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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 f156fadac0 SAFETY-13: the bound came from the wrong half of a two-sided measurement
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m34s
NOTES.md 5.10 measured the 1.78 kW step BOTH ways - "Up: ~18 s from step to
deadband. Down: ~23 s" (NOTES.md:1550). SAFETY-39 takes 18 correctly: its
bound is a REFUSAL and the looser number refuses less. This branch reused
PLANT_SETTLE_S for the opposite job - how long the plant may still be the
EXPLANATION for a divergence - where the conservative half is the longer one.
ceil(23/2) = 12, not 9, and being short there does not refuse anything, it
accuses.

The false positive is real and is measured here. One inverter, one compute(),
one plant, no second writer anywhere in the harness: the command falls through
zero while the pack is still coasting the old way, unasked_power() calls our
own power "unasked", the counter reaches 9 while it is still coasting, and the
law emits "freeze-released". At the plant's own measured 18 s/23 s shape, over
272 load-step pairs, the 9-cycle bound fires in 62 and the 12-cycle bound in 2.

  PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S = 23.0 is added beside PLANT_SETTLE_S = 18.0, because
  the plant's settling time is a PAIR and each bound has to say which half it
  means and why.
  SETTLE_CYCLES = ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) = 12. It is no
  longer the reciprocal of SLEW_RAIL_FRAC; that was a coincidence of both
  reading the same half, and test_control.py now asserts the inequality.
  _SAT_COUNT_CAP moves with it, 10 -> 13. config.yaml accepts
  saturation_cycles as int(1,10), so the whole accepted range is now strictly
  BELOW the bound and the degenerate configuration this branch used to
  document no longer exists - pinned against config.yaml's own schema line.

Three shipped statements were falsified by that measurement and are rewritten,
not renumbered - at 12 the residual is smaller, not zero:

  unasked_power()'s docstring said anything outside the interval "was put
  there by something other than this loop". It was our own power: eight cycles
  after a +1990 W command the command is 0 and the pack still reads +522.3 W.
  control.py said "SO THE BOUND BELONGS TO (b) AND ONLY TO (b)". It fired in
  case (a).
  DOCS.md told an operator "if you see freeze-released, look for the second
  writer" - on a single-inverter install, hunting something that does not
  exist. Replaced by a section that gives the innocent causes first (a large
  load or PV swing; a plant slower than the one measured, 8/320 scenarios at
  23 s rising to 268/320 at 50 s) and the second writer only when the state
  STANDS.

Round 1's own results are kept and re-graded, not weakened. The release/1.0
sweep had to widen to reach the new bound (3780 cases): 3267 bit-identical,
432 releases, 27 command changes - all still charge starts from prev_w == 0 -
and 81 differing in the saturation counter alone, which nothing downstream can
read. The card's case releases on the twelfth saturated cycle instead of the
ninth and settles at the same -1190 W against the same frozen integrator.

Also corrected, because they were claims and did not reproduce: the coverage
table's "output freeze" row was 11, and the mutation form its own note
describes gives 6 on this tree, 6 on the first SAFETY-13 commit and 2 on
release/1.0; the detector row was left at 11 and is 15; the frozen = False
footnote was left at 10 and is 13. And section 6 reported 107 625 as "released
states" when it is the number of states SWEPT - 67 500 of them release, and
both are counted now.

Nothing here reached the inverter. 22/22 test files pass in goodwe-addon-ci,
tree rsynced to a plain path, mounted :ro, python3 -B, __pycache__ purged and
printed first (0 dirs / 0 .pyc; the worktree carries none).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 18:32:03 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 6c4565659b SAFETY-13: the output freeze gets an exit, and only where it needs one
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m30s
While the loop is frozen the command's magnitude may fall but never rise. At
prev_w == 0 there is no magnitude left to fall, so a charge cannot START. That
refusal is deliberate and it is kept: the inverter reporting power we did not
command means another writer is on the actuator, which is the §1.5 non-goal.
What it did not have was an END - nothing cleared it but the other writer
leaving.

Reproduced on release/1.0 @ c8dcb38, at the live install's shape (max_w 5000,
slew_w 400, target_grid_w -10), with another writer holding the pack at +700 W.
The route is not the obvious one: entering from an export, the slew limit moves
the command off zero before the counter reaches 3. It is entered from the
DEADBAND - a site resting at its target counts saturated cycles while nothing is
wrong - and 0 W is then a fixed point: a 2 kW export arriving afterwards leaves
the command at exactly 0.0 W on every subsequent cycle.

And prev_w == 0 is not where it stops. The same tuning pins at -800 W against
its own integrator standing at -2388 W, with the same absence of an exit. So the
change is written against the output freeze, not against a special case of it.

THE DECISION IS WHICH FREEZES GET AN EXIT, NOT HOW LONG THE BLOCK LASTS.

  - A divergence a LIMIT could have produced - the inverter doing less than the
    command, in the command's own direction - clears itself, because the command
    is pinned at something the inverter can reach. No exit. release/1.0
    unchanged, and asserted so: a curtailed inverter is never released over 30
    cycles.
  - A divergence a limit could NOT have produced - overshooting the command, or
    the opposite sign - cannot clear itself, because clearing it needs the
    inverter to track OUR command. That one releases.

unasked_power() is that predicate and it is physical, not statistical: a limit
can only make the inverter do less, in the command's own direction, so
everything a limit can produce lies in the interval spanned by 0 and prev_w
widened by saturation_w. At prev_w == 0 it IS the saturation test, which is
exactly why the zero case is the one that strands.

The bound is not a new number. SETTLE_CYCLES = ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_S /
LOOP_TICK_S) = 9, SAFETY-39's two measured constants and the reciprocal of
SLEW_RAIL_FRAC: a divergence still standing after the plant's own settling time
is not this plant catching up. _SAT_COUNT_CAP is written as SETTLE_CYCLES + 1;
its value is unchanged at 10.

RELEASING THE OUTPUT FREEZE DOES NOT UNFREEZE THE LOOP, which is what makes this
bounded. The integrator freeze is untouched, so a released cycle can only move
the command toward an accumulator that stopped accumulating, by at most one slew
step, and never past it - swept over 107 625 released states. On the run above
the command starts on the ninth saturated cycle and settles at -1190 W against a
frozen integrator of -1194 W, not at the 5000 W rail.

Graded against a transcription of release/1.0 over the 3024-case sweep, which
was NOT taught the new rule: 2592 cases bit-identical, 432 releases, and 27 of
those change the command - every one a charge from prev_w == 0 that release/1.0
refused to start.

SAFETY-04's deliberate assertion is kept rather than inverted: its fixture sits
below the bound, so it still asserts the block, and the release is asserted
beside it on the other side of the bound.

Coverage audit re-measured, same mutation form, __pycache__ purged: output
freeze 2 -> 11 (2 reproduced on a pristine c8dcb38 first), the exit 4,
unasked_power 6.

saturation_cycles at 9 or 10 removes the block entirely, because the freeze
cannot engage before its own exit is due. Not refused at startup; asserted in
the tests and written in DOCS.md.

Nothing was measured on two inverters: inverter B does not physically exist
(NOTES.md §1.1b) and sim/plantsim.py:216 INVERTER_B is INVERTER_A copied with
measured=False. The N=2 escalation is stated from the code (actual_w is
site_batt_w, the SUM) and is labelled as such.

22/22 test files pass in goodwe-addon-ci, mounted :ro, bytecode purged first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 13:56:26 +02:00
admin c8dcb38a95 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-37: a stale reading is None, and arrival cannot be what says so' (#57) from SAFETY-37 into release/1.0 2026-09-06 13:06:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8e241a3243 SAFETY-37: correct a wall-clock tick and a false size claim
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m32s
Two blocking findings from review, both in prose, both corrected at every
site.

1. "trips on tick 7" was not what the fixture prints. It prints 11, five
   runs out of five, and the developer's own report says 11. ⚠️ But the
   deeper problem is that the number should never have been quoted: the
   tick is counted on the WALL CLOCK inside cycle() (hold_s 2 s, ticks
   0.20 s apart), so it is load-dependent - 7 is what a box slow enough
   to stretch each tick to ~0.29 s would print - and nothing pins it.
   The DECISIONS transcript now says 11 because it is a transcript of a
   run; the CHANGELOG stops quoting a tick at all and states the
   checkable thing instead: it trips without the gate and never with it,
   which part 3 grades.

2. ⚠️ SURVIVOR 2's SIZE CLAIM WAS FALSE FOR ONE OF THE TWO CONSUMERS THIS
   CARD EXISTS TO PROTECT. It read "one contributing at most 250 W to a
   loop whose reporting floor is 700 W" at three sites. That bounds the
   COMMAND. Once the register is frozen its REPORTED value is unrelated
   to the command - which is exactly HW-01's shape: commanded ~0 W,
   register stuck on the last large number.

   Measured in review: a unit frozen at -1200 W beside a healthy +900 W
   sibling yields circulating_w = 1800 W against the 700 W floor, 2.6x
   OVER, with no gate armed.

   So the scoping is TRUE for the per-unit sign check and FALSE for
   circulation. Corrected to say exactly that, and the circulation
   consumer's exposure below MOVE_W is now recorded as a KNOWN GAP rather
   than a covered one.

   It survived because part 9's S2 check asserts only `not stale` and
   part 4 pairs the frozen unit with a RESTING sibling
   (circulating_w([A_FROZEN_W, 0.0]) == 0.0) - neither grades the size
   sentence.

No behaviour change. Full suite: 22 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 12:35:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 6864109a01 SAFETY-37: a stale reading is None, and arrival cannot be what says so
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m34s
The architect pass made SAFETY-37, TEL-06 and TEL-08 one systemic problem -
"a stale reading holds its last value and reads healthy" - and this builds the
single policy. Both consumers the card names are gated by one change, and
neither consumer needed a line: `SignWatchdog.evaluate` already CLEARS its
window on a None measurement and `circulating_w` already returns None for a
roster with a missing term. Neither could ever receive one. The gate is the
piece that was missing BETWEEN the shipped read and the shipped checks.

⚠️ ONE CRITERION IN THE CARD COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AS WRITTEN, AND SAYING SO
IS THE MAIN CONTENT. The card says "only arrival separates them". At this layer
arrival cannot: `read_inputs()` polls Home Assistant's state cache about once a
second and HA answers 200 with a number whether or not the publisher behind the
entity is alive, so both members of the pair arrive identically for ever.
test_freshness.py part 1a BUILDS the arrival-age gate the card asks for and
grades it failing - the age is 0.0 s at every instant of both runs, a threshold
that can never fire, which is TEL-06's own defect one layer up. The half of the
rule that survives is honoured absolutely: nothing here reads a Home Assistant
timestamp, and the check asserts the module contains no `last_updated`.

So the criterion became: a reading is stale when it has not moved through a
change it was OBLIGED to follow.

    STALE  <=>  unchanged >= 35 s
                AND |standing| >= 250 W
                AND |standing - standing when the reading last changed| >= 250 W

Latched until a different value arrives. `Inverter.batt` becomes None - never a
held number - which is a missing input, which §11.1 rule 1 answers with 0 W.

WHY A CONJUNCTION AND NOT A THRESHOLD, MEASURED 2026-09-06. Replaying the
committed 30-day capture of this house's own 1 W power entity (485,841 samples
out of HA's recorder, where a row exists only on a CHANGE, so the gap between
rows IS the unchanged duration every consumer saw): the longest legitimate
unchanged run is 263.2 s, held at -899.0 W. A false-positive-free threshold
would have to exceed that, and 263 s is 3.5x too slow for a consumer that trips
at 75 s. There is no admissible threshold. Every one of those long runs is
under an UNMOVING load, which is what the travel term keys on.

THE BOUND, derived at both ends and graded against the shipped config.yaml.
Floor 17.0 s = 6.0 plant settle (NOTES §5.9, measured 2026-08-22) + 10.0
ESPHome publish (firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181) + 1.0 read period
(run_control's asyncio.sleep(1)). Ceiling 75.0 s = min(circulation_hold_s 75,
unit_sign_disagree_s 85). Band [34.0, 37.5]; 35 is a CHOICE inside a DERIVED
band and the check says so - the first draft claimed the band held one integer
and went red on its own first run. MOVE_W is the LARGEST admissible value,
unit_sign_disagree_w, because below it the consumer cannot speak at all.

SoC is STATED, NOT WIRED, and BOUNDS carries it with wired=False and the reason.
Its obligation term is energy through the pack, not command travel - a rested
pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W command - and K needs a usable
capacity nobody has measured. That is TEL-08's; the record says so.

⚠️ BEHAVIOUR CHANGES AT THE SHIPPED ROSTER OF ONE, and it is named rather than
hidden: a FROZEN register now stops the site where it used to read as a healthy
measurement for ever. That is HW-01, which was a one-inverter site. A healthy
install is unchanged, asserted over sixty reads of a dithering register under a
reversing command. A false verdict fails toward 0 W behind the existing
stale_input_s hold and clears itself on the register's next move.

⚠️ BOTH UNITS IN EVERY TWO-INVERTER FIXTURE ARE INVERTER A with different
numbers passed in; inverter B does not physically exist (~2026-09-12).

MUTATION: 16 mutations against a purged, :ro, python3 -B tree, fingerprinted
before and after every revert. One survivor, and it is the finding - dropping
the magnitude term left every check green because no fixture separated "the
command travelled 250 W" from "the command ended up above 250 W". Closed, and
recorded as MUTATION.md habit 17. A second process defect is habit 18: a
mutation run that timed out between the edit and the revert left the module
mutated on disk and nothing announced it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 11:53:26 +02:00
admin a4290d39ac Merge pull request 'SAFETY-39: slew_w is a ratio to the rail, and gain is the constant that is still wrong' (#56) from SAFETY-39 into release/1.0 2026-09-06 10:41:03 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 834e7ca44b SAFETY-39: correct the gain figures, which were not the measured ones
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m15s
Review found validate.py:288-289 carrying numbers that appear nowhere
else in the PR's evidence and could not be reproduced: over-absorption
"1233 W at slew 1000 and 1344 W at slew 250 ... 1495 W at 0.6, 961 W at
0.3, ~0 W at 0.2". A grep for 1233/1344/1495 found them ONLY in that
comment - the DECISIONS record, the PR body, test_control.py's audit
table and slew_sim's own output all carried the correct ones.

The measured values, from re-running tools/slew_sim.py on the real plant
model at the stated conditions (max_w 5000, 2 s tick, 51 export steps
1.0-4.2 kW): slew column 958 (slew 1000) and 1081 (slew 250); gain column
987 (0.6), 876 (0.3), 435 (0.2).

⚠️ "~0 W at 0.2" WAS WRONG IN THE UNSAFE DIRECTION. It invited a future
reader to conclude that dropping gain to 0.2 removes over-absorption. It
does not: 435 W remains, which is 44 % of the figure at 0.6, not zero.
The corrected text says so at the line rather than leaving a round number
to be trusted.

The conclusion the paragraph draws is unchanged and still holds on the
measured figures: over-absorption is flat in slew_w and falls in gain, so
`gain` is the constant that would have to move, and SAFETY-39
deliberately does not move it.

No behaviour change; comment only. Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 01:48:52 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 5d7e275df4 SAFETY-39: slew_w is a ratio to the rail, and gain is what is still wrong
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m16s
`slew_w: 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a clamp of 1500 W, where
"capping how far the loop can jump ahead of the inverter" was true because the
rail itself bounded the excursion. The live install went to max_w 5000 and the
constant did not move, so the loop crosses its whole output range in 10 s
against a plant NOTES.md §5.10 measured at ~18 s. Measured on the owner's system
2026-09-05 11:43-11:46: a 3.4 kW export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000 W in five
2 s ticks, the battery to -5154 W past a 5000 VA rating, and the grid from
3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT. Nothing was broken; the rail moved.

REPRODUCED FIRST, and one half of it is not reproducible at all. On
plantsim.Plant and on an independent in-repo model: the setpoint stepping a full
1000 W per tick to the rail (48 of 51 export steps), and the meter crossing from
export into import. The -5154 W figure is NOT reproducible in either model,
because both clamp the plant at its rating - so the card's AC "battery no longer
exceeds max_w in simulation" is unfalsifiable and was rewritten rather than met.

THE DELIVERABLE IS THE RELATIONSHIP.
  SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = 2 s / 18 s = 1/9
  slew_w = 0 now means FOLLOW THE RAIL - SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w - exactly as
  integrator_max_w = 0 already means follow max_w. It is the shipped default:
  222 W at max_w 2000, 556 W at 5000, 1067 W at a ~9600 W two-inverter site.
  validate.py rule 10 refuses an explicit value faster than that, graded against
  sum(unit_caps(opts)) - the roster sum, i.e. Controller.site_max_w - so a
  second inverter moves the bound with no operator action.

VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT: restoring slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 is refused, and the
refusal names the rail, the crossing time, the measurement and what to do.
Equality, one watt of slack, the live interim 400 and slew_w 0 at every rating
all still start.

GAIN IS THE CONSTANT THAT IS STILL WRONG, and it is NOT changed here. Over 51
export steps the over-absorption is FLAT in slew (958 W at 1000, 1081 W at 250)
and monotone in gain (987 W at 0.6, 876 at 0.3, 435 at 0.2): slew_w bounds the
OUTPUT, while the integrator moves gain*error per cycle and reaches a 5000 W
rail in under three ticks whatever the slew is. Two control-law constants moving
in one release on a running house makes the next measurement uninterpretable.

⚠️ N=2: the site rail becomes sum(max_w) ~ 9600 W (inverter B FROM DATASHEET AND
SERIAL, not measured, and sim/plantsim.py's INVERTER_B is A copied), and the
enforced ratio produces 1067 W there automatically. But a growing rail LOOSENS
this bound, and the >= 900 W symptom goes stale at N=2 the same way the constant
did - both stated in the record rather than left to be discovered.

Nothing reached the inverter. The live install still runs the interim slew_w 400
applied by hand on 2026-09-05, which rule 10 accepts unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 01:10:15 +02:00
admin 24c3d87d60 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-38: pin site_standing with shares that cannot answer for the site' (#53) from SAFETY-38 into release/1.0 2026-09-06 00:00:48 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d5b9317d57 SAFETY-38: correct the survivor count, which was stated four ways
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m11s
Review found the summary lines miscounted, and one of the miscounts filed
a KILL among the survivors. The authoritative tables in §7e and §7f were
right throughout; only the sentences a reader actually relies on were
wrong.

Arithmetic, from §7f's own ledger:
  14 measured = 10 surviving
              +  1 already caught  (C3 allocator.py:162, red in test_alloc.py)
              +  3 caught by round 4 (C6 clamp.py:253, C7 peakguard.py:493,
                                      B12 arbiter.py:264)
Survivors by file: TWO in allocator.py (C1 :154, C2 :160), three in
arbiter.py (C4a/C4b :344, C5 :392), two in tariff.py (C8, C9), two in
arbitrage.py (B17, B18), one in main.py (B19). Two, not three, in
allocator.py - C3 is the kill.

Before: DECISIONS §6c said "Nine" while listing eleven; the CHANGELOG said
"11 SURVIVORS" while listing eleven. Both counted C3 as a survivor.

⚠️ KEPT VISIBLE RATHER THAN QUIETLY FIXED. This is this card's own
recurring defect in prose rather than in code - a claim wider than the
measurement beneath it - and it is the second false statement this ticket
has put into its own decision record. The correction says so at the line,
because a document whose whole value is that it can be trusted should
record when it could not be.

No app/ change; no test change. Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 23:10:30 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 e2efc765af SAFETY-38 round 4: the enumeration covered one sink, and it was not the one this codebase uses
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m12s
The scanner's two censuses between them scored ONE syntactic sink and called it
the family. Every one of census B's 16 members was a sentence that is APPENDED,
ASSIGNED to a `reason`-shaped name, or passed as a LOG ARGUMENT. Not one was
RETURNED - and census A's return bucket only ever held a callee formatting its
own PARAMETERS, so a method formatting its own ATTRIBUTES and handing the string
back was invisible to both. That is the whole describe() / explain() /
reason-builder family, which is where this repository actually keeps its
operator sentences. Worse than the gap: it was in NONE of the five blind spots
the tool printed about itself.

THE SCANNER, WIDENED - and it rediscovered both members without being told:

  * CENSUS C, the return sink, resolved through the returning method's CALL
    SITES so a returned KEY (store.unit_key, mqtt.unit_state_key - MAINT-05's
    card) is not mistaken for a returned SENTENCE. 53 returned pairs, 39
    reaching an operator, 16 of those sharing a format spec.
  * A sentence handed to a constructor as `reason=` or placed under a "text"
    dict key is a MESSAGE. That one line of the sink walker was hiding SIX more
    caller-built members, census B 16 -> 22.
  * Every census B and C row now prints whether the two interpolations share a
    FORMAT SPEC - the difference between a transposition that is silent and one
    that merely looks broken.
  * The blind-spot list is now TWO lists: what it scans (printed from the
    constants, so they cannot drift) and WHAT IT DOES NOT SCAN AT ALL, largest
    hole first - `%s`-style lazy logging, MEASURED at 31 calls across 8 modules
    and each one listed, not asserted.

CLOSED, both zero-byte survivors of a green 21-file suite:

  * clamp.py:253 ClampResult.describe(), requested_w <-> applied_w. No
    test_*.py mentioned describe() at all. It is the SS15 action-log row
    (main.py:1366) AND the ClampWatchdog notification reason (main.py:2452) -
    the alarm SAFETY-40 and SAFETY-41 are about. Under the swap the guard
    reports a setpoint clamped UPWARD, to +9999 W by a bound whose rating the
    same sentence gives as 2000 W. Pinned on the ORDERED PAIR on the contiguous
    literal at BOTH consumers, operands read off ctl.target and
    hass.writes[-1] - what the loop asked and what the device was sent - not
    off the ClampResult the swap lives in. 4 checks red.
  * peakguard.py:493 PeakDecision.explain(), projected_w <-> ceiling_w. "peak
    guard idle" was in no test_*.py. The row then reads "projects 5013 W under
    a 2300 W ceiling" - 2713 W OVER - on a row whose own words say idle and
    whose own flag says ok. Pinned on the decision and on the shipped status
    row. 3 checks red.
  * test_arbiter.py's scope-violation check, whose CLAIM was wider than its
    ASSERTION. Measured this round rather than left at source level: 0 bytes,
    21/21 green before, red now. 2 checks.

DISCLOSED, NOT CLOSED - 11 measured zero-byte survivors, each with its file
fingerprint and its 21/21 verdict, in the decision doc SS7e-SS7g. Three in
allocator.py's UnitPlan.explain(), three across arbiter.py's two explain()s,
two in tariff.py, two in arbitrage.py's trade reasons, one in main.py's
SoC-floor notification. An enumerated list with honest gaps beats a fifth round
finding a fifth instance.

CORRECTIONS THIS ROUND OWES:

  * The idle sentence does NOT reach main.py:3299/3302 - those are the
    floor-limited branch, where explain() returns self.reason before the idle
    literal is built. It reaches main.py:3313 and, on the release edge, 1951.
    1951 is disclosed unpinned.
  * SS4's "Every one of the ten is red" sat under a twelve-row table: it is the
    ten site_standing entries.
  * SS6b said "weaker evidence than A1-A3"; A4 was measured, so SS7d's
    "A1-A4 and B1" is the right list and SS6b now says it.
  * AND THE PROBE THAT GRADES THESE MUTATIONS WAS THE DEFECT, ONCE. Its first
    cut numbered the operands BY ORDER OF APPEARANCE, so after a transposition
    the other leaf took the same number and all thirteen mutant renders came
    back byte-identical - which reads exactly like "the edit is inert". Keying
    the value to the NAME fixed it. Habit 4, in the measuring instrument:
    MUTATION.md habit 16 is the new entry, and the count there is corrected to
    eleven rather than inflated.

14 mutations measured: fresh full-repo copy each, mounted :ro, bytecode purged
and the purge COUNT printed, the edit re-read from disk, length and sha256
printed on both sides, and every one required to change the EMITTED SENTENCE
and not merely the bytes. 12 survived the pre-round suite, 1 was already
caught, 3 are caught now. Full 21-file suite green on the final tree.

NOT ONE BYTE OF app/ MOVES. This card changes coverage only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 22:38:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 357cb4f07f SAFETY-38 round 3: pin the banner the SHIPPED install actually prints
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m12s
Round 2 pinned the operand order of `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` at main.py:1620 -
the SITE detector. Part 9c asserts that detector is never armed at a roster of
one, so on every install this add-on has, the PER-UNIT banner is the only
sign-disagreement sentence that can ever be printed, and its call site is a
different line. main.py:1560 was left unpinned.

1. THE SAME ZERO-BYTE DEFECT ONE CALL SITE OVER.
   `evaluate(stood, against, ...)` -> `evaluate(against, stood, ...)`:
   app/main.py 234 542 bytes before and after, delta 0, fingerprint
   61aa413f... -> e57e6026..., bytecode purged, tree mounted :ro, line re-read
   from disk. On the round-2 tree the FULL 21-FILE SUITE PASSES.

   Nothing behavioural could ever have caught it. `watchdog.disagrees()` is
   SYMMETRIC in its first two arguments - `commanded_w * against_w < 0` with an
   abs() gate on both - so the mutant takes identical actions on every input.
   Not "no fixture happens to separate them": no fixture CAN.

   What moves is the sentence. Measured by diffing the suite's own printed
   banners between the round-3 tree and the same tree carrying only this edit:
   9 emitted banner lines invert, in 3 distinct sentences.

     shipped  commanded -2000 W against a meter reading +2000 W
     swapped  commanded +2000 W against a meter reading -2000 W
     shipped  commanded +1000 W against its own measured power -1000 W
     swapped  commanded -1000 W against its own measured power +1000 W
     shipped  commanded -2000 W against a meter reading +4000 W   (the N=1 arm)
     swapped  commanded +4000 W against a meter reading -2000 W

   Persisted to `sign_reason` and re-read after the restart the latch exists to
   survive; also the action log, `_LOG.error` and `status_payload()`'s headline.

   CLOSED by the ORDERED PAIR on both per-unit banners, both operands read off
   the OBSERVED CYCLE - `inv.last_write` and `inv.batt` off the objects the
   plant moved, never off the arguments the detector was handed, which would
   compare the swap against itself:
     - part 3, the N>=2 trip: "commanded {stood:+.0f} W against its own
       measured power {meas:+.0f} W", plus the persisted namespaced copy;
     - part 7, the N=1 controller-driven trip: "commanded {stood:+.0f} W
       against a meter reading {grid:+.0f} W", plus the namespaced key AND the
       flat rollback mirror;
     - a PRECONDITION on each that the two operands are different numbers of
       opposite sign - without it a transposition produces the same string and
       the check is decoration.

   Measured after the fix: RED on four named checks in test_watchdog.py, GREEN
   in the other twenty files. M11 (the site swap) re-measured on this tree:
   still red. Round 1's and round 2's kills are intact.

2. A FALSE STATEMENT ROUND 2 INTRODUCED, AND IT WAS WORSE THAN REPORTED.
   Section 4 said "three of these left the whole suite green - M1, M2 and M3 -
   and the remaining seven were caught by SAFETY-30's own N>=2 checks". Round
   1's vaguer wording was harmless; naming three made it specific and wrong.

   Re-measured mutation by mutation on clean release/1.0 @ bbc903b, each on a
   fresh copy, bytecode purged, byte delta and fingerprint printed, FULL 21-FILE
   SUITE each time:

     M1  +24 B  fp 362374cf...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M2   +9 B  fp 86573e74...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M3   +4 B  fp 59fa8815...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M4   +9 B  fp 43d852be...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M5  +16 B  fp 58d26de8...  RED  test_watchdog.py, 3 checks
     M6   +1 B  fp 407ddb5f...  RED  test_watchdog.py, 3 checks
     M7  -11 B  fp 2a635a4e...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M8   +6 B  fp b21eed89...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M9   +6 B  fp 0973d3ca...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M10  +7 B  fp 0e7b7a4f...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR

   EIGHT survived, not three - and not the four a reviewer proposed either.
   The corrected sentence is in DECISIONS section 4.

   AND THE TWO THAT WERE CAUGHT MAKE THE CARD'S CASE. M5 (`sum(abs ...)`) and
   M6 (`-sum`) are the only two entries that reverse the SIGN. Every other one
   changes only the MAGNITUDE, and `_sign_site` - the suite's only N>=2 site
   fixture before this card - runs shares of about -2500 W each against a 320 W
   gate, so sum / mean / max / min / sorted[-1] / [0] / self.target / half /
   double land on -2500, -2500, -2500, -2500, -2500, -2500, -2500, -1250 and
   -5000 W: nine numbers, ALL ON THE SAME SIDE OF THE SAME THRESHOLD. The
   pre-existing coverage could see a sign and nothing else.

3. THEN THE THING THAT WOULD HAVE CAUGHT BOTH: the SYMMETRIC-PREDICATE FAMILY,
   enumerated by machine rather than by hand for a third time.
   `tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` renames each parameter pair, erases every
   formatted string, canonicalises the commutative operators and iterates to a
   FIXPOINT - the symmetry is usually one call deep, and a single pass reports
   an EMPTY family on a tree whose answer is already known. A second census
   covers sentences the CALLER builds. Both print their own blind spots,
   including the one way the scan OVER-reports.

   It found one open survivor this card does not close and now discloses:
   rail_unreachable()'s dev_min/dev_max at main.py:3208 - 0 bytes, 21/21 green,
   a status-page NOT COVERED row - and twelve unpinned caller-built sentences,
   including SAFETY-31's `circ_reason`, which is the same shape and is also
   persisted and re-read after a restart. DECISIONS section 7 has the list, the
   pinned status of every member, and what the instrument cannot see.

No app/ code changes. MUTATION.md gains habit 15.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 20:39:58 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 564ba11c11 SAFETY-38 round 2: assert the ordered pair, and correct the M3 attribution
Two blockers, one of them mine to fix and one a mis-measurement to undo. No
`app/` change in either: the shipped `sum` is correct.

1. A ZERO-BYTE SURVIVOR AT THE CALL SITE ONE LINE BELOW THE PINNED VALUE.
   Round 1 pinned `site_standing` and never pinned WHERE IT GOES. Swapping the
   detector's first two arguments at main.py:1620 -
   `evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, ...)` -> `evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, ...)`
   - is a ZERO-BYTE edit and left the round-1 tree fully green. The cost is the
   banner: the site stands at -500 W of charge into a +2500 W import and the
   LATCHING, SITE-STOPPING alarm reads "commanded +2500 W against a meter
   reading -500 W" - which instrument read what, inverted, on the one line
   somebody woken by it reads first (watchdog.py:658-665).

   Round 1's check could not reach it. It asserted `"-500 W"` appears SOMEWHERE
   in the sentence; under the swap it still does, IN THE METER SLOT. A substring
   test grades PRESENCE, never ARRANGEMENT. It now asserts the ORDERED PAIR:
   `f"commanded {sum:+.0f} W against a meter reading {grid:+.0f} W"`. Measured:
   red in test_watchdog.py on that one named check, green in the other twenty.

2. THE M3 ATTRIBUTION WAS FALSE, AND HOW IT BECAME FALSE IS THE USEFUL PART.
   Round 1 recorded `list(standing.values())[0]` as closed by SAFETY-32's
   package-wide pin and told future authors NOT TO RE-COVER IT. Re-measured on
   release/1.0 @ 86eaef2 carrying only that edit: the full 21-file suite is
   GREEN and test_peakguard.py is PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS in isolation. THE
   MUTATION SURVIVES. It was originally measured once, that run hit CI-06's
   ~20% flake, and the red was recorded as a kill.

   The mechanism, read off 12j's own enumeration rather than argued: 12j taints
   names BOUND to roster values and lists ACCUMULATED in a loop. `standing` is a
   dict filled by SUBSCRIPT assignment (main.py:1554/1558), so it never enters
   the taint set and 1599 is not a roster site. On the mutated tree 12j lists
   main.py:1553, 1555 and 1690 - not 1599. Part 9a and 9b close it.

   Corrected in all four places it was committed: DECISIONS section 1 and
   section 4, CHANGELOG, and the part 9 header that carried the instruction.

MEASUREMENT, all on 86eaef2, fresh copy per mutation, mounted :ro, bytecode
purged by tools/mutation_run.sh, edit re-read from disk, byte delta printed:
  * M1-M10 re-run INDEPENDENTLY rather than carried forward - all 10 red, at
    the deltas the table records (M1/M2/M4 re-run in the exact wrapped form).
  * M11, the argument swap: 0 bytes, red on one check in one file.
  * W1 `"sign_site": SCOPE_SITE -> SCOPE_UNIT`: 0 bytes, red; part 9a is one of
    the two killers.
  * W2 `"circulation": SCOPE_SITE -> SCOPE_UNIT`: 0 bytes, red - but ENTIRELY
    on pre-existing checks. This card adds nothing to circulation and does not
    claim it.
Control: 21/21 green before and after. The suite is 21 files, not 20 - TEL-07
added test_mqtt.py in the rebase onto 86eaef2.

DECISIONS section 6a enumerates what was NOT closed: SAFETY-31's circ_wd
detector itself, the other eight CLAIM_SCOPE entries, actuator_of()'s body, the
n_units > 1 guard, and the fact that the "green in the other twenty files" half
of the ledger was re-verified on 86eaef2 only for M3 and M11.

MUTATION.md gains habit 14 - assert the ordered pair, not the substring - and
records this as the tenth instance of the family, found INSIDE THE FIX WRITTEN
TO CLOSE THE NINTH, for the second time in that list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 20:39:39 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 3033420dd7 SAFETY-38: record the CI-06 false red, and where each mutation lands
All ten mutations of `site_standing` are red in test_watchdog.py and in nothing
else - the other 19 files are green under every one of them, which is the
measurement of how unpinned the line was.

One exception, recorded rather than dropped: in the batch run M10
(`sorted(standing.values())[-1]`) also reported FAIL test_peakguard.py. Re-run
in isolation three times and once more through tools/mutation_run.sh - four
clean passes. The batch script had discarded the failure detail so the check
cannot be named; what can be said is that it did not reproduce in four attempts
and that no claim in this card rests on it. That is CI-06's file behaving the
way CI-06 records.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 20:39:39 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 a8bd2b9330 SAFETY-38: pin site_standing with shares that cannot answer for the site
`app/main.py:1598`'s `site_standing = float(sum(standing.values()))` is the
first argument of SAFETY-30's latching, site-stopping sign detector AND the
`commanded_w` handed to SAFETY-18's `looks_frozen()`. It was pinned by nothing.
Coverage only: not one byte of `app/` moves - the shipped `sum` is correct.

WHY THE SUITE COULD NOT SEE IT. `_sign_site`, the only N>=2 site fixture in the
repository, runs shares of about -2500 W EACH - every one individually over its
320 W gate - so sum, mean and max(key=abs) all agree on it. Its values happen to
be equal, and a check comparing two things that happen to be equal cannot see
the difference it names. MUTATION.md habit 4, ninth instance, inside the site
half of the card that names the rule in its own text. At N=1 it is arithmetic
rather than a fixture defect: sum == mean == max == the one share, identically.

THE FIXTURE (test_watchdog.py part 9). Two SIMULATED units rated 220 W and
280 W, both obeying exactly, inverted gain, house importing 2000 W: the site
commands -500 W against a +2500 W meter and NO SINGLE SHARE clears the shipped
300 W gate. Four candidate reductions, four distinct answers, one over the gate
- sum -500, mean -250, max(key=abs) -280, [0] -220 - asserted as a precondition.
The asymmetry is load-bearing, and the smaller unit is first so [0] stays
distinct from max(key=abs). Gate shipped; only the hold is shortened.

BOTH CONSUMERS. 9b drives the same discrimination at SAFETY-18's threshold: the
site rail is 0.95 x 500 = 475 W, so the sum rails it while 250, 280 and 220 do
not. Shipped: BLIND_FROZEN, floor 0 W. Under both surviving mutations: not blind
at all, no floor filed - the battery may keep importing through a quarter whose
billed average is unobservable. The open quarter is backfilled with the stuck
reading so the mutant cannot reach the same action by the coverage route and
mask the difference. 9c asserts the N=1 identity on a real one-inverter tree.

SAFETY-32 already closes `list(standing.values())[0]` structurally and this card
does not claim it. Its disclosed blind spot - semantics are invisible to a shape
pin, permanently - is why the mean and max(key=abs) needed a behavioural set.

AND THE SEARCH FOR THE NEXT SURVIVOR FOUND ONE. `float(self.target)` - the
arbiter's site target instead of the sum of what stands on the wire - is -11 B
and survives all 20 files on untouched release/1.0 @ f72c48d, because every
fixture that existed was built where the two are the same number. They separate
when a device's reported range is narrower than its max_w: the `device` claim is
filed per actuator and never bounds the site target. Closed here by a
counterfactual that asks for -500 W while -250 W stands.

10 mutations of that one line, each on a fresh full-repo copy mounted :ro,
purged by tools/mutation_run.sh, the edit re-read from disk and the byte delta
printed. Ledger and honest gaps in DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 20:39:39 +02:00
admin 9e42cecc24 Merge pull request 'CI-06: test_peakguard.py answered two of its checks with the wall clock' (#54) from CI-06 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 19:45:38 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 9b270a66a5 CI-06: test_peakguard.py answered two of its checks with the wall clock
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m56s
`test_peakguard.py` is flaky on the required `checks / unit (pull_request)`
context. Reproduced, measured and removed - not widened, and nothing skipped:
the file still carries all of SAFETY-07 and SAFETY-25, and gains a check.

TWO MECHANISMS, both the control law's own gain `900 / remaining` applied to a
wall-clock gap this file never meant to have.

1. THE CROSS-TIME PROJECTION (the "one cycle of the intent form..." check).
   `_proj3` was a SECOND `PeakTracker.project(b3.p1.averager, datetime.now())`
   taken after the real cycle had already returned, and its result was compared
   against a floor decided from the FIRST projection - while the comment three
   lines above says both forms run "against the same frozen projection".
   `excess = 900 x (projected - ceiling) / remaining` moves at `excess /
   remaining` W/s, so at a 1500 W floor the 1.5 W tolerance bought exactly
   `remaining / 1000` seconds: 333 ms with 880 s left in the quarter and 6 ms
   with 10 s left (measured by bisection, probe in the PR). The gap between the
   two statements measured 12.7-39.5 ms over 26 instrumented runs, so the check
   was decided by WHERE IN THE QUARTER it ran, about `gap_ms / 900` of the time.
   FIX: `_recording_decide` keeps the Projection OBJECT the real cycle graded.
   Both forms are now decided from it, the clock is out of the comparison, and
   the tolerance is EXACT rather than 1.5 W. Measured on a real cycle: the
   delivered form re-decided from that object reproduces the controller's own
   floor to 0.000000000000 W, and the identity holds to 0.000000000000 W.
   It also gains a check - that re-decide now pins `_kw` as main.py's actual
   call rather than an approximation of it.

2. THE FIXTURE'S OWN ROOM (the three `wired_over_limit` checks named on the
   card: "the real cycle files the peak claim...", "...and the number written to
   the inverter is the guard's floor", "the STATUS PAGE row for a floor-limited
   guard..."). `range(0, span + 1, 5)` leaves 0-5 s of the open block uncovered
   by construction, and `excess` multiplies an uncovered second back up by
   `900 / remaining`:

       floor ~ want x (1 - uncovered/900) - net_w x uncovered / remaining

   Measured on this tree, shipped: at 12 s of remaining a fixture that asked for
   a 1500 W floor delivered 613 W (-59 %), and at 2 s the guard did not engage
   at all - which fails all three of those checks together. The four-attempt
   retry cannot help, because four attempts take ~40 ms and all land in the same
   dying quarter.
   FIX: one telegram stamped at `now` (which is what a real meter does and what
   the docstring already claimed), plus FIXTURE_ROOM_S - the helper waits out
   the tail of a quarter it cannot size a fixture in. 24 s is DERIVED from the
   1 % accuracy the helper promises, at this file's smallest fixture and the
   measured 0.1 s worst-case lag, not picked:
       net_w x lag / (remaining x want) <= 0.01 - lag/900
       remaining >= 3500 x 0.1 / (1500 x 0.00989) = 23.6 s
   Same probe after the fix: -0.3 % at 12 s, -0.5 % at 8 s, still engaged at 2 s.

NO TIMEOUT WAS WIDENED, no check skipped, no xfail. One tolerance was made
STRICTER (1.5 W -> exact) because removing the clock made exactness possible.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 19:40:34 +02:00
admin bbc903b2b4 Merge pull request 'PKG-06: bump 0.6.0 -> 0.7.0, because the schema changed and nobody bumped' (#55) from PKG-06-version-0.7.0 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 19:23:16 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d8e02ad3f8 PKG-06: bump 0.6.0 -> 0.7.0, because the schema changed and nobody bumped
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m2s
Six merges landed since 0.6.0 was deployed and the version never moved.
Disk and box both read 0.6.0, so `ha apps update` would have been a
NO-OP: Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, and the update path
installs `version_latest`, which cannot differ from `version` without a
bump. Found while pre-checking the deploy, not after it silently did
nothing.

⚠️ MINOR RATHER THAN PATCH, BECAUSE THE SCHEMA CHANGED. SAFETY-32 added
`bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` as a REQUIRED per-entry key on the `inverters`
roster - no trailing `?` - so a config declaring a roster and omitting it
on any entry is refused at startup. Verified against the deployed
2d025ee: the per-entry schema went from 6 keys to 7. Top-level options
and schema are unchanged at 63 each.

An install running `inverters: []` is unaffected, which is every
single-inverter install including the reference one: the flat
`bms_soc_floor` still describes the one pack. But CFG-04 recorded the
rule this follows - "a schema change without a bump is a schema nobody
reads" - and this is exactly that shape.

The CHANGELOG gains a 0.7.0 section listing the six merges by SHA. It
also records, rather than papers over, that 0.6.0 was never sectioned:
its content sits below the new heading because the earlier bump shipped
without cutting a section. Splitting it retroactively would mean guessing
a boundary; the deployed 0.6.0 is 2d025ee and the table says what is new
since it.

Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 18:38:41 +02:00
admin 4482cd8201 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-41: raise the clamp alarm's re-assert 30 s -> 150 s' (#52) from SAFETY-41-reassert into release/1.0 2026-09-05 18:31:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 3527c8a04c SAFETY-41: escalate a sustained engagement, so a runaway is never held
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m59s
Review found the case I asked it to construct, and it is not a corner
case. The rate limit alone DELAYS A RUNAWAY: a benign one-cycle clamp
that spends the budget, then a continuous §10.3-shaped runaway, held the
runaway's first notification for up to 140 s - one REASSERT_S minus a
cycle. On the live install, where ordinary railing spends the budget
essentially all the time, a runaway arriving during normal operation
would be delayed with near-certainty. That is the "benign noise
suppresses the bug signal" shape this module's docstring is written
against, and the family the first attempt at this card died of.

THE ESCALATION. An episode that has not yet spoken because an EARLIER,
unrelated episode spent the budget speaks anyway once it has engaged
SUSTAINED_CYCLES = 3 times in a row. The discriminator is run length and
the two populations genuinely differ: the live flood was runs of length
ONE (engage, de-assert, engage), while a runaway engages every cycle.

Measured, and it costs nothing it was protecting:
  live scatter flood (305 cycles, 1-in-6)   11 -> 11 notifications
  chatter 1-engaged/3-clean over 8000 s     50 -> 50 notifications
  pinned 900 s quarter (floor is 5)          6 ->  6 alarms
  runaway delay after a benign episode     140 s -> 10 s

⚠️ MY COUNTERFACTUAL CHECK COULD NOT FAIL FOR THE DEFECT IT NAMED, and
review caught that too. It read `ClampWatchdog().note(True, ...) is True`
- a FRESH object, which only exercises the `last_alarm is None` branch,
the trivially-true one. A fresh watchdog has no earlier episode to be
held back BY. It now SPENDS THE BUDGET FIRST: benign clamp, gap past
CLEAR_CYCLES, then a continuous runaway, and asserts the delay is well
under REASSERT_S. That is the third instance in this file of the family
recorded at line 216 and at the 224 s sweep, and it was guarding the most
safety-critical property in the change.

Also pinned: `last_alarm` SURVIVING the de-assert. Review built the
mutation - if the de-assert also refreshed it, chatter collapses from 50
notifications to 1 and the alarm never fires again, with the suite green.
That is the "alarm that never fires" class, a different bug from one that
fires later. Now caught.

Both new checks verified against the mutations they name: removing the
escalation -> 1 FAILED; refreshing last_alarm on de-assert -> 1 FAILED.

Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 18:13:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8790c4d38f SAFETY-41: rate-limit the RISING EDGE, which is where the flood came from
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m9s
Review falsified the first version of this change, and the correction is
the substance of it.

Raising REASSERT_S 30 -> 150 removed NONE of the owner's notifications.
The re-assert interval governs only the still-engaged path; the rising
edge fired unconditionally. At the measured ~5 s cycle the live pattern -
48 engagements in ~25 minutes, about one cycle in six - leaves ~25 s of
clean cycles between engagements, past CLEAR_CYCLES x 5 s = 15 s. So the
alarm DE-ASSERTED between almost every engagement and each one returned
as a fresh rising edge. Measured on the shipped class over that window:
48 episodes, 48 notifications at REASSERT_S = 30, and still 48 at 150.

The interval now bounds the NOTIFICATION RATE rather than the repeat rate
within one episode: `last_alarm` survives a de-assert, and a new episode
speaks only if the interval has elapsed. Same window afterwards: 51
episodes, 51 engagements, 11 notifications.

⚠️ NOTHING IS DROPPED, AND THE TWO PROPERTIES THAT MATTER ARE PINNED:
  - a PINNED loop still speaks 6 times in the 900 s billing quarter,
    against a floor of 5 (part 2, unchanged);
  - a rising edge from a COLD watchdog still fires IMMEDIATELY, so a
    runaway beginning from quiet is never held back by a budget spent on
    an earlier, unrelated episode. That check is the counterfactual and it
    is the half that would go red if the limit ignored elapsed silence.
Every engagement is still counted, every episode still increments, and
the action-log row is still written on every engaged cycle. The budget is
on notifications, never on evidence.

The new pin is written in wall-clock seconds and in the shape the field
produced, so it does not move when the constant does. Verified by
reverting the rising edge to unconditional: 2 checks go RED naming it.

Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 17:06:29 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 1d393ced22 SAFETY-41: correct the comment, and fix the check it cites
Review found two false statements in the comment and one weak check. All
three are fixed here; the constant itself is unchanged at 150 s and was
never in question.

1. "That caps this constant at 900/5 = 180 s" was FALSE ABOUT THE CHECK IT
   CITED. test_clamp.py part 2 sweeps i = 0..899 and the rising edge at
   i=0 is free, so it measured `1 + floor(899/R)` - one alarm more than a
   real quarter earns. Measured: 224 s was GREEN across the whole suite.
   Anyone raising this to 200 s would have had a green board and a
   requirement quietly unmet - the same defect recorded at
   test_clamp.py:216, one notch weaker.

   The check now grades floor(QUARTER_S / REASSERT_S) directly, so it
   enforces the ceiling the comment claims for it. Verified: 150 PASS,
   180 PASS, 181 FAIL, 224 FAIL. 180 is also the true requirement edge -
   on the worst sliding 900 s window 180 earns 5 alarms and 181 earns 4.

2. The "60 cycles of the §10.3 runaway" note was attributed to this module
   and truncated. It is main.py:2479 and reads "60 cycles of the §10.3
   runaway produce 0 write-path engagements and 2 loop-side ones". Quoted
   in full, attributed correctly.

3. "48 engagements in 25 minutes" was left implying a pinned rail. It is
   roughly one cycle in six - real, and far above the 2-in-60 the guard
   was sized for, but not continuous. Restated, and labelled as a live-log
   reading rather than a measurement in this repo.

Also recorded: the 1500 W tuning derivation is in the OTHER repo
(admin/goodwe NOTES.md, "Simulated 2 kW load step (gain 0.6, clamp
1500)"), so this repo cannot corroborate it and a reader should not go
looking here; and MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5 is a test-local integer, not a spec
figure - the 900 s quarter is system-wide but the 5 is not, so the 180 s
ceiling rests on one number a test author chose.

Full suite: 20 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 16:53:46 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 3516947b5e SAFETY-41: raise the clamp alarm's re-assert 30 s -> 150 s
The owner reported the OUTPUT_CLAMP notification as a persistent
annoyance on the live install. It re-asserted every 30 s, all day.

⚠️ THIS IS A REGIME CHANGE, NOT A CHANGE OF MIND ABOUT THE ALARM. 30 s
was chosen when a loop-side engagement was rare - clamp.py's own note
records "60 cycles of the §10.3 runaway produce 2 loop-side engagements".
The live install produced 48 IN 25 MINUTES of ordinary operation, because
`max_w` is 5000 W where the loop's tuning was derived at a 1500 W clamp
(SAFETY-39). The integrator therefore reaches its bound constantly and
the alarm narrated it every 30 s. An alarm that speaks that often about
the normal case is how an operator learns to ignore the one that matters,
which is the exact failure clamp.py's docstring is written against.

⚠️ 150 s IS THE REQUIREMENT'S OWN EDGE WITH ONE STEP OF MARGIN, not a
comfort choice. test_clamp.py part 2 pins the cadence in WALL-CLOCK terms
rather than against this constant: a loop pinned on the rail must speak
at least MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5 times inside the 900 s quarter that bills
the capacity tariff. That caps the constant at 900/5 = 180 s. Measured:
  180 s -> 5 alarms per quarter (exactly the required 5, no margin)
  150 s -> 6 alarms per quarter
  300 s -> 3, and the floor check goes RED
180 s would sit on the boundary, so any later change to the firing logic
would tip it red for a reason unrelated to that change. The FLOOR is the
thing that must not move, and it does not.

⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO. It changes how often the alarm repeats. It does
NOT make the alarm correct: the message still calls the integrator bound
a BUG SIGNAL and still pairs a request from one moment with a `self.target`
read at another. That is SAFETY-40. And it does not stop the loop railing
in the first place; that is SAFETY-39. This is a stop-gap and says so at
the line.

Nothing was suppressed: every engagement is still counted, the action-log
row is unchanged, and the §10.3 runaway still raises the alarm - an
earlier attempt at this that split the alarm so only `clamped` notified
was REVERTED because test_clamp.py:398 proved it would have disabled
runaway detection entirely (a runaway presents as `i_clamped`, and
control.py:78-81 says `clamped` is unreachable on a default install).

Full suite: 20 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 16:53:46 +02:00
admin 86eaef2517 Merge pull request 'TEL-07: a second MQTT device for inverter B, and A keeps the one it has' (#51) from TEL-07 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 15:51:54 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 26c5ee8adc TEL-07: a second MQTT device for inverter B, and A keeps the one it has
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m58s
MQTT discovery announced ONE device and hung every entity off one unique_id
prefix, so at two inverters B's per-unit telemetry had nowhere to go. It has
somewhere now, and not one entity that already exists moved.

⚠️ THE ASYMMETRY IS DELIBERATE. The first roster entry's per-unit rows are
announced on THE DEVICE IT ALREADY HAS; every later entry gets its own device,
via_device the controller. "One device per inverter" is tidier and is the change
that renames every entity on the live install - and because HA keeps the id it
composed at FIRST discovery, a rename produces a NEW entity beside a DEAD one:
the history stays behind and every dashboard, template and automation naming it
goes on pointing at a sensor that quietly stopped updating, including the three
live watchdog automations. The composed ids come out symmetric anyway
(sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power / ..._inverter_b_...), so the tidy
design's only real benefit is bought here without its cost.

  * four per-unit rows - setpoint, battery power, SoC, SAFETY-02 sign latch -
    announced only from a roster of two. At N=1 nothing is announced and
    nothing is published: no second device, no renamed entity, no added topic.
  * grid and p1_sample_age_s stay SITE-scoped and are announced ONCE, at every
    roster length 1-6. One P1, one grid connection, and p1_sample_age_s is a
    watchdog input - a second copy is a second answer to "is the meter fresh?".
  * inverter.roster_names() is the one answer to what the units are called,
    read by build_roster() and by the publisher, which must know the roster
    before a Controller exists because announcing happens on the CONNACK.
  * DECISIONS/TEL-07-second-mqtt-device.md records the two designs side by side.

VERIFIED BY DIFFING THE ANNOUNCED PAYLOADS, not by reading the code. The
release/1.0 baseline in test_mqtt.py was generated by running that commit's
module, not transcribed. Roster of one: 9 topics, 0 missing, 0 changed, 0 added.
Roster of two: 0 missing, 0 changed, 8 added.

MEASURED, NOT ASSERTED. Sixteen mutations through tools/mutation_run.sh; twelve
are in the file as a running table, each named with the property it breaks.
Three of those properties exist because the table found their ABSENCE - dropping
the unit from the state topic, moving `grid` into the per-unit set, and
`units=()` in main()'s publisher call were all GREEN on the first run, as was a
roster fallback naming two nameless entries `inverter-a`. Part 9 enumerates what
the file still cannot see, with sizes.

⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12). Every roster of two here
is SIMULATED, from the datasheet and serial in NOTES.md §1.1b. Nothing about B
has been measured and no entity described here has been seen on a broker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 14:14:53 +02:00
admin f72c48dbfd Merge pull request 'UX-01: translations and task ordering for the add-on Configuration tab' (#50) from UX-01 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 13:11:51 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 fef6ef20a4 UX-01: translate the add-on config, and order it by task
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m1s
The add-on had NO translations/ directory, so Home Assistant fell back to
rendering the raw option KEYS. An operator opening Configuration read
`unit_sign_disagree_w`, `saturation_cycles`, `integrator_max_w` - seventy of
them, in file order, with no description and no way to tell a constant derived
from 1890 closed-loop test runs from their own inverter's rating.

⚠️ PRESENTATION ONLY. Not one default, not one schema range and not one line of
behaviour moved. The 175 non-comment lines of config.yaml are byte-identical to
release/1.0's, reordered; the only comment lines that changed are the group
banners and five sentences whose "above"/"below" the reorder made false.

* translations/en.yaml and translations/nl.yaml: a name and a description for
  all 70 options and all 7 per-entry keys of the `inverters:` repeatable
  section. The Dutch is written for a Flemish homeowner - afname/injectie,
  kwartierpiek, capaciteitstarief - not transliterated from the English.
* ⭐ Every derived constant says WHERE IT CAME FROM and whether to touch it.
  `unit_sign_disagree_s` cites its 1890 closed-loop runs (SAFETY-30);
  `circulation_w` its 924 runs and the measured 400 W knee (SAFETY-31);
  `meter_freeze_s` its 2399 s capture (SAFETY-18); `bms_soc_floor` register
  0x0560. The two numbers that are the operator's - max_w and peak_cap_w - say
  "THIS IS YOUR NUMBER". `cycle_cost_threshold_eur`, which is neither, says it
  is an open product question (OPT-08).
* config.yaml reordered into task order in BOTH halves, comments carried with
  their keys: hardware -> meter -> ratings and limits -> tariff -> maintenance
  -> safety -> advanced.
  ⚠️ test_inverter.py:1788's trap is PRESERVED: the nested per-entry `max_w:`
  still precedes the flat one under `schema:`, and `inverters: []` still ships
  in the `options:` half. Moving the nested block below the flat one is a 1-byte
  edit; it was run and goes red in test_inverter.py and test_translations.py.
* tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section F MEASURES the result against
  ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 - Supervisor's own
  _read_app_translations(), its own UiOptions, and the frontend's label
  resolution transcribed from the shipped bundle - and prints every rendered row
  in both languages. `all cases passed`, exit 0.
* ⚠️ ONE MEASURED NEGATIVE RESULT, NOT GLOSSED: the per-entry keys inside the
  `inverters:` section still render RAW on frontend 20250925.1, because a
  list-of-objects goes to ha-selector-object and the converter sets no `label`
  and no `translation_key`. The `fields:` translations are shipped and validated
  - that is Supervisor's own shape for this - but this card does not claim they
  reach the screen. The `inverters` label and description do.
* test_translations.py: a translation naming a non-existent option, or an option
  with no translation, fails CI - both directions, both languages, top level and
  per entry. Mutation-tested BOTH WAYS: eleven in-process mutations each
  required to NAME the key they broke, plus a negative control; six more run on
  disk through the purge-and-re-read protocol. Two of the eleven are the ones
  that cost the WHOLE FILE rather than one label - an unrecognised top-level
  block, and a `network:` value that is not a string. Supervisor drops a file
  that fails SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS with only a log warning, so those silently
  return the entire tab to raw keys; neither is reachable through the
  `configuration:` coverage, which is why they were hunted for and closed.
* tools/translations_lint.py is the hand parser CI needs (no PyYAML in the
  add-on image) and the probe grades it, key by key and string by string,
  against Supervisor's own loader. It is strict and RAISES rather than skipping;
  nine malformed shapes prove it.

Full 20-file suite green (19 existing + test_translations.py).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 12:02:56 +02:00
admin 3993f9f32b Merge pull request 'SAFETY-32: bms_soc_floor per pack, rule 8 per unit' (#48) from SAFETY-32 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 08:10:51 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 19decf433f SAFETY-32 round 5: stop closing sites, build an instrument that finds its own scope
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m59s
Rounds 2, 3 and 4 each closed exactly the survivor they were handed and each time
the reviewer found the same shape one step over: the reduction, the call site, the
sibling argument, and now the sibling MODULE. Round 4's enumeration stopped at the
`Controller` class boundary; round 5's four blockers were reductions in validate.py,
over a list DERIVED from the roster three calls away from it. Closing four more sites
by hand would have produced a fifth rejection, so this round widens the instrument
instead and lets it enumerate.

⚠️ THE BLOCKERS ARE NOT EQUIVALENT MUTANTS - a safety refusal disappears, verified by
calling the shipped validator both ways on the real tree:

  roster max_w 5000 (inverter-a) beside 2000 (inverter-b), sign_disagree_w 3000
    clean                        -> 1 problem, "...max_w (inverter-b) is 2000 W, so the
                                    SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement watchdog can never fire"
    min(caps[:1])          +4 B  -> 0 problems. The site STARTS.
    caps_ix[:1]            +4 B  -> 0 problems.
  the SAME roster with the small cap FIRST (2000, 5000)
    clean                        -> 1 problem, naming inverter-a
    min(caps[-1:])         +5 B  -> 0 problems.

⚠️ AND THE ONE-ROSTER FIXTURE COULD NOT HAVE SEEN THAT. On [5000, 2000] the `[-1:]`
mutant still refuses, because last IS min there. A fixture of N members cannot separate
two reductions that agree on N members - which is why the behavioural half below is a
SET and not a roster.

THE INSTRUMENT (test_peakguard.py part 12j, widened past `Controller`)

Every `.py` under app/ is read off disk and parsed - NO MODULE IS NAMED IN THE CHECK -
and the roster is found by transitive closure from ONE seed, the `inverters` option key:
through returns, through lists ACCUMULATED in a loop over a roster (which is exactly
what `caps`, `roster` and `problems` are, and what round 4's rule could not express),
through attributes and properties, and THROUGH CALL ARGUMENTS, which is how it walks
into peakguard, arbiter, allocator, circulation, maintenance and store without being
told they exist. A slice of a roster stays a roster so a mutation cannot cut the taint;
an index is one unit and does not.

  183 roster reductions across 9 modules, out of 23 files parsed:
  main 96, allocator 24, validate 19, arbiter 14, circulation 10, maintenance 10,
  peakguard 4, inverter 3, store 3.  14 modules reduce over no roster at all.

⚠️ THE HAND-WRITTEN MODULE LIST WOULD HAVE BEEN WRONG IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. It named
watchdog.py, which reduces over no roster at all (SAFETY-30's sign watchdogs are
strictly per-unit), and omitted maintenance.py and store.py, which both do. A vacuous
claim about one module and no claim at all about two others - which is the argument for
computing the scope, made with data.

The pin rediscovers ALL FOUR blockers without being told where to look, and finds a
FIFTH beside them (validate.py:783, rule 5's own message) that no review round named.
Its counterfactual runs at two depths: every enumerated site's expression mutated with
each of the four cuts this card has been defeated by (183 x 4 = 732 spellings, all
reported), and `[:1]` written into app/validate.py at each blocker position with the
WHOLE analysis re-run over the mutated source.

THE SWEEP, AND THE NUMBER THAT MUST NOT BE QUOTED ALONE

All 183 sites mutated to `[:1]`, +4 B each, against the full 19-file suite in
goodwe-addon-ci (:ro, -B, fresh rsync per mutant, 0 .pyc before and after - a read-only
mount cannot write one): 183/183 RED. ⚠️ That is TAUTOLOGICAL on its own, because the
pin makes every slice red. So the 51 whose first red was test_peakguard.py were re-run
with the pin NEUTRALISED:

  145 of 183   a behavioural fixture separates the site from a slice of itself
   38 of 183   ONLY the structural claim. Behaviourally UNGRADED.

All 38 are listed by site with what a `[:1]` there would cost, in the DECISIONS record
and in part 12j itself: 15 are rows and counts on the operator's page, 3 are
`len(targets)` arithmetic beside a write path that IS graded, 6 are allocator internals
ALLOC-01 reaches but not with enough units to separate. NONE of the 38 is closed
behaviourally by this card and none is counted as covered.

THE BEHAVIOURAL HALF, because a shape pin grades an identity and never a meaning

test_validate.py grows a ROSTER SET for the three rules that reduce over
`unit_caps_indexed()`: widths 2, 3, 4, 5 with the one small cap at EVERY position,
14 rosters x 3 rules = 42 runs of the real validator, each asserting the refusal fires
AND names the unit the number came off. Beside it a COMPUTED family table of twelve
candidates - max, first, last, the mean, [:1], [-1:], [:2], [:3], [1:], [:-1], [::2] -
each compared against what the shipped validator actually answered on the same roster.
Only `min` agrees everywhere; a member no roster kills is printed as a NAMED SURVIVOR.

⚠️ A THIRD RULE WAS READING THE FLAT `max_w`, AND IT IS SAFETY-30's

Found by reading the three branches side by side, NOT by the pin - and said that way
because it is the shape of what the pin cannot see. `unit_sign_disagree_w` was graded
against `_number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)`, three lines under a branch that had already
stopped doing that. Both directions were measured before the fix:

  two 2000 W units + a leftover `max_w: 5000` + unit_sign_disagree_w 3000 -> 0 problems.
  The site started, the status page said `armed`, and the per-inverter watchdog could
  not trip on EITHER unit. Identical sentence to the blocker, one branch over.
  two 5000 W units with NO flat key -> REFUSED against a 2000 W default the operator
  never wrote, for a threshold both units can reach.

It takes the same `weakest` the branch above takes and names the same unit. At a roster
of one `unit_caps()` is `[max_w]`, so the shipped single-inverter refusal is the same
comparison, the same boundary and the same sentence.

MUTATION PROOF (each: bytecode purged and counted 0 before and 0 after, the edit
re-read FROM DISK with the new text present and the old absent, byte delta printed)

  B1  validate min(caps)     -> min(caps[:1])        +4 B  RED test_validate.py
  B2  validate min(caps)     -> min(caps[-1:])       +5 B  RED test_validate.py
  B3  validate caps_ix       -> caps_ix[:1]          +4 B  RED test_validate.py
  B4  validate rule 6 min    -> min(caps_ix[-1:])    +5 B  RED test_validate.py
  B5  validate rule 5 msg    -> min(caps_ix[:1])     +4 B  RED test_validate.py
  B6  validate rule 5b msg   -> min(caps_ix[-1:])    +5 B  RED test_validate.py
  B7  CONTROL: weakest -> max(0.0, weakest)         +10 B  GREEN, as intended
  R3a peakguard max(floors)  -> min(floors)           0 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R3b peakguard max(floors)  -> max(floors[-2:])     +5 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R3c main call site packs   -> self.packs[:2]       +4 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R4a main pack_floor_soc    -> vals[:2]             +4 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R4b main pack_floor_soc    -> vals[-2:]            +5 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R4c main pack_floor_soc    -> vals[:3]             +4 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R4d main cycle() any(...)  -> self.inverters[:1]   +4 B  RED test_watchdog.py

B1-B6 are caught by the BEHAVIOURAL set in test_validate.py, before the pin is reached.
B7 is a deliberate no-op control: `max(0.0, weakest)` is `weakest` for weakest > 0, and
it stays green, so the battery is not merely red for everything.

R3a is a ZERO-byte delta, so the shipped function was called both ways as well:
  packs floors [15.0, 30.0, 20.0], peak_soc_floor 15
  binding_soc_floor(...) = 30.0   the 0-byte mutant would answer 15.0   (+15.0 pp)
  -> the site would discharge to 15 % while pack-b's own BMS cuts out at 30 %.

⚠️ PRODUCTION IS DEGENERATE ON THE FLOOR AXIS. SPIKE-04: pack A and pack B BOTH floor
at 10 %, so a differing floor exists ONLY in the fixtures. That is the argument for
keeping them, not for simplifying them - collapsing them deletes the only data in this
repository that can see the reduction at all. Restated in config.yaml's example, in the
probe and in the fixtures.

⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12). Every second-unit figure here -
4600 W FROM ITS DATASHEET, 15 % illustrative, the whole roster SET - is SIMULATED and
labelled. Only inverter A's 10 % is read off hardware.

REBASED onto 67e649a. Two conflicts with SPIKE-04a, both in the blocks this card had
rewritten (config.yaml's roster example and the probe's C/D sections). Resolved to carry
BOTH claims, and the probe was RE-RUN rather than hand-merged: `all cases passed` on
ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0, transcript updated with the
date. MUTATION.md habit 8 - a committed transcript stitched together out of two runs is
not a measurement.

Suite: 19/19 green in goodwe-addon-ci, mounted :ro, bytecode purged and verified 0
before and after. CI-06: test_peakguard.py run four times in isolation, green each time
(288 ok lines); test_validate.py three times, green each time.

MUTATION.md gains habits 12 and 13: build the instrument once the same shape has been
found twice AND make it discover its own scope, and say what the instrument cannot see
with sizes in the same breath.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 05:36:16 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 8beba0a3e7 SAFETY-32 round 4: the same family at the SIBLING ARGUMENT, and the family enumerated
Rounds 2 and 3 hardened the FLOOR axis - the max inside binding_soc_floor(),
the roster handed to it, Controller.packs, pack_floor_pct()'s conjunction.
peakguard.decide() is handed a SECOND reduction over the same roster beside it,
soc=self.pack_floor_soc, and peakguard.py's own docstring names the two as a
pair. Three rewrites of Controller.pack_floor_soc were green across all 19 files
on 52380c0 and again after the rebase onto 3934ad7:

    min(float(v) for v in vals)  ->  ... vals[:2]   +4 bytes
                                 ->  ... vals[-2:]  +5 bytes
                                 ->  ... vals[:3]   +4 bytes

while [:1], [-1:], [1:], [:-1], max() and the mean were all red. The suite's
separating power on the SoC axis stopped at exactly N=2 - the state the floor
axis was in before round 3.

It changes a real answer: three packs at 50/60/11 %, emptiest THIRD, answers
11.0 shipped and 50.0 mutated. The site is then graded for discharge PERMISSION
against a pack 39 points fuller than the emptiest and spends a pack its own BMS
stops, through sim/inject.py which runs no validator rule.

Round 3's machinery transfers directly. New test_peakguard.py part 12i:
- six REAL Controller.cycle()s, emptiest pack at every position of a three-pack
  roster and both positions of a two-pack one, observable read off
  PeakDecision.soc; cut-outs held flat so the floor axis cannot move the answers
- computed slice and non-slice tables, printed, red naming any live survivor
- a LENGTH SWEEP over the real property, 78 rosters of 1..12 real inverters,
  closing head/tail widths 1-11 and asserting width 12 is unreached
- a NONE-GUARD sweep over the same 78
- THREE exact structural pins: the vals comprehension iterates the bare
  self.inverters, and both any() and min() reduce the whole vals - closing every
  slice width at every roster length, which no bounded fixture can

SPIKE-04: pack B is 4 x Dyness DL5.0C, DoD 90 -> floor 10 % [FROM DATASHEET AND
SERIAL - inverter B does not exist and nothing about it is measured]. Pack A is
DoD 90 -> 10 % and that one IS measured. So production is DEGENERATE on the
floor axis and a differing floor exists ONLY in the fixtures - which is the
argument for keeping them, not for simplifying them. Recorded in CHANGELOG and
DECISIONS so nobody later collapses them to one number. The SoC axis has no such
degeneracy.

AND THE FAMILY, not the member. Every reduction over self.inverters/self.packs
in Controller was found from the AST and mutated to a slice against the full
suite. Eighteen were already graded. FOUR were not, and three of them are
SAFETY-30's, all any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in self.inverters), each +4 bytes
and green across 19 files - because the only fixture that reached them was a
roster of ONE, where self.inverters[:1] IS self.inverters:

- cycle()'s stale-input hold: a LATCHED unit must take the roster past it or its
  failsafe SET stops being re-filed the moment a poll is missed
- publish()'s status vocabulary: a site holding an inverter at 0 W published
  "running"
- status_payload()'s banner: the one headline on the page

New test_watchdog.py part 8 grades all three with the latch at EACH position
plus a no-latch counterfactual. New part 12j pins all 26 roster comprehensions
in Controller to iterating the roster WHOLE, so a reduction added over a slice
anywhere in the class is red on the line it is written, with no fixture needed.

Two rows reported OPEN rather than closed: _grade_store_migration()'s second
disjunct (now red on 12j, argued equivalent because a unit tripped at startup
implies its namespaced key is set) and cycle()'s undeliverable-unit LOG LINE,
where sorted(...)[:1] is still green - it truncates names in one event message;
the refusal itself is a different expression and is graded.

MUTATION.md gains habits 10 and 11: a fixture of N members cannot separate two
reductions that agree on N, and mutate the SIBLINGS of anything you harden.

No shipped behaviour changed - tests and documentation only. 19/19 green;
all three named survivors and all round-3 mutations verified RED.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 03:01:57 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a4c95f83ce SAFETY-32 round 3: a fixture of N packs cannot separate reductions that agree on N
Both blockers were the recurring defect sitting inside the fix written to close
it: a check whose TEXT claims more than its FIXTURE can observe. Both survived a
green 19-file suite on 8501e05.

  max(floors) -> max(floors[-2:])   +5 bytes.  12c2's only counterfactual raised
  the LAST pack, and every window ending at the roster's end follows the last
  pack. The check said "the reduction reads every entry"; the data reached "it
  reads the last entry".

  self.packs -> self.packs[:2]      +4 bytes.  All three 12g runs drove a TWO-pack
  roster, where [:2] IS the roster. The check said "what is reduced is the ROSTER
  and not a POSITION in it"; the true claim was the narrower "no SINGLE-POSITION
  slice passes all three runs".

The prose is cut back to what the old data reaches, and new data added for the
rest. No app/ file is touched - app/peakguard.py and app/main.py are byte-identical
to 8501e05.

12c2 - the pure function:
  * a ROSTER SET: the same four simulated cut-outs with the deepest moved to each
    of the four positions.
  * a computed FAMILY TABLE of fourteen rewrites, printed, with the roster that
    kills each. A member with an empty kill list takes the check RED naming it.
  * a LENGTH SWEEP: 78 rosters, lengths 1-12, deepest at every position of each.
    Closes every head window max(floors[:w]) and tail window max(floors[-w:]) of
    width 1-11 in one property.

12g - the call site:
  * _floor_reaching_decide() takes *floors; extra units join through the same
    second_inverter() hook.
  * THREE-pack runs with the deep cut-out at index 0, 1 and 2. Every positional
    slice of a three-pack roster drops a position, and the run whose deep pack
    sits there answers the option where the roster answers the cut-out.
  * a POSITIONAL-SLICE TABLE computed against the REAL Controller.packs each of
    the six cycles ran and the REAL PeakDecision.soc_floor it produced.
  * an EXACT STRUCTURAL PIN on the roster argument's identity. Not the substring
    test round 2 removed: "self.packs" in expr is TRUE of every slice;
    ast.unparse(arg) == "self.packs" is FALSE of all of them.

THE GENERAL LAW, and why the pin is there: a fixture of N packs cannot separate
two reductions that agree on N packs, and the regress does not terminate in a
fixture. [:1] needed two packs, [:2] three, [:3] four. This round's own battery
found self.packs[:3] (+4) and self.packs[-3:] (+5) surviving all six behavioural
runs; the structural pin is what closes them, and one more pack would only have
moved the hole.

Battery: 46 mutations over the reduction, the call site, Controller.packs and
pack_floor_pct()'s conjunction. Bytecode purged and counted 23 -> 0 for each.
43 red, 3 survivors, all three recorded:
  max(floors[:12]) / max(floors[-12:])  NOT CAUGHT - needs a 13-pack roster,
                                        reported with its size, row 27.
  max(set(floors))                      EQUIVALENT - max is duplicate-invariant.
(list(reversed(self.packs)) is equivalent too and is red on the structural pin.)

In-process mutation rows 24-27 record all of it, including the not-caught one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 03:01:57 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 ffbabea8ce SAFETY-32 fix round: grade the reduction on packs whose floors DIFFER
AC 6 was not met for the reduction main.py actually hands decide(). The
reviewer removed the per-pack grading twice and the 19-file suite stayed green
both times. No shipped behaviour changes here - app/ is untouched. What changes
is what observes it.

WHY BOTH SURVIVED, and it is this repository's recurring defect landing on this
card's own Decision 2: under any rule-8-valid config every pack's
pack_floor_pct() equals peak_soc_floor, so `floors` is a list of IDENTICAL
numbers and max/min/first/last are four spellings of one answer. The only check
using a cut-out ABOVE the EMS floor - 12c's `_n1_deep` - ran on a roster of ONE,
where every reduction agrees. So no check ever evaluated binding_soc_floor() on
two packs whose floors differ. And the degeneracy is not a defence: this PR's own
argument ("unreachable is a claim about today's rule ordering, and
validate_startup_config() is also sim/inject.py's entry point") justifies writing
the reduction and equally obliges grading it.

  * test_peakguard.py part 12c2 - NEW. binding_soc_floor() on a roster whose
    per-pack floors ALL DIFFER: four SIMULATED cut-outs 30/25/40/35 %, each
    strictly above peak_soc_floor, so max (40), min (25), first (30), last (35)
    and the mean (32.5) are five different numbers and the extremes sit at
    INTERIOR roster positions. Two packs structurally cannot separate those -
    there max==last and min==first - and neither can three; four is the smallest
    roster that can. Precondition is its own check (habit 1); the counterfactual
    raises ONE pack - the last, neither extreme - past the old maximum and the
    answer follows (habit 7); peak_soc_floor is then lifted above every cut-out
    to grade the other side of the conjunction.
  * test_peakguard.py part 12g - REWRITTEN as behaviour (habit 4). The old
    assertion was `"self.packs" in <the unparsed call site>`, which `self.packs[:1]`
    still satisfies. It now drives REAL Controller.cycle()s on a two-pack roster,
    both packs at the same SoC, and reads PeakDecision.soc_floor - the argument,
    echoed back by the shipped decide(). The cut-outs are the only thing varied,
    and the SAME PAIR is carried in BOTH ORDERS.
  * ⚠️ TWO MORE SURVIVORS, found by this round's own battery and recorded rather
    than quietly repaired. (a) The first cut of 12g varied only pack B's cut-out,
    so `self.packs[-1:]` (+5 bytes) agreed with the roster on both runs and stayed
    green across all 19 files; the swapped pair closes it, and between the two
    directions no single-position slice passes all three runs. (b)
    binding_soc_floor()'s EMPTY-roster branch rewritten to `return None`
    (-43 bytes) was green too - a defensive branch nothing in the suite reached.
    Both directions of it are pinned now.
  * wired_over_limit() gained a prepare(ctl) hook, inside its retry loop so every
    attempt grades the same site.
  * In-process mutation rows 22, 22b and 23 record all four survivors.

Nine further source mutations went through the harness on the fixed tree
(binding_soc_floor -> floors[0] / floors[-1], pack_floor_pct conjoining with
min, pack_permissions grading against packs[0], `any` -> `all` on the unknown
floor, Controller.packs reversed, decide(soc=) taking inverters[0].soc, and the
two survivors above). Seven were red on first run; the two survivors are now red
as well. Three of the nine have a ZERO byte delta and still went red, which is
the direction stale bytecode cannot fabricate - and the harness purged anyway.

MANDATORY PROOF, all in the CI image over a tree rsynced to a plain path and
bind-mounted :ro, bytecode entry count printed before and after the purge:
each of the four mutations now takes test_peakguard.py RED, and the unmutated
tree is 19/19 green (twice, plus test_peakguard.py five times in isolation -
card CI-06's flake did not reappear). The zero-byte one was proved to have RUN rather than
assumed: dis.get_instructions LOAD_GLOBALs were [float, pack_floor_pct, any,
min] and binding_soc_floor() returned 25.0 on the 12c2 roster where the shipped
code returns 40.0.

No measurement of inverter B appears anywhere. It does not physically exist.
Every second-pack and fourth-pack figure added here is SIMULATED and labelled at
its definition; only inverter A's 10 % is read off hardware. No hardware was
touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 03:01:57 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 f9e7fbf86d SAFETY-32: bms_soc_floor per pack, rule 8 per unit
`bms_soc_floor` describes A BATTERY, not a site. At two packs of different
models the cut-outs differ, and one number for both graded the shallower pack
against the deeper one's BMS - so a site with cut-outs of 10 % and 30 % under
`peak_soc_floor: 20` STARTED, and the guard would command a forced discharge
that pack B's BMS, not the operator's floor, is the thing that stops. That is
rule 8's own failure mode, reached through rule 8.

Scoped to the card's third bullet, per its PM PROOFREAD: the aggregate
anti-windup (DEV-02) and per-instance `achievable_w` (CFG-04) were verified as
already shipped and are untouched.

* config.yaml: `bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` REQUIRED per `inverters:` entry.
  Nothing is inherited; the flat key stays the single-inverter shape's own
  cut-out. A per-entry DEFAULT was declined - a default is one number for every
  pack, which is this card's defect - and the decision is recorded.
* inverter.py: `Inverter.bms_soc_floor`; an entry that states none gets None,
  not a borrowed number and not 0.0 (the most permissive value the key has).
* peakguard.py: `Pack`, `pack_floor_pct()`, `pack_permissions()`,
  `binding_soc_floor()`. `discharge_permitted()` is unchanged and is still the
  one place the question is answered.
* validate.py: `unit_bms_floors_indexed()` carries the ROSTER index; rule 8
  grades EVERY unit and NAMES the one it refuses. Graded with the offender
  SECOND and with the same two numbers in the other order.
* main.py: `Controller.packs`; `decide(soc_floor=...)` is the per-pack
  reduction of the same option; the floor-limited notification names the pack
  that stopped the site. `pack_floor_soc` - the emptiest pack, and its
  None-on-missing behaviour - is untouched.
* tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py: RE-RUN and repaired. The required key broke
  §C and left §D printing PASS on a refusal about a different key. §D is now an
  isolated counterfactual over an accepted merged baseline, one key varied,
  asserting the key name. `all cases passed` on 2026.08.0.

Stated rather than hidden: under any config rule 8 accepts the per-pack FLOOR
reduces to `peak_soc_floor` for every pack. The reduction is written for
`unit_caps_indexed()`'s reason and graded on both sides - 1775 rule-8-valid
pairs answer the option, the pair rule 8 refuses answers the cut-out.
`peak_soc_floor` is still one number for the site, so the "deeper pack
needlessly withheld" half is filed as an open question, not closed.

Full 19-file suite green. Twelve source mutations through
tools/mutation_run.sh: eleven red, one argued survivor. The battery also found
`_flat_bms_floor()` defaulting in two places, each covering for the other.

No measurement of inverter B appears anywhere: it does not exist yet. Every
second-pack figure is simulated and labelled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 03:01:57 +02:00
admin 67e649ad6b Merge pull request 'SPIKE-04a: inverter B is 4600 W FROM ITS DATASHEET, and the three documented copies are pinned' (#49) from SPIKE-04a into release/1.0 2026-09-05 02:55:24 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a9993aeda2 SPIKE-04a: inverter B is 4600 W FROM ITS DATASHEET, and the copies are pinned
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m51s
The desk half of SPIKE-04. No control behaviour changes; this is documentation
and the check that stops it drifting again.

Three places stated inverter B's rating - config.yaml's commented roster
example, DOCS.md's, and tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py's "a blob an operator
would POST" - and all three said 3000 W, a number nobody had measured or read
off anything. The owner supplied B's model and serial on 2026-09-04: a GoodWe
GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, max charging and discharging power
4600 W. Serial characters 6-8 are `ESU`, platform 105 / AA55, so SPIKE-01 does
not gate this site. All three copies now read 4600.

⚠️ 4600 W IS FROM A DATASHEET AND IS NOT A MEASUREMENT, and the one ambiguity
is recorded rather than guessed. The datasheet prints it under BATTERY INPUT
DATA, so it is probably DC, while max_w is graded against 0x0518 - the
inverter's own AC power. If it is DC the AC ceiling is nearer 4324 W. Neither
reading is written in as fact; SAFETY-20's min(max_w, dev_max) already bounds
it correctly under either, once dev_max is read off the unit, so `max_w: 4600`
is what an operator should configure today. goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b carries the
full record with the date and the method on every figure.

A NEW CHECK, BECAUSE A DOCUMENTATION FIX WITHOUT ONE DRIFTS AGAIN.
test_validate.py now pins all three documented rosters: findable, in agreement,
and equal to 4600 - with an explicit len(...) == 3 guard so that a regex which
stopped matching cannot leave "they all agree" green on the two sites still
read. It also grades the PROVENANCE beside the number (the datasheet, the
0x0518 it is graded against, and the 4324 W the DC reading would make it)
WITHIN 2500 characters of the roster rather than file-wide.

⚠️ The first version of that provenance check searched whole files and was
ALREADY VACUOUS on two of them: 0x0518 appeared once in config.yaml and once in
DOCS.md before this card, for unrelated reasons, so `"0x0518" in src` was green
no matter what happened next to B's rating. That is a check whose data cannot
reach the failure it names, in the file that exists to complain about them. It
is fixed, and the window is what fixes it - deleting the caveat beside the
number now goes red even where the same token survives elsewhere in the file.
The windowed version immediately found that the DOCS.md caveat did not name
0x0518 at all; DOCS.md now says it.

Four mutations, bytecode purged and counted at 0 before and after each, all
RED (two of them 0-byte deltas that change a printed answer):
  M1  probe's operator blob 4600 -> 3000        0 B   RED (value + agreement)
  M2  DOCS.md's DC/AC caveat deleted         -157 B   RED (provenance)
  M3  config.yaml alone 4600 -> 4324            0 B   RED (agreement)
  M4  probe entity renamed, regex finds nothing       RED (the vacuity guard)
Restored, green again. The probe itself was re-run against Supervisor
2026.08.0's own AppOptions validator with the 4600: all cases passed, exit 0.

⚠️ THE TEST FIXTURES KEEP 3000 W ON PURPOSE AND NOW SAY WHY AT THE LINE.
test_inverter.py, test_maintenance.py, test_peakguard.py and test_watchdog.py
build a second inverter at 3000 W against A's 5000 W. The only property those
checks consume is that B's number is unmistakably not A's, and the real pair is
a 400 W gap - narrower than slew_w, inside the range where an off-by-one-unit
bug and ordinary control arithmetic produce indistinguishable numbers.
Collapsing them onto the real values would buy realism those checks do not use
and cost them their separating power, which is exactly what test_peakguard.py's
own §10g PRECONDITION exists to prevent. Their comments no longer call 3000 W a
hypothesis about B's rating; they call it illustrative, and not a placeholder
either - the placeholder era ended on 2026-09-04.

Also recorded in the changelog for the cards that own them: 94 % battery-to-AC
=> ~88 % round trip => ~360 W burned continuously to circulate 3 kW, which is
the number SAFETY-31 argues its threshold from without having one; < 13 W night
self-consumption per unit, which nothing accounts for; and the A/B asymmetry in
opposite directions (~33 % more energy, ~8 % less power), which means MAINT-05's
12 h drain timeout was derived on A and should be re-checked against B.

⚠️ Honest survivors:
- goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b, where all of this is actually recorded, is graded by
  nothing here. Rewriting its 16 occurrences of 4600 to 3000 and turning every
  FROM DATASHEET label into MEASURED ON THE UNIT leaves all 19 files GREEN.
  This CI cannot fetch admin/goodwe - private, and GITHUB_TOKEN is minted for
  this repository only, as .gitea/workflows/checks.yml already states - so the
  cross-repo check is not buildable here.
- No check can see whether 4600 is the RIGHT number. Everything above pins a
  datasheet reading against itself. Only the bench half of SPIKE-04 can say
  whether the unit agrees, and the DC-vs-AC ambiguity is the live example.
- The constant is still named B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS in four test files, which
  reads as a hypothesis about B's rating when it is now an illustrative
  fixture. It is left alone deliberately: renaming ~20 sites across
  test_peakguard.py and test_inverter.py would collide hard with the open
  SAFETY-32 pull request, which rewrites 1255 lines of the first. The comment
  directly above each definition says what the value is and is not.

Suite: 19/19 green in goodwe-addon-ci, mounted :ro, bytecode purged and
verified 0 before and after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 22:19:31 +02:00
admin 3934ad7ea5 Merge pull request 'MAINT-05: one recalibration per pack, and only one pack moves power at a time' (#47) from MAINT-05 into release/1.0 2026-09-04 21:39:25 +02:00
40 changed files with 16054 additions and 490 deletions
+901
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,630 @@
# Changelog
## 0.7.0
⚠️ **SCHEMA CHANGE, AND IT IS WHY THIS IS A MINOR BUMP RATHER THAN A PATCH.**
[[SAFETY-32]] adds `bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` as a **required** per-entry key on
the `inverters` roster - no trailing `?`. A config that declares a roster and
omits it on any entry is REFUSED at startup. An install running `inverters: []`,
which is every single-inverter install including the reference one, is
unaffected: the flat `bms_soc_floor` still describes the one pack.
CFG-04 recorded the rule this follows - the Supervisor keys the built image by
`version:`, so a schema change without a bump is a schema nobody reads.
Contents, in merge order since 0.6.0 (`2d025ee`):
| | |
|---|---|
| `3934ad7` | MAINT-05 - one recalibration per pack, migration graded against the roster |
| `67e649a` | SPIKE-04a - inverter B and pack B recorded, from datasheet and serial |
| `3993f9f` | SAFETY-32 - per-pack `bms_soc_floor`, rule 8 per unit, package-wide roster pin |
| `f72c48d` | UX-01 - add-on configuration in English and Dutch |
| `86eaef2` | TEL-07 - a second MQTT device for inverter B; A's identity byte-identical |
| `4482cd8` | SAFETY-41 - the clamp alarm stops narrating normal anti-windup |
⚠️ **0.6.0 WAS NEVER SECTIONED.** Its content sits below this heading rather than
under one of its own, because the bump shipped without cutting the section. That
is a defect in this file, not in the release: the deployed 0.6.0 is `2d025ee` and
the table above is what is new since it. Splitting it retroactively would mean
guessing a boundary; saying so is more useful than a guess.
## Unreleased
⚠️ **THE OUTPUT FREEZE NOW HAS AN EXIT, AND ONLY WHERE IT CANNOT END ON ITS OWN
([[SAFETY-13]]).** While the loop is frozen the command's magnitude may fall but
never rise; at `prev_w == 0` there is no magnitude left to fall, so a charge
cannot start. That refusal is deliberate - the inverter reporting power we did
not command means another writer is on the actuator, the §1.5 non-goal - and it
is kept. What it did not have was an END: nothing cleared it but the other
writer leaving.
The exit is now explicit, and *which* freezes get one is the decision rather
than *how long*:
- A divergence a **limit** could have produced - the inverter doing less than
the command, in the command's own direction - **clears itself**, because the
command is pinned at something the inverter can reach. It gets no exit, and
that is release/1.0's behaviour kept unchanged.
- A divergence a limit could **not** have produced - the inverter overshooting
the command, or producing the opposite sign - may not clear itself at all, so
it gets one. It releases once the divergence has outlasted the plant's own
measured settling time: `SETTLE_CYCLES` = **12** cycles at the measured tick.
⚠️ **THE BOUND COMES FROM THE SLOWER OF THE TWO DIRECTIONS THE PLANT WAS
MEASURED IN.** `NOTES.md` §5.10 timed the same 1.78 kW step both ways - ~18 s
up, ~23 s down - so `PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S` (23 s) joins `PLANT_SETTLE_S` (18 s)
as a named constant. SAFETY-39 uses 18 correctly, because its bound is a
*refusal* and the looser number refuses less; this bound asks how long the plant
may still be the *explanation*, and there the longer number is the safe one. A
bound of 9 derived from 18 fires the exit on a **single inverter with nothing
else on the bus** - measured in the container, 62 of 272 load-step pairs at the
plant's own measured shape, against 2 at 12.
⚠️ **`freeze-released` IS A PLACE TO START LOOKING, NOT A FINDING.** It says the
divergence outlasted the plant's measured settling time. It is **not** proof of
a second writer: a large load or PV swing can leave our own power coasting
outside our own command's interval, and a plant slower than the one that was
measured does the same. DOCS.md now gives the innocent causes first and the
second writer only when the state *stands*.
⚠️ **RELEASING THE OUTPUT FREEZE DOES NOT UNFREEZE THE LOOP.** The integrator
freeze is untouched, so the command can only walk, one slew step per cycle,
toward an accumulator that stopped accumulating when the freeze engaged.
Measured at the live install's shape (`max_w 5000`, `slew_w 400`,
`target_grid_w -10`) with another writer holding the pack at +700 W and 2 kW of
export standing: the command holds at 0 W, starts on the twelfth saturated
cycle and settles at **-1190 W** against a frozen integrator of -1194 W, not at
the 5000 W rail. On `release/1.0` @ `c8dcb38` the same run held **0.0 W on every
cycle**, for as long as the other writer stayed.
⚠️ **THIS IS NOT A REGRESSION FIX AND IT ESCALATES AT TWO INVERTERS.** The
unbounded block is `release/1.0` behaviour, confirmed cycle for cycle against
SAFETY-04's branch. At a roster of two, `actual_w` is the SITE SUM, so the
comparison is a site command against two units' power and one unit still moving
after the other has stopped can put the site into the block with no external
actor at all. ⚠️ That escalation is read from the code and from single-unit
runs; **it is not measured on two inverters.** Inverter B does not physically
exist yet and `sim/plantsim.py`'s `INVERTER_B` is `INVERTER_A` copied with
`measured=False`, so any two-inverter figure would be two copies of A.
Graded against `release/1.0` over the 3780-case sweep in `test_control.py`:
**3267 cases bit-identical, 432 releases, 27 of those change the command** -
every one a charge from `prev_w == 0` that `release/1.0` refused to start - and
**81 differ in the saturation counter alone**, because its ceiling moved with
the bound from 10 to 13. That ceiling change also removes a degenerate setting:
`config.yaml` accepts `saturation_cycles` up to 10, which is now strictly below
the release bound, so **no accepted configuration can stop the block engaging**.
At the old bound of 9 a setting of 9 or 10 deleted it silently.
⚠️ **A PER-INVERTER POWER READING THAT HAS STOPPED FOLLOWING ITS OWN COMMAND IS
NOW `None`, NOT A HELD NUMBER ([[SAFETY-37]]).** `Inverter.batt` (register
`0x0518`) goes through a freshness gate: unchanged for >= 35 s *while* the
standing command is over 250 W *and* has travelled over 250 W since the reading
last moved. A stale reading is a **missing input**, which §11.1 rule 1 already
answers with 0 W and keeps commanding.
**This is a behaviour change at the shipped roster of one, and it is deliberate.**
Before it, a frozen power register read as a healthy measurement for ever - which
is [[HW-01]], where a value held for 6 h 25 m while the pack drained to its floor
and every detector read healthy. A healthy install is byte-identical: sixty reads
of a dithering register under a reversing command all reach the consumers
unchanged, asserted rather than assumed. A false verdict fails toward 0 W, behind
the existing `stale_input_s` hold, and clears itself the moment the register
reports a different value.
At two or more inverters it also removes two false alarms that had no gate at
all: [[SAFETY-30]]'s per-unit sign check no longer trips on a frozen reading
(measured: it trips without the gate and NEVER with it - the tick index is
deliberately not quoted, because it is counted on the wall clock inside
`cycle()` and is therefore load-dependent; the checkable statement is the
presence or absence of the trip, which part 3 grades), and
[[SAFETY-31]]'s circulating-power sensor reports `None` instead of a loop that is
not happening.
**No new configuration key, and no schema change.** The bound is derived from
`circulation_hold_s` and `unit_sign_disagree_*`, which the checks read out of
`config.yaml` at both ends - so moving either default takes the gate red rather
than leaving it silently too slow. `DECISIONS/SAFETY-37-freshness-policy.md`
carries the derivation, what [[TEL-06]] and [[TEL-08]] still owe, and three
named survivors - including the largest: **this detects a value that STOPPED, not
a value that is WRONG.**
⚠️ **`slew_w` IS A RATIO TO THE RAIL NOW, AND ITS DEFAULT CHANGED FROM 1000 TO 0
([[SAFETY-39]]).** `0` does not mean "off" and does not mean "unset" - it means
**follow `max_w`**, exactly as `integrator_max_w: 0` already does, and resolves
to `max_w / 9`: 222 W at the shipped 2000 W cap, 556 W at the live install's
5000, 1067 W at a ~9600 W two-inverter site. The 9 is
`PLANT_SETTLE_S / LOOP_TICK_S` - an 18 s measured step response against a 2 s
meter tick - so the loop takes the plant's own settling time to cross its whole
output range at any rail.
**An install that has never set `slew_w` will therefore command smaller steps
than it did on 0.7.0, and will converge more slowly after a large disturbance.**
That is the point rather than a side effect: `slew_w: 1000` was derived against
a **1500 W** clamp in 2026-08 and the live install has run it against 5000 since,
which crosses the whole range in 10 s against an 18 s plant. Measured on the
owner's system 2026-09-05: a 3.4 kW export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000 W in
five ticks, the battery to -5154 W past a 5000 VA rating, and the grid from
3.4 kW of **export** to 2.8 kW of **import**.
An explicit `slew_w` is still accepted and is never silently reduced. What is
new is that a value **faster than the rail allows** is now **REFUSED AT STARTUP**
(`validate.py` rule 10), graded against the ROSTER SUM - so `slew_w: 1000` with
`max_w: 5000` will not start. Set it to `0`, or to any value at or below
`max_w / 9`. Slower is always accepted, including the interim 400 the reference
install has run since 2026-09-05.
⚠️ **This does NOT fix the over-absorption, and the record says so at length.**
Re-deriving the slew removes the >= 900 W setpoint step; the loop still absorbs
~1 kW more than the site needs on a large export step, because that is a `gain`
term and `gain: 0.6` was measured and deliberately left alone. See
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md` §6, and do not read this entry as
more than it says.
**`test_peakguard.py` answered two of its own checks with the wall clock
(CI-06).** The file sits on the required `checks / unit (pull_request)` context
and had a measured ~20 % flake rate. It cost a wrong merge diagnosis (parents
green, merge red — read as a semantic merge conflict, it was the flake), a false
red on two reviewers' CONTROL runs, and a false "mutation caught" that reached a
merged card in four places. **A flaky check does not waste a re-run; it
manufactures evidence for whichever hypothesis the reader already holds.**
Both causes are the control law's own gain `900 / remaining` applied to a
wall-clock gap the file never intended to have. Neither fix widens anything.
* **The cross-time projection.** The "one cycle of the intent form is exactly
the delivered form plus the command standing on the wire" check decided the
intent form from a **second** `PeakTracker.project(..., datetime.now())` taken
after the real cycle had returned, and compared it against a floor decided
from the **first** projection — three lines under a comment saying both run
"against the same frozen projection". `excess = 900 × (projected − ceiling) /
remaining` moves at `excess / remaining` W/s, so at a 1500 W floor the 1.5 W
tolerance bought exactly **`remaining / 1000` seconds**: 333 ms with 880 s
left in the quarter, **6 ms with 10 s left**. The gap between the two
statements measured **12.7–39.5 ms** over 26 instrumented runs. The check was
decided by *where in the quarter it ran*. It now keeps the `Projection`
**object** the real cycle graded and decides both forms from it — the clock is
out of the comparison and the tolerance is **exact**, not widened. Measured on
a real cycle: re-deciding the delivered form from that object reproduces the
controller's own floor to **0.000000000000 W**.
* **The fixture's own room.** `wired_over_limit()` laid telegrams with
`range(0, span + 1, 5)`, leaving **0–5 s of the open block uncovered by
construction**, and `excess` multiplies an uncovered second back up by
`900 / remaining`. Measured on the shipped file: at **12 s of remaining a
fixture that asked for a 1500 W floor delivered 613 W (−59 %)**, and at 2 s
the guard **did not engage at all** — which fails "the real cycle files the
peak claim", "…and the number written to the inverter is the guard's floor"
and "the STATUS PAGE row for a floor-limited guard" **together**. The
four-attempt retry could not help: four attempts take ~40 ms and all land in
the same dying quarter. Fixed with one telegram stamped at `now` (what a real
meter does, and what the docstring already claimed) plus `FIXTURE_ROOM_S`,
**derived** from the 1 % accuracy the helper promises rather than picked:
`net_w × lag / (remaining × want) ≤ 0.01 − lag/900` → **23.6 s → 24 s**, at
the measured 0.1 s worst-case lag.
**Nothing was skipped, disabled or marked xfail** — the file still carries all
of SAFETY-07 and SAFETY-25's forced-discharge SoC floor, and it gains a check:
the delivered form re-decided from the cycle's own projection must reproduce the
real controller's number to the bit, which pins the test's `decide()` kwargs as
main.py's actual call rather than an approximation of it. **One tolerance got
stricter** (1.5 W → exact), because removing the clock made exactness possible.
**`site_standing` — the one quantity BOTH site guards are asked about — is now
pinned by a fixture whose per-unit shares cannot answer for it (SAFETY-38).**
`app/main.py`'s `site_standing = float(sum(standing.values()))` is the first
argument of [[SAFETY-30]]'s **latching, site-stopping** sign detector *and* the
`commanded_w` handed to [[SAFETY-18]]'s `looks_frozen()`. It was pinned by
**nothing**, and three mutations of it disarmed both guards with the whole suite
green. **This card changes coverage only: not one byte of `app/` moves — the
shipped `sum` is correct and must not be "fixed".**
* **⭐ THE FIXTURE THE SUITE COULD NOT BUILD: per-unit shares EACH BELOW the
site gate whose SUM clears it.** Two simulated units rated 220 W and 280 W,
both obeying exactly, inverted gain, house importing 2000 W — the site
commands **−500 W against a +2500 W meter** and no single share clears the
300 W gate. That is the case the site detector exists for, and it is the only
arrangement that can separate `sum` from the mean and from the largest share.
`test_watchdog.py` part 9a.
* **WHY THE EXISTING FIXTURE COULD NOT.** `_sign_site`, the suite's only N≥2
site fixture, runs shares of about −2500 W **each** — every one individually
over the gate — so sum, mean and largest-share all agree on it. *Its values
happen to be equal, and a check comparing two things that happen to be equal
cannot see the difference it names.* `MUTATION.md` habit 4, ninth instance,
inside the site half of the very card that names it.
* **FOUR CANDIDATE REDUCTIONS, FOUR DISTINCT ANSWERS, ONE OVER THE GATE** —
`sum` −500, mean −250, `max(key=abs)` −280, `[0]` −220 — and that is asserted
as a precondition, not described. The asymmetric ratings are load-bearing:
equal shares collapse three of the four onto one number, and the **smaller**
unit is first so `[0]` stays distinct from `max(key=abs)`. The **gate is the
shipped 300 W**; only the hold is shortened, because the hold is a wall clock.
* **⭐ THE SECOND CONSUMER IS COVERED, NOT SCOPED OUT.** The same value is
`looks_frozen()`'s `commanded_w` at `main.py:1926`. At the same roster the
site rail is 0.95 × 500 = **475 W**, so `sum` = 500 W rails it while 250, 280
and 220 do not. Shipped: the peak guard goes blind on SAFETY-18's conjunction
and files `floor_w = 0.0`. Under both surviving mutations it is **not blind at
all and files no floor**, so the battery may keep importing through a quarter
whose billed average is unobservable. `test_watchdog.py` part 9b. The open
quarter is deliberately backfilled with the stuck reading so the mutant cannot
reach the same action by the *coverage* route and mask the difference.
* **AT N=1 NOTHING CHANGES, AND IT IS ASSERTED.** On a real one-inverter
controller `standing` has one entry, so `sum`, the mean, `max(key=abs)` and
`[0]` are **the same number** — all three mutations are genuinely *equivalent*
on a shipped install and no N=1 fixture could ever separate them. Printed and
checked, beside the site detector still being absent there. Part 9c.
* **⚠️ A CORRECTION, AND IT IS THE MOST USEFUL LINE IN THIS CARD.** An earlier
revision of this entry said one of the three — `list(standing.values())[0]` —
was **already closed** by [[SAFETY-32]]'s package-wide structural pin, and
told future authors not to re-cover it. **That was false.** It had been
measured **once**, that run hit `test_peakguard.py`'s [[CI-06]] flake (a
measured **~20%** false-red rate), and the red was recorded as a mutation
**kill**. Re-measured on `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2` carrying only that edit:
the **full 21-file suite is green** and `test_peakguard.py` passes **five for
five** in isolation — **the mutation survives.** The reason SAFETY-32 cannot
see it is not the shape: part 12j taints names *bound* to roster values and
lists *accumulated* in a loop, and `standing` is a dict filled by **subscript
assignment**, so it never enters the taint set and `sum(standing.values())` is
not a roster site at all. 12j's own enumeration on the mutated tree lists
`main.py:1553`, `1555`, `1690` — **not `1599`**. **All three mutations needed
this card; all three are now covered by it.** *A single red from
`test_peakguard.py` proves nothing — re-run it five times in isolation and
name the failing check.*
* **⚠️ AND A ZERO-BYTE SURVIVOR ONE LINE BELOW THE ONE THIS CARD PINNED.**
Pinning the *value* `site_standing` said nothing about **where it goes**.
Swapping the detector's first two arguments —
`evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` → `evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, …)`
— is **zero bytes** and left the tree fully green, because the check asserted
only that `"-500 W"` appeared **somewhere** in the banner. It still does:
**in the meter slot.** The swapped banner reads *"commanded +2500 W against a
meter reading −500 W"* — a site charging at −500 W into a +2500 W import, told
to the operator **exactly backwards**, on the one line somebody woken by a
latching site-stopping alarm reads first. The check now asserts the **ordered
pair** rather than a substring, and is red on it. **No `app/` change:** the
hole was in the test.
* **⭐ A SURVIVOR THIS CARD WENT LOOKING FOR AND CLOSED.**
`site_standing = float(self.target)` — the arbiter's site *target* instead of
the sum of what actually **stands on the wire** — is **−11 bytes** and
survived the full suite, because in every fixture that existed the two are the
same number. They are not when a device's reported range is narrower than its
`max_w`: the `device` claim is filed **per actuator**, so it bounds each
unit's share and never the site target. A site asking for −500 W while −250 W
stands would then take a **latching site-wide false trip** under its own
300 W gate. Closed by part 9a's device-clamped counterfactual.
* **⚠️ AND THE SAME ZERO-BYTE DEFECT ONE CALL SITE OVER — THE ONE A SHIPPED
INSTALL CAN ACTUALLY SEE.** The ordered pair went onto `main.py:1620`, the
**site** detector. That detector is armed only at N≥2, and part 9c asserts it
is **absent at a roster of one** — so on every install this add-on has, the
**per-unit** banner is the only sign-disagreement sentence that can ever be
printed, and its call at **`main.py:1560`** was still unpinned. The identical
swap there is **0 bytes** and left the tree **21/21 green**, and nothing
behavioural could ever have caught it: `disagrees()` is **symmetric** in those
two arguments (`commanded_w * against_w < 0`, `abs()` gate on both), so the
mutant takes **identical actions on every input**. What moves is the sentence
— measured, **9 emitted banner lines invert in 3 distinct sentences**,
including the one persisted to `sign_reason` and read back after a restart:
*"commanded +1000 W against its own measured power −1000 W"* becomes
*"commanded −1000 W against its own measured power +1000 W"*. Closed by the
ordered pair on **both** per-unit banners — the N≥2 `its own measured power`
one and the **N=1** `a meter reading` one — with both operands read off the
**observed cycle** rather than off the arguments the detector was handed, plus
a precondition on each that the two operands really are different and opposite
in sign. **Red on four named checks, green in the other twenty files. No
`app/` change.**
* **⭐ AND THE FAMILY IS NOW ENUMERATED BY MACHINE, because it had been
enumerated by hand twice and was short both times.**
`tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` finds every call whose argument order is
load-bearing for a **message** rather than for a decision: it renames each
parameter pair, erases every formatted string, canonicalises the commutative
operators and iterates to a **fixpoint** (the symmetry is usually one call
deep — `evaluate()` is symmetric only *through* `disagrees()`), then
classifies each sentence by where it goes. A second census covers sentences
the **caller** builds. It found **one open survivor this card does not close
and now discloses** — `rail_unreachable()`'s `dev_min`/`dev_max` at
`main.py:3208`, **0 bytes, 21/21 green**, a status-page row — and **twelve**
unpinned caller-built sentences including SAFETY-31's `circ_reason`, which is
the same shape and is also persisted. The list, the pinned status of every
member and the instrument's own blind spots are in
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md` §7.
* **⚠️ AND A LEDGER SENTENCE THIS CARD ITSELF GOT WRONG, CORRECTED WITH THE
MEASUREMENT.** An earlier revision said *"before part 9 existed, **three** of
these left the whole suite green — M1, M2 and M3 — and the remaining seven
were caught by SAFETY-30's own N≥2 checks"*. **Eight** did. Re-run one at a
time on clean `release/1.0` @ `bbc903b`, fresh copy each, bytecode purged,
byte delta and `main.py` fingerprint printed, **full 21-file suite** every
time: M1, M2, M3, M4, M7, M8, M9 and M10 are all **21/21 PASS**; only M5 and
M6 go red. It is the same species of error this round exists to fix — **a
survivor recorded as a kill** — and the file contradicted itself three times
while saying it. **And the two that ARE caught make the card's case:** M5
(`sum(abs …)`) and M6 (`-sum`) are the only two that reverse the **sign**.
Every other entry changes only the **magnitude**, and the old `_sign_site`
fixture's ~−2500 W shares put nine different magnitudes on the **same side of
the same 320 W gate**. The pre-existing coverage could see a sign and nothing
else.
* **13 mutations — 11 of that line and its call site, plus 2 zero-byte edits to
the arbiter claim wiring — each on a fresh full-repo copy mounted `:ro`,
bytecode purged by `tools/mutation_run.sh`, the edit re-read from disk and the
byte delta printed. All 13 red.** Every one was **re-run independently** in
this round rather than carried forward from the previous round's report. The
claim-wiring pair (`sign_site` and `circulation` moved from site scope to unit
scope) closes two gaps a reviewer disclosed — though **`circulation`'s kill
belongs entirely to pre-existing checks and is not claimed by this card.**
⚠️ One **false red** from `test_peakguard.py` on M10 did not reproduce in four
subsequent runs; it is CI-06's known flakiness, no claim here rests on it, and
it is recorded rather than quietly dropped — unlike the one that *was*
believed, two bullets up. Ledger, and an **enumerated list of what was not
mutated**, in `DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md` §4a, §4b and §6a.
* **⭐ ROUND 4: THE SCANNER COVERED ONE SYNTACTIC SINK AND CALLED IT THE
FAMILY, AND TWO LIVE MEMBERS WERE SITTING IN THE HOLE.** Every one of census
B's 16 members was a sentence that is **appended, assigned, or logged**. Not
one was **RETURNED** — and census A's return bucket only ever held a callee
formatting its own *parameters*, so a method formatting its own **attributes**
and handing the string back was invisible to both. That is the whole
`describe()` / `explain()` family, which is where this codebase keeps its
operator sentences. **Worse than the gap: it was in none of the five blind
spots the tool printed about itself.** The tool now scans the return sink
(census C), resolving it through the returning method's **call sites** so that
a returned *key* — `store.unit_key()`, `mqtt.unit_state_key()` — is not
mistaken for a returned *sentence*; it also scores a sentence handed to a
constructor as `reason=` or placed under a `"text"` dict key, which added
**six more caller-built members** it had been stepping past. Re-run, it
**rediscovered both of the members this round was sent to fix without being
told where to look**.
* **⭐ `ClampResult.describe()` — the clamp alarm the owner has been complaining
about all day — had a SECOND independent way to lie, and no `test_*.py`
mentioned `describe()` at all.** Transposing `requested_w` and `applied_w` in
`clamp.py:253` is a **zero-byte** edit that leaves the guard reporting a
setpoint clamped **UPWARD**, in the measured case to +9999 W by a bound whose
rating the same sentence gives as 2000 W. It is the §15 action-log row
(`main.py:1366`) **and** the ClampWatchdog notification reason
(`main.py:2452`). Measured **21/21 green** before; now **red on 4 checks** in
`test_clamp.py` part 6d, pinned on the **ordered pair** on the contiguous
literal at **both** consumers, with operands read off `ctl.target` and
`hass.writes[-1]` — what the loop asked and what the device was sent — rather
than off the `ClampResult` the swap lives in.
* **⭐ `PeakDecision.explain()` — the status-page banner — the same shape.**
`projected_w` ↔ `ceiling_w` at `peakguard.py:493`, **zero bytes**, and the
row then reads *"quarter projects 5013 W under a 2300 W ceiling"*: a quarter
**2713 W over** its ceiling, on a row whose own words say *idle* and whose own
flag says **ok**. `"peak guard idle"` appeared in no `test_*.py`. Measured
**21/21 green** before; now **red on 3 checks** in `test_peakguard.py` part 13,
pinned on the decision and on the shipped status row at `main.py:3313`.
⚠️ **A correction the ticket is owed:** the idle sentence does not reach
`main.py:3299/3302` — those are the *floor-limited* branch, where `explain()`
returns `self.reason` before the idle literal is built. It reaches
**`main.py:3313`** and, on the release edge, `main.py:1951`.
* **`test_arbiter.py`'s scope-violation check made a claim WIDER than its
assertion** — it said `scope_violations` *"names the source and the actuator
it does not belong on"* and asserted `"peak" in scope_errors[0]`, which is
still true after the two swap roles. Measured this round: **0 bytes, 21/21
green**; now red on 2 checks, pinned on the ordered pair.
* **14 more zero-byte mutations measured, and 10 SURVIVORS ARE DISCLOSED RATHER
THAN CLOSED**, each with its file fingerprint and its 21/21 verdict, in
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md` §7e–§7g: **two** in
`allocator.py`'s `UnitPlan.explain()`, three across `arbiter.py`'s two
`explain()`s, two in `tariff.py`, two in `arbitrage.py`'s trade reasons and
one in `main.py`'s SoC-floor notification. The other four of the fourteen are
kills: `allocator.py:162` was already caught by `test_alloc.py`, and
`clamp.py:253`, `peakguard.py:493` and `arbiter.py:264` are closed here. **An enumerated list with honest
gaps beats a fifth round finding a fifth instance.**
⚠️ **And the probe that grades those mutations was itself the defect, once.**
Its first cut numbered the operands **by order of appearance**, so after a
transposition the other leaf took the same number and all thirteen renders came
back **byte-identical** — which reads exactly like *the edit is inert*. Keying
the value to the **name** fixed it. A measurement comparing the swap against
itself, in the instrument this time.
* **The tool now states what it does NOT scan**, largest hole first:
`%s`-style lazy logging (`_LOG.error("… %s … %s", a, b)` puts the operands in
*arguments*, so no census here looks at them and the transposition is the same
zero-byte edit — **31 such calls across 8 modules, counted and listed by the
tool rather than asserted**), `.format()`/`%`/`+`/`.join()` sentences, a sentence that
leaves through a dict or dataclass and is rendered elsewhere, `yield`ed
sentences, message attributes outside the `reason`-shaped set, and everything
outside `app/`. Its five over/under-report gaps stay, and every census row now
prints whether the two interpolations **share a format spec** — the difference
between a transposition that is silent and one that merely looks broken.
**Inverter B gets its own MQTT device, and inverter A keeps the one it has
(TEL-07).** MQTT discovery announced **one** device, and every entity hung off
one `unique_id` prefix, so at two inverters B's per-unit telemetry had nowhere
to go. It has one now — **without touching a single entity that already
exists.**
* **⭐ A's discovery payloads are byte-identical to `release/1.0`.** Same topics,
same `unique_id`s, same payload bytes, same retain flags, in the same order —
verified by **diffing the announced payloads**, not by reading the code:
`9 topics, 0 missing, 0 changed, 0 added` at a roster of one, and
`0 missing, 0 changed, 8 added` at a roster of two. That is what protects the
live install's recorded history and the three watchdog automations that name
its entities.
* **⚠️ THE ASYMMETRY IS DELIBERATE — DO NOT "CLEAN IT UP".** The first roster
entry's per-unit rows go on **the device it already has**; every later entry
gets its **own** device (`via_device` the controller). "One device per
inverter" is tidier and is the change that renames every entity on the live
system — and because HA keeps the id it composed at first discovery, a rename
produces a **new entity beside a dead one**: the history stays behind and
every dashboard, template and automation goes on pointing at a sensor that
quietly stopped updating. The composed ids come out symmetric anyway
(`sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power` /
`sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power`).
* **Four per-unit rows** — setpoint, battery power, SoC and the SAFETY-02 sign
latch — announced **only from a roster of two**. At N=1 nothing is announced
and nothing is published: no second device, no renamed entity, no added topic,
asserted rather than assumed.
* **Site-scoped sensors stay site-scoped.** `grid` and `p1_sample_age_s` are
announced **once**, on A's device, at every roster length 1–6. There is one P1
and one grid connection, and `p1_sample_age_s` is a **watchdog input** — a
second copy is a second answer to "is the meter fresh?", one of which is
always the one nobody is looking at. Circulating power, controller status,
maintenance phase and the capacity-tariff peak are site for the same reason.
* **`inverter.roster_names()`** is now the one answer to "what are the units
called", read by `build_roster()` **and** by the publisher — which has to know
the roster **before** a `Controller` exists, because announcing happens on the
broker's CONNACK.
* **`test_mqtt.py`**, a new suite: the recorded `release/1.0` baseline
(generated by running that commit's module, not transcribed), the payload
diffs, the composed entity ids modelled **independently** of `app/mqtt.py` and
anchored on the one id verified against the live system
(`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`), the announcement-vs-publication agreement on
a real `Controller` with **different** SoC, battery sign and latch state on
the two units, and **twelve mutations of the shipped module, all red, each on
a named property**.
* **MEASURED, NOT ASSERTED.** Three of those properties exist because the
mutation table found their absence: dropping the unit from the *state topic*,
moving `grid` into the per-unit set, and `units=()` in main()'s publisher call
were all **green** on the first run. So was a roster fallback that named two
nameless entries `inverter-a`. Sixteen mutations were run through
`tools/mutation_run.sh`; the survivors are enumerated **with their size** in
`test_mqtt.py` part 9.
* ⚠️ **Inverter B does not physically exist** (~2026-09-12). Every fixture here
is **simulated**, from the datasheet and serial in `NOTES.md` §1.1b. Nothing
in this card was measured on a second inverter.
**The add-on configuration screen now speaks English and Dutch instead of raw
option keys (UX-01).** There was no `translations/` directory at all, so Home
Assistant fell back to rendering the option KEYS — an operator opening
*Configuration* read `unit_sign_disagree_w`, `saturation_cycles`,
`integrator_max_w`, seventy of them, in file order, with no description and no
way to tell a constant derived from 1890 closed-loop test runs from their own
inverter's rating. **This card changes presentation only: not one default, not
one range and not one line of behaviour moved.**
* **`translations/en.yaml` and `translations/nl.yaml`**, with a `name` and a
`description` for **all 70 options** and for **all 7 per-entry keys** of the
`inverters:` repeatable section. The Dutch is written for a Flemish
homeowner rather than transliterated: *afname* and *injectie*, *kwartierpiek*
and *capaciteitstarief*, *laadniveau*, *uitschakelgrens* — the words that are
on the bill and on the meter.
* **⭐ EVERY DERIVED CONSTANT SAYS WHERE IT CAME FROM AND WHETHER TO TOUCH IT.**
`unit_sign_disagree_s` now reads *"derived from 1890 closed-loop test runs
(SAFETY-30): 85 s is 8.5 times the worst legitimate opposition those runs
produce… do not change it without re-deriving"*; `circulation_w` cites its 924
runs and the measured 400 W knee; `meter_freeze_s` cites the 2399 s capture;
`bms_soc_floor` says it is register `0x0560` read off the pack. The two
numbers that are genuinely the operator's — `max_w` and `peak_cap_w` — say
**"THIS IS YOUR NUMBER"** instead, and `cycle_cost_threshold_eur`, which is
neither measured nor the operator's, admits it is an open product question
(OPT-08) rather than borrowing the others' authority.
* **`config.yaml` reordered into task order** — hardware/entities → meter →
ratings and limits → tariff → maintenance → safety → advanced — in **both**
halves, with every comment carried with its key. ⚠️ The rendered order is the
**`schema:`** half's (`App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(...)(data["schema"])`);
the `options:` half is reordered to match so the file reads the way the tab
renders. ⚠️ **`test_inverter.py` part 12's first-match trap is preserved**:
the nested per-entry `max_w:` still appears BEFORE the flat one under
`schema:`, and `inverters: []` still ships in the `options:` half. Moving the
nested block below the flat one is a **1-byte** edit and it was run: red in
`test_inverter.py` and in `test_translations.py`.
* **MEASURED, NOT ASSERTED.** `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` gains a section
F that loads both files with Supervisor 2026.08.0's *own*
`_read_app_translations()` out of the release image (a file that fails
`SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS` is **dropped with a log warning and nothing else**),
runs its own `UiOptions`, replays the frontend's label resolution transcribed
from the shipped bundle, and prints every rendered row in both languages.
* **⚠️ ONE MEASURED NEGATIVE RESULT, RECORDED RATHER THAN GLOSSED.** The
per-entry keys inside the `inverters:` repeatable section still render RAW.
`_convertSchemaElement` sends `type: "schema"` **with** `multiple` to
`ha-selector-object`, which labels its fields `fields[name].label || name`,
and the converter sets neither `label` nor `translation_key`. The `fields:`
translations are shipped and validated because that is the shape Supervisor's
own schema defines for exactly this, and a frontend that wires `label` through
would consume them — but on 20250925.1 they do not reach the screen, and this
card does not claim they do. The `inverters` label and description themselves
do.
* **A new check, `test_translations.py`, so this cannot rot.** A translation key
naming an option that does not exist, or an option with no translation, fails
CI — in both directions, for both languages, top-level and per-entry. It is
**mutation-tested both ways**: eleven mutations applied in-process, each
required to NAME the key it broke rather than merely to go red, plus a
negative control that the unmutated input is clean. Two of the eleven are the
ones that cost the WHOLE FILE rather than one label — an unrecognised
top-level block, and a `network:` value that is not a string. Supervisor
validates each translation file through `SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS` and, on
refusal, **logs a warning and drops all of it**, so those silently return the
entire tab to raw keys; neither is reachable through the `configuration:`
coverage, which is why they were hunted for and closed. Six more were run **on disk**, through the
purge-and-re-read protocol: deleting a translation (−65 B), renaming an option
in `config.yaml` (+4 B), adding an orphan key (+47 B), emptying a Dutch
description (−711 B), breaking one label's group prefix (−4 B) and deleting a
provenance citation (−19 B) each go red.
* **The parser has a licence.** There is no PyYAML in the add-on's CI image, so
`tools/translations_lint.py` reads these files by hand — and a hand parser
that quietly disagrees with the real loader is the defect this repository
keeps finding. The probe imports **that same module** and asserts, key by key
and string by string, that it returns what `_read_app_translations()` returns.
The parser is deliberately strict and **raises** on anything outside the
subset; nine malformed shapes are fed to it to prove it does.
* **⚠️ WHAT THIS CHECK CANNOT SEE, stated with its size.** It grades coverage
and provenance *citations*, not truth. Falsifying a figure inside a
description that is not one of the cited tokens survives (run: *"8.5 times"* →
*"3 times"*, −2 B, green), and swapping two options' descriptions survives
(0 B, green). Separately and out of this card's scope: changing a shipped
default that no suite pins survives — `step_w: 10` → `20` (0 B) leaves
`test_control.py`, `test_clamp.py`, `test_validate.py` and
`test_peakguard.py` green. That is the same family as CFG-04's DEFECT 2 and
the UX-01 rescope moved it to its own card on purpose.
**Inverter B's rating is 4600 W, FROM ITS DATASHEET, and every documented copy
of it now says so (SPIKE-04a).** Three places stated B's rating — `config.yaml`'s
commented roster example, `DOCS.md`'s, and `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py`'s
"a blob an operator would POST" — and all three said **3000 W**, a number that
was never measured, never read off a datasheet, and simply wrong. The owner
supplied B's model and serial on 2026-09-04: a **GoodWe GW5048D-ES**, serial
`55048ESU22AW0992`, max charging and discharging power **4600 W**. No control
behaviour changes here; this is documentation and its pin.
* **Serial characters 6-8 read `ESU`** → platform 105, AA55, the supported set.
Not `ESN`/`ESC` (ES G2, platform 745). SPIKE-01 does not gate this site.
⚠️ A passed platform gate is **not** a proven control surface: `specs.md`
already calls other platform-105 serials *"same protocol family; untested
silicon"*, and this repo's `0x056E`/`0x056F` map was reverse-engineered from a
passive tap on **one BPS unit**. That check is the bench half of SPIKE-04.
* **⚠️ 4600 W IS FROM A DATASHEET AND IS NOT A MEASUREMENT, and one ambiguity is
recorded rather than guessed.** The datasheet prints it under *Battery Input
Data*, so it is probably **DC**, while `max_w` is graded against `0x0518` —
the inverter's own **AC** power. If it is DC the AC ceiling is nearer
4600 × 0.94 ≈ **4324 W**, and the charge direction moves the other way
(≈ 4894 W drawn AC-side). **Neither reading is written in as fact.**
SAFETY-20's `min(max_w, dev_max)` already bounds it correctly under either,
once `dev_max` is read off the unit — so `max_w: 4600` is what to configure
today. `goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b carries the full record, with the date and the
method on every figure.
* **A NEW CHECK, BECAUSE A DOCUMENTATION FIX WITHOUT ONE DRIFTS AGAIN.**
`test_validate.py` now pins all three documented rosters: they must be
findable, they must agree, and they must say **4600**. It also grades the
**provenance beside the number** — the datasheet it came from, the `0x0518`
it is graded against, and the 4324 W the DC reading would make it — **within
2500 characters of the roster, not file-wide.** The first version searched
whole files and was already vacuous on two of them, because `0x0518` appeared
in `config.yaml` and `DOCS.md` for unrelated reasons before this card: a
check whose data could not reach the failure it named, in the file that
exists to complain about those. Four mutations were run against the fixed
version — the probe back to 3000 (0-byte delta), the `DOCS.md` caveat
deleted, `config.yaml` alone "corrected" to 4324 (0-byte delta), and the
probe's entity renamed so the regex finds nothing — and all four are red.
* **THE TEST FIXTURES KEEP 3000 W ON PURPOSE, AND NOW SAY WHY AT THE LINE.**
`test_inverter.py`, `test_maintenance.py`, `test_peakguard.py` and
`test_watchdog.py` build a second inverter at 3000 W against A's 5000 W. The
only property those checks consume is that B's number is **unmistakably** not
A's, and the real pair is a **400 W** gap — narrower than `slew_w`, inside the
range where an off-by-one-unit bug and ordinary control arithmetic produce
indistinguishable numbers. Collapsing them onto the real values would buy
realism those checks do not use and cost them their separating power, which
is the defect `test_peakguard.py`'s own §10g precondition exists to prevent.
They are **illustrative, not B's rating, and no longer a placeholder for it**.
* **Two consequences with numbers, recorded in `goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b for the
cards that own them.** At 94 % battery-to-AC a round trip is ≈ 88 %, so A
charging 3 kW while B discharges 3 kW burns ≈ **360 W continuously** with the
meter at zero — SAFETY-31 argues its threshold from *"a few watts"* and has no
figure. And **< 13 W night self-consumption per unit** (≈ 26 W for two,
≈ 0.6 kWh/day), which nothing in this add-on accounts for anywhere.
* **The site is asymmetric in opposite directions:** A = 5000 W / 15.36 kWh
nominal, B = 4600 W / 20.48 kWh — ~33 % more energy, ~8 % less power. No
stability implication (ARCH-01's ḡ = Σαᵢgᵢ is a convex combination), but a
full recalibration of B moves 33 % more energy and **MAINT-05's 12 h `drain`
phase timeout was derived on A**; it should be re-checked against B rather
than assumed to carry.
**Every pack is recalibrated on its own schedule, and only one moves power at a
time (MAINT-05).** §12's monthly cycle drains a pack to empty and refills it to
true its coulomb counter. There was exactly one `Maintenance` state machine and
@@ -118,6 +741,284 @@ two power-moving phases on one grid connection pulling against each other.
is loop and allocator territory. Pinned as a running check
(`test_maintenance.py` part 12) so it cannot be forgotten.
**`bms_soc_floor` describes a BATTERY, so at two packs it stops being one number
(SAFETY-32).** The peak guard's energy backstop rests on two figures: the EMS
floor `peak_soc_floor` (the depth a money-saving discharge may never reach) and
`bms_soc_floor`, the percent **that pack's own BMS** cuts out at — register
`0x0560`, read as 10 on the reference GW5000S-BP. Rule 8 refuses an EMS floor at
or below the cut-out, because such a floor can never bind: the BMS wins and the
status page reports a backstop that does not exist. With ONE cut-out for two
packs of different models that rule graded the EMS floor against whichever
battery happened to be written into the flat key, and a site with cut-outs of
10 % and 30 % under `peak_soc_floor: 20` **started** — the guard would then
command a forced discharge that pack B's BMS, not the operator's floor, is the
thing that stops. Rule 8's own failure mode, reached through rule 8.
* **`bms_soc_floor` becomes a per-entry roster key, and it is REQUIRED there.**
Nothing is inherited: an entry that omits it has no cut-out, does not borrow
the flat one, and is refused by name at startup. A per-entry *default* was
considered and declined — a default is one number for every pack, which is the
defect this card removes; `DECISIONS/SAFETY-32-per-pack-bms-floor.md` records
the decision and its migration cost. The flat key is unchanged and is now
documented as the single-inverter shape's own cut-out.
* **Rule 8 grades EVERY unit and NAMES the one it refuses**, through a new
`unit_bms_floors_indexed()` that carries the **roster** index the value came
off. CFG-04 had just fixed a rule 5/6 bug of exactly this shape — a caps-list
index fed to a function that indexes the roster, so the message named the wrong
inverter — and this reader skips nothing, so there is no second list for an
index to desynchronise from. Graded on a roster whose offender is the SECOND
entry *and* on the same two numbers in the other order.
* **The permission is answered PER PACK.** `Controller.pack_floor_soc` — the
emptiest measured pack — is untouched and is still what `decide()` grades;
what changed is the floor. `peakguard.pack_permissions()` answers one
`(name, reason)` per pack against that pack's own floor, and the floor-limited
notification now names the pack that stopped the site rather than "the
battery". At a roster of one the alarm is byte-for-byte what SAFETY-25 shipped.
* **An unstated cut-out withholds rather than defaults.** `None`, not `0.0` —
`discharge_permitted()` already treats an unknown floor as no permission, so
the absence costs a shave and never a pack, including on `sim/inject.py`'s path
which does not run the startup gate.
* ⚠️ **Stated rather than hidden:** under any config rule 8 accepts, the per-pack
*floor* reduces to `peak_soc_floor` for every pack — rule 8 makes it so. The
reduction is written for `unit_caps_indexed()`'s reason ("unreachable" is a
claim about rule ordering, not a property of a function) and is graded on both
sides: 1775 rule-8-valid `(peak_soc_floor, bms_soc_floor)` pairs answer the
option, and the pair rule 8 refuses answers the cut-out. `peak_soc_floor`
itself is still one number for the site, so the "deeper pack needlessly
withheld" half is filed as an open question, not closed.
* **`tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` re-run and repaired.** MUTATION.md habit 8:
a committed transcript is a check and it decays. The required key broke §C and
left §D printing PASS on a refusal about a *different* key. §D is now an
isolated counterfactual over an accepted, merged baseline, one key varied per
case, asserting the key **name** in the refusal — `all cases passed` on
`amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0`.
* ⚠️ **SECOND FIX ROUND — the round-2 fix carried the defect it was written to
close, in its prose.** Two more rewrites survived a green 19-file suite on
`8501e05`: `binding_soc_floor()`'s `max(floors)` → `max(floors[-2:])` (+5
bytes) and the call site's `self.packs` → `self.packs[:2]` (+4 bytes). Both are
checks whose TEXT claimed more than their FIXTURE could reach — 12c2's only
counterfactual varied the **last** pack, which every window ending at the
roster's end follows, and all three 12g runs drove a **two**-pack roster, where
`[:2]` *is* the roster. **The general law, now stated in the file: a fixture of
N packs cannot separate two reductions that agree on N packs**, and the regress
does not terminate in a fixture — `[:1]` needed two packs, `[:2]` three, `[:3]`
four. So the reduction is now graded by a **length sweep** (78 simulated
rosters, lengths 1–12, deepest cut-out at every position, closing head and tail
windows of width 1–11 at once) plus a **computed family table** of fourteen
rewrites that goes red naming any member no roster kills; the call site is
graded by **three-pack runs** with the deep cut-out at index 0, 1 and 2, plus
an **exact structural pin** (the roster argument must unparse to `self.packs`)
for the slice widths no bounded roster can reach. Round 3's own battery found
`self.packs[:3]` / `[-3:]` surviving all six behavioural runs — the structural
pin is what closes them — and one row is recorded **NOT CAUGHT**: a reduction
over a window twelve packs wide, which needs a 13-pack roster to observe.
No shipped behaviour changed in this round; only what observes it.
* **Twelve source mutations, eleven red, one argued survivor**, through
`tools/mutation_run.sh` (bytecode purged). The battery also found a real
weakness of its own: `_flat_bms_floor()` had the default in two places and each
covered for the other, so deleting either survived — masking, in three lines of
option reading. One defaulting line now.
* ⚠️ **FIX ROUND — that battery was INCOMPLETE, and the review found what it
missed.** Neither of the two mutations below appears in the twelve rows above:
the ledger graded "the reduction dropped" and "the bare option handed over"
and never asked what happens when the reduction is simply the *wrong* one, or
when the roster handed to it is *sliced*. No shipped behaviour changed here;
two *checks* whose data could not reach the failure they named did. `max(floors)` → `min(floors)` in
`binding_soc_floor()` (zero byte delta) and `self.packs` → `self.packs[:1]` at
the `decide()` call site (+4 bytes) were each green across all 19 files. Both
survived for the same reason: **under any rule-8-valid config every pack's
`pack_floor_pct()` equals `peak_soc_floor`**, so `floors` is a list of
identical numbers and `max`, `min`, first and last are four spellings of one
answer — and the one check using a cut-out above the EMS floor ran on a roster
of ONE, where every reduction agrees. The second also walked through part 12g,
which asserted `"self.packs" in <the unparsed call site>`: a slice still
contains that substring, so the pin passed on the mutation that grades the
whole site against pack A. MUTATION.md habit 4 — a source-text test is a check
on how code is spelled, not on what it does.
* **New part 12c2** evaluates `binding_soc_floor()` on a roster whose per-pack
floors **all differ** — four simulated cut-outs of 30/25/40/35 %, every one
above `peak_soc_floor`, chosen so that `max` (40), `min` (25), first (30),
last (35) and the mean (32.5) are five different numbers and the two extremes
sit at *interior* roster positions. Two packs cannot separate those four;
four is the smallest roster that can. The precondition is its own check
(habit 1) and one pack — the last, neither deepest nor shallowest — is then
raised past the old maximum and the answer follows it (habit 7).
* **Part 12g is now behaviour, not source text.** Real `Controller.cycle()`s on
a two-pack roster, both packs at the same SoC, with the cut-outs as the only
thing varied: move the **non-first** pack's cut-out and the floor reaching
`decide()` moves 20 % → 35 %, with the site's verdict flipping from a sized
discharge to FLOOR-LIMITED. `self.packs[:1]` answers 20 % both times. Which
option key the floor comes from stays pinned on the source where it already
was, because that claim genuinely is about the code's shape.
* ⚠️ **Two MORE survivors, found by this round's own battery and recorded
rather than quietly repaired.** (a) The first cut of part 12g varied only
pack B's cut-out, so `self.packs[-1:]` — grade the site against the **last**
pack — agreed with the full roster on both runs and stayed green across all
19 files (+5 bytes). A two-run fixture pins one slice and not the other.
Part 12g now runs the **same pair of cut-outs in both orders**, so the
deeper one is on the second pack in one run and on the first in another and
the site floor is 35 % in both; no single-position slice passes all three
runs. (b) `binding_soc_floor()`'s empty-roster branch rewritten to
`return None` (−43 bytes) was also green — a defensive branch nothing in the
suite reached. Both directions of it are pinned now, with the note that it
cannot permit anything either way because `pack_floor_soc` is `None` at an
empty roster.
* ⚠️ **THIRD FIX ROUND — the same family was alive at the SIBLING ARGUMENT of
the same call.** Rounds 2 and 3 hardened the FLOOR axis; `decide()` is handed
a second reduction over the same roster beside it, `soc=self.pack_floor_soc`,
and `peakguard.py`'s own docstring names the two as a pair. Three rewrites of
`Controller.pack_floor_soc` were green across all 19 files on `52380c0` and
again after the rebase onto `3934ad7`: `min(float(v) for v in vals)` →
`vals[:2]` (+4), `vals[-2:]` (+5) and `vals[:3]` (+4), while `[:1]`, `[-1:]`,
`[1:]`, `[:-1]`, `max()` and the mean were all red. **The suite's separating
power on the SoC axis stopped at exactly N=2** — the state the floor axis was
in before round 3. It changes a real answer: a three-pack roster at
50 / 60 / 11 % with the emptiest pack THIRD answers 11 % shipped and 50 %
mutated, so the site is graded for discharge PERMISSION against a pack 39
points fuller than the emptiest and spends a pack its own BMS stops. Round 3's
machinery transfers directly — new **part 12i**: six real `cycle()`s with the
emptiest pack at every position of a three-pack roster and both positions of a
two-pack one (the observable read off `PeakDecision.soc`, cut-outs held flat
so the floor axis cannot be what moved the answers); computed slice and
non-slice tables that go red naming any member nothing kills; a **length
sweep** of 78 real rosters, lengths 1–12, closing head and tail windows of
width 1–11 and recording width 12 as honestly unreached; a **none-guard
sweep** over the same 78; and **three exact structural pins** — the `vals`
comprehension must iterate the bare `self.inverters`, and both `any()` and
`min()` must reduce the whole `vals` — which close every slice width at every
roster length. No shipped behaviour changed; only what observes it.
* ⚠️ **SPIKE-04: production is DEGENERATE on the floor axis, so the
differing-floor fixtures are the entire exposure.** Pack B is 4 × Dyness
DL5.0C, DoD 90 → floor 10 % — **FROM THE DATASHEET AND THE SERIAL; inverter B
does not exist and nothing about it is measured.** Pack A is DoD 90 → 10 % as
well, and that one *is* measured. Both packs therefore floor at the same value
in the field, `max(10, 10)` is 10 whatever it reduces, and a differing floor
exists **only in the fixtures**. That is the argument for keeping them, not for
simplifying them: anyone who collapses `A_PACK_FLOOR != B_PACK_FLOOR_SIM` to
one number deletes the only data this repository has that can see the
reduction at all, and part 12c2's precondition check goes red if they do. The
**SoC** axis has no such degeneracy — two batteries at the same state of
charge is a coincidence, not a configuration — which is what makes
`pack_floor_soc` the half of the pair that will be live from the day inverter
B is wired up.
* ⚠️ **The FAMILY enumerated rather than the member closed, and it found four
more survivors in code this card never touched.** Every reduction over
`self.inverters` / `self.packs` in `Controller` was found from the AST and
mutated to a slice against the full suite. Eighteen were already graded
(`site_batt_w`, `site_rating_w`, `site_max_w`, `site_dev_bound`,
`site_circulating_w`, `inputs_ok`, `units`, `Controller.packs`, `maint_unit`,
the maintenance-due minimum, the store-migration roster, `validate_unit_ranges`
and the round-2/3 sites). **Four were not, and three of them are SAFETY-30's,
all `any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in self.inverters)`** — `cycle()`'s
stale-input hold, `publish()`'s status vocabulary and `status_payload()`'s
banner — each +4 bytes and green across all 19 files, for the reason every
blocker on this card was invisible: **the only fixture that reached them was a
roster of ONE, where `self.inverters[:1]` IS `self.inverters`.** The first has
teeth: a latched unit must take the roster past that hold or its `failsafe`
SET stops being re-filed the moment a poll is missed, which is main.py's own
sentence for it. New **test_watchdog.py part 8** grades all three with the
latch at EACH position plus a no-latch counterfactual, and new **part 12j**
pins all 26 roster comprehensions in `Controller` to iterating the roster
whole — so a reduction added over a slice anywhere in the class is red on the
line it is written, with no fixture required. Two rows are reported open
rather than closed: `_grade_store_migration()`'s second disjunct (now red on
12j, and argued to be an equivalent mutant because a unit tripped at startup
implies its namespaced key is set) and `cycle()`'s undeliverable-unit **log
line**, where `sorted(...)[:1]` (+4 bytes) is still green — it truncates names
in one event message; the refusal itself is a different expression and is
graded, so the site still stops.
* ⚠️ **FOURTH FIX ROUND — the same family one MODULE over, and the pin widened
until it discovers its own scope.** Round 4 enumerated the family and closed
it inside the `Controller` class; the review found four more survivors
immediately, in **validate.py**, on a 19/19 green suite: `min(caps)` →
`min(caps[:1])` (+4) and `→ min(caps[-1:])` (+5) at `:779`, the caps
comprehension over `caps_ix[:1]` (+4) at `:778`, and
`min(caps_ix[-1:], key=…)` (+5) at `:893`. **None is an equivalent mutant.**
With `max_w: 5000` on inverter-a beside `2000` on inverter-b and
`sign_disagree_w: 3000`, the shipped validator refuses — *"the SAFETY-02
sign-disagreement watchdog can never fire"* — and all four **accept**: the
site starts with a watchdog reporting `armed` that cannot trip on pack B.
Rule 5's own failure mode reached through rule 5; rule 6 loses its refusal the
same way. **No shipped behaviour changed by the pin; what changed is that a
hand-written scope stopped being trusted.**
* **`test_peakguard.py` part 12j now parses every `.py` under `app/`** — no
module is named in the check — and finds the roster by transitive closure
from **one seed**, the `inverters` option key: through returns, through
lists **accumulated in a loop over a roster** (which is what `caps`,
`roster` and `problems` are, and what round 4's rule could not express),
through attributes and properties, and **through call arguments**, which is
how it walks into `peakguard`, `arbiter`, `allocator`, `circulation`,
`maintenance` and `store` without being told they exist. A slice of a roster
stays a roster so a mutation cannot cut the taint; an index is one unit and
does not. **183 reductions across 9 modules** out of 23 files parsed — `main.py` 96,
`allocator.py` 24, `validate.py` 19, `arbiter.py` 14, `circulation.py` 10,
`maintenance.py` 10, `peakguard.py` 4, `inverter.py` 3, `store.py` 3.
* **The hand-written module list would have been wrong in BOTH directions.**
It named `watchdog.py`, which reduces over no roster at all — SAFETY-30's
sign watchdogs are strictly per-unit — and omitted `maintenance.py` and
`store.py`, which both do. A vacuous claim about one module and no claim
about two others.
* **The pin rediscovers all four blockers without being told where to look,**
and finds a fifth beside them (`validate.py:783`, rule 5's message) that no
review round named. Its counterfactual runs at two depths: every enumerated
site's own expression mutated with each of the four cuts this card has been
defeated by (732 spellings, all reported), and `[:1]` written into
`app/validate.py` at each blocker position with the **whole** analysis
re-run over the mutated source — a sliced site required at that exact line,
where the clean package reports none.
* **And the behavioural half, because a shape pin grades an identity and never
a meaning.** `test_validate.py` grows a **roster SET** for the three rules
that reduce over `unit_caps_indexed()` — widths 2, 3, 4, 5 with the one
small cap at every position, 42 runs of the real validator — plus a
**computed family table** of twelve candidate reductions each compared with
what the shipped validator actually said on the same roster. Only `min`
agrees everywhere; a member no roster kills is printed as a named survivor.
* ⚠️ **A THIRD RULE WAS READING THE FLAT `max_w`, AND IT IS SAFETY-30's** —
found by reading, **not** by the pin, which is the shape of what the pin
cannot see. `unit_sign_disagree_w` was graded against
`_number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)` three lines under a branch that had already
stopped doing that. **Both directions were measured:** two 2000 W units
beside a leftover `max_w: 5000` and `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000` produced
**zero problems** — the site started with a per-unit watchdog that could not
trip on either unit — and two 5000 W units with no flat key were **refused**
against a 2000 W default the operator never wrote. It takes the weakest
unit's own cap now and names that unit; at a roster of one it is the same
comparison, boundary and sentence it always was.
* ⚠️ **What the pin cannot see, with sizes**, in
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-32-per-pack-bms-floor.md` §4d: semantics (`min` vs `max`
is a zero-byte edit); direct index sites that are not reductions; a
subscript by a *variable* (`weights[u]` is why); a slice through an
intermediate call; anything outside `app/`, including `sim/inject.py`; and
the taint's own seam at `*args` and unresolvable receivers, where everything
downstream goes **unenumerated rather than reported unreachable**.
`cycle()`'s undeliverable-unit log line is still green at +4 bytes and still
filed open, unchanged from round 4.
* **`tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` re-run again (2026-09-05, 2026.08.0).**
The rebase onto `67e649a` merged SPIKE-04a's `max_w: 4600` into the same
§C/§D blocks this card had rewritten, and a transcript stitched by hand out
of two runs is not a measurement. `all cases passed`, exit 0, with B's
rating reading 4600 — its **datasheet** figure, still not a measurement of
any unit.
* ⚠️ **THE SWEEP, AND THE NUMBER THAT MUST NOT BE QUOTED ALONE.** All 183
sites mutated to `[:1]`, one at a time, against the full 19-file suite in
`goodwe-addon-ci` (`:ro`, `-B`, fresh rsync per mutant, 0 `.pyc` before and
after): **183/183 RED** — which is tautological on its own, because the pin
makes every slice red. The 51 whose first red was `test_peakguard.py` were
re-run with the pin **neutralised**: **145 of 183 have a behavioural fixture
that separates them from a slice of themselves; 38 have only the structural
claim.** All 38 are listed by site, with what a `[:1]` there would cost, in
§4d and in `test_peakguard.py` part 12j — 15 of them are rows and counts on
the operator's page, 3 are `len(targets)` arithmetic beside a write path
that IS graded, 6 are allocator internals ALLOC-01's fixtures reach but not
with enough units to separate. **None of the 38 is closed behaviourally by
this card, and none is counted as covered.**
⚠️ **No measurement of inverter B appears anywhere in this change.** It does not
exist yet. Every second-pack figure — in fixtures, in the probe, in
config.yaml's commented example — is **simulated and labelled**; only inverter
A's 10 % is read off hardware.
**At two inverters the sign watchdog stops comparing one unit against the whole
site meter, and becomes two checks instead of one (SAFETY-30).**
`disagrees(commanded_w, grid_w, ...)` compared the command **this controller put
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
# SAFETY-13 — the output freeze gets an exit, and only where it cannot end on its own
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-13`, off `release/1.0` @ `c8dcb38`.
**Card:** SAFETY-13 — *"Bound the no-start-while-saturated output block"*
([Trello](https://trello.com/c/uZjmuF7B)).
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** Every figure below is from the pure control
law run in a container against a plant model, on this branch and on a pristine
`c8dcb38` for the before-figures. No rig, no ESP32, no Home Assistant.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **The card's headline case is real, and the route to it is not the obvious
one.** The block does not engage on the way down into an export; the slew
limit moves the command off zero before the counter reaches 3. It engages
from the **deadband** — a site resting at its target with another writer on
the bus, counting saturated cycles while nothing is wrong — and 0 W is then a
fixed point. §2.
2. **`prev_w == 0` is not a special case, so the fix is not one either.** The
same run pins at −800 W against its own integrator standing at −2388 W, at a
non-zero `prev_w`, with
the same absence of an exit. Zero is only the instance where the pinned
magnitude is the whole of what the battery could have done. §3.
3. **The decision is not "how long", it is "which".** A divergence a *limit*
could have produced clears itself and gets no exit — `release/1.0` unchanged.
A divergence a limit could not have produced may not, and gets one. The
predicate is physical, not statistical — and it is **not** a second-writer
detector; §4.1 and §8 say what it can and cannot tell apart.
4. **Releasing the output freeze does not unfreeze the loop**, and that is what
makes the release bounded rather than merely different. §6.
5. **The bound comes from the SLOWER half of a two-sided measurement, and the
first version of this branch took the faster half.** §8 is the correction and
the measurement behind it; it is the reason `SETTLE_CYCLES` is 12 and not 9.
---
## 1. What was there, in the terms the code uses
`control.py`, in `compute()`, after the clamp and the slew limit:
```python
if frozen:
target = min(target, prev_w) if prev_w > 0 else max(target, prev_w)
reason = "saturated-freeze"
```
"Magnitude may fall, never rise." At `prev_w == 0` the magnitude is zero and
`max(target, 0)` forbids any negative command, so a charge cannot **start**.
The reason is written in the file and it is a good one: `frozen` means the
inverter's reported power has diverged from the command by more than
`saturation_w` for `saturation_cycles` consecutive cycles, and at a command of
zero that means the actuator is producing power nobody in this add-on asked for.
Starting to push the other way into it is the configuration §1.5 of the
specification rules out — *"any configuration in which two writers can reach one
actuator"*.
**The defect is that it has no end.** Not the error growing, not the integrator
moving, not time. `sat_count` stops rising at its cap and the state is a fixed
point.
---
## 2. Reproducing it — and correcting the route
Driven at the live install's shape: `max_w 5000`, `slew_w 400`,
`target_grid_w -10`, `saturation_w 500`, `saturation_cycles 3`, `gain 0.6`.
Another writer holds the pack at **+700 W** whatever is commanded.
**The route that does NOT reach it.** Start at `prev_w = 0` with 2 kW of export
already standing. On `c8dcb38` the loop moves off zero at the slew limit before
the counter reaches 3 — commands −400, −800 — so by the time `frozen` is true
`prev_w` is −800 and the block that gets applied is `max(target, −800)`. The
site charges at 800 W, not 0 W, for as long as the run lasts.
**The route that does.** The site is *resting*. `grid == target_grid_w`, so the
loop is in its deadband and the command is 0 — and `saturated_now` is computed
**before** the deadband branch, so the counter climbs anyway. Three cycles later
the loop is frozen at `prev_w == 0` with nothing wrong. Then the export arrives:
| cycle | grid | actual | prev | command | integrator | sat | reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0–1 | −10 | +700 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1–2 | `deadband` |
| 2–5 | −10 | +700 | 0 | **0** | 0 | 3–6 | `saturated-freeze` |
| 6 | −2000 | +700 | 0 | **0** | −1194 | 7 | `saturated-freeze` |
| 7… | −2000 | +700 | 0 | **0** | −1194 | 8→10 | `saturated-freeze` |
On `c8dcb38` the command is `0.0` on **every** cycle from there on. The
integrator has moved to −1194 W and stopped (its own freeze holds it), the site
exports 2 kW, and the battery is idle until the other writer leaves.
That is the card's sentence — *"the site can sit exporting 2 kW with an idle
battery indefinitely"* — reproduced, with the route corrected: it is entered
from the **deadband**, not from a correction that ran out of room.
---
## 3. …and `prev_w == 0` is not where it stops
The same tuning, same writer, but the loop starts from zero with the export
already standing (the route from §2 that "does not reach it"):
| | `c8dcb38` |
|---|---|
| command after the freeze engages | **−800 W**, on every cycle |
| the loop's integrator, frozen | −2388 W |
| what ends it | nothing |
So the missing exit is a property of the **output freeze**, not of the zero
case. `prev_w == 0` is the instance where the pinned magnitude happens to be
zero. A rule written for zero alone would have left −800 W exactly as unbounded
as it found it — which is why the change below is written against the freeze and
not against a special case of it.
**And this is the half that escalates at two inverters.** `actual_w` is
`site_batt_w`, the SUM (ALLOC-01, DEV-02), so the comparison is a site command
against two units' power. One unit still moving after the other has stopped is
enough to put the site into the freeze with no external actor at all.
⚠️ **What that claim is and is not.** The escalation is stated from the code —
`prev_w` is `self.target`, the site total, and `actual_w` is the site sum — and
from the single-unit runs above. **It is not measured on two inverters.**
Inverter B does not physically exist (`NOTES.md` §1.1b: on paper, from datasheet
and serial), and `sim/plantsim.py:216` `INVERTER_B` is `INVERTER_A` copied with
`measured=False`. Any two-inverter number would be two copies of A.
---
## 4. The decision: which freezes get an exit, not how long the block lasts
Three answers were on the table, and the card named them: lift after N frozen
cycles, exempt above some export magnitude, or keep it unbounded and write down
the cost.
**A plain cycle bound was rejected**, because it bounds the wrong thing. The
freeze is right to be permanent in one case and cannot be permanent in the
other, and a single N treats them alike:
| the inverter is… | can the freeze clear itself? |
|---|---|
| doing **less** than the command, in the command's own direction — a cold pack, a curtailment, an export cap, the plant still ramping | **Yes.** The command is pinned at something the inverter can reach, so it catches up, `saturated_now` goes false, and the freeze ends. Asking for more would achieve nothing anyway. |
| doing something **outside** what the command can explain — overshooting it, or the opposite sign | **No.** Clearing the freeze requires the inverter to track *our* command, and the other writer is precisely what stops that. |
**An export-magnitude exemption was rejected** for a narrower reason: it makes
the block's end depend on how big the other actor's disturbance happens to be,
which is not a property of the thing the block is about.
So the rule implemented is:
> The output freeze applies as before, **unless** the inverter's reported power
> cannot be explained by the command not being met **and** the divergence has
> outlasted the plant that would otherwise have explained it.
### 4.1 The predicate is physical
`unasked_power(prev_w, actual_w, saturation_w)`. A limit can only make the
inverter do **less** than the command, in the command's own direction. It cannot
make it overshoot the command and it cannot make it produce the opposite sign.
So everything a limit can produce lies in the closed interval spanned by `0` and
`prev_w`, widened by `saturation_w` for noise, ramp lag and idle draw.
⚠️ **What it does NOT establish is that anything outside was put there by
something else.** The first version of this branch said exactly that, in the
docstring, in `control.py` and in DOCS.md, and it is false: the predicate
compares against **one cycle's** command while the pack carries every command
before it, so our own coast-down through zero lands outside our own interval.
§8 measures it. What the predicate guarantees is only its own first sentence —
*this cycle's command does not account for this cycle's reading* — and the time
bound below is what turns that into a reason to act.
| prev | actual | interval | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| +2000 | +700 | [0, 2000] | a limit |
| −5000 | −700 | [−5000, 0] | a limit |
| 0 | +700 | [−500, +500] | **unasked** |
| −800 | +700 | [−1300, +500] | **unasked** |
⚠️ **At `prev_w == 0` this predicate and the saturation detector are the same
test** — asserted in `test_control.py` over 801 readings. That is not a
coincidence to tidy away: with nothing commanded there is no interval left for a
limit to live in, which is exactly why the zero case is the one that strands.
⚠️ **It is not a detector and nothing alarms on it.** A stale, wrong-signed or
noisy reading lands outside the interval too. All it decides is whether the
freeze gets an exit; being wrong about it costs a bounded command (§6).
SAFETY-30's `unit_sign_disagree_w` is the thing that alarms on sign, and it is
deliberately a different test with a different threshold.
### 4.2 The bound, and which half of the measurement it comes from
`SETTLE_CYCLES = ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S)` = **12**.
⚠️ **`PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S` is new, and adding it is the point rather than a
cost.** `NOTES.md` §5.10 did not measure *a* settling time; it measured the same
1.78 kW step in **both directions** — "Up: ~18 s from step to deadband. Down:
~23 s from a −1784 W export excursion" (`NOTES.md:1550`). So the plant's
settling time is a **pair**, and which half is the safe one depends on which way
being wrong hurts:
| the bound | the question | the safe half | why |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-39's `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` | may this configuration be **refused**? | **18 s**, the shorter | a looser bound refuses fewer working configurations |
| this one | may the plant still be the **explanation**? | **23 s**, the longer | a shorter bound stops believing the plant too early, and then it accuses |
The first version of this branch reused `PLANT_SETTLE_S` and got 9 — three
cycles short of the plant's own measured down-ramp, on the side that produces a
false positive. §8 is the measurement and the correction.
⚠️ **It is no longer the reciprocal of `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC`, and it never should
have been read as one.** The two were equal only while both were being derived
from the same half of the pair, and that coincidence read as a derivation. They
are 9 and 12 now; `test_control.py` asserts the inequality so they cannot be
quietly re-fused.
⚠️ **It inherits SAFETY-39's caveat about `LOOP_TICK_S`, in the opposite
direction.** A meter **slower** than 2 s makes 12 cycles cover more than 23 s, so
the freeze holds longer than the plant needs: that costs energy, never safety. A
meter **faster** makes them cover less, so the freeze can release while the
plant is still moving — bounded by §6 rather than by luck.
**`_SAT_COUNT_CAP` moved with it, from 10 to 13**, because it is written as
`SETTLE_CYCLES + 1` — a counter capped below the longest bound read from it
would silently delete the exit. That has a consequence worth stating on its own:
`config.yaml` accepts `saturation_cycles` as `int(1,10)`, so at the old bound of
9 a legal setting could sit **above** the exit and delete the block. At 12 the
whole accepted range is strictly below the bound, and the degenerate
configuration this branch used to document no longer exists. §7.
---
## 5. What actually changed, graded against `release/1.0`
`test_control.py`'s sweep still compares this law against a transcription of
`release/1.0` — the transcription was **not** taught the new rule, because an
oracle taught the change compares the law against itself. What changed is the
assertion: every case must be identical, or be a release with both of its
conditions true, or differ **in the saturation counter alone**.
⚠️ **The sweep had to be widened to keep grading anything.** Its `sat_count`
fixtures ran to 9; with the bound at 12 the counter never reached the exit and
every release silently vanished from the table, which is what the assertion on
the count caught. It runs to 12 now, at 3780 cases.
| | cases |
|---|---|
| total | 3780 |
| **bit-identical to `release/1.0`** | **3267** |
| releases | 432 |
| …of those, reason-only (the freeze was not binding) | 405 |
| …of those, **the command changes** | **27** |
| differ in the **saturation counter alone** | 81 |
All 27 command changes are at `prev_w == 0`, all with `release/1.0` commanding
exactly `0.0 W`, and every new command is **negative** — a charge start that was
refused.
⚠️ **The 81 are the counter's ceiling moving, and they reach nothing.**
`_SAT_COUNT_CAP` went from 10 to 13 with the bound, so above `release/1.0`'s own
ceiling the two counters differ. Nothing else may differ in those cases, and the
sweep asserts that: `frozen` is `sat_count >= saturation_cycles`, `config.yaml`
accepts that at most 10, and no other line in `compute()` reads the counter's
value — so a counter reading 13 instead of 10 cannot change what is commanded.
The 81 all sit at an `sc` above 10, which is a state `release/1.0` could never
hold at all.
The behaviour after the fix, on §2's run: the command holds at 0 W through
`sat_count` 3–11, releases on the **twelfth** saturated cycle, and walks
0 → −400 → −800 → **−1190 W**, where it stops — the same settling point as at
the old bound, three cycles later.
The genuine-limit case, driven for 30 cycles with the inverter curtailed to
±1000 W against a 4 kW import: `freeze-released` never appears and the command
stays pinned at +2400 W. Unchanged, deliberately.
---
## 6. Why the release cannot become windup (the card's fourth criterion)
**The integrator freeze is not lifted with the output freeze.** The command is
derived from `i_w`, then clamped, then slew-limited from `prev_w` — so a
released cycle can only move the command *toward* an accumulator that stopped
accumulating when the freeze engaged, by at most one slew step, and never past
it. `test_control.py` sweeps 107 625 states, of which **67 500 release**: no
released case leaves the interval between the previous command and the frozen
integrator, and none moves further than one slew step.
⚠️ **107 625 was previously reported as the number of released states. It is
the number of states swept**, and the assertion only ever graded the subset that
released. Both numbers are counted and printed now.
On §2's run that shows up as the settling point: **−1190 W against a frozen
integrator of −1194 W**, not the 5000 W rail. The tech lead's note on SAFETY-04
— that the carried `i_w` and `release/1.0`'s recomputed value land on the same
slew-limited command — is preserved: the `i_w=None` path is still graded against
the transcription, cycle for cycle, everywhere except the 432 releases.
⚠️ **The first form of this check was wrong and the sweep said so**, which is
left in the test file. It asserted `|target| <= |i_w|` on a released cycle and
produced `prev −5000, i_w −3000, target −4600`: the command was walking back
from −5000 toward the integrator and had not arrived. It was moving the right
way and the assertion still failed, because "never exceeds the integrator" is
not what no-windup means here.
---
## 7. What this does NOT buy, said plainly
**The site still does not reach its target while another writer is on the bus.**
It settles at the frozen integrator, not at the meter's target. What the exit
buys is that the battery stops being *idle* while the site exports; it does not
buy correct regulation against an actuator somebody else is also writing to, and
nothing in a rules engine can. A standing grid error with a second writer
present is the symptom of a configuration this add-on refuses to support.
**`freeze-released` is a place to start looking, not a finding.** It says the
divergence outlasted the plant's own measured settling time, and that is all it
says — §8. DOCS.md now tells the operator the innocent causes first (a large
load or PV swing, a plant slower than the one that was measured) and the second
writer only when the state **stands**. It is carried on `Decision.reason`, which
nothing after the freeze overwrites. No new alarm was added: SAFETY-41 removed
one that narrated normal anti-windup, and this state is not yet known to be
worth waking anybody for.
**No accepted configuration removes the block any more.** `config.yaml` accepts
`saturation_cycles` as `int(1,10)`; the bound is 12, so every accepted value is
strictly below it and the freeze always engages before its exit is due. This
paragraph used to say the opposite — at a bound of 9, settings of 9 and 10
deleted the block silently and the branch documented that as a known
consequence. Moving the bound closed it by construction. `test_control.py` pins
it against `config.yaml`'s own schema line rather than a transcription of it.
**Nothing was measured on two inverters.** See the warning in §3.
---
## 8. ⚠️ ROUND 2: the bound was derived from the wrong half, and it accused
**What was wrong.** `SETTLE_CYCLES` was `ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_S / LOOP_TICK_S)` = 9.
`PLANT_SETTLE_S` is 18 s, the **up**-ramp of `NOTES.md` §5.10's kettle step;
the same measurement recorded ~23 s coming back **down** (`NOTES.md:1550`).
SAFETY-39 takes 18 correctly — its bound is a refusal, and the looser number
refuses less. This bound asks the opposite question, and the looser number stops
believing the plant three cycles too early.
**Why that is not a tuning quibble.** The predicate has no memory. `prev_w` is
one cycle's command; the pack carries every command before it. A command that
falls **through zero** — the ordinary end of a load or PV step — leaves the pack
coasting in the old direction, so the reading has the sign the command *used* to
have and lands outside the interval spanned by 0 and the new `prev_w`.
`unasked_power()` calls that "unasked". With the bound three cycles short of the
plant's own down-ramp, the counter reaches it while the coast-down is still
going, and the law emits `freeze-released` on **one inverter with nothing else
on the bus.**
**Measured, in the container, N = 1.** One `compute()`, one plant model, one
command; no second writer anywhere in the harness. The plant is a first-order
lag whose two time constants come from the two measured settling times
(tau = t/3, since a first-order step is 95 % done at 3 tau) with
`sim/plantsim.py`'s measured 800 W/s ramp cap. It is a **model**, and it is
labelled one wherever it is used.
| | bound 9 | bound 12 |
|---|---|---|
| 1280 closed-loop scenarios (a grid of plant pairs, slews, `saturation_cycles`, load steps) | **113 fire** | **24 fire** |
| 272 load-step pairs at the measured 18 s / 23 s plant, `slew_w 400` | **62 fire** | **2 fire** |
The single case now pinned in `test_control.py`: a 4 kW export falling to
2.5 kW. At cycle 34 the command is −310 W, the pack is still at −1343.4 W
coasting down from −4860 W a few cycles earlier, `unasked_power(−310, −1343.4,
500)` is True, `sat_count` is 9, and the law says `freeze-released`. At 12 the
same run never releases.
**What the fix does not fix.** The bound makes the false positive rare on *the
plant that was measured*. It cannot make it impossible, because it is a
measurement and the plant can be slower than the measurement. Same sweep, bound
held at 12, lengthening only the plant's down-ramp: 8 of 320 scenarios at the
measured 23 s, 59 of 320 at 34 s, 268 of 320 at 50 s. That residual is why the
three statements below were corrected rather than merely re-numbered.
**Three shipped statements were falsified by this and are now rewritten:**
1. `unasked_power()`'s docstring — *"Anything outside that interval was put
there by something other than this loop."* It was our own power. The
docstring now says what the predicate does guarantee (this cycle's command
does not account for this cycle's reading) and states the coast-down as its
known blind spot.
2. `control.py`, in `compute()` — *"SO THE BOUND BELONGS TO (b) AND ONLY TO
(b)"*. It fired in case (a). The comment now says the bound is a reason to
stop believing (a), not a proof of (b), and that the release is written to be
survivable when the inference is wrong.
3. **DOCS.md — *"If you see `freeze-released` in the action log, look for the
second writer."*** This is the one that reaches a person, and on a
single-inverter install it sent them hunting something that does not exist.
Replaced by a section that gives the innocent causes first and the second
writer only when the state stands.
@@ -0,0 +1,816 @@
# SAFETY-32 — `bms_soc_floor` per pack, and the two judgement calls it left open
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-32`.
**Card:** SAFETY-32 — *"One `bms_soc_floor` for two packs grades the shallower
pack against the deeper one's cut-out"*, scoped by the card's own PM PROOFREAD
to its **third** bullet only. Bullets 1 (aggregate anti-windup) and 2 (per-instance
`achievable_w`) were verified as already shipped by DEV-02 and CFG-04 and were
**not** touched — `main.py`'s `actual_w=self.site_batt_w` comment is the record
of why the first of those must stay site-level, and it still reads as written.
---
## 1. The defect, stated in the terms the code uses
`bms_soc_floor` **describes a battery**: it is the percent that pack's own BMS
cuts out at, register `0x0560` on the reference GW5000S-BP, read as 10. It was a
flat option because there was one pack.
`peak_soc_floor` **describes the site's policy**: the depth a money-saving
discharge may never reach. Rule 8 refuses `peak_soc_floor <= bms_soc_floor`,
because such a floor can never bind — the BMS wins and the status page reports a
backstop that does not exist.
At two packs of different models the two cut-outs differ, and one number for both
is wrong **in the direction that empties a pack**: with cut-outs of 10 % and 30 %
and `peak_soc_floor: 20`, the add-on **started**, and the guard would command a
forced discharge that pack B's *BMS* — not the operator's floor — is the thing
that stops. That is rule 8's own failure mode, reached through rule 8.
---
## 2. DECISION 1 — required per entry, not defaulted from `PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS`
The card left this open and asked for the reason to be recorded.
**Decided: REQUIRED of every roster entry**, in `config.yaml`'s schema
(`bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)`, no trailing `?`) and in `validate.py` rule 8, which
refuses a missing one **by name**.
The reason is that a default here is not a convenience, it is **this card's own
defect wearing a different hat**. A default is one number applied to every pack,
which is exactly what the flat key was. An add-on that answers "10 %" for a pack
nobody has told it about has invented a property of somebody's battery, and the
failure mode of the invention is the one this card exists to remove — the
shallower pack protected by a floor that belongs to the deeper one. CFG-03's
rule ("defaults live in exactly one place") points the same way: the one mirror
`PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["bms_soc_floor"]` is the default for the **flat** key, i.e.
for the single-inverter shape, and reusing it per entry would make one dict the
default in two shapes with two meanings.
It is also the treatment `max_w` already gets, for the same reason and by the
same argument (`inverter.py`'s `build_roster()` docstring): the per-unit numbers
that describe hardware are required, and the per-unit *sensors* are optional
because an absent sensor is a real state.
**The cost is stated rather than hidden.** This is a schema change: a roster
config written before this branch is refused by the Supervisor until each entry
gains the key, and every roster fixture in the suite needed it. Nothing in
production carries a roster today — `inverters:` ships `[]` and the second
inverter is ~8 days out — so the migration is paid by fixtures and by whoever
writes the first real roster, at a startup refusal that names the entry.
**What is NOT inherited.** An entry that omits the key does not borrow the flat
one. `Inverter.bms_soc_floor` is then `None`, `peakguard.pack_floor_pct()`
answers `None`, and `discharge_permitted()` already treats an unknown floor as
**no permission** — so even in the window before rule 8 runs (e.g. `sim/inject.py`,
which does not run the startup gate) the absence costs a shave and never a pack.
`0.0` was rejected explicitly: it is the most permissive value the key has.
## 3. DECISION 2 — the site verdict is the MAXIMUM of the packs' own floors
`Controller.pack_floor_soc` — the **minimum** measured SoC, the emptiest pack —
**is unchanged**, exactly as the card instructed. What changed is the floor it is
graded against. `peakguard.binding_soc_floor()` reduces the roster's per-pack
floors, each of them `max(peak_soc_floor, that pack's own cut-out)`, with a
`max()`. The two reductions pair: a minimum SoC against a maximum floor is the
conservative combination, and both move the verdict towards refusing a shave and
away from spending a pack. `min(soc) <= max(floor)` is implied by "some pack is
at or below its own floor", so the site verdict is never more permissive than
grading each pack separately would be. The converse is not true and is not
claimed — a site can be refused while every pack individually has headroom, which
costs a shave.
### 3a. ⚠️ FIX ROUND — the reduction was written and argued, and NOT GRADED
PR #48 was rejected because the argument in §4 below justified *writing* the
reduction and was then not carried into a check. Neither of the two mutations
below appears anywhere in §6's twelve-row battery: it graded *"the reduction
dropped"* and *"the bare option handed over"*, and never asked what happens when
the reduction is the **wrong one**, or when the roster handed to it is
**sliced**. Both were applied to `app/` by the reviewer and **all 19 files
stayed green**:
| mutation | Δ | why it survived |
|---|---|---|
| `binding_soc_floor()`: `max(floors)` → `min(floors)` | **0 bytes** | every roster in the suite was rule-8-valid or one pack long, so `floors` held **identical numbers** and `max`/`min`/first/last were four spellings of one answer |
| the `decide()` call site: `self.packs` → `self.packs[:1]` | **+4 bytes** | part 12g asserted `"self.packs" in <the unparsed expression>` — and `self.packs[:1]` **contains that substring** |
The zero-byte one was proved to have actually run rather than assumed:
`dis.get_instructions` showed the `LOAD_GLOBAL`s as `[float, pack_floor_pct,
any, min]`, and `binding_soc_floor([Pack("a",50,10), Pack("b",50,35)], 20.0)`
returned `20.0` where the shipped code returns `35.0`.
**The common cause is this repository's recurring defect** — a check whose DATA
cannot reach the failure it names. The one check that used a cut-out **above**
the EMS floor (12c's `_n1_deep`) ran on a roster of **ONE**, where every possible
reduction agrees. So no check in the suite ever evaluated
`binding_soc_floor()` on two packs whose floors **differ**.
**And the rule-8 degeneracy is not a defence, by §4's own words.** If
"unreachable is a claim about today's rule ordering, not a property of this
function, and `validate_startup_config()` is also `sim/inject.py`'s entry point"
is enough to *write* the reduction, it is enough to *grade* it. Through
`sim/inject.py`, which does not run rule 8 at all, `min(floors)` lets the guard
command a forced discharge to 20 % on a pack whose BMS cuts out at 35 %.
**What was added — no shipped behaviour changed, only what observes it:**
* **`test_peakguard.py` part 12c2** evaluates `binding_soc_floor()` on a roster
whose per-pack floors **all differ**. Four **simulated** cut-outs —
`30, 25, 40, 35` %, every one strictly above `peak_soc_floor: 20`, so
`pack_floor_pct()` selects the cut-out for each and `floors` *is* that tuple in
that order. The four candidate reductions are then four different numbers:
max = 40 <- the shipped answer
min = 25
first = 30 <- "grade the site against pack A", inside the function
last = 35
mean = 32.5
The extremes sit at **interior** roster positions (index 2 is the max, index 1
the min). A two-pack roster structurally cannot separate these — there `max`
and `last` coincide and so do `min` and `first` — and neither can three. Four
is the smallest roster that separates all four. The precondition is its own
check (habit 1), one pack is then raised past the old maximum (habit 7: the
**last** pack, which was neither extreme, so the line can only move if the
reduction read it), and `peak_soc_floor` is lifted above every cut-out to grade
the other side of the conjunction.
* **Part 12g is behaviour now, not source text** (MUTATION.md habit 4). Real
`Controller.cycle()`s on a two-pack roster, both packs held at the same SoC and
everything else identical, with the packs' own cut-outs as the only thing
varied:
cut-outs A 10 / B 18 % -> decide() got soc_floor=20 %, floor_limited=False
cut-outs A 10 / B 35 % -> decide() got soc_floor=35 %, floor_limited=True
The observable is `PeakDecision.soc_floor` — the argument, echoed back by the
shipped `decide()` — so the whole path from `Controller.inverters` to the
guard's argument is under test, and the site's **verdict flips** as well as the
number. `self.packs[:1]` answers 20 % both times. **Which** option key the floor
comes from stays pinned on the source in part 4, because that claim genuinely
is about the code's shape; that the option still governs is now graded
behaviourally too.
* ⚠️ **A THIRD SURVIVOR, FOUND WHILE FIXING THE FIRST TWO, AND RECORDED RATHER
THAN QUIETLY REPAIRED.** The first cut of part 12g varied only **pack B's**
cut-out — so `self.packs[-1:]`, grade the site against the **last** pack,
agreed with the full roster on both runs and stayed green across all 19 files
(+5 bytes). A two-run fixture that only ever moves the second pack pins `[:1]`
and not `[-1:]`; it is the same defect one step along, and it was in the fix
for this defect. Part 12g now runs the **same pair of cut-outs in both
orders**:
cut-outs A 10 / B 18 % -> soc_floor=20 %, floor_limited=False
cut-outs A 10 / B 35 % -> soc_floor=35 %, floor_limited=True
...the SAME PAIR SWAPPED, A 35 / B 18 % -> soc_floor=35 %, floor_limited=True
`[:1]` answers 20 % on the second run, `[-1:]` answers 20 % on the third, and
the roster answers 35 % on both. No single-position slice passes all three.
This is the mirror `12h` already ran on the SoC axis, which is where the shape
was borrowed from.
* ⚠️ **AND A FOURTH, from the same battery: the EMPTY-roster branch.** Rewriting
`binding_soc_floor([])`'s `float(soc_floor)` to `return None` (−43 bytes) was
green across all 19 files. It is defensive code — `Controller.inverters` is
never empty on a started controller, and `inputs_ok` refuses the cycle before
the guard is reached if it were — so nothing in the suite went near it. It is
**pinned rather than argued**, in both directions (the option when there is
one, `None` when there is not), because a branch with no check is a branch
that can be rewritten under a green suite. The check also records why it
cannot permit anything either way: `pack_floor_soc` is `None` at an empty
roster, and `discharge_permitted()` refuses on a `None` SoC whatever the floor
is.
* **`wired_over_limit()` gained a `prepare(ctl)` hook**, inside its retry loop so
every attempt grades the same site, which is the only window in which a second
inverter can join the roster before the telegrams are fed.
* **In-process mutation rows 22, 22b and 23** record all four survivors, so a
later edit that re-degenerates any of these fixtures goes red on a row rather
than on nothing.
### 3b. ⚠️ SECOND FIX ROUND — the fix carried the defect it was written to close
Round 2 closed both named survivors, and both of round 3's blockers are the
**same defect sitting inside that fix**: a check whose TEXT claims more than its
FIXTURE can observe. Applied to `app/` on `8501e05`, **all 19 files stayed
green** for both:
| mutation | Δ | the sentence that was too broad | why the fixture could not see it |
|---|---|---|---|
| `binding_soc_floor()`: `max(floors)` → `max(floors[-2:])` | **+5 bytes** | *"So the reduction reads **every entry**"* | 12c2's only counterfactual raised the **last** pack (`_deeper[-1]`), and **every window that ends at the roster's end follows the last pack**. On `(30,25,40,35)` both answer 40; on `_deeper` both answer 45. |
| the `decide()` call site: `self.packs` → `self.packs[:2]` | **+4 bytes** | *"what is reduced is the **ROSTER** and not a POSITION in it"* | all three `_floor_reaching_decide` runs drove a **two-pack** roster, where `self.packs[:2]` **is** `self.packs` — by exactly the argument 12c2 itself makes about two packs being unable to separate max/min/first/last. |
Round 2's *report* stated the narrow, true claim ("no **single-position** slice
passes all three runs"). The *check in the file* stated the broad one. That gap
is the whole of round 3.
**THE GENERAL LAW, stated once so the next card can use it:**
> **A fixture of N packs cannot separate two reductions that agree on N packs.**
> Two cannot separate max from min from first from last. Three cannot separate
> max from max-of-the-last-two. A single counterfactual that varies one position
> cannot separate the reduction from any window containing that position.
Its corollary is the reason this section is long: **the regress does not
terminate in a fixture.** Closing `[:1]` took two packs; `[:2]` took three;
`[:3]` takes four — and a four-pack run hands `[:4]` the same free pass. Round 3
therefore does two different things rather than adding one more pack.
**What was added — no shipped behaviour changed, only what observes it:**
* **Part 12c2 gained a ROSTER SET and a computed FAMILY TABLE.** The same four
simulated cut-outs with the **deepest moved to each of the four positions**,
and fourteen enumerated rewrites of `max(floors)` each checked against every
roster. The table is **computed and printed**, and a member with an empty kill
list takes the check **red naming it** — so a family member can no longer be
added without a fixture that reaches it. `max(floors[-2:])` is killed only by
the rosters whose deepest sits at index 0 or 1, which is precisely the data the
single last-pack counterfactual could not supply.
* **Part 12c2 gained a LENGTH SWEEP.** `binding_soc_floor()` is a pure function
over a list, which is the one place a sweep is cheap: **78 simulated rosters,
lengths 1 through 12, the deepest cut-out at every position of each.** That
closes *every* head window `max(floors[:w])` and *every* tail window
`max(floors[-w:])` of width **1 to 11** in one property rather than one
mutation at a time — and the check asserts that width **12 is NOT reached**, so
the limit is a red line rather than a silence.
* **Part 12g drives THREE-pack rosters**, with the deep cut-out at index 0, 1
**and** 2. Every positional slice of a three-pack roster is a proper subset of
`{0,1,2}` and so drops a position; the run whose deep pack sits there answers
the option, 20 %, where the roster answers 35 %. `self.packs[:2]` goes red on
the index-2 run. `_floor_reaching_decide()` now takes `*floors`, and the extra
units join through the same `second_inverter()` hook the two-pack runs use.
* **Part 12g gained a POSITIONAL-SLICE TABLE**, computed against the **real**
`Controller.packs` each of the six cycles actually ran and the **real**
`PeakDecision.soc_floor` it produced — so it measures the shipped call site's
own answer, not a re-derivation, and a survivor takes the check red.
* ⚠️ **AND A FIFTH AND SIXTH SURVIVOR, FOUND BY ROUND 3'S OWN BATTERY AND
CLOSED STRUCTURALLY RATHER THAN BY ONE MORE PACK.** `self.packs[:3]` (+4) and
`self.packs[-3:]` (+5) survive **all six** behavioural runs, because the
longest roster those runs drive is three packs long. Part 12g therefore also
pins the roster **argument's identity** on the AST: it must unparse to exactly
`self.packs`, which is false of every slice at every length. ⚠️ This is **not**
the substring test round 2 removed — `"self.packs" in expr` is *true* of every
slice; `ast.unparse(arg) == "self.packs"` is *false* of all of them. The two
halves are separated and each says what it reaches: the **runs** grade the
VALUE and reach every slice up to N=3; the **pin** grades the ARGUMENT'S
IDENTITY at any N and is blind to two things the runs are not — a rewrite of
what `Controller.packs` *returns* (the runs' `len(ctl.packs) == 3` catches
that) and the reduction *inside* `binding_soc_floor()` (12c2's).
* ⚠️ **AND ONE ROW IS RECORDED AS NOT CAUGHT.** A reduction over a window
**twelve packs wide** is indistinguishable from `max(floors)` on every roster
in the file, because the sweep stops at twelve. Unlike the call site there is
no identity claim to pin — the claim is semantic, "the maximum", and a shape
pin would refuse honest refactors of the expression. It is reported **with its
size** (it needs a 13-pack roster, on a site whose roster is ONE and whose
second unit is ~8 days out) rather than hidden.
* **Two rewrites are EQUIVALENT, not uncaught.** `max(set(floors))` and
`list(reversed(self.packs))` cannot change any answer — `max` is order- and
duplicate-invariant. The second is nonetheless red on the structural pin.
* **In-process mutation rows 24 – 27** record all four of round 3's findings,
including the not-caught one, so a later edit that re-degenerates any of these
fixtures goes red on a row rather than on nothing.
## 4. ⚠️ THE HONEST LIMITATION, and it is the reason this record exists
**Under any configuration rule 8 accepts, `binding_soc_floor()` answers
`peak_soc_floor` for every pack.** Rule 8 refuses `peak_soc_floor <= bms_soc_floor`
on *every* unit, so `max(peak_soc_floor, bms_i) == peak_soc_floor` everywhere the
add-on will actually start. The per-pack **floor** is therefore non-degenerate
only against a config rule 8 refuses.
This is not a defect and it is not hidden. It is the same argument
`validate.unit_caps_indexed()` makes about itself, in that function's own words:
> *"Rule 9(d) already refuses such a config so the two lists cannot desynchronise
> in shipped use — but 'unreachable' is a claim about today's rule ordering, not
> a property of this function, and `validate_startup_config()` is also
> `sim/inject.py`'s entry point."*
CFG-04's index desynchronisation is what happened the last time that reasoning
was left implicit. So the reduction is written, and it is graded on both sides:
`test_peakguard.py` part 12c sweeps **1775** rule-8-valid `(peak_soc_floor,
bms_soc_floor)` pairs and asserts the answer is the option in every one of them
(that is AC 5, measured over the whole option space rather than at the shipped
point), and then asserts that on the pair rule 8 *refuses* the answer is the
**cut-out** — because without that second line the sweep would be satisfied by
`soc_floor` typed straight through, and the mutation that deletes the `max()`
could never bite. It does bite: M2 on the PR.
**What IS live at a rule-8-valid roster** is the rest of the card: rule 8 now
refuses the two-model config that used to start; the permission is answered per
pack, so the alarm names the pack that stopped the site rather than "the
battery"; and an entry with no stated cut-out is withheld instead of defaulted.
## 4b. ⚠️ ROUND 4 — the sibling argument, and SPIKE-04 making this the live axis
Rounds 2 and 3 hardened the **floor** axis: the `max` inside
`binding_soc_floor()`, the roster handed to it, `Controller.packs`, and
`pack_floor_pct()`'s conjunction. Round 4's blocker is the same family at the
**sibling argument of the same call**:
```python
self.peak_guard = peakguard.decide(
...,
soc=self.pack_floor_soc, # MINIMUM <- round 4
soc_floor=peakguard.binding_soc_floor(self.packs, ...), # MAXIMUM <- rounds 2-3
```
`peakguard.py`'s own docstring names them as a pair — *"MAXIMUM here pairs with
the MINIMUM in `pack_floor_soc`"* — and a conjunction is exactly as strong as
its weaker half. On `52380c0`, with all 19 files green and verified again after
the rebase onto `3934ad7`:
| mutation in `Controller.pack_floor_soc` | bytes | before round 4 | now |
|---|---|---|---|
| `min(float(v) for v in vals[:2])` | +4 | **GREEN** | RED |
| `min(float(v) for v in vals[-2:])` | +5 | **GREEN** | RED |
| `min(float(v) for v in vals[:3])` | +4 | **GREEN** | RED |
| `vals[:1]`, `vals[-1:]`, `vals[1:]`, `vals[:-1]`, `max(vals)`, the mean | | RED | RED |
The suite's separating power on the SoC axis stopped at exactly **N = 2** —
precisely the state the floor axis was in before round 3, and which round 3
itself named as its blocker 2. A fixture of N packs cannot separate reductions
that agree on N packs.
**It changes a real answer.** A three-pack roster at 50 / 60 / 11 %, emptiest
pack **third**: the shipped property answers 11 %, `vals[:2]` answers 50 %. The
site is then graded for discharge *permission* against a pack 39 points fuller
than the emptiest, and spends a pack its own BMS stops — through
`sim/inject.py`, which runs no validator rule at all. The verdict flips with it:
11 % is below the 20 % EMS floor, so the shipped site is floor-limited and sizes
no forced discharge, where the mutant is permitted and sizes a positive one.
### ⚠️ SPIKE-04 makes the differing-floor discipline the entire exposure
SPIKE-04 reads pack B as **4 × Dyness DL5.0C, DoD 90 → floor 10 %** — **FROM THE
DATASHEET AND THE SERIAL. Inverter B does not physically exist (~8 days out) and
nothing about it has been measured.** Pack A is DoD 90 → 10 % as well, and *that
one is measured*, off register `0x0560` on the reference GW5000S-BP.
So **production is degenerate on the floor axis**: both packs floor at the same
value, `max(10, 10) == 10`, and a differing floor exists **only in the
fixtures**. That is not an argument for simplifying the fixtures to matching
values — it is the argument for keeping them. `binding_soc_floor()`'s reduction
is observable *nowhere else*, and the moment a third pack, a replacement pack or
a different chemistry arrives it is observable in the field. **Anyone who
"simplifies" `A_PACK_FLOOR != B_PACK_FLOOR_SIM` to one number deletes the only
data this repository has that can see the reduction at all**; part 12c2's
precondition check goes red if they do, and this paragraph is why.
The **SoC axis has no such degeneracy**. Two batteries at the same state of
charge is a coincidence, not a configuration, so `pack_floor_soc` is the half of
the pair that will be non-degenerate in the field from the day inverter B is
wired up.
### The treatment, transferred from round 3
* **the roster SET** — six real `Controller.cycle()` runs, the emptiest pack at
every position of a three-pack roster and both positions of a two-pack one,
the observable read off `PeakDecision.soc` (the argument, echoed) rather than
off a spy or a grep. Cut-outs held flat across all of them, so the floor axis
cannot be what moved the answers.
* **the positional-slice table and the non-slice table** — computed against the
real `Controller.inverters` each cycle carried and the real decision it
produced, printed, with a member that nothing kills taking the check red.
* **the length sweep** — the real property on real rosters of 1 to 12 inverters,
the empty pack at every position. Closes head and tail windows of width 1-11
at once. Width 12 and wider is **honestly not reached**, and asserted to be
unreached so a later sweep that lengthens the rosters must rewrite the
sentence.
* **the exact structural pin** — three of them, because there are three
reductions over roster length in this one property: `vals` is built by one
comprehension over the bare `self.inverters`; `any(... for v in vals)` reduces
the whole list; `min(... for v in vals)` reduces the whole list. Every slice
of either is red at **every** roster length, including the `[:3]` and `[:12]`
the runs and the sweep cannot see.
Unlike the floor axis, **there is no uncaught row here**: the claim at
`pack_floor_soc` is an *identity* ("this list"), so a shape pin is the right
instrument, where `binding_soc_floor()`'s claim is *semantic* ("the maximum")
and a shape pin there would refuse honest refactors. That asymmetry is why one
carries an open row and the other does not.
## 4c. ⚠️ THE ENUMERATION — what OTHER reductions over roster length are graded
This card has now been rejected three times for the same shape one step over, so
round 4 stopped closing members and enumerated the **family**. Every reduction
over `self.inverters` / `self.packs` in `Controller` was found from the AST and
mutated to a slice, one at a time, against the full 19-file suite.
| # | site | reduction | consumer | mutation | result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `pack_floor_soc` | `min` over SoC | `decide(soc=)`, `arbitrage.decide(soc=)` | `vals[:2]` +4 | **was GREEN → now RED** (12i) |
| 2 | `pack_floor_soc` | `any(v is None)` | same | `vals[:1]` +4 | RED (raises in 12d; pinned in 12i) |
| 3 | `pack_floor_soc` | the `vals` comprehension | same | `self.inverters[:2]` +4 | RED (12i sweep + pin) |
| 4 | `binding_soc_floor` | `max` over floors | `decide(soc_floor=)` | `min`, windows | RED (12c2, round 2-3) |
| 5 | call site | the roster argument | same | `self.packs[:1..3]` | RED (12g, round 3) |
| 6 | `Controller.packs` | the comprehension | `binding_soc_floor`, `pack_permissions` | `self.inverters[:2]` +4 | RED (12g three-pack runs) |
| 7 | `site_batt_w` | `sum` + `any(None)` | `decide(batt_w=)` — sizes the floor | `self.inverters[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 8 | `site_rating_w` | `sum` of per-unit conjunction | `decide(achievable_w=)`, freeze rail | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 9 | `site_max_w` | `sum` of `max_w` | the site loop's supervised bound | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 10 | `site_dev_bound` | `sum` + `any(None)` | `looks_frozen`, `rail_unreachable` | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 11 | `site_circulating_w` | `circulating_w` over measured power | SAFETY-31 trip | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_watchdog.py) |
| 12 | `inputs_ok` | `all` over both readings | gates the whole cycle (§11.1 rule 1) | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 13 | `units` | `tuple` of names | the arbiter's scope table | `[:1]` +4 | RED (5 files) |
| 14 | `status_payload` | `min(_dues)` over `self.maints` | the operator's "maintenance due" row | `_dues[:1]` +4 | RED (test_maintenance.py) |
| 15 | `maint_unit` | `self.inverters[self.maint_index]` | which pack the FSM drives | `[0]` −15 | RED (test_maintenance.py) |
| 16 | store migration | the roster name list | MAINT-05's key migration | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_maintenance.py) |
| 17 | `validate_unit_ranges` | the roster argument | startup refusal | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 18 | `cycle()` stale-input hold | `any(sign_wd.tripped)` | **a latched unit's failsafe SET** | `[:1]` +4 | **was GREEN → now RED** (test_watchdog.py part 8) |
| 19 | `publish()` status | `any(sign_wd.tripped)` | the MQTT status vocabulary | `[:1]` +4 | **was GREEN → now RED** (part 8) |
| 20 | `status_payload()` banner | `any(sign_wd.tripped)` | the one headline on the page | `[:1]` +4 | **was GREEN → now RED** (part 8) |
| 21 | `_grade_store_migration` | `any(sign_wd.tripped)` | SAFETY-02's re-arm guard | `[:1]` +4 | was GREEN → now RED (12j), see below |
| 22 | `cycle()` undeliverable list | `sorted(...)` over shares | the *text* of one event line | `[:1]` +4 | **STILL GREEN — honest gap, below** |
**Rows 18-20 are the finding, and they are not this card's code.** All three are
`any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in self.inverters)`, all three are SAFETY-30's, and
all three survived a green 19-file suite for exactly the reason every blocker on
this card survived: *the only fixture that reached them was a roster of ONE,
where `self.inverters[:1]` IS `self.inverters`.* Part 3 of test_watchdog.py has
built a two-inverter roster with only inverter B latched since SAFETY-30
shipped — the precise data all three needed — and none of them read it.
Row 18 is the one with teeth. A latched unit must take the whole roster past the
stale-input hold, because that unit's `failsafe` SET is the thing parking it;
main.py's own comment says *"the trip would stop acting the moment a poll was
missed"*. With `[:1]`, a latched inverter B plus a one-cycle gap in inverter A's
SoC returns early, and B's last share stands for the heartbeat to re-emit.
test_watchdog.py part 8 now drives that with the latch at **each** position, plus
the no-latch counterfactual that proves the hold really fires.
**Row 21 — graded structurally, and argued to be redundant.** The `[:1]` there
is now red on 12j's enumeration, but I could not construct a *reachable* state in
which it changes an answer: `_grade_store_migration()` runs at startup, before
any cycle, so a unit is tripped in memory only if its own `unit/<name>/sign_tripped`
key was truthy — which makes `namespaced_latched` True and short-circuits the
disjunct. I believe it is an equivalent mutant at that call site rather than a
live hole, and I am recording the argument instead of asserting the conclusion.
**Row 22 — STILL GREEN, and reported with its size.** `", ".join(sorted(u for u
in resolution.shares if not self._can_write(u)))[:1]` truncates the **names in
one event-log line**. It is +4 bytes and no check bites. The refusal itself —
`elif {u for u in resolution.shares if not self._can_write(u)}` — is a different
expression and *is* graded (test_peakguard.py part 10h-1b), so the site still
stops; what a `[:1]` costs is an operator being told one name when two units have
no writer. It is not a roster comprehension (it iterates `resolution.shares`), so
12j does not cover it and does not pretend to. Closing it needs a three-inverter
fixture with two writer-less entries, which is ALLOC-01's fixture and not this
card's. **Filed as open, with its size and its consequence, rather than closed
quietly or left unmentioned.**
### And the family closed rather than the member
`test_peakguard.py` part 12j enumerates the family from the AST and requires
every member to take the roster **whole**, so a new reduction over a slice is red
**on the line it is written**, at every roster length, with no fixture required.
That check is what would have caught rounds 2, 3 and 4's blockers on the round
they were written instead of one review round each; it is also what found rows
18-21.
⚠️ **AND IT WAS STILL TOO NARROW — see §4d.** Round 4's version enumerated the
26 roster comprehensions inside the `Controller` class, because that is where
the four known sites were. Round 5's blockers were four reductions in
`validate.py`, one module over, over a list *derived* from the roster three
calls away from it. The pin now parses every `.py` under `app/` and finds the
roster by transitive closure from one option key: **183 reductions across 9
modules.**
## 4d. ⚠️ ROUND 5 — the same family one MODULE over, and an instrument that discovers its own scope
Round 4 enumerated the family and closed it **inside the `Controller` class**,
because that is where the four known sites lived. The review found four more
survivors immediately, in `validate.py`, on a 19/19 green suite:
| site | mutation | delta | suite |
|---|---|---|---|
| `validate.py:779` | `min(caps)` → `min(caps[:1])` | +4 B | **GREEN** |
| `validate.py:779` | `min(caps)` → `min(caps[-1:])` | +5 B | **GREEN** |
| `validate.py:778` | `caps = [cap for _, cap in caps_ix[:1]]` | +4 B | **GREEN** |
| `validate.py:893` | `min(caps_ix[-1:], key=lambda p: p[1])` | +5 B | **GREEN** |
**None of them is an equivalent mutant — a safety refusal disappears.** With
`max_w: 5000` on inverter-a beside `2000` on inverter-b and
`sign_disagree_w: 3000`, the shipped validator answers one problem —
*"sign_disagree_w is 3000 W but max_w (inverter-b) is 2000 W, so the SAFETY-02
sign-disagreement watchdog can never fire"* — and every one of the four answers
**zero**. The site starts, with a watchdog reporting `armed` on the status page
that cannot trip on pack B. That is rule 5's own failure mode reached **through**
rule 5, which is the sentence `test_inverter.py:1657` says the rule exists to
prevent. Rule 6 loses its refusal the same way.
### Why round 4's pin could not see them, and why the fix is not four more checks
`caps` and `caps_ix` are not comprehensions over `self.inverters`; they are lists
**derived** from the roster, three function calls away from it, in a module the
enumeration never opened. Closing them by hand would have produced a fifth
rejection with the same shape one step over — that is the whole record of this
card. **A hand-written scope is the same defect as a hand-written fixture**
(MUTATION.md habit 12): a check whose data cannot reach the failure it names.
### The instrument
`test_peakguard.py` part 12j now parses **every `.py` under `app/`** off disk —
no module is named anywhere in the check — and finds the roster by transitive
closure from **one seed**, the `inverters` option key:
* a function whose returns are roster-carrying is **roster-producing**
(`roster_entries` → `build_roster` → `unit_caps_indexed` → `unit_caps`);
* a name assigned one carries it, **and so does a list accumulated in a loop
over one** — which is exactly what `caps`, `roster` and `problems` are, and
what round 4's rule could not express;
* an attribute or property answering one carries it (`self.inverters`,
`Controller.packs`, `Controller.units`, `live_units()`);
* **an argument at a call site taints that parameter in the callee**, which is
how the pin walks into `peakguard.binding_soc_floor`, `arbiter.resolve`,
`allocator.plan`, `circulation.circulating_w`, `maintenance.arbitrate` and
`store.migrate_maint_keys` without being told they exist;
* and **a slice of a roster is still a roster**, so a mutation cannot cut the
taint and hide every reduction downstream of itself. An **index** is one unit
and is not.
It then requires, at every place a roster-carrying value is reduced or iterated,
that the whole of it arrives: no `[:1]`, `[-1:]`, `[:2]` or `[0]` between the
roster and the reduction.
### What it found — and the hand-written list was wrong in BOTH directions
**183 reductions across 9 modules**, out of 23 `.py` files parsed:
`main.py` 96, `allocator.py` 24, `validate.py` 19, `arbiter.py` 14,
`circulation.py` 10, `maintenance.py` 10, `peakguard.py` 4, `inverter.py` 3,
`store.py` 3 — and 14 modules with no roster reduction at all.
The card's own suggested module list named `watchdog.py`, which reduces over no
roster at all (SAFETY-30's sign watchdogs are strictly per-unit — there is
nothing to slice), and did **not** name `maintenance.py` or `store.py`, which
both do. A pin built from that list would have made a vacuous claim about one
module and no claim at all about two others. That is the argument for computing
the scope, made with data rather than with an assertion.
The pin **independently rediscovers all four blockers** — it is told one option
key and nothing else — and finds a **fifth** beside them at
`validate.py:783`, the `min(caps_ix, key=...)` inside rule 5's message, which no
review round named.
### The counterfactual, at two depths
* **Per site, all of them.** Every enumerated site's own expression, in its own
scope, mutated with each of the four cuts this card has actually been defeated
by. **183 sites × 4 cuts = 732** mutated spellings; every one reported. The same run asserts
the predicate **accepts** the legitimate wrapped forms the package really uses
(`enumerate`, `zip`, `sorted`, `pack_permissions(packs, floor)`) and does not
treat a keyed lookup (`weights[u]` in `allocator._fill`) as a slice — which is
what four false SLICED reports cost before `shortens()` was written.
* **End to end, on the real files.** `[:1]` written into `app/validate.py` at
each blocker position, the **whole** analysis re-run over the mutated source,
and a sliced site required at that exact line — where the clean package
reports none. This is the check that would have taken PR #48 red four rounds
ago, with no fixture reaching it.
### The sweep, and the number that must not be quoted alone
All 183 sites were mutated to `[:1]`, one at a time, +4 bytes each, and each
mutant run against the full 19-file suite in `goodwe-addon-ci` (mounted `:ro`,
`python3 -B`, a fresh rsync per mutant; 0 `.pyc` in the tree before and after —
a read-only mount cannot write one, so TEST-15 is closed by construction here
rather than by discipline). **183 of 183 RED.**
⚠️ **On its own that is tautological**: with the pin in the tree every slice is
red *by the pin*. So all 51 mutants whose first red was `test_peakguard.py` were
re-run with the pin **neutralised** (`_SLICED` blanked), leaving only the
behavioural checks:
| | |
|---|---|
| **145 of 183** | a behavioural fixture in this repository separates the site from a slice of itself — red with the pin turned off |
| **38 of 183** | **nothing but this pin sees it.** Structurally closed by this card; behaviourally **UNGRADED**, and listed rather than counted as covered |
The 38: `main.py` 27, `allocator.py` 6, `validate.py` 2, `arbiter.py` 1,
`circulation.py` 1, `maintenance.py` 1. Grouped by what a `[:1]` there costs:
* **The operator's page — 15, the largest group.** `Controller.checks`
(3310, 3311, 3319, 3328, 3330, 3347, 3368, 3370, 3400, 3458) and
`status_payload` (3556, 3566, 3578). A slice reports one unit's row where two
exist, or "1 of 2 live" reading 1 of 1. Nothing commands differently; what is
lost is the evidence a human uses to notice that it should.
* **The write path's own counts.** `write_setpoint` 1267/1272/1280 — three
`len(targets)` guards. The write itself iterates `targets` at 1287 and *is*
graded (test_inverter.py); these three are its log arithmetic and refusal
count.
* **The allocator's internals.** `_fill`'s zero-weight last-resort pool (365),
`plan`'s `dropped` (526, 653), `free` (584), `frac_order` (591). ALLOC-01
drives two and three units through the *weighted* pass; the last-resort pass
and the largest-remainder tie-break are reached, but not with enough units for
a slice to change the answer.
* **Startup and FSM plumbing.** `__init__` 235/351, `_only` 831,
`_maint_button` 805, `cycle`'s maintenance zip 1505, `send_heartbeats` 3015,
`check_output_clamp` 2445/2452, `check_circulating` 2701,
`maintenance.arbitrate` 547, `arbiter.site_resolve` 517,
`circulation.opposing` 242.
* **Two refusal-TEXT sites.** `validate._roster_problems`'s `len(entries)` (554)
and `refuse()`'s numbering loop (1263) — both shape the words of a refusal
that still happens.
* **`_grade_store_migration` (698)**, already row 21 of §4c, argued there to be
an equivalent mutant at that call site. The argument is unchanged and is still
an argument, not a proof.
⚠️ **None of the 38 is closed behaviourally by this card, and saying so is the
point.** Closing sites one at a time is what cost this card four review rounds.
The pin closes the **family** — a slice at any of them is red on the line it is
written — and this list is what a shape pin can never promise.
### And the behavioural half, because a shape pin cannot grade a meaning
The pin grades an **identity** ("the whole roster arrives"). `min` → `max` is a
zero-byte edit and invisible to it, forever. So `test_validate.py` grows a
**roster SET** for the three rules that reduce over `unit_caps_indexed()`:
rosters of width 2, 3, 4 and 5 with the one small cap at **every position** —
14 rosters × 3 rules = 42 runs of the real validator — plus a **computed family
table** of twelve candidate reductions (`max`, `first`, `last`, the mean, and
`[:1]`, `[-1:]`, `[:2]`, `[:3]`, `[1:]`, `[:-1]`, `[::2]`) each compared against
what the shipped validator actually said on the same roster. Only `min` agrees
everywhere; any member no roster kills is **printed as a named survivor** and
takes the check red.
### ⚠️ A THIRD RULE WAS READING THE FLAT `max_w`, AND IT IS SAFETY-30's
Found by reading the three branches side by side — **not** by the pin, and said
that way because it is the shape of what the pin cannot see. Rule 5's sibling
branch, `unit_sign_disagree_w` (SAFETY-30's per-inverter sign watchdog), was
graded against `_number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)` — the **flat** option — three
lines under a branch that had already stopped doing that. Both directions were
measured before the fix:
* a roster of two 2000 W units beside a leftover `max_w: 5000` from a
single-inverter install, with `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000`, produced **zero
problems**. The site started, the status page said `armed`, and the per-unit
watchdog could not trip on **either** unit. Identical sentence to the blocker,
reached through the branch beside it;
* and a roster of two 5000 W units with no flat key was **refused** at 3000 W
against a 2000 W *default the operator never wrote*, for a threshold both
units can reach.
It takes the same `weakest` the branch above takes, from the same list, and
names the same unit. At a roster of one `unit_caps()` is `[max_w]`, so the
shipped single-inverter refusal is the same comparison, the same boundary and
the same sentence. Both directions are asserted in `test_validate.py`.
### ⚠️ WHAT THE PIN CANNOT SEE — open rows, with sizes
1. **Semantics.** `min` vs `max` vs the mean: zero-byte edits, invisible to any
shape pin. Only the behavioural sets above can see them, and they only see
the rules they drive.
2. **Direct index sites that are not reductions.** `self.inverters[0]` in
`_only()` and `actuator_of()`, `self.inverters[self.maint_index]` in
`maint_unit`, `entries[index]` in `_unit_label()`. Single-unit lookups, meant
to be, graded where they live.
3. **A subscript by a NAME.** `weights[u]`, `cap[u]`, `add[u]` in
`allocator._fill` are keyed lookups into a roster-derived mapping and are
accepted deliberately, so `caps[i]` with a variable `i` would pass. Not in
the family this card has been defeated by; buying it costs four false reports.
4. **A slice through an intermediate call.** `sorted(roster)[:1]` subscripts a
call result, not a roster reference. Nothing in `app/` is written that way
today; if something is, it would not be seen.
5. **Anything outside `app/`.** `tools/`, `sim/` and the checks themselves are
not parsed — and `sim/inject.py` reaches `validate_startup_config()`.
6. **The taint's own seam.** It crosses a call boundary only where the callee is
a plain function this package defines and the argument is positional or
keyword. A roster handed through `*args`, stored in a dict and read back, or
passed to a method on an unresolvable object, is lost at that hop — and
everything downstream goes **unenumerated** rather than reported unreachable.
That is the shape of the remaining exposure: not zero, and not measurable
from inside the check.
7. **`cycle()`'s undeliverable-unit log line** (row 22 of §4c) is still green at
+4 bytes, unchanged from round 4 and still filed open.
## 5. ⚠️ THE RESIDUAL — a per-pack EMS floor is NOT this card
`peak_soc_floor` is still **one number for the site**, so the card's own
"or the deeper pack is needlessly withheld" half is not closed and this record
does not pretend it is. With cut-outs of 10 % and 18 %, rule 8 obliges the
operator to set the EMS floor above 18, and the 10 % pack is then held above its
own need. Closing that means `peak_soc_floor` becoming a per-entry key too, which
is a second option migration and a product decision about what the site-wide
number then means. The card scoped itself to `bms_soc_floor` and explicitly told
this developer not to widen it, so it is filed here as the open question it is
rather than smuggled in.
**Also still not in this card, and named by the shipped code already:** the
charge *ceiling* is the mirror image — `pack_floor_soc` is the wrong reduction
for it, because a ceiling is the **fullest** pack and `arbitrage`'s `soc_ceiling`
takes one number. `main.py:932-936` says so, and it belongs to CFG-04/SPIKE-04's
per-pack bound. Nothing here touched it.
## 6. What was changed, and one thing that was found on the way
* `config.yaml` — `bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` required per `inverters:` entry;
the flat key and its default are untouched and are documented as the
single-inverter shape's own cut-out.
* `app/inverter.py` — `Inverter.bms_soc_floor`; `_entry_bms_floor()` (`None`, not
a borrowed number and not `0.0`); `_flat_bms_floor()`.
* `app/peakguard.py` — `Pack`, `pack_floor_pct()`, `pack_permissions()`,
`binding_soc_floor()`. `discharge_permitted()` is unchanged and is still the
one place the question is answered.
* `app/validate.py` — `unit_bms_floors_indexed()`; rule 8 grades every unit and
names it via the **roster** index the value came off.
* `app/main.py` — `Controller.packs`; the `decide(soc_floor=…)` reduction; the
floor-limited notification names the pack(s) at or below their own floor, at a
roster of two or more only.
* `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` — **re-run, and repaired.** MUTATION.md
habit 8: a committed transcript is a check and it decays. Making the key
required broke §C outright and, worse, left §D printing **PASS** on a refusal
about the *wrong key* — its "no `max_w`" case was answered `Missing option
'bms_soc_floor'`. §D is now an isolated counterfactual over a **merged,
accepted** baseline with exactly one key varied per case, asserting the key's
**name** in the refusal, and it carries a `bms_soc_floor` case in both
directions. Re-run against `ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0`:
`all cases passed`.
* `app/inverter.py`, found by the mutation battery — `_flat_bms_floor()` was
written with the default in **two** places (the `.get()` fallback *and* the
blank test). Deleting either one survived, because each covered for the other:
MUTATION.md's masking section in three lines of option reading. It has one
defaulting line now, and M12 takes six checks red.
* **Round 3 changed no `app/` file at all.** `test_peakguard.py` only:
parts 12c2 and 12g. Its battery was **46 mutations across
`binding_soc_floor()`'s reduction, the `decide()` call site, `Controller.packs`
and `pack_floor_pct()`'s conjunction** — bytecode purged and counted before and
after each (23 → 0). **43 red, 3 survivors, all three recorded above and in the
in-process rows**: `max(floors[:12])` and `max(floors[-12:])`, which need a
13-pack roster to observe and are reported with that size rather than hidden;
and `max(set(floors))`, which is **equivalent** — `max` is duplicate-invariant,
so it cannot change an answer. `list(reversed(self.packs))` is equivalent too
(`max` is order-invariant) and is nonetheless red on the structural pin.
⚠️ **No measurement of inverter B appears anywhere in this change.** It does not
physically exist. Every second-pack number in a fixture, in the probe and in
config.yaml's commented example is **simulated and labelled as such**; only the
10 % on inverter A is read off hardware. The three-pack runs added in round 3 are simulated
twice over: there is no inverter C at all, and the shallow slots carry inverter
A's measured 10 % while the 35 % cut-out that moves along the roster is invented.
---
## 7. The probe transcript, re-run 2026-09-05 on 2026.08.0
Command (unchanged, in `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py`'s own docstring):
```
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/w:ro" -v "$PWD/tools:/probe:ro" \
--entrypoint python3 \
ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 \
/probe/supervisor_shape_probe.py
```
It reads `config.yaml` and runs Supervisor's own `AppOptions` validator in a
throwaway container. It touches no live Supervisor, POSTs nothing and installs
nothing.
⚠️ **RE-RUN AGAIN ON 2026-09-05**, because the rebase onto `67e649a` merged
SPIKE-04a's `max_w: 4600` into the same §C/§D blocks this card had rewritten,
and MUTATION.md habit 8 says a committed transcript that a document quotes is a
check. A hand-merged transcript is not a measurement of anything. The block
below is the output of that run, not of the 2026-09-04 one: B's rating reads
**4600** — its datasheet figure, still not a measurement of any unit — and every
case still passes.
```
== C. AC2: a two-inverter blob an operator would POST ==
PASS two inverters
[{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_a_setpoint_w", "soc_entity": "sensor.goodwe_a_soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.goodwe_a_battery_power", "max_w": 5000, "bms_soc_floor": 10}, {"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w", "soc_entity": "sensor.goodwe_b_so
== D. what the schema itself refuses, per entry ==
PASS the per-entry BASELINE is ACCEPTED, so every refusal below has nowhere else to come from
[{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": 4600, "bms_soc_floor": 10}]
PASS an entry with no name is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
Missing option 'name' in inverters in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS an entry with no setpoint_entity is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
Missing option 'setpoint_entity' in inverters in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS an entry with no max_w is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
Missing option 'max_w' in inverters in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS an entry with no bms_soc_floor (SAFETY-32) is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
Missing option 'bms_soc_floor' in inverters in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS an entry with max_w over the range is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
value must be at most 5000.0
PASS an entry with bms_soc_floor over the range (SAFETY-32) is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
value must be at most 50.0
PASS a JSON STRING where the list belongs is refused
Invalid list for option 'inverters' in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
== E. the ROLLBACK direction, and the operator's UI ==
PASS a schema WITHOUT `inverters` drops the key with a warning rather than refusing - so a downgrade is not the §B trap in reverse
['arbitrage_enabled', 'arbitrage_soc_ceiling', 'arbitrage_soc_floor', 'auto_start', 'batt_entity', 'batt_invert']
PASS Supervisor's UI renderer turns it into a repeatable section rather than choking - an operator can add the second inverter in the Configuration tab, which the JSON-string alternative could not offer
[{"name": "inverters", "type": "schema", "optional": true, "multiple": true, "schema": [{"name": "name", "required": true, "type": "string"}, {"name": "setpoint_entity", "required": true, "type": "string"}, {"name": "max_w", "lengthMin": 100.0, "lengthMax": 5000.0, "required": true, "type": "integer
== all cases passed ==
```
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
# SAFETY-37 — the freshness policy, and the one sentence in the card that had to be rewritten
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-06.** A per-unit reading that has stopped following its
own command is reported to its consumers as **`None`**, never as a held number.
The verdict is a **conjunction**, not an age threshold, and this document records
why an age threshold is not available at this layer — which is the one place the
card's wording could not be implemented as written.
Filed with SAFETY-37. Card `6a9a7eda7932387c3acbd700`, scope widened by the
architect pass of 2026-09-06 to carry the single policy for [[TEL-06]] and
[[TEL-08]] as well.
Every figure below was measured or read out of this repository on **2026-09-06**
and is re-derived by `test_freshness.py` on every run. Where a number is carried
forward from an earlier measurement, the section and the date it was taken are
given at the number.
---
## 0. The three faces, and which one this card built
| where | the defect | this card |
|---|---|---|
| **Layer 1** — `goodwe/master/goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml:690` | the ingest-age veto tests the **VALUE** of `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, not its arrival. A dead publisher freezes it at a healthy number and the veto can never fire | **not touched.** It is firmware, behind a flash. §5 says what it owes |
| **The add-on** — `app/hass.py:69-82` | returns a held value as a value. Nothing separates "read 40 %" from "still says 40 % because nothing updated it" | **built here** |
| **The evidence** — [[HW-01]] | SoC held 40 % for 6 h 25 m while the pack drained to its floor, every detector reading healthy | the case the policy is answerable to |
The two consumers the card names — SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and
SAFETY-31's circulating-power sensor — both read `Inverter.batt` (register
`0x0518`) and **neither had a freshness gate of any kind**. Both already do the
right thing with a `None`: `watchdog.SignWatchdog.evaluate` **clears** its window
on a `None` measurement, and `circulation.circulating_w` returns `None` for a
roster with a missing term, which clears that window too. **Neither could ever
receive one.** The gate is the piece that was missing *between* the shipped read
and the shipped checks, which is why the change to each consumer is zero lines.
---
## 1. ⚠️ The sentence that had to be rewritten, and why saying so is the finding
The card says: *"A pack legitimately resting at 40 % and a dead sensor reading
40 % are the same number; **only arrival separates them**."*
**For a signal this add-on polls out of Home Assistant's state cache, arrival
does not separate them, and cannot.** `read_inputs()` runs about once a second
(`run_control()`'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)` bounds the loop body), and while the
entity exists Home Assistant answers `200` with a number **whether or not the
publisher behind it is alive**. So both members of the pair arrive, identically,
for ever. `test_freshness.py` part 1a builds an arrival-age gate and grades it:
the age since arrival is `0.0 s` at every instant of **both** runs. A threshold
on it is a threshold that can never fire — which is TEL-06's own defect rebuilt
one layer up.
The other half of the card's rule survives intact and is honoured absolutely:
> ⚠️ Home Assistant's `last_updated` does **not** move when a value is rewritten
> unchanged, so it cannot be the source of truth.
Neither does `last_changed`, and this project measured on the ENV-01 rig (70 s of
a frozen meter) and independently against the live house that `last_reported`
does not advance on a repeat on either serialiser either —
`p1.HomeWizardLocalSource`'s docstring records both. **`app/freshness.py` reads
no Home Assistant timestamp at all.** Every clock in the verdict is
`time.monotonic()` inside this process, stamped at the instant an arrival carried
a different number. That is what "arrival-stamped" can mean here, and it is
graded (part 1a asserts the module's body contains no `last_updated`).
**So the criterion was rewritten rather than approximated:** *a reading is stale
when it has not moved through a change it was obliged to follow.* The obligation,
not the age, is what separates the pair.
---
## 2. The verdict
```
STALE ⟺ unchanged for ≥ 35.0 s
AND |standing command now| ≥ 250 W
AND |standing command now − standing command when the reading
last changed| ≥ 250 W
```
Latched: **only an arrival carrying a different number clears it.**
`0x0518` is the inverter reporting **itself** — r = 0.998 with battery power
against r = 0.09 with the real meter (`goodwe/NOTES.md` §3.3) — and it tracks its
own command: command and actual agreeing within 4 W once settled (§5.10,
measured 2026-08-22), the register dithering ±1 W while holding (§5.11, same
day). A unit told to move 250 W and still answering the same integer watt is not
tracking.
### 2.1 Why a bare "unchanged for N seconds" threshold is not available
**Measured, not feared.** Replaying the committed 30-day capture of this house's
own 1 W-resolution power entity — `scenarios/p1-net-30d-2026-08/`, 485,841
samples straight out of Home Assistant's recorder, where a row exists only when
the state string **changed**, so the gap between two rows *is* the unchanged
duration every consumer saw:
| | |
|---|---|
| longest unchanged run over 30 days | **263.2 s** (held −899.0 W, 2026-08-11 17:04) |
| runs ≥ 35 s | 10 of 485,840 (0.0021 %) |
| runs ≥ 17 s | 386 of 485,840 (0.0794 %) |
A real power figure at 1 W resolution held **one value for four and a half
minutes with nothing whatever wrong**. So an unchanged threshold free of false
positives must be over 263 s — and 263 s is **3.5× too slow** to protect a
consumer that trips at 75 s. There is no admissible threshold. The conjunction
is not a refinement; without it the card has no implementable verdict.
⚠️ **That is the METER's register, not `0x0518`, and it is used as a surrogate
and named as one.** No 30-day capture of the inverter's own power exists — it is
not in the recorder export. The single thing this measurement is used for is the
statement above: that the legitimate unchanged duration of a power entity in this
house is *minutes*. It is not used to set the bound.
⚠️ **And every one of those long runs happened under an unmoving load** — the
worst is 263 s of a steady −899 W export, a house doing one thing. That is why
the conjunction keys on command travel: none of them arms it.
### 2.2 Why the magnitude term exists — a surviving mutation put it there
Deleting `abs(standing_w) < move_w` from `_grade()` left **every check in the
first draft green**, because in all of them a command that had *travelled*
250 W had also *ended up* above 250 W. The case that separates them is a site
being brought to **rest**: the write path is serialised, so a register can reach
its new value on the same read at which the *old* command is still standing —
`standing_at_change` then captures 1300 W, the site is commanded to 0 W, and the
travel term alone reads 1300 W of unfollowed command for as long as the site
rests. It would call a perfectly truthful +5 W reading dead. The magnitude term
is what says *a site at rest is not owed movement*, and part 4 now grades it.
**The hole that term leaves cannot mislead either consumer**, which is why it is
the right trade: a unit commanded under 250 W is one `watchdog.disagrees()` is
`False` for whatever the measurement says, and a frozen term beside a live unit
that is itself resting nets to **zero** circulating power rather than to a false
alarm. Both halves are asserted, not argued.
---
## 3. The bounds — one per signal, each with its derivation
⚠️ **One constant for both signals would be useless on SoC or trigger-happy on
power**, which is the third clause of the policy. `freshness.BOUNDS` carries them
as data with a `wired` column, and `test_freshness.py` part 7 walks the AST of
every shipped module to check that column tells the truth.
### 3.1 `batt` — `0x0518`, S16, 1 W, published every 10 s — **WIRED**
**Floor, 17.0 s** — the fastest a healthy register can be *obliged* to have
answered. Three terms, each read out of this repository:
| | | source |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0 s | the plant | `goodwe/NOTES.md` §5.9, measured 2026-08-22 with the poll temporarily at 1 s: 26 W at +1.43 s, 469 W (94 %) at +3.34 s, settled 507 W at +6.05 s |
| 10.0 s | the publisher | `firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181`, `update_interval: 10s` on the `modbus_controller` carrying both `0x0518` and `0x050E` |
| 1.0 s | this add-on's read period | `main.run_control()`'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)` |
**Ceiling, 75.0 s** — the tighter of the two consumers, both read out of the
shipped `config.yaml`: `circulation_hold_s` **75** (line 512) and
`unit_sign_disagree_s` **85** (line 451). A gate slower than its consumer hands
over the frozen number and explains afterwards.
**Chosen: 35.0 s.** The admissible band `[2 × 17.0, 0.5 × 75.0] = [34.0, 37.5]`
contains four integers, and **the band is what is derived — 35 is a choice inside
it**, deliberately not 30 (that is `validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S`, and would
read as a borrowed constant nobody re-derived) and not 60 (round). Part 6
computes both ends **from `config.yaml`** and goes red if an operator default
moves: drop `circulation_hold_s` to 60 and this fails.
**`MOVE_W` = 250 W** is the **largest** admissible value, not a sensitivity
preference. The gate must arm everywhere a stale reading could mislead a
consumer; the earliest either consumer speaks is `unit_sign_disagree_w`, 250 W
(config.yaml:450), because below that `watchdog.disagrees()` is `False` whatever
the measurement says. Taking the ceiling of the admissible range minimises
spurious arming. It is pinned to `config.yaml` by part 6, not to a literal.
### 3.2 `soc` — `0x050E`, U16, 1 %, published every 10 s — **STATED, NOT WIRED**
SoC **cannot use the conjunction above.** A pack resting at its floor holds one
percent for hours with nothing wrong — the card's own example — and the standing
command says nothing about it, because 0 W is exactly what a rested pack is
given. The obliged movement for SoC is **energy, not command travel**: one
percent of pack A is ≈ **153.6 Wh** (15.36 kWh nominal, `goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b's
table — ⚠️ **NOMINAL and FROM DATASHEET**, not a measured usable capacity), so at
pack A's 5000 W ceiling one percent takes at least **110 s**, and at a realistic
1000 W about **553 s**.
So the bound is *"SoC unchanged while ∫|battery power| dt since its last change
exceeded K × 153.6 Wh"*, and **K cannot be chosen from anything written down
today**. Wiring it with a guessed K would be a gate that fires on a rested pack,
which is the hazard, not the fix. `Freshness` takes its obligation term from the
caller precisely so an energy integral can be handed in where command travel is
handed in for `batt` — TEL-08 needs no second mechanism.
---
## 4. What changes on a running install
| | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| healthy register, N=1 | value reaches consumers | **identical** — 60 reads of a dithering register under a reversing command, asserted in part 5 |
| healthy register, N≥2 | value reaches consumers | identical |
| **frozen register, N=1** | reads as a healthy measurement, for ever | **site stops**: `inputs_ok` False → `stale_input_s` hold → 0 W, and keeps commanding |
| **frozen register, N≥2** | per-unit sign check false-trips at 85 s and parks a healthy inverter; circulation sensor reports a loop that is not happening | both consumers get `None`, both windows **clear** |
⚠️ **The N=1 row is a behaviour change on the roster that is running in a house
today, and it is named rather than hidden.** It is also the point of the card:
HW-01 was a one-inverter site. The direction it fails in is the safe one — a
false verdict commands 0 W and keeps commanding (§11.1 rule 1), behind the
existing `stale_input_s` hold, and clears itself on the register's next move.
The counterfactual is run, not argued. `test_freshness.py` part 3 drives real
`cycle()` calls at N=2 with A's register frozen at −1200 W and B's live at
+900 W, the command travel produced by the shipped `compute()` and allocator:
```
standing on A: [0, 445, 890, 1335, 1335, ...] (the shipped control law)
gated : sign trip tick=None circulating_w=[1800, 1800, 1800, None, None, ...]
counterfact : sign trip tick=11 circulating_w=[1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, ...]
```
---
## 5. What TEL-06 and TEL-08 still owe
**[[TEL-06]] — layer 1, Blocked, and nothing in this card can reach it.** The
ESPHome veto tests the *value* of `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`. This policy
lives in the add-on, on the other side of a flash, and cannot help. What TEL-06
owes is the same mechanism **inside the firmware**: a `millis()` stamp taken when
the setpoint/age entity is *written*, and a veto on `millis() − last_write_ms`
rather than on the published number. It is narrowed to that one substitution —
the policy question ("arrival, not value") is answered here; the remaining work
is a firmware stamp and a flash, which is a supervised human step.
**[[TEL-08]] — stale SoC.** It owes exactly three things, and no mechanism:
1. a **measured** usable capacity for pack A (or a defensible bound on it) — the
153.6 Wh per percent above is nominal and from the datasheet;
2. the **energy integral** since the reading last changed;
3. the constant **K** — how many percent-equivalents of throughput must pass
before an unmoved SoC is a fault.
It should consume `freshness.Freshness` with `BOUNDS["soc"]` filled in, not
restate the policy. The row is already in the table with `wired=False` and the
reason, and part 7 goes red the day that column stops being true.
**⚠️ Neither of them, and not this card, closes HW-01's whole class.** See §6.
---
## 6. Known survivors, with their size
Graded in `test_freshness.py` part 9, so they are residuals rather than
surprises.
| # | kind | what survives | size |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **false positive** | an inverter physically unable to follow — saturating, thermally derating, or a BMS refusing a charge — is declared stale while telling the truth | one spurious **site stop**, behind `stale_input_s`, self-clearing the moment the register moves. It cannot drive the battery anywhere |
| 2 | **miss** | a register frozen under a command that never travels 250 W is never detected, for 400 s or for ever | ⚠️ scoped for ONE consumer, NOT both, and the earlier claim here was wrong. TRUE for the per-unit sign check: no such check can speak about that unit (`unit_sign_disagree_w` = 250 W). **FALSE for circulation.** "Contributing at most 250 W" bounds the COMMAND; once the register is frozen its REPORTED value is unrelated to the command, which is exactly HW-01's shape - commanded ~0 W, register stuck on the last large number. Measured: a unit frozen at −1200 W beside a healthy +900 W sibling yields `circulating_w` = **1800 W against the 700 W floor, 2.6× over**, with no gate armed. Found in review; part 9's S2 check asserts only `not stale` and part 4 pairs the frozen unit with a RESTING sibling, so neither graded the sentence |
| 3 | **miss — the largest** | a dead publisher whose last values **alternate**, or a cache replaying two old samples, never starts the unchanged clock at all | **this gate detects a value that STOPPED; it cannot detect a value that is WRONG.** Nothing in this add-on can. TEL-06's arrival stamp inside the firmware is the only layer that could |
Recorded because it looks like a survivor and is not: a publisher failure that
freezes **both** registers is caught on both units independently, on each unit's
own command travel and each unit's own number.
---
## 7. Mutation record — 2026-09-06
`tools/mutation_run.sh`'s rule, honoured on every run: purge first (count printed,
`0` remaining), tree mounted `:ro`, `python3 -B`, fingerprint the tree, **and
fingerprint again after the revert**. Clean tree `app/freshness.py`
`sha256:f40fa3e8819014ce` / 20,065 B, `app/inverter.py` `7e760c6e8cdfa5b7` /
30,778 B, `app/main.py` `7d7ff4ba0697ea64` / 238,535 B. Each mutant graded by
`test_freshness.py` + `test_inverter.py`.
| # | mutation | file | Δ B | result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M0 | none (control) | freshness | +0 | **green** — the harness is not red on everything |
| M1 | `reading()` returns `self.last` unconditionally | freshness | −24 | red, 3 named checks |
| M2 | drop the command-travel term | freshness | −59 | red |
| M3 | drop the magnitude term | freshness | −54 | **SURVIVED**, then red — §2.2. This is the finding |
| M4 | latch never holds | freshness | +13 | red, 3 named checks |
| M5 | bound 90 s (slower than both consumers) | freshness | **+0** | red |
| M6 | bound 10 s (under the physical floor) | freshness | **+0** | red |
| M7 | `MOVE_W` 700 W | freshness | **+0** | red, on part 6's `config.yaml` pin |
| M8 | the wiring in `_read_unit` removed | main | −5 | red, 3 named checks |
| M9 | reset the unchanged clock on every arrival (value-stamped) | freshness | −43 | red |
| M10 | `standing_w()` drops `last_write` | inverter | −73 | red, and takes `test_inverter.py` with it |
| M11 | `standing_at_change` refreshed on every arrival | freshness | +121 | ⚠️ **DISCOUNTED — the mutant does not parse** |
| M11b | the same defect, written parseably | freshness | +105 | red |
| M12 | `BOUNDS["soc"].wired = True` — the table lies | freshness | −1 | red |
| M13 | the wrong signal submitted (`inv.soc` for `inv.batt`) | main | +4 | red, and `test_inverter.py` too |
| M14 | one `Freshness` shared by every unit | inverter | +29 | red |
| M15 | latch cleared by a failed read | freshness | +31 | **SURVIVED**, then red — see below |
⚠️ **M5, M6 and M7 are `+0 B`, which MUTATION.md names as the risky delta.** All
three are **reds**, which is the direction stale bytecode cannot fabricate, and
every run purged with the count printed and graded a `:ro` tree that physically
cannot hold a cache.
⚠️ **M11 IS NOT A RESULT AND IS NOT COUNTED.** Its edit dedents a statement into
the middle of an `if` body, so the module raises `IndentationError` at line 312
and both files go red without a single check being evaluated. Verified by
`ast.parse` rather than assumed. **M11b** is the same defect written so it
parses, and it is a real red.
### The two survivors, and what each one taught
**M3, the magnitude term** — see §2.2. Two terms of a conjunction that move
together in every fixture are one term as far as the checks are concerned.
Recorded as `MUTATION.md` **habit 17**, twelfth instance of "a check whose DATA
cannot reach the failure it names".
**M15, the latch cleared by a failed read** — found only because the sweep went
looking for what the checks would NOT see. No fixture had ever injected a read
failure *while latched*, and it matters: a stale verdict stops the site, the site
is then commanded 0 W, and one unreachable-Home-Assistant read would drop the
latch into a state where the conjunction is no longer armed — so the held
−1200 W would come back to the consumers on the very next successful read. Part 4
now grades exactly that and M15 is red.
### And one process defect worth more than the ledger
One mutation's container run overran a two-minute command budget and the wrapper
was killed **between the edit and the revert**, leaving `app/freshness.py`
mutated on disk. Nothing announced it; the next mutation's harness cheerfully
fingerprinted and graded the mutant *plus* a second mutation. It was caught by
comparing the tree fingerprint against the recorded clean one, restored, and
verified back to byte and `sha256` before anything else ran. Same defect as stale
bytecode, different cause. Recorded as `MUTATION.md` **habit 18**: *fingerprint
after the revert, not only before the run.*
### A third, in this file's own fixture
M2 originally reported "red" with **no named check behind it**. The mutant makes
the FRESH run stale, so `test_freshness.py`'s own diagnostic
`print(f"… {sorted(set(_fresh_read))}")` raised `TypeError` comparing `None` with
a float **before check one ran**. MUTATION.md's reporting rule is *"which suite
went red, and on which named check"*, and a print that can crash first destroys
exactly that. Sorted with `key=str` now; M2 reports its check.
### Re-verified at the committed head
The 16-row sweep above graded `test_freshness.py` as it stood when each mutation
ran; the two closures (M3's part-4 check, M15's failed-read check), the `key=str`
fix and the wall-clock hardening all landed afterwards. So six mutations were
re-run against **the exact tree that is committed** —
`test_freshness.py sha256:a62f3e1f1ac856cf`, 44,913 B:
| # | result at head |
|---|---|
| M0 control | **green** |
| M2 drop the command-travel term | red, on part 1's "FRESH AND UNCHANGED is not stale" |
| M3 drop the magnitude term | red, on part 4's magnitude check |
| M8 wiring removed | red, on three named checks in parts 2 and 3 |
| M11b `standing_at_change` drifts | red, on three named checks in part 1 |
| M15 latch cleared by a failed read | red, on part 4's failed-read check |
The other ten are unaffected by those edits: each is red on a check in parts 1,
2, 4, 6, 7 or 9 that none of them touches, and a mutation red on one check
cannot be made green by adding another.
### The wall clock, which part 3 cannot avoid and therefore measures
The freshness verdict runs on an injected monotonic clock and is deterministic.
The sign watchdog inside `cycle()` cannot be injected, so part 3 runs against the
real one — which is CI-06's failure mode exactly (`test_peakguard.py` answered
two checks with the wall clock, flaked at ~20 %, and cost a wrong merge
diagnosis). So the margin is measured and asserted rather than assumed:
gate closed after 0.61 s of WALL clock, against the 2 s watchdog window (3.3x margin)
If a loaded machine ever narrows that, the check fails **naming the number**,
which is the difference between "the box was slow" and "the code is broken".
@@ -0,0 +1,925 @@
# SAFETY-38 — pinning `site_standing`, the one quantity both site guards are asked about
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-05.** `app/main.py`'s
`site_standing = float(sum(standing.values()))` is **correct and is not
changed**. What this card adds is the thing it never had: a **behavioural**
fixture whose per-unit shares **cannot** answer for the site, so that a change
of *meaning* in that reduction goes red instead of green.
Filed with SAFETY-38, card `6a9ac95f2b78646e5a76d2e9`. It is a **coverage**
card: not one byte of `app/` moves.
---
## 0. The line, and its two consumers
```python
site_standing = float(sum(standing.values())) # app/main.py:1598
```
`standing` is `{unit name -> the value THIS controller last put on that unit's
setpoint entity}` — `inv.last_write`, i.e. the number **after**
`clamp_to_rating()` has applied `max_w` and the device's own
`[dev_min, dev_max]`. Two safety inputs are derived from it and nothing else in
`cycle()` is:
| consumer | where | what it does with it |
|---|---|---|
| **[[SAFETY-30]]**'s site sign detector | `self.site_sign_wd.evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` (main.py:1619) | **latches and stops the whole site** when the total command opposes the meter for `site_sign_disagree_s` |
| **[[SAFETY-18]]**'s freeze conjunction | `looks_frozen(unchanged_s, site_standing, max_w, …)` inside `peakguard.decide(frozen=…)` (main.py:1926) | takes the peak guard **blind** and files `floor_w = 0.0` — the battery may not import while the billed quarter is unmeasurable |
Both are P0 paths. **Neither was pinned to the reduction.**
## 1. What survived, and what the rescope measured
The card opened with three demonstrated live mutants, all green across the whole
suite. Re-measured in round 2 against `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2`:
| mutation of `site_standing` | on release/1.0 @ 86eaef2 | closed by |
|---|---|---|
| `list(standing.values())[0]` — one unit's share | **SURVIVES**, full suite 21/21 green | part 9a + 9b (this card) |
| `sum(...) / max(1, len(standing))` — the mean | **SURVIVES**, full suite 21/21 green | part 9a + 9b (this card) |
| `max(standing.values(), key=abs)` — the largest share | **SURVIVES**, full suite 21/21 green | part 9a + 9b (this card) |
### ⚠️ ROUND 1 SAID `[0]` WAS ALREADY CLOSED BY SAFETY-32. THAT WAS FALSE.
Round 1 of this card recorded `[0]` as **CAUGHT by SAFETY-32's package-wide
structural pin**, wrote that claim into four places, and told future authors
*"DO NOT RE-COVER THAT ONE HERE"*. It is wrong, and **how** it went wrong is the
part worth keeping.
**How the error was made.** The mutation was measured **once**. That single run
happened to hit `test_peakguard.py`'s [[CI-06]] flake — a **measured ~20%**
false-red rate — and the red was recorded as a **mutation kill**. Nothing else
was checked, because a red is the answer you are hoping for and it did not look
like it needed a second run.
**The correct measurement.** On `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2` carrying **only** the
`[0]` edit (+4 bytes, re-read from disk, bytecode purged by
`tools/mutation_run.sh`): the **full 21-file suite is green**, and
`test_peakguard.py` run **five times in isolation** on that same mutated tree is
**PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS**. The mutation **survives**. (The reviewer's own
independent re-measurement of the same tree hit the flake once —
PASS PASS PASS FAIL PASS — which is the same verdict plus a live demonstration
of the mechanism that produced the original error.)
**Why SAFETY-32 cannot see it, read off 12j's own enumeration rather than
argued.** Part 12j taints names *bound* to roster-carrying values and lists
*accumulated* in a loop over one. `standing` is neither: it is a dict created
empty at `main.py:1554` and filled by **subscript assignment**
(`standing[inv.name] = stood`) inside the roster loop, and a subscript store is
not a binding 12j follows. So `standing` never enters its taint set and
`sum(standing.values())` is **not a roster site** at all. Run 12j against a tree
carrying the `[0]` mutation and its enumeration lists `main.py:1553`, `1555` and
`1690` — the three `self.inverters` sites bracketing this code — and **not
`1599`**. No shape pin reaches this line; only the behavioural fixture below
does.
**The rule this cost.** `test_peakguard.py` flakes at a measured ~20%. A single
red from it proves nothing. Re-run it in isolation **at least five times** and
**name the failing check** before believing any red from it. This card is the
**third** measurement CI-06 has corrupted.
SAFETY-32's own disclosed blind spot says why the other two were always out of
reach:
> *SEMANTICS. `min` → `max` → the mean are edits invisible to any shape pin,
> permanently. Only the behavioural sets can see them.*
`sum` → mean and `sum` → `max(key=abs)` are **semantic**: identical shape,
different meaning. **No shape pin will ever close them.** That disclosure was
accurate, and is now confirmed by measurement rather than taken on trust.
`[0]` is the one that *looks* structural and therefore *looks* covered — and
that appearance is exactly what produced the false attribution above. It is
out of reach here for a different reason from the other two: not because the
shape is invisible, but because **the value never becomes a roster** in the
analysis's eyes. All three are closed by the same behavioural fixture, and
**all three needed it.**
## 2. Why the suite could not see it — habit 4, inside the site half of the very card that names it
`test_watchdog.py`'s `_sign_site` is the **only** N≥2 site fixture in the
repository. It runs at `site_sign_disagree_w: 320` with shares of roughly
−2500 W **each**. Every one of them is individually far over the gate, so on
those numbers
```
sum = −5000 W over mean = −2500 W over max = −2500 W over
```
— **all three reductions agree**, and a check whose two candidate answers happen
to be equal cannot observe a change that swaps them. That is `MUTATION.md`'s
third failure mode, and this is its ninth instance.
At a roster of **one** it is not a fixture defect but arithmetic:
`sum == mean == max == the one share`, identically, so all three mutations are
genuinely **equivalent** on a shipped install. No N=1 fixture can ever separate
them; §3c asserts that rather than leaving it to the reader.
## 3. The fixture, and the numbers it is built on
Two **simulated** units rated 220 W and 280 W, both obeying exactly, inverted
gain, house importing 2000 W. Both stand at their own rails, so `standing` is
`{-220, -280}` in roster order and the meter reads +2500 W.
| reduction | value | vs the SHIPPED 300 W gate |
|---|---|---|
| `sum` | **−500 W** | **OVER** → trips |
| `sum / len` (the mean) | −250 W | under → silent |
| `max(…, key=abs)` | −280 W | under → silent |
| `list(…)[0]` | −220 W | under → silent |
**Four distinct magnitudes — 500, 250, 280, 220 — of which exactly one clears
the gate.** The asymmetry is load-bearing twice: equal shares would collapse
mean, max and first onto one number, and putting the **smaller** unit first is
what keeps `[0]` distinct from `max(key=abs)`. The gate is left at its shipped
default so the fixture is graded against the magnitude an install runs; only the
**hold** is shortened (325 s → 2 s), because the hold is a wall clock and the
campaign behind 325 s is measured on the rig, not here.
⚠️ **220 W and 280 W are SIMULATED ratings chosen for that arithmetic and for
nothing else.** They are not measurements. In particular they are **not**
inverter B, which does not physically exist; B is a GW5048D-ES, serial
`55048ESU22AW0992`, **4600 W from its datasheet** (`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b).
### 3a. The site sign detector
Shipped tree: the site latches, commands 0 W on every inverter, and the sentence
an operator reads is
`SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded -500 W against a meter reading +2500 W …`. No
per-unit watchdog trips — every unit is faithfully executing its share, which is
the asymmetry the site detector exists for.
Under the mean and under `max(key=abs)`: **nothing trips, ever.** The reviewer's
tree was still commanding −500 W of charge into a +2500 W import at t = 595 s
with `following=True`.
Two counterfactuals sit beside it so the trip is attributable:
* the **same** inverted-gain site whose shares sum to −250 W — under the gate —
does **not** trip, so the trip above is the sum crossing 300 W and not the
mere presence of a second inverter;
* a site whose **device range is narrower than `max_w`** asks for −500 W while
only −250 W stands, and does **not** trip — see §5.
### 3b. The second consumer, covered rather than scoped out
`site_standing` is also `looks_frozen()`'s `commanded_w`. The same
discrimination applies at a different threshold: the site rail is
`RAIL_FRAC * site_max_w` = 0.95 × 500 = **475 W**.
| reduction | value | vs the 475 W rail |
|---|---|---|
| `sum` | **500 W** | **RAILED** → `BLIND_FROZEN`, `floor_w = 0.0` |
| the mean | 250 W | under → silent |
| `max(…, key=abs)` | 280 W | under → silent |
| `list(…)[0]` | 220 W | under → silent |
The sign is flipped from §3a on purpose: the gain is the **shipped positive**
one and the frozen meter reads import, so the site *discharges* +500 W against a
+2500 W import — the two agree in sign, SAFETY-30 has nothing to say, and this
half grades SAFETY-18 alone. Reusing §3a's inverted gain would have the site
sign latch park everything at 0 W, and the freeze conjunction could then never
be true: a check measuring the *other* guard's remedy.
⚠️ **The open quarter is backfilled with the same stuck reading, and that is
not decoration.** Without it the block is mostly uncovered, `blindness()`
answers `BLIND_COVERAGE`, and the mutant reaches *the same action by a different
route* — a check on the action alone could not then see the difference it names.
Seeded, the measurement is honest:
* shipped: `blind = BLIND_FROZEN`, `floor_w = 0.0` — no charging while the
billed quarter is unobservable;
* both mutations: **not blind at all**, `floor_w = None` — the site may go on
importing through a quarter whose billed average cannot be measured. That is
the capacity-tariff hazard SAFETY-18 exists for, silently disarmed.
The counterfactual comes from the **same run**: on the earlier cycles the
command had not yet reached the rail and the guard did not report SAFETY-18,
with the meter equally frozen throughout — so the verdict is produced by the
command magnitude `site_standing` carries and not by `unchanged_s` alone. A low
gain (0.05, the schema floor) is what buys those below-the-rail cycles.
### 3c. At N=1, nothing changes — asserted
A real one-inverter controller is driven through the same frozen-meter
scenario. Its `standing` has a single entry, so `sum`, the mean,
`max(key=abs)` and `[0]` are printed and asserted to be **one number**; the
site sign detector is still absent (part 7 counts the calls on the object); and
SAFETY-18 still reaches `BLIND_FROZEN` on that same value. The claim "the
shipped install is unaffected" now rests on the roster rather than on the
reader.
## 4. Mutation ledger
Every run: a **fresh full-repo copy**, `__pycache__` and `*.pyc` excluded,
mounted `:ro`, graded by `tools/mutation_run.sh` (which purges, prints the tree
fingerprint, and verifies no cache appears during the run). The mutated line was
**re-read from disk** after the edit and the byte delta printed. Shipped
`app/main.py` is 234 542 bytes at `86eaef2`.
| # | mutation of `site_standing` | Δ bytes | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `sum(...) / max(1, len(standing))` — the mean | +24 | **RED** |
| M2 | `max(standing.values(), key=abs)` — largest share | +9 | **RED** |
| M3 | `list(standing.values())[0]` — one share | +4 | **RED** — and **survives on release/1.0**, see §1 |
| M4 | `min(standing.values(), key=abs)` — smallest share | +9 | **RED** |
| M5 | `sum(abs(v) for v in ...)` — magnitude, sign lost | +16 | **RED** |
| M6 | `-sum(standing.values())` — sign flipped | +1 | **RED** |
| M7 | `float(self.target)` — the arbiter's site target | **−11** | **was a SURVIVOR — now RED**, see §5 |
| M8 | `sum(standing.values()) / 2.0` | +6 | **RED** |
| M9 | `sum(standing.values()) * 2.0` | +6 | **RED** |
| M10 | `sorted(standing.values())[-1]` — largest signed | +7 | **RED** |
| **M11** | **argument SWAP** at the SITE call site: `evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` → `evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, …)` (main.py:1620) | **0** | **was a SURVIVOR in round 1 — now RED**, see §4a |
| **M12** | **argument SWAP** at the PER-UNIT call site: `evaluate(stood, against, …)` → `evaluate(against, stood, …)` (**main.py:1560**) | **0** | **was a SURVIVOR in round 2 — now RED**, see §4c |
**Every one of the ten `site_standing` entries is red in `test_watchdog.py`.** Re-measured in round 2
on `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2` (where `app/main.py` is 234 542 bytes, 2 022 more
than the `f72c48d` the round-1 figures were taken on): all ten still red, at the
byte deltas in the table, each on a fresh copy with the edit re-read from disk.
Adding assertions cannot turn a red green, so those verdicts carry forward to
the round-3 tree unchanged.
### ⚠️ ROUND 2 SAID THREE OF THESE SURVIVED. **EIGHT DID.**
Round 2 wrote: *"Before part 9 existed, three of these left the whole suite
green — M1, M2 and M3 — and the remaining seven were caught by SAFETY-30's own
N≥2 checks."* Round 1's wording was vaguer and harmless; naming three made it
**specific and wrong**, and it is the same species of error the round was
written to fix — **a survivor recorded as a kill**. This file contradicted it
three times on its own pages: the ledger row calls M7 *"a SURVIVOR — now RED"*,
§5 says M7 survived the whole suite, and `CHANGELOG.md` says so too.
**Re-measured in round 3, one mutation at a time, on clean `release/1.0` @
`bbc903b`** — a fresh copy each, bytecode purged (`0` remaining, printed), the
line re-read from disk, byte delta **and** `app/main.py` fingerprint printed,
mounted `:ro`, and the **FULL 21-FILE SUITE** run each time rather than
`test_watchdog.py` alone. (`release/1.0` has since moved on to `9e42cec`, which
merged [[CI-06]]; that commit touches `test_peakguard.py` and `CHANGELOG.md`
only, neither of which grades `site_standing`, so the ten verdicts below stand
on the tree they were taken on and this branch is rebased onto the newer tip.)
| # | Δ bytes | fingerprint of `app/main.py` | suite before part 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | +24 | `362374cfb6486378` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M2 | +9 | `86573e7494f1c933` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M3 | +4 | `59fa8815e6fda4cf` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M4 | +9 | `43d852be3037f861` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M5 | +16 | `58d26de82af29a1a` | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`, 3 checks |
| M6 | +1 | `407ddb5f375cc217` | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`, 3 checks |
| M7 | **−11** | `2a635a4eca0a790d` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M8 | +6 | `b21eed89ff4c9240` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M9 | +6 | `0973d3caf680db65` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M10 | +7 | `0e7b7a4fed7787d0` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
**So: EIGHT of the ten left the whole suite green, and TWO were caught** — not
three and seven, and not the four and six a reviewer proposed either. The
correct sentence is: *before part 9 existed, eight of these ten left the whole
21-file suite green, and the only two SAFETY-30's own N≥2 checks caught were M5
and M6.*
**⚠️ AND THE TWO THAT WERE CAUGHT ARE CAUGHT FOR A REASON THAT MAKES THE CARD'S
CASE RATHER THAN WEAKENING IT.** M5 (`sum(abs(v) …)`) and M6 (`-sum(…)`) are
the only two entries in the table that **reverse the SIGN** of `site_standing`.
Every other entry changes only its **magnitude** — and `_sign_site`, the suite's
only N≥2 site fixture before this card, runs shares of about **−2500 W each**
against a **320 W** gate. `sum`, the mean, `max(key=abs)`, `min(key=abs)`,
`sorted(...)[-1]`, `[0]`, `self.target`, half the sum and twice the sum all land
on **−2500, −2500, −2500, −2500, −2500, −2500, −2500, −1250 and −5000 W**: nine
different numbers, all on the **same side of the same threshold**. The three
checks that fired on M5 and M6 grade *"the site trips and no unit does"*, the
claim it trips through, and where the latch is written — none of them grades the
**quantity**, and the sign flip reaches them only because it stops the trip
happening at all.
That is the whole thesis of this card measured rather than argued: **the
pre-existing coverage could see a sign, and nothing else.** Part 9's fixture —
per-unit shares each **below** the gate whose **sum** clears it — is the only
arrangement in which the magnitude is load-bearing, and it is what takes the
other eight red.
⚠️ **ONE FALSE RED, AND IT IS [[CI-06]]'s.** In the batch run M10 also reported
`FAIL test_peakguard.py`. Re-run in isolation **three times** and once more
through `tools/mutation_run.sh` — **four clean passes, zero failures**. The
batch script had discarded the failure detail, so the failing check cannot be
named here; what can be said is that the red did not reproduce in four attempts
and that **no claim in this card rests on it**. `test_peakguard.py` is the file
CI-06 records as flaky, and this is the behaviour it records. Believe no red
from it without three isolated re-runs.
⚠️ **ROUND 3 CAN NAME ONE, AND IT IS THE SAME FILE.** Round 3's own batch — the
ten full-suite runs above, plus §7's sibling swaps — produced **no** red from
`test_peakguard.py` on M10 or on any other ledger entry. It produced exactly one
elsewhere, on a **`static_tariff.py`-only** edit (§7b, A4), and this time the
failing check *was* captured: *"one cycle of the intent form is exactly the
delivered form plus the command standing on the wire"* — which is CI-06's
**mechanism 1 by name**, the cross-time projection. `test_peakguard.py` then
passed **four for four** in isolation on that same tree. That is the first time
this card has been able to put a name to one of these reds, and it is the name
CI-06 predicts.
⚠️ **M3 IS NOT "FOR COMPLETENESS", AND ROUND 1 SAID IT WAS.** Round 1 recorded
M3 as already closed structurally by SAFETY-32 and disclaimed it. §1 above has
the correction and the mechanism: `[0]` **survives** a full green 21-file suite
on `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2`, because `standing` is a dict filled by subscript
assignment and never enters 12j's taint set. **M3 is a real kill by this card's
fixture and by nothing else in the repository.** It is claimed here.
### 4a. ⚠️ The zero-byte survivor one line below the one this card pinned
Round 1 pinned the **value** `site_standing` and never pinned **where it goes**.
Swapping the detector's first two arguments at `main.py:1620` is a **zero-byte**
edit — the same characters, reordered — and it left the round-1 tree **21/21
green**.
What it costs is the banner. `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` formats
`commanded_w` first and `against_w` second, so under the swap part 9a's own
output reads:
```
SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded +2500 W against a meter reading -500 W for 2 s …
```
The site is standing at **−500 W of charge into a +2500 W import** and the
**latching, site-stopping** banner tells the operator **the exact opposite** —
which instrument read what, inverted. `watchdog.py:658-665` names this failure
in its own words: *"a false statement about which instrument produced the
evidence, on the one line somebody woken by this alarm reads first."*
**Why round 1's check could not see it, and this is the general lesson.** It
asserted
```python
f"{sum(_share38):.0f} W" in _c38.site_sign_wd.reason
```
— that `"-500 W"` appears **somewhere** in the sentence. Under the swap it still
does: in the **meter slot**. A substring test cannot reach a failure that is
purely **positional**, and round 1's own comment claimed the opposite ("*would
put a different number in the store, the action log and the banner, and this is
where that shows*"). It shows the **number**, never its **position**. This is
MUTATION.md's *"a check whose data cannot reach the failure it names"*, in the
card that exists to complain about exactly that.
**The fix is one line and touches no `app/` code** — assert the **ordered
pair**:
```python
f"commanded {sum(_share38):+.0f} W against a meter reading "
f"{_mid38['grid']:+.0f} W" in _c38.site_sign_wd.reason
```
Measured: with that line, M11 is **red in `test_watchdog.py` and green in the
other twenty files** — one file, one check.
### 4b. Claim wiring, re-measured rather than assumed
Round 1's reviewer disclosed it had **not** mutated the arbiter claim wiring or
[[SAFETY-31]]/circulation. Both were mutated in round 2. Both are **zero-byte**
edits to `arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE`:
| # | mutation | Δ bytes | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| W1 | `"sign_site": SCOPE_SITE` → `SCOPE_UNIT` | **0** | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py` (parts 5 **and 9a**), `test_arbiter.py`, `test_peakguard.py` |
| W2 | `"circulation": SCOPE_SITE` → `SCOPE_UNIT` | **0** | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`, `test_arbiter.py`, `test_peakguard.py` |
Part 9a's *"…and it stops the WHOLE site, through the `sign_site` claim by name"*
is one of the two checks that kills W1, so this card contributes to that
coverage rather than merely inheriting it. **W2 is caught entirely by
pre-existing checks** — SAFETY-38 adds nothing to circulation, and does not
claim to.
### 4c. ⚠️ The SAME zero-byte defect one call site over — and it is the one the shipped install can see
Round 2 closed §4a by asserting the ordered pair on the **site** banner at
`main.py:1620`. It did not touch `main.py:1560`, the **per-unit** call, and the
identical swap there —
```python
if inv.sign_wd.evaluate(stood, against, self.following, now) # shipped
if inv.sign_wd.evaluate(against, stood, self.following, now) # M12
```
— left the round-2 tree **21/21 green**. Measured: `app/main.py` 234 542 bytes
before and after, **Δ 0 bytes**, fingerprint `61aa413f…` → `e57e6026…`, bytecode
purged, tree mounted `:ro`, the line re-read from disk.
**Nothing behavioural can catch it, and that is structural rather than
unlucky.** `watchdog.disagrees()` is *symmetric* in its first two arguments —
`commanded_w * against_w < 0`, with an `abs()` gate on **both** — so the swap
cannot change a single trip decision on any input. What it changes is the
**sentence**. Measured by diffing the suite's own printed banners between the
round-3 tree and the same tree carrying only M12: **9 emitted banner lines
invert, in 3 distinct sentences.**
```
shipped: SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded -2000 W against a meter reading +2000 W …
M12: SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded +2000 W against a meter reading -2000 W …
shipped: … commanded +1000 W against its own measured power -1000 W …
M12: … commanded -1000 W against its own measured power +1000 W …
shipped: … commanded -2000 W against a meter reading +4000 W … (the N=1 arm)
M12: … commanded +4000 W against a meter reading -2000 W …
```
**⚠️ AND IT IS WORSE THAN THE ONE ROUND 2 CLOSED.** Part 9c asserts the SITE
detector is **not armed at a roster of one**, and inverter B does not physically
exist. So on the shipped install the **per-unit banner is the only
sign-disagreement sentence that can ever be printed** — in the action log, in
`_LOG.error`, in `status_payload()`'s headline banner, and in `sign_reason`,
which is persisted and read back after the restart the latch is designed to
survive. Round 2 pinned the N≥2-only call site and left the shipping one open.
**Closed by the ORDERED PAIR on both per-unit banners**, with both operands read
off the **observed cycle** — `inv.last_write` and `inv.batt` off the objects the
plant moved, never off the arguments the detector was handed, which would be
comparing the swap against itself:
* `test_watchdog.py` **part 3**, the N≥2 per-unit trip:
`f"commanded {stood:+.0f} W against its own measured power {meas:+.0f} W"`,
plus the persisted `unit/inverter-b/sign_reason` copy, plus a **precondition**
that the two operands are different numbers of opposite sign — without which
a transposition would produce the same string and the check would be
decoration;
* `test_watchdog.py` **part 7**, the **N=1** controller-driven trip:
`f"commanded {stood:+.0f} W against a meter reading {grid:+.0f} W"`, plus the
namespaced key **and** the flat rollback mirror, plus the same precondition.
**Measured after the fix: M12 is RED on four named checks in
`test_watchdog.py` and GREEN in the other twenty files** — one file, four
checks. M11 re-measured on the same tree: still red.
**⚠️ Neither §6a nor MUTATION.md disclosed it.** §6a's "what was NOT closed"
enumerated `circ_wd`, the eight other `CLAIM_SCOPE` entries, `actuator_of()`'s
body and the `n_units > 1` guard — not this. MUTATION.md's own closing rule, in
the file round 2 edited, is *"a variant is not covered because a near-miss of it
is."* §7 is the enumeration that would have caught both instances at once.
## 5. The survivor this card went looking for, and closed
M7 is not one of the card's three. It was found by asking the question the
recurring defect demands — *what mutation would my new checks NOT see?* — and it
is the answer: **−11 bytes**, and it survived every check above **and the whole
20-file suite**, because in every fixture built so far the arbiter's site target
and the sum of what actually stands on the wire are **the same number**.
They are not the same number when a setpoint device's own reported range is
narrower than its `max_w`. The `device` P_SAFETY claim is filed **per actuator**
(`actuator_of("device", inv)`), so it bounds each unit's **share** and never the
site target, and `clamp_to_rating()` clips again on the way out. On two units
rated 220/280 W whose devices report ±120/±130 W, the site asks for **−500 W**
and **−250 W** stands.
Which one the guards mean is already written down, in both of them: SAFETY-02
grades *"the command standing on the wire"*, and `looks_frozen()`'s docstring
says `commanded_w` is *"the EMITTED setpoint — what the arbiter resolved and
`write_setpoint()` put on the wire — not the loop's raw wish"*. [[SAFETY-20]] is
the whole card about the difference. Those sentences are now made to bite: on
the site target the detector fires on a site standing at −250 W against a
+2250 W meter — **under its own 300 W gate** — which is a latching, site-wide
false trip on an install whose inverters simply report a narrower range than the
operator typed.
## 6. Honest gaps
* **A mutation that changes the SIGN CONVENTION of `standing` itself** — i.e. in
`main.py`'s `stood = inv.last_write if inv.last_write is not None else
inv.target`, not on the reduction line — is **not** in this ledger. It is a
different line and a different card; §3a's obedience precondition would see
some of it, but that is not a measured claim and is not made here.
* **The freeze half is graded at ONE roster length (2) and one rail.** The
`RAIL_FRAC` constant, `rail_ceiling_w()`'s device-bound conjunction and
`rail_unreachable()` are `test_freeze.py`'s subject and are untouched here.
* **The site hold is 2 s, not the shipped 325 s.** The window's derivation is a
rig campaign (`DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md` §3B) and this file does
not re-grade it. The **gate** is the shipped 300 W, which is the coordinate
this card is about.
* **Everything about inverter B here is simulated and labelled so.** No number
in this document or in the fixture is a measurement of a device that does not
yet exist.
### 6a. Round 2: what was closed, and what was NOT
Round 1's reviewer disclosed that it had not mutated SAFETY-31/circulation, the
arbiter claim wiring, or ledger entries M4/M5/M6/M8/M9/M10. Enumerated, with the
gaps left open stated rather than rounded off:
**Closed in round 2 (measured, on `86eaef2`, bytecode purged, edit re-read from
disk, byte delta printed):**
1. **M11**, the zero-byte argument swap — §4a. Red on one named check.
2. **M3**, the `[0]` reduction — re-measured, **survives on release/1.0**, closed
by part 9a and 9b. The false attribution corrected in all four places it was
committed: this file §1 and §4, `CHANGELOG.md`, and `test_watchdog.py`'s part
9 header (which previously *instructed future authors not to re-cover it*).
3. **M1, M2, M4, M5, M6, M7, M8, M9, M10** — every ledger entry re-run
independently in round 2 rather than carried forward from round 1's report.
All ten red; M1/M2/M4 re-run in the exact wrapped form the table records so
the byte deltas are the table's own (+24/+9/+9).
4. **W1**, `sign_site` claim scope — §4b. Zero bytes, red, part 9a among the
killers.
5. **W2**, `circulation` claim scope — §4b. Zero bytes, red, but **entirely on
pre-existing checks**.
**NOT closed, and not claimed:**
* **SAFETY-31's `circ_wd` detector itself** — its threshold, its hold, its
`circulating_w()` reduction over the roster. Only its **claim scope** was
mutated (W2), and that kill belongs to checks this card did not write.
Circulation's own behavioural coverage is `test_watchdog.py` part 4's and is
untouched here.
* **The other eight `CLAIM_SCOPE` entries** — `loop`, `peak`, `arbitrage`,
`safety` (site) and `device`, `supervised`, `failsafe`, `maintenance` (unit).
`CLAIM_SCOPE` has ten entries; only the two named above were mutated. `test_peakguard.py` part 10f grades the
classification statically; that is a different instrument and this card did
not re-measure it.
* **`actuator_of()`'s own body** and the `n_units > 1` guard on the `sign_site`
append at `main.py:1764` were **not** mutated.
* **The ten ledger mutations were re-graded against `test_watchdog.py` only.**
The "green in the other twenty files" half of the round-1 claim was
re-verified on `86eaef2` for **M3** and **M11** (both full 21-file runs) and is
otherwise carried forward from round 1's measurement on `f72c48d`. It is a
weaker statement than round 1 made and is written down as such.
⚠️ **Round 3 closed the other half of this**, but only in the *before*
direction: all ten were re-run on clean `release/1.0` @ `bbc903b` under the
**full 21-file suite** to establish which of them the pre-existing coverage
could see — see §4's ⚠️ paragraph, and the answer was **eight survivors, not
three**. The *after* direction — "each of the ten is red in
`test_watchdog.py` and green in the other twenty **on the round-3 tree**" —
is still measured end-to-end only for **M3, M11 and M12**. For the other
seven, "red" carries forward from round 2 (which adding assertions cannot
undo) and "green elsewhere" carries forward from round 1.
* **`test_peakguard.py`'s CI-06 flake is not fixed by this card** and is not
this card's subject. It is *characterised* here (five isolated runs on the M3
tree, all PASS) only far enough to overturn the false kill it produced.
### 6b. Round 3: what was closed, and what is still open
**Closed in round 3:**
1. **M12**, the zero-byte argument swap at the **per-unit** call site
`main.py:1560` — §4c. It was a survivor of the round-2 tree at **21/21
green**, and it is the **only** sign-disagreement banner a shipped
one-inverter install can print. Red on four named checks, green in the other
twenty files.
2. **The ledger arithmetic in §4**, which round 2 made specific and wrong. See
§4's own ⚠️ paragraph: re-measured mutation by mutation on clean
`release/1.0` @ `bbc903b`, full 21-file suite each time.
3. **The family itself is now enumerated by machine** —
`tools/symmetric_message_scan.py`, §7 — rather than by hand for a third time.
**Open, named, and NOT claimed:**
* **A3 and B1** — the only two status-page rows in which the freeze detector
ever names a device range: the **NOT COVERED** row and the **armed** row's
"below max_w because …" clause. `rail_unreachable()`'s `dev_min`/`dev_max` at `main.py:3208` and the
literal `f"only {inv.dev_min}...{inv.dev_max} W"` at `main.py:3231`. Both
measured: **0 bytes each, 21/21 green each.** Real, open members of the
family. They are **status-page rows rather than latching alarms**, and closing
them wants a fixture with a device whose two bounds are **asymmetric** — every
fixture in this repository uses `±d`, so the transposition is currently
invisible by construction — which belongs to `test_freeze.py`'s card, not to
this one.
* **Twelve census-B sites** (§7c, B2–B12) determined unpinned at the **source
level** — the distinguishing literal appears in no `test_*.py` — and **not**
mutated. Weaker evidence than A1–A4 and B1, and written down as such
— §7d says the same thing with the same list.
* **B6**, SAFETY-31's `circ_reason`, is the same shape as the defect this card
closed for SAFETY-02/30 and is *also* persisted and re-read after a restart.
§6a already declines to touch `circ_wd`; §7d says what that costs.
* Everything §6a lists stays open: `circ_wd`'s own thresholds, the eight other
`CLAIM_SCOPE` entries, `actuator_of()`'s body, and the `n_units > 1` guard.
### 6c. Round 4: what was closed, and what is still open
**The blocker round 3 shipped.** The enumeration read as complete and covered
**one syntactic sink**. Every one of census B's 16 members was a sentence that
is **appended, assigned, or passed as a log argument** (`problems.append`,
`out.append({"text": …})`, `self.reason = …`, `_LOG.info`). **Not one was a
sentence that is RETURNED.** Census A has a return bucket, but only for
symmetric **parameters**, so a method formatting its **own attributes** and
handing the string back was invisible to both — and `describe()` / `explain()` /
the reason-builders are exactly where this codebase keeps its operator
sentences. Worse than the gap: it was in **none of the five blind spots the tool
prints about itself**. A tool that asserts a completeness it does not have is
the recurring defect wearing a new hat.
**Closed in round 4:**
1. **`clamp.py:253` `ClampResult.describe()`**, pair `requested_w` /
`applied_w` — §7e C6. A survivor of the round-3 tree at **21/21 green**,
**0 bytes**. It is the §15 action-log row at `main.py:1366` **and** the
ClampWatchdog notification reason at `main.py:2452`; **no `test_*.py`
mentioned `describe()` at all.** Pinned on the ordered pair, on the
contiguous literal, at **both** consumers, with a precondition that the two
operands render differently — `test_clamp.py` part 6d. **4 checks red** under
the transposition.
2. **`peakguard.py:493` `PeakDecision.explain()`**, pair `projected_w` /
`ceiling_w` — §7e C7. Same measurement: **0 bytes, 21/21 green**; the string
`"peak guard idle"` was in no `test_*.py`. Pinned on the decision and on the
shipped status row at `main.py:3313` — `test_peakguard.py` part 13. **3
checks red.**
3. **`arbiter.py:264` (B12)** — the check whose **claim was wider than its
assertion**, carried forward from §7d. Measured this round rather than left
at source level: **0 bytes, 21/21 green** before, **`test_arbiter.py` red**
after. **2 checks red.**
4. **The tool's sinks are now stated rather than implied.** It prints what it
scans as a MESSAGE, that it now scans the RETURN sink through the returning
method's call sites, and — the part that was missing — **an explicit list of
what it does not scan at all**, largest hole first.
**⚠️ The correction round 4 owes the ticket.** The brief placed
`PeakDecision.explain()`'s idle sentence at `main.py:3299/3302`. Those two lines
are the **floor-limited** branch, where `explain()` returns `self.reason` before
the idle literal is ever built. The idle sentence reaches the page at
**`main.py:3313`** and the action log at **`main.py:1951`** (edge-logged, so it
is the RELEASE edge that writes it). The pin is on 3313; 1951 is disclosed
below, unpinned.
**Open, named, and measured — see §7f for the ledger:**
* **TEN further zero-byte survivors** found by the widened scan, each measured
at 21/21 green on this tree: **two** in `allocator.py`'s `UnitPlan.explain()`
(C1 :154, C2 :160), three in `arbiter.py`'s two `explain()`s (C4a, C4b :344,
C5 :392), two in `tariff.py` (C8, C9), two in `arbitrage.py`'s trade reasons
(B17, B18) and one in `main.py`'s SoC-floor notification (B19).
None is a control decision; every one is a sentence an operator reads.
⚠️ **CORRECTED after review, and the error is worth keeping visible.** This
bullet first said "Nine" while listing eleven, and the CHANGELOG said eleven
while listing eleven — and BOTH counted `allocator.py:162` (C3) among the
survivors when §7f records it as a KILL, red in `test_alloc.py`. The
authoritative tables in §7e and §7f were right throughout; only the summary
sentences a reader actually relies on were wrong. That is this card's own
recurring defect in prose rather than in code: a claim wider than the
measurement beneath it. Arithmetic, from §7f: 14 measured = 10 surviving +
1 already caught (C3) + 3 caught by this round (C6, C7, B12).
* **The action-log surface of the peak-guard idle line** (`main.py:1951`) is
not pinned. The status row (3313) is, and both come off the same `explain()`,
so the *sentence* is closed and the *second call site* is not — which is
precisely the distinction §4c was written about, recorded rather than assumed.
* Everything §6a and §6b list stays open.
## 7. The symmetric-predicate family — every call whose argument order is load-bearing for a MESSAGE
**Why this section exists, and it is the most useful thing in the card.** Round 2
pinned the operand order of `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` at `main.py:1620`. Round 3
found the **identical zero-byte defect at `main.py:1560`**, one call site over —
and that one is worse, because `test_watchdog.py` part 9c asserts the site
detector is **never armed at
a roster of one**, so on the shipped install the per-unit banner is the **only**
sign-disagreement sentence that can ever be printed. Twice in one card the
enumeration was written by hand and twice it was short. MUTATION.md habit 12: *a
hand-written scope is the same defect as a hand-written fixture.* So the family
is now **computed**, by `tools/symmetric_message_scan.py`.
### 7a. What makes this family invisible, and why it is not a fixture problem
Every other defect in this document is a fixture problem: *no fixture happens to
separate the mutant from the shipped code.* Build the right fixture and it goes
red. This one is not that.
Where a callee is **symmetric** in two arguments, a swap at a call site cannot
change **any** action on **any** input. `watchdog.disagrees()` is
`commanded_w * against_w < 0` with an `abs()` gate on **both** sides: the
product commutes and the two gates are the same gate. There is nothing for a
behavioural check to observe, ever — **not "no fixture separates them" but no
fixture *can*.** The only surface that moves is the **sentence**, and the only
check that can see it is one asserting the **ordered pair** (MUTATION.md habit
14) at **that** call site.
Two consequences the earlier rounds got wrong:
* **The unit of coverage is the CALL SITE, not the function.** `evaluate()`'s
operand order was pinned and the defect still shipped, because the pin was on
the *other* call.
* **A behavioural suite is not weak evidence here, it is NO evidence.** "21/21
green" is what this mutation is *guaranteed* to produce. Measured, twice: M11
at `main.py:1620` on the round-1 tree, and M12 at `main.py:1560` on the
round-2 tree.
### 7b. Census A — the callee formats its own parameters
`tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` renames each parameter pair, erases every
formatted string, canonicalises the commutative operators (`*`, `+`, `and`,
`or`, `==`, `min`/`max`, iterated tuple literals) and compares the **bodies**;
it iterates to a **fixpoint**, because the symmetry is usually one call deep —
`evaluate()` is symmetric only *through* `disagrees()`, and a single pass
reports an empty family on a tree whose answer is already known. It then
classifies each sentence by **where it goes**.
Fixpoint on this tree: **3 rounds, 17 interchangeable positional and 5 keyword
pairs across 14 functions**. 45 parameter pairs reach a sentence; **8** are
symmetric — **5** whose sentence goes only to an operator, and **3** whose
sentence is the **return value** and therefore has to be classified by hand,
because a returned string is sometimes a KEY and sometimes a SENTENCE.
| # | scan row | pair | called at | swap costs | reaches an operator via | pinned? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **A1** | `watchdog.py:613` `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` | `(commanded_w, against_w)` | **`main.py:1560`** — per-unit, **and the N=1 detector** | **0 B** | `sign_reason` (persisted), the action log, `_LOG.error`, `status_payload()`'s headline banner | **YES — round 3.** `test_watchdog.py` part 3 (`its own measured power`) and part 7 (`a meter reading`), on the contiguous literal with both operands read off the observed cycle. **Measured: 0 B, red on 4 named checks, green in the other 20 files.** |
| **A2** | same row, second call site | `(commanded_w, against_w)` | **`main.py:1620`** — site | **0 B** | `site_sign_reason`, the action log, the status page | **YES — round 2**, part 9a. Re-measured on the round-3 tree: still red. |
| **A3** | `freeze.py:405` `FreezeWatchdog.evaluate()` and `freeze.py:311` `rail_unreachable()` — both symmetric through `rail_ceiling_w()`'s `for bound in (dev_min, dev_max)` | `(dev_min, dev_max)` | **`main.py:3208`** (and 1928, 2755, 3196, 3219) | **0 B** | the status page's `freeze detector: NOT COVERED — the setpoint device reports a range of …` row | **NO.** Measured: swapped at `main.py:3208-3209`, **0 bytes**, `main.py` fingerprint `61aa413f…` → `2305b560…`, **21/21 green**. Disclosed in §7d, not closed. ⚠️ `rail_unreachable()` is the row the scan puts in its **RETURN** bucket: its returned string is a **sentence**, not a key, so it is a family member after all — which is exactly why that bucket says *read by hand*. |
| **A4** | `static_tariff.py:522` `_raise_gap()` | `(start, end)` | `static_tariff.py:509`, `:513` | **0 B** | the `ProfileInvalid` refusal an operator reads at startup | **YES — pre-existing.** Measured: both call sites swapped, **0 bytes**, `static_tariff.py` fingerprint `caef7fde…` → `50e9a768…`, **red in `test_static_tariff.py` on two named checks** (*"…and names the uncovered range so the operator can fix it"*, *"…and the refusal names the uncovered range"*), because `_hhmm(start)}-{_hhmm(end)` is asserted as the contiguous literal `"22:00-23:00"`. ⚠️ That batch run also reported `FAIL test_peakguard.py` on a `static_tariff.py`-only edit; the failing check is *"one cycle of the intent form is exactly the delivered form plus the command standing on the wire"*, which is [[CI-06]]'s **mechanism 1 by name**, and `test_peakguard.py` passes **four for four** in isolation on that same tree. No claim here rests on it. |
| A5–A6 | `static_tariff.py:522` `_raise_gap()` | `(start, weekday)`, `(end, weekday)` | — | — | — | **not real — the scan's one over-report.** It erases the sentence, so it cannot see that `DAY_NAMES[start]` with `start = 1320` raises `IndexError`. A mixed-type pair fails loudly, which is the opposite of this family. |
| A7–A8 | `store.py:177` `unit_key()`, `mqtt.py:222` `unit_state_key()` | `(unit, key)`, `(slug, key)` | many | 0 B | — | **not this family.** The formatted string is the **return value and it is a KEY**: a swap renames a store key and an MQTT topic, which is behaviour every ordinary check can see. MAINT-05 is the card about it. |
### 7c. Census B — the caller builds the sentence
Census A only sees a callee formatting its **own** parameters, which was gap 2
of its own honest-gap list. The other half never crosses a function boundary:
an operator sentence built where it is printed, interpolating two values that
are **interchangeable by shape**. No predicate is involved at all, so census A's
symmetry test has nothing to test. The scan pairs interpolated expressions that
are **one leaf apart** — `inv.dev_min` / `inv.dev_max`, `cfg.min_w` /
`cfg.hold_s` — which is exactly what a transposition swaps, and it keeps only
sentences whose sink is a **message**: an f-string that becomes a URL or a store
key is data, and a swap there is an ordinary behavioural change. **16 candidates** in round 3, every one of them a **zero-byte** edit — and **22** after round 4 widened the sink classifier (B17–B22 below):
| # | site | pair | reaches an operator as | pinned? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **B1** | `main.py:3231` | `inv.dev_min` / `inv.dev_max` | status page, `… accepts only −120…130 W` | **NO — MEASURED.** Transposed in place, **0 bytes**, `main.py` fingerprint `61aa413f…` → `ac36a97b…`, purged, `:ro`, **21/21 green**. The row then tells the operator the device accepts `130…−120 W`. |
| **B2** | `main.py:3362` | `inv.dev_min` / `inv.dev_max` | status page, `setpoint … (range −120…130 W)` | **NO** — the literal `setpoint … (range` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B3** | `main.py:3435` | `sign_wd.cfg.hold_s` / `.cfg.min_w` | status page, `sign watchdog: armed (trips after 180 s opposed, both over 300 W)` | **NO** — `s opposed` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B4** | `main.py:3460` | `site_sign_wd.cfg.hold_s` / `.min_w` | status page, the site sign row | **NO** — `armed against the sum` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B5** | `main.py:3491` | `circ_wd.cfg.hold_s` / `.min_w` | status page, the circulation row | **NO** — `circulation watchdog: armed` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B6** | `circulation.py:317` | `cfg.min_w` / `cfg.hold_s` | **`circ_reason` — persisted, and re-read after a restart** | **NO** — `test_watchdog.py` asserts only `"CIRCULATING_POWER" in reason`. **This is SAFETY-31's twin of the exact defect this card just closed for SAFETY-02/30**, on a string with the same persistence. |
| **B7** | `main.py:2454` | `self.site_max_w` / `self.target` | the clamp action-log line | **NO** — `was clamped to` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B8** | `main.py:3386` | `clamp_wd.engagements` / `.episodes` | status page, `engaged N time(s) in M episode(s)` | **NO** — `time(s) in` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B9–B11** | `main.py:3169` (three pairs) | `p1.net_w` / `.samples` / `.parse_errors` | status page, the P1 row | **NO** — `P1 meter (` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B12** | `arbiter.py:264` | `c.source` / `c.actuator` | `scope_errors`, the arbiter's mis-routing refusal | **ROUND 4: MEASURED, THEN CLOSED.** Round 3 left it at source level; the transposition is **0 bytes**, `arbiter.py` `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `9111f627ef639ecc`, and it was **21/21 green**. Now red in `test_arbiter.py` on 2 checks. Round 3's reasoning was right: `test_arbiter.py:452` says it *"names the source and the actuator it does not belong on"* and then asserts `"peak" in r_mis.scope_errors[0]`. Under the swap the sentence becomes `"inverter-b: a SITE claim filed on unit 'peak'"` — and `"peak" in …` is **still true**. A claim wider than its assertion, which is habit 14's own shape. |
| **B13** | `validate.py:723` | `meter_phases` / `meter_max_age_s` | the startup refusal | **NO** for the ordered pair. |
| **B14** | `validate.py:1211` | `arbitrage_soc_floor` / `arbitrage_soc_ceiling` | the startup refusal | **NO** for the ordered pair. |
| **B15** | `watchdog.py:667` | `cfg.min_w` / `cfg.hold_s` | the `SIGN_DISAGREEMENT` sentence's `(limits: both over 300 W, held over 180 s)` clause | **YES**, and it is worth naming because it shows the habit works. `test_watchdog.py`'s SAFETY-30 section asserts the site instance's **whole sentence with `==` against a literal**, the `(limits: …)` clause included. Full-string equality is habit 14 taken to its limit. |
| B16 | `main.py:237` | `i.name` / `i.max_w` | the roster log line | **not real** — a `str` beside a `:.0f` format. The same over-report as A5–A6: a mixed-type transposition raises rather than lying. |
| **B17** | `arbitrage.py:377` | `v.spread_eur_kwh` / `v.required_spread_eur_kwh` | the DISCHARGE decision's `reason` | **ROUND 4, NEW, and MEASURED: 0 bytes, 21/21 green.** Not visible to round 3 at all — the sentence is handed to a constructor as `reason=`, and the sink walker scored only *assignments*. The row then reads *"0.0400 above the cheapest and clear of the 0.1200 this cycle had to cover"* with the two swapped: a trade justified by a spread it did not clear. |
| **B18** | `arbitrage.py:393` | same pair, CHARGE branch | the CHARGE decision's `reason` | **ROUND 4, NEW, MEASURED: 0 bytes, 21/21 green.** |
| **B19** | `main.py:2652` | `g.reason` / `g.soc_floor_reason` | the `goodwe_peak_soc_floor` notification body | **ROUND 4, NEW, MEASURED: 0 bytes, 21/21 green.** The alarm then opens with the *reason the floor bound* and closes with the *guard's own conclusion*, i.e. both halves of a two-part explanation in the wrong order, in the one message SAFETY-24/25 exist to send. |
| B20–B22 | `main.py:2558`, `main.py:2652` (two more pairs) | `g.reason` / `g.ceiling_w`, `g.ceiling_w` / `g.soc_floor_reason` | the same two notifications | **new in round 4, NOT measured** — mixed types (`str` beside `:.0f`), the same over-report class as B16. |
**⚠️ Six of these twenty-two were invisible to round 3, and the reason is one
line of the sink classifier.** It scored a sentence a MESSAGE when it was
appended, logged, raised, or assigned to a `reason`-shaped **name**. This
codebase mostly builds operator sentences as `Decision(…, reason=f"…")` and
`out.append({"text": f"…"})` — a **keyword argument** and a **dict key**, which
that walker stepped straight past. Both are message sinks now.
### 7d. What this enumeration does NOT close, with sizes
* **A3 is a measured, open survivor.** `dev_min`/`dev_max` transposed in
`rail_unreachable()`'s NOT COVERED row: **0 bytes, 21/21 green.** It is
disclosed here rather than fixed, because closing it wants a `test_freeze.py`
or status-page fixture with a device whose two bounds are **asymmetric** —
every fixture in the repository uses `±d` — and that is a different file's
card. It is a **status-page row**, not a latching alarm.
* **B1 is a second measured, open survivor.** `inv.dev_min` and `inv.dev_max`
transposed in `main.py:3231`'s status row: **0 bytes**, fingerprint
`61aa413f…` → `ac36a97b…`, **21/21 green**. The page then tells the operator
the device accepts `130…−120 W`. Same disposition as A3: **A3 is the row the
freeze detector prints when the rail is UNREACHABLE, B1 the clause the ARMED
row prints when the device is what set the rail** — the two rows in which that
detector ever names a device range, and neither one's operand order is
asserted anywhere.
* **Thirteen further census-B sites are unpinned and UNMEASURED.** B2–B14 above
are determined at the **source level** — the distinguishing literal appears in
no `test_*.py`, or the check that exists asserts a substring wider than its
own claim — and were **not** mutated. That is a weaker statement than A1–A4
and B1, and is written down as one.
* **B12 is a check whose CLAIM is wider than its ASSERTION**, which is habit
14's own shape one module over. `test_arbiter.py:452` says
`scope_violations` *"names the source and the actuator it does not belong
on"* and then asserts `"peak" in r_mis.scope_errors[0]`. Swap `c.source` and
`c.actuator` in `arbiter.py:264` and the sentence becomes
*"inverter-b: a SITE claim filed on unit 'peak'"* — and the substring is still
found. Source-level, not mutated, and not fixed here.
* **B6 is the closest thing to a repeat.** SAFETY-31's `circ_reason` is
persisted and re-read after a restart, exactly like `sign_reason`, and its
two limits are graded by a bare `"CIRCULATING_POWER" in reason`. This card
does not fix it; §6a already declines to touch `circ_wd`, and this is the
precise shape of what that declining costs.
* **The instrument's own blind spots** are printed by the instrument, every
run: semantic symmetry it cannot spell (it under-reports), census B pairs
that are the same *kind* but not the same *shape*, `%s`-style logging and
non-f-string payloads, anything outside `app/`, and the one way it
**over-reports** — it erases the sentence, so a swap that would make the
formatting itself raise is scored as changing no decision (A5–A6 above).
### 7e. Census C — the sentence an object returns about itself (round 4)
**Why there is a third census.** A and B between them covered **one syntactic
sink**. Everything either of them reported was a sentence that is appended,
assigned, or logged; **none was returned**. Census A's RETURN bucket only ever
held a callee formatting its own **parameters**, so a method formatting its own
**attributes** and handing the string back fell between them — and that is the
whole `describe()` / `explain()` / reason-builder family, which is where the
operator sentences in this codebase actually live.
**The test** is census B's — one f-string, two interpolations **one leaf apart**
— run over the RETURN sink, plus one thing B never needed: **a returned string
is not yet a message.** `store.unit_key()` and `mqtt.unit_state_key()` return
f-strings too, and swapping there renames a store key and an MQTT topic, which
every ordinary check can see (MAINT-05). So the sink of a returned sentence is
**resolved through its call sites**: it is in this family only when some caller
in `app/` hands it to an operator. That resolution matches on the **bare method
name**, which over-collects — at least four unrelated classes have an
`explain()` — so every verdict is printed **with the sites that produced it**,
and a MESSAGE verdict is a prompt to read them, not a proof.
The scan reports **53 returned pairs, 39 reaching an operator, 16 of those
sharing a format spec** (two values rendered alike, so a transposition is silent
rather than visibly broken). It **rediscovered both members this round was sent
to fix without being told where to look**, which is the only reason to trust the
rest of the list.
| # | site | pair | reaches an operator as | Δ bytes | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **C6** | `clamp.py:253` `ClampResult.describe()` | `requested_w` / `applied_w` | §15 action log (`main.py:1366`) **and** the ClampWatchdog notification reason (`main.py:2452`) | **0** | **was a SURVIVOR at 21/21 — now RED**, `test_clamp.py` part 6d, 4 checks |
| **C7** | `peakguard.py:493` `PeakDecision.explain()` | `projected_w` / `ceiling_w` | status row `main.py:3313`; action log `main.py:1951` on the release edge | **0** | **was a SURVIVOR at 21/21 — now RED**, `test_peakguard.py` part 13, 3 checks |
| C1 | `allocator.py:154` `UnitPlan.explain()` | `self.span` / `self.why` | the arbiter/allocator log line | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C2 | `allocator.py:160` | `self.span` / `self.why` | the ENVELOPE VIOLATED line | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C3 | `allocator.py:162` | `self.span` / `self.why` | the ordinary in-envelope line | **0** | **RED** — `test_alloc.py` already asserts that whole literal. The one member of this census the suite could already see, and it says the habit works. |
| C4a | `arbiter.py:344` `UnitBounds.explain()` | `self.lo` / `self.hi` | `CONTRADICTION within the unit (device lo=… > peak hi=…)` | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C4b | `arbiter.py:344` | `self.lo_src` / `self.hi_src` | the same sentence, the two SOURCE names | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C5 | `arbiter.py:392` `Resolution.explain()` | `self.winner` / `self.bound_by` | `main.py:2236`'s `ARBITER:` action-log row and `self.reason` at `main.py:2329` | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** — the winner and the limiter swap names, on the line §10.1 exists to make legible |
| C8 | `tariff.py:279` `PeakReading.explain()` | `self.month` / `self.detail` | the PEAK UNREADABLE row | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C9 | `tariff.py:528` `Projection.explain()` | `self.projected_w` / `self.elapsed_s` | the projection line | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** — watts printed as seconds and seconds as watts, both `:.0f` |
**Not in the family, and the scan says why rather than dropping them silently:**
`inverter.py:338` `__repr__()` and `static_tariff.py:378` `words` are reported
**UNRESOLVED — no call site inside `app/`** (a `__repr__` is called by the
interpreter, not by a name the scan can match); `price_forecast.py:421/428` and
`tariff.py:214` `month_key()` resolve to **OTHER** — `month_key` is a **store
key**, which is MAINT-05's case and a swap there is behaviour every check sees.
### 7f. Round 4's mutation ledger
Same protocol as §4: a fresh full-repo copy per mutation, `:ro`, bytecode
purged **and the purge count printed** before the edit, the edited file
**re-read from disk**, both sides' length and sha256 printed, and the full
**21-file** suite via `tools/mutation_run.sh`. Every row is a pure
transposition, so **every Δ is 0 bytes** — verified, not assumed: `len(old) ==
len(new)` is asserted before the write and `len(after) == len(before)` after it.
**⚠️ And every row was also required to change the ANSWER.** A byte delta says
the file moved; it does not say the sentence did. Each mutated tree is rendered
through a scratch probe that evaluates the shipped f-string with **distinct
operands** and diffs it against the same render of the clean tree. **The first
cut of that probe numbered the operands by ORDER OF APPEARANCE** — so after a
transposition the other leaf took the same number and all thirteen diffs came
back **empty**, which reads exactly like "the edit is inert". Keying the value
to the **name** fixed it. That is the same defect as everything else in this
card, in the instrument this time: a measurement comparing the swap against
itself.
| mutation | file, before → after (sha256, 16) | Δ | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 `allocator.py:154` span↔why | `10c1b26ed0099654` → `ac0c174de1ec28ad` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C2 `allocator.py:160` span↔why | `10c1b26ed0099654` → `9b10730f4659befd` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C3 `allocator.py:162` span↔why | `10c1b26ed0099654` → `07097bf5da31f0c6` | 0 | **RED** — `test_alloc.py` |
| C4a `arbiter.py:344` lo↔hi | `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `009820de7ef0eff0` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C4b `arbiter.py:344` lo_src↔hi_src | `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `04cb8cf69dfc7432` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C5 `arbiter.py:392` winner↔bound_by | `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `9238c3db920da8ad` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| **C6** `clamp.py:253` requested↔applied | `0153133741497fa5` → `47e4e371043e3201` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21 before — RED after**, `test_clamp.py`, 4 checks |
| **C7** `peakguard.py:493` projected↔ceiling | `d95df61a51716c26` → `2d2ee3d0bcd51251` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21 before — RED after**, `test_peakguard.py`, 3 checks |
| C8 `tariff.py:279` month↔detail | `82790523dd5227c9` → `4b2147ca17a28425` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C9 `tariff.py:528` projected↔elapsed | `82790523dd5227c9` → `517e9148d26a243a` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| B17 `arbitrage.py:377` spread↔required | `67fbf949b2938349` → `cddd8045bdeb5e29` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| B18 `arbitrage.py:393` spread↔required | `67fbf949b2938349` → `04a4f3ad3d255de1` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| B19 `main.py:2652` reason↔soc_floor_reason | `61aa413fb890433e` → `bbcbb28f476a98d0` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| **B12** `arbiter.py:264` source↔actuator | `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `9111f627ef639ecc` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21 before — RED after**, `test_arbiter.py`, 2 checks |
**14 measured, 12 survived the full suite before this round's checks, 1 was
already caught, 3 are caught now.** The tree these were taken on is
`SAFETY-38` @ `357cb4f` rebased on `release/1.0` @ `9e42cec`; `app/main.py` is
234 542 bytes.
### 7g. What round 4 does NOT close, with sizes
* **Eleven measured zero-byte survivors are left open** — C1, C2, C4a, C4b, C5,
C8, C9, B17, B18, B19 and the three already open from round 3 (A3, B1, and the
B2–B11/B13–B14 source-level set). Each is a sentence an operator reads and
none is a control decision. They are disclosed with their measurement rather
than pinned because pinning each one wants a fixture in the file that owns the
module — `test_alloc.py`, `test_arbiter.py`, `test_tariff.py`,
`test_arbitrage.py` — and this card has now spent four rounds inside
`test_watchdog.py`'s subject. **An enumerated list with honest gaps beats a
fifth round finding a fifth instance**; what would NOT be honest is a fifth
round finding one that is **not on this list**.
* **`main.py:1951`, the action-log surface of the peak-guard idle line,** is
unpinned. The status row off the same `explain()` is pinned; the second call
site is not, and §4c is the card about exactly that costing a round.
* **The largest remaining hole is not in any census: `%s`-style lazy logging.**
`_LOG.error("… %s … %s", a, b)` puts the two operands in *arguments*, not in
an f-string, so nothing here looks at them and the transposition is the same
zero-byte edit. The tool now says so first in its NOT-SCANNED list, **with
the size measured rather than asserted: 31 such calls across 8 modules in
`app/`, each one listed**.
* **The tool's own blind-spot list was the round-4 blocker and is now two
lists.** "What this scans, and what it does not" enumerates its message sinks
from the constants themselves and then names, in order, what it never looks at:
`%s`-style logging, `.format()`/`%`/`+`/`.join()` sentences, a sentence that
leaves through a dict or dataclass and is rendered elsewhere, `yield`ed
sentences, attributes outside the `reason`-shaped set, and everything outside
`app/`. "What it can see but gets wrong" keeps the five gaps round 3 printed,
with the over-report gap now backed by a **printed format-spec column** so a
reader can tell a silent same-typed transposition from a noisy mixed-type one.
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
# SAFETY-39 — `slew_w` is a ratio to the rail, and `gain` is the constant that is still wrong
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-39`.
**Card:** SAFETY-39 — *"`slew_w` was derived at a 1500 W clamp and runs at 5000,
so the loop outruns the plant"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** The live install still runs the interim
`slew_w: 400` applied by hand on 2026-09-05 12:00, which this branch's new rule
accepts unchanged.
---
## 0. The three things a reader should take away
1. **The overshoot is reproduced in simulation, and one half of it is not
reproducible at all.** The setpoint stepping to the rail and the meter
crossing from export into import are both reproduced, on two independent
plant models. The **−5154 W battery figure is not reproducible in either**,
because both clamp the plant at its rating. An acceptance criterion written
on it would pass on the broken configuration too, so none is. §2.
2. **The deliverable is the relationship, not the number.** `slew_w: 0` now
means *follow the rail* and resolves to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`;
`validate.py` rule 10 refuses an explicit value faster than that against the
**site** rail. Verified by breaking it. §4, §5.
3. ⚠️ **`slew_w` does not own the over-absorption. `gain` does, and `gain` was
not changed.** Re-deriving the slew removes the ≥ 900 W step — the symptom
that escalated 2 → 1 → 13 → 43 per 30 min on the morning of the excursion —
and removes nothing else. Anyone reading this card as "the overshoot is
fixed" is reading more than was delivered. §6.
---
## 1. The defect, stated in the terms the code uses
`slew_w: 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a **clamp of 1500 W**
(goodwe/`NOTES.md`, *"Simulated 2 kW load step (gain 0.6, clamp 1500)"*). Its
stated justification:
> `slew: 1000` is the default because it puts most of the correction in the first
> cycle **while still capping how far the loop can jump ahead of the inverter**.
At 1500 W that sentence is true, and the reason is the rail rather than the
number: 1000 W/cycle reaches the rail in two cycles, so the excursion is bounded
by 1500 W whatever the loop does.
The live install then went to `max_w: 5000` and the constant did not move.
`DRIVER-07` ("raise actuator power cap to full inverter rating") is still in To
Do; the cap was raised ahead of it and `slew_w` was never revisited. **Nothing
in the code is broken.** The rail moved and the derivation did not.
| | derived at | shipped default | live install |
|---|---|---|---|
| `max_w` | **1500** | 2000 | **5000** |
| `slew_w` | 1000 | 1000 | **1000** |
Measured on the owner's system, 2026-09-05 11:43–11:46:
```
11:43:55 grid -3385 W a real 3.4 kW export
11:43:56 SP 380 → 1380 → 2380 → 3380 → 4380 → 5000 +1000 per 2 s tick
11:44:47 batt -5154 W ABOVE the 5000 VA rating
11:45:55 grid +2831 W flipped to 2.8 kW IMPORT
SP 5000 → 2930 → 3840 → 3750 hunting
```
Large (≥ 900 W) setpoint steps per ~30 min that morning: `2 → 1 → 13 → 43`.
---
## 2. ⭐ Reproduced first — and what could not be
`tools/slew_sim.py --repro`, against admin/goodwe's `plantsim.Plant`, the real
`compute()`, and the firmware's own encoder on the wire. Gain 0.6, `max_w` 5000,
`slew_w` 1000, 2 s tick, one 3385 W export step at t = 10 s:
```
t grid in setpoint battery grid out reason
10 -3739 -280 290 -3675 slew-limited
12 -3675 -1280 57 -3442 slew-limited
14 -3442 -2280 -316 -3069 slew-limited
...
34 -1012 -5000 -2823 -562 i-clamped ← the rail
38 -167 -5000 -3541 156 saturated-freeze ← EXPORT → IMPORT
44 562 -4310 -4018 633 saturated-freeze
50 544 -3210 -3804 419 tracking
```
Reproduced: the setpoint stepping a full 1000 W per tick to the rail, the loop
absorbing ~640 W more than the site needed, and the meter crossing from **3.7 kW
of export to +633 W of import** — the loop manufacturing the error it then
chases. Over a family of 51 export steps (1.0–4.2 kW × 3 phases), **48 of 51**
runs contain a ≥ 900 W setpoint step.
### ⚠️ What is NOT reproducible, and why no criterion is written on it
`plantsim.Plant.limit()` clamps the plant at `p_max`. The modelled battery
**cannot exceed its rating by one watt, at any tuning, on any step, ever.**
Neither can `test_control.py`'s independent model. So:
* the **−5154 W excursion is not reproducible in simulation at all**, and this
is a property of the models rather than of the tuning;
* the card's AC *"battery power no longer exceeds `max_w` on a step of the size
observed"* is **unfalsifiable in simulation** — it passes identically on the
configuration that produced the excursion. It is the one acceptance criterion
this card had to **rewrite rather than meet**, per the board's own rule that a
third review round means the AC is wrong.
What replaced it, and what is graded in CI: **the ≥ 900 W step is gone from
every member of the family**, and **the meter excursion and the over-absorption
are measured and reported rather than claimed to be fixed.**
### The two models agree
`test_control.py`'s in-repo first-order lag and admin/goodwe's ramp-plus-lag
`plantsim.Plant` are independent, and they agree on every sign and rank:
| | in-repo model | `plantsim.Plant` |
|---|---|---|
| ≥ 900 W steps at `slew_w` 1000 | 48/51 | 48/51 |
| ≥ 900 W steps at the derived value | 0/51 | 0/51 |
| over-absorption, slew 1000 → 250 | 1005 → 1330 W | 958 → 1081 W |
| over-absorption, gain 0.6 → 0.2 | 1109 → 393 W | 987 → 435 W |
---
## 3. The derivation
The constraint, in words, and it is the 2026-08-22 sentence made checkable:
> **The loop must not traverse its full output range faster than the plant takes
> to settle.**
Three measured quantities, and each is named where it came from:
| | value | where it was measured |
|---|---|---|
| plant settling time | **18 s** | goodwe/`NOTES.md` §5.10, 2026-08-22 — a 1.78 kW kettle step driven from HA off a plug that meters its own draw. ~18 s up to the deadband, ~23 s down. **18 is taken because it is the shorter and therefore the looser bound**; this is a refusal boundary, and rules 5 and 6 refuse the impossible case only, never "close to the rail". |
| control tick | **2 s** | the live install, measured 2026-09-05 — the setpoint stepped +1000 W every 2 s. `run_control()` runs a cycle on a changed meter value or on `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes first, so the tick is the *meter's* rate. |
| output range | `max_w` | `main.py` builds `Tuning(max_w=self.site_max_w)`, the **roster sum**. |
```
SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = 2 s / 18 s = 0.1111 (9 ticks)
slew_w ≤ SLEW_RAIL_FRAC × max_w
```
| rail | derived `slew_w` | ticks to cross | seconds to cross |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 (where the original was derived) | 167 W | 9 | 18 s |
| 2000 (shipped default) | 222 W | 9 | 18 s |
| **5000 (the live install)** | **556 W** | 9 | 18 s |
| 9600 (with inverter B — **datasheet, not measured**) | 1067 W | 9 | 18 s |
And the configuration that was measured failing: `slew_w` 1000 at `max_w` 5000
crosses the rail in **5.0 ticks = 10 s**, against a plant that takes 18 s.
### ⚠️ The tick is the weak term and it is not wrong in the safe direction
A **slower** meter makes this bound conservative — it refuses configurations that
would have been fine, which is visible immediately and costs one edit. A meter
**faster** than 2 s makes it loose by exactly that ratio and nothing in this
add-on would say so. `run_control()`'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)` bounds the tick
below at 1 s, so the worst case is a factor of two — but if a faster meter is
ever fitted, `LOOP_TICK_S` has to be **re-derived, not merely re-read**. Compare
`validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S`, which carries the same kind of copy and can
only ever be wrong the other way; that difference is why both numbers are
written out in `control.py` rather than their quotient.
### ⚠️ The rig cannot pick 556 out of the table, and is not asked to
`tools/slew_sim.py --slew`, worst case over 51 export steps:
```
slew_w 1000 ← 2026-09-05 live pair step 1000 W 48/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 958 W
slew_w 800 step 800 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1107 W
slew_w 700 step 700 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1133 W
slew_w 600 step 600 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1058 W
slew_w 555 ← the derived value step 560 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 987 W
slew_w 500 step 500 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1029 W
slew_w 400 ← the live interim step 400 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1150 W
slew_w 300 step 300 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1143 W
slew_w 250 step 250 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1081 W
```
The ≥ 900 W step disappears at 800 and stays gone. Below that the table is
**flat and slightly non-monotone**, and 800 is *better* than 556 on
over-absorption. So the rig does not choose the number — **the constraint
chooses it, and the rig says what the constraint does and does not buy.** That
is the same relationship the 2026-08-22 table had to its own three columns.
⚠️ **A single step is not evidence here.** The deadband, the 10 W quantisation
and the phase of the step against the tick move the result by hundreds of watts,
non-monotonically. The first cut of this derivation was a single step and ranked
gain 0.3 as *worse* than 0.6, which the family shows is backwards. Every number
above is a worst case over a family, which is how admin/goodwe grades the same
kind of quantity (`config.yaml`'s "1890 closed-loop runs", "924 runs").
---
## 4. What ships — the relationship, not the number
**`slew_w: 0` means FOLLOW THE RAIL.** `control.slew_limit_w()` resolves it to
`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`. It is the shipped default and it is the only value
that cannot be left behind when the rail moves. This is the idiom
`integrator_max_w: 0` has carried in the same options block since it was added —
not a new concept, the same one, applied to the key that needed it.
An explicit number is still accepted **and is never silently reduced**: the live
install runs 400, and silently reducing an operator's stated bound is case (a)
in `validate.py`'s own docstring — the defect that whole module exists to
prevent.
**`validate.py` rule 10** refuses an explicit `slew_w` above
`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC × site rail`. Graded against **`sum(unit_caps(opts))`**, the
roster sum — the same number `Controller.site_max_w` builds — and *not* against
the flat `max_w` and *not* against the weakest unit. Rules 5, 6 and 8 take
`min()` because each grades one watchdog, one shaping claim, one pack. `slew_w`
is not a per-unit quantity at all: `compute()` emits the **site** target and the
allocator divides it afterwards.
⚠️ `config.yaml`'s note on `site_sign_disagree_w` says there is deliberately no
rule pairing a site quantity with `max_w`, "because … `validate_startup_config()`
is handed options rather than a roster". That objection is to grading a site
quantity against the **flat key**, and it is answered rather than ignored:
`unit_caps()` already reads the roster the add-on will build, so the roster sum
*is* available at startup, and `site_rail_w()` is that number.
---
## 5. ⭐ Verified by breaking it
`test_validate.py`, section 10 — the acceptance criterion written as a test:
```
restoring slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 -> 1 problem(s)
slew_w is 1000 W against a site rail of 5000 W, so the loop crosses its
whole output range in 5.0 cycles - 10 s at the 2 s tick this site was
measured running - while the plant takes 18 s to settle …
```
and the four things the refusal has to say, each graded separately: which rail
it used, how long the crossing takes, which measurement it is graded against,
and what to do about it (including `0`, which cannot go stale). Plus:
* **equality starts** — at exactly the derived value the crossing takes exactly
the settling time, which is the constraint met, not violated (rule 6's case,
not rule 5's; getting it backwards would refuse the recommended value);
* **one watt of slack starts** — a boundary that is not meaningful to one watt
must not refuse on one watt;
* **the live interim `slew_w: 400` starts**, and so does the schema floor —
there is no such thing as too slow here, and refusing it would refuse the
mitigation that is holding;
* **`slew_w: 0` starts at every rating from 100 W to 15 kW.**
`test_control.py` grades the same boundary from the law's side, so the rule can
only ever refuse what the ratio says is too fast, and the two cannot drift apart.
---
## 5b. What the change found in this repository's own tests
Five files moved, and **none of them moved because a number was rounded
differently**. Each is worth reading as a finding.
**Two fixtures encoded the defect.** `test_inverter.py`'s `BASE_OPTS` paired
`slew_w: 1000` with `max_w: 5000` — the 2026-09-05 configuration exactly — and
`test_loop.py`'s `BASE` paired 1000 with 2000. Both were typed when those rails
were new; nothing in either file had noticed. Rule 10 refused them on its first
run, so those fixtures **would not start**. That is what a rule about a
*relationship* is for, and it is the clearest evidence the rule is not a
formality.
**Two reproductions depended on a default they never named.**
`test_alloc.py`'s `close_loop` and `test_freeze.py`'s "make both terms
reachable" case reached `slew_w: 1000` through `Tuning`'s default. ARCH-01's
4000 W broadcast limit cycle and SAFETY-18's proof-of-capability alarm would
both have gone quiet — reporting a measured finding as *absent* because a
default moved underneath them. Both now write the number beside the measurement
it belongs to.
**One harness had a latent off-by-one that only a ramping loop could expose.**
`test_watchdog.py` graded SAFETY-02's banner by pairing `c.grid` with
`last_write` sampled **after** `cycle()`, while the detector is evaluated
**inside** `cycle()` against the *standing* command from the previous one. At
`slew_w: 1000` the loop reached its rail in two cycles and consecutive commands
were identical, so the wrong pair and the right pair were the same numbers. At a
rail-following slew they differ by one step and the check went red. `_drive()`
now has a `pre` hook that reads the operands the detector will actually use, and
the check reads the **latching** cycle rather than the one before it. The
assertion is strictly stronger than it was.
**One tripwire had two assertions that were exact by coincidence.**
`test_peakguard.py` part 10c read `limited_discharging == limited` (49/49) and
`min_soc <= bms_soc_floor + 0.05`. At the slower slew the loop drains that pack
~82 Wh less over the same two hours and no longer touches the cut-out *inside
that window*: 48/49, low-water 10.57 % against a 10 % cut-out, 0 cycles at the
BMS limit instead of 190. **The finding is unchanged and is sharper on the
measure that carries it** — 162 cycles of granted discharge below the EMS floor,
up from 138. The two exact equalities were artefacts of one tuning, the old and
new numbers are tabulated in the file beside the checks, and the assertions now
grade the substance. ⚠️ *Loosening an assertion to get a branch green is the
first thing a reviewer should suspect here; the table is there so the suspicion
can be settled rather than argued.*
---
## 6. ⚠️ `gain: 0.6` — measured, and deliberately NOT changed
The card asks whether `gain` still holds at this clamp. **It does not, and here
is the measurement.**
`tools/slew_sim.py --gain`, `slew_w` at the derived 556 W, same 51-step family:
```
gain 0.6 ← shipped over-absorbed 987 W meter driven to +987 W
gain 0.5 over-absorbed 941 W
gain 0.4 over-absorbed 977 W
gain 0.3 over-absorbed 876 W
gain 0.2 over-absorbed 435 W
gain 0.1 over-absorbed 66 W
```
Against the slew column in §3, which is flat. The mechanism is visible in
`control.py` and is structural rather than empirical:
* **`slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT.**
* **The integrator accumulates `gain × error` per cycle** and is bounded only by
`integrator_max_w`. At gain 0.6 into a 3.4 kW error it moves **~2040 W per
tick** and reaches a 5000 W rail in **under three ticks, whatever `slew_w`
is**.
So the 2026-08-22 derivation's own sentence — *"the gain, not the slew, is the
limit by then"* — has become literally true, and `gain` is the term that owns
the over-absorption at this rail. It is written about a 1500 W rail, where
`gain × 1500 = 900 W` and the clamp caught it in two cycles; at 5000 there is
3.3× more room to wind before the clamp binds.
**Why nothing was changed:**
* `gain` is a live control-law constant on a running house. Two of them moving
in one release makes the next measurement uninterpretable — and the interim
`slew_w: 400` has been in service since 2026-09-05 12:00, so there is a clean
baseline to measure the next change against and it would be destroyed.
* A validator rule pairing `gain` with a rail would be **inventing a
relationship nobody has measured.** The bound would have to be
`gain × error_max ≤ SLEW_RAIL_FRAC × max_w`, and `error_max` is the
disturbance, which is not config and is not bounded.
* `integrator_max_w` is **not** the lever it looks like: it bounds the output as
well as the accumulator (`target = clamp(i_w, ±max_w)`), which is why setting
it to 2000 on the live system on 2026-09-05 capped the inverter to 2000 W of
its 5000 and was reverted the same day.
This is named in `validate.py`'s *"deliberately not refused"* list so that it is
a known open item rather than an omission, and it is asserted in
`test_control.py` so that nobody can quietly read this card as having fixed it.
**It wants its own ticket.**
---
## 7. N = 1 → N = 2: the rail is what moved
⚠️ **Inverter B does not exist on site** (SPIKE-04, ≈ 2026-09-12). Its figures
are from its **datasheet and serial**, not a measurement: GW5048D-ES, serial
`55048ESU22AW0992`, 4600 W, pack 4 × Dyness DL5.0C = 20.48 kWh, floor 10 %
(goodwe/`NOTES.md` §1.1b) — and the 4600 W is printed under *battery input data*,
so it may be DC, in which case the AC ceiling is nearer 4324 W.
⚠️ **And `sim/plantsim.py`'s `INVERTER_B` is inverter A copied**, carrying
`measured=False`. **Every two-inverter row below is a result about two copies of
A on a 10000 W rail, not about the ~9600 W site B implies.**
**The site rail becomes `sum(max_w)` ≈ 9600 W while `slew_w` is per-site.** The
derived value there is `0.1111 × 9600 = 1067 W` per tick, which at an even split
is 533 W per unit against each unit's own 5000/4600 W rating — ARCH-01's
split-invariance holding, as its `two_master_gain_sweep` already shows.
**Does the enforced relationship produce it automatically? Yes.** Rule 10 reads
`sum(unit_caps(opts))` and `slew_limit_w()` reads `Tuning.max_w`, which
`main.py` sets from `Controller.site_max_w`. Declaring inverter B moves both,
with no operator action and no second derivation. That is the property that
makes this a fix rather than a re-tune, and `test_validate.py` asserts the
9600 W arithmetic directly.
⚠️ **But the direction of the rule is not the one the ticket assumed, and it
must be said.** A rail that **grows loosens** this bound: `slew_w: 1000`
crosses 9600 W in 19.2 s and **passes**, while the same 1000 at 5000 W is the
configuration measured failing. That is what the constraint says and it is
correct — the bound is on how long the crossing *takes*. What the rule protects
against is the constant being left behind when the rail moves, in either
direction. **It is not a bound on how much power the site may command** (that is
each unit's own `max_w` through the arbiter's `supervised` claim) **and it does
not bound the over-absorption** (§6).
⚠️ **The ≥ 900 W symptom goes stale at N = 2 the same way the constant did.**
On the two-copies-of-A rows, 48/51 runs contain a ≥ 900 W step *at the derived
value*, because at a 10000 W rail the derived step **is** 1111 W. A check
written on the absolute 900 W would report the correct tuning as broken.
Anything grading this symptom at N ≥ 2 has to grade it as a **fraction of the
rail** too — which is this whole card, one layer out.
---
## 8. `max_w: 5000` — a recommendation, not a change
The battery reached **5154 W against a 5000 VA inverter**, so the configured cap
left no headroom for the overshoot that the loop was going to produce anyway.
Three things are worth writing down and none of them is changed here:
1. **The cap is the rating, so the overshoot has nowhere to go but past it.**
`compute()` bounds the *command* to `±max_w`; nothing bounds the plant's
response to a command at the rail, and §6 shows the loop asks for the rail on
any large step at gain 0.6. Recommend **`max_w` at 4500–4750 W**, i.e. 90–95 %
of the 5000 VA nameplate, leaving 250–500 W for the overshoot the loop still
has. This is `freeze.py`'s `RAIL_FRAC` argument applied to the cap itself.
2. **The −5154 W may not be an AC figure at all.** `batt_entity` is the pack
sensor and `max_w` is graded against `0x0518`, the inverter's **AC** power —
`config.yaml`'s roster comment already records exactly this ambiguity for
inverter B. If the battery reading is DC, 5154 W DC is ~4900 W AC and the
inverter was never over its nameplate. **Nobody has measured which**, and the
recommendation above is worth making either way.
3. **It is the owner's number.** `translations/en.yaml` marks `max_w` "THIS IS
YOUR NUMBER" precisely so it is not confused with a derived constant, and
changing it unilaterally in a pull request would undo that distinction.
`SAFETY-20`'s `min(max_w, dev_max)` settles the device side once ESPHome has
answered; the *headroom* question is a policy choice and belongs to the owner.
---
## 9. What was deliberately not done
* **`saturation_w` and the deadband were not touched.** The card forbids it and
it is right to: widening either hides the symptom. The loop is following its
command correctly; the command is wrong.
* **`gain` was not changed.** §6.
* **`max_w` was not changed.** §8.
* **`control.py`'s slew *limit* was not clamped to the bound.** An explicit
value above it is refused at startup, not quietly reduced — silently reducing
an operator's stated bound is case (a) in `validate.py`'s docstring.
* **Nothing in admin/goodwe was modified**, and nothing reached the inverter.
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
# TEL-07 — why inverter A does not get a device of its own, and B does
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-05.** MQTT discovery announces **two** devices at a
roster of two: the existing one, unchanged, plus one for the second inverter.
It does **not** announce one per inverter. This document exists because the
symmetrical design is the obvious one, is tidier, and would destroy the live
system's recorded history — so the next person to read `app/mqtt.py` needs the
reason written down where they will find it before they "fix" it.
Filed with TEL-07. Card `6a9bfa75f0a3550275ba4888`.
---
## 1. The mechanism, in one paragraph
`app/mqtt.py`'s own note records the finding, tested on HA 2026.8: Home
Assistant composes an entity id from the **device name plus the entity name**,
and `object_id` in the discovery payload does **not** override it. So the device
name is half of every entity id.
The second half of the mechanism is the half that makes it silent. Home
Assistant keeps the entity id it composed at **first** discovery. Re-scoping the
device therefore does not rename an entity in place; it creates a **new** entity
beside the old one. The recorded history stays on the old id, the old id stops
updating, and nothing errors. Every dashboard card, template and automation that
names it — including `goodwe_master_watchdog_held_*` and
`goodwe_master_parked_at_0_w_*`, which are live — keeps pointing at a sensor
that has quietly gone flat.
`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age` is the sharp end of it: the ESP32's stale-input
watchdog subscribes to that composed name, and its own comment calls this the
failure that "FAILS SILENTLY AND LOOKS CORRECT".
## 2. The two designs
| | **one device per inverter** | **what shipped** |
|---|---|---|
| A's device | new: `inverter-a` | **the one it already has** |
| B's device | new: `inverter-b` | new: `goodwe_rs485_controller_inverter_b` |
| A's existing entity ids | **all renamed** | **byte-identical** |
| A's recorded history | **stranded on dead ids** | kept |
| watchdog automations | **silently broken** | untouched |
| composed per-unit ids | `sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_*` / `..._b_*` | **the same** |
| reads as | symmetrical and tidy | asymmetrical, and needs this file |
The last two rows are the whole argument. The tidy design's only real benefit is
a pair of symmetric, predictable entity ids — and the shipped design produces
**exactly the same ids** by putting the unit's name in the *entity* name for the
first roster entry and in the *device* name for the others. There is nothing
left to buy, and the price was the live system's history.
## 3. What is per-unit and what is site
**Per-unit:** setpoint (this unit's share of the site target, the number its own
heartbeat re-emits), battery power (`Inverter.batt`, register `0x0518`, this
unit's own reading), SoC (`Inverter.soc` — **this** pack; the site row is the
*emptiest* pack, which at N≥2 may be the other one), and the SAFETY-02 sign
latch, which is one instance per actuator by construction.
**Site:** `grid` and `p1_sample_age_s`. There is one P1 meter and one grid
connection, so a per-inverter copy invents two of a thing there is one of — and
`p1_sample_age_s` is a **watchdog input**, so a second copy is a second answer to
"is the meter fresh?", one of which is always the one nobody is looking at.
Circulating power is site because it *is* a property of the set
(`sum(|Bᵢ|) − |sum(Bᵢ)|`); so are the controller status, the maintenance phase
and the capacity-tariff peak.
**Named as absent rather than left looking finished:** the card also lists
"inverter AC power" and per-unit heartbeats as per-unit. Neither has a source in
the add-on today — nothing reads an AC-power register per unit, and
`Inverter.last_beat` is a monotonic loop clock with no wall-clock age published
anywhere. Announcing them would create entities nothing ever feeds, which is the
hazard the `omit` note in `mqtt.py` exists to refuse. They are gaps.
## 4. Why a roster of one announces nothing
Every install running today is a roster of one, and at N=1 the site rows **are**
that unit's rows: `battery` is its power, `soc` is its pack. Four extra entities
would be four new rows carrying numbers already on the dashboard, on a live
system, for no information. `announced_units()` answers `[]` below
`PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER`, and `Controller.publish()` reads **that same list** —
the empty list is the gate on both halves, rather than a predicate written twice
that could later disagree.
## 5. How it was verified, and what that does not cover
The claim is a **diff of the announced payloads** against `release/1.0`,
generated by running that commit's module rather than transcribed from it:
`9 topics, 0 missing, 0 changed, 0 added` at a roster of one, and
`0 missing, 0 changed, 8 added` at a roster of two. `test_mqtt.py` part 2 shows
`_announce()` publishes exactly what is diffed, so the comparison is against the
bytes paho is handed.
Sixteen mutations were run. Twelve are in the file as a running table, each
named with the property it breaks. Three properties in that table exist only
because the table found their absence — dropping the unit from the state topic,
moving `grid` into the per-unit list, and `units=()` in main()'s publisher call
were all green on the first run, as was a roster fallback that named two
nameless entries `inverter-a`.
**What it does not cover is listed in `test_mqtt.py` part 9, with sizes.** The
largest item: Home Assistant itself is not in the loop. The entity-id
composition is a **model**, anchored on exactly one measured id
(`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, verified against the live system 2026-08-26).
Closing that needs a broker, an HA and the owner present, and this card is not
allowed near the live install.
## 6. ⚠️ Inverter B does not exist
Not until ~2026-09-12. Every roster of two in this repository's checks is
**simulated**; B's `max_w: 4600` is the datasheet's figure for a GW5048D-ES
(serial `55048ESU22AW0992`), recorded in `goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b, and nothing
about B has ever been measured. No entity described here has been seen on a
broker. When the second inverter is installed, the first thing to check is that
the eight ids in §1 are still updating — not that the new ones appeared.
+210 -4
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,30 @@ hardware holds it there.
## Configuration
### What the Configuration tab actually shows you (UX-01)
Since **UX-01** the add-on ships `translations/en.yaml` and `translations/nl.yaml`,
so Home Assistant's *Configuration* tab renders human labels and a description
for every option instead of the raw option keys. What that does and does not buy
you is worth stating plainly, because it was **measured against the Supervisor
image this site runs** (`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0`)
rather than assumed — `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` section F prints the
whole rendered list, in both languages.
| | |
|---|---|
| **All 70 options are always shown** | The frontend keeps a field when `name in options \|\| required`, and every key is in `options:`. There is no "advanced" fold |
| **Order comes from `schema:`** | `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(...)(data["schema"])`, so the **schema half** of `config.yaml` decides the order the tab renders in — not the `options:` half |
| **There are no section headers** | Add-on options are a flat list: no header primitive, no per-option advanced flag, no units on the input, no sliders. Grouping is approximated by **order** plus the `Group · ` prefix in each label, and by nothing else |
| **Groups, in task order** | Hardware → Meter → Limits → Tariff → Maintenance → Safety → Advanced |
| **The description says whether to touch it** | A number that was **derived** names the campaign it came from and says not to change it without re-deriving; a number that is genuinely yours (`max_w`, `peak_cap_w`) says **"THIS IS YOUR NUMBER"**; and `cycle_cost_threshold_eur`, which is neither, says it is an open product question |
| **Dutch falls back per key** | `translations[your language]?.name \|\| translations["en"]?.name \|\| the raw key`. A key missing from `nl.yaml` degrades to English; a key present but wrong does not degrade at all |
| **⚠️ The per-entry keys inside `inverters:` still render raw** | Measured, and negative. A list-of-objects becomes an `object` selector with `multiple: true`, and `ha-selector-object` labels its fields `fields[name].label \|\| name` — the converter sets no `label` and no `translation_key`. The `fields:` translations are shipped and validated (they are the shape Supervisor's own schema defines) but on frontend 20250925.1 they do **not** reach the screen. The `inverters` label and description themselves do |
`test_translations.py` is what stops this rotting: a translation naming an
option that does not exist, or an option with no translation, fails CI — in
either direction, and the check is mutation-tested both ways.
### Sources
| option | required | meaning |
@@ -78,9 +102,20 @@ inverters:
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_soc
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power
max_w: 3000
max_w: 4600
```
⚠️ **The 4600 W is inverter B's *datasheet* figure, not a measured one.** B is a
GoodWe GW5048D-ES (serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, identified 2026-09-04) whose
datasheet gives max charging and discharging power as 4600 W; with nothing
connected to its PV inputs the battery path is the ceiling, not the 5000 VA AC
nameplate. The datasheet prints that number under *Battery Input Data*, so it
may be a DC figure, while `max_w` is graded against register `0x0518` — the
inverter's own **AC** power. If it is DC the AC-side ceiling is nearer 4324 W.
`max_w: 4600` is still the right thing to configure, because the freeze rail is
`min(max_w, dev_max)` and the device range read off the unit is what binds.
`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b records both readings and picks neither.
| per-entry key | required | meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `name` | yes | Short identifier. It namespaces this unit's SAFETY-02 latch, heartbeat and write bookkeeping in the add-on's state file, so **two units may not share one** |
@@ -131,6 +166,53 @@ in the log rather than silent, but it is an outage until someone puts the
single-inverter entity back in that field. **Before downgrading, write down the
`setpoint_entity` of the unit you want to keep running.**
### What appears in Home Assistant at two inverters
**Nothing you already have changes.** The eight entities this add-on has always
published — `Setpoint`, `Grid power`, `Battery power`, `Battery SoC`,
`Circulating power`, `Maintenance phase`, `Controller status`, `P1 sample age` —
keep their device, their `unique_id`s and therefore their **entity ids and their
whole recorded history**. At a roster of one, nothing new is announced at all:
no second device, no renamed entity, not one added topic.
Declare a second inverter and **four rows per unit** appear beside them:
| per-unit row | what it is |
|---|---|
| `Setpoint` | this unit's own share of the site target — the number its heartbeat re-emits |
| `Battery power` | this unit's own reading, `+` = discharging |
| `Battery SoC` | **this** pack. The site `Battery SoC` row is the *emptiest* pack, which may be the other one |
| `Sign latch` | this unit's SAFETY-02 latch: `tripped` or `clear` |
⚠️ **The devices are deliberately asymmetric, and it is not an oversight.** The
first inverter's rows are added to the **existing** *GoodWe* device; every later
inverter gets its **own** device (*GoodWe Inverter B*), shown in Home Assistant
as connected via the controller. Home Assistant composes an entity id from the
**device name plus the entity name**, so giving the first inverter a device of
its own would rename every entity you already have — and because HA keeps the id
it composed at first discovery, you would get a new entity beside a dead one:
the history stays on the old id and every dashboard, template and automation
naming it silently stops updating. The entity ids come out symmetric anyway —
`sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power` beside
`sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power`.
**Do not rename the device.** Not in this add-on, and not in Home Assistant's
device page. It is half of every entity id, including
`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, which the ESP32's stale-input watchdog subscribes
to; a rename disarms that guard by leaving it waiting for a state that never
arrives, and it fails silently and looks correct.
**`Grid power` and `P1 sample age` stay site-scoped and are announced once.**
There is one P1 meter and one grid connection; a per-inverter copy would invent
two of a thing there is one of, and `P1 sample age` is a safety input. Same for
`Circulating power` (it is a property of the *set* of inverters), the controller
status, the maintenance phase and the capacity-tariff peak.
⚠️ **Two roster names that differ only in punctuation or case** — `inverter-b`
and `Inverter B` — are two names to the validator and one id once slugged. The
add-on gives the second one a `_2` suffix so nothing collides, but the ids you
get then depend on roster order. Give your inverters plainly different names.
### P1 meter ingestion
`meter_entity` above expects one signed sensor, which usually means a template
@@ -213,6 +295,42 @@ the P1 sample already went stale. Size the pair together: the ESP32's own
watchdog commands 0 W after ~30 s of silence from this add-on regardless, and
that layer is unaffected by either option.
#### How long a FROZEN inverter power register takes to reach 0 W
A third clock, and it is a different failure from the one above: the entity is
still there and still answering — it has simply stopped changing. Before
SAFETY-37 that read as a healthy measurement for ever, which is what happened on
2026-09-02 (HW-01): a value held for 6 h 25 m while the pack drained to its
floor, and every detector read healthy throughout.
`Inverter.batt` — the inverter's own AC power, register `0x0518` — is now
withheld from the control path when **all three** of these are true:
| | |
|---|---|
| the reading has not changed for | **35 s** |
| **and** the command standing on that inverter is over | **250 W** |
| **and** that command has travelled, since the reading last moved, over | **250 W** |
All three, because a converged site legitimately repeats one power figure for
minutes — measured at up to **263 s** over 30 days of this house's own meter —
and a site at rest is not owed movement. It is only when the controller has
*asked the inverter to move* and the register has not answered that the reading
is treated as missing.
**A withheld reading is a MISSING INPUT**, so it joins the `stale_input_s` clock
above: 35 s to withhold, then 15 s of hold, then 0 W. It clears itself the
instant the register reports a different value — one watt is enough, and this
register dithers ±1 W while holding — so a working inverter clears it on its
next 10 s publish. There is **no option to configure**: the 35 s is derived from
the ESPHome publish interval and the two watchdog windows it has to stay inside,
and the add-on's own checks refuse a value that does not.
⚠️ **What this does NOT catch: a register whose value is WRONG rather than
STOPPED**, including a dead publisher whose last two samples happen to
alternate. Detecting that needs an arrival stamp inside the ESP32 firmware
itself, which is TEL-06.
There is **no fallback to an inverter-side power figure**, deliberately. The
inverter's own AC power tracks its battery almost perfectly and the real meter
hardly at all, so a controller that failed over to it would be regulating
@@ -350,12 +468,12 @@ behind it would trip the firmware watchdog on a system that is working fine.
|---|---|---|
| `max_w` | 2000 | Hard limit on what may be commanded. Start low, raise after commissioning. **Not read when `inverters` is declared** — each entry carries its own, and the site ceiling is their sum |
| `gain` | 0.6 | Correction per cycle. **At the limit — do not raise** |
| `slew_w` | 1000 | Maximum change per cycle |
| `slew_w` | 0 | Largest change in one cycle. **0 means follow the rail** - `max_w / 9`, i.e. the loop takes the plant's own measured ~18 s settling time to cross its whole output range at the 2 s tick the live install runs. 222 W at `max_w: 2000`, 556 W at 5000, 1067 W at a ~9600 W two-inverter site. A fixed number is accepted and never silently reduced, but one FASTER than the rail implies is refused at startup (SAFETY-39): `slew_w: 1000` against `max_w: 5000` crossed the rail in 10 s against an 18 s plant, and on 2026-09-05 drove the meter from 3.4 kW of export to 2.8 kW of import |
| `deadband_w` | 15 | Ignore errors smaller than this |
| `target_grid_w` | -10 | What the meter should rest at. Negative = a slight export |
| `step_w` | 10 | Quantisation |
| `saturation_w` | 500 | Divergence that counts as "the inverter is at a limit" |
| `saturation_cycles` | 3 | How many consecutive cycles before freezing. A cycle is one meter update or `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes first - see the note below. **Do not set to 1** |
| `saturation_cycles` | 3 | How many consecutive cycles before freezing. A cycle is one meter update or `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes first - see the note below. **Do not set to 1**. Every value this file accepts (1-10) is below the freeze's own release bound of 12 cycles, so no accepted setting can stop the block engaging - see SAFETY-13, below |
| `integrator_max_w` | 0 | Bound on the loop's accumulator, and 0 means "same as `max_w`". Caps how much stale error can be waiting to unwind when the sign flips. **Do not raise it above `max_w`** - the output clamp already bounds what is commanded, so the only thing extra headroom buys is more cycles of wrong-direction power after every saturation event. Lowering it below `max_w` is the useful direction |
| `heartbeat_s` | 10 | Refresh interval; must stay well under the firmware watchdog |
| `cycle_floor_s` | 15 | The longest the loop may go without evaluating. A deadline on the gap between cycles, reset by every cycle — on a healthy meter it never elapses and changes nothing. Raise it only if your meter is slower than ~10 s; it must stay under `meter_max_age_s`, past which there is no reading to evaluate anyway |
@@ -510,6 +628,94 @@ correct toward that wrong value instead of holding a stale command. It is bounde
happened to a lying meter whose value merely jittered — bit-exact repetition was never a
safety property.
#### When the freeze lets go, and when it deliberately never does (SAFETY-13)
While the loop is frozen the command's **magnitude may fall but never rise**. That is
the anti-windup rule, and at `prev_w == 0` it reads as a refusal to *start*: with
nothing commanded there is no magnitude left to fall, so a charge cannot begin. That
refusal is deliberate. Commanding 0 W while the inverter reports hundreds of watts
means something is driving the actuator that this add-on did not ask, and starting to
push power the other way into it is how two controllers end up fighting over one
actuator — the configuration §1.5 of the specification rules out.
**What was missing was an end to it.** Nothing cleared the block: not the error growing,
not the integrator moving, not time. The exit is now explicit, and *which* freezes get
one is the decision:
| the inverter is… | can it clear itself? | what happens now |
|---|---|---|
| doing **less** than the command, in the command's own direction — a cold pack, a curtailment, an export cap | **yes.** The command is pinned at something the inverter can reach, so it catches up and the freeze clears | unchanged: frozen for as long as it lasts, with no exit |
| doing something **outside** what the command can explain — overshooting it, or the opposite sign | **not necessarily.** If another writer is on the actuator, clearing the freeze needs the inverter to track *our* command and the other writer is what stops it, so nothing ends it | the freeze releases once the divergence has outlasted the plant that could otherwise have explained it — see *what `freeze-released` actually tells you*, below, because this row is also where our own ramp lands |
The second row's threshold is the plant's own measured settling time — **the slower of
the two directions it was measured in.** The 2026-08-22 step test timed the same 1.78 kW
step both ways: about 18 s to settle going up, about 23 s coming back down. 23 s is the
one that belongs here, because the question this bound answers is *how long may the plant
still be the explanation*, and the safe answer is to keep believing the plant for as long
as the plant has ever been seen to take. At the measured 2 s meter tick that is
**12 cycles** (`control.py`, `SETTLE_CYCLES`).
⚠️ **The first version of this feature used 18 s, and 9 cycles was wrong in the direction
that accuses.** Nine cycles is three short of the plant's own down-ramp, so an ordinary
load step on a **single** inverter — the command falling through zero while the pack is
still coasting the old way — could produce `freeze-released` with nothing else on the bus
at all. Driven in the container against a model of the measured plant, one inverter and
no second writer anywhere: over 272 load-step pairs the 9-cycle bound produced a release
in 62 of them and the shipped 12-cycle bound in 2.
**Releasing the output freeze does not unfreeze the loop.** The *integrator* freeze is
untouched, so the command is free to move only as far as an accumulator that stopped
accumulating cycles ago, one slew step per cycle. Measured on the simulator at the live
install's shape (`max_w 5000`, `slew_w 400`, `target_grid_w -10`), with another writer
holding the pack at +700 W and 2 kW of export standing: the command holds at 0 W while
the counter climbs, starts on the **twelfth** saturated cycle, walks 0 → −400 → −800, and
settles at **−1190 W** against a frozen integrator of −1194 W — not at the 5000 W rail.
Before this change the same run held 0.0 W on every cycle, for as long as the other
writer stayed.
⚠️ **The site still does not reach its target in that state, and it is not supposed
to.** What the exit buys is that the battery stops being idle while the site exports;
what it does not buy is correct regulation against an actuator somebody else is also
writing to. A standing grid error with another writer on the bus is the symptom of a
configuration this add-on refuses to support, not a tuning problem.
#### What `freeze-released` in the action log actually tells you
**It says: the inverter's power did not match the command for longer than this plant has
ever been measured to take to settle.** That is all it says. It is a reason to go
looking; it is not a finding, and in particular it is **not** proof that a second writer
exists.
The test behind it compares the reading against **one cycle's** command, and the pack
carries more than one cycle of history. So our own power, arriving late, can look like
somebody else's:
- **A big, fast load step is the ordinary innocent cause.** The command falls through
zero while the pack is still coasting in the old direction, and for a few cycles the
reading has the sign the command *used* to have. Measured, one inverter, nothing else
on the bus: eight cycles after a +1990 W command the command was 0 and the pack still
read +522.3 W.
- **A plant slower than the one that was measured does it too.** The 12-cycle bound is
derived from a 23 s down-ramp. A colder or larger pack that takes longer than that will
produce releases on its own, and no constant read off the 2026-08-22 measurement can
prevent it. In the same container sweep, holding the bound at 12 and lengthening only
the plant's down-ramp, single-inverter releases went from 8 of 320 scenarios at the
measured 23 s to 59 of 320 at 34 s and 268 of 320 at 50 s.
**So, in order:** if you see `freeze-released` **once, during or just after a large load
or PV swing**, that is most likely the loop's own ramp and needs nothing. If you see it
**standing** — cycle after cycle, at a steady load, with a standing grid error the
battery is not correcting — then look for the second writer: another controller, a
scheduler in the inverter's own app, or an installer tool left connected. That is the
configuration §1.5 of the specification rules out, and it is the one this exit exists to
stop the loop stalling on forever.
⚠️ **No `saturation_cycles` you can set removes the block.** This file accepts 1-10, and
all of those are below the 12-cycle release bound, so the freeze always engages before
its own exit is due. (The first version of this feature had the bound at 9, where a
setting of 9 or 10 *did* silently delete the block; moving the bound to 12 closed that
by construction rather than by warning about it.)
#### Why `target_grid_w` is not zero
The deadband is a one-way ratchet: any resting point inside it holds until
@@ -554,7 +760,7 @@ help - see "Why the tuning is what it is".
| `peak_forecast_entity` | Quarter-hour demand forecast, for capacity-tariff markets. Empty = no cap |
| `peak_cap_w` | The site's capacity-tariff target |
| `peak_soc_floor` (20) | **The percent below which the capacity-peak guard will not discharge the battery.** ⚠️ It bounds **the peak guard only** — it is **not a pack-wide reserve**, and ordinary self-consumption discharges straight past it (SAFETY-25, see below). Not optional and not the same thing as `maintenance_soc_floor` |
| `bms_soc_floor` (10) | The pack's **own** cut-out percent, the number the BMS enforces whatever you set above. `peak_soc_floor` must be **strictly above** it or the add-on refuses to start |
| `bms_soc_floor` (10) | The pack's **own** cut-out percent, the number the BMS enforces whatever you set above. `peak_soc_floor` must be **strictly above** it or the add-on refuses to start. ⚠️ **At a declared `inverters:` roster this key moves INTO each entry and is REQUIRED there** (SAFETY-32): it describes a battery, and two packs of different models have different cut-outs, so one number for both protects the shallower pack with the deeper pack's BMS. Nothing is inherited — an entry that omits it is refused **by name** at startup, and the flat key below is then not read at all |
| `price_now_entity`, `price_avg_entity` | Dynamic tariff. Empty = never force a paid grid top-up |
On a capacity-tariff site the maintenance charge is capped by the headroom left
+289 -3
View File
@@ -135,12 +135,24 @@ manufactures them from a **fixture**: the check runs, the assertion is
evaluated, the sentence above it is true — and the numbers it compares are
arranged so that the failure it describes could not have changed the answer.
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. EIGHT instances in two weeks; four
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. ELEVEN instances in two weeks; four
were found by review, two - CFG-04's fixture pair - by an author's own mutation
battery, which is the cheaper place, one by review again, in the one
place nobody had thought to point the rule at: not a check in the suite, but a
COMMITTED EVIDENCE ARTIFACT four documents cite - and the eighth INSIDE THE FIX
WRITTEN TO CLOSE THE SEVENTH.
COMMITTED EVIDENCE ARTIFACT four documents cite - the eighth INSIDE THE FIX
WRITTEN TO CLOSE THE SEVENTH, the ninth inside the SITE HALF of the card
that names the rule in its own text - and the TENTH INSIDE THE FIX WRITTEN TO
CLOSE THE NINTH, for the second time in this list. See SAFETY-38 below: the
check that closed it asserted a NUMBER and not the number's POSITION.
⚠️ AND THE ELEVENTH IS IN A MEASURING INSTRUMENT RATHER THAN IN A CHECK, which
is where the seventh was too. SAFETY-38 round 4's render probe - the thing that
decides whether a mutation changed the SENTENCE and not merely the bytes -
numbered each interpolated operand BY ORDER OF APPEARANCE. After a transposition
the other operand takes the same number, so all thirteen mutant renders came back
BYTE-IDENTICAL to the clean tree: the probe compared the swap against itself, and
its output read exactly like "the edit is inert". Keying the value to the
operand's NAME fixed it. Habit 16.
⚠️ **AND IT HAS NOW APPEARED IN SIX CONSECUTIVE CARDS.** The seventh instance,
MAINT-05's, is the one that says why: the defect is not carelessness about
@@ -234,6 +246,65 @@ same place twice, the check is decoration.
assertion cannot fail is exactly the thing this section is about. Two habits
follow, and both are habit 5 and 6 below.
* **SAFETY-38** — `main.py`'s
`site_standing = float(sum(standing.values()))`, the first argument of
SAFETY-30's latching site sign detector *and* SAFETY-18's `looks_frozen()`
input. `test_watchdog.py`'s `_sign_site` is the suite's **only** N≥2 site
fixture, and it runs shares of about **−2500 W each** — every one
individually over the 320 W gate it is configured with. On numbers like those
`sum`, the mean and `max(key=abs)` **all agree**, so the reduction could be
swapped for either of the other two and the site guard went **blind with the
whole suite green** — still commanding −500 W of charge into a +2500 W import at
t = 595 s with `following=True`. At a roster of **one** it is worse and it is
not a fixture defect at all: `sum == mean == max == the one share`
*identically*, so every such mutation is genuinely **equivalent** there and no
N=1 fixture could ever separate them. The fixture that separates them is the
one the detector exists for — **per-unit shares EACH BELOW the gate whose SUM
clears it** — and it is now `test_watchdog.py` part 9, at asymmetric ratings
so that all four candidate reductions give four **distinct** answers.
⚠️ **AND THE CARD'S OWN SEARCH FOR ITS NEXT SURVIVOR FOUND ONE, WHICH IS THE
POINT OF ASKING.** Having built the fixture, the question *what mutation would
this NOT see?* produced `float(self.target)` — the arbiter's site target
instead of the sum of what stands on the wire — at **−11 B**, green across the
whole suite, because every fixture in the repository was built where the two
are the same number. They separate only when a device's reported range is
narrower than its `max_w`, since the `device` claim is filed **per actuator**
and never bounds the site target. Closed in the same commit, by a
counterfactual that asks for −500 W while −250 W stands.
⚠️ **AND THEN THE FIX ITSELF WAS THE TENTH INSTANCE — A SUBSTRING WHERE THE
FAILURE WAS POSITIONAL.** The check written to pin the banner asserted
`f"{sum(...):.0f} W" in reason`: that **"−500 W" appears somewhere** in the
sentence. Swapping the detector's first two arguments
(`evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` → `evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, …)`)
is a **ZERO-BYTE** edit that leaves both numbers in the string and moves each
into the other's slot — so the substring is still found, **in the meter
slot**, and the whole suite stayed green while the latching site-stopping
banner told the operator which instrument read what **exactly backwards**.
The fix is to assert the **ORDERED PAIR**,
`f"commanded {sum:+.0f} W against a meter reading {grid:+.0f} W"`.
⚠️ **AND THE ELEVENTH WAS THE SAME DEFECT ONE CALL SITE OVER — THE ONE A
SHIPPED INSTALL CAN ACTUALLY SEE.** Round 2 pinned the operand order of
`SignWatchdog.evaluate()` at `main.py:1620`. That call site is the **site**
detector, and `test_watchdog.py` part 9c asserts it is **never armed at a
roster of one** — which is every install this add-on has. The **per-unit**
call at `main.py:1560` was left unpinned, and swapping its first two
arguments is the same **ZERO-BYTE** edit: `disagrees()` is symmetric in them
(`commanded_w * against_w < 0` with an `abs()` gate on both), so **no trip
decision can change** and the full 21-file suite stays green — measured. What
moves is five banner lines, including the one persisted to `sign_reason` and
re-read after a restart: *"commanded −1000 W against its own measured power
+1000 W"*, operands inverted, on the only sign-disagreement sentence a
one-inverter install can ever print. Closed in round 3 by the ordered pair on
**both** per-unit banners — the N≥2 `its own measured power` one and the N=1
`a meter reading` one — red on four named checks, green in the other twenty
files. **Habit 15 is what falls out of finding the same shape twice in the
same card.**
The general habits are **14** and **15** below.
Note what these have in common with a masked rung: the mutation *runs*, and the
suite is *honestly* green. Nothing in a purge, a fingerprint or a disassembly
can see it, because the code under test really did behave identically on the
@@ -300,6 +371,221 @@ Cheap habits fall out of it, and all of them are now used in this repository:
assert the **shape** of that second report, not only its verdict, so the
check cannot silently revert to grading the first path.
10. **A fixture of N members cannot separate two reductions that agree on N
members — so grade the FAMILY, and grade it from the SOURCE.** This is the
only lesson SAFETY-32 cost four review rounds to learn, and it generalises
past packs to every roster, list and window in this repository. Two packs
cannot tell `max` from `min` from first from last. Three cannot tell `max`
from `max(x[-2:])`. **The regress does not terminate in a fixture**: `[:1]`
needs two members, `[:2]` three, `[:3]` four, and adding one more member
moves the hole rather than closing it. Three things follow, and all three
are now in `test_peakguard.py` parts 12c2, 12g, 12i and 12j:
* the fixture is a **SET** — the extreme at every position of the roster,
not one roster with the extreme somewhere;
* the family table is **COMPUTED and PRINTED**, so a member no fixture kills
shows up as a named survivor and takes the check red, instead of being
absent from a list nobody re-derived;
* where the claim is an **IDENTITY** ("this roster", "this list"), pin it
**exactly on the AST** — `ast.unparse(arg) == "self.packs"` is false of
every slice, where `"self.packs" in src` is true of all of them. Where the
claim is **SEMANTIC** ("the maximum"), a shape pin would refuse honest
refactors, so report the unreached width **with its size** instead.
11. **When a check of this shape is found, mutate its SIBLINGS before shipping
the fix.** SAFETY-32 was rejected three times for the same defect one step
over: the reduction, then the roster handed to it, then the reduction handed
to the *other argument of the same call*. Enumerating the family from the
AST and mutating each member took one afternoon and found **four more
survivors in code the card never touched** — three of SAFETY-30's
`any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in self.inverters)` reductions, invisible
because the only fixture that reached them was a roster of ONE, where
`self.inverters[:1]` **is** `self.inverters`. Ask of every fix: *what is the
sibling of the thing I just hardened, and does any fixture separate it from
a slice of itself?*
12. **When the same shape has been found twice, STOP CLOSING SITES AND BUILD
THE INSTRUMENT — and make it DISCOVER its own scope.** SAFETY-32 was
rejected four times, and each round closed exactly the site it was handed:
the reduction, then the roster handed to it, then the *sibling argument* of
the same call, then the same family one *module* over, in validate.py.
Round 4 did enumerate — and enumerated inside the `Controller` class,
because that is where the four known sites lived. **A hand-written scope is
the same defect as a hand-written fixture**: it is a check whose data cannot
reach the failure it names, and it goes on passing while the thing it was
supposed to cover sits in the file nobody added to the list. Round 5's pin
parses every `.py` under `app/`, seeds itself from ONE option key, and
propagates through returns, accumulator loops, attributes and *call
arguments* to find the roster wherever it went — 183 reductions across 9
modules. It rediscovered all four blockers without being told where to look,
and it named two modules the hand-written list would not have contained
(`maintenance.py`, `store.py`) while *omitting* one the list did contain
(`watchdog.py`, which is strictly per-unit and reduces over no roster at
all). **The list was wrong in both directions**, which is exactly what a
computed scope is for.
13. **Say what the instrument CANNOT see, with sizes, in the same breath.** A
structural pin grades an **identity** ("this whole roster arrives"); it can
never grade a **meaning** (`min` vs `max` is a zero-byte edit and invisible
to it). Ship the pin AND the behavioural set, name the gap, and give every
unreached case its byte delta — `cycle()`'s undeliverable-unit log line
(+4 B, still green), a subscript by a *variable* rather than a constant, a
slice taken through an intermediate call, anything outside `app/`. **An
enumerated list with an honest gap is worth more than a claim of
completeness a reviewer falsifies in ten minutes**, and every round of this
card that claimed the latter was rejected for it.
14. **An `in` test against a formatted sentence grades PRESENCE, never
ARRANGEMENT — so assert the ORDERED PAIR.** SAFETY-38 pinned the banner of a
latching, site-stopping alarm with
`f"{sum(_share38):.0f} W" in ...reason` — that `"-500 W"` appears
*somewhere*. Swapping the detector's first two arguments at the call site
(`evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` →
`evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, …)`) is a **ZERO-BYTE** edit: both
numbers are still in the string, each in the other's slot. The substring was
still found — **in the meter slot** — the whole suite stayed green, and the
banner told the operator which instrument read what **exactly backwards**.
Whenever the property you mean is "**this** value went in **this** slot" — a
reason string, a log line, a notification, an MQTT payload — assert the
surrounding **literal text with the value embedded in its own position**
(`f"commanded {x:+.0f} W against a meter reading {y:+.0f} W"`), or assert
the fields **before** they are formatted. Two values that both appear in one
sentence can always be transposed by an edit that costs **nothing**, and
that no byte delta, no fingerprint and no shape pin can see. ⚠️ Note where
this one was found: **inside the fix written to close the previous instance
of the same family**, which is the second time in this list.
⚠️ **AND THE FIX FOR IT WAS ONE CALL SITE WIDE, WHICH IS THE HALF WORTH
KEEPING.** The ordered pair went onto `main.py:1620`, the **site** detector
— armed only at N≥2, and part 9c asserts it is **absent at a roster of
one**. The identical swap at `main.py:1560`, the **per-unit** detector, was
still **ZERO BYTES**, still changed no decision, still left the 21-file
suite green — and it is the **only** sign-disagreement sentence a shipped
one-inverter install can ever print: *"commanded −1000 W against its own
measured power +1000 W"*, backwards, in the log, on the status page and in
`sign_reason` after the restart the latch is designed to survive. Measured
size: **main.py:1560, 0 bytes, 21/21 green.** So habit 14 is not "pin the
banner", it is **"pin every call site of the banner, and say which one the
shipped roster reaches"** — and habit 15 is how you find them all.
15. **A SYMMETRIC PREDICATE MAKES ARGUMENT ORDER A PROPERTY OF THE MESSAGE
ALONE — so ENUMERATE THAT FAMILY BY MACHINE, and grade the CALL SITES, not
the function.** Where a callee is symmetric in two arguments, a swap at any
call site is invisible to every behavioural check **by construction**: not
"no fixture happens to separate them" but *no fixture can*. There is
nothing for a mutation battery to find, because the mutant and the shipped
tree take identical actions on every input. The only surface that moves is
the sentence, and the only check that can see it is one asserting the
**ordered pair** (habit 14) at **that** call site.
Three consequences, and all three are why this is its own habit:
* **The unit of coverage is the CALL SITE.** SAFETY-38 pinned
`evaluate()`'s operand order and still shipped the defect, because the
pin was on the call two lines below the one that matters. Ask of every
banner: *how many places call this, and which does the shipped roster
reach?*
* **The scope must be COMPUTED** — habit 12's argument, and SAFETY-38 is
its proof: the family was enumerated by hand twice and was short both
times. `tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` renames each parameter pair,
erases every formatted string, canonicalises the commutative operators
and iterates to a **fixpoint** over `app/` (the symmetry is usually one
call deep — `evaluate()` is symmetric only *through* `disagrees()`), then
classifies each sentence by where it GOES. A returned string may be a
**key** — swapping `store.unit_key(unit, key)` renames a store key, which
is behaviour and is MAINT-05's card — or a **sentence**, which is this
family.
* **Say what the instrument cannot see, with shapes** (habit 13). That scan
under-reports semantic symmetry no canonicaliser on its finite list can
spell; its second census, for sentences the CALLER builds, pairs only
expressions **one leaf apart** and never sees `%s`-style logging; it
covers only `app/`; and it **over-reports in exactly one way** — it
erases the sentence, so a swap that would make the FORMATTING itself
raise is scored as changing no decision. It prints all of that on every
run. The family, every member's call sites, and which of them are pinned
are in `DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md` §7 — **with two
measured, still-open survivors named there rather than rounded off**,
both zero bytes and both 21/21 green.
* ⚠️ **AND THE SINK IS HALF THE SCOPE, WHICH IS HOW THE FIRST THREE ROUNDS
OF THIS SCAN MISSED THE PLACE THE CODEBASE ACTUALLY KEEPS ITS SENTENCES.**
The scan classified a sentence as operator-facing when it was **appended,
assigned to a `reason`-shaped name, or logged** — and every one of its 16
reported members was one of those. **None was RETURNED.** A method
formatting its own **attributes** and handing the string back —
`ClampResult.describe()`, `PeakDecision.explain()`, every reason-builder
in the tree — was outside all of it, and so were sentences handed to a
constructor as `reason=` or placed under a `"text"` dict key. Four
zero-byte survivors of a green 21-file suite were sitting there, two of
them on the alarm SAFETY-40 and SAFETY-41 are about. **The general form:
an enumeration is scoped by a SINK as much as by a PREDICATE, and a sink
list is a hand-written list like any other (habit 12).** Ask of any such
scan: *which syntactic forms does this call a message, and what does the
code under it actually use?*
16. ⚠️ **AN INSTRUMENT THAT ASSERTS A COMPLETENESS IT DOES NOT HAVE IS WORSE
THAN NO INSTRUMENT, AND ITS BLIND-SPOT LIST IS PART OF THE CODE UNDER
REVIEW.** `tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` printed five honest gaps and a
census count, and a reader — including its author, twice — took the count
for the family. The gap that mattered, the RETURN sink, was **in none of the
five**. A gap list is not a disclaimer; it is a claim, and it is the claim
most likely to be believed because nothing else in the output argues with
it. Two consequences:
* **State what is NOT scanned, largest hole first, as a list of forms** —
not "this under-reports". The tool now names `%s`-style lazy logging
(`_LOG.error("… %s … %s", a, b)`, where the operands are *arguments*, so
no f-string census can ever see them), `.format()`/`%`/`+`/`.join()`
sentences, sentences that leave through a dict or dataclass, `yield`,
message attributes outside its own constant set, and everything outside
`app/`. Where the list is derived from a constant in the file, it is
**printed from that constant**, so the two cannot drift.
* **AND THE PROBE THAT GRADES THE MUTATIONS IS SUBJECT TO EVERY HABIT
ABOVE.** Round 4's render probe gave each interpolated operand a value by
**order of appearance** — so after a transposition the other operand took
the same number and **all thirteen mutant renders came back
byte-identical**, which reads exactly like *the edit changed nothing*.
Keying the value to the operand's **NAME** fixed it. That is habit 4, in
the measuring instrument: the fixture's own values were arranged so the
failure it was built to see could not change the answer. **Eleventh
instance of habit 4 in this file, and the second one in an instrument
rather than in a check.**
17. ⚠️ **TWO TERMS OF A CONJUNCTION THAT MOVE TOGETHER IN EVERY FIXTURE ARE
ONE TERM AS FAR AS THE CHECKS ARE CONCERNED - TWELFTH INSTANCE OF HABIT 4,
and the third found by an author's own battery rather than by review.**
SAFETY-37's freshness gate is `unchanged >= 35 s AND |standing| >= 250 W
AND |travel| >= 250 W`. Deleting the MIDDLE term left every check in the
first draft green, because in all of them a command that had *travelled*
250 W had also *ended up* above 250 W: the fixture never separated the two,
so one of them was decoration as far as the suite could tell. The case that
separates them is a site being brought to REST - the register reaches its
new value on the same read at which the OLD command is still standing, so
the travel term alone reads 1300 W of unfollowed command while the site
sits truthfully at +5 W. Ask of every conjunction: **is there a fixture in
which each term is the ONLY one that is false?** If not, the suite cannot
tell an AND from an OR.
18. ⚠️ **AN UNVERIFIED REVERT IS THE SAME DEFECT AS STALE BYTECODE, AND TWO
HARNESSES SHARING ONE BACKUP PATH IS THE WORST VERSION OF IT.** SAFETY-37's
sweep hit this twice, in ascending order of nastiness.
* A mutation's container run overran a two-minute command budget and the
wrapper was killed **between the edit and the `cp` that puts the file
back**, leaving `app/freshness.py` mutated on disk. Nothing announced it;
the next mutation's harness cheerfully fingerprinted and graded the mutant
*plus* a second mutation.
* Then two copies of the sweep were started - a scheduling mistake, not a
tool defect - and the harness kept its backup at the FIXED path
`/tmp/mut.bak`. One copy saved `app/main.py` there; the other restored it
**over `app/freshness.py`**. The result was a 238 KB `freshness.py` that
still parsed as Python, plus `main.py` left holding a live mutation. No
error, no warning, and the only reason it was noticed is that the tree
fingerprint did not match the recorded clean one.
Two rules, and the first is the cheap one:
* **Fingerprint after the revert, not only before the run.**
`tools/mutation_run.sh` prints the tree it is about to grade for exactly
this reason; the revert deserves the same treatment, and a mismatch is a
stop-everything result rather than a note.
* **A harness's scratch file must be unique per invocation** (`mktemp`), so
that two of it cannot silently overwrite each other's work. A fixed path
in a tool that edits source is a shared mutable global with a filename.
And the mutation-table consequence: **a variant is not covered because a
near-miss of it is.** DEV-02's table listed the *actuator* variant of the
per-unit claim defect (`device`/`supervised` filed without `inv`), which the
+12
View File
@@ -122,6 +122,18 @@ CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
# 200 W -> 445.0 s 350 W -> 10.0 s 1000 W -> 5.0 s
# 250 W -> 40.0 s 400 W -> 5.0 s 1700 W -> 0.0 s
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39 MOVED THAT SCHEMA FLOOR FROM 50 TO 0, AND THE CAMPAIGN ABOVE
# WAS NOT RE-RUN. It does not have to be, and here is the argument rather
# than the assurance. What these windows are about is how long the command
# takes to CROSS ITS RAIL - the swept worst case is the SLOWEST crossing,
# which is `slew_w` at its floor, 5000/50 = 100 cycles. `slew_w: 0` means
# "follow the rail" and resolves to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, which is
# exactly 9 cycles at EVERY rail by construction. So the new value can never
# be the slowest crossing at any `max_w`, and it is strictly inside the
# envelope this campaign measured. An explicit number still spans 50..5000
# and is unchanged. If `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is ever loosened past 1/100, this
# paragraph stops being true and the campaign has to be re-run.
#
# THE KNEE IS AT 400 W and it is sharp. Below ~250 W a flapping load holds
# the sensor above the threshold for MINUTES at a time - 505 s at 100 W -
# and no window shorter than the 900 s billing quarter could tell that from
+135 -5
View File
@@ -145,14 +145,94 @@ from datetime import datetime
# nothing else in this add-on uses it. See "DISTINCT FROM SATURATION".
REASON_CODE = "OUTPUT_CLAMP"
# Re-assert the notification this often while the clamp stays engaged. 30 s is
# the planning cadence (2.3), i.e. slow enough not to flood and fast enough
# that a pinned loop is never quiet for a whole billing quarter.
REASSERT_S = 30.0
# Re-assert the notification this often while the clamp stays engaged.
#
# ⚠️ RAISED 30 s -> 150 s on 2026-09-05, and the reason is a REGIME CHANGE, not a
# change of mind about the alarm. 30 s was the planning cadence (2.3), chosen
# when a loop-side engagement was a rare event: `main.py`'s note at the action
# log records "60 cycles of the §10.3 runaway produce 0 write-path engagements
# and 2 loop-side ones". On the live install the counter reached 48 loop-side
# ENGAGEMENTS in ~25 minutes of ordinary operation - roughly one cycle in six,
# not a pinned rail, but far more often than a guard sized for 2-in-60 assumed -
# and the owner received a persistent notification about it all day. ⚠️ NOT
# because of the 30 s re-assert - see the block below; those notifications never
# consulted this constant at all.
#
# ⚠️ BOTH FIGURES ARE ENGAGEMENT COUNTS; only the regime differs - 2-in-60 was
# measured over a §10.3 RUNAWAY, 48-in-305 was ordinary running on the live
# install. The 48 is read off the live log, not measured in this repo.
#
# ⚠️ AND RAISING THIS CONSTANT ALONE DID NOT FIX THAT FLOOD - review found it
# and the first version of this change was wrong. At ~5 s cycles a 1-in-6
# engagement leaves ~25 s of clean cycles between engagements, past
# CLEAR_CYCLES x 5 s = 15 s, so the alarm DE-ASSERTED between almost every one
# and came back as a fresh rising edge. The rising edge used to fire
# unconditionally, so those notifications never consulted this constant at all:
# 48 notifications at 30 s, and still 48 at 150 s. The fix was to rate-limit the
# RISING EDGE too and let `last_alarm` survive a de-assert, so this interval
# bounds the notification rate across episodes rather than only within one.
# Measured on that same window afterwards: 51 episodes, 11 notifications.
#
# WHY the loop reaches its integrator bound so much more often than the guard's
# author saw: `max_w` on the live install is 5000 W, while the loop's slew was
# derived against a 1500 W clamp - admin/goodwe `NOTES.md` §"Simulated 2 kW load
# step (gain 0.6, clamp 1500)". ⚠️ THAT DERIVATION IS IN THE OTHER REPO; nothing
# in this one corroborates it, so do not go looking here. SAFETY-39 is the ticket
# that re-derives it, and fixing that is what would stop the railing; this
# constant only changes how often the alarm repeats.
#
# ⚠️ 150 s IS THE REQUIREMENT'S EDGE WITH MARGIN, AND THE CHECK NOW ENFORCES THAT
# EDGE. `test_clamp.py` part 2 grades the cadence in wall-clock terms - a pinned
# loop must speak at least MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5 times inside the 900 s quarter
# that bills the capacity tariff - which caps this constant at 900/5 = 180 s.
# Measured on the worst sliding 900 s window: 180 s earns 5 alarms, 181 s earns
# 4. 150 s earns 6.
#
# ⚠️ THAT CHECK USED TO PERMIT 224 s, AND THE FIX SHIPPED WITH THIS COMMIT. Its
# sweep starts at i=0, where the rising edge is free, so it measured one alarm
# more than a real quarter earns. A later editor raising this to 200 s would have
# had a green suite and a requirement quietly unmet. `test_clamp.py` now grades
# floor(QUARTER_S / REASSERT_S) directly.
#
# ⚠️ MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5 IS A TEST-LOCAL INTEGER, not a spec figure - it exists
# only in `test_clamp.py` and the CHANGELOG entry that introduced it. The 900 s
# quarter IS system-wide (`tariff.py`, `freeze.py`, `DOCS.md`). So the 180 s
# ceiling rests on one number a test author chose; if that number is ever
# revisited, this constant moves with it.
#
# ⚠️ THIS IS A STOP-GAP AND DOES NOT MAKE THE ALARM CORRECT. The message still
# calls the integrator bound a BUG SIGNAL and still pairs a request from one
# moment with a `self.target` read at another - SAFETY-40. Nothing here is
# suppressed: every engagement is still counted, the action-log row is written on
# every engaged cycle regardless, and the rising edge of every episode alarms
# unconditionally, so no alarm is DROPPED - only delayed.
REASSERT_S = 150.0
# Consecutive clean cycles before the alarm de-asserts (10.2 hysteresis).
CLEAR_CYCLES = 3
# ⚠️ SAFETY-41. Consecutive ENGAGED cycles after which an episode speaks even if
# the notification budget is spent. THE ESCALATION EXISTS BECAUSE THE RATE LIMIT
# ALONE DELAYS A RUNAWAY, and review measured it: a benign one-cycle clamp
# followed by a continuous runaway held the runaway's first notification for up
# to 140 s - one REASSERT_S minus a cycle. On the live install, where ordinary
# railing spends the budget essentially all the time, a runaway arriving during
# normal operation would be delayed with near-certainty. That is the "benign
# noise suppresses the bug signal" shape this module's docstring is written
# against.
#
# THE DISCRIMINATOR IS RUN LENGTH, and the two populations genuinely differ: the
# live flood was runs of length ONE (engage, de-assert, engage), while a §10.3
# runaway engages on EVERY cycle. So a sustained run speaks regardless of budget,
# and scattered chatter does not.
#
# Measured, shipped-without vs shipped-with - it costs nothing it was protecting:
# live scatter flood (305 cycles, 1-in-6) 11 -> 11 notifications
# chatter 1-engaged/3-clean over 8000 s 50 -> 50 notifications
# pinned 900 s quarter (floor is 5) 6 -> 6 alarms
# runaway delay after a benign episode 140 s -> 10 s
SUSTAINED_CYCLES = 3
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ClampResult:
@@ -258,6 +338,10 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
self.last_alarm: datetime | None = None
self.reason = ""
self.clean_cycles = 0
# SAFETY-41. Consecutive engaged cycles, and whether THIS episode has
# spoken yet - the two the escalation clause needs.
self.run_len = 0
self.spoken = False
def note(self, engaged: bool, reason: str, now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Advance one cycle. True when the caller should raise the alarm.
@@ -269,26 +353,72 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
self.engagements += 1
self.clean_cycles = 0
self.reason = reason
self.run_len += 1
if not self.active:
self.active = True
self.since = now
self.episodes += 1
self.spoken = False
# ⚠️ SAFETY-41. THE RISING EDGE IS RATE-LIMITED TOO, and it did
# not used to be. It fired unconditionally, so a condition that
# engages and clears repeatedly raised one notification PER
# EPISODE no matter how fast the episodes came - and
# `REASSERT_S` never entered into it, because it only governs
# the still-engaged path below.
#
# That is the shape the live install actually produced: 48
# engagements in 25 minutes, scattered roughly one cycle in six.
# At a ~5 s cycle the gaps are ~25 s of clean cycles, which
# exceeds CLEAR_CYCLES x 5 s = 15 s, so the alarm DE-ASSERTED
# between almost every engagement and each one came back as a
# fresh rising edge. Measured on this class over that window:
# 48 episodes and 48 notifications at REASSERT_S = 30 - and
# still 48 at REASSERT_S = 150. Raising the re-assert removed
# NONE of them, because none of them came from the re-assert.
#
# So the interval now bounds the NOTIFICATION RATE rather than
# the repeat rate within one episode: `last_alarm` survives a
# de-assert, and a new episode speaks only if the interval has
# elapsed. ⚠️ NOTHING IS DROPPED. Every engagement is still
# counted, every episode still increments, the action-log row is
# still written on every engaged cycle, and a genuine runaway -
# which by definition keeps engaging - is picked up by the
# re-assert path within REASSERT_S. Delay, not loss.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
return False
# ⚠️ THE ESCALATION. An episode that has not yet spoken because the
# budget was spent by an EARLIER, unrelated episode speaks anyway
# once it has engaged SUSTAINED_CYCLES times in a row. A runaway
# engages every cycle and reaches it; the scattered one-cycle
# railing that produced the live flood never does.
if not self.spoken and self.run_len >= SUSTAINED_CYCLES:
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
# Still engaged: re-assert on the slow cadence, not every cycle.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
return False
self.run_len = 0
if not self.active:
return False
self.clean_cycles += 1
if self.clean_cycles >= CLEAR_CYCLES:
self.active = False
self.since = None
self.last_alarm = None
# ⚠️ `last_alarm` DELIBERATELY SURVIVES THE DE-ASSERT. Clearing it
# here is what made the next rising edge speak immediately however
# soon it arrived, which is the flood described at the rising edge
# above. The episode ends; the notification budget does not reset
# with it.
self.reason = ""
self.clean_cycles = 0
return False
+339 -5
View File
@@ -16,14 +16,199 @@ the short version is in the comments below. Do not "clean this up" - each rule
exists because its absence produced a specific, observed failure.
"""
import math
from dataclasses import dataclass
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-39. THE ONE RELATIONSHIP IN THIS FILE THAT IS NOT A NUMBER.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT WENT WRONG, because the shape of it is the reason this is a ratio and
# not a constant. `slew_w: 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a clamp of
# 1500 W (goodwe/NOTES.md, "Simulated 2 kW load step (gain 0.6, clamp 1500)"),
# and its stated justification was that it "puts most of the correction in the
# first cycle WHILE STILL CAPPING HOW FAR THE LOOP CAN JUMP AHEAD OF THE
# INVERTER". At 1500 W that sentence was true: 1000 W/cycle reaches the rail in
# two cycles and the rail itself bounds the excursion.
#
# The rail then moved to 5000 W on the live install and the constant did not.
# 1000 W per 2 s tick is 500 W/s, so the loop traverses its WHOLE OUTPUT RANGE
# in 10 s against a plant NOTES.md §5.10 measured at ~18 s up / ~23 s down for a
# 1.78 kW step. It commands its entire range before it can observe its answer to
# the first step. Measured on the owner's system 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46: a real
# 3.4 kW export, the setpoint ramping 380 -> 5000 in five ticks, the battery at
# -5154 W against a 5000 VA inverter, and the grid pushed from 3.4 kW of EXPORT
# to 2.8 kW of IMPORT - the loop manufactured the error it then chased.
#
# ⚠️ SO THE FIX IS NOT A NEW NUMBER. A number is what went stale. What is
# written here is the RELATIONSHIP the 2026-08-22 sentence was really asserting:
#
# THE LOOP MUST NOT TRAVERSE ITS FULL OUTPUT RANGE FASTER THAN THE PLANT
# TAKES TO SETTLE.
#
# slew_w <= max_w * LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S
#
# `max_w` here is the SITE rail (main.py builds `Tuning(max_w=site_max_w)`, the
# roster sum), so the bound moves with the roster and a second inverter cannot
# re-open this by arriving. validate.py rule 10 refuses a configuration that
# breaks it; `slew_w = 0` below means "follow the rail" and is the shipped
# default, exactly as `integrator_max_w = None` already means "follow max_w".
#
# ⚠️ BOTH NUMBERS ARE WRITTEN OUT RATHER THAN THEIR QUOTIENT, AND THAT IS NOT
# TIDINESS. The quotient is only meaningful in the regime the two were measured
# in, and one of them is NOT a property of this code:
#
# PLANT_SETTLE_S is the inverter and the pack. goodwe/NOTES.md §5.10,
# 2026-08-22, a 1.78 kW kettle step driven from HA with a
# plug that meters its own draw: ~18 s from the step to the
# deadband going up, ~23 s coming down. 18 is taken because
# it is the SHORTER of the two and therefore the LOOSER
# bound - this is a refusal boundary, and rules 5 and 6 in
# validate.py refuse the impossible case only, never "close
# to the rail".
#
# ⚠️ AND THAT CHOICE IS LOCAL TO THIS BOUND. §5.10 MEASURED THE STEP IN BOTH
# DIRECTIONS, so "the plant's settling time" is a PAIR and not a number, and
# which half is the safe one depends on which way being wrong hurts. Taking
# 18 for a REFUSAL is right: the looser number refuses less. Taking 18 for a
# question of the form "how long does the plant remain a candidate
# explanation" is WRONG, because the looser number stops believing the plant
# too early - and there the answer is a false accusation. SAFETY-13 asks that
# second question and so reads PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S below, deliberately not
# this constant. Anything else added here has to say which of the two it
# means and why.
#
# LOOP_TICK_S is the METER, not this loop. `run_control()` runs a cycle on
# a changed meter value or on `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes
# first, so the tick is the meter's own update rate. 2.0 s is
# what the live install measured on 2026-09-05 (the setpoint
# stepped +1000 W every 2 s), and it is the fastest meter this
# project has ever run.
#
# ⚠️ AND THIS ONE IS NOT WRONG IN THE SAFE DIRECTION, WHICH IS WHY IT IS SAID
# HERE. A SLOWER meter makes this bound conservative - it refuses some
# configurations that would have been fine, which is visible immediately and
# costs one edit. A meter FASTER than 2 s makes it loose by exactly that ratio,
# and nothing in this add-on would say so. The tick cannot go below 1 s
# (`run_control()`'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)` bounds the loop body), so the
# worst case is a factor of two - but if a faster meter is ever fitted, this
# constant has to be RE-DERIVED and not merely re-read. Compare
# validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, which carries the same kind of copy and can
# only ever be wrong the other way.
PLANT_SETTLE_S = 18.0
LOOP_TICK_S = 2.0
SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S # 0.111..., i.e. 9 ticks
# The other half of the same measurement: the descent of the same 1.78 kW step,
# ~23 s from a -1784 W export excursion back into the deadband (goodwe/NOTES.md
# §5.10, the same run, the same day, the same plug). It is slower than the ramp
# up, which is the ordinary asymmetry of a pack that is pushed one way and
# coasts the other. Nothing above this line reads it; SAFETY-13 below does.
PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S = 23.0
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-13. HOW LONG THE PLANT STAYS A CANDIDATE EXPLANATION.
#
# The output freeze below stops the command growing while the inverter is not
# following. Two completely different things produce that divergence and the
# freeze cannot tell them apart on magnitude alone:
#
# (a) THE PLANT HAS NOT CAUGHT UP YET, or it is at a limit - a cold pack, a
# curtailment, an export cap. Asking for more is pointless, and the
# freeze is right to hold. It also CLEARS ITSELF: the command is pinned
# at something the inverter can do, so the inverter catches up to it and
# `saturated_now` goes false.
#
# ⚠️ AND (a) INCLUDES THE CASE `unasked_power()` BELOW CANNOT SEE AS (a):
# the command has fallen THROUGH ZERO and the pack is still coasting in
# the old direction, so the reading has the sign the command used to have
# and not the one it has now. That is this loop's own power, arriving
# late. It is the reason the time bound is what does the work here and
# the predicate alone is not enough.
#
# (b) SOMETHING ELSE IS DRIVING THE ACTUATOR - the §1.5 non-goal, two writers
# on one actuator. The freeze CANNOT clear itself here, because clearing
# it needs the inverter to track OUR command and the other writer is what
# stops it. Nothing ends this but the other writer going away.
#
# ⚠️ SO THE BOUND IS ONLY EVER A REASON TO STOP BELIEVING (a). It does not
# establish (b) and nothing below claims it does: what it says is that the
# plant has run out of alibi, and (b) is then the only explanation this loop
# has left - not the only one there is. Everything downstream of the release is
# written to be safe when that inference is wrong, because sometimes it is.
#
# Case (a) is bounded by the plant, and the plant was measured:
#
# SETTLE_CYCLES = ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S)
#
# ⚠️ THE **DOWN** NUMBER, AND THE DIRECTION IS THE WHOLE POINT. §5.10 measured
# the same step both ways - 18 s up, 23 s down - and SAFETY-39 takes 18 because
# 18 is the LOOSER bound for a REFUSAL. This is the opposite job. Here the
# question is "how long may the plant still be the explanation", and the
# conservative answer is the LONGER of the two: believe the plant for as long
# as the plant has ever been observed to take. Deriving this from 18 gives 9,
# which is three cycles SHORT of the plant's own measured down-ramp - and being
# short here does not refuse anything, it ACCUSES. Measured, single inverter,
# no second writer anywhere, 1280 closed-loop scenarios: at 9 the exit fires in
# 113 of them and at 12 in 24. The direction of that error is why the pair is
# now two named constants instead of one.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NO LONGER THE RECIPROCAL OF SLEW_RAIL_FRAC. It was, at 9, and
# that coincidence read as a derivation - two different questions that happened
# to share an answer while both were being asked of the same half of a two-
# sided measurement. They are 9 and 12 now. If they ever coincide again it is
# arithmetic, not agreement.
#
# ⚠️ IT INHERITS SAFETY-39's CAVEAT ABOUT LOOP_TICK_S, in the opposite
# direction, which is why it is repeated rather than cross-referenced. A meter
# SLOWER than 2 s makes these 12 cycles cover MORE than 23 s, so the freeze
# holds longer than the plant needs: that costs energy - see the case in
# DOCS.md - and never safety. A meter FASTER than 2 s makes them cover LESS,
# so the freeze can release while the plant is genuinely still moving. That one
# is bounded twice over and by neither this constant nor luck: the INTEGRATOR
# freeze is not released with the output freeze, so the command can only reach
# the integrator's frozen value, and the output clamp bounds that in turn.
#
# ⚠️ AND A PLANT SLOWER THAN THE ONE THAT WAS MEASURED DOES THE SAME THING,
# which no constant derived from a measurement can fix. In the same 1280
# scenarios, holding the bound at 12 and lengthening only the plant's down-ramp
# past the measured 23 s, the exit starts firing again on a single inverter:
# 8/320 at 23 s, 59/320 at 34 s, 268/320 at 50 s. A re-measured plant means a
# re-derived constant here, exactly as for the two above it.
SETTLE_CYCLES = math.ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) # 12
# The saturation counter's ceiling, one above the longest bound read from it. A
# counter capped BELOW that bound would silently make the bound unreachable -
# i.e. delete the exit condition - so it is written against SETTLE_CYCLES and
# not as a literal, and it moves when SETTLE_CYCLES moves.
#
# ⚠️ IT WAS 10, WHICH IS ALSO config.yaml's MAXIMUM FOR `saturation_cycles`,
# AND THAT COLLISION IS GONE. At a bound of 9 the largest accepted
# `saturation_cycles` (10) sat ABOVE the exit, so a legal configuration could
# push the freeze's engagement past its own release and the no-start block
# stopped existing. At 12 every accepted value 1..10 is strictly below the
# bound, so the freeze always engages before its exit is due and no accepted
# configuration can delete the block. `test_control.py` pins that at the schema
# edge rather than in prose, because it is a property of two files agreeing.
_SAT_COUNT_CAP = SETTLE_CYCLES + 1 # 13
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Tuning:
gain: float = 0.6
max_w: float = 2000.0
slew_w: float = 1000.0
# SAFETY-39. How far the command may move in one cycle. ⚠️ 0 MEANS "FOLLOW
# THE RAIL" - `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w` - and it is the default and the
# recommended setting, for the reason written at the top of this file: a
# fixed number here is a constant that outlives the rail it was derived
# against, and that is the defect measured on the live system on
# 2026-09-05. Read `slew_limit_w()`, never this field.
#
# It stays settable, because slower than the rail implies is a legitimate
# and sometimes necessary choice - the live install has run an explicit
# 400 W since 2026-09-05 12:00 - and because `slew_w` is an option an
# operator already has. FASTER than the rail implies is what validate.py
# rule 10 refuses.
slew_w: float = 0.0
deadband_w: float = 15.0
step_w: int = 10
saturation_w: float = 500.0
@@ -83,6 +268,93 @@ class Decision:
clamped: bool = False
def slew_limit_w(tuning: Tuning) -> float:
"""How far the command may move this cycle, in W. Always positive.
⚠️ THE ONE READER OF `Tuning.slew_w`, and everything else must come through
here. `slew_w = 0` means "follow the rail" and resolves to
`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, which is the whole of SAFETY-39: the limit is a
RATIO to the rail, so raising `max_w` moves it and cannot leave it behind.
A caller that read the field directly would see 0 and apply no limit at all
- the exact opposite of the setting's meaning - which is why this exists as
a function rather than as a comment telling people to remember.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT CLAMPED TO THE BOUND. An explicit `slew_w` above the rail
fraction is refused at STARTUP by validate.py rule 10, not silently reduced
here. Silently reducing it is the failure this whole module's docstring is
about - an operator's stated number quietly meaning something else - and
validate.py's own docstring calls it case (a).
"""
if tuning.slew_w:
return abs(float(tuning.slew_w))
return SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * abs(float(tuning.max_w))
def unasked_power(prev_w: float, actual_w: float, saturation_w: float) -> bool:
"""True when `actual_w` cannot be explained by THIS cycle's command not being met.
SAFETY-13. The one question the saturation magnitude test cannot answer:
is the inverter FAILING TO REACH what we asked, or is it doing something
the command in front of it does not account for?
⚠️ THE ANSWER IS PHYSICAL, NOT STATISTICAL, WHICH IS WHY IT IS A PREDICATE
AND NOT A THRESHOLD. A limit can only make the inverter do LESS than the
command, in the command's own direction. It cannot make it overshoot the
command, and it cannot make it produce power of the OPPOSITE sign. So the
whole set of readings a limit can produce is the closed interval spanned by
0 and `prev_w`, widened by `saturation_w` for measurement noise, ramp lag
and the inverter's own idle draw.
⚠️ WHAT IT DOES NOT SAY - AND AN EARLIER VERSION OF THIS DOCSTRING DID -
IS THAT ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE INTERVAL WAS PUT THERE BY SOMETHING OTHER THAN
THIS LOOP. THAT IS FALSE AND IT WAS MEASURED FALSE. This predicate has no
memory: `prev_w` is one cycle's command, while the plant carries every
command before it. Drive ONE inverter, with nothing else on the bus, from a
discharge down through zero, and the pack is still coasting in the old
direction after the command has crossed. Measured in the container, one
`compute()` against one plant: eight cycles after a +1990 W command the
command is 0 and the pack still reads +522.3 W, so
`unasked_power(0, 522.3, 500)` is True - and every watt of that 522.3 was
asked for by this loop. In 1280 single-inverter closed-loop scenarios with
no second writer in them at all, the exit built on this predicate fires in
24 of them.
So what it guarantees is exactly the sentence at the top: this cycle's
command does not account for this cycle's reading. What it CANNOT do is
tell "somebody else is writing" from "we are". That gap is the reason
SETTLE_CYCLES is derived from the plant's slower direction, why the caller
checks both, and why the reason string it produces is a place to start
looking rather than a finding.
Worked, at `saturation_w = 500`:
prev +2000, actual +700 -> inside [0, 2000] a limit. False.
prev -5000, actual -700 -> inside [-5000, 0] a limit. False.
prev 0, actual +700 -> outside [-500, 500] unasked. True.
prev -800, actual +700 -> outside [-1300, 500] unasked. True.
⚠️ AT `prev_w == 0` THIS IS EXACTLY `saturated_now`, and that is not a
coincidence to be tidied away - it is the reason the freeze's zero case is
the one the card was written about. With nothing commanded there is no
interval left for a LIMIT to live in, so at zero this test cannot be
answered by "the inverter is not reaching what we asked" at all. It can
still be answered by "the inverter has not finished leaving what we asked
for LAST time", which is the coast-down above and is why zero needs the
time bound as much as any other `prev_w` does.
⚠️ IT IS NOT A DETECTOR AND MUST NOT BE ALARMED ON. A saturated inverter
whose reading is stale, wrong-signed or simply noisy lands outside the
interval too, and so does our own ramp, above. All this predicate decides
is whether the output freeze gets an EXIT; being wrong about it costs at
most a bounded command that the frozen integrator and the output clamp both
still bound. SAFETY-30's `unit_sign_disagree_w` is the thing that alarms on
sign, and it is deliberately a different test with a different threshold.
"""
lo = min(0.0, float(prev_w)) - abs(float(saturation_w))
hi = max(0.0, float(prev_w)) + abs(float(saturation_w))
return not (lo <= float(actual_w) <= hi)
def compute(
prev_w: float,
grid_w: float,
@@ -130,7 +402,7 @@ def compute(
# clockless; the remaining ceiling is that saturation_cycles expresses a
# bound in seconds rather than an exact number of them.
saturated_now = abs(prev_w - actual_w) > tuning.saturation_w
sat_count = min(sat_count + 1, 10) if saturated_now else 0
sat_count = min(sat_count + 1, _SAT_COUNT_CAP) if saturated_now else 0
frozen = sat_count >= tuning.saturation_cycles
# --- deadband ----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -231,7 +503,8 @@ def compute(
if clamped:
reason = "clamped"
slewed = max(prev_w - tuning.slew_w, min(prev_w + tuning.slew_w, target))
slew = slew_limit_w(tuning)
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
target = slewed
@@ -243,8 +516,69 @@ def compute(
# implementation: commanding 0 while the inverter reports >500 W means
# something else is driving the bus, and that is not the moment to
# start pushing power the other way.
target = min(target, prev_w) if prev_w > 0 else max(target, prev_w)
reason = "saturated-freeze"
#
# --- SAFETY-13: ...AND IT IS NOT THE MOMENT FOREVER EITHER ----------
# Everything above stands. What was missing is an END. Held at
# `prev_w == 0` this is a refusal to START, and nothing in this
# function or above it clears it - not the error growing, not the
# integrator moving, not time. Measured on release/1.0 @ c8dcb38, at
# the live install's shape (max_w 5000, slew_w 400, target_grid_w -10):
# a site resting in the deadband with another writer holding the pack
# at +700 W reaches sat_count 3 with the command at 0, and 0 W is then
# a FIXED POINT - a 2 kW export arriving afterwards leaves the command
# at exactly 0.0 W on every subsequent cycle, with the integrator
# standing at -1194 W the whole time.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE ZERO CASE IS NOT SPECIAL, WHICH IS WHY THE FIX IS NOT
# SPECIAL EITHER. The same run pinned at prev_w == -800 W, against its
# own integrator standing at -2388 W, for as long as it ran.
# `prev_w == 0` is only the instance where the pinned magnitude happens
# to be zero - i.e. where the standing cost is the whole of what the
# battery could have done.
# A rule written for the zero case alone would have left the other
# instances exactly as unbounded as it found them.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT DECIDES IS NOT HOW LONG, IT IS WHETHER THE FREEZE CAN EVER
# END ON ITS OWN. See SETTLE_CYCLES and `unasked_power()` at the top:
# a divergence a LIMIT could produce clears itself once the inverter
# catches up to the pinned command, so it needs no exit and gets none -
# unbounded, exactly as shipped. A divergence a limit CANNOT produce
# does not clear itself by being waited on, so it gets one.
#
# ⚠️ AND THAT IS NOT THE SAME SENTENCE AS "THE OTHER WRITER". An
# earlier version of this comment said the two conditions below fire
# only in case (b); they do not, and the sweep says so. Our own plant
# coasting through a command that has just crossed zero satisfies
# `unasked_power()` too, because that predicate compares against ONE
# cycle's command and the pack remembers more than one - measured, a
# single inverter with nothing else on the bus reaching this branch in
# 24 of 1280 closed-loop scenarios. `SETTLE_CYCLES` is what keeps that
# rare rather than routine (113 of the same 1280 at the old bound of
# 9), and it does it by believing the plant for as long as the plant
# has ever been measured to take. It is a bound on how long we wait,
# not a proof about what we found.
#
# ⚠️ SO THE RELEASE IS WRITTEN TO BE SURVIVABLE WHEN IT IS WRONG, and
# that is the paragraph below, not this one: what a false release costs
# is one slew step per cycle toward a frozen integrator. If it ever has
# to cost less than that, the thing to change is what happens after the
# release, not the confidence of the sentence before it.
#
# ⚠️ RELEASING IS NOT UNFREEZING. The INTEGRATOR freeze above is not
# lifted, and that is what makes this bounded rather than merely
# different: the command is free to move, but only as far as an
# integrator that stopped accumulating cycles ago, through the same
# slew limit as any other cycle. It buys back the standing error, not
# the rail.
#
# `reason` is authoritative here in a way it is not elsewhere in this
# function: nothing after this line writes it.
if unasked_power(prev_w, actual_w, tuning.saturation_w) \
and sat_count >= SETTLE_CYCLES:
reason = "freeze-released"
else:
target = min(target, prev_w) if prev_w > 0 else max(target, prev_w)
reason = "saturated-freeze"
# --- quantise ----------------------------------------------------------
# 10 W. The register is 1 W and the inverter reports at 1 W, but its
+385
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
"""SAFETY-37 - a reading that holds its last value and reads healthy.
THE DEFECT, in one sentence: `hass.number()` returns a held value as a value,
and nothing anywhere in this add-on distinguishes "the inverter reports 40 %"
from "the entity still says 40 % because nothing has updated it since Tuesday".
The architect pass of 2026-09-06 put three cards on one mechanism. This module
is that mechanism; the other two are its consumers.
LAYER 1 `goodwe/master/goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml:690` - the
(TEL-06) ingest-age veto tests the VALUE of `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`.
A dead publisher leaves the entity frozen at a healthy number and
the veto can never fire. NOT FIXED HERE - it is firmware, it is on
the other side of a flash, and nothing in this module can reach
it. What it owes is written at the bottom of this docstring.
THIS ADD-ON `app/hass.py:69-82`, consumed by SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check
(SAFETY-37) and SAFETY-31's circulating-power sensor. Both read `Inverter.batt`
(register 0x0518) and NEITHER had a freshness gate of any kind.
THE EVIDENCE HW-01, 2026-09-02: SoC held 40 % for 6 h 25 m while the pack
drained to its floor. Every detector read healthy throughout.
⚠️ AT N>=2 EVERY ONE OF THOSE READINGS DOUBLES, which is why this card is the
one that had to build it: the per-unit sign check and the circulation sensor
only exist at N>=2, and both are fed straight from `Inverter.batt`.
WHAT CANNOT BE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH, AND IT IS NOT A DETAIL
==========================================================
Home Assistant's `last_updated` DOES NOT MOVE when a value is rewritten
unchanged. Neither does `last_changed`, and this project measured that
`last_reported` does not advance on a repeat on either serialiser either - see
`p1.HomeWizardLocalSource`'s docstring, which records the ENV-01 rig measurement
over 70 s of a frozen meter and an independent one against the live house.
So a value-side timestamp out of Home Assistant is a "time since the number
changed" sensor wearing an arrival sensor's name. Thresholding it is how a
detector ends up unable to fire, which is TEL-06's defect exactly. That trap
produced two false diagnoses on 2026-09-05, both by a reader who already knew
about it, which is why it is written here in full rather than referenced.
⚠️ AND THE CONVERSE TRAP IS THE ONE THIS MODULE HAD TO SOLVE. The add-on polls
Home Assistant's state cache roughly once a second (`run_control()`'s
`await asyncio.sleep(1)` bounds the loop body and `read_inputs()` runs every
pass). While the entity exists, HA answers 200 with a number whether or not the
publisher behind it is alive. So AN ARRIVAL AT THE ADD-ON IS NOT AN ARRIVAL FROM
THE INVERTER, and an arrival age alone cannot see HW-01 at all.
What IS arrival-stamped here, and what makes this module honest, is the clock
the verdict is measured on: `changed_mono` is the MONOTONIC INSTANT OF THE
ARRIVAL THAT LAST CARRIED A DIFFERENT NUMBER. Every term below is a fact about
arrivals this process observed, on its own clock. Nothing is read out of a Home
Assistant timestamp, and nothing would change if Home Assistant stopped
publishing timestamps altogether.
THE VERDICT, AND WHY IT IS A CONJUNCTION
========================================
A bare "unchanged for N seconds" threshold is not available, and that is
MEASURED rather than feared. Over the committed 30-day capture of this house's
own 1 W-resolution power entity - `scenarios/p1-net-30d-2026-08/`, 485,841
samples straight out of Home Assistant's recorder, where a row exists only when
the state string CHANGED, so the gap between two rows IS the unchanged duration
every consumer saw:
longest unchanged run, 30 days 263.2 s (held -899.0 W, 2026-08-11 17:04)
runs >= 35 s 10 of 485,840 (0.0021 %)
runs >= 17 s 386 of 485,840 (0.0794 %)
Measured on 2026-09-06 by replaying that capture. A real power figure at 1 W
resolution held ONE value for four and a half minutes with nothing whatever
wrong. ⚠️ That is the METER's register, not 0x0518, and it is named as a
surrogate rather than passed off as the thing: no 30-day capture of 0x0518
exists, because that register is not in the recorder export. What it does
establish - and this is all it is used for - is that the LEGITIMATE unchanged
duration of a power entity in this house is minutes, so an unchanged threshold
alone must be minutes, and minutes is three times too slow to protect consumers
that trip at 75 s and 85 s. The conjunction is not a refinement; without it
there is no admissible threshold at all.
⚠️ AND EVERY ONE OF THOSE LONG RUNS HAPPENED UNDER AN UNMOVING LOAD. That is
the way out, and it is the same shape `freeze.looks_frozen()` already uses for
the meter (unchanged AND the command pinned at the rail). A reading is stale
when it has not moved THROUGH A CHANGE IT WAS OBLIGED TO FOLLOW:
STALE <=> unchanged for >= UNCHANGED_S
AND |standing command now| >= MOVE_W
AND |standing command now - standing command when the reading
last changed| >= MOVE_W
0x0518 is the inverter reporting ITSELF and it tracks its own command: r = 0.998
with battery power against r = 0.09 with the real meter (goodwe/NOTES.md §3.3),
command and actual agreeing within 4 W once settled (§5.10, 2026-08-22), and the
register dithering +/-1 W while holding (§5.11, same day). A unit told to move
250 W and still answering the same integer watt cannot be tracking.
THE BOUNDS - ONE PER SIGNAL, EACH WITH ITS DERIVATION
=====================================================
⚠️ ONE CONSTANT FOR BOTH SIGNALS WOULD BE USELESS ON SoC OR TRIGGER-HAPPY ON
POWER, which is the third clause of the policy. They are separated here, and
only one of them is WIRED - see `BOUNDS` below and the note on SoC.
`batt` / 0x0518, S16, 1 W, published every 10 s
----------------------------------------------
LOWER BOUND, 17.0 s, the fastest a healthy register can be OBLIGED to have
answered. Three terms, each read out of this repository on 2026-09-06:
6.0 s the plant. goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22 with the poll
temporarily at 1 s and a 0 -> +500 W step: 26 W at +1.43 s, 469 W
(94 %) at +3.34 s, settled 507 W at +6.05 s.
10.0 s the publisher. `firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181`,
`update_interval: 10s` on the `modbus_controller` that carries both
0x0518 and 0x050E. A command that moves right after a poll is not
visible until the next one.
1.0 s this add-on's own read period - `run_control()`'s
`await asyncio.sleep(1)`, which bounds the loop body that calls
`read_inputs()`.
UPPER BOUND, 75.0 s, the tighter of the two consumers this card must protect,
both read from `config.yaml` on 2026-09-06:
75 s `circulation_hold_s` (config.yaml:512) - SAFETY-31 trips here.
85 s `unit_sign_disagree_s` (config.yaml:451) - SAFETY-30's per-unit sign
check trips here.
A gate slower than either is a gate that hands its consumer the frozen number
and then explains afterwards. ⚠️ AND THAT INEQUALITY IS GRADED, NOT ASSERTED -
`test_freshness.py` part 6 reads BOTH ends out of the shipped `config.yaml`
and goes red if an operator's default moves under this bound.
35.0 s IS THE CHOSEN VALUE, and the admissible band is narrow enough that it
is nearly forced: at least 2x the 17.0 s floor (34.0) and at most half the
75.0 s consumer window (37.5) leaves [34.0, 37.5]. 35 is the integer in it.
⚠️ DELIBERATELY NOT 30 AND NOT 60. 30 is `validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S` and
would read as a borrowed constant nobody re-derived; 60 is round, and a round
number here would be a guess wearing a measurement's clothes.
WHAT IT COSTS, stated rather than absorbed: a frozen 0x0518 on a unit that is
never asked to move 250 W is not detected by this module at all.
⚠️ THAT COST IS BOUNDED FOR ONE CONSUMER AND NOT FOR THE OTHER, and an earlier
version of this note claimed both. TRUE for the per-unit sign check: no such
check can speak about that unit either, since `unit_sign_disagree_w` is 250 W.
FALSE for circulation. "Contributing at most 250 W" bounds the COMMAND - but a
frozen register's REPORTED value is unrelated to its command, and that is
precisely HW-01's shape: commanded ~0 W, register stuck on the last large
number. Measured in review: a unit frozen at -1200 W beside a healthy +900 W
sibling gives `circulating_w` = 1800 W against a 700 W floor, 2.6x over, with
no gate armed. So this gate is scoped to where the SIGN consumer can be misled;
the circulation consumer keeps an unbounded exposure below MOVE_W and that is
a known, stated gap rather than a covered one.
`soc` / 0x050E, U16, 1 %, published every 10 s - STATED, NOT WIRED
-----------------------------------------------------------------
⚠️ THIS ROW IS THE POLICY'S ANSWER FOR TEL-08 AND IT IS NOT CONNECTED TO
ANYTHING. It is here because the third clause of the policy is "state each
bound and its derivation", and because a reader who finds only `batt` wired
would reasonably conclude SoC was forgotten. It was not; it needs a
corroborator this card cannot derive.
SoC CANNOT USE THE CONJUNCTION ABOVE. A pack resting at its floor holds one
percent for hours with nothing wrong - the card's own example - and the
standing command says nothing about it, because a command of 0 W is exactly
what a rested pack is given. The physically obliged movement for SoC is
ENERGY, not command travel: one percent of pack A is about 153.6 Wh (15.36 kWh
nominal, goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b's table - ⚠️ NOMINAL and FROM DATASHEET, not a
measured usable capacity), so at pack A's 5000 W ceiling one percent takes at
least 110 s and at a realistic 1000 W about 553 s. The bound TEL-08 needs is
therefore "SoC unchanged while the integral of |battery power| since its last
change exceeded K x 153.6 Wh", and K cannot be chosen from anything written
down today: nobody has measured this pack's usable capacity, its BMS reporting
granularity, or how far its reported percent lags true state of charge.
So TEL-08 owes: that capacity measurement (or a defensible bound on it), the
integrator, and K. It does NOT owe a second freshness mechanism - `Freshness`
below takes its obligation term from the caller precisely so that an energy
integral can be handed in where command travel is handed in here.
"""
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
# --- the three terms of the lower bound, each read out of this repository ----
# See the module docstring for where each one is measured. They are separate
# names rather than a literal 17.0 so that a reader who changes the firmware's
# `update_interval` can find this file by grepping for the number they moved.
PLANT_SETTLE_S = 6.0 # goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22
PUBLISH_PERIOD_S = 10.0 # firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181
READ_PERIOD_S = 1.0 # main.run_control()'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)`
BATT_OBLIGED_S = PLANT_SETTLE_S + PUBLISH_PERIOD_S + READ_PERIOD_S # 17.0
# The unchanged bound for register 0x0518. See the derivation above; the band is
# [2 * BATT_OBLIGED_S, 0.5 * circulation_hold_s] = [34.0, 37.5].
BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35.0
# How far the standing command must have travelled for the register to be
# OBLIGED to have followed it.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS THE LARGEST ADMISSIBLE VALUE, NOT A SENSITIVITY PREFERENCE, and that
# is what makes it a derivation. The gate has to arm everywhere a stale reading
# could mislead a consumer; the earliest either consumer speaks is
# `unit_sign_disagree_w`, 250 W (config.yaml:450), because below that
# `watchdog.disagrees()` is False whatever the measurement says. Taking the
# ceiling of the admissible range is what minimises spurious arming. A smaller
# number would arm the gate in states where nothing downstream can be misled,
# and every such arming is a spurious site stop bought for nothing.
#
# ⚠️ NOT A CONFIG KEY. CFG-03 tracks the places a default has to be kept in
# step and this does not earn another one - it is derived from a default
# `config.yaml` already carries, and `test_freshness.py` part 6 READS that file
# and goes red if the two drift.
MOVE_W = 250.0
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Bound:
"""One signal's freshness bound, and whether anything consumes it."""
signal: str
unchanged_s: float
move_w: float
wired: bool
derivation: str
# ⚠️ THE POLICY AS DATA, AND THE `wired` COLUMN IS LOAD-BEARING. A reader must be
# able to tell, without reading main.py, which of these bounds is actually
# gating a consumer today. `test_freshness.py` part 7 greps the shipped app/ for
# each row and refuses a row that claims to be wired and is not - and a row that
# claims not to be and is.
BOUNDS = {
"batt": Bound(
signal="batt (0x0518, AC power, S16, 1 W, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=BATT_UNCHANGED_S,
move_w=MOVE_W,
wired=True,
derivation="settle 6.0 + publish 10.0 + read 1.0 = 17.0 s floor; "
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]"),
"soc": Bound(
signal="soc (0x050E, pack SoC, U16, 1 %, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=float("inf"),
move_w=float("inf"),
wired=False,
derivation="TEL-08. Command travel is the WRONG obligation term for "
"SoC - a rested pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W "
"command. The term is energy: >= K x 153.6 Wh through the "
"pack since the reading last changed. K needs a measured "
"usable capacity nobody has taken."),
}
class Freshness:
"""One signal's arrival record, and the stale verdict it supports.
⚠️ ARRIVAL-DRIVEN THROUGHOUT. Every clock reading this object ever makes is
handed to `submit()` by the caller at the moment a value arrived; nothing
here reads a clock of its own and nothing here reads a Home Assistant
timestamp. That is what makes the verdict replayable - `test_freshness.py`
drives real seconds through it without sleeping - and it is the difference
between this and the value-stamped veto TEL-06 is blocked on.
⚠️ THE VERDICT LATCHES, AND WITHOUT THAT IT OSCILLATES AT ABOUT 1 Hz.
Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False, which
commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1), which drops the standing command below
`MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction, which would return the held number
to the consumers - and round again every read. So the ONLY thing that clears
the latch is an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number, which is exactly the
evidence the verdict was about. A register that is working clears it on its
next 10 s publish; a register that is not, does not.
"""
def __init__(self, bound: Bound):
self.bound = bound
# The last number that ARRIVED, or None if the most recent read did not
# produce one. This is what `reading()` hands back when the gate is open,
# so a read failure is still an immediate None exactly as it is today.
self.last = None
# The number the reading is currently HOLDING, and the monotonic instant
# of the arrival that last carried a different one. `held` survives a
# failed read; the unchanged clock is about the value, not about our
# ability to fetch it.
self.held = None
self.changed_mono = None
# The standing command at that same instant. The conjunction compares
# against THIS, not against the previous cycle's command: what matters
# is whether the register has followed anything since it last moved.
self.standing_at_change = None
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.arrivals = 0
def submit(self, value, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""One READ of this signal. `value` None means nothing arrived.
`value` the number `hass.number()` produced, or None.
`standing_w` what this controller currently has standing on this unit's
wire, signed, + = discharge. None when nothing is known.
`now_mono` the caller's monotonic clock, in seconds.
⚠️ A FAILED READ IS NOT AN ARRIVAL AND IS NOT AN AGE EITHER. It clears
`last` immediately - which is byte-for-byte what shipping code does
today, a missing reading being a missing reading - and it leaves the
unchanged clock running, because the value has not changed and our
inability to fetch it is not evidence that it has.
"""
if value is None:
self.last = None
return
value = float(value)
self.arrivals += 1
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
self.held = value
self.changed_mono = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_change = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
# Movement is the ONLY thing that clears the latch. See the class
# docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation this prevents.
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.last = value
self._grade(standing_w, now_mono)
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""The conjunction. Sets the latch; never clears it."""
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
return
held_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
if held_s < self.bound.unchanged_s:
return
# ⚠️ BOTH None GUARDS ARE FOR A CALLER THAT DOES NOT KNOW ITS OWN
# OBLIGATION YET, WHICH IS NOT `_read_unit`. `Inverter.standing_w()`
# always answers a float, so neither branch is reachable from the wired
# consumer today. They are here for TEL-08, whose obligation term is an
# energy integral that has nothing to say until it has a window - and
# "nothing to say" must withhold the verdict, not manufacture one.
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_change is None:
return
standing_w = float(standing_w)
if abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w:
return
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_change)
if moved_w < self.bound.move_w:
return
self.stale = True
self.reason = (
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {held_s:.0f} s "
f"while the standing command moved {moved_w:.0f} W to "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W - the reading is not following, so it is "
f"reported as MISSING rather than as a measurement (limits: "
f"unchanged over {self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s, command over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W and moved by over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W)")
def unchanged_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page."""
if self.changed_mono is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.changed_mono)
def reading(self):
"""What the consumers get: the value, or None when it cannot be trusted.
⚠️ `None`, NEVER A HELD NUMBER, and never a zero. Both consumers already
do the right thing with None and neither could ever receive one:
`watchdog.SignWatchdog.evaluate` CLEARS its window on a None measurement
rather than accumulating it, and `circulation.circulating_w` returns None
for a roster with a missing term, which clears the circulation window
too. This module is the thing that was missing between them.
"""
return None if self.stale else self.last
def note(self, unit_name: str) -> str:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
return f"{unit_name}: {self.reason}" if self.stale else ""
def monotonic() -> float:
"""The clock this module's callers use, in one place so tests can find it.
⚠️ `time.monotonic()`, not the wall clock, for `p1.P1Sample.age_s`'s reason:
an NTP step on a Raspberry Pi that has just found the network is routinely
minutes, and a freshness verdict computed across one would either fake a
stale reading or, worse, hide a real one.
"""
return time.monotonic()
+167 -13
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ The scalars, and what each one was silently asserting:
SAFETY-24's pack floor and arbitrage's bounds. An
average lets the emptier pack be driven below its own
floor; a maximum parks the fuller one.
`bms_soc_floor` SAFETY-32. ONE cut-out percent for every pack, and it
describes A BATTERY. Two packs of different models
have different cut-outs, so the flat key graded the
shallower pack against the deeper one's BMS - wrong
in the direction that empties a pack.
`batt` ONE battery power into the anti-windup saturation
detector - see the SITE/UNIT note at the bottom of
this docstring, because this one goes the OTHER WAY.
@@ -117,6 +122,15 @@ import math
from datetime import datetime
from .clamp import ClampResult
# SAFETY-37. The freshness policy, and the ONE place its bounds are written.
# freshness.py imports nothing from this package, so the direction is one-way.
from .freshness import BOUNDS, Freshness
# CFG-03's ONE in-code mirror of config.yaml's SAFETY-24 defaults. Imported
# rather than retyped: the flat-keys path below needs `bms_soc_floor`'s
# shipped default and a literal here would be the fourth defaults site that
# ticket exists to prevent. peakguard imports arbiter/control/tariff and none
# of those imports this module, so the direction is one-way.
from .peakguard import PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS
from .store import unit_key
from .watchdog import SignWatchdog, SignWatchdogConfig
@@ -170,7 +184,7 @@ class Inverter:
def __init__(self, name, *, setpoint_entity="", soc_entity="",
batt_entity="", batt_invert=False, max_w=2000.0,
store=None, sign_cfg=None):
bms_soc_floor=None, store=None, sign_cfg=None):
self.name = str(name)
self.setpoint_entity = str(setpoint_entity or "")
self.soc_entity = str(soc_entity or "")
@@ -179,6 +193,19 @@ class Inverter:
# The supervised cap on what may be written to THIS setpoint entity.
# See the module docstring on why this is a number and not a `Tuning`.
self.max_w = float(max_w)
# SAFETY-32. THIS PACK'S OWN BMS CUT-OUT, in percent, or None when the
# roster entry did not state one.
#
# ⚠️ NOT DEFAULTED HERE, AND None RATHER THAN A NUMBER. A cut-out is a
# property of the battery in the cupboard; inventing one for a pack that
# did not state it is precisely this card's defect - a pack graded
# against a floor that belongs to a different battery - rebuilt in the
# constructor. `peakguard.pack_floor_pct()` treats None as an unknown
# floor and `discharge_permitted()` treats an unknown floor as NO
# permission, so the absence costs a shave; validate.py rule 8 refuses
# the config by name long before that, at startup.
self.bms_soc_floor = (None if bms_soc_floor is None
else float(bms_soc_floor))
# --- the device's own reported range, read from its own entity -------
# None until `hass.limits()` has answered. NOT guessed at: ESPHome is
@@ -189,7 +216,22 @@ class Inverter:
# --- this unit's own measurements ------------------------------------
self.soc = None
# ⚠️ SAFETY-37: `batt` IS NOW THE GATED READING, NOT THE RAW ONE. It is
# None whenever `batt_fresh` says the register is not following its own
# command - see freshness.py - and a None here is a MISSING input, which
# §11.1 rule 1 answers with 0 W. The raw number that arrived is on
# `batt_fresh.last`; read that only for diagnostics, never for control.
self.batt = None
# SAFETY-37. One arrival record per SIGNAL per UNIT. Per unit for
# DEV-02's reason - a freshness verdict about B is not evidence about A,
# and at N>=2 a shared record would be the flat-scalar defect rebuilt
# inside the gate that exists to protect the per-unit checks.
#
# ⚠️ ONLY `batt` IS WIRED. `BOUNDS["soc"]` exists and is deliberately not
# constructed here: SoC's obligation term is energy through the pack, not
# command travel, and the constant it needs has not been measured. That
# is TEL-08's, and freshness.py's docstring says exactly what it owes.
self.batt_fresh = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
# --- what this unit was last told, and what it last accepted ---------
# `target` is THIS unit's share of the site target from the last
@@ -242,6 +284,24 @@ class Inverter:
self.store.set(self.key(name), value)
# -- the numbers other modules ask this object for -----------------------
def standing_w(self) -> float:
"""What this controller has standing on THIS unit's wire right now.
⚠️ ONE DEFINITION, TWO CALLERS, and it was a transcription before
SAFETY-37. `cycle()` computes this for the sign watchdog and
`_read_unit()` needs the identical number for the freshness conjunction;
two spellings of "what is standing" would be two answers to the question
the gate and the check it protects are both asking, and the copy that
drifts is always the one further from the wire.
`last_write` is the value after the device clamp and confirmed accepted;
`target` covers the case where nothing has been written yet and,
deliberately, the case where the last write was REJECTED - the inverter
is then still latched on `last_write`, which is what `last_write` holds.
"""
return float(self.last_write if self.last_write is not None
else self.target)
def rating_w(self) -> float:
"""The largest magnitude this unit can be commanded, in W.
@@ -295,6 +355,18 @@ class Inverter:
f"(limit {float(stale_s):.0f} s)")
return True, ""
def stale_note(self) -> str:
"""SAFETY-37's one line for the status page. Empty when nothing to say.
Separate from `link_note()` because they are about different halves of
the device and want opposite remedies: liveness is about the WRITE path
and its answer is to drop this unit and let the survivors carry it,
while a stale MEASUREMENT is about the read path and its answer is to
stop the site (`inputs_ok`). Folding one into the other is how a
measurement fault ends up handing a sibling extra power.
"""
return self.batt_fresh.note(self.name)
def link_note(self, now: datetime) -> str:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
if not self.has_writer():
@@ -333,14 +405,46 @@ def roster_entries(opts: dict) -> list:
return list(entries)
def roster_names(opts: dict) -> list:
"""The unit names, in roster order. THE one answer, for two callers.
⚠️ IT EXISTS BECAUSE MQTT DISCOVERY CANNOT WAIT FOR A ROSTER. TEL-07 gives
every unit past the first its own MQTT device, and `MqttPublisher` is
constructed in `main()` BEFORE `Controller.__init__` builds the roster -
announcing happens on the broker's CONNACK, which can land first. Building a
second roster there would construct a second set of `Inverter`s off the same
Store; transcribing the naming rule there would be a third spelling of it.
So the naming rule lives here, `build_roster()` reads it, and the two cannot
drift.
⚠️ THE FALLBACK NAME IS POSITIONAL, NOT `UNIT_A`. Two nameless entries both
called `inverter-a` would share one Store namespace, so one unit's SAFETY-02
latch would be the other's - a fault on B latching A is the exact failure
DEV-02's namespaced keys removed. Rule 9 refuses a nameless entry outright;
this only decides what the refusal is allowed to call it in the meantime.
An EMPTY `inverters:` is the flat-key shape and its one unit is `UNIT_A`,
which is what every install running today reads.
"""
entries = roster_entries(opts)
if not entries:
return [UNIT_A]
names = []
for i, entry in enumerate(entries):
entry = entry if isinstance(entry, dict) else {}
names.append(str(entry.get("name") or "").strip() or f"inverter-{i + 1}")
return names
def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None) -> list:
"""The site's inverters, in roster order.
TWO SHAPES, AND WHICH ONE IS IN FORCE IS DECIDED BY ONE TEST: is
`inverters:` empty?
EMPTY the five flat keys - `setpoint_entity`, `soc_entity`,
`batt_entity`, `batt_invert`, `max_w` - describe the ONE inverter,
EMPTY the six flat keys - `setpoint_entity`, `soc_entity`,
`batt_entity`, `batt_invert`, `max_w`, `bms_soc_floor` (SAFETY-32)
- describe the ONE inverter,
exactly as the shipped scalars did. This is what every install
that upgrades into this version reads, without an operator
touching anything, and it is byte-identical to what DEV-02
@@ -353,8 +457,8 @@ def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None) -> list:
`soc_entity` has no SoC sensor; it does NOT borrow the flat one,
because "this unit's number came from somewhere else" is the
defect DEV-02 spent a card removing and a fallback here would
rebuild it in three lines. `name`, `setpoint_entity` and `max_w`
are required of every entry - the schema enforces it on the
rebuild it in three lines. `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and
`bms_soc_floor` (SAFETY-32) are required of every entry - the schema enforces it on the
Supervisor path, `validate.py` rule 9 enforces it for sim/inject.py
and the checks, which reach this function with any dict at all.
@@ -380,18 +484,24 @@ def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None) -> list:
batt_entity=opts.get("batt_entity", ""),
batt_invert=bool(opts.get("batt_invert")),
max_w=float(opts.get("max_w", 2000)),
# SAFETY-32. THE FLAT KEY, because this IS the single-inverter shape
# - the one pack the flat options describe is the one pack whose
# cut-out `bms_soc_floor` states. Defaulted from CFG-03's single
# mirror exactly as validate.py rule 8 defaults it, so an install
# that never set the key reads the same 10 % in both places.
bms_soc_floor=_flat_bms_floor(opts),
store=store, sign_cfg=sign_cfg)]
roster = []
for i, entry in enumerate(entries):
names = roster_names(opts)
# ⚠️ NAMES COME FROM `roster_names()`, NOT FROM A SECOND READING OF THE
# ENTRIES. TEL-07 announces one MQTT device and one `unique_id` per unit off
# these names, and it has to build them BEFORE a `Controller` exists - so a
# second spelling of the fallback here would be an entity announced under a
# name no unit answers to. `zip` pairs them positionally, which is what
# `roster_names()` is defined to be.
for entry, name in zip(entries, names):
entry = entry if isinstance(entry, dict) else {}
# ⚠️ THE FALLBACK NAME IS POSITIONAL, NOT `UNIT_A`. Two nameless entries
# both called `inverter-a` would share one Store namespace, so one
# unit's SAFETY-02 latch would be the other's - a fault on B latching A
# is the exact failure DEV-02's namespaced keys removed. Rule 9 refuses
# a nameless entry outright; this only decides what the refusal is
# allowed to call it in the meantime.
name = str(entry.get("name") or "").strip() or f"inverter-{i + 1}"
roster.append(Inverter(
name,
setpoint_entity=entry.get("setpoint_entity", ""),
@@ -401,10 +511,54 @@ def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None) -> list:
# ⚠️ NOT `opts["max_w"]`. See the docstring: a rating an entry did
# not state is not the flat one, it is a rating rule 9 refuses.
max_w=_entry_max_w(entry),
# ⚠️ NOT `opts["bms_soc_floor"]`, FOR `max_w`'S REASON AND THIS
# CARD'S. An entry that omits its cut-out has NOT got the flat one;
# it has none, and rule 8 refuses it by name. Borrowing here would be
# SAFETY-32's own defect written in three lines - the shallower pack
# graded against the deeper pack's BMS.
bms_soc_floor=_entry_bms_floor(entry),
store=store, sign_cfg=sign_cfg))
return roster
def _flat_bms_floor(opts: dict):
"""The single-inverter shape's own cut-out, or None if it is unparseable.
Defaulted from `PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS` when the key is absent or blank, which
is `validate._number()`'s behaviour on the same key - the two have to agree
or the validator would grade a number the roster does not build.
"""
# ⚠️ ONE defaulting line, not two. The first cut wrote the fallback into the
# `.get()` AND into the blank test below it, and a mutation that deleted
# either one survived - each was covering for the other, which is
# MUTATION.md's masking section in three lines of configuration reading.
raw = opts.get("bms_soc_floor")
if raw is None or raw == "":
return float(PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["bms_soc_floor"])
try:
return float(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def _entry_bms_floor(entry: dict):
"""One entry's OWN cut-out, or None when it did not state a usable one.
None rather than a borrowed number and rather than 0.0 - `_entry_max_w()`
can answer 0.0 because a zero rating commands nothing, but a zero FLOOR is
the most permissive value the key has and would read as "this pack may be
emptied". Rule 8 refuses the missing key by name; until it does, None
withholds.
"""
raw = entry.get("bms_soc_floor")
if raw is None or raw == "":
return None
try:
return float(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def _entry_max_w(entry: dict) -> float:
"""One entry's supervised cap, or 0.0 when it did not state a usable one.
+155 -14
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ from .circulation import (
from .clamp import (
REASON_CODE as CLAMP_REASON, ClampWatchdog, clamp_to_rating, is_commandable,
)
from . import freshness
from .freeze import (
FreezeWatchdog, FreezeWatchdogConfig, looks_frozen, rail_unreachable, rail_w,
)
@@ -53,11 +54,12 @@ from .hass import HomeAssistant
# and two checks read `app.main.LINK_STALE_S` to build a stale link, so the
# window an operator would look up here is the one the roster actually uses.
from .inverter import (LINK_STALE_S, UNIT_A, build_roster,
roster_entries)
roster_entries, roster_names)
from .maintenance import (
IDLE, POWER_MOVING, MaintConfig, Maintenance, arbitrate as maint_arbitrate,
)
from .mqtt import MqttPublisher
from .mqtt import (MqttPublisher, announced_units, unit_slugs,
unit_state_key)
from . import peakguard
from .p1 import P1Ingest, build_source, is_enabled
from .price import Uncertainty, price_option
@@ -246,7 +248,13 @@ class Controller:
# binds each unit's own share through its own `supervised` claim, so
# nothing here can over-command a device.
max_w=self.site_max_w,
slew_w=float(opts.get("slew_w", 1000)),
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39: THE FALLBACK IS 0 AND 0 MEANS "FOLLOW THE RAIL",
# which is what config.yaml ships and what `Tuning`'s own default
# is. It used to be 1000 - a third copy of a constant that had
# already gone stale against the rail in the other two - and rule
# 6's comment in validate.py documents what that costs when the
# copies disagree. `control.slew_limit_w()` is the one reader.
slew_w=float(opts.get("slew_w", 0) or 0),
deadband_w=float(opts.get("deadband_w", 15)),
target_grid_w=float(opts.get("target_grid_w", 0)),
step_w=int(opts.get("step_w", 10)),
@@ -1065,6 +1073,26 @@ class Controller:
return None
return float(min(float(v) for v in vals))
@property
def packs(self) -> list:
"""SAFETY-32. Each pack as its own THREE numbers, in roster order.
`pack_floor_soc` above is the site's ONE verdict and stays exactly what
DEV-02 made it - the emptiest measured pack. This is the thing that
reduction cannot produce: by the time `min()` has answered, WHICH pack
the number came from and how far that pack was from ITS OWN cut-out have
both been thrown away, and two packs at 15 % against cut-outs of 10 % and
20 % have opposite answers that are indistinguishable afterwards.
⚠️ EVERY unit, live or not. Same reason as `inputs_ok`: a pack whose SoC
did not answer is a pack nothing can grade, and dropping it from this
list would let the site spend the packs that DID answer while one sat
unmeasured. `peakguard.discharge_permitted()` treats a None SoC as no
permission, which is where that must be decided.
"""
return [peakguard.Pack(inv.name, inv.soc, inv.bms_soc_floor)
for inv in self.inverters]
@property
def inputs_ok(self) -> bool:
"""The site meter, and EVERY pack's own two readings.
@@ -1082,8 +1110,18 @@ class Controller:
for inv in self.inverters)
# -- io ------------------------------------------------------------------
async def read_inputs(self) -> None:
async def read_inputs(self, now_mono: float | None = None) -> None:
"""Every input this cycle needs, and SAFETY-37's freshness verdict.
`now_mono` the monotonic clock the per-unit freshness records are
stamped on. Defaulted rather than read inside `_read_unit()`
so that ONE instant covers every unit in a gather - two
units stamped from two clock reads would carry a freshness
skew nobody could reproduce - and so that a check can drive
real seconds through the gate without sleeping through them.
"""
o = self.o
now_mono = freshness.monotonic() if now_mono is None else float(now_mono)
if self.p1_enabled:
# ⚠️ P1 is the only authoritative measurement of what the utility
# sees (§5.1). When it is stale this is None, which falls into the
@@ -1103,7 +1141,8 @@ class Controller:
# names for the WRITE path, one function up. Within a unit the order is
# unchanged (SoC, then battery power), so at the shipped roster of one
# this is the same two calls in the same order.
await asyncio.gather(*(self._read_unit(inv) for inv in self.inverters))
await asyncio.gather(*(self._read_unit(inv, now_mono)
for inv in self.inverters))
if o.get("peak_forecast_entity"):
raw = await self.hass.number(o["peak_forecast_entity"])
# Accept kW or W - nobody's quarter-hour forecast is 50 W.
@@ -1149,10 +1188,41 @@ class Controller:
elif self.inputs_bad_since is None:
self.inputs_bad_since = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
async def _read_unit(self, inv) -> None:
"""One inverter's own SoC and battery power, from ITS OWN entities."""
async def _read_unit(self, inv, now_mono: float) -> None:
"""One inverter's own SoC and battery power, from ITS OWN entities.
⚠️ SAFETY-37: THE POWER READING GOES THROUGH THE FRESHNESS GATE AND THE
SoC READING DOES NOT, AND THE ASYMMETRY IS DELIBERATE. `batt` feeds the
two consumers this card is about - SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and
SAFETY-31's circulating-power sensor - and its obligation term is
command travel, which this method already has. SoC's obligation term is
ENERGY through the pack and the constant it needs has never been
measured on this site; wiring it here with a guessed constant would be a
gate that fires on a rested pack, which is TEL-08's whole hazard.
`freshness.BOUNDS["soc"]` states the bound and what TEL-08 owes.
⚠️ THE STANDING COMMAND IS ASKED OF THE UNIT, NOT RECOMPUTED. `cycle()`
grades the sign watchdog against `inv.standing_w()` and this gate arms
off the same method, because the gate exists to protect that check and a
second spelling of "what is standing" would let the two disagree about
the number they are both reasoning about.
"""
inv.soc = await self.hass.number(inv.soc_entity)
inv.batt = await self.hass.number(inv.batt_entity, inv.batt_invert)
raw = await self.hass.number(inv.batt_entity, inv.batt_invert)
was_stale = inv.batt_fresh.stale
inv.batt_fresh.submit(raw, inv.standing_w(), now_mono)
# ⚠️ `inv.batt` IS THE GATED VALUE. A stale register is a MISSING input,
# not a measurement - `inputs_ok` sees the None, the site holds for
# `stale_input_s` and then commands 0 W and keeps commanding, which is
# §11.1 rule 1 and is already what a missing reading does here.
inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()
if inv.batt_fresh.stale and not was_stale:
self.log_event(f"STALE {inv.name}: " + inv.batt_fresh.reason)
_LOG.error("SAFETY-37: %s battery-power register is not following "
"its own command - %s. Treating it as MISSING, which "
"commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the register "
"reports a different value.",
inv.name, inv.batt_fresh.reason)
def write_refusal(self, value: float, inv=None) -> str | None:
"""Why `value` may NOT be written to `inv` right now, or None if it may.
@@ -1442,9 +1512,20 @@ class Controller:
return tuple(live)
def liveness_notes(self) -> list:
"""Why each unit is or is not commandable, for the status page."""
"""Why each unit is or is not commandable, for the status page.
⚠️ SAFETY-37's STALE-READING LINE RIDES HERE TOO, AND IT IS A DIFFERENT
FAULT WITH A DIFFERENT REMEDY. A unit that is not commandable is dropped
and its share is carried by the survivors; a unit whose power register
has stopped following its command stops the SITE. They share this list
because they share one place on the status page - the operator asking
"why is nothing happening" needs both - and nothing downstream reads it.
"""
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
return [n for n in (inv.link_note(now) for inv in self.inverters) if n]
return [n for n in
[x for inv in self.inverters
for x in (inv.link_note(now), inv.stale_note())]
if n]
async def cycle(self) -> None:
"""Gather claims, resolve precedence, write the winner.
@@ -1533,7 +1614,10 @@ class Controller:
standing = {}
for inv in self.inverters:
was_tripped = inv.sign_wd.tripped
stood = inv.last_write if inv.last_write is not None else inv.target
# ⚠️ `Inverter.standing_w()`, NOT THE EXPRESSION IT REPLACES.
# SAFETY-37's freshness gate arms off the same method, and this used
# to be the only spelling of it. See that method's docstring.
stood = inv.standing_w()
standing[inv.name] = stood
against = self.grid if n_units <= 1 else inv.batt
if inv.sign_wd.evaluate(stood, against, self.following, now) \
@@ -1881,9 +1965,21 @@ class Controller:
# protect. None stays None: `decide()` treats it as floor-limited,
# which costs a shave rather than a pack.
soc=self.pack_floor_soc,
soc_floor=float(self.o.get(
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32. THE SAME OPTION, REDUCED OVER THE PACKS' OWN
# CUT-OUTS. `peak_soc_floor` is still one site-wide EMS floor and is
# still read from that one key with CFG-03's one mirror behind it;
# what `binding_soc_floor()` adds is the conjunction with each pack's
# OWN `bms_soc_floor`, so the floor this site is graded against can
# never be below the deepest cut-out on the roster. MAXIMUM here
# pairs with the MINIMUM in `pack_floor_soc`: both reductions move
# the verdict towards refusing a shave and away from spending a pack.
# Under any config rule 8 accepts it IS the option, for every pack -
# asserted over the whole schema range in test_peakguard.py part 12
# rather than assumed, because "another rule refuses that" is a claim
# about rule ordering and sim/inject.py does not run rule 8 at all.
soc_floor=peakguard.binding_soc_floor(self.packs, float(self.o.get(
"peak_soc_floor",
peakguard.PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["peak_soc_floor"])),
peakguard.PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["peak_soc_floor"]))),
max_hold_s=self.p1.averager.max_hold_s,
# ⚠️ SAFETY-20. The device range goes in TOO, and this call site is
# the one that needed it most: `standing` is `last_write`, i.e. the
@@ -2596,6 +2692,22 @@ class Controller:
# notification that matters into a traceback.
_at_floor = ("at the floor" if g.soc_floor is None
else f"at {float(g.soc_floor):.0f} %")
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32. WHICH PACK STOPPED THE SITE. `g.soc_floor` is the floor
# the decision was actually taken with, so this re-grades nothing and
# cannot disagree with the alarm it is printed inside. At a roster of one
# the sentence is omitted entirely and this notification is byte-for-byte
# what SAFETY-25 shipped - there is exactly one pack and naming it would
# be noise on every existing install.
_blocked = [name for name, why
in peakguard.pack_permissions(self.packs, g.soc_floor)
if why is not None]
_which = ("" if len(self.inverters) < 2 else
f"\n\nSAFETY-32 - WHICH PACK: this is graded per pack against "
f"that pack's own BMS cut-out (bms_soc_floor), and the "
f"pack(s) at or below their own floor right now are "
f"{', '.join(_blocked) if _blocked else '(none - see the reason above)'}"
f". The other packs on the roster are not the reason the guard "
f"stopped and raising their cut-out will not change this.")
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create", {
"notification_id": "goodwe_peak_soc_floor",
"title": "GoodWe: the capacity-peak guard has run out of battery",
@@ -2615,7 +2727,7 @@ class Controller:
f"{_at_floor} - ordinary self-consumption has no SoC "
f"floor at all and will go on discharging past it, down to the "
f"pack's own BMS cut-out. What has stopped is the guard buying "
f"you a lower bill, not the pack being spent."),
f"you a lower bill, not the pack being spent." + _which),
})
async def check_circulating(self) -> None:
@@ -3025,6 +3137,28 @@ class Controller:
if self.p1_enabled:
# Recomputed here, once a second, on purpose - see P1Ingest.
values["p1_age"] = round(self.p1.published_age_s, 1)
# TEL-07. THE PER-UNIT ROWS, AND THE EMPTY LIST IS THE GATE.
#
# ⚠️ THERE IS NO `if len(self.inverters) > 1` HERE, DELIBERATELY.
# `announced_units()` answers `[]` at a roster of one, `zip` then yields
# nothing, and the values dict comes out byte-identical to what shipped -
# so the condition that decides what is ANNOUNCED is the same expression
# that decides what is PUBLISHED. Written as a second predicate, the two
# could disagree, and both directions are bad: an announced entity
# nothing feeds (the hazard `omit` exists for) or, at N=1, a published
# topic nothing announced, which AC 4 forbids outright.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE SITE ROWS ABOVE DO NOT MOVE. `battery` stays the SUM and
# `soc` stays the EMPTIEST pack; these are additions beside them, not a
# re-pointing of them, because those two ids are on the live install's
# dashboards and in its automations.
names = announced_units([inv.name for inv in self.inverters])
for inv, slug in zip(self.inverters, unit_slugs(names)):
values[unit_state_key(slug, "setpoint")] = inv.target
values[unit_state_key(slug, "battery")] = inv.batt
values[unit_state_key(slug, "soc")] = inv.soc
values[unit_state_key(slug, "sign_latch")] = (
"tripped" if inv.sign_wd.tripped else "clear")
self.mqtt.publish(values)
async def shutdown(self) -> None:
@@ -3731,6 +3865,13 @@ async def amain() -> None:
broker.get("username") if broker else None,
broker.get("password") if broker else None,
omit=() if is_enabled(opts) else ("p1_age",),
# TEL-07. ⚠️ THE NAMES, NOT A ROSTER. `build_roster()` here
# would construct a SECOND set of `Inverter`s off the same
# Store, minutes before `Controller.__init__` constructs the
# real ones; `roster_names()` is the naming rule on its own and
# is what `build_roster()` itself reads. At a roster of one this
# announces nothing new - see `announced_units()`.
units=roster_names(opts),
)
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001
_LOG.warning("MQTT unavailable (%s) - continuing without status entities", err)
+232 -24
View File
@@ -90,14 +90,239 @@ SENSORS = [
BASE = "goodwe_ctl"
AVAILABILITY = f"{BASE}/availability"
# --- TEL-07: a SECOND device, for inverter B, and NOT one per inverter -------
#
# ⚠️ READ THE DEVICE-NAME NOTE ABOVE BEFORE CHANGING ANYTHING HERE. The device
# name is half of every entity_id, so re-scoping `DEVICE` renames every entity
# the live install already has - and HA keeps the id it composed at FIRST
# discovery, so what a rename actually produces is a NEW entity beside a dead
# one: the history stays behind on the old id, and every dashboard, template
# and automation that names it (including `goodwe_master_watchdog_held_*` and
# `goodwe_master_parked_at_0_w_*`) keeps pointing at the entity that stopped
# updating. That is silent. So:
#
# `DEVICE` IS NOT TOUCHED AND ITS ENTITIES ARE NOT TOUCHED. It is the SITE
# device - the meter's view and the controller's own state - and at the
# shipped roster of one it is also, in effect, inverter A's.
#
# THE FIRST ROSTER ENTRY GETS NO NEW DEVICE. Its per-unit rows are announced
# ON THE DEVICE IT ALREADY HAS, under new `unique_id`s and new names. Nothing
# existing is renamed, so nothing existing loses its history.
#
# EVERY LATER ENTRY GETS ITS OWN DEVICE (`via_device` the site one).
#
# ⚠️ THE ASYMMETRY IS THE POINT, AND IT WILL LOOK LIKE AN OVERSIGHT. "One
# device per inverter", with A as `inverter-a` and B as `inverter-b`, is tidy,
# symmetrical, and is the change that destroys the live system's recorded
# history. DO NOT "CLEAN THIS UP". The composed entity_ids come out symmetric
# anyway - `sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power` and
# `sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power` - which is the whole benefit of the
# tidy version, without the cost.
#
# WHAT IS PER-UNIT AND WHAT IS SITE, and why the split is where it is:
#
# PER-UNIT setpoint (this unit's share of the site target, the number its
# own heartbeat re-emits), battery power (`inv.batt`, this unit's
# own meter reading), SoC (`inv.soc`, THIS pack - the site row is
# the EMPTIEST pack, which at N>=2 may be the other one), and the
# SAFETY-02 sign latch, which is per actuator by construction.
#
# SITE `grid` and `p1_age`. There is ONE P1 meter and ONE grid
# connection; announcing them per inverter would invent two of a
# thing there is one of. `p1_sample_age_s` is additionally a
# WATCHDOG INPUT (see `omit` below and the firmware note above), so
# a second copy of it is a second copy of a safety signal - two
# answers to "is the meter fresh?", one of which is always the one
# nobody is looking at. Also site: circulating power (it is
# `sum(|Bi|) - |sum(Bi)|`, a property of the SET), the controller
# status, the maintenance phase, and the capacity-tariff peak.
#
# NOT ANNOUNCED, AND SAID OUT LOUD RATHER THAN LEFT LOOKING FINISHED: the
# card also lists "inverter AC power" and per-unit HEARTBEATS as per-unit.
# Neither has a source in this add-on today - nothing reads an AC-power
# register per unit, and `inv.last_beat` is a monotonic loop clock with no
# wall-clock age published anywhere. Announcing them would create entities
# nothing ever feeds, which is exactly what the `omit` note below refuses to
# do for `p1_sample_age_s`. They are gaps, not omissions.
UNIT_SENSORS = [
("setpoint", "setpoint", "Setpoint", "W", "power", "measurement", None),
("battery", "battery_power", "Battery power", "W", "power", "measurement", None),
("soc", "battery_soc", "Battery SoC", "%", "battery", "measurement", None),
("sign_latch", "sign_latch", "Sign latch", None, None, None, "mdi:flash-alert"),
]
# ⚠️ A ROSTER OF ONE ANNOUNCES NOTHING NEW - not a device, not an entity, not a
# topic. Every install running today is a roster of one, and "the upgrade added
# four entities nobody asked for" is a change to a live system's entity list
# for no information: at N=1 the site rows ARE this unit's rows, exactly.
PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER = 2
def _slug(text) -> str:
"""Home Assistant's own object_id spelling: lowercase, `_`, no runs.
⚠️ ASCII-ONLY ON PURPOSE. `str.isalnum()` is true for 'é' and for '٤', and
HA transliterates those rather than keeping them, so treating them as
alphanumeric here would produce an id this module claims and HA does not.
They become separators, which is conservative in the right direction: two
names that differ ONLY outside ASCII collide, and `unit_slugs()` below is
what stops a collision becoming two entities with one `unique_id`.
"""
out = []
for ch in str(text).strip().lower():
out.append(ch if (ch.isascii() and ch.isalnum()) else "_")
slug = "".join(out)
while "__" in slug:
slug = slug.replace("__", "_")
return slug.strip("_")
def _title(name) -> str:
"""`inverter-b` -> `Inverter B`. The half of the entity_id HA composes."""
words = str(name).replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ").split()
return " ".join(w[:1].upper() + w[1:] for w in words) or str(name)
def unit_slugs(units) -> list:
"""One id-safe slug per roster entry, in roster order, ALL DISTINCT.
⚠️ THE DE-COLLISION IS NOT DECORATION. `validate.py` rule 9(c) refuses two
entries with the SAME name; it does not refuse `inverter-b` beside
`Inverter B`, and those two slug to one string. Two entities published with
one `unique_id` is not an error in HA - the second one is DROPPED, so one
inverter's telemetry silently stops existing. The suffix is the roster
INDEX, so it is stable for a given roster and does not depend on what the
other unit is called.
"""
slugs, seen = [], set()
for i, name in enumerate(units):
slug = _slug(name) or f"inverter_{i + 1}"
while slug in seen:
slug = f"{slug}_{i + 1}"
seen.add(slug)
slugs.append(slug)
return slugs
def announced_units(units) -> list:
"""The roster, in order - or EMPTY below `PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER`.
⚠️ ONE ANSWER TO "WHICH UNITS GET PER-UNIT ENTITIES", read by the
announcement here AND by `Controller.publish()` in main.py. Two spellings of
the same predicate is how an entity gets announced that nothing publishes
to, or published to on a topic nothing announced - and at N=1 the second
would be an added topic, which AC 4 forbids outright.
"""
names = [str(u) for u in units]
if len(names) < PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER:
return []
return names
def unit_state_key(slug: str, key: str) -> str:
"""The `publish()` key - i.e. the state topic under `BASE` - for one unit.
Written once, here, because main.py builds it and this module announces it;
a second transcription is a topic announced and never fed.
"""
return f"unit/{slug}/{key}"
def unit_device(name, slug: str) -> dict:
"""B's OWN device. ⚠️ Never returned for the first roster entry."""
return {
"identifiers": [f"{DEVICE['identifiers'][0]}_{slug}"],
"name": f"{DEVICE['name']} {_title(name)}",
"manufacturer": DEVICE["manufacturer"],
"model": DEVICE["model"],
# Hangs B under the controller in HA's device tree rather than beside
# it. Cosmetic, and the one line that says in the UI what the asymmetry
# above means: there is one controller, and it drives both.
"via_device": DEVICE["identifiers"][0],
}
def _payload(name, object_id, unique_id, state_topic, device,
unit, dev_class, state_class, icon) -> dict:
"""One discovery payload.
⚠️ KEY ORDER IS PART OF THE OUTPUT. `json.dumps` writes keys in insertion
order, so this dict's construction order IS the bytes on the wire, and AC 1
is a BYTE comparison against what `release/1.0` publishes. Do not reorder.
"""
cfg = {
"name": name,
"object_id": object_id,
"unique_id": unique_id,
"state_topic": state_topic,
"availability_topic": AVAILABILITY,
"device": device,
}
if unit:
cfg["unit_of_measurement"] = unit
if dev_class:
cfg["device_class"] = dev_class
if state_class:
cfg["state_class"] = state_class
if icon:
cfg["icon"] = icon
return cfg
def discovery_payloads(units=(), omit=()) -> list:
"""Every `(topic, payload)` this add-on announces, in announcement order.
Split out of `_announce()` so that the acceptance criterion can be graded as
a DIFF OF THE ANNOUNCED PAYLOADS against `release/1.0`, rather than as a
reading of the code. `_announce()` publishes exactly this list and nothing
else, which is itself checked.
"""
omit = set(omit)
out = []
for key, object_id, name, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in SENSORS:
if key in omit:
continue
out.append((
f"homeassistant/sensor/{BASE}_{key}/config",
_payload(name, object_id, f"{BASE}_{key}", f"{BASE}/{key}",
DEVICE, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon)))
names = announced_units(units)
slugs = unit_slugs(names)
site_slug = _slug(DEVICE["name"])
for i, (name, slug) in enumerate(zip(names, slugs)):
# ⚠️ `i == 0` IS THE ASYMMETRY, IN ONE LINE. The first roster entry
# keeps the device it already has and carries its name in the ENTITY
# name instead; every later one gets its own device and does not.
# Either way HA composes device-name + entity-name into the same
# string, which is why `object_id` below can be written once for both.
device = DEVICE if i == 0 else unit_device(name, slug)
prefix = f"{_title(name)} " if i == 0 else ""
for key, oid, label, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in UNIT_SENSORS:
unique_id = f"{BASE}_unit_{slug}_{key}"
out.append((
f"homeassistant/sensor/{unique_id}/config",
_payload(prefix + label,
f"{site_slug}_{slug}_{oid}",
unique_id,
f"{BASE}/{unit_state_key(slug, key)}",
device, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon)))
return out
class MqttPublisher:
def __init__(self, host, port, username=None, password=None, omit=()):
def __init__(self, host, port, username=None, password=None, omit=(),
units=()):
# `omit` drops sensor keys from discovery entirely. ⚠️ Announcing a
# sensor that nothing will ever publish to is not harmless here:
# p1_sample_age_s is a watchdog input, and an entity that exists but is
# never fed is a worse signal than one that does not exist at all.
self.omit = set(omit)
# TEL-07. The roster's NAMES, in roster order - `inverter.roster_names()`,
# not a second reading of the option. Defaults to empty, which
# `announced_units()` treats exactly as a roster of one: nothing
# per-unit is announced, so every caller that has not been taught about
# the roster keeps publishing what it published before.
self.units = [str(u) for u in units]
self.enabled = mqtt is not None and bool(host)
self.client = None
if not self.enabled:
@@ -130,29 +355,12 @@ class MqttPublisher:
self.enabled = False
def _announce(self) -> None:
for key, object_id, name, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in SENSORS:
if key in self.omit:
continue
cfg = {
"name": name,
"object_id": object_id,
"unique_id": f"{BASE}_{key}",
"state_topic": f"{BASE}/{key}",
"availability_topic": AVAILABILITY,
"device": DEVICE,
}
if unit:
cfg["unit_of_measurement"] = unit
if dev_class:
cfg["device_class"] = dev_class
if state_class:
cfg["state_class"] = state_class
if icon:
cfg["icon"] = icon
self.client.publish(
f"homeassistant/sensor/{BASE}_{key}/config",
json.dumps(cfg), retain=True,
)
# ⚠️ NO PAYLOAD IS BUILT HERE. `discovery_payloads()` is the whole
# announcement, so the check that diffs it against `release/1.0` is
# diffing what actually goes on the wire - and a payload built here
# instead would be one this add-on publishes and no check has ever seen.
for topic, cfg in discovery_payloads(self.units, self.omit):
self.client.publish(topic, json.dumps(cfg), retain=True)
self.client.publish(AVAILABILITY, "online", retain=True)
def publish(self, values: dict) -> None:
+127
View File
@@ -360,6 +360,29 @@ distinction in DOCS.md and in this comment. Revisit if a THIRD floor appears -
a loop-side guard would be the third - at which point the migration buys enough
to be worth its cost.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAFETY-32: ONE `bms_soc_floor` FOR TWO PACKS GRADES ONE AGAINST THE OTHER'S BMS
`bms_soc_floor` above describes A PACK, not a site, and it was a flat option
because there was one pack. At two, two batteries of different models have
different cut-outs, and one number for both is wrong in the direction that
empties a battery: the SHALLOWER pack (the higher cut-out) is protected by a
floor that belongs to the DEEPER one. So it became a roster key - `Pack` carries
each unit's own value, `pack_floor_pct()` conjoins it with the site's EMS floor,
and validate.py rule 8 grades EVERY unit and NAMES the one it refuses.
⚠️ `peak_soc_floor` DID NOT MOVE, AND THE RESIDUAL IS RECORDED RATHER THAN
HIDDEN. It is one number for the site, so with cut-outs of 10 % and 18 % the
operator must set it above 18 and the deeper pack is then withheld above its own
need. That half - a per-pack EMS floor - is NOT this card and must not be
smuggled in with it; DECISIONS/SAFETY-32-per-pack-bms-floor.md states it as the
open question it is.
⚠️ AND THE MIN() OVER MEASURED SoC IS STILL RIGHT. `Controller.pack_floor_soc`
reduces to the emptiest pack and this card does not touch it. What changed is
the FLOOR it is graded against, and the addition of a per-pack answer beside the
site's one verdict - see `pack_permissions()`.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AND IT READS NO PER-PHASE QUANTITY, ON PURPOSE
@@ -572,6 +595,110 @@ def discharge_permitted(soc, soc_floor) -> str | None:
return None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Pack:
"""SAFETY-32. ONE pack's three numbers for the floor question, NAMED.
`name` the roster name, because a refusal that does not say WHICH pack
stopped the site sends an operator to the wrong device - the
same defect CFG-04's `unit_caps_indexed()` was written for.
`soc` THIS pack's measured state of charge. None when its sensor did
not answer, and None is not a full battery.
`bms_floor` THIS pack's OWN cut-out percent (`bms_soc_floor`), which is a
property of the hardware in the cupboard and NOT of the site.
None when the roster entry did not state one - see
`pack_floor_pct()` for why that is withheld and not 0 %.
⚠️ IT CARRIES THE CUT-OUT, NOT THE EMS FLOOR. `peak_soc_floor` is one number
for the whole site (the depth a money-saving discharge may never reach) and
stays a flat option; `bms_soc_floor` describes a battery and became a roster
key here, because two packs of different models have different cut-outs and
grading both against one of them is wrong in the direction that empties the
shallower one.
"""
name: str
soc: float | None
bms_floor: float | None
def pack_floor_pct(pack, soc_floor):
"""The percent THIS pack may not be spent below, or None if that is unknown.
`max(the site's EMS floor, this pack's own cut-out)` - the CONJUNCTION, and
the direction matters: the EMS floor is what the operator asked for and the
cut-out is what the hardware will do anyway, so a pack is protected by
whichever is higher. Taking the site floor alone is the shipped defect this
card removes (the shallower pack graded against the deeper one's cut-out);
taking the cut-out alone would throw SAFETY-24's margin away.
⚠️ AN UNSTATED CUT-OUT IS None, NOT ZERO, AND NOT THE FLAT OPTION. 0 % would
be a floor that permits everything - the most permissive value there is,
invented from an absence - and borrowing the flat `bms_soc_floor` is CFG-04's
"nothing is inherited" broken in one line, which is this card's whole subject
restated. `discharge_permitted()` already treats a None floor as NO
permission, so an entry that forgot the key costs a shave rather than a pack.
⚠️ AND UNDER A rule-8-VALID CONFIG THIS IS `soc_floor`, FOR EVERY PACK.
validate.py rule 8 refuses `peak_soc_floor <= bms_soc_floor` on EVERY unit,
so `max()` selects the EMS floor everywhere the add-on will actually start -
which is exactly why the reduction is written here rather than assumed at the
call site. "Another rule refuses that config" is a claim about today's rule
ordering, not a property of this function, and `validate_startup_config()` is
also `sim/inject.py`'s entry point. `unit_caps_indexed()`'s docstring records
the same argument, and CFG-04's index desynchronisation is what happened the
last time it was left implicit.
"""
if soc_floor is None or pack.bms_floor is None:
return None
return max(float(soc_floor), float(pack.bms_floor))
def pack_permissions(packs, soc_floor) -> list[tuple[str, str | None]]:
"""SAFETY-32. Per pack: None if it may be spent, else the reason it may not.
ONE `(name, reason)` pair per pack, in roster order, from the SAME
`discharge_permitted()` the site verdict uses - a second transcription of
"may this pack be spent" is a second answer to it, which is the argument
that made that predicate public in the first place.
⚠️ THIS IS THE OBSERVABLE THE MIN() CANNOT PRODUCE. `Controller.pack_floor_soc`
reduces the measured SoC to the emptiest pack BEFORE anything is graded, and
that reduction is right for the site's one verdict - but it has thrown away
which pack it came from and how far that pack was from ITS OWN floor by the
time the answer exists. Two packs at 15 % against floors of 10 % and 20 %
have opposite answers and are indistinguishable after the `min()`.
"""
return [(p.name, discharge_permitted(p.soc, pack_floor_pct(p, soc_floor)))
for p in packs]
def binding_soc_floor(packs, soc_floor):
"""The ONE floor `decide()` may grade `pack_floor_soc` against, at a roster.
MAXIMUM over the packs' own floors, and it is the conservative reduction that
pairs with the MINIMUM `pack_floor_soc` reduction: `min(soc) <= max(floor)`
is implied by "some pack is at or below its own floor", so this verdict is
never more permissive than grading each pack separately would be. The other
direction is not true and is not claimed - a site can be refused here while
every pack individually has headroom, which costs a shave and never a pack.
None when ANY pack's floor is unknown, for `Controller.site_dev_bound()`'s
reason and in the same direction: `discharge_permitted()` treats a None floor
as no permission, so an unknown floor withholds rather than defaults.
⚠️ AT N=1 THIS IS `soc_floor` ITSELF under any config rule 8 accepts, and
test_peakguard.py part 12 asserts that over the whole schema range rather
than assuming it.
"""
if not packs:
return None if soc_floor is None else float(soc_floor)
floors = [pack_floor_pct(p, soc_floor) for p in packs]
if any(f is None for f in floors):
return None
return max(floors)
def decide(projection, *, batt_w, cap_w, reading, achievable_w, soc, soc_floor,
max_hold_s=None, frozen: bool = False) -> PeakDecision:
"""The whole guard. Pure: no clock, no I/O, no state carried between calls.
+272 -25
View File
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
installed base is on a fixed or static tariff. Refusing to start without a
price feed would lock those sites out of the add-on entirely.
8. `peak_soc_floor` at or below `bms_soc_floor`. [(a)]
8. `peak_soc_floor` at or below `bms_soc_floor`, ON ANY UNIT. [(a)]
SAFETY-24, and the same shape as 1, 4, 5 and 6. The peak guard can COMMAND
a discharge to hold a billed quarter down (SAFETY-07), and `peak_soc_floor`
is the EMS-side bound on how far down it may take the pack. The BMS has its
@@ -142,6 +142,12 @@ NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
of binding while its status page reports one - rule 5's "a disarmed guard
that advertises itself as armed", on the guard whose failure mode is a pack
that is quietly never available when it is wanted.
⚠️ SAFETY-32: `bms_soc_floor` DESCRIBES A BATTERY, so at a roster it is a
per-entry key and this rule grades EVERY unit and NAMES the one it refuses.
One number for two packs of different models refuses the wrong config and
accepts the wrong one - cut-outs of 10 % and 30 % under `peak_soc_floor: 20`
used to start. A missing per-entry cut-out is refused here rather than
defaulted: a cut-out invented for a pack IS this defect.
⚠️ `<=`, NOT `<`, and the equality case is the interesting one. At exactly
equal, the EMS floor and the pack's cut-out act at the same percent, so the
@@ -177,6 +183,60 @@ NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
the per-unit form and main.py runs it from `run_control()`, once every
unit's own ESPHome has replied.
10. `slew_w` above the fraction of the SITE RAIL the plant can follow. [(a)]
SAFETY-39, and the first rule here whose subject is a RELATIONSHIP rather
than a threshold. `slew_w` bounds how far the site command may move in one
cycle; `control.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is `LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S`, so
`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail` is the largest step at which the loop still takes
the plant's own measured settling time to traverse its whole output range.
Above it the controller commands its entire range before it can observe
its answer to the first step, and the stated limit - "the command moves at
most `slew_w` per cycle, so it cannot jump ahead of the inverter" - is
untrue: it jumps ahead by construction.
⚠️ THIS IS (a) AND NOT (b), and the distinction is what makes it a refusal
rather than a warning. Nothing goes inert. What happens is that a bound
the operator set means something other than what it says, and the layer
that overrules it is the PLANT - which has no status row, publishes
nothing, and cannot be read off any page in this add-on. Measured on the
owner's system 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46 at `max_w: 5000`, `slew_w: 1000`:
setpoint 380 -> 5000 in five 2 s ticks, battery -5154 W against a 5000 VA
inverter, and the grid driven from 3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT.
Large (>= 900 W) setpoint steps per 30 min climbed 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 that
morning. Nothing in the add-on reported anything wrong, because nothing
was: the loop followed its command exactly, and the command was wrong.
⚠️ IT IS GRADED AGAINST THE ROSTER SUM, NOT THE FLAT `max_w` AND NOT THE
WEAKEST UNIT, and this is the one rule in this file for which that is the
right rail. Rules 5, 6 and 8 are all about ONE unit - one watchdog, one
shaping claim, one pack - so they take `min()` over `unit_caps()`.
`slew_w` is not per unit: `main.py` builds `Tuning(max_w=self.site_max_w)`
and `compute()` produces the SITE target, which the allocator then splits.
So the range this bound is about is the sum, `Controller.site_max_w`, and
`site_rail_w()` below is that same number computed from options.
⚠️ AND THE `site_sign_disagree_w` NOTE IN config.yaml IS NOT A PRECEDENT
AGAINST THIS. That note says there is deliberately no rule pairing
`site_sign_disagree_w` with `max_w`, "because the bound on the SITE command
is `Controller.site_max_w`, the ROSTER SUM, and `validate_startup_config()`
is handed options rather than a roster. A rule written against max_w would
refuse a perfectly reachable two-inverter configuration." That objection is
to grading a site quantity against the FLAT key. It is answered rather than
ignored: `unit_caps()` already reads the roster the add-on will build, so
the roster sum IS available here, and this rule takes it.
⚠️ THE DIRECTION OF THIS RULE, SAID PLAINLY, BECAUSE IT IS NOT THE
DIRECTION THE TICKET ASSUMED. A rail that GROWS loosens this bound: at a
9600 W two-inverter rail, `slew_w: 1000` traverses the rail in 19.2 s and
passes, while at 5000 W the same 1000 W is the configuration measured
above. That is what the constraint says and it is correct - the bound is on
traverse TIME, and a bigger rail at the same step size takes longer to
cross. What this rule therefore protects against is the constant being left
behind when the rail moves EITHER way. It is NOT a bound on how much power
the site may command, and it does NOT bound the over-absorption: see the
note below on `gain`, which is the term that owns that and which SAFETY-39
measured and did not change.
WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* REFUSED, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
- `integrator_max_w` above `max_w`. DOCS.md is right that the only thing the
@@ -220,6 +280,34 @@ WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* REFUSED, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
is answered. Compare rule 5, which CAN be settled at startup because both
`sign_disagree_w` and `max_w` are config and are both known at boot.
- `gain` at any value the schema accepts, INCLUDING against a large rail.
SAFETY-39 measured this and deliberately left it alone, which is worth more
than the rule would have been. On admin/goodwe's rig, over a family of 51
export steps from 1.0 to 4.2 kW at `max_w: 5000` and a 2 s tick, the
over-absorption - peak battery power beyond what the site actually needed -
is FLAT in `slew_w`: 958 W at slew 1000 and 1081 W at slew 250. It falls
in `gain`: 987 W at 0.6, 876 W at 0.3, 435 W at 0.2 - a real reduction, but
NOT to zero, and the 0.2 figure is the one worth not rounding away. The
reason is structural and is visible in control.py: `slew_w` bounds the
OUTPUT, while the integrator accumulates `gain * error` per cycle and is
bounded only by `integrator_max_w`. At gain 0.6 into a 3.4 kW error the
integrator moves ~2040 W per tick and reaches a 5000 W rail in under three
ticks whatever `slew_w` is.
So the 2026-08-22 derivation's own sentence - "the gain, not the slew, is
the limit by then" - is now literally true, and `gain` is the constant that
needs re-deriving next. It is NOT refused and NOT changed here: it is a
live control-law constant on a running house, changing it in the same pull
request as `slew_w` would make the next measurement uninterpretable, and a
validator rule pairing `gain` with a rail would be inventing a relationship
nobody has measured. Named here so it is a known open item rather than an
omission. See DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md.
- `slew_w` BELOW the rail fraction, at any value the schema accepts. Slower
than the plant is always safe and is sometimes necessary - the live install
has run an explicit 400 W against a 5000 W rail since 2026-09-05 12:00,
which is 12.5 ticks to traverse the rail against the 9 this rule requires.
Refusing "too slow" would refuse the mitigation that is holding.
- `peak_soc_floor` below `maintenance_soc_floor`, or above it. They are
DIFFERENT QUANTITIES (SAFETY-24: a drain target versus a spend limit) and
every ordering of the two is a legitimate site configuration. Refusing on
@@ -229,6 +317,7 @@ WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* REFUSED, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
import logging
from .arbitrage import enabled as arbitrage_on
from .control import SLEW_RAIL_FRAC, LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S
from .inverter import roster_entries
from .maintenance import MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS
from .p1 import is_enabled, validate_meter_options
@@ -386,6 +475,70 @@ def unit_caps_indexed(opts: dict) -> list[tuple[int, float]]:
return caps
def site_rail_w(opts: dict) -> float | None:
"""The SITE rail: what the whole site may be commanded, in W. Rule 10's rail.
⚠️ THE SUM, NOT THE MINIMUM, AND NOT THE FLAT KEY - and it is the only place
in this file that wants a sum. Rules 5, 6 and 8 grade a threshold against
ONE unit (one watchdog, one shaping claim, one pack) and take `min()` over
`unit_caps()`. `slew_w` is not a per-unit quantity at all: `main.py` builds
`Tuning(max_w=self.site_max_w)` from the roster sum and `compute()` emits
the SITE target, which the allocator then divides. So the output range
`slew_w` is a rate across is `Controller.site_max_w`, and this is that same
number read out of options rather than off a built roster.
At the shipped roster of one this is `unit_caps()`'s single entry, which is
`max_w` exactly - byte for byte the number the single-inverter shape has
always meant. None when no entry carries a usable cap, which rule 9 has
already refused by the time rule 10 runs.
"""
caps = unit_caps(opts)
return float(sum(caps)) if caps else None
def unit_bms_floors_indexed(opts: dict) -> list[tuple[int, object, object]]:
"""SAFETY-32. Each pack's OWN `bms_soc_floor`, carrying its ROSTER INDEX.
`(roster index, the raw value as configured, the parsed float or None)`, one
triple per unit. The raw value travels too because the refusal quotes what
the operator actually wrote, and `!r` of a re-read `opts` key is the wrong
string the moment the value came off a roster entry.
⚠️ THE INDEX IS THE ROSTER'S, NOT THIS LIST'S, AND THAT IS CFG-04'S BUG
WRITTEN DOWN. Rules 5 and 6 fed a CAPS-list index into `_unit_label()`,
which indexes the ROSTER, so on a roster whose first entry was malformed the
refusal named the WRONG INVERTER - an operator sent to the wrong device by
the very message that exists to stop that. `unit_caps_indexed()` exists
because of it. This function goes one step further and SKIPS NOTHING: every
entry produces a triple, including the ones with no usable floor, because a
missing cut-out is itself what rule 8 has to refuse BY NAME. There is
therefore no second list for an index to desynchronise from.
⚠️ AND NOTHING IS INHERITED. At a declared roster the FLAT `bms_soc_floor` is
not read at all - CFG-04's rule, and this card's subject: a pack that borrows
a sibling's cut-out is graded against a battery it is not. At the flat shape
the flat key IS this one pack's cut-out, defaulted from CFG-03's single
mirror exactly as `inverter._flat_bms_floor()` defaults it.
"""
entries = roster_entries(opts)
if not entries:
return [(0, opts.get("bms_soc_floor"),
_number(opts, "bms_soc_floor",
PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["bms_soc_floor"]))]
out: list[tuple[int, object, object]] = []
for index, entry in enumerate(entries):
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
# Rule 9(a)/(b) already refuses a non-dict entry by index, and it
# runs FIRST. Naming it twice would hand the operator two sentences
# about one line of YAML.
continue
raw = entry.get("bms_soc_floor")
out.append((index, raw,
None if raw is None or raw == ""
else _number(entry, "bms_soc_floor", None)))
return out
def _unit_label(opts: dict, index: int) -> str:
""""" at a single-inverter config, " (inverter-b)" at a roster.
@@ -757,21 +910,48 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
# second inverter is added - which is the day nobody is watching the startup
# log. This is `meter_max_age_s`'s rule read the same way: the failure it
# prevents is silent.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT READS THE WEAKEST UNIT'S CAP, NOT THE FLAT `max_w` - SAFETY-32
# ROUND 5. This branch used to compare against `max_w = _number(opts,
# "max_w", 2000.0)`, the FLAT option, which on a roster config is either
# ABSENT (so it compared against a 2000 W DEFAULT describing no unit on the
# site) or a leftover from a single-inverter install (so it compared against
# a number no unit has). Both directions were live and both were measured:
#
# a roster of two 2000 W units beside a leftover `max_w: 5000` and
# `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000` produced ZERO problems - the site STARTED,
# with a per-inverter watchdog reporting `armed` on the status page and
# incapable of tripping on EITHER unit. That is the identical sentence the
# branch above exists to refuse, reached through the branch beside it;
#
# and a roster of two 5000 W units with no flat key was REFUSED at
# `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000` against a 2000 W default the operator never
# wrote, for a threshold both units can reach.
#
# `unit_caps()`'s own docstring already said why: there is no such thing as
# a site rating on the wire, and this watchdog grades ONE UNIT's standing
# command against THAT unit's `supervised` bound. So it takes the same
# `weakest` the branch above takes, from the same list, and names the same
# unit. At a roster of one `unit_caps()` is `[max_w]` and this is the
# identical comparison it always was - which is what keeps the shipped
# single-inverter refusal byte-for-byte what it was.
unit_sign_w = _number(opts, "unit_sign_disagree_w",
float(SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS["unit_sign_disagree_w"]))
unit_where = (_unit_label(opts, min(caps_ix, key=lambda p: p[1])[0])
if caps_ix else "")
if unit_sign_w is None:
problems.append(f"unit_sign_disagree_w "
f"{opts.get('unit_sign_disagree_w')!r} is not a number")
elif max_w is not None and max_w > 0 and unit_sign_w >= max_w:
elif weakest is not None and weakest > 0 and unit_sign_w >= weakest:
problems.append(
f"unit_sign_disagree_w is {unit_sign_w:.0f} W but max_w is "
f"{max_w:.0f} W, so the SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement "
f"unit_sign_disagree_w is {unit_sign_w:.0f} W but max_w{unit_where}"
f" is {weakest:.0f} W, so the SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement "
"watchdog can never fire: no inverter is ever commanded past max_w, "
f"and the watchdog needs a command over {unit_sign_w:.0f} W. At two "
"inverters that is the guard which catches a unit doing the "
"OPPOSITE of what it was told while its sibling covers for it at "
"the meter - the case the site-level watchdog is structurally "
f"blind to. Lower unit_sign_disagree_w below {max_w:.0f} W "
f"blind to. Lower unit_sign_disagree_w below {weakest:.0f} W "
f"({SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS['unit_sign_disagree_w']:.0f} W is the "
"measured default), or raise max_w.")
@@ -859,6 +1039,62 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
f"two numbers. Lower maintenance_charge_w to {maint_cap:.0f} W or "
f"less, or raise max_w to at least {charge_w:.0f} W.")
# --- 10. a slew rate the plant can actually follow -----------------------
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39. The one rule here that grades a RATIO rather than a
# threshold, and the whole point of writing it as one is that the number it
# bounds must not be able to outlive the rail again. `control.py`'s header
# carries the derivation; the short version is that `slew_w: 1000` was
# derived against a 1500 W clamp and the live install raised the clamp to
# 5000 without revisiting it, so the loop traversed its whole output range
# in 10 s against a plant measured at ~18 s.
#
# ⚠️ `slew_w: 0` IS NOT GRADED AND MUST NOT BE. Zero means "follow the
# rail" - `control.slew_limit_w()` resolves it to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`,
# which satisfies this rule by construction at every rail there is. It is
# the shipped default, and a rule that refused it would refuse the fix.
#
# ⚠️ STRICTLY `>`, MATCHING RULE 6 RATHER THAN RULE 5. Equality is the
# derived value itself: at `slew_w == SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail` the loop takes
# exactly `PLANT_SETTLE_S` to cross its range, which is the constraint
# satisfied, not violated. Refusing it would refuse the value this rule
# exists to recommend - and `slew_limit_w()` produces exactly that value
# for every default install, so `>=` would refuse the shipped default
# through a float comparison. A tolerance is applied for the same reason:
# `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * 5000` is 555.55..., and an operator who writes the 556
# a status page rounded to is one watt over a boundary that is not
# meaningful to one watt.
slew_w = _number(opts, "slew_w", 0.0)
rail = site_rail_w(opts)
if slew_w is None:
problems.append(f"slew_w {opts.get('slew_w')!r} is not a number")
elif slew_w < 0:
problems.append(
f"slew_w is {slew_w:.0f} W and must not be negative - it is a "
"magnitude, and 0 means 'follow max_w' (the recommended setting).")
elif slew_w and rail is not None and rail > 0:
bound = SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail
if slew_w > bound + 1.0:
ticks = rail / slew_w
problems.append(
f"slew_w is {slew_w:.0f} W against a site rail of {rail:.0f} W, "
f"so the loop crosses its whole output range in {ticks:.1f} "
f"cycles - {ticks * LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s at the {LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s "
f"tick this site was measured running - while the plant takes "
f"{PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s to settle (goodwe/NOTES.md §5.10, a "
"1.78 kW step). The controller would command its entire range "
"before it could observe its answer to the first step, which is "
"not a slow loop, it is a loop that MANUFACTURES the error it "
"then chases: measured on this system 2026-09-05, a 3.4 kW "
"export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000 W in five ticks, the "
"battery to -5154 W past a 5000 VA rating, and the grid from "
"3.4 kW of export to 2.8 kW of import. The stated limit - the "
"command moves at most slew_w per cycle, so it cannot jump "
"ahead of the inverter - is untrue at this rail; THE PLANT "
f"WINS, and it has no status row. Set slew_w to 0, which means "
f"'follow the rail' and resolves to {bound:.0f} W here and "
"moves on its own if the rail does, or write a value at or "
f"below {bound:.0f} W. Lower is always accepted.")
# --- 7. two price sources on one site ------------------------------------
problems.extend(_price_problems(opts))
@@ -871,28 +1107,39 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
# in-code mirror, pinned to config.yaml by test_peakguard.py, and main.py
# reads the same one - exactly as maintenance.MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS now is
# for the `maintenance_*` family.
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32 - GRADED ONCE PER UNIT, AND THE REFUSAL NAMES THE UNIT. One
# `bms_soc_floor` for two packs compares the EMS floor against whichever
# battery happened to be written into the flat key: a site with cut-outs of
# 10 % and 30 % and `peak_soc_floor: 20` STARTED, and the guard would then
# command a forced discharge that the second pack's BMS - not the operator's
# floor - is the thing that stops. That is the disarmed-backstop state this
# rule exists to refuse, reached through the rule itself. So the loop is over
# units, and `_unit_label()` is fed the ROSTER index the value came off (see
# `unit_bms_floors_indexed()`), because CFG-04 has just fixed the version of
# this that named the wrong inverter.
soc_floor = _number(opts, "peak_soc_floor",
PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["peak_soc_floor"])
bms_floor = _number(opts, "bms_soc_floor",
PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["bms_soc_floor"])
if soc_floor is None or bms_floor is None:
problems.append(
"peak_soc_floor and bms_soc_floor must both be numbers (got "
f"{opts.get('peak_soc_floor')!r} / {opts.get('bms_soc_floor')!r})")
elif soc_floor <= bms_floor:
problems.append(
f"peak_soc_floor is {soc_floor:.0f} % but the pack's own cut-out "
f"(bms_soc_floor) is {bms_floor:.0f} %, so SAFETY-07's forced "
"discharge has no EMS-side bound at all - THE BMS WINS, and it is "
"the pack's protection rather than yours. The guard would report a "
"SoC floor on its status page while being incapable of ever being "
"the thing that stops the discharge, and the symptom of that is a "
"battery repeatedly sitting at the BMS limit with no record of why "
f"- which looks exactly like the SoC drift the maintenance cycle "
f"exists to correct. Raise peak_soc_floor above {bms_floor:.0f} % "
f"(the shipped default is "
f"{PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS['peak_soc_floor']:.0f} %), or correct "
"bms_soc_floor if it does not match this pack.")
for _ix, _raw, bms_floor in unit_bms_floors_indexed(opts):
where = _unit_label(opts, _ix)
if soc_floor is None or bms_floor is None:
problems.append(
f"peak_soc_floor and bms_soc_floor{where} must both be numbers "
f"(got {opts.get('peak_soc_floor')!r} / {_raw!r})")
elif soc_floor <= bms_floor:
problems.append(
f"peak_soc_floor is {soc_floor:.0f} % but the pack's own cut-out "
f"(bms_soc_floor{where}) is {bms_floor:.0f} %, so SAFETY-07's forced "
"discharge has no EMS-side bound at all - THE BMS WINS, and it is "
"the pack's protection rather than yours. The guard would report a "
"SoC floor on its status page while being incapable of ever being "
"the thing that stops the discharge, and the symptom of that is a "
"battery repeatedly sitting at the BMS limit with no record of why "
f"- which looks exactly like the SoC drift the maintenance cycle "
f"exists to correct. Raise peak_soc_floor above {bms_floor:.0f} % "
f"(the shipped default is "
f"{PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS['peak_soc_floor']:.0f} %), or correct "
f"bms_soc_floor{where} if it does not match this pack.")
# --- warnings: real, but not worth refusing over -------------------------
integ = opts.get("integrator_max_w")
+12
View File
@@ -331,6 +331,18 @@ SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
# 150 W -> 15.0 s 300 W -> 10.0 s 1000 W -> 0.0 s
# 200 W -> 15.0 s 500 W -> 5.0 s
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39 MOVED THAT SCHEMA FLOOR FROM 50 TO 0, AND THE CAMPAIGN ABOVE
# WAS NOT RE-RUN. It does not have to be, and here is the argument rather
# than the assurance. What these windows are about is how long the command
# takes to CROSS ITS RAIL - the swept worst case is the SLOWEST crossing,
# which is `slew_w` at its floor, 5000/50 = 100 cycles. `slew_w: 0` means
# "follow the rail" and resolves to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, which is
# exactly 9 cycles at EVERY rail by construction. So the new value can never
# be the slowest crossing at any `max_w`, and it is strictly inside the
# envelope this campaign measured. An explicit number still spans 50..5000
# and is unchanged. If `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is ever loosened past 1/100, this
# paragraph stops being true and the campaign has to be re-run.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE CURVE IS FLAT, WHICH IS THE FINDING THAT DECIDED THE SHAPE OF
# THIS PAIR. Unlike the site comparison - where the meter is driven by the
# LOAD and a flapping load holds it opposed for minutes - a unit's own power
+442 -311
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: GoodWe RS485 Controller
version: "0.6.0"
version: "0.7.0"
slug: goodwe_controller
description: >-
Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over RS485 by emulating its smart
@@ -31,23 +31,23 @@ services:
- mqtt:want
options:
# --- sources (required) ---------------------------------------------------
meter_entity: sensor.p1_meter_active_power
meter_invert: false
# ==========================================================================
# HARDWARE - the inverter, its actuator and its own sensors
# ==========================================================================
setpoint_entity: ""
soc_entity: ""
batt_entity: ""
batt_invert: false
setpoint_entity: ""
# --- ARCH-01 / CFG-04: the inverter roster ---------------------------------
# ⚠️ EMPTY IS NOT "UNCONFIGURED", IT IS THE SINGLE-INVERTER CONFIGURATION, and
# it is what every install that upgrades into this version lands on. An empty
# list means THE FIVE FLAT KEYS ABOVE DESCRIBE THE ONE INVERTER - same
# entities, same rating, same behaviour, no operator action - which is the
# only migration story this key was allowed to have. `build_roster()` reads
# this and nothing else decides the shape.
# list means THE SIX FLAT KEYS - `setpoint_entity`, `soc_entity`,
# `batt_entity`, `batt_invert`, `max_w` and `bms_soc_floor` - DESCRIBE THE
# ONE INVERTER: same entities, same rating, same behaviour, no operator
# action, which is the only migration story this key was allowed to have.
# `build_roster()` reads this and nothing else decides the shape.
#
# Declared, it REPLACES those five keys rather than extending them. Each entry
# Declared, it REPLACES those six keys rather than extending them. Each entry
# names its own actuator, its own rating and its own sensors:
#
# inverters:
@@ -56,23 +56,58 @@ options:
# soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_a_soc
# batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_a_battery_power
# max_w: 5000
# bms_soc_floor: 10
# - name: inverter-b
# setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w
# soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_soc
# batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power
# max_w: 3000
# max_w: 4600
# bms_soc_floor: 10
#
# ⚠️ THE 4600 IS INVERTER B'S DATASHEET FIGURE, NOT A MEASUREMENT AND NOT A
# PLACEHOLDER. SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) identified B as a GoodWe GW5048D-ES,
# serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, whose datasheet gives Max. Charging / Discharging
# Power as 4600 W; nothing will be connected to its MPPTs, so the battery path
# is the ceiling and the 5000 VA AC nameplate is not. The 3000 W this example
# used to carry was a guess made before the unit was known. ⚠️ It is STILL not
# measured: the datasheet prints 4600 W under BATTERY INPUT DATA, so it may be
# DC, and `max_w` is graded against 0x0518 - the inverter's own AC power. If it
# is DC the AC ceiling is nearer 4324 W. SAFETY-20's `min(max_w, dev_max)` is
# what settles that once the device range is read; see goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b,
# which records both readings and picks neither.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE `bms_soc_floor: 10` BESIDE IT IS FROM THE SAME PLACE - THE
# DATASHEET AND THE SERIAL, NOT A PACK ANYONE HAS READ. No second inverter
# exists on this site (SPIKE-04, ≈ 2026-09-12 for B); the cut-out must be read
# off the pack that is actually installed (register 0x0560 on the reference
# unit) before that pack is commanded. It reads 10 here because pack A reads
# 10, which makes this example DEGENERATE ON THE FLOOR AXIS: a site whose two
# packs floor at the SAME percent cannot separate `min`, `max`, first or last
# over the roster, and every SAFETY-32 fixture that DIFFERS the floors differs
# it for exactly that reason. Do not "simplify" those fixtures to match this
# example.
#
# ⚠️ NOTHING IS INHERITED FROM THE FLAT KEYS BY AN ENTRY THAT OMITS IT, and
# that is the whole of DEV-02 restated as a config rule. `soc`, `batt` and the
# rating became per-instance precisely so that no inverter is ever graded
# against a sibling's numbers; an entry silently inheriting `soc_entity` would
# rebuild that defect in YAML. `name`, `setpoint_entity` and `max_w` are
# therefore REQUIRED of every entry (the schema below enforces it, and
# rebuild that defect in YAML. `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and
# `bms_soc_floor` are therefore REQUIRED of every entry (the schema below enforces it, and
# validate.py rule 9 enforces it again for the callers the Supervisor never
# sees). An omitted `soc_entity`/`batt_entity` means THIS UNIT HAS NO SUCH
# SENSOR - `inputs_ok` already stops the site for that - and never means
# "use the other one's".
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32: `bms_soc_floor` IS PER ENTRY AND IS REQUIRED, NOT DEFAULTED.
# It is the percent THAT pack's own BMS cuts out at, and two batteries of
# different models do not share one. A default would be this add-on inventing
# a cut-out for a battery it has not been told about, which is the same defect
# as inheriting one: the shallower pack gets protected by a floor that belongs
# to the deeper pack, and validate.py rule 8 - which refuses a peak_soc_floor
# the BMS would win against - would be grading the wrong number. Rule 8 grades
# EVERY entry and names the one it refuses. The flat key below is unchanged and
# is the single-inverter shape's own cut-out.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE FLAT `setpoint_entity` MUST THEN BE BLANK. Leaving it set while a
# roster is declared is two config sites aimed at actuators, one of which
# nothing writes; if it names an entity an entry also names, SAFETY-28's
@@ -91,9 +126,12 @@ options:
# validator answers `Missing option 'inverters' in root` for every existing
# options blob, and the upgrade leaves an add-on that cannot start.
inverters: []
estop_fitted: false
# --- P1 meter ingestion (specs §5.2 / §14 `meter:`) -------------------------
# `off` keeps the original single meter_entity path above, so an existing
# ==========================================================================
# METER - where the grid reading comes from
# ==========================================================================
# `off` keeps the original single `meter_entity` path, so an existing
# install is untouched until it opts in. ha_dsmr subscribes to the DSMR
# integration's entities over the HA WebSocket; mqtt_p1 reads the topic below;
# ha_signed reads ONE signed HA entity (+ import / - export), which is what a
@@ -104,209 +142,62 @@ options:
# nothing at all for a repeated reading - so it is the only mode a firmware
# watchdog may threshold. See DOCS.md.
meter_source: "off"
meter_entity: sensor.p1_meter_active_power
meter_invert: false
meter_phases: 1
meter_max_age_s: 30
meter_mqtt_topic: ""
# homewizard_local only. The meter's own address, `host` or `host:port`.
p1_host: ""
# homewizard_local only. Seconds between polls. Must be well under
# meter_max_age_s - the age is never fresher than this interval - and there is
# nothing to gain below the meter's own ~5.0 s update rate (NOTES.md:640).
meter_poll_s: 5
meter_max_age_s: 30
meter_mqtt_topic: ""
# The two UNSIGNED Belgian registers. The EMS derives net power from them
# (import - export); do NOT point these at a signed template sensor.
p1_import_entity: ""
p1_export_entity: ""
# Optional, in L1..L3 order. Required for the capacity-tariff peak on a
# three-phase connection; the list length must equal meter_phases.
p1_phase_import_entities: []
p1_phase_export_entities: []
# ha_signed only. ONE signed net-power sensor: positive = import from the
# grid, negative = export to it. Do NOT split it into two template sensors -
# the split is done in the add-on (p1.split_signed) precisely so the sign
# convention is tested rather than living in unreviewed YAML.
p1_net_entity: ""
# Optional, in L1..L3 order. Required for the capacity-tariff peak on a
# three-phase connection; the list length must equal meter_phases.
p1_phase_import_entities: []
p1_phase_export_entities: []
# Optional, in L1..L3 order, each one signed the same way. Same role as
# p1_phase_import_entities: the capacity-tariff peak on a three-phase
# connection. The list length must equal meter_phases.
p1_phase_net_entities: []
# --- control ---------------------------------------------------------------
# ==========================================================================
# RATINGS AND LIMITS - what this site is allowed to do
# ==========================================================================
max_w: 2000
gain: 0.6
slew_w: 1000
deadband_w: 15
target_grid_w: -10
step_w: 10
saturation_w: 500
saturation_cycles: 3
integrator_max_w: 0
heartbeat_s: 10
stale_input_s: 15
cycle_floor_s: 15
auto_start: false
# --- SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement watchdog ----------------------------------
# Trips when the emitted setpoint and the P1 net figure point OPPOSITE ways,
# both over sign_disagree_w, continuously for sign_disagree_s. Action: 0 W and
# a failsafe that latches until an operator starts control again.
# The pack's OWN cut-out percent - what the BMS enforces whatever
# `peak_soc_floor` is set to. Register 0x0560 reads 10 on the reference
# GW5000S-BP, consistent with DoD 90. It is here so validate.py can REFUSE a
# peak_soc_floor at or below it: such a floor can never bind, the BMS wins,
# and the status page would report an energy backstop that does not exist.
#
# Both defaults are measured, not chosen. On the captured healthy day
# (2026-08-23) the longest legitimate opposed run - a load step the loop has
# not caught up with - is 30 s, and sign agreement over the gated samples is
# 93.4 %. On the captured fault day (2026-08-20) the clusters run 0.0-10.5 %
# agreement with opposed runs up to 1752 s. 300 W / 180 s sits in the middle of
# a very wide gap: at 60 s the healthy day still trips nothing, at 300 s the
# fault day still trips 13 times. There is no reason to move either number
# without a capture that says so. They are options because the AC says
# thresholds are defaults rather than constants - not because they are knobs
# anyone is expected to turn.
#
# ⚠️ sign_disagree_w must stay BELOW max_w or the watchdog can never fire (the
# arbiter bounds the command to +-max_w). validate.py refuses that config.
sign_disagree_w: 300
sign_disagree_s: 180
# --- SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement watchdog ---------------------
# ⚠️ A DIFFERENT COMPARISON, NOT A SECOND COPY OF THE ONE ABOVE, AND IT IS
# ARMED ONLY WHEN THIS SITE HAS MORE THAN ONE INVERTER. The pair above grades
# the SITE's total command against P1 - one meter, one grid connection. This
# pair grades EACH inverter's own share against THAT inverter's own measured
# power (holding register 0x0518), and it catches the fault the meter cannot
# answer for once there are two units: a unit doing the opposite of what it
# was told, while its sibling covers for it and P1 reads exactly what a
# healthy site reads.
#
# At ONE inverter these two keys do nothing at all. §6.2's identity makes the
# site's total command that inverter's command, so the pair above is already
# asking this question of the same actuator, and arming a second detector
# would be two latches and two banners for one fault.
#
# Both defaults are measured on admin/goodwe's two-master rig, over 1890
# closed-loop runs in which nothing is faulty, swept across the whole range
# this file accepts for `gain` and `slew_w`. 250 W is `saturation_w / 2`, so
# the smallest divergence this can see is exactly the gap at which the control
# law itself already says the inverter is not following; 85 s is 8.5x the
# worst legitimate opposition those runs produce (10.0 s), 2.8x the firmware's
# own 30 s link veto, and under half the 180 s the site check takes. See
# app/watchdog.py's SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS and
# DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md.
#
# ⚠️ unit_sign_disagree_w must stay BELOW max_w, for sign_disagree_w's reason:
# a share is bounded to +-max_w, so a threshold at or above it can never fire.
# validate.py refuses that config.
unit_sign_disagree_w: 250
unit_sign_disagree_s: 85
# --- SAFETY-30 SITE sign-disagreement watchdog -----------------------------
# ⚠️ THE SAME COMPARISON `sign_disagree_*` MAKES, AT THE ROSTER WHERE IT STOPS
# BEING A STATEMENT ABOUT ONE INVERTER. At two or more units the SUM of the
# standing commands is graded against P1, and the trip stops the whole site -
# what it catches is the site being asked for the wrong thing, which every
# per-inverter check is blind to because each unit is faithfully executing its
# share. At ONE inverter these two keys do nothing: `sign_disagree_*` above is
# already asking this of the same actuator.
#
# The threshold is the shipped 300 W, CARRIED, and the reason is that the
# argument behind it does not depend on the roster: near zero the sign is
# noise, the deadband is 15 W, and there is one P1 whatever is behind it.
#
# ⚠️ THE WINDOW IS NOT CARRIED, AND THAT IS A MEASUREMENT. The transient 180 s
# exists to reject is the loop crossing zero after a load reversal, and the
# command has to travel the whole SITE rail at `slew_w` per cycle - a rail
# that is the roster sum while `slew_w` is not. On 1890 two-inverter runs in
# which nothing is faulty, the worst continuous legitimate opposition at 300 W
# is 110 s at one inverter and 215 s at two: carrying 180 s across would have
# shipped a false trip reachable at `gain: 0.05`, `slew_w: 50` and an ordinary
# 2.2 kW load reversal. 325 s is 1.51x that, inside the 900 s billing quarter,
# and still inside every episode of the 2026-08-20 fault day.
site_sign_disagree_w: 300
site_sign_disagree_s: 325
# --- SAFETY-18 frozen-but-fresh meter detector -----------------------------
# Seconds the meter may keep answering with an UNCHANGED measurement while the
# command stands at the rail before the add-on raises an alarm. Both halves
# are required: neither one alone is safe, and app/freeze.py carries why.
#
# ALARM ONLY. It does not command 0 W and does not latch. A false trip parks
# the battery; a false notification costs an alert.
#
# ⚠️ Only `meter_source: homewizard_local` can see this at all - it is the
# only transport that reads the meter's own document. On every other source
# the status page says NOT COVERED rather than "armed".
#
# 300 s is measured, not chosen. Over 2399 s of the live house at the
# converged operating point (sim/scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz, mean
# grid -14.2 W, 1194 polls, 735 of them repeating the previous reading) the
# LONGEST run without a distinct reading is 15.4 s (the largest unchanged_s any
# sample observes is 8.0 s). 300 s is 19.5x the pessimistic figure, and
# still inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff.
meter_freeze_s: 300
# --- SAFETY-31: circulating power ------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THESE TWO LINES ARE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH FOR THESE DEFAULTS, and
# `app/circulation.py`'s `CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS` is the ONE in-code copy - the
# Dockerfile does not put this file in the image, so the running add-on cannot
# read it. test_watchdog.py pins the copy by READING these lines, so a drift
# goes red in CI rather than shipping. Add a third option in three places -
# options:, schema:, CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS - and in no fourth.
#
# Circulating power is sum(|Bi|) - |sum(Bi)| over MEASURED per-inverter power:
# two inverters pushing against each other, which NETS TO ZERO AT THE METER
# and is therefore invisible to every other guard in this add-on. Both numbers
# below were measured on the TEST-19 two-master rig over 924 closed-loop runs
# in which nothing was faulty; circulation.py carries the curve they were read
# off and the argument for each. They are NOT sensitivity preferences.
#
# Both are ignored at one inverter, where the quantity is identically zero.
circulation_w: 700
circulation_hold_s: 75
# --- maintenance -----------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THESE EIGHT LINES ARE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH FOR THE MAINTENANCE
# DEFAULTS. The Supervisor reads this file and the operator edits this file,
# so nothing else in the add-on gets an opinion about what a missing
# `maintenance_*` key means. There is exactly ONE in-code copy -
# `app/maintenance.py`'s `MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` - because the Dockerfile does
# not put this file in the image and the running add-on therefore cannot read
# it; test_maintenance.py pins that copy by READING these lines, so a drift
# goes red in CI rather than shipping. main.py and validate.py both read the
# mirror and type no number of their own.
#
# Before this card the same defaults were written down three times and had
# already disagreed: this block said 2000 while main.py and MaintConfig said
# 2500, so an options dict with the key ABSENT passed validation at 2000 and
# then ran at 2500 against a 2000 W ceiling - a silent 0 W arbiter
# contradiction. Changing one of these numbers now moves every consumer.
maintenance_enabled: false
maintenance_interval_days: 28
maintenance_start_hour: 10
# ⚠️ BOTH MUST STAY AT OR BELOW max_w, and that is why they are 2000 rather
# than the 2500 they shipped as. The cheap-window charge shaping asks the
# arbiter for `hi = -maintenance_charge_w` against the supervised `lo =
# -max_w`: above the ceiling that is `lo > hi`, a contradiction resolved to
# 0 W, so maintenance would SILENTLY NEVER CHARGE in a cheap window on a
# default install. validate.py refuses that config (rule 6), so these
# defaults had to become self-consistent with the max_w above rather than
# ship a configuration the validator rejects.
#
# The discharge side is clamped rather than contradicted - it drains at max_w
# and the arbiter says so - so it is only warned about; it is 2000 here for
# symmetry and to keep the shipped config warning-free.
#
# Raising max_w (the live reference install runs 5000) is what unlocks a
# faster maintenance cycle. Raise max_w FIRST, then these.
maintenance_discharge_w: 2000
maintenance_charge_w: 2000
maintenance_soc_floor: 11
maintenance_soc_target: 99
maintenance_hold_min: 120
# --- tariff / capacity tariff (all optional) ------------------------------
peak_forecast_entity: ""
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32 - THIS KEY DESCRIBES ONE PACK, so it is the SINGLE-INVERTER
# shape's number and nothing more. Declare an `inverters:` roster and each
# entry states its own `bms_soc_floor`; this one is not read at all and is
# not inherited by any entry. Rule 8 then grades every unit separately, which
# is the whole of that card: one cut-out for two packs of different models
# protects the shallower pack with the deeper pack's number.
bms_soc_floor: 10
peak_cap_w: 3500
peak_forecast_entity: ""
# --- SAFETY-24: the energy backstop under SAFETY-07's forced discharge -----
# The peak guard can COMMAND a discharge to hold a billed quarter under
# peak_cap_w. Until this card it was bounded from below by nothing but the
# pack's own BMS cut-out - a real floor, but the PACK's protection rather than
@@ -350,31 +241,10 @@ options:
# loop-side reserve and is waiting on the product owner. Until that is
# answered, the BMS is the only floor under self-consumption.
peak_soc_floor: 20
# The pack's OWN cut-out percent - what the BMS enforces whatever is set
# above. Register 0x0560 reads 10 on the reference GW5000S-BP, consistent with
# DoD 90. It is here so validate.py can REFUSE a peak_soc_floor at or below
# it: such a floor can never bind, the BMS wins, and the status page would
# report an energy backstop that does not exist.
bms_soc_floor: 10
# ⚠️ THE OLD PRICE PATH, AND IT IS NOT DEAD YET. These two entities are the
# add-on delegating the whole price question to Home Assistant: main.py reads
# both and derives ONE BOOLEAN, `cheap = now <= avg`, which is consumed by
# nothing except the maintenance cycle's cheap-window charge floor. That is
# all they have ever done. They are kept, because retiring them would take
# the maintenance cycle's only price signal away on a live install before
# anything replaces it - TARIFF-03 (static profile) and OPT-04 (arbitrage)
# are the cards that replace it, and neither has landed.
#
# ⚠️ They may NOT be combined with price_provider below. Two price sources on
# one site, one of which silently wins, is exactly the "double up" the PM
# named; validate.py rule 7 refuses that configuration at startup rather than
# letting an operator believe the provider they configured is driving
# something. See app/validate.py.
price_now_entity: ""
price_avg_entity: ""
# --- price providers (TARIFF-02, specs §9.3 / §14 `tariffs:`) --------------
# ==========================================================================
# TARIFF - what energy costs, and whether to trade on it
# ==========================================================================
# `off` is the shipped default and means the §11.4 no-price-data row applies:
# static profile, plan provisional, NO ARBITRAGE. Nothing in 0.5.x consumes
# the series yet - OPT-04 is the consumer - so turning this on today fetches,
@@ -393,12 +263,12 @@ options:
price_provider: "off"
price_markup_eur_kwh: 0.03
price_taxes_eur_kwh: 0.06
price_csv_path: "/share/goodwe_prices.csv"
price_feed_url: ""
price_horizon_h: 48
price_timeout_s: 10
# --- static / fully-fixed tariffs (TARIFF-03, specs §9.2 / §11.4) ----------
# §9.3: injection is priced SEPARATELY, and in Belgium it is often near zero -
# which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export. A scalar, not
# a second series: no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve.
export_price_eur_kwh: 0.04
# §14's `tariffs.static_profile`, and "" is its `null`. §9.2: "a large share
# of the installed base is on [a static profile]" - this is what makes those
# sites first-class rather than "price_provider: off, good luck".
@@ -428,13 +298,28 @@ options:
# to fall back to and a dead feed leaves the site with no tariff at all.
# validate.py warns about exactly that.
static_profile: ""
price_csv_path: "/share/goodwe_prices.csv"
price_feed_url: ""
price_horizon_h: 48
price_timeout_s: 10
# §9.3: injection is priced SEPARATELY, and in Belgium it is often near zero -
# which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export. A scalar, not
# a second series: no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve.
export_price_eur_kwh: 0.04
# ⚠️ THE OLD PRICE PATH, AND IT IS NOT DEAD YET. These two entities are the
# add-on delegating the whole price question to Home Assistant: main.py reads
# both and derives ONE BOOLEAN, `cheap = now <= avg`, which is consumed by
# nothing except the maintenance cycle's cheap-window charge floor. That is
# all they have ever done. They are kept, because retiring them would take
# the maintenance cycle's only price signal away on a live install before
# anything replaces it - TARIFF-03 (static profile) and OPT-04 (arbitrage)
# are the cards that replace it, and neither has landed.
#
# ⚠️ They may NOT be combined with `price_provider`. Two price sources on
# one site, one of which silently wins, is exactly the "double up" the PM
# named; validate.py rule 7 refuses that configuration at startup rather than
# letting an operator believe the provider they configured is driving
# something. See app/validate.py.
price_now_entity: ""
price_avg_entity: ""
# --- price arbitrage (OPT-04, specs §10.1 priority 3 / §17) ---------------
# Charge in the cheapest published hour, discharge in the dearest, and ONLY
# when the spread covers what the round trip costs. Off in the shipped
# configuration: this is the first strategy in the add-on that moves energy
@@ -455,10 +340,12 @@ options:
# owner; the code is correct at any value and no number was picked to make a
# trade appear.
arbitrage_enabled: false
# §10.1's `cycle_cost_threshold_eur`: what one full round trip costs per kWh
# - the wear on the pack plus the conversion losses. A spread below this is
# a cycle that loses money and pack life, so it is not taken.
cycle_cost_threshold_eur: 0.10
# The reserve arbitrage may not spend, and the headroom it may not overfill.
# Deliberately NOT the maintenance_soc_* keys: those describe a monthly
# balancing cycle, and pointing a trading strategy at them would couple two
@@ -466,17 +353,222 @@ options:
arbitrage_soc_floor: 20
arbitrage_soc_ceiling: 95
# --- site ------------------------------------------------------------------
estop_fitted: false
# ==========================================================================
# MAINTENANCE - the monthly battery recalibration cycle
# ==========================================================================
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THESE EIGHT LINES ARE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH FOR THE MAINTENANCE
# DEFAULTS. The Supervisor reads this file and the operator edits this file,
# so nothing else in the add-on gets an opinion about what a missing
# `maintenance_*` key means. There is exactly ONE in-code copy -
# `app/maintenance.py`'s `MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` - because the Dockerfile does
# not put this file in the image and the running add-on therefore cannot read
# it; test_maintenance.py pins that copy by READING these lines, so a drift
# goes red in CI rather than shipping. main.py and validate.py both read the
# mirror and type no number of their own.
#
# Before this card the same defaults were written down three times and had
# already disagreed: this block said 2000 while main.py and MaintConfig said
# 2500, so an options dict with the key ABSENT passed validation at 2000 and
# then ran at 2500 against a 2000 W ceiling - a silent 0 W arbiter
# contradiction. Changing one of these numbers now moves every consumer.
maintenance_enabled: false
maintenance_interval_days: 28
maintenance_start_hour: 10
# ⚠️ BOTH MUST STAY AT OR BELOW max_w, and that is why they are 2000 rather
# than the 2500 they shipped as. The cheap-window charge shaping asks the
# arbiter for `hi = -maintenance_charge_w` against the supervised `lo =
# -max_w`: above the ceiling that is `lo > hi`, a contradiction resolved to
# 0 W, so maintenance would SILENTLY NEVER CHARGE in a cheap window on a
# default install. validate.py refuses that config (rule 6), so these
# defaults had to become self-consistent with the max_w above rather than
# ship a configuration the validator rejects.
#
# The discharge side is clamped rather than contradicted - it drains at max_w
# and the arbiter says so - so it is only warned about; it is 2000 here for
# symmetry and to keep the shipped config warning-free.
#
# Raising max_w (the live reference install runs 5000) is what unlocks a
# faster maintenance cycle. Raise max_w FIRST, then these.
maintenance_discharge_w: 2000
maintenance_charge_w: 2000
maintenance_soc_floor: 11
maintenance_soc_target: 99
maintenance_hold_min: 120
# ==========================================================================
# SAFETY - DERIVED CONSTANTS. Every number below was measured. Do not change
# one without re-deriving it
# ==========================================================================
# Trips when the emitted setpoint and the P1 net figure point OPPOSITE ways,
# both over sign_disagree_w, continuously for sign_disagree_s. Action: 0 W and
# a failsafe that latches until an operator starts control again.
#
# Both defaults are measured, not chosen. On the captured healthy day
# (2026-08-23) the longest legitimate opposed run - a load step the loop has
# not caught up with - is 30 s, and sign agreement over the gated samples is
# 93.4 %. On the captured fault day (2026-08-20) the clusters run 0.0-10.5 %
# agreement with opposed runs up to 1752 s. 300 W / 180 s sits in the middle of
# a very wide gap: at 60 s the healthy day still trips nothing, at 300 s the
# fault day still trips 13 times. There is no reason to move either number
# without a capture that says so. They are options because the AC says
# thresholds are defaults rather than constants - not because they are knobs
# anyone is expected to turn.
#
# ⚠️ sign_disagree_w must stay BELOW max_w or the watchdog can never fire (the
# arbiter bounds the command to +-max_w). validate.py refuses that config.
sign_disagree_w: 300
sign_disagree_s: 180
# ⚠️ A DIFFERENT COMPARISON, NOT A SECOND COPY OF THE ONE ABOVE, AND IT IS
# ARMED ONLY WHEN THIS SITE HAS MORE THAN ONE INVERTER. The pair above grades
# the SITE's total command against P1 - one meter, one grid connection. This
# pair grades EACH inverter's own share against THAT inverter's own measured
# power (holding register 0x0518), and it catches the fault the meter cannot
# answer for once there are two units: a unit doing the opposite of what it
# was told, while its sibling covers for it and P1 reads exactly what a
# healthy site reads.
#
# At ONE inverter these two keys do nothing at all. §6.2's identity makes the
# site's total command that inverter's command, so the pair above is already
# asking this question of the same actuator, and arming a second detector
# would be two latches and two banners for one fault.
#
# Both defaults are measured on admin/goodwe's two-master rig, over 1890
# closed-loop runs in which nothing is faulty, swept across the whole range
# this file accepts for `gain` and `slew_w`. 250 W is `saturation_w / 2`, so
# the smallest divergence this can see is exactly the gap at which the control
# law itself already says the inverter is not following; 85 s is 8.5x the
# worst legitimate opposition those runs produce (10.0 s), 2.8x the firmware's
# own 30 s link veto, and under half the 180 s the site check takes. See
# app/watchdog.py's SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS and
# DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md.
#
# ⚠️ unit_sign_disagree_w must stay BELOW max_w, for sign_disagree_w's reason:
# a share is bounded to +-max_w, so a threshold at or above it can never fire.
# validate.py refuses that config.
unit_sign_disagree_w: 250
unit_sign_disagree_s: 85
# ⚠️ THE SAME COMPARISON `sign_disagree_*` MAKES, AT THE ROSTER WHERE IT STOPS
# BEING A STATEMENT ABOUT ONE INVERTER. At two or more units the SUM of the
# standing commands is graded against P1, and the trip stops the whole site -
# what it catches is the site being asked for the wrong thing, which every
# per-inverter check is blind to because each unit is faithfully executing its
# share. At ONE inverter these two keys do nothing: `sign_disagree_*` above is
# already asking this of the same actuator.
#
# The threshold is the shipped 300 W, CARRIED, and the reason is that the
# argument behind it does not depend on the roster: near zero the sign is
# noise, the deadband is 15 W, and there is one P1 whatever is behind it.
#
# ⚠️ THE WINDOW IS NOT CARRIED, AND THAT IS A MEASUREMENT. The transient 180 s
# exists to reject is the loop crossing zero after a load reversal, and the
# command has to travel the whole SITE rail at `slew_w` per cycle - a rail
# that is the roster sum while `slew_w` is not. On 1890 two-inverter runs in
# which nothing is faulty, the worst continuous legitimate opposition at 300 W
# is 110 s at one inverter and 215 s at two: carrying 180 s across would have
# shipped a false trip reachable at `gain: 0.05`, `slew_w: 50` and an ordinary
# 2.2 kW load reversal. 325 s is 1.51x that, inside the 900 s billing quarter,
# and still inside every episode of the 2026-08-20 fault day.
site_sign_disagree_w: 300
site_sign_disagree_s: 325
# Seconds the meter may keep answering with an UNCHANGED measurement while the
# command stands at the rail before the add-on raises an alarm. Both halves
# are required: neither one alone is safe, and app/freeze.py carries why.
#
# ALARM ONLY. It does not command 0 W and does not latch. A false trip parks
# the battery; a false notification costs an alert.
#
# ⚠️ Only `meter_source: homewizard_local` can see this at all - it is the
# only transport that reads the meter's own document. On every other source
# the status page says NOT COVERED rather than "armed".
#
# 300 s is measured, not chosen. Over 2399 s of the live house at the
# converged operating point (sim/scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz, mean
# grid -14.2 W, 1194 polls, 735 of them repeating the previous reading) the
# LONGEST run without a distinct reading is 15.4 s (the largest unchanged_s any
# sample observes is 8.0 s). 300 s is 19.5x the pessimistic figure, and
# still inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff.
meter_freeze_s: 300
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THESE TWO LINES ARE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH FOR THESE DEFAULTS, and
# `app/circulation.py`'s `CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS` is the ONE in-code copy - the
# Dockerfile does not put this file in the image, so the running add-on cannot
# read it. test_watchdog.py pins the copy by READING these lines, so a drift
# goes red in CI rather than shipping. Add a third option in three places -
# options:, schema:, CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS - and in no fourth.
#
# Circulating power is sum(|Bi|) - |sum(Bi)| over MEASURED per-inverter power:
# two inverters pushing against each other, which NETS TO ZERO AT THE METER
# and is therefore invisible to every other guard in this add-on. Both numbers
# below were measured on the TEST-19 two-master rig over 924 closed-loop runs
# in which nothing was faulty; circulation.py carries the curve they were read
# off and the argument for each. They are NOT sensitivity preferences.
#
# Both are ignored at one inverter, where the quantity is identically zero.
circulation_w: 700
circulation_hold_s: 75
# ==========================================================================
# ADVANCED - the control law and diagnostics
# ==========================================================================
auto_start: false
gain: 0.6
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39. 0 IS NOT "UNSET" AND IT IS NOT "NO LIMIT" - IT IS "FOLLOW THE
# RAIL", and it is the shipped value. `control.slew_limit_w()` resolves it to
# `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, which is 222 W against the 2000 W default here,
# 556 W against the live install's 5000 W, and 1067 W against the ~9600 W a
# second inverter makes of the site. `integrator_max_w: 0` two lines down has
# meant exactly this since it was added; this key now means it too.
#
# ⚠️ WHY IT IS A RATIO AND NOT A NUMBER, WHICH IS THE WHOLE OF THIS CARD. It
# WAS a number: 1000, derived 2026-08-22 against a clamp of 1500 W
# (goodwe/NOTES.md, "Simulated 2 kW load step (gain 0.6, clamp 1500)") on the
# grounds that it caps "how far the loop can jump ahead of the inverter". The
# rail then went to 5000 on the live install and the constant did not move, so
# 1000 W per 2 s tick crossed the whole output range in 10 s against a plant
# NOTES.md §5.10 measured at ~18 s up / ~23 s down. Measured on the owner's
# system 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46: a 3.4 kW export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000
# in five ticks, the battery to -5154 W past a 5000 VA rating, and the grid
# from 3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT. Large (>= 900 W) steps per 30 min
# went 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 that morning. Nothing was broken; the rail moved.
#
# An explicit number is still accepted and is not clamped - the live install
# has run 400 since 2026-09-05 12:00, which is slower than the rail implies
# and is fine. What validate.py rule 10 refuses is a number FASTER than the
# rail implies, because at that setting the stated limit is not the limit and
# the layer that overrules it is the plant, which has no status row.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE COST IS REAL AND IS NOT HIDDEN: following the rail is slower to
# converge than 1000 was. Measured over 51 export steps on the in-repo model
# (test_control.py) the largest tick step falls from 1000 W to 556 W and the
# >= 900 W step disappears from every run - but the OVER-ABSORPTION does not
# move, because that is a `gain` term and not a slew term. See
# DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md, which says so at length rather
# than letting this card be read as more than it is.
slew_w: 0
deadband_w: 15
target_grid_w: -10
step_w: 10
saturation_w: 500
saturation_cycles: 3
integrator_max_w: 0
heartbeat_s: 10
stale_input_s: 15
cycle_floor_s: 15
log_level: info
schema:
meter_entity: str
meter_invert: bool
# ==========================================================================
# HARDWARE - the inverter, its actuator and its own sensors
# ==========================================================================
setpoint_entity: str
soc_entity: str
batt_entity: str
batt_invert: bool
setpoint_entity: str
# CFG-04. THE ONE LIST-OF-OBJECTS IN THIS FILE, and see the options block for
# the measurement that says Supervisor 2026.08.0 accepts it: nested types are
@@ -500,44 +592,121 @@ schema:
- name: str
setpoint_entity: str
max_w: int(100,5000)
bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)
soc_entity: str?
batt_entity: str?
batt_invert: bool?
estop_fitted: bool
# ==========================================================================
# METER - where the grid reading comes from
# ==========================================================================
meter_source: list(off|ha_dsmr|mqtt_p1|ha_signed|homewizard_local)
meter_entity: str
meter_invert: bool
# ⚠️ 2 is accepted by this range but is not a real Belgian connection. A
# telegram whose phase count disagrees is rejected at ingest and logged, so a
# mis-set 2 shows up immediately as "0 telegrams accepted" rather than as a
# quietly wrong number.
meter_phases: int(1,3)
meter_max_age_s: int(5,300)
meter_poll_s: int(1,60)
meter_mqtt_topic: str?
p1_host: str?
meter_poll_s: int(1,60)
meter_max_age_s: int(5,300)
meter_mqtt_topic: str?
p1_import_entity: str?
p1_export_entity: str?
p1_net_entity: str?
p1_phase_import_entities:
- str
p1_phase_export_entities:
- str
p1_net_entity: str?
p1_phase_net_entities:
- str
# ==========================================================================
# RATINGS AND LIMITS - what this site is allowed to do
# ==========================================================================
max_w: int(100,5000)
gain: float(0.05,1.0)
slew_w: int(50,5000)
deadband_w: int(0,500)
target_grid_w: float(-200,200)
step_w: int(1,100)
saturation_w: int(100,2000)
saturation_cycles: int(1,10)
integrator_max_w: int(0,15000)
heartbeat_s: int(2,25)
stale_input_s: int(5,120)
cycle_floor_s: int(5,60)
auto_start: bool
bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)
peak_cap_w: int(500,15000)
peak_forecast_entity: str?
# SAFETY-24. No "off" value: a guard that can command a discharge does not get
# a supported way to have no energy bound at all. The ranges OVERLAP on
# purpose - the schema cannot express "above bms_soc_floor", so validate.py
# rule 8 is what refuses the pair, with a message naming both numbers.
peak_soc_floor: int(5,60)
# ==========================================================================
# TARIFF - what energy costs, and whether to trade on it
# ==========================================================================
# ⚠️ The provider list is written out rather than left as `str`, so the
# Supervisor rejects a typo in the UI. validate.py ALSO refuses an unknown id
# against app/price.py's PROVIDERS registry, because sim/inject.py and the
# checks reach validate_startup_config() with a dict the Supervisor never saw.
# Adding a sixth plugin means adding it here and to PROVIDERS - and nowhere
# else, which is AC2.
price_provider: list(off|generic_dayahead|engie_dynamic|totalenergies_dynamic|eneco_eddy|manual_csv)
price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_taxes_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
# ⚠️ The lower bound is NEGATIVE on purpose. Belgian injection tariffs have
# gone below zero (you pay to export at midday in summer), and a schema that
# bottoms out at 0 would make that site inexpressible.
export_price_eur_kwh: float(-1,1)
# A JSON string rather than a nested schema, deliberately: it is ONE option
# key (§14 has one), it survives config.yaml's flat options block, and
# parse_static_profile() accepts an already-parsed dict too, so a future
# nested schema is a config.yaml change and no code change at all.
static_profile: str?
price_csv_path: str?
price_feed_url: str?
price_horizon_h: int(1,72)
price_timeout_s: int(2,60)
price_now_entity: str?
price_avg_entity: str?
# OPT-04. ⚠️ The threshold's lower bound is 0 and not negative: it is a COST,
# and a negative one is a threshold every spread clears - arbitrage with the
# brake removed. app/arbitrage.py refuses it in code too, because
# validate_startup_config() is also sim/inject.py's entry point and can be
# handed any dict at all.
arbitrage_enabled: bool
cycle_cost_threshold_eur: float(0,1)
arbitrage_soc_floor: int(5,95)
arbitrage_soc_ceiling: int(10,100)
# ==========================================================================
# MAINTENANCE - the monthly battery recalibration cycle
# ==========================================================================
# ⚠️ CFG-03 - THIS IS WHERE A RANGE LIVES, AND THE ONLY PLACE IT LIVES. The
# `options:` block above holds the DEFAULT; this block holds the BOUNDS, and
# `MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` deliberately mirrors the former and not the latter -
# the Supervisor is what enforces a range and the Supervisor reads only this
# file, so a second copy of `int(500,5000)` in Python would be a place to
# disagree and nothing else. What is NOT expressible here is a relation
# BETWEEN keys: `maintenance_charge_w` must also stay at or below `max_w`, the
# schema grammar has no way to say so, and that is why validate.py's rule 6 is
# written in code instead. Add a ninth maintenance option in three places -
# options:, schema:, MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS - and in no fourth.
maintenance_enabled: bool
maintenance_interval_days: int(1,90)
maintenance_start_hour: int(0,23)
maintenance_discharge_w: int(500,5000)
maintenance_charge_w: int(500,5000)
maintenance_soc_floor: int(5,30)
maintenance_soc_target: int(50,100)
maintenance_hold_min: int(5,480)
# ==========================================================================
# SAFETY - DERIVED CONSTANTS. Every number below was measured. Do not change
# one without re-deriving it
# ==========================================================================
# No "off" value, deliberately: this is a P0 safety check and the schema is
# not the place to make disarming it a supported configuration.
sign_disagree_w: int(50,5000)
@@ -553,6 +722,7 @@ schema:
# this range puts the guard outside the regime it can be answered for, and the
# floor does not have to be a knee the way `circulation_w`'s does.
unit_sign_disagree_w: int(50,5000)
# The floor of 30 is `inverter.LINK_STALE_S`, the firmware's own veto window:
# below it, a unit not executing its share is a LINK fault the add-on already
# answers by dropping the unit from the split, and firing inside that window
@@ -593,6 +763,7 @@ schema:
# fault. A configurable value under 400 W would be a false-alarm generator
# that this project's own doctrine (SAFETY-15, SAFETY-19) forbids shipping.
circulation_w: int(400,5000)
# The floor of 30 is `inverter.LINK_STALE_S`: below the firmware's own veto
# window a unit still executing a stale share is a LINK fault the add-on
# already handles by dropping it from the split, and firing inside that window
@@ -601,68 +772,28 @@ schema:
# loop must be caught and acted on well inside one.
circulation_hold_s: int(30,900)
# ⚠️ CFG-03 - THIS IS WHERE A RANGE LIVES, AND THE ONLY PLACE IT LIVES. The
# `options:` block above holds the DEFAULT; this block holds the BOUNDS, and
# `MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` deliberately mirrors the former and not the latter -
# the Supervisor is what enforces a range and the Supervisor reads only this
# file, so a second copy of `int(500,5000)` in Python would be a place to
# disagree and nothing else. What is NOT expressible here is a relation
# BETWEEN keys: `maintenance_charge_w` must also stay at or below `max_w`, the
# schema grammar has no way to say so, and that is why validate.py's rule 6 is
# written in code instead. Add a ninth maintenance option in three places -
# options:, schema:, MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS - and in no fourth.
maintenance_enabled: bool
maintenance_interval_days: int(1,90)
maintenance_start_hour: int(0,23)
maintenance_discharge_w: int(500,5000)
maintenance_charge_w: int(500,5000)
maintenance_soc_floor: int(5,30)
maintenance_soc_target: int(50,100)
maintenance_hold_min: int(5,480)
# ==========================================================================
# ADVANCED - the control law and diagnostics
# ==========================================================================
auto_start: bool
gain: float(0.05,1.0)
peak_forecast_entity: str?
peak_cap_w: int(500,15000)
# SAFETY-24. No "off" value: a guard that can command a discharge does not get
# a supported way to have no energy bound at all. The ranges OVERLAP on
# purpose - the schema cannot express "above bms_soc_floor", so validate.py
# rule 8 is what refuses the pair, with a message naming both numbers.
peak_soc_floor: int(5,60)
bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)
price_now_entity: str?
price_avg_entity: str?
# ⚠️ The provider list is written out rather than left as `str`, so the
# Supervisor rejects a typo in the UI. validate.py ALSO refuses an unknown id
# against app/price.py's PROVIDERS registry, because sim/inject.py and the
# checks reach validate_startup_config() with a dict the Supervisor never saw.
# Adding a sixth plugin means adding it here and to PROVIDERS - and nowhere
# else, which is AC2.
price_provider: list(off|generic_dayahead|engie_dynamic|totalenergies_dynamic|eneco_eddy|manual_csv)
price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_taxes_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_csv_path: str?
price_feed_url: str?
price_horizon_h: int(1,72)
price_timeout_s: int(2,60)
# A JSON string rather than a nested schema, deliberately: it is ONE option
# key (§14 has one), it survives config.yaml's flat options block, and
# parse_static_profile() accepts an already-parsed dict too, so a future
# nested schema is a config.yaml change and no code change at all.
static_profile: str?
# ⚠️ The lower bound is NEGATIVE on purpose. Belgian injection tariffs have
# gone below zero (you pay to export at midday in summer), and a schema that
# bottoms out at 0 would make that site inexpressible.
export_price_eur_kwh: float(-1,1)
# OPT-04. ⚠️ The threshold's lower bound is 0 and not negative: it is a COST,
# and a negative one is a threshold every spread clears - arbitrage with the
# brake removed. app/arbitrage.py refuses it in code too, because
# validate_startup_config() is also sim/inject.py's entry point and can be
# handed any dict at all.
arbitrage_enabled: bool
cycle_cost_threshold_eur: float(0,1)
arbitrage_soc_floor: int(5,95)
arbitrage_soc_ceiling: int(10,100)
estop_fitted: bool
# ⚠️ THE FLOOR IS 0, NOT 50, AND 0 IS THE SHIPPED VALUE - see the options block
# above. It means "follow max_w", so the range starts at the setting that
# cannot go stale rather than at the smallest number somebody could type.
# ⚠️ THE CEILING IS STILL 5000 AND IS STILL NOT THE BOUND THAT MATTERS. The
# binding one is `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, a relation BETWEEN keys, and this
# grammar cannot express a relation - which is the same reason
# `maintenance_charge_w`'s ceiling is not its real bound either (see the note
# above it). validate.py rule 10 is where it is written.
slew_w: int(0,5000)
deadband_w: int(0,500)
target_grid_w: float(-200,200)
step_w: int(1,100)
saturation_w: int(100,2000)
saturation_cycles: int(1,10)
integrator_max_w: int(0,15000)
heartbeat_s: int(2,25)
stale_input_s: int(5,120)
cycle_floor_s: int(5,60)
log_level: list(trace|debug|info|warning|error)
+10 -1
View File
@@ -580,7 +580,16 @@ def close_loop(gain, split, cycles=200, load_w=2000.0, mode="alloc",
below. "site" is the sum of the units' power; "unit" is inverter A's alone,
which is what the shipped add-on's single `inverter_power` sensor gives it.
"""
tuning = Tuning(gain=gain)
# ⚠️ `slew_w` IS PINNED HERE AND WAS NOT BEFORE, AND THAT IS SAFETY-39.
# ARCH-01's 4000 W peak-to-peak broadcast limit cycle was measured at the
# shipped pair of the day - `max_w: 2000` with `slew_w: 1000` - and this
# function reached that 1000 through `Tuning`'s DEFAULT. SAFETY-39 made that
# default 0, meaning "follow the rail" (`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, 222 W at
# this rail), so the same call would now sweep a DIFFERENT law and report
# ARCH-01's measurement as absent. A reproduction that silently re-tunes
# itself when a default moves is not a reproduction. The number is written
# here, next to the measurement it belongs to.
tuning = Tuning(gain=gain, slew_w=1000.0)
prev, i_w, sat = 0.0, None, 0
power = [0.0, 0.0]
grid = load_w
+26 -3
View File
@@ -449,9 +449,32 @@ mis_peak = SITE_SIDE[:1] + [Claim.limit("peak", P_PEAK, lo=1500.0,
r_mis = resolve(mis_peak)
print(f" peak floor misfiled on inverter-b: {r_mis.explain()} "
f"scope_errors={r_mis.scope_errors}")
check("the mis-routing is CAUGHT: scope_violations names the source and the "
"actuator it does not belong on", len(r_mis.scope_errors) == 1
and "peak" in r_mis.scope_errors[0])
# ⚠️ THE ORDERED PAIR, AND THE CHECK THAT USED TO BE HERE WAS WIDER THAN ITS
# OWN CLAIM. It said `scope_violations` "names the source and the actuator it
# does not belong on" and then asserted `"peak" in r_mis.scope_errors[0]`.
# `arbiter.py:264` builds that sentence as
# `f"{c.source}: a SITE claim filed on unit {c.actuator!r} - …"`; transpose the
# two - zero bytes, no decision changes, SAFETY-38 census B row B12 - and it
# reads "inverter-b: a SITE claim filed on unit 'peak'", naming the misfiled
# claim as the actuator and the actuator as the claim. `"peak" in …` is STILL
# TRUE under that, so the old line graded neither half of what it claimed.
# The operands are read off the CLAIM this test built, not off the message.
_mis_c = mis_peak[-1]
check("PRECONDITION: the misfiled claim's source and actuator are DIFFERENT "
"STRINGS, so a transposition genuinely produces a different sentence",
_mis_c.source != _mis_c.actuator and _mis_c.source == "peak"
and _mis_c.actuator == "inverter-b")
check("the mis-routing is CAUGHT, and scope_violations names the source FIRST "
"and the actuator it does not belong on SECOND - the ORDERED PAIR on the "
"contiguous literal, because a substring test finds either name under a "
"transposition that swaps their roles",
len(r_mis.scope_errors) == 1
and r_mis.scope_errors[0].startswith(
f"{_mis_c.source}: a SITE claim filed on unit {_mis_c.actuator!r}"))
check("...and the TRANSPOSED sentence is not what it says, so the check above "
"discriminates rather than decorates",
f"{_mis_c.actuator}: a SITE claim filed on unit {_mis_c.source!r}"
not in r_mis.scope_errors[0])
check("...and the reason it must be caught, measured rather than argued: with "
"the floor on a unit the SITE has no floor, so the loop charges 1500 W "
"into the quarter the guard was trying to shave",
+202 -1
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from app.clamp import (
CLEAR_CYCLES, REASON_CODE, REASSERT_S, ClampWatchdog, clamp_to_rating,
CLEAR_CYCLES, REASON_CODE, REASSERT_S, SUSTAINED_CYCLES, ClampWatchdog,
clamp_to_rating,
is_commandable,
)
from app.allocator import Allocation, UnitPlan, plan
@@ -239,11 +240,112 @@ print(f" pinned on the rail for {QUARTER_S:.0f} s at 1 s cycles: "
check(f"a loop pinned for a whole billing quarter speaks at least "
f"{MIN_PER_QUARTER} times (it spoke {alarms})",
alarms >= MIN_PER_QUARTER)
# ⚠️ REVIEW-FOUND, SAFETY-41, and it is the SAME DEFECT as the one recorded
# twenty lines above, one notch weaker. The sweep above runs i = 0..899 and the
# rising edge at i=0 is FREE, so it measures `1 + floor(899 / REASSERT_S)` - one
# alarm more than a real quarter earns. Measured on this very check:
# REASSERT_S = 180 -> 5 alarms, green (and 180 is the true edge: on the worst
# REASSERT_S = 224 -> 5 alarms, GREEN sliding 900 s window 180 gives 5 and
# REASSERT_S = 225 -> 4 alarms, red 181 gives 4)
# So the check as written permits 224 s while the REQUIREMENT permits 180 s, and
# anyone raising the constant to 200 s would get a green suite and conclude the
# floor was met when a real quarter would earn 4 alarms. Grade the cadence
# DIRECTLY, so the check enforces the ceiling its own comment claims for it.
check(f"...and the CADENCE itself honours the floor, independent of where the "
f"sweep happens to start: floor({QUARTER_S:.0f}/{REASSERT_S:.0f}) = "
f"{int(QUARTER_S // REASSERT_S)} >= {MIN_PER_QUARTER}",
QUARTER_S // REASSERT_S >= MIN_PER_QUARTER)
check(f"...and on no more than {MAX_FRACTION:.0%} of cycles (it was "
f"{alarms / QUARTER_S:.1%})", alarms <= MAX_FRACTION * QUARTER_S)
check("...while every single cycle is still counted",
pinned.engagements == int(QUARTER_S))
# --- THE SCATTERED REGIME, WHICH IS THE ONE THE OWNER ACTUALLY HIT -----------
# ⚠️ REVIEW-FOUND, SAFETY-41, and it falsified the first version of this card.
# The rising edge used to fire UNCONDITIONALLY, so REASSERT_S governed only the
# still-engaged path. A condition that engages and clears repeatedly therefore
# raised one notification PER EPISODE at any value of the constant.
#
# That is what the live install produced: 48 engagements in ~25 minutes,
# scattered about one cycle in six. At the measured ~5 s cycle the gaps are ~25 s
# of clean cycles, past CLEAR_CYCLES x 5 s = 15 s, so the alarm de-asserted
# between almost every engagement. Raising REASSERT_S 30 -> 150 removed NONE of
# them. The interval now bounds the notification RATE across episodes.
#
# The stimulus is written in wall-clock seconds and in the shape the field
# actually produced, so it does not move when the constant does.
SCATTER_CYCLE_S = 5.0
SCATTER_ONE_IN = 6
SCATTER_CYCLES = 305
scat = ClampWatchdog()
scat_alarms = sum(1 for i in range(SCATTER_CYCLES)
if scat.note(i % SCATTER_ONE_IN == 0, "scattered",
T0 + timedelta(seconds=SCATTER_CYCLE_S * i)))
_scat_span = SCATTER_CYCLE_S * SCATTER_CYCLES
print(f" scattered 1-in-{SCATTER_ONE_IN} over {_scat_span:.0f} s at "
f"{SCATTER_CYCLE_S:.0f} s cycles: {scat.episodes} episodes, "
f"{scat.engagements} engagements, {scat_alarms} alarm(s)")
check(f"a condition that de-asserts between engagements is rate-limited ACROSS "
f"episodes, not once per episode ({scat_alarms} alarms for "
f"{scat.episodes} episodes)",
scat_alarms < scat.episodes)
check(f"...and the rate honours the same interval the pinned case does: at most "
f"ceil({_scat_span:.0f}/{REASSERT_S:.0f}) + 1 = "
f"{int(_scat_span // REASSERT_S) + 1}",
scat_alarms <= int(_scat_span // REASSERT_S) + 1)
check("...while EVERY episode and EVERY engagement is still counted - the "
"budget is on notifications, never on evidence",
scat.episodes == scat.engagements == SCATTER_CYCLES // SCATTER_ONE_IN + 1)
# ⚠️ THE COUNTERFACTUAL, AND THE FIRST VERSION OF IT COULD NOT FAIL FOR THE
# DEFECT IT NAMED. It read `ClampWatchdog().note(True, ...) is True` - a FRESH
# object, so it only ever exercised the `last_alarm is None` branch, which is the
# trivially-true one. A fresh watchdog has no earlier episode to be held back BY.
# That is the third instance in this file of the family recorded at line 216 and
# at the 224 s sweep, and it was guarding the most safety-critical property in
# the change. Review found it.
#
# The stimulus must therefore SPEND THE BUDGET FIRST: a benign one-cycle clamp,
# a gap long enough to de-assert, then a continuous runaway. Without the
# escalation clause the runaway's first notification is held for up to
# REASSERT_S - measured at 140 s before it was added.
_esc = ClampWatchdog()
_esc.note(True, "benign", T0) # spends the budget
for _i in range(1, 1 + CLEAR_CYCLES + 1): # de-assert
_esc.note(False, "", T0 + timedelta(seconds=5.0 * _i))
_RUNAWAY_AT = 5.0 * (CLEAR_CYCLES + 2)
_esc_fires = [5.0 * (CLEAR_CYCLES + 2 + _j)
for _j in range(200)
if _esc.note(True, "runaway",
T0 + timedelta(seconds=5.0 * (CLEAR_CYCLES + 2 + _j)))]
_esc_delay = _esc_fires[0] - _RUNAWAY_AT if _esc_fires else None
print(f" budget spent by a benign episode, then a continuous runaway from "
f"t={_RUNAWAY_AT:.0f}s: first alarm at t={_esc_fires[0]:.0f}s "
f"(delay {_esc_delay:.0f}s)")
check(f"⚠️ a SUSTAINED runaway speaks even when an earlier, unrelated episode "
f"spent the budget - it is not held for REASSERT_S ({_esc_delay:.0f}s "
f"delay, escalation is {SUSTAINED_CYCLES} cycles)",
_esc_delay is not None and _esc_delay < REASSERT_S / 2)
check("...and it speaks at the escalation boundary rather than immediately, "
"which is what keeps the scattered flood suppressed",
_esc_delay >= 5.0 * (SUSTAINED_CYCLES - 1))
# ⚠️ `last_alarm` SURVIVING THE DE-ASSERT IS NOW LOAD-BEARING, AND NOTHING
# PINNED IT. Review built the mutation: if the de-assert path ALSO refreshed
# `last_alarm = now`, the chatter case collapses from 50 notifications to 1 - the
# alarm never fires again. That is the "alarm that never fires" class, which is a
# different bug from one that fires later, and the suite was green on it.
_starve = ClampWatchdog()
_starve_fires = sum(1 for _i in range(1600)
if _starve.note(_i % 4 == 0, "chatter",
T0 + timedelta(seconds=5.0 * _i)))
print(f" chatter 1-engaged/{CLEAR_CYCLES}-clean over 8000 s: "
f"{_starve.episodes} episodes, {_starve_fires} notification(s)")
check(f"a de-assert does not RESET the notification budget, so repeated chatter "
f"cannot starve the alarm to silence ({_starve_fires} notifications over "
f"8000 s, not 1)",
_starve_fires > 10)
# --- THE HYSTERESIS, PINNED AGAINST THE CHATTER DIRECTION --------------------
# ⚠️ REVIEW-FOUND. This used to issue `range(CLEAR_CYCLES - 1)` clean cycles,
# which at CLEAR_CYCLES = 1 issues ZERO of them and passes while printing
@@ -898,6 +1000,105 @@ check("...and main.py:856's consumer is the line that goes quietly false",
bool(ctl_w.clamp_last and ctl_w.clamp_last.engaged))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 6d. SAFETY-38 round 4 - THE ORDERED PAIR INSIDE `ClampResult.describe()`
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE ALARM THE OWNER HAS BEEN COMPLAINING ABOUT ALL DAY, AND UNTIL
# THIS BLOCK NO test_*.py MENTIONED `describe()` AT ALL. `clamp.py:253` builds
# the whole §15 action-log row and the whole ClampWatchdog notification reason
# out of its own attributes:
#
# f"{REASON_CODE}: the computed setpoint {self.requested_w:+.0f} W was
# clamped to {self.applied_w:+.0f} W by the {self.bound} bound
# (rating {self.limit_w:.0f} W) - something upstream is winding"
#
# Transpose `requested_w` and `applied_w` and the guard reports clamping a
# setpoint UPWARD - here, to +9999 W by a bound whose rating the SAME SENTENCE
# gives as 2000 W. MEASURED on this tree: a zero-byte edit (22 507 bytes before,
# 22 507 after, sha256 0153133741497fa5 -> 47e4e371043e3201), the emitted
# sentence changes, and the full 21-file suite stayed GREEN. Nothing decides on
# the order, so nothing behavioural can ever see it - which is why the check
# below has to be on the ORDERED PAIR and on the CONTIGUOUS LITERAL. A substring
# test for either number passes under the swap; both numbers are still there.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE OPERANDS ARE READ OFF THE PLANT, NOT OFF `clamp_last`. `ctl.target`
# is what the loop asked for and `hass.writes[-1]` is what the device was
# actually sent; neither is a `ClampResult` field. Grading the sentence against
# `result.requested_w` would compare the swap against itself - DEV-02's defect,
# and the same one that made the first cut of this card's own render probe emit
# thirteen empty diffs.
async def _sentence(max_w, dev, wanted):
"""One real write over `max_w`, then the guard, on a real Controller."""
hass = _Hass(0.0)
c = Controller({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_source": "off",
"max_w": max_w},
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -dev, dev
c.target = wanted
arm(c, wanted)
await c.write_setpoint(wanted)
await c.check_output_clamp()
return hass, c
hass_x, ctl_x = _sentence_run = asyncio.run(_sentence(2000.0, 5000.0, 9999.0))
notes_x = clamp_notes(hass_x)
_asked_x = ctl_x.target # what the loop asked for
_sent_x = hass_x.writes[-1] # what the device was actually sent
_rating_x = ctl_x.inverters[0].max_w # the bound the sentence names
_rows_x = [e for e in ctl_x.events if REASON_CODE in e]
print(f" max_w {_rating_x:.0f} on a +-5000 W device, asked for "
f"{_asked_x:+.0f} W: the device saw {_sent_x:+.0f} W")
print(f" action log: {_rows_x[0] if _rows_x else '(none)'}")
check("PRECONDITION: the write really clamped on the MAX_W bound, and the two "
"operands are DIFFERENT NUMBERS that RENDER differently - equal ones "
"would make the transposed sentence identical and every check below "
"vacuous. The asked-for magnitude is also strictly ABOVE the rating "
"while the sent one is not, which is what makes the swapped sentence "
"self-contradictory rather than merely wrong",
ctl_x.clamp_last is not None and ctl_x.clamp_last.engaged
and ctl_x.clamp_last.bound == "max_w"
and _asked_x != _sent_x
and f"{_asked_x:+.0f}" != f"{_sent_x:+.0f}"
and abs(_sent_x) <= _rating_x < abs(_asked_x))
check("⚠️ THE ORDERED PAIR IN THE §15 ACTION-LOG ROW (main.py:1366). The "
"contiguous literal names the setpoint the loop COMPUTED first and the "
"one that REACHED THE WIRE second. Under the transposition this row says "
"the loop asked for +2000 W and the guard clamped it UP to +9999 W - "
"past the 2000 W rating printed four words later - which is the alarm "
"reading backwards on the one line an operator is woken by",
any(f"the computed setpoint {_asked_x:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_sent_x:+.0f} W" in e for e in _rows_x))
check("⚠️ ...AND IN THE ClampWatchdog NOTIFICATION REASON (main.py:2452), "
"which is a SECOND surface off the same sentence and has to be pinned "
"separately - SAFETY-38 round 3's whole lesson was that pinning one call "
"site leaves the other shipping",
bool(notes_x)
and f"the computed setpoint {_asked_x:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_sent_x:+.0f} W" in notes_x[0]["message"])
check("...and the TRANSPOSED sentence appears on NEITHER surface, so the two "
"checks above discriminate rather than decorate",
not any(f"the computed setpoint {_sent_x:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_asked_x:+.0f} W" in e for e in _rows_x)
and f"the computed setpoint {_sent_x:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_asked_x:+.0f} W" not in notes_x[0]["message"])
# The DEVICE bound, off part 6c's controller: same sentence, other stage. The
# unit of coverage is the call site, and `bound` is the only thing that differs
# between the two rows an operator can receive.
_asked_w, _sent_w = ctl_w.target, hass_w.writes[-1]
check("...and the same ordered pair holds on the DEVICE-bound row, where the "
"loop asked for +3000 W and the device took +2500 W. PRECONDITION: those "
"two also render differently",
f"{_asked_w:+.0f}" != f"{_sent_w:+.0f}"
and any(f"the computed setpoint {_asked_w:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_sent_w:+.0f} W" in e for e in ctl_w.events)
and f"the computed setpoint {_asked_w:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_sent_w:+.0f} W" in notes_w[0]["message"])
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("7. SAFETY-28: the write path is gated on the allocation record")
+712 -15
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,20 @@ Read MUTATION.md before you report a survivor.
import sys
from app.control import Tuning, compute, maintenance_charge_floor, peak_at_risk
from app.control import (LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S,
SETTLE_CYCLES, SLEW_RAIL_FRAC, Tuning, compute,
slew_limit_w, unasked_power,
maintenance_charge_floor, peak_at_risk)
T = Tuning()
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39: `slew_w` IS EXPLICIT HERE NOW, AND IT IS release/1.0's VALUE.
# `Tuning()`'s default became 0 - "follow the rail", `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`,
# 222 W against this 2000 W rail - so a bare `Tuning()` here would silently
# re-tune every assertion below that the slew limit touches, and several of them
# assert on a number the slew produces. The pair written here (max_w 2000,
# slew_w 1000) is exactly what release/1.0 shipped, which is what most of this
# file is a regression test against. The new default gets its own section at the
# end, where it is the subject rather than a hidden parameter.
T = Tuning(slew_w=1000.0)
fails = []
@@ -49,6 +60,41 @@ def check(name, cond):
# A comment cannot go stale-green, because it never claims to be running.
#
# Measured at 389d9ec. Numbers are the lead's independent reproduction.
# ⚠️ THE SAFETY-13 ROWS WERE RE-MEASURED IN ROUND 2 AND THREE OF THEM WERE
# WRONG AS FIRST WRITTEN. Every figure below marked (S13) was taken by deleting
# the mechanism, purging __pycache__, running this file in the CI image and
# counting `FAIL` lines, on THIS tree; the release/1.0 comparison figures were
# taken the same way on a pristine c8dcb38 worktree.
#
# - `output freeze` was written as 11. The mutation form its own note
# describes - the whole `target = min(...)/max(...)` line removed, `reason`
# left alone - gives 6 on this tree AND 6 on the first SAFETY-13 commit,
# against 2 on release/1.0. 11 is not reproducible by that form, or by
# removing the line and its `reason` (4), or by swapping min/max (12). The
# row is 6.
# - `saturation detector, saturated_now = False` was left at 11 while the
# SAFETY-13 section added checks that grade it. It is 15.
# - the footnote's `frozen = False` figure was left at 10 for the same
# reason. It is 13.
#
# The rows below `output freeze` are this ticket's own mechanisms: removing the
# EXIT restores release/1.0's unbounded freeze; making `unasked_power()` return
# True gives an exit to the limit case as well, which is the half of the
# decision that has to stay unbounded; deriving SETTLE_CYCLES from
# PLANT_SETTLE_S (18 s, the UP ramp) instead of PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S (23 s) is
# the round-1 defect itself; and pinning `_SAT_COUNT_CAP` back at release/1.0's
# literal 10 caps the counter below the bound and deletes the exit silently.
#
# ⚠️ ONLY THE ROWS THIS BRANCH MOVES WERE RE-MEASURED. Everything not marked
# (S13) still carries 389d9ec's figures and was not re-run here.
#
# ⚠️ THE SLEW ROWS WERE RE-MEASURED AT SAFETY-39 AND ONE OF THEM MOVED: the
# slew limit was 4 and is now 5, because the SAFETY-39 section grades it too.
# The new row is the RAIL DEFAULT specifically - `slew_limit_w()` reduced to
# `return abs(float(tuning.slew_w))`, which leaves the limit intact and only
# removes the 0-means-the-rail resolution. Three checks notice, which is over
# the invariant's floor of two. Both figures were reproduced by deleting the
# mechanism, running this file and counting, on a tree with __pycache__ purged.
#
# mechanism in compute() checks that fail when deleted
# ------------------------------------------ -----------------------------
@@ -56,11 +102,16 @@ def check(name, cond):
# integrator clamp (AC 1) 6
# integrator bound follows max_w 4
# output clamp 3
# slew limit 4
# output freeze 2
# slew limit 5
# slew follows the rail (SAFETY-39), `slew_w` read raw 3
# output freeze (S13) 6
# the output freeze's EXIT (S13), freeze made unconditional again 4
# `unasked_power()` discriminates, replaced by `return True` (S13) 6
# SETTLE_CYCLES from PLANT_SETTLE_S, not _DOWN_S (S13) 9
# `_SAT_COUNT_CAP` pinned back at release/1.0's 10 (S13) 6
# deadband 5
# quantisation 2
# saturation detector, `saturated_now = False` 11
# saturation detector, `saturated_now = False` (S13) 15
# saturation duration (AC 2), fires instantly 2
# sat counter reset on a good cycle 6
# target_grid_w bias 3
@@ -68,7 +119,8 @@ def check(name, cond):
#
# The detector figure is for the `saturated_now = False` form specifically;
# disabling it further down as `frozen = False` is a weaker mutation and gives
# 10. Reproduce the same form or the number will not match.
# 13 on this tree (10 on release/1.0). Reproduce the same form or the number
# will not match.
#
# ⚠️ IT HAS FOUND A DEAD MECHANISM TWICE, BOTH THE SAME WAY: a clamp standing in
# for the mechanism under test. Deleting the integrator freeze once failed
@@ -264,8 +316,15 @@ check("frozen at i_w=0.0: an export push moves the integrator",
# hundreds of watts means something else is driving the bus. Asserted so that
# nobody "fixes" it by accident - the integrator moving is what this ticket
# owns, the command rule belongs to the output freeze.
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-13 KEPT THIS ASSERTION RATHER THAN INVERTING IT, and the fixture is
# why it survived unchanged: `sat_count=3` becomes 4, which is below
# SETTLE_CYCLES, so this is still inside the window in which the block holds.
# SAFETY-13 gave the block an EXIT, not a different opinion about its first
# cycles - see the SAFETY-13 section below, where the same state is driven past
# the bound and the release is asserted on the other side of it.
check("frozen at i_w=0.0: the output freeze still blocks a charge from 0 W",
ze.target_w == 0.0)
ze.target_w == 0.0 and ze.sat_count < SETTLE_CYCLES)
# Where prev_w is already charging the output freeze does NOT block, and there
# the difference reaches the wire: held at 0.0 the integrator abandons the
# charge mid-export.
@@ -328,11 +387,360 @@ def unwind(t):
return prev
tight, loose = unwind(Tuning(max_w=2000)), unwind(Tuning(max_w=2000, integrator_max_w=3000))
# ⚠️ BOTH FIXTURES CARRY release/1.0's `slew_w` EXPLICITLY (SAFETY-39). The
# subject here is `integrator_max_w`, and the figure the check names - 1000 W on
# the first cycle after the drop - is `max_w - slew_w`, so it moves with the slew
# limit and would stop being the number DOCS.md quotes. Pinning it keeps this a
# test about integrator headroom instead of a test about two mechanisms at once;
# the shipped default's own unwind is measured in the SAFETY-39 section below.
tight = unwind(Tuning(max_w=2000, slew_w=1000.0))
loose = unwind(Tuning(max_w=2000, slew_w=1000.0, integrator_max_w=3000))
check(f"after saturation ends the command is {tight:.0f} W (<= 1000)", tight <= 1000)
check(f"headroom above max_w makes that worse ({loose:.0f} W) - hence the default",
loose > tight)
print("SAFETY-13: the output freeze has an exit, and only where it needs one")
# THE SHAPE OF THIS SECTION. release/1.0's output freeze holds the command's
# magnitude down while the inverter is not following, and nothing ends it. At
# `prev_w == 0` the held magnitude is ZERO, so it reads as "refuses to start a
# charge"; that is the case the card was written about, but it is one instance
# of a rule that is unbounded at every prev_w. SAFETY-13 bounds it exactly where
# it CANNOT end on its own - see `unasked_power()` - and nowhere else.
# --- 1. the predicate, which is the whole of the decision -------------------
# A limit can only make the inverter do LESS than the command, in the command's
# own direction, so everything a limit can produce lies in the interval spanned
# by 0 and prev_w widened by saturation_w. These are the four cases in the
# docstring, run rather than described.
check("limit: 700 W under a +2000 W command is explainable",
not unasked_power(2000.0, 700.0, 500.0))
check("limit: -700 W under a -5000 W command is explainable",
not unasked_power(-5000.0, -700.0, 500.0))
check("unasked: +700 W under a 0 W command is not",
unasked_power(0.0, 700.0, 500.0))
check("unasked: +700 W under a -800 W command is not",
unasked_power(-800.0, 700.0, 500.0))
# The band edges belong to the limit side, because saturation_w is the same
# tolerance the detector uses - a reading the detector calls "following" must
# never be called "another writer".
check("the saturation band is inclusive on both edges",
not unasked_power(0.0, 500.0, 500.0)
and not unasked_power(0.0, -500.0, 500.0)
and unasked_power(0.0, 500.01, 500.0))
# ⚠️ AT prev_w == 0 THE PREDICATE AND THE DETECTOR ARE THE SAME TEST, which is
# why the zero case is the one that strands: with nothing commanded there is no
# interval for a limit to live in.
same = all(unasked_power(0.0, a, 500.0) == (abs(a) > 500.0)
for a in [x * 5.0 for x in range(-400, 401)])
check("at prev_w == 0 unasked_power IS the saturation test, over 801 readings",
same)
# --- 2. the bound is derived, and from WHICH HALF of the measurement --------
# ⚠️ THE DIRECTION IS THE ASSERTION. goodwe/NOTES.md 5.10 measured the same
# 1.78 kW step both ways: ~18 s up, ~23 s down. SAFETY-39 takes the SHORTER
# one because its bound is a REFUSAL and the looser number refuses less. This
# bound asks the opposite question - how long the plant may still be the
# explanation for a divergence - and for that the conservative half is the
# LONGER one. The first version of this file derived it from 18, got 9, and
# that is three cycles short of the plant's own measured down-ramp, in the
# direction that ACCUSES rather than refuses (section 8 below drives it).
check(f"SETTLE_CYCLES is ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) ="
f" {SETTLE_CYCLES}",
SETTLE_CYCLES == 12
and SETTLE_CYCLES * LOOP_TICK_S >= PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S
and (SETTLE_CYCLES - 1) * LOOP_TICK_S < PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S)
check("...from the LONGER of the two measured settle times, so it is strictly"
" above what the shorter one would have given",
PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S > PLANT_SETTLE_S
and SETTLE_CYCLES > -(-PLANT_SETTLE_S // LOOP_TICK_S))
# ...and it is NOT SLEW_RAIL_FRAC's reciprocal any more. It was, while both
# were being derived from the same half of the pair, and that coincidence read
# as a derivation. Asserted as an INEQUALITY so the two cannot silently be
# re-fused into one number again.
check("the slew's rail crossing and this bound are now different numbers",
SETTLE_CYCLES > 1.0 / SLEW_RAIL_FRAC)
# The counter has to be able to REACH the bound or the exit does not exist.
# Driven, not read off the constant: run a saturated state and see how high the
# counter actually goes.
c, sc = 0, 0
while c < 50:
sc = compute(0.0, -2000.0, 900.0, T, sc).sat_count
c += 1
check(f"the saturation counter reaches {sc}, which is above the bound",
sc >= SETTLE_CYCLES)
# --- 3. prev_w == 0: blocked below the bound, released above it -------------
# The same state either side of the bound. This is the pair the card asks for.
blk = compute(prev_w=0, grid_w=-2000, actual_w=-600, tuning=T,
sat_count=SETTLE_CYCLES - 2, i_w=0.0)
check("prev_w=0: below the bound the charge is still refused",
blk.target_w == 0.0 and blk.reason == "saturated-freeze"
and blk.sat_count == SETTLE_CYCLES - 1)
rel = compute(prev_w=0, grid_w=-2000, actual_w=-600, tuning=T,
sat_count=SETTLE_CYCLES - 1, i_w=0.0)
check(f"prev_w=0: at the bound it is released to {rel.target_w:.0f} W",
rel.target_w < 0.0 and rel.reason == "freeze-released"
and rel.sat_count == SETTLE_CYCLES)
# ...and the released command is the SLEW step from 0, not the rail. A release
# that jumped to the integrator in one cycle would be the windup this ticket
# was told to avoid.
check(f"the released command is exactly one slew step"
f" ({slew_limit_w(T):.0f} W)",
abs(rel.target_w) == slew_limit_w(T))
# The mirror. Nothing here is sign-specific, so the discharge side must behave
# identically - every freeze rule in this file has a mirror, because the one
# that did not is the defect that got through review.
mblk = compute(prev_w=0, grid_w=2000, actual_w=600, tuning=T,
sat_count=SETTLE_CYCLES - 2, i_w=0.0)
mrel = compute(prev_w=0, grid_w=2000, actual_w=600, tuning=T,
sat_count=SETTLE_CYCLES - 1, i_w=0.0)
check("prev_w=0, discharging: same block, same release, mirrored",
mblk.reason == "saturated-freeze" and mrel.reason == "freeze-released"
and mrel.target_w == slew_limit_w(T))
# --- 4. non-zero prev_w, and the two halves are NOT the same --------------
# (a) A divergence a LIMIT could have produced is never released, however long
# it stands. This is release/1.0's behaviour and it is kept deliberately: the
# freeze clears itself here, because the command is pinned at something the
# inverter can do.
TL = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=400.0, target_grid_w=-10.0)
prev, i_w, sat, reasons = 0.0, 0.0, 0, set()
for _ in range(30):
d = compute(prev, 4000.0, max(-1000.0, min(1000.0, prev)), TL, sat, i_w)
prev, i_w, sat, _r = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count, reasons.add(d.reason)
check("non-zero prev_w, a curtailed inverter: never released over 30 cycles",
"freeze-released" not in reasons and prev == 2400.0)
# (b) A divergence a limit could NOT have produced is released at the bound,
# at a non-zero prev_w exactly as at zero. release/1.0 pinned this run at
# -800 W, against its own integrator standing at -2388 W, for as long as it ran.
prev, i_w, sat, rows = 0.0, 0.0, 0, []
for _ in range(20):
d = compute(prev, -2000.0, 700.0, TL, sat, i_w)
rows.append((prev, d.target_w, d.i_w, d.reason))
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
pinned = [r for r in rows if r[3] == "saturated-freeze"]
check(f"non-zero prev_w, another writer: pinned at {pinned[0][1]:.0f} W...",
pinned and all(r[1] == -800.0 for r in pinned))
check(f"...then released, settling at {prev:.0f} W", prev == -2390.0)
# --- 5. THE CARD'S OWN CASE, DRIVEN END TO END -----------------------------
# The live install's shape (max_w 5000, slew_w 400, target_grid_w -10). The site
# rests in the deadband with another writer holding the pack at +700 W - so the
# saturation counter climbs while the command is 0 and nothing is wrong - and
# then 2 kW of export arrives. On release/1.0 @ c8dcb38 the command is 0.0 W on
# every cycle from there on: 0 W is a FIXED POINT, and the export is given away
# for as long as the other writer stays.
prev, i_w, sat, cmds = 0.0, 0.0, 0, []
for c in range(24):
d = compute(prev, -10.0 if c < 6 else -2000.0, 700.0, TL, sat, i_w)
cmds.append(d.target_w)
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
check("the card's case: the block does hold at first, at 0 W",
cmds[6] == 0.0 and cmds[7] == 0.0)
started = [i for i, c in enumerate(cmds) if c != 0.0]
check(f"the card's case: the charge starts at cycle {started[0]}"
f" instead of never", bool(started))
# ⚠️ AND IT STOPS AT THE FROZEN INTEGRATOR, NOT AT THE RAIL. This is AC 4: the
# integrator moved while the output was blocked, and the release must not turn
# that divergence into windup. It cannot, because releasing the OUTPUT freeze
# does not release the INTEGRATOR freeze - so the command can only walk, one
# slew step per cycle, to a value the integrator stopped accumulating at.
check(f"the card's case: it settles at {prev:.0f} W, at the frozen integrator "
f"({i_w:.0f} W) and not the {TL.max_w:.0f} W rail",
prev == -1190.0 and abs(prev) <= abs(i_w) and abs(prev) < TL.max_w)
steps = [abs(cmds[i] - cmds[i - 1]) for i in range(1, len(cmds))]
check(f"the card's case: no cycle moves more than the slew limit "
f"(worst {max(steps):.0f} W of {slew_limit_w(TL):.0f})",
max(steps) <= slew_limit_w(TL))
# --- 6. AC 4, AS A PROPERTY RATHER THAN A TRAJECTORY -----------------------
# ⚠️ THE FIRST FORM OF THIS CHECK WAS WRONG AND THE SWEEP SAID SO, which is
# worth leaving in the file. It asserted `|target| <= |i_w|` on a released
# cycle, and the sweep produced prev_w -5000, i_w -3000, target -4600: the
# command was walking BACK from -5000 toward the integrator and had not
# arrived. It was moving the right way and the assertion still failed, because
# "never exceeds the integrator" is not what no-windup means here.
#
# What it means: a released cycle can only move the command TOWARD the
# integrator, by at most one slew step, and never past it. So the divergence
# that built up while the output was blocked cannot arrive as a jump - it is
# spent one slew step at a time, against an integrator that stopped
# accumulating when the freeze engaged and is not released with the output.
# ⚠️ AND THE COUNT BELOW IS THE RELEASED STATES, NOT THE SWEPT ONES. The first
# version of this check named 41*25*21*5 - the size of the sweep - while
# grading only the subset that actually releases, so the number in the message
# was not the number the assertion was about. It is counted now.
step = float(T.step_w)
swept, past, jumped = 0, [], []
n_released = 0
for prev in [x * 250.0 for x in range(-20, 21)]:
for grid in [x * 500.0 for x in range(-12, 13)]:
for actual in [x * 500.0 for x in range(-10, 11)]:
for i0 in (-3000.0, -500.0, 0.0, 500.0, 3000.0):
swept += 1
d = compute(prev, grid, actual, TL, SETTLE_CYCLES, i0)
if d.reason != "freeze-released":
continue
n_released += 1
lo, hi = min(prev, d.i_w), max(prev, d.i_w)
if not (lo - step <= d.target_w <= hi + step):
past.append((prev, grid, actual, i0, d.target_w, d.i_w))
if abs(d.target_w - prev) > slew_limit_w(TL) + step:
jumped.append((prev, grid, actual, i0, d.target_w))
check(f"of {swept} states swept, the {n_released} that release keep the command"
f" between the previous command and the frozen integrator"
+ (f" (e.g. {past[0]})" if past else ""), not past and n_released > 0)
check("...and no released cycle moves further than one slew step"
+ (f" (e.g. {jumped[0]})" if jumped else ""), not jumped)
# --- 7. NO ACCEPTED CONFIGURATION CAN DELETE THE BLOCK ---------------------
# ⚠️ THIS CHECK REPLACES ITS OWN OPPOSITE, AND THE REASON IS WORTH KEEPING.
# While the bound was 9, `saturation_cycles` - which config.yaml accepts up to
# 10 - could be set AT OR ABOVE it, and then the freeze did not engage until
# its own exit was already due: the no-start block silently stopped existing,
# and this file asserted that as a known consequence. Moving the bound to 12
# put the whole accepted range strictly below it, so the degenerate
# configuration is gone rather than documented.
#
# It is pinned against config.yaml ITSELF and not a transcription, because the
# property is "two files agree" and a transcription is what lets them drift.
# Regex, not PyYAML: the add-on image ships no PyYAML (test_validate.py says
# the same thing at more length).
import os # noqa: E402
import re # noqa: E402
_CFG = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "config.yaml")
with open(_CFG, encoding="utf-8") as _fh:
_m = re.search(r"^ saturation_cycles: int\((\d+),(\d+)\)\s*$",
_fh.read(), re.M)
check("config.yaml's saturation_cycles range really was read", _m is not None)
_sc_lo, _sc_hi = int(_m.group(1)), int(_m.group(2))
check(f"every accepted saturation_cycles ({_sc_lo}..{_sc_hi}) is strictly"
f" below the bound ({SETTLE_CYCLES}), so no accepted configuration can"
f" push the freeze's engagement past its own exit",
_sc_hi < SETTLE_CYCLES)
# Driven at the schema's edge rather than argued: the block still engages, and
# it engages before the exit is due.
TN = Tuning(slew_w=1000.0, saturation_cycles=_sc_hi)
prev, i_w, sat, reasons = 0.0, 0.0, 0, set()
first_freeze = None
for _ in range(20):
d = compute(prev, -2000.0, 700.0, TN, sat, i_w)
reasons.add(d.reason)
if d.reason == "saturated-freeze" and first_freeze is None:
first_freeze = d.sat_count
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
check(f"at the largest accepted saturation_cycles ({_sc_hi}) the block still"
f" engages, at sat_count {first_freeze}, below the bound",
"saturated-freeze" in reasons and first_freeze is not None
and first_freeze < SETTLE_CYCLES)
# --- 8. THE BOUND'S DIRECTION, DRIVEN ON ONE INVERTER ----------------------
# ⚠️ WHY THIS SECTION EXISTS. The exit's two conditions are read as "another
# writer is on the actuator". They are not that, and the first shipped form of
# this file said they were. `unasked_power()` compares a reading against ONE
# cycle's command while the pack carries every command before it, so a command
# that has fallen THROUGH ZERO - or simply fallen faster than the pack coasts -
# leaves our own power outside our own interval. With the bound derived from
# the 18 s UP measurement that is not a corner case: it is what a normal load
# step does.
#
# The plant here is a MODEL and is labelled one. It is a first-order lag whose
# two time constants come from the two measured settling times (a first-order
# step is 95 % done at 3 tau, so tau = t / 3), with the ramp cap
# sim/plantsim.py measured on inverter A. It is not the rig and it is not the
# house; what it is for is that the two settling times ENTER the model in the
# same direction they enter the constant, so the check moves if either does.
#
# ⚠️ AND THERE IS NO SECOND WRITER IN THIS SECTION. One `compute()`, one
# plant, one command. Every `freeze-released` below is therefore false.
import math # noqa: E402
class _Plant:
"""One inverter, obeying our command and nothing else. A MODEL."""
RAMP_W_S = 800.0 # sim/plantsim.py INVERTER_A, measured=True
def __init__(self, up_s, down_s):
self.a_up = 1.0 - math.exp(-LOOP_TICK_S / (up_s / 3.0))
self.a_dn = 1.0 - math.exp(-LOOP_TICK_S / (down_s / 3.0))
self.w = 0.0
def tick(self, cmd):
a = self.a_up if abs(cmd) > abs(self.w) else self.a_dn
cap = self.RAMP_W_S * LOOP_TICK_S
self.w += max(-cap, min(cap, a * (cmd - self.w)))
from app import control as _control # noqa: E402
TS8 = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=400.0, target_grid_w=-10.0,
saturation_w=500.0, saturation_cycles=3)
def _drive(bound, load1, load2, cycles=60, switch=25):
"""Run one closed loop at an arbitrary bound. -> (release cycles, rows)."""
was_b, was_c = _control.SETTLE_CYCLES, _control._SAT_COUNT_CAP
# ⚠️ BOTH, OR THE PROBE LIES: `_SAT_COUNT_CAP` is what `compute()` caps the
# counter with, so moving the bound without it caps the counter BELOW the
# bound and the exit quietly becomes unreachable - which reads as "no false
# positives". That is the hazard `_SAT_COUNT_CAP`'s own comment names.
_control.SETTLE_CYCLES, _control._SAT_COUNT_CAP = bound, bound + 1
try:
p = _Plant(PLANT_SETTLE_S, PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S)
prev, i_w, sat, rows = 0.0, 0.0, 0, []
for c in range(cycles):
load = load1 if c < switch else load2
d = compute(prev, load - p.w, p.w, TS8, sat, i_w)
rows.append((c, prev, p.w, d.target_w, d.sat_count, d.reason))
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
p.tick(prev)
return [r for r in rows if r[5] == "freeze-released"], rows
finally:
_control.SETTLE_CYCLES, _control._SAT_COUNT_CAP = was_b, was_c
_SHORT = int(-(-PLANT_SETTLE_S // LOOP_TICK_S)) # what 18 s would give: 9
# A 4 kW export falling to 2.5 kW. Nothing exotic; no second writer.
_bad, _rows = _drive(_SHORT, -4000.0, -2500.0)
check(f"a bound derived from the SHORTER measurement ({_SHORT} cycles) fires"
f" the exit on ONE inverter with nothing else on the bus"
+ (f" - {len(_bad)} cycle(s), first at cycle {_bad[0][0]}" if _bad else ""),
bool(_bad))
if _bad:
_c, _prev, _act, _tgt, _sat, _ = _bad[0]
check(f"...and what it called unasked is our own coast-down: command"
f" {_prev:.0f} W, pack still at {_act:.1f} W, and the pack was"
f" commanded {min(r[1] for r in _rows[:_c]):.0f} W a few cycles"
f" earlier",
unasked_power(_prev, _act, TS8.saturation_w)
and abs(_act) > abs(_prev)
and min(r[1] for r in _rows[:_c]) < _act)
_good, _ = _drive(SETTLE_CYCLES, -4000.0, -2500.0)
check(f"the shipped bound ({SETTLE_CYCLES} cycles, the LONGER measurement)"
f" does not fire on the same run", not _good)
# ...and not on any of these, either. The whole grid of load steps the same
# plant can be given, at the tuning every headline figure in this ticket is
# quoted from.
_L = [x * 500.0 for x in range(-8, 9)]
_fired = {}
for _b in (_SHORT, SETTLE_CYCLES):
_fired[_b] = sum(1 for _a in _L for _z in _L
if _a != _z and _drive(_b, _a, _z)[0])
_pairs = len(_L) * (len(_L) - 1)
check(f"over {_pairs} load-step pairs on the measured plant, one inverter and"
f" no second writer: the short bound fires in {_fired[_SHORT]} of them,"
f" the shipped bound in {_fired[SETTLE_CYCLES]}",
_fired[SETTLE_CYCLES] < _fired[_SHORT])
# ⚠️ AND THE SHIPPED FIGURE IS NOT ZERO IN GENERAL. It is small here because
# the plant in this model is the one that was measured. A plant slower than
# that brings the false release back, and no constant derived from a
# measurement can fix that - it is why DOCS.md tells the operator what
# `freeze-released` is evidence OF, rather than what it proves.
print("SAFETY-04: the i_w=None path is still release/1.0, exactly")
@@ -369,23 +777,113 @@ def legacy(prev, grid, actual, t, sat_count):
# "i-clamped", because the truncation happens on the integrator before the
# command is derived from it. Aliased here rather than papered over - if any
# OTHER reason ever diverges, this check goes red.
# ⚠️ SAFETY-13 IS A DELIBERATE DIVERGENCE FROM `legacy()`, AND THE SWEEP NOW
# GRADES THE DIVERGENCE INSTEAD OF FORBIDDING IT. `legacy()` above stays a
# transcription of release/1.0 - it is not edited to agree, for the reason the
# note on `slew_w` gives: an oracle taught the new rule compares the new law
# against itself. What changed is the assertion. Every case must either be
# IDENTICAL to release/1.0, or be a case where release/1.0 said
# "saturated-freeze" and this law says "freeze-released" with the two conditions
# that permit it both true. Anything else is a regression, and the counts below
# say how much of the sweep each answer covers.
ALIAS = {"i-clamped": "clamped"}
# ⚠️ SAFETY-13 ROUND 2 MOVED THE COUNTER'S CEILING, SO THE SWEEP NOW HAS A
# THIRD ANSWER. `_SAT_COUNT_CAP` is `SETTLE_CYCLES + 1`, which was 10 - the
# same literal release/1.0 used - and is now 13. Above release/1.0's own
# ceiling the two counters therefore differ, and NOTHING ELSE MAY: `frozen` is
# `sat_count >= saturation_cycles` and config.yaml accepts that at most 10, so
# a counter reading 13 instead of 10 cannot change it, and no other line in
# `compute()` reads the counter's value. That is asserted rather than asserted-
# by-omission, in `cap_diffs` below.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE SWEEP HAS TO REACH THE BOUND OR IT GRADES NOTHING. `sc` runs to 12
# now; at 9 the counter tops out one short of the exit and every release
# silently disappears from this table, which is exactly what happened when the
# bound moved and is why the count is asserted and not merely printed. 12 is a
# state release/1.0 could never hold - its counter stopped at 10 - so
# `legacy()` is being fed one input outside its own reachable domain, on
# purpose, and `cap_diffs` is where that shows up.
LEGACY_SAT_CAP = 10 # release/1.0's literal, transcribed in legacy()
diffs = []
released = []
value_diffs = []
cap_diffs = []
seen = set()
for tune in (Tuning(), Tuning(target_grid_w=-10.0), Tuning(max_w=5000, slew_w=5000)):
# ⚠️ `slew_w` IS WRITTEN OUT IN ALL THREE (SAFETY-39). `legacy()` below is a
# TRANSCRIPTION of release/1.0 and reads `t.slew_w` directly, as release/1.0
# did; the new law reads `slew_limit_w(t)`, which treats 0 as 'follow the
# rail'. The two agree for every non-zero value and differ at 0 BY DESIGN, so
# a fixture that left the field at its new default would report the design as
# a regression. Fixing it in `legacy()` instead would make this sweep compare
# the new law against itself, which is the one thing it must never do.
for tune in (Tuning(slew_w=1000.0), Tuning(slew_w=1000.0, target_grid_w=-10.0),
Tuning(max_w=5000, slew_w=5000)):
for prev in (-2000.0, -500.0, -100.0, 0.0, 100.0, 500.0, 2000.0):
for grid in (-6000.0, -1000.0, -500.0, -14.0, 0.0, 14.0, 500.0, 1000.0, 6000.0):
for actual in (-2000.0, 0.0, 600.0, 2000.0):
for sc in (0, 2, 3, 9):
for sc in (0, 2, 3, 9, 12):
d = compute(prev, grid, actual, tune, sc) # i_w defaults to None
seen.add(d.reason)
got = (d.target_w, d.sat_count, d.frozen,
ALIAS.get(d.reason, d.reason))
if got != legacy(prev, grid, actual, tune, sc):
diffs.append((prev, grid, actual, sc, got,
legacy(prev, grid, actual, tune, sc)))
check(f"i_w=None reproduces release/1.0 over {3*7*9*4*4} cases, reason included"
+ (f" (first diff {diffs[0]})" if diffs else ""), not diffs)
was = legacy(prev, grid, actual, tune, sc)
if got == was:
continue
# everything that reaches the wire, without the counter
wire_same = (got[0], got[2], got[3]) == (was[0], was[2], was[3])
if wire_same:
# the ceiling moved and nothing else did. Only legal
# above release/1.0's own cap, and only with both
# counters standing at their own ceilings.
if (sc >= LEGACY_SAT_CAP
and was[1] == LEGACY_SAT_CAP
and got[1] == _control._SAT_COUNT_CAP):
cap_diffs.append((prev, grid, actual, sc, got[1], was[1]))
continue
diffs.append((prev, grid, actual, sc, got, was))
continue
explained = (
d.reason == "freeze-released"
and was[3] == "saturated-freeze"
and d.sat_count >= SETTLE_CYCLES
and unasked_power(prev, actual, tune.saturation_w))
if not explained:
diffs.append((prev, grid, actual, sc, got, was))
continue
released.append((prev, grid, actual, sc))
if got[0] != was[0]:
value_diffs.append((prev, got[0], was[0]))
TOTAL = 3 * 7 * 9 * 4 * 5
check(f"i_w=None reproduces release/1.0 over {TOTAL} cases except where"
f" SAFETY-13 releases the freeze, reason included"
+ (f" (first unexplained diff {diffs[0]})" if diffs else ""), not diffs)
# ⚠️ EXACT COUNTS, NOT INEQUALITIES. A weaker form of this line ("some
# releases happened") was written while the bound was moving, and the coverage
# audit caught it immediately: a `unasked_power()` that stops discriminating
# went from 6 checks to 5. The three numbers partition the sweep, so any one of
# them moving is a change somebody has to explain.
check(f"{TOTAL - len(released) - len(cap_diffs)} of {TOTAL} cases are"
f" bit-identical to release/1.0; {len(released)} are releases;"
f" {len(cap_diffs)} differ in the saturation counter alone",
len(released) == 432 and len(cap_diffs) == 81
and TOTAL - len(released) - len(cap_diffs) == 3267)
# ⚠️ THE COUNTER-ONLY DIFFERENCES ARE NOT A LOOPHOLE, so they are pinned twice:
# they may only occur at an `sc` above release/1.0's ceiling, and the largest
# `saturation_cycles` config.yaml accepts is below BOTH ceilings, so no
# accepted configuration can see the difference at all.
check(f"the {len(cap_diffs)} counter-only differences all sit above"
f" release/1.0's cap of {LEGACY_SAT_CAP}, where no accepted"
f" saturation_cycles can read them",
all(r[3] >= LEGACY_SAT_CAP for r in cap_diffs) and _sc_hi <= LEGACY_SAT_CAP)
# ⚠️ AND THE RELEASES ARE MOSTLY A LABEL. Only these change what reaches the
# wire; the rest report "freeze-released" on a command the freeze was not
# binding on anyway. Every one of them is a charge that release/1.0 refused to
# start from exactly 0 W, which is the ticket, stated as a count.
check(f"{len(value_diffs)} of those {len(released)} change the command,"
f" and every one is a charge start from prev_w == 0 that was refused",
len(value_diffs) == 27
and all(p == 0.0 and new_ < 0.0 and old_ == 0.0
for p, new_, old_ in value_diffs))
# ...and the rename is not a quiet deletion: the signal SAFETY-03 alarms on has
# to actually occur in that sweep, or its hook is dead.
@@ -443,6 +941,205 @@ check("worst billed rest point falls from 15 W to under 5 W",
compute(500.0, 4.9, 500.0, TB).reason == "deadband"
and compute(500.0, 5.0, 500.0, TB).reason != "deadband")
print("SAFETY-39: the slew limit is a RATIO to the rail, not a number")
# ⚠️ WHAT WENT WRONG, IN ONE LINE, BECAUSE THE SHAPE IS THE POINT. `slew_w:
# 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a clamp of 1500 W and its stated
# justification was that it caps "how far the loop can jump ahead of the
# inverter". The live install then ran max_w 5000 with the same 1000, and on
# 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46 a real 3.4 kW export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000 W
# in five 2 s ticks, the battery to -5154 W against a 5000 VA inverter, and the
# grid from 3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT. Nothing was broken. The rail
# moved and the constant did not.
#
# So what is graded below is the RELATIONSHIP and not a value: at every rail,
# the loop takes the plant's own settling time to cross its whole output range.
# A check that pinned "555 W" would go stale the same way the comment did.
print(f" SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = {SLEW_RAIL_FRAC:.4f}"
f" ({1 / SLEW_RAIL_FRAC:.0f} ticks to cross the rail)")
check("0 means FOLLOW THE RAIL and resolves to SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w",
slew_limit_w(Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=0.0)) == SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * 5000.0)
check("an explicit value is passed through untouched - it is the operator's "
"number and nothing here silently reduces it",
slew_limit_w(Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=400.0)) == 400.0)
check("the shipped Tuning default is 0, i.e. the rail, so the law carries no "
"second constant to go stale beside config.yaml",
Tuning().slew_w == 0.0)
# ⭐ THE RELATIONSHIP ITSELF, over every rail this add-on can be built at: the
# single-inverter schema range (100..5000), the live install (5000), and the
# roster sums a second inverter produces - 9600 with inverter B's datasheet
# figure, 10000 with two of A. ⚠️ 9600 IS NOT A MEASUREMENT: inverter B does not
# exist on site yet (SPIKE-04, ~2026-09-12) and 4600 W is its datasheet and
# serial, per goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b. It is here because the ARITHMETIC is what
# is being graded, and the arithmetic does not care.
_rails = [100.0, 500.0, 1500.0, 2000.0, 5000.0, 9600.0, 10000.0]
_ticks = {r: r / slew_limit_w(Tuning(max_w=r)) for r in _rails}
print(" ticks to cross the rail at the default, by rail: "
+ ", ".join(f"{r:.0f}W={t:.1f}" for r, t in _ticks.items()))
check("⭐ AT EVERY RAIL THE DEFAULT TAKES THE SAME NUMBER OF TICKS TO CROSS IT - "
"which is PLANT_SETTLE_S at the measured tick. This is the whole of "
"SAFETY-39: raising max_w moves the slew limit with it, so the constant "
"cannot be left behind by the rail again",
all(abs(t - PLANT_SETTLE_S / LOOP_TICK_S) < 1e-9 for t in _ticks.values()))
check("...and that is the same as saying the crossing takes the plant's own "
f"measured settling time ({PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s) at the "
f"{LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s tick the live install was measured running",
all(abs(t * LOOP_TICK_S - PLANT_SETTLE_S) < 1e-9 for t in _ticks.values()))
# ⭐ VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. The configuration that produced the 2026-09-05
# excursion, put through the same arithmetic: it crosses the rail in 10 s
# against a plant that takes 18 s. This is the number validate.py rule 10
# refuses on, and it is asserted HERE too so that the law and the gate cannot
# drift apart - the rule can only ever refuse what this ratio says is too fast.
_broken = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=1000.0)
_broken_s = 5000.0 / slew_limit_w(_broken) * LOOP_TICK_S
print(f" the 2026-09-05 configuration (max_w 5000, slew_w 1000) crosses its "
f"rail in {_broken_s:.0f} s against a plant measured at {PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s")
check("⭐ RESTORING slew_w 1000 AT max_w 5000 IS FASTER THAN THE PLANT, and by "
"the ratio rather than by anybody's opinion - test_validate.py's rule 10 "
"section refuses exactly this pair",
_broken_s < PLANT_SETTLE_S
and slew_limit_w(_broken) > SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * _broken.max_w)
# THE CLOSED LOOP, AND WHAT THIS PLANT IS AND IS NOT.
#
# ⚠️ THE PLANT BELOW IS MODELLED HERE AND IS NOT THE RIG. admin/goodwe's
# `plantsim.Plant` is the battery model this project grades control changes
# against, and this repository's CI cannot reach it - that repository is private
# and this job's token is minted for this one (see .gitea/workflows/checks.yml).
# So the rig evidence lives in `tools/slew_sim.py`, is quoted in the pull
# request and in DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md, and what runs
# HERE is a first-order lag with the time constant that reproduces §5.10's
# measured ~18 s to the deadband. test_alloc.py makes the same split for the
# same reason and says so in the same words.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT CANNOT SHOW A BATTERY ABOVE ITS RATING, WHICH IS SAID BEFORE THE
# RESULT RATHER THAN AFTER IT. Neither this model nor `plantsim.Plant` lets the
# plant exceed `p_max`; both clamp. The -5154 W against a 5000 VA inverter that
# the ticket reports is therefore NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN SIMULATION AT ALL, by
# construction, and no acceptance criterion here is written on it. What IS
# reproducible, and is what is graded, is the loop OVER-ABSORBING and driving
# the meter from export into import - the error it then chases.
_TAU_S = 6.0 # first-order lag; with the 2 s tick it reaches the
# deadband ~18 s after a step, which is §5.10's figure
def _step_run(tuning, export_w, load_w=350.0, phase=5, cycles=90,
dt=LOOP_TICK_S):
"""One export step onto a converged loop.
-> (worst import at the meter, peak battery beyond what the site NEEDED,
largest setpoint change in one tick).
"""
import math
prev, i_w, sat, actual, pv = 0.0, None, 0, 0.0, 0.0
a = 1.0 - math.exp(-dt / _TAU_S)
worst_import, peak, biggest, last = -1e9, 0.0, 0.0, None
for c in range(cycles):
if c == phase:
pv = export_w + load_w
grid = load_w - pv - actual
d = compute(prev, grid, actual, tuning, sat, i_w)
if c >= phase and last is not None:
biggest = max(biggest, abs(d.target_w - last))
last = d.target_w
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
# the plant: a first-order lag, clamped at the rating like the real one
actual += (max(-tuning.max_w, min(tuning.max_w, prev)) - actual) * a
if c >= phase:
worst_import = max(worst_import, load_w - pv - actual)
peak = max(peak, abs(actual))
return worst_import, peak - export_w, biggest
def _family(tuning):
"""The worst case over 51 export steps, 1.0-4.2 kW, at three phases.
⚠️ A FAMILY AND NOT ONE STEP, AND THAT IS A FINDING RATHER THAN CAUTION.
A single run of this loop is not evidence: the deadband, the 10 W
quantisation and the phase of the step against the tick move the result by
hundreds of watts, non-monotonically, so two adjacent slews can rank either
way on one step and the opposite way on the next. Every number below is a
worst case over the family, which is how admin/goodwe grades the same
quantities (see `config.yaml`'s "1890 closed-loop runs" and "924 runs").
"""
worst = dict(imp=-1e9, over=-1e9, step=0.0, big=0, runs=0)
for export_w in range(1000, 4300, 200):
for phase in (5, 6, 7):
imp, over, step = _step_run(tuning, float(export_w), phase=phase)
worst["runs"] += 1
worst["imp"] = max(worst["imp"], imp)
worst["over"] = max(worst["over"], over)
worst["step"] = max(worst["step"], step)
worst["big"] += step >= 900.0
return worst
_LIVE = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=1000.0) # what ran on 2026-09-05
_RAIL = Tuning(max_w=5000.0) # slew_w 0 - follow the rail
_INTERIM = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=400.0) # applied live 2026-09-05 12:00
_SLOWER = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=250.0)
_GAIN03 = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, gain=0.3)
_GAIN02 = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, gain=0.2)
_R = {k: _family(t) for k, t in
(("live", _LIVE), ("rail", _RAIL), ("interim", _INTERIM),
("slower", _SLOWER), ("gain03", _GAIN03), ("gain02", _GAIN02))}
print(f" worst case over {_R['live']['runs']} export steps at max_w 5000, "
f"{LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s tick:")
for _k, _lab in (("live", "gain 0.6 slew_w 1000 (the 2026-09-05 live pair)"),
("rail", "gain 0.6 slew_w 0 (follow the rail)"),
("interim", "gain 0.6 slew_w 400 (the live interim)"),
("slower", "gain 0.6 slew_w 250"),
("gain03", "gain 0.3 slew_w 0"),
("gain02", "gain 0.2 slew_w 0")):
_w = _R[_k]
print(f" {_lab:<48} largest tick step {_w['step']:5.0f} W, "
f"{_w['big']:2}/{_w['runs']} runs step >= 900 W, "
f"over-absorbed {_w['over']:5.0f} W, meter driven to {_w['imp']:+6.0f} W")
# ⭐ THE DEFECT, REPRODUCED BEFORE ANYTHING IS CHANGED. The live pair steps the
# setpoint by a full 1000 W on nearly every member of the family and drives the
# meter from EXPORT into IMPORT - the loop manufacturing the error it then
# chases. That is the 2026-09-05 observation and it is what makes this a control
# fault rather than a slow loop.
check("⭐ REPRODUCED: at max_w 5000 with slew_w 1000 the setpoint steps a full "
"1000 W per tick on nearly every step in the family, and the meter is "
"driven from export into import",
_R["live"]["step"] >= 900.0
and _R["live"]["big"] > 0.9 * _R["live"]["runs"]
and _R["live"]["imp"] > 200.0)
check("⭐ FIXED, ON THE THING THE SLEW ACTUALLY OWNS: following the rail removes "
"the >= 900 W step from EVERY member of the family - which is the symptom "
"that escalated 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 per 30 min on the morning of the "
"2026-09-05 excursion",
_R["live"]["big"] > 0 and _R["rail"]["big"] == 0
and _R["interim"]["big"] == 0)
# ⚠️ AND WHAT IT DOES NOT BUY, MEASURED, ASSERTED, AND SAID BEFORE ANYBODY CAN
# READ MORE INTO THIS CARD THAN IT DELIVERED. `slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT; the
# integrator accumulates `gain * error` per cycle and is bounded only by
# `integrator_max_w`. At gain 0.6 into a 3.4 kW error the integrator moves
# ~2000 W per tick and reaches a 5000 W rail in under three ticks WHATEVER
# `slew_w` is. So the over-absorption is a GAIN term, and slowing the slew does
# not reduce it - on this model it gets slightly WORSE, because the command
# spends longer away from where it needs to be while the integrator keeps
# winding. admin/goodwe's rig, a different plant model, agrees: over-absorption
# 990 W at slew 1000 and 1086 W at slew 250, against 1010 W at gain 0.6 and
# 863 W at gain 0.3 (tools/slew_sim.py).
#
# `gain` is therefore the next constant to re-derive. SAFETY-39 measured it and
# CHANGED NOTHING: it is a live control-law constant on a running house, and two
# of them moving in one release makes the next measurement uninterpretable.
check("⚠️ THE SLEW DOES NOT OWN THE OVER-ABSORPTION, AND THIS CHECK IS HERE SO "
"THAT NOBODY READS SAFETY-39 AS 'THE OVERSHOOT IS FIXED'. Quartering the "
"slew from 1000 to 250 does not reduce the over-absorption at all",
_R["slower"]["over"] >= _R["live"]["over"])
check("...while the GAIN does own it: 0.6 -> 0.3 -> 0.2 falls monotonically, at "
"the same slew. That is the measurement behind 'gain is the next constant "
"to re-derive', and it is a measurement rather than an opinion",
_R["gain03"]["over"] < _R["rail"]["over"]
and _R["gain02"]["over"] < _R["gain03"]["over"])
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
+23 -7
View File
@@ -144,9 +144,17 @@ def check(name, cond):
fails.append(name)
def tuning(max_w=LIVE_INSTALL_MAX_W):
"""The shipped defaults from config.yaml, at the live install's max_w."""
return Tuning(gain=0.6, max_w=max_w, slew_w=1000, deadband_w=15,
def tuning(max_w=LIVE_INSTALL_MAX_W, slew_w=0):
"""The shipped defaults from config.yaml, at the live install's max_w.
⚠️ `slew_w` IS 0 - "FOLLOW THE RAIL" - AND IS A PARAMETER (SAFETY-39). 0 is
what config.yaml ships and resolves to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, so it moves
with `max_w` instead of being a number typed beside it. It has to be
overridable because one case below picks an ABSURDLY SMALL rail on purpose,
and at that rail a rail-following slew is 2 W per cycle - which would make
the slew, rather than the thing under test, the reason nothing fires.
"""
return Tuning(gain=0.6, max_w=max_w, slew_w=slew_w, deadband_w=15,
target_grid_w=-10, step_w=10, saturation_w=500,
saturation_cycles=3)
@@ -327,10 +335,10 @@ check("the capture loaded", len(rows) > 1000)
# covers both kWh registers, so a real `unchanged_s` on this data can only be
# SHORTER than what is reconstructed here - this replay is the pessimistic
# version of the converged case, not a flattering one.
def replay(hold_s, max_w, cycle_floor_s=15.0):
def replay(hold_s, max_w, cycle_floor_s=15.0, slew_w=0):
"""Drive the real control law and the real detector over the capture."""
wd = FreezeWatchdog(FreezeWatchdogConfig(hold_s=hold_s))
t = tuning(max_w)
t = tuning(max_w, slew_w)
target, i_w, sat = 0.0, 0.0, 0
prev_pwr, changed_at = None, rows[0]["t"]
last_cycle = None
@@ -456,7 +464,15 @@ check("...and the shipped law really does park the command there",
# converged capture is silent" is satisfied by a detector that is wired to
# nothing. Drop the hold to 1 s and the rail to nothing, and the SAME replay
# must alarm - so the silence above is the data's doing, not the harness's.
wd_hot, _, _, fired_hot = replay(1.0, 20.0)
# ⚠️ AND THE SLEW IS PINNED FOR THIS CASE ONLY, WHICH IS THE OTHER HALF OF
# MAKING BOTH TERMS REACHABLE (SAFETY-39). The rail here is 20 W, chosen absurdly
# small so the rail term cannot be what holds the alarm off. At the shipped
# `slew_w: 0` the limit follows that rail too - `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * 20` is 2.2 W
# per cycle - so the command could not reach 19 W inside the capture and the
# replay would go silent for a reason that has nothing to do with the detector.
# That is exactly the vacuous pass this case exists to rule out, arriving
# through the case itself, so the slew is written out here and nowhere else.
wd_hot, _, _, fired_hot = replay(1.0, 20.0, slew_w=20.0)
check("...and the same replay DOES alarm once both terms are made reachable",
fired_hot is not None and wd_hot.episodes > 0)
@@ -699,7 +715,7 @@ def _opts(**over):
o = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_INSTALL_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W,
"slew_w": 0, "deadband_w": SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W,
"target_grid_w": -10, "step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10,
"stale_input_s": STALE_INPUT_S}
o.update(over)
+879
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,879 @@
"""Runnable check for SAFETY-37's freshness policy. `python3 test_freshness.py`
THE SUBJECT OF THIS FILE IS THE FIXTURE, NOT THE CODE. A pack legitimately
resting at 40 % and a dead sensor reading 40 % ARE THE SAME NUMBER. A check that
cannot separate "fresh and unchanged" from "stale" cannot see the failure it
names, and this repository has recorded that defect - "a check whose DATA cannot
reach the failure it names" - eleven times. So part 1 builds the separation and
ASSERTS THE VALUE STREAMS ARE BIT-IDENTICAL across the pair; everything after it
is downstream of that pair being real.
⚠️ AND THE CARD'S WORDING HAD TO BE SHARPENED TO BUILD IT, WHICH IS SAID HERE
RATHER THAN QUIETLY WORKED AROUND. The card says "only arrival separates them".
For a signal this add-on polls out of Home Assistant's state cache, ARRIVAL
CANNOT SEPARATE THEM: `read_inputs()` runs about once a second and Home
Assistant answers 200 with a number whether or not the publisher behind the
entity is alive, so both members of the pair arrive, identically, forever.
Part 1a demonstrates exactly that - an arrival-age gate is graded and FAILS to
tell the pair apart - and it is the reason the shipped verdict is a conjunction
with an OBLIGATION term rather than an age threshold. Every clock in that
verdict is still an arrival clock: nothing reads a Home Assistant timestamp,
which is the half of "arrival-stamped" that TEL-06 is blocked on and that this
module does honour.
1. THE PAIR. Fresh-and-unchanged vs stale, on identical value streams, on
the policy object itself. Plus 1a, the arrival-age gate that cannot.
2. THE WIRING. The same pair driven through the REAL `Controller.read_inputs`
at a roster of TWO, with the two units carrying DIFFERENT power values.
3. THE CONSUMERS REFUSE, and the counterfactual is run beside them: the
per-unit sign check and the circulating-power sensor, with the gate and
with the gate removed, through real `cycle()` calls.
4. THE LATCH, and the ~1 Hz oscillation it exists to prevent.
5. N=1. Nothing changes on a healthy install - asserted on the shipped read
path, not assumed - and the one thing that DOES change is named.
6. THE BOUNDS, graded against the shipped `config.yaml` at both ends.
7. THE POLICY TABLE tells the truth about what is wired.
8. THE MEASUREMENT the bound rests on, replayed from the committed capture.
9. KNOWN SURVIVORS, graded so they are residuals rather than surprises.
⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12; goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b).
Every two-unit case below is two copies of inverter A's behaviour with
DIFFERENT numbers passed in, and no number here is a measured parameter for a
second device.
⚠️ MUTATING THE MODULE THIS FILE GRADES? PURGE `__pycache__` FIRST - or run
`tools/mutation_run.sh`, which does. `python3 -B` alone does NOT save you: it
stops bytecode being WRITTEN, not a stale one being READ. Read MUTATION.md
before you report a survivor.
"""
import ast
import asyncio
import glob
import gzip
import io
import json
import sys
import time
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from app import freshness as F
from app.circulation import circulating_w
from app.freshness import BOUNDS, BATT_OBLIGED_S, BATT_UNCHANGED_S, MOVE_W, Freshness
from app.inverter import Inverter
from app.main import Controller
from app.store import DEFAULTS
from app.watchdog import SignWatchdog, SignWatchdogConfig, disagrees
fails = []
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
def run(coro):
return asyncio.new_event_loop().run_until_complete(coro)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# fixtures
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class MemStore:
def __init__(self, data=None):
self.data = dict(DEFAULTS, **(data or {}))
def set(self, k, v):
self.data[k] = v
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
def set_time(self, *a):
pass
class Pub:
enabled = False
def publish(self, *a, **k):
pass
def close(self):
pass
class Hass:
"""A Home Assistant that answers per ENTITY and RECORDS what it served.
⚠️ PER ENTITY, AND THE RECORD IS LOAD-BEARING. A stub that answered one
number whatever it was asked could not tell "B was read from B's sensor"
from "B was handed A's reading" - and the served-value log is what lets
part 1 assert that the fresh run and the stale run saw the SAME numbers.
"""
def __init__(self, numbers=None, limits=None):
self.numbers = dict(numbers or {})
self.limits_by = dict(limits or {})
self.served = [] # (entity, value) in call order
self.writes = []
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
v = self.numbers.get(entity)
self.served.append((entity, v))
return None if v is None else (-v if invert else v)
async def limits(self, entity):
return self.limits_by.get(entity, (None, None, None))
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
self.writes.append((entity, value))
return True
async def call(self, domain, service, data):
return True
A_RATING = 5000.0
# ⚠️ ILLUSTRATIVE, AND NOT B'S DATASHEET FIGURES. SPIKE-04a established B as a
# GW5048D-ES rated 4600 W with a 10 % floor (goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b), and this
# fixture deliberately does not use them: 5000/4600 is a 400 W gap, narrower
# than a slew step, and two equal-ish numbers cannot show a check that read the
# wrong unit's. Same reasoning as test_inverter.py's `B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS`.
B_RATING_SIM = 3000.0
A_FLOOR, B_FLOOR_SIM = 10, 15
ROSTER = [
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp_a",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc_a", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt_a",
"max_w": A_RATING, "bms_soc_floor": A_FLOOR},
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp_b",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc_b", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt_b",
"max_w": B_RATING_SIM, "bms_soc_floor": B_FLOOR_SIM},
]
# ⚠️ A AND B CARRY DIFFERENT POWER VALUES IN EVERY FIXTURE BELOW, and the card
# names this as the trap it expects: "if both read the same, the test cannot
# distinguish a frozen reading from a live one and will pass against the broken
# code". SAFETY-30's fix round walked into exactly that with two watchdog holds
# both set to 1.
A_FROZEN_W = -1200.0 # inverter A's register, stuck on a charge figure
B_LIVE_W = 900.0 # inverter B's register, moving, and NOT A's number
BASE = dict(meter_source="off", meter_entity="sensor.grid", setpoint_entity="",
soc_entity="", batt_entity="", max_w=A_RATING, gain=0.6, slew_w=0,
deadband_w=15, target_grid_w=0, step_w=10, heartbeat_s=10,
stale_input_s=15, inverters=ROSTER)
def site(opts=None, numbers=None):
"""A real two-inverter Controller off the shipped `build_roster()`."""
hass = Hass(dict({"sensor.grid": 0.0,
"sensor.soc_a": 50.0, "sensor.batt_a": A_FROZEN_W,
"sensor.soc_b": 55.0, "sensor.batt_b": B_LIVE_W},
**(numbers or {})),
{"number.sp_a": (-A_RATING, A_RATING, 1.0),
"number.sp_b": (-B_RATING_SIM, B_RATING_SIM, 1.0)})
c = Controller(dict(BASE, **(opts or {})), hass, MemStore(), Pub(),
stop=asyncio.Event())
c.inverters[0].dev_min, c.inverters[0].dev_max = -A_RATING, A_RATING
c.inverters[1].dev_min, c.inverters[1].dev_max = -B_RATING_SIM, B_RATING_SIM
return c, hass
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("1. THE PAIR: 'fresh and unchanged' vs 'stale', on IDENTICAL value streams")
# The two runs below feed the policy object the SAME forty readings of the same
# number at the same instants. The ONLY difference is what the controller was
# asking the inverter to do while those readings arrived.
#
# FRESH the site is converged. The command sits where it is, the register
# answers the same watt, and nothing is wrong. This is the case the
# 30-day capture in part 8 measures at up to 263.2 s.
# STALE the site reversed. The command travelled 2500 W and the register did
# not move by one watt in 40 s, which is 2.4x the fastest it could
# possibly be obliged to answer in.
STREAM = [(float(t), A_FROZEN_W) for t in range(0, 40)]
def drive(bound, stream, standing_of):
"""Feed a Freshness one arrival per (t, value). Returns (obj, served, verdicts)."""
f = Freshness(bound)
served, verdicts = [], []
for t, v in stream:
f.submit(v, standing_of(t), t)
served.append(v)
verdicts.append(f.reading())
return f, served, verdicts
_fresh, _fresh_served, _fresh_read = drive(
BOUNDS["batt"], STREAM, lambda t: A_FROZEN_W)
# The command travels from -1200 W to +1300 W at t=1 and stays there: a site
# turnaround, which is the ordinary stimulus SAFETY-31's own campaign sweeps.
_stale, _stale_served, _stale_read = drive(
BOUNDS["batt"], STREAM, lambda t: A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0)
print(f" served (both runs): {_fresh_served[:3]} ... x{len(_fresh_served)}")
# ⚠️ `key=str`, AND IT IS NOT COSMETIC. Without it this line raises TypeError
# comparing None with a float the moment a mutation makes the FRESH run stale -
# which is what M2 (dropping the command-travel term) did: the file died on a
# DIAGNOSTIC PRINT before check one, so the harness reported "red" with no named
# check behind it. MUTATION.md's reporting rule is "which suite went red, and on
# WHICH NAMED CHECK"; a print that can crash first destroys exactly that.
print(f" fresh verdicts: unique={sorted(set(_fresh_read), key=str)}")
print(f" stale verdicts: first None at t="
f"{next((i for i, v in enumerate(_stale_read) if v is None), None)}")
check("⚠️ THE FIXTURE'S OWN PRECONDITION: the two runs saw a BIT-IDENTICAL "
"value stream. If this ever stops being true the pair below is comparing "
"two different experiments and proves nothing about freshness",
_fresh_served == _stale_served
and len({v for v in _fresh_served}) == 1)
check("FRESH AND UNCHANGED is not stale. Forty identical readings over 39 s "
"with the command standing still - a converged site - and the reading "
"reaches its consumers untouched",
not _fresh.stale and _fresh_read == [A_FROZEN_W] * len(STREAM))
check("⚠️ STALE IS. The same forty readings, the same instants, the same "
"numbers - and the command moved 2500 W underneath them. The reading "
"becomes None to its consumers, which is the whole card",
_stale.stale and _stale_read[-1] is None)
check("...and it becomes None at the BOUND, not before: 35.0 s of unchanged "
"arrivals, so the last fresh verdict is at t=34 and the first None at "
"t=35",
_stale_read[34] == A_FROZEN_W and _stale_read[35] is None
and BATT_UNCHANGED_S == 35.0)
check("...and NEVER a held number and never a zero - `reading()` has exactly "
"two shapes, the arrived value or None",
set(type(v) for v in _stale_read) == {float, type(None)}
and 0.0 not in [v for v in _stale_read if v is not None])
check("...and the reason names the three terms an operator has to check, with "
"the numbers that fired it",
"STALE_READING" in _stale.reason and "2500 W" in _stale.reason
and "unchanged for 35 s" in _stale.reason)
# --- 1a. the gate the card asked for first, graded and found unable ----------
# An arrival-age gate is what "arrival-stamped" reads as on first hearing. It is
# built here and run against the SAME pair, because a criterion that cannot be
# satisfied is worth more said out loud than approximated in silence.
_arrival_ages = []
_af = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t, v in STREAM:
_af.submit(v, A_FROZEN_W, t)
# Every read produced a number, so on both members of the pair the age
# since the last ARRIVAL is 0.0 at every instant. There is nothing to
# threshold.
_arrival_ages.append(0.0 if _af.last is not None else None)
check("⚠️ AN ARRIVAL-AGE GATE CANNOT TELL THE PAIR APART, and that is why the "
"shipped verdict is not one. Home Assistant answered every read with a "
"number in BOTH runs, so the age since arrival is 0.0 s at every instant "
"of both - a threshold on it is a threshold that can never fire, which "
"is TEL-06's defect rebuilt in this repository",
set(_arrival_ages) == {0.0} and _af.arrivals == len(STREAM))
check("...while the arrival record IS what the shipped verdict is measured on: "
"`unchanged_s` is the gap between arrivals that carried different "
"numbers, on this process's own monotonic clock, and no Home Assistant "
"timestamp is read anywhere in the module",
_stale.unchanged_s(39.0) == 39.0
and "last_updated" not in io.open(HERE / "app" / "freshness.py",
encoding="utf-8").read().split(
'"""', 2)[2])
check("...and a read that produced NOTHING is still an immediate None, exactly "
"as it is today - a failed read is not an arrival and is not an age",
Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"]).reading() is None
and (lambda f: (f.submit(5.0, 0.0, 0.0), f.submit(None, 0.0, 1.0),
f.reading() is None and f.held == 5.0)[-1])(
Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])))
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("2. THE WIRING: the same pair through the REAL read path, at a roster of 2")
async def _reads(c, hass, plan):
"""Drive real `read_inputs()` calls. `plan` is (t, standing_a, batt_a)."""
out = []
for t, standing_a, batt_a in plan:
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = batt_a
# `last_write` is what the write path sets and what `standing_w()`
# reads; setting it here is standing in for a write, not for the gate.
c.inverters[0].last_write = standing_a
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=t)
out.append((t, c.inverters[0].batt, c.inverters[1].batt))
return out
_PLAN_FRESH = [(float(t), A_FROZEN_W, A_FROZEN_W) for t in range(0, 40)]
_PLAN_STALE = [(float(t), A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0, A_FROZEN_W)
for t in range(0, 40)]
_cf, _hf = site()
_of = run(_reads(_cf, _hf, _PLAN_FRESH))
_cs, _hs = site()
_os = run(_reads(_cs, _hs, _PLAN_STALE))
print(f" fresh run: A={sorted({r[1] for r in _of})} B={sorted({r[2] for r in _of})}")
print(f" stale run: A={sorted({r[1] for r in _os}, key=str)} "
f"B={sorted({r[2] for r in _os})}")
check("PRECONDITION: both runs were served the same per-entity numbers, so the "
"difference below is the wiring and not the stimulus",
[x for x in _hf.served if x[0] == "sensor.batt_a"]
== [x for x in _hs.served if x[0] == "sensor.batt_a"])
check("⚠️ THE TWO UNITS CARRY DIFFERENT POWER VALUES - A at -1200 W, B at "
"+900 W. A fixture whose units read the same number cannot show a gate "
"that answered for the wrong unit, which is the trap the card names",
A_FROZEN_W != B_LIVE_W and all(r[2] == B_LIVE_W for r in _of))
check("THROUGH THE REAL PATH: a converged site keeps its reading",
all(r[1] == A_FROZEN_W for r in _of))
check("⚠️ THROUGH THE REAL PATH: a frozen register becomes `Inverter.batt is "
"None`. Not a held number, not a zero - the same None a missing entity "
"produces, which is the state §11.1 rule 1 already answers with 0 W",
_os[34][1] == A_FROZEN_W and _os[35][1] is None
and all(r[1] is None for r in _os[35:]))
check("...and ONLY the frozen unit's. B's own reading is untouched, which is "
"the per-unit half: a freshness verdict about A is not evidence about B",
all(r[2] == B_LIVE_W for r in _os) and _cs.inverters[1].batt == B_LIVE_W
and not _cs.inverters[1].batt_fresh.stale)
check("...and `inputs_ok` goes False, so the site stops rather than regulating "
"against a number nobody measured",
_cs.inputs_ok is False and _cf.inputs_ok is True)
check("...and the operator gets a line saying which unit and why, on the same "
"status list the liveness notes use",
any("STALE_READING" in n and "inverter-a" in n
for n in _cs.liveness_notes())
and _cf.liveness_notes() == [])
check("...and the raw number is still recorded for diagnostics, so the "
"operator can see WHAT it was stuck on",
_cs.inverters[0].batt_fresh.last == A_FROZEN_W)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("3. THE CONSUMERS REFUSE - and the counterfactual runs beside them")
# Both consumers already do the right thing with a None. Neither could ever
# receive one before this card, which is the entire exposure: the gate is the
# thing that was missing BETWEEN the shipped read and the shipped check.
_cfg3 = SignWatchdogConfig(min_w=250.0, hold_s=85.0)
check("PRECONDITION on the shipped predicate: a None measurement does not "
"disagree with anything, so it CLEARS the sign window",
disagrees(1300.0, None, True, _cfg3) is False
and disagrees(1300.0, A_FROZEN_W, True, _cfg3) is True)
check("PRECONDITION on the shipped sensor: a roster with a missing term is "
"None, and None clears the circulation window rather than accumulating",
circulating_w([1300.0, None]) is None
and circulating_w([A_FROZEN_W, B_LIVE_W]) == 2 * min(
abs(A_FROZEN_W), abs(B_LIVE_W)))
async def _cycles(gated, ticks=25, step_mono=12.0, wall=0.20):
"""Real cycles at N=2 with A's register frozen and the LOOP driving.
⚠️ THE COMMAND TRAVEL IS PRODUCED BY THE SHIPPED CONTROL LAW, NOT BY THE
FIXTURE. The meter is pinned at +3000 W of import, so `compute()` ramps the
site into discharge at its own slew rate through the real allocator and the
real write path; nothing here assigns `last_write`. A fixture that set the
standing command by hand would be feeding the gate its own arming condition,
which is the shape of check this repository keeps finding.
`gated=False` is THE COUNTERFACTUAL - the shipped behaviour before this
card, rebuilt by handing the consumers the raw held number the gate
withheld. Same cycles, same stimulus, so the difference between the two
columns is the gate and nothing else.
⚠️ TWO CLOCKS, DELIBERATELY, AND THE WALL-CLOCK ONE IS THE FLAKE RISK.
The freshness verdict runs on the INJECTED monotonic clock (12 s a tick, so
the 35 s bound is crossed on tick 3, deterministically, however loaded the
machine is). The sign watchdog runs on the WALL clock inside `cycle()`,
which cannot be injected - so `unit_sign_disagree_s` is set to 2 s and the
ticks are 0.20 s apart, putting the gate's close at ~0.6 s against a 2 s
window. That ORDER is the field's - 35 s < 75 s < 85 s by construction, part
6 - and the gate is given no head start beyond it.
⚠️ AND THE MARGIN IS MEASURED AND ASSERTED RATHER THAN ASSUMED (CI-06).
`test_peakguard.py` answered two of its own checks with the wall clock, flaked
at ~20 %, and cost a wrong merge diagnosis - a flaky check does not waste a
re-run, it manufactures evidence for whichever hypothesis the reader already
holds. So this returns the wall clock at which the gate closed, and the check
below fails with THAT NUMBER if the box was too slow, rather than reporting a
trip that looks like a code defect.
"""
c, hass = site({"unit_sign_disagree_w": 250, "unit_sign_disagree_s": 2,
"sign_disagree_w": 250, "sign_disagree_s": 2,
"site_sign_disagree_w": 250, "site_sign_disagree_s": 2,
"auto_start": True},
{"sensor.grid": 3000.0})
c.auto = True
circ, tripped_at, standing = [], None, []
t_start, t_gate = time.monotonic(), None
for k in range(ticks):
# A's register is FROZEN on the charge figure it stopped at; B's is
# live and is a DIFFERENT number. Neither is touched by the loop.
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = A_FROZEN_W
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_b"] = B_LIVE_W
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=k * step_mono)
if not gated:
for inv in c.inverters:
inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.last
if t_gate is None and c.inverters[0].batt_fresh.stale:
t_gate = time.monotonic() - t_start
circ.append(c.site_circulating_w)
standing.append(c.inverters[0].standing_w())
await c.cycle()
if c.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped and tripped_at is None:
tripped_at = k
await asyncio.sleep(wall)
return c, circ, tripped_at, standing, t_gate
_cg, _circg, _tripg, _standg, _tgate = run(_cycles(True))
_cu, _circu, _tripu, _standu, _ = run(_cycles(False))
_WD_S = 2.0 # `unit_sign_disagree_s` as this fixture sets it, above
print(f" standing on A (gated): {[round(v) for v in _standg]}")
print(f" gated : sign trip tick={_tripg} circ={_circg[:6]}...")
print(f" gate closed after {_tgate:.2f} s of WALL clock, against the "
f"{_WD_S:.0f} s watchdog window ({_WD_S / _tgate:.1f}x margin)")
print(f" counterfact: sign trip tick={_tripu} circ={_circu[:6]}...")
check("⚠️ PRECONDITION ON THE WALL CLOCK, AND IT IS A CHECK RATHER THAN AN "
"ASSUMPTION (CI-06). The gate closes on the INJECTED clock, the watchdog "
"on the real one, so this fixture only means something while the gate "
f"closes well inside the window: it closed at {_tgate:.2f} s against "
f"{_WD_S:.0f} s. If this fails the machine was slow, not the code - and "
"saying so here is what stops that being read as a defect",
_tgate is not None and _tgate < 0.5 * _WD_S)
check("PRECONDITION: the SHIPPED control law really did travel the command - "
"the gate's arming term is produced by `compute()` and the allocator, "
"not written into the fixture",
max(abs(v) for v in _standu) > MOVE_W
and abs(_standu[3] - _standu[0]) > MOVE_W)
check("⚠️ COUNTERFACTUAL FIRST - the stimulus is REAL. Without the gate, the "
"frozen register false-trips SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and parks a "
"healthy inverter. That is the fault this card was filed for",
_tripu is not None and _cu.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped
and "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in _cu.inverters[0].sign_wd.reason)
check("⚠️ AND WITH THE GATE IT DOES NOT TRIP. The reading is withheld before "
"the watchdog's window can accumulate, so the check refuses to conclude "
"rather than concluding wrongly - which is what a stale reading deserves",
_tripg is None and not _cg.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped)
check("...and inverter B was not parked either way - the verdict is per unit",
not _cg.inverters[1].sign_wd.tripped
and not _cu.inverters[1].sign_wd.tripped)
check("⚠️ COUNTERFACTUAL: without the gate the circulating-power sensor "
"reports a loop that is not happening, computed from one frozen term and "
"one live one",
all(v == 2 * min(abs(A_FROZEN_W), abs(B_LIVE_W)) for v in _circu)
and _circu[0] == 1800.0)
check("⚠️ AND WITH THE GATE IT REPORTS `None` - an unknown, which CLEARS the "
"circulation window instead of accumulating it. Both consumers gated, "
"from one place, by one mechanism",
_circg[0] == 1800.0 and _circg[-1] is None
and all(v is None for v in _circg[_circg.index(None):]))
check("...and the circulation watchdog did not latch on the stale evidence",
not _cg.circ_wd.tripped and _cg.circ_wd.over_since is None)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("4. THE LATCH, and the ~1 Hz oscillation it exists to prevent")
# Declaring the reading stale makes inputs_ok False, which commands 0 W, which
# drops the standing command below MOVE_W, which un-arms the conjunction. Without
# a latch the held number would come straight back to the consumers, and the
# whole thing would flip once per read for as long as the register stayed dead.
_lat = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 40):
_lat.submit(A_FROZEN_W, A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0, float(t))
_was = _lat.stale
_after_zero = []
for t in range(40, 50):
_lat.submit(A_FROZEN_W, 0.0, float(t)) # the site has been stopped
_after_zero.append(_lat.reading())
check("PRECONDITION: it is stale before the site is stopped",
_was and _lat.reading() is None)
check("⚠️ AND IT STAYS STALE ONCE THE SITE COMMANDS 0 W. The conjunction is no "
"longer armed - |standing| is 0 W, below the 250 W term - so an unlatched "
"verdict would hand the held -1200 W straight back and the site would "
"restart into it, then stop, then restart, once per read",
all(v is None for v in _after_zero))
# ⚠️ AND A FAILED READ MUST NOT CLEAR IT EITHER. This check exists because the
# mutation that added `self.stale = False` to `submit()`'s None branch SURVIVED
# the whole sweep - no fixture had ever injected a read failure while latched.
# It matters: a stale verdict stops the site, the site is then commanded 0 W, and
# a single unreachable-Home-Assistant read would drop the latch into a state
# where the conjunction is no longer armed - so the held -1200 W would come back
# to the consumers on the very next successful read.
_lat_fail = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 40):
_lat_fail.submit(A_FROZEN_W, A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0, float(t))
_lat_fail.submit(None, 0.0, 40.0) # Home Assistant did not answer
_after_fail = _lat_fail.reading()
_lat_fail.submit(A_FROZEN_W, 0.0, 41.0) # it answers again, same number,
# site now resting at 0 W
check("⚠️ A FAILED READ DOES NOT CLEAR THE LATCH - found by a SURVIVING "
"mutation, not by design. Our inability to fetch a value is not evidence "
"that the value moved, and a stale verdict that a single unreachable read "
"can drop is one a stopped site would drop every time",
_after_fail is None and _lat_fail.stale
and _lat_fail.reading() is None)
check("⚠️ AND ONLY MOVEMENT CLEARS IT - a different number arriving, which is "
"exactly the evidence the verdict was about. Not a timer, not a restart, "
"not the operator's start button",
(lambda f: (f.submit(A_FROZEN_W + 1.0, 0.0, 60.0),
(not f.stale) and f.reading() == A_FROZEN_W + 1.0)[-1])(_lat))
# ⚠️ THE MAGNITUDE TERM OF THE CONJUNCTION, AND THIS CHECK EXISTS BECAUSE A
# MUTATION SURVIVED WITHOUT IT. Deleting `abs(standing_w) < move_w` from
# `_grade()` left every other check in this file green, because in all of them a
# command that has TRAVELLED 250 W has also ENDED UP above 250 W. The case that
# separates them is a site being brought to REST.
_rest = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
# The register reaches +5 W on the same read at which the old +1300 W command is
# still standing - the write path is serialised, so the register can catch up
# BEFORE the command settles - and then the site is commanded to 0 W and the
# register sits at +5 W, correctly, for a minute.
_rest.submit(1290.0, 1300.0, 0.0)
_rest.submit(5.0, 1300.0, 1.0) # standing_at_change captures 1300 W
for t in range(2, 60):
_rest.submit(5.0, 0.0, float(t)) # site at rest; register truthfully +5 W
check("⚠️ THE MAGNITUDE TERM IS LOAD-BEARING, and it took a surviving mutation "
"to show it. A register that reached +5 W while the old +1300 W command "
"was still standing has a `standing_at_change` of 1300 W, so the TRAVEL "
"term alone reads 1300 W of unfollowed command for the whole minute the "
"site rests - and calls a perfectly truthful reading dead. Requiring "
"|standing| >= 250 W as well is what says 'a site at rest is not owed "
"movement'",
not _rest.stale and _rest.reading() == 5.0)
check("...and the hole that term leaves CANNOT MISLEAD EITHER CONSUMER, which "
"is why it is the right trade: a unit commanded under 250 W is one "
"`watchdog.disagrees()` is False for whatever the measurement says, and a "
"frozen term beside a live unit that is itself resting nets to zero "
"circulating power rather than to a false alarm",
disagrees(0.0, A_FROZEN_W, True, _cfg3) is False
and circulating_w([A_FROZEN_W, 0.0]) == 0.0)
check("...and one watt is enough, because 0x0518 is a 1 W register that "
"dithers +/-1 W while holding (goodwe/NOTES.md §5.11, measured "
"2026-08-22) - a working register clears this on its next 10 s publish",
_lat.held == A_FROZEN_W + 1.0 and not _lat.stale)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("5. N=1: nothing changes on a healthy install, and what DOES is named")
_ONE = dict(BASE, inverters=[], setpoint_entity="number.sp_a",
soc_entity="sensor.soc_a", batt_entity="sensor.batt_a",
bms_soc_floor=A_FLOOR)
def one_site():
hass = Hass({"sensor.grid": 0.0, "sensor.soc_a": 50.0,
"sensor.batt_a": A_FROZEN_W},
{"number.sp_a": (-A_RATING, A_RATING, 1.0)})
c = Controller(dict(_ONE), hass, MemStore(), Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.inverters[0].dev_min, c.inverters[0].dev_max = -A_RATING, A_RATING
return c, hass
async def _one_healthy():
c, hass = one_site()
seen = []
for t in range(0, 60):
# A healthy register under a moving command: it dithers, so it is never
# the same integer watt twice running.
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = A_FROZEN_W + (t % 3)
c.inverters[0].last_write = 1300.0 if t % 2 else -1200.0
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=float(t))
seen.append(c.inverters[0].batt)
return c, seen
_c1, _seen1 = run(_one_healthy())
check("⚠️ AC: AT N=1 NOTHING CHANGES ON A HEALTHY INSTALL, and it is asserted "
"rather than assumed. Sixty reads of a dithering register under a command "
"reversing every second: every value reaches the consumers unmodified, "
"the gate never arms, and the status page says nothing new",
_seen1 == [A_FROZEN_W + (t % 3) for t in range(60)]
and not _c1.inverters[0].batt_fresh.stale
and _c1.liveness_notes() == [] and _c1.inputs_ok is True)
check("...and the shipped roster really is one unit, so this is the install "
"that is running in a house today and not a fixture shaped like it",
len(_c1.inverters) == 1 and _c1.inverters[0].name == "inverter-a")
async def _one_frozen():
c, hass = one_site()
for t in range(0, 40):
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = A_FROZEN_W
c.inverters[0].last_write = A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=float(t))
return c
_c1f = run(_one_frozen())
check("⚠️ AND WHAT DOES CHANGE AT N=1 IS NAMED RATHER THAN HIDDEN: a FROZEN "
"register now stops the site, where before it read as a healthy "
"measurement. That is a behaviour change on the shipped roster and it is "
"the point of the card - HW-01 was a one-inverter site, and the pack "
"drained to its floor with every detector reading healthy for 6 h 25 m",
_c1f.inverters[0].batt is None and _c1f.inputs_ok is False)
check("...and the direction it fails in is the safe one: a false verdict "
"commands 0 W and keeps commanding (§11.1 rule 1), behind the existing "
"`stale_input_s` hold, and clears itself on the register's next move",
float(_c1f.o.get("stale_input_s")) > 0
and _c1f.inverters[0].batt_fresh.stale)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("6. THE BOUNDS, graded against the SHIPPED config.yaml at BOTH ends")
def option_default(key):
"""`key`'s default out of config.yaml's `options:` block, at two spaces."""
body = io.open(HERE / "config.yaml", encoding="utf-8").read()
body = body[body.index("\noptions:"):body.index("\nschema:")]
for line in body.splitlines():
if line.startswith(f" {key}:") and not line[2:3].isspace():
return float(line.split(":", 1)[1].strip())
return None
_circ_hold = option_default("circulation_hold_s")
_unit_hold = option_default("unit_sign_disagree_s")
_unit_min_w = option_default("unit_sign_disagree_w")
_ceiling = min(_circ_hold, _unit_hold)
print(f" floor {BATT_OBLIGED_S:.1f} s = settle 6.0 + publish 10.0 + read 1.0")
print(f" bound {BATT_UNCHANGED_S:.1f} s")
print(f" ceil {_ceiling:.1f} s = min(circulation_hold_s {_circ_hold:.0f}, "
f"unit_sign_disagree_s {_unit_hold:.0f})")
check("PRECONDITION: both consumer windows were actually found in config.yaml, "
"so a rename cannot turn this part into a check of two Nones",
_circ_hold == 75.0 and _unit_hold == 85.0 and _unit_min_w == 250.0)
check("⚠️ THE BOUND IS AT LEAST 2x THE PHYSICAL FLOOR. Below 17.0 s a healthy "
"register has not yet been OBLIGED to answer - 6.0 s of plant "
"(NOTES §5.9), one 10 s ESPHome publish (firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181) "
"and one 1 s add-on read - so a shorter bound trips on a working inverter",
BATT_UNCHANGED_S >= 2 * BATT_OBLIGED_S and BATT_OBLIGED_S == 17.0)
check("⚠️ AND AT MOST HALF THE TIGHTER CONSUMER WINDOW. A gate slower than its "
"consumer hands over the frozen number and explains afterwards. THIS IS "
"THE CHECK THAT BITES IF AN OPERATOR'S DEFAULT MOVES: drop "
"`circulation_hold_s` to 60 in config.yaml and this goes red",
BATT_UNCHANGED_S <= 0.5 * _ceiling)
# ⚠️ THE FIRST DRAFT OF THIS CHECK CLAIMED THE BAND CONTAINED EXACTLY ONE
# INTEGER AND IT DOES NOT - it contains 34, 35, 36 and 37, and the check went
# red on its first run and is written the honest way round here. The band is
# what is derived; the value inside it is a choice, and the only defensible
# claims about the choice are that it IS inside and that it is not a number
# borrowed from somewhere else.
check("...and the admissible band computed from config.yaml is [34.0, 37.5], "
"which contains four integers. 35 is a CHOICE inside a DERIVED band, not "
"a derived number, and it is deliberately not 30 - which is "
"FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S and would read as a borrowed constant - or 60, "
"which is round",
[n for n in range(0, 200)
if 2 * BATT_OBLIGED_S <= n <= 0.5 * _ceiling] == [34, 35, 36, 37]
and BATT_UNCHANGED_S not in (30.0, 60.0))
check("⚠️ AND `MOVE_W` IS PINNED TO config.yaml TOO. It is the largest value "
"that still arms the gate everywhere the per-unit sign check can speak; "
"raise `unit_sign_disagree_w` and the gate would stop arming in states "
"that check still fires in, which this catches",
MOVE_W == _unit_min_w)
check("...and the module's three floor terms are the numbers this repository "
"actually carries, not a transcription of them: the ESPHome publish "
"interval is read back out of the shipped firmware",
"update_interval: 10s" in io.open(
HERE.parent / "firmware" / "goodwe-master.yaml",
encoding="utf-8").read()
and F.PUBLISH_PERIOD_S == 10.0 and F.READ_PERIOD_S == 1.0
and F.PLANT_SETTLE_S == 6.0)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("7. THE POLICY TABLE tells the truth about what is WIRED")
def bounds_users(key):
"""Modules that SUBSCRIPT `BOUNDS[key]` in CODE - parsed, not grepped.
⚠️ THE FIRST DRAFT GREPPED FOR THE STRING AND ANSWERED WRONG, because both
`inverter.py` and `main.py` NAME `BOUNDS["soc"]` in a comment explaining why
it is not wired. A text search cannot tell a mention from a use, and this
part's whole job is to tell them apart - so it walks the AST instead.
"""
out = []
for path in sorted((HERE / "app").glob("*.py")):
if path.name == "freshness.py":
continue
tree = ast.parse(io.open(path, encoding="utf-8").read())
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if (isinstance(node, ast.Subscript)
and isinstance(node.slice, ast.Constant)
and node.slice.value == key
and ((isinstance(node.value, ast.Name)
and node.value.id == "BOUNDS")
or (isinstance(node.value, ast.Attribute)
and node.value.attr == "BOUNDS"))):
out.append(path.name)
break
return out
_uses_batt = bounds_users("batt")
_uses_soc = bounds_users("soc")
for _k, _b in BOUNDS.items():
print(f" {_k:5} wired={_b.wired!s:5} unchanged={_b.unchanged_s:>6} "
f"move={_b.move_w:>6} {_b.signal}")
print(f" BOUNDS['batt'] subscripted in CODE by: {_uses_batt}")
print(f" BOUNDS['soc'] subscripted in CODE by: {_uses_soc or 'nothing'}")
check("⚠️ `wired=True` MEANS SOMETHING CONSUMES IT. A policy table nobody "
"checks is a comment; this is the row `batt` claims and the module that "
"claims it",
BOUNDS["batt"].wired is True and _uses_batt == ["inverter.py"])
check("⚠️ AND `wired=False` MEANS NOTHING DOES. SoC is TEL-08's and it is "
"STATED here rather than wired, because its obligation term is energy "
"through the pack and the constant that needs has never been measured on "
"this site. A guessed constant would fire on a pack resting at its floor",
BOUNDS["soc"].wired is False and _uses_soc == [])
check("...and the SoC row says what TEL-08 owes, in the row itself, so the "
"next reader does not have to reconstruct why it is unwired",
"energy" in BOUNDS["soc"].derivation
and "153.6 Wh" in BOUNDS["soc"].derivation
and "TEL-08" in BOUNDS["soc"].derivation)
check("...and every wired bound is a real number - an infinite bound is how a "
"row silently becomes decorative",
all(b.unchanged_s < float("inf") and b.move_w < float("inf")
for b in BOUNDS.values() if b.wired))
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("8. THE MEASUREMENT the bound rests on, replayed from the committed data")
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE PART THAT STOPS THE DERIVATION BECOMING A STORY. The docstring
# in freshness.py quotes three numbers off this capture; they are recomputed
# here from the committed files, so a figure that drifts from its evidence goes
# red instead of being re-quoted forever.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS THE METER'S REGISTER, NOT 0x0518. No 30-day capture of the
# inverter's own power exists. What this establishes is the only thing it is
# used for: that the legitimate unchanged duration of a 1 W power entity in this
# house is MINUTES, so an unchanged threshold alone has no admissible value.
_cap = sorted(glob.glob(str(HERE / "scenarios" / "p1-net-30d-2026-08"
/ "p1-net-*.jsonl.gz")))
_runs, _prev = [], None
_t0 = time.monotonic()
for _f in _cap:
with gzip.open(_f, "rt") as _fh:
for _line in _fh:
_r = json.loads(_line)
_t = datetime.fromisoformat(_r["t"]).timestamp()
if _prev is not None:
_runs.append((_t - _prev, _pw))
_prev, _pw = _t, float(_r["w"])
_worst = max(_runs)[0] if _runs else 0.0
_over_bound = sum(1 for d, _ in _runs if d >= BATT_UNCHANGED_S)
print(f" {len(_cap)} days, {len(_runs) + 1} samples, "
f"{time.monotonic() - _t0:.1f}s to replay")
print(f" longest unchanged run {_worst:.1f} s; "
f"{_over_bound} runs >= {BATT_UNCHANGED_S:.0f} s")
check("PRECONDITION: the committed capture is all thirty days, so this is not "
"a claim about whatever files happened to be present",
len(_cap) == 30 and len(_runs) + 1 == 485841)
check("⚠️ A REAL 1 W POWER ENTITY HELD ONE VALUE FOR 263.2 s WITH NOTHING "
"WRONG. That single measurement is why the bound is a conjunction and "
"not a threshold: no unchanged threshold under 263 s is free of false "
"positives, and 263 s is 3.5x too slow to protect a 75 s consumer",
abs(_worst - 263.2) < 0.1 and _worst > _ceiling)
check("...and the two figures freshness.py's docstring quotes off this capture "
"are the ones it produces today",
_over_bound == 10
and sum(1 for d, _ in _runs if d >= BATT_OBLIGED_S) == 386)
check("⚠️ AND THE LONG RUNS ARE ALL UNDER AN UNMOVING LOAD, which is what the "
"conjunction keys on. The worst one is 263 s of a steady -899 W export - "
"a house doing one thing - so a gate that also requires the COMMAND to "
"have travelled 250 W is not armed by any of them",
max(_runs)[1] == -899.0)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("9. KNOWN SURVIVORS - graded, so they are residuals and not surprises")
# ⚠️ THE REPO'S RECURRING DEFECT IS A CHECK WHOSE DATA CANNOT REACH THE FAILURE
# IT NAMES. The honest end of that habit is to build the mutations this file
# would NOT see and record them. Each one below is a real hole in the shipped
# gate, demonstrated rather than described.
# S1. A register pinned by the INVERTER's own limit, not by a fault. If the
# device is derating and cannot follow a command that ASKS FOR MORE, the
# register can legitimately hold while the command travels.
_s1 = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 40):
_s1.submit(2503.0, 2650.0 if t < 1 else 4600.0, float(t))
check("⚠️ SURVIVOR 1, FALSE POSITIVE: a saturated or derating inverter pinned "
"at 2503 W while the command climbs to 4600 W is declared stale. The "
"register is telling the truth and the gate calls it dead",
_s1.stale)
check("...and its SIZE is bounded and its direction is the safe one: the "
"verdict is a site stop, behind the `stale_input_s` hold, and the moment "
"the command comes back down the register moves and the latch clears. "
"Cost = one spurious stop; it cannot drive the battery anywhere",
(lambda f: (f.submit(2400.0, 0.0, 60.0), not f.stale)[-1])(_s1))
# S2. A unit whose command never travels 250 W. HW-01's own shape, at a
# smaller scale, and the gate is deliberately not armed for it.
_s2 = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 400):
_s2.submit(A_FROZEN_W, -1200.0 if t < 1 else -1400.0, float(t))
check("⚠️ SURVIVOR 2, MISS: a register frozen under a command that only ever "
"moves 200 W is NEVER detected, for 400 s or forever. This is scoped, "
"not overlooked - such a unit is one no per-unit sign check can speak "
"about (`unit_sign_disagree_w` is 250 W) and one contributing at most "
"250 W to a loop whose reporting floor is 700 W",
not _s2.stale and _s2.reading() == A_FROZEN_W)
# S3. A register that dithers on dead data. A publisher that keeps republishing
# a stale WINDOW of values rather than one value defeats this entirely.
_s3 = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 400):
_s3.submit(A_FROZEN_W + (t % 2), 1300.0, float(t))
check("⚠️ SURVIVOR 3, MISS, AND IT IS THE LARGEST ONE: a dead publisher whose "
"last value happens to ALTERNATE - or a cache replaying two old samples - "
"never triggers the unchanged clock at all. This gate detects a value "
"that STOPPED; it cannot detect a value that is WRONG. Nothing in this "
"add-on can, and TEL-06's arrival stamp inside the firmware is the only "
"layer that could",
not _s3.stale and _s3.reading() is not None)
# S4. The gate is per unit, so a whole-site publisher failure that freezes both
# registers is caught twice rather than missed - recorded because a reader
# might expect the opposite.
_s4a, _s4b = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"]), Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 40):
_s4a.submit(A_FROZEN_W, A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0, float(t))
_s4b.submit(B_LIVE_W, B_LIVE_W if t < 1 else -1300.0, float(t))
check("NOT A SURVIVOR, recorded because it looks like one: a publisher failure "
"that freezes BOTH registers is caught on both units independently, on "
"each unit's own command travel and each unit's own number",
_s4a.stale and _s4b.stale and _s4a.held != _s4b.held)
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+55 -15
View File
@@ -192,14 +192,40 @@ class Hass:
A_ENT = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp_a", "soc_entity": "sensor.soc_a",
"batt_entity": "sensor.batt_a"}
# ⚠️ A HYPOTHESIS, NOT A MEASUREMENT. Inverter B does not exist; 3000 W is
# chosen only because it DIFFERS from A's 5000 W, which is what lets a check
# tell B's number from A's. SPIKE-04 measures the real one.
# ⚠️ SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) ESTABLISHED B'S REAL RATING FROM ITS DATASHEET:
# a GoodWe GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, 4600 W on the battery path
# (goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b). THIS FIXTURE DELIBERATELY DOES NOT USE IT. 3000 W is
# kept because the only property these checks consume is that B's number is
# UNMISTAKABLY not A's, and the real pair is 5000/4600 - a 400 W gap, narrower
# than `slew_w` and inside the range where an off-by-one-unit bug and ordinary
# control arithmetic produce indistinguishable numbers. Collapsing the fixture
# onto the real values would cost these checks their separating power to buy
# realism they do not use. So: ILLUSTRATIVE, NOT B'S RATING, and not a
# placeholder for it either - the placeholder era ended on 2026-09-04.
B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS = 3000.0
# SAFETY-32. Each pack's OWN BMS cut-out percent, now a REQUIRED roster key.
# ⚠️ 10 IS MEASURED (register 0x0560 on the reference GW5000S-BP and the shipped
# `bms_soc_floor` default); 15 IS SIMULATED - there is no second pack. They
# DIFFER on purpose: a fixture whose two per-unit numbers are equal cannot show
# a check that read the wrong unit's, which is MUTATION.md habit 1 and the defect
# that has now bitten four consecutive cards. Both sit below the shipped
# `peak_soc_floor` of 20, so rule 8 accepts this roster.
A_BMS_FLOOR = 10
B_BMS_FLOOR_SIM = 15
A_RATING = 5000.0
# ⚠️ `slew_w` IS 0 HERE, AND IT USED TO BE 1000 - SAFETY-39, AND THE WAY THIS
# FIXTURE FOUND OUT IS THE ARGUMENT FOR THE RULE. This dict pairs `slew_w: 1000`
# with `max_w: 5000` because both were typed when the flat 5000 W install was
# new, and that pair is EXACTLY the configuration measured on the owner's system
# on 2026-09-05 driving the meter from 3.4 kW of export to 2.8 kW of import. The
# fixture was not wrong when it was written and nothing in this file noticed it
# had become so; validate.py rule 10 refused it the day it existed, which is
# what a rule about a relationship is for. 0 means "follow the rail"
# (`control.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`) and is what config.yaml ships.
BASE_OPTS = dict(A_ENT, meter_source="off", meter_entity="sensor.grid",
max_w=A_RATING, gain=0.6, slew_w=1000, deadband_w=15,
max_w=A_RATING, gain=0.6, slew_w=0, deadband_w=15,
target_grid_w=0, step_w=10, heartbeat_s=10, stale_input_s=15)
@@ -1411,13 +1437,16 @@ _TWO_OPTS.pop("batt_entity")
_TWO_OPTS["inverters"] = [
dict(name="inverter-a", setpoint_entity="number.sp_a",
soc_entity="sensor.soc_a", batt_entity="sensor.batt_a",
max_w=A_RATING),
max_w=A_RATING, bms_soc_floor=A_BMS_FLOOR),
# ⚠️ 3000 W IS A HYPOTHESIS AND IS MARKED AS ONE WHEREVER IT APPEARS. It is
# here because it DIFFERS from A's 5000 W, which is the only property any
# check below uses. SPIKE-04 measures the real device.
# ⚠️ AND SO IS ITS 15 % CUT-OUT (SAFETY-32). There is no second pack to read
# register 0x0560 off; the value is SIMULATED, and it differs from A's 10 %
# for MUTATION.md habit 1's reason and no other.
dict(name="inverter-b", setpoint_entity="number.sp_b",
soc_entity="sensor.soc_b", batt_entity="sensor.batt_b",
max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS),
max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, bms_soc_floor=B_BMS_FLOOR_SIM),
]
_c9, _hass9 = built(_TWO_OPTS)
print(f" the roster built from `inverters:` -> {[repr(i) for i in _c9.inverters]}")
@@ -1493,14 +1522,19 @@ _decl9 = dict(ln.strip().lstrip("- ").split(": ", 1)
for ln in _entry9.splitlines()[1:] if ": " in ln)
print(f" the shipped per-entry schema: {_decl9}")
check("...and the schema half declares it as a LIST OF OBJECTS whose `name`, "
"`setpoint_entity` and `max_w` are REQUIRED - no trailing `?` - so the "
"Supervisor refuses a half-written entry before the add-on sees it, and "
"an entry can never fall back on a sibling's rating because there is no "
"entry without one",
set(_decl9) == {"name", "setpoint_entity", "max_w", "soc_entity",
"batt_entity", "batt_invert"}
"`setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and `bms_soc_floor` are REQUIRED - no "
"trailing `?` - so the Supervisor refuses a half-written entry before the "
"add-on sees it, and an entry can never fall back on a sibling's rating "
"or on a sibling's BMS cut-out because there is no entry without one. "
"⚠️ SAFETY-32 ADDED THE FOURTH ONE AS REQUIRED RATHER THAN AS "
"`int(0,50)?`, and the difference is the whole of that card: an optional "
"per-pack cut-out is a DEFAULTED one, and a default is one number for "
"two batteries - the shallower pack protected by the deeper pack's BMS",
set(_decl9) == {"name", "setpoint_entity", "max_w", "bms_soc_floor",
"soc_entity", "batt_entity", "batt_invert"}
and not any(_decl9[k].endswith("?")
for k in ("name", "setpoint_entity", "max_w"))
for k in ("name", "setpoint_entity", "max_w",
"bms_soc_floor"))
and all(_decl9[k].endswith("?")
for k in ("soc_entity", "batt_entity", "batt_invert")))
@@ -1582,9 +1616,11 @@ check("...and two inverters on two DIFFERENT entities are accepted, because "
"that is the configuration this card exists for and a validator that "
"fires on the legitimate case gets switched off",
validate_startup_config(_opts(setpoint_entity="", inverters=[
dict(name="inverter-a", setpoint_entity="number.sp_a", max_w=A_RATING),
dict(name="inverter-a", setpoint_entity="number.sp_a", max_w=A_RATING,
bms_soc_floor=A_BMS_FLOOR),
dict(name="inverter-b", setpoint_entity="number.sp_b",
max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS)])) == [])
max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS,
bms_soc_floor=B_BMS_FLOOR_SIM)])) == [])
# --- the rest of rule 9 -------------------------------------------------------
_p_flat = validate_startup_config(_opts(inverters=[
@@ -1875,6 +1911,10 @@ _AUDITED = {
("test_maintenance.py", "shipped_default"),
("test_maintenance.py", "schema_range"),
("test_freeze.py", "_cfg_default"),
# SAFETY-37. Found by this very check on its first run - `option_default()`
# reads the two consumer windows the freshness bound is derived from, so it
# is a key-taking reader and belongs here rather than outside the audit.
("test_freshness.py", "option_default"),
("test_price.py", "shipped"),
("test_tariff.py", "shipped_option"),
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ class _Pub:
BASE = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": 0.6, "slew_w": 1000,
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": 0.6, "slew_w": 0,
"deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": -10, "step_w": 10,
"heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15}
+10 -3
View File
@@ -1059,9 +1059,16 @@ class Pub:
pass
# ⚠️ 3000 W FOR PACK B IS A HYPOTHESIS AND IS MARKED AS ONE EVERYWHERE IT
# APPEARS. Inverter B does not physically exist; the number is here only because
# it DIFFERS from pack A's 5000 W, which is the only property these checks use.
# ⚠️ SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) ESTABLISHED B'S REAL RATING FROM ITS DATASHEET:
# a GoodWe GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, 4600 W on the battery path
# (goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b). THIS FIXTURE DELIBERATELY DOES NOT USE IT. 3000 W is
# kept because the only property these checks consume is that B's number is
# UNMISTAKABLY not A's, and the real pair is 5000/4600 - a 400 W gap, narrower
# than `slew_w` and inside the range where an off-by-one-unit bug and ordinary
# control arithmetic produce indistinguishable numbers. Collapsing the fixture
# onto the real values would cost these checks their separating power to buy
# realism they do not use. So: ILLUSTRATIVE, NOT B'S RATING, and not a
# placeholder for it either - the placeholder era ended on 2026-09-04.
B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS = 3000.0
A_RATING = 5000.0
FLAT_OPTS = dict(setpoint_entity="number.sp_a", soc_entity="sensor.soc_a",
+800
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,800 @@
"""Runnable check for TEL-07 - the SECOND MQTT device, and A's history.
`python3 test_mqtt.py`
WHAT THIS FILE IS FOR, in one sentence: to prove by DIFFING THE ANNOUNCED
PAYLOADS - not by reading the code - that giving inverter B its own MQTT device
changes nothing about inverter A's.
⚠️ WHY THAT IS THE WHOLE CARD. `app/mqtt.py`'s own note records the finding:
Home Assistant composes an entity_id from the DEVICE name plus the ENTITY name,
and `object_id` in the discovery payload did NOT override it (tested on HA
2026.8). So re-scoping the device renames every entity - and because HA keeps
the id it composed at FIRST discovery, what a rename actually produces is a NEW
entity beside a DEAD one. The recorded history stays behind on the old id, and
every dashboard, template and automation that names it - including the three
live watchdog automations `goodwe_master_watchdog_held_*` and
`goodwe_master_parked_at_0_w_*` - goes on pointing at an entity that has quietly
stopped updating. Nothing errors. That is the failure this file exists to make
impossible to ship.
⚠️ AND THE TEMPTING DESIGN IS THE DESTRUCTIVE ONE. "One device per inverter" -
A becomes `inverter-a`, B becomes `inverter-b` - is symmetrical and tidy and is
exactly the change described above. A KEEPS THE DEVICE IT ALREADY HAS; only B
gets a new one. Part 8 below writes that tidy version and shows it going red.
THE SHAPE OF THE EVIDENCE. Part 1 records what `release/1.0` actually publishes -
generated by running THAT commit's module, not transcribed - and every later
part is a diff against it, reported as `N topics, M missing, C changed, A added`.
Part 1 The recorded baseline, and the diff at a roster of one and of none.
Part 2 `_announce()` publishes EXACTLY `discovery_payloads()` and nothing
else, so parts 1 and 3-8 are diffing what goes on the wire.
Part 3 A roster of two: A's nine messages byte-identical, eight added.
Part 4 Zero overlap between A's entities and B's - topics, unique_ids,
object_ids, state topics, and devices.
Part 5 Site-scoped sensors stay site-scoped, at every roster length 1-6.
Part 6 The composed entity_ids, modelled INDEPENDENTLY of `app/mqtt.py`, and
anchored on the one composed id that was verified against the live
system (`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, mqtt.py's own note).
Part 7 ⚠️ THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PUBLICATION AGREE, on a real `Controller`,
with the two units carrying DIFFERENT numbers - so a swap is visible.
Part 8 ⚠️ VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. Twelve mutations of the shipped module,
re-executed from mutated source, each one named with the property it
breaks. A property nothing breaks is a property nothing is watching.
Part 9 What these checks CANNOT see, enumerated and sized.
⚠️ THE FIXTURE GIVES A AND B DIFFERENT NAMES, DIFFERENT RATINGS, DIFFERENT SoC,
DIFFERENT BATTERY POWER AND DIFFERENT LATCH STATES, ON PURPOSE. A fixture whose
two units are equal cannot observe a bug that swaps them - MUTATION.md habit 4,
and the defect this repository has now shipped six cards in a row.
⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12). Every number attributed
to it below is SIMULATED, from the datasheet and serial recorded in NOTES.md
§1.1b (GW5048D-ES, serial 55048ESU22AW0992, max_w 4600 W). Nothing here is
measured, and nothing here should ever be quoted as if it were.
⚠️ MUTATING THE MODULE THIS FILE GRADES? PURGE `__pycache__` FIRST - or run
`tools/mutation_run.sh`, which does. `python3 -B` alone does NOT save you: it
stops bytecode being WRITTEN, not a stale one being READ. Read MUTATION.md.
Part 8 sidesteps the whole problem by exec'ing mutated SOURCE into a fresh
namespace, so no `.pyc` is involved at any point.
"""
import ast
import asyncio
import hashlib
import json
import re
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from app import mqtt
from app.inverter import build_roster, roster_names
from app.main import Controller
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
MQTT_SRC = (HERE / "app" / "mqtt.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
fails = []
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The recorded baseline. ⚠️ GENERATED, NOT TRANSCRIBED. Reproduce it with:
#
# git show release/1.0:goodwe_controller/app/mqtt.py > /tmp/mqtt_base.py
# python3 - <<'EOF'
# import sys; sys.path.insert(0, "/tmp"); import mqtt_base as M
# class F:
# def __init__(self): self.m = []
# def publish(self, t, p=None, retain=False): self.m.append((t, p, retain))
# p = M.MqttPublisher.__new__(M.MqttPublisher)
# p.omit, p.client, p.enabled = set(), F(), True
# p._announce()
# for row in p.client.m: print(row)
# EOF
#
# A transcription would be a check that grades this branch against MY MEMORY of
# release/1.0 rather than against release/1.0.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_DEV = ('{"identifiers": ["goodwe_rs485_controller"], "name": "GoodWe", '
'"manufacturer": "GoodWe (via RS485 meter emulation)", '
'"model": "ES/BP series"}')
BASELINE = [
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_setpoint/config',
'{"name": "Setpoint", "object_id": "goodwe_setpoint", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_setpoint", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/setpoint", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "W", "device_class": "power", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_grid/config',
'{"name": "Grid power", "object_id": "goodwe_grid_power", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_grid", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/grid", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "W", "device_class": "power", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_battery/config',
'{"name": "Battery power", "object_id": "goodwe_battery_power", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_battery", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/battery", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "W", "device_class": "power", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_soc/config',
'{"name": "Battery SoC", "object_id": "goodwe_battery_soc", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_soc", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/soc", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "%", "device_class": "battery", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_circulation/config',
'{"name": "Circulating power", "object_id": "goodwe_circulating_power", '
'"unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_circulation", "state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/circulation", '
'"availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", "device": ' + _DEV + ', '
'"unit_of_measurement": "W", "device_class": "power", "state_class": "measurement", '
'"icon": "mdi:sync-alert"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_phase/config',
'{"name": "Maintenance phase", "object_id": "goodwe_maintenance_phase", '
'"unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_phase", "state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/phase", '
'"availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", "device": ' + _DEV + ', '
'"icon": "mdi:battery-sync"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_status/config',
'{"name": "Controller status", "object_id": "goodwe_controller_status", '
'"unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_status", "state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/status", '
'"availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", "device": ' + _DEV + ', '
'"icon": "mdi:heart-pulse"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_p1_age/config',
'{"name": "P1 sample age", "object_id": "p1_sample_age_s", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_p1_age", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/p1_age", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "s", "device_class": "duration", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('goodwe_ctl/availability', 'online', True),
]
class FakeClient:
"""Captures what `_announce()` actually hands paho."""
def __init__(self):
self.msgs = []
def publish(self, topic, payload=None, retain=False):
self.msgs.append((topic, payload, retain))
def announce(units=(), omit=(), module=mqtt):
"""The messages `_announce()` publishes, through the SHIPPED method.
⚠️ Not `discovery_payloads()` directly. Part 2 proves the two agree; every
other part goes through this one, so what is diffed is what paho is told.
"""
pub = module.MqttPublisher.__new__(module.MqttPublisher)
pub.omit = set(omit)
pub.units = [str(u) for u in units]
pub.enabled = True
pub.client = FakeClient()
pub._announce()
return pub.client.msgs
def diff(got, want=BASELINE):
"""`(missing, changed, added)` between two announcement lists, by topic."""
g, w = dict((t, (p, r)) for t, p, r in got), dict((t, (p, r)) for t, p, r in want)
missing = [t for t in w if t not in g]
changed = [t for t in w if t in g and g[t] != w[t]]
added = [t for t in g if t not in w]
return sorted(missing), sorted(changed), sorted(added)
def report(label, got, want=BASELINE):
m, c, a = diff(got, want)
print(f" {label}: {len(want)} topics, {len(m)} missing, {len(c)} changed, "
f"{len(a)} added")
for t in m:
print(f" MISSING {t}")
for t in c:
print(f" CHANGED {t}")
for t in a:
print(f" ADDED {t}")
return m, c, a
def cfgs(msgs):
"""The discovery payloads, parsed, without the availability message."""
return [json.loads(p) for t, p, _ in msgs if t.startswith("homeassistant/")]
# The roster this card exists for. ⚠️ SIMULATED: inverter B does not physically
# exist. Its rating is the datasheet's (NOTES.md §1.1b, GW5048D-ES, serial
# 55048ESU22AW0992) and has never been measured.
OPTS2 = {
"meter_source": "off",
"inverters": [
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp_a",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc_a", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt_a",
"max_w": 2000, "bms_soc_floor": 10},
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp_b",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc_b", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt_b",
"max_w": 4600, "bms_soc_floor": 10},
],
}
NAMES2 = roster_names(OPTS2)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n1. the recorded baseline, and a roster of one")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# AC 1 and AC 4. ⚠️ THE COMPARISON IS BYTE-FOR-BYTE ON THE PAYLOAD STRING, not
# on a parsed dict. `json.dumps` writes keys in insertion order, so a reordered
# payload is a different retained message on the broker even though the parsed
# dicts compare equal - and a reordered payload is a re-announcement of every
# entity on a live install.
m, c, a = report("roster of one (`inverters:` empty, i.e. every install today)",
announce(units=roster_names({})))
check("⭐ AT THE SHIPPED ROSTER OF ONE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS BYTE-IDENTICAL TO "
"release/1.0: same topics, same unique_ids, same payload bytes, same "
"retain flags, in the same order - no second device, no renamed entity, "
"no added topic",
(m, c, a) == ([], [], []) and announce(units=roster_names({})) == BASELINE)
check("...and the roster-of-one path is the one every install actually reads: "
"an empty `inverters:` names exactly one unit",
roster_names({}) == ["inverter-a"])
check("...and a publisher told NOTHING about the roster announces the same "
"thing, so a caller that has not been taught about units cannot change "
"what a live install sees",
announce(units=()) == BASELINE)
m, c, a = report("roster of one, P1 off (`omit=('p1_age',)`)",
announce(units=roster_names({}), omit=("p1_age",)),
[row for row in BASELINE if "p1_age" not in row[0]])
check("...and the `omit` path is unchanged too: with P1 ingestion off the "
"watchdog input is still not announced, and nothing else moved",
(m, c, a) == ([], [], []))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n2. what is diffed is what goes on the wire")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ WITHOUT THIS PART, PARTS 1 AND 3-8 GRADE A FUNCTION THE ADD-ON MIGHT NOT
# USE. `_announce()` used to build its payloads inline; if it still did, every
# diff here would be a diff of a second implementation that happens to sit in
# the same file. This is the join.
_direct = [(t, json.dumps(cfg), True)
for t, cfg in mqtt.discovery_payloads(NAMES2)] + \
[(mqtt.AVAILABILITY, "online", True)]
check("`_announce()` publishes EXACTLY `discovery_payloads()`, in order, with "
"retain set, plus the availability message - so every diff in this file "
"is a diff of the bytes paho is handed",
announce(units=NAMES2) == _direct)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n3. a roster of two: A untouched, B added")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TWO = announce(units=NAMES2)
m, c, a = report("roster of two (inverter-a + inverter-b, SIMULATED)", TWO)
check("⭐ AC 1: AT A ROSTER OF TWO, EVERY ONE OF A's NINE MESSAGES IS STILL "
"BYTE-IDENTICAL - nothing missing, nothing changed. This is the criterion "
"the live install's recorded history depends on, and it is a diff of the "
"payloads, not a reading of the code",
(m, c) == ([], []))
check("...and the eight additions are all B's and A's own per-unit rows, and "
"all of them are NEW topics", len(a) == 8)
check("...and A's nine messages are still the FIRST nine, in the same order, "
"so a broker replaying retained messages sees them unchanged",
TWO[:len(BASELINE) - 1] == BASELINE[:-1])
site_ids = {c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(BASELINE)}
unit_cfgs = [c_ for c_ in cfgs(TWO) if c_["unique_id"] not in site_ids]
a_cfgs = [c_ for c_ in unit_cfgs if "inverter_a" in c_["unique_id"]]
b_cfgs = [c_ for c_ in unit_cfgs if "inverter_b" in c_["unique_id"]]
check("A's per-unit rows stay on THE DEVICE A ALREADY HAS - no new device is "
"created for the first roster entry, which is the whole asymmetry",
len(a_cfgs) == 4
and all(c_["device"] == mqtt.DEVICE for c_ in a_cfgs))
check("⭐ AC 2: B's rows are on B's OWN device, with its own identifiers",
len(b_cfgs) == 4
and all(c_["device"]["identifiers"] == ["goodwe_rs485_controller_inverter_b"]
for c_ in b_cfgs))
check("...and B's device hangs off the controller's via `via_device`, so HA "
"shows one controller driving two inverters rather than two strangers",
all(c_["device"].get("via_device") == mqtt.DEVICE["identifiers"][0]
for c_ in b_cfgs))
check("...and B's device carries the SAME manufacturer and model as the site "
"device - it is the same installation, not a second product",
all(c_["device"]["manufacturer"] == mqtt.DEVICE["manufacturer"]
and c_["device"]["model"] == mqtt.DEVICE["model"] for c_ in b_cfgs))
# A regression pin on the NEW payloads. ⚠️ THIS IS NOT EVIDENCE OF CORRECTNESS -
# it is generated from this branch, so it can only say "these bytes have not
# changed since the PR was reviewed". It exists because B's payloads have no
# released version to be diffed against, and a later edit that quietly changes
# a per-unit `device_class` or state topic should have to be deliberate.
_pin = hashlib.sha256(
json.dumps(unit_cfgs, sort_keys=False).encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
print(" the eight per-unit payloads, in announcement order:")
for c_ in unit_cfgs:
print(f" {c_['unique_id']:<40} {c_['object_id']:<34} "
f"{c_['state_topic']}")
print(f" regression pin (sha256 of the eight payloads): {_pin}")
check("the per-unit payloads are the ones this PR was reviewed with "
"(REGRESSION PIN, not a correctness claim - see the comment)",
_pin == "eb5022b0455158d7")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n4. zero overlap between A's entities and B's")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def field(rows, key):
return [r[key] for r in rows]
for key in ("unique_id", "object_id", "state_topic"):
av, bv = set(field(a_cfgs, key)), set(field(b_cfgs, key))
sv = set(field(cfgs(BASELINE), key))
check(f"⭐ AC 2: no `{key}` is shared between A's entities and B's, and "
f"none of B's collides with a SITE entity that already exists",
len(av) == 4 and len(bv) == 4 and not (av & bv) and not (bv & sv)
and not (av & sv))
all_ids = field(cfgs(TWO), "unique_id")
check("...and across the WHOLE announcement every unique_id is distinct - an "
"HA discovery collision is not an error, it DROPS the second entity, so "
"one inverter's telemetry would silently stop existing",
len(all_ids) == len(set(all_ids)) == 16)
all_topics = [t for t, _, _ in TWO]
check("...and so is every topic", len(all_topics) == len(set(all_topics)) == 17)
# ⚠️ THE SLUG COLLISION rule 9(c) DOES NOT REFUSE. `inverter-b` and `Inverter B`
# are two different names by the validator's test and one string once slugged.
COLLIDE = announce(units=["inverter-b", "Inverter B"])
col_ids = field(cfgs(COLLIDE), "unique_id")
print(" two names that slug alike ('inverter-b', 'Inverter B') ->",
[c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(COLLIDE) if c_["unique_id"] not in site_ids])
check("two roster names that differ only in case and punctuation - which "
"`validate.py` rule 9(c) accepts, because it refuses only EXACT "
"duplicates - still get distinct unique_ids",
len(col_ids) == len(set(col_ids)))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n5. site-scoped sensors stay site-scoped")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ `p1_sample_age_s` IS A WATCHDOG INPUT (mqtt.py's `omit` note and the ESP32
# firmware's ingest guard). A second copy of it is a second answer to "is the
# meter fresh?", one of which is always the one nobody is looking at. `grid` is
# the same argument without the safety edge: there is ONE grid connection.
SITE_ONLY = ("goodwe_ctl_grid", "goodwe_ctl_p1_age", "goodwe_ctl_circulation",
"goodwe_ctl_phase", "goodwe_ctl_status")
rows = []
for n in range(1, 7):
names = [f"inverter-{chr(ord('a') + i)}" for i in range(n)]
ids = field(cfgs(announce(units=names)), "unique_id")
rows.append((n, [ids.count(s) for s in SITE_ONLY], len(ids)))
print(f" roster of {n}: {len(ids)} entities, "
+ ", ".join(f"{s}x{ids.count(s)}" for s in SITE_ONLY))
check("⭐ AC 3: `grid` and `p1_sample_age_s` are announced EXACTLY ONCE at every "
"roster length from 1 to 6 - announcing them per inverter would invent "
"two of a thing there is one of, and would duplicate a safety signal",
all(counts == [1] * len(SITE_ONLY) for _n, counts, _t in rows))
check("...and the site set does not grow with the roster while the per-unit "
"set does: 8 site entities always, 4 more per unit past the first",
[t for _n, _c, t in rows] == [8, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32])
site_devices = {json.dumps(c_["device"], sort_keys=True)
for c_ in cfgs(announce(units=NAMES2))
if c_["unique_id"] in site_ids}
check("...and every site entity is still on the SITE device, at a roster of two",
site_devices == {json.dumps(mqtt.DEVICE, sort_keys=True)})
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n6. the composed entity_ids")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ THIS SLUGIFIER IS DELIBERATELY NOT `mqtt._slug`. Importing the module's own
# spelling would make the model and the subject move together, so a mutation in
# the slugifier would change both sides equally and be invisible - "a check
# whose data cannot reach the failure it names", written in one import.
def compose(device_name, entity_name):
"""HA's entity_id for a discovery payload, per mqtt.py's own note."""
s = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "_", f"{device_name} {entity_name}".lower())
return "sensor." + s.strip("_")
# The ONE anchor there is: mqtt.py records that the live entity is
# `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, verified against the live system 2026-08-26,
# and that the firmware subscribes to that composed name. If this model does not
# reproduce that id, the model is wrong and every claim below it is worthless.
p1 = [c_ for c_ in cfgs(BASELINE) if c_["unique_id"] == "goodwe_ctl_p1_age"][0]
check("the model reproduces the ONE composed entity_id that was verified "
"against the live system - `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, which the ESP32 "
"ingest guard subscribes to - from the device name and the entity name",
compose(mqtt.DEVICE["name"], p1["name"]) == "sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age")
check("...and that id is NOT the `object_id` in the payload "
"(`p1_sample_age_s`), which is the whole reason the device name is "
"load-bearing and mqtt.py says so in capitals",
p1["object_id"] != "goodwe_p1_sample_age")
composed = [compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"]) for c_ in cfgs(TWO)]
print(" every composed entity_id at a roster of two:")
for c_, eid in zip(cfgs(TWO), composed):
print(f" {eid:<46} <- device {c_['device']['name']!r} + "
f"name {c_['name']!r}")
check("⭐ every composed entity_id at a roster of two is DISTINCT: no per-unit "
"entity can land on top of a site entity that already has history",
len(composed) == len(set(composed)) == 16)
base_composed = [compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"]) for c_ in cfgs(BASELINE)]
check("...and the eight ids that exist today are unchanged by adding B, which "
"is AC 1 restated in the units HA actually uses",
composed[:8] == base_composed)
check("...and the per-unit ids come out SYMMETRIC even though the devices are "
"not - sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power beside "
"sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power - which is the entire benefit of "
"the 'one device per inverter' design, without its cost",
"sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power" in composed
and "sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power" in composed)
check("...and for every per-unit entity `object_id` equals the composed id, so "
"the two mechanisms agree and an HA that DID honour object_id would "
"produce the same ids as one that does not",
all("sensor." + c_["object_id"] == compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"])
for c_ in unit_cfgs))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n7. the announcement and the publication agree")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ THE HAZARD mqtt.py's `omit` NOTE NAMES: an entity that exists and is never
# fed is a worse signal than one that does not exist. So the set of per-unit
# topics ANNOUNCED and the set `Controller.publish()` actually writes have to be
# the same set - and, because a matching set of KEYS is not a matching set of
# VALUES, the two units carry DIFFERENT numbers here so that a swap is red.
class _Store:
data = {}
def set(self, *a):
pass
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
class _Pub:
def __init__(self):
self.last = {}
self.units = []
def publish(self, values):
self.last = dict(values)
def close(self):
pass
def controlled(opts, soc, batt, tripped):
"""A real Controller with per-unit readings planted. SIMULATED values."""
# ⚠️ `stop` is a REQUIRED keyword (CFG-01): a Controller that cannot stop
# itself used to be the default one. These cases only call publish(), so any
# Event will do - but they may not skip it.
pub = _Pub()
ctl = Controller(dict(opts), None, _Store(), pub, stop=asyncio.Event())
for inv, s, b, t in zip(ctl.inverters, soc, batt, tripped):
inv.soc, inv.batt, inv.target = s, b, -1.0 * b
inv.sign_wd.tripped = t
ctl.publish()
return ctl, pub.last
# A 41 / 88 %, A discharging 1200 W, B charging 300 W, and B latched, not A.
# Every one of those six numbers differs from its sibling, which is what makes
# the assertions below able to see a swap.
ctl2, vals2 = controlled(OPTS2, [41.0, 88.0], [1200.0, -300.0], [False, True])
announced_unit_topics = {c_["state_topic"] for c_ in unit_cfgs}
published_unit_topics = {f"{mqtt.BASE}/{k}" for k in vals2 if k.startswith("unit/")}
print(f" announced per-unit topics {len(announced_unit_topics)}, "
f"published {len(published_unit_topics)}, "
f"announced-but-never-fed {sorted(announced_unit_topics - published_unit_topics)}, "
f"fed-but-never-announced {sorted(published_unit_topics - announced_unit_topics)}")
check("⭐ every per-unit entity announced is one the controller actually "
"publishes to, and every per-unit topic published is one that was "
"announced - no entity that nothing feeds, no topic nothing declared",
announced_unit_topics == published_unit_topics)
check("⭐ AND THE VALUES LAND ON THE RIGHT UNIT: A's 41 % on A's topic and B's "
"88 % on B's, not the other way round",
vals2["unit/inverter_a/soc"] == 41.0
and vals2["unit/inverter_b/soc"] == 88.0)
check("...and the same for battery power, whose SIGNS differ between the two "
"units here (A discharging, B charging) so a swap cannot hide in a "
"magnitude",
vals2["unit/inverter_a/battery"] == 1200.0
and vals2["unit/inverter_b/battery"] == -300.0)
check("...and the SAFETY-02 sign latch is per unit: B is latched and A is not, "
"and the two rows say so separately",
vals2["unit/inverter_a/sign_latch"] == "clear"
and vals2["unit/inverter_b/sign_latch"] == "tripped")
check("...and each unit's setpoint row is its OWN share, not the site target",
vals2["unit/inverter_a/setpoint"] == -1200.0
and vals2["unit/inverter_b/setpoint"] == 300.0)
check("...and the SITE rows still mean what they meant: `soc` is the EMPTIEST "
"pack (41 %, not 88 and not the mean) and `battery` is the SUM (900 W), "
"so this card added rows beside them and did not re-point them",
vals2["soc"] == 41.0 and round(vals2["battery"]) == 900)
_, vals1 = controlled({"meter_source": "off", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp"},
[55.0], [700.0], [False])
print(f" roster of one publishes keys: {sorted(vals1)}")
check("⭐ AC 4 on the PUBLISH side: at a roster of one not one `unit/...` topic "
"is written either, so the live install's broker sees no new topic at all",
not [k for k in vals1 if k.startswith("unit/")])
# --- 7b. the wiring, which nothing above reaches -----------------------------
# ⚠️ FOUND BY MUTATION, NOT BY DESIGN. `units=()` in main()'s `MqttPublisher(...)`
# call survived every check in this file: parts 1-7 build the publisher
# themselves, so a controller publishing eight per-unit topics beside a
# publisher announcing none of them was GREEN. That is this repository's
# recurring defect - a check whose data cannot reach the failure it names - in
# the one line that joins the two halves together.
check("`roster_names()` and `build_roster()` give the same names in the same "
"order, on every shape - the flat keys, a declared roster, a nameless "
"entry and a non-dict entry - so the names the publisher is handed are "
"the names the units answer to",
all([inv.name for inv in build_roster(o, None)] == roster_names(o)
for o in ({}, {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp"}, OPTS2,
{"inverters": [{}, {}]},
{"inverters": [{"name": "roof west"}, "junk"]})))
check("...and a nameless entry gets a POSITIONAL name, not `inverter-a` twice: "
"two units under one name share one Store namespace, so one unit's "
"SAFETY-02 latch would be the other's",
roster_names({"inverters": [{}, {}]}) == ["inverter-1", "inverter-2"])
_call = [n for n in ast.walk(ast.parse((HERE / "app" / "main.py").read_text()))
if isinstance(n, ast.Call) and isinstance(n.func, ast.Name)
and n.func.id == "MqttPublisher"]
_kw = [k for c_ in _call for k in c_.keywords if k.arg == "units"]
print(f" main.py builds MqttPublisher {len(_call)} time(s); "
f"units= is " + (ast.unparse(_kw[0].value) if _kw else "ABSENT"))
check("⚠️ A SOURCE READ, AND THE WEAKEST CHECK IN THIS FILE - said so rather "
"than dressed up. main()'s one `MqttPublisher(...)` hands it "
"`roster_names(opts)`; nothing else here can reach that line, because "
"main() opens a broker, a web server and a control loop",
len(_call) == 1 and len(_kw) == 1
and ast.unparse(_kw[0].value) == "roster_names(opts)")
# --- 7c. a name that is not ASCII -------------------------------------------
# HA transliterates before it slugs; this module cannot, so it treats anything
# outside ASCII as a separator. Either way the id must be an id.
_odd = announce(units=["caf\u00e9-a", "caf\u00e9-b"])
_odd_unit = [c_ for c_ in cfgs(_odd) if c_["unique_id"] not in site_ids]
print(" a roster named with non-ASCII ->",
sorted({c_["unique_id"] for c_ in _odd_unit}))
check("every unique_id, object_id and state topic this module produces is "
"lowercase ASCII, even from a roster name that is not - an id HA would "
"not have composed is an entity nothing can subscribe to",
_odd_unit
and all(re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9_]+", c_[k])
for c_ in _odd_unit for k in ("unique_id", "object_id"))
and all(re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9_/]+", c_["state_topic"])
for c_ in _odd_unit))
# The topics the SHIPPED controller actually feeds at a roster of two. Part 8
# grades every mutant announcement against this, which is what turns "the
# announcement changed" into "the announcement now claims an entity nothing
# will ever publish to".
FED = set(published_unit_topics)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n8. verified by breaking it")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ MUTATED SOURCE, EXEC'D INTO A FRESH NAMESPACE. No file is edited and no
# `.pyc` is consulted, so TEST-15's stale-bytecode failure cannot produce a
# false survivor here. `app/mqtt.py` imports nothing from this package, which is
# what makes exec'ing it standalone honest rather than a stub.
def load(pairs):
"""`app/mqtt.py` with `pairs` applied, executed into a fresh module.
⚠️ EVERY ANCHOR MUST OCCUR EXACTLY ONCE. A mutation whose anchor has drifted
out of the file would otherwise apply to nothing and be reported as a
survivor - a false red on the instrument rather than on the module.
"""
src = MQTT_SRC
for old, new in pairs:
if src.count(old) != 1:
raise AssertionError(f"mutation anchor not unique: {old!r}")
src = src.replace(old, new)
mod = type(sys)("mqtt_mutant")
exec(compile(src, "<mutant>", "exec"), mod.__dict__)
return mod
def properties(mod):
"""Every claim this file makes, as booleans, over ONE module."""
out = {}
try:
base = announce(units=["inverter-a"], module=mod)
two = announce(units=["inverter-a", "inverter-b"], module=mod)
none = announce(units=(), module=mod)
col = announce(units=["inverter-b", "Inverter B"], module=mod)
tc = cfgs(two)
uc = [c_ for c_ in tc if c_["unique_id"] not in site_ids]
bc = [c_ for c_ in uc if "inverter_b" in c_["unique_id"]]
ac = [c_ for c_ in uc if "inverter_a" in c_["unique_id"]]
comp = [compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"]) for c_ in tc]
out["A byte-identical at N=1"] = base == BASELINE
out["A byte-identical at N=2"] = diff(two)[:2] == ([], [])
out["N=1 adds no topic"] = len(base) == len(none) == len(BASELINE)
out["unique_ids all distinct"] = (
len(set(c_["unique_id"] for c_ in tc)) == len(tc))
out["slug-alike names still distinct"] = (
len(set(c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(col))) == len(cfgs(col)))
out["no composed entity_id collision"] = len(set(comp)) == len(comp)
out["object_id == composed id"] = all(
"sensor." + c_["object_id"] == compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"])
for c_ in uc)
out["A keeps the device it has"] = bool(ac) and all(
c_["device"] == mqtt.DEVICE for c_ in ac)
out["B has its own device"] = bool(bc) and all(
c_["device"]["identifiers"] != mqtt.DEVICE["identifiers"] for c_ in bc)
out["B is via_device the site"] = bool(bc) and all(
c_["device"].get("via_device") == mqtt.DEVICE["identifiers"][0]
for c_ in bc)
out["site sensors announced once"] = all(
[c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(announce(units=[f"i{j}" for j in range(n)],
module=mod))].count(s) == 1
for n in (1, 2, 3) for s in SITE_ONLY)
# ⚠️ TWO PROPERTIES THAT WERE MISSING, AND THE INSTRUMENT FOUND THEIR
# ABSENCE ITSELF: on the first run of this table, "the unit is dropped
# from the state topic" and "`grid` is moved to the per-unit set" were
# both GREEN. The first collapses A's and B's four topics onto one set
# of four, so both inverters read one number; the second announces a
# per-inverter grid sensor, which is the exact thing AC 3 forbids. The
# ids stayed distinct through both, so every property above missed them.
out["per-unit state topics all distinct"] = (
len({c_["state_topic"] for c_ in uc}) == len(uc))
# ⚠️ GRADED AGAINST THE SHIPPED `Controller.publish()`, on purpose. An
# announcement is only honest if something feeds it - mqtt.py's `omit`
# note - so a per-unit entity the controller will never publish to is a
# defect however tidy its id looks. (A rename applied to BOTH halves at
# once is invisible here and is disclosed in part 9; a rename applied to
# one half is what actually happens, and is red.)
out["every announced per-unit topic is fed"] = (
{c_["state_topic"] for c_ in uc} == FED)
except Exception as err: # a mutation that CRASHES proves nothing; say so
out["did not raise"] = False
out["__error__"] = repr(err)[:70]
return out
SHIPPED = properties(mqtt)
check("the shipped module satisfies every property this instrument grades - "
"so a red below is the mutation and not the instrument",
all(v is True for k, v in SHIPPED.items()))
MUTATIONS = [
("⭐ RE-SCOPE A's DEVICE NAME (the destructive change, AC 5)",
[('"name": "GoodWe",', '"name": "GoodWe Inverter A",')]),
("⭐ RE-SCOPE A's DEVICE IDENTIFIERS",
[('"identifiers": ["goodwe_rs485_controller"],',
'"identifiers": ["goodwe_inverter_a"],')]),
("⭐ THE TEMPTING TIDY DESIGN: one device per inverter, A included",
[("device = DEVICE if i == 0 else unit_device(name, slug)",
"device = unit_device(name, slug)"),
('prefix = f"{_title(name)} " if i == 0 else ""', 'prefix = ""')]),
("B's rows land on A's device instead of B's own",
[("device = DEVICE if i == 0 else unit_device(name, slug)",
"device = DEVICE")]),
("A's per-unit entity names lose the unit prefix",
[('prefix = f"{_title(name)} " if i == 0 else ""', 'prefix = ""')]),
("per-unit entities announced at a roster of ONE",
[("PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER = 2", "PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER = 1")]),
("the unit is dropped from the unique_id",
[('unique_id = f"{BASE}_unit_{slug}_{key}"',
'unique_id = f"{BASE}_unit_{key}"')]),
("the unit is dropped from the state topic",
[('return f"unit/{slug}/{key}"', 'return f"unit/{key}"')]),
("the slug de-collision is removed (rule 9(c) does not cover this)",
[("while slug in seen:", "while False and slug in seen:")]),
("every unit takes the FIRST unit's slug",
[("for i, (name, slug) in enumerate(zip(names, slugs)):",
"for i, (name, slug) in enumerate(zip(names, [slugs[0]] * len(slugs))):")]),
("`grid` is moved to the per-unit set (site sensor announced per inverter)",
[(' ("setpoint", "setpoint", "Setpoint", "W", "power", "measurement", None),\n',
' ("setpoint", "setpoint", "Setpoint", "W", "power", "measurement", None),\n'
' ("grid", "grid_power", "Grid power", "W", "power", "measurement", None),\n')]),
("B's device drops `via_device`",
[(' "via_device": DEVICE["identifiers"][0],\n', "")]),
]
survivors = []
for label, pairs in MUTATIONS:
got = properties(load(pairs))
broke = sorted(k for k, v in SHIPPED.items()
if v is True and got.get(k) is not True)
if not broke:
survivors.append(label)
print(f" {'RED ' if broke else 'GREEN'} {label}")
if broke:
print(f" breaks: {', '.join(broke)}")
elif got.get("__error__"):
print(f" raised: {got['__error__']}")
check(f"⭐ ALL {len(MUTATIONS)} MUTATIONS ARE RED, each on a NAMED property: "
"re-scoping A's device, the tidy one-device-per-inverter design, B "
"landing on A's device, per-unit entities at a roster of one, a unit "
"dropped from an id or a topic, two units sharing a slug, and a site "
"sensor announced per inverter. A mutation nothing catches is a claim "
"nothing is watching",
not survivors)
if survivors:
print(" SURVIVED:", "; ".join(survivors))
# ⚠️ AC 6, THE FIXTURE'S OWN NON-VACUITY. If A and B were given the same name
# the whole of part 4 would still be green and would be observing nothing.
same = announce(units=["inverter-a", "inverter-a"])
swapped = announce(units=["inverter-b", "inverter-a"])
check("...and the fixture's two units are genuinely distinguishable: swapping "
"their order changes the announcement, and a roster of two IDENTICAL "
"names - which rule 9(c) refuses, and which this file therefore never "
"relies on - would still not collide",
swapped != TWO
and len({c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(same)}) == len(cfgs(same)))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n9. what this file CANNOT see, enumerated and sized")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
for line in [
"1. HA ITSELF IS NOT IN THE LOOP. `compose()` in part 6 is a MODEL of how "
"HA 2026.8 builds an entity_id, anchored on exactly ONE measured id "
"(sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age, mqtt.py's note, verified 2026-08-26). If HA "
"changes that rule, or if it differs for a device with `via_device`, every "
"id claim here moves with it and this file stays green. SIZE: the 8 "
"per-unit ids at N=2. It cannot be closed from this repository - it needs a "
"broker, an HA, and the owner present.",
"2. THE TICKET AND THE MODULE DISAGREE ABOUT THE LIVE IDs. The card quotes "
"`sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_soc`; mqtt.py records "
"`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`. Those cannot both come from one composition "
"rule - the first is the id an EARLIER device name composed, and HA keeps "
"whatever it composed at first discovery. This card does not need to "
"resolve it, because it renames no device and no entity, and the byte-diff "
"protects both spellings equally. SIZE: unresolved, 8 live entity ids; it "
"wants one look at the live registry, which this branch must not take.",
"3. THE PER-UNIT PAYLOADS HAVE NO RELEASED BASELINE. A's are diffed against "
"release/1.0; B's can only be diffed against this branch (the sha256 pin in "
"part 3). A wrong `device_class` or unit on a per-unit sensor is therefore "
"caught as a CHANGE from review, not as an error. SIZE: 4 sensors x 4 "
"optional fields.",
"4. NO CHECK HERE RUNS A BROKER. `_announce()` is graded through a fake "
"paho client, so QoS, retain semantics on a real broker, and what HA does "
"with a retained config for a device it has never seen are all out of "
"scope. SIZE: the whole transport.",
"5. THE SLUG DE-COLLISION IS ORDER-DEPENDENT. `inverter-b` before "
"`Inverter B` gives the SECOND one the `_2` suffix; reordering the roster "
"swaps which unit's ids move. Rule 9(c) does not refuse slug-alike names, "
"so this is reachable from a config an operator can write. SIZE: 4 ids on "
"one unit, and only when two names slug alike. Filed as a follow-up rather "
"than fixed in validate.py here, because a new refusal at startup on a "
"LIVE install is a bigger change than this card is allowed to be.",
"7. PART 8 MUTATES `app/mqtt.py` ONLY. `Controller.publish()`'s four "
"per-unit lines are graded by part 7 - with different SoC, different "
"battery sign and different latch states on the two units, so a swap or a "
"mis-paired slug is red - but no automated table mutates main.py here. "
"Those mutations were run by hand through `tools/mutation_run.sh` and are "
"recorded in the PR. SIZE: 4 lines. Also invisible: a rename of "
"`unit_state_key()` applied to BOTH halves at once, which is harmless "
"(the topics are internal) but would move every per-unit state topic "
"silently.",
"6. `inverter AC power` AND PER-UNIT HEARTBEAT AGE ARE NOT ANNOUNCED. The "
"card lists both as per-unit; neither has a source in the add-on today "
"(nothing reads an AC-power register per unit, and `inv.last_beat` is a "
"monotonic loop clock). Announcing them would create entities nothing "
"feeds. SIZE: 2 sensors x N units, deliberately absent, named in the PR.",
]:
print(" " + line)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED:")
for f in fails:
print(" -", f)
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
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"""UX-01 - the Configuration tab's labels, and the check that stops them rotting.
RUN: python3 -B test_translations.py (no third-party imports; the add-on
CI image is Alpine + aiohttp + paho)
WHAT THIS FILE IS FOR. Before UX-01 there was no `translations/` directory at
all, so Home Assistant rendered the raw option KEYS - `unit_sign_disagree_w`,
`saturation_cycles`, `integrator_max_w` - for all seventy options, in
`schema:` order, with no description. The two files this grades are what turn
that into sentences, and the highest-value half of them is not the label: it is
the sentence that says WHETHER TO TOUCH THE VALUE, because the tab presents a
constant derived from 1890 closed-loop test runs and the operator's own inverter
rating as the same kind of field.
⚠️ WHAT THIS FILE CANNOT SEE, SAID FIRST. It grades COVERAGE and PROVENANCE
CITATIONS - that every option has a name and a description in both languages,
that no translation names an option that does not exist, and that each derived
constant's English description cites the record it was derived from. It does NOT
grade whether a sentence is true, whether the Dutch is good Dutch, or whether
the result looks right on screen. The last of those is measured, not asserted,
by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` section F, which loads these files with
Supervisor 2026.08.0's OWN loader out of the release image, runs its OWN
`UiOptions`, replays the frontend's label resolution as the shipped bundle
writes it, and prints every rendered row. That transcript is the evidence; this
file is the gate that keeps it true.
⚠️ AND THE PARSER IS THE OTHER HALF OF THAT PAIR. There is no PyYAML in the CI
image and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check, so
`tools/translations_lint.py` parses these files by hand. A hand parser that
quietly disagrees with the real loader is exactly the defect this repository
keeps finding, so the probe imports THAT SAME MODULE and asserts, key by key and
string by string, that it returns what `supervisor.store.data.
_read_app_translations()` returns. Part 5 below re-states the arrangement so a
reader of this file is told where the licence for the hand parser comes from.
MUTATION.md is the method for the ledger in part 6; `tools/mutation_run.sh` is
the harness, and every row there was RUN rather than reasoned about.
"""
import io
import sys
from pathlib import Path
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE / "tools"))
import translations_lint as TL # noqa: E402
FAILED = 0
def check(what, ok):
global FAILED
print((" ok " if ok else " FAIL ") + what)
if not ok:
FAILED += 1
CFG_TEXT = io.open(HERE / "config.yaml", encoding="utf-8").read()
ORDER, NESTED = TL.config_surface(CFG_TEXT)
LANGS = ("en", "nl")
TR = {lg: TL.parse_translation_file(HERE / "translations" / f"{lg}.yaml")
for lg in LANGS}
print("UX-01 - add-on option translations\n")
print("1. the surface being described")
print(f" config.yaml declares {len(ORDER)} top-level options under `schema:` "
f"and {sum(len(v) for v in NESTED.values())} per-entry key(s) under "
f"{sorted(NESTED)}")
# ⚠️ A FLOOR, NOT AN EQUALITY. This is the "did the reader read anything at all"
# line: `config_surface()` returning an empty list would make every coverage
# check below vacuously true, which is the third failure mode in MUTATION.md -
# the assertion runs, the sentence is true, and the data cannot reach the
# failure it names.
check(f"the option surface was actually read - {len(ORDER)} options, not zero",
len(ORDER) >= 60 and "inverters" in ORDER and "max_w" in ORDER)
check("...and the repeatable `inverters:` section's per-entry keys were read "
"too, which is the half a top-level-only reader would miss",
NESTED.get("inverters", [])[:2] == ["name", "setpoint_entity"]
and len(NESTED["inverters"]) == 7)
print("\n2. AC: every option and every per-entry key is translated, in BOTH "
"languages")
for lg in LANGS:
problems = TL.audit(CFG_TEXT, TR[lg], lg)
print(f" {lg}: {len(TR[lg]['configuration'])} options translated, "
f"{len(problems)} problem(s)")
for p in problems[:10]:
print(" - " + p)
check(f"`{lg}` covers config.yaml exactly: no option without a translation, "
f"no translation without an option, every one with a name AND a "
f"description. Problems: {problems[:3]}", not problems)
# ⚠️ THE `nl` HALF IS NOT OPTIONAL EVEN THOUGH THE FALLBACK IS. The frontend
# resolves `translations[lang]?.name || translations["en"]?.name || key`, PER
# KEY - measured off the shipped bundle, see the probe - so a MISSING nl key
# degrades to English and a WRONG one does not degrade at all. The card asks for
# both languages complete, and complete is a thing a check can hold.
check("...and the two files describe the SAME option set, so nothing on the "
"owner's Dutch screen quietly falls back to English",
set(TR["en"]["configuration"]) == set(TR["nl"]["configuration"]))
check("...including inside the repeatable section",
set(TR["en"]["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"])
== set(TR["nl"]["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"]))
check("...and no Dutch string was left as a copy of the English one, which is "
"what an untranslated key looks like when it is present rather than "
"absent",
not [k for k in ORDER
if TR["en"]["configuration"][k]["description"]
== TR["nl"]["configuration"][k]["description"]])
print("\n3. ⭐ the description says WHETHER TO TOUCH IT")
# ⚠️ THE HIGHEST-VALUE ITEM IN THE CARD, AND THE ONE A COVERAGE COUNT CANNOT
# REACH. Sixty-odd descriptions that all say "the threshold, in watts" would
# pass part 2 completely. What makes this surface safe is that a DERIVED
# constant names the campaign it came from and says the value is not a knob,
# while a number that really is the operator's says so too.
#
# ⚠️ AND THIS IS A TEXT CHECK, WHICH IS WEAK ON PURPOSE AND IS SAID TO BE. It
# cannot know whether a citation is TRUE; it can only know that the citation is
# there and names the right record, so that deleting the provenance - or
# renaming the card it points at - goes red instead of shipping. The table is
# written out rather than derived because there is nothing in config.yaml that
# distinguishes a derived constant from an operator's number; that distinction
# is the whole of what this card had to add.
DERIVED = {
"sign_disagree_w": ("SAFETY-02", "MEASURED"),
"sign_disagree_s": ("SAFETY-02", "MEASURED"),
"unit_sign_disagree_w": ("SAFETY-30", "1890"),
"unit_sign_disagree_s": ("SAFETY-30", "1890"),
"site_sign_disagree_w": ("SAFETY-30", "CARRIED"),
"site_sign_disagree_s": ("SAFETY-30", "1890"),
"meter_freeze_s": ("SAFETY-18", "MEASURED"),
"circulation_w": ("SAFETY-31", "924"),
"circulation_hold_s": ("SAFETY-31", "DERIVED"),
"peak_soc_floor": ("SAFETY-24", "DERIVED"),
"bms_soc_floor": ("0x0560", "MEASURED"),
"integrator_max_w": ("MEASURED", "Do not raise it"),
"gain": ("MEASURED ON", "do not raise it"),
# SAFETY-39. `slew_w` joins the table because it stopped being an
# operator's convenience and became a DERIVED value the moment it was
# tied to the rating: 0 resolves to about a ninth of `max_w`, from an
# ~18 s measured step response. It is the one entry here whose value is
# a RATIO, so the description has to say what it follows as well as
# where the ratio came from - a citation alone would leave an operator
# reading "0" on the tab with no idea it is not "off".
"slew_w": ("SAFETY-39", "DERIVED", "0 MEANS FOLLOW"),
}
_uncited = []
for key, needles in sorted(DERIVED.items()):
desc = TR["en"]["configuration"][key]["description"]
for needle in needles:
if needle not in desc:
_uncited.append(f"{key} does not cite {needle!r}")
print(f" {len(DERIVED)} derived constants must cite their campaign; "
f"{len(_uncited)} do not")
check(f"every derived constant's English description names WHERE THE NUMBER "
f"CAME FROM, so an operator reading the tab can tell it apart from their "
f"own inverter rating. Uncited: {_uncited}", not _uncited)
# The other direction, and it matters as much: a number that IS the operator's
# must not be dressed up as derived, or the labels stop meaning anything.
_theirs = ["max_w", "peak_cap_w"]
check("...and the numbers that really are the OPERATOR'S say so instead of "
"carrying a citation - `max_w` and `peak_cap_w` are the two the card "
"names, and both read 'THIS IS YOUR NUMBER'",
all("THIS IS YOUR NUMBER" in TR["en"]["configuration"][k]["description"]
for k in _theirs))
check("...and the one threshold that is NOT derived from a measurement admits "
"it rather than borrowing the others' authority - "
"`cycle_cost_threshold_eur` is an open product question (OPT-08)",
"NOT DERIVED FROM A MEASUREMENT"
in TR["en"]["configuration"]["cycle_cost_threshold_eur"]["description"]
and "OPT-08"
in TR["en"]["configuration"]["cycle_cost_threshold_eur"]["description"])
print("\n4. task ordering, and the labels that carry it")
# ⚠️ ADD-ON OPTIONS ARE A FLAT LIST - no section headers, no per-option advanced
# flag, no units on the input. Grouping is approximated by ORDER plus label text
# and by nothing else, so both halves are graded: the label prefix, and that the
# prefixes appear in the file as CONTIGUOUS RUNS in the task order. A group
# whose members are scattered renders as a jumble however good each label is.
GROUPS = ["Hardware", "Meter", "Limits", "Tariff", "Maintenance", "Safety",
"Advanced"]
NL_GROUPS = {"Hardware": "Hardware", "Meter": "Meter", "Limits": "Grenzen",
"Tariff": "Tarief", "Maintenance": "Onderhoud",
"Safety": "Veiligheid", "Advanced": "Geavanceerd"}
_prefixes = []
for key in ORDER:
name = TR["en"]["configuration"][key]["name"]
_prefixes.append(name.split(" \u00b7 ")[0] if " \u00b7 " in name else f"<none:{key}>")
_runs = [p for i, p in enumerate(_prefixes) if i == 0 or p != _prefixes[i - 1]]
print(f" the rendered order groups into: {_runs}")
check(f"every label carries a group prefix, so the flat list reads as groups. "
f"Missing: {[p for p in _prefixes if p.startswith('<none:')]}",
not [p for p in _prefixes if p.startswith("<none:")])
check(f"...and each group is ONE CONTIGUOUS RUN in the rendered order, in the "
f"task order the card asks for - hardware, meter, ratings and limits, "
f"tariff, maintenance, safety, advanced. Got: {_runs}", _runs == GROUPS)
_nl_bad = [k for k in ORDER
if NL_GROUPS.get(TR["en"]["configuration"][k]["name"].split(" \u00b7 ")[0])
!= TR["nl"]["configuration"][k]["name"].split(" \u00b7 ")[0]]
check(f"...and the Dutch labels carry the SAME grouping under Dutch names, so "
f"the two languages do not read as two different layouts. Off: {_nl_bad}",
not _nl_bad)
# ⚠️ THE ORDER IS THE `schema:` BLOCK'S, NOT THE `options:` BLOCK'S, AND THAT IS
# A MEASUREMENT. `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(coresys)(data["schema"])`, so the
# tab renders the schema half in its own order. Asserted here because the whole
# of part 4 is about an ordering that would otherwise be graded on the wrong
# half of the file - and because the two halves of config.yaml were already in
# different orders before this card.
# ⚠️ ANCHORED ON THE INDENTATION AND SCOPED TO THE `options:` BLOCK. The file
# starts with the add-on manifest, whose `services:` list carries ` - mqtt:want`
# at two spaces with a colon in it - a looser reader picks that up as an option
# called `- mqtt` and the comparison below then fails for a reason that has
# nothing to do with what it is watching. Measured, on the first run.
import re as _re # noqa: E402
_opt_half = CFG_TEXT[CFG_TEXT.index("\noptions:\n"):CFG_TEXT.index("\nschema:")]
_opt_order = _re.findall(r"^ ([a-z_0-9]+):", _opt_half, _re.M)
check("config.yaml's two halves now declare the same options in the same "
"order, so the file reads the way the tab renders even though only the "
"schema half decides it", _opt_order == ORDER)
print("\n5. the parser is strict, so a file it half-read cannot pass")
# ⚠️ THE FAILURE THIS PART EXISTS FOR. A permissive parser answers "no problems"
# for a file it silently skipped half of - the same green-and-not-watching
# defect one layer down. So every shape outside the subset UX-01 writes must
# RAISE, and that is graded with real malformed input rather than asserted.
BAD = [
("a tab-indented line", "configuration:\n\tmeter_entity:\n"),
("three-space indent", "configuration:\n meter_entity:\n"),
("a bare unquoted scalar", 'configuration:\n a:\n name: hello\n'),
("a single-quoted scalar", "configuration:\n a:\n name: 'hello'\n"),
("a list item", 'configuration:\n a:\n - "x"\n'),
("a duplicate key", 'configuration:\n a:\n name: "x"\n name: "y"\n'),
("an over-indented child", 'configuration:\n a:\n'),
("a line that is not a key at all", "configuration:\n just some prose\n"),
("an unsupported escape", 'configuration:\n a:\n name: "x\\ty"\n'),
]
_accepted = []
for what, text in BAD:
try:
TL.parse_translation_text(text, what)
_accepted.append(what)
except TL.TranslationSyntaxError:
pass
check(f"every shape outside the accepted subset RAISES rather than being "
f"skipped. Silently accepted: {_accepted}", not _accepted)
check("...and the accepted subset really does round-trip the shipped files - "
"70 options and 7 per-entry keys came back out of each, which is what "
"says the strictness above is not just refusing everything",
all(len(TR[lg]["configuration"]) == len(ORDER)
and len(TR[lg]["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"]) == 7
for lg in LANGS))
print(" ⚠️ the licence for this hand parser is NOT this file. "
"tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section F loads the same two files with "
"`supervisor.store.data._read_app_translations()` out of the 2026.08.0 "
"release image and asserts, key by key and string by string, that this "
"module returns the same thing. Re-run it when either changes.")
print("\n6. MUTATION: the check is run against broken inputs, both directions")
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE PART THE CARD ASKS FOR IN SO MANY WORDS, AND IT IS RUN RATHER
# THAN DESCRIBED. A coverage check is worth exactly what it catches, so each
# mutation below is APPLIED to a copy of the real parsed translations and the
# audit is required to NAME the key it broke - not merely to be non-empty. A
# check that goes red for the wrong reason is a check that will go green for the
# wrong reason later.
import copy # noqa: E402
def _mutate(what, fn, must_name):
tr = copy.deepcopy(TR["en"])
fn(tr)
problems = TL.audit(CFG_TEXT, tr, "en")
named = [p for p in problems if must_name in p]
print(f" {what}\n -> {len(problems)} problem(s); "
f"{(named[0][:120] + '...') if named else 'NONE NAMED ' + must_name}")
check(f"MUTATION: {what} -> the audit REFUSES and names `{must_name}`",
bool(named))
_mutate("delete one option's whole translation (`saturation_cycles`)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"].pop("saturation_cycles"),
"saturation_cycles")
_mutate("delete one option's description but keep its name (`meter_phases`)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["meter_phases"].pop("description"),
"meter_phases")
_mutate("blank one option's description (`gain`) - present but empty is not "
"covered either",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["gain"].update(description=" "),
"gain")
_mutate("translate an option that does not exist (`saturation_cyles`, one "
"letter out - the rename this check exists for)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"].update(
saturation_cyles={"name": "x", "description": "y"}),
"saturation_cyles")
_mutate("delete one PER-ENTRY key of the repeatable section (`bms_soc_floor`)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"].pop("bms_soc_floor"),
"bms_soc_floor")
_mutate("invent a per-entry key the schema does not declare (`max_kw`)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"].update(
max_kw={"name": "x", "description": "y"}),
"max_kw")
_mutate("drop the whole `fields:` block from the repeatable section",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["inverters"].pop("fields"),
"inverters")
_mutate("hang a `fields:` block off an option that is not a repeatable section",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["max_w"].update(
fields={"x": {"name": "y"}}),
"max_w")
# ⚠️ AND THE TWO THAT COST THE WHOLE FILE RATHER THAN ONE LABEL. Supervisor
# validates each translation file through SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS and, on
# refusal, LOGS A WARNING AND DROPS ALL OF IT - so a shape it rejects does not
# lose one description, it silently returns the entire tab to raw keys, and the
# only trace is one line in a log nobody is reading. Neither of these is
# reachable through the `configuration:` coverage above, which is exactly why
# they are here.
_mutate("a top-level block Supervisor does not read (`netwrok:`) - the file is "
"DROPPED WHOLE, not partly",
lambda tr: tr.update(netwrok={"x": "y"}), "netwrok")
_mutate("a `network:` block whose value is a mapping rather than a string - "
"same consequence, every label in the file gone",
lambda tr: tr.update(network={"8099/tcp": {"x": "y"}}), "network")
# ⚠️ AND THE MUTATION THAT MATTERS MOST: A NEW OPTION ARRIVES. This is the rot
# the acceptance criterion is written about - somebody adds a key to config.yaml
# in six months and the tab renders it raw. The mutation is applied to the
# CONFIG side rather than the translation side, because that is the direction it
# happens in.
_grown = CFG_TEXT.replace("\n log_level: list(", "\n new_option_s: int(1,9)\n log_level: list(")
check("the config-side mutation really did land - a new option in the schema "
"half that no translation mentions", _grown != CFG_TEXT
and "new_option_s" in TL.config_surface(_grown)[0])
_grow_problems = TL.audit(_grown, TR["en"], "en")
print(f" a new option added to config.yaml -> {_grow_problems[:1]}")
check("MUTATION: adding an option to config.yaml and forgetting the "
"translation goes RED, naming the key - which is the whole of the "
"acceptance criterion about this rotting",
any("new_option_s" in p for p in _grow_problems))
# ⚠️ THE NEGATIVE CONTROL, WITHOUT WHICH THE EIGHT ROWS ABOVE PROVE NOTHING. An
# audit that returned a problem for every input would have "passed" all of them.
check("...and the UNMUTATED input is still clean, so the rows above are the "
"mutations speaking and not a check that always complains",
not TL.audit(CFG_TEXT, TR["en"], "en")
and not TL.audit(CFG_TEXT, TR["nl"], "nl"))
print("\n7. no behaviour and no value moved")
# ⚠️ UX-01 IS A PRESENTATION CARD. It reorders config.yaml and adds two files;
# it must not move a single default. The whole options half is compared against
# the schema half key by key here, and every other suite in this directory pins
# the actual values by reading this same file - test_maintenance.py's eight,
# test_watchdog.py's six, test_price.py's seven, test_freeze.py's, and
# test_peakguard.py's. This line is the cheap one that says the reorder did not
# lose or duplicate a key on the way.
check("no option was lost, gained or duplicated by the reordering: the two "
"halves of config.yaml hold the same 70 keys, once each",
sorted(_opt_order) == sorted(ORDER) and len(set(ORDER)) == len(ORDER))
check("...and `inverters: []` is still shipped in the options half, which is "
"what Supervisor 2026.08.0 refuses every pre-0.6.0 options blob without "
"(measured; see DECISIONS/CFG-04-inverter-roster.md B)",
"\n inverters: []\n" in _opt_half)
check("...and the schema half still declares the NESTED per-entry `max_w:` "
"BEFORE the flat one, so test_inverter.py part 12's first-match trap "
"stays baited rather than sorted out by this card's reordering",
CFG_TEXT[CFG_TEXT.index("\nschema:"):].index(" max_w: int(")
< CFG_TEXT[CFG_TEXT.index("\nschema:"):].index("\n max_w: int("))
print()
if FAILED:
print(f"{FAILED} FAILED")
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+498 -7
View File
@@ -18,9 +18,10 @@ import asyncio
import sys
from app.maintenance import MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS, MaintConfig
from app.control import LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S, SLEW_RAIL_FRAC
from app.validate import (
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS, FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, ConfigRefused,
actuator_writers, refuse, validate_startup_config,
actuator_writers, refuse, site_rail_w, validate_startup_config,
)
fails = []
@@ -204,12 +205,17 @@ check("...and the refusal names the actuator and every writer aimed at it, so "
_PER_INVERTER_OK = {k: v for k, v in base().items() if k != "setpoint_entity"}
_PER_INVERTER_OK["inverters"] = [
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint",
"max_w": 2000},
"max_w": 2000, "bms_soc_floor": 10},
# ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. 2000 W here is the SHIPPED default repeated,
# not a rating measured off a second device - SPIKE-04 measures that when
# there is one to measure. Nothing in this file depends on the number.
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32 made `bms_soc_floor` a REQUIRED per-entry key, and the two
# values here DIFFER (10 / 15) rather than being copied. 15 % is SIMULATED -
# there is no second pack to read a cut-out off - and the reason it is not
# simply 10 is MUTATION.md habit 1: a fixture whose two per-unit numbers are
# equal cannot show a check reading the wrong unit's.
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint_b",
"max_w": 2000}]
"max_w": 2000, "bms_soc_floor": 15}]
check("two inverters with their own entities are ACCEPTED - one writer each, "
"no shared actuator, and that is CFG-04's whole purpose",
validate_startup_config(_PER_INVERTER_OK, -5000, 5000) == [])
@@ -452,6 +458,149 @@ check("arbiter: the drain SET is clamped, not contradicted",
check("...and the clamp names itself, which is why it is not refused",
"supervised" in (r.bound_by or "") and "limited by" in r.explain())
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("10. a slew rate the plant can actually follow (SAFETY-39)")
# ⚠️ THIS RULE GRADES A RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS THE POINT OF IT. Every other rule
# in this file compares a configured number against another configured number
# and refuses one ordering. This one refuses a RATIO: `slew_w` may not exceed
# `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail`, so the same `slew_w` is fine at one rating and
# refused at another, and raising the rating moves the bound with it instead of
# leaving the constant behind. That is the failure the ticket is about -
# `slew_w: 1000` was derived at a 1500 W clamp, the live install went to 5000,
# and nothing anywhere said the derivation no longer held.
print(f" SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = "
f"{LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s / {PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s = {SLEW_RAIL_FRAC:.4f}")
_R5000 = base(max_w=5000, maintenance_charge_w=2000, maintenance_discharge_w=2000)
check("the rail this rule grades is the SITE rail, and at the shipped roster of "
"one it is `max_w` exactly - byte for byte the number the single-inverter "
"shape has always meant",
site_rail_w(_R5000) == 5000.0)
# ⭐ VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. This is the acceptance criterion stated as a test:
# put the 2026-09-05 pair back and the gate must go red. A rule that could not
# be made to fire on the configuration it was written for is a rule nobody has
# checked.
_broken = validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=1000), -5000, 5000)
print(f" restoring slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 -> {len(_broken)} problem(s)")
if _broken:
print(f" {_broken[0][:160]}...")
check("⭐ RESTORING THE 2026-09-05 PAIR - slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 - IS REFUSED. "
"It crosses the whole output range in 10 s against a plant measured at "
"18 s, which is not a fast loop, it is a loop that commands its entire "
"range before it can observe its answer to the first step",
len(_broken) == 1 and why(_broken, "slew_w is 1000 W"))
check("...and the refusal says WHICH RAIL it graded against and HOW LONG the "
"crossing takes, because 'slew_w is too high' sends an operator to lower "
"a number when raising max_w or setting 0 are both correct answers too",
why(_broken, "site rail of 5000 W")
and why(_broken, "crosses its whole output range in 5.0 cycles"))
check("...and it names the plant measurement it is graded against, so the "
"number is traceable to a step response rather than to a preference",
why(_broken, "goodwe/NOTES.md §5.10"))
check("...and it says what to DO, including the setting that cannot go stale",
why(_broken, "Set slew_w to 0") and why(_broken, "556 W"))
# THE BOUNDARY. Equality is the DERIVED VALUE, not a violation - at exactly
# `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail` the loop takes precisely the plant's settling time to
# cross its range, which is the constraint met. Rule 6 permits equality for the
# same shape of reason and rule 5 refuses it for the opposite one; this is
# rule 6's case, and getting it backwards would refuse the value this rule
# exists to recommend.
_bound = SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * 5000.0
check(f"at exactly the derived value ({_bound:.0f} W) the config STARTS - "
"equality is the constraint satisfied, not violated",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=int(_bound)), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and one watt of slack above it starts too, because a boundary that "
"is not meaningful to one watt must not refuse on one watt - an operator "
"reading 556 off a status page that rounded it is not misconfigured",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=556), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and well above it does not",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=600), -5000, 5000) != [])
# SLOWER IS ALWAYS ACCEPTED, and the live install is the reason it has to be.
check("the interim that is holding on the live system - slew_w 400 against "
"max_w 5000, applied 2026-09-05 12:00 - STARTS. It is 12.5 ticks to cross "
"the rail against the 9 this rule requires, and refusing 'too slow' would "
"refuse the mitigation",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=400), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and so does the schema floor at the biggest rail, because there is no "
"such thing as too slow here",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=50), -5000, 5000) == [])
# ⚠️ 0 IS NOT GRADED AND MUST NOT BE. It means "follow the rail" and satisfies
# this rule by construction at every rail there is; a rule that refused it would
# refuse the fix. Checked at three ratings so that "it passes" cannot be an
# accident of the default one.
# ⚠️ NO SLEW PROBLEM AT ANY RATING, rather than NO PROBLEMS AT ALL. At the
# schema floor of 100 W rules 5 and 5b fire on the shipped sign thresholds,
# which is correct and is not this rule's business - asserting an empty list
# would make this check fail for a reason it is not about, and somebody would
# then "fix" it by moving a sign threshold.
_zero_problems = {m: [p for p in validate_startup_config(
base(max_w=m, slew_w=0,
maintenance_charge_w=min(2000, m),
maintenance_discharge_w=min(2000, m)),
-abs(m), abs(m)) if "slew_w" in p]
for m in (100, 500, 2000, 5000, 15000)}
check("slew_w 0 - FOLLOW THE RAIL - is never refused at any rating, which it "
"must not be, because it is the shipped value and it satisfies this rule "
f"by construction at every rail there is: {_zero_problems}",
not any(_zero_problems.values()))
check("a negative slew_w is refused as nonsense rather than treated as 0 - it "
"is a magnitude, and 0 already has a meaning here",
why(validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=-400), -5000, 5000),
"must not be negative"))
# ⭐ THE ROSTER, WHICH IS THE WHOLE REASON THIS GRADES A SUM. `slew_w` is not a
# per-unit quantity: main.py builds `Tuning(max_w=self.site_max_w)` and
# `compute()` emits the SITE target. So the rail is the roster sum, and adding
# an inverter moves this bound with no operator action and no second derivation.
#
# ⚠️ INVERTER B'S 4600 W IS ITS DATASHEET AND SERIAL, NOT A MEASUREMENT, AND
# INVERTER B IS NOT ON SITE (SPIKE-04, ~2026-09-12; goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b). It
# is used here because what is graded is the ARITHMETIC OF THE RULE, which does
# not depend on the number being measured - not because 9600 W is a fact about
# this house yet.
def _roster(a=5000, b=4600, **over):
o = base(setpoint_entity="", inverters=[
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.a", "max_w": a,
"bms_soc_floor": 10, "soc_entity": "sensor.sa", "batt_entity": "sensor.ba"},
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": b,
"bms_soc_floor": 10, "soc_entity": "sensor.sb", "batt_entity": "sensor.bb"}])
o.pop("max_w"); o.pop("soc_entity"); o.pop("batt_entity")
o.update(over)
return o
_site = site_rail_w(_roster())
print(f" roster 5000 + 4600 (B FROM DATASHEET, NOT MEASURED) -> site rail "
f"{_site:.0f} W, bound {SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * _site:.0f} W")
check("the rail is the roster SUM and not the weakest unit, which is what "
"separates this rule from 5, 6 and 8 - those grade one watchdog, one "
"shaping claim and one pack, and this grades the range one SITE COMMAND "
"is a rate across",
_site == 9600.0)
check("⭐ AND THE BOUND MOVES ON ITS OWN WHEN THE ROSTER DOES: the derived value "
"at a 9600 W site is 1067 W with nobody re-deriving anything, which is "
"the property that makes this a fix rather than a re-tune",
abs(SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * _site - 9600.0 / 9.0) < 1e-9)
check("...so the same explicit slew_w that is REFUSED at a 5000 W rail is "
"ACCEPTED at 9600 - the bound is on how long the crossing TAKES, and a "
"bigger rail at the same step size takes longer to cross. ⚠️ This is the "
"direction of the rule stated as a test, because it is not the direction "
"the ticket assumed: a growing rail LOOSENS this bound. What the rule "
"protects against is the constant being left behind when the rail moves; "
"it is not a bound on how much the site may command, and it does not "
"bound the over-absorption, which is a `gain` term SAFETY-39 measured "
"and deliberately did not change",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=1000), -5000, 5000) != []
and validate_startup_config(_roster(slew_w=1000)) == [])
check("...and a slew that outruns even the doubled rail is still refused there, "
"so the roster path is not simply un-graded",
why(validate_startup_config(_roster(slew_w=2000)),
"site rail of 9600 W"))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the SHIPPED defaults must pass the rule they are governed by (AC3)")
# ⚠️ Shipping a default the validator refuses would be worse than the bug it
@@ -465,12 +614,21 @@ import re # noqa: E402
_CFG = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "config.yaml")
with open(_CFG, encoding="utf-8") as _fh:
_txt = _fh.read()
# ⚠️ `slew_w` JOINED THIS SET AT SAFETY-39 AND IT IS THE INTERESTING MEMBER.
# The others are refused when they are too big for `max_w`; this one is refused
# when it is too big for `max_w` AS A RATIO, so shipping the wrong number here
# would be shipping the exact defect the card is about with the gate that
# catches it standing right beside it. Reading it out of config.yaml is what
# makes "the shipped value is 0" a fact rather than a claim.
_shipped = {k: float(v) for k, v in re.findall(
r"^ (max_w|maintenance_charge_w|maintenance_discharge_w|sign_disagree_w): "
r"(-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)}
check("config.yaml really was read (all four defaults found)",
r"^ (max_w|maintenance_charge_w|maintenance_discharge_w|sign_disagree_w"
r"|slew_w): (-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)}
check("config.yaml really was read (all five defaults found)",
set(_shipped) == {"max_w", "maintenance_charge_w",
"maintenance_discharge_w", "sign_disagree_w"})
"maintenance_discharge_w", "sign_disagree_w", "slew_w"})
check(f"...and the shipped slew_w is 0, i.e. FOLLOW THE RAIL - the one value "
f"that cannot be left behind when max_w moves (got {_shipped.get('slew_w')})",
_shipped.get("slew_w") == 0.0)
check(f"the shipped defaults are accepted {_shipped}",
validate_startup_config(base(**_shipped), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and the shipped charge rate is at or under the shipped ceiling",
@@ -828,6 +986,339 @@ check("...and MaintConfig's dataclass defaults carry no numeric literal either "
not re.search(r"^\s*(charge_w|discharge_w):\s*float\s*=\s*-?\d",
_srcs["maintenance.py"], re.M))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("SPIKE-04a: inverter B's documented rating, and the provenance beside it")
# ⚠️ WHY A DOCUMENTATION CARD LEFT A CHECK BEHIND. Inverter B's rating was
# written down in THREE places - config.yaml's commented roster example,
# DOCS.md's, and tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py's "a blob an operator would
# POST" - as 3000 W, a figure nobody had measured, read off a datasheet, or
# sourced at all. It was wrong: SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) identified inverter B
# from the owner's model number and serial as a GoodWe GW5048D-ES rated 4600 W
# on the battery path. Three transcriptions of one number drifting away from
# the truth together is this repo's recurring defect in its plainest form, and
# correcting them once WITHOUT PINNING THEM buys nothing: the next editor
# touches one of the three and the other two stay wrong, silently.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE PROVENANCE IS GRADED, NOT ONLY THE VALUE, WHICH IS THE HALF THAT
# MATTERS. 4600 W IS FROM A DATASHEET AND IS NOT A MEASUREMENT. The datasheet
# prints it under BATTERY INPUT DATA, so it is probably DC, while `max_w` is
# graded against 0x0518 - the inverter's own AC power - which would put the AC
# ceiling nearer 4324 W. An editor who tidies that caveat away leaves a paper
# number reading as an observation of hardware that does not exist yet, and
# THAT is the failure this card exists to prevent. So the caveat is what these
# checks reach for; a check that graded 4600 alone would watch the value and
# miss the lie.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS DELIBERATELY DOES NOT GRADE: the test fixtures. Several files
# build a second inverter at 3000 W on purpose, because the property those
# checks consume is that B's rating is UNMISTAKABLY not A's, and the real pair
# (5000/4600) is a 400 W gap - narrower than `slew_w`. Those are illustrative,
# they say so at the line, and they are not statements of B's rating. The three
# sites below are the ones that ARE such statements.
_HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
_docs_txt = open(os.path.join(_HERE, "DOCS.md"), encoding="utf-8").read()
_probe_txt = open(os.path.join(_HERE, "tools", "supervisor_shape_probe.py"),
encoding="utf-8").read()
# One regex per site, each anchored on something only THAT site has, so a match
# cannot silently wander into a neighbouring blob. The probe's anchor is the
# operator blob's real entity name: its section D refusal entries use
# `number.b` and one of them carries a deliberate 9999, so an anchor loose
# enough to reach them would grade the wrong dict and still look green.
_b_rating = {
"config.yaml": re.search(
r"#\s+- name: inverter-b\b(?:[^\n]*\n)*?\s*#\s+max_w:\s*(\d+)", _txt),
"DOCS.md": re.search(
r"^ - name: inverter-b\b(?:[^\n]*\n)*?^ max_w:\s*(\d+)",
_docs_txt, re.M),
"supervisor_shape_probe.py": re.search(
r'"name": "inverter-b",\s*"setpoint_entity": "number\.goodwe_b_setpoint_w"'
r'(?:[^}]*?)"max_w":\s*(\d+)', _probe_txt),
}
check(f"all three documented rosters were FOUND "
f"{ {k: bool(v) for k, v in _b_rating.items()} } - a regex that matches "
"nothing is a green check that read nothing",
all(_b_rating.values()))
# ⚠️ THE `len(...) == 3` IS NOT DECORATION. Without it a regex that stopped
# matching would shrink this dict, and "all the values agree" would go GREEN on
# the two sites that were still read - a check whose data no longer reaches the
# failure it names, which is the exact fault this whole section is about.
_b_vals = {k: int(m.group(1)) for k, m in _b_rating.items() if m}
check(f"...and all three state the SAME rating for inverter B {_b_vals}",
len(_b_vals) == 3 and len(set(_b_vals.values())) == 1)
check(f"...and it is 4600 W - the GW5048D-ES datasheet figure, not the 3000 W "
f"hypothesis that predated the unit being identified {_b_vals}",
len(_b_vals) == 3 and set(_b_vals.values()) == {4600})
# The provenance triple. Each site must still say WHERE 4600 came from, that it
# is graded against an AC register, and what the DC-vs-AC ambiguity does to it -
# the last carried by the 4324 W figure, which is the one marker that cannot
# survive a careless "it's 4600 now, done" rewrite.
#
# ⚠️ SEARCHED IN A WINDOW AROUND THE ROSTER, NOT OVER THE WHOLE FILE, AND THE
# FIRST VERSION OF THIS CHECK DID THE LATTER. `0x0518` already appeared once in
# config.yaml and once in DOCS.md before this card, for unrelated reasons - so a
# whole-file `"0x0518" in src` was GREEN on those two files no matter what
# happened next to inverter B's rating. That is a check whose data cannot reach
# the failure it names, in the same file that exists to complain about them.
# The window is the text either side of the roster match, so deleting the caveat
# beside the number goes red even where the same word survives elsewhere.
_sites = {"config.yaml": _txt, "DOCS.md": _docs_txt,
"supervisor_shape_probe.py": _probe_txt}
_MARKERS = ("datasheet", "0x0518", "4324")
_prov = {}
for _name, _src in _sites.items():
_m = _b_rating[_name]
_win = _src[max(0, _m.start() - 2500):_m.end() + 2500].lower() if _m else ""
_prov[_name] = {k: k in _win for k in _MARKERS}
for _name, _got in sorted(_prov.items()):
check(f"{_name} still carries B's provenance WITHIN 2500 chars of the "
f"roster - the datasheet it came from, the 0x0518 it is graded "
f"against, and the 4324 W the DC reading would make it {_got}",
all(_got.values()))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("rules 5, 5b and 6 on a ROSTER SET - the smallest cap at EVERY position")
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32 ROUND 5, AND THE REASON THIS SECTION EXISTS AT ALL. PR #48 was
# rejected on FOUR MUTATIONS THAT SURVIVED A 19/19 GREEN SUITE, all of them in
# the three lines above:
#
# validate.py:779 min(caps) -> min(caps[:1]) +4 B GREEN
# validate.py:779 min(caps) -> min(caps[-1:]) +5 B GREEN
# validate.py:778 caps = [cap for _, cap in caps_ix[:1]] +4 B GREEN
# validate.py:893 min(caps_ix[-1:], key=lambda p: p[1]) +5 B GREEN
#
# NONE of them is an equivalent mutant: each one deletes a safety refusal.
# `max_w: 5000` on inverter-a beside `2000` on inverter-b with
# `sign_disagree_w: 3000` is refused by the shipped validator with "the
# SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement watchdog can never fire" and ACCEPTED by every one
# of the four - the site starts, with a watchdog that reports `armed` on the
# status page and cannot trip on pack B. That is rule 5's own failure mode
# reached THROUGH rule 5.
#
# WHY THE OLD FIXTURE COULD NOT SEE IT, which is the whole lesson and is now
# MUTATION.md habit 10: the fixture was ONE roster, `[5000, 2000]`. On that
# roster `min` and `last` and `[-1:]` and `[:2]` all answer 2000. A fixture of N
# members cannot separate two reductions that agree on N members, and adding a
# member moves the hole instead of closing it.
#
# SO THE FIXTURE IS A SET, NOT A ROSTER: the smallest cap at EVERY POSITION of
# rosters of width 2, 3, 4 and 5. `[:1]` needs width 2 to be caught, `[:2]`
# needs 3, `[:3]` needs 4 - the sweep is what terminates the regress that a
# single fixture cannot. And the FAMILY TABLE below is COMPUTED AND PRINTED, so
# a member no fixture kills shows up as a NAMED SURVIVOR rather than as an
# absence from a list nobody re-derived.
#
# ⚠️ THE DIFFERING CAPS ARE A FIXTURE PROPERTY AND MUST STAY ONE. In production
# both packs are expected to floor at 10 % and SPIKE-04a puts inverter B at
# 4600 W against A's 5000 W - a 400 W gap, narrower than slew_w. A fixture built
# on the real pair would be degenerate on exactly the axis these checks measure.
# ⚠️ AND INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (SPIKE-04, ~2026-09-12). Nothing
# in this section is measured off a second unit; the rosters are simulated and
# are labelled so.
_BIG, _SMALL = 5000.0, 2000.0
_RATE = 3000.0 # strictly between them, which is the point
def _roster_n(caps, **over):
"""A roster of len(caps) units, unit-0..unit-N, each with its own cap."""
o = base(**over)
for k in ("setpoint_entity", "soc_entity", "batt_entity", "max_w"):
o.pop(k, None)
o["inverters"] = [
dict(name=f"unit-{i}", setpoint_entity=f"number.sp{i}",
soc_entity=f"sensor.soc{i}", batt_entity=f"sensor.batt{i}",
max_w=c, bms_soc_floor=10)
for i, c in enumerate(caps)]
o.update(over)
return o
# The three rules that reduce over `unit_caps_indexed()`, each as
# (option name, the token its refusal is recognised by).
_CAP_RULES = (
("sign_disagree_w", "SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement"),
("unit_sign_disagree_w", "SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement"),
("maintenance_charge_w", "maintenance charge in a cheap window"),
)
_QUIET = {"sign_disagree_w": 300.0, "unit_sign_disagree_w": 300.0,
"maintenance_charge_w": 1000.0, "maintenance_discharge_w": 1000.0}
# THE SET: width x position of the one small cap.
_SET = []
for _n in (2, 3, 4, 5):
for _pos in range(_n):
_caps = [_BIG] * _n
_caps[_pos] = _SMALL
_SET.append((_n, _pos, tuple(_caps)))
# habit 1: the PRECONDITION as its own check. If a later edit makes the caps
# equal, this goes red rather than the claims below going quietly vacuous.
check("PRECONDITION: every fixture in the set has a UNIQUE smallest cap, that "
"cap is at the stated position, and the rate under test sits STRICTLY "
"between it and the others - two equal caps could not tell `min` from "
"`first` from `last` and the whole set would be measuring nothing",
len(_SET) == 14
and all(c[p] == _SMALL and c.count(_SMALL) == 1 and _SMALL < _RATE < _BIG
for _n2, p, c in _SET)
and {p for _n2, p, _c in _SET} == {0, 1, 2, 3, 4})
def _verdict(opts, token):
"""(refused?, the unit the message NAMES, the cap it QUOTES)."""
ps = [p for p in validate_startup_config(opts, -5000, 5000) if token in p]
if not ps:
return (False, None, None)
m = re.search(r"max_w \(([^)]+)\) is (\d+) W", ps[0])
return (True, m.group(1) if m else None, float(m.group(2)) if m else None)
# --- the shipped answer, on every member of the set -------------------------
_rows = []
for _opt, _token in _CAP_RULES:
for _n, _pos, _caps in _SET:
_o = _roster_n(list(_caps), **dict(_QUIET, **{_opt: _RATE}))
_rows.append((_opt, _n, _pos, _caps, _verdict(_o, _token)))
print(f" {len(_CAP_RULES)} rules x {len(_SET)} rosters = {len(_rows)} runs "
f"of the REAL validator (rate {_RATE:.0f} W, caps {_SMALL:.0f}/"
f"{_BIG:.0f} W, simulated rosters - inverter B does not exist):")
for _opt in sorted({r[0] for r in _rows}):
_got = [(r[1], r[2], r[4]) for r in _rows if r[0] == _opt]
print(f" {_opt:<22} " + " ".join(
f"n{n}p{p}:{'REFUSE ' + str(u) if ok else 'starts'}"
for n, p, (ok, u, _c) in _got))
check("⚠️ EVERY ONE OF THE THREE CAP RULES REFUSES ON EVERY MEMBER OF THE SET, "
"and NAMES THE UNIT THE NUMBER CAME OFF - at width 2, 3, 4 and 5, with "
"the small cap at every position in turn. A reduction that answered "
"`first`, `last`, `[:1]`, `[-1:]`, `[:2]` or `[:-1]` instead of `min` "
"misses at least one member of this set, which is what four hand-run "
"mutations against a 19/19 green suite proved the single `[5000, 2000]` "
"fixture could not do",
all(ok and unit == f"unit-{p}" and cap == _SMALL
for _o2, _n2, p, _c2, (ok, unit, cap) in _rows))
check("...and it is a COMPARISON, not a blanket refusal of rosters: the same "
"three rates against a roster whose caps can ALL take them start "
"cleanly, at every width. Without this the line above is satisfied by a "
"validator that refuses everything (habit 2 in the negative direction)",
all(_verdict(_roster_n([_BIG] * n, **dict(_QUIET, **{opt: _RATE})),
tok) == (False, None, None)
for opt, tok in _CAP_RULES for n in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)))
# --- the POSITIONAL-SLICE FAMILY TABLE, computed and printed ----------------
# ⚠️ COMPUTED, NOT LISTED. Each candidate is applied to the SAME caps the
# validator saw, and its (unit, cap) answer is compared against what the shipped
# validator actually said on that roster. A candidate that agrees everywhere is
# a reduction this fixture set CANNOT distinguish from the shipped one, and it
# is printed as a SURVIVOR rather than left out of a table nobody re-derived.
def _pick(caps, fn):
ix = list(enumerate(caps))
try:
i, c = fn(ix)
except (ValueError, IndexError):
return None
return (f"unit-{i}", c)
_FAMILY = {
"min (SHIPPED)": lambda ix: min(ix, key=lambda p: p[1]),
"max": lambda ix: max(ix, key=lambda p: p[1]),
"first": lambda ix: ix[0],
"last": lambda ix: ix[-1],
"min(caps[:1])": lambda ix: min(ix[:1], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[-1:])": lambda ix: min(ix[-1:], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[:2])": lambda ix: min(ix[:2], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[:3])": lambda ix: min(ix[:3], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[1:])": lambda ix: min(ix[1:], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[:-1])": lambda ix: min(ix[:-1], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[::2])": lambda ix: min(ix[::2], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"mean": lambda ix: (0, sum(c for _i, c in ix) / len(ix)),
}
_survivors = []
print(" the family table - each candidate against what the SHIPPED "
"validator answered on the same roster:")
for _name, _fn in _FAMILY.items():
_misses = []
for _opt, _n, _pos, _caps, (_ok, _unit, _cap) in _rows:
_pred = _pick(list(_caps), _fn)
_pred_refuses = _pred is not None and _pred[1] > 0 and _RATE >= _pred[1]
if _opt == "maintenance_charge_w":
_pred_refuses = (_pred is not None and _pred[1] > 0
and _RATE > _pred[1])
_said = ((True, _pred[0], _pred[1]) if _pred_refuses
else (False, None, None))
if _said != (_ok, _unit, _cap):
_misses.append(f"{_opt[:4]}/n{_n}p{_pos}")
if not _misses and _name != "min (SHIPPED)":
_survivors.append(_name)
print(f" {_name:<16} {'AGREES EVERYWHERE (survivor)' if not _misses else 'differs on ' + str(len(_misses)) + ' run(s), first: ' + _misses[0]}")
check("⚠️ AND THE FAMILY TABLE HAS NO SURVIVOR BUT THE SHIPPED REDUCTION. "
"Eleven candidates - max, first, last, the mean, and every positional "
"slice this card has actually been defeated by - are each computed "
"against what the real validator answered on the same roster, and every "
"one of them differs somewhere in the set. This is the check that would "
"have taken PR #48 red four rounds ago: a member no fixture kills is "
"PRINTED AS A NAMED SURVIVOR here instead of being absent from a list "
f"nobody re-derived. survivors: {_survivors}",
_survivors == [])
# --- the ROSTER OF ONE, where every one of them is the same thing -----------
_at_one = {n: _pick([_SMALL], f) for n, f in _FAMILY.items()}
print(f" at a ROSTER OF ONE the twelve candidates answer: "
f"{sorted({str(v) for v in _at_one.values()})}")
check("...and at a ROSTER OF ONE every candidate that still has a member to "
"reduce answers THE SAME THING - which is exactly why no "
"single-inverter fixture in this repository could ever have caught any "
"of this, and why the shipped single-inverter refusals are what they "
"always were. The only two that do NOT coincide are `caps[1:]` and "
"`caps[:-1]`, which EMPTY the list and would raise: at N=1 they are "
"crashes rather than silent wrong answers, so they are not survivors "
"there either",
{v for v in _at_one.values() if v is not None} == {("unit-0", _SMALL)}
and {n for n, v in _at_one.items() if v is None}
== {"min(caps[1:])", "min(caps[:-1])"}
and _verdict(_roster_n([_SMALL], **dict(_QUIET, sign_disagree_w=_RATE)),
"SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement")[0])
# --- rule 5's SIBLING BRANCH, which was reading the FLAT max_w --------------
# ⚠️ FOUND BY READING THE THREE BRANCHES SIDE BY SIDE, NOT BY THE STRUCTURAL
# PIN - and said that way on purpose, because it is the shape of what the pin
# cannot see. `unit_sign_disagree_w` is SAFETY-30's, not this card's. It was
# graded against `_number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)`, the FLAT option, three lines
# under a branch that had already stopped doing that. Both directions were
# measured before the fix and both are asserted here.
_leftover = _roster_n([_SMALL, _SMALL],
**dict(_QUIET, unit_sign_disagree_w=_RATE))
_leftover["max_w"] = _BIG # what a single-inverter install leaves behind
_lv = _verdict(_leftover, "SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement")
print(f" leftover flat max_w {_BIG:.0f} beside a roster of two "
f"{_SMALL:.0f} W units, unit_sign_disagree_w {_RATE:.0f} -> {_lv}")
check("⚠️ A LEFTOVER FLAT `max_w` NO LONGER DISARMS SAFETY-30's PER-UNIT "
"WATCHDOG SILENTLY. Two 2000 W units beside a `max_w: 5000` left over "
"from a single-inverter install and `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000` used to "
"produce ZERO problems - the site started, the status page said `armed`, "
"and the watchdog could not trip on EITHER unit. It is refused now, "
"against the weakest unit's own cap, and the message names that unit",
_lv == (True, "unit-0", _SMALL))
check("...and the over-refusal in the OTHER direction is gone too: a roster of "
"two 5000 W units with NO flat `max_w` was refused at 3000 W against a "
"2000 W DEFAULT the operator never wrote, for a threshold both units can "
"reach. It starts",
_verdict(_roster_n([_BIG, _BIG],
**dict(_QUIET, unit_sign_disagree_w=_RATE)),
"SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement")
== (False, None, None))
check("...and the flat single-inverter config it always refused is refused "
"IDENTICALLY - `unit_caps()` at a roster of one is `[max_w]`, so this is "
"the same comparison, the same boundary and the same sentence",
why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, unit_sign_disagree_w=2000),
-5000, 5000), "unit_sign_disagree_w")
and validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, unit_sign_disagree_w=1999),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
if fails:
+882 -8
View File
@@ -798,9 +798,18 @@ print(" circulation the allocator NEVER COMMANDED")
from app.inverter import Inverter # noqa: E402
# ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST - it is ~10 days out and SPIKE-04
# measures it. Its rating here is a HYPOTHESIS, named as one, exactly as
# test_peakguard.py's helper names its own.
# ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST - it is ~8 days out (2026-09-04) and
# the bench half of SPIKE-04 measures it.
# ⚠️ SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) ESTABLISHED B'S REAL RATING FROM ITS DATASHEET:
# a GoodWe GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, 4600 W on the battery path
# (goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b). THIS FIXTURE DELIBERATELY DOES NOT USE IT. 3000 W is
# kept because the only property these checks consume is that B's number is
# UNMISTAKABLY not A's, and the real pair is 5000/4600 - a 400 W gap, narrower
# than `slew_w` and inside the range where an off-by-one-unit bug and ordinary
# control arithmetic produce indistinguishable numbers. Collapsing the fixture
# onto the real values would cost these checks their separating power to buy
# realism they do not use. So: ILLUSTRATIVE, NOT B'S RATING, and not a
# placeholder for it either - the placeholder era ended on 2026-09-04.
B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS = 3000.0
@@ -1384,13 +1393,29 @@ def _sign_site(hass, store=None, **over):
return c
async def _drive(c, n=14, dt=0.2, watch=None):
async def _drive(c, n=14, dt=0.2, watch=None, pre=None):
"""Drive `n` real cycles. `watch` samples AFTER each cycle, `pre` BEFORE it.
⚠️ `pre` EXISTS BECAUSE `watch` ALONE CANNOT SEE WHAT A DETECTOR WAS HANDED,
AND SAFETY-39 IS HOW THAT WAS FOUND. `cycle()` evaluates the sign watchdogs
against THE STANDING COMMAND - the write from the PREVIOUS cycle - and then
issues a new one. So `watch`'s `last_write` is the command AFTER the
detector ran, and pairing it with `c.grid` builds a pair the detector never
saw. While `slew_w` was 1000 the loop was at its rail within two cycles and
consecutive commands were IDENTICAL, so the off-by-one was invisible; at a
rail-following slew the loop ramps and the two numbers differ by one step.
That is a fault in this harness, not in the code it grades - and a check
that compares an operator-facing sentence against the wrong cycle is
precisely the "the data could not reach the failure the text names" defect
MUTATION.md keeps finding. `pre` reads the operands the detector will use.
"""
seen = []
for _ in range(n):
await c.read_inputs()
before = {} if pre is None else pre(c)
await c.cycle()
if watch is not None:
seen.append(watch(c))
seen.append({**before, **watch(c)})
await asyncio.sleep(dt)
return seen
@@ -1499,6 +1524,50 @@ check("⚠️ AC 1. THE REVERSED UNIT TRIPS AND ITS SIBLING DOES NOT. The eviden
check("...and the reason names the instrument, so the operator is sent to the "
"right one", AGAINST_OWN_POWER in _b30.sign_wd.reason)
print(f" {_b30.sign_wd.reason!r}")
# ⚠️ THE LAST CYCLE BEFORE B LATCHED, NAMED RATHER THAN INDEXED - part 5's
# lesson and 9a's. After the trip B's share is 0 W and its measured power
# follows it down, so a fixed index reads the REMEDY instead of the evidence.
# Both operands are read off THIS OBSERVED CYCLE - `last_write` and `batt` off
# the objects - and not off the fixture's constants, so the check cannot be
# satisfied by two numbers the fixture happens to hold anyway (habit 2).
_preb30 = [x for x in _s30 if not x["b"]]
_midb30 = _preb30[-1]
print(f" last cycle before B latched: B stood "
f"{_midb30['stood'][1]:+.0f} W, B measured {_midb30['meas'][1]:+.0f} W")
check("⚠️ ...AND THE ORDERED PAIR, on the ONE SIGN-DISAGREEMENT SENTENCE A "
"SHIPPED INSTALL CAN EVER PRINT. Part 9a pins the SITE banner's operand "
"order at main.py:1620; that call site is armed only at N>=2 and part 9c "
"asserts it is ABSENT at a roster of one, so on the shipped install the "
"PER-UNIT banner is the only one there is - and its call site is a "
"different line. Swapping the first two arguments at main.py:1560 - "
"`evaluate(stood, against, ...)` -> `evaluate(against, stood, ...)` - is "
"a ZERO-BYTE edit that changes NO trip decision, because `disagrees()` "
"is symmetric in those two arguments (`commanded_w * against_w < 0` with "
"an abs() gate on both). Nothing behavioural can see it and the full "
"21-file suite stayed green. What it changes is the SENTENCE: 'commanded "
"-1000 W against its own measured power +1000 W', the exact opposite of "
"which instrument read what, on the line somebody woken by this alarm "
"reads first - and it is persisted to `sign_reason` and re-read after a "
"restart. Graded on the CONTIGUOUS LITERAL with each value in its own "
"slot, per MUTATION.md habit 14: an `in` test on a number grades "
"PRESENCE, never ARRANGEMENT",
f"commanded {_midb30['stood'][1]:+.0f} W against its own measured power "
f"{_midb30['meas'][1]:+.0f} W" in _b30.sign_wd.reason)
check("PRECONDITION for the line above, and without it that check is "
"decoration: the two operands are DIFFERENT NUMBERS and OPPOSITE IN "
"SIGN, so transposing them really does produce a different string. A "
"cycle where B's share and B's measured power were equal, or where "
"either was 0 W, would make the swapped sentence identical to the "
"correct one and the assertion could not reach the failure it names",
_midb30["stood"][1] != _midb30["meas"][1]
and _midb30["stood"][1] * _midb30["meas"][1] < 0
and f"{_midb30['stood'][1]:+.0f}" != f"{_midb30['meas'][1]:+.0f}")
check("...and the SAME ordered pair is what an operator finds AFTER A RESTART, "
"because `sign_reason` is the persisted copy of this string. The swap "
"survives the container restart the same way the latch does",
f"commanded {_midb30['stood'][1]:+.0f} W against its own measured power "
f"{_midb30['meas'][1]:+.0f} W"
in str(_c30.store.data.get(unit_key("inverter-b", "sign_reason"), "")))
# ⚠️ READ OFF THE ALLOCATION RECORD, NOT OFF `Controller.reason`. At a roster
# of two `reason` is the SITE resolution's line - "loop -> 2000 W" - because
# B's failsafe is a UNIT claim resolved on B's own actuator and never competes
@@ -1755,11 +1824,27 @@ async def _n1_sign():
return _orig_eval(*a, **kw)
c.site_sign_wd.evaluate = _spy
await _drive(c, n=12, dt=0.2)
return c, _n1_calls
# ⚠️ THE WATCH READS THE CONTROLLER'S OWN STATE, NOT `_spy`'s ARGUMENTS.
# `_n1_calls` records what was HANDED to a detector, so grading the banner
# against it would compare the swap against itself - the DEV-02 defect.
# `last_write` and `c.grid` are read off the objects the plant moved.
# ⚠️ `stood` COMES FROM `pre`, i.e. BEFORE `cycle()` RUNS (SAFETY-39). It is
# the STANDING command the sign watchdog is evaluated against; taking it
# after the cycle would pair this cycle's meter with next cycle's command
# and grade the banner against a pair that never existed. See `_drive`.
# `n` is 24 rather than 12 because at the shipped rail-following `slew_w`
# the loop needs nine cycles to reach a 2000 W rail instead of two.
seen = await _drive(c, n=24, dt=0.2, pre=lambda c: dict(
stood=(c.inverters[0].last_write
if c.inverters[0].last_write is not None
else c.inverters[0].target)),
watch=lambda c: dict(
grid=c.grid,
tripped=c.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped))
return c, _n1_calls, seen
_c1s, _n1_site_calls = asyncio.run(_n1_sign())
_c1s, _n1_site_calls, _seen1s = asyncio.run(_n1_sign())
_inv1 = _c1s.inverters[0]
print(f" roster={_c1s.units} armed against {_inv1.sign_wd.against!r} "
f"at {_inv1.sign_wd.cfg.min_w:.0f} W / {_inv1.sign_wd.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s")
@@ -1777,6 +1862,55 @@ check("...the reason sentence still says 'a meter reading', word for word - it "
"is what an operator reads, what the action log carries and what is "
"persisted, so it is graded on the literal",
"against a meter reading" in _inv1.sign_wd.reason)
# THE CYCLE THE LATCH HAPPENED ON, named rather than indexed: afterwards the
# failsafe stands 0 W and the plant's meter relaxes, so a fixed index reads the
# remedy. Both operands come off the controller, not off the fixture's options.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS THE FIRST *TRIPPED* SAMPLE, AND IT USED TO BE THE LAST UN-TRIPPED ONE
# (SAFETY-39). The detector is evaluated INSIDE `cycle()` against the STANDING
# command - the write from the previous cycle - and against the meter read at
# the top of THIS one, and it latches on the cycle whose pair crosses the hold.
# So the operands the sentence quotes belong to the LATCHING cycle, not to the
# one before it. `stood` is now sampled by `_drive`'s `pre` hook, before
# `cycle()` overwrites it with the failsafe's 0 W, which is what makes that
# cycle readable at all - and it is why the old form had to reach back a cycle.
# The two forms agreed while `slew_w` was 1000 and the loop sat at its rail with
# consecutive commands IDENTICAL; at a rail-following slew the loop ramps and
# they differ by exactly one step, which is how this was found.
_first1s = [x for x in _seen1s if x["tripped"]]
_mid1s = _first1s[0]
print(f" the cycle the latch happened on: stood {_mid1s['stood']:+.0f} W, "
f"meter {_mid1s['grid']:+.0f} W")
print(f" {_inv1.sign_wd.reason!r}")
check("⚠️ ...AND THE ORDERED PAIR ON THE SHIPPING CALL SITE. This is the SAME "
"zero-byte defect part 9a closed at main.py:1620, one call site over at "
"main.py:1560 - and this is the one a one-inverter install actually "
"reaches, since the site detector is never armed here (asserted below). "
"`evaluate(stood, against, ...)` -> `evaluate(against, stood, ...)` "
"changes no trip decision - `disagrees()` is symmetric in those two "
"arguments - and inverts the banner to 'commanded +4000 W against a "
"meter reading -2000 W': the loop is standing at -2000 W of charge INTO "
"a +4000 W import and the latching banner says the opposite. The "
"substring check above passes under the swap, because both numbers are "
"still in the sentence; only the ORDERED PAIR can tell the slots apart "
"(MUTATION.md habit 14)",
f"commanded {_mid1s['stood']:+.0f} W against a meter reading "
f"{_mid1s['grid']:+.0f} W" in _inv1.sign_wd.reason)
check("PRECONDITION: the two operands are DIFFERENT NUMBERS and OPPOSITE IN "
"SIGN on that cycle, so a transposition genuinely produces a different "
"string. Equal or zero operands would make the swapped banner identical "
"and the check above vacuous",
_mid1s["stood"] != _mid1s["grid"]
and _mid1s["stood"] * _mid1s["grid"] < 0
and f"{_mid1s['stood']:+.0f}" != f"{_mid1s['grid']:+.0f}")
check("...and the persisted copy carries the same ordered pair, under BOTH the "
"namespaced key and the flat rollback mirror - which is what an operator "
"reads after the restart the latch is designed to survive",
f"commanded {_mid1s['stood']:+.0f} W against a meter reading "
f"{_mid1s['grid']:+.0f} W" in str(_c1s.store.data.get(REASON_KEY, ""))
and f"commanded {_mid1s['stood']:+.0f} W against a meter reading "
f"{_mid1s['grid']:+.0f} W"
in str(_c1s.store.data.get("sign_reason", "")))
check("...the latch is under the same namespaced key with the same flat "
"rollback mirror, and SAFETY-30's site pair is untouched at its default. "
"A one-inverter install's state file is byte-identical to what it was",
@@ -1809,6 +1943,746 @@ check("...and no `sign_site` claim can be filed at a roster of one, so the "
"arbitration is byte-identical to what shipped",
"sign_site" not in _c1s.reason)
print()
print("8. SAFETY-32 ROUND 4's ENUMERATION: the two `any(...)` reductions over")
print(" the roster whose only evidence is a latched NON-FIRST unit")
# ⚠️ THIS SECTION IS NOT SAFETY-32's SUBJECT, AND IT IS HERE BECAUSE OF IT.
# SAFETY-32 was rejected three times for the same shape one step over: a
# reduction over roster length whose fixture could not separate it from a slice
# of the roster. Round 4 therefore ENUMERATED every such reduction in
# `Controller` - min, max, sum, any, all, sorted, [0], [-1] over
# `self.inverters` / `self.packs` - and mutated each to `[:1]` to find out which
# were GRADED. Two survived a green 19-file suite, both `any(i.sign_wd.tripped
# for i in self.inverters)`, both SAFETY-30's, and this block is what closes
# them. No shipped behaviour changes; the reductions were already right.
#
# main.py `cycle()`, the stale-input hold - +4 bytes, 19/19 GREEN
# main.py `publish()`, the status vocabulary - +4 bytes, 19/19 GREEN
#
# ⚠️ WHY THE SUITE COULD NOT SEE THEM, and it is the same sentence every time:
# the only fixture that reached either was a roster of ONE, where
# `self.inverters[:1]` IS `self.inverters`. Part 3 above builds a two-inverter
# roster in which ONLY inverter B is latched - the exact data both reductions
# needed - and neither of them was read on it. A fixture of N units cannot
# separate reductions that agree on N units, one card over.
#
# ⚠️ AND BOTH ORDERS ARE RUN, for 12g's reason: a single "only B is latched"
# fixture kills `[:1]` and leaves `[-1:]` - grade the roster by its LAST unit -
# answering identically. The pair is what leaves no single-position slice.
async def _latched_then_input_gap(reversed_idx):
"""Latch ONE unit's sign watchdog, then take a SIBLING's reading away.
⚠️ A REAL LATCH FROM A REAL EPISODE, not `sign_wd.tripped = True`: the same
`_SignHass` plant and the same `_drive()` part 3 uses, so the detector
reaches its verdict through the shipped path. Then one pack's SoC goes
missing for LESS than `stale_input_s`, which is the state the hold exists
for - a single missed poll must not become a fault.
THE FAULT THIS GRADES: a LATCHED unit must take the whole roster past that
hold, because the unit's `failsafe` SET is the thing parking it. Return
early and the unit's last share stays standing for the heartbeat to
re-emit - main.py's own comment: "the trip would stop acting the moment a
poll was missed". A reduction that looked at one roster POSITION would do
exactly that whenever the latched unit was not the position it looked at.
"""
hass = _SignHass(load_w=2000.0, reversed_units={reversed_idx})
c = _sign_site(hass)
await _drive(c)
sibling = c.inverters[1 - reversed_idx]
sibling.soc = None
c.inputs_bad_since = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
await c.cycle()
return c
_gap_b = asyncio.run(_latched_then_input_gap(1))
_gap_a = asyncio.run(_latched_then_input_gap(0))
for _tag, _c, _i in (("B latched", _gap_b, 1), ("A latched", _gap_a, 0)):
_pl = [p for p in (_c.allocation.plans if _c.allocation else ())
if p.unit == _c.inverters[_i].name]
print(f" {_tag}, sibling's SoC missing 0 s: inputs_ok="
f"{_c.inputs_ok}, reason={_c.reason!r}, latched unit target="
f"{_c.inverters[_i].target}, why={_pl[0].why if _pl else '(no plan)'}")
check("PRECONDITION (habit 1): on BOTH runs the site really is in the state "
"the hold is for - one pack's reading is missing, `inputs_ok` is False, "
"the gap is younger than `stale_input_s`, and the SITE latch is NOT "
"tripped, so the only thing that can carry the roster past the hold is "
"the per-unit `any()`. And exactly ONE unit is latched on each run, at "
"the OTHER position",
_gap_b.inputs_ok is False and _gap_a.inputs_ok is False
and _gap_b.site_sign_wd.tripped is False
and _gap_a.site_sign_wd.tripped is False
and [i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _gap_b.inverters] == [False, True]
and [i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _gap_a.inverters] == [True, False])
check("⚠️ A LATCHED UNIT TAKES THE ROSTER PAST THE STALE-INPUT HOLD FROM EITHER "
"POSITION. Neither cycle parks on `inputs missing`; both go on to file "
"claims, and the latched unit is commanded 0 W by its OWN `failsafe` "
"claim, named in the allocation record. Grade this with "
"`self.inverters[:1]` and the B-latched run returns early - the +4-byte "
"mutation that was GREEN across all 19 files - and with "
"`self.inverters[-1:]` the A-latched run does. The remedy stops acting "
"the moment a poll is missed, which is main.py's own sentence for it",
not (_gap_b.reason or "").startswith("inputs missing")
and not (_gap_a.reason or "").startswith("inputs missing")
and _gap_b.inverters[1].target == 0.0
and _gap_a.inverters[0].target == 0.0
and all(any(p.unit == c.inverters[i].name and "failsafe" in p.why
for p in (c.allocation.plans if c.allocation else ()))
for c, i in ((_gap_b, 1), (_gap_a, 0))))
# ...and the counterfactual, which is what makes the two lines above a
# DIFFERENCE rather than a description: with NOTHING latched, the very same
# input gap DOES park the site on the hold. Without this the checks above would
# be satisfied by a `cycle()` that never had a hold at all.
async def _gap_no_latch():
c = _sign_site(_SignHass(load_w=2000.0))
await _drive(c, n=2)
c.inverters[0].soc = None
c.inputs_bad_since = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
await c.cycle()
return c
_gap_none = asyncio.run(_gap_no_latch())
print(f" nothing latched, same gap: reason={_gap_none.reason!r}")
check("...and the counterfactual (habit 7): with NO unit latched the SAME gap "
"DOES hold the site - `inputs missing 0s` - so the two runs above show "
"the latch carrying the roster past a hold that is really there, rather "
"than a hold that never fires",
(_gap_none.reason or "").startswith("inputs missing")
and not any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _gap_none.inverters))
# --- and the SECOND survivor: the status vocabulary publish() hands the broker
# ⚠️ THE EXISTING CHECK IS AT A ROSTER OF ONE, which is why this one exists.
# "MQTT's controller-status sensor reports 'failsafe'" above drives a
# single-inverter Controller, where `self.inverters[:1]` is the whole roster.
# A site at 0 W reporting `running` is the failure main.py's comment names, and
# at two inverters it is reachable whenever the latched unit is not the one a
# narrowed reduction happens to read.
_pub = {}
def _published(ctl):
_pub.clear()
ctl.mqtt = type("P", (), {"enabled": True,
"publish": lambda _s, v: _pub.update(v),
"close": lambda _s: None})()
ctl.publish()
return dict(_pub)
_pb, _pa = _published(_gap_b), _published(_gap_a)
_pn = _published(_gap_none)
print(f" published status: B latched -> {_pb.get('status')!r}, "
f"A latched -> {_pa.get('status')!r}, none latched -> "
f"{_pn.get('status')!r}")
check("⚠️ AND `publish()` SAYS `failsafe` WHICHEVER UNIT IS LATCHED. The status "
"sensor is the vocabulary every dashboard already reads, and a site with "
"one inverter parked by its own failsafe claim reporting `running` is "
"the exact failure main.py's comment names. `self.inverters[:1]` "
"publishes `running` on the B-latched site - +4 bytes, GREEN across all "
"19 files - and `self.inverters[-1:]` does it on the A-latched one",
_pb.get("status") == "failsafe" and _pa.get("status") == "failsafe")
check("...and the counterfactual: the same two-inverter site with NOTHING "
"latched publishes `running`, so the two above are a difference the "
"reduction produced and not a constant",
_pn.get("status") == "running" and _gap_none.auto is True)
# --- and the THIRD one the same enumeration found: the OPERATOR'S BANNER -----
# ⚠️ `status_payload()`'s failsafe branch is a fourth `any(... for i in
# self.inverters)`, and `self.inverters[:1]` there was +4 bytes and GREEN across
# all 19 files too - for the third time, because the only fixture that reached
# it was a roster of ONE. The banner is the ONE sentence at the top of the page;
# a site holding an inverter at 0 W under a "Stopped" or "NOT READY" headline
# sends the operator to the wrong question.
_bn_b = _gap_b.status_payload()
_bn_a = _gap_a.status_payload()
_bn_n = _gap_none.status_payload()
print(f" banner: B latched -> {_bn_b['banner']!r}")
print(f" A latched -> {_bn_a['banner']!r}")
print(f" none -> {_bn_n['banner']!r}")
check("⚠️ AND THE BANNER LEADS WITH THE FAILSAFE WHICHEVER UNIT IS LATCHED, at "
"level `bad`, with the N>=2 sentence that names the unit's OWN measured "
"power rather than the meter. `self.inverters[:1]` drops the headline on "
"the B-latched site and `self.inverters[-1:]` on the A-latched one, and "
"the page then leads with whatever the next branch says",
_bn_b["level"] == _bn_a["level"] == "bad"
and _bn_b["banner"] == _bn_a["banner"]
and _bn_b["banner"].startswith("FAILSAFE")
and "its own measured power" in _bn_b["banner"])
check("...and the counterfactual again: the same site with nothing latched "
"carries neither that level nor that sentence, so the banner really is "
"being produced by the reduction under test",
not _bn_n["banner"].startswith("FAILSAFE")
and _bn_n["banner"] != _bn_b["banner"])
print()
print("9. SAFETY-38: `site_standing` - the ONE quantity BOTH site guards are")
print(" asked about - pinned by shares that CANNOT answer for it")
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS SECTION PINS, AND WHY NOTHING ABOVE IT COULD.
# `main.py`'s `site_standing = float(sum(standing.values()))` is the first
# argument of SAFETY-30's site sign detector AND the `commanded_w` handed to
# SAFETY-18's `looks_frozen()`. It was pinned by NOTHING. THREE mutations of it
# were demonstrated live against a full green suite, and ALL THREE ARE COVERED
# HERE:
#
# sum(...) / max(1, len(standing)) the MEAN
# max(standing.values(), key=abs) the LARGEST SHARE
# list(standing.values())[0] the FIRST SHARE
#
# ⚠️ ROUND 1 OF THIS CARD SAID THE THIRD ONE WAS ALREADY CLOSED BY SAFETY-32's
# PACKAGE-WIDE STRUCTURAL PIN AND TOLD FUTURE AUTHORS "DO NOT RE-COVER THAT ONE
# HERE". THAT WAS FALSE, AND HOW IT BECAME FALSE IS THE USEFUL PART. It was
# measured ONCE; that single run happened to hit test_peakguard.py's ~20%
# CI-06 flake, the red was recorded as a mutation KILL, and the claim was then
# written into four places. RE-MEASURED IN ROUND 2, on release/1.0 @ 86eaef2
# carrying ONLY the `[0]` edit (+4 bytes, re-read from disk): the full suite is
# 21/21 GREEN, and test_peakguard.py run FIVE times in isolation on that same
# mutated tree is PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS. The mutation SURVIVES. (The
# reviewer's own independent re-measurement of the same tree caught the flake
# once - PASS PASS PASS FAIL PASS - which is the same verdict: a survivor, plus
# a demonstration of the flake that produced the original error.) A SINGLE RED
# FROM test_peakguard.py PROVES NOTHING - re-run it at least five times and NAME
# the failing check before believing it. That rule is CI-06's, and this card is
# the third measurement it has corrupted.
#
# THE MECHANISM, confirmed by reading 12j's own enumeration rather than by
# argument. SAFETY-32's part 12j taints names BOUND to roster-carrying values
# and lists ACCUMULATED in a loop over one. `standing` is neither: it is a dict
# created empty at main.py:1554 and filled by SUBSCRIPT assignment
# (`standing[inv.name] = stood`) inside the roster loop, and a subscript store
# is not a binding 12j follows. So `standing` never enters its taint set at all,
# and `sum(standing.values())` is not a roster site. Run 12j on a tree carrying
# the `[0]` mutation and it enumerates main.py:1553, 1555 and 1690 - the three
# `self.inverters` sites around this code - and NOT 1599. A structural pin
# cannot see this line. Only the behavioural fixture below can.
#
# Identical shape, different meaning - which is precisely the blind spot
# SAFETY-32 disclosed in its own words ("SEMANTICS. `min` -> `max` -> the mean
# are edits invisible to any shape pin, permanently"). No shape pin will ever
# close them. Only a behavioural fixture can, and this is it.
#
# ⚠️ WHY PART 5 ABOVE CANNOT SEE THEM, AND IT IS THIS REPOSITORY'S RECURRING
# DEFECT INSIDE THE SITE HALF OF THE VERY CARD THAT NAMES IT. `_sign_site` is
# the only N>=2 site fixture in the suite and it runs at
# `site_sign_disagree_w: 320` with shares of about -2500 W EACH - every one of
# them individually far OVER the gate. On values like those the sum, the mean
# and the largest share all clear it, so all three reductions agree, and a
# check whose two candidate answers happen to be EQUAL cannot observe a change
# that swaps them. MUTATION.md habit 4. At a roster of ONE it is worse: there
# `sum == mean == max == the one share` identically, so every mutation is
# EQUIVALENT there - see 9c, where that identity is asserted rather than
# assumed.
#
# ⚠️ SO THE NUMBERS BELOW ARE CHOSEN TO DISCRIMINATE, AND HERE IS THE
# ARITHMETIC THEY ARE CHOSEN FOR. Two simulated units rated 220 W and 280 W
# stand at their own rails, so `standing` is {-220, -280} in roster order:
#
# sum -500 W |500| > 300 OVER the gate -> TRIPS
# mean -250 W |250| < 300 under it -> silent
# max(..., key=abs) -280 W |280| < 300 under it -> silent
# list(...)[0] -220 W |220| < 300 under it -> silent
#
# FOUR DISTINCT MAGNITUDES - 500, 250, 280, 220 - of which exactly ONE clears
# the SHIPPED 300 W gate. The asymmetry is load-bearing twice over: equal
# shares would collapse mean, max and first onto one number and the fixture
# could not tell them apart, and putting the SMALLER unit first is what keeps
# `[0]` distinct from `max(key=abs)`.
#
# ⚠️ THE RATINGS ARE SIMULATED AND ARE NOT ANY REAL INVERTER'S. 220 W and 280 W
# are chosen for the arithmetic in that table and for nothing else. In
# particular they are NOT inverter B, which does not physically exist; B's
# rating is 4600 W FROM ITS DATASHEET (goodwe/NOTES.md 1.1b) and no number in
# this section is a measurement of anything.
#
# ⚠️ THE GATE IS THE SHIPPED ONE AND THE HOLD IS NOT. `site_sign_disagree_w` is
# left at its default so this fixture is graded against the magnitude an
# install actually runs; `site_sign_disagree_s` is shortened from 325 s to 2 s
# because the hold is a wall clock and the campaign behind 325 s is measured on
# the rig, not here. The gate is the coordinate this section is about.
from app import peakguard as _pg38 # noqa: E402
from app.freeze import rail_w as _rail_w38 # noqa: E402
from app.p1 import P1Sample as _P1Sample38 # noqa: E402
import time as _time38 # noqa: E402
_S38_A_W, _S38_B_W = 220.0, 280.0 # SIMULATED. See the note above.
_S38_LOAD_W = 2000.0
_S38_FROZEN_METER_W = 2500.0
def _s38_roster(*ratings):
"""A CFG-04 `inverters:` roster, which is the shape an N>=2 install runs.
⚠️ NOT `_sign_site`'s "build one from the flat keys and append a second".
`Controller.__init__` builds `Tuning` FROM the roster - `max_w=site_max_w` -
so a unit appended afterwards leaves the site loop bounded at ONE unit's
rating. That is harmless where part 3 uses it and fatal here: the whole
fixture is a site command standing at the ROSTER's rail.
"""
return [{"name": name, "setpoint_entity": f"number.sp_{tag}",
"soc_entity": f"sensor.soc_{tag}", "batt_entity": f"sensor.batt_{tag}",
"max_w": w, "bms_soc_floor": 10}
for name, tag, w in zip(("inverter-a", "inverter-b", "inverter-c"),
("a", "b", "c"), ratings)]
class _S38Plant:
"""Units that obey INSTANTLY and a meter that is `load - sum(measured)`.
The same modelling choice part 3 makes and for the same reason: an instant
plant removes the one mechanism that could make an obedient unit look
disobedient, so what remains to be graded is the ATTRIBUTION.
"""
def __init__(self, load_w=_S38_LOAD_W):
self.load_w = float(load_w)
self.writes = []
self.calls = []
self.ctrl = None
async def call(self, domain, service, data):
self.calls.append((domain, service, data))
async def limits(self, entity):
return None
def measured(self):
if self.ctrl is None:
return []
return [float((i.last_write if i.last_write is not None else i.target) or 0.0)
for i in self.ctrl.inverters]
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
m = self.measured()
if entity == "sensor.grid":
return self.load_w - sum(m)
for i, tag in enumerate(("a", "b", "c")):
if entity == f"sensor.soc_{tag}":
return 50.0
if entity == f"sensor.batt_{tag}":
return m[i] if i < len(m) else None
return None
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
self.writes.append((entity, float(value)))
return True
def _s38_ctrl(hass, ratings, store=None, **over):
opts = {"meter_entity": "sensor.grid", "meter_source": "off",
"inverters": _s38_roster(*ratings),
"gain": -0.6,
# The per-unit pair, distinct from the site pair in BOTH
# coordinates, for part 3's reason: an equality below must be able
# to fail on the magnitude alone or on the hold alone.
"unit_sign_disagree_w": 250, "unit_sign_disagree_s": 1,
# ⚠️ `site_sign_disagree_w` DELIBERATELY ABSENT - the shipped 300 W
# default is the gate this whole section is graded against.
"site_sign_disagree_s": 2,
# SAFETY-31 is given a long window so the SITE is not stopped by
# circulation while this section grades the sign attribution. It is
# isolation, not a claim that SAFETY-31 is silent here.
"circulation_hold_s": 3600, "auto_start": True}
opts.update(over)
c = Controller(opts, hass, store if store is not None else _MemStore(),
_P(), stop=asyncio.Event())
for inv in c.inverters:
inv.dev_min, inv.dev_max = -inv.max_w, inv.max_w
c.auto = True
hass.ctrl = c
return c
def _s38_stood(c):
return [inv.last_write if inv.last_write is not None else inv.target
for inv in c.inverters]
print()
print("9a. the SITE sign detector: per-unit shares EACH BELOW the gate whose")
print(" SUM clears it - the case the site detector exists for")
async def _s38_site():
hass = _S38Plant()
c = _s38_ctrl(hass, (_S38_A_W, _S38_B_W))
seen = []
for _ in range(20):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
seen.append(dict(grid=c.grid, stood=_s38_stood(c),
meas=[i.batt for i in c.inverters],
site=c.site_sign_wd.tripped,
units=[i.sign_wd.tripped for i in c.inverters],
following=c.following))
await asyncio.sleep(0.2)
return c, seen
_c38, _s38seen = asyncio.run(_s38_site())
# The last sample BEFORE the trip, named rather than indexed - part 5's lesson.
# After the trip every command is 0 W, so a fixed index reads the REMEDY.
_pre38 = [x for x in _s38seen if not x["site"]]
_mid38 = _pre38[-1]
_GATE38 = _c38.site_sign_wd.cfg.min_w
_share38 = list(_mid38["stood"])
_red38 = {"sum": sum(_share38),
"mean": sum(_share38) / max(1, len(_share38)),
"max(key=abs)": max(_share38, key=abs),
"[0]": _share38[0]}
print(f" last cycle before the trip: stood "
f"{[round(x) for x in _share38]} measured "
f"{[round(x) for x in _mid38['meas']]} meter {_mid38['grid']:+.0f} W")
print(f" site gate {_GATE38:.0f} W (SHIPPED default), hold "
f"{_c38.site_sign_wd.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s")
for _k, _v in _red38.items():
print(f" {_k:>13} = {_v:+7.1f} W "
f"{'OVER' if abs(_v) > _GATE38 else 'under'} the gate")
check("PRECONDITION: the gate really is the SHIPPED 300 W, so this fixture is "
"graded against the magnitude an install runs and not against a number "
"chosen to make it pass",
_GATE38 == float(SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS["site_sign_disagree_w"]) == 300.0)
check("⚠️ PRECONDITION, AND IT IS THE WHOLE OF SAFETY-38. EVERY per-unit share "
"is BELOW the site gate and their SUM is OVER it. `_sign_site` above "
"cannot make this statement - its shares are each individually over the "
"gate, so sum, mean and largest-share all agree there and its values "
"cannot observe a change that swaps them",
len(_share38) >= 2
and all(abs(s) < _GATE38 for s in _share38)
and abs(sum(_share38)) > _GATE38)
check("...and the FOUR candidate reductions give FOUR DISTINCT answers on it, "
"of which exactly ONE clears the gate. That is what makes this fixture "
"able to tell `sum` from the mean, from the largest share and from the "
"first share - and it is the property the existing site fixture lacks",
len({round(v, 6) for v in _red38.values()}) == 4
and [k for k, v in _red38.items() if abs(v) > _GATE38] == ["sum"])
check("PRECONDITION: EVERY inverter is obeying - each unit's measured power "
"agrees in sign with its own share - and the site is charging into an "
"importing house. Without this the trip below could be a per-unit fault "
"in disguise rather than the site fault this grades",
all(s * m > 0 for s, m in zip(_mid38["stood"], _mid38["meas"]))
and sum(_mid38["stood"]) * _mid38["grid"] < 0
and _mid38["following"] is True)
check("⚠️ THE SITE WATCHDOG TRIPS ON THE SUM, and no per-unit watchdog does. "
"Under ALL THREE semantic mutations - `sum -> mean`, "
"`sum -> max(key=abs)` AND `sum -> list(...)[0]` - NOTHING trips, ever: "
"the reviewer's tree was still commanding -500 W of charge into a "
"+2500 W import at t = 595 s with following=True. This is the check all "
"three go red on. `[0]` is here BECAUSE IT IS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE - "
"see the section header for the mis-measurement that said it was",
_c38.site_sign_wd.tripped
and not any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _c38.inverters))
print(f" {_c38.site_sign_wd.reason!r}")
check("⚠️ ...and the sentence an operator reads carries THE SUM IN THE "
"COMMANDED SLOT AND THE METER IN THE METER SLOT - the ORDERED PAIR, not "
"two numbers loose in a sentence. ROUND 1 ASSERTED `f'{sum(...):.0f} W' "
"in reason`, i.e. that '-500 W' appears SOMEWHERE, AND THAT WAS A HOLE "
"ONE LINE WIDE. Swapping the detector's first two arguments - "
"`evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, ...)` -> "
"`evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, ...)`, a ZERO-BYTE edit at "
"main.py:1620 - leaves BOTH numbers in the string and moves each into "
"the other's slot, so the substring test still passed and the whole "
"suite stayed green. The swapped banner reads 'commanded +2500 W "
"against a meter reading -500 W': the site is standing at -500 W of "
"charge INTO a +2500 W import and the latching, site-stopping banner "
"tells the operator the exact opposite, on the one line somebody woken "
"by this alarm reads first. watchdog.py:658-665 calls naming the wrong "
"instrument there 'a false statement about which instrument produced "
"the evidence'. A check whose data cannot reach the failure it names is "
"MUTATION.md's own defect; this is the line that closes it",
f"commanded {sum(_share38):+.0f} W against a meter reading "
f"{_mid38['grid']:+.0f} W" in _c38.site_sign_wd.reason)
check("...and it stops the WHOLE site, through the `sign_site` claim by name "
"rather than by some other guard happening to stop it",
_c38.target == 0.0 and "sign_site" in _c38.reason
and all(i.target == 0.0 for i in _c38.inverters)
and _c38.store.data.get("site_sign_tripped") is True)
# ⚠️ THE COUNTERFACTUAL, and it is what says the check above is produced by the
# SUM crossing the gate rather than by two inverters being present. Same plant,
# same roster shape, same everything - except the units are rated so that the
# sum lands UNDER the gate. Nothing may trip.
_S38_SMALL = (120.0, 130.0) # sum 250 W: under the 300 W gate
async def _s38_under():
hass = _S38Plant()
c = _s38_ctrl(hass, _S38_SMALL)
for _ in range(20):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
await asyncio.sleep(0.2)
return c
_c38u = asyncio.run(_s38_under())
print(f" counterfactual: stood {[round(x) for x in _s38_stood(_c38u)]} "
f"sum {sum(_s38_stood(_c38u)):+.0f} W meter {_c38u.grid:+.0f} W")
check("...and the counterfactual: the SAME inverted-gain site whose shares sum "
"to 250 W - under the gate - does NOT trip, over the same 20 cycles. So "
"the trip above is the sum crossing 300 W and not the mere presence of a "
"second inverter",
abs(sum(_s38_stood(_c38u))) < _GATE38
and not _c38u.site_sign_wd.tripped
and not any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _c38u.inverters))
# ⚠️ AND A SECOND COUNTERFACTUAL, WHICH EXISTS BECAUSE OF A MUTATION THE CHECKS
# ABOVE COULD NOT SEE AND THIS SEARCH WENT LOOKING FOR.
# `site_standing = float(self.target)` - the arbiter's SITE TARGET instead of
# the sum of what actually stands on the wire - is -11 bytes, and it survived
# every check above AND the whole 20-file suite, because in every fixture so
# far the two are the same number. THEY ARE NOT THE SAME NUMBER when a setpoint
# device's own reported range is narrower than its `max_w`: the `device`
# P_SAFETY claim is filed PER ACTUATOR (main.py, `actuator_of("device", inv)`),
# so it bounds each unit's SHARE and never the site target, and
# `clamp_to_rating()` clips again on the way out. Here the site asks for -500 W
# and -250 W stands.
#
# WHICH ONE THE GUARDS MEAN IS ALREADY WRITTEN DOWN, IN BOTH OF THEM: SAFETY-02
# grades "the command standing on the wire", and `looks_frozen()`'s docstring
# says `commanded_w` is "the EMITTED setpoint - what the arbiter resolved and
# `write_setpoint()` put on the wire - not the loop's raw wish". SAFETY-20 is
# the whole card about the difference. This check is those sentences made to
# bite: on the site target the detector fires on a site that is standing at
# -250 W against a +2250 W meter - under its own 300 W gate - which is a
# LATCHING, site-stopping false trip on an install whose inverters simply
# report a narrower range than the operator typed.
_S38_DEV = (120.0, 130.0) # narrower than the 220/280 W ratings
async def _s38_devclamped():
hass = _S38Plant()
c = _s38_ctrl(hass, (_S38_A_W, _S38_B_W))
for inv, d in zip(c.inverters, _S38_DEV):
inv.dev_min, inv.dev_max = -d, d
for _ in range(20):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
await asyncio.sleep(0.2)
return c
_c38d = asyncio.run(_s38_devclamped())
_stood38d = _s38_stood(_c38d)
print(f" device-clamped: site target {_c38d.target:+.0f} W but only "
f"{[round(x) for x in _stood38d]} = {sum(_stood38d):+.0f} W stands, "
f"meter {_c38d.grid:+.0f} W")
check("PRECONDITION: the site TARGET and the EMITTED total are DIFFERENT "
"numbers here, on opposite sides of the gate - -500 W asked, -250 W "
"standing. Without that separation this check and the one above compare "
"two values that happen to be equal, which is the defect this card is "
"the sixth instance of",
abs(_c38d.target) > _GATE38 and abs(sum(_stood38d)) < _GATE38)
check("⚠️ ...and NOTHING TRIPS, because the quantity graded is what STANDS ON "
"THE WIRE and not what the arbiter asked for. `float(self.target)` is "
"-11 bytes, survives the other 20 files, and turns this ordinary "
"narrow-rating install into a latching site-wide false trip",
not _c38d.site_sign_wd.tripped
and not any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _c38d.inverters)
and _c38d.target != 0.0)
print()
print("9b. THE SECOND CONSUMER: the same value is SAFETY-18's `commanded_w`")
print(" inside `looks_frozen()`, and both mutations blind it too")
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE AC THE CARD REFUSES TO LET BE SCOPED OUT SILENTLY.
# `site_standing` is handed to `looks_frozen()` at main.py's `peakguard.decide(
# ..., frozen=...)` call, where it is the EMITTED command graded against the
# site rail. Both surviving mutations shrink it there too, and nothing went red.
#
# THE RAIL ARITHMETIC, and it is the same discrimination as 9a at a different
# threshold: the site rail is `RAIL_FRAC * site_max_w` = 0.95 * 500 = 475 W.
#
# sum 500 W >= 475 RAILED -> BLIND_FROZEN, floor 0 W
# mean 250 W < 475 silent
# max(..., key=abs) 280 W < 475 silent
# list(...)[0] 220 W < 475 silent
#
# ⚠️ THE SIGN IS FLIPPED FROM 9a ON PURPOSE. Here the gain is the SHIPPED
# POSITIVE one and the frozen meter reads IMPORT, so the site discharges +500 W
# against a +2500 W import - the two agree in sign, SAFETY-30 has nothing to
# say, and this section grades SAFETY-18 alone. Reusing 9a's inverted gain
# would have the site sign latch park everything at 0 W and the freeze
# conjunction could then never be true: a check measuring the other guard's
# remedy.
#
# WHAT THE MUTATIONS COST HERE, measured rather than asserted: on the shipped
# tree the guard goes blind and files `floor_w = 0.0` - "the battery may not
# import while the billed quarter cannot be measured". Under both mutations it
# is NOT BLIND AT ALL and files `floor_w = None`, so the site may go on
# charging through a quarter whose billed average is unobservable. That is the
# capacity-tariff hazard SAFETY-18 exists for, silently disarmed.
class _S38Src:
"""The transport's own `unchanged_s`, which only homewizard_local has."""
def __init__(self, unchanged_s):
self.unchanged_s = float(unchanged_s)
def _s38_feed(c, w, ts=None, mono=None):
now = ts if ts is not None else datetime.now(timezone.utc)
c.p1.submit(_P1Sample38(
ingest_ts=now,
ingest_mono=mono if mono is not None else _time38.monotonic(),
telegram_ts=now, source="homewizard_local",
import_w=max(w, 0.0), export_w=max(-w, 0.0), net_w=w,
per_phase_w=(w,), per_phase_import_w=(max(w, 0.0),)))
def _s38_seed_quarter(c, w):
"""Backfill the OPEN quarter with the same stuck value, at 10 s spacing.
⚠️ THIS IS NOT DECORATION. Without it the open block is mostly uncovered and
`blindness()` answers BLIND_COVERAGE - which is still blind, still floor
0 W, and would therefore MASK the mutations: the mutant would reach the
same action by a different route and a check on the action alone could not
see the difference it names. Seeded, the mutant is not blind at ALL, which
is the honest measurement of what the mutation costs. A meter that has been
stuck at the same reading all quarter is also what SAFETY-18 is about.
"""
wall = _time38.time()
q0 = (int(wall) // 900) * 900
mono0 = _time38.monotonic() - (wall - q0)
t = float(q0)
while t < wall:
_s38_feed(c, w, datetime.fromtimestamp(t, timezone.utc), mono0 + (t - q0))
t += 10.0
def _s38_frozen_ctrl(hass, ratings, unchanged_s=600.0, gain=0.05):
# ⚠️ `gain` 0.05 IS THE SCHEMA FLOOR AND IT IS HERE TO BUY A RAMP. At the
# shipped 0.6 the loop is at the rail on cycle 0 and the fixture has no
# BELOW-the-rail cycles to use as its counterfactual. At 0.05 the site
# climbs 125 W a cycle and crosses 475 W part way through the run, so the
# SAME run carries both answers.
c = _s38_ctrl(hass, ratings, meter_source="homewizard_local",
p1_host="meter.local", gain=gain)
c.p1_source = _S38Src(unchanged_s)
return c
# ⚠️ `n` IS 20 AND WAS 8 (SAFETY-39). The comment on `_s38_frozen_ctrl` says
# gain 0.05 is there "to buy a ramp" so that the SAME run carries both a
# below-the-rail and an at-the-rail answer. At the shipped rail-following
# `slew_w` the ramp is now the SLEW - 55 W a cycle against this 500 W site,
# where gain 0.05 alone gave 125 - so eight cycles no longer reach the rail and
# the run carried only the counterfactual. The fixture needs the cycles, not a
# different tuning: the point is a run that crosses the rail part way through.
async def _s38_frozen(ratings, meter_w=_S38_FROZEN_METER_W, n=20):
hass = _S38Plant()
c = _s38_frozen_ctrl(hass, ratings)
_s38_seed_quarter(c, meter_w)
seen = []
for _ in range(n):
_s38_feed(c, meter_w)
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
pg = c.peak_guard
seen.append(dict(stood=_s38_stood(c),
blind=None if pg is None else pg.blind,
floor=None if pg is None else pg.floor_w))
await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
return c, seen
_c38f, _s38f = asyncio.run(_s38_frozen((_S38_A_W, _S38_B_W)))
_RAIL38 = _rail_w38(_c38f.site_max_w,
dev_min=_c38f.site_dev_bound("dev_min"),
dev_max=_c38f.site_dev_bound("dev_max"))
_last38 = _s38f[-1]
_below38 = [x for x in _s38f if abs(sum(x["stood"])) < _RAIL38]
print(f" site rail {_RAIL38:.0f} W of site_max_w {_c38f.site_max_w:.0f} W; "
f"meter stuck at {_S38_FROZEN_METER_W:+.0f} W for "
f"{_c38f.p1_source.unchanged_s:.0f} s (freeze hold "
f"{_c38f.freeze_wd.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s)")
for _x in _s38f:
print(" stood %-16s sum %+7.1f W floor=%s blind=%r"
% ([round(v) for v in _x["stood"]], sum(_x["stood"]),
_x["floor"], _x["blind"]))
check("PRECONDITION: at the rail EVERY per-unit share is BELOW the site rail "
"and their SUM is at or over it - the same discrimination as 9a, at "
"SAFETY-18's threshold instead of SAFETY-30's. `[0]`, the mean and the "
"largest share are 220, 250 and 280 W against a 475 W rail",
len(_last38["stood"]) >= 2
and all(abs(s) < _RAIL38 for s in _last38["stood"])
and abs(sum(_last38["stood"])) >= _RAIL38
and len({round(v, 6) for v in
(sum(_last38["stood"]),
sum(_last38["stood"]) / len(_last38["stood"]),
max(_last38["stood"], key=abs),
_last38["stood"][0])}) == 4)
check("⚠️ THE PEAK GUARD GOES BLIND ON SAFETY-18's CONJUNCTION and forbids "
"charging - floor 0 W - because the SITE's total command is at the rail "
"while the meter has stopped moving. Under `sum -> mean` and "
"`sum -> max(key=abs)` it is not blind at all and files no floor, so the "
"battery may keep importing through an unmeasurable billed quarter. This "
"is the second consumer, and it is covered rather than scoped out",
_last38["blind"] == _pg38.BLIND_FROZEN and _last38["floor"] == 0.0)
check("...and the counterfactual, from the SAME run: on the earlier cycles the "
"site command had not yet reached the rail, and the guard did NOT report "
"SAFETY-18 - with the meter equally frozen the whole time. So the "
"verdict is produced by the COMMAND MAGNITUDE `site_standing` carries, "
"not by `unchanged_s` alone",
len(_below38) >= 2
and all(x["blind"] != _pg38.BLIND_FROZEN for x in _below38))
print()
print("9c. AT ONE INVERTER NOTHING CHANGES, and 'nothing' is asserted")
# ⚠️ THE REASON THIS SUBSECTION EXISTS. At a roster of one `standing` has a
# single entry, so `sum`, the mean, `max(key=abs)` and `[0]` are THE SAME
# NUMBER: all three mutations are genuinely EQUIVALENT there and no fixture at
# N=1 can ever separate them. That is a fact about the arithmetic, and leaving
# it implicit is how "the shipped install is covered" gets believed. It is
# asserted here, on a real one-inverter controller's own standing command, so
# the claim rests on the roster rather than on the reader.
_S38_ONE = (500.0,)
async def _s38_one():
hass = _S38Plant()
c = _s38_frozen_ctrl(hass, _S38_ONE)
_s38_seed_quarter(c, _S38_FROZEN_METER_W)
for _ in range(20): # SAFETY-39: the slew is the ramp now - see _s38_frozen
_s38_feed(c, _S38_FROZEN_METER_W)
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
return c
_c38one = asyncio.run(_s38_one())
_one38 = _s38_stood(_c38one)
_onered38 = (sum(_one38), sum(_one38) / max(1, len(_one38)),
max(_one38, key=abs), _one38[0])
print(f" roster of {len(_c38one.inverters)}: stood "
f"{[round(v) for v in _one38]} -> sum/mean/max/first = "
f"{tuple(round(v, 1) for v in _onered38)}")
check("at a roster of ONE the four reductions are ONE NUMBER - so all three "
"mutations of `site_standing` are EQUIVALENT on a shipped install and no "
"N=1 fixture could ever tell them apart. That is why this card needed a "
"roster of two, stated as an assertion rather than left to the reader",
len(_c38one.inverters) == 1
and len({round(v, 6) for v in _onered38}) == 1)
check("...and the one-inverter site still reaches SAFETY-18's verdict on that "
"same number, unchanged: the command is at the rail, the meter has "
"stopped moving, the guard is blind and forbids charging",
_c38one.peak_guard is not None
and _c38one.peak_guard.blind == _pg38.BLIND_FROZEN
and _c38one.peak_guard.floor_w == 0.0
and abs(sum(_one38)) >= _rail_w38(
_c38one.site_max_w,
dev_min=_c38one.site_dev_bound("dev_min"),
dev_max=_c38one.site_dev_bound("dev_max")))
check("...and the SITE sign detector is still absent at a roster of one - part "
"7 counts the calls; this only records that a fixture built the other "
"way round, from an `inverters:` roster, reaches the same state",
not _c38one.site_sign_wd.tripped
and _c38one.site_sign_wd.disagree_since is None)
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
+339
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""SAFETY-39's evidence, on admin/goodwe's OWN plant model.
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --repro # ⭐ the 2026-09-05 excursion, replayed
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --slew # the derivation: slew against the rail
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --gain # what the slew does NOT own
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --roster # N=1 -> N=2, and the rail that moved
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --all
WHY THIS IS A SCRIPT AND NOT A `test_*.py`
==========================================
Byte for byte tools/alloc_sim.py's reason, and it has not changed: this needs
admin/goodwe checked out beside this repository for `plantsim.Plant`, and the
add-on's CI job has no credentials for that repository - it is private and the
job's token is minted for this one. A `test_*.py` here is globbed and RUN by
.gitea/workflows/checks.yml, so a file that needs the sibling repo would either
fail the gate or - worse - pass SILENTLY having checked nothing.
So the rig evidence lives here and is quoted in the pull request and in
DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md, and test_control.py's SAFETY-39
section grades the same properties in CI against a plant it models itself and
says it models. The two plants are INDEPENDENT - a first-order lag written in
test_control.py versus `plantsim.Plant`'s ramp-plus-lag with an efficiency and
a SoC integrator - and they agree on every sign and rank below, which is worth
more than either alone.
WHAT IS REAL IN HERE
====================
* the control law - `compute()` and `Tuning`, imported out of THIS checkout,
never transcribed.
* the wire - every command goes out through `frame_check.setpoint_atomic()`,
the firmware's own encoder, and back in through `plantsim.parse`/`decode`,
because `Inverter.command()` is what drives the modelled unit.
* the plant - `plantsim.Plant`, the model the rig uses.
MODELLED, and therefore not evidence about the thing modelled:
* the meter. `grid = load - pv - sum(battery)` with no poll delay and no
noise, sampled once per tick. The real P1 is a poll with its own age.
* the tick. 2.0 s, which is what the live install was MEASURED running on
2026-09-05; it is a parameter here (`--tick`) and not a constant, because
the whole of this card is that the derivation depends on the regime.
⚠️ WHAT THIS CANNOT SHOW, SAID BEFORE THE RESULTS RATHER THAN AFTER THEM
=======================================================================
THE -5154 W BATTERY EXCURSION IS NOT REPRODUCIBLE HERE, AND NOT BECAUSE THE
TUNING IS WRONG. `plantsim.Plant.limit()` clamps the plant at `p_max`, so the
modelled battery cannot exceed its rating by one watt at any tuning, on any
step, ever. Neither can test_control.py's model. An acceptance criterion of
"battery power no longer exceeds max_w in simulation" would therefore be
UNFALSIFIABLE - it passes on the broken configuration too - so no criterion in
this card is written on it, and the ticket's own AC to that effect is the one
that had to be rewritten rather than met.
What IS reproducible, and is what everything below measures:
* the setpoint stepping a full `slew_w` per tick, over and over (the live
symptom that escalated 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 large steps per 30 min);
* the loop OVER-ABSORBING - taking more than the site needed - and driving
the meter from EXPORT into IMPORT, i.e. manufacturing the error it chases.
⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is inverter A's numbers
COPIED, `measured=False`. Every N=2 row below is therefore a result about TWO
COPIES OF A on a 10000 W rail, NOT about the ~9600 W site that B's datasheet
and serial imply (goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b; B is a GW5048D-ES rated 4600 W, and
that figure may itself be DC). Each such row prints the caveat with it.
"""
import argparse
import math
import os
import pathlib
import sys
HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
ADDON = HERE.parent.parent # the goodwe-addon checkout root
def find_sim():
"""admin/goodwe's `sim/` directory, or None - and the caller says which.
$GOODWE_SIM first, the same override test_freeze.py and alloc_sim.py take,
then the sibling checkouts that actually occur. A missing sibling is not a
finding about the control law and must never be reported as one.
"""
cands = []
if os.environ.get("GOODWE_SIM"):
cands.append(pathlib.Path(os.environ["GOODWE_SIM"]))
for up in (ADDON.parent, ADDON.parent.parent):
cands += [up / "goodwe" / "sim", up / "goodwe-session" / "goodwe" / "sim"]
for c in cands:
if (c / "plantsim.py").exists():
return c
return None
def load(sim):
sys.path[:0] = [str(sim), str(sim.parent / "master")]
os.environ.setdefault("GOODWE_ADDON_REPO", str(ADDON))
sys.path[:0] = [str(ADDON / "goodwe_controller")]
import plantsim # noqa: E402
from app import control # noqa: E402
return plantsim, control
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# one experiment
def step_run(plantsim, control, *, gain, slew_w, rail_w, n=1, tick_s=2.0,
export_w=3385.0, load_w=350.0, phase=5, cycles=300, dt=0.05,
lag_s=None):
"""One export step onto a converged loop, through the real wire.
`rail_w` is the SITE rail - what `main.py` hands `compute()` as `max_w`
(`Controller.site_max_w`, the roster sum). Each of the `n` modelled units
is rated `rail_w / n` and is commanded its even share, which is the
arrangement ARCH-01's split-invariance says any valid split is equivalent
to at the meter.
"""
over = {} if lag_s is None else dict(lag_s=lag_s)
spec = dict(plantsim.INVERTER_A, rating_w=rail_w / n, **over)
invs = [plantsim.Inverter.from_spec(name, spec) for name in "AB"[:n]]
site = plantsim.Site(invs, load=load_w, pv=0.0)
tuning = control.Tuning(gain=gain, max_w=rail_w, slew_w=slew_w,
target_grid_w=-10.0)
prev, i_w, sat = 0.0, None, 0
worst_import, peak, biggest, last = -1e9, 0.0, 0.0, None
for c in range(cycles):
if c == phase:
site.pv = export_w + load_w
site.grid = site.load - site.pv - site.battery
# ⚠️ ONE UNIT'S POWER, NOT THE SITE'S SUM, at n > 1. The shipped add-on
# binds a single `inverter_power` sensor, so a two-inverter install has
# a loop that sees unit A only. sitesim.run_site() makes the same choice
# and says at length why feeding the sum would be a KINDER rig than the
# deployment.
actual = invs[0].plant.actual
d = control.compute(prev, site.grid, actual, tuning, sat, i_w)
if c >= phase and last is not None:
biggest = max(biggest, abs(d.target_w - last))
last = d.target_w
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
for inv in invs:
inv.command(d.target_w / n)
site.settle(tick_s, dt=dt)
if c >= phase:
worst_import = max(worst_import, site.grid)
peak = max(peak, abs(site.battery))
return dict(imp=worst_import, over=peak - export_w, step=biggest)
def family(plantsim, control, *, exports=None, phases=(5, 6, 7), **kw):
"""The worst case over a family of step sizes and phases.
⚠️ A FAMILY, NOT ONE STEP, AND THAT IS ITSELF A FINDING. A single run of
this loop is not evidence: the 15 W deadband, the 10 W quantisation and the
phase of the step against the tick move the answer by hundreds of watts,
NON-MONOTONICALLY, so two adjacent slews rank either way depending on which
step you happen to run. The first version of this derivation was a single
step and reported gain 0.3 as WORSE than gain 0.6, which the family shows is
backwards. Everything printed below is a worst case over the family, which
is how admin/goodwe grades the same kind of quantity (config.yaml's "1890
closed-loop runs", "924 runs").
"""
exports = exports or range(1000, 4300, 200)
worst = dict(imp=-1e9, over=-1e9, step=0.0, big=0, runs=0)
for export_w in exports:
for phase in phases:
r = step_run(plantsim, control, export_w=float(export_w),
phase=phase, **kw)
worst["runs"] += 1
worst["imp"] = max(worst["imp"], r["imp"])
worst["over"] = max(worst["over"], r["over"])
worst["step"] = max(worst["step"], r["step"])
worst["big"] += r["step"] >= 900.0
return worst
def row(label, w):
print(f" {label:<44} step {w['step']:6.0f} W "
f"{w['big']:3}/{w['runs']} runs >= 900 W "
f"over-absorbed {w['over']:6.0f} W meter to {w['imp']:+7.0f} W")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def repro(ps, ct, tick_s):
print("⭐ THE 2026-09-05 EXCURSION, REPLAYED - gain 0.6, max_w 5000, "
f"slew_w 1000, {tick_s:.0f} s tick")
print(" Live, 11:43:55-11:45:55: grid -3385 W, setpoint 380 -> 5000 in five")
print(" ticks, battery -5154 W, grid +2831 W. One 3385 W export step here:\n")
print(f" {'t':>5} {'grid in':>9} {'setpoint':>9} {'battery':>9} {'grid out':>9} reason")
spec = dict(ps.INVERTER_A)
inv = ps.Inverter.from_spec("A", spec)
site = ps.Site([inv], load=350.0, pv=0.0)
t = ct.Tuning(gain=0.6, max_w=5000.0, slew_w=1000.0, target_grid_w=-10.0)
prev, i_w, sat = 0.0, None, 0
for c in range(34):
if c == 5:
site.pv = 3385.0 + 350.0
site.grid = site.load - site.pv - site.battery
g = site.grid
d = ct.compute(prev, g, inv.plant.actual, t, sat, i_w)
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
inv.command(d.target_w)
site.settle(tick_s, dt=0.05)
print(f" {c * tick_s:5.0f} {g:9.0f} {d.target_w:9.0f} "
f"{site.battery:9.0f} {site.grid:9.0f} {d.reason}")
print("\n ⚠️ THE BATTERY NEVER PASSES 5000 W HERE AND CANNOT: plantsim.Plant")
print(" clamps at its rating. The -5154 W figure is NOT reproducible in")
print(" this model at any tuning, so nothing in this card is graded on it.")
print(" What IS reproduced is the setpoint stepping 1000 W a tick to the")
print(" rail, and the meter crossing from export into import.")
def slew_table(ps, ct, tick_s, rail):
frac = ct.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC
print(f"THE DERIVATION - gain 0.6, site rail {rail:.0f} W, {tick_s:.0f} s tick, "
f"51 export steps 1.0-4.2 kW\n")
print(f" the constraint: the loop must not cross its whole output range "
f"faster than the")
print(f" plant settles. {rail:.0f} W / ({ct.PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s / "
f"{tick_s:.0f} s per tick) = {frac * rail:.0f} W per tick.\n")
for slew in (1000, 800, 700, 600, int(frac * rail), 500, 400, 300, 250):
w = family(ps, ct, gain=0.6, slew_w=float(slew), rail_w=rail,
tick_s=tick_s)
tag = " <- the derived value" if slew == int(frac * rail) else (
" <- the 2026-09-05 live pair" if slew == 1000 else (
" <- the live interim" if slew == 400 else ""))
row(f"slew_w {slew}{tag}", w)
print("\n READ IT THIS WAY. The >= 900 W step - the live symptom, which")
print(" escalated 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 per 30 min that morning - is gone from")
print(" every run below 900 W of slew, and that is what the slew owns.")
print(" The OVER-ABSORPTION does not move, and at the slowest slews it is")
print(" slightly WORSE. The rig cannot pick the derived value out of that")
print(" column, and it is not asked to: the CONSTRAINT picks it, and this")
print(" table is what says what the constraint does and does not buy.")
def gain_table(ps, ct, tick_s, rail):
frac = ct.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC
print(f"WHAT THE SLEW DOES NOT OWN - slew_w at the derived "
f"{frac * rail:.0f} W, gain swept\n")
for gain in (0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1):
w = family(ps, ct, gain=gain, slew_w=frac * rail, rail_w=rail,
tick_s=tick_s)
row(f"gain {gain}" + (" <- shipped" if gain == 0.6 else ""), w)
print("\n `slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT. The integrator accumulates")
print(" `gain * error` per cycle and is bounded only by `integrator_max_w`,")
print(" so at gain 0.6 into a 3.4 kW error it moves ~2000 W per tick and")
print(f" reaches the {rail:.0f} W rail in under three ticks WHATEVER the slew is.")
print(" The over-absorption is therefore a GAIN term. `gain: 0.6` is the")
print(" next constant to re-derive; SAFETY-39 measured it and changed")
print(" nothing, because two control-law constants moving in one release on")
print(" a running house makes the next measurement uninterpretable.")
def roster_table(ps, ct, tick_s):
frac = ct.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC
print("N=1 -> N=2: THE RAIL IS WHAT MOVED\n")
print(" ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST (SPIKE-04, ~2026-09-12) AND")
print(" plantsim.INVERTER_B IS INVERTER A COPIED, measured=False. The")
print(" N=2 rows are therefore about TWO COPIES OF A on a 10000 W rail.")
print(" The site B actually implies is ~9600 W (5000 + 4600), and 4600 is")
print(" B's DATASHEET and SERIAL, not a measurement, and may be DC -")
print(" goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b. Read the rows as architecture, not as a")
print(" prediction about this house.\n")
for n, rail in ((1, 5000.0), (2, 10000.0)):
for slew in (1000.0, frac * rail):
w = family(ps, ct, gain=0.6, slew_w=slew, rail_w=rail, n=n,
tick_s=tick_s)
lab = (f"n={n} rail {rail:.0f} slew {slew:.0f}"
+ (" [B = A COPIED]" if n == 2 else ""))
row(lab, w)
print(f"\n The derived value at the REAL 9600 W site is "
f"{frac * 9600:.0f} W per tick, and")
print(" validate.py reads it off `sum(unit_caps(opts))` - the same number")
print(" `Controller.site_max_w` builds - so adding inverter B moves the")
print(" bound with no operator action and no second derivation.")
print("\n ⚠️ AND THE DIRECTION IS NOT THE ONE THE TICKET ASSUMED. A rail that")
print(" GROWS loosens this bound: slew_w 1000 crosses a 9600 W rail in")
print(" 19.2 s and PASSES, while at 5000 W the same 1000 is the")
print(" configuration that was measured failing. That is what the")
print(" constraint says and it is correct - the bound is on how long the")
print(" crossing TAKES, and a bigger rail at the same step size takes")
print(" longer to cross.")
print("\n ⚠️ AND THE >= 900 W STEP COUNT STAYS AT 48/51 AT THE DERIVED VALUE")
print(" ON THE N=2 ROW, WHICH IS NOT A FAILURE - IT IS THE THRESHOLD GOING")
print(" STALE, on the same day and in the same way as the constant. 900 W")
print(" was a meaningful step against a 5000 W rail; against 10000 W the")
print(" derived step IS 1111 W, and a check written on the absolute 900")
print(" would report the correct tuning as broken. Anything grading this")
print(" symptom at N>=2 has to grade it as a FRACTION of the rail too.")
print("\n WHAT DOES NOT GET WORSE HERE, STATED BECAUSE IT WAS EXPECTED TO.")
print(" Over the SAME family of 1.0-4.2 kW export steps, doubling the rail")
print(" does not worsen the over-absorption (958 -> 810 W): the extra rail")
print(" is headroom these disturbances never ask for. That is a statement")
print(" about this family, not about the site - a bigger site sees bigger")
print(" steps, and the over-absorption is a `gain` term either way, which")
print(" the enforced ratio does not bound and this card did not change.")
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--repro", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--slew", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--gain", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--roster", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--all", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--tick", type=float, default=None,
help="seconds per control cycle (default: control.LOOP_TICK_S)")
ap.add_argument("--rail", type=float, default=5000.0)
a = ap.parse_args()
if not any((a.repro, a.slew, a.gain, a.roster, a.all)):
a.all = True
sim = find_sim()
if sim is None:
sys.exit("slew_sim: admin/goodwe's sim/ is not beside this checkout, so "
"plantsim.Plant is unavailable. Clone it as a sibling or set "
"$GOODWE_SIM. This is a missing repository, NOT a result about "
"the control law - do not report it as one.")
ps, ct = load(sim)
tick = a.tick if a.tick is not None else ct.LOOP_TICK_S
print(f"slew_sim: plant from {sim}")
print(f" control law from {ADDON / 'goodwe_controller' / 'app'}")
print(f" {ps.Inverter.from_spec('A', ps.INVERTER_A).describe()}")
print(f" tick {tick:.1f} s, SLEW_RAIL_FRAC {ct.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC:.4f} "
f"= {ct.LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s / {ct.PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s\n")
if a.repro or a.all:
repro(ps, ct, tick); print()
if a.slew or a.all:
slew_table(ps, ct, tick, a.rail); print()
if a.gain or a.all:
gain_table(ps, ct, tick, a.rail); print()
if a.roster or a.all:
roster_table(ps, ct, tick)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
+260 -12
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,24 @@ DECISIONS/CFG-04-inverter-roster.md:
reconstruction happens to lack FIRST, which is an artefact of the
reconstruction and NOT evidence about `inverters`. B is that evidence.
C. A two-inverter blob validates, per-entry types enforced.
D. An entry missing `name`, `setpoint_entity` or `max_w` is refused BY NAME,
and a JSON string where the list belongs is refused outright.
D. An entry missing `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` or `bms_soc_floor` is
refused BY NAME - one key varied from an ACCEPTED baseline, and the key's
own name asserted in the refusal - and a JSON string where the list belongs
is refused outright.
⚠️ RE-RUN 2026-09-04 FOR SAFETY-32, which made `bms_soc_floor` a REQUIRED
per-entry key. That change broke §C and, worse, left §D printing PASS on a
refusal about the WRONG KEY - the exact decay MUTATION.md habit 8 describes. §C
now carries the key and §D is an isolated counterfactual asserting the key name.
⚠️ RE-RUN AGAIN 2026-09-05, on the same 2026.08.0 image, because SAFETY-32's
rebase onto SPIKE-04a merged two independent edits into §C and §D - the required
`bms_soc_floor` and inverter B's datasheet `max_w: 4600`. A transcript stitched
together by hand from two runs is not a measurement, so this one was measured:
`all cases passed`, exit 0. B's 4600 W is STILL its DATASHEET figure and not a
reading off any unit, and B's `bms_soc_floor: 15` in §C is illustrative - it
differs from A's 10 so that the per-entry number is exercised at all, while
production is expected to have BOTH packs at 10 %.
"""
import sys, json, copy
sys.path.insert(0, "/usr/src/supervisor")
@@ -145,13 +161,47 @@ show("the same blob MERGED with these defaults - what App.options actually is",
f"max_w={out.get('max_w')!r}" if ok else out)
print("\n== C. AC2: a two-inverter blob an operator would POST ==")
# ⚠️ B's 4600 W IS FROM ITS DATASHEET, NOT A PLACEHOLDER AND NOT A MEASUREMENT.
# SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) identified inverter B from the owner's model number and
# serial - a GoodWe GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992` - and the datasheet's
# Max. Charging / Discharging Power is 4600 W. The 3000 W that stood here was a
# hypothesis from before the unit was known and was simply wrong; the 5000 VA AC
# nameplate is wrong for this purpose too, because nothing will be connected to
# B's MPPTs so the battery path is the ceiling. See goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS STILL NOT MEASURED. The datasheet prints 4600 W under BATTERY
# INPUT DATA, so it is probably DC, while `max_w` is graded against 0x0518 - the
# inverter's own AC power. If it is DC the AC ceiling is nearer 4600 x 0.94 =
# 4324 W. NOTES.md §1.1b records both readings without picking one, and
# SAFETY-20's `min(max_w, dev_max)` is what bounds it correctly once dev_max is
# read off the unit. So this blob is what an operator would POST TODAY, not a
# claim about what inverter B will turn out to do.
#
# ⚠️ THE TWO RATINGS ARE STILL DIFFERENT (5000 / 4600) AND MUST STAY DIFFERENT.
# This file's own §B is the record of what an instrument that cannot distinguish
# its two cases is worth. Note that 5000/4600 is a much NARROWER separation than
# the 5000/3000 it replaces - fine here, where nothing computes on the numbers,
# and NOT fine in the test fixtures, which is why those keep a wide illustrative
# pair instead of the real one.
#
# ⚠️ AND `bms_soc_floor` IS A REQUIRED PER-ENTRY KEY SINCE SAFETY-32, so this
# blob is also what proves an operator can still POST a two-inverter config
# after that. THE TWO FLOORS DIFFER ON PURPOSE (10 and 15): equal values would
# not exercise a per-entry number at all, for the same reason the two ratings
# must stay different.
# ⚠️ NEITHER OF B'S NUMBERS IS A MEASUREMENT OF A PACK. Only inverter A's 10 %
# is read off hardware (register 0x0560 on the reference GW5000S-BP). B's 4600 W
# is its DATASHEET figure and B's 15 % is an illustrative value chosen to differ
# - there is no second pack on this site, and in production BOTH packs are
# expected to floor at 10 %, which is why the differing pair lives here and in
# the fixtures rather than in config.yaml's example.
TWO = dict(LIVE, setpoint_entity="", inverters=[
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_a_setpoint_w",
"soc_entity": "sensor.goodwe_a_soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.goodwe_a_battery_power",
"max_w": 5000},
"max_w": 5000, "bms_soc_floor": 10},
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w",
"soc_entity": "sensor.goodwe_b_soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power",
"max_w": 3000}])
"max_w": 4600, "bms_soc_floor": 15}])
ok, out = validate(MERGER.merge(copy.deepcopy(defaults), copy.deepcopy(TWO)))
show("two inverters", ok, json.dumps(out.get("inverters")) if ok else out)
# The validated blob, for anyone who wants to POST it. Optional: the probe's
@@ -162,14 +212,38 @@ except OSError:
pass
print("\n== D. what the schema itself refuses, per entry ==")
for title, entry in (
("no name", {"setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": 3000}),
("no setpoint_entity", {"name": "inverter-b", "max_w": 3000}),
("no max_w", {"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b"}),
("max_w over the range", {"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": 9999})):
ok, out = validate(dict(TWO, inverters=[entry]))
show(f"an entry with {title} is refused", not ok, out)
ok, out = validate(dict(TWO, inverters="[]"))
# ⚠️ ONE KEY VARIED FROM AN ACCEPTED BASELINE, AND THE REFUSAL IS ASSERTED BY
# NAME - §B's two lessons, applied here because SAFETY-32 is what broke this
# section. These entries used to omit several keys at once and assert a bare
# `not ok`; the moment `bms_soc_floor` became required, the "no max_w" case went
# on printing PASS while the refusal it printed said `Missing option
# 'bms_soc_floor'`. A refusal of unknown provenance is not a measurement of
# anything, so the baseline below is COMPLETE and each case deletes exactly one
# key - or, for the range case, moves exactly one value out of range.
D_FULL = {"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": 4600,
"bms_soc_floor": 10}
# MERGED with the shipped defaults, exactly as §C is and as App.options is: the
# raw LIVE blob is missing root keys unrelated to this section (`maintenance_
# start_hour` on the run that caught it), and a baseline refused for one of THOSE
# is the provenance problem §B2 is kept as a warning about.
D_BASE = MERGER.merge(copy.deepcopy(defaults), copy.deepcopy(TWO))
ok, out = validate(dict(D_BASE, inverters=[D_FULL]))
show("the per-entry BASELINE is ACCEPTED, so every refusal below has nowhere "
"else to come from", ok, json.dumps(out.get("inverters")) if ok else out)
for title, entry, expect in (
("no name", {k: v for k, v in D_FULL.items() if k != "name"}, "name"),
("no setpoint_entity",
{k: v for k, v in D_FULL.items() if k != "setpoint_entity"}, "setpoint_entity"),
("no max_w", {k: v for k, v in D_FULL.items() if k != "max_w"}, "max_w"),
("no bms_soc_floor (SAFETY-32)",
{k: v for k, v in D_FULL.items() if k != "bms_soc_floor"}, "bms_soc_floor"),
("max_w over the range", dict(D_FULL, max_w=9999), "at most 5000"),
("bms_soc_floor over the range (SAFETY-32)",
dict(D_FULL, bms_soc_floor=99), "at most 50")):
ok, out = validate(dict(D_BASE, inverters=[entry]))
show(f"an entry with {title} is refused, and the refusal NAMES it",
(not ok) and expect in str(out), out)
ok, out = validate(dict(D_BASE, inverters="[]"))
show("a JSON STRING where the list belongs is refused", not ok, out)
@@ -198,6 +272,180 @@ except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
show("Supervisor's UI renderer survives the shape", False, f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}")
print("\n== F. UX-01: the TRANSLATED Configuration tab, rendered ==")
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS SECTION MEASURES, AND WHY IT IS NOT AN ASSERTION ABOUT A FILE.
# UX-01 adds translations/en.yaml and translations/nl.yaml. Whether they reach
# an operator depends on two pieces of somebody else's software, not on us:
#
# 1. SUPERVISOR decides whether a file is loaded at all.
# `supervisor/store/data.py:_read_app_translations()` globs this directory,
# keys each file by its STEM, and runs it through `SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS`.
# ⚠️ A FILE THAT FAILS THAT SCHEMA IS DROPPED WITH A LOG WARNING AND
# NOTHING ELSE: `except (ConfigurationFileError, vol.Invalid): _LOGGER.
# warning(...); continue`. The add-on then renders raw keys and the only
# trace is one line in the Supervisor log. So the loader is RUN here, out
# of the release image, rather than the schema being re-implemented.
# 2. THE FRONTEND decides what it does with what Supervisor loaded. The
# resolution below is not invented: it is transcribed from the shipped
# bundle in THIS image, `api/panel/frontend_latest/5680.*.js`
# (frontend 20250925.1), which reads
#
# _getTranslationEntry(lang,s,o){let e=this.addon.translations[lang]?.
# configuration; if(e){if(o?.path)for(const t of o.path)
# if(e=e[t]?.fields,!e)return; return e[s.name]}}
# computeLabel =(s,_,o)=>this._getTranslationEntry(this.hass.language,s,o)?.name
# ||this._getTranslationEntry("en",s,o)?.name||s.name
# computeHelper=(s,o) =>this._getTranslationEntry(this.hass.language,s,o)?.description
# ||this._getTranslationEntry("en",s,o)?.description||""
# _filteredSchema=(opts,schema)=>schema.filter(e=>e.name in opts||e.required)
#
# i.e. the fallback is PER KEY, en is the second chance, and the raw key
# name is the third.
from supervisor.apps.validate import SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS # noqa: E402
from supervisor.store.data import _read_app_translations # noqa: E402
TRANSLATIONS = _read_app_translations(Path("/w"))
show("Supervisor's OWN translation loader accepts both files - a file that "
"fails SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS is DROPPED with a log warning and the tab "
"silently goes back to raw keys, so 'it is on disk' is not the question",
set(TRANSLATIONS) == {"en", "nl"}, sorted(TRANSLATIONS))
ui = UiOptions(None)(schema)
print(f" the Configuration tab renders {len(ui)} fields, in `schema:` order "
"(App.schema_ui is UiOptions(...)(data['schema']), so the ORDER IS THE "
"SCHEMA BLOCK'S and not the options block's)")
def _entry(lang, name, path=()):
node = TRANSLATIONS.get(lang, {}).get("configuration")
if not node:
return None
for step in path:
node = (node.get(step) or {}).get("fields")
if not node:
return None
return node.get(name)
def _label(lang, name, path=()):
for lg in (lang, "en"):
e = _entry(lg, name, path)
if e and e.get("name"):
return e["name"], lg
return name, "RAW KEY"
def _helper(lang, name, path=()):
for lg in (lang, "en"):
e = _entry(lg, name, path)
if e and e.get("description"):
return e["description"], lg
return "", "NONE"
# ⚠️ EVERY FIELD, PRINTED. This is the transcript the card asks for: what the
# owner's Supervisor puts on the screen, not a claim that it would look nice.
for lang in ("en", "nl"):
print(f"\n --- as rendered at hass.language == {lang!r} "
f"(the owner's HA runs Europe/Brussels) ---")
for node in ui:
lbl, src = _label(lang, node["name"])
hlp, hsrc = _helper(lang, node["name"])
flag = "" if src == lang else f" [name from {src}]"
print(f" {node['name']:28s} -> {lbl}{flag}")
print(f" {'':28s} {hlp[:150]}{'...' if len(hlp) > 150 else ''}")
for sub in node.get("schema", ()):
slbl, ssrc = _label(lang, sub["name"], (node["name"],))
print(f" · {sub['name']:24s} -> {slbl}"
+ ("" if ssrc == lang else f" [{ssrc}]"))
_raw = [n["name"] for n in ui if _label("en", n["name"])[1] == "RAW KEY"]
show("NOT ONE top-level field falls through to its raw key name in `en` - "
f"which is what the tab rendered for all {len(ui)} of them before this "
f"card, because there was no translations/ directory at all. Raw: {_raw}",
not _raw)
_nohelp = [n["name"] for n in ui if not _helper("en", n["name"])[0]]
show("...and not one is left without a description, which is the half that "
f"says WHETHER TO TOUCH IT. Missing: {_nohelp}", not _nohelp)
_nl_missing = [n["name"] for n in ui if _label("nl", n["name"])[1] != "nl"]
show("...and every one of them is translated in `nl` too, so nothing on the "
f"owner's own screen falls back to English. Falling back: {_nl_missing}",
not _nl_missing)
# ⚠️ THE HONEST HALF, AND IT IS A NEGATIVE RESULT. `inverters` is a
# list-of-objects, so UiOptions gives it type "schema" WITH multiple: True, and
# `_convertSchemaElement` sends exactly that case to a SELECTOR rather than to a
# nested ha-form:
#
# if("schema"===t.type&&!t.multiple) return {...type:"expandable"...} <- not us
# if("schema"===t.type){const o={};for(const a of t.schema)
# o[a.name]={required:a.required,selector:...}; return {object:{multiple:t.multiple,fields:o}}}
#
# and ha-selector-object labels those fields with
#
# computeLabel=e=>{const t=this.selector.object?.translation_key;
# if(this.localizeValue&&t){...}
# return this.selector.object?.fields?.[e.name]?.label||e.name}
#
# `_convertSchemaElementToSelector` sets neither `label` nor `translation_key`,
# so ON THIS FRONTEND the per-entry keys inside the repeatable section render as
# `setpoint_entity`, `max_w`, `bms_soc_floor` - RAW - however well they are
# translated here. The `fields:` block is still shipped and still validated,
# because it is the shape Supervisor's own schema defines for exactly this and
# it is what a frontend that wires `label` through would consume; but this card
# must not claim it reaches the operator today, and the count below is asserted
# so that the day it changes, this transcript says so.
_multi = [n for n in ui if n.get("multiple") and n.get("type") == "schema"]
show("`inverters` is rendered as a REPEATABLE SECTION (type schema, multiple), "
"which is CFG-04's measurement re-confirmed",
[n["name"] for n in _multi] == ["inverters"], json.dumps(_multi)[:200])
show("⚠️ MEASURED AND NEGATIVE: this frontend gives that section's per-entry "
"keys to ha-selector-object, which labels them `fields[name].label || "
"name` - and the converter sets no `label` and no `translation_key`. So "
"the per-entry translations below are SHIPPED AND VALIDATED but do NOT "
"reach the screen on 20250925.1. The top-level `inverters` label and "
"description DO.",
bool(_multi) and all("label" not in s and "translation_key" not in s
for n in _multi for s in n.get("schema", ())),
"per-entry keys as rendered today: "
+ ", ".join(s["name"] for n in _multi for s in n.get("schema", ())))
# ⚠️ AND THE HAND PARSER CI USES IS GRADED AGAINST THIS LOADER, KEY BY KEY.
# test_translations.py runs in the add-on's CI image, which has no PyYAML, so it
# parses these files with tools/translations_lint.py. A hand parser that
# disagrees with the real loader is a check whose data cannot reach the failure
# it names, so the two are compared here - where both are available - rather
# than assumed to agree.
sys.path.insert(0, "/probe")
import translations_lint as _tl # noqa: E402
_mismatch = []
for lang in ("en", "nl"):
hand = _tl.parse_translation_file(f"/w/translations/{lang}.yaml")
real = {"configuration": TRANSLATIONS[lang].get("configuration", {})}
# SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS fills `description: None` for an absent one; the
# hand parser simply has no key. Normalise that ONE difference and nothing
# else, so a real disagreement cannot hide behind the normalisation.
def _norm(d):
return {k: {kk: vv for kk, vv in v.items() if vv is not None
and kk != "fields"}
| ({"fields": _norm(v["fields"])} if v.get("fields") else {})
for k, v in d.items()}
if _norm(hand.get("configuration", {})) != _norm(real["configuration"]):
a, b = _norm(hand.get("configuration", {})), _norm(real["configuration"])
_mismatch += [f"{lang}:{k}" for k in sorted(set(a) | set(b))
if a.get(k) != b.get(k)]
show("the hand parser CI uses (tools/translations_lint.py) returns EXACTLY "
"what Supervisor's own loader returns, for both files, key by key and "
f"string by string. Disagreements: {_mismatch}", not _mismatch)
_cfg_text = Path("/w/config.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
_probs = []
for lang in ("en", "nl"):
_probs += _tl.audit(
_cfg_text,
{"configuration": TRANSLATIONS[lang].get("configuration", {})}, lang)
show(f"...and the coverage audit is clean against the real loader's view too. "
f"Problems: {_probs}", not _probs)
# ⚠️ THE EXIT CODE IS PART OF THE INSTRUMENT. Without it the probe prints FAIL
# and still succeeds, and a transcript is only evidence if a wrong answer is
# distinguishable from a right one by something other than reading it.
@@ -0,0 +1,878 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""SAFETY-38 round 3 - the SYMMETRIC-PREDICATE FAMILY, enumerated by machine.
WHAT IT LOOKS FOR, in one sentence: a call whose argument ORDER is load-bearing
for a MESSAGE and for nothing else - so swapping the arguments cannot change a
single decision, is invisible to every behavioural check BY CONSTRUCTION, and
still inverts what an operator reads on the line they are woken by.
⚠️ WHY IT IS AN INSTRUMENT AND NOT A LIST. MUTATION.md habit 12: "a hand-written
scope is the same defect as a hand-written fixture". SAFETY-38 met this family
twice - `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` called at `main.py:1620` (round 2) and at
`main.py:1560` (round 3), ONE CALL SITE OVER - and both times the enumeration
was written by hand and both times it was short. So the scope is computed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE TEST IT APPLIES
For every function in `app/` and every pair (a, b) of its parameters:
rename a -> b and b -> a throughout the body, ERASE every string literal
and f-string, CANONICALISE the commutative operators, and compare the two
ASTs. If they are EQUAL, nothing the function DECIDES can depend on which
of the two values arrived first.
Then, if some f-string in that function mentions BOTH names, the order is
load-bearing for the MESSAGE ALONE, and the pair is reported.
⚠️ THE SYMMETRY IS USUALLY ONE CALL DEEP, WHICH IS WHY THIS IS A FIXPOINT AND
NOT A SINGLE PASS. `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` does not compare its two arguments
itself; it hands them to `watchdog.disagrees()`, whose body is
`commanded_w * against_w < 0 and abs(commanded_w) > min_w and
abs(against_w) > min_w`. An intraprocedural scan sees `disagrees(a, b, ...)`
become `disagrees(b, a, ...)`, calls that a difference, and reports NOTHING -
which is exactly what the first version of this file did, on a tree where the
answer was already known. So symmetric pairs discovered in one round are used
to canonicalise CALL ARGUMENTS in the next, and the scan iterates until the set
stops growing.
CANONICALISATION, and each entry is here because something in `app/` needs it:
* `a * b`, `a + b` - operand order sorted (`disagrees`)
* `x and y`, `x or y` - term order sorted (`disagrees`' conjunction)
* `a == b`, `a != b` - operand order sorted
* `min(a, b)`, `max(a, b)` - argument order sorted (`clamp_to_rating`)
* a tuple/list/set LITERAL being iterated - element order sorted
(`rail_ceiling_w`'s `for bound in (dev_min, dev_max)`)
* arguments at a KNOWN SYMMETRIC POSITION PAIR of a called function - sorted
(the fixpoint)
Equal ASTs after the rename is a SUFFICIENT condition for behavioural
invariance, not a necessary one. This scan therefore UNDER-REPORTS and says so
- see "WHAT THIS CANNOT SEE". That is the conservative direction: everything it
names is genuinely in the family, and the gap is stated with its shape.
Run: `python3 tools/symmetric_message_scan.py [--quiet]` from goodwe_controller/.
Exit status is 0 always; it is a census, not a gate.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import ast
import itertools
import pathlib
import sys
APP = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "app"
# {function name: {(i, j) positional index pairs that are interchangeable}}
_SYM: dict[str, set[tuple[int, int]]] = {}
# ⚠️ AND THE SAME THING FOR KEYWORD-ONLY PARAMETERS, WHICH THE FIRST FIXPOINT
# DROPPED. `freeze.rail_ceiling_w(max_w, *, dev_min=None, dev_max=None)` folds
# its two device bounds with `for bound in (dev_min, dev_max): ceiling = min(
# ceiling, abs(bound))` - perfectly symmetric - and `rail_unreachable()` prints
# `"a range of {dev_min}...{dev_max} W"`. A scan that only followed POSITIONAL
# arguments called that pair asymmetric and hid a genuine member of the family
# behind an implementation detail of its own traversal.
_SYM_KW: dict[str, set[tuple[str, str]]] = {}
class _Canon(ast.NodeTransformer):
"""Rename one pair, erase every string, and sort what commutes."""
COMMUTATIVE_BINOP = (ast.Mult, ast.Add, ast.BitAnd, ast.BitOr, ast.BitXor)
COMMUTATIVE_CMP = (ast.Eq, ast.NotEq)
COMMUTATIVE_CALL = ("min", "max")
def __init__(self, a: str = "", b: str = ""):
self.a, self.b = a, b
# -- the rename ---------------------------------------------------------
def visit_Name(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
if self.a and node.id == self.a:
node.id = self.b
elif self.b and node.id == self.b:
node.id = self.a
return node
def visit_arg(self, node):
if self.a and node.arg == self.a:
node.arg = self.b
elif self.b and node.arg == self.b:
node.arg = self.a
return node
# -- the message is exactly what is ALLOWED to differ --------------------
def visit_JoinedStr(self, node):
return ast.Constant(value="<msg>")
def visit_Constant(self, node):
if isinstance(node.value, str):
return ast.Constant(value="<msg>")
return node
# -- canonicalisation ---------------------------------------------------
def visit_BinOp(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
if isinstance(node.op, self.COMMUTATIVE_BINOP):
l, r = ast.dump(node.left), ast.dump(node.right)
if l > r:
node.left, node.right = node.right, node.left
return node
def visit_BoolOp(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
node.values = sorted(node.values, key=ast.dump)
return node
def visit_Compare(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
if (len(node.ops) == 1
and isinstance(node.ops[0], self.COMMUTATIVE_CMP)):
l, r = ast.dump(node.left), ast.dump(node.comparators[0])
if l > r:
node.left, node.comparators[0] = node.comparators[0], node.left
return node
def visit_For(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
if isinstance(node.iter, (ast.Tuple, ast.List, ast.Set)):
node.iter.elts = sorted(node.iter.elts, key=ast.dump)
return node
def visit_Call(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
name = (node.func.id if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name)
else node.func.attr if isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute)
else "")
if name in self.COMMUTATIVE_CALL and len(node.args) == 2 \
and not node.keywords:
if ast.dump(node.args[0]) > ast.dump(node.args[1]):
node.args = [node.args[1], node.args[0]]
return node
# the fixpoint: sort the arguments at a known symmetric position pair
for (i, j) in sorted(_SYM.get(name, ())):
if j < len(node.args):
if ast.dump(node.args[i]) > ast.dump(node.args[j]):
node.args[i], node.args[j] = node.args[j], node.args[i]
# ...and at a known symmetric KEYWORD pair
for (ka, kb) in sorted(_SYM_KW.get(name, ())):
ia = next((k for k, w in enumerate(node.keywords)
if w.arg == ka), None)
ib = next((k for k, w in enumerate(node.keywords)
if w.arg == kb), None)
if ia is not None and ib is not None:
va, vb = node.keywords[ia].value, node.keywords[ib].value
if ast.dump(va) > ast.dump(vb):
node.keywords[ia].value, node.keywords[ib].value = vb, va
return node
def _canon(src: str, a: str = "", b: str = "") -> str:
return ast.dump(_Canon(a, b).visit(ast.parse(src)))
# ⚠️ THE SINK IS HALF THE CLAIM, AND THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS SCAN OMITTED IT.
# Erasing every f-string makes a function whose ONLY job is to FORMAT one look
# perfectly symmetric - `store.unit_key(unit, key)` and
# `mqtt.unit_state_key(slug, key)` both came back as "the swap changes nothing"
# when in fact the string IS the return value: swapping there renames a STORE
# KEY and an MQTT TOPIC, which is a behaviour change every ordinary check can
# see, and MAINT-05 is the card about exactly that. The family this file is
# looking for is narrower - the string goes to an OPERATOR and to nobody else -
# so each sentence is classified by where it GOES.
_LOG_SINKS = {"debug", "info", "warning", "warn", "error", "exception",
"critical", "log", "log_event", "notify", "persistent_notify"}
_MSG_ATTRS = {"reason", "message", "msg", "banner", "detail", "note",
"explanation", "why", "text"}
def _sink_of(fn, target, follow=True):
"""RETURN | MESSAGE | OTHER - where this f-string node ends up.
`follow` is the ONE step of data flow below, and it is off on the recursive
call so that two locals that interpolate each other cannot loop forever.
"""
for stmt in ast.walk(fn):
for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(stmt):
pass
# a parent map is cheaper than repeated walks
parent = {}
for node in ast.walk(fn):
for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(node):
parent[id(child)] = node
cur = target
while id(cur) in parent:
up = parent[id(cur)]
if isinstance(up, ast.Return):
return "RETURN"
if isinstance(up, ast.Raise):
return "MESSAGE"
if isinstance(up, (ast.Assign, ast.AnnAssign, ast.AugAssign)):
tgts = (up.targets if isinstance(up, ast.Assign) else [up.target])
for t in tgts:
if isinstance(t, ast.Attribute) and t.attr in _MSG_ATTRS:
return "MESSAGE"
if isinstance(t, ast.Name) and t.id in _MSG_ATTRS:
return "MESSAGE"
# ⚠️ ONE STEP OF DATA FLOW, AND IT IS NOT OPTIONAL. `main.py`'s
# status page builds the device-range clause into a LOCAL - `_cap =
# "; ".join(f"... accepts only {inv.dev_min}...{inv.dev_max} W" ...)`
# - and only then concatenates it into the row's `text`. Stopping at
# the assignment scores that OTHER and drops a member this card
# MEASURED as a live survivor (0 bytes, 21/21 green). So: if the
# name assigned here is interpolated into some other sentence in the
# same function that IS a message, this one is a message too.
if follow:
for t in tgts:
if isinstance(t, ast.Name) and _feeds_a_message(fn, t.id,
up):
return "MESSAGE"
return "OTHER"
# ⚠️ ROUND 4. A SENTENCE HANDED TO A CONSTRUCTOR AS `reason=` IS A
# MESSAGE, and scoring only ASSIGNMENTS missed every one of them. This
# codebase builds most of its operator sentences that way -
# `ArbitrageDecision(action=..., reason=f"...")`,
# `out.append({"text": f"..."})` - so the sentence never touches a name
# this walker was watching. arbitrage.py's two DISCHARGE/CHARGE reasons
# were scored OTHER for exactly this and are genuine members.
if isinstance(up, ast.keyword) and up.arg in _MSG_ATTRS:
return "MESSAGE"
if isinstance(up, ast.Dict):
for k, v in zip(up.keys, up.values):
if (v is cur and isinstance(k, ast.Constant)
and k.value in _MSG_ATTRS):
return "MESSAGE"
if isinstance(up, ast.Call):
name = (up.func.attr if isinstance(up.func, ast.Attribute)
else up.func.id if isinstance(up.func, ast.Name) else "")
if name in _LOG_SINKS:
return "MESSAGE"
if name == "append":
return "MESSAGE"
cur = up
return "OTHER"
def _feeds_a_message(fn, name, origin):
"""Is `name` interpolated into some OTHER sentence that IS a message?"""
for node in ast.walk(fn):
if not isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr) or node is origin:
continue
used = any(isinstance(x, ast.Name) and x.id == name
for v in node.values if isinstance(v, ast.FormattedValue)
for x in ast.walk(v.value))
if used and _sink_of(fn, node, follow=False) == "MESSAGE":
return True
return False
def _fstring_pairs(fn, params):
"""{(a, b): [(lineno, sink), ...]} for every f-string mentioning both."""
out: dict[tuple[str, str], list[tuple[int, str]]] = {}
for node in ast.walk(fn):
if not isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr):
continue
used = set()
for v in node.values:
if isinstance(v, ast.FormattedValue):
for x in ast.walk(v.value):
if isinstance(x, ast.Name) and x.id in params:
used.add(x.id)
if len(used) < 2:
continue
sink = _sink_of(fn, node)
for a, b in itertools.combinations(sorted(used), 2):
out.setdefault((a, b), []).append((node.lineno, sink))
return out
def _functions():
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
for fn in ast.walk(tree):
if isinstance(fn, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)):
yield path, fn
def _positional(fn):
return [a.arg for a in fn.args.posonlyargs + fn.args.args
if a.arg != "self"]
def _all_params(fn):
return _positional(fn) + [a.arg for a in fn.args.kwonlyargs]
def _body_src(fn) -> str:
"""The function's BODY alone.
⚠️ NOT `ast.unparse(fn)`. The signature lists the parameters IN ORDER, so
renaming a pair inside it reorders `arguments.args` and every function in
the repository compares unequal to itself - which is what the first version
of this scan did, silently, and it reported an empty family on a tree whose
answer was already known. The claim being tested is about what the body
DECIDES, and the body is what is compared.
"""
return ast.unparse(ast.Module(body=list(fn.body), type_ignores=[]))
def _symmetric(fn, a, b) -> bool:
src = _body_src(fn)
return _canon(src) == _canon(src, a, b)
def build_fixpoint(max_rounds=6):
"""Fill `_SYM` until it stops growing. Returns the number of rounds."""
for round_no in range(1, max_rounds + 1):
grew = False
for _path, fn in _functions():
pos = _positional(fn)
kws = [a.arg for a in fn.args.kwonlyargs]
if len(pos) + len(kws) < 2:
continue
found = set()
for i, j in itertools.combinations(range(len(pos)), 2):
if _symmetric(fn, pos[i], pos[j]):
found.add((i, j))
found_kw = set()
for ka, kb in itertools.combinations(sorted(kws), 2):
if _symmetric(fn, ka, kb):
found_kw.add((ka, kb))
if found - _SYM.get(fn.name, set()):
_SYM.setdefault(fn.name, set()).update(found)
grew = True
if found_kw - _SYM_KW.get(fn.name, set()):
_SYM_KW.setdefault(fn.name, set()).update(found_kw)
grew = True
if not grew:
return round_no
return max_rounds
def scan():
rows = []
for path, fn in _functions():
params = _all_params(fn)
if len(params) < 2:
continue
kwonly = {a.arg for a in fn.args.kwonlyargs}
for (a, b), hits in sorted(_fstring_pairs(fn, params).items()):
rows.append(dict(
module=path.name, func=fn.name, line=fn.lineno, a=a, b=b,
msg_lines=sorted(set(hits)),
sinks={s for _l, s in hits},
symmetric=_symmetric(fn, a, b),
positional=not (a in kwonly or b in kwonly)))
return rows
# =============================================================================
# CENSUS B - THE SENTENCE THE CALLER BUILDS
# =============================================================================
# ⚠️ CENSUS A ABOVE ONLY SEES A CALLEE FORMATTING ITS OWN PARAMETERS, AND THAT
# WAS GAP 2 OF ITS OWN "WHAT THIS CANNOT SEE" LIST. The other half of the family
# never passes through a function boundary at all: an operator sentence built
# where it is printed, interpolating two values that are INTERCHANGEABLE BY
# SHAPE. `main.py`'s status page says
#
# f"{inv.setpoint_entity or inv.name} accepts only {inv.dev_min}...{inv.dev_max} W"
#
# and transposing those two costs ZERO BYTES, changes nothing any check can
# observe, and tells the operator a range backwards. No predicate is involved,
# so census A's symmetry test has nothing to test.
#
# THE TEST: inside one MESSAGE-sink f-string, take every pair of interpolated
# expressions, blank every attribute NAME and every string CONSTANT, and compare.
# If the blanked forms are EQUAL while the originals DIFFER, the two expressions
# are the same shape with one leaf changed - `inv.dev_min` / `inv.dev_max`,
# `site_dev_bound("dev_min")` / `site_dev_bound("dev_max")` - which is exactly
# the pair a transposition swaps. Same direction as census A: it under-reports
# (two values of the same KIND spelled differently are missed) rather than
# inventing members.
class _Blank(ast.NodeTransformer):
def visit_Attribute(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
node.attr = "<leaf>"
return node
def visit_Constant(self, node):
if isinstance(node.value, str):
return ast.Constant(value="<leaf>")
return node
def _blanked(expr):
return ast.dump(_Blank().visit(ast.parse(ast.unparse(expr))))
def _called_name(func):
return (func.attr if isinstance(func, ast.Attribute)
else func.id if isinstance(func, ast.Name) else "")
def _innermost(tree):
"""{id(node): INNERMOST enclosing function}, or None at module level.
⚠️ NOT `for fn in ast.walk(tree): for node in ast.walk(fn)`, which is what
the first version of census B did. That visits every sentence once per
ENCLOSING def, so a sentence inside a nested function was classified twice -
once against the inner scope and once against the outer - and the two
classifications are not obliged to agree. The rows were de-duplicated
afterwards, which hid the double visit rather than removing it.
"""
m = {}
def rec(node, fn):
for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(node):
f = (child if isinstance(child, (ast.FunctionDef,
ast.AsyncFunctionDef)) else fn)
m[id(child)] = f
rec(child, f)
rec(tree, None)
return m
def _spec(fv):
"""The FORMAT SPEC of one interpolation, as text; '' when there is none.
⚠️ IT IS PRINTED BESIDE EVERY PAIR BECAUSE IT IS THE ONE CHEAP TYPE SIGNAL
THIS SCAN HAS, and gap 4 of the second list below is exactly about the pairs
that do not share
one. `{self.requested_w:+.0f}` beside `{self.applied_w:+.0f}` is two floats
rendered identically - a transposition there is silent and reads as a fact.
`{self.limit_w:.0f}` beside `{self.bound}` is a float beside a string: a
transposition there prints `rating max_w W`, which is visibly broken rather
than quietly wrong. Same row in this census, very different hazard, and the
reader cannot tell them apart without this column.
"""
if fv.format_spec is None:
return ""
return "".join(str(v.value) if isinstance(v, ast.Constant) else "{...}"
for v in fv.format_spec.values)
def _same_shape_pairs(node):
"""Pairs of interpolations in ONE f-string that are exactly one leaf apart."""
fvs = [v for v in node.values if isinstance(v, ast.FormattedValue)]
for x, y in itertools.combinations(fvs, 2):
ua, ub = ast.unparse(x.value), ast.unparse(y.value)
if ua == ub:
continue
if _blanked(x.value) != _blanked(y.value):
continue
yield ua, ub, _spec(x), _spec(y)
def _sentences():
"""(path, innermost fn, JoinedStr, sink) for every f-string in app/."""
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
inner = _innermost(tree)
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr):
continue
fn = inner.get(id(node))
if fn is None:
continue
yield path, fn, node, _sink_of(fn, node)
def scan_caller():
rows = []
for path, fn, node, sink in _sentences():
# ⚠️ MESSAGE SINKS ONLY, AND THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS CENSUS SAID
# "anything but a RETURN". That let in `p1.py`'s
# `self.url = f"http://{self.host}:{self.port}…"` - an f-string that is
# DATA, used to make a request, where a transposition is an ordinary
# behavioural change every check can see. A formatted string is only in
# this family when its only consumer is a person. RETURN is not OTHER
# though, and treating it as if it were is what census C below fixes.
if sink != "MESSAGE":
continue
for ua, ub, sa, sb in _same_shape_pairs(node):
rows.append((path.name, node.lineno, fn.name, ua, ub, sa, sb))
return sorted(set(rows), key=lambda r: (r[0], r[1], r[3]))
# =============================================================================
# CENSUS C - THE SENTENCE THE OBJECT RETURNS ABOUT ITSELF
# =============================================================================
# ⚠️ SAFETY-38 ROUND 4. CENSUS A AND CENSUS B BETWEEN THEM COVERED ONE
# SYNTACTIC SINK AND CALLED IT THE FAMILY. Every member either census reported
# was a sentence APPENDED, ASSIGNED to a `reason`-shaped attribute, or passed as
# a LOG ARGUMENT. Not one was a sentence that is RETURNED. Census A had a RETURN
# bucket, but only for a callee formatting its own PARAMETERS - so a method
# formatting its own ATTRIBUTES and handing the string back was invisible to
# both, and `describe()` / `explain()` / the reason-builders are precisely where
# this codebase keeps its operator sentences. Two live members were sitting in
# that hole:
#
# clamp.py ClampResult.describe() requested_w <-> applied_w
# peakguard.py PeakDecision.explain() projected_w <-> ceiling_w
#
# Worse than the gap: it was in NONE of the five blind spots this file prints
# about itself. A tool that asserts a completeness it does not have is the
# recurring defect in a new hat, and the list at the bottom now names its sinks.
#
# THE TEST is census B's - one f-string, two interpolations one leaf apart - run
# over the RETURN sink, plus one thing census B never needed: A RETURNED STRING
# IS NOT YET A MESSAGE. `store.unit_key()` and `mqtt.unit_state_key()` return
# f-strings too, and swapping there renames a store key and an MQTT topic, which
# every ordinary check can see (MAINT-05 is the card about that). So the sink of
# a returned sentence is RESOLVED THROUGH ITS CALL SITES: the string is in this
# family only when some caller in `app/` feeds it to an operator.
def _return_consumers(func_name, depth=0, seen=frozenset()):
"""[(site, sink, verdict)] - where the STRING RETURNED BY `func_name` goes.
One hop is not enough: `Resolution.explain()` is returned again by wrappers
that are themselves logged, so a call site whose own sink is RETURN is
resolved by recursing on the ENCLOSING function's name, bounded by `depth`
and by `seen` so mutual recursion cannot loop.
⚠️ THE MATCH IS ON THE BARE METHOD NAME, exactly as `call_sites()` above,
and `explain` is the name of at least four unrelated methods in this tree
(`PeakDecision`, `UnitPlan`, `Resolution`, the maintenance migration
report). So this OVER-collects sites, which pushes a verdict towards
MESSAGE. That is the deliberate direction for a census whose measured
failure has twice been under-reporting - but it means the verdict is a
PROMPT TO READ THE SITES PRINTED BESIDE IT, not a proof.
"""
if func_name in seen or depth > 2:
return []
seen = seen | {func_name}
out = []
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
inner = _innermost(tree)
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
if _called_name(node.func) != func_name:
continue
fn = inner.get(id(node))
if fn is None:
continue
sink = _sink_of(fn, node)
label = f"{path.name}:{node.lineno} `{ast.unparse(node.func)}`"
if sink == "RETURN":
sub = _return_consumers(fn.name, depth + 1, seen)
if any(v == "MESSAGE" for _l, _s, v in sub):
verdict = "MESSAGE"
elif not sub:
verdict = "UNRESOLVED"
else:
verdict = "OTHER"
sink = f"RETURN by {fn.name}() -> {verdict}"
else:
verdict = sink
out.append((label, sink, verdict))
return sorted(set(out))
def scan_returned():
"""Census C rows: a returned sentence, two interpolations one leaf apart."""
rows = []
for path, fn, node, sink in _sentences():
if sink != "RETURN":
continue
pairs = list(_same_shape_pairs(node))
if not pairs:
continue
sites = _return_consumers(fn.name)
if any(v == "MESSAGE" for _l, _s, v in sites):
verdict = "MESSAGE"
elif not sites:
verdict = "UNRESOLVED - no call site inside app/"
else:
verdict = "OTHER"
for ua, ub, sa, sb in pairs:
rows.append(dict(module=path.name, line=node.lineno, func=fn.name,
a=ua, b=ub, spec_a=sa, spec_b=sb,
verdict=verdict, sites=sites))
return sorted(rows, key=lambda r: (r["module"], r["line"], r["a"]))
# ⚠️ THE UNIT OF COVERAGE IS THE CALL SITE, NOT THE FUNCTION - which is the
# whole lesson of SAFETY-38 round 3. `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` had its operand
# order pinned and the defect still shipped, because the pin was on the call two
# lines below the one a one-inverter roster actually reaches. So a family member
# is reported WITH EVERY PLACE IT IS CALLED.
def call_sites(name):
out = []
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
if _called_name(node.func) != name:
continue
# ⚠️ THE RECEIVER IS PRINTED, because matching on the bare
# attribute name conflates methods: `evaluate` is the name of
# SAFETY-02's, SAFETY-18's and SAFETY-31's watchdogs alike, and
# a list of four lines with no receiver tells a reader nothing
# about which detector they are looking at. `inv.sign_wd` and
# `self.freeze_wd` are the disambiguation, and they are the
# caller's own words.
out.append(f"{path.name}:{node.lineno} `{ast.unparse(node.func)}`")
return out
def lazy_log_sites():
"""Log calls with a %-format template and >=2 substitution ARGUMENTS.
⚠️ THE SIZE OF THE LARGEST HOLE, MEASURED RATHER THAN ASSERTED. The
NOT-SCANNED list below used to end "and app/ uses that form", which is a
claim about the tree with no number on it - the exact shape this card has
spent four rounds arguing against. `_LOG.error("%s ... %s", a, b)` puts both
operands in ARGUMENTS, so no f-string census here can ever reach them, and
transposing the two costs the same zero bytes. This counts them.
"""
out = []
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
if _called_name(node.func) not in _LOG_SINKS or len(node.args) < 3:
continue
head = node.args[0]
tmpl = ""
if isinstance(head, ast.Constant) and isinstance(head.value, str):
tmpl = head.value
elif isinstance(head, ast.BinOp) or isinstance(head, ast.JoinedStr):
tmpl = ast.unparse(head)
if tmpl.count("%") >= 2:
out.append((path.name, node.lineno,
f"{path.name}:{node.lineno} "
f"`{ast.unparse(node.func)}` with "
f"{len(node.args) - 1} args"))
return [r[2] for r in sorted(out)]
def _pair_line(sa, sb):
same = sa == sb
return (f" format spec: '{sa}' / '{sb}' -> "
+ ("SAME - two values rendered alike, so a transposition is "
"SILENT and reads as a fact"
if same else
"DIFFERENT - likely mixed types, so a transposition is more "
"likely to look broken than to lie (gap 4 below)"))
def main():
quiet = "--quiet" in sys.argv
rounds = build_fixpoint()
rows = scan()
fam = [r for r in rows if r["symmetric"] and "MESSAGE" in r["sinks"]
and "RETURN" not in r["sinks"]]
valued = [r for r in rows if r["symmetric"] and "RETURN" in r["sinks"]]
print("SYMMETRIC-PREDICATE FAMILY - argument order load-bearing for a "
"MESSAGE only")
print("=" * 78)
print(f"fixpoint reached after {rounds} round(s); "
f"{sum(len(v) for v in _SYM.values())} interchangeable positional "
f"and {sum(len(v) for v in _SYM_KW.values())} keyword pair(s) "
f"across {len(set(_SYM) | set(_SYM_KW))} function(s) in app/")
print(f"functions formatting >=2 of their own parameters into one "
f"sentence: {len(rows)} pair(s)")
print(f"of those, pairs whose SWAP LEAVES EVERY DECISION IDENTICAL: "
f"{len(fam) + len(valued)}")
print(f" ...of which the sentence is RETURNED (so the swap is a VALUE "
f"change an ordinary check can see): {len(valued)}")
print(f" ...and the sentence goes ONLY TO AN OPERATOR - THE FAMILY: "
f"{len(fam)}")
print()
print("THE FAMILY - a swap here is invisible to every behavioural check "
"BY CONSTRUCTION:")
for r in sorted(fam, key=lambda r: (r["module"], r["line"])):
kind = ("POSITIONAL - a transposition at a call site costs ZERO BYTES"
if r["positional"] else
"KEYWORD-ONLY at the definition - a transposition has to be "
"written out by name, which is not free and not silent")
print(f" {r['module']}:{r['line']} {r['func']}() pair "
f"({r['a']}, {r['b']})")
print(f" sentence at line(s): "
f"{', '.join(f'{l} -> {s}' for l, s in r['msg_lines'])}")
print(f" {kind}")
sites = call_sites(r["func"])
print(f" CALL SITES ({len(sites)}) - each one is a separate pin, "
f"and the receiver says which detector it is:")
for site in sites or ["(none inside app/)"]:
print(f" {site}")
print()
print("SYMMETRIC, BUT THE SENTENCE IS THE RETURN VALUE - READ THIS BUCKET "
"BY HAND.")
print("A returned string is sometimes a KEY (a swap renames a store key or "
"an MQTT topic,")
print("which is behaviour every ordinary check can see - MAINT-05 is the "
"card about it)")
print("and sometimes a SENTENCE (a swap is message-only after all, and it "
"IS this family):")
for r in sorted(valued, key=lambda r: (r["module"], r["line"])):
print(f" {r['module']}:{r['line']} {r['func']}() pair "
f"({r['a']}, {r['b']})")
print()
print("=" * 78)
print("CENSUS B - SENTENCES THE CALLER BUILDS, interpolating two values of "
"the SAME SHAPE")
print("A transposition inside one of these is ZERO BYTES and no predicate "
"is involved at")
print("all, so nothing behavioural can ever see it. Same rule: assert the "
"ORDERED PAIR.")
cb = scan_caller()
print(f"candidates: {len(cb)}")
for mod, line, fn, ua, ub, sa, sb in cb:
print(f" {mod}:{line} in {fn}()")
print(f" {ua} <-> {ub}")
print(_pair_line(sa, sb))
print()
print("=" * 78)
print("CENSUS C - SENTENCES AN OBJECT RETURNS ABOUT ITSELF (SAFETY-38 "
"round 4)")
print("A method formatting its OWN ATTRIBUTES and RETURNING the string was "
"in neither")
print("census above: census A only reads a callee's PARAMETERS, census B "
"only scored a")
print("MESSAGE sink. The verdict below is resolved through the CALL SITES "
"of the")
print("returning method - a returned string is only in this family once "
"some caller")
print("hands it to an operator (contrast store.unit_key(), whose return "
"value is a KEY).")
cc = scan_returned()
fam_c = [r for r in cc if r["verdict"] == "MESSAGE"]
hot = [r for r in fam_c if r["spec_a"] == r["spec_b"]]
print(f"returned sentences with a same-shape pair: {len(cc)} pair(s); "
f"{len(fam_c)} reach an operator;")
print(f"of those, {len(hot)} ALSO share a format spec - two values "
f"rendered alike, which is")
print("the hazard gap 4 below names: a transposition there is silent and "
"reads as a fact.")
print()
print("*** = reaches an operator AND shares a format spec - THE ACTIONABLE "
"SUBSET")
print(" ! = reaches an operator, specs differ (a swap is likelier to look "
"broken)")
print(" = does not reach an operator, or could not be resolved")
# grouped by the sentence, so the CONSUMERS list is printed once per
# method rather than once per pair - the ungrouped form was 20 identical
# lines under each of six pairs and nobody reads that.
for key in sorted({(r["module"], r["line"], r["func"]) for r in cc}):
mod, line, fname = key
group = [r for r in cc if (r["module"], r["line"], r["func"]) == key]
v = group[0]["verdict"]
print(f" {mod}:{line} {fname}() verdict: {v}")
for r in group:
mark = ("***" if r["verdict"] == "MESSAGE"
and r["spec_a"] == r["spec_b"]
else " ! " if r["verdict"] == "MESSAGE" else " ")
print(f" {mark} {r['a']} <-> {r['b']}")
print(f" {_pair_line(r['spec_a'], r['spec_b']).strip()}")
if not quiet:
sites = group[0]["sites"]
print(f" CONSUMERS ({len(sites)}) - bare-name match, so read "
f"the receiver:")
for label, sink, _v in sites or [("(none inside app/)", "", "")]:
print(f" {label} -> {sink}")
print()
print("=" * 78)
print("WHAT THIS SCANS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT - stated because round 4's "
"blocker was")
print("a completeness this file ASSERTED and did not have. The sink "
"classifier is a")
print("syntactic walk up the parent chain plus ONE step of local data "
"flow, and it")
print("recognises exactly these sinks and no others:")
print(f" SCANNED as a MESSAGE : a call to {sorted(_LOG_SINKS)}")
print(" ...or to `append`; a `raise`; an "
"assignment to an")
print(f" attribute or local named {sorted(_MSG_ATTRS)}")
print(" ...or to a local that is then interpolated "
"into one of")
print(" those (the one data-flow step).")
print(" SCANNED as a RETURN : census C - resolved through the returning "
"method's")
print(" call sites, one hop plus two of recursion.")
print(" NOT SCANNED AT ALL, and each of these can hold a member:")
lazy = lazy_log_sites()
print(" * `%s`-style lazy logging - `_LOG.error('%s ... %s', a, b)`. The "
"arguments")
print(" are not an f-string, so no census here looks at them, and a "
"transposition")
print(" of two `%s` arguments is the same zero-byte edit. THIS IS THE "
"LARGEST")
print(f" REMAINING HOLE, and it is MEASURED, not asserted: "
f"{len(lazy)} such call(s)")
print(f" in app/, across "
f"{len({s.split(':')[0] for s in lazy})} module(s). None of them is "
f"scanned by anything")
print(" above. Listed here so the size of the hole is a number:")
for site in lazy or ["(none)"]:
print(f" {site}")
print(" * `.format()`, `%`-formatting, and sentences built by `+` or "
"`.join()` out of")
print(" non-f-string pieces.")
print(" * A sentence that leaves the function inside a DICT, LIST or "
"dataclass and is")
print(" rendered somewhere else - the one data-flow step is local and "
"follows only")
print(" a bare Name.")
print(" * `yield`ed sentences, and sentences stored on an object by any "
"attribute")
print(f" name outside {sorted(_MSG_ATTRS)}.")
print(" * Anything outside `app/`: `sim/`, `tools/`, `web.py`'s "
"templates, the")
print(" translations JSON, the firmware, the witness.")
print()
print("WHAT IT CAN SEE BUT GETS WRONG - the shape of each gap, named "
"rather than")
print("rounded off:")
print(" 1. SEMANTIC symmetry no canonicaliser above spells. The list of "
"commutative")
print(" forms is finite and hand-written; a function symmetric only "
"through a form")
print(" not on it is REJECTED and never appears. This under-reports.")
print(" 2. In CENSUS B and C, two interpolated values of the same KIND "
"that are not the")
print(" same SHAPE - `a.lo` beside `hi`, or one of them behind a local "
"variable.")
print(" Only one-leaf-apart expressions are paired.")
print(" 3. WHETHER each call site is pinned. The sites are listed above; "
"whether a")
print(" check asserts the ORDERED PAIR at each one is a fact about "
"`test_*.py` and is")
print(" recorded in DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md section "
"7. Call sites")
print(" outside `app/` are not listed either, and every site list here "
"matches on the")
print(" bare METHOD NAME - three watchdogs are all called `evaluate` "
"and at least")
print(" four unrelated classes have an `explain()` - so the receiver is "
"printed")
print(" beside each one and a reader has to pick.")
print(" 4. ⚠️ IT CAN ALSO OVER-REPORT, IN ONE EXACT WAY. The sentence is "
"ERASED before")
print(" census A's comparison, so a swap that would make the FORMATTING "
"ITSELF fail")
print(" - a `DAY_NAMES[start]` where `start` is 1320 - is scored as "
"'changes no")
print(" decision'. `_raise_gap`'s (start, weekday) pairs are that. The "
"hazard is a")
print(" SAME-TYPED pair, which is why every census B and C row now "
"prints whether")
print(" the two format specs match.")
print(" 5. CENSUS C's verdict is a bare-name resolution (gap 3) and "
"therefore reads")
print(" MESSAGE too readily. Every verdict is printed with the sites "
"that produced")
print(" it; a MESSAGE verdict is a prompt to read them, not a proof.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
"""UX-01: read config.yaml's option surface and the translations, and compare.
⚠️ WHY THIS IS A MODULE AND NOT A FUNCTION INSIDE THE CHECK. Two very different
programs have to agree about what is in `translations/*.yaml`:
* `test_translations.py`, which runs in the add-on's own CI image - Alpine,
python3 + py3-aiohttp + py3-paho-mqtt and NOTHING ELSE. There is no PyYAML
there and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check, so the parser
below is written by hand;
* `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py`, which runs inside the real Home Assistant
Supervisor image and loads the same files with the loader Home Assistant
ACTUALLY uses (`supervisor.utils.yaml.read_json_or_yaml_file`, validated by
`SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS`).
A hand parser that quietly disagrees with the real loader is precisely the
defect this repository keeps finding - a check whose data cannot reach the
failure it names. So the probe imports THIS module and asserts, key by key and
string by string, that `parse_translation_file()` and the real loader return the
same thing. That equality is the licence for CI to use the hand parser at all.
The parser is DELIBERATELY STRICT. It accepts exactly the shape UX-01 generates
- two-space indentation, one `key:` mapping opener or one `key: "double quoted
scalar"` per line, `#` comments, blank lines - and RAISES on anything else. A
permissive parser would answer "no problems" for a file it had silently skipped
half of, which is the same failure wearing a passing grade.
"""
import io
import re
__all__ = ["parse_translation_file", "parse_translation_text", "config_surface",
"audit"]
class TranslationSyntaxError(ValueError):
"""The file is not in the subset this parser accepts. Never silently skip."""
_LINE = re.compile(r"^(?P<indent> *)(?P<name>[A-Za-z0-9_.:/-]+):(?P<rest>.*)$")
def _unescape(raw, lineno):
"""The body of a YAML double-quoted scalar -> its value."""
out, i = [], 0
while i < len(raw):
ch = raw[i]
if ch == "\\":
if i + 1 >= len(raw):
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"line {lineno}: trailing backslash")
nxt = raw[i + 1]
if nxt not in ('"', "\\"):
# Deliberately narrow: UX-01's generator emits only these two.
# Anything else is a shape this parser has not been measured on.
raise TranslationSyntaxError(
f"line {lineno}: unsupported escape \\{nxt}")
out.append(nxt)
i += 2
continue
if ch == '"':
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"line {lineno}: unescaped quote")
out.append(ch)
i += 1
return "".join(out)
def parse_translation_text(text, where="<text>"):
"""A nested dict from the strict two-space YAML subset UX-01 writes.
Raises TranslationSyntaxError on ANY line it does not fully understand.
"""
root = {}
stack = [(-2, root)] # (indent, mapping)
for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
if not line.strip() or line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
continue
if line.rstrip() != line:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: trailing whitespace")
m = _LINE.match(line)
if not m:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: not `key:` -> {line!r}")
indent, name, rest = len(m.group("indent")), m.group("name"), m.group("rest")
if indent % 2:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(
f"{where} line {lineno}: indent {indent} is not a multiple of 2")
while stack and indent <= stack[-1][0]:
stack.pop()
if not stack:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: dedented past the root")
parent_indent, parent = stack[-1]
if indent != parent_indent + 2:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(
f"{where} line {lineno}: indent {indent} does not open under "
f"indent {parent_indent}")
if name in parent:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: duplicate key {name!r}")
if rest == "":
child = {}
parent[name] = child
stack.append((indent, child))
continue
if not rest.startswith(" "):
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: no space after the colon")
value = rest[1:]
if len(value) < 2 or value[0] != '"' or value[-1] != '"':
raise TranslationSyntaxError(
f"{where} line {lineno}: scalars must be double quoted -> {value!r}")
parent[name] = _unescape(value[1:-1], lineno)
return root
def parse_translation_file(path):
return parse_translation_text(io.open(path, encoding="utf-8").read(), str(path))
# --- config.yaml's option surface --------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ THE SCHEMA HALF, NOT THE OPTIONS HALF, AND THAT IS A MEASUREMENT RATHER
# THAN A PREFERENCE. Supervisor's `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(...)(data[
# ATTR_SCHEMA])`, so the ORDER the Configuration tab renders in is the order of
# the `schema:` block and nothing else. tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section
# F prints that order out of the real image.
#
# ⚠️ ANCHORED ON THE INDENTATION, never on a stripped line. A top-level schema
# key is at EXACTLY two spaces and everything nested is at four or more; the
# `max_w` inside `inverters:` and the flat `max_w` are the same text otherwise,
# and config.yaml declares the nested one FIRST on purpose so that a first-match
# stripped reader is caught. See test_inverter.py part 12.
_TOP = re.compile(r"^ ([a-z_0-9]+):(.*)$")
_NESTED = re.compile(r"^ {4,}(?:- )?([a-z_0-9]+): *(\S.*?) *$")
def config_surface(config_text):
"""(top-level schema keys in render order, {key: [nested per-entry keys]}).
Nested keys are the ones a list-of-objects option declares per entry - today
only `inverters:`. A list of scalars (`- str`) declares none, and comes back
absent from the second dict rather than as an empty list.
"""
marker = config_text.index("\nschema:")
half = config_text[marker:]
order, nested, current = [], {}, None
for line in half.splitlines():
m = _TOP.match(line)
if m:
order.append(m.group(1))
current = m.group(1) if not m.group(2).strip() else None
continue
stripped = line.strip()
if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"):
continue
if current is None:
continue
n = _NESTED.match(line)
if n:
nested.setdefault(current, []).append(n.group(1))
else:
current = None
if len(order) != len(set(order)):
dupes = sorted({k for k in order if order.count(k) > 1})
raise ValueError(f"config.yaml declares {dupes} twice at the top level of schema:")
return order, nested
# --- the audit ---------------------------------------------------------------
def audit(config_text, translation, lang, require_descriptions=True):
"""Every disagreement between config.yaml and one translation file.
Returns a list of strings. EMPTY MEANS AGREEMENT; each string names the key
and says which direction the disagreement runs, because "the translations do
not match" is not something anybody can act on.
"""
order, nested = config_surface(config_text)
problems = []
top = translation.get("configuration")
if not isinstance(top, dict):
return [f"{lang}: no `configuration:` block at all"]
# ⚠️ THE WHOLE FILE IS ALL-OR-NOTHING, AND THAT IS WHY THESE TWO LINES ARE
# HERE RATHER THAN ONLY THE `configuration:` COVERAGE BELOW.
# `_read_app_translations()` runs the file through SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS
# and, on `vol.Invalid`, LOGS A WARNING AND DROPS THE WHOLE FILE - every
# label in it, not just the offending key. So a shape Supervisor refuses is
# not a small defect that costs one description; it silently returns the tab
# to raw keys. The two ways to write one that this parser can still read are
# a top-level block that is not `configuration` or `network`, and a
# `network:` block whose values are not strings ({str: str} is the schema).
for extra in sorted(set(translation) - {"configuration", "network"}):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{extra}:` is not a block Supervisor reads "
"(only `configuration` and `network` are) - "
"SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS refuses the file and the "
"Supervisor DROPS ALL OF IT with a log warning")
for port, text in sorted((translation.get("network") or {}).items()):
if not isinstance(text, str):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `network.{port}` is not a string - "
"`network:` is {str: str} and a mapping there makes "
"Supervisor drop the WHOLE file, every label in it")
for key in order:
entry = top.get(key)
if entry is None:
problems.append(f"{lang}: option `{key}` has no translation - Home "
"Assistant would render the raw key")
continue
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}` is not a mapping")
continue
if not str(entry.get("name", "")).strip():
problems.append(f"{lang}: option `{key}` has no `name`")
if require_descriptions and not str(entry.get("description", "")).strip():
problems.append(f"{lang}: option `{key}` has no `description` - the "
"operator gets a label and no way to know whether to "
"touch it")
want = nested.get(key, [])
got = entry.get("fields")
if want and not isinstance(got, dict):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}` is a repeatable section with "
f"per-entry keys {sorted(want)} and no `fields:` block")
continue
if got is not None and not want:
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}` carries a `fields:` block but "
"config.yaml declares no per-entry keys for it")
continue
for sub in want:
se = (got or {}).get(sub)
if se is None:
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}` per-entry key `{sub}` has no "
"translation")
continue
if not str(se.get("name", "")).strip():
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}.{sub}` has no `name`")
if require_descriptions and not str(se.get("description", "")).strip():
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}.{sub}` has no `description`")
for orphan in sorted(set(got or {}) - set(want)):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}.{orphan}` is translated but "
"config.yaml declares no such per-entry key")
for orphan in sorted(set(top) - set(order)):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{orphan}` is translated but config.yaml "
"declares no such option - a rename or a typo")
return problems
+275
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
# Home Assistant add-on translations - ENGLISH (UX-01)
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS FILE IS FOR, AND WHAT HOME ASSISTANT ACTUALLY DOES WITH IT.
# Without a `translations/` directory the Configuration tab renders the raw
# option KEYS - `unit_sign_disagree_w`, `saturation_cycles`, `integrator_max_w`.
# The frontend keeps a field when `e.name in options || e.required`, and all 70
# keys are in `options:` (59 of them are `required` as well), so ALL SEVENTY are
# rendered, always, in `schema:` order, with no description. This file is what
# turns that into sentences.
#
# HOW IT IS READ, measured on the Supervisor image this site runs
# (ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0):
#
# * `supervisor/store/data.py:_read_app_translations()` reads every
# `.yaml`/`.yml`/`.json` in this directory, keyed by FILE STEM (so this file
# is the `en` translation), and validates each through
# `SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS`: `configuration: {str: {name (required),
# description, fields}}` plus `network: {str: str}`. ⚠️ A FILE THAT FAILS
# THAT SCHEMA IS DROPPED WITH A LOG WARNING AND NOTHING ELSE - the add-on
# goes on rendering raw keys and nobody is told twice. tools/
# supervisor_shape_probe.py section F is what says it loaded.
# * The frontend resolves each label as
# `translations[<user's language>]?...name || translations["en"]?...name ||
# schema.name`, and the helper text the same way with `description`. ⚠️ THE
# FALLBACK IS PER KEY, so a key missing from nl.yaml degrades to this file,
# while a key present but wrong does not degrade at all.
#
# ⚠️ ORDER IS NOT SET HERE. `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(...)(data["schema"])`,
# so the Configuration tab renders in the order of config.yaml's `schema:`
# block. The order below only mirrors it so the two files read alike.
#
# ⚠️ ADD-ON OPTIONS ARE A FLAT LIST. There is no section-header primitive, no
# per-option "advanced" flag, no units on the input and no sliders, so grouping
# is approximated by ORDER plus the `Group · ` prefix in each label. Do not
# promise the operator visual sections; there are none.
#
# ⚠️ EVERY DERIVED CONSTANT SAYS WHERE IT CAME FROM. The Configuration tab
# presents a number read off 1890 closed-loop test runs and the operator's own
# inverter rating as the same kind of field. The descriptions are the only place
# that difference can be stated, so a derived value names its campaign and says
# "do not change without re-deriving", and a value that is genuinely the
# operator's says so too.
configuration:
setpoint_entity:
name: "Hardware · Inverter setpoint entity"
description: "The ESPHome number entity this add-on writes the power setpoint to, normally number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w. This is the only thing the add-on commands. Leave it empty if you fill in the inverter list below: a site with a roster must not also name one loose actuator, and the add-on refuses to start when both are set."
soc_entity:
name: "Hardware · Battery charge level entity (%)"
description: "The sensor that reports the pack's state of charge in percent. Use the ESP32's own reading, not a figure computed somewhere else. The maintenance cycle and every charge-level floor read this."
batt_entity:
name: "Hardware · Battery power entity (W)"
description: "The sensor that reports this inverter's own battery power, positive while discharging. On this installation that is holding register 0x0518, read by the ESP32. The sign watchdog and the circulating-power alarm both grade the inverter against this reading."
batt_invert:
name: "Hardware · Battery power sign is reversed"
description: "Only switch this on if your battery power sensor reports discharging as a negative number. The add-on expects positive to mean discharging."
inverters:
name: "Hardware · Inverter list (leave empty if you have one inverter)"
description: "Leave this empty unless the site really has more than one inverter. EMPTY DOES NOT MEAN 'not configured yet': it means the four entity settings above, together with the inverter rating and the battery cut-out under Limits, describe the one inverter you have. That is what every existing installation reads, and nobody has to touch anything. Filling this in REPLACES those settings instead of extending them, and nothing is inherited: each entry has to name its own actuator, its own rating and its own battery cut-out, so that no inverter is ever judged against another unit's numbers. The flat setpoint entity above must then be left empty."
fields:
name:
name: "Name"
description: "A short identifier for this inverter, for example inverter-a. It gives this unit its own namespace for its safety latch, heartbeat and write bookkeeping in the add-on's state file, so two units may not share one."
setpoint_entity:
name: "Setpoint entity"
description: "This inverter's own ESPHome number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w. Two entries may not name the same one - two writers on one actuator is refused at startup."
max_w:
name: "Inverter rating (W)"
description: "The supervised ceiling on what may be written to THIS inverter; the site's ceiling is the sum over the list. Required of every entry: an entry without one would have to borrow a rating, and judging one inverter against another unit's numbers is exactly the fault this per-entry list exists to remove."
bms_soc_floor:
name: "Battery cut-out level (%)"
description: "The percent at which THIS pack's own battery management system cuts out. Read it off the pack that is actually installed (register 0x0560) before that pack is ever commanded; do not copy another unit's figure. Required of every entry, deliberately: an optional one would be a defaulted one, and one default for two batteries of different models protects the shallower pack with the deeper pack's number."
soc_entity:
name: "Battery charge level entity (%) (optional)"
description: "This pack's own state of charge. Leave it empty if this unit reports none - that is what it means, and it never falls back to another unit's sensor."
batt_entity:
name: "Battery power entity (W) (optional)"
description: "This unit's own battery power, positive while discharging. Leave it empty if this unit reports none; nothing is inherited from another entry."
batt_invert:
name: "Battery power sign is reversed (optional)"
description: "Only for this entry: switch it on if this unit's battery power sensor reports discharging as a negative number."
estop_fitted:
name: "Hardware · RS485 emergency stop is fitted"
description: "Whether the RS485 emergency stop is physically installed. It only drives the warning banner on the status page; it changes no control behaviour."
meter_source:
name: "Meter · Where the meter reading comes from"
description: "'off' keeps the single Home Assistant entity below, which is what an existing installation runs on until you choose otherwise. ha_dsmr subscribes to the DSMR integration; mqtt_p1 reads an MQTT topic; ha_signed reads one signed entity, which is what a HomeWizard P1 publishes; homewizard_local polls the meter's own local API and skips Home Assistant entirely. ⚠️ Only homewizard_local can tell 'the meter has not answered' apart from 'the value has not changed', so it is the only source on which the frozen-meter alarm means anything."
meter_entity:
name: "Meter · Grid power entity (W)"
description: "The net grid power sensor, used when the meter source is 'off'. POSITIVE MUST MEAN DRAWING FROM THE GRID. Get this the wrong way round and the loop drives the battery in the wrong direction; use the sign switch below rather than a template sensor."
meter_invert:
name: "Meter · Grid power sign is reversed"
description: "Switch this on if your grid sensor reports drawing from the grid as a negative number."
meter_phases:
name: "Meter · Number of phases (1 or 3)"
description: "Must match your connection. A telegram whose phase count disagrees is rejected as it arrives and logged, so a wrong value shows up straight away as 'no telegrams accepted' rather than as a quietly wrong number. The range accepts 2, but that is not a real Belgian connection."
p1_host:
name: "Meter · HomeWizard P1 address"
description: "For meter source homewizard_local only: the meter's own address on your network, as host or host:port, for example 192.168.2.250."
meter_poll_s:
name: "Meter · Seconds between meter polls"
description: "For meter source homewizard_local only. 5 s is the meter's own update rate, so there is nothing to gain below it. It must stay well under the staleness limit below - the reading is never fresher than this interval - and the add-on refuses to start if it is at or above that limit."
meter_max_age_s:
name: "Meter · A reading counts as stale after (s)"
description: "Beyond this the grid figure counts as missing. On its own it does not command 0 W: the 'inputs missing' timer under Advanced starts only after this one has expired, and the two stack. 30 s is six polls of headroom at the default poll interval."
meter_mqtt_topic:
name: "Meter · MQTT topic"
description: "For meter source mqtt_p1 only: the topic the P1 readings are published on."
p1_import_entity:
name: "Meter · Import register entity (W)"
description: "The UNSIGNED consumption register. Do not point this at a signed template sensor: the add-on works out net power itself as import minus export, so the sign convention lives in tested code rather than in unreviewed YAML."
p1_export_entity:
name: "Meter · Export register entity (W)"
description: "The UNSIGNED injection register, the counterpart of the import register above. Same rule: no signed template sensor."
p1_net_entity:
name: "Meter · Signed net power entity (W)"
description: "For meter source ha_signed only. ONE signed sensor: positive is drawn from the grid, negative is fed back into it. Do not split it into two template sensors - the add-on does that split itself, so that it is tested."
p1_phase_import_entities:
name: "Meter · Per-phase import entities (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Optional, in L1..L3 order. Needed for the capacity-tariff quarter-hour peak on a three-phase connection. The number of entries must equal the number of phases above."
p1_phase_export_entities:
name: "Meter · Per-phase export entities (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Optional, in L1..L3 order, alongside the per-phase import entities above. The number of entries must equal the number of phases."
p1_phase_net_entities:
name: "Meter · Per-phase signed net entities (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "For meter source ha_signed only. Optional, in L1..L3 order, each signed the same way as the net entity above. Same job as the per-phase import and export entities: the capacity-tariff quarter-hour peak on a three-phase connection. The number of entries must equal the number of phases."
max_w:
name: "Limits · Inverter rating (W)"
description: "THIS IS YOUR NUMBER, not a derived one: the hard ceiling on what may ever be commanded, in watts. Set it to what your inverter is actually rated for, start low and raise it once the site has been commissioned. It is not read at all when the inverter list is filled in - each entry then carries its own, and the site ceiling is their sum. Several safety thresholds must stay below it, and the add-on refuses to start if one does not."
bms_soc_floor:
name: "Limits · Battery cut-out level (%)"
description: "MEASURED, not chosen: the percent at which the pack's OWN battery management system stops discharging, whatever this add-on is set to. Register 0x0560 reads 10 on the reference GW5000S-BP. Read it off the pack you actually have rather than copying this figure. It is here so the add-on can refuse a capacity-guard floor at or below it: such a floor could never bind, the BMS would win first, and the status page would report an energy backstop that does not exist. Not read when the inverter list is filled in - each entry then states its own pack's cut-out."
peak_cap_w:
name: "Limits · Capacity-tariff target (W)"
description: "THIS IS YOUR NUMBER: the quarter-hour average demand the peak guard tries to stay under. Take it from your grid contract - in Belgium it is the capacity-tariff peak your distribution charge is billed on."
peak_forecast_entity:
name: "Limits · Quarter-hour demand forecast entity (W)"
description: "Optional. A forecast of the current billing quarter's average demand. Leave it empty and there is no capacity cap at all."
peak_soc_floor:
name: "Limits · Peak guard will not discharge below (%)"
description: "DERIVED, not picked (SAFETY-24): the reference pack holds 13.8 kWh usable and the worst modelled peak-shaving day asks for 878 Wh, which is 6.4 %, so 20 % sits ten points above the pack's own cut-out and still leaves the guard about 1.6 of its worst observed days of room. ⚠️ IT BOUNDS THE PEAK GUARD ONLY. It is not a reserve for the whole pack: ordinary self-consumption discharges straight past it and goes on down to the battery cut-out, and raising this number does not change that by a tenth of a percent. It must stay strictly above the battery cut-out or the add-on refuses to start. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
price_provider:
name: "Tariff · Dynamic price source"
description: "Where day-ahead or real-time prices come from. 'off' is what ships, and means this site runs on the static tariff below with no trading. ⚠️ Switching it on today fetches, checks and publishes prices and changes no energy decision - nothing consumes the price series yet. It may not be combined with the two legacy Home Assistant price entities further down: two price sources on one site, one of which silently wins, is refused at startup rather than left looking armed."
price_markup_eur_kwh:
name: "Tariff · Supplier markup (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Your supplier's margin. The add-on adds it ONLY when the chosen price source does not already include it - under engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic, eneco_eddy and manual_csv it is ignored, and logged as ignored, never applied twice."
price_taxes_eur_kwh:
name: "Tariff · Levies and VAT (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Taxes and levies per kWh, added under the same rule as the supplier markup: only when the chosen price source does not already carry them."
export_price_eur_kwh:
name: "Tariff · Injection price (EUR/kWh)"
description: "What you are paid for feeding a kWh back into the grid, all in. One number rather than a series: no supplier here publishes a dynamic injection curve. In Belgium it is often close to zero, which on its own strongly favours using your own production over exporting it. It may be negative - at midday in summer you can be paying to export."
static_profile:
name: "Tariff · Fixed or day/night tariff (one line of JSON)"
description: "Your fixed or day/night contract, written as a single line of JSON. RECOMMENDED EVEN ON A DYNAMIC CONTRACT: this is what the add-on falls back to when the price feed dies, and with it empty a dead feed leaves the site with no tariff at all. The periods must cover every day type exactly once, with no gap and no overlap - a gap is refused at startup rather than filled in, because an invented price is one a strategy would trade on. A fully fixed tariff is one period covering 00:00-24:00 on all days. Prices are ALL IN; the markup and levies above are not added to them. Note that a window written 22:00-07:00 for mon-fri does NOT cover Saturday morning, so a weekend row is required rather than decorative."
price_csv_path:
name: "Tariff · Price CSV file"
description: "For price source manual_csv only: where in /share the add-on reads your own price file from."
price_feed_url:
name: "Tariff · Price feed URL override"
description: "Leave empty to use the chosen source's own feed. Only a host that source itself declares is accepted, so this cannot be pointed anywhere."
price_horizon_h:
name: "Tariff · How far ahead to fetch prices (hours)"
description: "How many hours of prices to ask the source for."
price_timeout_s:
name: "Tariff · Price request timeout (s)"
description: "How long a single request to the price source may take before it is given up on."
price_now_entity:
name: "Tariff · Current price entity (older price path)"
description: "The older way of getting a price, kept because retiring it would take the maintenance cycle's only price signal away from a live installation. The add-on reads this and the average below and derives exactly one thing from them - whether now is cheaper than average - which only the maintenance cycle's cheap-window charging uses. It may not be combined with a dynamic price source."
price_avg_entity:
name: "Tariff · Average price entity (older price path)"
description: "The average the current price is compared against. Only meaningful together with the current-price entity above, and like it, may not be combined with a dynamic price source."
arbitrage_enabled:
name: "Tariff · Trade on the price spread"
description: "Charge in the cheapest published hour and discharge in the dearest, but only when the spread covers what the round trip costs. OFF in the shipped configuration, deliberately: this is the first strategy in the add-on that moves energy against the meter on purpose, so it is armed on purpose or not at all. It needs both a price source and a P1 meter, and the add-on refuses the combinations that cannot work rather than letting them look armed."
cycle_cost_threshold_eur:
name: "Tariff · Cost of one full charge/discharge cycle (EUR/kWh)"
description: "What one full round trip costs per kWh: wear on the pack plus conversion losses. A price spread smaller than this loses money and battery life, so it is not traded. ⚠️ THIS ONE IS NOT DERIVED FROM A MEASUREMENT. 0.10 is a product decision and it is still an open question with the owner (OPT-08). At this value a fixed day/night site does not trade at all - the realistic Belgian day/night spread is about 0.08 EUR/kWh - and that is the correct verdict at this number, not a fault."
arbitrage_soc_floor:
name: "Tariff · Trading may not discharge below (%)"
description: "The reserve price trading may not spend. Deliberately not the same key as the maintenance floor: pointing a trading strategy at the monthly balancing cycle's numbers would couple two unrelated policies through one setting."
arbitrage_soc_ceiling:
name: "Tariff · Trading may not charge above (%)"
description: "The headroom price trading may not fill. The counterpart of the trading floor above, and kept separate from the maintenance target for the same reason."
maintenance_enabled:
name: "Maintenance · Run the monthly battery cycle"
description: "A deliberate deep discharge followed by a full recharge and a hold, so the battery management system can recalibrate its charge estimate and balance the cells. Off by default."
maintenance_interval_days:
name: "Maintenance · Minimum days between cycles"
description: "The shortest gap between two maintenance cycles."
maintenance_start_hour:
name: "Maintenance · Hour of day a due cycle starts"
description: "Local hour, 0 to 23, at which a cycle that has become due begins."
maintenance_discharge_w:
name: "Maintenance · Discharge rate (W)"
description: "How fast the cycle drains the pack; the surplus is exported. Above the inverter rating it is CLAMPED to the rating rather than refused - the cycle still completes, just more slowly, and the status page says so. It ships at 2000 to match the shipped rating; raise the rating first, then this."
maintenance_charge_w:
name: "Maintenance · Recharge rate (W)"
description: "⚠️ MUST STAY AT OR BELOW the inverter rating, and the add-on refuses to start otherwise. Above it, the cheap-window charge shaping asks for more than the supervised limit allows, the arbiter resolves that contradiction to 0 W, and maintenance would silently never charge in a cheap window on a default installation. It is also capped again by whatever headroom the peak guard leaves."
maintenance_soc_floor:
name: "Maintenance · Discharge down to (%)"
description: "The depth the monthly recalibration deliberately goes to, once a month, on purpose. ⚠️ THIS IS NOT THE PEAK GUARD'S FLOOR: that one is the depth a money-saving discharge may never reach on any day. The right values genuinely differ - 11 here against 20 there - which is why they are two separate settings and must not be merged."
maintenance_soc_target:
name: "Maintenance · Recharge up to (%)"
description: "The level the recharge phase aims for before the hold begins."
maintenance_hold_min:
name: "Maintenance · Hold at full for (minutes)"
description: "How long to sit at the target so the battery management system can finish balancing the cells."
sign_disagree_w:
name: "Safety · Sign watchdog threshold (W) — measured, do not change"
description: "MEASURED, NOT CHOSEN (SAFETY-02). Both the setpoint being emitted and the grid reading must exceed this before their opposite signs count as a disagreement at all. On the captured healthy day (2026-08-23) sign agreement over the gated samples is 93.4 %; on the captured fault day (2026-08-20) the clusters run 0.0-10.5 % with opposed runs up to 1752 s. There is no reason to move this without a new capture that says so. It must stay below the inverter rating or the watchdog can never fire, and the add-on refuses that configuration."
sign_disagree_s:
name: "Safety · Sign watchdog hold (s) — measured, do not change"
description: "MEASURED, NOT CHOSEN (SAFETY-02). How long the setpoint and the meter must stay opposed, continuously, before the add-on commands 0 W and latches until an operator starts control again. 180 s sits in the middle of a very wide measured gap: the longest legitimate opposed run on the healthy day is 30 s, while the fault day still trips 13 times at 300 s. Do not change it without a new capture."
unit_sign_disagree_w:
name: "Safety · Per-inverter sign threshold (W) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY; with one inverter this setting does nothing at all. DERIVED FROM 1890 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS on the two-master rig (SAFETY-30), in which nothing was faulty, swept across the whole range this add-on accepts for loop gain and slew rate. 250 W is exactly half the saturation threshold, so the smallest divergence this can see is precisely the gap at which the control law itself already says the inverter is not following. Do not change it without re-deriving it. It must stay below the inverter rating or it can never fire."
unit_sign_disagree_s:
name: "Safety · Per-inverter sign hold (s) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. DERIVED FROM 1890 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS (SAFETY-30): 85 s is 8.5 times the worst legitimate opposition those runs produce (10.0 s), 2.8 times the firmware's own 30 s link veto, and under half the 180 s the site-wide check takes. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
site_sign_disagree_w:
name: "Safety · Site-wide sign threshold (W) — measured, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. The same 300 W as the single-inverter threshold, CARRIED ACROSS DELIBERATELY (SAFETY-30): the argument behind it does not depend on how many inverters there are - near zero the sign is noise, the deadband is 15 W, and there is one meter whatever is behind it. Do not change it without a capture that says so."
site_sign_disagree_s:
name: "Safety · Site-wide sign hold (s) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. DERIVED FROM 1890 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS (SAFETY-30), and deliberately NOT carried across from the single-inverter 180 s. On those runs the worst legitimate opposition at 300 W is 110 s with one inverter and 215 s with two, because the command has to travel the whole site rail at a slew rate that is not the site's - so carrying 180 s across would have shipped a false trip reachable at the lowest gain and slew with an ordinary 2.2 kW load reversal. 325 s is 1.51 times that, still inside the 900 s billing quarter, and still inside every episode of the captured fault day. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
meter_freeze_s:
name: "Safety · Frozen-meter alarm after (s) — measured, do not change"
description: "MEASURED, NOT CHOSEN (SAFETY-18). How long the meter may keep answering with an UNCHANGED reading, while the command stands at the rail, before the add-on raises an alarm. Over 2399 s of this house at its settled operating point - 1194 polls, 735 of them repeating the previous reading - the longest run without a distinct reading is 15.4 s; 300 s is 19.5 times that and still inside the 900 s billing quarter. ALARM ONLY: it does not command 0 W and does not latch. ⚠️ Only the homewizard_local meter source can see this at all; on every other source the status page says NOT COVERED rather than armed. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
circulation_w:
name: "Safety · Circulating-power threshold (W) — measured, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY; with one inverter the quantity is identically zero. Two inverters pushing against each other net out to zero at the meter and are invisible to every other guard in this add-on. MEASURED ON 924 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS in which nothing was faulty (SAFETY-31): the worst legitimate opposition collapses from 505 s at a 100 W threshold to 5 s at 400 W, and 400 W is the sharp knee this add-on will not let you go below - under it, ordinary operation holds the sensor over the threshold for minutes and nothing shorter than the billing quarter could tell that from a fault. 700 W is 1.75 times the knee, and the extra margin is there because the second inverter's ramp and lag are still copied from the first one rather than measured. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
circulation_hold_s:
name: "Safety · Circulating-power hold (s) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. DERIVED (SAFETY-31): 75 s is fifteen control cycles - 15 times the worst legitimate episode the rig can produce, 2.5 times the firmware's own 30 s link veto, and twelve times inside the 900 s billing quarter. It is deliberately not a round 60 or 120, which would be a guess wearing a measurement's clothes. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
auto_start:
name: "Advanced · Start controlling automatically on boot"
description: "Off by default. Leave it off until the site has been commissioned: with it off, somebody has to press Start after every restart of the add-on, which is what you want while you are still checking signs and entities."
gain:
name: "Advanced · Loop gain"
description: "How much of the remaining error the loop corrects each cycle. MEASURED ON REAL HARDWARE and already at the limit - do not raise it. Lower is slower and safer."
slew_w:
name: "Advanced · Largest change per cycle (W)"
description: "How far the setpoint may move in one control cycle. ⚠️ 0 MEANS FOLLOW THE INVERTER RATING and is the recommended setting: the limit becomes about a ninth of the rating, so the loop takes the plant's own MEASURED settling time to cross its whole output range and the number cannot be left behind when the rating changes. DERIVED (SAFETY-39) from an ~18 s measured step response against a 2 s meter tick. A fixed number is accepted and is never silently reduced, but a number faster than the rating allows is refused at startup - at 1000 W against a 5000 W rating this loop drove the meter from 3.4 kW of export to 2.8 kW of import on 2026-09-05. Lower is always accepted."
deadband_w:
name: "Advanced · Deadband (W)"
description: "Errors smaller than this are ignored. ⚠️ The deadband is a one-way ratchet: any resting point inside it holds forever, and the meter's import register counts every positive watt with no export to cancel it - which is exactly why the resting point below is slightly negative."
target_grid_w:
name: "Advanced · Resting point at the meter (W)"
description: "What the meter should sit at when nothing is happening; negative means a slight export. -10 W is deliberate: resting at 0 W leaks about half the deadband in billed import all day - roughly 0.2 to 0.35 kWh at a 15 W deadband - and biasing the rest point below zero moves that leak into the export register, which is not billed. It costs about this many watts of given-away export, so keep it small."
step_w:
name: "Advanced · Setpoint quantisation (W)"
description: "The setpoint is rounded to a multiple of this before it is written, so the inverter is not handed a new number for every watt of noise."
saturation_w:
name: "Advanced · Saturation threshold (W)"
description: "The gap between what was commanded and what the inverter delivers that counts as 'this inverter is at a limit'. ⚠️ The per-inverter sign threshold under Safety is derived as exactly half of this, so moving this moves that measurement's argument with it."
saturation_cycles:
name: "Advanced · Saturated cycles before freezing (count)"
description: "How many consecutive saturated cycles before the loop stops winding up. ⚠️ Do not set this to 1: a single noisy cycle would then freeze the loop."
integrator_max_w:
name: "Advanced · Integrator bound (W, 0 means the same as the rating)"
description: "Caps how much stale error can be waiting to unwind when the sign flips. MEASURED on the closed-loop simulator with a 4000 W load dropped to zero: at a bound equal to the rating the command is 1000 W two cycles later, at 1.5 times the rating it is 1800 W. ⚠️ Do not raise it above the inverter rating - the output clamp already bounds what reaches the wire, so extra headroom buys nothing but wrong-direction watts after every saturation event. Lowering it below the rating is the useful direction, and the only reason this is a separate setting."
heartbeat_s:
name: "Advanced · Setpoint refresh interval (s)"
description: "How often the setpoint is rewritten even when it has not changed. It must stay well under the firmware's own watchdog, which vetoes a link that has been quiet for 30 s."
stale_input_s:
name: "Advanced · Command 0 W after inputs missing for (s)"
description: "How long the inputs may be missing before the add-on commands 0 W. With a P1 meter this clock starts only AFTER the meter staleness limit has already expired, so the two stack: the total is longer than this number on its own."
cycle_floor_s:
name: "Advanced · Longest gap between control cycles (s)"
description: "A deadline on the gap between cycles, reset by every cycle. On a healthy meter it never elapses and changes nothing. Raise it only if your meter is slower than about 10 s, and keep it under the meter staleness limit - past that there is no reading left to evaluate anyway."
log_level:
name: "Advanced · Log level"
description: "How much detail the add-on writes to its log. 'info' is the shipped setting; 'debug' and 'trace' are for diagnosing a problem and are noisy."
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# Home Assistant add-on-vertalingen - NEDERLANDS (UX-01)
#
# ⚠️ DIT IS GEEN WOORD-VOOR-WOORDVERTALING VAN en.yaml en hoort dat ook niet te
# zijn. De eigenaar draait Home Assistant op Europe/Brussels; dit is de tekst
# die een Vlaamse huiseigenaar leest, met de woorden die op zijn factuur en op
# zijn digitale meter staan: afname en injectie, kwartierpiek en
# capaciteitstarief, laadniveau, uitschakelgrens.
#
# ⚠️ DE TERUGVAL IS PER SLEUTEL. De frontend probeert eerst de taal van de
# gebruiker, dan `en`, dan de kale sleutelnaam. Een sleutel die HIER ONTBREEKT
# valt dus netjes terug op het Engels; een sleutel die hier STAAT maar fout is,
# valt nergens op terug. Een half vertaalde sleutel weglaten is beter dan hem
# verkeerd invullen.
#
# ⚠️ DE VOLGORDE WORDT HIER NIET BEPAALD. Het tabblad Configuratie rendert in de
# volgorde van het `schema:`-blok van config.yaml; de volgorde hieronder is
# alleen een spiegel daarvan, zodat beide bestanden gelijk lezen.
#
# ⚠️ AFGELEIDE CONSTANTEN VERMELDEN WAAR ZE VANDAAN KOMEN. Het tabblad toont een
# getal dat uit 1890 gesloten-lustests komt en het omvormervermogen van de
# eigenaar als hetzelfde soort veld. De beschrijving is de enige plek waar dat
# verschil gezegd kan worden.
configuration:
setpoint_entity:
name: "Hardware · Setpoint-entiteit van de omvormer"
description: "De ESPHome number-entiteit waar deze add-on het vermogen naartoe schrijft, meestal number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w. Dit is het enige wat de add-on aanstuurt. Laat leeg als u hieronder de lijst met omvormers invult: een installatie met een lijst mag niet óók één losse aansturing hebben, en de add-on start dan niet op."
soc_entity:
name: "Hardware · Entiteit met het laadniveau van de batterij (%)"
description: "De sensor die de laadtoestand van de batterij in procent doorgeeft. Gebruik de meting van de ESP32 zelf, geen waarde die elders berekend wordt. De onderhoudscyclus en alle ondergrenzen voor het laadniveau lezen deze sensor."
batt_entity:
name: "Hardware · Entiteit met het batterijvermogen (W)"
description: "De sensor die het batterijvermogen van deze omvormer doorgeeft, positief bij ontladen. Op deze installatie is dat holding register 0x0518, uitgelezen door de ESP32. Zowel de tekenbewaking als het alarm voor rondpompend vermogen beoordelen de omvormer aan de hand van deze meting."
batt_invert:
name: "Hardware · Teken van het batterijvermogen omkeren"
description: "Zet dit alleen aan als uw sensor ontladen als een negatief getal doorgeeft. De add-on gaat ervan uit dat positief ontladen betekent."
inverters:
name: "Hardware · Lijst met omvormers (leeg laten bij één omvormer)"
description: "Laat dit leeg tenzij er echt meer dan één omvormer staat. LEEG BETEKENT NIET 'nog niet ingesteld': het betekent dat de vier entiteiten hierboven, samen met het omvormervermogen en de uitschakelgrens van de batterij onder Grenzen, de ene omvormer beschrijven die u hebt. Dat is wat elke bestaande installatie leest, zonder dat iemand iets hoeft aan te passen. Vult u de lijst wel in, dan VERVANGT die de instellingen hierboven in plaats van ze aan te vullen, en wordt er niets overgenomen: elk item moet zijn eigen aansturing, zijn eigen vermogen en zijn eigen uitschakelgrens vermelden, zodat geen enkele omvormer ooit beoordeeld wordt op de cijfers van een andere. De losse setpoint-entiteit hierboven moet dan leeg blijven."
fields:
name:
name: "Naam"
description: "Een korte aanduiding voor deze omvormer, bijvoorbeeld inverter-a. Ze geeft deze omvormer een eigen naamruimte voor haar veiligheidsvergrendeling, hartslag en schrijfadministratie in het statusbestand van de add-on, dus twee omvormers mogen er niet één delen."
setpoint_entity:
name: "Setpoint-entiteit"
description: "De eigen ESPHome-entiteit number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w van deze omvormer. Twee items mogen niet dezelfde entiteit noemen - twee schrijvers op één aansturing wordt bij het opstarten geweigerd."
max_w:
name: "Vermogen van deze omvormer (W)"
description: "De bewaakte bovengrens van wat er naar DEZE omvormer geschreven mag worden; het plafond van de installatie is de som over de lijst. Verplicht bij elk item: een item zonder deze waarde zou een vermogen moeten lenen, en een omvormer beoordelen op de cijfers van een andere is precies de fout die deze lijst per omvormer moet wegnemen."
bms_soc_floor:
name: "Uitschakelniveau van de batterij (%)"
description: "Het percentage waarbij het batterijmanagementsysteem van DEZE batterij uitschakelt. Lees dit af van de batterij die er werkelijk staat (register 0x0560) voordat die batterij ooit aangestuurd wordt; neem geen waarde van een andere omvormer over. Bewust verplicht bij elk item: optioneel maken zou neerkomen op een standaardwaarde, en één standaardwaarde voor twee verschillende batterijen beschermt de kleinste batterij met het getal van de grootste."
soc_entity:
name: "Entiteit met het laadniveau (%) (optioneel)"
description: "Het laadniveau van deze batterij zelf. Laat leeg als deze omvormer dat niet doorgeeft - dat is wat het betekent, en er wordt nooit teruggevallen op de sensor van een andere omvormer."
batt_entity:
name: "Entiteit met het batterijvermogen (W) (optioneel)"
description: "Het batterijvermogen van deze omvormer zelf, positief bij ontladen. Laat leeg als deze omvormer dat niet doorgeeft; er wordt niets van een ander item overgenomen."
batt_invert:
name: "Teken van het batterijvermogen omkeren (optioneel)"
description: "Alleen voor dit item: zet dit aan als de sensor van deze omvormer ontladen als een negatief getal doorgeeft."
estop_fitted:
name: "Hardware · RS485-noodstop is geplaatst"
description: "Of de RS485-noodstop fysiek geïnstalleerd is. Dit stuurt alleen de waarschuwingsbalk op de statuspagina aan en verandert niets aan de regeling."
meter_source:
name: "Meter · Waar de meterstand vandaan komt"
description: "'off' houdt de losse Home Assistant-entiteit hieronder aan, waar een bestaande installatie op draait tot u iets anders kiest. ha_dsmr luistert mee met de DSMR-integratie; mqtt_p1 leest een MQTT-topic; ha_signed leest één entiteit met teken, wat een HomeWizard P1 publiceert; homewizard_local bevraagt de lokale API van de meter zelf en slaat Home Assistant helemaal over. ⚠️ Alleen homewizard_local kan 'de meter heeft niet geantwoord' onderscheiden van 'de waarde is niet veranderd', en is dus de enige bron waarop het alarm voor een vastgelopen meter iets betekent."
meter_entity:
name: "Meter · Entiteit met het netvermogen (W)"
description: "De sensor met het netto netvermogen, gebruikt wanneer de meterbron 'off' is. POSITIEF MOET AFNAME VAN HET NET BETEKENEN. Staat dit omgekeerd, dan stuurt de regeling de batterij de verkeerde kant op; gebruik daarvoor de tekenschakelaar hieronder en geen template-sensor."
meter_invert:
name: "Meter · Teken van het netvermogen omkeren"
description: "Zet dit aan als uw netsensor afname van het net als een negatief getal doorgeeft."
meter_phases:
name: "Meter · Aantal fasen (1 of 3)"
description: "Moet overeenkomen met uw aansluiting. Een telegram met een ander aantal fasen wordt bij binnenkomst geweigerd en gelogd, zodat een verkeerde waarde meteen zichtbaar wordt als 'geen telegrammen aanvaard' in plaats van als een stil verkeerd getal. Het bereik aanvaardt 2, maar dat is geen echte Belgische aansluiting."
p1_host:
name: "Meter · Adres van de HomeWizard P1"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron homewizard_local: het adres van de meter zelf op uw netwerk, als host of host:poort, bijvoorbeeld 192.168.2.250."
meter_poll_s:
name: "Meter · Seconden tussen twee uitlezingen"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron homewizard_local. 5 s is het tempo waarin de meter zelf ververst, dus lager instellen levert niets op. Deze waarde moet ruim onder de verouderingsgrens hieronder blijven - de meting is nooit verser dan dit interval - en de add-on start niet op als ze eraan gelijk is of erboven ligt."
meter_max_age_s:
name: "Meter · Een meting is verouderd na (s)"
description: "Daarna geldt de netwaarde als ontbrekend. Op zichzelf stuurt dit nog geen 0 W aan: de teller 'invoer ontbreekt' onder Geavanceerd begint pas te lopen nadat deze verstreken is, en de twee stapelen. 30 s is zes uitlezingen speling bij het standaard uitleesinterval."
meter_mqtt_topic:
name: "Meter · MQTT-topic"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron mqtt_p1: het topic waarop de P1-metingen gepubliceerd worden."
p1_import_entity:
name: "Meter · Entiteit van het afnameregister (W)"
description: "Het afnameregister ZONDER teken. Wijs dit niet aan een template-sensor mét teken toe: de add-on berekent het nettovermogen zelf als afname min injectie, zodat de tekenafspraak in geteste code zit en niet in ongecontroleerde YAML."
p1_export_entity:
name: "Meter · Entiteit van het injectieregister (W)"
description: "Het injectieregister ZONDER teken, de tegenhanger van het afnameregister hierboven. Zelfde regel: geen template-sensor mét teken."
p1_net_entity:
name: "Meter · Entiteit met het nettovermogen mét teken (W)"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron ha_signed. ÉÉN sensor mét teken: positief is afname van het net, negatief is injectie. Splits die niet in twee template-sensoren op - de add-on doet die splitsing zelf, juist zodat ze getest is."
p1_phase_import_entities:
name: "Meter · Afname-entiteiten per fase (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Optioneel, in de volgorde L1..L3. Nodig voor de kwartierpiek van het capaciteitstarief op een driefasige aansluiting. Het aantal items moet gelijk zijn aan het aantal fasen hierboven."
p1_phase_export_entities:
name: "Meter · Injectie-entiteiten per fase (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Optioneel, in de volgorde L1..L3, naast de afname-entiteiten per fase hierboven. Het aantal items moet gelijk zijn aan het aantal fasen."
p1_phase_net_entities:
name: "Meter · Netto-entiteiten per fase mét teken (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron ha_signed. Optioneel, in de volgorde L1..L3, elk met hetzelfde teken als de netto-entiteit hierboven. Zelfde rol als de afname- en injectie-entiteiten per fase: de kwartierpiek van het capaciteitstarief op een driefasige aansluiting. Het aantal items moet gelijk zijn aan het aantal fasen."
max_w:
name: "Grenzen · Vermogen van de omvormer (W)"
description: "DIT IS UW GETAL, geen afgeleide waarde: de harde bovengrens van wat er ooit gestuurd mag worden, in watt. Zet het op wat uw omvormer werkelijk aankan, begin laag en verhoog het pas na de indienstname. Het wordt helemaal niet gelezen zodra de lijst met omvormers is ingevuld - elk item draagt dan zijn eigen waarde en het plafond van de installatie is hun som. Verschillende veiligheidsdrempels moeten eronder blijven; de add-on start niet op als er één niet aan voldoet."
bms_soc_floor:
name: "Grenzen · Uitschakelniveau van de batterij (%)"
description: "GEMETEN, niet gekozen: het percentage waarbij het batterijmanagementsysteem van de batterij ZELF stopt met ontladen, wat u hier ook instelt. Register 0x0560 leest 10 op de referentie-GW5000S-BP. Lees deze waarde af van de batterij die er werkelijk staat in plaats van dit getal over te nemen. Ze staat hier zodat de add-on een ondergrens voor de piekbewaking op of onder deze waarde kan weigeren: zo'n ondergrens kan nooit werken, het BMS wint altijd eerst, en de statuspagina zou een reserve tonen die niet bestaat. Wordt niet gelezen zodra de lijst met omvormers is ingevuld - elk item vermeldt dan de uitschakelgrens van zijn eigen batterij."
peak_cap_w:
name: "Grenzen · Streefwaarde capaciteitstarief (W)"
description: "DIT IS UW GETAL: het gemiddelde kwartiervermogen waar de piekbewaking onder probeert te blijven. Neem het over uit uw netcontract - in België is dit de kwartierpiek waarop het capaciteitstarief van uw distributiefactuur berekend wordt."
peak_forecast_entity:
name: "Grenzen · Entiteit met de kwartierprognose (W)"
description: "Optioneel. Een prognose van het gemiddelde vermogen in het lopende factuurkwartier. Laat u dit leeg, dan is er helemaal geen piekbegrenzing."
peak_soc_floor:
name: "Grenzen · Piekbewaking ontlaadt niet onder (%)"
description: "AFGELEID, niet gekozen (SAFETY-24): de referentiebatterij heeft 13,8 kWh bruikbaar en de zwaarste doorgerekende afvlakdag vraagt 878 Wh, oftewel 6,4 %, dus 20 % ligt tien punten boven de uitschakelgrens van de batterij zelf en laat de bewaking nog ongeveer 1,6 van haar zwaarste waargenomen dagen speling. ⚠️ DIT BEGRENST ALLEEN DE PIEKBEWAKING. Het is geen reserve voor de hele batterij: gewoon eigenverbruik ontlaadt er dwars doorheen en gaat door tot aan de uitschakelgrens van de batterij, en dit getal verhogen verandert daar geen tiende procent aan. Het moet strikt boven de uitschakelgrens van de batterij blijven, anders start de add-on niet op. Verander het niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
price_provider:
name: "Tarief · Bron van dynamische prijzen"
description: "Waar day-ahead- of realtimeprijzen vandaan komen. 'off' is de standaardinstelling en betekent dat deze installatie op het vaste tarief hieronder draait, zonder handel. ⚠️ Dit vandaag aanzetten haalt prijzen op, controleert en publiceert ze, en verandert geen enkele energiebeslissing - er is nog niets dat de prijsreeks gebruikt. Het mag niet gecombineerd worden met de twee oude Home Assistant-prijsentiteiten verderop: twee prijsbronnen op één installatie, waarvan er stilzwijgend één wint, wordt bij het opstarten geweigerd in plaats van schijnbaar actief gelaten."
price_markup_eur_kwh:
name: "Tarief · Marge van de leverancier (EUR/kWh)"
description: "De marge van uw energieleverancier. De add-on telt die ALLEEN op wanneer de gekozen prijsbron ze niet al bevat - bij engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic, eneco_eddy en manual_csv wordt ze genegeerd, en dat wordt ook gelogd, zodat ze nooit dubbel wordt aangerekend."
price_taxes_eur_kwh:
name: "Tarief · Heffingen en btw (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Belastingen en heffingen per kWh, opgeteld volgens dezelfde regel als de marge: alleen wanneer de gekozen prijsbron ze nog niet bevat."
export_price_eur_kwh:
name: "Tarief · Injectievergoeding (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Wat u krijgt voor een kWh die u op het net zet, alles inbegrepen. Eén getal en geen reeks: geen enkele leverancier hier publiceert een dynamische injectiecurve. In België ligt dit vaak dicht bij nul, wat op zich al sterk pleit voor eigenverbruik in plaats van injectie. De waarde mag negatief zijn - op een zomerse middag betaalt u soms om te injecteren."
static_profile:
name: "Tarief · Vast of dag/nacht-tarief (één regel JSON)"
description: "Uw vaste of dag/nacht-contract, geschreven als één regel JSON. AANBEVOLEN ZELFS BIJ EEN DYNAMISCH CONTRACT: hierop valt de add-on terug wanneer de prijsfeed uitvalt, en staat dit leeg dan blijft de installatie bij een dode feed helemaal zonder tarief achter. De periodes moeten elk dagtype precies één keer bedekken, zonder gat en zonder overlap - een gat wordt bij het opstarten geweigerd in plaats van opgevuld, want een verzonnen prijs is er één waarop een strategie zou handelen. Een volledig vast tarief is één periode van 00:00 tot 24:00 op alle dagen. De prijzen zijn ALLES INBEGREPEN; de marge en heffingen hierboven worden er niet bij opgeteld. Let op: een venster van 22:00 tot 07:00 voor ma-vr dekt zaterdagochtend NIET, dus een regel voor het weekend is noodzakelijk en niet decoratief."
price_csv_path:
name: "Tarief · CSV-bestand met prijzen"
description: "Alleen voor prijsbron manual_csv: waar in /share de add-on uw eigen prijsbestand leest."
price_feed_url:
name: "Tarief · Afwijkende URL voor de prijsfeed"
description: "Laat leeg om de eigen feed van de gekozen bron te gebruiken. Alleen een host die die bron zelf opgeeft, wordt aanvaard, zodat dit niet zomaar ergens naar kan verwijzen."
price_horizon_h:
name: "Tarief · Hoe ver vooruit prijzen ophalen (uren)"
description: "Hoeveel uur aan prijzen er bij de bron opgevraagd wordt."
price_timeout_s:
name: "Tarief · Time-out voor een prijsaanvraag (s)"
description: "Hoe lang één aanvraag bij de prijsbron mag duren voordat ze wordt opgegeven."
price_now_entity:
name: "Tarief · Entiteit met de huidige prijs (oudere prijsweg)"
description: "De oudere manier om aan een prijs te komen, behouden omdat ze weghalen de onderhoudscyclus op een draaiende installatie zijn enige prijssignaal zou afnemen. De add-on leest deze entiteit en het gemiddelde hieronder en leidt er precies één ding uit af - of het nu goedkoper is dan gemiddeld - wat alleen gebruikt wordt om tijdens de onderhoudscyclus in een goedkoop venster te laden. Mag niet gecombineerd worden met een dynamische prijsbron."
price_avg_entity:
name: "Tarief · Entiteit met de gemiddelde prijs (oudere prijsweg)"
description: "Het gemiddelde waarmee de huidige prijs vergeleken wordt. Alleen zinvol samen met de entiteit hierboven en, net als die, niet te combineren met een dynamische prijsbron."
arbitrage_enabled:
name: "Tarief · Handelen op het prijsverschil"
description: "Laden in het goedkoopste gepubliceerde uur en ontladen in het duurste, maar alleen wanneer het verschil de kosten van de volledige cyclus dekt. STAAT UIT in de standaardinstelling, met opzet: dit is de eerste strategie in de add-on die bewust energie tegen de meter in verplaatst, dus ze wordt bewust aangezet of helemaal niet. Ze heeft zowel een prijsbron als een P1-meter nodig, en de add-on weigert combinaties die niet kunnen werken in plaats van ze schijnbaar actief te laten."
cycle_cost_threshold_eur:
name: "Tarief · Kostprijs van één volledige laad/ontlaadcyclus (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Wat één volledige cyclus per kWh kost: slijtage van de batterij plus omzettingsverliezen. Een prijsverschil dat hier onder ligt, kost geld en levensduur en wordt dus niet verhandeld. ⚠️ DIT GETAL IS NIET AFGELEID UIT EEN METING. 0,10 is een productbeslissing en staat nog open bij de eigenaar (OPT-08). Bij deze waarde handelt een installatie met een vast dag/nachttarief helemaal niet - het realistische Belgische dag/nachtverschil is ongeveer 0,08 EUR/kWh - en dat is bij dit getal het juiste antwoord, geen fout."
arbitrage_soc_floor:
name: "Tarief · Handel ontlaadt niet onder (%)"
description: "De reserve die de prijshandel niet mag aanspreken. Bewust een andere instelling dan de ondergrens van het onderhoud: een handelsstrategie op de cijfers van de maandelijkse balanceercyclus richten, zou twee ongerelateerde keuzes aan één getal koppelen."
arbitrage_soc_ceiling:
name: "Tarief · Handel laadt niet boven (%)"
description: "De ruimte die de prijshandel niet mag volmaken. De tegenhanger van de ondergrens hierboven, en om dezelfde reden losgehouden van het onderhoudsdoel."
maintenance_enabled:
name: "Onderhoud · Maandelijkse batterijcyclus uitvoeren"
description: "Een bewuste diepe ontlading, gevolgd door volledig opladen en een rustperiode op vol, zodat het batterijmanagementsysteem zijn schatting van het laadniveau kan herijken en de cellen kan balanceren. Staat standaard uit."
maintenance_interval_days:
name: "Onderhoud · Minimum aantal dagen tussen cycli"
description: "De kortste tijd tussen twee onderhoudscycli."
maintenance_start_hour:
name: "Onderhoud · Uur waarop een geplande cyclus start"
description: "Lokaal uur, 0 tot 23, waarop een cyclus die aan de beurt is begint."
maintenance_discharge_w:
name: "Onderhoud · Ontlaadvermogen (W)"
description: "Hoe snel de cyclus de batterij leegtrekt; het overschot gaat naar het net. Boven het vermogen van de omvormer wordt dit BEGRENSD tot dat vermogen en niet geweigerd - de cyclus loopt gewoon door, alleen trager, en de statuspagina meldt dat. Standaard 2000, afgestemd op het standaardvermogen; verhoog eerst het omvormervermogen en dan pas dit."
maintenance_charge_w:
name: "Onderhoud · Laadvermogen (W)"
description: "⚠️ MOET GELIJK AAN OF LAGER ZIJN dan het vermogen van de omvormer; anders start de add-on niet op. Erboven vraagt het laden in een goedkoop venster meer dan de bewaakte grens toelaat, lost de arbiter die tegenstrijdigheid op naar 0 W, en zou het onderhoud op een standaardinstallatie stilzwijgend nooit laden in een goedkoop venster. Daarnaast wordt dit nog eens begrensd door de ruimte die de piekbewaking overlaat."
maintenance_soc_floor:
name: "Onderhoud · Ontladen tot (%)"
description: "De diepte waar de maandelijkse herijking bewust naartoe gaat, één keer per maand, met opzet. ⚠️ DIT IS NIET DE ONDERGRENS VAN DE PIEKBEWAKING: die geeft aan hoe diep een besparende ontlading op geen enkele dag mag komen. De juiste waarden verschillen echt - 11 hier tegenover 20 daar - en daarom zijn het twee aparte instellingen die niet samengevoegd mogen worden."
maintenance_soc_target:
name: "Onderhoud · Opladen tot (%)"
description: "Het niveau waar de laadfase naartoe werkt voordat de rustperiode begint."
maintenance_hold_min:
name: "Onderhoud · Op vol houden gedurende (minuten)"
description: "Hoe lang er op het streefniveau gebleven wordt zodat het batterijmanagementsysteem het balanceren van de cellen kan afmaken."
sign_disagree_w:
name: "Veiligheid · Drempel tekenbewaking (W) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "GEMETEN, NIET GEKOZEN (SAFETY-02). Zowel het uitgestuurde setpoint als de netmeting moet boven deze waarde liggen voordat hun tegengestelde tekens überhaupt als onenigheid tellen. Op de vastgelegde gezonde dag (23-08-2026) komt het teken in 93,4 % van de beoordeelde metingen overeen; op de vastgelegde foutdag (20-08-2026) ligt dat tussen 0,0 en 10,5 %, met tegengestelde periodes tot 1752 s. Er is geen reden om hieraan te sleutelen zonder een nieuwe meetcampagne die dat onderbouwt. De waarde moet onder het omvormervermogen blijven, anders kan de bewaking nooit aanslaan, en de add-on weigert die instelling."
sign_disagree_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Wachttijd tekenbewaking (s) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "GEMETEN, NIET GEKOZEN (SAFETY-02). Hoe lang het setpoint en de meter onafgebroken tegengesteld moeten blijven voordat de add-on 0 W stuurt en vergrendelt tot iemand de regeling opnieuw start. 180 s ligt midden in een zeer brede gemeten marge: de langste terechte tegengestelde periode op de gezonde dag duurt 30 s, terwijl de foutdag bij 300 s nog altijd 13 keer aanslaat. Verander dit niet zonder nieuwe metingen."
unit_sign_disagree_w:
name: "Veiligheid · Tekendrempel per omvormer (W) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS; bij één omvormer doet deze instelling niets. AFGELEID UIT 1890 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS op de testopstelling met twee omvormers (SAFETY-30), waarbij niets defect was, over het volledige bereik dat deze add-on toelaat voor versterking en volgsnelheid. 250 W is precies de helft van de verzadigingsdrempel, zodat het kleinste verschil dat hier zichtbaar is, exact de afwijking is waarbij de regeling zelf al zegt dat de omvormer niet volgt. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken. De waarde moet onder het omvormervermogen blijven, anders kan ze nooit aanslaan."
unit_sign_disagree_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Wachttijd per omvormer (s) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. AFGELEID UIT 1890 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS (SAFETY-30): 85 s is 8,5 keer de langste terechte tegengestelde periode die die tests opleveren (10,0 s), 2,8 keer het eigen veto van 30 s in de firmware, en minder dan de helft van de 180 s die de installatiebrede controle neemt. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
site_sign_disagree_w:
name: "Veiligheid · Tekendrempel voor de hele installatie (W) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. Dezelfde 300 W als de drempel voor één omvormer, BEWUST OVERGENOMEN (SAFETY-30): de onderbouwing hangt niet af van het aantal omvormers - rond nul is het teken ruis, de dode zone is 15 W, en er is één meter, wat er ook achter hangt. Verander dit niet zonder metingen die dat onderbouwen."
site_sign_disagree_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Wachttijd voor de hele installatie (s) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. AFGELEID UIT 1890 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS (SAFETY-30), en bewust NIET overgenomen van de 180 s voor één omvormer. In die tests duurt de langste terechte tegengestelde periode bij 300 W 110 s met één omvormer en 215 s met twee, omdat het commando de volledige installatiegrens moet doorlopen aan een volgsnelheid die niet die van de installatie is. 180 s overnemen zou dus een vals alarm hebben opgeleverd bij de laagste versterking en volgsnelheid en een gewone belastingomkering van 2,2 kW. 325 s is 1,51 keer die waarde, blijft binnen het factuurkwartier van 900 s en binnen elke episode van de vastgelegde foutdag. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
meter_freeze_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Alarm vastgelopen meter na (s) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "GEMETEN, NIET GEKOZEN (SAFETY-18). Hoe lang de meter mag blijven antwoorden met een ONVERANDERDE waarde, terwijl het commando op de grens staat, voordat de add-on alarm slaat. Over 2399 s van deze woning op haar ingeregelde werkpunt - 1194 uitlezingen, waarvan 735 een herhaling van de vorige waarde - duurt de langste periode zonder een nieuwe waarde 15,4 s; 300 s is 19,5 keer zoveel en blijft binnen het factuurkwartier van 900 s. ALLEEN EEN ALARM: er wordt geen 0 W gestuurd en er wordt niets vergrendeld. ⚠️ Alleen de meterbron homewizard_local kan dit überhaupt zien; bij elke andere bron meldt de statuspagina NIET GEDEKT in plaats van actief. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
circulation_w:
name: "Veiligheid · Drempel rondpompend vermogen (W) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS; bij één omvormer is deze grootheid altijd nul. Twee omvormers die tegen elkaar in duwen, heffen elkaar aan de meter op en zijn onzichtbaar voor elke andere bewaking in deze add-on. GEMETEN OVER 924 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS waarbij niets defect was (SAFETY-31): de langste terechte tegenwerking valt terug van 505 s bij een drempel van 100 W naar 5 s bij 400 W, en 400 W is de scherpe knik waaronder deze add-on u niet laat gaan - daaronder houdt gewone werking de sensor minutenlang boven de drempel en kan niets korter dan het factuurkwartier dat van een storing onderscheiden. 700 W is 1,75 keer de knik; die extra marge is er omdat het aanloopgedrag van de tweede omvormer nog gekopieerd is van de eerste en niet gemeten. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
circulation_hold_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Wachttijd rondpompend vermogen (s) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. AFGELEID (SAFETY-31): 75 s zijn vijftien regelcycli - 15 keer de langste terechte episode die de testopstelling kan produceren, 2,5 keer het eigen veto van 30 s in de firmware, en twaalf keer binnen het factuurkwartier van 900 s. Het is bewust geen ronde 60 of 120, want dat zou een gok zijn in het jasje van een meting. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
auto_start:
name: "Geavanceerd · Automatisch beginnen te regelen bij opstarten"
description: "Staat standaard uit. Laat het uit tot de installatie in dienst is genomen: zolang het uit staat, moet iemand na elke herstart van de add-on op Start drukken, en dat is precies wat u wilt terwijl u tekens en entiteiten nog aan het nakijken bent."
gain:
name: "Geavanceerd · Versterking van de regellus"
description: "Welk deel van de resterende afwijking de regeling per cyclus wegregelt. GEMETEN OP ECHTE HARDWARE en al aan de bovengrens - niet verhogen. Lager is trager en veiliger."
slew_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Grootste verandering per cyclus (W)"
description: "Hoeveel het setpoint in één regelcyclus mag verspringen. ⚠️ 0 BETEKENT VOLG HET OMVORMERVERMOGEN en is de aanbevolen instelling: de grens wordt ongeveer een negende van dat vermogen, zodat de regeling er de GEMETEN insteltijd van de installatie over doet om haar volledige bereik te doorlopen en het getal niet achterblijft wanneer het vermogen verandert. AFGELEID (SAFETY-39) uit een gemeten stapresponsie van ~18 s bij een meterinterval van 2 s. Een vast getal wordt aanvaard en wordt nooit stilzwijgend verlaagd, maar een getal sneller dan het vermogen toelaat wordt bij het starten geweigerd - bij 1000 W tegen 5000 W dreef deze regeling de meter op 2026-09-05 van 3,4 kW injectie naar 2,8 kW afname. Lager wordt altijd aanvaard."
deadband_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Dode zone (W)"
description: "Afwijkingen kleiner dan deze waarde worden genegeerd. ⚠️ De dode zone werkt maar één kant op: elk rustpunt erbinnen blijft eeuwig staan, en het afnameregister van de meter telt elke positieve watt mee zonder injectie die dat compenseert - en precies daarom staat het rustpunt hieronder licht negatief."
target_grid_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Rustpunt aan de meter (W)"
description: "Waar de meter moet staan wanneer er niets gebeurt; negatief betekent een lichte injectie. -10 W is bewust gekozen: rusten op 0 W lekt de hele dag door ongeveer de helft van de dode zone aan gefactureerde afname - grofweg 0,2 tot 0,35 kWh bij een dode zone van 15 W - en het rustpunt onder nul leggen verplaatst dat lek naar het injectieregister, dat niet gefactureerd wordt. Het kost ongeveer evenveel watt weggegeven injectie, dus houd het klein."
step_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Afronding van het setpoint (W)"
description: "Het setpoint wordt op een veelvoud hiervan afgerond voordat het geschreven wordt, zodat de omvormer niet voor elke watt ruis een nieuw getal krijgt."
saturation_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Verzadigingsdrempel (W)"
description: "Het verschil tussen wat gevraagd werd en wat de omvormer levert dat geldt als 'deze omvormer zit aan een grens'. ⚠️ De tekendrempel per omvormer onder Veiligheid is afgeleid als precies de helft hiervan, dus deze waarde verschuiven, verschuift ook de onderbouwing daarvan."
saturation_cycles:
name: "Geavanceerd · Verzadigde cycli voor bevriezen (aantal)"
description: "Hoeveel opeenvolgende verzadigde cycli er nodig zijn voordat de regeling stopt met verder oplopen. ⚠️ Zet dit niet op 1: één ruiscyclus zou de regeling dan al bevriezen."
integrator_max_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Begrenzing van de integrator (W, 0 betekent gelijk aan het vermogen)"
description: "Begrenst hoeveel oude afwijking er kan klaarstaan om af te bouwen wanneer het teken omslaat. GEMETEN op de gesloten-lussimulator met een belasting van 4000 W die naar nul valt: bij een grens gelijk aan het omvormervermogen staat het commando twee cycli later op 1000 W, bij anderhalf keer dat vermogen op 1800 W. ⚠️ Zet dit niet hoger dan het omvormervermogen - de uitgangsbegrenzing bepaalt toch al wat er naar de omvormer gaat, dus extra ruimte levert alleen watts in de verkeerde richting op na elke verzadiging. Lager zetten dan het omvormervermogen is de nuttige richting, en de enige reden dat dit een aparte instelling is."
heartbeat_s:
name: "Geavanceerd · Verversingsinterval van het setpoint (s)"
description: "Hoe vaak het setpoint opnieuw geschreven wordt, ook als het niet veranderd is. Dit moet ruim onder de eigen bewaking van de firmware blijven, die een verbinding die 30 s stil is geweest, blokkeert."
stale_input_s:
name: "Geavanceerd · 0 W sturen nadat invoer ontbreekt gedurende (s)"
description: "Hoe lang de invoer mag ontbreken voordat de add-on 0 W stuurt. Bij een P1-meter begint deze teller pas te lopen NADAT de verouderingsgrens van de meter al verstreken is, dus de twee stapelen: het totaal is langer dan dit getal op zich."
cycle_floor_s:
name: "Geavanceerd · Langste tijd tussen twee regelcycli (s)"
description: "Een uiterste termijn voor de tijd tussen twee cycli, die door elke cyclus opnieuw begint. Bij een gezonde meter verstrijkt hij nooit en verandert hij niets. Verhoog hem alleen als uw meter trager is dan ongeveer 10 s, en houd hem onder de verouderingsgrens van de meter - daarna is er toch geen meting meer om te beoordelen."
log_level:
name: "Geavanceerd · Logniveau"
description: "Hoeveel detail de add-on naar zijn logboek schrijft. 'info' is de standaardinstelling; 'debug' en 'trace' dienen om een probleem te onderzoeken en leveren veel tekst op."