering correctly. The accessor is now graded directly: exactly the
published points, by identity and in order.

Both are the degeneracy rule this file states at the top, in a new dress - a
stimulus that cannot distinguish the two things it grades.

⚠️ AND THE REASON THE M9 MUTATION "SURVIVED" IN MY EARLIER REPORT: a stale
__pycache__. Reverting `self.provisional` to `here.provisional` changes neither
the file size nor, at one-second resolution, the mtime, so CPython kept the
MUTATED bytecode and a green run afterwards proved nothing about that line. Every
mutation here now clears __pycache__ first; re-run that way, M9 is caught. The
committed source was always correct - the checks were not being run against it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-31 00:15:32 +02:00
admin e7c95bfd8a SAFETY-07: cap the loop before it sets the month's billed capacity peak (#18)
The first thing in this system that can STOP a runaway rather than alarm on one. Each cycle it projects the open 900 s block from P1 telegrams and, over the ceiling, files one arbiter claim: a lower bound at P_PEAK, sized as excess = 900*(projected-ceiling)/remaining added to the MEASURED battery power. No writes, no I/O, no clock, no state between calls.

Replayed independently by the reviewer on a separate harness: 2026-08-20's billed quarter 5029.8 W -> 3485.3 W, both days 189/190 -> 190/190 under the 3500 W soft limit, 878 Wh modelled discharge on the failure day and 0 Wh with 0 engagements on the healthy one.

Verified as properties rather than witnesses: the lo-limit claim cannot cap discharge or export (hi is inf; 0 of 54 loop/floor pairs lowered the target; no floor in 0..5000 W reduces a full-rate discharge; decide() emitted 0 negative floors over 630 input combinations), and the 900/remaining gain is exactly 1.0 at the top of the block, growing, bounded at the end by the achievable_w clamp so it can never file lo > hi.

Round one held this PR on three wiring mutations that left all twelve suites green while a default install parked at 0 W in the billed quarter - including the suppression re-gated on the optional peak_forecast_entity, verbatim the historical defect this card's own comment described. All three are closed. The conjunction moved out of main.py into peakguard.shaping_suspended() so the check can assert on the shipped expression, and part 7 now executes the mutations against the real Controller.cycle(). The reviewer confirmed the harness cannot go vacuous: re-inlining the conjunction in main.py with behaviour-identical code turns B1 and B2 RED rather than green, because they assert the mutation takes effect.

Eight further reviewer mutations this round, all red, no survivors. One note recorded, not blocking: the parsed-syntax grade on decide(batt_w=...) is defeated by a decoy .decide() call or by overwriting self.batt before the call, and it is the behavioural checks beside it that catch both.

AC 3 remains TARIFF-01's and is NOT met - do not close the card as AC 3 met. SAFETY-24, the missing SoC backstop on the forced discharge, is named in peakguard.py with the 878 Wh figure and must land before this reaches a client install.
2026-08-30 23:56:20 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 dd40c56ab4 FCST-03: yesterday's prices, flagged as yesterday's, and unable to move anything
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m43s
§8.3 fills the hours a day-ahead feed has not published yet with yesterday's
profile and flags them provisional, and forbids any irreversible action on such
a price. The whole risk of this ticket is one line - a carried point and a
published point are three fields and a bool, so `provisional=y.provisional`
copies yesterday's False onto today's guess and produces stale data presented as
current. That is SAFETY-18's frozen-but-fresh meter one layer up.

So the flag is never passed through. Carried points come from a constructor with
no provisional parameter; published points pass through BY IDENTITY, so no copy
exists that could lose one; an audit re-derives the expected flag for every
emitted point and raises rather than repairing; and the check walks the module's
own AST so the pass-through idiom cannot come back looking ordinary. A published
point may itself be provisional (eneco_eddy's imbalance print is), so the rule
for a published hour is "whatever the feed said", never False.

The fill keys on the Brussels wall clock rather than t-24h, so the 23- and
25-hour days are right; a late publication rebuilds the series, moving the
number and the flag together.

AC2 and AC3 landed on TARIFF-03's existing verdict surface rather than beside
it. Refusal 3 became "fewer than two FIRM hours" - refusing on "any point is
provisional" would have switched arbitrage off every morning on every dynamic
site - and refusal 5 is new: the spread must clear a threshold widened by the
widest active uncertainty source (max, never a product). The permitting variant
now refuses to be constructed around a provisional point at all, and the
cheap-window flag became per-hour for the same reason.

The irreversible action is a value carrying the hours it commits, derived from
maintenance.py's own DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN; the gate blocks a maintenance drain
whose window reaches into a carried hour, and the phase machine stays idle. It
is the price-justified entry point only - a gate that blocked on no_data would
stop the monthly cycle on every default install.

Zero new config options; TEST-14's signature scan ported to cover both Gate's
and Arbitrage's constructors, closing _Refused.reason's open hole.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 23:54:07 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c2ed509565 Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-03) into SAFETY-07
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m12s
The anticipated conflict again, and only it: both cards prepend to CHANGELOG.md's
Unreleased section. Both entries kept, SAFETY-07 first. app/main.py and DOCS.md
auto-merged, so the overlap claim on #18 still holds - config.yaml and
validate.py remain untouched by this card even after TARIFF-02 and TARIFF-03
widened both.

Full suite green on the merge result, test_price.py and test_static_tariff.py
included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 23:43:35 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 2d570d84ce SAFETY-07 review: defend the three wiring mutations that survived
The reviewer's finding was correct and the shape of it matters: everything the
first cut graded was in peakguard.py, and grading the module is not the same as
grading the guard. Three one-line changes to main.py's CALL SITE left all twelve
suites green while a default install parked at 0 W in the quarter that sets the
month's bill.

B2 was the serious one. My own comment described that defect - "that entity is
optional and empty on a default install, so until now the suspension could not
fire on the site that needed it" - and nothing could regress it. A comment that
documents a fix nobody can test is the same shape as a corrected comment nobody
tests, which this project has already been caught by once.

WHAT CHANGED

The suppression conjunction moved out of main.py and into
peakguard.shaping_suspended(), for the reason watchdog.loop_is_following() and
freeze.looks_frozen() live where they do: the check that grades a safety
predicate must assert on THE SHIPPED EXPRESSION, not on a transcription that can
drift apart from it in silence. Its docstring carries both terms and why neither
is sufficient alone. main.py's call site now says READ THAT FUNCTION FIRST, and
records that a reviewer mutated it back to its historical broken form with every
suite staying green.

test_peakguard.py part 7 gains a section that EXECUTES the three mutations
rather than describing them. Each one is put in place on the shipped module and
the REAL Controller.cycle() is driven with it, on the dangerous fixture: a
default install (no peak_forecast_entity, so peak_fc is None and peak_at_risk is
False forever) with maintenance in its CHARGE phase, so a P_MAINT_SHAPE `hi <= 0`
limit is live, and the guard genuinely engaged on the measurement. That the
mutations are monkeypatched onto the shipped module is itself load-bearing: if
main.py inlined either expression again the patch would do nothing and these
checks would pass vacuously.

    SHIPPED   suspended=True    loop -> 1498 W, limited by peak    +1497.8 W
    B1        suspended=False   CONTRADICTION between limits           0.0 W
    B2        suspended=False   CONTRADICTION between limits           0.0 W
    B2b (forecast term dropped instead) - caught by its own check

B3 is graded three ways, because the single-cycle form is only INFLATED and the
failure is what happens on the next cycle:

  * the value main.py actually hands decide() is recorded off the real call, with
    the measured battery at 0 W and the command standing at +3000 W;
  * the one-cycle difference is asserted to be exactly the standing command - the
    whole defect in one line, watts that were asked for and never arrived counted
    as if they had;
  * both forms are then run forward against the REAL controller's own projection
    with an inverter that never follows:

        intent-sized floor    4482 5000 5000 5000 ...  SATURATED at cycle 2
        delivered-power floor 1482 1482 1482 1482 ...  stationary

  * and the call site is graded on parsed syntax, so a rename cannot quietly
    reintroduce it: `decide(batt_w=...)` must unparse to `self.batt`.

SAFETY-24 is now named in peakguard.py, in its own section, with the number that
makes it real - 878 Wh of forced discharge on the 2026-08-20 replay - and the
statement that this must not go to a client install before that ticket lands. A
ticket nobody can find from the code is a ticket nobody reads before shipping.

RED AND GREEN

Fifteen mutations run against the shipped modules, each reverted after: the six
new wiring ones (B1, B2, B2b, B3, B3b, and deleting the SAFETY-24 pointer) and
the eight from the first round, re-run to confirm they still bite. All fifteen
turn test_peakguard.py red. Full suite green, test_price.py and TARIFF-03's
included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 23:40:39 +02:00
admin cf5094c608 TARIFF-03: the static day/night profile as a first-class product and the 11.4 fallback (#19)
app/static_tariff.py: StaticProfile derives STATIC vs FIXED from its own prices, one generator serves both the configured product and the degradation fallback differing only in the provisional flag. TariffPlan.arbitrage() is a refusal type behind a required keyword-only peak_guard_active, and a flat tariff is refused by arithmetic rather than by matching PriceProduct.FIXED. main.py touched only in read_inputs() else-branch, one field, one status row - nothing in cycle(), the arbiter or the peak path; an empty profile is bit-for-bit the old behaviour. Rule 7 tripwire re-aimed rather than silenced.
2026-08-30 23:24:53 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9f8b721a4d Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-02) into SAFETY-07
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m9s
Conflict was the one anticipated: both cards prepend to CHANGELOG.md's
Unreleased section. Both entries kept, SAFETY-07 first. Nothing else of
TARIFF-02's surface (app/price.py, validate.py rule 7, config.yaml, DOCS.md)
overlaps this card - config.yaml and validate.py are untouched here, so the
CFG-03 check still reads a config.yaml that only TARIFF-02 has widened.

Full suite green on the merge result, test_price.py included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 23:13:29 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 303525cfc5 TARIFF-03: static day/night and fully-fixed tariffs, first-class
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m43s
§9.2 puts a large share of the Belgian installed base on a static profile, and
an EMS that only works under dynamic pricing is an EMS for a minority. A new
`static_profile` option describes a two-period day/night tariff - or a single
fixed price - and app/static_tariff.py turns it into the same canonical
{start, eur_per_kwh, provisional} series the fetched providers emit.

Not a sixth provider plugin, for two mechanical reasons. capabilities() is a
classmethod, so a plugin's PriceProduct is fixed when the class is written -
but §9.2 makes STATIC and FIXED two different products and which one a site is
on is a property of the operator's data; StaticProfile.product derives it from
the number of distinct prices. And the plugin framework exists to stop a
FETCHED figure being marked up twice, which a number typed as all-in cannot be.
So the profile sits where §11.4 already says it does - under the providers, as
the fallback. Configured product and feed-is-down are one generator differing
in one flag, so the degradation path cannot rot unused.

"No arbitrage" is a type. TariffPlan.arbitrage() returns a variant whose
ALLOWED arm carries the spread and the cheapest/dearest hours and whose REFUSED
arm carries a reason and nothing else - .spread_eur_kwh on a refusal raises
rather than answering 0.0, so an optimiser cannot compute a trade from one.
Four refusals, all derived: peak guard holding, no price data, plan
provisional, or the series is FLAT. The last is AC2: a fixed tariff disables
arbitrage by arithmetic, not by matching on an enum. peak_guard_active is a
required keyword argument, so §10.1's priority 2 over 3 cannot be skipped.

Time-window shifting reaches the one shiftable load that exists: main.py's
cheap-window flag falls back to the static profile, and the UI gained a Tariff
row. Cheap is STRICTLY below the seven-day mean - `<=` would call every hour of
a flat tariff cheap, and 48 h taken on a Friday is two-thirds weekend.

A profile must tile every day type exactly once, checked at startup; a gap is
refused with the range named rather than filled in. `22:00-07:00 mon-fri` does
not cover Saturday morning, and that trap is what the check catches.

validate.py rule 7's stated reason expired exactly as TARIFF-02 predicted: the
test_price.py section 12 tripwire went red naming static_tariff.py. The message
now says what is true instead, and the tripwire is re-aimed rather than removed
- consumer set pinned, expired phrase asserted gone. Rule 7 also grew a second
refusal for static_profile alongside the HA price pair, the same silent-loser
conflict and a live one.

CFG-03 is not widened: static_profile went into price.py's PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS
- the one in-code mirror pinned to config.yaml by a check - and the new module
carries no defaults dict of its own.

Measured on the two committed days of this house's real P1 meter. 2026-08-20
(Thursday): 15.220 kWh imported, 9.606 day / 5.614 night, EUR 4.7185 under
day/night vs EUR 4.6725 flat, shifting saves EUR 0.8069 = 9.606 kWh x the
0.0840 spread, derived twice. 2026-08-23 (Sunday): 0.728 kWh, all of it
night-priced, which is the weekend row proving itself. §17 names six Belgian
scenarios; this is the seventh, and it is two days rather than a season - the
file says so rather than implying an annual figure.

All 12 suites green. Eleven mutations of static_tariff.py were each caught by
at least one check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 23:07:53 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 616b62d3e9 SAFETY-07: cap the loop before it sets the month's billed capacity peak
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m7s
TARIFF-01 measured the quarter and said the consumer would be this card. It is
one new module, app/peakguard.py, and one new claim.

THE MECHANISM. Every cycle the guard projects the open 900 s block to its
end-of-interval average - from P1 telegrams only, never from the command - and
compares it to a ceiling. Over the ceiling it files ONE arbiter claim: a lower
bound on the setpoint at P_PEAK. That single shape is both behaviours 10.1 asks
for, a hard clamp on charging and pre-emptive discharge, and it cannot cap
discharge or export, because a floor cannot. 9.1's asymmetry becomes a property
of the object instead of a rule to remember.

    excess = 900 x (projected - ceiling) / seconds remaining
    floor  = MEASURED battery power + excess

The 900/remaining gain is 1.0 at the top of the quarter and grows, so the guard
is gentlest where its projection rests on the least evidence. The floor is sized
from delivered battery power, not the standing command: a floor built on intent
re-adds its own unmet ask every cycle and winds to the rail whenever the inverter
fails to follow, and test_peakguard.py part 1 shows the two diverging.

IT TRIPS, AND THE CAPTURES DECIDED THAT. On the healthy reference day it engages
on zero of 95 quarters. The action is level-triggered, unlatched and re-derived
every cycle, so a false engagement costs one cycle of discharge rather than a
parked battery - the cost SAFETY-18 could not bound and this one can. Replayed on
2026-08-20 the billed quarter goes from 5029.8 W, above the inverter's own 5000 W
rating, to 3485 W, under the soft limit and without saturating. Quarters under
the limit across both committed days: 189/190 -> 190/190. Two days is not thirty
and AC 3 remains TARIFF-01's open item.

BLINDNESS IS CHECKED BEFORE THE PROJECTION IS GRADED, and it is a different
action. A fresh averager projects a confident 0 W, which is under every ceiling
there is; a meter gap longer than meter_max_age_s makes the projection read LOW;
a frozen meter reading export projects 0 W at full coverage. All three become a
floor of 0 W - no importing while the billed quantity is unobservable - which is
one-directional and cannot cost pack energy. That is the backstop SAFETY-18 could
not be: its alarm arrives at 300 s of a 900 s quarter and commands nothing. The
frozen term is freeze.looks_frozen() itself, on this cycle's standing command.

THE CEILING IS peak_cap_w, RAISED ONLY BY AN OBSERVED READING. NO_RECORD and
NOT_OBSERVED both leave it at the cap, so an unreadable peak store makes the
guard stricter and never looser. The gate is the reading's STATE, not whether a
number happens to be attached: today a `peak_w is not None` test behaves
identically, and depending on that coincidence is how a future last-known-peak
field would raise the ceiling off a read that failed. headroom_w() is
deliberately not consumed - cap minus peak turns a zero peak into FULL freedom.

TWO DEFECTS FOUND BUILDING IT, both in the interaction rather than the
arithmetic, and both caught by running the thing rather than by reading it:

  * A LIMIT does not out-vote another LIMIT. arbiter.resolve() applies every
    limit at or above the winner's priority and takes the most restrictive, so
    the peak floor (lo >= 0) and the maintenance charge-only shaping (hi <= 0)
    resolved to a CONTRADICTION and 0 W - the battery parked in the exact quarter
    it should shave. Fixed by suppression, not priority: main.py drops the
    maintenance shaping while the guard is engaged, which is what that branch
    already did for the optional peak_forecast_entity - a key empty on a default
    install, so until now the suspension could not fire on the site that needed
    it.
  * Thresholding `excess > 0` released the claim the instant it began working,
    producing seventeen engage/release cycles in one 900 s quarter and leaving
    that quarter 49 W over the limit it had spent fifteen minutes holding. That
    is 10.2's oscillation. The threshold is now the floor itself, which is the
    same arithmetic read as a level rather than as a switch.

PeakTracker.project() no longer reads a private name with a default.
getattr(averager, "_last_net", 0.0) failed quiet AND disarming - a rename credits
0 W held, the projection reads low, the money guard does not engage.
QuarterAverager.held_net_w is a documented public property now, read without a
default, and Projection carries it. TEST-13 item 4.

NO NEW OPTION AND NO FOURTH DEFAULTS SITE. The ceiling is peak_cap_w, the
coverage threshold is meter_max_age_s, the freeze predicate is meter_freeze_s,
and the achievable discharge comes from max_w and the device rating. config.yaml
and validate.py are untouched; 14's capacity_peak_limit_kw stays declined. On
meter_source: off there are no telegrams, so the guard does not run at all and
the status page says NOT COVERED - running it there blinded it permanently and
stopped every legacy install from charging, which is what the first cut did until
test_clamp.py's export case caught it.

test_peakguard.py: eight parts, all figures derived from the shipped config.yaml
and the committed captures. Part 8 runs seven one-line defeats of the guard and
reports which check bites; six do, and the seventh is reported as NOT caught,
because max(cap, peak) makes a zero peak the strictest ceiling there is and there
is nothing left to catch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 23:05:05 +02:00
admin 91ea676af4 TARIFF-02: price provider plugins + the canonical all-in price format (#16)
Five providers behind a registry, canonical all-in {start, eur_per_kwh, provisional}. Plugins return RawPoints and declare capabilities().sources; assemble() adds the complement once. register() refuses at import any plugin whose class code mentions a framework key, PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, price_option or _o - closing the three routes review used to double-count. PriceRead.series/no_data as an absence type; all-zero is a series, no_data forbids arbitrage. Additive only: main.py untouched, zero deletions.
2026-08-30 22:35:49 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 862f0fa574 Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-01) into TARIFF-02
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m39s
TARIFF-01 (#17) landed on release/1.0 first, so this branch was two
commits behind and Gitea reported the PR unmergeable. Integrating rather
than rebasing: the two reviewed commits stay addressable, and the branch
is protected against force-push anyway.

ONE CONFLICT, AND IT IS THE BORING HALF OF THE ONE REVIEW PREDICTED.
Review of #16 expected collisions in four places - the tail of
`options:`, the tail of `schema:`, the rule list inside
validate_startup_config(), and the tail of validate.py. None of them
happened: TARIFF-01 touched neither config.yaml nor validate.py. It
added app/tariff.py, test_tariff.py, two P1 scenario captures, and edits
to main.py and p1.py, none of which this branch goes near.

The only conflict was CHANGELOG.md, where both branches prepended a
block under the same `## Unreleased` heading. Both blocks kept, TARIFF-02
above TARIFF-01 since it lands second. Nothing was dropped or reworded on
either side, and the resolution adds no line of its own beyond the blank
one between them.

Checked rather than assumed after the merge:
  - all ELEVEN test files pass, including TARIFF-01's own test_tariff.py
    (which this branch had never run) and the 93 s test_loop.py;
  - the 24-mutation battery still has 0 survivors;
  - no semantic overlap in config: TARIFF-01's peak tracker reads the
    peak_cap_w / peak_forecast_entity options that already existed, so
    the price options added here neither shadow nor duplicate anything.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 19:42:16 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 e102cde841 TARIFF-02 review: close the three other doors to the markup, and stop overclaiming
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m34s
Review of PR #16 wrote a double-counting plugin four ways. PluginOptions
blocked one. The one that decided it touched nothing but
PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS - a public dict in the module every plugin must
already import for register() - so "the number is not in scope" was
simply false, and an absolute guarantee a reviewer trusts is worse than
a stated limit, because they stop checking.

register() now refuses, AT IMPORT, any plugin whose own code mentions a
framework-owned name: FRAMEWORK_KEYS plus PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS,
price_option and _o. code_leaks() parses the class and drops every
docstring node before searching, because every plugin is REQUIRED to
name its sourced components in prose - engie_dynamic says "markup" in
its docstring and a raw text scan false-positives on the documentation
the same file mandates. A check that fires on required documentation is
a check somebody deletes. test_price.py asserts that a raw scan really
would have false-positived, so the strip is proven load-bearing rather
than asserted.

It fails OPEN if inspect.getsource() cannot find the .py, which the
add-on image always can. Refusing to start a battery controller because
a static analysis could not run would trade a real outage for a
hypothetical accounting error - so instead the checks assert source was
found for all five shipped plugins, and a build that lost it is a red
check rather than a quietly disarmed guard.

All three reachable attacks are written out as plugins in the suite and
each must be refused at registration. The cost is measured, not
asserted: honest wholesale 0.188, every attack 0.219 - one markup high,
every hour, invisible in every log this add-on writes.

The guarantee is now stated at its true size everywhere it appears: the
framework adds the complement exactly once, GIVEN A CORRECT sources
DECLARATION. A plugin that declares {ENERGY} while its feed is all-in
still doubles while touching no framework name, and no code can catch
that - the declaration is an unverifiable claim about somebody else's
tariff. Measured in the suite (0.276) so the limit is a number rather
than a caveat. The docstring/declaration check verifies that a plugin's
two claims AGREE, not that either is true; that now says so.

The three surviving mutations:

M3 - _NoData's reason taking a default. This is the identical survivor
left open on RIG-01's _Unread.cause: the shape was borrowed from
sim/riglock.py including its blind spot, which is what borrowing a shape
does if nobody re-runs the mutations against the copy. Closed by
SIGNATURE - no constructor or handler of an outcome type may carry a
default - so the next one is red without anyone writing a new case.

M5 - the ENERGY-required guard was untested. Its consequence is that
adds becomes {ENERGY, TAXES} and the emitted price silently omits the
energy it is pricing.

M7 - deleting the TLS refusal went green AND the check named for it
still passed, because the old parser stripped a fixed len("https://")
and mangled http://api.energy-charts.info/p into the host
pi.energy-charts.info, which then failed the ALLOW-LIST. An assertion
that does not test what it names, inside a security check. Fixed on both
sides: the scheme is parsed as a scheme, so an http URL now resolves to
its real and declared host and only the TLS rule can refuse it; and the
check asserts the REASON. Fixing it surfaced M7b - the no-scheme guard
was survivable the same way - found by mutating my own fix, and closed
the same way.

Also carried forward: rule 7's refusal is correct forever but its stated
reason ("the provider decides nothing") expires the moment TARIFF-03 or
OPT-04 lands. test_price.py section 12 now greps app/ by AST for a
load_prices consumer and goes red when one appears, telling whoever
lands it to update the message in the same commit. The first draft of
that tripwire used a substring and matched the comment in validate.py
explaining the tripwire - the same false-positive class as the plugin
docstrings, hit twice in one ticket, and fixed the same way.

Documented rather than coded around: vars(read).get("points", []) and
bool(read) both still get past the absence type, and neither is worth
code - defining __bool__ would turn a line that reads like a guard into
one that IS a guard by accident, which is how .get(k, default) got here
in the first place.

Stated plainly in DOCS/CHANGELOG/PR: every fixture is synthetic, so the
five feed URLs and JSON shapes are verified against a belief about what
those suppliers publish rather than against the feeds. A wrong shape
degrades to no-price-data, not to a wrong price.

Review's own DST verification recorded: 149,040 hourly instants,
2020-2036, zero mismatches against zoneinfo. The residual is political,
not arithmetic, and the docstring now says so.

24 mutations driven through the suite, 0 survivors. Whole add-on suite
green. No deleted lines outside this ticket's own files; main.py still
untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 19:35:36 +02:00
admin 0dbd485b5a TARIFF-01: measure the month's billed capacity peak, and make it survive a restart (#17)
The instrument SAFETY-07 will read: the highest clock-aligned 15-minute average offtake of the calendar month, persisted in /data/tariff.db across two retention tiers, with a monthly peak that recompute_month() proves has not diverged from the 15-minute tier. Files no claim, applies no clamp, commands nothing.

AC 1 was already built and unwired - p1.QuarterAverager on the base already does clock-aligned 900 s blocks, time-weighted over irregular spacing, offtake-only, per-phase, with the max_hold_s gap rule; verified on 9aadf46 rather than taken on the PR's word, and the p1.py diff removes zero lines. So this is persistence and reduction rather than a second source of truth for the quantity the money depends on.

Block rather than rolling, and the reading is provable: a 900 s burst centred on a :15 boundary bills at 2000 W and reads 4000 W through a trailing window - exactly 2.00x, the supremum - and since the aligned windows are a subset of all trailing windows, a rolling figure can only ever read HIGH, never low. On the real captures, 1.09x and 1.05x.

Reviewed independently: the encoded EU DST rule graded against zoneinfo at minute resolution over eight transitions, all of 2026 hourly and every month boundary - 0 mismatches - and the wrong-arm fromutc() mutation that differs only inside the one-hour transition window now goes red, which is the class that escaped the first draft. All four persistence behaviours produced rather than read, including a hard os._exit with no close() losing neither a banked quarter nor the open checkpoint. The SAFETY-20 syntax grader discriminates on names; two evasions remain in its import half.

AC 3 is NOT met and the check says so: no 30-day dataset exists. The two days that do exist replay to 189/190 quarters = 99.5 % under the 3500 W soft limit, uncontrolled - the baseline SAFETY-07 must improve on - and 2026-08-20's peak reproduces independently at 5029.8 W, a billed quarter over the live install's own 5000 W rating. Do not close the card as AC 3 met; start the 30-day capture.

Four reviewer mutations survive, recorded on the PR. The one to act on: record_block() ignoring its policy argument stays green, because every block reaching the store in the check is single-phase where NET, SUM and MAX collapse - the third instance of the degeneracy trap this file already documents twice, sitting on the exact line the pending per-phase product decision will change.

No conflict with TARIFF-02 (#16) beyond CHANGELOG.md, verified from both sides.
2026-08-30 19:33:57 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 f4914a174a TARIFF-01: measure the month's billed peak, and make it survive a restart
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m38s
The 15-minute block average was already built and unwired. p1.QuarterAverager
computes clock-aligned 900 s blocks, time-weighted over irregular telegram
spacing, offtake-only and per-phase; P1Ingest.blocks was a 96-entry list in
memory that a restart erased. So this is the persistence and the monthly
reduction, not a second accumulator - a second one would be a second source of
truth for the exact quantity the money depends on.

BLOCKS, NOT A SLIDING WINDOW. The card says "rolling"; 9.1 bills "the highest
15-minute average offtake" and states its own worked case per QUARTER - one
4998 W quarter moving a monthly peak from 4832 to 5013 W. A trailing window
reports a peak the meter never bills, and reports it HIGH: a burst straddling
:15 fills the window completely while contributing to two block averages at
partial weight.

DELIVERED, NOT INTENDED. tariff.py only ever sees P1Sample - the meter's own
reading - and never a setpoint. SAFETY-20's open question does not arise for a
capacity tariff: the utility integrates the current that flowed.

AN UNREADABLE STORE IS NOT A ZERO PEAK. peak() answers OBSERVED / NO_RECORD /
NOT_OBSERVED with peak_w None unless observed, which is riglock.holder()'s fix
applied to something that spends money. A peak read as 0 W hands SAFETY-07
maximum headroom and disarms the guard at the moment its own storage breaks.

Restart mid-block resumes the accumulator through a new snapshot()/restore()
pair, checkpointed every 15 s and cleared in the same breath as a block close.
The held sample keeps its ORIGINAL timestamp, so an outage is integrated under
the same max_hold_s rule a running process would apply. quarter_start is the
primary key and a re-bank may only ever RAISE a figure.

Calendar months are LOCAL: a quarter starting 22:15 UTC on 31 August bills in
September.

No new option (the limit is the existing peak_cap_w), so config.yaml and
validate.py are untouched and CFG-03 is not widened. No second peak entity:
peak_forecast_entity stays the input to maintenance_charge_floor(), because
repointing that consumer changes what moves energy and belongs to SAFETY-07.

AC 3 is NOT met. It asks for 30 days of replay; two days of this house's real
meter exist and are committed here. test_tariff.py part 9 replays them, reports
the percentage next to the sample size in days, and asserts nothing about 95 %.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 19:13:58 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 852fc7ced6 TARIFF-02: one canonical price format, and a seam that keeps supplier names out of the optimiser
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m33s
Five provider plugins - generic_dayahead, engie_dynamic,
totalenergies_dynamic, eneco_eddy, manual_csv - all emitting exactly
{"prices": [{"start", "eur_per_kwh", "provisional"}]}, tz-aware at the
Brussels offset, EUR/kWh, all-in. Nothing consumes it yet; the seam
lands first, per the PM's ordering.

It is built in goodwe_controller/app/ rather than at specs.md 2.2's
ems/ingest/prices/, per the product owner's decision of 2026-08-30. The
behaviour 9.3 / 8.3 / 11.4 specifies is unchanged.

Three things shape the design, and each is the mechanism rather than a
comment saying to be careful:

Double-counting the markup is unreachable. A plugin does not return a
price - it returns the figure its source published and declares which of
{energy, markup, taxes} that figure already contains. assemble() adds
the complement, once, in the framework. A plugin is never handed
price_markup_eur_kwh: PluginOptions raises FrameworkOption on it, so the
line that adds the margin a second time cannot be written. Engie and
TotalEnergies publish a retail figure with their margin inside; adding
the configured 3 c/kWh on top would have made every arbitrage decision
wrong by that amount with nothing reporting it.

The product type is declared, not inferred from the plugin's name.
eneco_eddy is real-time/imbalance and gets 8.3's widened thresholds
through capabilities().product and volatility_regime(), never through a
name comparison - which is AC2. test_price.py asserts mechanically that
no plugin id appears anywhere in the framework's code, and drives a
sixth provider defined inside the test file to the right regime with
price.py untouched.

"No price data" is a type, not an empty list - the same rework
sim/riglock.py took under TEST-04. A fetch returns PriceRead.series(...)
or PriceRead.no_data(reason), and only the first carries fields. An
empty series is not constructible; no_data has no .points, no .at(), and
.get("points", []) raises rather than returning the default. A day of
free electricity and a day with no prices are different instructions -
arbitrage is pointless under one and forbidden under the other - and an
implementation returning [] cannot tell them apart. Every site-level
failure returns no_data; nothing raises into the control tick.

Also: injection stays a separate scalar (export_price_eur_kwh, AC4),
negative prices survive the boundary validator (17's regression case),
egress is allow-listed against each plugin's own declaration (16), and
no tzdata is used - the shipped Alpine image has none, so Brussels
offsets come from the EU rule and instants are carried as UTC.

validate.py grows rule 7: an unknown provider id, manual_csv with no
path, and - the HA overlap the PM told us to decide about -
price_provider set alongside price_now_entity/price_avg_entity, which is
two price sources where the HA pair silently wins. The HA sensors are
kept and still work alone; TARIFF-03 and OPT-04 are what replace them.

CFG-03 is not widened: the price defaults have ONE in-code mirror,
PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, which validate.py imports rather than restating
and which test_price.py pins to config.yaml by reading the file.

test_price.py is runnable, assert-free in the house style, and every
verdict it prints is derived. It grades the markup arithmetic with
0.031/0.057 rather than the shipped 0.03/0.06, because 0.06 is exactly
twice 0.03 and a degenerate pair would make double-counting
indistinguishable from correct addition - and it asserts that
non-degeneracy as its first section. The DST checks run on the 23-hour
and 25-hour days, not on a normal day where a fixed 24-slot
implementation and a correct one agree. Thirteen mutations were driven
through it; all thirteen go red.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 19:05:12 +02:00
admin 9aadf469bc TEST-06: pin the cycle() ordering, the NOT COVERED string and the shipped meter_freeze_s (#14)
Closes the three mutations that survived SAFETY-18 suite green. Ordering pinned by consequence (N8 red above the assignment, N3 green below it); NOT COVERED asserted in both directions; shipped meter_freeze_s and its schema bounds pinned. notes_of()/all_notes_of() split so this guard and the whole notification surface are separately nameable, with the three surface-wide claims decided per scenario after SAFETY-03. app/ change is comment-only (AST-identical).
2026-08-30 18:39:07 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 4b521b2df0 ci: trigger a run on the rebased head
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m33s
No content change. The gate never created a run for 0942228d - the newest
run stayed on d31a12b7, the pre-rebase head - so `checks / unit` had
nothing to report and sat pending. Why no run was created is CI-02 and
belongs to CI-01's owner; this commit only asks for one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 18:11:21 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0942228d65 Merge release/1.0 (SAFETY-03) into TEST-06
checks / unit (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Two conflicts, both predicted, both mine as the later merger.

app/main.py - #12 inserted `await self.check_output_clamp()` on the line
immediately above `await self.check_meter_frozen()`, so its hunk abuts my
comment correction. Resolved so EACH CALL CARRIES ITS OWN BOUNDARY,
because the two guards do not share one:

  - check_output_clamp() reads `self.clamp_last`, which is None until
    write_setpoint() has run, so its boundary IS the write;
  - check_meter_frozen() grades `self.target`, assigned further up, so
    its boundary is the assignment.

Letting my correction generalise across both would have been worse than
the vague comment it replaces, because it would read as deliberate. The
AST of app/main.py is identical to merged release/1.0 (+1251 bytes, all
comment).

test_freeze.py - #12 independently added `frozen_notes()` keyed on the
same id. `notes_of()` subsumes it: same id, plus the title fallback that
keeps the id's own check independently falsifiable, plus `all_notes_of()`
for claims about the whole surface.

THE THREE SURFACE-WIDE ASSERTIONS, DECIDED ONE AT A TIME. Measured on the
merged tree:

  scenario                              surface  ids             freeze
  frozen meter, railed command             2     frozen + clamp     1
  TEL-05 converged, -14.2 W                0     -                  0
  moving meter, a real 8 kW load           1     clamp              0
  uncovered transport, no unchanged_s      1     clamp              0

  - the wiring scenario STAYS SURFACE-WIDE and now asserts exactly TWO
    alarms with BOTH IDS NAMED. The answer to "is this still meant to
    raise one alarm" is no, it raises two, and a third guard has to come
    back to this line. That is the one assertion in the file that
    accounts for the controller's entire alarm output;
  - the CONVERGED case stays surface-wide and stays silent: at the
    operating point the whole add-on should have nothing to say, that is
    still true, and narrowing it would give away a real property;
  - the other two NARROW to notes_of(). The clamp alarm there is correct
    and is SAFETY-03's subject: a real 8 kW load does drive the loop past
    the rating, and an uncovered transport does not stop it. Asserting
    whole-surface silence would make this file fail whenever another
    guard correctly does its job. Each still owns the load-bearing half -
    THE FREEZE DETECTOR SAID NOTHING - and the surface is PRINTED so a
    reader sees what else fired without this file grading it.

Re-verified on the merged tree: M1 RED 4, M2 RED 5, M3 RED 3 + RED 2,
N6 RED 1, N3 green (correctly), N8 RED 4, R1 RED 2, R2 RED 1. All nine
suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:45:09 +02:00
admin 6aabb832fc SAFETY-03: alarm when a computed setpoint exceeds the rating, do not just clip it (#12)
The clamp already existed; the alarm did not, and specs 10.3 records a silently clipped integrator that reached 14,768 W while every dashboard read a legal 5000 W. OUTPUT_CLAMP now alarms on every engagement, with its own reason code, notification_id, status row and counter, distinct from ordinary saturation. Clamp lives in write_setpoint(), the one path every write takes; the alarm runs after it, out of the write path. Not a trip: the clamped value is written and the loop keeps running.

Reviewed over two rounds. Round one held the PR on three findings: clamp_to_rating() returned early from the max_w stage so the device bound was never applied when the first stage engaged (the bigger the overshoot, the less the guard did), and two checks that could not fail - range(CLEAR_CYCLES - 1) issued zero clean cycles at CLEAR_CYCLES=1, and REASSERT_S + 9 passed for any value including an hour of silence. All three fixed in 4e66583 and verified independently: both clamp stages now run on symmetric, asymmetric and wider-device ratings with no escapes; the 492-point sweep was shown to bite where the witness values cannot (a positive-side-only device bound gives 181 escapes with both witnesses passing, and a single-grid-point hole gives 1); and the rewritten checks pin the requirement rather than the constant - CLEAR_CYCLES red at 1 and at 51, REASSERT_S red at <=5 and at >=300.

Author's six mutations all reproduced red, including the cross-suite one where removing the event-log coalescing turns test_freeze red - this guard's log had been evicting SAFETY-18's METER FROZEN? row. Headline claim reproduced: keying the alarm on Decision.reason instead of the i_clamped/clamped booleans takes the 10.3 replay from 2 engagements to 0. AC2 verified with an independent saturation-without-clamping scenario: sat_count 10 at 21.6% of the rating, zero clamp engagements.

Two reviewer mutations survive, both recorded and neither blocking: describe() dropping the bound name (the bound field itself is pinned), and abs() on limit_w (unreachable under the int(100,5000) schema).

First merge in this repository to pass through CI-01's gate rather than around it: 46383c5 merged release/1.0 in so the required context could run at all, and checks / unit (pull_request) reports success in 2m32s.

Note for TEST-06 (#14), which rebases behind this: it conflicts in BOTH app/main.py and test_freeze.py, and its 8 red assertions are its own service-keyed notification counting - keying those four call sites on notification_id turns the whole suite green against this app/ with no change here.
2026-08-30 17:22:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d31a12b7c6 TEST-06: the id-selection note said 'the only assertion'; there are two
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m32s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:10:42 +02:00
glenn schrooyen 2983d7c3b0 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/release/1.0' into TEST-06
checks / unit (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
2026-08-30 17:05:35 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 611d3dbcdf TEST-06 review follow-ups: two notification surfaces, the real ordering boundary, the schema bounds
1. notes_of() could not tell this guard's alarm from anybody else's. It
   selected by SERVICE, so against #12's app/ (which adds
   goodwe_output_clamp) eight assertions went red, AC1's core check among
   them. Blanket id-keying is not the repair and was measured, not
   guessed:

       selector                    vs #12's app/   id renamed
       by service (as committed)     8 red           1 red
       by id alone                   3 red           6 red
       by id or title (shipped)      3 red           1 red

   all_notes_of() is the whole surface; notes_of() is this guard's,
   recognised by the id it should carry OR the title it writes - the `or`
   is what keeps the one assertion whose subject IS the id able to fail on
   its own. The three surface-wide claims stay surface-wide, each with a
   comment naming which surface it is about and why the next guard's
   author must decide rather than narrow them. They are the three that go
   red against #12, which is the correct signal.

2. The ordering comment named the wrong boundary. N3 - moving the call to
   immediately before write_setpoint() - is green and correctly so:
   self.target is assigned two lines earlier, write_setpoint() clamps only
   a local and can skip the write entirely. So the invariant is "after
   `self.target = resolution.target_w`", and the detector grades pre-clamp
   INTENT, not the wire. Corrected in test_freeze.py and in main.py's own
   note above the call (comment-only; I merge second and own the
   conflict). N8 - moving the call above the assignment - is RED 4.

3. The schema range's own bounds are now pinned. int(60,3600) ->
   int(1,86400) survived green: an operator could set meter_freeze_s:
   86400 and the guard is dead with nothing red. Both bounds are
   re-derived rather than restated.

4. find_hwsim() crashed the whole suite on a checkout one level below the
   root (HERE.parents[1] -> IndexError, reproduced at C:/goodwe_controller).
   Guarded. And part 3 now names its transport in the summary: the rig
   hwsim and the stub are not equivalent - the rig path failed 1 run in 3
   - so a green log has to say which one backed it.

Also: the "revived transport re-rails" check is labelled a PRECONDITION
like its sibling; freeze_rows() records that flipping p1_enabled exercises
the row's content and never its gate; and the note about the deleted
assertion is corrected - it was REDUNDANT, not undecidable. The reviewer
falsified it in one line (move the hass.call above `if not fired: return`,
RED 9). "I could not construct a falsifier, therefore it cannot fail" was
exactly the inference this file exists to distrust.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:05:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 46383c5ae5 Merge release/1.0 (CI-01) into SAFETY-03 so the required check can run
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m32s
Branch protection on release/1.0 now requires the context
`checks / unit (pull_request)`, and CI-01's workflow arrived after this
branch was cut - so no run had ever been triggered for this PR and the
required context would have sat pending forever. Clean merge, no
conflicts: .gitattributes, .gitea/ci/Dockerfile and
.gitea/workflows/checks.yml only. No add-on source or check is touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 16:03:32 +02:00
admin 5e966ca59f CI-01: this repository's first automated check (#13) 2026-08-30 16:00:42 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 4e66583a52 SAFETY-03 review fixes: both clamp stages always run, and two checks that could not fail
1. BEHAVIOURAL, and a regression this PR introduced. clamp_to_rating() returned
early from the max_w stage, so the device bound was applied only when the rating
bound had NOT fired - the bigger the overshoot, the less the guard did. At max_w
5000 against a +-4000 device, +9999 emitted +5000 W, outside the device range,
while +4500 was correctly held to +4000. It undid the pre-PR guarantee "never
send a value the device will reject outright" and undercut this module's own
case for max_w-not-min(), which rests on that stage catching a validation that
did not run. Both stages now always run; the result names both bounds when both
bite (max_w+device). Asserted over a 492-point sweep, because the defect was
invisible to any single-value check sitting inside one stage.

2. The hysteresis check issued range(CLEAR_CYCLES - 1) clean cycles, which at
CLEAR_CYCLES = 1 issues zero, passes, and prints "0 clean cycles do NOT clear
it" - green for the chatter setting the constant exists to prevent. Now: ONE
clean cycle must not clear the alarm, a literal that does not move with the
constant, and the de-assert count is measured by looping until it clears.

3. The re-assert check stimulated at REASSERT_S + 9, green for any value
including 3600 - the hour of silence the module promises not to produce. Now
stated in wall-clock terms: a loop pinned across the 900 s capacity-tariff
quarter must speak at least 5 times and on no more than 20% of cycles. Pinned in
both directions.

Red confirmed for each: the restored early return (3 checks), CLEAR_CYCLES = 1
(1), REASSERT_S = 3600 (1) and REASSERT_S = 0 (3).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 15:52:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c34b5a2922 TEST-06: close the three gaps that survived SAFETY-18's suite green
None of the three is a bug in the shipped code. They are gaps in what the
suite could detect, and the next person to touch freeze.py had less
protection than the passing count implied.

1. WHERE check_meter_frozen() runs in cycle(). Moving it to the top left
   the whole file green. Pinned by CONSEQUENCE, not by source order, so a
   refactor that keeps the semantics stays green:
     - the alarm must land on the SAME cycle the command reaches the rail
       (at the top it grades the previous command against this cycle's
       meter and arrives a cycle late);
     - the dead-poll-task composition: poll task dies, stale_input_s is
       crossed, the arbiter commands 0 W, and on THAT cycle the alarm is
       already clear - because the detector ran after the 0 W write.
   wired() now returns a per-cycle trace, which is what makes "on which
   cycle" an observation rather than a hope.

2. The NOT COVERED status row. The old check only asserted that an
   uncovered transport is SILENT, which a page claiming `armed` on a guard
   that cannot run also satisfies. The string is now asserted in both
   directions: the uncovered row must say NOT COVERED, name the
   meter_source and homewizard_local, and warn; the covered row must still
   say armed, or "does not say armed" would be satisfied by deleting the
   armed branch.

3. meter_freeze_s. Pinned in test_validate.py by MAINT-04's regex
   technique (no PyYAML in the image), and in test_freeze.py by its
   consequences: the shipped value drives the replays, must stay inside
   the 900 s billing quarter, and 3600/hold_s must stay inside the shipped
   deadband. A Controller built with the key ABSENT must land on the same
   number, which pins main.py's fallback without touching CFG-03.

All three demonstrated red before being accepted green, and every new
check was mutated to confirm it can fail; one candidate assertion ("no new
notification while parked at 0 W") was DELETED because no mutation could
break it, and replaced by the exact notification count across a revived
transport, which can.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 15:50:08 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9c1a23328a CI-01: this repository's first automated check
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m39s
Before this commit `admin/goodwe-addon` had no `.gitea/workflows/` directory at
all. Eight runnable test files - `test_loop.py` alone drives the real
`run_control()` for 93 s of wall clock - and not one of them had ever been run
by a machine. Every merge here was a human reading a diff, and the product
owner's requirement that a green CI gate a merge could not be met on a
repository with no CI to be green.

One job, `unit`, with no `paths:` filter, so it reports on every PR and can
therefore be a REQUIRED status check: Gitea leaves a required context it never
receives pending forever, which is the failure mode on the other side of this
ticket. Concurrency is scoped per PR from the start rather than to a bare group
name - the bare name is what let the infra repo's run 521 be superseded while
still pending, so its four jobs concluded `cancelled` with `started_at` at the
Unix epoch and its PR merged on no evidence at all.

The tests run in `.gitea/ci/Dockerfile`: `alpine:3` plus `py3-aiohttp` and
`py3-paho-mqtt` from apk, matching goodwe_controller/Dockerfile exactly, because
pip would install glibc wheels of a library the shipped image gets from Alpine.
The runner itself cannot host them - bare python3, no aiohttp, no pip - and
mutating a shared long-lived runner with `apk add` is invisible to anyone
reading this repo.

Two things measured while building it and recorded in the file rather than
learned again: the checkout must sit two levels below the mount root or
test_freeze.py's `find_hwsim()` dies on `IndexError: 1` before its first
assertion, and test_freeze's hwsim section is silently absent here because
admin/goodwe is private - so its PASS is a weaker claim than it looks, and the
file says so.

Verified green on release/1.0 content before this workflow was written: 8 of 8
files pass, ~4 minutes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 15:46:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c040aac4b8 SAFETY-03: alarm when a computed setpoint exceeds the rating, do not just clip it
The clamp was never the missing half. specs.md 10.3 records an unclamped
integrator climbing ~130 W per 4 s past 10 kW and reporting 14 768 W pinned at
the 5 kW rail; clipped silently that is a flat, legal-looking 5000 W hold and
nothing says the loop asked for three times it.

write_setpoint() - the one path every write takes - now clamps to the VALIDATED
max_w and reports whether the raw value differed; check_output_clamp() raises
OUTPUT_CLAMP as a notification, an ERROR, an event row and a red status banner.
Not a trip: the clamped value is written and the loop keeps running.

The rating is max_w and nothing is min()ed at runtime - CFG-01 already refuses a
max_w outside the device range at startup. The device range is applied second as
defence in depth; it cannot bite after a successful validation, so if it ever
does it alarms too and names the bound. No new config key.

Decision grew i_clamped / clamped booleans, and that is the load-bearing part:
`reason` is one string that slew-limiting and the saturation freeze overwrite,
so an alarm keyed on it is silent on exactly the cycles a winding loop produces.
Mutating main.py back onto the string drops the 10.3 replay from 2 engagements
to 0.

Distinct from saturation by construction - no shared reason code, notification
id, status row or counter - and checked in the negative, after first asserting
the saturation freeze really did engage.

Two things found by running it rather than by reading it: a row per engagement
flushed the 40-row event log and evicted SAFETY-18's own METER FROZEN? row (now
coalesced per episode with an exact count), and a naive clamp turns a nan into a
command at the full rating because every comparison against nan is False.

test_clamp.py is new: assert-based, no framework. Six author mutations
reproduced red, including "clamp kept, alarm deleted". Two of the check's own
hypotheses about the freeze/clamp interaction were refused by its sweep and
rewritten to what it measured.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 15:22:22 +02:00
admin 0cdaa3bd3e SAFETY-18: alarm on a meter frozen at a wrong-but-fresh value (#11)
A meter answering 200 OK with a document that never changes reads healthy to every freshness mechanism in the stack while the loop rails. Detected by a conjunction - unchanged_s >= meter_freeze_s AND |command| within 5% of max_w - which fails in both directions for independent reasons. Alarm only: no claim, no latch, no 0 W.

Reviewed: all six author mutations reproduced red (redder than reported), four more added, three survivors recorded for follow-up. Capture figures re-derived independently. Attack point 4 (dead poll task) measured, not just reasoned. Known follow-up: a device rating that clips max_w by >5% silently disarms the rail term while the status page says armed - does not affect the live install, where dev_max == max_w == 5000.
2026-08-30 03:20:38 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 7cde5d862a Merge release/1.0 into SAFETY-18 - CHANGELOG only
MAINT-04 (#10) landed on release/1.0 mid-review, so both branches had
prepended a stanza. config.yaml and DOCS.md auto-merged clean; only the
CHANGELOG needed a hand. Both stanzas are kept verbatim, MAINT-04's
Unreleased above the new 0.5.2 - no text from either author edited.
MAINT-04 is unreleased and 0.5.2 is being cut here, so a release manager
may want to fold the two; that is an editorial call, not a reviewer's.

Full suite green on the merged tree: arbiter, control, loop, maintenance,
p1, validate, watchdog, freeze.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 03:20:26 +02:00
admin b0a17474a3 MAINT-04: refuse a maintenance charge the ceiling cannot deliver (#10)
Rule 6 and the default change verified; four claimed mutations plus six of my own all reproduce red. The cross-file default divergence is now pinned by a check that fails in both directions, including when someone closes it - verified against MaintConfig-only, one-call-site-refactored, both-refactored and one-literal-silently-changed.
2026-08-30 03:01:14 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 ffb8ec6373 MAINT-04 review: pin the default divergence with a check, not a comment
validate.py's comment said "if config.yaml's value moves, move this and
main.py's together" and nothing enforced it - a comment where a check
belonged, in a PR that elsewhere proves it knows the difference.

test_validate.py now reads main.py and maintenance.py directly and asserts
the divergence EXACTLY AS IT STANDS: config.yaml/validate.py at 2000,
main.py's two fallbacks and MaintConfig's dataclass default at 2500. It
records the mismatch rather than demanding it be closed, so it passes today
and goes red if either side moves - including when somebody closes it in
main.py, at which point the check and validate.py's block are deleted
together. Nothing in a file another ticket owns is touched.

The consequence is asserted through the real code as well as the literals:
with the key absent the validator accepts, MaintConfig builds 2500 W against
a 2000 W ceiling, and the arbiter resolves it to 0 W as a contradiction -
the bug rule 6 exists to catch, passing rule 6. Production-unreachable (the
Supervisor always supplies every key) but fully reachable from sim/inject.py
and the tests, which is where anyone debugging maintenance works.

Also: a CHANGELOG section for the upgrade path, covering both the case where
the Supervisor re-derives the default and the case where it persisted the
old one, since which applies was not verifiable without probing the live
install. And maintenance.py's timeout comment said 13.5 kWh where everything
else says 13.8 (300 Ah x 51.2 V, DoD 90); SAFETY-18 does not touch that file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 02:51:40 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0ba3a200fe SAFETY-18: verify on the real rig, and record what it showed
AC3 says "verified on the rig". The previous commit drove hwsim in-process
because `riglock status` reported UNKNOWN - which is the tool declining to
observe, not an observation. riglock shells out to the local docker CLI; on a
Windows host without DOCKER_HOST that resolves to a Docker Desktop npipe which
is not running, and the result is indistinguishable from a genuinely absent rig.
The rig was up the whole time. With DOCKER_HOST=ssh://homelab@192.168.2.147 it
reads FREE.

Re-run under sim/riglock.py against the real goodwe-sim compose project, with
the shipped modules staged into goodwe-sim-plant so they poll that container's
own hwsim while plantsim drives it. Both phases passed, lock released cleanly.

The rig produced a result the in-process stub could not, and it strengthens the
design rather than merely confirming it: in the NEGATIVE twin - +8000 W of house
load, healthy meter, correctly railed command - `active_power_w` did not move at
all, sitting at exactly 10130.0 W for 26 consecutive polls. The only thing
keeping `unchanged_s` at 0.0 s was the kWh registers advancing.

So the register terms in measurement_fingerprint() are not belt-and-braces for
this detector, they ARE the negative case: fingerprinted on the power figure
alone it would have raised a false alarm on a healthy meter under a real load,
which is precisely how a safety guard gets switched off. Recorded in freeze.py
so nobody simplifies the fingerprint without meeting that run first.

No behaviour change - documentation and the harness note only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 02:49:55 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 7aa1bd052e SAFETY-18: a meter frozen at a wrong-but-fresh value now raises an alarm
A meter that answers 200 OK with a stale document forever is ARRIVING on every
poll, so every freshness mechanism in the stack reads it as healthy while the
loop integrates a constant error and rails: 360/135/75 s at the live install's
max_w: 5000 for a meter frozen at 350/1000/>=3000 W. Fifteen minutes of a 5 kW
unattended import sets the month's billed capaciteitstarief peak.

The detector is a conjunction, not the bare unchanged_s threshold TEL-05
measured and rejected:

    unchanged_s >= meter_freeze_s   AND   |command| within 5 % of max_w

Both terms already existed and were already on the status page, and they fail
for independent reasons: at the converged point the command is nowhere near the
rail, and at the rail against a real load the kWh registers move in seconds. At
the shipped 300 s the relation is structural rather than a margin - the slowest
a healthy 1 Wh register can tick and still look unchanged is 12 W, which is
inside the 15 W deadband, so the command there is parked at 0 W.

Notification only, deliberately: an HA persistent notification with a fixed
notification_id, an ERROR log line, a UI event and a red status row. No claim,
no latch, no 0 W. A false trip parks the battery; a false notification costs an
alert. Only meter_source: homewizard_local is covered - the status page says
NOT COVERED elsewhere rather than pretending the guard is armed.

DOCS.md states the capacity-tariff exposure this does NOT close: peak_cap_w caps
maintenance charging and nothing caps the loop. That cap is SAFETY-07.

test_freeze.py grades both directions and was verified by breaking what it
watches (six mutations, all red): silent over the committed 40-minute converged
capture, silent over an hour of TEL-05's low-power case where the rejected bare
threshold is shown to fire, alarming on a genuinely frozen meter driven over
real HTTP through the real HomeWizardLocalSource (the rig's own hwsim freeze
fault when reachable), silent on the same railed command against a meter that is
still moving, and asserting on the service call that leaves Controller.cycle()
rather than on the watchdog's own flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 02:39:54 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 878a6ce452 MAINT-04: refuse a maintenance charge the ceiling cannot deliver
config.yaml shipped max_w 2000 against maintenance_charge_w 2500. The
cheap-window shaping files Claim.limit(hi = -maintenance_charge_w) against
the supervised SAFETY limit's lo = -max_w, so lo > hi - the arbiter's
clause 3, correctly resolved to 0 W and logged as a CONTRADICTION.
Maintenance silently never charged in a cheap window on a default install,
and the only evidence read like a bug in the arbiter rather than like the
two numbers the operator set.

validate_startup_config() now refuses maintenance_charge_w > max_w, the
same shape as CFG-01's sign_disagree_w >= max_w. Equality is reachable
(-max_w is a single valid point) and is not refused. Demonstrated by
starting the add-on on the pre-fix pair: exit 78 and the refusal banner.

maintenance_discharge_w was checked rather than assumed and is NOT the same
case: the drain phase OWNS the actuator (Claim.set at P_MAINTENANCE), so
the ceiling clamps it to +2000 W and the arbiter's explain() names the
clamp every cycle. Loud, and it still moves energy - warned, not refused.

The shipped maintenance rates drop to 2000 so the defaults pass the rule;
max_w was deliberately not raised, because it is the supervised safety
ceiling. test_validate.py now reads config.yaml itself, so a default the
validator refuses cannot ship again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 02:28:09 +02:00
admin bb64f8fdd7 SAFETY-02 follow-up: persist the latch, and make the gate assertion bite (#9) 2026-08-28 23:09:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e40eb0768d SAFETY-02: the P_PEAK assertion was pinning the test's copy of the gate
Review finding 2, and it is the same duplication `disagrees()` just removed, so
it gets the same fix rather than a follow-up card.

`following_from()` in test_watchdog.py was a TRANSCRIPTION of the gate in
main.py, carrying "keep the two in step" as an instruction - which is exactly the
arrangement that does not keep two things in step. Measured: editing the shipped
gate alone to `winner in ("loop", "peak")` left every suite green while the
watchdog went blind for the duration of every peak event. The row whose whole job
is to force whoever lands peak shaving to come and change an expectation did not
do that.

The expression is now `watchdog.loop_is_following()`, called by main.py and by
the test. One definition, two callers, same reasoning as `disagrees()`: the copy
that drifts is always the one in the harness doing the grading.

⚠️ AND EXTRACTING IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT - the drift proof still came out green
after the extraction, which is why it was worth running rather than assuming. The
realistic P_PEAK row has peak shaving asking for MORE than the loop, so the
magnitude term rejects it whatever `winner` says and masks the term under test. A
second row with peak asking for LESS makes `winner` the only deciding term. With
that row, widening the shipped gate fails two checks; without it, none.

Also enforcing the write ordering that was documented and not asserted: swapping
the two `store.set` calls passed everything. A store that fails the second write
now proves the property the ordering exists for - a crash mid-trip leaves a
reason with no latch, never a latch with no explanation. Swapping them now turns
that check red.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 22:59:46 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 cc4e88490b SAFETY-02 review: a latch that a restart clears is not a latch
BLOCKER. `auto` was persisted and `sign_wd.tripped` was not, so reconstructing
the Controller against the same store - which is what a container restart does -
brought it back ARMED, into the same fault, unattended: tripped=False, banner
back to NOT READY, and it resumed commanding -1000 then -2000 W before
re-tripping 180 s later. "Restart the add-on" is the first thing an operator
looking at a FAILSAFE banner and a 0 W inverter will try, and under a supervisor
that restarts a crashed add-on it is a loop of three-minute wrong-direction
bursts. DOCS.md's "it does not clear itself" was false across a restart.

`sign_tripped` and `sign_reason` are Store keys now, beside the maintenance
state and for the reason store.py's own docstring gives. Written the moment the
trip happens - reason first, flag second, so a crash between the two can never
persist a latch with no explanation - restored in Controller.__init__, cleared
only by the operator's start. The regression is covered: reverting the restore
fails seven checks in test_watchdog.py.

Review follow-ups, no behaviour change:

- The arming gate is tested against the REAL arbiter. It is the decision the
  ticket turns on and it was asserted in three comment blocks and verified by
  nothing - every case passed `following` in as a literal. Twelve claim
  configurations now derive it from resolve(), including the redirect case
  `winner == "loop"` alone would have got wrong and the `lo` limit that raises
  magnitude without flipping sign.
- The MQTT `status: "failsafe"` value is tested. The check that claimed to cover
  it restated the line above it and never touched the payload.
- The worked example described a config that does not ship: at the defaults
  maintenance_charge_w 2500 against max_w 2000 is an arbiter contradiction and
  0 W, not a -2500 W charge. Rewritten at 1500 W. The contradiction is a real
  pre-existing bug - a default cheap-window maintenance charge silently never
  happens - filed separately and deliberately not fixed here.
- Forward hazard recorded at the gate: `winner == "loop"` disarms the watchdog
  under any higher-priority SET, and a peak-shaving strategy at P_PEAK IS
  grid-following in sign, so it would blind this for every peak event.
- disagrees() is public so the replay harness stops carrying its own copy of the
  predicate it grades.
- held_s takes the clock instead of reading one.
- The two limits are now each stated in both places rather than one each.
- The no-false-positive argument is tied to control.py's freeze permitting the
  command to cross zero; under the shrink-only encoding control.py records as
  rejected, this would false-trip on a load step.
- Measured figures corrected: 93.4 % / 4212 of 17280, per-cluster
  0.3/0.9/10.5/0.0, and the near-circularity of those figures is now stated
  rather than leaned on.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 22:33:15 +02:00
admin 2513ba1f12 SAFETY-02: the sign-disagreement watchdog (#8) 2026-08-28 21:55:52 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9aed43990b SAFETY-02: a loop can be fresh, tracking and inside its rating and still push the wrong way
The stale-input watchdog asks whether the meter is still talking. The saturation
freeze asks whether the inverter can follow. The output clamp asks whether the
number is too big. A loop can pass all three while charging the battery out of
the grid, because the only thing wrong is the sign.

On 2026-08-20 a commercial controller did exactly that four times in one day,
for up to 77 minutes at a stretch, reaching a commanded -14 768 W against a
±5000 W inverter. app/watchdog.py compares the emitted setpoint against the
authoritative P1 figure and, when they oppose each other with both over 300 W
for 180 s continuously, files a failsafe SET claim at P_SAFETY, commands 0 W and
latches there until an operator starts control again.

Validated against that day rather than against an argument: sim/replay_sign.py
in the infra repo drives this module over the committed captures of both
2026-08-20 and the healthy 2026-08-23 and reaches 18 trips on the fault day -
every one inside a window NOTES.md §4.7 accounts for - and 0 on the healthy day.
The four episodes do share one signature: 0.3 / 0.9 / 10.5 / 0.0 % sign
agreement inside them against 92.9 % healthy.

Three decisions the ticket could not make:

- It is DISARMED whenever the grid-following loop is not what is driving. Sign
  agreement is a property of a loop that follows the meter, and a maintenance
  grid charge opposes the meter by design - 2500 W of charge into a house
  drawing 500 W is +3000 W on the meter against a -2500 W command, for hours.
  The gate tests the emitted number, not the winning claim's name, because a
  limit claim can let the loop "win" and still replace its value.
- The trip LATCHES. Commanding 0 W removes the command side of the comparison,
  so the disagreement always clears the moment the trip works.
- sign_disagree_w at or above max_w is refused at startup. The arbiter never
  lets a command exceed max_w, so such a threshold leaves the watchdog incapable
  of firing while the status page still reports it armed.

What it does not catch, said out loud: an inverter that ACTS opposite to its
command moves the meter further the same way, leaving command and meter in
agreement. That is the saturation freeze's job.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 21:51:35 +02:00
admin 35856a73ae SAFETY-12: a loop that only thinks when the number changes cannot fail safe (#7) 2026-08-28 21:18:20 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 aae74d7571 SAFETY-12 review: name the safety claim that could not fire, and fix two figures
Review fixes.

A. test_loop.py takes 73 s, not the ~35 s claimed in three places. That number
is the whole defence against a future developer deleting a slow test, so it was
understated by 2x in exactly the place it matters. Corrected - and it is now
~95 s (measured 93 s), because this commit adds the scenario below rather than
trimming windows to make an inconvenient number smaller. Both call sites carry
an instruction to re-measure if the windows change.

B. "242 checks" was test_p1's own count quoted as the total for all five
suites. The real figure is 395 across the five, plus 14 here.

And the finding this PR should have led with. stale_input_s and the
`inputs missing -> 0 W` claim both live INSIDE cycle(), so pre-fix, on a meter
whose value happened to repeat, that claim could not fire at all. Constant
meter, SoC entity dying at t=4 s, one binary:

  pre-fix   final target 220.0 W, reason 'loop -> 220 W'
  post-fix  final target   0.0 W, reason 'safety -> 0 W'

The old controller held 220 W through the whole input outage with its status
line still reading loop -> 220 W, and layer 1 does not cover that on a
`meter_source: off` install - no P1 age sensor is published, so the firmware has
nothing to veto on, while the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed. The pre-fix
behaviour was not "holds a stale command safely"; it was a failsafe a repeating
meter switched off. Asserted in test_loop.py, both halves.

Three points of reasoning tightened, none of them wrong before:

- the re-tune is unreachable by construction, not merely by the reset: the
  combined cycle rate is max(arrival rate, 1/floor), never the sum, and 1/15 s
  is strictly slower than the ~1/5 s arrival rate. That holds only while the
  floor exceeds the meter's update interval - and the schema minimum of 5 s is
  exactly the reference meter's interval. Flagged for validate.py, not fixed
  here.
- the ~11 s lower bracket is not only a dropped poll: a 5.0 s poller against a
  4.97 s meter beats, so about every 14 minutes the poller steps over an update
  entirely. Reaching 15 s takes a beat-skip AND a failed poll.
- the "freshness is decided upstream" guarantee is transport-conditional. On
  `meter_source: off` the grid figure comes straight from hass.number() with no
  age gate. Running the full law is still right; the claim is narrower than it
  was stated.

The 15 s default is not independently justified - it rests on the firmware's
30 s ingest veto and moves if that ever does. Said beside the constant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 21:14:58 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8cc9438aec SAFETY-12: record the six-minute observation, not just the unit check
test_loop.py proves the property in 35 s. This is the same three scenarios run
for six and three real minutes each, on one binary, and it is what AC2 and AC3
were actually asked for: 1 cycle before vs 24 after on a constant meter with the
command stuck at 220 W against a 350 W import, and byte-identical write
sequences on both the converged and the normally-changing meter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 20:48:49 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 96a808a057 HANDOVER: run every suite before deploying, and say why one is slow
The pre-deploy command listed three of the five suites; test_validate and
test_p1 were never added when they arrived. Adds those and test_loop, with a
note that test_loop's ~35 s is the cost of proving a wall-clock property about a
loop that sleeps 1 s a tick rather than a sign something is wrong.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 20:32:00 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 88cd97cc7a SAFETY-12: the loop thinks on a clock, not only when the number moves
run_control() ran cycle() only when the meter value differed from the previous
poll. A meter that repeats a value therefore ran no control cycles at all -
while the heartbeat kept re-emitting the last command and the firmware kept
putting it on the wire every 2 s. Layer 1 stayed fed and every indicator read
healthy, so a command computed from an old reading went on being executed
through whatever the load did next. TEL-05 measured it: 70 s at a literally
constant 350.0 W, 14 arrivals, zero cycles.

cycle_floor_s (default 15 s) is a deadline on the GAP between cycles, reset by
every cycle whichever trigger fired - not a second scheduler. On a healthy meter
it never elapses, so the cycle rate and the commanded sequence are unchanged;
test_loop.py asserts that by driving the real loop twice on one binary (a huge
cycle_floor_s reproduces the old behaviour) and diffing the writes.

15 s is bracketed: above the ~11 s worst gap on a merely-unlucky healthy meter
(~5 s arrivals, 1 s detection, one dropped poll retried on the next tick), below
meter_max_age_s and the firmware's 30 s ingest veto, and equal to stale_input_s.

A floor cycle runs the full law. Freshness is already decided upstream - past
meter_max_age_s the reading is None, which is a P_SAFETY 0 W claim - and the
integrator advances per cycle, not per second, so bounding the gap bounds the
accumulation.

Not a freeze detector: nothing here decides whether a repeated reading is true.
DOCS.md's "accepted deviation" passage is qualified rather than deleted - the
window is now bounded at 3 x cycle_floor_s instead of open-ended, and its
"nothing accumulates while it is stalled" argument is called out as having
covered windup and not staleness. Same correction in control.py's comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 20:29:16 +02:00
admin e2e331ea54 CFG-01 AC2: refuse to start on a config the lower layer will silently override (#6) 2026-08-28 20:17:55 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 547d796c5d CFG-01 review: widen the rule, refuse the firmware-veto case, fix the stop footgun
Review findings, all confirmed in code before changing anything.

THE RULE DID NOT AUTHORISE ITS OWN BEST REFUSAL. The stated test was
"makes a safety mechanism inoperative, or makes a stated limit untrue",
and a blank setpoint_entity does neither - layer 1 pinning the inverter
at 0 W is the failsafe WORKING, as validate.py's own text admitted. The
real justification is a second, separate category: the add-on is inert
and indistinguishable from healthy. Stated as (a) and (b), with each
refusal tagged, and with both halves explicitly bounded - (a) is not
"any two numbers that could disagree", (b) is not "anything degraded".
Left implicit, the gap is where trivia-creep comes back in.

meter_max_age_s ABOVE THE FIRMWARE'S VETO IS NOW REFUSED. The schema
allows int(5,300); the firmware's threshold is a compile-time
`max_age_s: "30"` and it trips layer 1 at `p1_age_s >= 30`. At 120 the
add-on believes a 119 s reading is fresh and keeps commanding while the
board has already vetoed and is holding at 0 W - healthy meter, running
controller, nothing moving. Structurally identical to the max_w case,
and unlike max_w it is settable on this install, so the headline
behaviour finally has a live demonstration. That firmware file's own
comment says a lower bound on this "belongs in CFG-01, not here".

Only ABOVE is refused: below the veto the add-on gives up first, which
is fail-safe and visible on its own status page. Scoped to P1 being
enabled, because meter_max_age_s governs nothing otherwise.
FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S cannot be imported from a compile-time YAML
substitution, so it carries a note on the single direction in which it
can go stale - and a warning that TEL-06 is editing `ingest_stale`, so a
matching integer may stop meaning a matching rule.

stop= WAS A LIVE FOOTGUN. It defaulted to None, which made a Controller
that cannot stop itself the DEFAULT one. On the late-refusal path that
meant: log the banner, return, and leave the process alive forever with
no control loop and no exit - the exact "inert but looks healthy"
failure this module exists to refuse. Now required and keyword-only, so
the broken shape does not construct; test_p1.py's five call sites pass
an Event.

That whole path had no test and no live demo. It has one now: it drives
run_control() against a device that only reports a narrower range once
the loop starts, and asserts it refuses, signals, returns, and writes
NOTHING - plus the converse, that an agreeing device leads to real
writes. This also covers the max_w composition that cannot be reached
through the Supervisor on the live install.

max_w <= 0 is refused. Schema-blocked in production, but
validate_startup_config() is the simulation suite's entry point too, and
a non-positive max_w inverts the arbiter's supervised bounds into a
contradiction that reads as a safety trip rather than a typo.

Verified live 2026-08-28 (backup goodwe_controller-cfg01r2-1787940076):
meter_max_age_s 120 refused with a message naming 120, 30, and THE
FIRMWARE WINS; no traceback; add-on restored byte-exact and running.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 20:05:10 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 fc9bd89dca CFG-01: refuse to start on a configuration that cannot be honoured
main.py used to read the setpoint device's own +-5000 W rating, notice a
configured max_w above it, log one WARNING, and run anyway with
write_setpoint() quietly clamping. The operator's stated ceiling was never
the real ceiling and the only evidence had scrolled off the log. specs
§1.5 is explicit that such a config is refused at startup, not survived at
runtime.

validate_startup_config() runs in amain() before the broker, the web
server or any task exists, so a refusal cannot leave half a controller
running behind a UI. It refuses exactly three things, all sharing one
property - continuing makes a safety mechanism inoperative or makes a
stated limit untrue:

  1. max_w outside the setpoint device's own rating.
  2. No setpoint_entity: every write is a no-op, the device rating is
     never read, and the ESP32 heartbeat that holds off the layer-1
     failsafe never happens. It ran, looked healthy, and moved nothing.
  3. A meter_source that can never produce a reading. These were already
     caught, but they only DISABLED ingestion, which leaves grid None
     forever: permanent inputs-missing, 0 W, and a status page
     indistinguishable from a healthy meter nobody has fed yet.

Those last predicates move into p1.validate_meter_options(), which
build_source() also calls - one definition, two callers, not two
competing validators. ha_dsmr with half its entities and mqtt_p1 with a
blank topic gained the check the other two transports already had.

Deliberately not refused, because untidy is not unsafe: integrator_max_w
above max_w (the arbiter still bounds the wire to +-max_w, so the cost is
unwind latency - warned), a missing soc/batt entity (fail-safe and
already a red NOT READY banner), a setpoint entity that has not appeared
on the Core API yet (ESPHome is routinely late; re-checked in
run_control() once the real rating arrives), and a thin meter_poll_s
margin.

A refusal is legible as one: a banner saying in words that this is
configuration and nothing is broken, numbered problems, no traceback, and
exit 78 (EX_CONFIG).

Verified on the live add-on 2026-08-28, not by reading the code: a blank
setpoint_entity and a meter_poll_s equal to meter_max_age_s each stopped
the add-on with the banner and no stack trace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 19:29:35 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0422127cab HANDOVER said 0.2.0; the running add-on is 0.4.0
Two versions stale. 0.3.0 shipped SAFETY-04 and TEL-01, 0.4.0 shipped TEL-04
and TEL-05 and changed the meter transport to homewizard_local - so a reader
taking this line at face value would look for a meter path that is no longer
how this system reads the grid.

Found in the 2026-08-27 backlog audit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-27 23:55:37 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 80ebb96e7d Two comments asserted an entity id that has never existed
mqtt.py said the P1 age entity "must be exactly sensor.p1_sample_age_s,
because SAFETY-01's firmware watchdog subscribes to that literal id", and
main.py:340 repeated it. Both are wrong, and wrong in the direction that
disarms a safety layer.

On HA 2026.8 object_id in a discovery payload does not determine entity_id.
HA composes it from the device name plus the entity name, so this one is
sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age. That is what the firmware subscribes to, that is
what exists on the live system (verified 2026-08-26), and the firmware's own
comment records that sensor.p1_sample_age_s never existed on any HA.

The hazard is not the stale name itself, it is that two shipped artefacts
disagreed about a safety-critical id while sounding certain. A reader who
trusted these comments would have "corrected" the firmware to a name that
resolves to nothing - and the failure is silent, because has_state() simply
stays false forever and the ingest guard never arms. The firmware calls that
out as the shape that FAILS SILENTLY AND LOOKS CORRECT.

The comment now says what actually determines the id, and states plainly that
renaming the device or the entity's friendly name changes the composed id and
disarms the guard. It also cross-references TEL-06, since the guard reads this
sensor's value rather than its arrival and so cannot fire for a dead publisher.

Found in a backlog audit, as the substance behind PKG-02's premise: the real
coupling between firmware and add-on is names, not versions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-27 23:48:40 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c70239cac2 0.4.0: the meter transports that fit this house
TEL-04 and TEL-05 merged without a version bump, so Home Assistant would not
have offered the update - the same trap DEPLOY-01 caught at 0.2.1, recurring
because merging a feature does not touch the version.

ha_signed reads one signed entity. homewizard_local polls the meter's own API,
where every HTTP response is a genuine arrival - the property the firmware
watchdog needs, and the one HA cannot provide for a repeated reading.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-26 01:31:54 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 08f17f65dd TEL-05: read the meter, not Home Assistant's opinion of the meter
sensor.p1_sample_age_s measured time since the value CHANGED, not since the
meter REPORTED. Home Assistant fires no state_changed for a repeated reading and
exposes no arrival signal at all - proven on the rig three ways and confirmed
against the live house, where ten repeated meter values left last_reported
frozen every time. Real captured data in sim/scenarios/ has inter-change gaps of
42.2 s and 97.0 s, and the firmware watchdog thresholds that age at 30 s, so it
would have commanded 0 W on a perfectly healthy meter.

meter_source: homewizard_local polls GET /api/v1/data. Every HTTP response is a
genuine arrival. Same pipeline as ha_signed - only the arrival mechanism changed.

The decisive evidence is the STEADY case, not the frozen one: hwsim served a
literally constant 350.0 W for 70 s - the exact state where the HA path recorded
samples: 0 across 45 s - and this transport took 14 arrivals with the age never
exceeding the poll cadence. Reproduced independently by the reviewer against the
real hwsim, and again by the tester at 14/14.

179 -> 242 checks. Twelve mutants from the reviewer and six from the developer,
every one reddening a NAMED check rather than aborting the suite.

WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO. The ticket asked for two things that cannot both be true:
that the age reset on every HTTP response including an unchanged value, AND that
a frozen meter show a climbing age. A frozen meter still answers 200 OK - it IS
arriving - so no arrival detector can do both. That acceptance criterion was
wrong and was written by the PM; the developer refused it rather than quietly
building half of it.

Freeze detection is delivered separately as unchanged_s on the energy registers,
which the local API exposes and HA never did: 70.2 s frozen against 10.0 s
steady. Deliberately unthresholded, because at the converged -10 W this
controller aims for, a 1 Wh register needs about six minutes to move while the
power figure legitimately repeats - any threshold would rebuild the false-trip
cycle at the target operating point. It is surfaced on the status line so a
human can read it, which is what makes leaving it unthresholded defensible
rather than a dodge.

So the flash covers meter SILENCE, not meter DISHONESTY.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 21:27:13 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 4d41b0a79e TEL-05 review follow-ups: show unchanged_s, name a timeout, keep the poll task alive
Four follow-ups on the reviewed and approved TEL-05 work. Additive; no shipped
behaviour changes except the two failure paths below.

1. unchanged_s had no operator surface. DOCS.md told a reader "the transport
   tracks it as unchanged_s" and there was nowhere to look: main.py built the
   transport, scheduled run(), and never read the object again. The status page
   now shows it on the healthy P1 line. Still NOT thresholded and NOT folded
   into the age - that refusal was reviewed and upheld, because at the converged
   -10 W this controller aims for a 1 Wh register needs ~6 minutes to move, so
   any limit false-trips at the target operating point. The whole argument for
   leaving it to a human requires the human being able to see it.

2. The "equivalent mutant" note on the content_type guard was wrong, and the
   comment is downgraded to say so. web.Response(text=...) defaults to
   text/plain, so the fake meter CAN serve valid JSON under the wrong mimetype.
   Test added; shipped behaviour was already correct.

3. A timed-out poll logged an empty reason: str(asyncio.TimeoutError()) is "",
   so the status page read "last error:" and then nothing, on a hung meter, at
   the moment the battery had just gone to 0 W. Falls back to the class name.
   Note str(err), not `err or ...` - an exception object is always truthy.

4. submit() sat outside the try in poll_once() and run() had no except, so a
   raise would kill the poll task permanently and SILENTLY - safe (the age
   climbs, the controller commands 0 W) but indistinguishable from a dead meter.
   Both wrapped; poll_s is already the retry cadence, so no backoff.

Also a comment at the parse_homewizard range(phases) slice: a 3-phase meter
configured as 1-phase understates the capacity-tariff figure. Filed separately,
not fixed here.

242 checks in test_p1.py (236 before, 6 new). test_control 55, test_arbiter 18,
test_maintenance 21, all untouched and green. Each new check proved non-vacuous:
six mutations, six named reds, no suite aborts, sources restored byte-identical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-25 21:17:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 98109a9b91 TEL-05: read the meter, not Home Assistant's opinion of the meter
A fourth meter_source, `homewizard_local`, polling a HomeWizard P1's own
local API (GET /api/v1/data) instead of watching an HA entity.

The point is the age sensor. sensor.p1_sample_age_s is FW-01's watchdog
input, and on every transport we had it measured "time since the value
CHANGED", not "time since the meter REPORTED". Home Assistant offers
nothing better: a repeated reading emits no state_changed, advances
last_reported on neither serialiser, and state_reported cannot be
subscribed to at all. Measured twice - 70 s of a frozen meter on the
ENV-01 rig, and ten repeated readings against the live house. Our own
capture of this house's meter goes 42.2 s and 97.0 s between changes,
both past the default meter_max_age_s of 30, so the age sensor would
have commanded 0 W on a perfectly healthy meter.

Here every HTTP response is an arrival. The meter answered, now, with
its current reading; whether the number moved is not consulted. Five
identical readings are five arrivals.

Reuses TEL-01's pipeline rather than restructuring it: same split_signed
sign convention as ha_signed, same make_sample, same ingest stamping,
meter_max_age_s, clock-recomputed age, plausibility bounds and the §20
unsigned-decode rejection. A failed or timed-out poll submits nothing,
so it is a missing reading - never 0 W - and does not reset the age.
meter_poll_s (default 5 s, the meter's own rate) is checked against
meter_max_age_s once at startup, like the ha_signed entity ids.

⚠️ An arrival stamp cannot see a FROZEN meter, and no arrival detector
can - one answering 200 OK with a stale number is arriving. The local
API does expose what HA never had (the total_power_*_kwh registers stop
advancing) and the transport tracks it as `unchanged_s`, but it is
deliberately not folded into the age and not thresholded: this
controller regulates grid toward ~0 W, and at a converged -10 W the
export register needs six minutes to move by its 1 Wh resolution while
the power figure legitimately repeats. Thresholding that would rebuild
the false-trip limit cycle at the exact operating point we aim for.

test_p1.py 179 -> 236 checks. Still defaults to off.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-25 20:51:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 ad9c5772a4 TEL-04: a meter source for the meter this house actually has
TEL-01 shipped ha_dsmr and mqtt_p1. Neither fits the installed meter - a
HomeWizard P1 publishing one signed figure, where ha_dsmr requires two unsigned
registers and refuses negatives. So sensor.p1_sample_age_s could not be produced
here at all.

ha_signed is a subclass of HaDsmrSource overriding only _wanted() and build(),
so ingest timestamping, staleness, the clock-recomputed age, plausibility bounds
and unavailable-is-never-zero are inherited by construction rather than copied.
A reviewer traced every inherited member and confirmed nothing in the base
assumes two entities.

122 -> 179 checks. Sign convention asserted against real captures in
sim/scenarios/: -5710 W at 13:46 local under full sun, +775 W at midnight,
verified to the timestamp by two people independently.

WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO, documented in DOCS.md, the docstring and the CHANGELOG
rather than discovered later: the age it publishes measures time since the VALUE
CHANGED, not since the meter reported. Home Assistant exposes no arrival signal
for a repeated reading - proven on the rig against a frozen meter (no
state_changed, last_reported advancing on neither serialiser, state_reported
rejected outright) and confirmed independently against the live house, where ten
repeated values all left last_reported frozen. So this entity must NOT yet be
thresholded by the firmware watchdog. ha_dsmr has the same blind spot and
escapes only statistically, because a DSMR telegram moves several entities.

The fix is to read the meter's own API, where every response is an arrival.
That is TEL-05, and it is FW-01's real gate.

Two equivalent mutants are known and recorded: the per-phase split, documented
at the site, and the incomplete-phase-set guard, which is cosmetic - both paths
return False, one via an extra log line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 18:00:42 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 1b343da8e3 DOCS: say plainly that ha_dsmr and mqtt_p1 have never seen real hardware
No meter in this installation uses either transport. Both were written to
specs.md 5.2's assumption that a Belgian P1 exposes two unsigned registers,
which the meter actually fitted here does not - it is the HomeWizard P1 that
ha_signed reads. Their only coverage is test_p1.py and an end-to-end test
against a fake Home Assistant.

Deliberately not called "experimental". That word says the design is
unfinished, which is not the defect and is vaguer than the truth; these are
complete and reviewed, they have simply never had a real telegram through
them. The failure this note is guarding against is a future session debugging
a meter problem, treating those two paths as proven, and looking elsewhere.

Placed where the mode is chosen rather than in a footnote, because the choice
is the decision it should inform.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-25 17:35:11 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e663e10245 TEL-04 review: unshadow the helper, validate config at startup, and record
what the rig proved about the age sensor

Review findings 1, 3, 5 and 6. Finding 2 is deliberately untouched - it is
its own ticket.

3. `built` was rebound at test_p1.py:816 by `built = build_source(...)`,
   silently disarming the build() wrapper for anything appended below it.
   Renamed to `sel`. Reproduced the reviewer's failure before fixing:
   appending a check that calls built() after that line gives
   `TypeError: 'HaSignedSource' object is not callable` and aborts at 163 of
   180; with the rename the same probe reaches 180 and passes.

5. DOCS.md now states the "length must equal meter_phases" constraint that
   config.yaml already carried, plus what leaving the list empty actually
   costs: on the surveyed reading the phases carry 2769 W of import while the
   connection nets 187 W, so the tariff quantity is understated ~15x.

6. build_source now checks the ha_signed wiring once at startup instead of
   once per telegram: a blank p1_net_entity, or a phase list whose length
   disagrees with meter_phases, logs an error and disables ingestion. Both
   otherwise fail in the single way indistinguishable from a healthy source
   nobody has fed yet - no samples, a climbing age, the watchdog holding the
   battery at 0 W, and nothing in the log.

1. THE AGE SENSOR. Measured on the ENV-01 rig against the real HomeWizard
   integration, meter frozen via hwsim's `?fault=freeze` seam (cleared in a
   finally:, rig verified restored):

     - websocket state_changed for the meter over 70 s : 0
     - last_reported advanced (REST serialiser)        : no
     - last_reported advanced (websocket serialiser)   : no
     - subscribe_events(state_reported)                : rejected,
       "Event filter is required for event state_reported"

   So Home Assistant exposes NO arrival signal for a repeated reading, and
   the proposed fix - stamp from last_reported via subscribe_entities - is
   not available. subscribe_entities listens only to EVENT_STATE_CHANGED, and
   as_compressed_state carries no last_reported at all.

   The age is therefore "time since the value changed", which on ha_dsmr is
   mostly harmless (a telegram moves several entities) and on ha_signed is
   not: one entity means a healthy meter under a flat load is
   indistinguishable from a dead one. Recorded loudly in DOCS.md, in the
   HaSignedSource docstring and in the CHANGELOG, with the measured 42.2 s
   and 97.0 s gaps from our own capture.

   meter_max_age_s is deliberately NOT widened. The two conditions produce an
   identical signal, so a larger number does not separate them - it only
   chooses which of the two errors you get, and it would disarm the watchdog
   for a genuinely dead meter as well. The honest fix is an arrival stamp the
   meter itself provides.

test_p1.py: 174 -> 179 checks, all green. Other three suites unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-25 17:34:37 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 632be44f6c TEL-04: make a missing build() guard fail legibly instead of aborting
Review point from the non-vacuity run. Deleting build()'s "is the net entity
cached at all" guard makes build() raise KeyError rather than return False.
That still failed the suite, but by aborting it with a traceback at whichever
check ran first - a red that costs the next person ten minutes deciding
whether the suite is broken or the code is.

New `built()` helper in test_p1.py wraps build() and turns an escaping
exception into a returned value, so the comparison against True/False fails
by name. Applied only to the ha_signed section; TEL-01's own checks are
untouched.

Mutation 4 before: 0 named checks red, aborted at check 123 of 174.
Mutation 4 after:  2 named checks red - "nothing cached yet builds nothing"
and "an unavailable entity does not build a sample" - all 174 reached.

Still 174 checks, all green, and the other nine mutations are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-25 17:01:33 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8b51a51e20 TEL-04: a third meter_source for a single signed entity
TEL-01 shipped ha_dsmr and mqtt_p1, and neither can read the meter that is
actually fitted here. The house has a HomeWizard P1 exposing ONE signed
entity, sensor.p1_meter_active_power (+ import, - export); ha_dsmr wants two
unsigned registers and refuses a negative one outright, which is every
exporting telegram. So sensor.p1_sample_age_s could not be produced at this
site, and FW-01's watchdog needs it - measured, not theoretical: the house P1
went 51.1 s and 36.2 s without a state change overnight, both past
meter_max_age_s 30, so without the age sensor the watchdog would false-trip
the battery to 0 W.

Adds meter_source: ha_signed, reading p1_net_entity (and optionally
p1_phase_net_entities in L1..L3 order for the capacity-tariff peak). The
derivation is split_signed(), sitting next to make_sample's subtraction for
the same reason it does - the moment a user is asked to write two template
sensors that split a signed value, the sign convention is back in unreviewed
YAML underneath a safety input, which is exactly what TEL-01 removed.

The transport is a subclass of HaDsmrSource overriding only _wanted() and
build(), so every rule TEL-01 established is inherited rather than
re-implemented: ingest timestamping, meter_max_age_s, the clock-recomputed
sensor.p1_sample_age_s republished ~1 Hz, the plausibility ceiling, the
"prime the cache from get_states but never build a sample out of it" rule,
"a reconnect emits nothing", and unavailable/unknown treated as a MISSING
reading and never as 0 W.

Defaults to off. An existing install is unaffected until it opts in.

test_p1.py: 122 -> 174 checks. Includes an end-to-end run of the new
transport against a fake Home Assistant websocket, and the sign convention
asserted against real captured readings from
sim/scenarios/ha-p1_meter_active_power-2026-08-{20,23}.json (-5710 W at
13:46 local under full sun is export; +775 W at midnight is import).

Non-vacuity: ten mutations of the new rules, each applied alone and reverted
byte-identical. Nine turn the suite red. The tenth - splitting the per-phase
signed values rather than passing them through - is an equivalent mutant,
because make_sample subtracts the two lists again and does not sign-check
per-phase figures. That is recorded in a ponytail: comment at the site rather
than left for the next reviewer to rediscover.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-25 16:44:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c24bc0a011 Pin LF, because the deployment target is a Linux container
core.autocrlf=true gave the checkout CRLF .py and .yaml. run.sh happened to be
LF, which is the only reason a plain copy would not have produced a "bad
interpreter" failure on the add-on's entrypoint.

0.3.0 was deployed by extracting from git with autocrlf forced off and verified
byte-identical to the blobs before copying. This makes that the default rather
than something the deployer has to remember.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 16:01:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 80402c978f DEPLOY-01: 0.3.0, so the update is installable at all
release/1.0 carried SAFETY-04 and TEL-01 but still declared version 0.2.1 -
identical to what is installed and running on the house. Home Assistant keys
add-on updates off the version string, so the update would never have been
offered.

Two files. No code, no option defaults. What reaches the house at these
defaults is SAFETY-04's control law alone, and it carries a 4,928-case
equivalence proof against the previous law at integrator_max_w: 0. TEL-01 is
inert until meter_source is turned on.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 15:52:47 +02:00
36 changed files with 17949 additions and 98 deletions
+18
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# This add-on is deployed to a Linux container. core.autocrlf=true on the
# authoring box gave the checkout CRLF, so a plain copy shipped CRLF files -
# run.sh with CRLF is a "bad interpreter" failure, and any hash-based drift
# check between repo and deployment fails for a reason that has nothing to do
# with the code. Deploy with:
# git -c core.autocrlf=false archive release/1.0 goodwe_controller | tar -x
# which is how 0.3.0 went out, byte-identical to the blobs.
* text=auto eol=lf
*.png binary
*.gz binary
# `.gitea/workflows/*.yml` steps embed shell heredocs; a `\r` on the terminator
# line means the heredoc never closes and the job fails on a syntax error that is
# invisible in the diff. A Windows checkout with core.autocrlf=true would
# reintroduce it on the next edit. CI-01.
*.yml text eol=lf
*.yaml text eol=lf
Dockerfile text eol=lf
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# The image the add-on's tests run in (CI-01). This repo had NO CI at all before
# that ticket - eight runnable test files, none of them ever run by a machine.
#
# ⚠️ THE DEPENDENCIES ARE THE SHIPPED ONES, FROM APK, AND THAT IS THE POINT.
# goodwe_controller/Dockerfile installs `py3-aiohttp py3-paho-mqtt` from Alpine
# packages rather than pip, because Alpine ships musl and there are no musl
# wheels for aiohttp - pip would compile it from source on a client's Raspberry
# Pi. Testing against pip-installed glibc wheels would be testing a different
# add-on from the one that ships. Same base, same package manager, same names.
#
# ⚠️ NOT `FROM ghcr.io/home-assistant/...-base`. The real Dockerfile takes its
# base from the Supervisor's `BUILD_FROM` build-arg, which is per-architecture
# and not resolvable outside a Supervisor build. `alpine:3` is what those images
# are, minus the s6 supervision the tests do not use - and it is already cached
# on this runner's host, so the gate does not depend on a registry pull.
#
# ⚠️ The runner container itself CANNOT run these tests: it is Alpine with a bare
# python3, no aiohttp, no pip (`No module named pip`; checked on the box, not
# assumed). An image is not gold-plating here, it is the only option that does
# not mutate a shared long-lived runner.
FROM alpine:3
RUN apk add --no-cache python3 py3-aiohttp py3-paho-mqtt
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@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
# CI-01: this repository's FIRST automated check. Before this file, admin/goodwe-addon
# had no `.gitea/workflows/` directory at all - eight runnable test files, ~100 s
# of real coverage including a wall-clock cadence test, and not one machine ever
# ran them. Every merge here was a human reading a diff.
#
# ⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on
# release/1.0 requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Gitea leaves a
# required context it never receives PENDING forever, so the moment this workflow
# learns to sit a PR out, that PR becomes unmergeable. Condition a STEP if you
# must; never the workflow.
#
# ⚠️ THE RUNNER IS SHARED WITH THE OTHER REPO'S RIG. `goodwe-runner` on
# 192.168.2.147 carries the labels `self-hosted` and `goodwe-rig` and is
# registered `:host`, and it is the only runner there is - so this job wears the
# rig label without wanting a rig. Nothing below starts, stops, or reads the
# `goodwe-sim` compose project or takes `sim/riglock.py`; it runs one short
# container and exits. It does occupy the runner's single slot (`capacity: 1`),
# so it QUEUES behind a rig campaign - a delayed verdict, never a destroyed one.
#
# NO JS ACTIONS: the runner image has no node, so `actions/checkout` cannot run.
# Checkout is seven lines of git below.
name: checks
on:
pull_request:
branches: [release/1.0, master]
workflow_dispatch:
concurrency:
# ⚠️ PER PULL REQUEST, NOT A BARE NAME. A shared group holds one running and
# one pending run, so a bare name lets a second PR supersede a first PR's run
# before any runner has picked it up - which is exactly what happened to the
# other repo's run 521 (four jobs, `started_at` at the Unix epoch,
# `runner_id: 0`, concluded `cancelled`, and the PR merged anyway). Do not
# replace this with a constant.
group: addon-checks-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
unit:
runs-on: [self-hosted, goodwe-rig]
timeout-minutes: 70 # ~4 to run; the rest is queueing for the single slot
env:
# ⚠️ UNDER /home/homelab, NOT $GITHUB_WORKSPACE (ENV-01, and re-measured
# during CI-01). act's workspace is `/root/.cache/act/<id>/hostexecutor`, a
# path that exists only INSIDE the runner container. Hand it to the host's
# snap-confined dockerd and the build fails with "failed to read
# dockerfile", or - worse, and this is the documented case - a bind mount
# resolves to an EMPTY DIRECTORY with no error at all. /home/homelab is
# mirrored 1:1 into the runner and is under $HOME, where snap confinement
# accepts it. The same probe under /tmp failed and under $HOME succeeded.
WS: /home/homelab/ci/addon-checks-${{ github.run_number }}
steps:
# ⚠️ THE CHECKOUT IS TWO LEVELS BELOW THE MOUNT ROOT, DELIBERATELY.
# test_freeze.py's find_hwsim() reads `HERE.parents[1] / "goodwe" / "sim"`,
# looking for the infra repo as a SIBLING of this one. Check out flat -
# goodwe_controller directly at the mount root - and `parents[1]` does not
# exist, so the test dies on `IndexError: 1` before its first assertion.
# Measured during CI-01; the flat layout was tried first and did exactly
# that. $WS/goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller gives parents[1] == $WS.
- name: checkout into a path the host shares (git; no node for actions/checkout)
env:
URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}.git
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -eu
rm -rf "$WS" && mkdir -p "$WS/goodwe-addon" && cd "$WS/goodwe-addon"
git init -q .
git remote add origin "$(echo "$URL" | sed "s#://#://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@#")"
git fetch -q --depth 1 origin "$GITHUB_REF" || git fetch -q --depth 1 origin "$GITHUB_SHA"
git checkout -qf FETCH_HEAD
echo "checked out $(git log --oneline -1)"
- name: build the test image (shipped deps, from apk - see .gitea/ci/Dockerfile)
run: |
set -eu
docker build -q -t goodwe-addon-checks:1 "$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/ci" >/dev/null
docker run --rm goodwe-addon-checks:1 python3 -c \
'import aiohttp, paho.mqtt.client as m, sys; print("python", sys.version.split()[0], "aiohttp", aiohttp.__version__)'
# ⚠️ THE FILE LIST IS DERIVED FROM THE TREE, NOT TYPED HERE. A hand-written
# list is how a new test file joins the repo and is never run - the exact
# shape of failure this ticket exists to close. The step globs `test_*.py`,
# prints the count, and REFUSES A COUNT OF ZERO: a loop over an empty glob
# exits 0 and would report a green gate that examined nothing.
#
# ⚠️ test_loop.py TAKES ~93 SECONDS OF WALL CLOCK ON PURPOSE (its own
# docstring says so, and says why: it drives the real `run_control()`
# against a real wall-clock floor, and mocking the clock would leave the
# assertion testing the mock). It is not hung. Do not "fix" it with a
# shorter timeout - a 60 s limit was tried during CI-01 and reported
# exactly the false hang the docstring predicts.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS RUN DOES NOT COVER, stated because a pass here would
# otherwise over-claim. test_freeze.py's third section wants the infra
# repo's `sim/hwsim.py` to drive a real HTTP meter through the real
# transport. admin/goodwe is PRIVATE (checked via the API) and this
# workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN is minted for THIS repository only, so hwsim is
# absent here and `find_hwsim()` returns None. The rest of the file runs
# and passes. It does so SILENTLY - the file prints nothing to say the
# hwsim section was skipped - so "test_freeze.py: PASS" below is a weaker
# claim than it looks. That belongs to whoever owns test_freeze.py next;
# naming it here is the least this gate can do about it.
- name: the add-on's own tests
run: |
set -eu
docker run --rm -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu -c '
cd /w/goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller
set -- test_*.py
if [ "$1" = "test_*.py" ]; then
echo "NO test_*.py FOUND - the mount is empty or the layout moved. NOTHING has been checked."
exit 1
fi
echo "$# test file(s) to run"
rc=0
for f in "$@"; do
start=$(date +%s)
if python3 "$f" > /tmp/out 2>&1; then
echo "PASS $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
else
echo "FAIL $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
tail -40 /tmp/out
rc=1
fi
done
exit $rc
'
- name: clean up
if: always()
run: |
rm -rf "$WS" || true
# Root-owned by this runner inside a directory the `homelab` user owns,
# and sudo on that box is interactive-only, so the user cannot clean
# this up and the job that made it has to.
ls -1dt /home/homelab/ci/addon-checks-*/ 2>/dev/null | tail -n +6 | xargs -r rm -rf || true
+33 -2
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ a GoodWe GW5000S-BP.
| | |
|---|---|
| running | `local_goodwe_controller` **0.2.0**, `boot: auto`, holding grid at zero |
| running | `local_goodwe_controller` **0.4.0**, `boot: auto`, holding grid at zero |
| installed as | a **Local** add-on: `/addons/goodwe_controller` on HA OS at 192.168.2.158 |
| repo | Gitea `admin/goodwe-addon` (ssh://git@192.168.2.147:2222) — **private** |
| tuning | gain 0.6, `max_w` 5000, slew 1000, deadband 15, step 10, saturation 500/3, heartbeat 10 s |
@@ -52,9 +52,40 @@ Run the checks before deploying. No framework needed:
```bash
cd goodwe_controller
python3 test_control.py && python3 test_maintenance.py && python3 test_arbiter.py
python3 test_control.py && python3 test_maintenance.py && python3 test_arbiter.py \
&& python3 test_validate.py && python3 test_p1.py && python3 test_watchdog.py \
&& python3 test_loop.py
```
`test_watchdog.py` covers SAFETY-02's logic, its arming gate (derived from the
real arbiter, not passed in), its trip path, and the fact that the latch survives
an add-on restart. Its headline validation is not here at all: `sim/replay_sign.py`
in the infra repo drives the same module over the two captured RS485 days and must
fire on all four of the 2026-08-20 episodes and stay silent on 2026-08-23. That
needs both checkouts:
```bash
GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon python3 sim/replay_sign.py
GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon python3 sim/replay_sign.py --stub
```
The second run checks the grader still *discriminates* rather than merely still
passing — a watchdog that never trips and one that always trips must both be
rejected.
⚠️ **If you are testing the failsafe by hand, note that stopping and starting the
add-on will not clear a trip.** That is the point of it; use the *Start / stop
control* button twice, or delete `sign_tripped` from `/data/state.json`.
⚠️ `test_loop.py` takes about **95 seconds** (measured 93 s) and that is not a bug. It
drives the real control loop, which sleeps 1 s a tick, eight times over, to prove a
wall-clock property about it (SAFETY-12); mocking the clock there would leave the
assertion testing the mock. The other six suites together are ~440 checks and finish in
seconds — `test_watchdog.py` spends ~3 s of that driving a real `Controller` through a
trip. If you shorten `test_loop.py`'s windows, re-measure and correct this figure —
an understated runtime is what makes a slow test look like a hung one, and a slow test
that looks hung gets deleted.
---
## 3. Known broken / unfinished
+986
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,991 @@
# Changelog
## Unreleased
**Provisional prices, and what may not rest on one (FCST-03).**
Day-ahead prices arrive once a day, around 14–16 h CET. Until they do, §8.3 says
the unknown hours use yesterday's profile and are flagged `provisional: true` —
and **no irreversible action may be taken on a provisional price.**
`app/price_forecast.py` does the fill, and the whole module is shaped by one
defect: a carried-forward point and a published one are the same three fields
and a bool, so the natural line `PricePoint(..., provisional=y.provisional)`
copies yesterday's `False` onto today's guess and produces stale data presented
as current. That is the meter-side SAFETY-18 failure one layer up — the reading
arrives on time, looks fresh, and is wrong.
**So the flag is never passed through.** Carried points are built by a
constructor that has no `provisional` parameter at all (the literal `True` lives
in one place, and there is nothing for a caller to forget or copy); published
points are passed through **by identity**, so there is no copy that could lose a
flag; and an audit re-derives the expected flag for every emitted point from the
set of hours the feed actually published and *raises* rather than repairing one.
A published point may itself be provisional — `eneco_eddy`'s current-quarter
imbalance print is — so the audit's rule for a published hour is "whatever the
feed said", never "False".
**The fill keys on the Brussels wall clock, not on `t − 24 h`.** A 23-hour day
has no 02:00 and a 25-hour day has two, so a fixed 24-hour subtraction shifts
every carried hour by one across a transition and misprices a whole day with
nothing to show for it. Re-running the fill after a late publication replaces
the carried hours with the real print: the number and the flag move together
because the series is rebuilt, never patched.
**Arbitrage now drops provisional hours instead of refusing the whole day.**
The refusal that read "the plan is provisional" would have switched arbitrage off
every morning on every dynamic site once carry-forward filling landed — a
part-firm series is the *normal* state before the print. What §8.3 forbids is
acting **on** a provisional price, so the provisional hours are dropped and the
spread, the cheapest hour and the dearest hour are computed over the published
ones only; fewer than two firm hours is still a refusal, which is where the
§11.4 fallback (wholly provisional) lands. The permitting variant now refuses to
be *constructed* around a provisional point at all. The cheap-window flag became
per-hour for the same reason, so a site's maintenance charge floor does not go
dark every morning.
**Real-time / imbalance products get measurably wider thresholds.** One widening
path, driven by a set of active uncertainty sources: the product's own (§9.2 row
2, derived from the declared `PriceProduct` and never from a plugin id) and
§11.4's "no weather data" row, which the spec widens by a different trigger and
which is the same mechanism. The combination rule is `max`, not a product — two
independent doubts must not compound into a threshold nothing can clear. The
caller supplies the base round-trip cost threshold, so OPT-04 still owns what
the number *is*; this owns only how much wider it gets and why, and the allowed
verdict reports the threshold it cleared.
**An irreversible action is a value, not a judgement call at each call site.**
`Irreversible` carries the hours an action commits — the maintenance drain's
window is derived from `maintenance.DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN` rather than typed twice —
and the gate looks at exactly those hours, blocking on a provisional one, on an
hour the series does not cover, and on no price data at all: three different
reasons, none of them an answer. ⚠️ It is the entry point for a start being
*justified by a price*; the calendar path main.py runs today is untouched,
because a gate that blocked on `no_data` would stop the monthly cycle on every
default install — §12's opening sentence.
**Zero new options.** No `config.yaml` key, no new defaults dict, no `o.get(k,
X)` in main.py: the module reads no options at all, so CFG-03 did not widen.
**The grid-following loop is now capped against the month's billed capacity peak
(SAFETY-07).** New `app/peakguard.py`. TARIFF-01 measured the quarter; this is the
consumer it was built for. Every cycle the guard projects the open quarter,
compares it to a ceiling and files ONE arbiter claim: a lower bound on the
setpoint at `P_PEAK`. That shape is both behaviours §10.1 asks for — a hard clamp
on charging and pre-emptive discharge — and it cannot cap discharge or export,
because a floor cannot. `excess = 900 × (projected − ceiling) ÷ remaining`, and
the floor is the MEASURED battery power plus that: a floor built on the standing
command winds itself to the rail whenever the inverter fails to follow, and one
built on delivered power cannot.
**It trips where SAFETY-18 only notifies, and the captures decided that.** On the
healthy reference day it engages on zero of 95 quarters; the action is
level-triggered, unlatched and re-derived every cycle, so a false engagement costs
one cycle of discharge rather than a parked battery. Replayed on 2026-08-20 the
billed quarter goes from **5029.8 W — above the inverter's own 5000 W rating — to
3485 W**, under the soft limit and without saturating. Quarters under the limit
across both committed days: 189/190 → 190/190. Two days is not thirty; AC 3 is
still TARIFF-01's open item and this does not claim it.
**Blindness forbids importing, and it is checked before the projection is
graded.** A fresh averager projects a confident 0 W, which is under every ceiling
there is; a meter gap longer than `meter_max_age_s` makes the projection read LOW;
and a frozen meter reading export projects 0 W at full coverage. All three become
a floor of 0 W, which is one-directional and cannot cost pack energy. That is the
backstop SAFETY-18 could not be — its alarm arrives at 300 s of a 900 s quarter
and commands nothing. The frozen term is `freeze.looks_frozen()` itself, evaluated
on this cycle's standing command, not a second copy of the conjunction.
**The ceiling is `peak_cap_w`, raised only by an OBSERVED reading.** `NO_RECORD`
and `NOT_OBSERVED` both leave it at the cap, so an unreadable peak store makes the
guard STRICTER. The gate is the reading's STATE, not whether a number happens to
be attached to it: today a `peak_w is not None` test behaves identically, and
depending on that coincidence is how a future last-known-peak field would silently
raise the ceiling off a read that failed. `headroom_w()` is deliberately not
consumed — `cap − peak` turns a zero peak into FULL freedom.
**Two defects found building it, both in the interaction rather than the
arithmetic.** A LIMIT does not out-vote another LIMIT — `arbiter.resolve()` applies
every limit at or above the winner's priority and takes the most restrictive — so
the peak floor (`lo ≥ 0`) and the maintenance charge-only shaping (`hi ≤ 0`)
resolved to a CONTRADICTION and 0 W, parking the battery in the exact quarter it
should shave. Fixed by suppression rather than priority: main.py drops the
maintenance shaping while the guard is engaged, which is what that branch already
did for the optional `peak_forecast_entity` — a key that is empty on a default
install, so until now the suspension could not fire on the site that needed it.
And thresholding `excess > 0` released the claim the instant it started working,
producing seventeen engage/release cycles in one 900 s quarter (§10.2's
oscillation) and leaving that quarter 49 W over; the threshold is now the floor
itself, which is the same arithmetic read as a level rather than as a switch.
**`PeakTracker.project()` no longer reads a private name with a default.**
`getattr(averager, "_last_net", 0.0)` failed quiet AND in the disarming direction:
a rename credits 0 W held, the projection reads low, and the money guard does not
engage. `QuarterAverager.held_net_w` is now a documented public property, read
without a default, and `Projection` carries it. TEST-13 item 4.
**No new option, and no fourth defaults site.** The ceiling is `peak_cap_w`, the
coverage threshold is `meter_max_age_s`, the freeze predicate is `meter_freeze_s`,
and the achievable discharge comes from `max_w` and the device rating.
`config.yaml` and `validate.py` are untouched; §14's `capacity_peak_limit_kw`
stays declined as the kW/W mismatch trap it is. On `meter_source: off` there are
no telegrams, so the guard does not run at all and the status page says NOT
COVERED — running it there would have blinded it permanently and stopped every
legacy install from charging, which is what the first cut did until
`test_clamp.py`'s export case caught it.
**Static day/night and fully-fixed tariffs, first-class (TARIFF-03).**
§9.2 puts a large share of the Belgian installed base on a static profile, and
an EMS that only works under dynamic pricing is an EMS for a minority. A new
`static_profile` option describes a two-period day/night tariff — or a single
fixed price — as JSON, and `app/static_tariff.py` turns it into the same
canonical `{start, eur_per_kwh, provisional}` series the fetched providers emit,
so nothing downstream learns that a tariff can be static.
**It is not a sixth provider plugin, and the reason is mechanical.**
`PriceProvider.capabilities()` is a classmethod, so a plugin's `PriceProduct` is
fixed when the class is written — but §9.2 makes STATIC and FIXED two different
products with two different required behaviours, and which one a site is on is a
property of the operator's data, not of any class. `StaticProfile.product`
derives it from the number of distinct prices instead. The second reason: the
plugin framework exists to stop a *fetched* figure being marked up twice, and a
number the operator typed as all-in has no publisher to disagree with.
**So the profile sits where §11.4 already says it does — under the providers, as
the fallback.** The configured-product path and the feed-is-down path are the
same generator differing in one flag: `provisional`. A static-tariff site runs
that path every day, so the degradation path for a dynamic site cannot rot
unused.
**"No arbitrage" is a type, not a boolean somebody has to remember to check.**
`TariffPlan.arbitrage()` returns a variant: the *allowed* arm carries the
spread and the cheapest and dearest hours, and the *refused* arm carries a
reason and nothing else — `.spread_eur_kwh` on a refusal raises rather than
answering 0.0. An optimiser cannot compute a trade from a refusal because it
cannot get the inputs out of one. Four refusals, all derived: the peak guard is
holding, there is no price data, the plan is provisional, or **the series is
flat**. That last one is AC2 — a fully-fixed tariff disables arbitrage by
arithmetic rather than by matching on an enum, and a dynamic feed that happens
to print one price all day is refused for the same true reason.
**Peak shaving outranks arbitrage, expressed so OPT-04 cannot skip it.**
`arbitrage()` takes `peak_guard_active` as a required keyword argument, so the
spread is not obtainable without first answering whether §10.1's priority 2 is
holding. §9.1's capacity tariff is a network cost charged whatever the energy
product is.
**Time-window shifting reaches the one shiftable load that exists.** main.py's
cheap-window flag — previously fed only by the `price_now_entity` /
`price_avg_entity` pair — now falls back to the static profile, and the Web UI
gained a **Tariff** row naming the window, the price, when it next changes and
why it is or is not cheap. The rule is *strictly* below the seven-day mean:
under a flat tariff `<=` would call every hour cheap and a fixed-tariff site
would top up from the grid at any hour, which is the opposite of
self-consumption only. Seven days rather than 48 hours because a 48 h mean taken
on a Friday is two-thirds weekend, and the same Tuesday 09:00 would come out
cheap or dear depending on when you asked.
**A profile must tile every day type exactly once, checked at startup.** A gap
is refused with the uncovered range named rather than filled in — an invented
price is one an optimiser would trade on — and an overlap is refused because
otherwise one of two prices wins silently on list order. The trap this catches
in practice: `22:00–07:00 mon-fri` does **not** cover Saturday morning, because
a window applies on the day the clock reads.
**validate.py rule 7's stated reason expired, exactly as TARIFF-02 predicted.**
That ticket left a tripwire in `test_price.py` section 12 asserting that nothing
in `app/` consumed `load_prices()`, with instructions to fix the refusal's
wording in the same commit when it went red. It went red naming
`static_tariff.py`. The message now says what is true instead — the series *is*
consumed, but main.py acts on the static side of it and not on a fetched one —
and the tripwire is re-aimed rather than removed: the consumer set is pinned, so
a second consumer (OPT-04) goes red again, and the expired phrase is asserted
gone so a bad merge cannot restore it. Rule 7 also grew a second refusal:
`static_profile` alongside the Home Assistant price pair is the same
silent-loser conflict, and a live one.
**No new place for an option default (CFG-03 is not widened).**
`static_profile` was added to `app/price.py`'s `PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS` — the one
in-code mirror TARIFF-02 created and pinned to `config.yaml` by a check — rather
than to a defaults dict in the new module, which has none. main.py grew no
`o.get("static_profile", …)` fallback. That is TARIFF-02's pattern, stated
here so a reviewer does not have to infer it.
**Measured, on the data that exists.** `test_static_tariff.py` replays the two
committed days of this house's real P1 meter (`scenarios/p1-net-2026-08-{20,23}`)
priced under a Belgian day/night profile. 2026-08-20 is a Thursday: 15.220 kWh
imported, 9.606 in the day window and 5.614 in the night one, EUR 4.7185 under
day/night against EUR 4.6725 flat, and shifting the day-window energy into the
night window saves EUR 0.8069 — which is 9.606 kWh x the 0.0840 spread, derived
twice and required to agree. 2026-08-23 is a Sunday: 0.728 kWh, **all** of it
night-priced, which is the weekend row proving itself on real data. §17 names
six Belgian scenarios and a static-profile case is not among them; this is the
seventh, and it is two captured days rather than a season — the file says so
rather than implying an annual figure.
Also worth knowing before OPT-04: on realistic Belgian day/night numbers the
whole-tariff spread is about 0.08 EUR/kWh, **below** the shipped
`cycle_cost_threshold_eur` of 0.10. A correct optimiser will decline to cycle
for the tariff alone on such a site. That is a product finding, not a defect.
**Price provider plugins, and one canonical all-in price format (TARIFF-02).**
`app/price.py` ships five providers - `generic_dayahead` (wholesale EPEX BE),
`engie_dynamic`, `totalenergies_dynamic`, `eneco_eddy` and the offline
`manual_csv` - all emitting exactly `{"prices": [{"start", "eur_per_kwh",
"provisional"}]}`, tz-aware at the Brussels offset, EUR/kWh, all-in. **Nothing
consumes it yet**: this is the seam, landed first, so that the arbitrage work
that follows never learns a supplier's name.
**Double-counting the markup is refused rather than discouraged, given a
correct declaration.** A plugin does not return a price; it returns the figure
its source published and declares which of {energy, markup, taxes} that figure
contains. The framework adds the complement, once. Engie and TotalEnergies
publish a retail figure with their margin already inside; adding the configured
3 c/kWh on top would make every future arbitrage decision wrong by that amount
with nothing reporting it.
Two mechanisms, because one was not enough. `PluginOptions` raises on the
framework-owned keys - and review of PR #16 then wrote a double-counting plugin
three more ways, one of them touching nothing but `PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS`, a
public dict in the module every plugin already imports. So `register()` now also
**refuses at import any plugin whose own code mentions a framework key**
(`code_leaks()`, docstrings stripped via `ast` so a plugin's mandated
`SOURCES:` line does not false-positive). Honest wholesale baseline 0.188
EUR/kWh; every attack landed 0.219.
**The guarantee's precise shape**, stated because an overclaim is worse than no
claim: the framework adds the complement exactly once *given a correct `sources`
declaration*. A plugin that declares `{energy}` while its feed is really all-in
still comes out one markup high while touching no framework name, and no code
can catch that - the declaration is the plugin's unverifiable claim about
somebody else's tariff. What is mechanised is reachability; what stays human is
truthfulness.
**The product type is declared, not inferred from the plugin's name.**
`eneco_eddy` is a real-time/imbalance product and gets widened arbitrage
thresholds; that reaches a consumer through `capabilities().product` and
`volatility_regime()`, never through a name comparison. `test_price.py` asserts
mechanically that no plugin id appears anywhere in the framework's own code,
and drives a sixth provider defined inside the test file to the correct regime
with `price.py` untouched.
**"No price data" is a type, not an empty list.** Following the same rework
`sim/riglock.py` took, a fetch returns `PriceRead.series(...)` or
`PriceRead.no_data(reason)`, and only the first carries fields. An empty series
is not constructible; `no_data` has no `.points` to iterate, no `.at()`, and
`.get("points", [])` raises rather than returning the default. **A day of free
electricity and a day with no prices are different instructions** - arbitrage is
pointless under the first and forbidden under the second - and an implementation
that returns `[]` on a failed fetch cannot tell them apart. Every site-level
failure returns `no_data`; nothing raises into the control tick.
**What is not verified, and cannot be by an offline suite:** every fixture is
synthetic, so the five feed URLs and JSON shapes are checked against a belief
about what those suppliers publish, not against the feeds. The parse layer is
exercised; the contract with each supplier is not. Expect the first live fetch
of each to need a shape fix, and note that a wrong shape degrades to
no-price-data rather than to a wrong price.
**`manual_csv` is the documented offline fallback** and needs no network, no
supplier account and no HTTP stack. See DOCS.md for the format. Its `start`
column must carry a UTC offset - a bare local timestamp is refused, because one
hour every October names two moments.
**Injection is priced separately** (`export_price_eur_kwh`), a scalar rather
than a second series, and negative values are accepted. Consumption plugins
cannot reach it.
**`price_provider` may not be combined with `price_now_entity` /
`price_avg_entity`** - the add-on refuses to start on that pair. The Home
Assistant sensors are the existing delegation of pricing to HA and still work
alone; with both configured they would silently keep deciding while the status
page named a supplier that decided nothing.
**No timezone database is used.** The shipped Alpine image has no `tzdata`, so
Brussels offsets are computed from the EU rule and every instant is carried as
UTC and rendered at the offset that applies to it. The checks drive both 2026
transitions - the 23-hour and 25-hour days - rather than a normal day, where a
fixed 24-slot implementation and a correct one agree.
**The capacity-tariff peak is now measured, banked and survives a restart
(TARIFF-01).** New `app/tariff.py`. The 15-minute block average itself was
already built and unwired - `p1.QuarterAverager` computes clock-aligned 900 s
blocks, time-weighted over irregular telegram spacing, offtake-only and
per-phase - and `P1Ingest.blocks` was a 96-entry list a restart erased. This
adds the SQLite behind it (`/data/tariff.db`): one row per completed quarter in
the indefinite 15-min tier, one row per calendar month in the permanent peak
tier, and no `DELETE` against either anywhere in the module.
**Blocks, not a sliding window.** The card says "rolling"; 9.1 bills "the
highest 15-minute average offtake", stated per QUARTER. "Rolling" here means
continuously updated, not a trailing-15-minutes window - a trailing window
reports a peak the meter never bills, and reports it HIGH, because a burst
straddling :15 fills it completely while contributing to two block averages at
partial weight.
**A restart mid-block resumes it, and a restart that outlives the block banks
it.** `QuarterAverager` grew `snapshot()`/`restore()`; the tracker checkpoints
the open block every 15 s (worst case 1.7 % of one quarter) and clears the
checkpoint in the same breath as a block close. The held sample keeps its
ORIGINAL timestamp across the restart, so the outage is integrated under the
same `max_hold_s` rule a running process would apply and uncovered seconds drag
the closed block DOWN rather than being held forward. `quarter_start` is the
primary key and a re-bank may only ever RAISE a figure, so a replay cannot
double-count and a partial re-run cannot lower a quarter already measured.
**An unreadable store is not a zero peak.** `peak()` answers `OBSERVED` /
`NO_RECORD` / `NOT_OBSERVED` and carries `peak_w = None` unless observed - the
`riglock.holder()` fix applied to something that spends money. A peak read as
0 W hands SAFETY-07 maximum headroom and silently disarms the guard at the
moment its own storage breaks, so there is no accessor that defaults it: a
caller who forgets gets a `TypeError`, and the status page prints a different
row for "no quarter yet" than for "the database did not answer".
**Calendar months are LOCAL, blocks are UTC.** A quarter starting 22:15 UTC on
31 August bills in September. Block alignment still needs no timezone.
**No new option, and no second peak entity.** The soft limit is the existing
`peak_cap_w`; `config.yaml` and `validate.py` are untouched, so CFG-03 is not
widened. `peak_forecast_entity` stays the input to `maintenance_charge_floor()`
- repointing that consumer changes what moves energy and belongs to SAFETY-07.
**It measures and nothing else.** No claim, no clamp, no command; graded on the
parsed syntax in `test_tariff.py`, which also proves the same grader lights up
on `main.py`. Per SAFETY-20, the quantity is DELIVERED power - `tariff.py` only
ever sees `P1Sample`, the meter's own reading, never a setpoint.
**AC 3 is not met and the check says so.** It asks for 30 days of replay; two
days of this house's real meter exist (2026-08-20, 2026-08-23), now committed as
`scenarios/p1-net-*.jsonl.gz`. `test_tariff.py` part 9 replays them, reports
the percentage under the shipped limit next to the sample size in days, and
asserts nothing about the 95 % figure.
**A computed setpoint over the rating now alarms instead of being clipped in
silence (SAFETY-03).** The clamp was never the missing half - specs.md 10.3
records an unclamped integrator climbing ~130 W per 4 s past 10 kW and reporting
**14 768 W** while pinned at the 5 kW rail, and a silent clamp turns exactly that
into a flat, legal-looking 5000 W hold. `write_setpoint()` - the one path every
write takes, cycle, heartbeat, operator button and shutdown alike - now clamps to
the **validated** `max_w` and reports whether the raw value differed, and
`Controller.check_output_clamp()` raises `OUTPUT_CLAMP`: a persistent
notification (`goodwe_output_clamp`), an `ERROR`, an event row and a red status
banner. **Not a trip**: the clamped value is written and the loop keeps running,
per 11.2's "clamp *and alarm*".
**The bound is `max_w` and nothing is `min()`ed at runtime.** Section 14 requires
the loop clamp and the driver's `setpoint_limit_w` to agree, validated at startup
with a refusal on mismatch - which CFG-01 already ships. The device range is
still applied second, as defence in depth; after a successful validation it
cannot engage, so if it ever does, that is louder than the first stage and it
alarms too, naming the bound. No new config key: the guard's limit is the one
the operator already set, and its cadence is a module constant.
**`Decision` grew `i_clamped` / `clamped` booleans, and that is the load-bearing
part.** `reason` is one string that later stages overwrite - a cycle that clamps
the integrator and is then slew limited reports `slew-limited`, and one that
clamps while saturated reports `saturated-freeze`. Both *are* the winding case,
so an alarm keyed on the string is silent on exactly the cycles it exists for:
mutating main.py back onto `"clamp" in decision.reason` drops the 10.3 replay
from 2 engagements to **0**. The flags are set where the clamp happens and are
never overwritten. On a default install (`integrator_max_w` following `max_w`)
the integrator bound is the one that bites and the output clamp is unreachable,
so the integrator flag is the whole signal.
**Distinct from the saturation freeze, and checked in the negative.** A clamp is
a *software* bug signal; saturation is the *hardware* failing to follow a legal
command, and its action is to freeze the integrator, not to alarm. They share no
reason code, notification id, status row or counter. `test_clamp.py` drives a
loop that saturates for 10 consecutive cycles at 1.4 % of the rating and asserts
zero clamp notifications, zero engagements, no log row and no status row - after
first asserting that the saturation freeze *really did* engage, so the silence is
an observation rather than a scenario that did nothing.
**The action log is coalesced per episode, and that was a real bug.**
`log_event()` keeps 40 rows; one row per engagement flushed the entire ring
within 40 cycles of a winding loop, and the first thing it evicted was
SAFETY-18's own `METER FROZEN?` row - this guard silencing another guard's log.
Caught by `test_freeze.py` going red, not by inspection. One row per episode now,
carrying the exact engagement count read off the counter.
**A non-finite setpoint is refused, and it was worse than passing one through.**
`nan` is loss of input (11.1 rule 1: command zero, keep commanding), not an
out-of-range value. Measured: because every comparison against `nan` is False, a
naive `max(-limit, min(limit, nan))` keeps its *first* argument and turns a `nan`
into a command **at the full rating**, then reports it as a clamp engagement.
**Review fixes (PR #12).** Three, and the first was a behavioural regression
this PR introduced: `clamp_to_rating()` **returned early** from the `max_w`
stage, so the device bound - the "applied second, defence in depth" half - was
reached only when the rating bound had NOT fired. The bigger the overshoot, the
less the guard did. At `max_w` 5000 against a +-4000 device, +9999 emitted
**+5000 W, outside the device range**, while a mere +4500 was correctly held to
+4000. That undid the pre-PR guarantee "never send a value the device will
reject outright" and undercut this module's own case for clamping to `max_w`
rather than a runtime `min()`, which rests entirely on that stage catching a
validation that did not run. Both stages now always run, the result names both
bounds when both bite (`max_w+device`), and the property is asserted over a
492-point sweep rather than on witness values - the defect was invisible to any
single-value check that happened to sit inside one stage. No reachable
production path was found for it (two validation gates and the arbiter bound sit
in front), but latent is not harmless.
Two harness defects, both of the kind where a check cannot fail for the value it
forbids: the hysteresis check issued `range(CLEAR_CYCLES - 1)` clean cycles,
which at `CLEAR_CYCLES = 1` issues **zero** and passes while printing
"0 clean cycles do NOT clear it" - green for the chatter setting the constant
exists to prevent. And the re-assert check stimulated at `REASSERT_S + 9`, green
for **any** value including 3600, i.e. the hour of silence the module promises
not to produce. Both are now written in wall-clock terms that do not move when
the constant does: **one** clean cycle must not clear the alarm, and a loop
pinned across the 900 s capacity-tariff quarter must speak at least 5 times and
on no more than 20 % of cycles. `CLEAR_CYCLES = 1`, `REASSERT_S = 3600` and
`REASSERT_S = 0` each go red.
**`test_clamp.py`** (new, assert-based, no framework) covers the clamp
arithmetic and its boundaries - exactly +-`max_w` is *not* an engagement - the
alarm's edge/re-assert/hysteresis cadence, the 10.3 runaway replayed through the
real `Controller.cycle()` against an unclamped transcription, the saturation
negative, and the direct-write path. Six author mutations reproduced red,
including "clamp kept, alarm deleted" (the historical build) and "alarm keyed on
`reason`". Two of the check's own hypotheses about how the freeze and the clamp
interact were **refused by the sweep** and rewritten to what it measured: a
frozen cycle *can* clamp, and does so exactly when the integrator reverses.
`test_freeze.py`'s notification assertions now filter by `notification_id`
rather than by service - the add-on raises more than one kind of notification,
and its railing scenarios legitimately raise this one too.
**Cheap-window maintenance charging was unreachable at the shipped defaults, and
now the config that makes it unreachable is refused (MAINT-04).** `config.yaml`
shipped `max_w: 2000` against `maintenance_charge_w: 2500`. The cheap-window
shaping files `Claim.limit(hi = -maintenance_charge_w)` against the supervised
SAFETY limit's `lo = -max_w`, so `lo > hi` — the arbiter's clause 3, correctly
resolved to **0 W** and logged as a CONTRADICTION. **Maintenance silently never
charged in a cheap window on a default install**, and the only evidence read
like a bug in the arbiter rather than like the two numbers an operator set.
Measured against the real arbiter, loop asking +500 W:
```
max_w=2000 hi=-2500 -> +0 W contradiction=True
max_w=2500 hi=-2500 -> -2500 W limited by supervised(max_w)
max_w=3000 hi=-2500 -> -2500 W limited by maintenance(cheap-window charge)
```
`validate_startup_config()` now refuses `maintenance_charge_w > max_w` (rule 6),
the same shape as CFG-01's `sign_disagree_w >= max_w`: a number the operator set,
overridden by a layer they cannot see. Equality is reachable (`-max_w` is a
single valid point) and deliberately not refused. Verified by starting the
add-on on the pre-fix pair: exit 78, the refusal banner, no traceback.
**`maintenance_discharge_w` was checked, not assumed, and it is NOT the same
case.** The shaping is not symmetric. The drain phase does not shape the loop,
it OWNS the actuator — `Claim.set(P_MAINTENANCE, +discharge_w)` — and a SET is
*clamped* by the limits above it rather than contradicted by them. 2500 against
a 2000 W ceiling emits **+2000 W**, and the arbiter's own `explain()` prints
`maintenance -> 2000 W, limited by supervised(max_w)` every cycle. Nothing is
silent and energy still moves; the cycle completes slower (13.8 kWh usable at
2000 W is ~6.9 h against the 720 min drain timeout). **Warned about, not
refused.**
**The shipped defaults changed so the validator does not reject them.**
`maintenance_charge_w` and `maintenance_discharge_w` are now **2000**, at the
shipped `max_w`. `max_w` was deliberately NOT raised instead: it is the
supervised safety ceiling and raising a default upward ships more power to every
new install. Raising `max_w` (the reference install runs 5000) is what unlocks a
faster maintenance cycle — raise it first, then these. `test_validate.py` now
reads `config.yaml` itself and asserts the shipped numbers pass the rule, so a
default that the validator refuses cannot ship again.
### ⚠️ Upgrading an existing default install: the add-on may refuse to start
An install still carrying `maintenance_charge_w: 2500` against `max_w: 2000`
now meets rule 6 and **exits 78 with the refusal banner** instead of starting.
That is the intended behaviour — the configuration was already broken, it was
just silent about it — but an add-on that will not come back after an update
needs the fix stated here rather than only in the log.
**The fix, either way: set `maintenance_charge_w` to `2000` or lower, OR raise
`max_w` to `2500` or higher** (Settings → Add-ons → GoodWe RS485 Controller →
Configuration), then start it. The banner in the log says the same thing and
names both numbers.
Whether you hit this at all depends on whether the Supervisor kept the old
value, and **both cases are covered above because we did not verify which one
applies here.** The Supervisor merges an add-on's *stored* options over the
defaults in `config.yaml`, so:
- **A key the operator never edited** re-derives from the new `config.yaml` and
becomes 2000 on upgrade. Non-event, nothing to do.
- **A key the operator did set** persists at 2500 and the add-on refuses to
start until it is changed. Note this includes anyone who used the
Configuration page's YAML editor, which writes the whole options block back —
so "I never touched that field" is not a guarantee the old value is gone.
⚠️ **This is reasoned from the Supervisor's documented merge behaviour, not
measured on the live install.** The reference install's stored options could not
be read (`/api/hassio/` refuses a long-lived token) and probing it was out of
scope — it regulates a real battery. It runs `max_w: 5000` and is unaffected
either way.
⚠️ **Known, deliberately left, and worth a follow-up:** `main.py` and
`maintenance.py` still fall back to **2500** when the key is absent from the
options dict, while `config.yaml` and `validate.py` now say 2000. Unreachable on
a Supervisor install (every key is always supplied) and reachable only from
tests/`sim`. The real fix is one source of truth for option defaults, which is
bigger than this ticket and touches files another ticket is in.
## 0.5.2
**A meter frozen at a wrong-but-fresh value now raises an alarm. It still is not
stopped.** (SAFETY-18)
A meter that answers `200 OK` with a stale document forever is *arriving* on
every poll, so every freshness mechanism in the stack reads it as healthy:
`meter_max_age_s` is reset by each response, the firmware watchdog is fed by the
heartbeat and by a sample age that never climbs, and the arbiter contributes only
±`max_w`. The loop integrates a constant error and rails — replaying the real
`compute()` at 15 s cycles, in 150/60/30 s at `max_w: 2000` for a meter frozen at
350/1000/≥3000 W, and 360/135/75 s at `max_w: 5000`. **The live install runs
`max_w: 5000`**, which is both the schema maximum and the device rating.
The new detector (`app/freeze.py`) is a **conjunction**, not the bare
`unchanged_s` threshold TEL-05 measured and rejected:
unchanged_s ≥ meter_freeze_s AND |command| within 5 % of max_w
Both terms already existed and were already on the status page. They fail for
independent reasons: at the converged point the command is nowhere near the rail,
and at the rail against a real load the kWh registers move within seconds. At the
shipped 300 s there is also a structural relation, not just a margin — the
slowest a healthy 1 Wh register can tick and still look unchanged is 12 W, which
is inside the 15 W deadband, so the command there is parked at 0 W and the two
halves cannot both be true.
**Notification only, deliberately.** An HA persistent notification (fixed
`notification_id`, so a repeat replaces rather than stacks), an `ERROR` log line,
a UI event and a red status banner. No claim, no latch, no 0 W: a false trip
parks the battery and the operator's next move is to switch the guard off; a
false notification costs an alert. The trip is a separate decision that needs
data from a real install.
- New option `meter_freeze_s` (default 300, range 60–3600, no "off").
- **Only `meter_source: homewizard_local` is covered** — it is the only transport
that sees the meter's own document. Everywhere else the status page says
**NOT COVERED** rather than "armed".
- `DOCS.md` now states the **capacity-tariff exposure** this does *not* close:
`peak_cap_w` caps maintenance charging and nothing caps the loop, so a lying
meter can drive a 5 kW unattended import, and ≥15 minutes of that sets the
month's billed peak (measured: one 4998 W quarter moved a monthly peak from
4832 → 5013 W). That cap is SAFETY-07.
- `test_freeze.py` grades it in both directions: silent over 40 minutes of the
live house's real converged capture (committed as
`scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz`), silent over an hour of TEL-05's
low-power case where a bare threshold is shown to fire, and alarming on a
genuinely frozen meter driven over real HTTP through the real
`HomeWizardLocalSource` — against the rig's own `hwsim` `freeze` fault when the
infra repo is reachable, an equivalent stub otherwise. Its negative twin is the
load-bearing one: the same railed command against a meter that is still moving
must stay silent at the same threshold.
## 0.5.1
**SAFETY-02's latch now survives an add-on restart, which is the difference
between a latch and a pause.** `auto` was persisted and `sign_wd.tripped` was
not, so reconstructing the `Controller` against the same store — exactly what a
container restart does — brought it back **armed, into the same fault, with no
operator involved**: `tripped=False`, banner back to `NOT READY`, and it resumed
commanding (measured: −1000 W, −2000 W) before re-tripping 180 s later. Under a
Supervisor that restarts a crashed add-on that is a loop of three-minute
wrong-direction bursts — and "restart the add-on" is the first thing an operator
looking at a `FAILSAFE` banner and a 0 W inverter will try.
`sign_tripped` and `sign_reason` are now `Store` keys beside the maintenance
state, written the moment the trip happens (reason first, flag second, so a crash
between the two can never persist a latch with no explanation) and restored in
`Controller.__init__`. Cleared only by the operator's start. `DOCS.md` said "it
does not clear itself"; that was false across a restart and now is not.
Also in this release, all of it review follow-up rather than new behaviour:
- **The arming gate is tested against the real arbiter.** It was the decision the
whole ticket turns on and it was asserted in three comment blocks and verified
by nothing — every case passed `following` in as a literal. `test_watchdog.py`
now derives it from `resolve()` across twelve claim configurations, including
the redirect case `winner == "loop"` alone would have got wrong and the `lo`
limit that raises magnitude without flipping sign.
- **The MQTT `status: "failsafe"` value is tested.** The check that claimed to
cover it restated the assertion three lines above it and never touched the
payload.
- **A forward hazard written down where it will be read, and made to bite.**
`winner == "loop"` disarms the watchdog under any higher-priority SET claim.
Today only maintenance and the safety stops emit one and neither follows the
meter; a peak-shaving strategy at `P_PEAK` **does**, and would blind the
watchdog for every peak event.
The gate is now `watchdog.loop_is_following()`, called by both `main.py` and
the test, for the same reason `disagrees()` was extracted: the test held a
*transcription* of the shipped expression, so editing the shipped gate alone to
`winner in ("loop", "peak")` left every suite green while the watchdog went
blind. Two copies, and the one that drifts is the one doing the grading.
⚠️ Extracting it was not sufficient on its own. The realistic P_PEAK row —
peak shaving asking for *more* than the loop — still could not detect the
widened gate, because the magnitude term rejects it regardless and masks the
winner term. A second row with peak asking for *less* isolates `winner` as the
only deciding term, and that is the one that turns red.
- **The worked example described a configuration that does not ship.** At the
defaults `maintenance_charge_w` (2500) exceeds `max_w` (2000), so that claim is
an arbiter *contradiction* resolving to 0 W, not a −2500 W charge. The example
is now written at 1500 W. (The contradiction is a real pre-existing bug —
a default cheap-window maintenance charge silently never happens — filed
separately, deliberately not fixed here.)
- **`disagrees()` is public**, so `sim/replay_sign.py` stops carrying its own copy
of the predicate it grades.
- `held_s` takes the clock instead of reading one, restoring the pure-function
property the module advertises.
- **The `sign_reason`-before-`sign_tripped` write ordering is enforced, not just
documented.** Swapping the two lines used to pass every check. A store that
fails the second write now proves the property the ordering exists for: what
survives a crash mid-trip is a reason with no latch, never a latch with no
explanation.
- Measured figures corrected throughout: 93.4 % / 4212 of 17280 (was 92.9 % /
4127 of 16349), per-cluster 0.3 / 0.9 / 10.5 / 0.0 %.
## 0.5.0
**SAFETY-02 — the sign-disagreement watchdog.** The add-on now watches whether
the setpoint it is emitting and the grid figure it is regulating on point the
same way. If they oppose each other, both over `sign_disagree_w` (300 W), for
`sign_disagree_s` (180 s) **continuously**, it files a failsafe claim at
`P_SAFETY`, commands **0 W**, and latches there until an operator starts control
again. New module `app/watchdog.py`; new options `sign_disagree_w` and
`sign_disagree_s`.
This is the gap the existing failsafes leave open. The stale-input watchdog asks
whether the meter is still talking, the saturation freeze asks whether the
inverter can follow, the output clamp asks whether the number is too big — a
loop can pass all three while charging the battery out of the grid, because the
only thing wrong is the sign. On 2026-08-20 a commercial controller did exactly
that four times in one day, for up to 77 minutes at a stretch, and reached a
commanded −14 768 W against a ±5000 W inverter.
Validated against that day. `sim/replay_sign.py` in the infra repo drives this
module over the committed RS485 captures of both 2026-08-20 (the four episodes)
and 2026-08-23 (healthy): **18 trips on the fault day, every one inside a window
`NOTES.md` §4.7 accounts for, and 0 on the healthy day.** The four episodes do
share one signature rather than merely resembling each other — sign agreement
runs 0.3 / 0.9 / 10.5 / 0.0 % inside them against 93.4 % on the healthy day.
Three decisions worth knowing about:
- **It is disarmed whenever the grid-following loop is not what is driving.**
Sign agreement is a property of a loop that follows the meter. A maintenance
grid charge opposes the meter *by design* — 2500 W of charge into a house
drawing 500 W is +3000 W on the meter against a −2500 W command, for hours —
and armed unconditionally this would trip on every maintenance cycle. The gate
tests the emitted number, not the winning claim's name: a limit claim can let
the loop "win" and still replace its value with one pointing the other way.
- **The trip latches.** Commanding 0 W removes the command side of the
comparison, so the disagreement always clears the moment the trip works.
Un-latched, this would trip, clear, and hand the actuator back to the loop that
was driving the wrong way, every three minutes forever.
- **`sign_disagree_w` at or above `max_w` is refused at startup** (validator rule
5). The arbiter never lets a command exceed `max_w`, so such a threshold makes
the watchdog incapable of firing while the status page still reports it armed.
A disarmed guard that advertises itself as armed is the failure mode this
project keeps refusing to ship.
What it does **not** catch, stated so nobody assumes otherwise: an inverter that
acts opposite to what it was told moves the meter *further* the same way, so
command and meter agree while everything runs away. That is the saturation
freeze's job, which compares the command against the battery's actual power.
`test_validate.py`'s "the smallest sane max_w still starts" case now names a
reachable sign threshold, because a 1 W ceiling genuinely does disarm the 300 W
default and is now correctly refused.
## 0.4.0
**CFG-01.** The add-on now refuses to start on a configuration it cannot honour,
instead of logging a line and carrying on. `validate_startup_config()` runs in
`amain()` before the broker, the web server or any task exists, so a refusal
cannot leave half a controller running behind a UI.
It refuses only where continuing produces one of two outcomes: **(a)** a stated
limit is untrue - the operator configured a bound and a lower layer silently
enforces a different one - or **(b)** the add-on is inert and indistinguishable
from healthy. (b) is not a special case of (a): with no `setpoint_entity`, layer
1 pinning the inverter at 0 W is the failsafe *working*. The system does not
become unsafe, it becomes a convincing impression of a working controller.
Four things qualify:
- **`max_w` above (or below) the setpoint device's own rating.** This is the one
that changed behaviour. It used to warn `the device wins` and run anyway, with
`write_setpoint()` silently clamping, so the configured ceiling was never the
real one and the only evidence had scrolled off the log. The refusal names the
configured value, the device's value, and which wins.
- **No `setpoint_entity`.** A controller with no actuator: every write is a
no-op, the device rating is never read, and the ESP32 heartbeat that holds off
the layer-1 failsafe never happens. It ran, looked healthy, and moved nothing.
- **A `meter_source` that can never produce a reading** - missing `p1_host`,
missing `p1_net_entity`, a blank MQTT topic, a phase list disagreeing with
`meter_phases`, an unknown source name, or a `meter_poll_s` at or past
`meter_max_age_s`. These were already caught, but they only *disabled
ingestion*, which leaves the grid reading None forever: permanent "inputs
missing", 0 W, and a status page indistinguishable from a healthy meter nobody
has sent anything to yet.
- **`meter_max_age_s` above the firmware's ingest veto.** The schema accepts
`int(5,300)`; the ESP32's threshold is a compile-time `max_age_s: "30"` and it
trips layer 1 at `p1_age_s >= 30`. Set 120 and the add-on treats a 119 s
reading as fresh and keeps commanding, while the firmware has already vetoed
and is holding the inverter at 0 W - healthy meter, running controller,
nothing moving, and no line anywhere saying the number you set was overruled.
Structurally the same fault as the `max_w` case. Only *above* the veto is
refused: below it the add-on gives up first, which is fail-safe and visible on
its own status page. Mirrored as `validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S` - it cannot
be imported from a compile-time YAML substitution, so it carries a note about
the one direction in which it can go stale.
`max_w` at or below zero is refused too. Schema-blocked on a real install, but
`validate_startup_config()` is now also the simulation suite's entry point, and
a non-positive `max_w` inverts the arbiter's `supervised` bounds into a
contradiction that resolves to 0 W - i.e. it would read as a safety trip rather
than as the typo it is.
The predicates for the meter group still live in `p1.validate_meter_options()`,
which `build_source()` also calls - one definition, two callers, not two
competing validators. Two transports gained a check they never had: `ha_dsmr`
with only one of its two entities, and `mqtt_p1` with a blank topic, both of
which previously built a transport that could never read.
Deliberately **not** refused, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
`integrator_max_w` above `max_w` (the arbiter still bounds the wire to ±max_w,
so the cost is unwind latency, not amperage - warned), a missing `soc_entity` /
`batt_entity` (fail-safe, and already a red NOT READY banner naming it), a
`setpoint_entity` that has not appeared on the Core API yet (ESPHome is routinely
late; refusing would make a slow boot need a human - re-checked once the real
rating arrives), and a thin-but-nonzero `meter_poll_s` margin.
A refusal is legible as a refusal: a banner that says in words that this is a
configuration problem and nothing is broken, the numbered problems, no traceback,
and exit status 78 (`EX_CONFIG`).
**SAFETY-12.** The control loop now evaluates on a clock as well as on a change.
`run_control()` ran `cycle()` only when the meter value differed from the
previous poll, so a meter that repeated a value ran **no control cycles at
all** - while the heartbeat went on re-emitting the last command and the
firmware went on putting it on the wire every 2 s. Layer 1 stayed fed, every
indicator read healthy, and a command computed from an old reading kept being
executed through whatever the load did next. Measured on the rig during TEL-05:
70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W with 14 arrivals and zero cycles.
**It was worse than a latency limit: it was a safety claim that could not
fire.** `stale_input_s` and the `inputs missing -> 0 W` claim both live *inside*
`cycle()`. Pre-fix, if the meter value happened to be constant, `cycle()` was
never called again - so that claim had no way to run. Constant meter, SoC entity
dying at t=4 s, same binary:
```
pre-fix writes: [(0.0, 220.0), (0.0, 220.0), (10.1, 220.0)]
final target: 220.0 W reason: 'loop -> 220 W'
post-fix writes: [(0.0, 220.0), (0.0, 220.0), (3.0, 430.0), (9.1, 0.0), (10.1, 0.0)]
final target: 0.0 W reason: 'safety -> 0 W'
```
The pre-fix controller held 220 W through the entire input outage with its
status line still reading `loop -> 220 W`, and layer 1 does not cover that case
on a `meter_source: off` install: no P1 age sensor is published, so the firmware
has nothing to veto on, while the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed. So the old
behaviour was not "holds a stale command safely" - it was a failsafe that a
repeating meter switched off. `test_loop.py` asserts both halves.
`cycle_floor_s` (default **15 s**) is a deadline on the gap between cycles, not
a second scheduler: every cycle resets it, whichever trigger fired. On a healthy
meter it never elapses, so the cycle rate, the write sequence and therefore the
per-cycle gain the tuning was measured against are unchanged - asserted in
`test_loop.py` by driving the real loop twice on one binary (a huge
`cycle_floor_s` reproduces the old behaviour exactly) and comparing the
commanded values.
The reset is not the only thing holding that up, and the other argument is the
sturdier one: the combined cycle rate is `max(arrival rate, 1/floor)`, never the
sum. At 1/15 s the floor is strictly slower than the ~1/5 s arrival rate, so
even a hypothetical floor racing the arrivals could not exceed the nominal
healthy rate. The re-tune is unreachable by construction. ⚠️ That holds only
while `cycle_floor_s` stays above the meter's update interval, and the schema
minimum is 5 s - which is exactly the reference meter's interval. Nothing
enforces the relationship; `validate.py` is the obvious home for it and does not
have it yet.
Observed over six real minutes on the same rig, one binary, meter held at a
literally constant 350.0 W: **before, 1 cycle** (at startup) and then nothing,
the command stuck at 220 W against a 350 W import for the rest of the window.
**After, 24 cycles**, worst gap 15.14 s, and the ordinary PI ramp doing its job -
220, 430, 650, 860, 1080, 1300, 1510, 1730, 1940, 2000 W, one step per cycle,
rail at t=136 s and flat after. Three minutes with the meter parked at the
target instead: **1 cycle before, 12 after, and 19 writes either way - the same
19**. Three minutes on a normally-changing meter: **36 cycles and 49 writes on
both sides, the same values in the same order.** The heartbeat write count never
moves; the only writes the fix adds are the ten the loop was supposed to be
making all along.
15 s is bracketed, not round.
**Below it, ~11 s, and it arises more routinely than a dropped poll.**
`HomeWizardLocalSource` polls at 5.0 s against a meter that updates every 4.97 s
(NOTES.md:640). Two near-equal periods beat, so roughly once every ~14 minutes
the poller steps over an update entirely - a ~10 s gap between changed values on
a perfectly healthy meter, plus up to 1 s for the 1 s tick to notice. A failed
HTTP poll (retried on the next tick, no backoff) adds another 5 s. The floor
sits above the beat-skip so it does not fire on that alone; what it takes to
reach 15 s is a beat-skip *and* a failed poll coinciding.
**Above it, 30 s.** `meter_max_age_s` is 30 s, past which there is no reading to
evaluate, and the firmware's ingest veto is also 30 s - so the loop is
guaranteed to have re-decided at least twice inside any window in which layer 1
might otherwise be the only thing deciding. ⚠️ The default is therefore not
independently justified at 15: if the firmware's veto ever moves, this moves
with it. Noted beside the constant in `main.py`.
It is also exactly `stale_input_s`, this system's existing answer to "how long
may we hold without re-deciding".
A floor cycle runs the **full** law on the same inputs, integrator included. In
P1 mode the freshness question is already answered upstream and answered harder
- past `meter_max_age_s` the reading is None, which is "inputs missing", which
is a `P_SAFETY` 0 W claim - so a floor cycle there can only ever run on a reading
this system already calls fresh. ⚠️ That is transport-conditional: with
`meter_source: off`, `read_inputs()` takes the grid figure straight from
`hass.number()` with **no age gate at all**, so a Home Assistant entity that has
gone quiet reads as current on that path, with or without this change. Running
the full law is still right there - the alternative is a degraded second law
reasoning about an age nobody measured - but the floor does not make that path
fresh. The integrator advances per *cycle*, not per second,
so bounding the gap bounds the accumulation; `integrator_max_w` bounds it after
that. A gentler second law for floor cycles would be a second set of dynamics
nobody can test on this hardware.
⚠️ **This is not a freeze detector**, and TEL-05 established one cannot be built
here: at the converged -10 W target a 1 Wh register needs ~6 minutes to move
while the power figure legitimately repeats, so any threshold on `unchanged_s`
false-trips at the exact operating point we run at. Nothing in this change
decides whether a repeated reading is *true*. It stops "the number is the same"
from meaning "do not think". The consequence, stated plainly: against a meter
genuinely frozen at a wrong value the loop will now correct toward that wrong
value rather than hold a stale command, bounded by `max_w`, the arbiter and the
device rating. That was already what happened to a lying meter whose value
merely jittered; bit-exact repetition was never a safety property.
`DOCS.md`'s "Saturation is counted in cycles, not seconds" section documented
the old behaviour as an accepted deviation. It is **qualified, not deleted**:
the deviation survives (the window is still counted in cycles, and 3 x 15 s is
still not the specification's 10 s) but it is now bounded at 45 s instead of
open-ended, and the passage's second justification - "nothing accumulates while
it is stalled" - is called out as having covered integrator windup and not
staleness, which was the actual hazard. The same wrong argument in
`control.py`'s saturation comment is corrected too.
**TEL-04.** `meter_source: ha_signed` reads a single *signed* power entity, which
is the shape a HomeWizard P1 publishes. Both transports 0.3.0 shipped require two
unsigned registers and refuse negatives, so neither fits the meter installed here.
**TEL-05.** `meter_source: homewizard_local` polls the meter's own local API
directly. This exists because of something the HA paths cannot do: Home Assistant
fires no state change for a repeated reading and exposes no arrival signal at
all, so `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` on those transports measures time since the
*value changed*, not since the meter *reported*. Real captured data has gaps of
42 s and 97 s between changes on a perfectly healthy meter - long enough for a
30 s staleness threshold to command 0 W for no reason. Every HTTP response to the
local API is a genuine arrival, so the age means what it says.
Verified on the rig against a literally constant 350.0 W for 70 s - the exact
state where the HA path recorded zero samples in 45 s - with 14 arrivals and the
age never exceeding the poll cadence.
Set `p1_host` to the meter's address and `meter_poll_s` (default 5 s, matching
the meter's own ~5 s update). Still defaults to `off`; nothing changes for an
install that does not opt in.
Freeze detection is separate and deliberately not thresholded: a meter answering
200 OK with a stale number *is* arriving, so no arrival stamp can flag it. The
energy registers carry that as `unchanged_s`, surfaced on the status line for a
human to read rather than alarmed on - at a converged -10 W a 1 Wh register needs
about six minutes to move, so any threshold would false-trip at the target
operating point.
## Unreleased
**TEL-05.** A fourth `meter_source`, `homewizard_local`, which polls a
HomeWizard P1's **own local API** (`GET /api/v1/data`) instead of watching a
Home Assistant entity. Set `p1_host` to the meter's address; `meter_poll_s`
(default 5 s, the meter's own update rate) sets the cadence.
✅ **This is the first transport whose `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` measures when
the meter *reported*, and therefore the first one a firmware watchdog may
threshold.** Every HTTP response is an arrival: the meter answered, now, with
its current reading, and whether the *number* moved is not consulted. Home
Assistant cannot express that at all — a repeated reading emits no
`state_changed`, advances `last_reported` on neither serialiser, and
`state_reported` is not subscribable ("Event filter is required"). On
`ha_signed` that made a healthy meter under a flat load indistinguishable from
a dead one, and our own capture of this house's meter goes 42.2 s and 97.0 s
between changes — both past the default `meter_max_age_s` of 30, i.e. a false
trip to 0 W on a meter that is fine. If you have a HomeWizard P1, move to this
mode.
Everything TEL-01 established is reused, not re-implemented: ingest
timestamping, `meter_max_age_s`, the clock-recomputed age, the plausibility
bounds and the §20 unsigned-decode rejection, and the same `split_signed` sign
convention `ha_signed` uses. A failed or timed-out poll submits nothing, so it
is a *missing* reading — never 0 W — and it does not reset the age.
Verified on the ENV-01 rig against `sim/hwsim.py`, steady and with `--fault
freeze` injected. Still defaults to `off`.
⚠️ **An arrival stamp still cannot see a *frozen* meter**, and no arrival
detector can: a meter answering `200 OK` forever with a stale number is
arriving. The local API does expose what the HA path never had — the
`total_power_*_kwh` registers stop advancing — and the transport tracks it as
`unchanged_s`, but that is deliberately **not** folded into the age and not
thresholded: this controller regulates grid power toward ~0 W, and at a
converged −10 W the export register needs six minutes to move by its 1 Wh
resolution while the power figure legitimately repeats. Thresholding it at 30 s
would rebuild the false-trip limit cycle at the exact operating point we aim
for. Freeze detection needs the low-power case solved first, separately. It is
shown on the status page's P1 line instead — leaving it unthresholded only
holds up if a human can read it, so now they can.
**TEL-04.** A third `meter_source`, `ha_signed`, reading **one signed** Home
Assistant entity: positive = import, negative = export. That is the shape a
HomeWizard P1 publishes (`sensor.p1_meter_active_power`), and it is the meter
actually fitted here - which neither TEL-01 transport can read, because
`ha_dsmr` needs two unsigned registers and refuses a negative one, i.e. every
exporting telegram. Set `p1_net_entity`, and `p1_phase_net_entities` for the
per-phase capacity-tariff figures on a three-phase connection.
Everything TEL-01 established is inherited rather than re-implemented - the
new transport is a subclass of the `ha_dsmr` one overriding only which
entities it wants and how they become a sample. So ingest timestamping,
`meter_max_age_s`, `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` recomputed against the clock and
republished once a second, the plausibility bounds, and `unavailable` /
`unknown` treated as a *missing reading and never 0 W* all behave identically
across the three sources.
Still defaults to `off`; an existing install is unaffected until it opts in.
⚠️ **`sensor.p1_sample_age_s` is published on `ha_signed`, but must not yet be
thresholded by the ESP32 stale-input watchdog.** On the HA WebSocket paths the
age is stamped from `state_changed`, so it measures time since the value
*changed*, not since the meter *reported* - and Home Assistant exposes no
arrival signal for a repeated reading (no `state_changed`, no `last_reported`
movement on either serialiser, and `state_reported` is not subscribable over
the WebSocket). Measured on the ENV-01 rig against the real HomeWizard
integration. `ha_dsmr` mostly escapes it because a telegram moves several
entities at once; `ha_signed` has one, so a healthy meter under a flat load is
indistinguishable from a dead one. Our own capture has the house meter going
42.2 s and 97.0 s between changes. Raising `meter_max_age_s` does not fix that,
it only chooses which error you get; the fix is an arrival stamp from the meter
itself and is a separate ticket. Full detail in DOCS.md.
## 0.3.0
**SAFETY-04.** The control law's integrator is now an explicit accumulator,
+611 -28
View File
@@ -24,9 +24,16 @@ The inverter **holds its last command forever** — it has no meter-timeout. So:
commanding it.
- This add-on commands 0 W when its inputs go missing, when you stop control,
and when it shuts down.
- This add-on commands 0 W **and latches there** if what it is commanding and
what the meter reads point opposite ways for three minutes — see "The
sign-disagreement failsafe" below.
- The **optional RS485 e-stop** is the only thing that covers this machine
dying. Without it, a failed host leaves the battery latched at its last
command until someone intervenes.
- This add-on **raises an alarm — and nothing more —** when the meter keeps
answering with a reading that never changes while the command sits at the
rail. See "The frozen-meter alarm" and, before you rely on it, "Capacity-tariff
exposure of the grid-following loop".
**If anything looks wrong: stop the add-on.** That commands 0 W and the
hardware holds it there.
@@ -51,21 +58,67 @@ phase having charged nothing.
### P1 meter ingestion
`meter_entity` above expects one signed sensor, which usually means a template
someone wrote by hand. A Belgian P1 meter does not publish one: it publishes two
**unsigned** registers, consumption and injection. Setting `meter_source` moves
that subtraction into the add-on, where it is done once and tested, and replaces
`meter_entity` entirely.
someone wrote by hand. Setting `meter_source` moves the whole derivation into
the add-on, where it is done once and tested, and replaces `meter_entity`
entirely.
Which mode you want depends on what your P1 reader publishes, and there are two
shapes in the wild:
- **Two unsigned registers**, consumption and injection, which is what a Belgian
P1 read over DSMR gives you → `ha_dsmr`, or `mqtt_p1` for a bridge. The add-on
subtracts them.
- **One signed figure**, positive = import and negative = export, which is what
a HomeWizard P1 gives you (`sensor.p1_meter_active_power`) → `ha_signed`. The
add-on splits it. `ha_dsmr` **cannot** read this: it wants two registers and
rejects a negative one outright, which is every exporting telegram.
Either way, do not build the missing shape out of template sensors. The point of
`meter_source` is that the sign convention is derived in one tested place rather
than in YAML nobody reviews underneath a safety input.
> ✅ **If your meter is a HomeWizard P1, use `homewizard_local`, not
> `ha_signed`.** It reads the same meter and produces the same numbers, but it
> polls the meter directly instead of watching a Home Assistant entity — and
> that is the difference between an age sensor a watchdog can threshold and one
> it cannot. See "`sensor.p1_sample_age_s`" below; `ha_signed` remains for
> installs where the meter is only reachable through Home Assistant.
> ⚠️ **`ha_dsmr` and `mqtt_p1` have never processed a telegram from real
> hardware.** No meter in this installation uses either one. Both were written
> to the assumption in `specs.md` §5.2 that a Belgian P1 exposes two unsigned
> registers, and the meter actually fitted here does not — it is the HomeWizard
> P1 that `ha_signed` reads. They are covered by the unit checks in `test_p1.py`
> and by an end-to-end test against a fake Home Assistant, and nothing more.
>
> This is recorded because the realistic way it bites is someone debugging a
> meter problem months from now treating those two paths as proven and looking
> for the fault elsewhere. If you are the first person to point one at a real
> meter, expect to find something, and please update this note when you do.
| option | default | meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `meter_source` | `off` | `off` keeps `meter_entity`. `ha_dsmr` subscribes to the DSMR integration over the HA WebSocket; `mqtt_p1` reads a topic |
| `meter_source` | `off` | `off` keeps `meter_entity`. `ha_dsmr` subscribes to the DSMR integration over the HA WebSocket; `mqtt_p1` reads a topic; `ha_signed` subscribes to one signed entity over the HA WebSocket; `homewizard_local` polls a HomeWizard P1's own local API, bypassing Home Assistant |
| `meter_phases` | 1 | 1 or 3. Must match the telegram, or every telegram is rejected and logged |
| `meter_max_age_s` | 30 | Beyond this the reading is stale and grid power reads as *missing*. On its own it does **not** command 0 W — see the timing note below. It is also the longest a reading is held forward into the 15-minute average |
| `meter_poll_s` | 5 | `homewizard_local` only. Seconds between polls. **Must be well under `meter_max_age_s`** — see below |
| `p1_host` | | `homewizard_local` only. The meter's own address, `host` or `host:port` (e.g. `192.168.2.250`) |
| `meter_mqtt_topic` | | `mqtt_p1` only |
| `p1_import_entity` | | The **unsigned** consumption sensor. Do not point this at a signed template |
| `p1_export_entity` | | The **unsigned** injection sensor |
| `p1_phase_import_entities` | `[]` | L1..L3, in order. Needed for the capacity-tariff peak on a three-phase connection |
| `p1_phase_export_entities` | `[]` | L1..L3, in order |
| `p1_net_entity` | | `ha_signed` only. The **signed** net-power sensor: `+` import, `-` export |
| `p1_phase_net_entities` | `[]` | `ha_signed` only. L1..L3, in order, each signed the same way. Needed for the capacity-tariff peak on a three-phase connection. **The list length must equal `meter_phases`** |
Both per-phase lists are checked against `meter_phases` **once at startup**: a
list of the wrong length disables P1 ingestion with an error in the log, rather
than letting every telegram fail its phase-count check one at a time. Leaving
the list empty is fine and is not an error — you simply get no per-phase
figures, and therefore no capacity-tariff peak. On a three-phase connection
that is a much bigger omission than it looks: on a surveyed reading here the
phases carried 2769 W of import while the connection netted 187 W, so the
billed quantity is understated roughly fifteenfold if the phases are missing.
#### How long a dead meter takes to reach 0 W
@@ -106,6 +159,55 @@ tested, and guessing a key here means guessing a kilowatt:
it is present it is used for the age, which is what stops a retained message
replayed on reconnect from presenting a ten-minute-old reading as current.
#### `homewizard_local` — polling the meter instead of Home Assistant
Set `p1_host` to the meter's address and the add-on does `GET /api/v1/data` on
it every `meter_poll_s` seconds, reading `active_power_w` (signed, same
convention as `ha_signed`) and the three `active_power_l{1,2,3}_w` fields. Home
Assistant is not involved: no entity, no WebSocket, no integration to
mis-configure. Per-phase figures are used only when the meter serves all
`meter_phases` of them — a single-phase meter returns `null` for L2/L3, and the
connection-level reading is still accepted on its own.
**Why this mode exists:** every HTTP response is an *arrival*. The meter
answered, now, with its current reading — whether or not the number moved. That
is the signal `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` needs and the one Home Assistant cannot
give it at all (see the note below). It is also simply fewer moving parts: the
five-second cadence is the meter's own, rather than an integration's polling of
it re-published as a state change.
**Cadence.** The age is never fresher than the poll interval, so:
| | |
|---|---|
| meter's own update rate | ~5.0 s (measured 4.97 s) |
| `meter_poll_s` default | 5 s — nothing to gain below the meter's own rate |
| `meter_max_age_s` default | 30 s, i.e. six polls of headroom |
| `meter_poll_s >= meter_max_age_s` | **refused at startup** — every reading would be stale before its successor arrived |
| `meter_poll_s > meter_max_age_s / 2` | warned — one missed poll makes the reading stale |
A failed poll — timeout, connection refused, non-200, unparseable body — is a
**missing** reading. It submits nothing, so the reading does not become 0 W, the
last good value and its timestamp are left alone, and the age goes on climbing.
That is exactly what a dead meter should look like.
**What it still cannot see: a frozen meter.** A meter that answers `200 OK`
forever with a stale number is arriving, so no arrival detector — this one
included — can tell it from a healthy one. The local API does expose the raw
material the HA path never had (the `total_power_*_kwh` registers stop
advancing), and the transport tracks it as `unchanged_s`, but it is deliberately
*not* folded into the age and *not* thresholded: this controller regulates grid
power toward ~0 W, and at a converged −10 W the export register needs six
minutes to move by its 1 Wh resolution while the power figure legitimately
repeats. Thresholding that at 30 s would rebuild the false-trip limit cycle at
the exact operating point the controller aims for. Freeze detection is a
separate problem and needs the low-power case solved first.
You read it yourself instead: the add-on's status page shows it on the P1 line,
as `… 4 rejected, measurement unchanged for 312 s`. On a house drawing real
power that figure stays in the seconds; minutes of it while the load is clearly
not near zero is the meter to go and look at.
#### `sensor.p1_sample_age_s`
Published over MQTT discovery whenever a broker is available: **seconds since the
@@ -123,13 +225,48 @@ The entity is only created when `meter_source` is not `off`. With P1 ingestion
disabled there is nothing feeding it, and an age sensor climbing with no ingester
behind it would trip the firmware watchdog on a system that is working fine.
> **Known limit, `mqtt_p1` only.** The age measures *arrival*, not change. On the
> `ha_dsmr` path that is exactly right: a frozen meter emits no `state_changed`,
> so nothing arrives and the age climbs. On the MQTT path a bridge that is stuck
> republishing its last telegram keeps arriving, so the age stays near zero and a
> frozen meter still looks fresh. Detecting *that* needs a change-detector rather
> than an arrival-detector, and it is not in this version. Prefer `ha_dsmr` where
> both are available.
> **Known limit, `mqtt_p1`.** The age measures *arrival*. On the MQTT path a
> bridge that is stuck republishing its last telegram keeps arriving, so the age
> stays near zero and a frozen meter still looks fresh. Detecting *that* needs a
> change-detector rather than an arrival-detector, and it is not in this version.
> ⚠️ **Known limit, `ha_signed` — do not drive a watchdog off this age yet.**
> On the HA WebSocket paths the age is stamped when a `state_changed` arrives,
> which means it measures *time since the value last changed*, not time since
> the meter last reported. Home Assistant offers nothing better: a repeated
> reading produces no `state_changed`, does **not** advance `last_reported` on
> either the REST or the WebSocket serialiser, and `state_reported` cannot be
> subscribed to over the WebSocket at all (`Event filter is required for event
> state_reported`). All three measured on the ENV-01 rig against the real
> HomeWizard integration with the meter frozen: 0 `state_changed` in 70 s and no
> timestamp movement anywhere.
>
> `ha_dsmr` mostly escapes this because a DSMR telegram updates several entities
> and something in the set almost always moves. **`ha_signed` has exactly one
> entity, so a healthy meter under a flat load is indistinguishable from a dead
> one.** This is not hypothetical: in our own captures
> (`sim/scenarios/ha-p1_meter_active_power-2026-08-20.json`) the real house meter
> went **42.2 s and 97.0 s** between changes, and 23 Aug peaks at 29.1 s — all
> past the default `meter_max_age_s` of 30.
>
> So `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` on `ha_signed` is safe to *read*, and it is
> correct whenever the value is moving, but it must not yet be thresholded by
> the ESP32 stale-input watchdog: a quiet house would trip the battery to 0 W.
> Raising `meter_max_age_s` is **not** the fix — the two conditions produce an
> identical signal, so a bigger number only chooses which of the two errors you
> get. The real fix is an arrival stamp the meter itself provides — and that now
> exists: **`meter_source: homewizard_local`**. If you have a HomeWizard P1,
> switch to it. If your meter is only reachable through Home Assistant, this
> limit still applies to you and the watchdog threshold still must not be armed.
**Where the age is trustworthy:**
| mode | the age measures | safe to threshold from firmware |
|---|---|---|
| `homewizard_local` | time since the meter **answered** | **yes** — every HTTP response is an arrival |
| `ha_dsmr` | time since one of several entities changed | no — statistically usually fine, which is a masked bug, not an absent one |
| `ha_signed` | time since the one entity changed | **no** — see above |
| `mqtt_p1` | time since a message arrived | arrivals yes, but a stuck bridge republishing keeps arriving |
### Control
@@ -142,11 +279,69 @@ behind it would trip the firmware watchdog on a system that is working fine.
| `target_grid_w` | -10 | What the meter should rest at. Negative = a slight export |
| `step_w` | 10 | Quantisation |
| `saturation_w` | 500 | Divergence that counts as "the inverter is at a limit" |
| `saturation_cycles` | 3 | How many consecutive cycles before freezing. A cycle is one *changed* meter reading, not a fixed period - see the note below. **Do not set to 1** |
| `saturation_cycles` | 3 | How many consecutive cycles before freezing. A cycle is one meter update or `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes first - see the note below. **Do not set to 1** |
| `integrator_max_w` | 0 | Bound on the loop's accumulator, and 0 means "same as `max_w`". Caps how much stale error can be waiting to unwind when the sign flips. **Do not raise it above `max_w`** - the output clamp already bounds what is commanded, so the only thing extra headroom buys is more cycles of wrong-direction power after every saturation event. Lowering it below `max_w` is the useful direction |
| `heartbeat_s` | 10 | Refresh interval; must stay well under the firmware watchdog |
| `cycle_floor_s` | 15 | The longest the loop may go without evaluating. A deadline on the gap between cycles, reset by every cycle — on a healthy meter it never elapses and changes nothing. Raise it only if your meter is slower than ~10 s; it must stay under `meter_max_age_s`, past which there is no reading to evaluate anyway |
| `stale_input_s` | 15 | How long inputs may be missing before commanding 0 W. In P1 mode this clock starts only *after* `meter_max_age_s` has already expired — the two stack, see "How long a dead meter takes to reach 0 W" |
| `auto_start` | false | Start controlling on boot (only after commissioning) |
| `sign_disagree_w` | 300 | Both the command and the meter must exceed this before a sign difference counts. Must stay **below `max_w`** or the watchdog can never fire, and the add-on refuses to start |
| `sign_disagree_s` | 180 | How long they must stay opposed, continuously, before the failsafe trips |
#### The sign-disagreement failsafe
If the setpoint this add-on is emitting and the grid figure it is regulating on
point **opposite ways** — charging the battery while the house imports, or
discharging it while the house exports — with both over `sign_disagree_w`, for
`sign_disagree_s` **continuously**, the add-on commands **0 W** and holds it
there. The banner reads `FAILSAFE`, the commissioning list says which two
numbers disagreed and for how long, and the `Controller status` entity reports
`failsafe`.
**It does not clear itself, and restarting the add-on does not clear it either.**
Pressing *Start / stop control* twice — stop, then start — is the only thing that
does. That is deliberate on both counts:
- Commanding 0 W removes the command side of the comparison, so the disagreement
always vanishes the instant the trip works. A watchdog that took that as proof
the fault was over would hand the inverter straight back to the loop that was
driving the wrong way, three minutes later, forever.
- The trip is written to `/data/state.json` and restored on startup. Restarting
the add-on is the first thing most people try when they see a red banner, and
a latch that a restart clears would bring the controller back **armed, into the
same fault, unattended** — and under a Supervisor that restarts a crashed add-on
automatically, would do so in a loop. After a restart the banner, the 0 W and
the recorded reason are all still there.
**What it is for.** This is a loop-integrity check: it asks whether the loop's
output direction still matches the input state it was regulating. It catches a
polarity error anywhere between the meter and the wire, and an integrator so far
wound up that unwinding takes minutes. It is the check that would have caught all
four episodes of 2026-08-20, when a commercial controller charged the battery out
of the grid, four times, for up to 77 minutes at a time.
**What it is not for.** It does not detect an inverter that acts opposite to what
it was told — that moves the meter *further* the same way, so command and meter
agree while everything runs away. That is the saturation freeze's job
(`saturation_w` / `saturation_cycles`), which compares the command against the
battery's actual power. The two checks are complementary and neither replaces the
other.
**Why it will not false-trip on ordinary operation.** A battery that refuses a
command (empty, full, standby) leaves the meter where it was, so command and
meter agree. A frozen meter drives the loop into agreeing with it. Around the
resting point both signals are inside the 300 W gate, so the deadband can never
produce one. A load step does flip the meter's sign before the loop catches up —
measured on a full captured day, the longest such crossing is 30 s, against a
180 s window. And the watchdog is **disarmed whenever the grid-following loop is
not what is driving**: a maintenance grid charge opposes the meter by design and
must not be mistaken for a fault.
Both numbers are measured rather than chosen, and are exposed only because the
ticket requires defaults rather than constants. On the captured healthy day sign
agreement is 93.4 %; on the four captured fault clusters it is 0.3 %, 0.9 %,
10.5 % and 0.0 %. There is no reason to move either value without a capture that
says so.
#### Saturation is counted in cycles, not seconds
@@ -154,22 +349,43 @@ The specification states the saturation window as **"> 10 s"**. This add-on coun
**cycles** instead, and that is a deliberate, accepted deviation rather than an
oversight - the acceptance criterion is not met as literally written.
A cycle here is one *changed* meter reading: the controller only runs the loop when the
meter value differs from the previous poll. At the reference P1's ~5 s update rate the
default of 3 cycles is usually around 15 s, but there is **no guaranteed wall-clock
window** - a meter that repeats the same value stalls the counter for as long as it
repeats.
A cycle here is one meter update **or `cycle_floor_s` elapsing, whichever comes
first**. At the reference P1's ~5 s update rate the default of 3 cycles is usually
around 15 s, and the worst case is bounded at `3 x cycle_floor_s` = 45 s. It is still
not the 10 s the specification asks for, so the deviation stands - but it is now a
bounded number rather than an open one.
Two reasons that is acceptable:
⚠️ **This passage used to say something different, and the second half of it was
wrong.** Until SAFETY-12 the loop ran only when the meter value *changed*, so a meter
that repeated a value stalled the counter for as long as it repeated, with no upper
bound at all. That was defended here on the grounds that "a stalled counter is a
detection-latency limit and not a runaway risk - the condition that stalls it stops the
whole loop, so nothing accumulates while it is stalled". That argument covers
**integrator windup and nothing else**. The hazard it misses is **staleness**: while the
loop was stopped the heartbeat kept re-emitting the last command and the firmware kept
putting it on the wire every 2 s, so a command computed from an old reading went on
being executed through a real load change, with every indicator reading healthy.
Measured on the rig during TEL-05: 70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W, 14 arrivals,
zero control cycles.
- the control law is a pure function with no clock, which is what makes it testable
without hardware, and a seconds-based window would have to live in the controller;
- a stalled counter is a detection-latency limit and not a runaway risk. The condition
that stalls it - an unchanging meter - stops the whole loop, so nothing accumulates
while it is stalled.
The half that survives is the first one: the control law is still a pure function with
no clock, and the wall-clock window still lives in `Controller`, which has one - see
`run_control()`. What changed is that the controller now enforces a floor on the gap
between cycles, so `saturation_cycles` finally means a bounded number of seconds.
If a guaranteed window matters on your site, raise `saturation_cycles` for a fast meter,
and treat the figure as "N meter updates" rather than "N seconds".
If a tighter window matters on your site, lower `cycle_floor_s` (not below your meter's
update interval, or the floor starts firing on a healthy meter) or raise
`saturation_cycles` for a fast meter.
**This is not a freeze detector, and it deliberately cannot be one.** Nothing here
decides whether a repeated reading is true — see `unchanged_s` in the meter section for
why no threshold on that is safe at the converged operating point. The floor only stops
"the number is the same" from meaning "do not think". The consequence is worth stating
plainly: against a meter that is genuinely frozen at a wrong value, the loop will now
correct toward that wrong value instead of holding a stale command. It is bounded by
`max_w`, the arbiter and the device rating, and it is the same thing that already
happened to a lying meter whose value merely jittered — bit-exact repetition was never a
safety property.
#### Why `target_grid_w` is not zero
@@ -202,8 +418,8 @@ help - see "Why the tuning is what it is".
| `maintenance_enabled` | false | Enable the monthly cycle |
| `maintenance_interval_days` | 28 | Minimum gap between cycles |
| `maintenance_start_hour` | 10 | Hour of day a due cycle begins |
| `maintenance_discharge_w` | 2500 | Drain rate (exports the surplus) |
| `maintenance_charge_w` | 2500 | Charge ceiling, capped again by peak headroom |
| `maintenance_discharge_w` | 2000 | Drain rate (exports the surplus). Above `max_w` it is **clamped** to `max_w` — the drain phase SETs the setpoint and the arbiter bounds it, saying so on the status page (`limited by supervised(max_w)`). Warned about, not refused: the cycle still completes, just slower |
| `maintenance_charge_w` | 2000 | Charge ceiling, capped again by peak headroom. Must stay **at or below `max_w`** or the cheap-window shaping (`hi = -maintenance_charge_w`) contradicts the supervised limit (`lo = -max_w`), the arbiter resolves it to **0 W**, and maintenance silently never charges in a cheap window — **the add-on refuses to start** |
| `maintenance_soc_floor` | 11 | Drain target — stay just above the inverter's own floor |
| `maintenance_soc_target` | 99 | Charge target |
| `maintenance_hold_min` | 120 | Hold at full so the BMS can balance |
@@ -221,6 +437,373 @@ under `peak_cap_w`, and if the forecast goes over the cap the charge-only clamp
is dropped so the battery can shave the peak instead. Money outranks the
maintenance schedule.
#### Capacity-tariff exposure of the grid-following loop
⚠️ **This section described the exposure BEFORE SAFETY-07. The loop is now
capped — see "The capacity-peak guard" below — and what follows is kept because it
is still the clearest statement of WHAT is being guarded and why the number is
worth what it is.**
⚠️ **`peak_cap_w` caps MAINTENANCE charging. It does not cap the loop.** The
grid-following loop is bounded by `max_w` and by the device rating, and by
nothing else. That is deliberate — the loop exists to *reduce* what crosses the
meter, so under every healthy condition it lowers the peak rather than raising
it — but it means one thing is true and worth writing down:
**If the meter lies, the loop will happily buy `max_w` from the grid for as long
as the lie lasts, and no cap in this add-on stops it.** A meter frozen at a large
export reads as "the house is exporting hard", the loop charges the battery to
correct it, and the correction is a grid import. At the schema maximum
`max_w: 5000` — which is what this house runs, and is also the device rating —
that is a 5 kW unattended import.
The bill is not the energy. In the Belgian capaciteitstarief the month is billed
on its highest quarter-hour average, so **fifteen minutes of this sets the whole
month's peak.** A measured case: one 4998 W quarter moved a monthly peak from
4832 W to 5013 W, and every day of that month was billed at the higher figure.
What exists today, and what does not:
| | |
|---|---|
| `max_w` bounds the magnitude | ✅ — but the exposure IS the magnitude |
| Maintenance charging capped under `peak_cap_w` | ✅ |
| **Loop capped under `peak_cap_w`** | ✅ — SAFETY-07, on every `meter_source` but `off` |
| Frozen meter detected | ✅ on `homewizard_local` only, **alarm only** |
| Frozen meter *stopped* | ✅ — SAFETY-07 forbids importing while the meter is frozen |
| SoC guard on the loop | ❌ — the BMS is the only energy backstop |
On the legacy `meter_source: off` path there are no P1 telegrams, so there is no
quarter-hour average to guard, and the status page says **NOT COVERED**. There
the mitigation is still operational: set `max_w` no higher than the loop actually
needs (the tuning was measured at 2000 W and a 1.78 kW load step is tracked fine
there), fit the e-stop, and watch for the alarm.
### The capacity-peak guard
**What it does.** Every cycle the add-on projects the open quarter to its
end-of-interval average — from P1 telegrams only, never from the command — and
compares it to a ceiling. Over the ceiling it files one claim: a **lower bound on
the setpoint**, at `P_PEAK`. That single shape is both behaviours §10.1 asks for:
a hard clamp on charging while the bound sits above the standing charge, and
pre-emptive discharge while it sits above zero. It can never cap discharge or
export, because a floor cannot.
**The number.** `excess = 900 × (projected − ceiling) ÷ seconds remaining`, and
the floor is the **measured** battery power plus that. The 900/remaining factor
is the design rather than an accident: it is 1.0 at the top of the quarter and
grows, so the guard is gentlest when its projection rests on the least evidence
and becomes aggressive only once the quarter is nearly measured.
**The ceiling** is `peak_cap_w`, raised to the month's banked peak when that
already stands higher — once a month's bill is set at 5013 W, holding later
quarters to 3500 W buys nothing and costs real charging. **That relaxation is
granted only by an OBSERVED reading:** a peak store that cannot be read leaves the
ceiling at the cap, so a broken instrument makes the guard stricter, never looser.
**When it cannot see, it forbids importing.** Three states are not evidence and
are checked before the projection is graded: no open quarter (a fresh averager
projects a confident 0 W, which is under every ceiling there is), a meter gap
longer than `meter_max_age_s`, and SAFETY-18's frozen-meter conjunction. In all
three the claim becomes a floor of **0 W**. That is the backstop for the frozen
meter: the alarm arrives at `meter_freeze_s` (300 s) of a 900 s billing quarter
and commands nothing, and this stops the import.
**It trips, where the freeze detector only notifies,** and the captures are why.
On the healthy reference day (2026-08-23) it engages on **zero** of 95 quarters.
The action is level-triggered and unlatched — re-derived from a fresh projection
every cycle, released the instant the projection drops back — so a false
engagement costs one cycle of discharge rather than a parked battery. And it is a
LIMIT, so every stop in the watchdog table still outranks it.
**Replayed on 2026-08-20**, the day the vendor controller failed: the billed
quarter measured **5029.8 W**, above the inverter's own 5000 W rating, and the
guard brings it to **3485 W** — under the soft limit, without ever asking for more
than the inverter can give. Across both committed days the quarters under the
limit go from 189/190 to 190/190. Two days is not thirty and does not close AC 3;
it is the comparison two days can support.
**What it alarms on is saturation, not engagement.** An engagement is an ordinary
control action and goes to the action log and the status page. A *saturated*
guard — asking for everything the inverter has while the quarter is still
projected over — raises one notification (`goodwe_peak_saturated`), because that
is the one state where the money will be spent and shedding load is the only
thing left that changes the bill.
**No new option.** The ceiling is `peak_cap_w`, which already shipped. The
coverage threshold is `meter_max_age_s`, the freeze predicate is
`meter_freeze_s`, and the achievable discharge comes from `max_w` and the device
rating — every one of them a key that already exists.
### The winding-loop alarm (the output clamp)
Every setpoint this add-on writes is clamped to `max_w` before it leaves the
process, and **when that clamp actually engages, it alarms.** The clamp on its
own is not the feature - this project already clipped, and the clipping is what
hid the defect the guard exists for: with the inverter switched off entirely an
unclamped integrator climbed ~130 W per 4 s past 10 kW and, pinned at the 5 kW
rail, reported **14 768 W**. Clipped silently, that is a flat, legal-looking
5000 W hold on every dashboard, and nothing anywhere says the loop asked for
three times it.
**What "the rating" is.** The bound is `max_w`, and only `max_w`. It is already
validated against the setpoint device's own range at startup - the add-on
*refuses to start* if `max_w` exceeds what the device accepts (and again once
ESPHome is up and the real rating is known), so by the time the loop runs the two
numbers agree. The device range is applied a second time inside the write as
defence in depth; after a successful validation it cannot bite, and if it ever
does, that engagement alarms too and names the bound.
**Clamping is not saturation, and the two never share a channel.**
| | what it means | what happens |
|---|---|---|
| **clamp** | the *computed* value exceeded the rating | a software bug signal - something upstream is winding. **Alarm.** |
| **saturation** | the inverter is not following a perfectly *legal* command | a hardware condition - freeze the integrator. **No alarm.** |
A loop can be legally saturated all day: a cold pack, a curtailed inverter, an
export limit. Routing the clamp through a saturation-shaped alarm puts the bug
signal inside the noise, which is the same silence as clipping quietly. They
share no reason code, no notification id, no status row and no counter.
**It is an alarm, not a trip.** The clamped value is written and the loop keeps
running - this is not the sign-disagreement failsafe, which commands 0 W. You
get a persistent notification (`goodwe_output_clamp`, replaced rather than
stacked), an `ERROR` in the log with the reason code `OUTPUT_CLAMP`, a row in
the event list, and a red status banner while it is engaged. Once it clears, a
warning row keeps the engagement count so the evidence does not vanish with the
condition. Consecutive engagements share one event row carrying the exact count,
because the event list keeps only 40 rows and a row per cycle would flush every
other guard's entries out of it.
**There is nothing to configure**, deliberately. The bound is `max_w`, which you
already set; giving the guard a limit of its own would be a second number that
can disagree with the first, which is exactly the failure the startup validation
exists to prevent. The alarm's cadence - first engagement, then re-asserted every
30 s while it persists, cleared after 3 clean cycles - is fixed for the same
reason `RAIL_FRAC` is: it describes the notification bus, not the plant.
WARNING: **on a default install the engagement you will see is the integrator's,
not the output's.** The control law bounds the integrator to `max_w` and *then*
derives the command from it, so the command itself can never come out over the
rating unless `integrator_max_w` has been deliberately raised above `max_w`.
Both are watched. A guard that watched only the emitted value would be silent on
every standard configuration.
### The frozen-meter alarm
A meter that has died is easy — it stops answering, the sample age climbs past
`meter_max_age_s`, the reading becomes missing, and the add-on and the ESP32 both
command 0 W. A meter that keeps answering `200 OK` with a document that never
changes is the hard one: **every freshness mechanism in the stack reads it as
healthy**, because it really is arriving on every poll. The loop then integrates
a constant error and winds to the rail, in 75–360 s at `max_w: 5000`.
The add-on alarms when **both** of these are true at once:
- the meter's own document (power figure *and* both kWh registers) has not
changed for `meter_freeze_s` — 300 s by default; **and**
- the command standing on the wire is at the rail, within 5 % of `max_w`.
Neither half is usable alone. A bare "unchanged for N seconds" rule false-trips
at the exact operating point this controller aims for — at a converged −10 W a
1 Wh register legitimately takes about six minutes to move — and a bare "at the
rail" rule fires on any genuinely large load. Together they are safe in both
directions, because a real railed condition means kilowatts still crossing the
meter, and a kilowatt advances a 1 Wh register every 3.6 s.
**It is an alarm and nothing else.** It does not command 0 W, does not latch, and
does not claim the actuator. A false trip here parks the battery; a false
notification costs an alert. Turning it into a trip is a separate decision that
needs data from a real install — and an answer to "what should the loop do
instead", given that 0 W is itself an import of whatever the house is drawing.
When it fires you get a Home Assistant persistent notification
(`goodwe_meter_frozen`, replaced rather than stacked on a repeat), an `ERROR` in
the add-on log, an entry in the UI's event list, and a red banner on the status
page. **The loop keeps running.** If the meter really is stuck, stop control from
the add-on UI.
⚠️ **Only `meter_source: homewizard_local` is covered.** It is the only transport
that reads the meter's own document; on `ha_dsmr`, `mqtt_p1`, `ha_signed` and
`off` there is no signal to threshold and the status page says **NOT COVERED**
rather than pretending the guard is armed.
| option | default | meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `meter_freeze_s` | 300 | Seconds of an unchanged measurement, *while the command is at the rail*, before the alarm |
Why 300 s: over 2399 s of this house at the converged operating point (mean grid
−14.2 W, 1194 polls, 735 of them repeating the previous reading) the largest
`unchanged_s` any sample sees is **8.0 s**, and the longest interval serving no
distinct reading at all is **15.4 s**. There is also a structural reason not to
lower it much: at 300 s the slowest a *healthy* register can tick and still look
unchanged is 12 W, which is inside the 15 W deadband — so the command there is
parked at 0 W and the two halves of the rule cannot both be true. At the schema
floor of 60 s that figure is 60 W and only the margin is left.
### Energy price providers
> **No *fetched* price moves energy in 0.5.x.** This release ships the
> *plumbing*: the five provider plugins, the canonical all-in format they emit,
> and the config that selects one. Turning a provider on fetches, validates and
> publishes prices and changes no charging decision; the arbitrage strategy that
> would use it is a later ticket.
>
> The one exception is `static_profile` below. A static day/night tariff needs
> no network, so its cheap window is computed on every cycle and does reach the
> maintenance cycle's grid top-up.
| option | meaning |
|---|---|
| `price_provider` | `off` (default) or one of the five plugins below |
| `price_markup_eur_kwh` | Your supplier's margin, EUR/kWh. **Added only when the chosen plugin's feed does not already contain it** |
| `price_taxes_eur_kwh` | Levies and VAT, EUR/kWh. Same rule |
| `export_price_eur_kwh` | The **injection** price. A separate scalar, not a series — see below |
| `price_csv_path` | Where `manual_csv` reads its file |
| `price_feed_url` | Override the plugin's default feed. Only a host the plugin itself declares is accepted |
| `price_horizon_h` | How far ahead to ask for, hours |
| `price_timeout_s` | Per-request timeout |
| `static_profile` | A static day/night or fully-fixed tariff. Empty by default — see below |
**Which plugin sources what.** This is the one thing to get right, because
adding your markup to a price that already contains it makes every future
arbitrage decision wrong by that amount, in a direction nothing reports.
| plugin | product | the published figure contains | the add-on adds |
|---|---|---|---|
| `generic_dayahead` | day-ahead | energy only (wholesale EPEX BE) | markup **and** taxes |
| `engie_dynamic` | day-ahead | energy + Engie's markup | taxes |
| `totalenergies_dynamic` | day-ahead | energy + TotalEnergies' markup | taxes |
| `eneco_eddy` | **real-time / imbalance** | everything, all-in | nothing |
| `manual_csv` | day-ahead | everything, all-in | nothing |
You cannot get this wrong by editing the markup: each plugin *declares* what its
feed contains and the add-on adds only the rest. Set a markup under a plugin
that already carries one and it is **ignored, with a line in the log saying so**
— never applied twice.
That holds **given a correct declaration**, and it is worth knowing where the
line is. What the add-on enforces mechanically is that a plugin cannot obtain
the markup or apply it: the numbers are not reachable from plugin code, and a
plugin whose code mentions them fails to load at all. What it cannot check is
whether a plugin described its supplier's feed truthfully — that is a claim
about somebody else's tariff, and no code can verify it. If you write a plugin,
the `sources` declaration is the part a reviewer has to read.
`eneco_eddy` is a real-time/imbalance product rather than a day-ahead one. It is
flagged as high-volatility, which widens arbitrage thresholds once the
optimiser lands. That comes from the plugin's own declaration, not from its
name.
**`manual_csv` — the offline fallback.** It needs no internet, no supplier
account and no HTTP stack at all, and it is the supported way to run this
add-on price-aware on a site with no outbound connectivity. Write a file and
point `price_csv_path` at it:
```csv
start,eur_per_kwh,provisional
2026-01-15T00:00:00+01:00,0.1834,false
2026-01-15T01:00:00+01:00,-0.0210,true
2026-01-15T02:00:00+01:00,0.3115,false
```
- `start` **must carry its UTC offset** (`+01:00` in winter, `+02:00` in
summer). A bare `2026-01-15 00:00` is refused, because for one hour every
October a local wall clock names two different moments.
- `eur_per_kwh` is **all-in** — energy *plus* markup *plus* taxes. This plugin
has no way to know what your numbers already include, so it assumes
everything and adds nothing.
- Negative prices are valid and are kept. They are the best charging hours of
the year.
- `provisional` is optional; omit the column and every hour is treated as
settled.
**When there are no prices at all** — provider off, feed unreachable, CSV
missing — the add-on does not guess. It reports *no price data*, which is a
distinct state from "prices, all of them zero": the plan is marked provisional
and arbitrage is disabled, per the degradation matrix. It never falls back to a
price of zero, which would read as free electricity.
**Injection is priced separately** (`export_price_eur_kwh`). In Belgium it is
often near zero, which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export.
It is a single number rather than a curve because no supported supplier
publishes a dynamic injection tariff; negative values are accepted.
**The old Home Assistant price sensors.** `price_now_entity` and
`price_avg_entity` still work and are unchanged: the add-on compares them and
uses the result as a cheap-window hint for the maintenance charge. They are
**not compatible with `price_provider`, and not with `static_profile` either**
— configure two of them and the add-on refuses to start, naming the conflict,
because the add-on reads exactly one and the loser is silent. Use one.
### Static day/night and fully-fixed tariffs (`static_profile`)
Most Belgian households are **not** on a dynamic contract, and an EMS that only
works under hourly pricing is an EMS for a minority. `static_profile` is how a
two-period day/night tariff or a single fixed price becomes a first-class
configuration rather than "turn the price feature off and hope".
It is one option, holding a JSON object, on one line:
```json
{"periods": [
{"name":"day", "from":"07:00","to":"22:00","days":"mon-fri","eur_per_kwh":0.34},
{"name":"night", "from":"22:00","to":"07:00","days":"mon-fri","eur_per_kwh":0.26},
{"name":"night", "from":"00:00","to":"24:00","days":"sat,sun", "eur_per_kwh":0.26}]}
```
A **fully fixed** tariff is one period covering the whole week:
```json
{"periods": [
{"name":"fixed","from":"00:00","to":"24:00","days":"all","eur_per_kwh":0.31}]}
```
- `eur_per_kwh` is **all-in** — energy *plus* your supplier's markup *plus*
taxes — exactly like `manual_csv`. `price_markup_eur_kwh` and
`price_taxes_eur_kwh` are **not** added to it.
- `days` takes `mon`…`sun`, ranges (`mon-fri`, `fri-mon`), comma lists
(`sat,sun`) and the words `weekday`, `weekend`, `all`.
- Times are **local Belgian time** and windows are half-open: `07:00`–`22:00`
includes 07:00 and excludes 22:00. A window may cross midnight.
- The clock changes twice a year and the add-on handles it. It generates prices
against absolute instants, so a spring-forward day is 23 hours and an
autumn-back day is 25.
> ⚠️ **A window belongs to the day the clock reads, not the day it started.**
> `22:00`–`07:00` on `mon-fri` covers Friday 23:00 but **not** Saturday 03:00 —
> Saturday 03:00 is Saturday's. That is why the example above has a third row
> for the weekend. Leave it out and the add-on **refuses to start**, naming the
> uncovered hours.
**Every day type must be covered exactly once.** The periods have to tile all
seven days with no gap and no overlap, and the add-on checks that at startup. A
gap is refused rather than filled in, because a made-up price is one the
optimiser would trade on; an overlap is refused because otherwise one of the two
prices silently wins on the order you typed them in.
**What it changes today.** The add-on works out which window you are in and
whether that window is *cheap* — strictly below the tariff's seven-day average.
The Web UI shows both on a new **Tariff** row, and the maintenance cycle's
cheap-window grid top-up uses it, which is exactly the "shift load into the
cheap window" behaviour a day/night tariff asks for. Nothing else moves energy
on a price yet.
Under a **fully fixed** tariff every hour equals the average, so there is *no*
cheap window by construction and the add-on runs self-consumption only — which
is the correct behaviour for that product, not a limitation. Peak shaving, the
capacity-tariff tracker, the reserve floor and the maintenance schedule are all
unaffected: the capacity tariff is a network cost charged whatever your energy
contract is.
**Recommended even on a dynamic contract.** When a price feed is unreachable the
add-on falls back to your static profile, marks the plan provisional and
disables arbitrage. With `static_profile` empty there is nothing to fall back
to, and the site simply has no tariff until the feed returns. It is not required
— the add-on warns rather than refusing — but filling it in is what makes that
fallback work.
### Site
| option | meaning |
+284
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@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
"""SAFETY-03 - the output clamp, and the alarm that makes it audible.
WHAT IT CATCHES, in one sentence: a control law that computes a setpoint the
actuator cannot deliver, which every layer below it will happily clip to
something legal-looking while the thing that produced it goes on winding.
THE CLAMP IS NOT THE DELIVERABLE. specs.md 10.3 is explicit that this project
already clipped, and that the clipping is what hid the defect:
with the inverter switched off entirely, an unclamped integrator climbed
~130 W per 4 s to over 10 kW and, pinned at the 5 kW rail, reported
14 768 W
A clamp alone turns that into a silent, perfectly flat 5000 W hold. Every
dashboard reads "commanded 5000 W", which is a legal number, and nothing
anywhere says the loop asked for three times it. 11.2's watchdog row says
"Clamp AND ALARM - the loop is winding"; the second verb is this module.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHAT "THE RATING" IS HERE, AND WHY IT IS ONE NUMBER AND NOT A MIN()
The card names two bounds and warns against choosing between them:
- `DriverCapabilities.setpoint_limit_w` (3.2), the inverter's own magnitude
rating. In this add-on that arrives as the setpoint entity's `min`/`max`
from `hass.limits()` - `Controller.dev_min` / `dev_max`.
- `optimizer.loop.clamp_w` (14), the configured loop clamp. In this add-on
that is the `max_w` option, which `Tuning.max_w` and the arbiter's
`supervised` limit both already use.
14 says these two must AGREE, validated at startup with a refusal on
mismatch - and that gate already ships: `validate_startup_config()` refuses
`max_w > dev_max` and `-max_w < dev_min` (validate.py, problem 1), and
run_control() re-runs it once ESPHome is up and the real rating is known.
So this guard clamps to `max_w`, THE VALIDATED VALUE, and does not `min()` it
with the device rating at runtime. That is the card's instruction and it is also
the only reading that keeps `max_w` meaningful: a silent runtime `min()` is
precisely the "helper bounded to +-500 W under a loop clamped to 1500 W" failure
the 14 warning box is about.
WARNING - THE DEVICE BOUND IS STILL APPLIED, SECOND, AND IT IS NOT REDUNDANT.
After a successful validation `+-max_w` lies inside `[dev_min, dev_max]`, so the
second stage is arithmetically a no-op and can never engage. If it DOES engage,
the validation did not run or no longer holds - `hass.limits()` returns
(None, None) whenever ESPHome is not up yet, and the range checks are skipped
rather than guessed at - and that is a louder fault than the first stage, not a
quieter one. It therefore alarms too, through the same channel, with the bound
named. This is NOT SAFETY-20; nothing here changes what `freeze.py` measures its
rail against.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHERE THE WIND ACTUALLY SHOWS UP - READ THIS BEFORE "SIMPLIFYING" THE CALLER
`control.compute()` bounds the integrator to `integrator_max_w or max_w` and
THEN derives the command from it, so on a default install (`integrator_max_w`
unset, i.e. following `max_w`) the command can never exceed `max_w` and the
actuator-side clamp below IS UNREACHABLE. control.py says so in as many words:
SAFETY-03 ... must watch for THIS, not for "clamped" below.
An alarm wired only to this module's `ClampResult.engaged` would therefore be
silent on the exact configuration the whole ticket is about. The winding is
visible one layer up, at the integrator bound, and that is why `Decision` now
carries `i_clamped` / `clamped` BOOLEANS and the caller ORs them in here.
AND WHY BOOLEANS RATHER THAN `Decision.reason`. `reason` is a single string that
later stages overwrite: a cycle that clamps the integrator and is then slew
limited reports "slew-limited", and one that clamps while saturated reports
"saturated-freeze". Both are exactly the winding-into-a-rail case, and on the
string the clamp signal is destroyed before anything can alarm on it. The two
flags are set where the clamp happens and are never overwritten. A check in
test_clamp.py drives that precise combination.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DISTINCT FROM SATURATION - THIS IS ACCEPTANCE CRITERION 2, NOT A NICETY
clamp the COMPUTED value exceeded the rating. A software bug signal:
something upstream is winding. Alarm, every engagement.
saturation |command - inverter AC power| > `saturation_w` for
`saturation_cycles`. The HARDWARE cannot follow a perfectly legal
command. Action is "freeze the integrator" (11.2), not an alarm.
A loop can be legally saturated all day - a cold pack, a curtailed inverter, an
export limit - so a saturation-shaped alarm is one an operator learns to ignore.
Routing the clamp through it puts the bug signal inside the noise, which is the
same silence 10.3 is complaining about. They share no reason code, no
notification id, no status row and no counter.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANTI-FLOOD, WITHOUT GOING SILENT
A genuinely winding loop clamps on EVERY cycle for as long as it winds. One HA
notification per cycle is how an operator learns to dismiss notifications
unread, and this add-on already made that argument once (see the fixed
`notification_id` note in main.check_meter_frozen).
So the two surfaces are split, deliberately:
- EVERY engagement is recorded, never deduplicated, and that record is what
says how hard the loop is pushing. 15's action log is this add-on's
`Controller.events`, and it gets a row from `write_setpoint()` on every
engaged WRITE; `engagements` here counts every engaged CYCLE. The two layers
are counted separately on purpose - the heartbeat re-writes an
already-clamped value between cycles, so a per-write count would inflate and
a per-cycle log would miss an out-of-cycle write.
- THE NOTIFICATION fires on the rising edge and then RE-ASSERTS every
`REASSERT_S`, so a loop pinned on the rail for an hour does not go quiet.
- It DE-ASSERTS only after `CLEAR_CYCLES` consecutive clean cycles, which is
the 10.2 hysteresis: a command sitting exactly on the rail dithers in and
out of engagement by one quantisation step, and without this the alarm
chatters.
`REASSERT_S` and `CLEAR_CYCLES` are module constants, not options, for the same
reason `freeze.RAIL_FRAC` is: they describe the event bus, not the plant, and
every knob 10.3 asked to keep exposed is a LOOP TUNING knob and is untouched by
this module. No new config key is added anywhere - CFG-03 already has three
places a default has to be kept in step and this ticket does not earn a fourth.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOT A TRIP
Clamping does not stop the loop and does not command 0 W. The clamped value is
written and control continues, which is what 11.2 asks for ("Clamp and alarm")
and what distinguishes this from SAFETY-01/02, whose action is 0 W. It follows
that this must NOT drive the failsafe status - `publish()` keeps reporting
"running", because the controller is.
"""
import math
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime
# The reason code, distinct from any saturation-freeze code by construction:
# nothing else in this add-on uses it. See "DISTINCT FROM SATURATION".
REASON_CODE = "OUTPUT_CLAMP"
# Re-assert the notification this often while the clamp stays engaged. 30 s is
# the planning cadence (2.3), i.e. slow enough not to flood and fast enough
# that a pinned loop is never quiet for a whole billing quarter.
REASSERT_S = 30.0
# Consecutive clean cycles before the alarm de-asserts (10.2 hysteresis).
CLEAR_CYCLES = 3
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ClampResult:
"""What the guard did, with the RAW value preserved.
AC 2 turns on "the raw computed value differed from the clamped one", so the
raw value has to survive the call - a guard that returns only the applied
number cannot be asked the question the acceptance criterion asks.
"""
requested_w: float
applied_w: float
limit_w: float
engaged: bool
bound: str = "" # "" | "max_w" | "device" - which stage bit
def describe(self) -> str:
return (f"{REASON_CODE}: the computed setpoint {self.requested_w:+.0f} W "
f"was clamped to {self.applied_w:+.0f} W by the {self.bound} "
f"bound (rating {self.limit_w:.0f} W) - something upstream is "
f"winding")
def is_commandable(value) -> bool:
"""False for None, NaN and the infinities.
A non-finite setpoint is LOSS OF INPUT, not an out-of-range value, and
11.1 rule 1 says loss of input means command zero and keep commanding. It
must not reach the clamp arithmetic: `min(limit, nan)` returns nan on
CPython, so a nan would sail straight through a naive clamp and then report
`engaged` True on the `applied != requested` test - because nan != nan - i.e.
a transport bug filed in the winding-loop counter, with a nan on the wire.
"""
if value is None:
return False
try:
return math.isfinite(float(value))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return False
def clamp_to_rating(requested_w, limit_w, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> ClampResult:
"""Bound a computed setpoint to the validated rating. The ONLY clamp.
`limit_w` the validated magnitude bound - `max_w`. Symmetric, because
3.2 calls `setpoint_limit_w` a MAGNITUDE clamp: it binds import
(+) and export (-) identically.
`dev_min` / `dev_max` the device's own asymmetric range, applied second and
expected never to bite. See the module note.
Public, and the predicate lives here rather than in the test, for the reason
`freeze.looks_frozen()` gives: a safety expression transcribed into its own
check is one copy plus a future disagreement about what the check means.
EXACTLY +-`limit_w` IS NOT AN ENGAGEMENT. The bound is inclusive; a loop
resting on the rail is doing what it was told, and alarming there would fire
on every healthy full-power hour.
"""
requested = float(requested_w)
limit = abs(float(limit_w))
# ⚠️ BOTH STAGES ALWAYS RUN. THIS USED TO `return` FROM THE FIRST ONE, AND
# THAT WAS A REGRESSION AGAINST THE CODE IT REPLACED. `write_setpoint()`
# previously clamped to the device range unconditionally, under the comment
# "never send a value the device will reject outright"; short-circuiting here
# meant the device bound was applied only when the rating bound had NOT
# fired, i.e. THE BIGGER THE OVERSHOOT THE LESS THE GUARD DID. Measured on
# the shipped function at max_w 5000 against a device of +-4000:
#
# +9999 -> +5000 bound='max_w' <- outside the device range
# +4500 -> +4000 bound='device'
#
# It also undercut this module's own argument for clamping to `max_w` rather
# than a runtime `min()`, which rests entirely on this stage catching the
# case where the startup validation did not run.
applied = max(-limit, min(limit, requested))
bound = "max_w" if applied != requested else ""
# Second stage. Arithmetically dead after a successful startup validation -
# and therefore worth alarming on precisely BECAUSE it fired.
if dev_min is not None and dev_max is not None:
bounded = max(float(dev_min), min(float(dev_max), applied))
if bounded != applied:
bound = "device" if not bound else "max_w+device"
applied = bounded
return ClampResult(requested, applied, limit, applied != requested, bound)
class ClampWatchdog:
"""One instance per controller. Counts every engagement, alarms sparsely.
`note()` is called once per write with whether the clamp bit; the caller ORs
in the loop's own `i_clamped` / `clamped` flags, which is where the winding
is actually visible on a default install (see the module note).
"""
def __init__(self):
self.active = False
self.engagements = 0 # every engagement, never deduplicated
self.episodes = 0 # rising edges
self.since: datetime | None = None
self.last_alarm: datetime | None = None
self.reason = ""
self.clean_cycles = 0
def note(self, engaged: bool, reason: str, now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Advance one cycle. True when the caller should raise the alarm.
`now` is the caller's clock, the same discipline as
`SignWatchdog.evaluate()` and `FreezeWatchdog.evaluate()`.
"""
if engaged:
self.engagements += 1
self.clean_cycles = 0
self.reason = reason
if not self.active:
self.active = True
self.since = now
self.episodes += 1
self.last_alarm = now
return True
# Still engaged: re-assert on the slow cadence, not every cycle.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
return True
return False
if not self.active:
return False
self.clean_cycles += 1
if self.clean_cycles >= CLEAR_CYCLES:
self.active = False
self.since = None
self.last_alarm = None
self.reason = ""
self.clean_cycles = 0
return False
+39 -15
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,23 @@ class Decision:
# and quantisation. Carry it back in as `i_w` next cycle; that is what keeps
# it a separate quantity from the command.
i_w: float = 0.0
# SAFETY-03. Did a clamp actually engage this cycle - i.e. did the RAW
# computed value differ from the bounded one?
#
# ⚠️ THESE EXIST BECAUSE `reason` CANNOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION. `reason` is
# one string and every later stage overwrites it: a cycle that clamps the
# integrator and is then slew limited reports "slew-limited", and one that
# clamps while saturated reports "saturated-freeze". Both ARE the winding
# case, and on the string the clamp signal is gone before anything can alarm
# on it. These two are written where the clamp happens and are never
# overwritten, so they mean exactly what they say and nothing else.
#
# `i_clamped` is the one that fires on a default install: the integrator
# bound is reached first, so `clamped` is unreachable unless
# `integrator_max_w` is deliberately set above `max_w`. Alarm on BOTH - see
# the comment at the bound below, and clamp.py.
i_clamped: bool = False
clamped: bool = False
def compute(
@@ -95,19 +112,23 @@ def compute(
# lets slew be larger than saturation_w.
#
# The spec states this window twice and differently: "> 10 s" (§11.2) and
# "3 samples" (§10.3). This counts CYCLES, and a cycle is not a unit of
# time: run_control() calls cycle() only when the meter value CHANGES
# (`if self.grid != last_grid`), so three cycles is three distinct meter
# readings and nothing more. At the reference P1's ~5 s update rate that is
# usually ~15 s, but there is no upper bound on it - a meter that repeats a
# value stalls the counter.
# "3 samples" (§10.3). This counts CYCLES, and a cycle is still not a unit
# of time - but it is now a BOUNDED one. run_control() runs a cycle on a
# changed meter value OR on `cycle_floor_s` elapsing, whichever comes first
# (SAFETY-12), so three cycles is at most 3 x cycle_floor_s = 45 s at the
# defaults, and usually ~15 s at the reference P1's ~5 s update rate.
#
# That is a detection-latency limit, not a windup hazard: the same
# condition that stalls the counter stalls the whole loop, so nothing
# accumulates in the meantime either. If a wall-clock window is ever
# required, it belongs in Controller (which has a clock) and not here.
# ponytail: this function is worth keeping clockless; the ceiling is that
# saturation_cycles cannot express a guaranteed number of seconds.
# ⚠️ THIS COMMENT USED TO CLAIM there was no upper bound and that it did not
# matter, "because the same condition that stalls the counter stalls the
# whole loop, so nothing accumulates in the meantime". The first clause was
# true and the second was the bug: a stalled loop does not stop commanding,
# it goes on emitting its last command through the heartbeat. Windup was
# never the hazard; staleness was.
#
# The wall-clock window lives in Controller, which has a clock, exactly as
# this comment always said it should. ponytail: this function stays
# clockless; the remaining ceiling is that saturation_cycles expresses a
# bound in seconds rather than an exact number of them.
saturated_now = abs(prev_w - actual_w) > tuning.saturation_w
sat_count = min(sat_count + 1, 10) if saturated_now else 0
frozen = sat_count >= tuning.saturation_cycles
@@ -184,7 +205,8 @@ def compute(
# bound is not. It is what makes the worst-case unwind time finite and
# knowable instead of a function of how long the error happened to stand.
bounded = max(-limit, min(limit, i_w))
if bounded != i_w:
i_clamped = bounded != i_w
if i_clamped:
# ⚠️ SAFETY-03 (alarm whenever the loop winds into a rail) must watch
# for THIS, not for "clamped" below. At the default limit == max_w the
# integrator bound is reached first and the command derived from it can
@@ -205,7 +227,8 @@ def compute(
# --- ORDER MATTERS: clamp -> slew -> freeze ----------------------------
# An early draft applied a floor after the clamp and let demand escape it.
target = max(-tuning.max_w, min(tuning.max_w, want))
if target != want:
clamped = target != want
if clamped:
reason = "clamped"
slewed = max(prev_w - tuning.slew_w, min(prev_w + tuning.slew_w, target))
@@ -231,7 +254,8 @@ def compute(
step = max(1, int(tuning.step_w))
target = round(target / step) * step
return Decision(float(target), sat_count, frozen, reason, float(i_w))
return Decision(float(target), sat_count, frozen, reason, float(i_w),
i_clamped, clamped)
def maintenance_charge_floor(
+275
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
"""SAFETY-18 - the frozen-but-fresh meter detector.
WHAT IT CATCHES, in one sentence: a meter that keeps answering 200 OK with a
document that never changes, which every freshness mechanism in this stack reads
as perfectly healthy while the loop winds to the rail and stays there.
THE FAILURE NEEDS NO FAULT ANYWHERE ELSE. A frozen-but-talking meter is
*arriving* on every poll, so:
- `meter_max_age_s` is structurally blind. Every response resets the arrival
stamp (p1.py, `HomeWizardLocalSource`), so the age never climbs. Age catches
a meter that stops TALKING; this one stops CHANGING.
- firmware layer 1 is fed. Its watchdog keys on setpoint staleness, which the
heartbeat satisfies, and on `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, which a talking
meter satisfies.
- the arbiter contributes only the device rating and +-`max_w` - it bounds the
magnitude, which is the number this fault drives us to, not away from.
- there is no SoC guard on the grid-following loop at all. `soc_floor` belongs
to the maintenance cycle; the BMS is the sole energy backstop.
The loop reads a constant error and integrates it. Time from freeze to the rail,
replaying the real `control.compute()` at 15 s cycles:
meter frozen at to rail, max_w 2000 to rail, max_w 5000
350 W 150 s 360 s
1000 W 60 s 135 s
>= 3000 W 30 s 75 s
⚠️ THE LIVE INSTALL RUNS `max_w: 5000`, which is both the schema maximum and the
device rating, so the right-hand column is the one that describes this house.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THIS HAS A EURO FIGURE, AND IT IS THE REASON THE TICKET IS P1
`maintenance_charge_floor()` caps MAINTENANCE charging against `peak_cap_w`. The
grid-following loop is not capped by anything but `max_w`. A meter frozen
reading a large export drives a 5 kW unattended grid IMPORT, and >= 15 minutes
of that sets the month's billed capaciteitstarief peak: specs.md:583 records a
measured case where a single 4998 W quarter moved a monthly peak from 4832 W to
5013 W and billed the whole month at it.
⚠️ THIS CUT DOES NOT CAP THAT. It notifies. See DOCS.md, "Capacity-tariff
exposure of the grid-following loop", and SAFETY-07.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHY IT IS A CONJUNCTION AND NOT AN `unchanged_s` THRESHOLD
`unchanged_s` (p1.py) already measures exactly the right thing: seconds since
the meter served a DIFFERENT measurement, fingerprinted over the power figure
and both energy registers. It is computed, it is on the status page, and TEL-05
deliberately refused to threshold it - correctly:
this controller regulates grid power toward ~0 W, and at a converged -10 W
the export register takes about six minutes to advance by its 1 Wh
resolution while the power figure legitimately repeats.
So a bare `unchanged_s > N` false-trips at the exact operating point we aim for,
and `p1.py` says as much in a note that ends "whoever wires a freeze detector
must handle the low-power case first". This is that handling, and it is not a
smaller number:
unchanged_s >= hold_s AND |commanded_w| is at the rail
The second term is what TEL-05's case cannot satisfy. At the converged point the
command is nowhere near +-`max_w`; on the 40 minutes of live converged behaviour
in `sim/scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz` the meter never once leaves
+-500 W, so the loop never even approaches a 5000 W rail. And the reverse case -
a command genuinely pinned at the rail by a real 8 kW load - cannot satisfy the
FIRST term, because a real railed condition means kilowatts still crossing the
meter, and a kilowatt advances a 1 Wh register every 3.6 s.
The two terms fail for independent reasons. That is the whole design.
⚠️ AND THE SECOND HALF OF THAT WAS MEASURED ON THE RIG, WITH A RESULT WORTH
READING CAREFULLY. Driving the real transport against the rig's own hwsim under
+8000 W of house load - a genuinely railed command, meter perfectly healthy - the
POWER FIGURE DID NOT MOVE AT ALL: `active_power_w` sat at exactly 10130.0 W for
26 consecutive polls. What kept `unchanged_s` pinned at 0.0 s was the kWh
registers advancing, and nothing else.
So the register terms in `measurement_fingerprint()` are not belt-and-braces
here, they are the entire negative case. A freeze detector fingerprinted on the
power figure alone would have raised a false alarm on that rig run - a healthy
meter, a real load, a correctly railed command - which is the exact failure mode
that gets a safety guard switched off. Anyone tempted to simplify the fingerprint
should read that run first.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHERE `hold_s` COMES FROM
Measured on `sim/scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz` - 2399 s (40 min) of the
live house at the converged operating point, mean grid -14.2 W, 1194 polls:
polls that repeated the previous reading 735 of 1193 (61.6 %)
distinct-reading transitions 458
median gap between distinct readings 6.0 s
p95 gap 6.0 s
LARGEST `unchanged_s` any sample observes 8.0 s
longest interval serving no distinct reading 15.4 s
samples outside +-500 W 0
The default 300 s is 37x the largest `unchanged_s` this house has been recorded
producing while converged, and 19.5x the longest interval in which it served no
distinct reading at all. The two figures differ because the capture has an 11.4 s
hole in its OWN polling; the second is quoted because it is the pessimistic one.
300 s is not fitted to either margin - it is picked as "clearly past any
plausible register-tick interval, and clearly inside the 900 s quarter that bills
the capacity tariff". test_freeze.py re-measures both every run, so this
paragraph cannot quietly stop being true.
⚠️ BE PRECISE ABOUT WHAT THAT CAPTURE PROVES. It is POWER-ONLY - the shipped
fingerprint also covers both kWh registers, so a real `unchanged_s` on that data
can only be shorter, never longer, which makes it a conservative measurement of
the converged case. But it does NOT on its own refute a bare `unchanged_s`
threshold, and saying it did would be exactly the overstatement this project
keeps having to walk back: at 8 s worst, a bare 300 s threshold is silent on it
too. The case that refutes the bare threshold is the one below, which no capture
of THIS meter contains because this meter's power figure jitters.
The floor on the other side: at the rail, the smallest residual grid flow that
still ticks a 1 Wh register inside 300 s is 12 W. Any condition that genuinely
pins this loop at +-5000 W has three orders of magnitude more than that crossing
the meter.
⚠️ AND THOSE TWO NUMBERS DO NOT MERELY HAVE MARGIN - THEY CANNOT BOTH BE TRUE.
The worry the conjunction has to answer is "a HEALTHY meter whose register is
slower than `hold_s`". At 300 s that is |grid| < 12 W. The shipped `deadband_w`
is 15 W, so anywhere the register is that slow the control law is already inside
its deadband and the command is parked - the rail term is not merely unlikely to
be true there, it is 0 W. The two terms are mutually exclusive by construction
at the defaults, not just far apart, and the check re-derives that every run.
That relationship is the one to protect. `hold_s` may be lowered only while
3600/hold_s stays under `deadband_w`; at the schema floor of 60 s that is 60 W
against a 15 W deadband, and the mutual exclusion is gone. A 60 s `meter_freeze_s`
is a supported configuration that gives up this argument and keeps only the
margin - do not set one without a capture that says the margin is enough.
⚠️ WHAT `hold_s` DOES NOT BUY IS DETECTION SPEED. The alert lands at
max(hold_s, time-to-rail) after the freeze, so at the shipped default and
`max_w: 5000` that is 300-360 s. The rail is REACHED first, from 75 s. A
notification is not a brake; see the DOCS.md note.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE RAIL TERM, PRECISELY
abs(commanded_w) >= RAIL_FRAC * max_w
`commanded_w` is the EMITTED setpoint - what the arbiter resolved and
`write_setpoint()` put on the wire - not the loop's raw wish, for the same
reason SAFETY-02 uses the emitted value: the wire carries the emitted number.
RAIL_FRAC is 0.95 and is a constant rather than an option. The command is
quantised to `step_w` (max 100) and clamped to `max_w` (min 100), so at the rail
the emitted value IS `max_w` on every schema-legal combination; the 5 % is slack
for a device rating that clips `max_w` slightly in `write_setpoint()`, not a
tuning knob. Making it configurable would offer a way to widen the one term that
carries the whole no-false-positive argument.
⚠️ NOT GATED ON `following`, and that is deliberate. A maintenance charge
commands against the meter on purpose and can sit at the rail for hours - but it
does so while pushing kilowatts through the meter, so the FIRST term is what
excludes it, and it excludes it on physics rather than on bookkeeping. Gating on
`following` as well would additionally blind the detector to a maintenance phase
running against a meter that really has frozen, which is the same fault with a
worse actuator behind it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTIFY, DO NOT TRIP
First cut is an alarm and nothing else: an HA persistent notification, an ERROR
in the log, an event on the status page, and a failed check row. It does NOT
claim the actuator, does NOT file a P_SAFETY claim and does NOT latch.
That is a deliberate ordering of costs, not timidity. A false trip here parks
the battery - on a house that is running this loop precisely to avoid buying
power at the wrong moment - and the operator's response to a parked battery is
to switch the guard off. A false notification costs one alert. The trip is a
separate decision that has to be earned with observed data from a real install,
and it needs an answer to a question this cut does not have one for: what should
the loop do instead, given that 0 W is itself a grid import of whatever the
house is drawing.
⚠️ TRANSPORT-CONDITIONAL. `unchanged_s` exists ONLY on `homewizard_local`,
because it is the only transport that sees the meter's own document. Under
`ha_dsmr`, `mqtt_p1`, `ha_signed` and `meter_source: off` this detector is
silent and the exposure above is uncovered. The caller passes None and gets
False; there is no half-measure available on those paths, and pretending
otherwise would be worse than the gap.
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime
# See "THE RAIL TERM, PRECISELY" above. A constant, on purpose.
RAIL_FRAC = 0.95
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class FreezeWatchdogConfig:
"""Default, not a constant - config.yaml carries `meter_freeze_s`."""
hold_s: float = 300.0
def rail_w(max_w) -> float:
"""The magnitude at or above which a command counts as railed."""
return abs(float(max_w)) * RAIL_FRAC
def looks_frozen(unchanged_s, commanded_w, max_w,
cfg: FreezeWatchdogConfig) -> bool:
"""The predicate, and the ONLY place the conjunction is written down.
Public for the same reason `watchdog.disagrees()` is: the checks that grade
it must assert on THE SHIPPED EXPRESSION. A safety predicate transcribed
into its own test is one copy plus a future disagreement about what the
check means, and the copy that drifts is always the one doing the grading.
`unchanged_s` seconds since the meter served a different measurement, or
None on a transport that cannot know (see the module note).
`commanded_w` the EMITTED setpoint standing on the wire.
`max_w` the configured output bound the rail is measured against.
"""
if unchanged_s is None or commanded_w is None or not max_w:
return False
return (float(unchanged_s) >= cfg.hold_s
and abs(float(commanded_w)) >= rail_w(max_w))
class FreezeWatchdog:
"""One instance per controller, evaluated once per control cycle.
Level-triggered state with an EDGE for the alarm: `evaluate()` returns True
on the cycle the conjunction first becomes true and False on every cycle
after, so the caller raises one notification per episode rather than one
every second. `active` is the level, for the status page.
No latch, deliberately - see "NOTIFY, DO NOT TRIP". A latch exists so a trip
cannot erase its own evidence by working; nothing here acts, so there is
nothing to erase. When the meter starts moving again the alert clears
itself, which is the honest report of the state.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: FreezeWatchdogConfig | None = None):
self.cfg = cfg or FreezeWatchdogConfig()
self.active = False
self.since: datetime | None = None
self.reason = ""
self.episodes = 0
def evaluate(self, unchanged_s, commanded_w, max_w, now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Advance one cycle. Returns True ONLY on the rising edge.
`now` is the caller's clock so this stays testable and replayable - the
same discipline as `SignWatchdog.evaluate()`.
"""
if not looks_frozen(unchanged_s, commanded_w, max_w, self.cfg):
self.active = False
self.since = None
self.reason = ""
return False
self.reason = (
f"METER_FROZEN: the meter has answered {float(unchanged_s):.0f} s "
f"without its measurement changing while the command stands at "
f"{float(commanded_w):+.0f} W, at the {float(max_w):.0f} W rail "
f"(limits: unchanged over {self.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s, command over "
f"{rail_w(max_w):.0f} W)")
if self.active:
return False
self.active = True
self.since = now
self.episodes += 1
return True
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+4 -3
View File
@@ -28,9 +28,10 @@ _LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.maint")
IDLE, DRAIN, CHARGE, HOLD = "idle", "drain", "charge", "hold"
# A drain of a 13.5 kWh usable pack at 2500 W is ~5 h even with no house load
# helping. 12 h means the battery is not following commands - a fault, not a
# slow day. The charge phase deliberately waits for sun and for cheap hours, so
# A drain of a 13.8 kWh usable pack (300 Ah x 51.2 V, DoD 90) at the shipped
# 2000 W is ~6.9 h even with no house load helping - and less in practice, since
# house load drains alongside the export and soc_floor stops short of empty.
# 12 h means the battery is not following commands - a fault, not a slow day. The charge phase deliberately waits for sun and for cheap hours, so
# it is expected to span a night; 36 h still bounds it.
DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN = 720
CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN = 2160
+26 -7
View File
@@ -45,13 +45,32 @@ SENSORS = [
("soc", "goodwe_battery_soc", "Battery SoC", "%", "battery", "measurement", None),
("phase", "goodwe_maintenance_phase", "Maintenance phase", None, None, None, "mdi:battery-sync"),
("status", "goodwe_controller_status", "Controller status", None, None, None, "mdi:heart-pulse"),
# ⚠️ This one deliberately breaks the goodwe_ prefix above: the entity id
# must be exactly `sensor.p1_sample_age_s`, because SAFETY-01's firmware
# watchdog subscribes to that literal id and the ENV-01 simulation rig
# asserts on it. Renaming it silently disarms a safety layer. It is seconds
# since the newest accepted P1 telegram, republished every second so that a
# meter frozen at a constant value still shows a climbing age - which is the
# false-trip that this entity exists to remove.
# ⚠️ THE LIVE ENTITY IS `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, NOT what this
# object_id spells. An earlier version of this comment said the id "must be
# exactly sensor.p1_sample_age_s" - that name has never existed on any HA,
# and believing it is how a safety layer gets disarmed by someone tidying up.
#
# On HA 2026.8 `object_id` in a discovery payload does NOT determine the
# entity_id. HA composes it from the device name plus the entity name:
# "GoodWe RS485 Controller" + "P1 sample age" -> sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age.
# Verified against the live system 2026-08-26; the firmware subscribes to
# that composed name (goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml, homeassistant
# sensor p1_age_s), and its own comment records that sensor.p1_sample_age_s
# never existed.
#
# So: do NOT "fix" the firmware to match the object_id below, and do not
# rename the device or this entity's friendly name - either changes the
# composed id and silently disarms the ingest guard, because has_state()
# simply stays false forever and nothing reports it. The firmware calls this
# out as the failure that "FAILS SILENTLY AND LOOKS CORRECT".
#
# The value: seconds since the newest accepted P1 telegram, republished
# every second so a meter frozen at a constant value still shows a climbing
# age - the false-trip this entity exists to remove.
#
# ⚠️ Separately, and not fixed here: the firmware's ingest guard tests this
# sensor's VALUE rather than its arrival, so a dead publisher freezes the
# number and reads permanently fresh. Filed as TEL-06.
("p1_age", "p1_sample_age_s", "P1 sample age", "s", "duration", "measurement", None),
]
+571 -7
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,22 @@ Everything downstream trusts this module: the safety checks, the capacity-tariff
peak, the optimizer, the control loop's sign. So three things happen here and
nowhere else.
1. The IMPORT/EXPORT DERIVATION. A Belgian P1 meter exposes two UNSIGNED
registers - consumption and injection - never one signed figure. Net power
is `import_w - export_w`, positive = import, and that subtraction is done
1. The IMPORT/EXPORT DERIVATION. A Belgian P1 read over DSMR exposes two
UNSIGNED registers - consumption and injection. Net power is
`import_w - export_w`, positive = import, and that subtraction is done
exactly once, here (spec §5.2: "the derivation is the EMS's job, not a
template the user has to write"). A second copy of it somewhere else is a
second chance to invert the control loop.
Some P1 readers - the HomeWizard P1 among them - publish the OTHER shape:
one SIGNED figure, positive = import, and no unsigned registers at all.
`split_signed()` fans that back out into the same two magnitudes, so there
is still exactly one internal representation and one sign convention. ⚠️ It
lives here, next to the subtraction, for the same reason the subtraction
does: the moment a user is asked to write two template sensors that split a
signed value, the sign convention is back in unreviewed YAML underneath a
safety input, which is precisely what §5.2 moved into the EMS.
2. THE INGEST TIMESTAMP. Every accepted sample is stamped on arrival. A value
with no age is a value that cannot be trusted (§5.2), and staleness is the
failsafe trigger (§11.2).
@@ -47,6 +56,8 @@ _LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.p1")
SOURCE_HA = "ha_dsmr"
SOURCE_MQTT = "mqtt_p1"
SOURCE_HA_SIGNED = "ha_signed"
SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD = "homewizard_local"
QUARTER_S = 900
@@ -78,7 +89,7 @@ class P1Sample:
ingest_ts: datetime # tz-aware UTC, set at ingest
ingest_mono: float # time.monotonic() at ingest - see age_s()
telegram_ts: datetime | None # from the telegram, where the source has one
source: str # SOURCE_HA | SOURCE_MQTT
source: str # one of the SOURCE_* constants above
import_w: float # unsigned magnitude, as the meter reports it
export_w: float # unsigned magnitude
net_w: float # import_w - export_w (+ import, - export)
@@ -129,6 +140,29 @@ def _watts(value, what: str) -> float:
return out
def split_signed(net_w) -> tuple[float, float]:
"""One signed figure -> the (import, export) magnitudes the module speaks.
The inverse of make_sample's subtraction, and the easy direction: no second
register to disagree with, so there is nothing to mix a fresh reading with a
stale one. `+` is import, `-` is export - verified in test_p1.py against real
captured readings from this house's own meter, not against a datasheet.
⚠️ Exactly one of the two comes out non-zero. Splitting into `(max(v,0),
max(-v,0))` rather than clamping keeps `import_w - export_w == v` exactly, so
the signed value the meter published survives the round trip bit for bit -
a control loop must not be steered by a number that changed on the way in.
⚠️ Validation is `_watts`, the same gate the unsigned path uses: NaN,
infinity, non-numbers and the §20 open-question-5 unsigned-decode
contamination (64954 for -582 W) are all refused here rather than believed.
A signed source makes that check MORE important, not less - on this path
64954 is not obviously wrong the way a negative "unsigned" register is.
"""
v = _watts(net_w, "net")
return (v, 0.0) if v >= 0 else (0.0, -v)
def make_sample(source: str, import_w, export_w, *, phases: int,
phase_import_w=None, phase_export_w=None,
telegram_ts: datetime | None = None,
@@ -252,6 +286,26 @@ class QuarterAverager:
"""Offtake watt-seconds accumulated in the open block so far."""
return self._acc
@property
def held_net_w(self) -> float:
"""The signed net power currently being held forward, in W.
PUBLIC BECAUSE SAFETY-07 DEPENDS ON IT, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE REASON.
`PeakTracker.project()` extrapolates the rest of the quarter from this
value and used to reach it as `getattr(averager, "_last_net", 0.0)`. A
default on a private name fails QUIET and fails in the DISARMING
direction: rename `_last_net` and every projection silently credits 0 W
held, which reads LOW, which puts the peak guard under the ceiling
exactly when the meter says it is over. Filed as TEST-13 item 4 and
fixed here rather than inherited - a money guard may not rest on a read
that can go wrong without a symptom.
Positive is offtake, matching `P1Sample.net_w`. It is the raw held
value, NOT floored at zero: the flooring is the accumulator's rule (only
offtake is billed) and belongs where it is applied, not here.
"""
return self._last_net
@property
def offtake_avg_w(self) -> float:
"""Average offtake over the part of the open block seen so far."""
@@ -319,6 +373,54 @@ class QuarterAverager:
self._last_pp = sample.per_phase_w
return closed
# -- surviving a restart (TARIFF-01) ------------------------------------
def snapshot(self) -> dict:
"""The open block's whole state, as JSON-safe primitives.
⚠️ `last_t` is the HELD SAMPLE'S OWN timestamp and is stored as it is,
not refreshed to "now". That is what makes a restart integrate the gap
under exactly the `max_hold_s` rule a running process would have used:
a short restart is a plateau, a long one leaves uncovered seconds that
drag the closed block's average down. Rewriting it to the restore time
would silently credit the whole outage at the last value seen before it.
"""
return {
"block": self._block,
"acc": self._acc,
"pp_acc": list(self._pp_acc),
"elapsed": self._elapsed,
"last_t": self._last_t,
"last_net": self._last_net,
"last_pp": list(self._last_pp) if self._last_pp is not None else None,
"phases": self.phases,
}
def restore(self, state: dict) -> bool:
"""Put a `snapshot()` back. False if it does not fit this averager.
A phase-count change is a reconfiguration, not a resumption: the
per-phase accumulator would be reshaped mid-block and the two halves
would not be the same measurement. Refusing is the honest answer, and
the caller reports starting fresh rather than pretending it resumed.
"""
try:
if int(state.get("phases", self.phases)) != self.phases:
return False
pp_acc = list(state.get("pp_acc") or [])
if len(pp_acc) != self.phases:
return False
self._block = None if state["block"] is None else int(state["block"])
self._acc = float(state["acc"])
self._pp_acc = [float(v) for v in pp_acc]
self._elapsed = float(state["elapsed"])
self._last_t = None if state["last_t"] is None else float(state["last_t"])
self._last_net = float(state["last_net"])
lp = state.get("last_pp")
self._last_pp = tuple(float(v) for v in lp) if lp is not None else None
return True
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
return False
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# what the rest of the add-on talks to
@@ -668,6 +770,333 @@ class MqttP1Source:
self.ingest.reject(err)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# transport 3: Home Assistant WebSocket, one signed entity
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class HaSignedSource(HaDsmrSource):
"""The same websocket, subscribed to ONE signed power entity.
For readers that publish net power as a single signed figure - a HomeWizard
P1's `sensor.p1_meter_active_power`, positive = import - rather than the two
unsigned DSMR registers. This is the meter actually installed at the house,
and `ha_dsmr` cannot read it: it needs two registers and refuses a negative
one outright, which is every exporting telegram.
⚠️ A subclass, not a copy. The connect / auth / subscribe / reconnect /
`_absorb` machinery above is transport, not shape, and it has already been
debugged once - notably "prime the cache from get_states but never build a
sample out of it" and "a reconnect emits nothing". Only `_wanted` (which
entity ids) and `build` (how they become a sample) differ, so only those two
are overridden. Everything TEL-01 established therefore applies unchanged:
ingest timestamping, meter_max_age_s, the clock-recomputed age sensor, and
`unavailable` treated as a missing reading rather than 0 W.
⚠️ THE AGE ON THIS TRANSPORT MEASURES TIME SINCE THE VALUE CHANGED, not time
since the meter reported, and on one entity those are very different things.
Home Assistant offers no arrival signal for a repeated reading: it emits no
`state_changed`, it does not advance `last_reported` on either serialiser,
and `state_reported` cannot be subscribed to over the websocket at all
("Event filter is required for event state_reported"). All three measured on
the ENV-01 rig against the real HomeWizard integration with the meter frozen
- 0 state_changed in 70 s, no timestamp movement anywhere.
`ha_dsmr` mostly escapes it because a DSMR telegram moves several entities at
once. This transport has ONE, so a healthy meter under a flat load looks
exactly like a dead one - and our own capture has the real meter going 42.2 s
and 97.0 s between changes, both past the default max_age_s of 30. Hence
DOCS.md: sensor.p1_sample_age_s is correct while the value moves and must not
yet be thresholded by the firmware watchdog on this transport. Raising
meter_max_age_s does not fix it, it only chooses which of the two errors you
get. The fix is an arrival stamp from the meter itself - reading the
HomeWizard local API rather than an HA entity - which is a separate ticket.
⚠️ The debounce is inherited but does nothing useful here, and that is fine:
one telegram is one entity, so there is no burst of per-entity events to
coalesce and no window in which a new reading sits beside a stale one. It
costs one scheduled sleep per telegram at ~0.2 Hz. Left in place rather than
special-cased, because a second code path through build() is a second place
for the sign to go wrong.
"""
def _wanted(self) -> set[str]:
out = set()
if self.entities.get("net"):
out.add(self.entities["net"])
out.update(e for e in self.entities.get("phase_net") or [] if e)
return out
def build(self) -> bool:
"""Assemble one sample from the cache. Returns True if one was accepted."""
net_id = self.entities.get("net")
if net_id not in self.cache:
return False
pn = [self.cache.get(e) for e in self.entities.get("phase_net") or []]
if pn and None in pn:
return False # incomplete phase set: wait, do not guess
try:
imp, exp = split_signed(self.cache[net_id])
pi = pe = None
if pn:
# ponytail: this split is arithmetically redundant today -
# make_sample subtracts the two lists again and does not
# sign-check per-phase figures, so handing it the signed values
# with a zero export list produces the identical tuple. Verified:
# mutating it that way leaves all 174 checks green, i.e. no test
# can tell the difference, and it is recorded here rather than
# left as a silent equivalent mutant for the next reviewer to
# rediscover. Kept because `phase_import_w` means a MAGNITUDE:
# a negative in it is the double-signing that make_sample refuses
# outright for the connection-level registers, and the day that
# check is extended per-phase the shortcut breaks the meter, not
# the test.
pairs = [split_signed(v) for v in pn]
pi = [a for a, _ in pairs]
pe = [b for _, b in pairs]
self.ingest.submit(make_sample(
SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, imp, exp,
phases=self.ingest.phases,
phase_import_w=pi, phase_export_w=pe,
# ⚠️ No telegram_ts, for the same reason as ha_dsmr: HA's
# last_changed is when the VALUE changed, which on a steady meter
# is minutes ago while the telegram is current. sensor.
# p1_sample_age_s is what covers a genuinely frozen meter.
))
return True
except P1Error as err:
self.ingest.reject(err)
return False
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# transport 4: the HomeWizard P1's own local API
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
HOMEWIZARD_PATH = "/api/v1/data"
HOMEWIZARD_PORT = 80
def parse_homewizard(doc, phases: int, *, now: datetime | None = None,
ingest_mono: float | None = None) -> P1Sample:
"""One `GET /api/v1/data` document -> a sample. Raises P1Error.
The meter's own JSON, of which we read four keys:
{"active_power_w": -5710.0, # SIGNED, + import - export
"active_power_l1_w": ..., "active_power_l2_w": ..., "..._l3_w": ...,
"total_power_import_kwh": 1234.567, "total_power_export_kwh": 890.123}
Same shape as `ha_signed` - one signed connection figure plus signed
per-phase figures - so it goes through the same `split_signed` and the same
`make_sample`. Nothing about the sign convention is re-derived here.
⚠️ No telegram timestamp, because the API carries none, and that is correct
rather than a gap: the document was produced by the meter in the moment it
answered, so the ingest stamp IS the measurement time. This is the whole
reason the transport exists - see HomeWizardLocalSource.
⚠️ Per-phase figures are taken only when the meter serves ALL `phases` of
them. A single-phase HomeWizard returns `active_power_l2_w: null`, and a
partial set must not become a fabricated tuple. Unlike the HA transports
there is no "wait for the rest" case to worry about: every field here came
out of ONE response, so a missing phase cannot be a stale phase, and the
connection-level reading is still a genuine, complete measurement. Dropping
the whole sample over an absent per-phase field would turn a healthy meter
into a climbing age, which is the exact false-trip this ticket removes.
"""
if not isinstance(doc, dict):
raise P1Error(f"meter response is not a JSON object ({type(doc).__name__})")
imp, exp = split_signed(doc.get("active_power_w"))
pi = pe = None
# ⚠️ range(phases), not the legs the meter served: a 3-phase meter configured
# as meter_phases: 1 yields a per-phase tuple covering ONE leg of three.
# Control is unaffected (it uses the connection figure), but the
# capacity-tariff peak is understated. Filed separately - not fixed here.
legs = [doc.get(f"active_power_l{i + 1}_w") for i in range(phases)]
if all(v is not None for v in legs):
pairs = [split_signed(v) for v in legs]
pi = [a for a, _ in pairs]
pe = [b for _, b in pairs]
return make_sample(SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, imp, exp, phases=phases,
phase_import_w=pi, phase_export_w=pe,
ingest_ts=now, ingest_mono=ingest_mono)
def measurement_fingerprint(doc) -> tuple:
"""The part of a response that a genuinely new measurement has to move.
Power plus both energy registers. A meter under any real load advances a
kWh counter (1 Wh resolution: ~10 s at 350 W), so this changes even when the
power figure happens to repeat. Used ONLY for `unchanged_s` - see there for
why it must not be allowed anywhere near the age.
"""
if not isinstance(doc, dict):
return ()
return (doc.get("active_power_w"),
doc.get("total_power_import_kwh"),
doc.get("total_power_export_kwh"))
class HomeWizardLocalSource:
"""Polls the meter's own local HTTP API instead of a Home Assistant entity.
⚠️ THIS IS THE ONLY TRANSPORT WHOSE AGE MEASURES ARRIVAL. That is the entire
reason it exists, and it is not an optimisation - it is the difference
between an age sensor a firmware watchdog may threshold and one it may not.
Every HTTP response is a genuine arrival: the meter answered, now, with its
current reading. Whether the NUMBER moved is irrelevant, so a healthy meter
under a flat load resets the age exactly like a busy one. Home Assistant
cannot provide this at all - it emits `state_changed` only on a change, does
not advance `last_reported` on either serialiser for a repeat, and refuses a
`state_reported` subscription outright ("Event filter is required"). Measured
on the ENV-01 rig over 70 s of a frozen meter, and independently against the
live house over ten repeated readings. So on `ha_signed` the age means "time
since the value changed", and our own capture of this house's meter has
42.2 s and 97.0 s between changes - both past the default `meter_max_age_s`
of 30, i.e. a false trip to 0 W on a perfectly healthy meter.
Everything else is TEL-01's pipeline unchanged: ingest timestamping,
`meter_max_age_s`, the clock-recomputed age, the plausibility bounds, and a
failed read treated as a MISSING reading rather than 0 W.
⚠️ A failed or timed-out poll submits nothing. It is a rejection, so the
last good sample and its stamp stay exactly where they were and the age goes
on climbing - which is precisely the signal a dead meter should produce.
⚠️ POLL CADENCE vs `meter_max_age_s`. The age can only be as fresh as the
poll interval, so `meter_poll_s` must sit well under `meter_max_age_s` or the
reading flaps in and out of staleness on a healthy meter. The real meter
updates every ~5.0 s (NOTES.md:640 measures 4.97 s), so polling faster than
that buys nothing but re-reads. Default 5 s against a 30 s max age; the
startup check in build_source refuses `meter_poll_s >= meter_max_age_s` and
warns past half of it.
ponytail: a plain `asyncio.sleep` loop rather than a scheduler, and no
backoff. A poll that fails costs one rejection and is retried on the next
tick; a meter that is down stays down and the age reports it. The ceiling is
a meter so slow that polls overlap - the request timeout is held under the
poll interval so they cannot.
"""
def __init__(self, session, ingest: P1Ingest, host: str, *,
port: int = HOMEWIZARD_PORT, poll_s: float = 5.0,
timeout_s: float | None = None):
self.session = session
self.ingest = ingest
self.host, self.port = host, int(port)
self.poll_s = float(poll_s)
# ⚠️ Held under the poll interval on purpose: a timeout longer than the
# cadence queues polls behind a hung meter, and a backlog of requests
# all landing at once would stamp several arrivals for one measurement.
self.timeout_s = float(timeout_s) if timeout_s else max(1.0, self.poll_s * 0.8)
self.url = f"http://{self.host}:{self.port}{HOMEWIZARD_PATH}"
self.connected = False
self.polls = 0
self.poll_errors = 0
self._fingerprint: tuple | None = None
self._changed_mono: float | None = None
@property
def unchanged_s(self) -> float | None:
"""Seconds since the meter last served a DIFFERENT measurement.
⚠️ Diagnostic only, and deliberately NOT folded into
`sensor.p1_sample_age_s`. A frozen meter (SAFETY-01's six-minute
runaway) answers 200 OK with a stale document forever, so no arrival
detector can see it - only the document standing still can, and this is
that signal. It is exposed rather than acted on because it is NOT safe
as a 30 s watchdog input: this controller regulates grid power toward
~0 W, and at a converged -10 W the export register takes six minutes to
advance by its 1 Wh resolution while the power figure legitimately
repeats. Thresholding that would rebuild the very limit cycle the
arrival stamp just removed, at the exact operating point we aim for.
Whoever wires a freeze detector must handle the low-power case first.
"""
if self._changed_mono is None:
return None
return max(0.0, time.monotonic() - self._changed_mono)
async def run(self) -> None:
"""Long-lived task: poll, submit, sleep, forever.
⚠️ Nothing but cancellation may end this loop. An escaping exception
would kill the poll task for the lifetime of the add-on, and it would do
it QUIETLY: the failure mode is safe (no submissions, the age climbs, the
watchdog holds the battery at 0 W) but it looks identical to a dead
meter, so the operator goes hunting the wrong device. Retry on the next
tick instead - poll_s is already the retry cadence, so no backoff.
"""
_LOG.info("P1 ingest: polling %s every %.1fs", self.url, self.poll_s)
while True:
try:
await self.poll_once()
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - the task must outlive it
_LOG.warning("P1 meter poll %s: %s - retrying in %.1fs", self.url,
str(err) or type(err).__name__, self.poll_s)
await asyncio.sleep(self.poll_s)
async def poll_once(self) -> bool:
"""One GET. Returns True if a sample was accepted."""
self.polls += 1
try:
async with self.session.get(
self.url,
timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=self.timeout_s)) as resp:
if resp.status != 200:
raise P1Error(f"meter returned HTTP {resp.status}")
# content_type=None: the meter's own firmware is the authority on
# what it serves, and refusing a reading over a Content-Type
# header would be a fabricated outage.
# ⚠️ Kept because a real HomeWizard firmware that ever answers
# text/plain would otherwise read as a dead meter and hold the
# battery at 0 W. (This was once recorded here as an equivalent
# mutant - it is not. aiohttp's json_response always sets
# application/json, but web.Response(text=...) defaults to
# text/plain, so the fake meter CAN serve valid JSON under the
# wrong header, and test_p1.py now does.)
doc = await resp.json(content_type=None)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - any read failure is a gap
self.connected = False
self.poll_errors += 1
# ⚠️ str() of a bare asyncio.TimeoutError is the EMPTY STRING, so
# f"...: {err}" renders "last error:" and then nothing - on the
# status page, on a hung meter, at the moment the battery has just
# dropped to 0 W and someone is reading that line to find out why.
# The class name is the only thing that says "it timed out".
# ⚠️ str(err), not `err or ...`: an exception object is ALWAYS truthy,
# empty message or not, so the `or` would never reach the fallback.
self.ingest.reject(
f"meter poll {self.url}: {str(err) or type(err).__name__}")
return False
self.connected = True
try:
sample = parse_homewizard(doc, self.ingest.phases)
# ⚠️ Submitted unconditionally, INCLUDING a document identical to the
# last one. The response is the arrival; the number is not.
# Inside the try on purpose: submit() outside it would put a raise on
# a path with no handler at all, killing the poll task permanently -
# safely (the age climbs) but silently. run() backstops the rest.
self.ingest.submit(sample)
self._note(doc)
except P1Error as err:
self.ingest.reject(err)
return False
return True
def _note(self, doc) -> None:
fp = measurement_fingerprint(doc)
if self._changed_mono is None or fp != self._fingerprint:
self._fingerprint = fp
self._changed_mono = time.monotonic()
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# selection
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@@ -683,15 +1112,133 @@ def is_enabled(opts: dict) -> bool:
return str(opts.get("meter_source", "off") or "off").strip() not in ("off", "")
def homewizard_host_port(opts: dict) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""`p1_host` split into host and (still unparsed) port text.
One definition because validate_meter_options() and build_source() must
agree byte for byte about what counts as a usable address - a pasted browser
URL is the obvious way to fill this in wrong.
"""
host = str(opts.get("p1_host", "") or "").strip()
host = host.removeprefix("http://").removeprefix("https://").rstrip("/")
host, _, port_s = host.partition(":")
return host, port_s
def validate_meter_options(opts: dict, phases: int, max_age_s: float) -> list[str]:
"""Every way `meter_source` can name a meter that will never produce a reading.
⚠️ THIS IS THE ONLY PLACE THAT KNOWS THESE RULES. It used to be a run of
inline `return None`s inside build_source(); CFG-01 lifted them out because
the same predicates now have two callers with two different consequences:
validate.validate_startup_config() refuses to start the add-on
build_source() returns None, as it always did
They are one function and not two on purpose. A second copy of "what makes a
meter config wrong" would drift, and the half that drifted would be the one
that decides whether the process is allowed to run.
Checked ONCE at startup rather than per telegram, because a misconfigured
source otherwise fails in the one way indistinguishable from a healthy source
nobody has sent anything to yet: no samples, a climbing age, the firmware
watchdog holding the battery at 0 W, and nothing in the log saying why.
Returns a list of human-readable problems; empty means the config is usable.
`phases` and `max_age_s` are passed in rather than read from opts so the
caller decides whether it is validating the options or an already-built
P1Ingest - build_source() has an ingest whose values may not have come from
this dict.
"""
source = str(opts.get("meter_source", "off") or "off").strip()
if source in ("off", ""):
return []
problems: list[str] = []
if source == SOURCE_HA:
imp = str(opts.get("p1_import_entity", "") or "").strip()
exp = str(opts.get("p1_export_entity", "") or "").strip()
if not imp or not exp:
problems.append(
f"meter_source {SOURCE_HA} needs both p1_import_entity and "
f"p1_export_entity (got {imp or '<blank>'!r} / {exp or '<blank>'!r})")
elif source == SOURCE_HA_SIGNED:
net = str(opts.get("p1_net_entity", "") or "").strip()
phase_net = [str(e).strip() for e in
(opts.get("p1_phase_net_entities") or []) if str(e).strip()]
if not net:
problems.append(
f"meter_source {SOURCE_HA_SIGNED} needs p1_net_entity "
"(sensor.p1_sample_age_s would otherwise be announced with "
"nothing feeding it)")
if phase_net and len(phase_net) != phases:
problems.append(
f"p1_phase_net_entities has {len(phase_net)} entities but "
f"meter_phases is {phases} - every telegram would be rejected "
"on the phase-count check")
elif source == SOURCE_MQTT:
if not str(opts.get("meter_mqtt_topic", "") or "").strip():
problems.append(f"meter_source {SOURCE_MQTT} needs meter_mqtt_topic")
elif source == SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD:
host, port_s = homewizard_host_port(opts)
if not host:
problems.append(
f"meter_source {SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD} needs p1_host (the meter's "
"own address, e.g. 192.168.2.250)")
if port_s:
try:
int(port_s)
except ValueError:
problems.append(f"p1_host {opts.get('p1_host')!r} has an "
"unparseable port")
try:
# ⚠️ Not `or 5`: that turns an explicit 0 into the default, and a
# cadence of 0 is a misconfiguration that must be reported, not
# quietly corrected into something that looks like it was asked for.
raw = opts.get("meter_poll_s", 5)
poll_s = float(5 if raw is None or raw == "" else raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
problems.append(f"meter_poll_s {opts.get('meter_poll_s')!r} is not a number")
else:
if poll_s <= 0:
problems.append("meter_poll_s must be positive")
# ⚠️ The age can never be fresher than the poll interval. At or past
# max_age_s every reading is stale before its successor arrives, so
# the controller would sit permanently on missing inputs while the
# meter is perfectly healthy - refuse it rather than ship that.
elif poll_s >= max_age_s:
problems.append(
f"meter_poll_s {poll_s:.1f} is not under meter_max_age_s "
f"{max_age_s:.1f} - every reading would go stale before the "
"next poll")
else:
problems.append(
f"meter_source {source!r} is not one of "
+ ", ".join((SOURCE_HA, SOURCE_MQTT, SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD)))
return problems
def build_source(opts: dict, ingest: P1Ingest, session, broker: dict | None):
"""Return the transport named by `meter_source`, or None if disabled.
This is the whole of AC 1's "switchable": every consumer reads P1Ingest, so
changing transport is a config edit, never a code path.
⚠️ In the add-on this is now unreachable with a bad config -
validate_startup_config() refuses to start on anything
validate_meter_options() rejects. The guard stays because this function is
also called directly by tests and by anything embedding P1Ingest, and
"returns None" is a safer default for those callers than a transport that
can never read.
"""
source = str(opts.get("meter_source", "off") or "off").strip()
if not is_enabled(opts):
return None
problems = validate_meter_options(opts, ingest.phases, ingest.max_age_s)
if problems:
for problem in problems:
_LOG.error("%s - P1 ingestion disabled", problem)
return None
if source == SOURCE_HA:
return HaDsmrSource(session, ingest, {
"import": opts.get("p1_import_entity", ""),
@@ -699,12 +1246,29 @@ def build_source(opts: dict, ingest: P1Ingest, session, broker: dict | None):
"phase_import": opts.get("p1_phase_import_entities") or [],
"phase_export": opts.get("p1_phase_export_entities") or [],
})
if source == SOURCE_HA_SIGNED:
return HaSignedSource(session, ingest, {
"net": str(opts.get("p1_net_entity", "") or "").strip(),
"phase_net": [str(e).strip() for e in
(opts.get("p1_phase_net_entities") or []) if str(e).strip()],
})
if source == SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD:
host, port_s = homewizard_host_port(opts)
port = int(port_s) if port_s else HOMEWIZARD_PORT
raw = opts.get("meter_poll_s", 5)
poll_s = float(5 if raw is None or raw == "" else raw)
# A warning, not a refusal: one missed poll costs a stale reading and a
# 0 W cycle, which is fail-safe. The refusal above is for cadences that
# can NEVER be fresh.
if poll_s > ingest.max_age_s / 2:
_LOG.warning("meter_poll_s %.1f leaves no room under meter_max_age_s "
"%.1f: one missed poll makes the reading stale. The meter "
"updates every ~5 s; 5 s against 30 s is the tested pair.",
poll_s, ingest.max_age_s)
return HomeWizardLocalSource(session, ingest, host, port=port, poll_s=poll_s)
if source == SOURCE_MQTT:
broker = broker or {}
return MqttP1Source(ingest, str(opts.get("meter_mqtt_topic", "")),
broker.get("host"), broker.get("port", 1883),
broker.get("username"), broker.get("password"))
if source:
_LOG.error("meter_source %r is not %s or %s - P1 ingestion disabled",
source, SOURCE_HA, SOURCE_MQTT)
return None
+517
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
"""SAFETY-07 - the quarter-peak projection guard, and the only thing in this
add-on that is allowed to spend the loop's freedom to save money.
WHAT IT IS. TARIFF-01 built the INSTRUMENT: `tariff.py` measures the number the
Belgian capaciteitstarief bills on - the highest 15-minute average offtake of the
calendar month - and banks it where a restart cannot reach. It files no claim and
commands nothing, and says so in its own first paragraph. This module is the
CONSUMER it named. It turns that measurement into one arbiter claim and nothing
else: no writes, no I/O, no clock, no state between calls. Given a projection and
two measured numbers it returns a decision; `main.py` files it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE HAZARD, WITH THE EURO FIGURE
specs.md:583 records a measured case: ONE 4998 W quarter moved a monthly peak
from 4832 W to 5013 W and billed the whole month at it. The capacity tariff has
no averaging and no forgiveness - the month's single worst quarter is the bill.
SAFETY-18 shipped the ALARM for the way this system produces such a quarter by
itself: a meter that answers 200 OK forever with a document that never changes,
which every freshness mechanism in this stack reads as healthy while the loop
integrates a constant error to the rail and holds it there. freeze.py's own
table: at the live install's `max_w: 5000`, a meter frozen at >= 3000 W rails the
command in 75 s. SAFETY-18 notifies at `meter_freeze_s` (300 s default), against
a 900 s billing quarter. That is about nine minutes of human reaction time and
nothing else - freeze.py says so in the words "THIS CUT DOES NOT CAP THAT."
This is the cap. It is deliberately NOT a second freeze detector: it consumes
freeze.py's shipped predicate rather than transcribing it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE MECHANISM: ONE `lo` LIMIT AT `P_PEAK`, AND WHY THAT SHAPE
specs.md 10.1 row 2 asks for exactly two behaviours - "pre-emptive discharge as
the projected quarter average approaches the soft limit; hard clamp on charging
above it" - and 9.1 constrains the lever: "Discharge and export are never capped
by the peak guard; only charging and import are."
A LOWER BOUND on the setpoint is both of those in one object, and it is the only
shape that is:
* incapable of capping discharge - a floor never stops the loop discharging
HARDER, so 9.1's asymmetry is structural here rather than remembered;
* incapable of capping export, for the same reason;
* a hard clamp on charging whenever the floor is above the standing charge;
* pre-emptive discharge whenever the floor is above zero.
It is a LIMIT, not a SET, and that matters at both ends of the priority table.
`P_PEAK` (50) is above `P_LOOP` (10), so it binds the grid-following loop. It is
BELOW `P_MAINTENANCE` (60) and `P_SAFETY` (100), so a maintenance phase that owns
the actuator and every layer-1 stop still outrank it: arbiter.py's clause 2 only
applies limits whose priority is >= the WINNING SET's, so a P_SAFETY 0 W stop is
not dragged off zero by this floor. That is the correct order - a controller
pushing power the wrong way is wrong however much money it is trying to save.
⚠️ AND A LIMIT DOES NOT OUT-VOTE ANOTHER LIMIT. This was assumed, and it is
false: arbiter.py clause 2 applies EVERY limit at or above the winner's priority
and takes the MOST RESTRICTIVE, with no notion of priority between them - which
is exactly what makes the safety bounds unconditional and must not be changed.
So this floor (`lo >= 0`) and the maintenance charge-only shaping (`hi <= 0`) do
not resolve in P_PEAK's favour when both are filed. They resolve to `lo > hi`, a
CONTRADICTION, which arbiter.py answers with 0 W - the battery parked in the one
quarter of the month it should be shaving hardest. The rule for two limits that
can cross is therefore SUPPRESSION, not priority: main.py drops the maintenance
shaping for as long as this guard is engaged, which is the same thing that branch
already did for `peak_forecast_entity` and is why 9.1's "money outranks the
maintenance schedule" reads as a suppression there rather than as a priority
here. The floor's clamp to `achievable_w` closes the only other pair that could
cross - the P_SAFETY rating bounds.
AND IT IS WHY OPT-04 NEEDS NO CHANGE HERE. 9.1 requires peak shaving to outrank
arbitrage. Arbitrage does not exist yet, but it will arrive as a SET below
P_PEAK, and arbiter.py clause 2 will bind it with this floor on the day it lands,
with no edit to this file. Expressing the priority as a claim rather than as an
if/else in main.py is the whole reason that holds.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE FLOOR IS DERIVED, AND EVERY TERM OF IT IS MEASURED
Let `ceiling_w` be the quarter average that must not be exceeded and `remaining`
the seconds left in the open block. `project()` gives
projected = (acc + held * remaining) / 900
so the held level that would land the quarter exactly on the ceiling is
`held + 900 * (ceiling - projected) / remaining`, and the watts that must come
off the meter are the difference between the two:
excess_w = 900 * (projected - ceiling) / remaining
That single expression carries the whole control law, and two properties of it
are the argument for this design:
1. THE CLAIM IS FILED WHILE THE FLOOR IS POSITIVE, NOT WHILE THE EXCESS IS.
`excess` is what must come off the METER, so it falls to zero the moment the
battery is already taking it - and a guard that disengaged there would hand
the actuator back, watch the offtake spring straight to the raw load, and
engage again next cycle. That is not a hypothetical: it is what the first
cut of this file did to 2026-08-20's billed quarter on replay - seventeen
engage/release cycles in 900 s, and the quarter still finished 49 W over the
limit it had spent a quarter of an hour holding. 10.2 names the cost
exactly: "an EMS that oscillates is worse than no EMS, both for hardware
wear and - per 9.1 - for the peak it is trying to avoid."
`batt_w + excess` IS the quantity to threshold: the offtake there would be
with the battery at zero, less the level this quarter can still afford. Read
as a LEVEL rather than as a switch, the same arithmetic gives a claim that
is filed for as long as a positive floor is needed and decays continuously
to nothing as the load falls. So there is still no hysteresis constant in
this file - not because oscillation was ruled out by argument, but because
the thresholded quantity is the one that does not oscillate.
2. THE GAIN IS 900/remaining, WHICH IS 1.0 AT THE START OF THE QUARTER AND
GROWS. This is the answer to the degeneracy at the top of a block, where the
projection is an extrapolation from almost no evidence: the guard is at its
GENTLEST exactly when its evidence is weakest, and becomes aggressive only
once most of the quarter is behind it and the projection is nearly a
measurement. The formula supplies that; no minimum-evidence threshold was
invented, because inventing one would delay the guard in the case it exists
for - a sustained rail from second zero.
The floor itself is then
floor_w = batt_w + excess_w
`batt_w` IS THE MEASURED BATTERY POWER, NOT THE STANDING COMMAND. Both were
available. The measured one is right for two independent reasons. First, 9.1's
settled constraint is that the utility bills what FLOWED - the arithmetic
`grid = load - batt` is true of delivered power and false of intent. Second, and
concretely: when the inverter cannot follow (the saturation case control.py
already freezes the integrator for), a floor built on the command asks for
`command + excess` every cycle while the command never arrives, and winds itself
to the rail; a floor built on the measurement asks for `delivered + excess`,
which stops rising the moment delivery stops rising. The delivered form cannot
wind up. The intent form can.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE CEILING IS `peak_cap_w`, RAISED ONLY BY AN OBSERVATION
11.2's row is "Quarter peak | Projected quarter average approaches THE MONTHLY
PEAK | Clamp the command", and 9.1's soft limit is `peak_cap_w`. Both matter,
because the money is spent on `max(month's peak so far, this quarter)`:
ceiling_w = max(peak_cap_w, the month's banked peak)
Once a month's peak already stands at 5013 W, holding every later quarter to
3500 W buys nothing - the bill for that month is already 5013 W - while the
holding itself costs real charging the site wanted. Raising the ceiling to a peak
that has already been paid for is what stops one bad quarter from parking the
battery's charging for three weeks.
AND THAT RELAXATION IS GRANTED ONLY BY AN `OBSERVED` READING. `NO_RECORD` and
`NOT_OBSERVED` both leave the ceiling at `peak_cap_w`, the tighter of the two, so
a peak store that cannot be read makes this guard STRICTER and never looser. That
direction is the whole point: tariff.py's `PeakReading` exists because a database
that did not answer must not become a number, and the number it would have become
here - a zero peak - is exactly the one that reads as "no peak recorded, full
freedom". It is also why this module does NOT consume `headroom_w()`, whose
disarming failure it would otherwise inherit: a peak read as 0 W returns FULL
headroom, and full headroom is a guard that is not there.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BLINDNESS COMES FIRST, AND IT IS A DIFFERENT ACTION
A projection is evidence only if the quantity under it was actually measured.
Three ways it is not, all of them checked BEFORE the projection is graded,
because grading a stimulus where the quantity it grades is degenerate is how a
guard passes its own tests while being switched off:
* NO OPEN BLOCK. `project()` answers a fresh averager with
`Projection(0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, False, None, 0.0)` - a ZERO projection, which
compares as comfortably under any ceiling. That is not "the quarter is fine",
it is "there is no quarter". Graded as a number it silently disarms the guard
on exactly the startup path where nothing else is watching.
* COVERAGE. A meter gap longer than one `max_hold_s` window leaves seconds that
`QuarterAverager` deliberately does not accumulate (p1.py: holding a dead
meter's last value forward is how a fabricated peak gets onto a permanent
record). Those seconds make the projection read LOW, which is the
under-guarding direction. The threshold is `max_hold_s` itself - the point
p1.py already stops trusting a held sample - not a new number.
* FROZEN. SAFETY-18's conjunction, evaluated through `freeze.looks_frozen()`
rather than re-written here. A frozen meter is the worst case of all: the
samples keep ARRIVING, so coverage stays perfect and the projection is
confident - and if the stuck value is an export, the projection is a
confident ZERO while the real meter runs at the rail. This is the case
SAFETY-07 exists to backstop, and it is the case a projection cannot see.
THE BLIND ACTION IS `floor_w = 0.0`: the battery may not IMPORT while the billed
quantity is unobservable. It is the minimal action that closes the hazard, and it
is one-directional - forbidding charging can only ever lower delivered offtake,
never raise it - so a false blindness costs a charge the site wanted and cannot
cost energy the pack did not want to give. Contrast the graded branch, which can
force discharge; blindness deliberately does not earn that, because there is by
definition no measurement to size it from.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHY THIS ONE TRIPS WHERE SAFETY-18 ONLY NOTIFIES
SAFETY-18 shipped notification-first, and config.yaml says why in one line: "A
false trip parks the battery; a false alarm costs an alert." That reasoning is
right for a DETECTOR whose negative case had to be established on a rig run. It
does not carry to this guard, and the two committed captures say so:
* MEASURED FALSE-ENGAGEMENT RATE ON THE HEALTHY DAY: zero. 2026-08-23's worst
quarter is a few hundred watts against a 3500 W ceiling and nothing in its 95
quarters comes near engaging. test_peakguard.py re-measures that every run
from the committed capture rather than quoting it here.
* THE ACTION IS LEVEL-TRIGGERED AND UNLATCHED. It is re-derived from a fresh
projection every cycle and releases the instant the projection drops back
under the ceiling. There is no state to clear and no operator to wake. A
false engagement costs one cycle of discharge, not a parked battery - which
is precisely the cost SAFETY-18 could not bound and this one can.
* THE ACTION IS A LIMIT, NOT A SET. Every safety stop in 11.2's table outranks
it, so the worst thing a bug in this file can do is fail to relax a floor -
and a floor is bounded above by `achievable_w`, which main.py takes from the
same `max_w` and device rating the arbiter already enforces.
So it trips. It is also the only guard here whose trigger IS the billed quantity
itself, measured from parsed P1 telegrams, rather than a proxy for it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SATURATION IS REPORTED, NOT ALARMED AS A BUG
10.3's doctrine - "treat an out-of-range computed setpoint as a bug signal, clamp
it AND alarm" - is SAFETY-03's, and it is right there: a loop computing 14 768 W
is a winding integrator, i.e. a defect. A peak floor above the inverter's rating
is NOT a defect. It is the ordinary physics of a 5900 W house load on a 5000 W
inverter, which is literally what 2026-08-20 15:45 was. So the floor is clamped
to `achievable_w` and the decision carries `saturated`, and main.py raises ONE
notification on that - not because the controller is broken, but because it is
the one case where the money WILL be spent and the controller has already done
everything it can. An engagement that is not saturated is an ordinary control
action and goes to the action log, like the clamp's engagements do.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NO NEW OPTION. CFG-03 STILL TRACKS THREE PLACES.
`peak_cap_w` already ships, is already validated `int(500,15000)`, and is already
read by `control.peak_at_risk()`. `max_hold_s` comes off the averager the caller
already owns; `achievable_w` off `max_w` and the device rating the arbiter
already enforces; the freeze predicate off `meter_freeze_s`. config.yaml and
validate.py are untouched by this ticket, exactly as TARIFF-01 left them, and
14's `capacity_peak_limit_kw` stays declined - a kW key beside a W key is the
mismatch trap 14's own warning box describes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
⚠️ WHAT THIS GUARD DOES NOT HAVE: AN ENERGY BACKSTOP. SEE SAFETY-24.
The graded branch can FORCE DISCHARGE, and nothing in this file or in the loop
below it consults the state of charge - `soc_floor` belongs to the maintenance
cycle, and freeze.py already records that for the grid-following loop "the BMS
is the sole energy backstop". On the 2026-08-20 replay the guard asks for 878 Wh
in a day. Against a pack sitting near 9 % that is not nothing, and the guard will
keep asking as long as the meter says the quarter is over the ceiling.
That is deliberate for THIS card and it is filed as SAFETY-24. It is also the
reason this must not go to a client install before SAFETY-24 lands: on the
reference site the BMS is a known quantity and an operator is present, and on a
client site neither is true.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AND IT READS NO PER-PHASE QUANTITY, ON PURPOSE
The sum/max/net reduction is an open product question with the owner. TARIFF-01
put it behind `billed_w()` and defaulted to NET. Everything this module consumes
- `PeakReading.peak_w`, `Projection.projected_w` - is already reduced by that one
function, so whichever way the owner answers, this file does not change and does
not need re-testing. Nothing here indexes a phase.
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass
from .arbiter import P_PEAK, Claim
from .control import peak_at_risk
from .tariff import QUARTER_S
# Why the projection may not be graded. Reasons, not booleans: the status page
# and the action log both have to say WHICH, and "blind" alone is unactionable.
BLIND_NO_BLOCK = "no open quarter - the meter has produced no sample yet"
BLIND_COVERAGE = "meter gap"
BLIND_FROZEN = "SAFETY-18: the meter is answering without changing"
# Where the ceiling came from. Only the second is a relaxation, and only an
# OBSERVED reading may produce it.
CEILING_CAP = "peak_cap_w"
CEILING_MONTH_PEAK = "the month's banked peak"
SOURCE = "peak"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PeakDecision:
"""What the guard concluded this cycle, with everything it concluded it from.
Every field is derived from a measurement taken in the same cycle. There is
no `floor_w_or(default)` and there must not be one, for `PeakReading`'s
reason: an accessor that turns "not measured" into a number re-creates the
defect the type exists to remove.
"""
engaged: bool
floor_w: float | None # the `lo` the claim carries; None = no claim
ceiling_w: float
ceiling_from: str
blind: str | None = None
projected_w: float | None = None
excess_w: float = 0.0
wanted_w: float | None = None # the floor before `achievable_w` clamped it
saturated: bool = False
reason: str = ""
def explain(self) -> str:
if not self.engaged:
if self.projected_w is None:
return f"peak guard idle - {self.reason}"
return (f"peak guard idle - quarter projects "
f"{self.projected_w:.0f} W under a {self.ceiling_w:.0f} W "
f"ceiling ({self.ceiling_from})")
return self.reason
def quarter_ceiling_w(cap_w, reading) -> tuple[float, str]:
"""The average this quarter may not exceed, and where the number came from.
ONLY an OBSERVED reading may raise it. `NO_RECORD` (the store answered, this
month has nothing yet) and `NOT_OBSERVED` (the store did not answer) both
return the cap, which is the tighter answer. A failed read therefore makes
the guard stricter, never looser - see the module note.
"""
cap = float(cap_w)
if (reading is not None and getattr(reading, "is_observed", False)
and reading.peak_w is not None and float(reading.peak_w) > cap):
return float(reading.peak_w), CEILING_MONTH_PEAK
return cap, CEILING_CAP
def excess_w(projection, ceiling_w) -> float:
"""Watts that must come off the meter NOW to land the quarter on the ceiling.
The whole control law, and the only place it is written down:
excess = 900 * (projected - ceiling) / remaining
Positive means the quarter is projected over; zero or negative means it is
not. `remaining <= 0` is not a large number, it is an undefined one - a
quarter with no seconds left cannot be influenced - so it answers 0.0 rather
than dividing.
"""
remaining = QUARTER_S - float(projection.elapsed_s)
if remaining <= 0.0:
return 0.0
return QUARTER_S * (float(projection.projected_w) - float(ceiling_w)) / remaining
def uncovered_s(projection) -> float:
"""Seconds of the open block the meter did not actually cover.
Derived from what `Projection` already carries rather than re-measured:
`covered_frac` is `elapsed / elapsed_wall`, and `elapsed_s` IS that wall.
"""
return max(0.0, float(projection.elapsed_s)
* (1.0 - float(projection.covered_frac)))
def blindness(projection, max_hold_s, frozen: bool) -> str | None:
"""Why this projection may not be graded, or None if it may be.
Evaluated BEFORE the projection is compared to anything. Each of the three is
a way for the projected number to be confident and wrong, and the first - a
fresh averager's all-zero `Projection` - is confident, wrong AND under every
ceiling there is.
"""
if frozen:
return BLIND_FROZEN
if projection.block_start is None:
return BLIND_NO_BLOCK
gap = uncovered_s(projection)
if max_hold_s is not None and gap > float(max_hold_s):
return (f"{BLIND_COVERAGE}: {gap:.0f} s of this quarter uncovered, past "
f"the {float(max_hold_s):.0f} s the averager will hold a sample")
return None
def decide(projection, *, batt_w, cap_w, reading, achievable_w,
max_hold_s=None, frozen: bool = False) -> PeakDecision:
"""The whole guard. Pure: no clock, no I/O, no state carried between calls.
`batt_w` MEASURED battery power, positive = discharge. None when the
sensor for it is missing - and then there is nothing to size a
floor from, so no floor is invented.
`achievable_w` the largest discharge the arbiter could actually grant
(`min(max_w, device max)`). The floor is clamped to it so this
claim can NEVER produce `lo > hi` in the resolver - a
contradiction there resolves to 0 W, which would park the
battery in the exact minute it should be discharging hardest.
"""
ceiling, from_where = quarter_ceiling_w(cap_w, reading)
ceil_top = abs(float(achievable_w))
blind = blindness(projection, max_hold_s, frozen)
if blind is not None:
# 0.0, not a sized floor. There is no trustworthy measurement to size one
# from; the claim that remains is "do not add to the offtake you cannot
# see", which is one-directional and cannot cost pack energy.
return PeakDecision(
engaged=True, floor_w=0.0, ceiling_w=ceiling, ceiling_from=from_where,
blind=blind, projected_w=None,
reason=(f"PEAK GUARD BLIND ({blind}) - the battery may not import "
f"while the billed quarter cannot be measured; commanding no "
f"charging (floor 0 W)"))
projected = float(projection.projected_w)
if batt_w is None:
# main.py's P_SAFETY stop already owns a cycle with a missing input, at
# 0 W. Filing nothing is the honest answer: a floor sized from a
# measurement that is not there is a made-up number.
return PeakDecision(
engaged=False, floor_w=None, ceiling_w=ceiling,
ceiling_from=from_where, projected_w=projected,
reason="no battery measurement to size a floor from")
if QUARTER_S - float(projection.elapsed_s) <= 0.0:
# A block with no seconds left cannot be influenced. This is degenerate
# rather than urgent - `excess_w` answers 0.0 there and a floor equal to
# the battery's own current output would be a claim that says nothing.
return PeakDecision(
engaged=False, floor_w=None, ceiling_w=ceiling,
ceiling_from=from_where, projected_w=projected,
reason="the quarter has no seconds left to influence")
ex = excess_w(projection, ceiling)
wanted = float(batt_w) + ex
if wanted <= 0.0:
# ⚠️ THE TEST IS ON THE FLOOR, NOT ON `excess > 0`, AND THE REPLAY IS WHY.
# `excess` is the watts that must come off the METER, so it goes to zero
# as soon as the battery is already removing them - and a guard that
# disengaged there handed the actuator straight back, the offtake sprang
# back to the raw load, and the next cycle engaged again. On 2026-08-20's
# billed quarter that bang-bang cycled 17 times in 900 s and left the
# quarter 49 W over the limit it had just spent a quarter of an hour
# holding. §10.2: "an EMS that oscillates is worse than no EMS, both for
# hardware wear and - per §9.1 - for the peak it is trying to avoid."
#
# `batt_w + excess` is the offtake that would exist with the battery at
# zero, minus the level the quarter can afford. Testing THAT is the same
# arithmetic read as a level rather than as a switch: the claim is filed
# for as long as a positive floor is needed and decays continuously to
# nothing as the load falls, so there is still no hysteresis constant -
# the quantity being thresholded is simply the right one.
return PeakDecision(
engaged=False, floor_w=None, ceiling_w=ceiling,
ceiling_from=from_where, projected_w=projected, excess_w=ex,
wanted_w=wanted,
reason="the load is under the level this quarter can afford")
floor = min(wanted, ceil_top)
saturated = floor < wanted
return PeakDecision(
engaged=True, floor_w=floor, ceiling_w=ceiling, ceiling_from=from_where,
blind=None, projected_w=projected, excess_w=ex, wanted_w=wanted,
saturated=saturated,
reason=(
f"PEAK GUARD: quarter projects {projected:.0f} W against a "
f"{ceiling:.0f} W ceiling ({from_where}) with "
f"{QUARTER_S - projection.elapsed_s:.0f} s left, so {ex:.0f} W must "
f"come off the meter; battery measured {float(batt_w):+.0f} W, "
f"floor {floor:+.0f} W"
+ (f" - SATURATED, {wanted:+.0f} W was needed and the inverter can "
f"only give {ceil_top:.0f} W" if saturated else "")))
def shaping_suspended(decision, peak_forecast_w, cap_w) -> bool:
"""Must the maintenance charge-only shaping stand down this cycle?
THE ONE PLACE THIS CONJUNCTION IS WRITTEN, and it is public for the reason
`watchdog.loop_is_following()` and `freeze.looks_frozen()` are: the check
that grades it has to assert on THE SHIPPED EXPRESSION. A safety predicate
transcribed into its own test is one copy plus a future disagreement about
what the check means, and the copy that drifts is always the grading one.
It was inline in `main.py` and nothing could reach it; a reviewer mutated it
back to its historical broken form and all twelve suites stayed green.
⚠️ WHY SUPPRESSION AND NOT PRIORITY. The shaping is a LIMIT (`hi <= 0`) and
the peak guard's claim is a LIMIT (`lo >= 0`). arbiter.py clause 2 applies
EVERY limit at or above the winner's priority and takes the MOST RESTRICTIVE,
with no notion of one limit outranking another - which is precisely what
makes the safety bounds unconditional and must not be changed. Two crossing
limits are therefore a CONTRADICTION, which resolves to 0 W: the battery
PARKED, in the one quarter of the month that sets the bill. P_PEAK 50 >
P_MAINT_SHAPE 40 does not save it and never could.
⚠️ AND THE FIRST TERM IS NOT ENOUGH ON ITS OWN. `peak_forecast_entity` is
OPTIONAL and is empty on a default install, so `peak_forecast_w` is None
there and `peak_at_risk()` answers False forever. Before this card the
suspension therefore could not fire on the very site that needed it. The
second term is the MEASURED guard, which is always present wherever P1 is.
Deleting either term - or re-gating the whole thing on the forecast - parks
a default install at 0 W, silently, in the billed quarter. test_peakguard.py
part 7 drives the real cycle with each of those mutations in place.
"""
if peak_at_risk(peak_forecast_w, float(cap_w)):
return True
return decision is not None and decision.engaged
def claim(decision: PeakDecision) -> Claim | None:
"""The decision as one arbiter claim, or None when the guard is idle.
A LIMIT with only `lo` set. `hi` stays `+inf`, which is 9.1's "discharge and
export are never capped by the peak guard" expressed as a fact about the
object rather than as a rule somebody has to remember.
"""
if not decision.engaged or decision.floor_w is None:
return None
return Claim.limit(SOURCE, P_PEAK, lo=float(decision.floor_w),
reason=("blind" if decision.blind else "quarter peak"))
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"""FCST-03 - the hours the feed has not published yet, and what may not rest on them.
WHERE THIS LIVES. specs.md §2.2 puts price ingest under `ems/ingest/prices/`.
That layout does not exist and is not being built; the product owner's decision
of 2026-08-30 is that everything ships in `goodwe_controller/app/`. The
BEHAVIOUR §8.3 describes is unchanged and still authoritative - only the path
moved. Read `ems/...` as `app/...`.
§8.3, in full, because every line below is one clause of it:
"Day-ahead prices arrive once daily. Until they do, unknown hours use
yesterday's profile and are flagged `provisional: true` - and NO
IRREVERSIBLE ACTION MAY BE TAKEN ON A PROVISIONAL PRICE. Real-time /
imbalance products are treated as high-volatility: arbitrage thresholds
widen."
Three separate things, and this module owns the first two. The third - the
widening arithmetic - lives in price.py beside the product enum it is derived
from (`Uncertainty`, `widen_factor`, `required_spread`), and is spent by
`static_tariff.TariffPlan.arbitrage()`, because that is where the verdict this
repo already refuses to hand out casually is produced. FCST-03 added a refusal
to that existing ladder rather than a second mechanism beside it.
THE DEFECT THIS MODULE IS SHAPED BY: A COPY THAT KEEPS THE WRONG FLAG
=====================================================================
A point filled from yesterday and a point published this morning are the SAME
SHAPE. Three floats and a bool; only the bool tells them apart. And the natural
way to write a carry-forward fill is:
PricePoint(start=t, eur_per_kwh=y.eur_per_kwh, provisional=y.provisional)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
which copies yesterday's `False` onto today's guess and produces exactly the
thing the ticket exists to prevent: STALE DATA PRESENTED AS CURRENT. It reads
fine, it type-checks, it round-trips through §9.3's JSON, and every price on
the status page looks like a price. This is the meter-side SAFETY-18 defect one
layer up: the reading arrives on time, looks fresh, and is wrong - and a
freshness check that only asks "did something arrive" cannot see it.
So the flag is not passed through anywhere in this file:
* A CARRIED POINT IS BUILT BY `_carried()`, WHICH HAS NO PARAMETER FOR THE
FLAG. `provisional=True` is a literal in one place. There is no argument a
caller can pass, no keyword to forget, and no variable that could hold
yesterday's value at the moment the point is constructed.
* A PUBLISHED POINT IS NEVER COPIED AT ALL. It is passed through BY IDENTITY -
the object the provider produced is the object in the output series - so
there is no copy that could lose or gain a flag. `filled.points[i] is
fetched.points[j]` is a checkable property, and test_price_forecast.py
checks it.
* `_audit()` RE-DERIVES the expected flag for every output point from the set
of hours the feed actually published, and RAISES if any point disagrees.
It is a post-condition, not a filter: it never fixes a flag, because a
module that quietly corrects its own provenance is one whose provenance
cannot be trusted.
* and test_price_forecast.py walks THIS FILE'S AST and fails if any
`PricePoint(...)` in it passes anything but a literal for `provisional`, so
the pass-through idiom cannot come back in a later edit and pass review by
looking ordinary.
⚠️ "PUBLISHED" DOES NOT MEAN "FIRM". `eneco_eddy` is an imbalance product whose
current-quarter print is genuinely provisional and says so per point (§9.2,
TARIFF-02). Such a point is published AND provisional, and the audit's rule for
a published point is "the flag is whatever the feed said", never "False". A
provenance check that forced published points to False would be a bug that
looks like a guarantee.
THE FILL, AND WHY IT KEYS ON THE WALL CLOCK
===========================================
For every whole hour in the requested horizon that the feed has not published,
take yesterday's value for THE SAME BRUSSELS WALL-CLOCK HOUR - not `t - 86400
s`. On the two days a year that matter those are different instants, and the
difference is not academic: a 23-hour day has no 02:00 at all and a 25-hour day
has two, so a fill that subtracts a fixed 24 h shifts every carried hour by one
across a transition and misprices the whole day in a way nothing reports.
On the 25-hour day the two 02:00 hours - `02:00+02:00` and `02:00+01:00` - both
key to local hour 2 and are BOTH filled from yesterday's single 02:00 value.
That is deliberate: they are both guesses, they are both flagged, and nothing
irreversible may rest on either. If yesterday itself was a 25-hour day, the
first of its two 02:00 points is the one used, deterministically.
An hour with no published price AND no yesterday value is LEFT OUT of the
series. It is not filled with a neighbour, a mean, or a zero. §11.4 applies to
that hour - `_Series.at()` raises `Absence` for it - and the caller that wanted
a tariff for the whole horizon falls back to the static profile (TARIFF-03),
which is the row the spec actually writes for "no price data". If NOTHING can
be produced, the result is `PriceRead.no_data(reason)` and not an empty series,
because an empty series is not constructible on purpose (price.py trap 3).
AC2: THE IRREVERSIBLE-ACTION GATE
=================================
"The distinction should be an explicit property of the action, not a judgement
call at each call site" - so an irreversible action is a value, `Irreversible`,
carrying the number of hours it COMMITS. `price_permits()` looks at exactly
those hours and answers with a `Gate` variant that carries the evidence on the
permitting arm and a reason on the blocking one, the `_Outcome` shape price.py
borrowed from `sim/riglock.py`.
The shipped example is the maintenance drain (§12): starting one commits hours
of forced discharge that cannot be undone if the price turns out to have been
yesterday's. Its commitment window is DERIVED from `maintenance.DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN`
rather than typed here, so the gate and the phase machine cannot drift apart.
⚠️ WHAT DOES NOT GO THROUGH THIS GATE, AND WHY THAT MATTERS MORE THAN WHAT
DOES. The maintenance cycle is a CALENDAR obligation (§12.2: a cycle that
silently never fires is indistinguishable from one that is not due yet), and a
site with `price_provider: off` - the shipped default - has no price series at
all. Routing every maintenance start through a gate that blocks on `no_data`
would stop the monthly cycle on every default install, permanently and
silently: the exact failure §12 opens by naming. So `begin_phase()` is the
entry point for a start that is being JUSTIFIED BY A PRICE, main.py's existing
calendar path is untouched by this ticket, and OPT-04/MAINT-05 own the decision
of which one a site runs. Nothing here disables anything that runs today.
Reversible actions - ordinary self-consumption modulation, the loop that
actually holds the grid at zero - are not gated at all and cannot be: §6 says
absent machinery must not disable the loop.
"""
import logging
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from enum import Enum
from .maintenance import CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN, DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN
from .price import PricePoint, PriceRead, _Outcome, brussels
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.price.forecast")
class Provenance(Enum):
"""Where a point in a filled series came from. INTERNAL - §9.3's wire format
carries the boolean and nothing else, so this never leaves the module.
It exists so `_audit()` has a vocabulary to state its post-condition in, and
so the two cases have names in the log rather than being "the ones with the
flag" and "the others".
"""
PUBLISHED = "published" # the provider printed this hour. Flag: the
# feed's own - an imbalance print may be
# published AND provisional (§9.2).
CARRIED = "carried" # yesterday's same-wall-clock hour (§8.3).
# Flag: ALWAYS True, by construction.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# The fill
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def _utc_hour(instant: datetime) -> datetime:
u = instant.astimezone(timezone.utc)
return u.replace(minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0)
def _carried(start_utc: datetime, eur_per_kwh: float) -> PricePoint:
"""A point filled from yesterday's profile. §8.3: ALWAYS provisional.
⚠️ THERE IS NO `provisional` PARAMETER, AND THAT IS THE MECHANISM. This is
the only constructor of a carried point, the flag is a literal, and no
caller - including a future one editing in a hurry - has anything to pass,
default, or copy from the point being carried.
"""
return PricePoint(start=brussels(start_utc),
eur_per_kwh=round(float(eur_per_kwh), 6),
provisional=True)
def _audit(points, published) -> None:
"""Post-condition: every flag matches the point's TRUE provenance (AC1).
`published` maps a UTC hour to the point the provider produced for it.
⚠️ RAISES, NEVER REPAIRS. A module that silently corrects its own
provenance is one whose provenance means nothing; the only safe response to
"this point's flag disagrees with where it came from" is to refuse to emit
the series at all.
"""
seen = set()
for p in points:
u = _utc_hour(p.start)
if u in seen:
raise ValueError(f"the filled series repeats {u.isoformat()}; a "
f"duplicated hour is how a DST day gets mispriced")
seen.add(u)
src = published.get(u)
prov = Provenance.CARRIED if src is None else Provenance.PUBLISHED
if src is None:
if p.provisional is not True:
raise ValueError(
f"{u.isoformat()} is {prov.value} and is flagged "
f"provisional={p.provisional!r}. §8.3: an hour filled from "
f"yesterday's profile is provisional whether or not the "
f"number turns out to be right - the flag is a claim about "
f"PROVENANCE, not about accuracy.")
else:
if p is not src:
raise ValueError(
f"{u.isoformat()} is {prov.value} but the series carries a "
f"COPY of that point rather than the point itself. A copy "
f"is where the provisional flag gets lost; published points "
f"pass through by identity.")
def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
since: datetime, until: datetime,
stamp: datetime) -> PriceRead:
"""§8.3: fill the hours the feed has not published with yesterday's profile.
Every argument is required and keyword-only past the first. In particular
`yesterday` has NO DEFAULT: a fill with no yesterday to fill from is a
different situation from a fill that found nothing useful in one, and a
default `None` would make the two arrive looking identical.
Returns a `PriceRead`:
* a series, whose points are the provider's own objects for the hours it
published and `_carried()` points for the rest, ordered by instant;
* `no_data` when neither source can produce a single hour - never an
empty series, which is not constructible (price.py trap 3).
⚠️ IDEMPOTENT AND RE-RUNNABLE, WHICH IS THE §5.4 LATE-PUBLICATION CONTRACT.
Day-ahead publication at 14-16 h CET can be late or fail, so the fetcher
retries and this runs again against the fresher read. Published hours always
win over carried ones, so a re-run REPLACES a carried point with the real
print and the hour becomes firm - the flag and the number move together
because the whole series is rebuilt rather than patched in place.
"""
for name, value in (("since", since), ("until", until), ("stamp", stamp)):
if value.tzinfo is None or value.utcoffset() is None:
raise ValueError(f"{name} must be tz-aware; a naive instant is "
f"ambiguous for one hour every October")
published = read.match(
series=lambda r: {_utc_hour(p.start): p for p in r.points},
no_data=lambda _r: {})
# Yesterday's profile, keyed by BRUSSELS WALL-CLOCK HOUR. First point wins
# when yesterday itself was a 25-hour day and printed local hour 2 twice.
by_local_hour = {}
yesterday.match(
series=lambda r: [by_local_hour.setdefault(brussels(p.start).hour, p)
for p in r.points],
no_data=lambda _r: [])
out = []
u = _utc_hour(since)
end = until.astimezone(timezone.utc)
while u < end:
if u in published:
out.append(published[u]) # BY IDENTITY. No copy.
else:
src = by_local_hour.get(brussels(u).hour)
if src is not None:
out.append(_carried(u, src.eur_per_kwh))
u += timedelta(hours=1)
if not out:
reason = read.match(
series=lambda r: (f"the {len(r.points)} published hours all fall "
f"outside {since.isoformat()}..{until.isoformat()}"),
no_data=lambda r: r.reason)
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"§8.3 carry-forward produced no hours: {reason}, and yesterday's "
f"profile has nothing to fill them with either. §11.4 applies: "
f"static profile, plan provisional, no arbitrage")
_audit(out, published)
carried = sum(1 for p in out if _utc_hour(p.start) not in published)
if carried:
_LOG.info("§8.3: %d of %d hours carried forward from yesterday's "
"profile and flagged provisional; %d published",
carried, len(out), len(out) - carried)
product = read.match(series=lambda r: r.product,
no_data=lambda _r: yesterday.product)
provider = read.match(series=lambda r: r.provider,
no_data=lambda r: yesterday.provider)
return PriceRead.series(out, product, provider, stamp)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# AC2: irreversibility as a property of the ACTION, and the gate that reads it
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Irreversible:
"""An action that cannot be undone once started, and how far it commits.
`commits_h` is the horizon the action ties up - the hours whose prices must
therefore be firm before it may be justified by a price at all.
"""
name: str # the §10.2 reason code
commits_h: float
def __post_init__(self):
if not self.name or not isinstance(self.name, str):
raise ValueError("an irreversible action needs a reason code (§10.2)")
if isinstance(self.commits_h, bool) or \
not isinstance(self.commits_h, (int, float)) or \
not self.commits_h > 0:
raise ValueError(
f"commits_h must be a positive number of hours, not "
f"{self.commits_h!r}. An action that commits nothing is a "
f"reversible one and does not belong here.")
# ⚠️ DERIVED FROM THE PHASE MACHINE'S OWN BOUNDS, NOT TYPED HERE. maintenance.py
# already states how long each phase may run before it is a fault; a second copy
# of those numbers here would be a place for them to drift apart, and the drift
# would show up as a gate that checked the wrong hours.
MAINTENANCE_DRAIN = Irreversible("MAINTENANCE_DRAIN", DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN / 60.0)
MAINTENANCE_CHARGE = Irreversible("MAINTENANCE_CHARGE", CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN / 60.0)
class Gate(_Outcome):
"""May an irreversible action proceed on the price evidence available?
* `permitted` - carries `.action` and `.hours`, the firm points that were
actually checked. The evidence exists only on this arm.
* `blocked` - carries `.reason`. Nothing else; `.hours` raises `Absence`.
No `__bool__`, both `match()` arms required and keyword-only, for the reason
price.py's `_Outcome` gives: `if gate:` must not look like a guard while
being none.
"""
def match(self, *, permitted, blocked):
return {"permitted": permitted, "blocked": blocked}[self.kind](self)
@staticmethod
def permit(action, hours):
return _Permitted(action, hours)
@staticmethod
def block(reason):
if not reason or not isinstance(reason, str):
raise ValueError(
"Gate.block() takes a reason a human can act on. §6 requires "
"every decision to explain itself, and 'the maintenance cycle "
"did not start' with no reason is indistinguishable from a bug.")
return _Blocked(reason)
class _Permitted(Gate):
kind = "permitted"
def __init__(self, action, hours):
if not isinstance(action, Irreversible):
raise TypeError(f"action must be an Irreversible, not {action!r}")
pts = tuple(hours)
if not pts:
raise ValueError(
"a permission granted over ZERO checked hours is a permission "
"granted on no evidence - the shape this whole file exists to "
"refuse. Block instead.")
if any(p.provisional for p in pts):
raise ValueError(
"a permitted gate cannot carry a provisional hour: §8.3 is the "
"one rule this type has.")
self.action = action
self.hours = pts
self.words = (f"{action.name} permitted on {len(pts)} firm hours "
f"({pts[0].start.isoformat()} ..)")
class _Blocked(Gate):
kind = "blocked"
def __init__(self, reason):
self.reason = reason
self.words = f"blocked - {reason}"
def committed_hours(now: datetime, action: Irreversible) -> tuple:
"""The whole hours `action` started at `now` would run through.
Split out because the gate and its caller must agree on what "the hours it
commits" means, and because a window that quietly excluded the last hour
would be a gate that permits an action on an hour it never looked at.
"""
if not isinstance(action, Irreversible):
raise TypeError(f"action must be an Irreversible, not {action!r}")
if now.tzinfo is None or now.utcoffset() is None:
raise ValueError("now must be tz-aware")
out = []
u = _utc_hour(now)
end = now.astimezone(timezone.utc) + timedelta(hours=action.commits_h)
while u < end:
out.append(u)
u += timedelta(hours=1)
return tuple(out)
def price_permits(read: PriceRead, now: datetime,
action: Irreversible) -> Gate:
"""§8.3's rule, as a value: may this irreversible action rest on this price?
Blocks when the read observed nothing (§11.4 - an action justified by a
price nobody has is an action justified by nothing), when any hour it
commits has no price at all, and when any of those hours is provisional.
Names the offending hour, so an operator reading the log knows which one.
"""
hours = committed_hours(now, action)
return read.match(
series=lambda r: _walk(r, hours, action),
no_data=lambda r: Gate.block(
f"{action.name} is gated on a price and there is no price data: "
f"{r.reason}. §11.4 - and a missing price is not a cheap one"))
def _walk(series, hours, action) -> Gate:
pts = []
for u in hours:
if not series.covers(u):
return Gate.block(
f"{action.name} commits {action.commits_h:g} h from "
f"{hours[0].isoformat()} and no price covers "
f"{u.isoformat()}. An hour outside the series is an hour with "
f"no price (§11.4 for that hour), not a free one")
p = series.at(u)
if p.provisional:
return Gate.block(
f"{action.name} commits {action.commits_h:g} h from "
f"{hours[0].isoformat()} and {u.isoformat()} is PROVISIONAL - "
f"carried from yesterday's profile or standing in for a dead "
f"feed. §8.3: no irreversible action may be taken on a "
f"provisional price. It becomes available when the day-ahead "
f"print lands (~14-16 h CET, §5.4)")
pts.append(p)
return Gate.permit(action, pts)
def begin_phase(maint, now: datetime, read: PriceRead,
action: Irreversible) -> Gate:
"""Start a maintenance phase BECAUSE OF A PRICE, or refuse and say why.
The AC2 example made real: `maint.force_start(now)` - the call that moves
the phase machine out of `idle` and commits the pack to hours of forced
discharge - happens on the permitting arm and cannot happen on the other
one, because the blocking arm has no code path to it.
⚠️ READ THE MODULE DOCSTRING'S LAST WARNING BEFORE WIRING THIS IN. This is
the price-justified entry point, not the calendar one; a site with no price
provider must keep starting its monthly cycle the way it does today, or
§12's opening sentence comes true - a cycle that silently never fires.
"""
gate = price_permits(read, now, action)
return gate.match(permitted=lambda g: _go(maint, now, g),
blocked=lambda g: _no(g))
def _go(maint, now, gate) -> Gate:
maint.force_start(now)
_LOG.info("%s: %s", gate.action.name, gate.words)
return gate
def _no(gate) -> Gate:
_LOG.warning("irreversible action refused - %s", gate.reason)
return gate
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+23 -2
View File
@@ -22,11 +22,30 @@ _LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.store")
# `auto_start` option only when the key is absent - if a default supplied False,
# the fallback could never fire and auto_start would silently do nothing on
# every fresh install.
#
# ⚠️ `sign_tripped` IS in here, and the difference from `auto` is the whole
# reason both decisions are written down. `auto` has an option to fall back to
# (`auto_start`), so a stored default would mask a fresh install. A latched
# failsafe has no such fallback: absent means "never tripped", which is exactly
# what a default of False says.
#
# It is persisted for the reason this module's docstring gives for maintenance
# state, applied to something with a much shorter fuse. SAFETY-02's latch is the
# only thing standing between a controller that has been caught driving the wrong
# way and its own restart, and "restart the add-on" is the FIRST thing an operator
# looking at a FAILSAFE banner will try. Held only in memory it came back armed,
# into the fault, unattended - measured: after reconstructing Controller against
# the same store, `tripped` was False, the banner read NOT READY, and it resumed
# commanding -1000, -2000 W before re-tripping 180 s later. Under a supervisor
# that restarts a crashed add-on that is a loop, three minutes of wrong-direction
# power at a time, forever.
DEFAULTS = {
"phase": "idle",
"phase_started": None,
"last_completed": None,
"last_start_attempt": None,
"sign_tripped": False,
"sign_reason": "",
}
@@ -42,8 +61,10 @@ class Store:
loaded = json.load(fh)
if isinstance(loaded, dict):
self.data = {**DEFAULTS, **loaded}
_LOG.info("state restored: phase=%s last_completed=%s",
self.data.get("phase"), self.data.get("last_completed"))
_LOG.info("state restored: phase=%s last_completed=%s "
"sign_tripped=%s",
self.data.get("phase"), self.data.get("last_completed"),
self.data.get("sign_tripped"))
except FileNotFoundError:
_LOG.info("no saved state, starting fresh")
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError) as err:
+702
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,702 @@
"""TARIFF-01 - the monthly capacity-tariff peak, and the record that outlives it.
WHAT THIS IS, AND WHAT IT DELIBERATELY IS NOT. This module is an INSTRUMENT. It
measures the number the Belgian capaciteitstarief bills on - the highest
15-minute average offtake of the calendar month (Fluvius / Resa / Ores) - and it
writes that number down somewhere a restart cannot reach. It makes no claim,
applies no clamp, and commands nothing. The guard that will read it is SAFETY-07,
and it belongs in `arbiter.py` as a `P_PEAK` claim when it is built. Keeping the
measurement and the actuation apart is the whole reason this file is small.
WHAT WAS ALREADY BUILT, AND WHY THIS CARD IS NOT 8 SP OF NEW ARITHMETIC.
`p1.QuarterAverager` already computes AC 1 in full: clock-aligned 900 s blocks,
time-weighted over irregular telegram spacing, offtake-only, per-phase, with a
`max_hold_s` gap rule. It was unwired and unpersisted - `P1Ingest.blocks` is a
96-entry list in memory that a restart erases. So this file is the persistence
and the monthly reduction, not a second accumulator. Adding one would be adding
a second source of truth for the exact quantity the money depends on.
BLOCKS, NOT A SLIDING WINDOW. The Description says "rolling"; AC 1 says
"15-min block average". They are different numbers and the utility bills the
second one. §9.1 calls the billed unit the "highest 15-minute average offtake",
and §9.1's own worked case - "one 4998 W quarter moved a monthly peak from
4832 -> 5013 W" - is stated per QUARTER, an object a sliding window does not
have. "Rolling" here means CONTINUOUSLY UPDATED (the open block's partial
average is readable at every sample), not a trailing-15-minutes window. A
trailing window would report a peak the meter never bills, and it reports it
HIGHER than the real one: a load burst straddling :15 fills a trailing window
completely while contributing to two block averages at partial weight. Guarding
that would spend battery defending an interval nobody charges for.
DELIVERED POWER, NOT INTENDED POWER. SAFETY-20 has an open question about
whether guards should grade `Decision.target` (pre-clamp intent) or `standing`
(what actually reached the wire). For a capacity tariff there is no question to
ask: the utility's meter integrates the current that flowed. This module never
sees a setpoint at all - it consumes `P1Sample`, which is the meter's own
reading - and that is on purpose. A peak computed from intent would be wrong in
the expensive direction (a clamped 9 kW request that delivered 5 kW would
record 9 kW, and every consumer would shave against a peak that never existed).
AN UNREADABLE STORE IS NOT A ZERO PEAK. This is the defect this repo spent a
day removing from `sim/riglock.py`, where `holder()` was rewritten to answer
`observed / not_observed / gone` instead of a partial dict every caller
`.get()`s a default out of. The same trap is here and it is worse, because the
degenerate value is not merely wrong, it is DISARMING: a peak read as 0 W gives
SAFETY-07 the maximum possible headroom and silently switches the guard off at
the moment its own storage is broken. So `peak()` returns a `PeakReading` whose
`state` is one of OBSERVED / NO_RECORD / NOT_OBSERVED, `peak_w` is `None`
unless the state is OBSERVED, and there is no `.get(..., 0)` shaped accessor
anywhere on it. NO_RECORD ("this month has no completed block yet", a normal
state on the 1st) and NOT_OBSERVED ("the database did not answer") are
different types of thing and are never spelled the same way.
CONFIG: NONE ADDED, ON PURPOSE. CFG-03 is open because the option defaults
already live in three places held apart by a tripwire in `test_validate.py`. The
soft limit this measurement is graded against already exists as `peak_cap_w`
(config.yaml, default 3500), already validated, already read by
`control.peak_at_risk()`. §14 names a `tariffs.capacity_peak_limit_kw: 2.5` - in
KILOwatts, against watts everywhere else - and adding it would have made a fourth
defaults site AND imported the unit mismatch §14's own warning box says must be
caught at startup. So this module takes its limit as a plain constructor
argument in WATTS and config.yaml is untouched by this ticket.
THE DATABASE. SQLite in /data, the add-on's only durable volume, alongside
`store.py`'s state.json. Two tiers from §15, and their retention is the point:
quarter_blocks one row per completed 900 s block INDEFINITE
monthly_peak one row per calendar month PERMANENT
Neither is ever pruned here, and no sweep in this file can prune them - there is
no DELETE statement against either table anywhere in this module. §15's asymmetry
is why: raw samples vanish after 7 days, so a 15-minute aggregate that was not
written AS IT HAPPENED can never be recomputed. `monthly_peak` is maintained as a
derived record - upserted on every block close, and `recompute_month()` re-derives
it from `quarter_blocks` so the two can be PROVEN not to have diverged rather
than assumed not to have.
RESTART MID-BLOCK. The open block's accumulator is memory. A restart at minute 12
that dropped it would under-read the rest of the quarter, and SAFETY-07's clamp
would release exactly when it was most needed. So the accumulator is checkpointed
(`QuarterAverager.snapshot()`) into a single row, at most `CHECKPOINT_S` stale,
and restored on startup. Three cases, all of them exercised in `test_tariff.py`:
* the checkpoint's block is the block containing `now` -> restore it verbatim,
including the held sample's ORIGINAL timestamp, so the first sample after the
restart integrates the gap under the same `max_hold_s` rule a running process
would have applied. A restart longer than `max_hold_s` therefore leaves
uncovered seconds, and a closed block is always divided by the full 900 s, so
the gap DRAGS THE BILLED AVERAGE DOWN instead of being averaged away;
* the checkpoint's block ended while we were down -> that block really happened
and its measured part is real, so it is closed at `acc / 900` and recorded,
then a fresh block is opened. Discarding it would lose measured energy;
* no checkpoint, or one that cannot be read -> start clean and SAY SO. The
return value of `restore()` names which of the three happened; it is never
silently the first one.
Double counting is answered structurally rather than by care: `quarter_start` is
the PRIMARY KEY, and the recorded average may only ever be RAISED by a later
write (`ON CONFLICT ... WHERE excluded.offtake_avg_w > ...`). Replaying the same
block twice is therefore a no-op, and a restart that reprocesses a block with
LESS coverage than the first pass cannot lower a figure already banked.
MONTH BOUNDARY. Calendar months are LOCAL (Europe/Brussels); blocks are stored in
UTC. In August those differ by two hours, so a block starting 2026-08-31 22:15
UTC belongs to SEPTEMBER and putting it in August would move a month's bill.
Block alignment itself needs no timezone - every Belgian offset is a whole number
of hours, so the 900 s UTC grid lands on :00/:15/:30/:45 local on both sides of a
DST transition, which is the argument `QuarterAverager` already carries.
"""
import json
import logging
import os
import sqlite3
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone, tzinfo
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.tariff")
QUARTER_S = 900
# How stale the partial-block checkpoint may be. This is the ONLY thing a crash
# can lose from an open block, and the loss is bounded and one-directional: the
# lost seconds were already integrated into `_acc`, so dropping them makes the
# restored block read LOW, never high. At 15 s against a 900 s block the
# worst-case under-read of one quarter's average is 15/900 = 1.7 % of that
# quarter's own offtake - see test_tariff.py, which computes that bound from
# these two constants rather than quoting it.
CHECKPOINT_S = 15.0
# -- reading states. Three, and never fewer. -------------------------------- #
OBSERVED = "observed" # the store answered and there is a peak
NO_RECORD = "no_record" # the store answered and this month has none yet
NOT_OBSERVED = "not_observed" # the store did not answer. NOT a zero peak.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# local time, without a hard dependency on the tz database
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class _EUTimezone(tzinfo):
"""Europe/Brussels by the EU harmonised rule, for hosts with no tzdata.
⚠️ THIS IS A FALLBACK AND IT IS NOT SILENT. `zoneinfo` is tried first and is
what runs on the add-on's container. The fallback exists because the
alternative - quietly using UTC when tzdata is missing - misfiles every block
in the last two hours of a month into the wrong month's bill, and does it
without a symptom. Encoding the rule (CET, CEST from 01:00 UTC on the last
Sunday of March to 01:00 UTC on the last Sunday of October) is 20 lines and
is checked against zoneinfo, date by date, wherever zoneinfo is available.
"""
# The rule, in both frames. `fromutc` is overridden rather than inherited
# because the base implementation calls back into `utcoffset` with a
# datetime whose tzinfo is self - and the first version of this class
# answered that by calling `astimezone`, which calls `utcoffset`, which
# recursed until the stack ran out. A tzinfo must answer from the value it
# is handed, never by converting it.
@staticmethod
def _last_sunday(year: int, month: int, hour: int) -> datetime:
d = datetime(year, month + 1, 1) - timedelta(days=1)
return (d - timedelta(days=(d.weekday() + 1) % 7)).replace(hour=hour)
def _dst_local(self, naive: datetime) -> bool:
"""From a LOCAL wall clock: 02:00 CET last Sunday March -> 03:00 CEST
last Sunday October. The one ambiguous hour each autumn resolves to
standard time, which cannot move a month boundary."""
y = naive.year
return self._last_sunday(y, 3, 2) <= naive < self._last_sunday(y, 10, 3)
def _dst_utc(self, naive_utc: datetime) -> bool:
"""From UTC: both EU transitions happen at 01:00 UTC, everywhere."""
y = naive_utc.year
return self._last_sunday(y, 3, 1) <= naive_utc < self._last_sunday(y, 10, 1)
def fromutc(self, dt: datetime) -> datetime:
return dt + timedelta(hours=2 if self._dst_utc(dt.replace(tzinfo=None)) else 1)
def utcoffset(self, dt):
if dt is None:
return timedelta(hours=1)
return timedelta(hours=2 if self._dst_local(dt.replace(tzinfo=None)) else 1)
def dst(self, dt):
if dt is None:
return timedelta(0)
return timedelta(hours=1 if self._dst_local(dt.replace(tzinfo=None)) else 0)
def tzname(self, dt):
return "CEST" if dt is not None and self._dst_local(dt.replace(tzinfo=None)) else "CET"
def _billing_tz():
try:
from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo
tz = ZoneInfo("Europe/Brussels")
# Prove it resolves before trusting it: a ZoneInfo built from an empty
# tzdata answers, and answering wrongly is the failure being avoided.
if datetime(2026, 7, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc).astimezone(tz).hour == 2:
return tz
_LOG.warning("zoneinfo Europe/Brussels resolved but gave the wrong "
"summer offset - falling back to the encoded EU rule")
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - any failure
_LOG.info("no usable tz database (%s) - using the encoded EU rule", err)
return _EUTimezone()
BILLING_TZ = _billing_tz()
def month_key(when: datetime) -> str:
"""The calendar month a UTC instant is billed in, as 'YYYY-MM' LOCAL time."""
if when.tzinfo is None:
when = when.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
local = when.astimezone(BILLING_TZ)
return f"{local.year:04d}-{local.month:02d}"
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# the per-phase reduction policy - one function, deliberately
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# §9.1 requires the average be computed per-phase-aware, but does NOT say whether
# the BILLED figure on a three-phase connection is the sum of the phases or the
# worst single phase. §5.2 requires the per-phase data; nothing states the
# reduction. So it is one function with one argument, and correcting it later is
# a one-line change plus a test parameter rather than a change to the
# accumulator. §17's "Three-phase unbalanced load" scenario is the case that
# tells the three apart - on a balanced load all three agree, which is exactly
# why a balanced fixture must not be what this is tested on.
POLICY_NET = "net" # default: the connection's net offtake, what the meter bills
POLICY_SUM = "sum" # sum of the per-phase offtakes (differs when a phase exports)
POLICY_MAX = "max" # the worst single phase
def billed_w(block, policy: str = POLICY_NET) -> float:
"""Reduce one closed block to the single figure the month is billed on."""
pp = getattr(block, "per_phase_offtake_avg_w", None)
if policy == POLICY_NET or not pp:
return float(block.offtake_avg_w)
if policy == POLICY_SUM:
return float(sum(pp))
if policy == POLICY_MAX:
return float(max(pp))
raise ValueError(f"unknown per-phase reduction policy: {policy!r}")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# what a read of the store answers
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class PeakReading:
"""An answer about a month's peak, or an honest refusal to give one.
⚠️ There is no `peak_w_or(default)` and there must never be one. Every
accessor that lets a caller turn "the database did not answer" into a number
re-creates the defect this type exists to remove. Callers ask `is_observed`
first, and a caller that forgets gets `None` and a TypeError, which is loud.
"""
state: str
month: str
peak_w: float | None = None
quarter_start: datetime | None = None
per_phase_w: tuple | None = None
detail: str = ""
@property
def is_observed(self) -> bool:
return self.state == OBSERVED
@property
def is_unreadable(self) -> bool:
return self.state == NOT_OBSERVED
def explain(self) -> str:
if self.state == OBSERVED:
at = self.quarter_start.isoformat() if self.quarter_start else "?"
return f"{self.month}: peak {self.peak_w:.0f} W, set by the quarter at {at}"
if self.state == NO_RECORD:
return f"{self.month}: no completed quarter recorded yet"
return (f"{self.month}: PEAK UNREADABLE ({self.detail}) - this is NOT a "
f"zero peak and must not be used as headroom")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# the store
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
_SCHEMA = """
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS quarter_blocks (
quarter_start TEXT PRIMARY KEY, -- ISO-8601 UTC, aligned to 900 s
month TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'YYYY-MM', LOCAL calendar month
offtake_avg_w REAL NOT NULL,
per_phase_json TEXT
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS ix_quarter_month ON quarter_blocks(month);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS monthly_peak (
month TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
peak_w REAL NOT NULL,
quarter_start TEXT NOT NULL,
per_phase_json TEXT
);
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS partial_block (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
state_json TEXT NOT NULL
);
"""
class PeakStore:
"""SQLite behind /data. Every read answers with a state, never with a default."""
def __init__(self, path: str = "/data/tariff.db"):
self.path = path
self.ok = False
self.last_error: str | None = None
self._db: sqlite3.Connection | None = None
self._open()
def _open(self) -> None:
parent = os.path.dirname(self.path)
# ⚠️ THE DIRECTORY IS NOT CREATED. /data is mounted by the Supervisor and
# always exists on a real install, so `makedirs` here could only ever
# succeed where the durable volume is MISSING - manufacturing a database
# on the container's ephemeral layer that looks durable, reads fine, and
# is thrown away on the next restart. That is a peak store that silently
# forgets, which is worse than one that says it cannot answer.
if parent and not os.path.isdir(parent):
self.last_error = f"no durable volume at {parent}"
# INFO, not ERROR: on a dev host or in a test container there is no
# /data and nothing is wrong. A store that OPENED and then broke is
# the error case, and it is logged as one below.
_LOG.info("no peak store: %s - the monthly peak will read "
"NOT_OBSERVED", self.last_error)
return
try:
self._db = sqlite3.connect(self.path, timeout=5.0,
check_same_thread=False)
# WAL: a power cut mid-write must not leave a torn database that
# reads as "no peak this month" - the exact shape of the defect.
self._db.execute("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL")
self._db.executescript(_SCHEMA)
self._db.commit()
self.ok = True
self.last_error = None
except sqlite3.Error as err:
self._db = None
self.ok = False
self.last_error = str(err)
# ⚠️ Deliberately NOT raised. §6's fail-open rule: an aggregation
# fault must not stop a controller that is regulating a battery. The
# cost of continuing is a peak that reads NOT_OBSERVED, and every
# reader is built to treat that as "do not use me", not as 0 W.
_LOG.error("peak store unusable at %s (%s) - the monthly peak will "
"read NOT_OBSERVED, which is not a zero peak", self.path, err)
def close(self) -> None:
if self._db is not None:
try:
self._db.close()
finally:
self._db = None
self.ok = False
# -- writing ------------------------------------------------------------
def record_block(self, block, policy: str = POLICY_NET) -> bool:
"""Persist one completed block and fold it into its month's peak.
Both tables move in ONE transaction. A crash between them would leave a
banked quarter that the monthly peak does not know about, and the peak is
the record the money is read off.
"""
if self._db is None:
return False
w = billed_w(block, policy)
start = block.start.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
month = month_key(block.start)
pp = getattr(block, "per_phase_offtake_avg_w", None)
pp_json = json.dumps(list(pp)) if pp else None
try:
with self._db:
# A block may only ever be RAISED. A restart that reprocesses a
# quarter it had already banked will have LESS coverage than the
# first pass (its first seconds are gone), so an unconditional
# REPLACE would silently lower a recorded figure.
self._db.execute(
"INSERT INTO quarter_blocks(quarter_start, month, offtake_avg_w, per_phase_json)"
" VALUES(?,?,?,?)"
" ON CONFLICT(quarter_start) DO UPDATE SET"
" offtake_avg_w=excluded.offtake_avg_w,"
" per_phase_json=excluded.per_phase_json"
" WHERE excluded.offtake_avg_w > quarter_blocks.offtake_avg_w",
(start, month, w, pp_json))
self._db.execute(
"INSERT INTO monthly_peak(month, peak_w, quarter_start, per_phase_json)"
" VALUES(?,?,?,?)"
" ON CONFLICT(month) DO UPDATE SET"
" peak_w=excluded.peak_w,"
" quarter_start=excluded.quarter_start,"
" per_phase_json=excluded.per_phase_json"
" WHERE excluded.peak_w > monthly_peak.peak_w",
(month, w, start, pp_json))
return True
except sqlite3.Error as err:
self.last_error = str(err)
_LOG.error("could not record quarter %s (%s)", start, err)
return False
# -- reading ------------------------------------------------------------
def peak(self, when: datetime | None = None, month: str | None = None) -> PeakReading:
"""The billed peak for a month. Three possible answers, never a default."""
if month is None:
month = month_key(when or datetime.now(timezone.utc))
if self._db is None:
return PeakReading(NOT_OBSERVED, month,
detail=self.last_error or "store never opened")
try:
row = self._db.execute(
"SELECT peak_w, quarter_start, per_phase_json FROM monthly_peak"
" WHERE month=?", (month,)).fetchone()
except sqlite3.Error as err:
self.last_error = str(err)
return PeakReading(NOT_OBSERVED, month, detail=str(err))
if row is None:
return PeakReading(NO_RECORD, month)
pp = tuple(json.loads(row[2])) if row[2] else None
return PeakReading(OBSERVED, month, peak_w=float(row[0]),
quarter_start=datetime.fromisoformat(row[1]),
per_phase_w=pp)
def recompute_month(self, month: str) -> PeakReading:
"""Re-derive the peak from `quarter_blocks` - the divergence check.
`monthly_peak` is a derived record, so it can be PROVEN equal to the
tier it derives from instead of trusted to be. Read-only.
"""
if self._db is None:
return PeakReading(NOT_OBSERVED, month,
detail=self.last_error or "store never opened")
try:
row = self._db.execute(
"SELECT offtake_avg_w, quarter_start, per_phase_json FROM quarter_blocks"
" WHERE month=? ORDER BY offtake_avg_w DESC, quarter_start ASC LIMIT 1",
(month,)).fetchone()
except sqlite3.Error as err:
self.last_error = str(err)
return PeakReading(NOT_OBSERVED, month, detail=str(err))
if row is None:
return PeakReading(NO_RECORD, month)
pp = tuple(json.loads(row[2])) if row[2] else None
return PeakReading(OBSERVED, month, peak_w=float(row[0]),
quarter_start=datetime.fromisoformat(row[1]),
per_phase_w=pp)
def blocks_in(self, month: str) -> list:
"""(quarter_start, offtake_avg_w) for a month, oldest first. [] on error
is safe here ONLY because no caller reads emptiness as a peak - AC 3's
counter reports the sample size it actually got."""
if self._db is None:
return []
try:
return [(datetime.fromisoformat(a), float(b)) for a, b in self._db.execute(
"SELECT quarter_start, offtake_avg_w FROM quarter_blocks"
" WHERE month=? ORDER BY quarter_start", (month,))]
except sqlite3.Error as err:
self.last_error = str(err)
return []
# -- the open block's checkpoint ----------------------------------------
def save_partial(self, state: dict) -> bool:
if self._db is None:
return False
try:
with self._db:
self._db.execute(
"INSERT INTO partial_block(id, state_json) VALUES(1,?)"
" ON CONFLICT(id) DO UPDATE SET state_json=excluded.state_json",
(json.dumps(state),))
return True
except (sqlite3.Error, TypeError, ValueError) as err:
self.last_error = str(err)
return False
def load_partial(self) -> dict | None:
if self._db is None:
return None
try:
row = self._db.execute(
"SELECT state_json FROM partial_block WHERE id=1").fetchone()
return json.loads(row[0]) if row else None
except (sqlite3.Error, ValueError) as err:
self.last_error = str(err)
return None
def clear_partial(self) -> None:
# The one DELETE in this module, and it is against the checkpoint - a
# scratch row, not a retention tier. Neither quarter_blocks nor
# monthly_peak is deleted from anywhere in this file.
if self._db is None:
return
try:
with self._db:
self._db.execute("DELETE FROM partial_block WHERE id=1")
except sqlite3.Error as err:
self.last_error = str(err)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# the tracker: what main.py holds
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Projection:
"""The open block's end-of-quarter estimate, with the reasons to distrust it.
`elapsed_s` travels WITH the number rather than beside it, because early in a
quarter a projection is a 10-second extrapolation over 900 s and a consumer
that cannot see that will react to noise. `covered_frac` is separately useful:
it is below 1.0 when the meter had a gap, which is the "unreliable quarter"
the functional note asks be marked rather than reported low.
"""
projected_w: float
elapsed_w: float
elapsed_s: float
covered_frac: float
complete: bool
block_start: datetime | None
held_w: float
def explain(self) -> str:
return (f"quarter projects {self.projected_w:.0f} W "
f"({self.elapsed_s:.0f} s elapsed, {self.covered_frac * 100:.0f} % covered"
+ ("" if self.complete else ", INCOMPLETE") + ")")
class PeakTracker:
"""Drives the store from `P1Ingest`. Measures; never commands."""
def __init__(self, store: PeakStore, cap_w: float = 3500.0,
policy: str = POLICY_NET, checkpoint_s: float = CHECKPOINT_S):
self.store = store
self.cap_w = float(cap_w)
self.policy = policy
self.checkpoint_s = float(checkpoint_s)
self.recorded = 0
self.restore_state = "not attempted"
self._seen: set = set()
self._last_ckpt = 0.0
# -- startup ------------------------------------------------------------
def restore(self, averager, now: datetime | None = None) -> str:
"""Put the open block back. Returns which of the three cases happened."""
now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
snap = self.store.load_partial()
if not snap:
self.restore_state = ("fresh: no checkpoint" if self.store.ok
else "fresh: store unreadable")
return self.restore_state
block = snap.get("block")
if block is None:
self.restore_state = "fresh: checkpoint had no open block"
return self.restore_state
current = int(now.timestamp() // QUARTER_S) * QUARTER_S
if block == current:
if not averager.restore(snap):
# A reshaped accumulator (meter_phases changed) is a different
# measurement, not a resumable one. Say so; do not half-resume.
self.store.clear_partial()
self.restore_state = "fresh: checkpoint does not fit this averager"
return self.restore_state
self.restore_state = (
f"resumed the open block at {snap.get('elapsed', 0.0):.0f} s "
f"of {QUARTER_S} s ({snap.get('acc', 0.0) / QUARTER_S:.0f} W banked)")
return self.restore_state
# The block ended while the add-on was down. Its measured part really
# happened, so bank it at acc/900 rather than discard measured energy.
# It reads LOW because the seconds after the shutdown were never covered,
# and that is the honest figure: coverage a closed block did not get.
closed = _ClosedBlock(
start=datetime.fromtimestamp(block, timezone.utc),
offtake_avg_w=float(snap.get("acc", 0.0)) / QUARTER_S,
per_phase_offtake_avg_w=(tuple(v / QUARTER_S for v in snap["pp_acc"])
if snap.get("pp_acc") and snap.get("last_pp") else None))
banked = self.store.record_block(closed, self.policy)
self.store.clear_partial()
self.restore_state = (
f"closed a stale block from {closed.start.isoformat()} at "
f"{closed.offtake_avg_w:.0f} W (partial coverage), "
+ ("banked" if banked else "NOT banked - store unwritable"))
return self.restore_state
# -- steady state -------------------------------------------------------
def sync(self, ingest, now_mono: float | None = None) -> int:
"""Bank any blocks that closed, and refresh the checkpoint. Returns the
number of blocks newly recorded on this call."""
import time as _t
n = 0
for block in getattr(ingest, "blocks", ()):
key = block.start.timestamp()
if key in self._seen:
continue
if self.store.record_block(block, self.policy):
self._seen.add(key)
self.recorded += 1
n += 1
if n:
# A block just closed, so the checkpoint's block is gone: clearing it
# in the same breath is what stops a crash here from replaying it.
self.store.clear_partial()
self._last_ckpt = 0.0
self.checkpoint(ingest, now_mono or _t.monotonic())
return n
def checkpoint(self, ingest, now_mono: float, force: bool = False) -> bool:
if not force and (now_mono - self._last_ckpt) < self.checkpoint_s:
return False
avg = getattr(ingest, "averager", None)
if avg is None:
return False
self._last_ckpt = now_mono
return self.store.save_partial(avg.snapshot())
# -- reading ------------------------------------------------------------
def peak(self, when: datetime | None = None) -> PeakReading:
return self.store.peak(when)
def headroom_w(self, when: datetime | None = None) -> float | None:
"""Watts left under the soft limit, or None when it cannot be known.
⚠️ `None`, not `self.cap_w`. An unreadable peak returning full headroom
is the disarming default this whole module is shaped against.
"""
r = self.peak(when)
if r.state == NO_RECORD:
return self.cap_w
if not r.is_observed:
return None
return max(0.0, self.cap_w - r.peak_w)
def warning_frac(self, when: datetime | None = None) -> float | None:
"""Peak as a fraction of the soft limit - §9.1's 80 % warning entity."""
r = self.peak(when)
if r.state == NO_RECORD:
return 0.0
if not r.is_observed or self.cap_w <= 0:
return None
return r.peak_w / self.cap_w
@staticmethod
def project(averager, now: datetime) -> Projection:
"""End-of-quarter average if the last sample held for the rest of it.
⚠️ The two divisors are DIFFERENT and only coincide at the end of the
block. `elapsed_w` divides by the seconds actually covered (what the
meter has shown so far); `projected_w` divides by the full 900 s and
credits the held value over what remains. At `elapsed_s == 900` and full
coverage they are equal - which is precisely why nothing may be tested
only at that point.
"""
start = averager.block_start
if start is None:
# ⚠️ A ZERO PROJECTION, AND IT IS NOT "THE QUARTER IS FINE". It is
# "there is no quarter". `block_start is None` is the flag that says
# which, and SAFETY-07 grades that flag BEFORE it grades the number -
# see peakguard.blindness(). A consumer that reads only
# `projected_w` here reads 0 W, which is under every ceiling there
# is, on exactly the startup path where nothing else is watching.
return Projection(0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, False, None, 0.0)
elapsed_wall = max(0.0, (now - start).total_seconds())
elapsed = averager.elapsed_s
acc = averager.partial_ws
remaining = max(0.0, QUARTER_S - elapsed_wall)
# ⚠️ NO `getattr` DEFAULT, AND THAT IS THE FIX, NOT A TIDY-UP. This read
# was `getattr(averager, "_last_net", 0.0)`: a private name with a
# fallback, so renaming the attribute would have kept every projection
# green while crediting 0 W held - a projection that reads LOW, which is
# the UNDER-GUARDING direction for SAFETY-07's floor. TEST-13 item 4.
# `held_net_w` is now a documented public property on QuarterAverager and
# is read without a default, so the same rename raises AttributeError on
# the first cycle instead of quietly disarming the money guard.
held = max(averager.held_net_w, 0.0)
return Projection(
projected_w=(acc + held * remaining) / QUARTER_S,
elapsed_w=(acc / elapsed) if elapsed > 0 else 0.0,
elapsed_s=elapsed_wall,
covered_frac=(elapsed / elapsed_wall) if elapsed_wall > 0 else 0.0,
complete=elapsed_wall <= 0 or elapsed >= elapsed_wall - 1e-9,
block_start=start,
# Carried so a consumer can see WHAT was extrapolated, not only the
# extrapolation. It is the signed held value; `projected_w` uses the
# offtake-only form above, and the two differ whenever the site is
# exporting - which is the healthy operating point here.
held_w=averager.held_net_w)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class _ClosedBlock:
"""A block reconstructed from a checkpoint. Shaped like `p1.QuarterBlock` so
`record_block` has one input type; kept private so nothing else makes one."""
start: datetime
offtake_avg_w: float
per_phase_offtake_avg_w: tuple | None
+572
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"""Startup configuration validation - the gate before the control loop runs.
WHAT THIS IS FOR, in one sentence: some configurations are not "a bit off", they
are configurations under which the add-on's own safety machinery does not work,
and for those the correct behaviour is to refuse to start rather than to log a
line and carry on.
⚠️ THE FAILURE THIS REPLACES. `main.py` used to read the setpoint device's own
±5000 W rating, notice that a configured `max_w` of, say, 8000 W exceeded it,
write one WARNING to a log nobody reads, and then run anyway with
`write_setpoint()` quietly clamping. The operator's stated ceiling was simply not
the ceiling, and the only evidence was a line that had scrolled off. specs §1.5
is explicit that a configuration in which the system cannot honour what it was
told is refused at startup, not survived at runtime.
WHERE THE LINE IS DRAWN, and why it is not further out. A validator that refuses
on trivia gets switched off by the first person it inconveniences, so this one
refuses only where **continuing produces one of two outcomes:**
(a) **a stated limit is untrue** - the operator configured a bound, a lower
layer silently enforces a different one, and nothing says which won; or
(b) **the add-on is inert and indistinguishable from healthy** - it starts,
serves its UI, reports green, and moves no energy, with no symptom that
separates it from a correctly-idle system.
⚠️ (b) IS NOT A SPECIAL CASE OF (a), and an earlier draft of this file wrongly
implied it was by claiming every refusal here "makes a safety mechanism
inoperative". It does not: when `setpoint_entity` is blank, layer 1 pinning the
inverter at 0 W is the failsafe WORKING. The problem is not that the system
becomes unsafe, it is that it becomes a very convincing impression of a working
controller - and an operator has no way to tell. That is its own reason to
refuse, and stating it as one is what stops the rule being stretched later to
cover mere untidiness.
Both halves have to stay narrow. (a) is not "any two numbers that could
disagree"; it is a bound the operator SET being overridden by a layer they
cannot see. (b) is not "anything degraded"; it is inert AND silent - if a red
NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
1. `max_w` outside the setpoint device's own rating. [(a)]
The stated limit is untrue. arbiter.py's `supervised` SAFETY claim says the
output is bounded by ±max_w; it is not, it is bounded by the device, and the
two numbers disagree. Which one wins is a coin toss to anyone reading the
config.
2. No `setpoint_entity`. [(b)]
A controller with no actuator, and nothing about it looks broken.
`write_setpoint()` returns immediately on a blank entity, so: no device
rating is ever read (the `device` SAFETY claim is never made at all), and
the ESP32 heartbeat - the thing that feeds LAYER 1 - never happens. The
add-on serves a UI, publishes MQTT, resolves claims, and moves nothing.
Layer 1 then holds the inverter at 0 W, which is the failsafe working
exactly as designed - this is (b), not (a). Nothing is unsafe; it is simply
impossible to tell from the outside that the thing is doing nothing.
3. A `meter_source` that can never produce a reading. [(b)]
§5.1 makes P1 the only authoritative measurement and deliberately provides
no fallback, so a transport that cannot be built means `grid` is None
forever: permanent "inputs missing", 0 W, and a status page that reports a
meter with a climbing age exactly as it would for a healthy meter nobody has
sent anything to yet. The predicates live in `p1.validate_meter_options()`,
which is also what `build_source()` uses - one definition, two callers.
4. `meter_max_age_s` above the firmware's own ingest veto. [(a)]
The purest example of (a) in the system, and structurally the same fault as
1. The add-on's schema accepts `int(5,300)`. The firmware's threshold is a
COMPILE-TIME SUBSTITUTION - `max_age_s: "30"` in
goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml - used by both its monotonic receipt
clock and its `ingest_stale` veto, which trips layer 1 on
`p1_age_s >= 30`. Set 120 and the add-on believes a 119 s reading is fresh
and keeps commanding into it, while the firmware vetoed at 30 s and is
holding the inverter at 0 W. Status page: healthy meter, running
controller, nothing moving, and no line anywhere saying the number you set
was overruled. That firmware file's own comment says a lower bound on this
"belongs in CFG-01, not here" - so here it is.
5. `sign_disagree_w` at or above `max_w`. [(a)]
The arbiter's `supervised` limit bounds every command to +-max_w, and
SAFETY-02's predicate needs `abs(command) > sign_disagree_w`. Set the
threshold at or above the ceiling and the command side of the comparison
is unsatisfiable BY CONSTRUCTION: the watchdog can never fire, on any
input, ever. Same shape as 1 and 4 - the operator set a number, a layer
they cannot see makes it mean something else, and nothing says so. Worse
here, because what the status page reports in that state is "sign
watchdog: armed". A disarmed guard that advertises itself as armed is the
one thing this project has decided repeatedly it will not ship.
6. `maintenance_charge_w` above `max_w`. [(a)]
The same shape as 5, and found the same way - by checking a worked example
against what actually ships. maintenance's cheap-window shaping files
`Claim.limit(hi=-maintenance_charge_w)` at P_MAINT_SHAPE, against the
`supervised` SAFETY limit's `lo=-max_w`. Both bind (P_SAFETY and
P_MAINT_SHAPE both outrank the loop that wins the SET), so a charge rate
above the ceiling gives `lo > hi` - the arbiter's clause 3, which it
correctly resolves to 0 W and logs as a CONTRADICTION. Measured against
the arbiter, loop asking +500 W:
max_w=2000 hi=-2500 -> +0 W contradiction=True
max_w=2500 hi=-2500 -> -2500 W limited by supervised(max_w)
max_w=3000 hi=-2500 -> -2500 W limited by maintenance(...)
So MAINTENANCE SILENTLY NEVER CHARGES IN A CHEAP WINDOW until max_w is at
or above the charge rate, and the only evidence is a contradiction line
that reads like a bug in the arbiter rather than like the two numbers the
operator set. Equality is fine and deliberately not refused - at
max_w == charge_w the window is a single reachable point, -max_w.
⚠️ `maintenance_discharge_w` IS NOT THE SAME CASE, and this was checked
rather than assumed. THE SHAPING IS NOT SYMMETRIC: the drain phase does
not shape the loop, it OWNS the actuator - `Claim.set(P_MAINTENANCE,
+discharge_w)`. A SET is clamped by the limits above it, not contradicted
by them, so 2500 against a 2000 W ceiling emits +2000 W and the arbiter's
own explain() says `maintenance -> 2000 W, limited by supervised(max_w)`
on the status page every cycle. That is neither (a) - nothing is silent -
nor (b) - it moves energy and the cycle still completes, just slower
(13.8 kWh usable at 2000 W is ~6.9 h against the 720 min DRAIN_TIMEOUT).
It is warned about below, not refused.
7. A price configuration that cannot mean what it says. [(a)]
Three cases, all in `_price_problems()`: an unknown `price_provider` id
(refused rather than defaulted to 'off', per the §14 warning box);
`price_provider` set alongside `price_now_entity`/`price_avg_entity`,
which is TWO PRICE SOURCES ON ONE SITE where the Home Assistant pair
silently wins; and `manual_csv` with no `price_csv_path`, which turns the
documented offline fallback into a permanent no-price-data condition
reached by accident. Same shape as 1, 4 and 5 every time - a source the
operator chose, overridden by a layer they cannot see.
⚠️ `price_provider: "off"` IS NOT REFUSED AND MUST NOT BECOME SO. §11.4
makes no-price-data a supported state, and §9.2 says a large share of the
installed base is on a fixed or static tariff. Refusing to start without a
price feed would lock those sites out of the add-on entirely.
WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* REFUSED, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
- `integrator_max_w` above `max_w`. DOCS.md is right that the only thing the
extra headroom buys is more wrong-direction power to unwind after
saturation - but the arbiter's `supervised` limit still binds the wire to
±max_w, so nothing out of range ever reaches the inverter. The cost is
latency, not amperage. Warned about, not refused.
- A missing `soc_entity` / `batt_entity`. `inputs_ok` goes False, the loop
commands 0 W, and `checks()` already renders a red NOT READY banner naming
the missing entity. Fail-safe AND already loud; a refusal adds nothing.
- A `setpoint_entity` that exists in the config but is not found on the Core
API at startup. This is the transient case - ESPHome is frequently not up
yet when the add-on boots - and refusing here would turn a device that
arrives thirty seconds late into a restart loop needing a human. It stays a
NOT READY banner.
- `meter_poll_s` above half `meter_max_age_s`. One missed poll costs a stale
reading and a 0 W cycle. Warned about in p1.py, not refused.
- `maintenance_discharge_w` above `max_w`. Clamped, not contradicted, and the
clamp names itself in the arbiter's explain() - see rule 6. Warned about,
not refused.
"""
import logging
from .p1 import is_enabled, validate_meter_options
from .price import PROVIDERS
from .static_tariff import ProfileInvalid, parse_static_profile
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.config")
# ⚠️ A MIRROR OF A FIRMWARE CONSTANT, AND IT CANNOT BE IMPORTED. The firmware
# threshold is a compile-time YAML substitution baked into the ESP32 image
# (`max_age_s: "30"`, master/goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml), so nothing at
# runtime can ask the board what value it was built with. This number is a copy,
# and a copy of a constant in another repo is a thing that goes stale.
#
# What makes that acceptable here: the copy can only ever be WRONG IN THE SAFE
# DIRECTION for the check below. If the firmware's veto is raised above 30, this
# refuses some configs that would in fact have worked - annoying, visible
# immediately, and fixed by editing one line. It cannot start accepting a config
# the firmware vetoes unless the firmware's number goes DOWN, which would be a
# tightening nobody does silently.
#
# ⚠️ TEL-06 IS EDITING `ingest_stale` DIRECTLY. If that ticket changes what the
# veto MEANS - e.g. thresholding arrival rather than the sensor's value - this
# constant's justification has to be re-read, not just its number. Do not assume
# a matching integer means a matching rule.
FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S = 30.0
# ⚠️ The complete set of option keys through which this add-on can reach an
# actuator. specs §1.5 makes "any configuration in which two writers can reach
# one actuator" a non-goal, and the way that non-goal is ENFORCED here is by
# construction: there is exactly one such key, so a second writer is not
# expressible in the options schema at all. sim/inject.py's `two_writers`
# scenario asserts on this tuple - if a second write path is ever added, that
# scenario goes red and somebody has to decide how the two are arbitrated
# BEFORE the config that allows both can ship.
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS = ("setpoint_entity",)
class ConfigRefused(Exception):
"""The configuration is wrong. Not "something broke" - see main.py's handler.
Carries the list of problems so the caller can render them; str() is the
first one, so an unhandled traceback still names something useful.
"""
def __init__(self, problems: list[str]):
self.problems = problems
super().__init__(problems[0] if problems else "configuration refused")
def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]:
"""Return the list of reasons this configuration must not be started.
Empty list means go. `dev_min`/`dev_max` are the setpoint device's own
reported range (`hass.limits()`), or None when the device could not be
reached - in which case the range checks are skipped rather than guessed at,
for the transient reason in this module's docstring.
Pure and side-effect free apart from two warnings, so it can be called from
a test or from sim/inject.py without a Home Assistant anywhere near it.
"""
problems: list[str] = []
# --- 1. an actuator to write to ------------------------------------------
writers = [k for k in ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS
if str(opts.get(k, "") or "").strip()]
if not writers:
problems.append(
"setpoint_entity is not set, so this add-on has no actuator: every "
"write is a no-op, the device's own rating is never read, and the "
"ESP32 heartbeat that holds off the layer-1 failsafe never happens. "
"It would run, look healthy, and move no energy at all. Set it to "
"the ESPHome number entity that carries the setpoint.")
# --- 2. the configured ceiling against the device's own rating -----------
max_w = _number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)
if max_w is None:
problems.append(f"max_w {opts.get('max_w')!r} is not a number")
# ⚠️ config.yaml's int(100,5000) already blocks this on a real install, so
# the check is not for the Supervisor path - it is because
# validate_startup_config() is now also sim/inject.py's entry point and can
# be handed any dict at all. A max_w of 0 or below inverts the arbiter's
# `supervised` bounds (lo=-max_w becomes the HIGHER number), and a limit
# claim whose lo exceeds its hi is exactly the contradiction the arbiter
# resolves to 0 W - i.e. it would look like a safety trip rather than the
# nonsense config it is.
elif max_w <= 0:
problems.append(
f"max_w is {max_w:.0f} W and must be positive - it is a magnitude, "
"not a signed setpoint. At or below zero the arbiter's supervised "
f"limit becomes lo={-max_w:.0f} / hi={max_w:.0f}, which is a "
"contradiction it resolves to 0 W, so the controller would look "
"like it was tripping rather than misconfigured.")
elif dev_max is not None and max_w > dev_max:
problems.append(
f"max_w is {max_w:.0f} W but {opts.get('setpoint_entity') or 'the setpoint device'} accepts at "
f"most {dev_max:.0f} W - THE DEVICE WINS, so the {max_w:.0f} W you "
f"configured would silently never happen. Lower max_w to "
f"{dev_max:.0f} W or less, or point setpoint_entity at a device that "
f"can take {max_w:.0f} W.")
elif dev_min is not None and -max_w < dev_min:
problems.append(
f"max_w is {max_w:.0f} W, so this controller may command "
f"{-max_w:.0f} W, but {opts.get('setpoint_entity') or 'the setpoint device'} accepts no less "
f"than {dev_min:.0f} W - THE DEVICE WINS on the charge side. Lower "
f"max_w to {abs(dev_min):.0f} W or less.")
# --- 3. a meter that can actually read -----------------------------------
# ⚠️ Not a second copy of these rules - p1.py owns them, because
# build_source() has to apply the identical predicates and a drifted copy
# would be worse than no check.
phases = _number(opts, "meter_phases", 1.0)
max_age_s = _number(opts, "meter_max_age_s", 30.0)
if phases is None or max_age_s is None:
problems.append("meter_phases and meter_max_age_s must both be numbers "
f"(got {opts.get('meter_phases')!r} / "
f"{opts.get('meter_max_age_s')!r})")
else:
problems.extend(validate_meter_options(opts, int(phases), max_age_s))
# --- 4. the staleness window the FIRMWARE will actually enforce -----------
# ⚠️ Only when P1 ingestion is on, and that is a real scope limit rather than
# caution: meter_max_age_s is read by nothing but P1Ingest, and the veto it
# collides with keys off `p1_age_s.has_state()`, which is only ever published
# when ingestion is running (see Controller.publish()). With meter_source off
# there is no sensor, the veto is inert, and the number governs nothing.
#
# Strictly greater, not >=: the firmware trips at `>= 30` and P1Ingest goes
# stale at `> max_age_s`, so 30 against 30 has the firmware fractionally
# stricter by one sample. That is the shipped default and the tested pair.
# BELOW 30 is fine and deliberately not refused - the add-on then gives up
# first, which is fail-safe and visible on its own status page. Only ABOVE is
# the silent case, where the add-on keeps commanding into a reading the board
# has already rejected.
if (is_enabled(opts) and max_age_s is not None
and max_age_s > FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S):
problems.append(
f"meter_max_age_s is {max_age_s:.0f} s but the ESP32 firmware vetoes "
f"any P1 sample at {FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S:.0f} s and forces the "
"layer-1 failsafe - THE FIRMWARE WINS, and it wins silently. This "
f"add-on would treat a {max_age_s - 1:.0f} s reading as fresh and "
"keep commanding, while the inverter sat at 0 W with a healthy-"
"looking meter on the status page. Lower meter_max_age_s to "
f"{FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S:.0f} s or less (30 s is the tested value), "
"or rebuild the firmware with a matching max_age_s and update "
"validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S.")
# --- 5. a sign watchdog that can actually fire ---------------------------
# ⚠️ Strictly `>=`, matching the predicate exactly: watchdog.py tests
# `abs(commanded_w) > min_w`, and the arbiter holds `abs(commanded_w)` at or
# below max_w, so threshold == max_w is already unsatisfiable. Anything
# BELOW max_w is reachable and therefore fine - this refuses the disarmed
# case only, not "close to the rail".
sign_w = _number(opts, "sign_disagree_w", 300.0)
if sign_w is None:
problems.append(f"sign_disagree_w {opts.get('sign_disagree_w')!r} is not a number")
elif max_w is not None and max_w > 0 and sign_w >= max_w:
problems.append(
f"sign_disagree_w is {sign_w:.0f} W but max_w is {max_w:.0f} W, so "
"the SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement watchdog can never fire: the "
"arbiter never lets a command exceed max_w, and the watchdog needs "
f"a command over {sign_w:.0f} W. It would sit there reporting "
"'armed' on the status page while being incapable of tripping - the "
f"one runaway failure mode this system has actually observed. Lower "
f"sign_disagree_w below {max_w:.0f} W (300 W is the measured "
"default), or raise max_w.")
# --- 6. a maintenance charge the ceiling can actually accommodate --------
# ⚠️ Strictly `>`, matching the arbiter exactly. The shaping is
# `Claim.limit(hi=-charge_w)` against `supervised`'s `lo=-max_w`, so
# charge_w == max_w leaves the single reachable point -max_w and works;
# only ABOVE is `lo > hi`, arbiter clause 3, 0 W and a contradiction.
#
# Not scoped to maintenance_enabled, deliberately. The pair is
# contradictory whether or not the schedule is on, and scoping it would
# leave the trap armed for the one operator action - ticking
# maintenance_enabled - that cannot possibly be expected to change what a
# charge rate means.
# ⚠️ THE FALLBACK IS config.yaml's SHIPPED VALUE, and it has to be kept
# equal to it - that is the whole point of AC3. It is reachable only when a
# caller hands over a dict with the key missing (sim/inject.py, a test); the
# Supervisor always supplies every key from config.yaml, so on a real
# install the argument is always present.
#
# ⚠️ KNOWN MISMATCH, LEFT DELIBERATELY AND FLAGGED RATHER THAN FIXED HERE:
# `main.py` still falls back to 2500 in two places
# (`opts.get("maintenance_charge_w", 2500)`), as does maintenance.py's
# MaintConfig dataclass. So a dict with the key ABSENT is accepted by this
# rule at 2000 and then built by main.py at 2500 - the contradiction this
# rule exists to catch, in the one case it cannot see. It is unreachable on
# a Supervisor install and those files are another ticket's right now.
# THE REAL FIX is one source of truth for option defaults; until then the
# divergence is PINNED BY A CHECK rather than by this comment - see
# test_validate.py, "the KNOWN cross-file default divergence". It asserts
# the mismatch as it stands and goes red if EITHER side moves, including
# when somebody closes it in main.py, at which point this block and that
# check both get deleted.
charge_w = _number(opts, "maintenance_charge_w", 2000.0)
if charge_w is None:
problems.append(
f"maintenance_charge_w {opts.get('maintenance_charge_w')!r} is not a number")
elif max_w is not None and max_w > 0 and charge_w > max_w:
problems.append(
f"maintenance_charge_w is {charge_w:.0f} W but max_w is "
f"{max_w:.0f} W, so a maintenance charge in a cheap window can "
"never happen: the shaping asks the arbiter for at most "
f"{-charge_w:.0f} W while the supervised limit allows no less than "
f"{-max_w:.0f} W, which is a contradiction it resolves to 0 W - "
"THE CEILING WINS, and what you would see is an ARBITER "
"CONTRADICTION line that reads like a bug rather than like these "
f"two numbers. Lower maintenance_charge_w to {max_w:.0f} W or less, "
f"or raise max_w to at least {charge_w:.0f} W.")
# --- 7. two price sources on one site ------------------------------------
problems.extend(_price_problems(opts))
# --- warnings: real, but not worth refusing over -------------------------
integ = opts.get("integrator_max_w")
integ_w = None if not integ else _number(opts, "integrator_max_w", None)
if integ_w is not None and max_w is not None and integ_w > max_w:
_LOG.warning(
"integrator_max_w %.0f W is above max_w %.0f W. Not refused - the "
"arbiter still bounds the wire to +-max_w - but the only thing the "
"extra headroom buys is more wrong-direction power to unwind after "
"saturation. 0 (follow max_w) is the recommended value.",
integ_w, max_w)
# ⚠️ THE SIBLING OF RULE 6, AND NOT THE SAME CASE - see the docstring. The
# drain phase OWNS the actuator (`Claim.set` at P_MAINTENANCE), and a SET is
# clamped by the limits above it rather than contradicted by them. So this
# drains at max_w instead of the configured rate, the arbiter says so in
# words on the status page every cycle, and the cycle still completes -
# slower, and eating into maintenance.DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN. Loud and it moves
# energy, so it is neither (a) nor (b): warned, not refused.
disch_w = _number(opts, "maintenance_discharge_w", 2000.0)
if disch_w is not None and max_w is not None and max_w > 0 and disch_w > max_w:
_LOG.warning(
"maintenance_discharge_w %.0f W is above max_w %.0f W. Not refused - "
"the drain phase SETS the setpoint and the arbiter clamps it to "
"%.0f W and names the clamp ('limited by supervised(max_w)'), so "
"nothing is silent and the cycle still completes. But it drains at "
"%.0f W, not the %.0f W you configured, and the drain phase has a "
"720 min timeout. Lower it to %.0f W or raise max_w to remove the "
"surprise.",
disch_w, max_w, max_w, max_w, disch_w, max_w)
return problems
def _price_problems(opts: dict) -> list[str]:
"""Rule 7 (TARIFF-02): the price configuration, refused where it is untrue.
⚠️ NOTE WHAT IS *NOT* HERE. `price_provider: "off"` is not refused and never
will be: §11.4 makes no-price-data a first-class supported state (static
profile, provisional plan, no arbitrage), and an add-on that will not start
without a price feed is an add-on that a Belgian fixed-tariff site - a large
share of the installed base, per §9.2 - cannot run at all.
Four refusals and two log lines (TARIFF-03 added one refusal, one parse and
two notices), and every refusal is still case (a) from this module's
docstring: a source the operator SET being overridden by a layer they cannot
see. The additions are `static_profile` alongside the Home Assistant price
pair - the same silent-loser shape as provider-plus-pair, and a LIVE one -
and a `static_profile` that does not tile the day, which would leave hours
with no price at all.
"""
problems: list[str] = []
pid = str(opts.get("price_provider", "") or "off").strip() or "off"
if pid != "off" and pid not in PROVIDERS:
problems.append(
f"price_provider is {pid!r}, which is not a shipped plugin. The "
f"ids that exist are: off, {', '.join(sorted(PROVIDERS))}. "
"Refused rather than defaulted, per the §14 warning box - a "
"silent fall back to 'off' would look exactly like a working "
"provider that happens never to find a cheap hour.")
return problems # nothing below can be judged against an unknown id
# ⚠️ THE HA-SIDE OVERLAP THE PM TOLD US TO DECIDE ABOUT, DECIDED HERE.
# price_now_entity/price_avg_entity are the original delegation of pricing
# to Home Assistant: main.py reduces them to ONE BOOLEAN, `cheap`, read by
# the maintenance cheap-window charge floor. They are KEPT - retiring them
# would take a live install's only price signal away - but they may not run
# alongside another price source, because main.py reads exactly one and the
# loser is silent. That is (a), and it is the "silently double up" the PM
# named on 2026-08-30.
#
# ⚠️ THE REASON THIS REFUSAL GIVES WAS REWRITTEN BY TARIFF-03, AND THE OLD
# WORDING IS WHY. Until TARIFF-03 this message said the configured provider
# "would decide nothing", which was true only because nothing consumed the
# series; test_price.py section 12 carried a tripwire that went red the
# moment a consumer landed, with instructions to fix the wording here in the
# same commit. It landed, it went red, and this is that fix. What is true
# NOW, stated exactly and no wider:
#
# * app/static_tariff.py consumes load_prices(). resolve_tariff() turns a
# provider series into a TariffPlan, a cheap-window flag and an
# arbitrage verdict, so the seam is no longer inert.
# * main.py reads the STATIC side of that module every cycle
# (static_status()), which makes static_profile a real writer of `cheap`.
# * main.py does NOT yet call resolve_tariff() on the control tick, and
# that is deliberate: a provider fetch is network I/O and the tick is
# what feeds the ESP32 heartbeat. So a configured PROVIDER still shapes
# no energy decision on its own; a configured STATIC PROFILE does.
#
# Hence two refusals below rather than one, and neither claims more than
# that list. When OPT-04 puts resolve_tariff() on a background refresh, the
# first message's middle clause is what changes - not the rule.
ha_price = [k for k in ("price_now_entity", "price_avg_entity")
if str(opts.get(k, "") or "").strip()]
if pid != "off" and ha_price:
problems.append(
f"price_provider is {pid!r} AND {' and '.join(ha_price)} "
f"{'is' if len(ha_price) == 1 else 'are'} set, which is two price "
"sources on one site. THE HOME ASSISTANT ENTITIES WIN: they are "
"what main.py reduces to the `cheap` flag the maintenance cycle "
"reads. The provider series IS consumed now - app/static_tariff.py "
"builds a tariff plan and an arbitrage verdict from it - but it is "
"not what main.py acts on, so the supplier you configured would "
"shape no energy decision while the status page named it. Clear "
"price_now_entity and price_avg_entity to use the "
f"{pid!r} plugin, or set price_provider to 'off' to keep the "
"Home Assistant sensors.")
# ⚠️ THE SAME RULE FOR THE SOURCE TARIFF-03 ADDED, AND THIS ONE IS A LIVE
# CONFLICT RATHER THAN A LATENT ONE. main.py's read_inputs() takes `cheap`
# from the Home Assistant pair when it is set and from the static profile
# otherwise - one flag, first writer wins, and the operator who filled in a
# day/night tariff has no way to see that it lost.
if ha_price and str(opts.get("static_profile", "") or "").strip():
problems.append(
f"static_profile is set AND {' and '.join(ha_price)} "
f"{'is' if len(ha_price) == 1 else 'are'} set, which is two "
"tariff sources feeding one cheap-window flag. THE HOME ASSISTANT "
"ENTITIES WIN: main.py reads them first and never looks at the "
"static profile, so the day/night tariff you typed would decide "
"nothing and nothing would say so. Clear price_now_entity and "
"price_avg_entity to use static_profile, or clear static_profile "
"to keep the Home Assistant sensors.")
# ⚠️ THE PROFILE ITSELF, PARSED AT STARTUP RATHER THAN AT 02:00. A profile
# that does not tile the day has hours with no price, and the only ways to
# serve those are to invent a number or to fail at the moment the clock
# reaches them. §14's warning box - refuse to start on a mismatch rather
# than clamp quietly - is the same instruction one level down.
raw_profile = opts.get("static_profile", "")
if str(raw_profile or "").strip() or isinstance(raw_profile, (list, dict)):
try:
profile = parse_static_profile(raw_profile)
except ProfileInvalid as e:
profile = None
problems.append(f"static_profile cannot be used: {e}")
if profile is not None and profile.product is not None \
and len(set(profile.prices)) == 1:
_LOG.info(
"static_profile carries one distinct price (%.4f EUR/kWh "
"all-in), so this site is priced as FULLY FIXED. Arbitrage is "
"off by arithmetic - a flat series has no spread - and the "
"add-on runs self-consumption only, which is §9.2's handling "
"for this product. Peak shaving, reserve management and the "
"maintenance cycle are unaffected.", profile.prices[0])
# ⚠️ A WARNING, NOT A REFUSAL, AND THE ASYMMETRY IS DELIBERATE. §11.4 says a
# site with no price data falls back to the static profile; a dynamic site
# with none configured has nothing to fall back to when its feed dies. That
# is a real gap worth naming - but refusing to start over it would break
# every install TARIFF-02 shipped, none of which could have had one.
if pid != "off" and not str(opts.get("static_profile", "") or "").strip():
_LOG.warning(
"price_provider is %r but static_profile is empty. §11.4's "
"degradation row is 'no price data -> fall back to the static "
"profile'; with none configured, a feed outage leaves this site "
"with no tariff at all rather than with a coarse one. Not refused, "
"but filling it in is what makes that row work.", pid)
if pid == "manual_csv" and not str(opts.get("price_csv_path", "") or "").strip():
problems.append(
"price_provider is 'manual_csv' but price_csv_path is empty, so "
"the offline fallback has no file to read. Every fetch would "
"return no-price-data with a filesystem error as its reason - "
"which is §11.4 behaviour arrived at by accident rather than by "
"configuration. Point it at the CSV, or set price_provider to "
"'off', which says the same thing on purpose.")
return problems
def _number(opts: dict, key, default):
raw = opts.get(key, default)
if raw is None or raw == "":
return default
try:
return float(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def refuse(problems: list[str]) -> None:
"""Log a refusal an operator can tell apart from a crash. Does not raise.
⚠️ THE POINT OF THE BANNER. "You configured this wrong" must not read like
"it broke". A Python traceback in an add-on log means the same thing to most
operators as a segfault - file a bug - whereas this block names the keys,
names the fix, and says in words that nothing is broken. main.py catches
ConfigRefused and exits 78 (sysexits EX_CONFIG), so no traceback is printed
at all and even the exit status distinguishes the two.
"""
_LOG.error("=" * 72)
_LOG.error("REFUSING TO START: the add-on configuration is not usable.")
_LOG.error("This is a CONFIGURATION problem, not a crash. Nothing is broken;")
_LOG.error("the add-on will start as soon as the settings below are fixed.")
_LOG.error("Fix them in Settings > Add-ons > GoodWe RS485 Controller >")
_LOG.error("Configuration, then start the add-on again.")
_LOG.error("-" * 72)
for i, problem in enumerate(problems, 1):
_LOG.error(" %d. %s", i, problem)
_LOG.error("=" * 72)
+354
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
"""SAFETY-02 - the sign-disagreement watchdog.
WHAT IT CATCHES, in one sentence: a grid-following loop that is pushing power in
the wrong direction, which every other guard in this system is blind to.
The stale-input watchdog (SAFETY-01) asks "is the meter still talking?". The
saturation freeze asks "can the inverter follow?". The output clamp asks "is the
number too big?". A loop can pass all three and still be charging the battery
out of the grid while the house imports - the meter is fresh, the inverter is
tracking beautifully, and the magnitude is inside the rating. The only thing
that separates that from healthy operation is the SIGN.
⚠️ THIS IS NOT A HYPOTHETICAL. On 2026-08-20 the vendor controller (Illusmart)
did exactly this four times in one day (NOTES.md §4.7). Both captures of that
bus are committed - `sim/scenarios/bus-2026-08-20.log.gz` and the healthy
`bus-2026-08-23.log.gz` in the infra repo - and `sim/replay_sign.py` drives this
module over both of them. Every number in this file was measured on those two
days, not chosen:
day samples gated in sign agreement
2026-08-23 4 212 / 17 280 93.4 % (healthy)
2026-08-20 7 182 / 17 280 56.4 % (the whole fault day)
cluster A 15:26-16:43 0.3 %
cluster B 17:11-18:28 0.9 %
cluster C 20:01-20:31 10.5 %
cluster D 20:55-21:11 0.0 %
⚠️ THOSE AGREEMENT FIGURES ARE THE WEAKEST EVIDENCE ON THIS PAGE, and an earlier
version of this comment leaned on them as though they were the strongest. The
clusters are found by looking for sustained opposed samples, so measuring "how
opposed is this cluster" over them is close to a tautology - and "the healthy day
contains no such cluster" is the same sentence as "the healthy day produces no
trip", not independent corroboration of it.
What actually carries the argument is two things neither the detector nor the
clustering assumes:
1. The RUN-LENGTH DISTRIBUTION. The longest unbroken opposed run on the healthy
day is 30 s. On the fault day there are 18 runs over 180 s and the longest is
1750 s. Nothing about that gap was chosen - it is what the two days measure.
2. The clusters land where a human independently wrote down onsets. NOTES.md
§4.7 records 15:01, 16:56, 19:57 and 20:23 from watching it happen, before
any of this existed, and cluster D coincides with the separately documented
inverter-off runaway of §4.7 item 2.
Be precise about (2), because the convenient overstatement is available and wrong:
the clustering does NOT reproduce four episodes. It yields THREE clusters over the
four documented onsets - C spans both 19:57 and 20:23 - plus a fourth for §4.7
item 2, which is not one of the four. Every trip does fall inside a documented
window, which is the claim worth making.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHY IT LIVES HERE AND NOT IN THE FIRMWARE OR THE WITNESS
Three vantage points see three different things. The firmware knows what it
WROTE, the witness Pi knows what was ON THE WIRE and whether the inverter ACKed
it, and the add-on knows what it INTENDED and holds the authoritative meter.
This check is not command-versus-wire; it is command-versus-physics. It needs
the emitted setpoint and the P1 net figure in the same place, and it needs the
authority to command zero when they fight:
- the witness is read-only by charter and cannot command anything, so it could
raise the alarm but never take the trip action the AC requires;
- the firmware has the wire but not the meter. §5.1 makes P1 the only
authoritative grid figure and the board only ever receives its AGE
(`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`), never its value. Putting the check there
would mean shipping the meter to the ESP32 for no other reason, and it would
be C++ per install rather than one generic guard;
- the add-on has both halves already, plus an arbiter that can outrank every
strategy with a P_SAFETY claim.
The cost of standing here is real and worth stating: this watchdog compares what
we MEANT to put on the wire against the meter. If the firmware or the driver
inverts the sign on the way out, the add-on's own view still agrees with itself
and this check stays silent. That gap is a wire-versus-intent problem and it
belongs to the witness, not here.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHAT "DISAGREEMENT" MEANS, PRECISELY
disagree = following
and commanded_w * grid_w < 0
and abs(commanded_w) > min_w
and abs(grid_w) > min_w
Four gates, and each one exists to exclude a specific thing that is NOT a fault:
1. `following`. ⚠️ THE GATE THAT IS EASIEST TO FORGET AND MOST EXPENSIVE TO
OMIT. Sign agreement is a property of a GRID-FOLLOWING loop. It is not
expected of a strategy that deliberately commands against the meter -
maintenance is exactly that. A maintenance grid charge of 1500 W into a house
drawing 500 W puts +2000 W on the meter against a -1500 W command: opposed,
both far over any sane threshold, and sustained for HOURS. Armed
unconditionally this watchdog would trip on every single maintenance cycle,
which is not a tuning problem, it is the wrong question being asked. So the
caller says whether the grid-following loop actually won the arbitration this
cycle, and the timer only accumulates when it did.
⚠️ 1500 W, NOT THE DEFAULT 2500 W, AND THE REASON IS NOT COSMETIC. At the
shipped defaults `maintenance_charge_w` is 2500 and `max_w` is 2000, so the
cheap-window claim is `hi = -2500` against a supervised `lo = -2000`: lo > hi,
which arbiter.py resolves as a CONTRADICTION and 0 W, not as a -2500 W charge.
The example above is written at 1500 W because that is a combination the
schema and the arbiter both actually produce. (The contradiction at the
defaults is a real pre-existing bug - a default maintenance charge silently
never happens in a cheap window - but it is maintenance's, not this module's,
and it is filed separately. Do not "fix" it here.)
2. The strict `< 0` product. "Opposed" and "neither side is zero" in one
expression.
3. The 300 W magnitude gate ON BOTH SIDES. Near zero the sign is noise, and near
zero is where a healthy loop LIVES - the deadband holds the command still
while the meter wanders either side of `target_grid_w`. On the healthy day
only 4 212 of 17 280 samples (24 %) are even gated in; the other 76 % are the
converged band where sign carries no information. This is also why the
deadband cannot produce a false trip: inside it the meter is by definition
under 300 W.
4. The 180 s continuity requirement. This is what excludes the legitimate
transient. A load step reverses the meter's sign instantly while the command
is still where the last cycle left it; slew limiting then needs a few cycles
to cross over. Measured on the healthy day, the LONGEST such crossing is 30 s
- and that is with a vendor controller far cruder than ours. 180 s is six
times that. It is not a fitted threshold: at 60 s the healthy day still
produces zero trips, and at 300 s the fault day still produces 13.
⚠️ A BATTERY THAT REFUSES A COMMAND CANNOT TRIP THIS, and that is structural
rather than lucky. At SoC 10 % in Standby, a 1350 W discharge command into a
1350 W import is DECLINED: the battery does nothing, so the meter stays at
+1350 W and the command stays at +1350 W. Same sign. Agreement. A refusal leaves
the meter where it was; only the inverter ACTING moves it, and acting in the
commanded direction moves it toward zero, not through it. The failure mode this
check keys on is the opposite of a refusal - it is the inverter obediently doing
a wrong thing.
⚠️ A FROZEN METER cannot trip it either, for the same reason read the other way:
a stuck reading of +800 W makes the loop command discharge and keep commanding
discharge. Command and meter converge on AGREEING. Freezes are SAFETY-12's and
SAFETY-01's problem, and this watchdog neither helps nor hinders there.
⚠️ ALL OF THAT DEPENDS ON ONE PROPERTY OF THE CONTROL LAW, so it is an invariant
and not a happy accident: the saturation freeze in control.py must keep letting
the command FALL, CROSS ZERO AND REVERSE - "may not wind further in the direction
it is already pushing", not "only corrections that shrink |i_w|". control.py
records the shrink-only encoding as tried and rejected because it pins the command
at its last value indefinitely; a pinned command against a meter that has moved on
is precisely a sustained sign disagreement, so under that encoding this watchdog
WOULD false-trip on a plain load step. If anyone ever revisits that freeze, this
module's no-false-positive argument is downstream of the answer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHAT IT DOES NOT CATCH
An inverter that ACTS opposite to what it was told. Tell it to discharge 2000 W
and have it charge instead, and the meter moves FURTHER the way it was already
going - so the command and the meter agree, all the way into the rail. This
watchdog compares the loop's output direction against the input state it was
regulating; it is blind to the plant lying about which way it went. That is the
saturation freeze's question (|command - the battery's actual power| > 500 W,
NOTES.md §4.7 row 4), and the two checks are complementary rather than
overlapping. Neither substitutes for the other.
Nor does it see a sign inversion introduced DOWNSTREAM of this add-on - in the
firmware, on the wire, or in a future driver. Our view stays self-consistent and
this stays silent. That is a wire-versus-intent problem and it belongs to the
witness, which is the only vantage point that sees both.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE, TRIP AND LATCH
One timestamp, not a sample counter. The cycle rate is not fixed - a meter
arrival, or `cycle_floor_s` elapsing, whichever comes first - so N samples is a
different wall-clock window on every path, and the AC is written in minutes.
The latch is not optional and not a nicety. Commanding 0 W removes the command
side of the comparison (|0| is not > 300), so the disagreement disappears the
instant the trip works. Un-latched, this watchdog would trip, clear itself, and
hand the actuator straight back to the loop that was driving the wrong way -
three minutes later, forever. `tripped` therefore stays true until an operator
`reset()`s it by starting control again, which is a deliberate human act after
looking at why.
⚠️ AND THE LATCH HAS TO OUTLIVE THE PROCESS. Held only in memory it is not a
latch at all - a container restart clears it and the add-on comes back armed,
into the same fault, unattended. Worse than merely losing state: "restart the
add-on" is the first thing an operator confronted with a FAILSAFE banner and a
0 W inverter will try, and under a supervisor that restarts a crashed add-on it
is a loop of three-minute wrong-direction bursts. `tripped` and `reason` are
therefore constructor arguments, restored from `Store` in `Controller.__init__`
and written back the moment the trip happens. See store.py.
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SignWatchdogConfig:
"""Defaults, not constants - config.yaml carries both (SAFETY-02 AC 5)."""
min_w: float = 300.0
hold_s: float = 180.0
def disagrees(commanded_w, grid_w, following: bool,
cfg: SignWatchdogConfig) -> bool:
"""The predicate, and the ONLY place it is written down.
⚠️ Public because `sim/replay_sign.py` needs it too - to describe episodes, to
measure agreement, to sweep the clock-skew guard - and it had reimplemented it
inline. Two copies of a safety predicate is one copy plus a future
disagreement about what the check means, and the copy that drifts is always
the one in the harness that grades it.
"""
return (following
and commanded_w is not None and grid_w is not None
and commanded_w * grid_w < 0
and abs(commanded_w) > cfg.min_w
and abs(grid_w) > cfg.min_w)
def loop_is_following(resolution, loop_asked) -> bool:
"""Did the grid-following loop actually choose the number going on the wire?
Gate 1 of the predicate above, and it lives here rather than inline in
`cycle()` for the reason `disagrees()` does: the test suite has to be able to
assert on THE SHIPPED EXPRESSION, not on a transcription of it that drifts
apart from it in silence.
⚠️ IT WAS A TRANSCRIPTION, AND THAT WAS MEASURED, NOT FEARED. The P_PEAK case
in test_watchdog.py exists to make whoever lands peak shaving come here and
change an expectation. With the expression copied into the test it did not do
that: editing the shipped gate alone to `winner in ("loop", "peak")` left every
suite green while the watchdog went blind for the whole of every peak event.
One definition, two callers, and that test now bites.
`resolution` the arbiter's Resolution. Duck-typed on `.winner` and
`.target_w` so this module still imports nothing from arbiter.
`loop_asked` what the grid-following loop claimed this cycle, or None if it
did not claim at all.
"The loop won" is NOT the question, and the difference is a whole class of
false trip. A LIMIT claim can survive the loop winning and still replace its
number: maintenance's cheap-window shaping is `hi = -maintenance_charge_w`, so
at 1500 W the loop can ask for +500 W of discharge, win the arbitration, and
have the emitted value come out at -1500 W of grid charge. Winner says "loop";
the wire carries maintenance's intent.
So the test is on the NUMBER: the loop is following only while the emitted
value points the way the loop asked AND is no larger than it asked - limits
reduced it, they did not redirect it. The magnitude half is load-bearing on
its own, because a `lo` limit can raise magnitude without flipping sign, and
that is not the loop following either. Zero on either side falls out as
not-following, which costs nothing: a 0 W command cannot be a
wrong-direction command.
⚠️ FORWARD HAZARD, and the claim block in cycle() already anticipates it.
`winner == "loop"` disarms the watchdog under ANY higher-priority SET claim.
Today only maintenance and the safety stops emit one and neither follows the
meter, so the gate costs nothing. A peak-shaving strategy claiming SET at
P_PEAK **is** grid-following in sign, and the moment it lands this goes blind
for the duration of every peak event. Widening it means asking "does the
winning strategy follow the meter", not adding another name to a comparison.
"""
return (resolution.winner == "loop" and loop_asked is not None
and resolution.target_w * loop_asked > 0
and abs(resolution.target_w) <= abs(loop_asked))
class SignWatchdog:
"""One instance per actuator, evaluated once per control cycle.
⚠️ NOT SHARED ACROSS CADENCES. `disagree_since` is a wall-clock start time,
so driving one instance from two loops at two rates would have each one
resetting the other's window. If a fast on-device path ever wants this
check, it gets its own instance - the same exactly-one-writer discipline the
arbiter applies to the actuator, applied to the detector's own state.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: SignWatchdogConfig | None = None, *,
tripped: bool = False, reason: str = ""):
self.cfg = cfg or SignWatchdogConfig()
self.disagree_since: datetime | None = None
# ⚠️ RESTORED FROM THE STORE, NOT DEFAULTED. A latch that lives only in
# memory is not a latch: a container restart clears it, and the add-on
# comes back armed, into the same fault, with no operator involved. See
# store.py's note on `sign_tripped` for the measured behaviour.
self.tripped = bool(tripped)
self.reason = reason if self.tripped else ""
# -- the whole check, and it is a pure function of its arguments ----------
def evaluate(self, commanded_w, grid_w, following: bool,
now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Advance the detector one cycle. Returns True while tripped.
`commanded_w` the EMITTED setpoint - what is standing on the wire now,
after deadband, slew, quantisation and the arbiter. Not
the optimizer's raw wish: the wire carries the emitted
value, so anything else can disagree with the meter for a
reason that is not a fault.
`grid_w` net P1, + = importing. None when the meter is stale or
missing, which CLEARS the timer rather than accumulating
- a frozen figure held against a moving command would
otherwise manufacture a disagreement in about three
minutes, on top of SAFETY-01 having already commanded
zero for the same cause.
`following` did the grid-following loop actually win this cycle? See
gate 1 in the module docstring.
`now` the caller's clock, so this stays testable and replayable.
"""
if self.tripped:
# Latched. Do not re-evaluate: the trip removed the evidence.
return True
cfg = self.cfg
if not disagrees(commanded_w, grid_w, following, cfg):
self.disagree_since = None
return False
if self.disagree_since is None:
self.disagree_since = now
return False
held = (now - self.disagree_since).total_seconds()
if held < cfg.hold_s:
return False
self.tripped = True
self.reason = (
f"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded {commanded_w:+.0f} W against a meter "
f"reading {grid_w:+.0f} W for {held:.0f} s continuously "
f"(limits: both over {cfg.min_w:.0f} W, held over {cfg.hold_s:.0f} s)"
)
return True
def held_s(self, now: datetime) -> float:
"""How long the current disagreement has been standing, for the UI.
⚠️ Takes the clock rather than reading one. It was a property calling
`datetime.now()`, which quietly broke the property this module's header
advertises - every other observable here is a pure function of what it
was handed - and an unclocked function is one nothing can test, which is
exactly what happened to it.
"""
if self.disagree_since is None:
return 0.0
return (now - self.disagree_since).total_seconds()
def reset(self) -> None:
self.disagree_since = None
self.tripped = False
self.reason = ""
+202 -5
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: GoodWe RS485 Controller
version: "0.3.0"
version: "0.5.2"
slug: goodwe_controller
description: >-
Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over RS485 by emulating its smart
@@ -42,11 +42,24 @@ options:
# --- P1 meter ingestion (specs §5.2 / §14 `meter:`) -------------------------
# `off` keeps the original single meter_entity path above, so an existing
# install is untouched until it opts in. ha_dsmr subscribes to the DSMR
# integration's entities over the HA WebSocket; mqtt_p1 reads the topic below.
# integration's entities over the HA WebSocket; mqtt_p1 reads the topic below;
# ha_signed reads ONE signed HA entity (+ import / - export), which is what a
# HomeWizard P1 publishes and what ha_dsmr cannot consume.
# homewizard_local skips Home Assistant entirely and polls the meter's own
# local API. ⚠️ It is the ONLY mode whose sensor.p1_sample_age_s measures when
# the meter REPORTED rather than when the value last CHANGED - HA emits
# nothing at all for a repeated reading - so it is the only mode a firmware
# watchdog may threshold. See DOCS.md.
meter_source: "off"
meter_phases: 1
meter_max_age_s: 30
meter_mqtt_topic: ""
# homewizard_local only. The meter's own address, `host` or `host:port`.
p1_host: ""
# homewizard_local only. Seconds between polls. Must be well under
# meter_max_age_s - the age is never fresher than this interval - and there is
# nothing to gain below the meter's own ~5.0 s update rate (NOTES.md:640).
meter_poll_s: 5
# The two UNSIGNED Belgian registers. The EMS derives net power from them
# (import - export); do NOT point these at a signed template sensor.
p1_import_entity: ""
@@ -55,6 +68,15 @@ options:
# three-phase connection; the list length must equal meter_phases.
p1_phase_import_entities: []
p1_phase_export_entities: []
# ha_signed only. ONE signed net-power sensor: positive = import from the
# grid, negative = export to it. Do NOT split it into two template sensors -
# the split is done in the add-on (p1.split_signed) precisely so the sign
# convention is tested rather than living in unreviewed YAML.
p1_net_entity: ""
# Optional, in L1..L3 order, each one signed the same way. Same role as
# p1_phase_import_entities: the capacity-tariff peak on a three-phase
# connection. The list length must equal meter_phases.
p1_phase_net_entities: []
# --- control ---------------------------------------------------------------
max_w: 2000
@@ -68,14 +90,71 @@ options:
integrator_max_w: 0
heartbeat_s: 10
stale_input_s: 15
cycle_floor_s: 15
auto_start: false
# --- SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement watchdog ----------------------------------
# Trips when the emitted setpoint and the P1 net figure point OPPOSITE ways,
# both over sign_disagree_w, continuously for sign_disagree_s. Action: 0 W and
# a failsafe that latches until an operator starts control again.
#
# Both defaults are measured, not chosen. On the captured healthy day
# (2026-08-23) the longest legitimate opposed run - a load step the loop has
# not caught up with - is 30 s, and sign agreement over the gated samples is
# 93.4 %. On the captured fault day (2026-08-20) the clusters run 0.0-10.5 %
# agreement with opposed runs up to 1752 s. 300 W / 180 s sits in the middle of
# a very wide gap: at 60 s the healthy day still trips nothing, at 300 s the
# fault day still trips 13 times. There is no reason to move either number
# without a capture that says so. They are options because the AC says
# thresholds are defaults rather than constants - not because they are knobs
# anyone is expected to turn.
#
# ⚠️ sign_disagree_w must stay BELOW max_w or the watchdog can never fire (the
# arbiter bounds the command to +-max_w). validate.py refuses that config.
sign_disagree_w: 300
sign_disagree_s: 180
# --- SAFETY-18 frozen-but-fresh meter detector -----------------------------
# Seconds the meter may keep answering with an UNCHANGED measurement while the
# command stands at the rail before the add-on raises an alarm. Both halves
# are required: neither one alone is safe, and app/freeze.py carries why.
#
# ALARM ONLY. It does not command 0 W and does not latch. A false trip parks
# the battery; a false notification costs an alert.
#
# ⚠️ Only `meter_source: homewizard_local` can see this at all - it is the
# only transport that reads the meter's own document. On every other source
# the status page says NOT COVERED rather than "armed".
#
# 300 s is measured, not chosen. Over 2399 s of the live house at the
# converged operating point (sim/scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz, mean
# grid -14.2 W, 1194 polls, 735 of them repeating the previous reading) the
# LONGEST run without a distinct reading is 15.4 s (the largest unchanged_s any
# sample observes is 8.0 s). 300 s is 19.5x the pessimistic figure, and
# still inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff.
meter_freeze_s: 300
# --- maintenance -----------------------------------------------------------
maintenance_enabled: false
maintenance_interval_days: 28
maintenance_start_hour: 10
maintenance_discharge_w: 2500
maintenance_charge_w: 2500
# ⚠️ BOTH MUST STAY AT OR BELOW max_w, and that is why they are 2000 rather
# than the 2500 they shipped as. The cheap-window charge shaping asks the
# arbiter for `hi = -maintenance_charge_w` against the supervised `lo =
# -max_w`: above the ceiling that is `lo > hi`, a contradiction resolved to
# 0 W, so maintenance would SILENTLY NEVER CHARGE in a cheap window on a
# default install. validate.py refuses that config (rule 6), so these
# defaults had to become self-consistent with the max_w above rather than
# ship a configuration the validator rejects.
#
# The discharge side is clamped rather than contradicted - it drains at max_w
# and the arbiter says so - so it is only warned about; it is 2000 here for
# symmetry and to keep the shipped config warning-free.
#
# Raising max_w (the live reference install runs 5000) is what unlocks a
# faster maintenance cycle. Raise max_w FIRST, then these.
maintenance_discharge_w: 2000
maintenance_charge_w: 2000
maintenance_soc_floor: 11
maintenance_soc_target: 99
maintenance_hold_min: 120
@@ -83,9 +162,84 @@ options:
# --- tariff / capacity tariff (all optional) ------------------------------
peak_forecast_entity: ""
peak_cap_w: 3500
# ⚠️ THE OLD PRICE PATH, AND IT IS NOT DEAD YET. These two entities are the
# add-on delegating the whole price question to Home Assistant: main.py reads
# both and derives ONE BOOLEAN, `cheap = now <= avg`, which is consumed by
# nothing except the maintenance cycle's cheap-window charge floor. That is
# all they have ever done. They are kept, because retiring them would take
# the maintenance cycle's only price signal away on a live install before
# anything replaces it - TARIFF-03 (static profile) and OPT-04 (arbitrage)
# are the cards that replace it, and neither has landed.
#
# ⚠️ They may NOT be combined with price_provider below. Two price sources on
# one site, one of which silently wins, is exactly the "double up" the PM
# named; validate.py rule 7 refuses that configuration at startup rather than
# letting an operator believe the provider they configured is driving
# something. See app/validate.py.
price_now_entity: ""
price_avg_entity: ""
# --- price providers (TARIFF-02, specs §9.3 / §14 `tariffs:`) --------------
# `off` is the shipped default and means the §11.4 no-price-data row applies:
# static profile, plan provisional, NO ARBITRAGE. Nothing in 0.5.x consumes
# the series yet - OPT-04 is the consumer - so turning this on today fetches,
# validates and publishes prices and changes no energy decision.
#
# ⚠️ THESE DEFAULTS ARE MIRRORED ONCE, IN app/price.py's
# PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, and test_price.py reads THIS FILE and asserts the two
# agree key for key. Do not add a third copy in main.py - CFG-03 is open
# because that has already happened three times.
#
# markup/taxes are the §14 `tariffs.energy_price.*` figures and are added by
# the FRAMEWORK, only for the components the chosen plugin declares its feed
# does not already contain. engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic, eneco_eddy
# and manual_csv publish a figure that already carries the markup, so setting
# it under those is ignored - and logged as ignored, never applied twice.
price_provider: "off"
price_markup_eur_kwh: 0.03
price_taxes_eur_kwh: 0.06
price_csv_path: "/share/goodwe_prices.csv"
price_feed_url: ""
price_horizon_h: 48
price_timeout_s: 10
# --- static / fully-fixed tariffs (TARIFF-03, specs §9.2 / §11.4) ----------
# §14's `tariffs.static_profile`, and "" is its `null`. §9.2: "a large share
# of the installed base is on [a static profile]" - this is what makes those
# sites first-class rather than "price_provider: off, good luck".
#
# A JSON object, on one line, whose periods must tile every day type exactly
# once - no gap and no overlap. A gap is REFUSED at startup rather than
# defaulted, because an invented price is one an optimiser would trade on.
# A fully-fixed tariff is ONE period covering 00:00-24:00, all days; the
# add-on derives "fixed" from there being one distinct price, so there is no
# box to tick and none to tick wrongly.
#
# {"periods": [
# {"name":"day", "from":"07:00","to":"22:00","days":"mon-fri","eur_per_kwh":0.34},
# {"name":"night","from":"22:00","to":"07:00","days":"mon-fri","eur_per_kwh":0.26},
# {"name":"night","from":"00:00","to":"24:00","days":"sat,sun", "eur_per_kwh":0.26}]}
#
# ⚠️ A window written "22:00-07:00 mon-fri" does NOT cover Saturday morning -
# a period applies on the day the CLOCK reads, so the weekend row above is
# required, not decorative. See DOCS.md.
#
# eur_per_kwh is ALL-IN (energy + markup + taxes, §9.3), the same basis the
# dynamic providers are assembled onto. price_markup_eur_kwh and
# price_taxes_eur_kwh are NOT added to it.
#
# ⚠️ RECOMMENDED EVEN ON A DYNAMIC SITE. §11.4's degradation row is "no price
# data -> fall back to the static profile"; with this empty there is nothing
# to fall back to and a dead feed leaves the site with no tariff at all.
# validate.py warns about exactly that.
static_profile: ""
# §9.3: injection is priced SEPARATELY, and in Belgium it is often near zero -
# which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export. A scalar, not
# a second series: no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve.
export_price_eur_kwh: 0.04
# --- site ------------------------------------------------------------------
estop_fitted: false
log_level: info
@@ -98,20 +252,25 @@ schema:
batt_invert: bool
setpoint_entity: str
meter_source: list(off|ha_dsmr|mqtt_p1)
meter_source: list(off|ha_dsmr|mqtt_p1|ha_signed|homewizard_local)
# ⚠️ 2 is accepted by this range but is not a real Belgian connection. A
# telegram whose phase count disagrees is rejected at ingest and logged, so a
# mis-set 2 shows up immediately as "0 telegrams accepted" rather than as a
# quietly wrong number.
meter_phases: int(1,3)
meter_max_age_s: int(5,300)
meter_poll_s: int(1,60)
meter_mqtt_topic: str?
p1_host: str?
p1_import_entity: str?
p1_export_entity: str?
p1_phase_import_entities:
- str
p1_phase_export_entities:
- str
p1_net_entity: str?
p1_phase_net_entities:
- str
max_w: int(100,5000)
gain: float(0.05,1.0)
@@ -124,8 +283,23 @@ schema:
integrator_max_w: int(0,15000)
heartbeat_s: int(2,25)
stale_input_s: int(5,120)
cycle_floor_s: int(5,60)
auto_start: bool
# No "off" value, deliberately: this is a P0 safety check and the schema is
# not the place to make disarming it a supported configuration.
sign_disagree_w: int(50,5000)
sign_disagree_s: int(30,1800)
# No "off" value, for SAFETY-02's reason: disarming a safety alarm is not a
# supported configuration. ⚠️ THE FLOOR OF 60 IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION. At 300 s
# the slowest a HEALTHY meter's 1 Wh register can tick and still look unchanged
# is 12 W, which is inside the 15 W deadband, so the two terms of the
# conjunction are mutually exclusive rather than merely far apart. At 60 s that
# figure is 60 W and the argument is gone - only the margin is left. See
# app/freeze.py.
meter_freeze_s: int(60,3600)
maintenance_enabled: bool
maintenance_interval_days: int(1,90)
maintenance_start_hour: int(0,23)
@@ -140,5 +314,28 @@ schema:
price_now_entity: str?
price_avg_entity: str?
# ⚠️ The provider list is written out rather than left as `str`, so the
# Supervisor rejects a typo in the UI. validate.py ALSO refuses an unknown id
# against app/price.py's PROVIDERS registry, because sim/inject.py and the
# checks reach validate_startup_config() with a dict the Supervisor never saw.
# Adding a sixth plugin means adding it here and to PROVIDERS - and nowhere
# else, which is AC2.
price_provider: list(off|generic_dayahead|engie_dynamic|totalenergies_dynamic|eneco_eddy|manual_csv)
price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_taxes_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_csv_path: str?
price_feed_url: str?
price_horizon_h: int(1,72)
price_timeout_s: int(2,60)
# A JSON string rather than a nested schema, deliberately: it is ONE option
# key (§14 has one), it survives config.yaml's flat options block, and
# parse_static_profile() accepts an already-parsed dict too, so a future
# nested schema is a config.yaml change and no code change at all.
static_profile: str?
# ⚠️ The lower bound is NEGATIVE on purpose. Belgian injection tariffs have
# gone below zero (you pay to export at midday in summer), and a schema that
# bottoms out at 0 would make that site inexpressible.
export_price_eur_kwh: float(-1,1)
estop_fitted: bool
log_level: list(trace|debug|info|warning|error)
+550
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
"""Runnable check for SAFETY-03, the output clamp and its winding-loop alarm.
python3 test_clamp.py
No framework, asserts only, same house style as test_freeze.py.
Five parts, and parts 3 and 4 are the ones that carry the acceptance criteria:
1. THE CLAMP ARITHMETIC, on the shipped `clamp_to_rating()` - boundaries,
symmetry, the device second stage, and the non-finite cases. Table driven.
2. THE ALARM'S CADENCE - rising edge, re-assert, hysteresis - on the shipped
`ClampWatchdog`. Every engagement counted, notifications not flooded.
3. AC 1 + AC 3, WIRED. A computed setpoint that exceeds the rating, driven
through the REAL `Controller.cycle()`: nothing over the rating reaches the
device, and the alarm fires. Includes the historical runaway from
specs.md 10.3 replayed against an unclamped transcription, so the check
says what the clamp is actually worth in watts rather than asserting a
constant.
4. AC 2, AND IT IS THE LOAD-BEARING HALF. A loop that SATURATES WITHOUT
CLAMPING - the inverter refusing to follow a perfectly legal command - must
raise NO clamp alarm. If it does, the bug signal is inside the noise again
and the whole ticket has bought nothing.
5. NO PATH BYPASSES IT. write_setpoint() is the only route to the wire, so it
is called directly with an out-of-range value the way the heartbeat and the
operator's buttons call it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHY PART 4 ALSO ASSERTS ON `Decision`'s BOOLEANS AND NOT ON `reason`
`Decision.reason` is one string and the stages after the clamp overwrite it. The
check below drives a cycle that clamps the integrator AND is then slew limited,
and asserts that `reason` does NOT say so while `i_clamped` does. That is not a
style preference - an alarm keyed on the string is silent on exactly the cycles a
winding loop produces, and this is the check that would go red if someone
"simplified" main.py back onto it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHAT THIS CHECK DOES NOT COVER
- The firmware-side magnitude clamp (the card's "two clamps, not one"). This
add-on's `write_setpoint()` is the add-on half; the ESP32 half is DRIVER-07's
and is not in this repo's Python.
- A rig run. Nothing here needs one: the clamp is arithmetic on the write path
and part 3 drives the shipped `Controller.cycle()` against a stub Home
Assistant, which is the same surface test_freeze.py part 1-2 use. The wire-
level invariant the card asks for (`|emitted| <= rating` on every frame) is
asserted here over every value that reached `set_number()`, which is the last
thing this process controls; proving it at the inverter needs the witness log
and belongs with DRIVER-07.
"""
import asyncio
import math
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from app.clamp import (
CLEAR_CYCLES, REASON_CODE, REASSERT_S, ClampWatchdog, clamp_to_rating,
is_commandable,
)
from app.control import Tuning, compute
from app.main import Controller
fails = []
T0 = datetime(2026, 8, 30, 9, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
# The live install's numbers. NOTES.md and freeze.py both say max_w: 5000 there,
# which is also the device rating, so this is the bound the alarm is written at.
LIVE_MAX_W = 5000.0
CLAMP_ID = "goodwe_output_clamp"
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
# ==============================================================================
print("1. the clamp arithmetic, on the shipped expression")
# (requested, limit, expected applied, expected engaged, expected bound)
TABLE = [
(5001.0, 5000.0, 5000.0, True, "max_w"), # +limit+1
(-5001.0, 5000.0, -5000.0, True, "max_w"), # -limit-1, the export side
(5000.0, 5000.0, 5000.0, False, ""), # exactly +limit: NOT engaged
(-5000.0, 5000.0, -5000.0, False, ""), # exactly -limit: NOT engaged
(0.0, 5000.0, 0.0, False, ""), # the failsafe value
(1234.0, 5000.0, 1234.0, False, ""),
(14768.0, 5000.0, 5000.0, True, "max_w"), # 10.3's reported runaway
]
for requested, limit, want_applied, want_engaged, want_bound in TABLE:
r = clamp_to_rating(requested, limit)
check(f"{requested:+.0f} W against a {limit:.0f} W rating -> "
f"{r.applied_w:+.0f} W, engaged={r.engaged}, bound={r.bound!r}",
r.applied_w == want_applied and r.engaged is want_engaged
and r.bound == want_bound)
# It is a MAGNITUDE clamp (3.2), so import and export must be bound identically.
# Derived over a sweep rather than asserted on two hand-picked values.
asym = [m for m in range(0, 12001, 37)
if clamp_to_rating(m, LIVE_MAX_W).applied_w
!= -clamp_to_rating(-m, LIVE_MAX_W).applied_w]
check(f"symmetric over {len(range(0, 12001, 37))} magnitudes "
f"({len(asym)} asymmetric)", not asym)
# The engagement flag has to mean "the RAW value differed", which is the words
# AC 2 uses. Re-derived from the result's own fields, not from the table.
mismatch = [m for m in range(0, 12001, 37)
for r in [clamp_to_rating(m, LIVE_MAX_W)]
if r.engaged != (r.requested_w != r.applied_w)]
check("engaged is exactly 'raw differs from applied', over the same sweep",
not mismatch)
# The device second stage. Only reachable when max_w is ABOVE the device range,
# i.e. when validate_startup_config() did not run or no longer holds.
r = clamp_to_rating(3000.0, 5000.0, dev_min=-2000.0, dev_max=2000.0)
check(f"a device narrower than max_w still bites, and says which bound "
f"({r.applied_w:+.0f} W, {r.bound!r})",
r.applied_w == 2000.0 and r.engaged and r.bound == "device")
r = clamp_to_rating(3000.0, 5000.0, dev_min=-5000.0, dev_max=5000.0)
check("...and is a no-op once the startup validation holds",
r.applied_w == 3000.0 and not r.engaged)
# ⚠️ REGRESSION, REVIEW-FOUND. THE FIRST STAGE USED TO `return` AND THE DEVICE
# STAGE WAS THEN NEVER REACHED, so the harder the overshoot the less the guard
# did: at max_w 5000 against a +-4000 device, +9999 emitted +5000 - OUTSIDE THE
# DEVICE RANGE - while a mere +4500 was correctly held to +4000. That inverts
# the guard and it was a regression against the pre-PR `write_setpoint()`, whose
# comment read "never send a value the device will reject outright".
#
# The property is asserted over a sweep, not on the two witness values, because
# the defect was invisible to every single-value check that happened to sit
# inside one stage.
DEV_LO, DEV_HI = -4000.0, 4000.0
escapes = [(m, clamp_to_rating(m, 5000.0, DEV_LO, DEV_HI).applied_w)
for m in range(-15000, 15001, 61)
for a in [clamp_to_rating(m, 5000.0, DEV_LO, DEV_HI).applied_w]
if not (DEV_LO <= a <= DEV_HI)]
big = clamp_to_rating(9999.0, 5000.0, DEV_LO, DEV_HI)
small = clamp_to_rating(4500.0, 5000.0, DEV_LO, DEV_HI)
print(f" max_w 5000 vs a device of {DEV_LO:+.0f}..{DEV_HI:+.0f}: "
f"+9999 -> {big.applied_w:+.0f} W ({big.bound}), "
f"+4500 -> {small.applied_w:+.0f} W ({small.bound})")
check(f"BOTH stages always run - {big.requested_w:+.0f} W emits "
f"{big.applied_w:+.0f} W, inside the device's {DEV_HI:+.0f} W, and names "
f"both bounds ({big.bound!r})",
big.applied_w == DEV_HI and big.bound == "max_w+device")
check(f"...and it holds over the whole range, so no overshoot escapes the "
f"device ({len(escapes)} escapes in {len(range(-15000, 15001, 61))})",
not escapes)
check("...a big overshoot is not clamped LESS than a small one",
abs(big.applied_w) <= abs(small.applied_w) + 0.0)
print(" non-finite input is loss of input, not an out-of-range value")
for bad in (None, float("nan"), float("inf"), float("-inf"), "abc", object()):
check(f"is_commandable({bad!r:.30}) is False", is_commandable(bad) is False)
for good in (0, -5000.0, 5000, 12.5):
check(f"is_commandable({good!r}) is True", is_commandable(good) is True)
# ⚠️ WHY THAT GUARD EXISTS, AND THE ANSWER IS WORSE THAN "it passes a nan
# through". MEASURED HERE, not recalled: every comparison against a nan is
# False, so `min(limit, nan)` keeps its FIRST argument and a naive clamp turns a
# nan into a command at the FULL RATING - and then reports engaged=True, because
# limit != nan, so the winding-loop counter gets a transport bug filed in it.
# The number below is computed by the same expression the guard replaces.
nan = float("nan")
naive = max(-LIVE_MAX_W, min(LIVE_MAX_W, nan))
check(f"a naive clamp turns a nan into {naive:+,.0f} W and calls it "
f"engaged={naive != nan} - hence the guard",
naive == LIVE_MAX_W and (naive != nan) is True)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("2. the alarm's cadence: every engagement counted, no flood")
wd = ClampWatchdog()
t = T0
fired = [wd.note(True, "winding", t + timedelta(seconds=i)) for i in range(10)]
check(f"the rising edge fires ({fired[0]})", fired[0] is True)
check(f"the next 9 one-second cycles fire {sum(fired[1:])} more times "
f"(re-assert is {REASSERT_S:.0f} s)", sum(fired[1:]) == 0)
check(f"but every one of them is counted: engagements={wd.engagements}",
wd.engagements == 10)
check(f"and it is one episode, not ten: episodes={wd.episodes}",
wd.episodes == 1)
# --- THE RE-ASSERT CADENCE, PINNED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS ------------------------
# ⚠️ REVIEW-FOUND. This used to read `wd.note(True, ..., T0 + REASSERT_S + 9)`,
# which is green for ANY value of the constant - REASSERT_S = 3600 passed, and an
# hour of silence is precisely what the module promises not to do. A check whose
# stimulus is written in terms of the constant it is grading cannot grade it.
#
# The requirements are stated in wall-clock seconds and derived from what the
# alarm is FOR, so they do not move when the constant does:
#
# floor - a loop pinned on the rail must speak at least MIN_PER_QUARTER times
# inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff. That window
# is the same one freeze.py and DOCS.md reason about.
# ceiling - it must not speak on more than MAX_FRACTION of cycles, or it is
# the per-cycle flood the split exists to remove.
QUARTER_S = 900.0
MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5
MAX_FRACTION = 0.20
pinned = ClampWatchdog()
alarms = sum(1 for i in range(int(QUARTER_S))
if pinned.note(True, "pinned", T0 + timedelta(seconds=i)))
print(f" pinned on the rail for {QUARTER_S:.0f} s at 1 s cycles: "
f"{pinned.engagements} engagements, {alarms} alarm(s) "
f"({alarms / QUARTER_S:.1%} of cycles)")
check(f"a loop pinned for a whole billing quarter speaks at least "
f"{MIN_PER_QUARTER} times (it spoke {alarms})",
alarms >= MIN_PER_QUARTER)
check(f"...and on no more than {MAX_FRACTION:.0%} of cycles (it was "
f"{alarms / QUARTER_S:.1%})", alarms <= MAX_FRACTION * QUARTER_S)
check("...while every single cycle is still counted",
pinned.engagements == int(QUARTER_S))
# --- THE HYSTERESIS, PINNED AGAINST THE CHATTER DIRECTION --------------------
# ⚠️ REVIEW-FOUND. This used to issue `range(CLEAR_CYCLES - 1)` clean cycles,
# which at CLEAR_CYCLES = 1 issues ZERO of them and passes while printing
# "0 clean cycles do NOT clear it". Green for every value >= 1 - including 1,
# which IS the chatter the constant exists to prevent. The stimulus is a literal
# now: ONE clean cycle must not clear the alarm, whatever the constant says.
wd2 = ClampWatchdog()
wd2.note(True, "winding", T0)
wd2.note(False, "", T0 + timedelta(seconds=1))
check(f"ONE clean cycle does NOT clear the alarm (active={wd2.active}) - "
f"a command dithering across the rail must not chatter",
wd2.active is True)
survived = 1
while wd2.active and survived < 50:
wd2.note(False, "", T0 + timedelta(seconds=1 + survived))
survived += 1
print(f" it took {survived} consecutive clean cycles to de-assert "
f"(CLEAR_CYCLES = {CLEAR_CYCLES})")
check(f"...and it does de-assert, after {survived} of them, rather than "
f"latching", wd2.active is False and survived == CLEAR_CYCLES)
check("...and the engagement count survives the clear, so the evidence does",
wd2.engagements == 1)
check("a clean cycle on an idle watchdog says nothing",
wd2.note(False, "", T0 + timedelta(seconds=300)) is False)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("3. AC 1 + AC 3, wired: over the rating both clamps AND alarms")
class _Store:
data = {}
def set(self, *a):
pass
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
class _Pub:
enabled = False
def publish(self, *a, **k):
pass
def close(self):
pass
class _Hass:
"""Stub HA. `track` False models an inverter that is switched off entirely,
which is the 10.3 runaway's own setup."""
def __init__(self, grid, batt=0.0, track=True):
self.grid = grid
self.batt = batt
self.track = track
self.calls = []
self.writes = []
async def limits(self, entity):
return (-LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W, 1.0)
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
return {"sensor.grid": self.grid, "sensor.soc": 50.0,
"sensor.batt": self.batt}.get(entity)
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
self.writes.append(float(value))
if self.track:
self.batt = float(value)
return True
async def call(self, domain, service, data):
self.calls.append((domain, service, data))
return True
def wired(grid, cycles=40, batt=0.0, track=True, **over):
async def go():
hass = _Hass(grid, batt=batt, track=track)
c = Controller(dict(
{"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": 0,
"step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15},
**over), hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
# The red status row exists only WHILE the clamp is engaged, and the
# hysteresis clears it a few cycles later - so it is captured live
# rather than looked for after the run, when it is correctly gone.
c.red_snapshot = []
for _ in range(cycles):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
if c.clamp_wd.active and not c.red_snapshot:
c.red_snapshot = c.checks()
return hass, c
return asyncio.run(go())
def clamp_notes(hass):
return [d for dom, svc, d in hass.calls
if (dom, svc) == ("persistent_notification", "create")
and d.get("notification_id") == CLAMP_ID]
# THE 10.3 RUNAWAY, replayed. "With the inverter switched off entirely, an
# unclamped integrator climbed ~130 W per 4 s to over 10 kW and, pinned at the
# 5 kW rail, reported 14 768 W." `track=False` is the inverter switched off: it
# reports 0 W however hard it is commanded, so the error never closes.
hass_r, ctl_r = wired(6000.0, cycles=60, track=False)
emitted = [abs(w) for w in hass_r.writes]
# What the SAME error would have done to an accumulator with no bound - the
# transcription is deliberately the unclamped velocity form 10.3 describes, so
# the figure below is computed here and not quoted from the spec.
runaway, err = 0.0, 6000.0
for _ in range(60):
runaway += 0.6 * err
print(f" unclamped, the same 60 cycles reach {runaway:,.0f} W; "
f"the largest value that reached the device is {max(emitted):,.0f} W")
check(f"an unbounded accumulator really does run away here "
f"({runaway:,.0f} W >> {LIVE_MAX_W:.0f} W)", runaway > 3 * LIVE_MAX_W)
check(f"AC 1: NOT ONE of the {len(emitted)} values that reached the device "
f"exceeds the {LIVE_MAX_W:.0f} W rating",
emitted and max(emitted) <= LIVE_MAX_W)
# ⚠️ AND THE CLAMP IS NOT THE ONLY THING HOLDING THAT LINE HERE, which is worth
# saying out loud rather than letting the number above imply otherwise. Against
# an inverter reporting 0 W the saturation freeze engages after
# `saturation_cycles` and pins the command well BELOW the rail - that is why the
# largest emitted value is what it is and not 5000 W. The clamp is what makes it
# bounded; the freeze is what makes it small. A check that read
# `max(emitted) == max_w` would have been asserting the freeze, not the clamp.
check(f"...and the saturation freeze is what pins it at {max(emitted):,.0f} W "
f"rather than the rail", ctl_r.sat_count >= ctl_r.tuning.saturation_cycles)
notes_r = clamp_notes(hass_r)
print(f" the loop clamped on {ctl_r.clamp_wd.engagements} of {60} cycles, "
f"in {ctl_r.clamp_wd.episodes} episode(s), raising {len(notes_r)} "
f"notification(s)")
check("AC 3: and it ALARMED - silently clipping this is the defect",
ctl_r.clamp_wd.engagements > 0 and len(notes_r) >= 1)
check("...with its own notification_id, not shared with any other guard",
all(d["notification_id"] == CLAMP_ID for d in notes_r))
check("...one episode, re-asserted rather than one per cycle",
ctl_r.clamp_wd.episodes == 1 and len(notes_r) < ctl_r.clamp_wd.engagements)
check("...and it names itself a bug signal, not a limit in use",
bool(notes_r) and "out of range" in notes_r[0]["message"])
rows_r = [e for e in ctl_r.events if REASON_CODE in e]
check(f"the action log records every engagement, coalesced into one row per "
f"episode ({len(rows_r)} row(s), {ctl_r.clamp_wd.engagements} "
f"engagement(s))",
len(rows_r) == ctl_r.clamp_wd.episodes
and f"{ctl_r.clamp_wd.engagements} engagement(s)" in rows_r[0])
# ⚠️ REGRESSION, AND IT WAS A REAL BUG BEFORE IT WAS A CHECK. `log_event()` keeps
# 40 rows. A row per engagement flushes that ring inside 40 cycles of a winding
# loop, and the first thing it evicted was SAFETY-18's own "METER FROZEN?" row -
# i.e. this guard silencing another guard's log. Driven here with a plant that
# TRACKS the command, so the saturation freeze never engages and the integrator
# clamps on essentially every cycle.
hass_l, ctl_l = wired(9000.0, cycles=80, track=True)
rows_l = [e for e in ctl_l.events if REASON_CODE in e]
other_l = [e for e in ctl_l.events if REASON_CODE not in e]
print(f" 80 winding cycles: {ctl_l.clamp_wd.engagements} engagement(s) -> "
f"{len(rows_l)} log row(s), leaving room for {len(other_l)} other event(s)")
check(f"a long winding episode does NOT flood the 40-row event log "
f"({len(rows_l)} rows for {ctl_l.clamp_wd.engagements} engagements)",
ctl_l.clamp_wd.engagements > 40 and len(rows_l) <= ctl_l.clamp_wd.episodes)
check("...and the count in the row is the counter's, so nothing is lost",
f"{ctl_l.clamp_wd.engagements} engagement(s)" in rows_l[-1])
# The RED row exists only while engaged, and the episode above is short, so it
# is captured mid-run rather than asserted after the hysteresis has cleared it.
check("the status page goes red WHILE it is engaged",
any(not c["ok"] and not c["warn"] and "OUTPUT CLAMP ENGAGED" in c["text"]
for c in ctl_r.red_snapshot))
check("...and once clear, a warn row still says how many times it engaged",
any(c["warn"] and f"{ctl_r.clamp_wd.engagements} time(s)" in c["text"]
for c in ctl_r.checks()))
# ⚠️ NOT A TRIP. 11.2's action is "clamp and alarm"; the loop keeps running and
# keeps writing the clamped value. If a later cut changes that it must come here.
check(f"it is NOT a trip - the command stands at {ctl_r.target:+.0f} W, not 0 W",
ctl_r.target != 0.0 and ctl_r.target == hass_r.writes[-1])
check("...and the controller still reports itself running, not failsafe",
ctl_r.auto and not ctl_r.sign_wd.tripped)
# The export side, because the clamp is a magnitude clamp and a sign bug in it
# would be invisible on the import case alone.
hass_x, ctl_x = wired(-6000.0, cycles=60, track=False)
check(f"the export side clamps and alarms too "
f"({min(hass_x.writes):+,.0f} W, {len(clamp_notes(hass_x))} note(s), "
f"{ctl_x.clamp_wd.engagements} engagement(s))",
min(hass_x.writes) < 0 and abs(min(hass_x.writes)) <= LIVE_MAX_W
and clamp_notes(hass_x) and ctl_x.clamp_wd.engagements > 0)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("4. AC 2: saturation WITHOUT clamping must NOT raise a clamp alarm")
# A legal command the inverter will not follow. The meter sits just outside the
# deadband so the loop moves a little and then rests; `batt` is pinned far from
# whatever is commanded, which is the saturation condition (|cmd - actual| >
# saturation_w) and nothing else. The integrator never approaches the rating.
hass_s, ctl_s = wired(60.0, cycles=40, batt=2500.0, track=False)
peak = max(abs(w) for w in hass_s.writes)
print(f" saturated for {ctl_s.sat_count} consecutive cycles; the command "
f"peaked at {peak:.0f} W, {peak / LIVE_MAX_W:.1%} of the rating")
# ⚠️ THE POSITIVE HALF FIRST. A negative check that saw nothing happen is not an
# observation - if the saturation freeze never engaged, "no clamp alarm" is
# vacuous and this check is worthless.
check(f"the saturation freeze REALLY DID engage (sat_count="
f"{ctl_s.sat_count} >= {ctl_s.tuning.saturation_cycles})",
ctl_s.sat_count >= ctl_s.tuning.saturation_cycles)
check("...and the event log says so, in the saturation's own words",
any("saturation freeze" in e for e in ctl_s.events))
check(f"...while the command stayed well inside the rating "
f"({peak:.0f} W < {LIVE_MAX_W:.0f} W)", peak < LIVE_MAX_W)
# Now the negative, which is only worth anything because of the three above.
check("AC 2: NO clamp notification was raised", not clamp_notes(hass_s))
check("AC 2: the clamp counted ZERO engagements", ctl_s.clamp_wd.engagements == 0)
check("AC 2: no OUTPUT_CLAMP row in the action log",
not [e for e in ctl_s.events if REASON_CODE in e])
check("AC 2: and no clamp row on the status page",
not [c for c in ctl_s.checks() if "output clamp" in c["text"].lower()])
print(" ...and the two alarms do not share a notification_id")
ids_clamp = {d["notification_id"] for d in clamp_notes(hass_r)}
ids_other = {d.get("notification_id") for dom, svc, d in hass_r.calls
if svc == "create"} - ids_clamp
check(f"clamp ids {sorted(ids_clamp)} are disjoint from every other alarm's "
f"{sorted(x for x in ids_other if x)}", not (ids_clamp & ids_other))
print(" ...and the alarm cannot be keyed on Decision.reason")
# A cycle that clamps the integrator AND is then slew limited. `reason` reports
# the LAST stage, so a string-keyed alarm is silent on it; the boolean is not.
t = Tuning(max_w=2000.0, slew_w=100.0, gain=0.6)
d = compute(prev_w=1000.0, grid_w=6000.0, actual_w=1000.0, tuning=t, i_w=1900.0)
print(f" reason={d.reason!r} i_clamped={d.i_clamped} clamped={d.clamped}")
check("the integrator DID clamp on that cycle", d.i_clamped is True)
check("...but `reason` says 'slew-limited' - the clamp was overwritten "
"downstream, so a string-keyed alarm is SILENT here",
d.reason == "slew-limited" and "clamp" not in d.reason)
# And the same for the OUTPUT clamp, on a config that lets the integrator run
# above the rail - then both flags fire and `reason` still reports neither.
t2 = Tuning(max_w=2000.0, integrator_max_w=3000.0, slew_w=100.0, gain=0.6)
d2 = compute(prev_w=1000.0, grid_w=6000.0, actual_w=1000.0, tuning=t2, i_w=2900.0)
print(f" reason={d2.reason!r} i_clamped={d2.i_clamped} clamped={d2.clamped}")
check("both clamps engaged, and `reason` reports neither",
d2.i_clamped and d2.clamped and "clamp" not in d2.reason)
# ⚠️ HOW THE FREEZE AND THE CLAMP INTERACT, MEASURED RATHER THAN ASSUMED, AND
# THE MEASUREMENT REFUSED TWO GUESSES BEFORE THIS ONE. Written first as "a
# frozen cycle never clamps" (false), then as "only the i_w == 0 reseed
# exception clamps" (also false - at i_w == 0 with a matching actual the cycle
# is not saturated at all, so it is never frozen). What the sweep actually
# shows: a frozen cycle clamps exactly when the integrator REVERSES. control.py
# permits that on purpose - "it may fall, cross zero, or reverse outright" -
# because the alternative deadlocks the loop, and a reversal is a full swing
# that can clear the bound on the far side in one step.
#
# That matters for this ticket rather than being trivia: it is the one shape
# where the saturation freeze and a clamp engagement coincide, so it is exactly
# where an alarm that shared a channel with saturation would lose the clamp.
grid_sweep = (-9000.0, -3000.0, 3000.0, 9000.0)
grid = [(pp, g) for pp in (-1900.0, -500.0, 0.0, 500.0, 1900.0)
for g in grid_sweep]
runs = {(pp, g): compute(pp, g, 0.0, t, sat_count=5, i_w=pp) for pp, g in grid}
frozen = [k for k, d in runs.items() if d.frozen]
frozen_clamps = [k for k in frozen if runs[k].i_clamped]
# The property, stated independently of the control law's own branches: the
# correction pushes AGAINST the standing integrator, and the resulting swing
# clears the bound.
reversals = [(pp, g) for pp, g in frozen
if pp * g < 0 and abs(pp + t.gain * g) > t.max_w]
print(f" {len(frozen)} of {len(grid)} sweep cells are frozen; "
f"those that also clamp: {frozen_clamps}")
check(f"a frozen cycle CAN clamp, and only by reversing "
f"({len(frozen_clamps)} of {len(frozen)} frozen cells)",
frozen_clamps and frozen_clamps == reversals)
check("...and a frozen cycle pushing the way it already leans never clamps - "
"that is the freeze doing its job",
not [k for k in frozen if runs[k].i_clamped and k[0] * k[1] > 0])
check("a healthy cycle sets neither flag",
not any([compute(0.0, 100.0, 0.0, t).i_clamped,
compute(0.0, 100.0, 0.0, t).clamped]))
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("5. no path reaches the wire around the clamp")
async def _direct():
hass = _Hass(0.0)
c = Controller({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "max_w": 2000,
"meter_source": "off"},
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
# The shape the heartbeat, shutdown() and handle_action() all use.
await c.write_setpoint(9999.0, force=True)
await c.write_setpoint(-9999.0, force=True)
await c.write_setpoint(float("nan"), force=True)
await c.write_setpoint(1500.0, force=True)
return hass, c
hass_d, ctl_d = asyncio.run(_direct())
print(f" asked for 9999 / -9999 / nan / 1500 W; the device saw "
f"{hass_d.writes}")
check("a direct out-of-range write is clamped, not passed through",
hass_d.writes[:2] == [2000.0, -2000.0])
check("a nan is refused and becomes 0 W, per 11.1 rule 1",
hass_d.writes[2] == 0.0)
check("...and is NOT counted as a clamp engagement - it is a transport bug",
sum(1 for e in ctl_d.events if REASON_CODE in e) == 2)
check("an in-range value is untouched", hass_d.writes[3] == 1500.0)
check("every emitted frame satisfies |emitted| <= the rating",
all(abs(w) <= 2000.0 for w in hass_d.writes))
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
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"""Runnable check for the control loop's cadence. `python3 test_loop.py`
SAFETY-12: the loop must evaluate on a clock as well as on a change. Before the
fix, `run_control()` ran `cycle()` only when the meter value differed from the
previous poll, so a meter that repeats a value ran NO control cycles while the
heartbeat kept re-emitting the last command - measured on the rig during TEL-05
as 70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W with 14 arrivals and zero cycles.
⚠️ THIS TEST TAKES ~95 SECONDS OF WALL CLOCK (measured 93 s), on purpose, and
that figure is the only thing standing between it and a future developer who
decides a slow test is a broken one. The thing under test is a wall-clock floor
inside a loop that sleeps 1 s; mocking the clock would leave the assertion
testing the mock. It drives the real `run_control()` and counts what actually
happened. Eight runs of the real loop is what the eight scenarios cost.
⚠️ If you shorten the windows, re-measure and update this number and the one in
HANDOVER.md. An understated runtime reads as a hang.
`cycle_floor_s` is read from options with no lower bound in code, so a huge
value reproduces the pre-fix behaviour exactly. Every claim below is therefore
an A/B on one binary, not a comparison against a remembered old one.
"""
import asyncio
import sys
import time
from app.main import Controller
fails = []
NEVER = 1e9 # cycle_floor_s so large the floor can never elapse: pre-fix
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
class FakeHass:
"""A scripted meter and a plant that tracks the command instantly."""
def __init__(self, meter, soc_dies_at=None):
self.meter = meter
self.soc_dies_at = soc_dies_at
self.batt = 0.0
self.writes = []
self.t0 = time.monotonic()
async def limits(self, entity):
return (-5000.0, 5000.0, 1.0)
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
now = time.monotonic() - self.t0
if entity == "sensor.grid":
return self.meter(now)
if entity == "sensor.batt":
return self.batt
if entity == "sensor.soc":
if self.soc_dies_at is not None and now >= self.soc_dies_at:
return None
return 50.0
return None
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
self.writes.append(float(value))
self.batt = float(value)
return True
class _Store:
data = {}
def set(self, *a):
pass
class _Pub:
enabled = False
def publish(self, *a, **k):
pass
def close(self):
pass
BASE = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": 0.6, "slew_w": 1000,
"deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": -10, "step_w": 10,
"heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15}
def drive(meter, floor, seconds, soc_dies_at=None, **over):
"""Run the real control loop for `seconds`; return (cycle times, writes)."""
async def go():
hass = FakeHass(meter, soc_dies_at)
c = Controller(dict(BASE, cycle_floor_s=floor, **over), hass, _Store(),
_Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
stamps = []
real = c.cycle
async def counted():
stamps.append(time.monotonic() - hass.t0)
await real()
c.cycle = counted
task = asyncio.create_task(c.run_control())
await asyncio.sleep(seconds)
c.stopping = True
await asyncio.wait_for(task, timeout=10)
return stamps, hass.writes, c.target, c.reason
return asyncio.run(go())
def worst_gap(stamps, seconds):
"""Longest stretch with no cycle, including the tail after the last one."""
edges = [0.0] + list(stamps) + [seconds]
return max(b - a for a, b in zip(edges, edges[1:]))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("a meter that repeats the same value")
FLAT = lambda t: 350.0 # noqa: E731
FLOOR, SECONDS = 3.0, 12.0
pre_stamps, pre_writes, _, _ = drive(FLAT, NEVER, SECONDS)
# The defect itself, demonstrated rather than described: one cycle at startup
# and then nothing for the rest of the window, while writes keep happening.
check("pre-fix: a constant meter runs exactly one cycle, at startup",
len(pre_stamps) == 1)
check("...while the heartbeat keeps writing anyway, so nothing looks wrong",
len(pre_writes) >= 2)
post_stamps, post_writes, _, _ = drive(FLAT, FLOOR, SECONDS)
check("post-fix: the same constant meter runs cycles throughout",
len(post_stamps) >= int(SECONDS / FLOOR) - 1)
# The actual acceptance criterion: a BOUND on the gap, not a count.
gap = worst_gap(post_stamps, SECONDS)
check(f"...with no gap longer than the floor ({gap:.1f}s <= {FLOOR + 1.5:.1f}s)",
gap <= FLOOR + 1.5)
check("...and the loop actually corrected, instead of holding a stale command",
len(post_writes) > len(pre_writes))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("a meter that changes normally - nothing may move")
# ⚠️ THE REGRESSION GUARD, and the more important half. The floor is a deadline
# on the gap between cycles, reset by every cycle whichever trigger fired - not
# a second scheduler. On a healthy meter it must never elapse, so the cycle
# count, the write count and the commanded values must be IDENTICAL either side
# of the fix. Anything else is a new write cadence, which SAFETY-12 forbids:
# the deadband, step_w and the 10 s force-write decide what reaches the wire,
# and this change is only allowed to alter when the loop thinks.
STEPS = [0.0, 300.0, 850.0, -400.0, 120.0, -900.0, 60.0]
LIVE = lambda t: STEPS[int(t // 2) % len(STEPS)] # noqa: E731
a_stamps, a_writes, _, _ = drive(LIVE, NEVER, 12.0)
b_stamps, b_writes, _, _ = drive(LIVE, FLOOR, 12.0)
check("a changing meter runs the same number of cycles as before the fix",
len(a_stamps) == len(b_stamps))
check("...commanding exactly the same sequence of values", a_writes == b_writes)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("a meter parked at the target - the converged operating point")
# The case TEL-05 warned about: at the converged target the power figure
# legitimately repeats for minutes. The loop must still run, and must still
# write nothing but the heartbeat, because the deadband - not the arrival
# trigger - is what holds the command still.
AT_TARGET = lambda t: -10.0 # noqa: E731
c_stamps, c_writes, _, _ = drive(AT_TARGET, NEVER, 12.0)
d_stamps, d_writes, _, _ = drive(AT_TARGET, FLOOR, 12.0)
check("the loop evaluates at the converged point too", len(d_stamps) > len(c_stamps))
check("...and the deadband still holds the command, so writes are unchanged",
d_writes == c_writes)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("an input dies while the meter repeats - the safety claim must still fire")
# ⚠️ THE STRONGEST PROPERTY IN SAFETY-12, and the one that makes it a safety fix
# rather than a latency fix. The `inputs missing -> 0 W` claim lives INSIDE
# cycle() (main.py, the stale_input_s branch and the P_SAFETY claim below it).
# Pre-fix, on a meter whose value happened to repeat, cycle() was never called
# again - so that claim could not fire AT ALL. The controller held its last
# command through an input outage of unbounded length with the status line still
# reading "loop -> N W".
#
# Layer 1 does not cover this either on a `meter_source: off` install: no P1 age
# sensor is published (see Controller.publish), so the firmware has nothing to
# veto on, and the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed the whole time.
#
# stale_input_s is shortened to 3 s here so the outage resolves inside a test
# rather than inside a quarter of a minute. The mechanism is the default one.
c2_stamps, c2_writes, pre_target, pre_reason = drive(
FLAT, NEVER, 10.0, soc_dies_at=4.0, stale_input_s=3)
check("pre-fix: a dead input during a constant meter never reaches the safety claim",
pre_target != 0.0 and "safety" not in pre_reason)
check(f"...so it holds its last command instead ({pre_target:g} W, {pre_reason!r})",
pre_target == 220.0)
d2_stamps, d2_writes, post_target, post_reason = drive(
FLAT, FLOOR, 10.0, soc_dies_at=4.0, stale_input_s=3)
check("post-fix: the same outage commands 0 W", post_target == 0.0)
check(f"...through the safety claim, not by accident ({post_reason!r})",
"safety" in post_reason)
check("...and the 0 W actually reached the device", 0.0 in d2_writes)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: " + "; ".join(fails))
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+822 -5
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ computes the wrong quarter-hour figure whenever the telegram cadence changes.
"""
import asyncio
import json
import sys
import time
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
@@ -18,8 +19,11 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import aiohttp # already required by app.p1, so this adds no new dependency
from app.p1 import (
P1Error, P1Ingest, HaDsmrSource, QuarterAverager, SOURCE_HA, SOURCE_MQTT,
make_sample, parse_mqtt_payload,
P1Error, P1Ingest, HaDsmrSource, HaSignedSource, HomeWizardLocalSource,
QuarterAverager,
SOURCE_HA, SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, SOURCE_MQTT,
build_source, is_enabled, make_sample, parse_homewizard, parse_mqtt_payload,
split_signed,
)
fails = []
@@ -56,6 +60,25 @@ def raises(name, fn):
fails.append(name)
def built(src):
"""`src.build()`, with any escaping exception turned into a visible value.
⚠️ Legibility of a RED, not leniency. build() is contracted to return a bool
and to funnel every bad telegram through ingest.reject() - a guard that goes
missing (say the "is the net entity cached at all" one) makes it raise
instead. That still fails the suite, but by aborting it with a traceback at
whichever check happened to run first, which costs the next person ten
minutes deciding whether the suite is broken or the code is. Returning the
exception makes it compare unequal to True/False, so the NAMED check goes red
and says which rule died.
"""
try:
return src.build()
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - a raise here is itself the failure
print(f" build() raised {type(err).__name__}: {err}")
return err
def sample(net_import, net_export=0.0, at=BASE, phases=1, pi=None, pe=None):
return make_sample(SOURCE_HA, net_import, net_export, phases=phases,
phase_import_w=pi, phase_export_w=pe,
@@ -548,6 +571,726 @@ check("the averager integrated the live stream", live.averager.elapsed_s > 0.2)
check("the primed cache let the first telegram build immediately",
live.samples == 2 and live.last.import_w == 0.0)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("ha_signed: one signed entity -> the same two magnitudes")
# The meter actually fitted at this house is a HomeWizard P1 publishing ONE
# signed sensor. ha_dsmr cannot read it - it wants two unsigned registers and
# refuses a negative one, which is every exporting telegram.
check("a positive reading is import", split_signed(1500.0) == (1500.0, 0.0))
check("a negative reading is export", split_signed(-900.0) == (0.0, 900.0))
check("zero is a balanced reading, not a missing one",
split_signed(0.0) == (0.0, 0.0))
check("exactly one magnitude is ever non-zero",
all(a == 0.0 or b == 0.0 for a, b in
(split_signed(v) for v in (-5710.0, -1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 4384.0))))
# ⚠️ The split must not change the number. A control loop steered by a value
# that was rounded or clamped on the way in is steered by a different meter.
check("the split round-trips the signed value exactly",
all(make_sample(SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, *split_signed(v), phases=1).net_w == v
for v in (-11763.0, -5710.0, -0.5, 0.0, 0.5, 775.0, 4384.0)))
raises("a non-numeric signed reading is rejected", lambda: split_signed("n/a"))
raises("a signed None is rejected, not read as zero", lambda: split_signed(None))
raises("a signed NaN is rejected", lambda: split_signed(float("nan")))
raises("a signed infinity is rejected", lambda: split_signed(float("inf")))
# ⚠️ This one matters MORE on the signed path than on the unsigned one. On
# ha_dsmr the §20 contamination is also caught by "unsigned cannot be negative";
# here 64954 arrives as a perfectly well-formed positive signed reading and the
# plausibility ceiling is the only thing standing in front of it.
raises("the 64954 signed-decode contamination is still rejected",
lambda: split_signed(64954.0))
raises("...and its negative twin too", lambda: split_signed(-64954.0))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("ha_signed: the sign convention, against real captured readings")
# ⚠️ Not a datasheet claim. These are literal values out of
# sim/scenarios/ha-p1_meter_active_power-2026-08-{20,23}.json, HA recorder
# exports of sensor.p1_meter_active_power at this house, copied here rather than
# read from that repo so this file still runs on a laptop with nothing installed
# (§17). If the convention were inverted, the physics below would be absurd.
# 2026-08-23T11:46:52Z - the day's most negative reading, 13:46 local, full sun.
s = make_sample(SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, *split_signed(-5710.0), phases=1)
check("the midday PV peak (-5710 W) is EXPORT, not a 5.7 kW draw",
s.net_w == -5710.0 and s.export_w == 5710.0 and s.import_w == 0.0)
# 2026-08-19T22:00:00Z - midnight local, 20 Aug's file starts here. No sun.
s = make_sample(SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, *split_signed(775.0), phases=1)
check("the overnight base load (+775 W) is IMPORT",
s.net_w == 775.0 and s.import_w == 775.0 and s.export_w == 0.0)
# 2026-08-20T12:20:58Z - 14:20 local, the largest export in either capture.
s = make_sample(SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, *split_signed(-11763.0), phases=1)
check("the -11763 W midday extreme is export and survives the ceiling",
s.net_w == -11763.0 and s.export_w == 11763.0)
# 2026-08-23T10:18:28Z - the largest import in the healthy capture.
s = make_sample(SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, *split_signed(4384.0), phases=1)
check("the +4384 W peak is import", s.net_w == 4384.0 and s.import_w == 4384.0)
# The whole convention in one line: night draws, midday feeds back.
check("night is positive and midday is negative, which is the convention",
split_signed(775.0)[0] > 0 and split_signed(-5710.0)[1] > 0)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("ha_signed transport: building a sample out of one entity state")
NET = {"net": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "phase_net": []}
ing = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
sig = HaSignedSource(None, ing, NET, token="x")
check("nothing cached yet builds nothing", built(sig) is False and ing.last is None)
sig._absorb("sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "1000")
check("one signed entity is a complete telegram on its own",
built(sig) is True and ing.net_w == 1000.0)
check("the sample is tagged with its own transport",
ing.last.source == SOURCE_HA_SIGNED)
sig._absorb("sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "-2500")
built(sig)
check("a negative state lands as a negative net", ing.net_w == -2500.0)
before = ing.last
sig._absorb("sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "unavailable")
check("an unavailable signed entity is a parse error", ing.parse_errors == 1)
check("an unavailable entity does not build a sample", built(sig) is False)
# ⚠️ The rule the whole ticket turns on: a missing reading is MISSING. Resolving
# it to 0 W would read as a perfectly balanced house and defeat the staleness
# trigger that FW-01's watchdog is built on.
check("an unavailable entity leaves the last good sample untouched, not 0 W",
ing.last is before and ing.net_w == -2500.0)
sig._absorb("sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "unknown")
check("an unknown signed entity is treated the same way", ing.parse_errors == 2)
sig._absorb("sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "banana")
check("a non-numeric signed state is a parse error, not 0 W",
ing.parse_errors == 3 and ing.net_w == -2500.0)
sig._absorb("sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "64954")
check("64954 is refused at the signed transport too",
built(sig) is False and ing.parse_errors == 4)
sig._absorb("sensor.not_ours", "123")
check("an unsubscribed entity is never cached by the signed transport",
"sensor.not_ours" not in sig.cache)
# A rejected reading must not make the age look fresh - the age is what the
# firmware watchdog reads, and a rejection is exactly when it must keep climbing.
ing = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
sig = HaSignedSource(None, ing, dict(NET), token="x")
ing.submit(make_sample(SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, 1200, 0, phases=1,
ingest_mono=time.monotonic() - 20.0))
sig._absorb("sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "unavailable")
built(sig)
check("a rejected reading does not reset the published age",
ing.published_age_s > 19 and ing.net_w == 1200.0)
ing.submit(make_sample(SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, 1200, 0, phases=1,
ingest_mono=time.monotonic() - 40.0))
check("...and the age keeps climbing past max_age_s on its own",
ing.stale is True and ing.net_w is None)
# The three-phase reading the TEL-04 survey recorded at this house: L1 +2301 W,
# L2 +468 W, L3 -2582 W, netting +187 W. A signed per-phase set splits the same
# way, and the exporting phase must still clamp out of the billed figure.
ing3 = P1Ingest(phases=3, max_age_s=30.0)
NET3 = {"net": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power",
"phase_net": ["sensor.p1_l1", "sensor.p1_l2", "sensor.p1_l3"]}
sig3 = HaSignedSource(None, ing3, NET3, token="x")
for eid, val in (("sensor.p1_meter_active_power", "187"), ("sensor.p1_l1", "2301")):
sig3._absorb(eid, val)
check("an incomplete signed phase set waits instead of guessing", built(sig3) is False)
sig3._absorb("sensor.p1_l2", "468")
sig3._absorb("sensor.p1_l3", "-2582")
check("a complete signed three-phase set builds", built(sig3) is True)
check("signed per-phase entities keep the exporting phase negative",
ing3.last.per_phase_w == (2301.0, 468.0, -2582.0))
check("per-phase IMPORT clamps the exporting phase to zero",
ing3.last.per_phase_import_w == (2301.0, 468.0, 0.0))
check("the phase import sum is 2769 W while the connection nets 187 W",
sum(ing3.last.per_phase_import_w) == 2769.0 and ing3.last.net_w == 187.0)
check("the signed per-phase tuple length matches meter_phases",
len(ing3.last.per_phase_w) == ing3.phases == 3)
sig_bad = HaSignedSource(None, P1Ingest(phases=3, max_age_s=30.0),
{"net": "sensor.net", "phase_net": ["sensor.a", "sensor.b"]},
token="x")
for eid in ("sensor.net", "sensor.a", "sensor.b"):
sig_bad._absorb(eid, "100")
check("two phases delivered against meter_phases 3 is rejected, not padded",
built(sig_bad) is False and sig_bad.ingest.last is None
and sig_bad.ingest.parse_errors == 1)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("ha_signed transport: end to end against a fake Home Assistant")
# The transport is a subclass, so this is what proves the INHERITED machinery -
# auth, subscribe, the get_states priming rule, the reconnect-emits-nothing
# rule - still behaves when only _wanted() and build() were replaced.
async def _e2e_signed():
from aiohttp import web
import app.p1 as p1mod
done = asyncio.Event()
eid = "sensor.p1_meter_active_power"
async def fake_ha(request):
ws = web.WebSocketResponse()
await ws.prepare(request)
await ws.send_json({"type": "auth_required", "ha_version": "2026.8"})
auth = await ws.receive_json()
assert auth["type"] == "auth" and auth["access_token"] == "tok"
await ws.send_json({"type": "auth_ok"})
sub = await ws.receive_json()
assert sub["type"] == "subscribe_events"
await ws.send_json({"id": sub["id"], "type": "result", "success": True})
get = await ws.receive_json()
assert get["type"] == "get_states"
await ws.send_json({"id": get["id"], "type": "result", "success": True, "result": [
{"entity_id": eid, "state": "775.0"},
{"entity_id": "sensor.something_else", "state": "hello"},
]})
# Two real telegrams, both literal captured values: overnight import,
# then the midday export peak.
for val in ("775.0", "-5710.0"):
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
await ws.send_json({"type": "event", "event": {"data": {
"entity_id": eid,
"new_state": {"entity_id": eid, "state": val}}}})
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
await ws.send_json({"type": "event", "event": {"data": {
"entity_id": eid,
"new_state": {"entity_id": eid, "state": "unavailable"}}}})
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
done.set()
return ws
srv = web.Application()
srv.router.add_get("/ws", fake_ha)
runner = web.AppRunner(srv)
await runner.setup()
site = web.TCPSite(runner, "127.0.0.1", 0)
await site.start()
port = site._server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
p1mod.WS_URL = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/ws"
ing = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as sess:
src = HaSignedSource(sess, ing, dict(NET), token="tok")
task = asyncio.get_running_loop().create_task(src.run())
try:
await asyncio.wait_for(done.wait(), 20)
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
finally:
task.cancel()
try:
await task
except asyncio.CancelledError:
pass
await runner.cleanup()
return ing, src
live, wire = asyncio.run(_e2e_signed())
# ⚠️ TWO, not three - the same rule as the ha_dsmr e2e. get_states primes the
# cache but must never become a sample: after a Core restart it is a
# RestoreEntity value of unknown age, and stamping it with ingest_ts=now reports
# a fresh meter that may have been dead for an hour.
check("ha_signed does not manufacture a sample from cached HA state",
live.samples == 2)
check("the signed telegrams arrived over a real websocket",
live.last.source == SOURCE_HA_SIGNED)
check("the final export telegram nets negative, over the wire",
live.last.net_w == -5710.0 and live.last.export_w == 5710.0)
check("ha_signed subscribes to the one entity and caches nothing else",
wire.ids == {"sensor.p1_meter_active_power"}
and "sensor.something_else" not in wire.cache)
check("a mid-stream unavailable signed state is a parse error, not a sample",
live.parse_errors == 1 and live.samples == 2)
# ⚠️ And the cached half is DROPPED, so no later telegram can be assembled out
# of a value that stopped reporting.
check("an unavailable entity is evicted from the cache", wire.cache == {})
check("the last good reading survives the unavailable, and is not 0 W",
live.net_w == -5710.0)
check("the averager integrated the live signed stream", live.averager.elapsed_s > 0.2)
# ⚠️ The entity FW-01 waits on. It must be a number here exactly as it is on the
# other transports - the house P1 went 51.1 s and 36.2 s between state changes
# overnight, and without this the watchdog false-trips the battery to 0 W.
check("sensor.p1_sample_age_s is a live number on this transport too",
isinstance(live.published_age_s, float) and live.published_age_s >= 0.0)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("ha_signed: selection by config")
check("ha_signed is enabled", is_enabled({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED}) is True)
# ⚠️ `sel`, not `built` - that name is the build() wrapper defined at the top of
# this file, and rebinding it here silently disarms every check appended below
# this line. Caught in review: an added check went `TypeError: 'HaSignedSource'
# object is not callable` and aborted the suite, which is the exact failure the
# wrapper exists to prevent, reintroduced by a name collision.
sel = build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED,
"p1_net_entity": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power"},
P1Ingest(), None, None)
check("meter_source ha_signed selects the signed transport",
isinstance(sel, HaSignedSource))
check("...wired to p1_net_entity, and subscribed to exactly that one entity",
sel.ids == {"sensor.p1_meter_active_power"})
# ⚠️ The three modes must not bleed into each other: ha_dsmr must keep ignoring
# p1_net_entity, or a half-configured install silently reads the wrong sensor.
plain = build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA,
"p1_import_entity": "sensor.i", "p1_export_entity": "sensor.e",
"p1_net_entity": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power"},
P1Ingest(), None, None)
check("ha_dsmr still selects the unsigned transport and ignores p1_net_entity",
type(plain) is HaDsmrSource and plain.ids == {"sensor.i", "sensor.e"})
check("meter_source off still selects nothing",
build_source({"meter_source": "off"}, P1Ingest(), None, None) is None)
check("an unrecognised meter_source selects nothing rather than guessing",
build_source({"meter_source": "ha_signd"}, P1Ingest(), None, None) is None)
# ⚠️ Caught once at startup, not once per telegram. A source that is wired up
# wrong otherwise fails in the one way indistinguishable from a healthy source
# nobody has sent anything to yet: no samples, a climbing age, the watchdog
# holding the battery at 0 W, and nothing in the log saying why.
check("a blank p1_net_entity is refused rather than silently never receiving",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, "p1_net_entity": ""},
P1Ingest(), None, None) is None)
check("...and whitespace does not sneak past it",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, "p1_net_entity": " "},
P1Ingest(), None, None) is None)
check("a phase list that disagrees with meter_phases is refused at startup",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, "p1_net_entity": "sensor.n",
"p1_phase_net_entities": ["sensor.a", "sensor.b"]},
P1Ingest(phases=3), None, None) is None)
check("a phase list that agrees with meter_phases is accepted",
isinstance(build_source(
{"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, "p1_net_entity": "sensor.n",
"p1_phase_net_entities": ["sensor.a", "sensor.b", "sensor.c"]},
P1Ingest(phases=3), None, None), HaSignedSource))
check("no phase list at all is still fine - per-phase billing is optional",
isinstance(build_source(
{"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, "p1_net_entity": "sensor.n"},
P1Ingest(phases=3), None, None), HaSignedSource))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("homewizard_local: parsing the meter's own /api/v1/data document")
# The same JSON `sim/hwsim.py` serves and the same JSON the real meter at
# 192.168.2.250 serves. One SIGNED connection figure plus three signed legs, so
# it goes through the same split_signed as ha_signed - the sign convention is
# not re-derived on this transport, it is reused.
def hw_doc(w, l1=None, l2=None, l3=None, imp_kwh=1234.567, exp_kwh=890.123):
return {"wifi_ssid": "sim", "smr_version": 50, "meter_model": "SIM-P1",
"total_power_import_kwh": imp_kwh, "total_power_export_kwh": exp_kwh,
"active_power_w": w,
"active_power_l1_w": l1, "active_power_l2_w": l2,
"active_power_l3_w": l3, "total_gas_m3": 0.0}
s = parse_homewizard(hw_doc(775.0, l1=775.0), 1)
check("the overnight base load (+775 W) is import on this transport too",
s.net_w == 775.0 and s.import_w == 775.0 and s.export_w == 0.0)
check("the sample is tagged homewizard_local", s.source == SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD)
s = parse_homewizard(hw_doc(-5710.0, l1=-5710.0), 1)
check("the midday PV peak (-5710 W) is export, not a 5.7 kW draw",
s.net_w == -5710.0 and s.export_w == 5710.0)
check("a single-phase document still yields its one leg", s.per_phase_w == (-5710.0,))
# The TEL-04 three-phase survey reading, served the HomeWizard way.
s = parse_homewizard(hw_doc(187.0, 2301.0, 468.0, -2582.0), 3)
check("signed legs keep the exporting phase negative",
s.per_phase_w == (2301.0, 468.0, -2582.0))
check("per-phase import clamps the exporting leg out of the billed figure",
s.per_phase_import_w == (2301.0, 468.0, 0.0))
check("the legs sum to 2769 W while the connection nets 187 W",
sum(s.per_phase_import_w) == 2769.0 and s.net_w == 187.0)
# ⚠️ A single-phase HomeWizard serves `active_power_l2_w: null`. Unlike the HA
# transports there is no "wait for the rest" case - every field came out of ONE
# response, so a missing leg cannot be a STALE leg. Dropping the whole sample
# over it would turn a healthy meter into a climbing age, which is the exact
# false trip this transport exists to remove.
def parsed(doc, phases=1):
"""parse_homewizard(), with an escaping exception turned into a visible value.
Same reason as `built()` above: if the "all legs or none" guard goes missing,
parsing raises, and without this the suite aborts on a traceback instead of
reddening the NAMED check that says which rule died.
"""
try:
return parse_homewizard(doc, phases)
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - a raise here is itself the failure
print(f" parse_homewizard raised {type(err).__name__}: {err}")
return err
s = parsed(hw_doc(500.0, l1=500.0), 3)
check("a meter serving fewer legs than meter_phases still gives a reading",
getattr(s, "net_w", None) == 500.0 and getattr(s, "per_phase_w", "?") is None)
check("...and does not fabricate a partial phase tuple",
getattr(s, "per_phase_import_w", "?") is None)
raises("a response that is not a JSON object is rejected",
lambda: parse_homewizard([1, 2, 3], 1))
raises("a document with no active_power_w is rejected, not read as 0 W",
lambda: parse_homewizard({"total_gas_m3": 0.0}, 1))
raises("a null active_power_w is rejected", lambda: parse_homewizard(hw_doc(None), 1))
raises("a string active_power_w is rejected", lambda: parse_homewizard(hw_doc("775"), 1))
raises("a NaN active_power_w is rejected",
lambda: parse_homewizard(hw_doc(float("nan")), 1))
raises("the 64954 signed-decode contamination is refused here too",
lambda: parse_homewizard(hw_doc(64954.0), 1))
raises("a non-numeric leg is rejected rather than quietly dropped",
lambda: parse_homewizard(hw_doc(600.0, "2000", 0.0, 100.0), 3))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("homewizard_local: every HTTP response is an arrival")
# THE WHOLE TICKET. sensor.p1_sample_age_s has to mean "time since the meter
# REPORTED", not "time since the value CHANGED". Home Assistant cannot express
# the first: a repeated reading emits no state_changed, advances last_reported
# on neither serialiser, and state_reported cannot be subscribed to at all
# ("Event filter is required"). Measured on the ENV-01 rig over 70 s of a frozen
# meter and again against the live house over ten repeated readings. Our own
# capture of this house's meter goes 42.2 s and 97.0 s between changes, both past
# the default meter_max_age_s of 30 - i.e. the age sensor would command 0 W on a
# perfectly healthy meter. Polling the meter itself removes that: the response is
# the arrival, and the number in it is not consulted.
class _FakeMeter:
"""hwsim in eight lines: serves whatever document it is told to, or a fault."""
def __init__(self, doc=None):
self.doc = doc
self.status = 200
self.body = None # set to raw text to serve something unparseable
self.delay = 0.0 # set to seconds to imitate a meter that hangs
self.hits = 0
async def handle(self, request):
from aiohttp import web
self.hits += 1
if self.delay:
await asyncio.sleep(self.delay)
# ⚠️ web.Response(text=...) defaults to text/plain. That is not just the
# "unparseable body" path: fed VALID json it serves a good document under
# the wrong mimetype, which is the only way to reach the content_type
# guard in poll_once - json_response can never produce it.
if self.body is not None:
return web.Response(text=self.body, status=self.status)
return web.json_response(self.doc, status=self.status)
async def _hw_rig(fn):
"""Run `fn(make_source, meter)` against a real HTTP server on localhost."""
from aiohttp import web
meter = _FakeMeter(hw_doc(350.0, l1=350.0))
app = web.Application()
app.router.add_get("/api/v1/data", meter.handle)
runner = web.AppRunner(app)
await runner.setup()
site = web.TCPSite(runner, "127.0.0.1", 0)
await site.start()
port = site._server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as sess:
try:
return await fn(sess, port, meter)
finally:
await runner.cleanup()
async def _arrivals(sess, port, meter):
ing = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
src = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, ing, "127.0.0.1", port=port, poll_s=1.0)
out = {}
out["first"] = await src.poll_once()
out["stamp1"] = ing.last.ingest_mono
# Four more polls of the IDENTICAL document - the meter has not moved a watt.
for _ in range(4):
await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
await src.poll_once()
out["ing"], out["src"], out["meter"] = ing, src, meter
return out
r = asyncio.run(_hw_rig(_arrivals))
ing, src = r["ing"], r["src"]
check("a poll of the meter's own API builds a sample",
r["first"] is True and ing.net_w == 350.0)
# ⚠️ THE acceptance criterion. Five identical readings, five arrivals. On
# ha_signed this whole sequence produces exactly ONE state_changed and then
# silence, and the age climbs to 30 s on a meter that is answering perfectly.
check("five identical readings are five arrivals, not one",
ing.samples == 5 and r["meter"].hits == 5 and src.polls == 5)
check("an unchanged value still stamps a NEW arrival time",
ing.last.ingest_mono > r["stamp1"])
check("...so the age resets on a response carrying an unchanged number",
ing.published_age_s < 1.0 and ing.stale is False)
check("no arrival was ever a parse error", ing.parse_errors == 0)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("homewizard_local: frozen vs steady, the pair HA cannot separate")
# ⚠️ Read this before changing anything here. A frozen meter (hwsim --fault
# freeze) answers 200 OK forever with a stale document. It is ARRIVING. So the
# age - an arrival detector, correctly - reads fresh on both, and that is not a
# defect in the age, it is the definition of the signal. What the local API adds
# that Home Assistant never had is the ENERGY REGISTERS: a meter under real load
# advances total_power_import_kwh (1 Wh resolution, ~10 s at 350 W) even when the
# power figure repeats, and a frozen one does not. That is the discriminator, and
# it is exposed as `unchanged_s` - deliberately NOT folded into the age, because
# this controller regulates grid power toward ~0 W and at a converged -10 W the
# export register needs six minutes to move. Thresholding unchanged_s at 30 s
# would rebuild the false-trip limit cycle at the exact operating point we aim
# for. See DOCS.md and HomeWizardLocalSource.unchanged_s.
async def _freeze_vs_steady(sess, port, meter):
ing_f = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
frozen = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, ing_f, "127.0.0.1", port=port, poll_s=1.0)
meter.doc = hw_doc(350.0, l1=350.0) # --fault freeze: never moves
for i in range(4):
if i:
await asyncio.sleep(0.1) # sleep BEFORE, so unchanged_s
await frozen.poll_once() # is read the instant a poll lands
ing_s = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
steady = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, ing_s, "127.0.0.1", port=port, poll_s=1.0)
kwh = 1234.567
for i in range(4):
if i:
await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
# A steady 350 W house: the power figure repeats, the register climbs.
kwh += 0.001
meter.doc = hw_doc(350.0, l1=350.0, imp_kwh=round(kwh, 3))
await steady.poll_once()
return (ing_f, frozen), (ing_s, steady)
(ing_f, frozen), (ing_s, steady) = asyncio.run(_hw_rig(_freeze_vs_steady))
check("a frozen meter keeps arriving, so both read the same power",
ing_f.net_w == 350.0 and ing_s.net_w == 350.0)
# ⚠️ Recorded as a rule, not a shortcoming: the age is an ARRIVAL detector and a
# frozen meter genuinely is arriving. Anyone tempted to make the age catch freeze
# is about to reintroduce the false trip on a steady house.
check("the age cannot separate them, and is fresh on both",
ing_f.published_age_s < 1.0 and ing_s.published_age_s < 1.0)
check("the frozen meter's measurement stands still", frozen.unchanged_s > 0.25)
check("...while the steady meter's energy register keeps advancing",
steady.unchanged_s < 0.05)
check("so the two ARE separable on the local API, which HA could not do",
frozen.unchanged_s > steady.unchanged_s * 3)
check("unchanged_s is None before the first response ever lands",
HomeWizardLocalSource(None, P1Ingest(), "h").unchanged_s is None)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("homewizard_local: a failed poll is a missing reading, never 0 W")
async def _failures(sess, port, meter):
ing = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
src = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, ing, "127.0.0.1", port=port, poll_s=1.0)
await src.poll_once()
# Age the good sample by hand so a reset would be unmistakable.
ing.submit(make_sample(SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, 350.0, 0.0, phases=1,
ingest_mono=time.monotonic() - 90.0))
out = {}
meter.status = 500
out["http500"] = await src.poll_once()
out["conn_after_500"] = src.connected
meter.status, meter.body = 200, "<html>gateway</html>"
out["notjson"] = await src.poll_once()
meter.body = None
meter.doc = {"total_gas_m3": 0.0} # 200 OK, no power in it
out["nopower"] = await src.poll_once()
out["ing"], out["src"] = ing, src
# And a meter that is not listening at all: `--fault down`.
dead = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0),
"127.0.0.1", port=1, poll_s=1.0)
out["down"] = await dead.poll_once()
out["dead"] = dead
return out
r = asyncio.run(_hw_rig(_failures))
ing, src = r["ing"], r["src"]
check("an HTTP 500 is not a reading", r["http500"] is False)
# A source that was connected and then failed must SAY it is disconnected -
# otherwise the diagnostic reads healthy while the age climbs, which is exactly
# the "connected: True, parse_errors: 0, samples: 0" state the rig recorded.
check("a poll that fails clears the connected flag", r["conn_after_500"] is False)
check("a 200 OK carrying something that is not JSON is not a reading",
r["notjson"] is False)
check("a 200 OK with no active_power_w in it is not a reading", r["nopower"] is False)
check("a meter that refuses the connection is not a reading",
r["down"] is False and r["dead"].connected is False)
check("every failure was counted as a parse error", ing.parse_errors == 3)
check("...and the transport records the transport-level ones separately",
src.poll_errors == 2 and src.polls == 4)
# ⚠️ The rule the safety chain rests on. A failed poll must not manufacture a
# balanced house, and must not reset the clock the watchdog reads.
check("a failed poll does not reset the age", ing.published_age_s > 89)
check("a failed poll leaves the last good value in place, and it is not 0 W",
ing.last.net_w == 350.0 and ing.stale is True and ing.net_w is None)
check("no failed poll ever became a sample", ing.samples == 2)
check("a 200 OK marks the transport connected even when its body is refused",
src.connected is True)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("homewizard_local: a wrong header, a hung meter, a submit that throws")
# Three failure shapes that all end the same way if they are mishandled - no
# sample, a climbing age, the battery at 0 W - and each of which would send the
# operator hunting the wrong device.
async def _header_and_timeout(sess, port, meter):
out = {}
# Valid JSON under text/plain: exactly what content_type=None is for.
meter.body = json.dumps(hw_doc(350.0, l1=350.0))
ing = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
src = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, ing, "127.0.0.1", port=port, poll_s=1.0)
out["mimetype"] = await src.poll_once()
out["ing"] = ing
meter.body = None
# A meter that takes the connection and then does not answer.
meter.delay = 0.6
ing_t = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
slow = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, ing_t, "127.0.0.1", port=port,
poll_s=1.0, timeout_s=0.05)
out["timeout"] = await slow.poll_once()
out["timeout_err"] = ing_t.last_error
meter.delay = 0.0
return out
r = asyncio.run(_hw_rig(_header_and_timeout))
# ⚠️ A real firmware answering text/plain must not read as a dead meter. Drop
# content_type=None from poll_once and this goes red with "unexpected mimetype".
check("valid JSON under the wrong Content-Type is still a reading",
r["mimetype"] is True and r["ing"].samples == 1 and r["ing"].net_w == 350.0)
# ⚠️ str(asyncio.TimeoutError()) is the EMPTY STRING. Without the class-name
# fallback the status page reads "last error:" and then nothing, on a hung
# meter, at the moment someone is reading that line to find out why the battery
# went to 0 W.
check("a timed-out poll names the fault instead of logging an empty reason",
r["timeout"] is False and "TimeoutError" in (r["timeout_err"] or ""))
async def _submit_rejects(sess, port, meter):
"""submit() raising P1Error must be a rejection, not an escaping exception."""
class _P1Boom(P1Ingest):
def submit(self, sample):
raise P1Error("register went backwards")
ing = _P1Boom(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0)
src = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, ing, "127.0.0.1", port=port, poll_s=1.0)
try:
ok = await src.poll_once()
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - an escape IS the failure
ok = err
return ok, ing.parse_errors
ok, errs = asyncio.run(_hw_rig(_submit_rejects))
check("a submit that rejects the sample is handled, not left to escape",
ok is False and errs == 1)
async def _submit_explodes(sess, port, meter):
"""And an UNEXPECTED raise must not kill the poll task for good."""
class _Boom(P1Ingest):
def submit(self, sample):
raise RuntimeError("kaboom")
src = HomeWizardLocalSource(sess, _Boom(phases=1, max_age_s=30.0),
"127.0.0.1", port=port, poll_s=0.05)
task = asyncio.create_task(src.run())
await asyncio.sleep(0.3)
alive = not task.done()
task.cancel()
# ⚠️ BaseException, and the same reason built() exists: if run() loses its
# guard the task is already dead HOLDING the RuntimeError, and awaiting it
# re-raises - aborting the whole suite with a traceback instead of reddening
# the check that names the rule. The death is what `alive` records; catching
# it here is bookkeeping, not leniency.
try:
await task
except BaseException: # noqa: BLE001
pass
return alive, src.polls
# ⚠️ The silent-death case. A dead poll task fails SAFE - the age climbs and the
# controller commands 0 W - but it looks exactly like a dead meter, so the
# operator spends the outage power-cycling hardware that was never at fault.
alive, polls = asyncio.run(_hw_rig(_submit_explodes))
check("a raise inside a poll does not permanently kill the polling task",
alive is True and polls > 1)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("homewizard_local: selection by config")
check("homewizard_local is enabled", is_enabled({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD}) is True)
sel = build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": "192.168.2.250"},
P1Ingest(), None, None)
check("meter_source homewizard_local selects the polling transport",
isinstance(sel, HomeWizardLocalSource))
# ⚠️ getattr, not attribute access, for the same reason `built()` exists: a
# startup guard that goes wrong returns None here, and `None.url` would abort the
# suite with a traceback instead of reddening the check that names the rule.
check("...pointed at the meter's own local API on the default port",
getattr(sel, "url", None) == "http://192.168.2.250:80/api/v1/data")
check("the default cadence is the meter's own ~5 s update rate",
getattr(sel, "poll_s", None) == 5.0)
# ⚠️ The request must not outlive the poll interval: a backlog of queued requests
# behind a slow meter would land several arrivals for one measurement.
check("the request timeout is held under the poll interval",
getattr(sel, "timeout_s", 99) < getattr(sel, "poll_s", 0))
sel = build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": "10.0.0.9:8080"},
P1Ingest(), None, None)
check("an explicit host:port is honoured, which is how the sim is reached",
getattr(sel, "url", None) == "http://10.0.0.9:8080/api/v1/data")
sel = build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD,
"p1_host": "http://192.168.2.250/"}, P1Ingest(), None, None)
check("a pasted browser URL still resolves to the right host",
getattr(sel, "url", None) == "http://192.168.2.250:80/api/v1/data")
# ⚠️ Caught once at startup, not once per poll - a source wired up wrong
# otherwise fails in the one way indistinguishable from a healthy one nobody has
# polled yet: no samples, a climbing age, the watchdog at 0 W, nothing in the log.
check("a blank p1_host is refused rather than silently never polling",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": ""},
P1Ingest(), None, None) is None)
check("...and whitespace does not sneak past it",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": " "},
P1Ingest(), None, None) is None)
check("an unparseable port is refused rather than guessed",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": "meter:eighty"},
P1Ingest(), None, None) is None)
# ⚠️ The age can never be fresher than the poll interval, so a cadence at or past
# max_age_s means every reading is stale before its successor arrives: the
# controller would sit permanently on missing inputs while the meter is fine.
check("a poll cadence at meter_max_age_s is refused",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": "m",
"meter_poll_s": 30}, P1Ingest(max_age_s=30), None, None) is None)
check("...and one past it too",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": "m",
"meter_poll_s": 45}, P1Ingest(max_age_s=30), None, None) is None)
check("a cadence with headroom is accepted",
isinstance(build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": "m",
"meter_poll_s": 5}, P1Ingest(max_age_s=30),
None, None), HomeWizardLocalSource))
check("a zero cadence is refused rather than spinning",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": "m",
"meter_poll_s": 0}, P1Ingest(max_age_s=30), None, None) is None)
check("a non-numeric cadence is refused",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD, "p1_host": "m",
"meter_poll_s": "fast"}, P1Ingest(max_age_s=30), None, None) is None)
# The four modes must not bleed into each other.
check("ha_signed ignores p1_host and still selects the entity transport",
type(build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, "p1_net_entity": "sensor.n",
"p1_host": "192.168.2.250"}, P1Ingest(), None, None))
is HaSignedSource)
check("homewizard_local ignores p1_net_entity and needs its own host",
build_source({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD,
"p1_net_entity": "sensor.n"}, P1Ingest(), None, None) is None)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the age sensor must not exist when P1 is off")
# ⚠️ This is a fleet-wide regression guard, not a nicety. The ESP32 watchdog
@@ -556,7 +1299,6 @@ print("the age sensor must not exist when P1 is off")
# age were published with meter_source off it would climb past 30 s on every
# existing install within half a minute and pin the inverter at 0 W forever.
from app.p1 import is_enabled # noqa: E402
from app.mqtt import SENSORS, MqttPublisher # noqa: E402
check("meter_source off is disabled", is_enabled({"meter_source": "off"}) is False)
@@ -564,6 +1306,8 @@ check("a missing meter_source is disabled", is_enabled({}) is False)
check("an empty meter_source is disabled", is_enabled({"meter_source": ""}) is False)
check("ha_dsmr is enabled", is_enabled({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA}) is True)
check("mqtt_p1 is enabled", is_enabled({"meter_source": SOURCE_MQTT}) is True)
check("homewizard_local is enabled here too",
is_enabled({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD}) is True)
# The entity id SAFETY-01's firmware subscribes to, pinned by object_id.
row = [s for s in SENSORS if s[0] == "p1_age"]
@@ -602,6 +1346,17 @@ check("with P1 on the age sensor IS announced",
from app.main import Controller # noqa: E402
def _never():
"""A stop Event these publish-only tests never set.
`stop` is a REQUIRED keyword argument (CFG-01): a Controller that cannot
stop itself used to be the default one, and on the late-refusal path that
meant a live process with no control loop and no exit. These cases only call
publish(), so any Event will do - but they may not skip it.
"""
return asyncio.Event()
class _Store:
data = {}
@@ -624,18 +1379,80 @@ class _Pub:
pub_off = _Pub()
Controller({"meter_source": "off"}, None, _Store(), pub_off).publish()
Controller({"meter_source": "off"}, None, _Store(), pub_off, stop=_never()).publish()
check("with P1 off, p1_age is absent from the published payload",
"p1_age" not in pub_off.last)
check("...while the normal status keys are still published",
"setpoint" in pub_off.last and "grid" in pub_off.last)
pub_on = _Pub()
Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA}, None, _Store(), pub_on).publish()
Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA}, None, _Store(), pub_on, stop=_never()).publish()
check("with P1 on, p1_age is published", "p1_age" in pub_on.last)
check("...as a number, so has_state() becomes true only once we feed it",
isinstance(pub_on.last["p1_age"], float))
# ⚠️ And on ha_signed identically - this is the whole reason TEL-04 exists. The
# age sensor is a hard prerequisite for the FW-01 flash, and it has to appear on
# the transport that can actually read the meter in this house.
pub_sig = _Pub()
Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED}, None, _Store(), pub_sig, stop=_never()).publish()
check("with ha_signed selected, p1_age is published too",
"p1_age" in pub_sig.last and isinstance(pub_sig.last["p1_age"], float))
# ⚠️ And on homewizard_local, where it is the one age FW-01 may actually
# threshold - every other transport's age measures when the VALUE changed.
pub_hw = _Pub()
Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD}, None, _Store(), pub_hw, stop=_never()).publish()
check("with homewizard_local selected, p1_age is published",
"p1_age" in pub_hw.last and isinstance(pub_hw.last["p1_age"], float))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("unchanged_s has somewhere an operator can read it")
# ⚠️ The counter is deliberately NOT thresholded and NOT folded into the age -
# at the converged -10 W this controller aims for, a 1 Wh register needs six
# minutes to move, so any limit false-trips at the target operating point. That
# refusal only holds up if a HUMAN can interpret the number instead, and DOCS.md
# tells them "the transport tracks it as unchanged_s". Before this, nothing ever
# read the transport object back: connected, polls, poll_errors and unchanged_s
# were all write-only, and the documented signal existed nowhere an operator
# could see it.
def p1_rows(ctl):
"""The P1 status line(s), or the exception that stopped checks() making one.
Same reason as built(): a status line that raises would abort the suite with
a traceback instead of reddening the check that names the rule.
"""
try:
return [c["text"] for c in ctl.checks() if c["text"].startswith("P1 meter")]
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001 - a raise here is itself the failure
print(f" checks() raised {type(err).__name__}: {err}")
return err
def _fed(source):
ctl = Controller({"meter_source": source}, None, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=_never())
ctl.p1.submit(make_sample(source, 350.0, 0.0, phases=1,
ingest_mono=time.monotonic()))
return ctl
hw_ctl = _fed(SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD)
hw_src = HomeWizardLocalSource(None, hw_ctl.p1, "127.0.0.1")
hw_src._note(hw_doc(350.0, l1=350.0))
hw_ctl.p1_source = hw_src # what amain() does once the transport exists
rows = p1_rows(hw_ctl)
check("the healthy P1 status line reports the transport's unchanged_s",
isinstance(rows, list) and len(rows) == 1 and "unchanged" in rows[0])
# ⚠️ getattr, not attribute access: p1_source is None until amain() builds one,
# and ha_dsmr/ha_signed/mqtt_p1 have no such counter at all. Reaching for it
# directly would turn the whole status page into a 500 on every other transport.
ha_rows = p1_rows(_fed(SOURCE_HA))
check("...and the line is unharmed on a transport that has no such counter",
isinstance(ha_rows, list) and len(ha_rows) == 1 and "unchanged" not in ha_rows[0])
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} of {total} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
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"""Runnable check for FCST-03 - provisional prices. `python3 test_price_forecast.py`
WHAT THIS FILE IS DEFENDING, in the order the ticket's acceptance criteria name
it:
AC1 Every price point carries a `provisional` flag MATCHING ITS TRUE
PROVENANCE - a point filled from yesterday's profile is provisional even
when the number happens to be right, a point the feed published keeps
whatever flag the feed gave it, and an unmarked carry-forward is not
constructible rather than merely discouraged.
AC2 An irreversible action gated on a provisional price is REJECTED, with the
spec's own example - a maintenance-phase transition - actually refused:
the phase machine is still in `idle` afterwards.
AC3 Real-time / imbalance prices get MEASURABLY WIDER thresholds. Measured,
by finding the smallest spread each regime will accept and comparing the
two numbers - not by reading a constant back out of the module that
defines it.
THREE RULES THIS FILE HOLDS ITSELF TO, because the reviewer will:
* EVERY VERDICT IS DERIVED. The carried/published split is re-derived here
from the set of hours the fixture published, by different arithmetic than
app/price_forecast.py uses; the DST day lengths come from the offset
difference rather than from a 23 or a 25 typed into a check; the widening
factor is MEASURED by bisecting the accept/refuse boundary and then
compared with the declared one.
* NO STIMULUS IS EVALUATED WHERE THE QUANTITY IT GRADES IS DEGENERATE, and
this ticket is full of that trap:
- YESTERDAY AND TODAY MUST PRICE EVERY HOUR DIFFERENTLY, or a fill that
carried the wrong day forward is invisible. Asserted first, as a check.
- THE PROVISIONAL HOURS MUST CONTAIN THE CHEAPEST HOUR, or "arbitrage
ignores provisional hours" grades nothing: the firm-only spread and the
whole-series spread would be the same number. Asserted before it is
used, and it is the realistic shape of the danger - yesterday's cheap
hour luring a charge that today's prices do not justify.
- THE TWO WIDENING FACTORS MUST DIFFER, or `max`, `sum` and `product` are
indistinguishable combination rules. Asserted, then all three are
computed and only one matches what the code does.
- THE LOCAL-HOUR FILL AND A NAIVE `t - 24 h` FILL MUST DISAGREE on the
transition days, or the DST check passes for both implementations.
Asserted, then the correct one is graded.
- PRICES ARE WRITTEN TO SIX DECIMALS with distinct 3-, 4- and 6-dp
roundings, so an implementation that rounds differently is visible.
(TARIFF-03's fixtures were 3-dp, where those three are one number.)
* A FAILED READ IS NOT AN OBSERVATION. A missing price is not a zero price
and a stale one is not a fresh one: the gate blocks on `no_data`, blocks on
an hour the series does not cover, and blocks on a provisional hour - three
different reasons, none of them an answer.
"""
import ast
import inspect
import os
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from app import price as _price
from app import price_forecast as _fc
from app import static_tariff as _st
from app.maintenance import (
CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN, DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN, DRAIN, IDLE, MaintConfig, Maintenance,
)
from app.price import (
Absence, PricePoint, PriceProduct, PriceRead, PROVIDERS, Uncertainty,
WIDEN_FACTOR, brussels, brussels_offset, plan_is_provisional,
required_spread, uncertainty_of, widen_factor,
)
from app.price_forecast import (
MAINTENANCE_CHARGE, MAINTENANCE_DRAIN, Gate, Irreversible, committed_hours,
fill_from_yesterday, price_permits, begin_phase,
)
from app.static_tariff import Arbitrage, TariffPlan
UTC = timezone.utc
HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
fails = []
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
def raises(fn, exc):
"""True only if fn() raises EXACTLY `exc`. A different exception is False -
'it was refused' and 'it broke on the way to being refused' must not grade
the same."""
try:
fn()
except exc:
return True
except Exception:
return False
return False
class _Raised:
def __init__(self, e):
self.e = e
def __eq__(self, other):
return False
def __hash__(self):
return id(self)
def __bool__(self):
return False
def __repr__(self):
return f"<raised {type(self.e).__name__}: {self.e}>"
def derived(fn):
"""A value a check grades. An exception becomes `_Raised`, which equals
nothing and is falsy - NOT a default."""
try:
return fn()
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
return _Raised(e)
def near(a, b, tol=1e-9):
try:
return abs(float(a) - float(b)) <= tol
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return False
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Fixtures.
#
# ⚠️ SIX-DECIMAL PRICES, DELIBERATELY. TARIFF-03's fixtures were 0.3410 /
# 0.2570, where rounding to 3, 4 and 6 decimals gives the same number - so an
# implementation that rounded differently from the one being graded survived
# every check. These are chosen so those three roundings differ.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def y_price(h):
"""Yesterday's all-in EUR/kWh for local hour h."""
return round(0.123437 + 0.010700 * h, 6)
def t_price(h):
"""Today's PUBLISHED all-in EUR/kWh for local hour h. Different from
yesterday's at every hour, on purpose - see the degeneracy note above."""
return round(0.206562 + 0.009300 * h, 6)
def local_midnight(y, m, d) -> datetime:
"""The UTC instant of Brussels local midnight on that date, derived from
`brussels_offset` rather than from a table of dates."""
naive = datetime(y, m, d, 0, 0)
for hours in (1, 2):
guess = naive.replace(tzinfo=UTC) - timedelta(hours=hours)
if brussels_offset(guess).utcoffset(None) == timedelta(hours=hours):
return guess
raise AssertionError(f"no consistent Brussels offset for {naive}")
def hours_between(a, b):
out, u = [], a
while u < b:
out.append(u)
u += timedelta(hours=1)
return out
def series_of(instants, price_of, product, provider, *, provisional):
return PriceRead.series(
[PricePoint(start=brussels(u), eur_per_kwh=price_of(u),
provisional=provisional) for u in instants],
product, provider, instants[0])
# A plain winter day: local 2026-01-15, 24 hours, no transition in sight.
D0 = local_midnight(2026, 1, 15)
D1 = local_midnight(2026, 1, 16)
YEST0 = local_midnight(2026, 1, 14)
DAY = hours_between(D0, D1)
YDAY = hours_between(YEST0, D0)
YESTERDAY = series_of(YDAY, lambda u: y_price(brussels(u).hour),
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, "generic_dayahead",
provisional=False)
# The feed has published the first 12 hours of today and nothing after - the
# ordinary state of a dynamic site before the 14-16 h CET print (§5.4).
PUBLISHED_N = 12
TODAY_PART = series_of(DAY[:PUBLISHED_N], lambda u: t_price(brussels(u).hour),
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, "generic_dayahead",
provisional=False)
print()
print("0. the fixtures are not degenerate (checked before anything is graded)")
check("yesterday and today price EVERY shared hour differently, so a fill that "
"carried the wrong day forward would be visible in the value and not "
"only in the flag",
all(y_price(h) != t_price(h) for h in range(24)))
_roundings = derived(lambda: {round(y_price(3), n) for n in (3, 4, 6)})
check(f"...and a fixture price rounds to three DIFFERENT numbers at 3, 4 and 6 "
f"decimals {sorted(_roundings)}, so a divergent rounding cannot hide",
len(_roundings) == 3)
check("...and both widening factors differ, so max / sum / product are three "
"distinguishable answers",
len(set(WIDEN_FACTOR.values())) == len(WIDEN_FACTOR) >= 2)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("1. AC1 - the flag matches PROVENANCE, and an unmarked fill is not "
"constructible")
FILLED = fill_from_yesterday(TODAY_PART, yesterday=YESTERDAY,
since=D0, until=D1, stamp=D0)
_pub_starts = {u for u in DAY[:PUBLISHED_N]}
_expected_prov = {u: (u not in _pub_starts) for u in DAY}
_got_prov = derived(lambda: {p.start.astimezone(UTC): p.provisional
for p in FILLED.points})
check(f"the filled series covers every hour of the day "
f"{len(FILLED.points) if FILLED.kind == 'series' else FILLED}",
FILLED.kind == "series" and len(FILLED.points) == len(DAY))
check("...and EVERY point's flag equals what its provenance says it should be, "
"re-derived here from the set of hours the fixture published",
_got_prov == _expected_prov)
_carried = derived(lambda: [p for p in FILLED.points if p.provisional])
check(f"...which is {len(DAY) - PUBLISHED_N} carried hours and {PUBLISHED_N} "
f"published ones, counted rather than asserted",
len(_carried) == len(DAY) - PUBLISHED_N)
check("...and the carried hours carry YESTERDAY's number for the same wall "
"clock hour, not today's and not a neighbour's",
all(near(p.eur_per_kwh, y_price(brussels(p.start).hour))
for p in _carried))
check("...while the published hours carry TODAY's, so the two halves are not "
"the same data wearing two flags",
all(near(p.eur_per_kwh, t_price(brussels(p.start).hour))
for p in FILLED.points if not p.provisional))
# ⚠️ THE COPY IS THE DEFECT. A published point that survives as a COPY is one
# whose flag could have been rewritten on the way through; identity is the only
# property that rules that out for every field at once.
check("a published point is passed through BY IDENTITY - the object the "
"provider produced is the object in the filled series",
all(any(p is q for q in TODAY_PART.points)
for p in FILLED.points if not p.provisional))
check("...and the canonical §9.3 dict carries the flag out to the wire for "
"both kinds",
FILLED.canonical()["prices"][0]["provisional"] is False
and FILLED.canonical()["prices"][-1]["provisional"] is True)
check("...and plan_is_provisional() sees the series as provisional overall, "
"because at least one hour is",
plan_is_provisional(FILLED) is True)
# The audit is a post-condition that RAISES. Feed it the exact defect.
_stale_copy = PricePoint(start=FILLED.points[-1].start,
eur_per_kwh=FILLED.points[-1].eur_per_kwh,
provisional=False) # the copy-the-flag bug
check("the provenance audit REFUSES a carried hour flagged non-provisional - "
"the 'stale but plausible' point, which is SAFETY-18's frozen-but-fresh "
"meter one layer up",
raises(lambda: _fc._audit([_stale_copy], {}), ValueError))
check("...and refuses a published hour that arrived as a COPY rather than as "
"the published object, which is where a flag gets lost",
raises(lambda: _fc._audit(
[PricePoint(start=TODAY_PART.points[0].start,
eur_per_kwh=TODAY_PART.points[0].eur_per_kwh,
provisional=TODAY_PART.points[0].provisional)],
{D0: TODAY_PART.points[0]}), ValueError))
check("...and never repairs a flag: the audit's only outcomes are silence and "
"an exception, so a series it passed was already correct",
_fc._audit(list(FILLED.points), {u: TODAY_PART.points[i]
for i, u in enumerate(DAY[:PUBLISHED_N])})
is None)
# ⚠️ A PUBLISHED POINT MAY BE PROVISIONAL. eneco_eddy's current-quarter print
# is settled after the fact and says so (§9.2). "Published" is not "firm".
_eddy = series_of(DAY[:2], lambda u: t_price(brussels(u).hour),
PriceProduct.REALTIME, "eneco_eddy", provisional=True)
_eddy_filled = derived(lambda: fill_from_yesterday(
_eddy, yesterday=YESTERDAY, since=D0, until=D1, stamp=D0))
check("a PUBLISHED point that the feed itself flagged provisional keeps that "
"flag - the audit checks provenance, and does not force published hours "
"to False",
_eddy_filled.kind == "series"
and all(p.provisional for p in _eddy_filled.points[:2])
and _eddy_filled.points[0] is _eddy.points[0])
# The structural half: the constructor has nothing to pass, and the file is
# scanned so the pass-through idiom cannot come back looking ordinary.
check("_carried() has NO `provisional` parameter, so a caller has nothing to "
"forget, default, or copy from the point being carried",
"provisional" not in inspect.signature(_fc._carried).parameters)
_SRC = derived(lambda: open(os.path.join(HERE, "app", "price_forecast.py"),
encoding="utf-8").read())
def _nonliteral_provisional(src):
"""Every `PricePoint(...)` in the module whose `provisional` is not a
literal. AST, not a substring: the module docstring quotes the defect it
exists to prevent, and a text scan would match its own documentation."""
out = []
for node in ast.walk(ast.parse(src)):
if isinstance(node, ast.Call) and \
getattr(node.func, "id", None) == "PricePoint":
kw = {k.arg: k.value for k in node.keywords}
v = kw.get("provisional")
if not isinstance(v, ast.Constant):
out.append(ast.dump(node)[:80])
return out
_leaks = derived(lambda: _nonliteral_provisional(_SRC))
check(f"no PricePoint built in app/price_forecast.py takes its `provisional` "
f"from an expression - it is a literal at every construction site, so "
f"`provisional=y.provisional` cannot reappear in a later edit {_leaks}",
_leaks == [])
# The scan must be able to fail, or it grades nothing.
check("...and that scan FAILS on the defect it names, so it is a check and not "
"a decoration",
_nonliteral_provisional(
"PricePoint(start=t, eur_per_kwh=v, provisional=y.provisional)") != [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("2. the fill keys on the WALL CLOCK, so the 23- and 25-hour days are right")
for label, (y, m, d) in (("spring forward (23 h)", (2026, 3, 29)),
("fall back (25 h)", (2026, 10, 25))):
a = local_midnight(y, m, d)
b = local_midnight(y, m, d + 1)
yb = local_midnight(y, m, d - 1)
yesterday = series_of(hours_between(yb, a),
lambda u: y_price(brussels(u).hour),
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, "generic_dayahead",
provisional=False)
# Nothing published at all yet: the whole day is carried forward.
nothing = PriceRead.no_data("the day-ahead print has not landed yet")
got = derived(lambda: fill_from_yesterday(nothing, yesterday=yesterday,
since=a, until=b, stamp=a))
# ⚠️ DERIVED FROM THE OFFSETS, not from a 23 or a 25 typed here.
off_a = brussels_offset(a).utcoffset(None).total_seconds() / 3600
off_b = brussels_offset(b - timedelta(seconds=1)).utcoffset(None) \
.total_seconds() / 3600
expect = int(24 - (off_b - off_a))
check(f"{label}: the day is {expect} hours long, derived from the offset "
f"change {off_a:+.0f} -> {off_b:+.0f}, and the fill emits exactly "
f"that many",
got.kind == "series" and len(got.points) == expect)
check(f"{label}: every hour of it is flagged provisional - nothing was "
f"published",
got.kind == "series" and all(p.provisional for p in got.points))
# The discriminating part: a naive `t - 24 h` fill would give a DIFFERENT
# answer here, so this check separates the two implementations.
y_by_utc = {u: y_price(brussels(u).hour) for u in hours_between(yb, a)}
naive = [y_by_utc.get(u - timedelta(hours=24)) for u in hours_between(a, b)]
wall = [y_price(brussels(u).hour) for u in hours_between(a, b)]
check(f"{label}: the wall-clock fill and a naive t-24h fill DISAGREE, so "
f"the check below can tell them apart",
naive != wall)
check(f"{label}: ...and the emitted values are the WALL-CLOCK ones",
got.kind == "series"
and [round(p.eur_per_kwh, 6) for p in got.points] == wall)
# The 25-hour day's two 02:00 hours are two distinct instants, both filled.
_oct = local_midnight(2026, 10, 25)
_oct_end = local_midnight(2026, 10, 26)
_oct_fill = fill_from_yesterday(
PriceRead.no_data("nothing yet"),
yesterday=series_of(hours_between(local_midnight(2026, 10, 24), _oct),
lambda u: y_price(brussels(u).hour),
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, "generic_dayahead",
provisional=False),
since=_oct, until=_oct_end, stamp=_oct)
_twos = [p for p in _oct_fill.points if brussels(p.start).hour == 2]
check("the 25-hour day has TWO local 02:00 points, at different offsets, and "
"both are filled and both are flagged - a 24-slot implementation would "
"collide them into one",
len(_twos) == 2
and _twos[0].start.utcoffset() != _twos[1].start.utcoffset()
and all(p.provisional for p in _twos))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("3. §5.4 - a late publication REPLACES a carried hour and re-flags it")
_late = fill_from_yesterday(
series_of(DAY, lambda u: t_price(brussels(u).hour),
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, "generic_dayahead", provisional=False),
yesterday=YESTERDAY, since=D0, until=D1, stamp=D1)
_h20 = DAY[20]
_before = derived(lambda: FILLED.at(_h20))
_after = derived(lambda: _late.at(_h20))
check("before the print, hour 20 is provisional and carries YESTERDAY's number",
_before.provisional is True and near(_before.eur_per_kwh, y_price(20)))
check("...after it, the same hour is FIRM and carries today's - the flag and "
"the number move together, because the series is rebuilt and not patched",
_after.provisional is False and near(_after.eur_per_kwh, t_price(20)))
check("...and the two numbers actually differ, so 'it was replaced' is a "
"measurement and not a restatement",
not near(_before.eur_per_kwh, _after.eur_per_kwh))
check("...and re-running the fill over an already-complete series changes "
"nothing: it is idempotent",
[p.canonical() for p in fill_from_yesterday(
_late, yesterday=YESTERDAY, since=D0, until=D1, stamp=D1).points]
== [p.canonical() for p in _late.points])
# Nothing to fill from, and nothing published: no_data, never an empty series.
_nothing = derived(lambda: fill_from_yesterday(
PriceRead.no_data("the feed timed out"),
yesterday=PriceRead.no_data("and there is no yesterday either"),
since=D0, until=D1, stamp=D0))
check("with neither a published hour nor a yesterday, the result is no_data - "
"not an empty series, and not a series of zeros",
_nothing.kind == "no_data")
check("...so it has no .points to iterate and no .get() to default out of",
raises(lambda: _nothing.points, Absence)
and raises(lambda: _nothing.get("points", []), Absence))
check("...and its reason names §11.4 for an operator",
"§11.4" in _nothing.reason)
check("a naive `since` is refused rather than silently interpreted as UTC",
raises(lambda: fill_from_yesterday(TODAY_PART, yesterday=YESTERDAY,
since=datetime(2026, 1, 15),
until=D1, stamp=D0), ValueError))
check("...and `yesterday` has no default, so a fill with nothing to fill from "
"cannot be written by accident",
raises(lambda: fill_from_yesterday(TODAY_PART, since=D0, until=D1,
stamp=D0), TypeError))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("4. AC2 - an irreversible action is REJECTED on a provisional price")
class FakeStore:
"""Same surface as app/store.Store, no disk. Copied from test_maintenance."""
def __init__(self):
self.data = {"phase": IDLE, "phase_started": None,
"last_completed": None, "last_start_attempt": None}
def set(self, k, v):
self.data[k] = v
def set_time(self, k, when):
self.data[k] = when
def get_time(self, k):
return self.data.get(k)
def save(self):
pass
def maint():
return Maintenance(MaintConfig(enabled=True), FakeStore())
check("the drain's commitment window is DERIVED from the phase machine's own "
"timeout, so the gate and maintenance.py cannot drift apart",
near(MAINTENANCE_DRAIN.commits_h, DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN / 60.0)
and near(MAINTENANCE_CHARGE.commits_h, CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN / 60.0))
# The shipped `maintenance_start_hour` is 10:00 local, so a drain started on
# schedule runs into the evening - hours a morning-only day-ahead print has not
# covered. That is the ticket's scenario and it is where the window is placed.
START = D0 + timedelta(hours=MaintConfig().start_hour)
_hours = derived(lambda: committed_hours(START, MAINTENANCE_DRAIN))
check(f"...and it commits {len(_hours) if not isinstance(_hours, _Raised) else _hours} "
f"whole hours, one per hour of the timeout",
len(_hours) == int(DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN / 60))
check("an action that commits nothing is not an irreversible one and cannot be "
"declared", raises(lambda: Irreversible("X", 0), ValueError)
and raises(lambda: Irreversible("", 4), ValueError))
# The stimulus: the first hours are firm, the drain's window reaches into the
# carried ones. THIS is the ticket's scenario - a cycle started at 10:00 on
# prices that were published for the morning and guessed for the evening.
_m = maint()
_gate_bad = derived(lambda: begin_phase(_m, START, FILLED, MAINTENANCE_DRAIN))
_first_prov = derived(lambda: next(u for u in _hours if FILLED.at(u).provisional))
check("the drain's window really does reach past the published hours while "
"staying INSIDE the series, so the refusal below is about provenance and "
"not about a short series",
FILLED.covers(_hours[-1])
and any(not FILLED.at(u).provisional for u in _hours)
and any(FILLED.at(u).provisional for u in _hours))
check("a maintenance DRAIN whose window includes a carried-forward hour is "
"BLOCKED", _gate_bad.kind == "blocked")
check("...and the phase machine did not move: it is still idle, so the "
"rejection is of the ACTION and not merely of a verdict object",
_m.phase == IDLE)
check("...and the reason names §8.3, the offending hour, and when the real "
"price is expected",
"§8.3" in _gate_bad.reason
and _first_prov.isoformat() in _gate_bad.reason
and "14-16" in _gate_bad.reason)
# The positive arm, so the block above is discriminating rather than universal.
_firm_long = series_of(hours_between(START,
START + timedelta(hours=len(_hours) + 2)),
lambda u: t_price(brussels(u).hour % 24),
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, "generic_dayahead",
provisional=False)
_m2 = maint()
_gate_ok = derived(lambda: begin_phase(_m2, START, _firm_long,
MAINTENANCE_DRAIN))
check("...while the SAME transition on a fully published series is PERMITTED, "
"and the phase machine actually moves to drain",
_gate_ok.kind == "permitted" and _m2.phase == DRAIN)
check("...and the permitting arm carries the evidence it checked - one firm "
"point per committed hour",
_gate_ok.kind == "permitted" and len(_gate_ok.hours) == len(_hours)
and not any(p.provisional for p in _gate_ok.hours))
# The other two ways a price can fail to be an observation.
_m3 = maint()
_gate_none = begin_phase(_m3, START, PriceRead.no_data("the feed timed out"),
MAINTENANCE_DRAIN)
check("no price data at all BLOCKS an irreversible action too - a missing "
"price is not a cheap one (§11.4)",
_gate_none.kind == "blocked" and "§11.4" in _gate_none.reason
and _m3.phase == IDLE)
_short = series_of(DAY[:4], lambda u: t_price(brussels(u).hour),
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, "generic_dayahead",
provisional=False)
_gate_short = price_permits(_short, D0, MAINTENANCE_DRAIN)
check("...and so does an hour the series does not cover, which is §11.4 for "
"that hour rather than a reason to reach for a neighbour",
_gate_short.kind == "blocked" and "no price covers" in _gate_short.reason)
# The variant type itself, held to the same shape as PriceRead and Arbitrage.
check("a BLOCKED gate carries a reason and nothing else: .hours and .action "
"raise Absence rather than answering with an empty tuple",
raises(lambda: _gate_bad.hours, Absence)
and raises(lambda: _gate_bad.action, Absence))
check("...it is not iterable and has no .get(), the other two routes to an "
"empty, harmless-looking loop",
raises(lambda: list(_gate_bad), Absence)
and raises(lambda: _gate_bad.get("hours", []), Absence))
check("...match() demands BOTH arms, so the block cannot be fallen through",
raises(lambda: _gate_bad.match(permitted=lambda g: 1), TypeError))
check("...and there is no falsy variant, so `if gate:` cannot look like a "
"guard while being none",
bool(_gate_bad) is True and bool(_gate_ok) is True)
# A genuinely carried point - the flagged one, not the mis-flagged copy above.
_prov_pt = FILLED.points[-1]
check("the point the two constructor checks below are handed really is "
"provisional, or they would be grading nothing",
_prov_pt.provisional is True)
check("a permitted gate cannot be built over a provisional hour or over no "
"hours at all - §8.3 is the one rule this type has",
raises(lambda: Gate.permit(MAINTENANCE_DRAIN, [_prov_pt]), ValueError)
and raises(lambda: Gate.permit(MAINTENANCE_DRAIN, []), ValueError))
# TEST-14, PORTED. A default on any of these constructors reopens the exact
# hole `_NoData.reason` had - and static_tariff's `_Refused.reason` still has,
# because nothing scanned it. Scanned by SIGNATURE, so a default added later is
# red without anyone remembering to write a new case.
def _defaulted(fn):
try:
ps = list(inspect.signature(fn).parameters.values())
except (TypeError, ValueError) as e: # pragma: no cover
return _Raised(e)
return [q.name for q in ps
if q.name != "self" and q.default is not inspect.Parameter.empty]
_ctors = {"Gate.permit": Gate.permit, "Gate.block": Gate.block,
"Gate.match": Gate.match,
"_Permitted.__init__": _fc._Permitted.__init__,
"_Blocked.__init__": _fc._Blocked.__init__,
# ⚠️ static_tariff's outcome type is scanned HERE because nothing
# scanned it before: TEST-14 records `_Refused.reason` gaining a
# default as a mutation that survived every check in that file.
"Arbitrage.allow": Arbitrage.allow, "Arbitrage.refuse": Arbitrage.refuse,
"Arbitrage.match": Arbitrage.match,
"_Allowed.__init__": _st._Allowed.__init__,
"_Refused.__init__": _st._Refused.__init__}
_with_defaults = derived(lambda: {n: d for n, d in
((n, _defaulted(f)) for n, f in _ctors.items())
if d})
check(f"no constructor or handler of an outcome type - Gate's OR Arbitrage's - "
f"carries a DEFAULT, so a verdict can never be built out of nothing "
f"{_with_defaults}", _with_defaults == {})
check("...so a block with no reason is a TypeError at the call site, not a "
"blank status line",
raises(lambda: Gate.block(), TypeError)
and raises(lambda: Gate.block(""), ValueError))
check("...and the same holds for the refusal FCST-03 added to Arbitrage",
raises(lambda: Arbitrage.refuse(), TypeError))
# ⚠️ ONE CALL PER ROLE, AND THE FIRST DRAFT SHOWED WHY. Passing the provisional
# point as BOTH `cheapest` and `dearest` is a stimulus that cannot distinguish
# "the constructor guards the cheapest hour" from "the constructor guards both
# hours": a guard on either one alone raises, and the check goes green for an
# implementation that leaves the sell hour unguarded. That is the degeneracy
# rule this file states at the top, in a new dress - so the two roles are
# stimulated SEPARATELY, each with a firm point in the other seat.
_firm_pt = TODAY_PART.points[0]
check("the two points these constructor checks use really differ in provenance, "
"or neither of them grades anything",
_prov_pt.provisional is True and _firm_pt.provisional is False)
check("an ALLOWED arbitrage verdict cannot be constructed with a provisional "
"CHEAPEST hour - the buy hour - even directly: §8.3 is enforced at the "
"constructor, not only in the ladder above it",
raises(lambda: Arbitrage.allow(0.1, _prov_pt, _firm_pt, "normal",
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, 0.0, frozenset()),
ValueError))
check("...nor with a provisional DEAREST hour - the sell hour - which a guard "
"written for `cheapest` alone would have let through",
raises(lambda: Arbitrage.allow(0.1, _firm_pt, _prov_pt, "normal",
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, 0.0, frozenset()),
ValueError))
check("...while two firm points build the verdict perfectly well, so the two "
"refusals above are discriminating rather than universal",
Arbitrage.allow(0.1, _firm_pt, _firm_pt, "normal",
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, 0.0, frozenset()).kind
== "allowed")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("5. AC3 - real-time thresholds are MEASURABLY wider (measured, not read)")
def plan_with_spread(spread, product, provider):
"""A two-hour series with exactly `spread` between its two prices."""
lo, hi = 0.150000, round(0.150000 + spread, 6)
pts = [PricePoint(start=brussels(D0), eur_per_kwh=lo, provisional=False),
PricePoint(start=brussels(D0 + timedelta(hours=1)),
eur_per_kwh=hi, provisional=False)]
return TariffPlan(PriceRead.series(pts, product, provider, D0), None,
"provider")
def min_accepted_spread(product, sources, base, provider="generic_dayahead"):
"""The SMALLEST spread this configuration will trade on, found by bisecting
the accept/refuse boundary of the real verdict. Nothing here reads a
factor out of the module it is grading."""
lo, hi = 0.0, 4.0
for _ in range(60):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
v = plan_with_spread(mid, product, provider).arbitrage(
peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=base,
uncertainty=sources)
if v.kind == "allowed":
hi = mid
else:
lo = mid
return hi
BASE = 0.104000 # a caller's own round-trip cost threshold, EUR/kWh
_normal = derived(lambda: min_accepted_spread(PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD,
frozenset(), BASE))
_wide = derived(lambda: min_accepted_spread(PriceProduct.REALTIME,
frozenset(), BASE))
_weather = derived(lambda: min_accepted_spread(
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, frozenset({Uncertainty.NO_WEATHER}), BASE))
_both = derived(lambda: min_accepted_spread(
PriceProduct.REALTIME, frozenset({Uncertainty.NO_WEATHER}), BASE))
check(f"a day-ahead product trades on any spread above its own threshold "
f"{_normal:.6f}, which is the base {BASE} it was given",
near(_normal, BASE, 1e-6))
check(f"a REAL-TIME / imbalance product needs {_wide:.6f} - MEASURABLY wider, "
f"by a factor of {(_wide / _normal) if _normal else 0:.3f} measured from "
f"two verdict boundaries and not read from any constant",
_wide > _normal + 1e-6)
check(f"...and that measured factor equals the declared one for "
f"REALTIME_PRODUCT ({WIDEN_FACTOR[Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT]}), so "
f"the declaration and the behaviour are the same thing",
near(_wide / _normal, WIDEN_FACTOR[Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT], 1e-4))
check(f"§11.4's no-weather row reaches the SAME widening path by a different "
f"trigger, and lands at {_weather:.6f}",
near(_weather / _normal, WIDEN_FACTOR[Uncertainty.NO_WEATHER], 1e-4))
# ⚠️ THE COMBINATION RULE, ON A STIMULUS WHERE THE THREE CANDIDATES DIFFER.
_f1 = WIDEN_FACTOR[Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT]
_f2 = WIDEN_FACTOR[Uncertainty.NO_WEATHER]
check(f"with BOTH sources active the threshold is max(f1,f2)={max(_f1, _f2)} x "
f"base and NOT the product ({_f1 * _f2}) or the sum ({_f1 + _f2}) - two "
f"independent doubts must not compound into a threshold nothing can "
f"clear",
near(_both / _normal, max(_f1, _f2), 1e-4)
and not near(_both / _normal, _f1 * _f2, 1e-3)
and not near(_both / _normal, _f1 + _f2, 1e-3))
# The regime must follow the DECLARED product, never the plugin id.
_wide_named_dayahead = derived(lambda: min_accepted_spread(
PriceProduct.REALTIME, frozenset(), BASE, provider="generic_dayahead"))
_normal_named_eddy = derived(lambda: min_accepted_spread(
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, frozenset(), BASE, provider="eneco_eddy"))
check("the widening follows the DECLARED PriceProduct even when the provider "
"is called 'generic_dayahead', and does NOT follow the name "
"'eneco_eddy' when the declared product is day-ahead - so a sixth "
"supplier is widened by its declaration and not by an id in a list",
near(_wide_named_dayahead, _wide, 1e-9)
and near(_normal_named_eddy, _normal, 1e-9))
check("...and the shipped plugin §9.2 names IS the one that declares REALTIME, "
"so the mechanism is pointed at the real product",
PROVIDERS["eneco_eddy"].capabilities().product is PriceProduct.REALTIME
and uncertainty_of(PriceProduct.REALTIME)
== frozenset({Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT})
and uncertainty_of(PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD) == frozenset())
check("a string in the uncertainty set is REFUSED rather than widening by 1.0 "
"and reporting that it widened",
raises(lambda: widen_factor({"realtime"}), TypeError)
and raises(lambda: required_spread(0.1, {"realtime"}), TypeError))
check("...and a negative or non-finite base threshold is refused, since it is "
"one every spread clears",
raises(lambda: required_spread(-0.01, frozenset()), ValueError)
and raises(lambda: required_spread(float("nan"), frozenset()), ValueError))
check("required_spread() with nothing uncertain is the base itself, so the "
"widening is additive machinery and not a permanent surcharge",
near(required_spread(BASE, frozenset()), BASE))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("6. the refusal ladder - provisional hours are DROPPED, not traded on")
# ⚠️ THE PROVISIONAL HOURS CARRY THE CHEAPEST PRICE. That is the realistic
# danger (yesterday's cheap night luring a charge) AND the non-degenerate
# stimulus: the firm-only spread and the whole-series spread differ, so a check
# on the spread can tell which set was used.
_cheap_stale = [PricePoint(start=brussels(DAY[i]),
eur_per_kwh=0.041250, provisional=True)
for i in range(3)]
_firm_rest = [PricePoint(start=brussels(DAY[i]),
eur_per_kwh=round(0.212500 + 0.013750 * i, 6),
provisional=False) for i in range(3, 12)]
_mixed = TariffPlan(PriceRead.series(_cheap_stale + _firm_rest,
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD,
"generic_dayahead", D0), None, "provider")
_all_spread = derived(lambda: _mixed.spread_eur_kwh())
_firm_spread = derived(lambda: round(
max(p.eur_per_kwh for p in _firm_rest)
- min(p.eur_per_kwh for p in _firm_rest), 6))
check(f"the fixture is non-degenerate: the whole-series spread "
f"{_all_spread:.6f} and the firm-only spread {_firm_spread:.6f} are "
f"different numbers, so a verdict can be traced to one of them",
not near(_all_spread, _firm_spread, 1e-6))
_v = derived(lambda: _mixed.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False,
min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0,
uncertainty=frozenset()))
check("a PART-published series still allows arbitrage - §8.3 forbids acting on "
"a provisional price, not trading at all until 16:00",
_v.kind == "allowed")
check(f"...on the FIRM spread {_firm_spread:.6f}, not the one yesterday's "
f"carried-forward cheap hour would have invented",
near(_v.spread_eur_kwh, _firm_spread, 1e-9))
check("...and the cheapest and dearest hours it hands an optimiser are both "
"PUBLISHED hours - the two points ARE the trade",
_v.cheapest.provisional is False and _v.dearest.provisional is False)
check("...and it reports the threshold it cleared and why, rather than leaving "
"OPT-04 to re-derive it from a product enum",
near(_v.required_spread_eur_kwh, 0.0) and _v.uncertainty == frozenset())
_all_prov = TariffPlan(PriceRead.series(_cheap_stale, PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD,
"generic_dayahead", D0), None,
"fallback")
_vp = derived(lambda: _all_prov.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False,
min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0,
uncertainty=frozenset()))
check("a WHOLLY provisional series - the §11.4 fallback, or a day before any "
"print - is still refused, and the reason counts the firm hours",
_vp.kind == "refused" and "0 of 3" in _vp.reason and "§8.3" in _vp.reason)
check("...and the refusal carries no numbers to trade on",
raises(lambda: _vp.spread_eur_kwh, Absence)
and raises(lambda: _vp.cheapest, Absence))
_one_firm = TariffPlan(
PriceRead.series(_cheap_stale + _firm_rest[:1], PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD,
"generic_dayahead", D0), None, "provider")
check("one firm hour is not enough either: a buy hour and a sell hour must "
"BOTH be published before a cycle can be committed",
_one_firm.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0,
uncertainty=frozenset()).kind == "refused")
check("§10.1 still holds above all of it: the peak guard refuses the same "
"series that is otherwise allowed",
_mixed.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=True, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0,
uncertainty=frozenset()).kind == "refused")
check("the three questions cannot be skipped: all of peak_guard_active, "
"min_spread_eur_kwh and uncertainty are required and keyword-only",
raises(lambda: _mixed.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False), TypeError)
and raises(lambda: _mixed.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False,
min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0), TypeError)
and raises(lambda: _mixed.arbitrage(False, 0.0, frozenset()), TypeError))
check("...nor answered with a truthy 'unknown' or a negative threshold",
raises(lambda: _mixed.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=None,
min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0,
uncertainty=frozenset()), TypeError)
and raises(lambda: _mixed.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False,
min_spread_eur_kwh=-0.1,
uncertainty=frozenset()), TypeError))
# The cheap-window flag is the other consumer of provisionality, and it is the
# one a live install's maintenance charge floor already reads.
_firm_hour = _firm_rest[0].start
_prov_hour = _cheap_stale[0].start
check("the cheap-window flag is decided per HOUR: a provisional hour is never "
"cheap, whatever its (stale) number says",
_mixed.cheap_now(_prov_hour) is False)
check("...while a firm hour below the firm mean still is, so carry-forward "
"filling does not switch the maintenance charge floor off every morning",
_mixed.cheap_now(_firm_hour) is True)
# ⚠️ GRADED DIRECTLY, BECAUSE ITS CONSUMERS CANNOT GRADE IT. The §11.4 refusal
# and `cheap_now` both guard provenance independently, so `firm_points()`
# returning the carried hours TOO still leaves both of them answering correctly
# - a stimulus that cannot distinguish an over-reporting accessor from a
# correct one. So the tuple itself is compared with the published points, by
# identity and in order, rather than only the mean it feeds.
check("firm_points() returns EXACTLY the published points, in order - not the "
"carried ones as well, which its two consumers would have absorbed "
"without either of them changing its answer",
list(_mixed.firm_points()) == _firm_rest
and all(a is b for a, b in zip(_mixed.firm_points(), _firm_rest)))
check("...and the firm mean it compares against is derived from published "
"hours only",
near(sum(p.eur_per_kwh for p in _mixed.firm_points())
/ len(_mixed.firm_points()),
sum(p.eur_per_kwh for p in _firm_rest) / len(_firm_rest)))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("7. CFG-03 and validate.py rule 7 - what this ticket did NOT widen")
_defaults = derived(lambda: sorted(_price.PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS))
_cfg = derived(lambda: open(os.path.join(HERE, "config.yaml"),
encoding="utf-8").read())
check(f"FCST-03 added ZERO option keys: the in-code mirror still holds exactly "
f"TARIFF-02's and TARIFF-03's {_defaults}",
_defaults == sorted(["price_provider", "price_markup_eur_kwh",
"price_taxes_eur_kwh", "export_price_eur_kwh",
"price_csv_path", "price_feed_url",
"price_horizon_h", "price_timeout_s",
"static_profile"]))
check("...and every one of them is still in config.yaml, which stays the "
"source of truth",
isinstance(_cfg, str)
and all(f"\n {k}:" in _cfg for k in _price.PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS))
def _names(path):
try:
tree = ast.parse(open(path, encoding="utf-8").read())
except (OSError, SyntaxError): # pragma: no cover
return set()
out = set()
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if isinstance(node, ast.ImportFrom):
out |= {a.name for a in node.names}
if isinstance(node, ast.Name):
out.add(node.id)
if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
out.add(node.attr)
return out
_FC = os.path.join(HERE, "app", "price_forecast.py")
_used = derived(lambda: _names(_FC))
check("app/price_forecast.py reads NO options at all - it takes a PriceRead "
"and instants, so there is no fourth place for an option default to live",
isinstance(_used, set)
and not ({"price_option", "PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS", "PluginOptions"}
& _used))
# ⚠️ RULE 7'S TRIPWIRE, RESPECTED RATHER THAN TRIPPED. test_price.py section 12
# pins the set of modules that consume `load_prices()` to exactly
# ["static_tariff.py"], and goes red when a second one appears. This module
# deliberately does NOT fetch: it transforms a read somebody else obtained, so
# rule 7's message about what a configured provider does or does not drive is
# unchanged by this ticket and needed no rewording.
check("...and it does not consume load_prices(), so validate.py rule 7's "
"pinned consumer list is still true and its wording still accurate",
"load_prices" not in _used)
print()
print("FAILED" if fails else "OK")
for f in fails:
print(" -", f)
sys.exit(1 if fails else 0)
+861
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,861 @@
"""Runnable check for static day/night and fully-fixed tariffs. `python3 test_static_tariff.py`
WHAT THIS FILE IS DEFENDING, in the order the ticket's acceptance criteria name
it:
AC1 `static_profile` (§14) drives TIME-WINDOW SHIFTING for a two-period
tariff - the right window at the right local instant, on both sides of
both 2026 DST transitions, and reaching the one shiftable load the add-on
actually has.
AC2 Fully-fixed pricing DISABLES ARBITRAGE and leaves self-consumption only.
AC3 The Belgian scenario suite carries a static-profile regression case.
THREE RULES THIS FILE HOLDS ITSELF TO, because the reviewer will:
* EVERY VERDICT IS DERIVED. No `check("the split is right", True)`. Where a
check needs an expected number it is computed HERE, by different arithmetic
than app/static_tariff.py uses - the window split is re-derived by summing
over samples with an independent local-hour test, the profile mean by a
second pass, the saving by two routes that must agree.
* NO STIMULUS IS EVALUATED WHERE THE QUANTITY IT GRADES IS DEGENERATE. A
two-period tariff has this trap BUILT IN and it is the main hazard here:
- THE PERIOD BOUNDARY IS THE DEGENERACY. At 07:00 and at 22:00 the "which
window" question and the "is it cheap" question agree under almost any
bug, and a probe at 12:00 cannot tell a correct wrap-around from one
that treats 22:00-07:00 as 22:00-24:00. So probes sit at 06:59 / 07:00 /
07:01 and 21:59 / 22:00 / 22:01, and a Saturday 03:00 probe exists
specifically because the mon-fri night window MUST NOT cover it.
- MEAN-CHEAP AND MINIMUM-CHEAP AGREE ON A TWO-LEVEL TARIFF. Under two
prices "below the mean" and "is the cheapest price" are the same set, so
a two-period profile cannot tell `cheap_now` from `price == min`.
Section 3 therefore runs a THREE-level profile where those two answers
differ, and asserts they differ before grading anything with it.
- DAY AND NIGHT MUST HAVE DIFFERENT PRICES AND NEITHER MAY BE ZERO, or the
whole shifting question collapses. Asserted as checks in their own
right, first, rather than assumed.
- THE DST CHECKS RUN ON THE 23-HOUR AND 25-HOUR DAYS, not on a normal day
where a 24-slot implementation and a correct one agree exactly.
- THE REPLAY DAY MUST CARRY IMPORT IN BOTH WINDOWS. A day whose whole
import fell in one window grades no split at all; section 6 asserts that
before it reports a saving.
* A FAILED READ IS NOT AN OBSERVATION. A missing static_profile is not a zero
price, and zero is exactly the value that makes everything look free. So
`static_plan` with no profile is checked to produce a read with NO
`.points`, and `price_at` on it must RAISE rather than answer 0.0.
"""
import gzip
import json
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from app.price import (
Absence, PricePoint, PriceProduct, PriceRead, arbitrage_allowed, brussels,
plan_is_provisional,
)
from app.static_tariff import (
MEAN_WINDOW_DAYS, ProfileInvalid, StaticProfile, TariffPlan,
parse_static_profile, resolve_tariff, static_plan, static_status,
)
from app.validate import validate_startup_config
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
UTC = timezone.utc
fails = []
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
def raises(fn, exc):
"""True only if fn() raises EXACTLY `exc`. A different exception is False -
'it was refused' and 'it broke on the way to being refused' must not grade
the same."""
try:
fn()
except exc:
return True
except Exception:
return False
return False
def reason(fn):
try:
fn()
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
return str(e)
return ""
class _Raised:
def __init__(self, e):
self.e = e
def __eq__(self, other):
return False
def __hash__(self):
return id(self)
def __bool__(self):
return False
def __repr__(self):
return f"<raised {type(self.e).__name__}: {self.e}>"
def derived(fn):
"""A value a check grades. An exception becomes `_Raised`, which equals
nothing and is falsy - NOT a default. See test_price.py for why."""
try:
return fn()
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
return _Raised(e)
def near(a, b, tol=1e-9):
try:
return abs(float(a) - float(b)) <= tol
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return False
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# The fixtures. Belgian day/night numbers, and their degeneracies asserted.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
DAY_P = 0.3410 # all-in EUR/kWh, day
NIGHT_P = 0.2570 # all-in EUR/kWh, night
FIXED_P = 0.3070 # all-in EUR/kWh, single-tariff site
TWO_PERIOD = {"periods": [
{"name": "day", "from": "07:00", "to": "22:00", "days": "mon-fri",
"eur_per_kwh": DAY_P},
{"name": "night", "from": "22:00", "to": "07:00", "days": "mon-fri",
"eur_per_kwh": NIGHT_P},
{"name": "night", "from": "00:00", "to": "24:00", "days": "sat,sun",
"eur_per_kwh": NIGHT_P},
]}
FULLY_FIXED = {"periods": [
{"name": "fixed", "from": "00:00", "to": "24:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": FIXED_P},
]}
# ⚠️ THREE LEVELS, AND SECTION 3 EXISTS BECAUSE OF IT. Under two prices "cheaper
# than the mean" and "is the minimum price" are the same set of hours, so a
# two-period profile cannot distinguish `cheap_now`'s rule from `price == min`.
# Here the middle level sits BELOW the mean without being the minimum (the four
# expensive evening hours pull the mean up past it), so those two rules give
# DIFFERENT answers at 12:00 - and section 3 proves they differ before grading
# anything with it.
THREE_LEVEL = {"periods": [
{"name": "peak", "from": "17:00", "to": "21:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": 0.4800},
{"name": "day", "from": "07:00", "to": "17:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": 0.2900},
{"name": "evening", "from": "21:00", "to": "24:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": 0.2900},
{"name": "night", "from": "00:00", "to": "07:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": 0.1900},
]}
def opts(profile=None, **over):
o = {"price_provider": "off",
"static_profile": "" if profile is None else json.dumps(profile)}
o.update(over)
return o
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("0. the arithmetic this file grades with must not be degenerate")
# ⚠️ These ARE the guard against a section that passes for the wrong reason. If
# any goes red, every shifting assertion below is measuring nothing.
check("day and night prices differ, so 'used the wrong window' is visible",
DAY_P != NIGHT_P)
check("...and neither is zero, so 'dropped the price entirely' is visible",
DAY_P != 0 and NIGHT_P != 0)
check("...and the fixed price is neither of them, so a fixed-tariff result "
"cannot be a day/night result in disguise",
FIXED_P not in (DAY_P, NIGHT_P))
check("...and the day/night spread is not the fixed price, so 'reported the "
"spread where the price was wanted' is visible",
not near(DAY_P - NIGHT_P, FIXED_P))
_lv = sorted({p["eur_per_kwh"] for p in THREE_LEVEL["periods"]})
check(f"the three-level fixture really has three levels {_lv}", len(_lv) == 3)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("1. AC1 - the two-period profile puts the right window on the right hour")
TWO = parse_static_profile(json.dumps(TWO_PERIOD))
check("a JSON string parses (what config.yaml's flat `str?` option carries)",
isinstance(TWO, StaticProfile))
check("...and so does an already-parsed dict (what /data/options.json would "
"carry under a nested schema, and what sim/inject.py hands over)",
isinstance(parse_static_profile(TWO_PERIOD), StaticProfile))
check("...and a bare list of periods, without the wrapper",
isinstance(parse_static_profile(TWO_PERIOD["periods"]), StaticProfile))
# ⚠️ THE PRODUCT IS DERIVED FROM THE DATA. Nobody ticks a box saying 'static'.
check("the product is derived from the number of distinct prices, not declared: "
"two levels -> STATIC", TWO.product is PriceProduct.STATIC)
check("...and one level -> FIXED, from the same code, with no flag anywhere",
parse_static_profile(FULLY_FIXED).product is PriceProduct.FIXED)
# ...and it is really the PRICES, not the row count: three rows, one price.
_three_rows_one_price = parse_static_profile({"periods": [
dict(p, eur_per_kwh=FIXED_P) for p in TWO_PERIOD["periods"]]})
check("...and THREE rows carrying ONE price is still FIXED, so the derivation "
"is on the prices and not on len(periods)",
_three_rows_one_price.product is PriceProduct.FIXED
and len(_three_rows_one_price.periods) == 3)
# ⚠️ PROBES AT THE BOUNDARY, NOT IN THE MIDDLE OF A WINDOW. 2026-01-15 is a
# Thursday and Belgium is on CET (+01:00) then, so local == UTC + 1 h.
THU = datetime(2026, 1, 15, tzinfo=UTC)
def at_local(day, hh, mm=0):
"""A UTC instant whose BRUSSELS wall clock reads hh:mm on `day`.
Built by search rather than by adding an offset, so this helper cannot
inherit the same offset bug it is meant to detect.
"""
for minutes in range(-180, 24 * 60 + 180):
u = day + timedelta(minutes=minutes)
loc = brussels(u)
if loc.hour == hh and loc.minute == mm and loc.date() == \
brussels(day + timedelta(hours=12)).date():
return u
raise AssertionError(f"no instant reads {hh:02d}:{mm:02d} local on {day}")
_probes = [(6, 59, "night"), (7, 0, "day"), (7, 1, "day"),
(21, 59, "day"), (22, 0, "night"), (22, 1, "night"),
(12, 0, "day"), (3, 0, "night")]
_got = [(hh, mm, TWO.at(at_local(THU, hh, mm)).name) for hh, mm, _ in _probes]
check(f"the half-open boundaries land exactly - 06:59 night, 07:00 day, "
f"21:59 day, 22:00 night {_got}",
all(name == want for (hh, mm, want), (_, __, name)
in zip(_probes, _got)))
check("...and the 22:00-07:00 window really wraps midnight: Thursday 03:00 is "
"night, which a [22:00,24:00) reading would call uncovered",
TWO.at(at_local(THU, 3)).name == "night")
# ⚠️ THE DAY-TYPE TRAP. A `mon-fri` night window must NOT bleed into Saturday
# morning - a period applies on the day the CLOCK reads. The weekend row is what
# covers Saturday 03:00, and it is a DIFFERENT Period object.
SAT = datetime(2026, 1, 17, tzinfo=UTC) # a Saturday
_sat3 = TWO.at(at_local(SAT, 3))
_thu3 = TWO.at(at_local(THU, 3))
check("Saturday 03:00 is served by the WEEKEND row, not by Friday's night "
"window bleeding over - same name and price, different period",
_sat3.name == _thu3.name and _sat3 is not _thu3
and 5 in _sat3.days and 5 not in _thu3.days)
check("...and Saturday 12:00 is night-priced, because a Belgian weekend tariff "
"runs all day - a weekday-shaped lookup would call it day",
near(TWO.price_at(at_local(SAT, 12)), NIGHT_P))
check("...while Thursday 12:00 is day-priced, so the two are really different "
"answers and not one answer twice",
near(TWO.price_at(at_local(THU, 12)), DAY_P))
# next_change: the shifting primitive - "how long until the cheap window".
_nc = TWO.next_change(at_local(THU, 12))
check(f"next_change from Thursday 12:00 is the 22:00 flip "
f"{None if _nc is None else brussels(_nc).isoformat()}",
_nc is not None and brussels(_nc).hour == 22 and brussels(_nc).minute == 0)
_nc2 = TWO.next_change(at_local(SAT, 12))
check("...and from Saturday noon it is Monday 07:00, because the whole weekend "
"is one window - a scan that stopped at midnight would say 24 h",
_nc2 is not None and brussels(_nc2).hour == 7
and brussels(_nc2).weekday() == 0)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("2. AC2 - a fully-fixed tariff disables arbitrage, by arithmetic")
FIX = parse_static_profile(FULLY_FIXED)
# ⚠️ The window OPENS A DAY EARLY. `at_local(THU, 0)` is 23:00 UTC on the 14th -
# Belgium is an hour ahead - so a plan starting at THU would not cover midnight
# local, and `price_at` would correctly raise for it. That raise is the right
# behaviour (an hour outside the series is an hour with no price) but it is not
# what these sections are grading.
SPAN_A, SPAN_B = THU - timedelta(days=1), THU + timedelta(days=2)
p_fixed = static_plan(opts(FULLY_FIXED), SPAN_A, SPAN_B)
p_two = static_plan(opts(TWO_PERIOD), SPAN_A, SPAN_B)
check("the fixed plan really produced a series (so the refusal below is about "
"the tariff, not about a failed read)",
p_fixed.has_prices and len(p_fixed.read.points) == 72)
_spread_fixed = derived(p_fixed.spread_eur_kwh)
_spread_two = derived(p_two.spread_eur_kwh)
check(f"...and its spread is exactly zero {_spread_fixed}",
near(_spread_fixed, 0.0))
check(f"...while the two-period spread is the day/night difference "
f"{_spread_two}, re-derived here as {DAY_P - NIGHT_P:.4f}",
near(_spread_two, DAY_P - NIGHT_P, 1e-9))
_v_fixed = p_fixed.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset())
_v_two = p_two.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset())
check("a fully-fixed tariff REFUSES arbitrage", _v_fixed.kind == "refused")
check("...for the true reason - the series is flat, so there is nothing to buy "
"low and sell high, not because a FIXED enum was matched on",
"flat" in _v_fixed.reason and "self-consumption only" in _v_fixed.reason)
check("...and a two-period tariff, on the same code path, ALLOWS it - so the "
"refusal is discriminating rather than universal",
_v_two.kind == "allowed")
# ⚠️ NOT KEYED ON THE PRODUCT ENUM. A DAY-AHEAD series that happens to print one
# price all day must be refused for the same reason, or the rule is a label
# check wearing arithmetic's clothes.
_flat_dayahead = TariffPlan(
PriceRead.series(
[PricePoint(start=brussels(THU + timedelta(hours=i)),
eur_per_kwh=0.2222, provisional=False) for i in range(24)],
PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD, "generic_dayahead", THU),
None, "provider")
check("a DAY_AHEAD series that happens to be flat is refused too, so the rule "
"is arithmetic and not a product label",
_flat_dayahead.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset()).kind == "refused")
# The numbers an optimiser needs exist ONLY on the permitting variant.
check("the allowed verdict carries the spread, the cheapest hour and the "
"dearest hour - the whole input set for a trade",
near(_v_two.spread_eur_kwh, DAY_P - NIGHT_P)
and near(_v_two.cheapest.eur_per_kwh, NIGHT_P)
and near(_v_two.dearest.eur_per_kwh, DAY_P))
check("...and a REFUSED verdict carries none of them: .spread_eur_kwh raises "
"Absence rather than answering 0.0, which is the number that would make "
"every hour look equally good",
raises(lambda: _v_fixed.spread_eur_kwh, Absence)
and raises(lambda: _v_fixed.cheapest, Absence))
check("...and it is not iterable and has no .get(), the other two routes from "
"a refusal to an empty, harmless-looking loop",
raises(lambda: list(_v_fixed), Absence)
and raises(lambda: _v_fixed.get("spread_eur_kwh", 0.0), Absence))
check("...and match() demands BOTH arms, so the refusal cannot be fallen "
"through", raises(lambda: _v_fixed.match(allowed=lambda v: 1), TypeError))
check("...and there is no falsy variant, so `if verdict:` cannot look like a "
"guard while being none", bool(_v_fixed) is True and bool(_v_two) is True)
# §10.1 priority 2 over priority 3, expressed so OPT-04 cannot skip it.
check("peak shaving outranks arbitrage: the SAME allowed plan is refused when "
"the peak guard is holding",
p_two.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=True, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset()).kind == "refused")
check("...and the reason names the ordering rather than the tariff",
"priority 2" in p_two.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=True, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset()).reason)
check("...and the question cannot be skipped: peak_guard_active is required "
"and keyword-only, so a spread is not obtainable without answering it",
raises(lambda: p_two.arbitrage(), TypeError)
and raises(lambda: p_two.arbitrage(False), TypeError))
check("...nor answered with a truthy 'unknown'",
raises(lambda: p_two.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=None), TypeError)
and raises(lambda: p_two.arbitrage(peak_guard_active="no"), TypeError))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("3. the cheap-window rule, on a tariff where it is not degenerate")
# ⚠️ WHY THREE LEVELS. Under two prices, "below the mean" and "equal to the
# minimum" select the SAME hours, so a two-period profile cannot tell
# cheap_now()'s actual rule from `price == min(prices)`. This fixture's `day`
# level sits between the two, and the check below PROVES the two rules disagree
# before anything is graded with it.
THREE = parse_static_profile(THREE_LEVEL)
p3 = static_plan(opts(THREE_LEVEL), SPAN_A,
SPAN_A + timedelta(days=MEAN_WINDOW_DAYS))
_mean3 = p3.mean_eur_kwh()
_min3 = min(p.eur_per_kwh for p in p3.read.points)
_day3 = 0.2900
check(f"the three-level fixture is non-degenerate: the minimum {_min3:.4f} is "
f"strictly below the middle level {_day3:.4f}, which is strictly below "
f"the mean {_mean3:.4f} - so 'below the mean' and 'is the minimum' select "
f"DIFFERENT sets of hours and this fixture can tell them apart",
_min3 < _day3 < _mean3)
check("...so cheap_now() calls the 07:00-17:00 MIDDLE level cheap - it is under "
"the mean without being the cheapest price of the day, which a "
"`price == min(prices)` rule would get wrong and a `price < mean` rule "
"gets right", p3.cheap_now(at_local(THU, 12)) is True)
check("...and the middle level really is not the minimum, so that check graded "
"the difference rather than restating it",
not near(p3.price_at(at_local(THU, 12)), _min3))
check("...and calls the 00:00-07:00 minimum cheap",
p3.cheap_now(at_local(THU, 3)) is True)
check("...and the 17:00-21:00 peak not cheap",
p3.cheap_now(at_local(THU, 18)) is False)
# ⚠️ STRICTLY BELOW, AND THAT IS AC2 IN THE SHIFTING HALF. On a flat series
# `<=` would make EVERY hour a cheap window and a fixed-tariff site would top
# the battery up from the grid at any hour - the opposite of self-consumption
# only.
_fixed_hours = [at_local(THU, h) for h in range(0, 24, 3)]
check(f"a fully-fixed tariff has NO cheap window at any hour of the day "
f"{[h for h in range(0, 24, 3) if p_fixed.cheap_now(at_local(THU, h))]} - "
f"which is what `<` buys and `<=` would destroy",
not any(p_fixed.cheap_now(t) for t in _fixed_hours))
check("...and the price really is defined at every one of those hours, so the "
"'no cheap window' answer is a priced no and not a missing read",
all(near(p_fixed.price_at(t), FIXED_P) for t in _fixed_hours))
# ...and on the two-period tariff the cheap hours are exactly the night ones.
_cheap_h = {h for h in range(24) if p_two.cheap_now(at_local(THU, h))}
_night_h = {h for h in range(24) if TWO.at(at_local(THU, h)).name == "night"}
check(f"on the day/night tariff the cheap hours ARE the night hours, derived "
f"two ways {sorted(_cheap_h)}",
_cheap_h == _night_h and 0 < len(_cheap_h) < 24)
# ⚠️ THE MEAN IS OVER SEVEN DAYS, NOT OVER THE HOUR YOU ASKED AT. A 48 h mean on
# a Friday afternoon is ~2/3 weekend, so the same Tuesday 09:00 would come out
# cheap or dear depending on when the question was put.
FRI = datetime(2026, 1, 16, tzinfo=UTC)
_from_thu = static_status(opts(TWO_PERIOD), at_local(THU, 12))
_from_fri = static_status(opts(TWO_PERIOD), at_local(FRI, 15))
_mean_thu = static_plan(opts(TWO_PERIOD), at_local(THU, 12),
at_local(THU, 12) + timedelta(days=MEAN_WINDOW_DAYS)
).mean_eur_kwh()
_mean_fri = static_plan(opts(TWO_PERIOD), at_local(FRI, 15),
at_local(FRI, 15) + timedelta(days=MEAN_WINDOW_DAYS)
).mean_eur_kwh()
check(f"the 7-day mean is stable across the day it is asked on "
f"({_mean_thu:.4f} vs {_mean_fri:.4f}), so a window's cheapness is a "
f"property of the tariff and not of the clock",
near(_mean_thu, _mean_fri, 5e-4))
_mean48_thu = static_plan(opts(TWO_PERIOD), at_local(THU, 12),
at_local(THU, 12) + timedelta(days=2)).mean_eur_kwh()
_mean48_fri = static_plan(opts(TWO_PERIOD), at_local(FRI, 15),
at_local(FRI, 15) + timedelta(days=2)).mean_eur_kwh()
check(f"...and the 48 h mean this replaces is NOT stable ({_mean48_thu:.4f} vs "
f"{_mean48_fri:.4f}), so the seven days are buying something real",
not near(_mean48_thu, _mean48_fri, 5e-4))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("4. DST - 23 and 25 hour days, where a 24-slot implementation is wrong")
# ⚠️ 2026: CEST from 01:00 UTC Sunday 29 March, CET from 01:00 UTC Sunday
# 25 October (price.py's brussels_offset, checked in PR #16 against zoneinfo
# over 149,040 instants). Both are SUNDAYS, so the weekend row prices them -
# which is itself worth knowing, because the wrap-around weekday row is not what
# is under test here.
SPRING = datetime(2026, 3, 29, tzinfo=UTC)
AUTUMN = datetime(2026, 10, 25, tzinfo=UTC)
def local_day_points(profile, day_utc):
"""Hourly points whose BRUSSELS date is that of `day_utc` + 12 h."""
target = brussels(day_utc + timedelta(hours=12)).date()
pts = profile.series(day_utc - timedelta(hours=6),
day_utc + timedelta(hours=30), provisional=False)
return [p for p in pts if p.start.date() == target]
_spring = derived(lambda: local_day_points(TWO, SPRING))
_autumn = derived(lambda: local_day_points(TWO, AUTUMN))
check(f"the spring-forward local day emits 23 points, not 24 "
f"({len(_spring) if not isinstance(_spring, _Raised) else _spring})",
not isinstance(_spring, _Raised) and len(_spring) == 23)
check(f"the autumn-back local day emits 25 points, not 24 "
f"({len(_autumn) if not isinstance(_autumn, _Raised) else _autumn})",
not isinstance(_autumn, _Raised) and len(_autumn) == 25)
check("...and the two 02:00 points in October are DIFFERENT instants at "
"DIFFERENT offsets, which a naive local-hour key would collide",
len({p.start.utcoffset() for p in _autumn if p.start.hour == 2}) == 2)
check("...and every emitted start is strictly increasing in UTC, which is what "
"price.py's boundary check demands of a fetched feed too",
all(a.start.astimezone(UTC) < b.start.astimezone(UTC)
for a, b in zip(_autumn, _autumn[1:])))
# A weekday profile across a transition, so the wrap-around path sees one too.
_wrapdays = local_day_points(TWO, datetime(2026, 3, 30, tzinfo=UTC))
check("a normal Monday still emits 24, so the 23/25 above are the transitions "
"and not a systematic miscount", len(_wrapdays) == 24)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("5. a failed read is not an observation, and a gap is not a price")
_none = static_plan(opts(None), THU, THU + timedelta(days=1))
check("no static_profile produces a NO-DATA read, not an empty series and not "
"a zero one", not _none.has_prices)
check("...and reading a price off it RAISES rather than answering 0.0 - the "
"value that would make every hour look free",
raises(lambda: _none.price_at(THU), Absence)
and raises(_none.mean_eur_kwh, Absence)
and raises(_none.spread_eur_kwh, Absence))
check("...and its underlying read has no .points at all, so `min(read.points)` "
"cannot run against it",
raises(lambda: _none.read.points, Absence))
check("...and arbitrage is refused, per §11.4",
_none.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset()).kind == "refused"
and arbitrage_allowed(_none.read) is False)
check("...and static_status() says so in words rather than reporting a price",
static_status(opts(None), THU) == (False, "no static profile"))
# ⚠️ THE TILING REFUSAL. An uncovered hour has no price and the only ways to
# serve it are to invent one or to fail when the clock reaches it.
_gap = {"periods": [
{"name": "day", "from": "07:00", "to": "22:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": DAY_P},
{"name": "night", "from": "23:00", "to": "07:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": NIGHT_P}]}
check("a profile with a 22:00-23:00 gap is REFUSED, not defaulted",
raises(lambda: parse_static_profile(_gap), ProfileInvalid))
check("...and names the uncovered range so the operator can fix it",
"22:00-23:00" in reason(lambda: parse_static_profile(_gap)))
_overlap = {"periods": [
{"name": "day", "from": "07:00", "to": "22:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": DAY_P},
{"name": "night", "from": "21:00", "to": "07:00", "days": "all",
"eur_per_kwh": NIGHT_P}]}
check("...and an overlap is refused too - two prices for one hour means one "
"wins on list order",
raises(lambda: parse_static_profile(_overlap), ProfileInvalid)
and "2 prices" in reason(lambda: parse_static_profile(_overlap)))
# THE CLASSIC MISTAKE the docstring warns about: no weekend row.
_noweekend = {"periods": [
{"name": "day", "from": "07:00", "to": "22:00", "days": "mon-fri",
"eur_per_kwh": DAY_P},
{"name": "night", "from": "22:00", "to": "07:00", "days": "mon-fri",
"eur_per_kwh": NIGHT_P}]}
check("a weekday-only profile is refused because Saturday and Sunday have no "
"price - the mistake a wrap-around window invites",
raises(lambda: parse_static_profile(_noweekend), ProfileInvalid)
and "sat" in reason(lambda: parse_static_profile(_noweekend)))
# ...and the shipped shape is accepted, so the rule is not simply "refuse all".
check("...while the three-row Belgian shape IS accepted, so the tiling rule "
"discriminates rather than refusing everything",
isinstance(parse_static_profile(TWO_PERIOD), StaticProfile))
_bad = [
("not JSON at all", "day 07:00-22:00 0.34"),
("a price in cents", {"periods": [dict(FULLY_FIXED["periods"][0],
eur_per_kwh=30.7)]}),
("a non-numeric price", {"periods": [dict(FULLY_FIXED["periods"][0],
eur_per_kwh="cheap")]}),
("a missing days selector", {"periods": [
{"name": "x", "from": "00:00", "to": "24:00", "eur_per_kwh": 0.3}]}),
("an unknown day name", {"periods": [dict(FULLY_FIXED["periods"][0],
days="mon-frd")]}),
("a decimal hour", {"periods": [dict(FULLY_FIXED["periods"][0],
**{"from": "7.5"})]}),
("an unsupported timezone", dict(FULLY_FIXED, timezone="Europe/Madrid")),
("an empty periods list", {"periods": []}),
]
for label, value in _bad:
payload = value if isinstance(value, str) else json.dumps(value)
check(f"refused: {label}",
raises(lambda p=payload: parse_static_profile(p), ProfileInvalid))
check("...and every one of those refusals says something an operator can act "
"on, rather than just failing",
all(len(reason(lambda p=(v if isinstance(v, str) else json.dumps(v)):
parse_static_profile(p))) > 40 for _, v in _bad))
for label, value in (("empty", ""), ("null", "null"), ("absent", None),
("whitespace", " ")):
check(f"...while {label!r} means 'no profile' rather than an error",
parse_static_profile(value) is None)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("6. AC3 - the static-profile regression case, on the Belgian data that exists")
# ⚠️ WHAT THE "BELGIAN SCENARIO SUITE" ACTUALLY IS IN THIS REPO. specs §17 names
# six scenarios; none of them is a static-profile case, which is why AC3 asks
# for a seventh. What exists as DATA is two days of this house's real P1 net
# power, captured from the live meter and committed as
# `scenarios/p1-net-2026-08-{20,23}.jsonl.gz` - the same fixtures test_tariff.py
# part 9 replays for the capacity tariff. Nothing longer was ever captured.
#
# So this case is measured against REAL BELGIAN HOUSEHOLD LOAD, and the two days
# happen to be one weekday and one weekend day, which is exactly the pair a
# day/night tariff needs to be graded on. It is NOT a 30-day replay and this
# section does not claim to be one; the numbers it prints are the numbers those
# two days actually produce.
REPLAY = sorted((HERE / "scenarios").glob("p1-net-*.jsonl.gz"))
print(f" replay fixtures found: {len(REPLAY)} "
f"({', '.join(p.name for p in REPLAY) or 'none'})")
check("the committed replay fixtures are present - a regression fixture CI "
"cannot see is not a regression fixture", len(REPLAY) >= 2)
MAX_GAP_S = 60.0 # a longer hole in the capture is not counted as energy
def replay_import(path):
"""(kWh imported per local tariff window, total kWh, span hours, weekday).
⚠️ THE WINDOW IS DECIDED HERE BY AN INDEPENDENT ROUTE - the Brussels-local
hour of the sample, tested against the fixture's own 07:00/22:00 boundaries
- rather than by asking the module under test. The two must agree; that
agreement is the check.
"""
per_window = {}
total = 0.0
first = last = None
prev = None
days = set()
with gzip.open(path, "rt", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
for line in fh:
row = json.loads(line)
t = datetime.fromisoformat(row["t"])
w = float(row["w"])
if first is None:
first = t
last = t
if prev is not None:
dt = (t - prev[0]).total_seconds()
if 0 < dt <= MAX_GAP_S and prev[1] > 0:
kwh = prev[1] * dt / 3_600_000.0
loc = brussels(prev[0])
days.add(loc.weekday())
window = ("day" if loc.weekday() < 5
and 7 <= loc.hour < 22 else "night")
per_window[window] = per_window.get(window, 0.0) + kwh
total += kwh
prev = (t, w)
span = (last - first).total_seconds() / 3600.0 if first else 0.0
return per_window, total, span, days
def cost_under(path, profile):
"""EUR the imported energy cost, priced sample by sample by the MODULE."""
total = 0.0
prev = None
with gzip.open(path, "rt", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
for line in fh:
row = json.loads(line)
t = datetime.fromisoformat(row["t"])
w = float(row["w"])
if prev is not None:
dt = (t - prev[0]).total_seconds()
if 0 < dt <= MAX_GAP_S and prev[1] > 0:
total += (prev[1] * dt / 3_600_000.0) * profile.price_at(prev[0])
prev = (t, w)
return total
replay_days = 0.0
graded = 0
for path in REPLAY:
windows, total_kwh, span_h, weekdays = replay_import(path)
replay_days += span_h / 24.0
day_kwh = windows.get("day", 0.0)
night_kwh = windows.get("night", 0.0)
kind = "weekday" if weekdays and min(weekdays) < 5 else "weekend"
print(f" {path.name}: {span_h:.1f} h, {kind} "
f"(weekday indices {sorted(weekdays)}), {total_kwh:.3f} kWh imported "
f"= {day_kwh:.3f} day + {night_kwh:.3f} night")
check(f"{path.name}: the two routes to the total agree",
near(day_kwh + night_kwh, total_kwh, 1e-9))
# The module's own pricing must reproduce the independently-split volumes.
c_two = cost_under(path, TWO)
c_expect = day_kwh * DAY_P + night_kwh * NIGHT_P
check(f"{path.name}: the module prices the real day at "
f"EUR {c_two:.4f}, which equals the independently-split "
f"{day_kwh:.3f} kWh x {DAY_P} + {night_kwh:.3f} kWh x {NIGHT_P} = "
f"EUR {c_expect:.4f}", near(c_two, c_expect, 1e-9))
c_fix = cost_under(path, FIX)
check(f"{path.name}: under a FULLY FIXED tariff the same energy costs "
f"EUR {c_fix:.4f} = {total_kwh:.3f} kWh x {FIXED_P}, one price for "
f"every hour", near(c_fix, total_kwh * FIXED_P, 1e-9))
# ⚠️ THE SHIFTING FIGURE, AND THE DEGENERACY GUARD IN FRONT OF IT. A day
# whose entire import landed in one window grades nothing: the saving would
# be 0 under a correct implementation AND under one that ignored the clock.
if day_kwh > 0 and night_kwh > 0:
graded += 1
saving = c_two - total_kwh * NIGHT_P
check(f"{path.name}: this day DOES import in both windows "
f"({day_kwh:.3f} / {night_kwh:.3f} kWh), so the split grades "
f"something", True)
check(f"{path.name}: shifting every day-window kWh into the night "
f"window saves EUR {saving:.4f}, which is exactly "
f"{day_kwh:.3f} kWh x the {DAY_P - NIGHT_P:.4f} spread - two "
f"routes to one number",
near(saving, day_kwh * (DAY_P - NIGHT_P), 1e-9) and saving > 0)
# AC2 on the same real data: under a fixed tariff there is nothing to
# shift, and that is arithmetic rather than a special case.
check(f"{path.name}: under the FIXED tariff the identical shift saves "
f"exactly nothing, so self-consumption-only is the right "
f"behaviour for that product",
near(c_fix - total_kwh * FIXED_P, 0.0, 1e-12))
else:
print(f" {path.name}: import fell in ONE window only "
f"({day_kwh:.3f} day / {night_kwh:.3f} night) - this day is a "
f"day-typing witness, not a shifting one, and no saving is "
f"claimed from it")
print()
print(f" AC3 MEASURED: {replay_days:.1f} DAYS of real Belgian household "
f"P1 data, {graded} of {len(REPLAY)} days carrying import in BOTH tariff "
f"windows and therefore grading the split.")
print(f" AC3 ASKS FOR A REGRESSION CASE IN THE BELGIAN SUITE, AND THIS IS "
f"ONE - but the suite holds two captured days, not a season, so nothing "
f"here is a claim about annual savings. §17's six named scenarios do not "
f"include a static-profile case; this is the seventh, and TEST-01 should "
f"say so.")
check("the replay produced a measurable split over a stated sample size, "
"rather than a criterion quietly redefined to fit the data",
graded >= 1 and replay_days < 30)
check("...and BOTH day types are present in the fixtures, which is what makes "
"the weekend row testable on real data at all",
len({("weekday" if min(replay_import(p)[3]) < 5 else "weekend")
for p in REPLAY}) == 2)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("7. §11.4 - the profile is the fallback, and the fallback is provisional")
async def _dead(url, timeout_s):
raise OSError("the supplier's feed is down")
def run(coro):
import asyncio
return asyncio.run(coro)
_cfg = opts(TWO_PERIOD, price_provider="generic_dayahead",
price_feed_url="https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE",
price_timeout_s=1, price_markup_eur_kwh=0.03,
price_taxes_eur_kwh=0.06)
_fb = run(resolve_tariff(_cfg, THU, THU + timedelta(days=1), transport=_dead))
check("a dead feed falls back to the static profile rather than to nothing",
_fb.origin == "fallback" and _fb.has_prices)
check("...with the SAME prices the configured-product path produces, because "
"it is one generator and not a second implementation",
[p.eur_per_kwh for p in _fb.read.points]
== [p.eur_per_kwh for p in static_plan(
opts(TWO_PERIOD), THU, THU + timedelta(days=1)).read.points])
check("...marked PROVISIONAL, which is the one flag that differs",
_fb.provisional and plan_is_provisional(_fb.read))
check("...and arbitrage is refused on it, per §11.4, even though a full series "
"exists and has a real spread",
_fb.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset()).kind == "refused"
and near(_fb.spread_eur_kwh(), DAY_P - NIGHT_P))
check("...while the SAME profile as the configured product allows it - so the "
"refusal is about provisionality and not about the profile",
static_plan(opts(TWO_PERIOD), THU, THU + timedelta(days=1)
).arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset()).kind == "allowed")
check("...and the provisional plan has no cheap window either: §8.3 forbids an "
"irreversible action on a provisional price, and a grid top-up is one",
not any(_fb.cheap_now(at_local(THU, h)) for h in range(24)))
_fb_none = run(resolve_tariff(opts(None, price_provider="generic_dayahead",
price_timeout_s=1),
THU, THU + timedelta(days=1), transport=_dead))
check("a dead feed with NO static_profile has nothing to fall back to, and "
"says that rather than inventing a tariff",
_fb_none.origin == "none" and not _fb_none.has_prices)
# A live feed still wins over the profile.
_body = json.dumps({"data": [
{"start": (THU + timedelta(hours=i)).isoformat(), "price_eur_mwh": 40 + i}
for i in range(24)]}).encode()
async def _live(url, timeout_s):
return _body
_live_plan = run(resolve_tariff(_cfg, THU, THU + timedelta(days=1),
transport=_live))
check("a live feed is used in preference to the static profile",
_live_plan.origin == "provider"
and _live_plan.product is PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD)
check("...and arbitrage is allowed on it, with the spread derived from the "
"feed rather than from the profile",
_live_plan.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset()).kind == "allowed"
and near(_live_plan.arbitrage(peak_guard_active=False, min_spread_eur_kwh=0.0, uncertainty=frozenset()).spread_eur_kwh,
0.023, 1e-9))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("8. the startup gate, and CFG-03")
def vbase(**over):
o = {"setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint", "max_w": 2000,
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off",
"maintenance_charge_w": 2000, "maintenance_discharge_w": 2000}
o.update(over)
return o
def why(problems, needle):
return any(needle in p for p in problems)
check("a good static_profile starts",
validate_startup_config(
vbase(static_profile=json.dumps(TWO_PERIOD)), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("a gapped one is REFUSED at startup, not at 22:00 on the day it bites",
why(validate_startup_config(vbase(static_profile=json.dumps(_gap)),
-5000, 5000),
"static_profile cannot be used"))
check("...and the refusal names the uncovered range",
why(validate_startup_config(vbase(static_profile=json.dumps(_gap)),
-5000, 5000), "22:00-23:00"))
check("static_profile alongside the Home Assistant price entities is refused - "
"main.py reads one of them and the loser is silent",
why(validate_startup_config(
vbase(static_profile=json.dumps(TWO_PERIOD),
price_now_entity="sensor.now", price_avg_entity="sensor.avg"),
-5000, 5000), "HOME ASSISTANT"))
check("...and the Home Assistant pair ALONE still starts, so nothing is taken "
"away from a live install",
validate_startup_config(vbase(price_now_entity="sensor.now",
price_avg_entity="sensor.avg"),
-5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and an empty static_profile is never refused: §9.2 puts a large share "
"of the installed base on a fixed tariff, and §11.4 makes no-price-data a "
"supported state",
validate_startup_config(vbase(static_profile=""), -5000, 5000) == []
and validate_startup_config(vbase(), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and a fully-fixed profile starts, since a one-price site is a "
"supported product and not a misconfiguration",
validate_startup_config(vbase(static_profile=json.dumps(FULLY_FIXED)),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# ⚠️ CFG-03 IS NOT WIDENED BY THIS TICKET. `static_profile` was added to
# app/price.py's PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS - the ONE in-code mirror TARIFF-02
# created and pinned to config.yaml - rather than to a second defaults dict in
# the new module. That mirror is enforced by test_price.py section 1, which
# reads config.yaml; this check is the other half of the claim: the new module
# must carry NO defaults dict of its own.
_SRC = (HERE / "app" / "static_tariff.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
check("the new module holds no option-defaults dict of its own, so this ticket "
"added ZERO new places an option default lives (CFG-03)",
"OPTION_DEFAULTS" not in _SRC.replace("PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS", ""))
check("...and it reads the option through price.price_option(), the framework's "
"single read path, rather than through opts.get(key, <a number>)",
"price_option(opts" in _SRC and 'opts.get("static_profile"' not in _SRC)
_MAIN = (HERE / "app" / "main.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
check("...and main.py grew no `o.get(\"static_profile\", <a default>)` fallback "
"either - it calls static_status(o, now), and the option is read once, "
"inside the framework",
'get("static_profile"' not in _MAIN and "static_status(" in _MAIN)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: " + "; ".join(fails))
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+910
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,910 @@
"""Runnable check for TARIFF-01, the capacity-tariff measurement.
python3 test_tariff.py
Ten parts. What each is for, and - where it matters - what it is deliberately
NOT allowed to be tested at:
1. THE BLOCK ARITHMETIC, against a worked example written out segment by
segment. The fixture is chosen to be non-degenerate on three axes at once:
irregular sample spacing, a sample that STRADDLES the :15 boundary, and a
gap longer than `max_hold_s` so the block's coverage is short of 900 s.
2. THE 900 s DEGENERACY, named and then avoided. `acc/elapsed`, `acc/900` and
the end-of-quarter projection are THREE DIFFERENT FORMULAS that all agree
at exactly full coverage of a complete block. A check run only there proves
nothing about any of them, so part 2 first shows them agreeing at that
point (so the trap is documented rather than asserted around), then shows
part 1's fixture separating all three - and every later part uses fixtures
that are away from it.
3. RESTART MID-BLOCK, through the real `QuarterAverager.snapshot()`/`restore()`
and a real SQLite file: a restarted run must land on the same closed block
as an uninterrupted one, and a run that DOES NOT restore must land lower.
Without that second half, "restore works" is satisfied by a fixture where
restoring changes nothing.
4. MONTH ROLLOVER, in LOCAL time, including a restart that straddles it.
5. AN UNREADABLE STORE IS NOT A ZERO PEAK - the acceptance argument. Three
states, three different answers, and no accessor that turns "the database
did not answer" into a number.
6. THE TIMEZONE FALLBACK, graded against `zoneinfo` day by day.
7. THE PER-PHASE REDUCTION on an UNBALANCED load. §17's three-phase case. On a
balanced load net/sum/max all coincide, which is why a balanced fixture is
worth nothing here.
8. `monthly_peak` vs a recompute from `quarter_blocks` - the derived record
proven equal to the tier it derives from, and proven never to be lowered.
9. AC 3, ON THE REPLAY DATA THAT ACTUALLY EXISTS. See the honesty note below.
10. THE WIRING, through the real `Controller` and its real status page.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
⚠️ AC 3 IS NOT MET, AND PART 9 DOES NOT PRETEND OTHERWISE.
AC 3 asks for "the monthly peak held under the soft limit in >= 95 % of
intervals over a 30-day simulation replay". THERE IS NO 30-DAY DATASET. The
infra repo's `sim/scenarios/` holds exactly two days of this house's real meter
- 2026-08-20 (the Illusmart failure day) and 2026-08-23 (the healthy reference)
- exported on 2026-08-25 because they were about to age out of HA's recorder,
and nothing longer was ever captured. `sim/scenarios/README.md` lists the whole
inventory; the rest is RS485 bus frames, OTA witness logs and a 578-row rollback
poll, none of which carries grid power over calendar time.
So part 9 replays the two days that exist, reports the percentage over them, and
states the sample size in days next to it. It is a MEASUREMENT, not a verdict:
nothing in it exits non-zero on the 95 % figure, because a 2-day run cannot pass
or fail a 30-day criterion and a check that claimed it could would be the more
expensive of the two mistakes. Both days are also *uncontrolled* - the add-on
was not shaving peaks on either - so the figure they give is the BASELINE the
guard has to improve on, which is the useful thing a 2-day replay can say.
The two days are committed here as `scenarios/p1-net-<date>.jsonl.gz`
(`{"t": iso8601, "w": signed_watts}` per line, derived from the HA recorder
export) for the reason `scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz` already is: the
infra repo is private, CI's token is minted for this repository only, and a
regression fixture that CI cannot see is not a regression fixture.
Closing AC 3 needs 30 days of capture. That is TEST-01's replay harness, and it
cannot start before somebody starts recording.
"""
import asyncio
import gzip
import json
import shutil
import sys
import tempfile
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from app.main import Controller
from app.p1 import P1Ingest, QuarterAverager, QUARTER_S, make_sample, split_signed
from app.tariff import (
BILLING_TZ, CHECKPOINT_S, NO_RECORD, NOT_OBSERVED, POLICY_MAX,
POLICY_NET, POLICY_SUM, PeakStore, PeakTracker, _EUTimezone, billed_w,
month_key,
)
fails = []
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
TMP = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="goodwe-tariff-"))
# The live install's numbers: NOTES.md and freeze.py both record max_w 5000
# there. `peak_cap_w` ships at 3500 in config.yaml and is the SOFT LIMIT AC 3
# grades against - read out of the shipped file in part 10 rather than typed.
LIVE_MAX_W = 5000.0
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
def near(a, b, tol=1e-6):
return a is not None and b is not None and abs(a - b) <= tol
def sample(t: datetime, net_w: float, phases=1, phase_net=None):
"""One P1 telegram, through the SHIPPED derivation.
`split_signed` and `make_sample` are what the real transports call, so the
sign convention under test is the one that ships rather than a local
re-derivation of it.
"""
imp, exp = split_signed(net_w)
pi = pe = None
if phase_net is not None:
pairs = [split_signed(v) for v in phase_net]
pi = [a for a, _ in pairs]
pe = [b for _, b in pairs]
return make_sample("ha_signed", imp, exp, phases=phases,
phase_import_w=pi, phase_export_w=pe,
ingest_ts=t, ingest_mono=t.timestamp())
def fresh_store(name: str) -> PeakStore:
return PeakStore(str(TMP / f"{name}.db"))
# B is a clock-aligned quarter boundary: proved, not assumed, because every
# other number in part 1 rests on it.
B = datetime(2026, 8, 30, 9, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
# ==============================================================================
print("1. the block arithmetic, on a worked example")
check(f"the fixture's start {B.isoformat()} really is 900 s aligned",
int(B.timestamp()) % QUARTER_S == 0)
# (t seconds after B, net W). Deliberately irregular, with an export, a gap
# longer than max_hold_s, and a last sample that straddles the boundary.
MAX_HOLD_S = 30.0
FIXTURE = [(0, 1000.0), (20, 2000.0), (30, -500.0), (50, 3000.0),
(250, 4000.0), (880, 1200.0), (1000, 900.0)]
# The worked example, written as the segments a person would compute by hand:
# each HELD value and how many seconds of the FIRST block it is evidence for.
# Two rules do all the work: a sample is held forward until the next one, capped
# at MAX_HOLD_S; and export is 0 W of offtake, never a negative contribution.
SEGMENTS = [
(1000.0, 20), # 0 -> 20, a normal telegram interval, held in full
(2000.0, 10), # 20 -> 30, likewise
(0.0, 20), # 30 -> 50: -500 W is EXPORT, so 0 W of offtake for 20 s
(3000.0, 30), # 50 -> 250 is a 200 s GAP; only the first 30 s is evidence
(4000.0, 30), # 250 -> 880 is a 630 s gap; again only 30 s is evidence
(1200.0, 20), # 880 -> 900: the STRADDLE's first half, up to the boundary
]
# The straddle's second half: the same held 1200 W, from the boundary until its
# hold expires at 880 + 30. It must be credited to the NEXT block, not to this
# one and not to neither.
SPLIT_TAIL_W, SPLIT_TAIL_S = 1200.0, 10
EXP_WS = sum(w * s for w, s in SEGMENTS)
EXP_COVERED_S = sum(s for _, s in SEGMENTS)
EXP_BLOCK_AVG = EXP_WS / QUARTER_S # what the utility bills
EXP_ELAPSED_AVG = EXP_WS / EXP_COVERED_S # what a /elapsed divisor gives
NAIVE_MEAN = sum(max(w, 0.0) for _, w in FIXTURE[:-1]) / (len(FIXTURE) - 1)
avg = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
closed = []
for dt_s, w in FIXTURE:
closed += avg.add(sample(B + timedelta(seconds=dt_s), w))
print(f" {len(SEGMENTS)} held segments -> {EXP_WS:,.0f} Ws over "
f"{EXP_COVERED_S:.0f} s of the {QUARTER_S} s block")
check(f"exactly one block closed", len(closed) == 1)
check(f"...starting at the fixture's own boundary {B.isoformat()}",
bool(closed) and closed[0].start == B)
check(f"...averaging {EXP_BLOCK_AVG:.2f} W - the worked example's "
f"{EXP_WS:,.0f} Ws over the FULL {QUARTER_S} s",
bool(closed) and near(closed[0].offtake_avg_w, EXP_BLOCK_AVG, 1e-9))
# The three ways of being wrong, each of which produces a plausible number.
print(f" the same data read three other ways: /elapsed = {EXP_ELAPSED_AVG:.2f} W, "
f"naive mean of samples = {NAIVE_MEAN:.2f} W, "
f"billed = {EXP_BLOCK_AVG:.2f} W")
check("...and /elapsed is NOT the billed figure - a gap must drag the average "
"down, not be averaged away",
abs(EXP_ELAPSED_AVG - EXP_BLOCK_AVG) > 1.0)
check("...and a naive mean over samples is NOT the billed figure either - it "
"weights a burst of fast telegrams like a slow one",
abs(NAIVE_MEAN - EXP_BLOCK_AVG) > 1.0)
# The straddle: the 4000 W sample at t=400 is held ACROSS 900. Its evidence
# expires at 430, so the second block gets none of it - and the second block
# must still have been OPENED at 900, not at 1000.
check(f"the block after the straddle opens at the boundary, not at the sample",
avg.block_start == B + timedelta(seconds=QUARTER_S))
print(f" the straddling sample is SPLIT at the boundary: "
f"{SEGMENTS[-1][0]:.0f} W x {SEGMENTS[-1][1]} s into the first block, "
f"x {SPLIT_TAIL_S} s into the second")
check(f"...and the second block is credited the tail "
f"({SPLIT_TAIL_W * SPLIT_TAIL_S:,.0f} Ws), so a sample spanning :15 is "
f"attributed to BOTH blocks in proportion and wholly to neither",
near(avg.partial_ws, SPLIT_TAIL_W * SPLIT_TAIL_S, 1e-9))
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("2. the 900 s degeneracy - where three different formulas agree")
# A complete block at a constant power, fully covered. Here acc/elapsed,
# acc/900 and the projection are ALL the same number. Anything checked only
# here is checked against nothing.
HELD_W = 2400.0
deg = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
deg_closed = []
for i in range(0, QUARTER_S + 1, 5):
deg_closed += deg.add(sample(B + timedelta(seconds=i), HELD_W))
d_block = deg_closed[0].offtake_avg_w
deg2 = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
LAST_S = QUARTER_S - 5
for i in range(0, LAST_S + 1, 5):
deg2.add(sample(B + timedelta(seconds=i), HELD_W))
d_partial = deg2.offtake_avg_w
# Graded AT the last sample: full coverage behind it, a held value in front.
d_proj = PeakTracker.project(deg2, B + timedelta(seconds=LAST_S)).projected_w
print(f" at full coverage of a whole block: acc/900 = {d_block:.2f} W, "
f"acc/elapsed = {d_partial:.2f} W, projection = {d_proj:.2f} W")
check("all three formulas coincide at exactly 900 s of full coverage - so a "
"check placed only there distinguishes none of them",
near(d_block, HELD_W, 1e-6) and near(d_partial, HELD_W, 1e-6)
and near(d_proj, HELD_W, 1e-6))
# Away from it, on part 1's fixture at a point mid-block, they must separate.
mid = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
for dt_s, w in FIXTURE[:-1]:
mid.add(sample(B + timedelta(seconds=dt_s), w))
NOW = B + timedelta(seconds=500)
p = PeakTracker.project(mid, NOW)
print(f" at t=500 s on part 1's fixture: acc/elapsed = {p.elapsed_w:.2f} W, "
f"projection = {p.projected_w:.2f} W, coverage = {p.covered_frac * 100:.1f} %")
check("mid-block, with a gap in it, the elapsed average and the projection are "
"DIFFERENT numbers", abs(p.elapsed_w - p.projected_w) > 1.0)
check("...and the projection carries elapsed_s, so a consumer can see it is an "
f"extrapolation over {QUARTER_S - p.elapsed_s:.0f} s it has not seen",
near(p.elapsed_s, 500.0, 1e-6))
check("...and a gap shows up as coverage below 1.0 rather than as a confident "
"low number", p.covered_frac < 1.0 and not p.complete)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("3. restart mid-block: the same block, or a lower one, never a lost one")
RUN_W = 2000.0
STEP_S = 1
RESTART_AT_S = 600 # minute 10 of the quarter - the functional note's case
def feed(avg, t0_s, t1_s, w=RUN_W):
out = []
for i in range(t0_s, t1_s + 1, STEP_S):
out += avg.add(sample(B + timedelta(seconds=i), w))
return out
# (a) the control: no restart at all.
ctrl = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
ctrl_closed = feed(ctrl, 0, QUARTER_S)
CTRL_W = ctrl_closed[0].offtake_avg_w
# (b) restarted at minute 10, checkpoint restored through a real SQLite file.
st = fresh_store("restart")
tr = PeakTracker(st, cap_w=LIVE_MAX_W)
a1 = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
feed(a1, 0, RESTART_AT_S)
check("the checkpoint round-trips through SQLite", st.save_partial(a1.snapshot()))
a2 = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S) # a brand-new process
restored = tr.restore(a2, B + timedelta(seconds=RESTART_AT_S + 1))
print(f" restore() said: {restored}")
check("...and restore() reports RESUMING rather than starting fresh",
restored.startswith("resumed"))
r_closed = feed(a2, RESTART_AT_S + STEP_S, QUARTER_S)
RESTART_W = r_closed[0].offtake_avg_w if r_closed else None
# (c) the mutation guard: the SAME restart with no restore.
a3 = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
n_closed = feed(a3, RESTART_AT_S + STEP_S, QUARTER_S)
NORESTORE_W = n_closed[0].offtake_avg_w if n_closed else None
print(f" uninterrupted {CTRL_W:.2f} W | restored {RESTART_W:.2f} W | "
f"restart with no restore {NORESTORE_W:.2f} W")
check(f"a restart at {RESTART_AT_S} s lands on the SAME billed block as an "
f"uninterrupted run", near(RESTART_W, CTRL_W, 1e-6))
check("...and without the restore it lands LOWER - so 'the restore works' is "
"not satisfied by a fixture where restoring changes nothing",
NORESTORE_W is not None and NORESTORE_W < CTRL_W - 1.0)
# Derived, not asserted against a literal: the lost part is exactly the seconds
# before the restart, at the power that was flowing.
DROPPED_S = RESTART_AT_S + STEP_S # the resumed feed starts one step later
check(f"...and it is lower by exactly the {DROPPED_S} s it dropped "
f"({RUN_W * DROPPED_S / QUARTER_S:.2f} W)",
near(CTRL_W - NORESTORE_W, RUN_W * DROPPED_S / QUARTER_S, 1e-6))
# (d) a LONG outage: restored, but the meter was away past max_hold_s. The
# uncovered seconds must drag the block DOWN, not be held forward.
OUTAGE_S = 200
a4 = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
st4 = fresh_store("outage")
st4.save_partial(a1.snapshot())
PeakTracker(st4, cap_w=LIVE_MAX_W).restore(a4, B + timedelta(seconds=RESTART_AT_S + OUTAGE_S))
o_closed = feed(a4, RESTART_AT_S + OUTAGE_S, QUARTER_S)
OUTAGE_UNCOVERED_S = OUTAGE_S - MAX_HOLD_S
print(f" a {OUTAGE_S} s outage inside the quarter, of which "
f"{OUTAGE_UNCOVERED_S:.0f} s is past the {MAX_HOLD_S:.0f} s hold: "
f"{o_closed[0].offtake_avg_w:.2f} W")
check(f"...reads lower than the uninterrupted block by exactly the uncovered "
f"seconds ({RUN_W * OUTAGE_UNCOVERED_S / QUARTER_S:.2f} W) - a gap is "
f"never held forward across the whole outage",
near(CTRL_W - o_closed[0].offtake_avg_w,
RUN_W * OUTAGE_UNCOVERED_S / QUARTER_S, 1e-6))
# (e) double counting is answered by the primary key, not by care.
st5 = fresh_store("dedupe")
st5.record_block(ctrl_closed[0])
st5.record_block(ctrl_closed[0])
st5.record_block(ctrl_closed[0])
rows = st5.blocks_in(month_key(B))
check("banking the same quarter three times leaves ONE row - quarter_start is "
"the primary key, so a replay or a restart cannot double-count",
len(rows) == 1 and near(rows[0][1], CTRL_W, 1e-9))
# ...and a later pass with LESS coverage may not lower a banked figure.
from app.tariff import _ClosedBlock as _CB
st5.record_block(_CB(start=B, offtake_avg_w=CTRL_W / 2, per_phase_offtake_avg_w=None))
after = st5.blocks_in(month_key(B))
check(f"...and re-banking the same quarter at half the figure leaves it at "
f"{CTRL_W:.0f} W - a restart's partial re-run must never lower a "
f"quarter that was already measured in full",
len(after) == 1 and near(after[0][1], CTRL_W, 1e-9))
# (f) the checkpoint's own staleness bound, derived from the constant.
print(f" CHECKPOINT_S = {CHECKPOINT_S:.0f} s, so a crash can lose at most "
f"{CHECKPOINT_S / QUARTER_S * 100:.1f} % of one quarter's average")
check("the checkpoint bound is small enough that its worst case is under 2 % "
"of a quarter", CHECKPOINT_S / QUARTER_S < 0.02)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("4. month rollover, in LOCAL time, and across a restart that straddles it")
# CEST is UTC+2, so the last two hours of 31 August UTC are already September.
AUG_LATE = datetime(2026, 8, 31, 21, 45, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
SEP_EARLY = datetime(2026, 8, 31, 22, 15, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
print(f" {AUG_LATE.isoformat()} is local "
f"{AUG_LATE.astimezone(BILLING_TZ).isoformat()} -> {month_key(AUG_LATE)}")
print(f" {SEP_EARLY.isoformat()} is local "
f"{SEP_EARLY.astimezone(BILLING_TZ).isoformat()} -> {month_key(SEP_EARLY)}")
check("a quarter starting 21:45 UTC on 31 Aug bills in AUGUST",
month_key(AUG_LATE) == "2026-08")
check("a quarter starting 22:15 UTC on 31 Aug bills in SEPTEMBER - filing it "
"under August would move a whole month's bill",
month_key(SEP_EARLY) == "2026-09")
check("...and the two are genuinely on opposite sides of the boundary, not "
"the same answer twice", month_key(AUG_LATE) != month_key(SEP_EARLY))
# Winter, where the offset is +1 and the boundary sits an hour later.
JAN_LATE = datetime(2026, 1, 31, 22, 45, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
check("in WINTER the same trap is an hour later: 22:45 UTC on 31 Jan is still "
"January, and 23:15 UTC is February",
month_key(JAN_LATE) == "2026-01"
and month_key(JAN_LATE + timedelta(minutes=30)) == "2026-02")
st6 = fresh_store("months")
AUG_PEAK_W, SEP_PEAK_W = 4998.0, 900.0
st6.record_block(_CB(AUG_LATE, AUG_PEAK_W, None))
st6.record_block(_CB(SEP_EARLY, SEP_PEAK_W, None))
r_aug, r_sep = st6.peak(month="2026-08"), st6.peak(month="2026-09")
print(f" {r_aug.explain()}")
print(f" {r_sep.explain()}")
check(f"August's peak is the {AUG_PEAK_W:.0f} W quarter (specs.md:583's own "
f"measured case) and September's is not",
r_aug.is_observed and near(r_aug.peak_w, AUG_PEAK_W)
and r_sep.is_observed and near(r_sep.peak_w, SEP_PEAK_W))
check("...so a new month starts from its OWN quarters, not from the previous "
"month's peak", r_sep.peak_w < r_aug.peak_w)
# The restart that straddles the boundary: a checkpoint whose open block is in
# August, restored when `now` is already September.
st7 = fresh_store("straddle")
tr7 = PeakTracker(st7, cap_w=LIVE_MAX_W)
straddler = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
for i in range(0, 400, STEP_S):
straddler.add(sample(AUG_LATE + timedelta(seconds=i), RUN_W))
st7.save_partial(straddler.snapshot())
after_boot = QuarterAverager(phases=1, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
said = tr7.restore(after_boot, SEP_EARLY + timedelta(minutes=3))
print(f" restore() across the boundary said: {said}")
aug7, sep7 = st7.peak(month="2026-08"), st7.peak(month="2026-09")
check("a restart that straddles the month boundary BANKS the dead August "
"quarter rather than dropping measured energy",
said.startswith("closed a stale block") and aug7.is_observed)
check(f"...at its partial-coverage figure ({aug7.peak_w:.2f} W = "
f"{RUN_W * 399 / QUARTER_S:.2f} W, the seconds it actually covered)",
near(aug7.peak_w, RUN_W * 399 / QUARTER_S, 1e-6))
check("...and September reads NO_RECORD, which is a different answer from "
"August's peak AND from a zero",
sep7.state == NO_RECORD and sep7.peak_w is None)
check("...and the checkpoint is cleared, so a second boot cannot re-bank it",
st7.load_partial() is None)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("5. AN UNREADABLE STORE IS NOT A ZERO PEAK (the acceptance argument)")
# Three stores, three states, and the three must not answer alike.
good = fresh_store("states")
good_tr = PeakTracker(good, cap_w=LIVE_MAX_W)
empty_r = good_tr.peak(B)
gone = fresh_store("gone")
gone_tr = PeakTracker(gone, cap_w=LIVE_MAX_W)
gone.record_block(_CB(B, 3000.0, None))
gone.close() # the database goes away under a live reader
gone_r = gone_tr.peak(B)
never = PeakStore(str(TMP / "no-such-dir" / "x.db"))
never_tr = PeakTracker(never, cap_w=LIVE_MAX_W)
never_r = never_tr.peak(B)
# A store that is OPEN and whose query FAILS is a third code path - a closed
# handle short-circuits before the SQL ever runs, so without this the
# `except sqlite3.Error` arm of peak() is never executed by anything.
broken = fresh_store("broken-table")
broken.record_block(_CB(B, 3000.0, None))
broken._db.execute("DROP TABLE monthly_peak")
broken._db.commit()
broken_r = PeakTracker(broken, cap_w=LIVE_MAX_W).peak(B)
for label, r in (("fresh store, no quarter yet", empty_r),
("store that broke under a live reader", gone_r),
("store that never opened", never_r),
("store open, query failed", broken_r)):
print(f" {label:38s} -> {r.state:13s} {r.explain()}")
check("a fresh store with no quarter yet says NO_RECORD - a normal state on "
"the 1st of the month", empty_r.state == NO_RECORD)
check("a store that broke says NOT_OBSERVED", gone_r.state == NOT_OBSERVED)
check("a store that never opened says NOT_OBSERVED", never_r.state == NOT_OBSERVED)
check("a store whose QUERY fails says NOT_OBSERVED too - a different code path "
"from a closed handle, and the one a half-corrupt database takes",
broken_r.state == NOT_OBSERVED and broken_r.peak_w is None)
# ...and losing the DERIVED record does not lose the peak, which is the whole
# argument for keeping monthly_peak recomputable from the 15-min tier.
_rec = broken.recompute_month(month_key(B))
print(f" ...but with the 15-min tier intact, recompute_month() still "
f"answers: {_rec.explain()}")
check("...while recompute_month() STILL answers from the surviving 15-min "
"tier - the permanent record is derived, so losing it is recoverable",
_rec.is_observed and near(_rec.peak_w, 3000.0))
broken._db.execute("DROP TABLE quarter_blocks")
broken._db.commit()
check("...and once BOTH tiers are gone it says NOT_OBSERVED rather than "
"raising into the control loop",
broken.recompute_month(month_key(B)).state == NOT_OBSERVED)
check("...and NO_RECORD and NOT_OBSERVED are DIFFERENT states, not two "
"spellings of the same one", empty_r.state != gone_r.state)
check("...and they read differently to a human, too",
empty_r.explain() != gone_r.explain()
and "NOT" in gone_r.explain() and "zero peak" in gone_r.explain())
check("an unreadable peak is None, not 0.0 - there is no number to mistake",
gone_r.peak_w is None and never_r.peak_w is None)
check("...and NO_RECORD carries no number either", empty_r.peak_w is None)
_typed = False
try:
float(gone_r.peak_w)
except TypeError:
_typed = True
check("...and a caller who forgets to ask gets a TypeError rather than a "
"silently disarming zero", _typed)
check("PeakReading exposes no accessor that defaults a missing peak to a "
"number - no .get(), no _or() ",
not [a for a in dir(gone_r)
if a.startswith(("get", "value")) or a.endswith("_or")])
# The consequence, which is the reason any of this matters.
print(f" headroom under a {LIVE_MAX_W:.0f} W limit: "
f"no quarter yet -> {good_tr.headroom_w(B)}, "
f"unreadable -> {gone_tr.headroom_w(B)}")
check("an unreadable store yields NO headroom figure - the disarming default "
"(full headroom, guard silently off) is unreachable",
gone_tr.headroom_w(B) is None and never_tr.headroom_w(B) is None)
check(f"...where a genuinely empty month yields the full {LIVE_MAX_W:.0f} W, "
f"which is correct and is a different answer",
near(good_tr.headroom_w(B), LIVE_MAX_W))
check("the 80 % warning fraction is likewise None when nothing was observed",
gone_tr.warning_frac(B) is None and good_tr.warning_frac(B) == 0.0)
# And a real peak reduces headroom, so "always None" does not pass this part.
good.record_block(_CB(B, LIVE_MAX_W * 0.9, None))
print(f" after one {LIVE_MAX_W * 0.9:.0f} W quarter: "
f"headroom {good_tr.headroom_w(B):.0f} W, "
f"warning {good_tr.warning_frac(B) * 100:.0f} % of the limit")
check("a real observed peak gives a real headroom, so this part is not passed "
"by a store that answers None to everything",
near(good_tr.headroom_w(B), LIVE_MAX_W * 0.1, 1e-6))
check(f"...and it is over §9.1's 80 % warning threshold",
good_tr.warning_frac(B) > 0.8)
# A CORRUPT database file is the third way a store fails, and it must land in
# NOT_OBSERVED too rather than raising into the control loop.
corrupt_path = TMP / "corrupt.db"
corrupt_path.write_bytes(b"this is not a database" * 64)
corrupt = PeakStore(str(corrupt_path))
c_r = PeakTracker(corrupt, cap_w=LIVE_MAX_W).peak(B)
print(f" a corrupt database file -> {c_r.state}")
check("a corrupt database reads NOT_OBSERVED and does not raise into the "
"control loop (§6 fail-open)", c_r.state == NOT_OBSERVED)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("6. the timezone fallback, graded against zoneinfo")
_zi = None
try:
from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo
_zi = ZoneInfo("Europe/Brussels")
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001
print(f" zoneinfo unavailable here ({err}) - the fallback IS the tz")
if _zi is None:
check("zoneinfo is absent, so the encoded rule cannot be graded here - "
"reported, not silently passed", True)
else:
fb = _EUTimezone()
# ⚠️ HOURLY, NOT 3-HOURLY, ACROSS THE TRANSITION DAYS. Both EU transitions
# happen at 01:00 UTC, so a rule that is wrong BY AN HOUR differs from the
# right one only between 01:00 and 02:00 UTC. A 3-hourly sweep steps over
# that window entirely and grades nothing - measured: a mutation moving the
# UTC threshold from 01:00 to 02:00 survived the whole file at 3-hourly.
probes = [datetime(2026, 1, 1, 12, tzinfo=timezone.utc)]
probes += [datetime(2026, m, d, h, mi, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
for m in (3, 10) for d in (28, 29, 30, 31)
for h in range(24) for mi in (0, 30)]
probes += [datetime(2026, m, 1, 0, 30, tzinfo=timezone.utc) for m in range(1, 13)]
# ⚠️ COMPARE THE CONVERTED WALL CLOCK, NOT ITS utcoffset(). `astimezone`
# goes through `fromutc`, but the RESULT carries local wall values, so
# asking it for `.utcoffset()` routes straight back into the LOCAL arm and
# never grades `fromutc` at all. Measured: a mutation moving the UTC
# threshold by an hour survived 397 offset-comparing probes and dies
# immediately on the wall clock they produce.
def _wallclock(t, tz):
return t.astimezone(tz).replace(tzinfo=None)
bad = [t for t in probes if _wallclock(t, fb) != _wallclock(t, _zi)]
print(f" {len(probes)} probes across both DST transitions and every "
f"month boundary: {len(bad)} disagreement(s) in the LOCAL WALL CLOCK "
f"each one converts to")
check("the encoded EU rule converts every probe to the same local wall "
"clock as zoneinfo, including the two transition weekends", not bad)
# ...and the probes are not all the same offset, or the check is vacuous.
offsets = {t.astimezone(_zi).utcoffset() for t in probes}
check(f"...and the probe set spans BOTH offsets ({sorted(str(o) for o in offsets)}), "
f"so agreeing is not free", len(offsets) == 2)
check(f"BILLING_TZ resolved to zoneinfo on this host, not the fallback",
not isinstance(BILLING_TZ, _EUTimezone))
# ⚠️ THE PROBES ABOVE ONLY EXERCISE `fromutc()`. `astimezone` on a UTC
# instant never calls `utcoffset()` with a local wall time, so the local
# arm of the rule was ungraded - a mutation that moved it by an hour
# survived the whole file. These probes drive it directly. Noon is used
# because it is unambiguous on every day of the year, including the two
# transition days where 02:00-03:00 local is missing or repeated.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE LOCAL PROBES MUST INCLUDE 03:00-03:59 ON THE OCTOBER SUNDAY.
# That hour is where a local rule that ends DST an hour late still claims
# CEST while zoneinfo has already returned to CET; at noon both answers
# agree and the probe is worth nothing. Measured: at noon-only, a mutation
# moving the local thresholds from 02:00/03:00 to 03:00/04:00 survived.
#
# The MARCH gap (02:00-02:59 local, which does not exist) is deliberately
# NOT probed: Python hands a nonexistent local time to `utcoffset` as an
# ordinary value and any answer is defensible, so grading it would pin an
# arbitrary choice. It cannot move a month boundary - it is the last Sunday
# of March, never the 1st of a month - which is the only thing this tz is
# used for.
wall = [datetime(2026, m, d, 12) for m, d in
[(3, 27), (3, 28), (3, 29), (3, 30), (10, 24), (10, 25),
(10, 26), (10, 27)]]
wall += [datetime(2026, 10, 25, h, mi) for h in range(0, 6) for mi in (0, 30)
if h != 2] # 02:00 local is the ambiguous fold
wall += [datetime(2026, 3, 29, h, mi) for h in (0, 1, 3, 4, 5) for mi in (0, 30)]
wall += [datetime(2026, m, 1, 12) for m in range(1, 13)]
bad_w = [w for w in wall
if w.replace(tzinfo=fb).utcoffset() != w.replace(tzinfo=_zi).utcoffset()]
w_offsets = {w.replace(tzinfo=_zi).utcoffset() for w in wall}
print(f" {len(wall)} LOCAL-wall probes through utcoffset(): "
f"{len(bad_w)} disagreement(s), spanning "
f"{sorted(str(o) for o in w_offsets)}")
check("utcoffset() on local wall time matches zoneinfo across both "
"transition weekends - the arm astimezone() never reaches", not bad_w)
check("...and those probes span both offsets too", len(w_offsets) == 2)
bad_n = [w for w in wall
if w.replace(tzinfo=fb).tzname() != w.replace(tzinfo=_zi).tzname()]
check("...and tzname() agrees with zoneinfo at every one of them (CET/CEST)",
not bad_n)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("7. the per-phase reduction, on an UNBALANCED three-phase load (§17)")
# One phase exporting is what separates the three policies. On a balanced load
# they all give the same number, which is why this fixture is not balanced.
PH = (3000.0, 500.0, -200.0)
NET = sum(PH)
u = QuarterAverager(phases=3, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
u_closed = []
for i in range(0, QUARTER_S + 1, 5):
u_closed += u.add(sample(B + timedelta(seconds=i), NET, phases=3, phase_net=PH))
blk = u_closed[0]
vals = {p: billed_w(blk, p) for p in (POLICY_NET, POLICY_SUM, POLICY_MAX)}
print(f" phases {PH} (net {NET:+.0f} W) -> "
+ ", ".join(f"{k}={v:.0f} W" for k, v in vals.items()))
check(f"the NET policy bills the connection's net offtake ({NET:.0f} W)",
near(vals[POLICY_NET], NET, 1e-6))
check(f"the SUM policy clips each phase first, so the exporting phase does not "
f"net off ({sum(max(v, 0.0) for v in PH):.0f} W)",
near(vals[POLICY_SUM], sum(max(v, 0.0) for v in PH), 1e-6))
check(f"the MAX policy bills the worst single phase ({max(PH):.0f} W)",
near(vals[POLICY_MAX], max(PH), 1e-6))
check("...and on THIS fixture all three are different numbers - which is the "
"whole reason the reduction is a named policy and not an assumption",
len({round(v, 6) for v in vals.values()}) == 3)
check("the shipped default is NET, the meter's own billed register",
billed_w(blk) == vals[POLICY_NET])
bal = QuarterAverager(phases=3, max_hold_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
b_closed = []
for i in range(0, QUARTER_S + 1, 5):
b_closed += bal.add(sample(B + timedelta(seconds=i), 3000.0, phases=3,
phase_net=(1000.0, 1000.0, 1000.0)))
b_vals = {p: billed_w(b_closed[0], p) for p in (POLICY_NET, POLICY_SUM, POLICY_MAX)}
check(f"...and on a BALANCED load NET and SUM coincide ({b_vals[POLICY_NET]:.0f} W), "
f"so a balanced fixture could not have told them apart",
near(b_vals[POLICY_NET], b_vals[POLICY_SUM], 1e-6))
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("8. monthly_peak is DERIVED, and provably has not diverged")
st8 = fresh_store("derive")
QUARTERS = [(0, 1200.0), (1, 4998.0), (2, 3357.0), (3, 800.0), (4, 4832.0)]
for q, w in QUARTERS:
st8.record_block(_CB(B + timedelta(seconds=q * QUARTER_S), w, None))
MAXQ = max(w for _, w in QUARTERS)
stored = st8.peak(month=month_key(B))
derived = st8.recompute_month(month_key(B))
print(f" {len(QUARTERS)} quarters banked; stored peak {stored.peak_w:.0f} W, "
f"recomputed from quarter_blocks {derived.peak_w:.0f} W")
check(f"the stored monthly peak is the largest quarter ({MAXQ:.0f} W - "
f"specs.md:583's own figure)",
stored.is_observed and near(stored.peak_w, MAXQ))
check("...and re-deriving it from the 15-min tier gives the same number and "
"the same quarter, so the two records are proven equal rather than "
"assumed to be",
derived.is_observed and near(derived.peak_w, stored.peak_w)
and derived.quarter_start == stored.quarter_start)
check("...and the two measured regressions from §9.1 land on DIFFERENT peaks - "
f"the sustained {MAXQ:.0f} W quarter, not the oscillating 3357 W one",
not near(stored.peak_w, 3357.0))
# A quarter arriving LATER and lower must not lower the month.
st8.record_block(_CB(B + timedelta(seconds=9 * QUARTER_S), 100.0, None))
check("a later, smaller quarter does not lower the month's peak",
near(st8.peak(month=month_key(B)).peak_w, MAXQ))
check("...and the recompute agrees with it after that write, too",
near(st8.recompute_month(month_key(B)).peak_w, MAXQ))
# No pruning: §15 says these two tiers are indefinite / permanent.
src = (HERE / "app" / "tariff.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
check("§15's retention is structural: no DELETE against quarter_blocks or "
"monthly_peak exists anywhere in tariff.py",
"DELETE FROM quarter_blocks" not in src
and "DELETE FROM monthly_peak" not in src
and "DROP TABLE" not in src)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("9. AC 3, on the replay data that actually exists")
REPLAY = sorted((HERE / "scenarios").glob("p1-net-*.jsonl.gz"))
print(f" replay fixtures found: {len(REPLAY)} "
f"({', '.join(p.name for p in REPLAY) or 'none'})")
check("the committed replay fixtures are present - a regression fixture CI "
"cannot see is not a regression fixture", len(REPLAY) >= 2)
# ⚠️ `peak_cap_w:` appears TWICE in config.yaml - once under `options:` with the
# default, once under `schema:` with `int(500,15000)`. Taking the last match
# would blow up on the schema line, and taking any match that parses would be
# luck; the FIRST is the options block, which is the number an install lands on.
SHIPPED_CAP_W = None
for line in (HERE / "config.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
if line.strip().startswith("peak_cap_w:"):
try:
SHIPPED_CAP_W = float(line.split(":", 1)[1].strip())
except ValueError:
continue
break
check("config.yaml's shipped peak_cap_w was read out of the file rather than "
"typed here", SHIPPED_CAP_W is not None)
replay_days = 0
total_q = 0
under = 0
for path in REPLAY:
st9 = fresh_store("replay-" + path.stem)
ing = P1Ingest(phases=1, max_age_s=MAX_HOLD_S)
tr9 = PeakTracker(st9, cap_w=SHIPPED_CAP_W or LIVE_MAX_W)
first = last = None
with gzip.open(path, "rt", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
for line in fh:
row = json.loads(line)
t = datetime.fromisoformat(row["t"])
first = first or t
last = t
ing.submit(sample(t, float(row["w"])))
tr9.sync(ing)
months = {month_key(b.start) for b in ing.blocks}
span_h = (last - first).total_seconds() / 3600.0
qs = [w for _, w in st9.blocks_in(sorted(months)[0])] if months else []
peak = max(qs) if qs else 0.0
ok_q = sum(1 for w in qs if w <= (SHIPPED_CAP_W or LIVE_MAX_W))
total_q += len(qs)
under += ok_q
replay_days += span_h / 24.0
print(f" {path.name}: {span_h:.1f} h, {len(qs)} closed quarters, "
f"month peak {peak:.0f} W, "
f"{ok_q}/{len(qs)} = {100.0 * ok_q / max(len(qs), 1):.1f} % under the "
f"{SHIPPED_CAP_W:.0f} W soft limit")
check(f"{path.name}: the month's peak equals its own largest quarter",
near(st9.peak(month=sorted(months)[0]).peak_w, peak, 1e-9))
check(f"{path.name}: a full day of real telegrams produces ~96 quarters, "
f"got {len(qs)}", 90 <= len(qs) <= 96)
PCT = 100.0 * under / max(total_q, 1)
print()
print(f" AC 3 MEASURED: {under}/{total_q} quarters = {PCT:.1f} % under the "
f"{SHIPPED_CAP_W:.0f} W soft limit, over {replay_days:.1f} DAYS of "
f"replay, UNCONTROLLED (no peak shaving was running on either day).")
print(f" AC 3 ASKS FOR 30 DAYS. {replay_days:.1f} days exist. "
f"AC 3 IS NOT MET and this run does not claim it is - see the module "
f"docstring. The figure above is the BASELINE SAFETY-07 has to improve.")
check("the replay produced a measurable number over a stated sample size, "
"rather than a criterion quietly redefined to fit the data",
total_q > 100 and replay_days < 30)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("10. the wiring: the real Controller, and what its status page says")
class _Store:
data = {}
def set(self, *a):
pass
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
class _Pub:
enabled = False
def publish(self, *a, **k):
pass
def close(self):
pass
class _Hass:
async def limits(self, entity):
return (-LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W, 1.0)
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
return None
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
return True
async def call(self, domain, service, data):
return True
def built(db_path, opts=None):
return Controller(dict(
{"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_source": "ha_signed",
"p1_net_entity": "sensor.net", "meter_phases": 1,
"max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6, "slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": 15,
"target_grid_w": 0, "step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10,
"stale_input_s": 15}, **(opts or {})),
_Hass(), _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event(),
peak_db_path=str(db_path))
c = built(TMP / "wired.db")
check(f"a Controller built with peak_cap_w ABSENT takes the SHIPPED "
f"{SHIPPED_CAP_W:.0f} W, so config.yaml and main.py's fallback cannot "
f"drift apart unnoticed", c.peak.cap_w == SHIPPED_CAP_W)
# Drive one real quarter through the real ingest, then the real cycle's sync.
for i in range(0, QUARTER_S + 1, 5):
c.p1.submit(sample(B + timedelta(seconds=i), 4998.0))
n = c.peak.sync(c.p1)
wr = c.peak.peak(B)
print(f" after one 4998 W quarter through the real ingest: "
f"{n} banked, {wr.explain()}")
check("the closed quarter reached SQLite through the tracker the cycle calls",
n == 1 and wr.is_observed and near(wr.peak_w, 4998.0, 1e-6))
# ⚠️ `cycle()` calls sync() ONCE A SECOND against a `blocks` list that keeps a
# closed quarter for a DAY. Without a dedupe that is ~86 000 re-banks of the
# same row per block, and `recorded` - the number the status page prints as
# "quarters banked" - would be a count of loop iterations rather than of
# quarters. The database stays correct either way, which is exactly why this
# needs its own check instead of being caught by the peak.
again = c.peak.sync(c.p1)
third = c.peak.sync(c.p1)
print(f" sync() called three times over the same closed quarter: "
f"{n}, {again}, {third} newly banked; tracker reports "
f"{c.peak.recorded} quarter(s)")
check("...and syncing the same quarter again banks nothing new, so the count "
"the status page shows is quarters and not cycles",
again == 0 and third == 0 and c.peak.recorded == 1)
check("...and the peak is unchanged by the repeat",
near(c.peak.peak(B).peak_w, 4998.0, 1e-6))
rows = [r for r in c.checks() if "capacity-tariff" in r["text"] or "peak" in r["text"]]
peak_rows = [r for r in rows if "peak" in r["text"] and "quarter(s) banked" in r["text"]]
print(" status row: " + (peak_rows[0]["text"] if peak_rows else "(none)"))
check("the status page carries exactly one capacity-tariff peak row",
len(peak_rows) == 1)
check("...naming the peak, the soft limit and the quarters banked, all derived "
"from the controller that was actually built",
bool(peak_rows) and "4998 W" in peak_rows[0]["text"]
and f"{SHIPPED_CAP_W:.0f} W soft limit" in peak_rows[0]["text"]
and "1 quarter(s) banked" in peak_rows[0]["text"])
check("...and it is FLAGGED, because 4998 W is over §9.1's 80 % warning point "
f"on a {SHIPPED_CAP_W:.0f} W limit",
bool(peak_rows) and not peak_rows[0]["ok"] and peak_rows[0]["warn"])
# The half that matters: the same page with a store that cannot answer.
c2 = built(TMP / "no-such-dir" / "nope.db")
u_rows = [r for r in c2.checks() if "capacity-tariff peak" in r["text"]]
print(" status row (unreadable store): "
+ (u_rows[0]["text"] if u_rows else "(none)"))
check("an unreadable store gets its OWN row, saying UNREADABLE", len(u_rows) == 1)
check("...and it does NOT read as a quiet month at 0 W - without this, a broken "
"instrument looks exactly like a month with no peak",
bool(u_rows) and "UNREADABLE" in u_rows[0]["text"]
and "0 %" not in u_rows[0]["text"] and u_rows[0]["warn"])
check("...and the healthy row and the unreadable row are different text",
bool(u_rows) and bool(peak_rows)
and u_rows[0]["text"] != peak_rows[0]["text"])
# THE MEASUREMENT IS OF DELIVERED POWER (SAFETY-20). Graded on the parsed
# SYNTAX, not on the text: the module docstring argues this at length and names
# every forbidden word while doing so, so a grep over the source would be
# satisfied by deleting the explanation and would fail on writing one. What must
# be true is that no NAME the code evaluates refers to a command.
import ast as _ast
_tree = _ast.parse(src)
_names = {n.id for n in _ast.walk(_tree) if isinstance(n, _ast.Name)}
_names |= {n.attr for n in _ast.walk(_tree) if isinstance(n, _ast.Attribute)}
_names |= {n.name for n in _ast.walk(_tree)
if isinstance(n, (_ast.FunctionDef, _ast.ClassDef))}
_FORBIDDEN = {"setpoint", "write_setpoint", "target", "Decision", "i_clamped",
"clamped", "Claim", "resolve", "P_PEAK", "arbiter"}
_found = sorted(_names & _FORBIDDEN)
_imports = sorted(m.module or "" for m in _ast.walk(_tree)
if isinstance(m, _ast.ImportFrom))
print(f" tariff.py evaluates {len(_names)} distinct names and imports "
f"from {_imports or ['(stdlib only)']}")
check(f"none of them is a command-side name {sorted(_FORBIDDEN)} - the utility "
f"bills what FLOWED, so this reads the meter and nothing else"
+ (f"; found {_found}" if _found else ""), not _found)
check("...and it imports nothing from arbiter, clamp or control: it files no "
"claim, applies no clamp, and commands nothing - SAFETY-07's job",
not [m for m in _imports if m in ("arbiter", "clamp", "control",
".arbiter", ".clamp", ".control")])
# ...and the guard is not vacuous: the same grader run over main.py, which DOES
# command, must light up.
_main = {n.attr for n in _ast.walk(
_ast.parse((HERE / "app" / "main.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")))
if isinstance(n, _ast.Attribute)}
check(f"the same grader over main.py finds {sorted(_main & _FORBIDDEN)}, so it "
f"is capable of failing", bool(_main & _FORBIDDEN))
# ==============================================================================
print()
shutil.rmtree(TMP, ignore_errors=True)
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+574
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
"""Runnable check for the startup gate. `python3 test_validate.py`
Two halves, and the second is the one that matters. The first asserts that the
three refusable configurations are refused. The second asserts that everything
on validate.py's "deliberately not refused" list still STARTS - because the way
a validator dies is not by missing a fault, it is by refusing something harmless
until somebody deletes the call.
"""
import asyncio
import sys
from app.validate import (
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS, FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, ConfigRefused, refuse,
validate_startup_config,
)
fails = []
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
def base(**over):
"""A configuration that must start. Everything else is this, spoilt."""
# ⚠️ The maintenance rates are named EXPLICITLY, at the values config.yaml
# ships (MAINT-04). They are not decoration: with the key absent, rule 6
# falls back to main.py's 2500 W, which against this 2000 W ceiling is a
# genuine refusal - so a base() without them would be a config that does
# not start, and every check below would be measuring the wrong thing.
o = {"setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint", "max_w": 2000,
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off",
"maintenance_charge_w": 2000, "maintenance_discharge_w": 2000}
o.update(over)
return o
def why(problems, needle):
return any(needle in p for p in problems)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the baseline must start, or nothing below means anything")
check("a good config with a 5000 W device is accepted",
validate_startup_config(base(), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and with no device reachable yet, too",
validate_startup_config(base(), None, None) == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("1. max_w against the device's own rating")
# ⚠️ THE ORIGINAL BUG. main.py used to log 'the device wins' and run anyway,
# with write_setpoint() clamping, so the configured ceiling was never the real
# one and the only evidence had scrolled off the log.
p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=8000), -5000, 5000)
check("max_w above the device maximum is refused", len(p) == 1)
check("...and the message names the configured value", why(p, "8000"))
check("...and the device's value", why(p, "5000"))
check("...and says which one wins", why(p, "THE DEVICE WINS"))
check("max_w exactly at the device maximum is fine",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=5000), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("max_w under it is fine",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000), -5000, 5000) == [])
# The charge side is a separate rail and an asymmetric device is legal.
p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=4000), -2500, 5000)
check("a max_w the device cannot take on the CHARGE side is refused too",
len(p) == 1 and why(p, "charge side"))
check("...naming the device's floor", why(p, "-2500"))
# ⚠️ Not guessed at: the entity may simply not have booted yet. run_control()
# re-runs this the moment the real rating arrives.
check("an unreachable device skips the range check rather than assuming",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=8000), None, None) == [])
check("a non-numeric max_w is refused",
why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w="lots"), -5000, 5000), "not a number"))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("2. an actuator to write to")
# A controller with no actuator: write_setpoint() returns on the blank entity,
# so no rating is read, no heartbeat is sent, layer 1 pins the inverter at 0 W,
# and the add-on looks perfectly healthy the whole time.
for blank in ("", " ", None):
p = validate_startup_config(base(setpoint_entity=blank), None, None)
check(f"setpoint_entity {blank!r} is refused", len(p) == 1)
check("...and the message says why it is dangerous rather than untidy",
why(validate_startup_config(base(setpoint_entity=""), None, None),
"heartbeat"))
# specs §1.5: two writers on one actuator is not expressible in this schema.
check("there is exactly one way to reach the actuator",
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS == ("setpoint_entity",))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("3. a meter that can never read")
# ⚠️ These predicates belong to p1.validate_meter_options(), which build_source()
# also uses. Asserted here to prove the gate actually consults it - one entry
# point, not two.
check("meter_source off asks nothing of the P1 keys",
validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="off"), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("homewizard_local with no p1_host is refused",
why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="homewizard_local"),
-5000, 5000), "p1_host"))
check("...and with a host it is accepted",
validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="homewizard_local",
p1_host="192.168.2.250"), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("a poll cadence at meter_max_age_s is refused at STARTUP, not just disabled",
why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="homewizard_local",
p1_host="m", meter_poll_s=30,
meter_max_age_s=30), -5000, 5000),
"meter_max_age_s"))
check("ha_signed with no p1_net_entity is refused",
why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="ha_signed"), -5000, 5000),
"p1_net_entity"))
check("a phase list disagreeing with meter_phases is refused",
why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="ha_signed",
p1_net_entity="sensor.n", meter_phases=3,
p1_phase_net_entities=["a", "b"]),
-5000, 5000), "phase-count"))
check("mqtt_p1 with no topic is refused",
why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="mqtt_p1"), -5000, 5000),
"meter_mqtt_topic"))
check("ha_dsmr with only half its entities is refused",
why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="ha_dsmr",
p1_import_entity="sensor.i"), -5000, 5000),
"p1_export_entity"))
check("a misspelt meter_source is refused rather than silently ignored",
why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="ha_signd"), -5000, 5000),
"is not one of"))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("4. meter_max_age_s against the firmware's compile-time veto")
# ⚠️ The schema allows int(5,300); the firmware's threshold is baked in at 30 s
# and wins silently. Same shape as the max_w case: a configured bound overridden
# by a lower layer, with nothing saying so.
hw = dict(meter_source="homewizard_local", p1_host="m")
p = validate_startup_config(base(**hw, meter_max_age_s=120), -5000, 5000)
check("a meter_max_age_s above the firmware veto is refused", len(p) == 1)
check("...naming the configured value", why(p, "120"))
check("...naming the firmware's value", why(p, "30"))
check("...and saying which one wins", why(p, "THE FIRMWARE WINS"))
check("the tested pair 30/30 is accepted",
validate_startup_config(base(**hw, meter_max_age_s=30), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("one second above it is refused",
validate_startup_config(base(**hw, meter_max_age_s=31), -5000, 5000) != [])
# Below the veto the add-on gives up FIRST, which is fail-safe and visible on
# its own status page. Only above is the silent case.
check("below the veto is fine - the add-on being stricter is not a conflict",
validate_startup_config(base(**hw, meter_max_age_s=10,
meter_poll_s=4), -5000, 5000) == [])
# ⚠️ Scope: meter_max_age_s is read by nothing but P1Ingest, and the veto keys
# off a sensor only published when ingestion runs. With the meter off it governs
# nothing, so refusing would be pure trivia.
check("with meter_source off the number governs nothing and is not refused",
validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="off", meter_max_age_s=300),
-5000, 5000) == [])
check("the constant is the firmware's, not a rounded guess",
FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S == 30.0)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("6. a maintenance charge the ceiling can actually accommodate (MAINT-04)")
# ⚠️ THE SHIPPED BUG. config.yaml shipped max_w 2000 against
# maintenance_charge_w 2500, so the cheap-window shaping asked for hi=-2500
# against the supervised lo=-2000 - lo > hi, arbiter clause 3, 0 W. Maintenance
# silently never charged in a cheap window on a default install.
p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, maintenance_charge_w=2500),
-5000, 5000)
check("maintenance_charge_w above max_w is refused", len(p) == 1)
check("...and the message names the charge rate", why(p, "2500"))
check("...and the ceiling", why(p, "2000"))
check("...and says which one wins", why(p, "THE CEILING WINS"))
# ⚠️ Equality is REACHABLE, not a near miss: lo=-2000, hi=-2000 is the single
# point -2000 W. Refusing it would be exactly the trivia that gets a validator
# deleted, and it is the boundary the rule is written `>` for.
check("maintenance_charge_w exactly at max_w starts",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, maintenance_charge_w=2000),
-5000, 5000) == [])
check("below it starts",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, maintenance_charge_w=1500),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# Not scoped to maintenance_enabled: the pair is contradictory either way, and
# scoping would leave the trap armed for the one action - ticking the box - that
# cannot be expected to change what a charge rate means.
check("...and it is refused with maintenance_enabled off, as shipped",
why(validate_startup_config(
base(max_w=2000, maintenance_charge_w=2500,
maintenance_enabled=False), -5000, 5000), "THE CEILING WINS"))
# ⚠️ THE SIBLING, CHECKED RATHER THAN ASSUMED. The shaping is NOT symmetric:
# drain files Claim.set at P_MAINTENANCE and owns the actuator, so the ceiling
# CLAMPS it (+2000 W) instead of contradicting it, and the arbiter's explain()
# names the clamp every cycle. Loud, and it still moves energy - so warned, not
# refused. If someone later "fixes the asymmetry" by making this a refusal,
# this check goes red and they have to justify it.
check("maintenance_discharge_w above max_w WARNS but starts",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, maintenance_discharge_w=2500),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# The demonstration the rule is derived from, asserted rather than described.
from app.arbiter import ( # noqa: E402
Claim, P_LOOP, P_MAINTENANCE, P_MAINT_SHAPE, P_SAFETY, resolve,
)
def _charge(max_w, charge_w):
return resolve([Claim.limit("supervised", P_SAFETY, -max_w, max_w, "max_w"),
Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=-charge_w,
reason="cheap-window charge"),
Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 500.0, "grid")])
def _drain(max_w, disch_w):
return resolve([Claim.limit("supervised", P_SAFETY, -max_w, max_w, "max_w"),
Claim.set("maintenance", P_MAINTENANCE, disch_w, "drain"),
Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 500.0, "grid")])
r = _charge(2000, 2500)
check("arbiter: the refused pair really does emit 0 W",
r.target_w == 0.0 and r.contradiction)
r = _charge(2000, 2000)
check("arbiter: the permitted equality really does charge",
r.target_w == -2000.0 and not r.contradiction)
r = _charge(3000, 2500)
check("arbiter: raising max_w above the rate charges at the rate",
r.target_w == -2500.0 and not r.contradiction)
r = _drain(2000, 2500)
check("arbiter: the drain SET is clamped, not contradicted",
r.target_w == 2000.0 and not r.contradiction)
check("...and the clamp names itself, which is why it is not refused",
"supervised" in (r.bound_by or "") and "limited by" in r.explain())
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the SHIPPED defaults must pass the rule they are governed by (AC3)")
# ⚠️ Shipping a default the validator refuses would be worse than the bug it
# refuses. Read config.yaml itself rather than a transcription of it - a
# transcription is what lets the two drift apart silently. Regex, not PyYAML:
# the add-on image has no PyYAML (Dockerfile installs py3-aiohttp/py3-paho-mqtt
# only) and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check.
import os # noqa: E402
import re # noqa: E402
_CFG = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "config.yaml")
with open(_CFG, encoding="utf-8") as _fh:
_txt = _fh.read()
_shipped = {k: float(v) for k, v in re.findall(
r"^ (max_w|maintenance_charge_w|maintenance_discharge_w|sign_disagree_w): "
r"(-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)}
check("config.yaml really was read (all four defaults found)",
set(_shipped) == {"max_w", "maintenance_charge_w",
"maintenance_discharge_w", "sign_disagree_w"})
check(f"the shipped defaults are accepted {_shipped}",
validate_startup_config(base(**_shipped), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and the shipped charge rate is at or under the shipped ceiling",
_shipped["maintenance_charge_w"] <= _shipped["max_w"])
check("...and the shipped discharge rate too, so it warns about nothing",
_shipped["maintenance_discharge_w"] <= _shipped["max_w"])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the shipped meter_freeze_s, pinned (TEST-06 / AC3)")
# ⚠️ WHY A NUMBER GETS ITS OWN CHECK. `meter_freeze_s: 300` is the threshold
# SAFETY-18's entire argument is about, and before this it was pinned NOWHERE:
# 300 -> 3600 left test_freeze.py AND this file green, because the schema
# accepts int(60,3600) and no check ever read the shipped value. The schema
# bounds what is CONFIGURABLE; this pins what is SHIPPED, which is a different
# question and the one the docs answer.
#
# Read by regex like _shipped above, for the same reason: no PyYAML in the
# image, and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check.
_freeze_s = [float(v) for v in re.findall(
r"^ meter_freeze_s: (\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)]
_freeze_schema = re.findall(r"^ meter_freeze_s: int\((\d+),(\d+)\)\s*$",
_txt, re.M)
check(f"config.yaml carries exactly one meter_freeze_s default {_freeze_s}",
len(_freeze_s) == 1)
check("...and exactly one schema range for it", len(_freeze_schema) == 1)
_hold_s = _freeze_s[0] if _freeze_s else None
_lo, _hi = ((float(_freeze_schema[0][0]), float(_freeze_schema[0][1]))
if _freeze_schema else (None, None))
check("the shipped meter_freeze_s is still the measured 300 s that freeze.py, "
"config.yaml's own comment and test_freeze.py are all written at",
_hold_s == 300.0)
check(f"...and it is inside its own schema range ({_lo}-{_hi} s)",
None not in (_lo, _hi, _hold_s) and _lo <= _hold_s <= _hi)
# The two properties the number has to have, DERIVED rather than restated - so
# they go red on a value that is merely schema-legal. Both come straight from
# config.yaml's own comment on the key.
#
# upper: the alert must land inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity
# tariff, or the notification arrives after the money is spent;
# lower: the slowest a HEALTHY meter can tick a 1 Wh register and still look
# unchanged for hold_s is 3600/hold_s W, and that must stay inside the
# deadband or the conjunction's two terms stop being mutually
# exclusive (freeze.py, "WHERE hold_s COMES FROM").
_QUARTER_S = 900.0
_shipped_deadband = [float(v) for v in re.findall(
r"^ deadband_w: (\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)]
check(f"config.yaml carries exactly one deadband_w default {_shipped_deadband}",
len(_shipped_deadband) == 1)
_db = _shipped_deadband[0] if _shipped_deadband else None
_slowest_healthy_w = 3600.0 / _hold_s if _hold_s else None
print(f" shipped meter_freeze_s {_hold_s} s: alert inside the "
f"{_QUARTER_S:.0f} s billing quarter, and a healthy meter slow enough to "
f"look unchanged for it is {_slowest_healthy_w} W against a "
f"{_db} W deadband")
check(f"...the alarm still lands inside the {_QUARTER_S:.0f} s billing quarter",
_hold_s is not None and _hold_s < _QUARTER_S)
check("...and a healthy meter that looks unchanged for it is still inside the "
"deadband, so the two terms stay mutually exclusive",
_slowest_healthy_w is not None and _db is not None
and _slowest_healthy_w < _db)
# ⚠️ AND THE RANGE'S OWN BOUNDS. "300 sits inside the range" is worth nothing
# while the range itself is unpinned: widened to `int(1,86400)` an operator can
# configure `meter_freeze_s: 86400` and the guard is dead for a day at a time,
# with every check in this repo still green. That mutation survived the first
# cut of this PR and is what this block closes. Both numbers are argued for in
# config.yaml's own comment and in freeze.py, and each is re-derived here:
#
# 60 s the floor freeze.py calls NOT A RECOMMENDATION - there a healthy
# meter can look unchanged at 60 W, four times the shipped deadband, so
# the conjunction's two terms stop being mutually exclusive and only
# the margin is left;
# 3600 s the ceiling - already four times the billing quarter, so the top of
# the range has given up detecting a freeze inside the quarter that
# bills it. It is the last bound between a supported configuration and
# a disabled guard, and moving it is a decision rather than a tidy-up.
print(f" schema range {_lo}-{_hi} s: at the floor a healthy meter that looks "
f"unchanged is "
+ (f"{3600.0 / _lo:.0f} W" if _lo else "?")
+ f" against a {_db} W deadband; the ceiling is "
+ (f"{_hi / _QUARTER_S:.1f}x" if _hi else "?")
+ " the billing quarter")
check(f"the schema range itself is still the argued 60-3600 s (found "
f"{_lo}-{_hi})", (_lo, _hi) == (60.0, 3600.0))
check("...a floor that gives up the mutual exclusion and keeps only the "
"margin, which is why config.yaml calls it not a recommendation",
None not in (_lo, _db) and 3600.0 / _lo > _db)
check("...and a ceiling already past the billing quarter, so no value the "
"schema still accepts can alarm inside the quarter that bills it",
_hi is not None and _hi > _QUARTER_S)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the KNOWN cross-file default divergence, pinned rather than commented")
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS GUARDS, AND WHY IT ASSERTS THE BUG RATHER THAN THE FIX.
# config.yaml and validate.py now default maintenance_charge_w to 2000, while
# main.py's two `opts.get(..., 2500)` fallbacks and MaintConfig's dataclass
# default still say 2500. So an options dict with the key ABSENT is ACCEPTED by
# rule 6 at 2000 and then built by main.py at 2500 - which is a contradiction:
#
# validate_startup_config -> [] (accepted)
# MaintConfig().charge_w -> 2500.0
# arbiter -> 0.0 W, contradiction=True
#
# That is the bug rule 6 exists to catch, passing rule 6. It is unreachable on a
# Supervisor install (every key is always supplied from config.yaml) but fully
# reachable from sim/inject.py and from tests - which is exactly where anyone
# debugging maintenance works.
#
# The fix is ONE SOURCE OF TRUTH for option defaults. That is a bigger change
# than this ticket and it lands in main.py, which another ticket is live in - so
# the divergence is RECORDED here instead of closed. The check therefore passes
# on the mismatch and FAILS when either side moves, in EITHER direction:
#
# - config.yaml moves -> FAIL: re-decide what the fallback should be
# - main.py is fixed to match -> FAIL: the divergence is gone, DELETE this
# check and the ⚠️ block in validate.py
#
# A comment cannot do that, and "a comment where a check belonged" is this
# repo's most repeated defect.
_APP = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "app")
def _read(*parts):
with open(os.path.join(*parts), encoding="utf-8") as fh:
return fh.read()
# Every literal fallback for this key in main.py, whatever the call shape.
_main_falls = [float(m) for m in re.findall(
r'\.get\(\s*"maintenance_charge_w"\s*,\s*(-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*\)',
_read(_APP, "main.py"))]
# ...and MaintConfig's own dataclass default, which is the one that bites when
# main.py is bypassed entirely (a Maintenance built straight from defaults).
_dc_falls = [float(m) for m in re.findall(
r"^\s*charge_w:\s*float\s*=\s*(-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$",
_read(_APP, "maintenance.py"), re.M)]
check(f"main.py's fallbacks are still found and still 2500 {_main_falls}",
len(_main_falls) == 2 and set(_main_falls) == {2500.0})
check(f"MaintConfig's default is still found and still 2500 {_dc_falls}",
len(_dc_falls) == 1 and set(_dc_falls) == {2500.0})
check(f"...and config.yaml still ships 2000, so the divergence is UNCHANGED "
f"(shipped {_shipped['maintenance_charge_w']:.0f}, code 2500)",
_shipped["maintenance_charge_w"] == 2000.0)
# ⚠️ And the consequence itself, through the REAL code rather than through the
# numbers above - so that if someone "fixes" this by changing a literal without
# understanding it, the thing that goes red is the behaviour, not the transcript.
from app.maintenance import MaintConfig # noqa: E402
_absent = {k: v for k, v in base().items() if k != "maintenance_charge_w"}
_built = MaintConfig().charge_w
check("with the key ABSENT the validator accepts...",
validate_startup_config(_absent, -5000, 5000) == [])
check(f"...while the code would build {_built:.0f} W against a "
f"{_absent['max_w']:.0f} W ceiling...", _built > _absent["max_w"])
_r = _charge(_absent["max_w"], _built)
check("...which the arbiter resolves to 0 W as a contradiction - the hole, "
"asserted so it cannot widen unnoticed",
_r.target_w == 0.0 and _r.contradiction)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("max_w must be a positive magnitude")
# Schema-blocked on a real install, but validate_startup_config() is also
# sim/inject.py's entry point and can be handed any dict at all.
for bad in (0, -1, -2000):
p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=bad), -5000, 5000)
check(f"max_w {bad} is refused", len(p) == 1 and why(p, "must be positive"))
check("...and the message explains it would read as a trip, not a mistake",
why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=0), -5000, 5000), "contradiction"))
# ⚠️ SAFETY-02 changed what this case has to say, and the change is real rather
# than bookkeeping: with a 1 W ceiling the default 300 W sign-disagreement
# threshold is unreachable, so rule 5 refuses - correctly, because the watchdog
# would report itself armed while being incapable of firing. What this check is
# FOR is "a positive max_w is not itself a refusal", so it now names a sign
# threshold the ceiling can actually reach, and the interaction gets its own
# check below.
check("the smallest sane max_w still starts",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=1, sign_disagree_w=0.5,
maintenance_charge_w=1), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...but that same 1 W ceiling with the DEFAULT sign threshold is refused",
why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=1), -5000, 5000), "never fire"))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("what must NOT be refused - a validator that fires on trivia gets deleted")
# DOCS.md: the arbiter's `supervised` limit still binds the wire to +-max_w, so
# the only cost of the extra headroom is unwind latency after saturation.
check("integrator_max_w above max_w warns but starts",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, integrator_max_w=9000),
-5000, 5000) == [])
check("integrator_max_w 0 (follow max_w) starts",
validate_startup_config(base(integrator_max_w=0), -5000, 5000) == [])
# Fail-safe AND already a red NOT READY banner naming the entity: a refusal on
# top of that adds nothing an operator can act on.
check("a missing soc_entity is left to the readiness banner",
validate_startup_config(base(soc_entity=""), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("a missing batt_entity likewise",
validate_startup_config(base(batt_entity=""), -5000, 5000) == [])
# The transient case. ESPHome is routinely not up when the add-on boots, and
# refusing here would turn a device that arrives late into a restart loop.
check("a setpoint entity that is configured but not yet found starts",
validate_startup_config(base(), None, None) == [])
check("meter_poll_s with thin but non-zero headroom starts",
validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="homewizard_local", p1_host="m",
meter_poll_s=20, meter_max_age_s=30),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the refusal must be legible as a refusal, not as a crash")
p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=8000, setpoint_entity=""), -5000, 5000)
check("several problems are all reported, not just the first", len(p) >= 1)
refuse(p) # prints the banner; the eye is the assertion for its wording
err = ConfigRefused(p)
check("ConfigRefused carries every problem", err.problems == p)
check("...and str() names one of them", str(err) == p[0])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the LATE refusal, when the device only shows up after the gate has run")
# ⚠️ This path had no test at all and no live demonstration - the review's
# catch. ESPHome is routinely not up when the add-on boots, so hass.limits()
# returns (None, None), the range checks are skipped, and run_control() is the
# first place the device's real rating is ever known. Everything below is about
# what happens when it turns out to conflict.
from app.main import Controller # noqa: E402
class _LateHass:
"""Reports the range only run_control() gets to see."""
def __init__(self, lo, hi):
self.lo, self.hi = lo, hi
self.writes = []
async def limits(self, entity):
return (self.lo, self.hi, 1.0)
async def number(self, *a, **k):
return 0.0
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
self.writes.append(value)
return True
class _Store2:
data = {}
def set(self, *a):
pass
class _Pub2:
enabled = False
def publish(self, *a, **k):
pass
def close(self):
pass
def late(opts_over, lo, hi):
"""Drive run_control() against a device that only reports (lo, hi) now.
⚠️ Returns whether run_control() EXITED ON ITS OWN. That is the assertion
that matters: on a refusal it must return without entering the while loop,
and on a clean config it must not return at all. So the clean case is stopped
from outside after it has had time to write, rather than waited on - a
wait_for() here would just time out, which is the correct behaviour dressed
up as a failure.
"""
async def go():
stop = asyncio.Event()
hass = _LateHass(lo, hi)
# A device narrower than the shipped 5000 W schema ceiling is exactly
# the case that cannot be reached through the Supervisor on the live
# install, so it is reached here instead.
c = Controller(base(**opts_over), hass, _Store2(), _Pub2(), stop=stop)
c.auto = True
task = asyncio.create_task(c.run_control())
for _ in range(30): # up to ~3 s
if task.done():
break
await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
exited = task.done()
if not exited:
c.stopping = True
await asyncio.wait_for(task, timeout=5)
return c, stop, hass, exited
return asyncio.run(go())
c, stop, hass, exited = late({"max_w": 5000}, -3600.0, 3600.0)
check("a device narrower than max_w, discovered late, is refused",
c.refused is not None and len(c.refused) == 1)
check("...naming both values", why(c.refused, "5000") and why(c.refused, "3600"))
check("...signalling amain to wind down", stop.is_set())
check("...and returning instead of looping forever", exited)
# The whole point: run_control() must not fall through into the while loop. A
# single write here would mean it commanded the inverter under a config it had
# just declared unusable.
check("...having never entered the control loop, so it wrote nothing",
hass.writes == [])
check("...and it is recorded in the event log an operator reads",
any("REFUSED" in e for e in c.events))
# The same path when there is no conflict: it must NOT refuse, and it must
# actually regulate - asserted by a write reaching the device, not by absence.
c2, stop2, hass2, exited2 = late({"max_w": 2000}, -5000.0, 5000.0)
check("a late device that agrees does not trip the re-check", c2.refused is None)
check("...and the control loop runs, writing to the device", hass2.writes != [])
check("...and does not signal a shutdown", not stop2.is_set() and not exited2)
# ⚠️ THE FOOTGUN THE REVIEW FOUND. `stop` used to default to None, so this
# construction was legal and the refusal path then returned into a live process
# with no control loop, no exit and no further output.
try:
Controller(base(), _LateHass(-5000.0, 5000.0), _Store2(), _Pub2())
check("a Controller with no stop Event is rejected at construction", False)
except TypeError:
check("a Controller with no stop Event is rejected at construction", True)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: " + "; ".join(fails))
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+505
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,505 @@
"""Runnable check for the sign-disagreement watchdog. `python3 test_watchdog.py`
Every case here is either a fault this must catch or a piece of NORMAL behaviour
it must not mistake for one. The second list is the longer one on purpose: an
alarm that fires on ordinary operation is worse than no alarm, because the next
person switches it off.
The headline validation is not here - it is `sim/replay_sign.py` in the infra
repo, which drives this module over the two captured bus days. This file is the
table-driven half: boundaries, timers, the latch, and the arming gate.
"""
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from app.watchdog import (
SignWatchdog, SignWatchdogConfig, loop_is_following,
)
fails = []
T0 = datetime(2026, 8, 20, 15, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
def drive(samples, cfg=None, following=True):
"""Feed (offset_s, commanded_w, grid_w) tuples. Returns (wd, trip_offset)."""
wd = SignWatchdog(cfg)
trip_at = None
for item in samples:
offset, cmd, grid = item[0], item[1], item[2]
f = item[3] if len(item) > 3 else following
if wd.evaluate(cmd, grid, f, T0 + timedelta(seconds=offset)) and trip_at is None:
trip_at = offset
return wd, trip_at
def opposed(duration_s, step=5, cmd=-1000, grid=1500, following=True, start=0):
return [(start + t, cmd, grid, following)
for t in range(0, int(duration_s) + 1, step)]
print("the fault it exists to catch")
wd, at = drive(opposed(300))
check("charging into an importing house trips", wd.tripped)
check("and trips at 180 s, not before", at == 180)
check("the reason names both signals", "-1000" in wd.reason and "+1500" in wd.reason)
print(f" e.g. {wd.reason!r}")
wd, at = drive(opposed(300, cmd=2000, grid=-2000))
check("discharging into an exporting house trips too", wd.tripped and at == 180)
print()
print("the boundaries")
wd, _ = drive(opposed(600, cmd=-300, grid=1500))
check("300 W exactly does NOT qualify (strictly greater)", not wd.tripped)
wd, _ = drive(opposed(600, cmd=-301, grid=1500))
check("301 W does", wd.tripped)
wd, _ = drive(opposed(600, cmd=-1000, grid=300))
check("a 300 W meter does not qualify either", not wd.tripped)
wd, _ = drive(opposed(175))
check("175 s of disagreement does not trip", not wd.tripped)
wd, _ = drive(opposed(180))
check("180 s does (>= hold_s)", wd.tripped)
print()
print("continuity - the rule that produced zero false positives on real data")
broken = opposed(175) + [(180, -1000, -1500)] + opposed(175, start=185)
wd, _ = drive(broken)
check("179 s, one agreeing sample, then 175 s more: no trip", not wd.tripped)
check("and the window really was reset", wd.disagree_since is not None)
long_enough = broken + opposed(200, start=365)
wd, _ = drive(long_enough)
check("but a full 180 s after the reset does trip", wd.tripped)
print()
print("things that are NOT faults")
# The load-step transient. Measured on the healthy capture: longest 30 s.
wd, _ = drive(opposed(30) + [(35 + t, 800, 900) for t in range(0, 300, 5)])
check("a 30 s load-step crossover does not trip", not wd.tripped)
# SoC 10 %, Standby, declining a 1350 W discharge. The battery does nothing, so
# the meter stays where it was and the command agrees with it.
wd, _ = drive([(t, 1350, 1350) for t in range(0, 900, 5)])
check("a battery refusing a discharge command cannot trip it", not wd.tripped)
# A frozen meter drives command and reading into agreement, not disagreement.
wd, _ = drive([(t, 800, 800) for t in range(0, 900, 5)])
check("a frozen meter cannot trip it", not wd.tripped)
# Maintenance grid charge: 2500 W of charge against an importing house, for
# hours. Opposed, both huge - and entirely correct.
wd, _ = drive(opposed(7200, cmd=-2500, grid=3000, following=False))
check("two hours of maintenance grid charge does not trip", not wd.tripped)
check("and the timer never even started", wd.disagree_since is None)
wd, _ = drive([(t, -1000, None) for t in range(0, 900, 5)])
check("a missing meter reading does not trip", not wd.tripped)
wd, _ = drive(opposed(175) + [(180, -1000, None)] + opposed(600, start=185))
check("a missing reading mid-window RESETS it rather than accumulating",
wd.tripped and wd.disagree_since is not None)
wd, at = drive(opposed(175) + [(180, -1000, None)] + opposed(600, start=185))
check("...so the trip lands 180 s after the gap, not after 180 s total",
at == 365)
wd, _ = drive([(t, 0.0, 3000) for t in range(0, 900, 5)])
check("a 0 W command is not a wrong-direction command", not wd.tripped)
print()
print("the latch")
wd, _ = drive(opposed(200))
check("tripped after the fault", wd.tripped)
# The trip commands 0 W, which removes the command side of the comparison.
for t in range(200, 900, 5):
wd.evaluate(0.0, 3000, True, T0 + timedelta(seconds=t))
check("stays tripped once the command is zeroed", wd.tripped)
for t in range(900, 1500, 5):
wd.evaluate(1000, 1000, True, T0 + timedelta(seconds=t))
check("stays tripped even once everything looks healthy again", wd.tripped)
wd.reset()
check("reset() is the only way out", not wd.tripped and wd.disagree_since is None)
check("and the reason is cleared with it", wd.reason == "")
print()
print("the thresholds are configuration, not constants")
cfg = SignWatchdogConfig(min_w=800.0, hold_s=60.0)
wd, at = drive(opposed(300, cmd=-1000, grid=1500), cfg=cfg)
check("a 60 s hold trips at 60 s", wd.tripped and at == 60)
wd, _ = drive(opposed(600, cmd=-700, grid=1500), cfg=cfg)
check("an 800 W gate ignores a 700 W command", not wd.tripped)
print()
print("the configuration that would disarm it is refused")
from app.validate import validate_startup_config # noqa: E402
base = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_source": "off",
"meter_phases": 1, "meter_max_age_s": 30}
p = validate_startup_config({**base, "max_w": 2000, "sign_disagree_w": 300},
-5000, 5000)
check("300 W under a 2000 W ceiling is accepted", p == [])
p = validate_startup_config({**base, "max_w": 2000, "sign_disagree_w": 2000},
-5000, 5000)
check("a threshold AT max_w is refused", len(p) == 1 and "never fire" in p[0])
# ⚠️ maintenance_charge_w is named here only to keep this case about the SIGN
# rule. MAINT-04 added a second rule against the same ceiling, and a 500 W
# max_w is also below the 2000 W shipped maintenance charge - so without this
# the dict is refused twice, for two correct but different reasons, and the
# `len(p) == 1` below would be measuring the interaction rather than this rule.
p = validate_startup_config({**base, "max_w": 500, "sign_disagree_w": 3000,
"maintenance_charge_w": 500}, -5000, 5000)
check("a threshold above max_w is refused", len(p) == 1 and "never fire" in p[0])
p = validate_startup_config({**base, "max_w": 2000, "sign_disagree_w": 1999},
-5000, 5000)
check("one watt under the ceiling is reachable, so accepted", p == [])
print()
print("the arming gate, derived from the REAL arbiter")
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE DECISION THE WHOLE TICKET TURNS ON, and until now it was
# asserted in three comment blocks and verified by nothing: every other case in
# this file passes `following` in as a literal. What has to hold is that the
# expression in main.py - loop won AND the emitted value points the way the loop
# asked AND is no larger - is never True for a resolution the loop did not
# actually get. So run real claims through the real resolve() and derive it.
from app.arbiter import ( # noqa: E402
P_LOOP, P_MAINT_SHAPE, P_MAINTENANCE, P_PEAK, P_SAFETY, Claim, resolve,
)
def following_from(claims, asked):
"""THE SHIPPED gate, not a copy of it.
⚠️ This used to transcribe main.py's expression with a comment saying
"keep the two in step", which is exactly the arrangement that does not keep
two things in step. Measured: editing the shipped gate alone to
`winner in ("loop", "peak")` left this suite - including the P_PEAK row below,
whose entire job is to catch that edit - completely green, while the watchdog
went blind for the duration of every peak event. Import it or the P_PEAK
assertion is decoration.
"""
r = resolve(claims)
return r, loop_is_following(r, asked)
MAXW = Claim.limit("supervised", P_SAFETY, -2000, 2000, "max_w")
DEV = Claim.limit("device", P_SAFETY, -5000, 5000, "rating")
# name, claims, what the loop asked, expected `following`
TABLE = [
("the loop alone, unopposed",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 900)], 900, True),
("the loop bound by max_w - reduced, not redirected",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 4000), MAXW], 4000, True),
("charging, bound by max_w on the other side",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, -4000), MAXW], -4000, True),
("maintenance owns the setpoint outright",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 900),
Claim.set("maintenance", P_MAINTENANCE, -2500, "charge"), MAXW], 900, False),
("maintenance charge-only clamps the loop to 0 W",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 900),
Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=0.0, reason="charge-only"),
MAXW], 900, False),
# ⚠️ THE CASE `winner == \"loop\"` ALONE WOULD HAVE GOT WRONG. 1500 W, not
# the default 2500 W: at max_w 2000 a -2500 hi against a -2000 lo is an
# arbiter contradiction, not a charge - see main.py.
("cheap-window charge REDIRECTS the loop while it still 'wins'",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 500),
Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=-1500, reason="cheap-window"),
MAXW], 500, False),
("...and the contradiction at the shipped defaults is not following either",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 500),
Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=-2500, reason="cheap-window"),
MAXW], 500, False),
("a lo limit RAISES the magnitude without flipping the sign",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 200),
Claim.limit("floor", P_SAFETY, lo=800), MAXW], 200, False),
("a safety stop wins outright",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 900),
Claim.set("safety", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "stopped"), MAXW], 900, False),
("no claims at all - the arbiter's own failsafe",
[MAXW, DEV], None, False),
("the loop asked for zero",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 0.0), MAXW], 0.0, False),
# The forward hazard, asserted as it stands TODAY rather than as it should
# be. When peak shaving lands, these expectations are what have to change.
("peak shaving at P_PEAK disarms the gate (loop_is_following's forward hazard)",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 900),
Claim.set("peak", P_PEAK, 1800, "shaving"), MAXW], 900, False),
# ⚠️ AND THE ROW ABOVE CANNOT DETECT A WIDENED GATE ON ITS OWN, which was
# found by trying it: with the shipped gate edited to
# `winner in ("loop", "peak")` that case STILL comes out False, because peak
# shaving asked for MORE than the loop and the magnitude term rejects it
# anyway. The winner term is masked. This row isolates it - a peak claim
# smaller than the loop's ask and pointing the same way, so `winner` is the
# only term that can decide - and it is what actually turns red if the gate
# is widened without anyone revisiting the hazard.
("...and with peak BELOW the loop's ask, only the winner term separates them",
[Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, 1800),
Claim.set("peak", P_PEAK, 900, "shaving"), MAXW], 1800, False),
]
for name, claims, asked, expect in TABLE:
r, got = following_from(claims, asked)
check(f"{name} -> following={expect}", got is expect)
if got is not expect:
print(f" resolution was {r.explain()!r}")
# And the gate is never True when the loop did not win, whatever else is going on.
check("no configuration above arms the gate without the loop winning",
all(not following_from(c, a)[1]
for _, c, a, _ in TABLE if following_from(c, a)[0].winner != "loop"))
print()
print("end to end: the trip is COMMAND ZERO, not alarm-only")
# ⚠️ THE FAULT INJECTED HERE IS A NEGATIVE GAIN, and that is not a contrivance -
# it is the minimal faithful model of what this watchdog is for. The check
# compares the loop's OUTPUT DIRECTION against the INPUT STATE it was regulating,
# so what it detects is a loop whose two ends have become decoupled in sign: a
# gain, a claim or a strategy with its polarity inverted, or an integrator so far
# wound up that unwinding takes minutes. (Illusmart's was the last one: it
# reached -14 768 W against a +-5000 W rail while writing once every 20-60 s, and
# that arithmetic alone is 5-15 minutes of wrong-direction command.)
#
# `gain` is float(0.05,1.0) in the schema, so this is not a reachable
# configuration - it is a stand-in for a code regression, which is the case a
# unit test can actually hold the line on.
import asyncio # noqa: E402
from app.main import Controller # noqa: E402
class _Hass:
def __init__(self):
self.writes = []
self.calls = []
# ⚠️ ADDED FOR SAFETY-03, AND THE REASON IS WORTH READING. The e2e below
# runs a DELIBERATELY INVERTED loop (gain -0.6) into a steady 2000 W import,
# which is a loop that winds straight into the rail - so the output-clamp
# alarm fires here, and the stub not having `call` is how that was
# discovered. This scenario is now a second, independent witness that the
# clamp alarm sees a real winding loop; test_clamp.py asserts it explicitly.
async def call(self, domain, service, data):
self.calls.append((domain, service, data))
async def limits(self, entity):
return (-5000.0, 5000.0, 1.0)
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
# A house importing 2000 W, steadily, whatever the battery does.
return {"sensor.grid": 2000.0, "sensor.soc": 50.0,
"sensor.batt": 0.0}.get(entity)
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
self.writes.append(float(value))
return True
class _S:
data = {}
def set(self, *a):
pass
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
class _P:
enabled = False
def publish(self, *a, **k):
pass
def close(self):
pass
async def _e2e():
hass = _Hass()
opts = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": -0.6,
"sign_disagree_w": 300, "sign_disagree_s": 1, "auto_start": True}
c = Controller(opts, hass, _S(), _P(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
seen_wrong_way = False
for _ in range(12):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
if c.target < -300 and not c.sign_wd.tripped:
seen_wrong_way = True
await asyncio.sleep(0.25)
return c, hass, seen_wrong_way
ctrl, hass, wrong_way = asyncio.run(_e2e())
check("the broken loop really did command charge into an import first", wrong_way)
check("the watchdog tripped", ctrl.sign_wd.tripped)
check("the commanded value is 0 W", ctrl.target == 0.0)
check("0 W actually reached the device", 0.0 in hass.writes)
check("and it got there through the failsafe claim, not by accident",
"failsafe" in ctrl.reason)
print(f" status line: {ctrl.reason!r}")
check("the status page says so in words",
any("SIGN-DISAGREEMENT FAILSAFE" in c["text"] for c in ctrl.checks()))
check("the banner leads with it",
"FAILSAFE" in ctrl.status_payload()["banner"])
check("it stays at 0 W on later cycles too",
hass.writes[-1] == 0.0 and hass.writes.count(0.0) >= 1)
# ⚠️ THIS USED TO BE `check("MQTT reports the failsafe state", ctrl.sign_wd.tripped)`
# which restates the assertion three lines above and never touches the payload.
# The `status: "failsafe"` value was shipped untested. Capture what publish()
# actually hands the broker.
published = {}
ctrl.mqtt = type("P", (), {"enabled": True,
"publish": lambda _s, v: published.update(v),
"close": lambda _s: None})()
ctrl.publish()
check("MQTT's controller-status sensor reports 'failsafe'",
published.get("status") == "failsafe")
ctrl.sign_wd.reset()
ctrl.publish()
check("...and goes back to 'running' once cleared",
published.get("status") == "running")
print()
print("the latch survives a restart - it is the only thing between a tripped")
print("controller and the first thing an operator will try")
# ⚠️ THE BLOCKER THIS FILE MISSED FIRST TIME ROUND. `auto` is persisted and
# `tripped` was not, so reconstructing a Controller against the same Store -
# which is exactly what a container restart does - came back armed, into the
# fault, with no operator involved: tripped=False, banner NOT READY, and it
# resumed commanding -1000 then -2000 W before re-tripping 180 s later.
class _MemStore:
"""A Store that keeps its dict across "restarts", like the real file does."""
def __init__(self):
self.data = {"phase": "idle", "sign_tripped": False, "sign_reason": ""}
def set(self, k, v):
self.data[k] = v
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
async def _restart():
shared = _MemStore()
hass1 = _Hass()
opts = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": -0.6,
"sign_disagree_w": 300, "sign_disagree_s": 1, "auto_start": True}
a = Controller(opts, hass1, shared, _P(), stop=asyncio.Event())
a.auto = True
a.dev_min, a.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
for _ in range(12):
await a.read_inputs()
await a.cycle()
await asyncio.sleep(0.25)
# The restart. Same options, same store, brand new Controller and Hass.
hass2 = _Hass()
b = Controller(opts, hass2, shared, _P(), stop=asyncio.Event())
b.auto = True
b.dev_min, b.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
for _ in range(6):
await b.read_inputs()
await b.cycle()
await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
return a, b, shared, hass2
pre, post, store, hass2 = asyncio.run(_restart())
check("it tripped before the restart", pre.sign_wd.tripped)
check("the trip reached the store", store.data["sign_tripped"] is True)
check("...with the reason beside it, so the operator is told why",
"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in store.data["sign_reason"])
check("the new Controller comes back TRIPPED", post.sign_wd.tripped)
check("...and says why, restored rather than re-detected",
"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in post.sign_wd.reason)
check("...commands 0 W from its very first cycle", post.target == 0.0)
check("...and never commanded anything else after the restart",
hass2.writes != [] and set(hass2.writes) == {0.0})
check("the banner still leads with the failsafe",
"FAILSAFE" in post.status_payload()["banner"])
# ⚠️ TWO PRESSES, and the first one must NOT clear it. `auto` is True while
# tripped, so the first press stops control; only the transition back to True
# clears. That is the documented behaviour and it is worth an assertion, because
# a one-press clear would be reachable by an operator who never read the banner.
asyncio.run(post.handle_action("auto_toggle")) # -> stopped
check("pressing stop does not clear the failsafe",
post.sign_wd.tripped and store.data["sign_tripped"] is True)
asyncio.run(post.handle_action("auto_toggle")) # -> started
check("pressing start DOES clear it, and clears the store with it",
not post.sign_wd.tripped and store.data["sign_tripped"] is False
and store.data["sign_reason"] == "")
# One more restart from the cleared store, to prove the clear persisted too.
fresh = Controller({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_source": "off"},
_Hass(), store, _P(), stop=asyncio.Event())
check("...so the next restart comes back armed and untripped, as it should",
not fresh.sign_wd.tripped)
# ⚠️ THE WRITE ORDERING IS AN INVARIANT, SO IT GETS AN ASSERTION. main.py writes
# `sign_reason` and THEN `sign_tripped`, each one its own `save()`, so that a
# process that dies between the two leaves a reason nothing reads - harmless -
# rather than a latch with no explanation for the operator who has to decide
# whether to clear it. Documented reasoning is not enforcement: swapping those two
# lines used to pass every check in this file.
#
# The death is modelled as the second write raising. In the field it is a power
# cut or a container kill (Store.save() swallows OSError rather than raising), so
# what is asserted here is the PROPERTY - what survives on disk - not the
# mechanism.
class _CrashOnFlag(_MemStore):
def set(self, k, v):
if k == "sign_tripped" and v:
raise RuntimeError("power cut, mid-trip")
super().set(k, v)
async def _crash_mid_write():
store = _CrashOnFlag()
hass = _Hass()
opts = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": -0.6,
"sign_disagree_w": 300, "sign_disagree_s": 1, "auto_start": True}
c = Controller(opts, hass, store, _P(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
died = False
for _ in range(12):
try:
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
except RuntimeError:
died = True
break
await asyncio.sleep(0.25)
return store, died
crashed_store, died = asyncio.run(_crash_mid_write())
check("the second write is the one that sets the flag", died)
check("a crash between the two writes leaves the REASON on disk",
"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in crashed_store.data.get("sign_reason", ""))
check("...and never a latch with nothing to explain it",
not crashed_store.data.get("sign_tripped"))
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")