SAFETY-12 review: name the safety claim that could not fire, and fix two figures

Review fixes.

A. test_loop.py takes 73 s, not the ~35 s claimed in three places. That number
is the whole defence against a future developer deleting a slow test, so it was
understated by 2x in exactly the place it matters. Corrected - and it is now
~95 s (measured 93 s), because this commit adds the scenario below rather than
trimming windows to make an inconvenient number smaller. Both call sites carry
an instruction to re-measure if the windows change.

B. "242 checks" was test_p1's own count quoted as the total for all five
suites. The real figure is 395 across the five, plus 14 here.

And the finding this PR should have led with. stale_input_s and the
`inputs missing -> 0 W` claim both live INSIDE cycle(), so pre-fix, on a meter
whose value happened to repeat, that claim could not fire at all. Constant
meter, SoC entity dying at t=4 s, one binary:

  pre-fix   final target 220.0 W, reason 'loop -> 220 W'
  post-fix  final target   0.0 W, reason 'safety -> 0 W'

The old controller held 220 W through the whole input outage with its status
line still reading loop -> 220 W, and layer 1 does not cover that on a
`meter_source: off` install - no P1 age sensor is published, so the firmware has
nothing to veto on, while the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed. The pre-fix
behaviour was not "holds a stale command safely"; it was a failsafe a repeating
meter switched off. Asserted in test_loop.py, both halves.

Three points of reasoning tightened, none of them wrong before:

- the re-tune is unreachable by construction, not merely by the reset: the
  combined cycle rate is max(arrival rate, 1/floor), never the sum, and 1/15 s
  is strictly slower than the ~1/5 s arrival rate. That holds only while the
  floor exceeds the meter's update interval - and the schema minimum of 5 s is
  exactly the reference meter's interval. Flagged for validate.py, not fixed
  here.
- the ~11 s lower bracket is not only a dropped poll: a 5.0 s poller against a
  4.97 s meter beats, so about every 14 minutes the poller steps over an update
  entirely. Reaching 15 s takes a beat-skip AND a failed poll.
- the "freshness is decided upstream" guarantee is transport-conditional. On
  `meter_source: off` the grid figure comes straight from hass.number() with no
  age gate. Running the full law is still right; the claim is narrower than it
  was stated.

The 15 s default is not independently justified - it rests on the firmware's
30 s ingest veto and moves if that ever does. Said beside the constant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
This commit is contained in:
glenn schrooyen
2026-08-28 21:14:58 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 8cc9438aec
commit aae74d7571
4 changed files with 173 additions and 50 deletions
+7 -3
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@@ -56,9 +56,13 @@ python3 test_control.py && python3 test_maintenance.py && python3 test_arbiter.p
&& python3 test_validate.py && python3 test_p1.py && python3 test_loop.py
```
⚠️ `test_loop.py` takes about **35 seconds** and that is not a bug. It drives the real
control loop, which sleeps 1 s a tick, to prove a wall-clock property about it
(SAFETY-12); mocking the clock there would leave the assertion testing the mock.
⚠️ `test_loop.py` takes about **95 seconds** (measured 93 s) and that is not a bug. It
drives the real control loop, which sleeps 1 s a tick, eight times over, to prove a
wall-clock property about it (SAFETY-12); mocking the clock there would leave the
assertion testing the mock. The other five suites together are ~395 checks and finish in
seconds. If you shorten `test_loop.py`'s windows, re-measure and correct this figure —
an understated runtime is what makes a slow test look like a hung one, and a slow test
that looks hung gets deleted.
---
+61 -14
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@@ -76,6 +76,26 @@ indicator read healthy, and a command computed from an old reading kept being
executed through whatever the load did next. Measured on the rig during TEL-05:
70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W with 14 arrivals and zero cycles.
**It was worse than a latency limit: it was a safety claim that could not
fire.** `stale_input_s` and the `inputs missing -> 0 W` claim both live *inside*
`cycle()`. Pre-fix, if the meter value happened to be constant, `cycle()` was
never called again - so that claim had no way to run. Constant meter, SoC entity
dying at t=4 s, same binary:
```
pre-fix writes: [(0.0, 220.0), (0.0, 220.0), (10.1, 220.0)]
final target: 220.0 W reason: 'loop -> 220 W'
post-fix writes: [(0.0, 220.0), (0.0, 220.0), (3.0, 430.0), (9.1, 0.0), (10.1, 0.0)]
final target: 0.0 W reason: 'safety -> 0 W'
```
The pre-fix controller held 220 W through the entire input outage with its
status line still reading `loop -> 220 W`, and layer 1 does not cover that case
on a `meter_source: off` install: no P1 age sensor is published, so the firmware
has nothing to veto on, while the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed. So the old
behaviour was not "holds a stale command safely" - it was a failsafe that a
repeating meter switched off. `test_loop.py` asserts both halves.
`cycle_floor_s` (default **15 s**) is a deadline on the gap between cycles, not
a second scheduler: every cycle resets it, whichever trigger fired. On a healthy
meter it never elapses, so the cycle rate, the write sequence and therefore the
@@ -84,6 +104,16 @@ per-cycle gain the tuning was measured against are unchanged - asserted in
`cycle_floor_s` reproduces the old behaviour exactly) and comparing the
commanded values.
The reset is not the only thing holding that up, and the other argument is the
sturdier one: the combined cycle rate is `max(arrival rate, 1/floor)`, never the
sum. At 1/15 s the floor is strictly slower than the ~1/5 s arrival rate, so
even a hypothetical floor racing the arrivals could not exceed the nominal
healthy rate. The re-tune is unreachable by construction. ⚠️ That holds only
while `cycle_floor_s` stays above the meter's update interval, and the schema
minimum is 5 s - which is exactly the reference meter's interval. Nothing
enforces the relationship; `validate.py` is the obvious home for it and does not
have it yet.
Observed over six real minutes on the same rig, one binary, meter held at a
literally constant 350.0 W: **before, 1 cycle** (at startup) and then nothing,
the command stuck at 220 W against a 350 W import for the rest of the window.
@@ -96,21 +126,38 @@ both sides, the same values in the same order.** The heartbeat write count never
moves; the only writes the fix adds are the ten the loop was supposed to be
making all along.
15 s is bracketed, not round. Below it: arrivals are ~5 s (NOTES.md measures
4.97 s), detected up to 1 s late by the 1 s poll, and one dropped poll is
retried on the next tick - about 11 s worst case on a meter that is merely
unlucky, which the floor must not fire on. Above it: `meter_max_age_s` is 30 s,
past which there is no reading to evaluate, and the firmware's ingest veto is
also 30 s - so the loop is guaranteed to have re-decided at least twice inside
any window in which layer 1 might otherwise be the only thing deciding. It is
also exactly `stale_input_s`, this system's existing answer to "how long may we
hold without re-deciding".
15 s is bracketed, not round.
A floor cycle runs the **full** law on the same inputs, integrator included. The
freshness question is already answered upstream and answered harder - past
`meter_max_age_s` the reading is None, which is "inputs missing", which is a
`P_SAFETY` 0 W claim - so a floor cycle can only ever run on a reading this
system already calls fresh. The integrator advances per *cycle*, not per second,
**Below it, ~11 s, and it arises more routinely than a dropped poll.**
`HomeWizardLocalSource` polls at 5.0 s against a meter that updates every 4.97 s
(NOTES.md:640). Two near-equal periods beat, so roughly once every ~14 minutes
the poller steps over an update entirely - a ~10 s gap between changed values on
a perfectly healthy meter, plus up to 1 s for the 1 s tick to notice. A failed
HTTP poll (retried on the next tick, no backoff) adds another 5 s. The floor
sits above the beat-skip so it does not fire on that alone; what it takes to
reach 15 s is a beat-skip *and* a failed poll coinciding.
**Above it, 30 s.** `meter_max_age_s` is 30 s, past which there is no reading to
evaluate, and the firmware's ingest veto is also 30 s - so the loop is
guaranteed to have re-decided at least twice inside any window in which layer 1
might otherwise be the only thing deciding. ⚠️ The default is therefore not
independently justified at 15: if the firmware's veto ever moves, this moves
with it. Noted beside the constant in `main.py`.
It is also exactly `stale_input_s`, this system's existing answer to "how long
may we hold without re-deciding".
A floor cycle runs the **full** law on the same inputs, integrator included. In
P1 mode the freshness question is already answered upstream and answered harder
- past `meter_max_age_s` the reading is None, which is "inputs missing", which
is a `P_SAFETY` 0 W claim - so a floor cycle there can only ever run on a reading
this system already calls fresh. ⚠️ That is transport-conditional: with
`meter_source: off`, `read_inputs()` takes the grid figure straight from
`hass.number()` with **no age gate at all**, so a Home Assistant entity that has
gone quiet reads as current on that path, with or without this change. Running
the full law is still right there - the alternative is a degraded second law
reasoning about an age nobody measured - but the floor does not make that path
fresh. The integrator advances per *cycle*, not per second,
so bounding the gap bounds the accumulation; `integrator_max_w` bounds it after
that. A gentler second law for floor cycles would be a second set of dynamics
nobody can test on this hardware.
+49 -16
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@@ -345,17 +345,33 @@ class Controller:
# ⚠️ SAFETY-12. The floor is a DEADLINE ON THE GAP BETWEEN CYCLES, not a
# second scheduler running alongside the arrival trigger. Every cycle
# resets it, whichever trigger fired, so on a healthy changing meter it
# never elapses and not one existing cycle moves - no beat frequency
# between the two triggers, no doubled cycle rate, and therefore no
# never elapses and not one existing cycle moves - and therefore no
# change to the per-cycle gain the tuning was measured against.
#
# Why it has to exist: `self.grid != last_grid` alone means a meter that
# repeats a value runs NO control cycles at all, while the heartbeat
# below keeps re-emitting the last command and the firmware keeps
# putting it on the wire - so every indicator reads healthy while the
# loop has not evaluated and the load may have moved underneath it.
# Measured on the rig during TEL-05: 70 s at a literally constant
# 350.0 W, 14 arrivals, zero cycles.
# That is true twice over, and the second reason is the sturdier one:
# the combined cycle rate is max(arrival rate, 1/floor), never the sum.
# At the defaults 1/15 s is strictly slower than the ~1/5 s arrival
# rate, so even a floor that raced the arrivals could not push the loop
# past its nominal healthy rate. The re-tune is unreachable by
# construction, not merely by the reset. ⚠️ That argument holds only
# while floor > the meter's update interval - which is why the schema
# minimum of 5 s deserves the second look validate.py has not given it
# yet: 5 s IS the reference meter's interval, i.e. the one configurable
# value that would double the cycle rate.
#
# Why it has to exist, and it is not only about latency: `self.grid !=
# last_grid` alone means a meter that repeats a value runs NO control
# cycles at all. The heartbeat below keeps re-emitting the last command
# and the firmware keeps putting it on the wire, so every indicator
# reads healthy - and, worse, the `inputs missing -> 0 W` claim lives
# INSIDE cycle(), so on a repeating meter THAT SAFETY CLAIM CANNOT FIRE.
# Demonstrated in test_loop.py: constant meter, SoC entity dies at t=4 s,
# and the pre-fix controller holds 220 W through the whole outage with
# the status line still reading "loop -> 220 W". Layer 1 does not cover
# it on a `meter_source: off` install either - no P1 age sensor is
# published, so the firmware has nothing to veto on. Measured on the rig
# during TEL-05: 70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W, 14 arrivals, zero
# cycles.
#
# This is NOT a freeze detector, and deliberately so - see
# HomeWizardLocalSource.unchanged_s for why one cannot be built here (at
@@ -363,6 +379,13 @@ class Controller:
# so any freeze threshold false-trips at the exact operating point we
# run at). Nothing here decides whether a repeated reading is true. It
# only stops "the number is the same" from meaning "do not think".
#
# ⚠️ THE 15 s DEFAULT HAS A CEILING IT DOES NOT OWN. It is under
# validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S (30 s) and under meter_max_age_s on
# purpose, so the loop re-decides at least twice inside any window in
# which layer 1 might otherwise be the only thing deciding. If the
# firmware's veto ever moves, this default moves with it - it is not
# independently justified at 15.
floor = float(self.o.get("cycle_floor_s", 15))
last_cycle = None
while not self.stopping:
@@ -375,13 +398,23 @@ class Controller:
last_grid = self.grid
last_cycle = now_mono
# ⚠️ The FULL cycle, not a degraded one. A floor cycle runs the
# same law on the same inputs as an arrival cycle, because the
# freshness question is already answered upstream and answered
# harder: past `meter_max_age_s` (30 s) p1.net_w is None, which
# is "inputs missing", which becomes a P_SAFETY 0 W claim. So a
# floor cycle can only ever run on a reading this system already
# calls fresh - it cannot run the PI on a 60 s old figure,
# because at 60 s there is no figure. And the integrator
# same law on the same inputs as an arrival cycle, because in P1
# mode the freshness question is already answered upstream and
# answered harder: past `meter_max_age_s` (30 s) p1.net_w is
# None, which is "inputs missing", which becomes a P_SAFETY 0 W
# claim. So a floor cycle cannot run the PI on a 60 s old
# figure, because at 60 s there is no figure.
#
# ⚠️ THAT GUARANTEE IS TRANSPORT-CONDITIONAL, and saying so
# matters more than the guarantee: with `meter_source: off`,
# read_inputs() takes self.grid straight from hass.number() with
# NO age gate at all, so a Home Assistant entity that has gone
# quiet reads as a current value on that path with or without
# this change. Running the full law is still the right choice
# there - the alternative is a degraded second law reasoning
# about an age nobody measured - but the floor does not make
# that path fresh, and nothing here should be read as claiming
# it does. And the integrator
# advances per CYCLE, not per second (control.py), so bounding
# the gap bounds the accumulation: at most one extra
# gain x error per floor interval, under the same
+56 -17
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@@ -6,10 +6,15 @@ previous poll, so a meter that repeats a value ran NO control cycles while the
heartbeat kept re-emitting the last command - measured on the rig during TEL-05
as 70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W with 14 arrivals and zero cycles.
⚠️ THIS TEST TAKES ~35 SECONDS OF WALL CLOCK, on purpose. The thing under test
is a wall-clock floor inside a loop that sleeps 1 s; mocking the clock would
leave the assertion testing the mock. It drives the real `run_control()` and
counts what actually happened.
⚠️ THIS TEST TAKES ~95 SECONDS OF WALL CLOCK (measured 93 s), on purpose, and
that figure is the only thing standing between it and a future developer who
decides a slow test is a broken one. The thing under test is a wall-clock floor
inside a loop that sleeps 1 s; mocking the clock would leave the assertion
testing the mock. It drives the real `run_control()` and counts what actually
happened. Eight runs of the real loop is what the eight scenarios cost.
⚠️ If you shorten the windows, re-measure and update this number and the one in
HANDOVER.md. An understated runtime reads as a hang.
`cycle_floor_s` is read from options with no lower bound in code, so a huge
value reproduces the pre-fix behaviour exactly. Every claim below is therefore
@@ -35,8 +40,9 @@ def check(name, cond):
class FakeHass:
"""A scripted meter and a plant that tracks the command instantly."""
def __init__(self, meter):
def __init__(self, meter, soc_dies_at=None):
self.meter = meter
self.soc_dies_at = soc_dies_at
self.batt = 0.0
self.writes = []
self.t0 = time.monotonic()
@@ -45,11 +51,14 @@ class FakeHass:
return (-5000.0, 5000.0, 1.0)
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
now = time.monotonic() - self.t0
if entity == "sensor.grid":
return self.meter(time.monotonic() - self.t0)
return self.meter(now)
if entity == "sensor.batt":
return self.batt
if entity == "sensor.soc":
if self.soc_dies_at is not None and now >= self.soc_dies_at:
return None
return 50.0
return None
@@ -83,12 +92,12 @@ BASE = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15}
def drive(meter, floor, seconds):
def drive(meter, floor, seconds, soc_dies_at=None, **over):
"""Run the real control loop for `seconds`; return (cycle times, writes)."""
async def go():
hass = FakeHass(meter)
c = Controller(dict(BASE, cycle_floor_s=floor), hass, _Store(), _Pub(),
stop=asyncio.Event())
hass = FakeHass(meter, soc_dies_at)
c = Controller(dict(BASE, cycle_floor_s=floor, **over), hass, _Store(),
_Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
stamps = []
real = c.cycle
@@ -102,7 +111,7 @@ def drive(meter, floor, seconds):
await asyncio.sleep(seconds)
c.stopping = True
await asyncio.wait_for(task, timeout=10)
return stamps, hass.writes
return stamps, hass.writes, c.target, c.reason
return asyncio.run(go())
@@ -117,7 +126,7 @@ print("a meter that repeats the same value")
FLAT = lambda t: 350.0 # noqa: E731
FLOOR, SECONDS = 3.0, 12.0
pre_stamps, pre_writes = drive(FLAT, NEVER, SECONDS)
pre_stamps, pre_writes, _, _ = drive(FLAT, NEVER, SECONDS)
# The defect itself, demonstrated rather than described: one cycle at startup
# and then nothing for the rest of the window, while writes keep happening.
check("pre-fix: a constant meter runs exactly one cycle, at startup",
@@ -125,7 +134,7 @@ check("pre-fix: a constant meter runs exactly one cycle, at startup",
check("...while the heartbeat keeps writing anyway, so nothing looks wrong",
len(pre_writes) >= 2)
post_stamps, post_writes = drive(FLAT, FLOOR, SECONDS)
post_stamps, post_writes, _, _ = drive(FLAT, FLOOR, SECONDS)
check("post-fix: the same constant meter runs cycles throughout",
len(post_stamps) >= int(SECONDS / FLOOR) - 1)
# The actual acceptance criterion: a BOUND on the gap, not a count.
@@ -147,8 +156,8 @@ print("a meter that changes normally - nothing may move")
STEPS = [0.0, 300.0, 850.0, -400.0, 120.0, -900.0, 60.0]
LIVE = lambda t: STEPS[int(t // 2) % len(STEPS)] # noqa: E731
a_stamps, a_writes = drive(LIVE, NEVER, 12.0)
b_stamps, b_writes = drive(LIVE, FLOOR, 12.0)
a_stamps, a_writes, _, _ = drive(LIVE, NEVER, 12.0)
b_stamps, b_writes, _, _ = drive(LIVE, FLOOR, 12.0)
check("a changing meter runs the same number of cycles as before the fix",
len(a_stamps) == len(b_stamps))
check("...commanding exactly the same sequence of values", a_writes == b_writes)
@@ -160,12 +169,42 @@ print("a meter parked at the target - the converged operating point")
# write nothing but the heartbeat, because the deadband - not the arrival
# trigger - is what holds the command still.
AT_TARGET = lambda t: -10.0 # noqa: E731
c_stamps, c_writes = drive(AT_TARGET, NEVER, 12.0)
d_stamps, d_writes = drive(AT_TARGET, FLOOR, 12.0)
c_stamps, c_writes, _, _ = drive(AT_TARGET, NEVER, 12.0)
d_stamps, d_writes, _, _ = drive(AT_TARGET, FLOOR, 12.0)
check("the loop evaluates at the converged point too", len(d_stamps) > len(c_stamps))
check("...and the deadband still holds the command, so writes are unchanged",
d_writes == c_writes)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("an input dies while the meter repeats - the safety claim must still fire")
# ⚠️ THE STRONGEST PROPERTY IN SAFETY-12, and the one that makes it a safety fix
# rather than a latency fix. The `inputs missing -> 0 W` claim lives INSIDE
# cycle() (main.py, the stale_input_s branch and the P_SAFETY claim below it).
# Pre-fix, on a meter whose value happened to repeat, cycle() was never called
# again - so that claim could not fire AT ALL. The controller held its last
# command through an input outage of unbounded length with the status line still
# reading "loop -> N W".
#
# Layer 1 does not cover this either on a `meter_source: off` install: no P1 age
# sensor is published (see Controller.publish), so the firmware has nothing to
# veto on, and the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed the whole time.
#
# stale_input_s is shortened to 3 s here so the outage resolves inside a test
# rather than inside a quarter of a minute. The mechanism is the default one.
c2_stamps, c2_writes, pre_target, pre_reason = drive(
FLAT, NEVER, 10.0, soc_dies_at=4.0, stale_input_s=3)
check("pre-fix: a dead input during a constant meter never reaches the safety claim",
pre_target != 0.0 and "safety" not in pre_reason)
check(f"...so it holds its last command instead ({pre_target:g} W, {pre_reason!r})",
pre_target == 220.0)
d2_stamps, d2_writes, post_target, post_reason = drive(
FLAT, FLOOR, 10.0, soc_dies_at=4.0, stale_input_s=3)
check("post-fix: the same outage commands 0 W", post_target == 0.0)
check(f"...through the safety claim, not by accident ({post_reason!r})",
"safety" in post_reason)
check("...and the 0 W actually reached the device", 0.0 in d2_writes)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
if fails: