Compare commits

...
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 f156fadac0 SAFETY-13: the bound came from the wrong half of a two-sided measurement
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m34s
NOTES.md 5.10 measured the 1.78 kW step BOTH ways - "Up: ~18 s from step to
deadband. Down: ~23 s" (NOTES.md:1550). SAFETY-39 takes 18 correctly: its
bound is a REFUSAL and the looser number refuses less. This branch reused
PLANT_SETTLE_S for the opposite job - how long the plant may still be the
EXPLANATION for a divergence - where the conservative half is the longer one.
ceil(23/2) = 12, not 9, and being short there does not refuse anything, it
accuses.

The false positive is real and is measured here. One inverter, one compute(),
one plant, no second writer anywhere in the harness: the command falls through
zero while the pack is still coasting the old way, unasked_power() calls our
own power "unasked", the counter reaches 9 while it is still coasting, and the
law emits "freeze-released". At the plant's own measured 18 s/23 s shape, over
272 load-step pairs, the 9-cycle bound fires in 62 and the 12-cycle bound in 2.

  PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S = 23.0 is added beside PLANT_SETTLE_S = 18.0, because
  the plant's settling time is a PAIR and each bound has to say which half it
  means and why.
  SETTLE_CYCLES = ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) = 12. It is no
  longer the reciprocal of SLEW_RAIL_FRAC; that was a coincidence of both
  reading the same half, and test_control.py now asserts the inequality.
  _SAT_COUNT_CAP moves with it, 10 -> 13. config.yaml accepts
  saturation_cycles as int(1,10), so the whole accepted range is now strictly
  BELOW the bound and the degenerate configuration this branch used to
  document no longer exists - pinned against config.yaml's own schema line.

Three shipped statements were falsified by that measurement and are rewritten,
not renumbered - at 12 the residual is smaller, not zero:

  unasked_power()'s docstring said anything outside the interval "was put
  there by something other than this loop". It was our own power: eight cycles
  after a +1990 W command the command is 0 and the pack still reads +522.3 W.
  control.py said "SO THE BOUND BELONGS TO (b) AND ONLY TO (b)". It fired in
  case (a).
  DOCS.md told an operator "if you see freeze-released, look for the second
  writer" - on a single-inverter install, hunting something that does not
  exist. Replaced by a section that gives the innocent causes first (a large
  load or PV swing; a plant slower than the one measured, 8/320 scenarios at
  23 s rising to 268/320 at 50 s) and the second writer only when the state
  STANDS.

Round 1's own results are kept and re-graded, not weakened. The release/1.0
sweep had to widen to reach the new bound (3780 cases): 3267 bit-identical,
432 releases, 27 command changes - all still charge starts from prev_w == 0 -
and 81 differing in the saturation counter alone, which nothing downstream can
read. The card's case releases on the twelfth saturated cycle instead of the
ninth and settles at the same -1190 W against the same frozen integrator.

Also corrected, because they were claims and did not reproduce: the coverage
table's "output freeze" row was 11, and the mutation form its own note
describes gives 6 on this tree, 6 on the first SAFETY-13 commit and 2 on
release/1.0; the detector row was left at 11 and is 15; the frozen = False
footnote was left at 10 and is 13. And section 6 reported 107 625 as "released
states" when it is the number of states SWEPT - 67 500 of them release, and
both are counted now.

Nothing here reached the inverter. 22/22 test files pass in goodwe-addon-ci,
tree rsynced to a plain path, mounted :ro, python3 -B, __pycache__ purged and
printed first (0 dirs / 0 .pyc; the worktree carries none).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 18:32:03 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 6c4565659b SAFETY-13: the output freeze gets an exit, and only where it needs one
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m30s
While the loop is frozen the command's magnitude may fall but never rise. At
prev_w == 0 there is no magnitude left to fall, so a charge cannot START. That
refusal is deliberate and it is kept: the inverter reporting power we did not
command means another writer is on the actuator, which is the §1.5 non-goal.
What it did not have was an END - nothing cleared it but the other writer
leaving.

Reproduced on release/1.0 @ c8dcb38, at the live install's shape (max_w 5000,
slew_w 400, target_grid_w -10), with another writer holding the pack at +700 W.
The route is not the obvious one: entering from an export, the slew limit moves
the command off zero before the counter reaches 3. It is entered from the
DEADBAND - a site resting at its target counts saturated cycles while nothing is
wrong - and 0 W is then a fixed point: a 2 kW export arriving afterwards leaves
the command at exactly 0.0 W on every subsequent cycle.

And prev_w == 0 is not where it stops. The same tuning pins at -800 W against
its own integrator standing at -2388 W, with the same absence of an exit. So the
change is written against the output freeze, not against a special case of it.

THE DECISION IS WHICH FREEZES GET AN EXIT, NOT HOW LONG THE BLOCK LASTS.

  - A divergence a LIMIT could have produced - the inverter doing less than the
    command, in the command's own direction - clears itself, because the command
    is pinned at something the inverter can reach. No exit. release/1.0
    unchanged, and asserted so: a curtailed inverter is never released over 30
    cycles.
  - A divergence a limit could NOT have produced - overshooting the command, or
    the opposite sign - cannot clear itself, because clearing it needs the
    inverter to track OUR command. That one releases.

unasked_power() is that predicate and it is physical, not statistical: a limit
can only make the inverter do less, in the command's own direction, so
everything a limit can produce lies in the interval spanned by 0 and prev_w
widened by saturation_w. At prev_w == 0 it IS the saturation test, which is
exactly why the zero case is the one that strands.

The bound is not a new number. SETTLE_CYCLES = ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_S /
LOOP_TICK_S) = 9, SAFETY-39's two measured constants and the reciprocal of
SLEW_RAIL_FRAC: a divergence still standing after the plant's own settling time
is not this plant catching up. _SAT_COUNT_CAP is written as SETTLE_CYCLES + 1;
its value is unchanged at 10.

RELEASING THE OUTPUT FREEZE DOES NOT UNFREEZE THE LOOP, which is what makes this
bounded. The integrator freeze is untouched, so a released cycle can only move
the command toward an accumulator that stopped accumulating, by at most one slew
step, and never past it - swept over 107 625 released states. On the run above
the command starts on the ninth saturated cycle and settles at -1190 W against a
frozen integrator of -1194 W, not at the 5000 W rail.

Graded against a transcription of release/1.0 over the 3024-case sweep, which
was NOT taught the new rule: 2592 cases bit-identical, 432 releases, and 27 of
those change the command - every one a charge from prev_w == 0 that release/1.0
refused to start.

SAFETY-04's deliberate assertion is kept rather than inverted: its fixture sits
below the bound, so it still asserts the block, and the release is asserted
beside it on the other side of the bound.

Coverage audit re-measured, same mutation form, __pycache__ purged: output
freeze 2 -> 11 (2 reproduced on a pristine c8dcb38 first), the exit 4,
unasked_power 6.

saturation_cycles at 9 or 10 removes the block entirely, because the freeze
cannot engage before its own exit is due. Not refused at startup; asserted in
the tests and written in DOCS.md.

Nothing was measured on two inverters: inverter B does not physically exist
(NOTES.md §1.1b) and sim/plantsim.py:216 INVERTER_B is INVERTER_A copied with
measured=False. The N=2 escalation is stated from the code (actual_w is
site_batt_w, the SUM) and is labelled as such.

22/22 test files pass in goodwe-addon-ci, mounted :ro, bytecode purged first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 13:56:26 +02:00
admin c8dcb38a95 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-37: a stale reading is None, and arrival cannot be what says so' (#57) from SAFETY-37 into release/1.0 2026-09-06 13:06:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8e241a3243 SAFETY-37: correct a wall-clock tick and a false size claim
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m32s
Two blocking findings from review, both in prose, both corrected at every
site.

1. "trips on tick 7" was not what the fixture prints. It prints 11, five
   runs out of five, and the developer's own report says 11. ⚠️ But the
   deeper problem is that the number should never have been quoted: the
   tick is counted on the WALL CLOCK inside cycle() (hold_s 2 s, ticks
   0.20 s apart), so it is load-dependent - 7 is what a box slow enough
   to stretch each tick to ~0.29 s would print - and nothing pins it.
   The DECISIONS transcript now says 11 because it is a transcript of a
   run; the CHANGELOG stops quoting a tick at all and states the
   checkable thing instead: it trips without the gate and never with it,
   which part 3 grades.

2. ⚠️ SURVIVOR 2's SIZE CLAIM WAS FALSE FOR ONE OF THE TWO CONSUMERS THIS
   CARD EXISTS TO PROTECT. It read "one contributing at most 250 W to a
   loop whose reporting floor is 700 W" at three sites. That bounds the
   COMMAND. Once the register is frozen its REPORTED value is unrelated
   to the command - which is exactly HW-01's shape: commanded ~0 W,
   register stuck on the last large number.

   Measured in review: a unit frozen at -1200 W beside a healthy +900 W
   sibling yields circulating_w = 1800 W against the 700 W floor, 2.6x
   OVER, with no gate armed.

   So the scoping is TRUE for the per-unit sign check and FALSE for
   circulation. Corrected to say exactly that, and the circulation
   consumer's exposure below MOVE_W is now recorded as a KNOWN GAP rather
   than a covered one.

   It survived because part 9's S2 check asserts only `not stale` and
   part 4 pairs the frozen unit with a RESTING sibling
   (circulating_w([A_FROZEN_W, 0.0]) == 0.0) - neither grades the size
   sentence.

No behaviour change. Full suite: 22 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 12:35:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 6864109a01 SAFETY-37: a stale reading is None, and arrival cannot be what says so
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m34s
The architect pass made SAFETY-37, TEL-06 and TEL-08 one systemic problem -
"a stale reading holds its last value and reads healthy" - and this builds the
single policy. Both consumers the card names are gated by one change, and
neither consumer needed a line: `SignWatchdog.evaluate` already CLEARS its
window on a None measurement and `circulating_w` already returns None for a
roster with a missing term. Neither could ever receive one. The gate is the
piece that was missing BETWEEN the shipped read and the shipped checks.

⚠️ ONE CRITERION IN THE CARD COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AS WRITTEN, AND SAYING SO
IS THE MAIN CONTENT. The card says "only arrival separates them". At this layer
arrival cannot: `read_inputs()` polls Home Assistant's state cache about once a
second and HA answers 200 with a number whether or not the publisher behind the
entity is alive, so both members of the pair arrive identically for ever.
test_freshness.py part 1a BUILDS the arrival-age gate the card asks for and
grades it failing - the age is 0.0 s at every instant of both runs, a threshold
that can never fire, which is TEL-06's own defect one layer up. The half of the
rule that survives is honoured absolutely: nothing here reads a Home Assistant
timestamp, and the check asserts the module contains no `last_updated`.

So the criterion became: a reading is stale when it has not moved through a
change it was OBLIGED to follow.

    STALE  <=>  unchanged >= 35 s
                AND |standing| >= 250 W
                AND |standing - standing when the reading last changed| >= 250 W

Latched until a different value arrives. `Inverter.batt` becomes None - never a
held number - which is a missing input, which §11.1 rule 1 answers with 0 W.

WHY A CONJUNCTION AND NOT A THRESHOLD, MEASURED 2026-09-06. Replaying the
committed 30-day capture of this house's own 1 W power entity (485,841 samples
out of HA's recorder, where a row exists only on a CHANGE, so the gap between
rows IS the unchanged duration every consumer saw): the longest legitimate
unchanged run is 263.2 s, held at -899.0 W. A false-positive-free threshold
would have to exceed that, and 263 s is 3.5x too slow for a consumer that trips
at 75 s. There is no admissible threshold. Every one of those long runs is
under an UNMOVING load, which is what the travel term keys on.

THE BOUND, derived at both ends and graded against the shipped config.yaml.
Floor 17.0 s = 6.0 plant settle (NOTES §5.9, measured 2026-08-22) + 10.0
ESPHome publish (firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181) + 1.0 read period
(run_control's asyncio.sleep(1)). Ceiling 75.0 s = min(circulation_hold_s 75,
unit_sign_disagree_s 85). Band [34.0, 37.5]; 35 is a CHOICE inside a DERIVED
band and the check says so - the first draft claimed the band held one integer
and went red on its own first run. MOVE_W is the LARGEST admissible value,
unit_sign_disagree_w, because below it the consumer cannot speak at all.

SoC is STATED, NOT WIRED, and BOUNDS carries it with wired=False and the reason.
Its obligation term is energy through the pack, not command travel - a rested
pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W command - and K needs a usable
capacity nobody has measured. That is TEL-08's; the record says so.

⚠️ BEHAVIOUR CHANGES AT THE SHIPPED ROSTER OF ONE, and it is named rather than
hidden: a FROZEN register now stops the site where it used to read as a healthy
measurement for ever. That is HW-01, which was a one-inverter site. A healthy
install is unchanged, asserted over sixty reads of a dithering register under a
reversing command. A false verdict fails toward 0 W behind the existing
stale_input_s hold and clears itself on the register's next move.

⚠️ BOTH UNITS IN EVERY TWO-INVERTER FIXTURE ARE INVERTER A with different
numbers passed in; inverter B does not physically exist (~2026-09-12).

MUTATION: 16 mutations against a purged, :ro, python3 -B tree, fingerprinted
before and after every revert. One survivor, and it is the finding - dropping
the magnitude term left every check green because no fixture separated "the
command travelled 250 W" from "the command ended up above 250 W". Closed, and
recorded as MUTATION.md habit 17. A second process defect is habit 18: a
mutation run that timed out between the edit and the revert left the module
mutated on disk and nothing announced it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 11:53:26 +02:00
admin a4290d39ac Merge pull request 'SAFETY-39: slew_w is a ratio to the rail, and gain is the constant that is still wrong' (#56) from SAFETY-39 into release/1.0 2026-09-06 10:41:03 +02:00
12 changed files with 3128 additions and 24 deletions
+99
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,105 @@ guessing a boundary; saying so is more useful than a guess.
## Unreleased
⚠️ **THE OUTPUT FREEZE NOW HAS AN EXIT, AND ONLY WHERE IT CANNOT END ON ITS OWN
([[SAFETY-13]]).** While the loop is frozen the command's magnitude may fall but
never rise; at `prev_w == 0` there is no magnitude left to fall, so a charge
cannot start. That refusal is deliberate - the inverter reporting power we did
not command means another writer is on the actuator, the §1.5 non-goal - and it
is kept. What it did not have was an END: nothing cleared it but the other
writer leaving.
The exit is now explicit, and *which* freezes get one is the decision rather
than *how long*:
- A divergence a **limit** could have produced - the inverter doing less than
the command, in the command's own direction - **clears itself**, because the
command is pinned at something the inverter can reach. It gets no exit, and
that is release/1.0's behaviour kept unchanged.
- A divergence a limit could **not** have produced - the inverter overshooting
the command, or producing the opposite sign - may not clear itself at all, so
it gets one. It releases once the divergence has outlasted the plant's own
measured settling time: `SETTLE_CYCLES` = **12** cycles at the measured tick.
⚠️ **THE BOUND COMES FROM THE SLOWER OF THE TWO DIRECTIONS THE PLANT WAS
MEASURED IN.** `NOTES.md` §5.10 timed the same 1.78 kW step both ways - ~18 s
up, ~23 s down - so `PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S` (23 s) joins `PLANT_SETTLE_S` (18 s)
as a named constant. SAFETY-39 uses 18 correctly, because its bound is a
*refusal* and the looser number refuses less; this bound asks how long the plant
may still be the *explanation*, and there the longer number is the safe one. A
bound of 9 derived from 18 fires the exit on a **single inverter with nothing
else on the bus** - measured in the container, 62 of 272 load-step pairs at the
plant's own measured shape, against 2 at 12.
⚠️ **`freeze-released` IS A PLACE TO START LOOKING, NOT A FINDING.** It says the
divergence outlasted the plant's measured settling time. It is **not** proof of
a second writer: a large load or PV swing can leave our own power coasting
outside our own command's interval, and a plant slower than the one that was
measured does the same. DOCS.md now gives the innocent causes first and the
second writer only when the state *stands*.
⚠️ **RELEASING THE OUTPUT FREEZE DOES NOT UNFREEZE THE LOOP.** The integrator
freeze is untouched, so the command can only walk, one slew step per cycle,
toward an accumulator that stopped accumulating when the freeze engaged.
Measured at the live install's shape (`max_w 5000`, `slew_w 400`,
`target_grid_w -10`) with another writer holding the pack at +700 W and 2 kW of
export standing: the command holds at 0 W, starts on the twelfth saturated
cycle and settles at **-1190 W** against a frozen integrator of -1194 W, not at
the 5000 W rail. On `release/1.0` @ `c8dcb38` the same run held **0.0 W on every
cycle**, for as long as the other writer stayed.
⚠️ **THIS IS NOT A REGRESSION FIX AND IT ESCALATES AT TWO INVERTERS.** The
unbounded block is `release/1.0` behaviour, confirmed cycle for cycle against
SAFETY-04's branch. At a roster of two, `actual_w` is the SITE SUM, so the
comparison is a site command against two units' power and one unit still moving
after the other has stopped can put the site into the block with no external
actor at all. ⚠️ That escalation is read from the code and from single-unit
runs; **it is not measured on two inverters.** Inverter B does not physically
exist yet and `sim/plantsim.py`'s `INVERTER_B` is `INVERTER_A` copied with
`measured=False`, so any two-inverter figure would be two copies of A.
Graded against `release/1.0` over the 3780-case sweep in `test_control.py`:
**3267 cases bit-identical, 432 releases, 27 of those change the command** -
every one a charge from `prev_w == 0` that `release/1.0` refused to start - and
**81 differ in the saturation counter alone**, because its ceiling moved with
the bound from 10 to 13. That ceiling change also removes a degenerate setting:
`config.yaml` accepts `saturation_cycles` up to 10, which is now strictly below
the release bound, so **no accepted configuration can stop the block engaging**.
At the old bound of 9 a setting of 9 or 10 deleted it silently.
⚠️ **A PER-INVERTER POWER READING THAT HAS STOPPED FOLLOWING ITS OWN COMMAND IS
NOW `None`, NOT A HELD NUMBER ([[SAFETY-37]]).** `Inverter.batt` (register
`0x0518`) goes through a freshness gate: unchanged for >= 35 s *while* the
standing command is over 250 W *and* has travelled over 250 W since the reading
last moved. A stale reading is a **missing input**, which §11.1 rule 1 already
answers with 0 W and keeps commanding.
**This is a behaviour change at the shipped roster of one, and it is deliberate.**
Before it, a frozen power register read as a healthy measurement for ever - which
is [[HW-01]], where a value held for 6 h 25 m while the pack drained to its floor
and every detector read healthy. A healthy install is byte-identical: sixty reads
of a dithering register under a reversing command all reach the consumers
unchanged, asserted rather than assumed. A false verdict fails toward 0 W, behind
the existing `stale_input_s` hold, and clears itself the moment the register
reports a different value.
At two or more inverters it also removes two false alarms that had no gate at
all: [[SAFETY-30]]'s per-unit sign check no longer trips on a frozen reading
(measured: it trips without the gate and NEVER with it - the tick index is
deliberately not quoted, because it is counted on the wall clock inside
`cycle()` and is therefore load-dependent; the checkable statement is the
presence or absence of the trip, which part 3 grades), and
[[SAFETY-31]]'s circulating-power sensor reports `None` instead of a loop that is
not happening.
**No new configuration key, and no schema change.** The bound is derived from
`circulation_hold_s` and `unit_sign_disagree_*`, which the checks read out of
`config.yaml` at both ends - so moving either default takes the gate red rather
than leaving it silently too slow. `DECISIONS/SAFETY-37-freshness-policy.md`
carries the derivation, what [[TEL-06]] and [[TEL-08]] still owe, and three
named survivors - including the largest: **this detects a value that STOPPED, not
a value that is WRONG.**
⚠️ **`slew_w` IS A RATIO TO THE RAIL NOW, AND ITS DEFAULT CHANGED FROM 1000 TO 0
([[SAFETY-39]]).** `0` does not mean "off" and does not mean "unset" - it means
**follow `max_w`**, exactly as `integrator_max_w: 0` already does, and resolves
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
# SAFETY-13 — the output freeze gets an exit, and only where it cannot end on its own
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-13`, off `release/1.0` @ `c8dcb38`.
**Card:** SAFETY-13 — *"Bound the no-start-while-saturated output block"*
([Trello](https://trello.com/c/uZjmuF7B)).
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** Every figure below is from the pure control
law run in a container against a plant model, on this branch and on a pristine
`c8dcb38` for the before-figures. No rig, no ESP32, no Home Assistant.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **The card's headline case is real, and the route to it is not the obvious
one.** The block does not engage on the way down into an export; the slew
limit moves the command off zero before the counter reaches 3. It engages
from the **deadband** — a site resting at its target with another writer on
the bus, counting saturated cycles while nothing is wrong — and 0 W is then a
fixed point. §2.
2. **`prev_w == 0` is not a special case, so the fix is not one either.** The
same run pins at −800 W against its own integrator standing at −2388 W, at a
non-zero `prev_w`, with
the same absence of an exit. Zero is only the instance where the pinned
magnitude is the whole of what the battery could have done. §3.
3. **The decision is not "how long", it is "which".** A divergence a *limit*
could have produced clears itself and gets no exit — `release/1.0` unchanged.
A divergence a limit could not have produced may not, and gets one. The
predicate is physical, not statistical — and it is **not** a second-writer
detector; §4.1 and §8 say what it can and cannot tell apart.
4. **Releasing the output freeze does not unfreeze the loop**, and that is what
makes the release bounded rather than merely different. §6.
5. **The bound comes from the SLOWER half of a two-sided measurement, and the
first version of this branch took the faster half.** §8 is the correction and
the measurement behind it; it is the reason `SETTLE_CYCLES` is 12 and not 9.
---
## 1. What was there, in the terms the code uses
`control.py`, in `compute()`, after the clamp and the slew limit:
```python
if frozen:
target = min(target, prev_w) if prev_w > 0 else max(target, prev_w)
reason = "saturated-freeze"
```
"Magnitude may fall, never rise." At `prev_w == 0` the magnitude is zero and
`max(target, 0)` forbids any negative command, so a charge cannot **start**.
The reason is written in the file and it is a good one: `frozen` means the
inverter's reported power has diverged from the command by more than
`saturation_w` for `saturation_cycles` consecutive cycles, and at a command of
zero that means the actuator is producing power nobody in this add-on asked for.
Starting to push the other way into it is the configuration §1.5 of the
specification rules out — *"any configuration in which two writers can reach one
actuator"*.
**The defect is that it has no end.** Not the error growing, not the integrator
moving, not time. `sat_count` stops rising at its cap and the state is a fixed
point.
---
## 2. Reproducing it — and correcting the route
Driven at the live install's shape: `max_w 5000`, `slew_w 400`,
`target_grid_w -10`, `saturation_w 500`, `saturation_cycles 3`, `gain 0.6`.
Another writer holds the pack at **+700 W** whatever is commanded.
**The route that does NOT reach it.** Start at `prev_w = 0` with 2 kW of export
already standing. On `c8dcb38` the loop moves off zero at the slew limit before
the counter reaches 3 — commands −400, −800 — so by the time `frozen` is true
`prev_w` is −800 and the block that gets applied is `max(target, −800)`. The
site charges at 800 W, not 0 W, for as long as the run lasts.
**The route that does.** The site is *resting*. `grid == target_grid_w`, so the
loop is in its deadband and the command is 0 — and `saturated_now` is computed
**before** the deadband branch, so the counter climbs anyway. Three cycles later
the loop is frozen at `prev_w == 0` with nothing wrong. Then the export arrives:
| cycle | grid | actual | prev | command | integrator | sat | reason |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0–1 | −10 | +700 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1–2 | `deadband` |
| 2–5 | −10 | +700 | 0 | **0** | 0 | 3–6 | `saturated-freeze` |
| 6 | −2000 | +700 | 0 | **0** | −1194 | 7 | `saturated-freeze` |
| 7… | −2000 | +700 | 0 | **0** | −1194 | 8→10 | `saturated-freeze` |
On `c8dcb38` the command is `0.0` on **every** cycle from there on. The
integrator has moved to −1194 W and stopped (its own freeze holds it), the site
exports 2 kW, and the battery is idle until the other writer leaves.
That is the card's sentence — *"the site can sit exporting 2 kW with an idle
battery indefinitely"* — reproduced, with the route corrected: it is entered
from the **deadband**, not from a correction that ran out of room.
---
## 3. …and `prev_w == 0` is not where it stops
The same tuning, same writer, but the loop starts from zero with the export
already standing (the route from §2 that "does not reach it"):
| | `c8dcb38` |
|---|---|
| command after the freeze engages | **−800 W**, on every cycle |
| the loop's integrator, frozen | −2388 W |
| what ends it | nothing |
So the missing exit is a property of the **output freeze**, not of the zero
case. `prev_w == 0` is the instance where the pinned magnitude happens to be
zero. A rule written for zero alone would have left −800 W exactly as unbounded
as it found it — which is why the change below is written against the freeze and
not against a special case of it.
**And this is the half that escalates at two inverters.** `actual_w` is
`site_batt_w`, the SUM (ALLOC-01, DEV-02), so the comparison is a site command
against two units' power. One unit still moving after the other has stopped is
enough to put the site into the freeze with no external actor at all.
⚠️ **What that claim is and is not.** The escalation is stated from the code —
`prev_w` is `self.target`, the site total, and `actual_w` is the site sum — and
from the single-unit runs above. **It is not measured on two inverters.**
Inverter B does not physically exist (`NOTES.md` §1.1b: on paper, from datasheet
and serial), and `sim/plantsim.py:216` `INVERTER_B` is `INVERTER_A` copied with
`measured=False`. Any two-inverter number would be two copies of A.
---
## 4. The decision: which freezes get an exit, not how long the block lasts
Three answers were on the table, and the card named them: lift after N frozen
cycles, exempt above some export magnitude, or keep it unbounded and write down
the cost.
**A plain cycle bound was rejected**, because it bounds the wrong thing. The
freeze is right to be permanent in one case and cannot be permanent in the
other, and a single N treats them alike:
| the inverter is… | can the freeze clear itself? |
|---|---|
| doing **less** than the command, in the command's own direction — a cold pack, a curtailment, an export cap, the plant still ramping | **Yes.** The command is pinned at something the inverter can reach, so it catches up, `saturated_now` goes false, and the freeze ends. Asking for more would achieve nothing anyway. |
| doing something **outside** what the command can explain — overshooting it, or the opposite sign | **No.** Clearing the freeze requires the inverter to track *our* command, and the other writer is precisely what stops that. |
**An export-magnitude exemption was rejected** for a narrower reason: it makes
the block's end depend on how big the other actor's disturbance happens to be,
which is not a property of the thing the block is about.
So the rule implemented is:
> The output freeze applies as before, **unless** the inverter's reported power
> cannot be explained by the command not being met **and** the divergence has
> outlasted the plant that would otherwise have explained it.
### 4.1 The predicate is physical
`unasked_power(prev_w, actual_w, saturation_w)`. A limit can only make the
inverter do **less** than the command, in the command's own direction. It cannot
make it overshoot the command and it cannot make it produce the opposite sign.
So everything a limit can produce lies in the closed interval spanned by `0` and
`prev_w`, widened by `saturation_w` for noise, ramp lag and idle draw.
⚠️ **What it does NOT establish is that anything outside was put there by
something else.** The first version of this branch said exactly that, in the
docstring, in `control.py` and in DOCS.md, and it is false: the predicate
compares against **one cycle's** command while the pack carries every command
before it, so our own coast-down through zero lands outside our own interval.
§8 measures it. What the predicate guarantees is only its own first sentence —
*this cycle's command does not account for this cycle's reading* — and the time
bound below is what turns that into a reason to act.
| prev | actual | interval | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| +2000 | +700 | [0, 2000] | a limit |
| −5000 | −700 | [−5000, 0] | a limit |
| 0 | +700 | [−500, +500] | **unasked** |
| −800 | +700 | [−1300, +500] | **unasked** |
⚠️ **At `prev_w == 0` this predicate and the saturation detector are the same
test** — asserted in `test_control.py` over 801 readings. That is not a
coincidence to tidy away: with nothing commanded there is no interval left for a
limit to live in, which is exactly why the zero case is the one that strands.
⚠️ **It is not a detector and nothing alarms on it.** A stale, wrong-signed or
noisy reading lands outside the interval too. All it decides is whether the
freeze gets an exit; being wrong about it costs a bounded command (§6).
SAFETY-30's `unit_sign_disagree_w` is the thing that alarms on sign, and it is
deliberately a different test with a different threshold.
### 4.2 The bound, and which half of the measurement it comes from
`SETTLE_CYCLES = ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S)` = **12**.
⚠️ **`PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S` is new, and adding it is the point rather than a
cost.** `NOTES.md` §5.10 did not measure *a* settling time; it measured the same
1.78 kW step in **both directions** — "Up: ~18 s from step to deadband. Down:
~23 s from a −1784 W export excursion" (`NOTES.md:1550`). So the plant's
settling time is a **pair**, and which half is the safe one depends on which way
being wrong hurts:
| the bound | the question | the safe half | why |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-39's `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` | may this configuration be **refused**? | **18 s**, the shorter | a looser bound refuses fewer working configurations |
| this one | may the plant still be the **explanation**? | **23 s**, the longer | a shorter bound stops believing the plant too early, and then it accuses |
The first version of this branch reused `PLANT_SETTLE_S` and got 9 — three
cycles short of the plant's own measured down-ramp, on the side that produces a
false positive. §8 is the measurement and the correction.
⚠️ **It is no longer the reciprocal of `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC`, and it never should
have been read as one.** The two were equal only while both were being derived
from the same half of the pair, and that coincidence read as a derivation. They
are 9 and 12 now; `test_control.py` asserts the inequality so they cannot be
quietly re-fused.
⚠️ **It inherits SAFETY-39's caveat about `LOOP_TICK_S`, in the opposite
direction.** A meter **slower** than 2 s makes 12 cycles cover more than 23 s, so
the freeze holds longer than the plant needs: that costs energy, never safety. A
meter **faster** makes them cover less, so the freeze can release while the
plant is still moving — bounded by §6 rather than by luck.
**`_SAT_COUNT_CAP` moved with it, from 10 to 13**, because it is written as
`SETTLE_CYCLES + 1` — a counter capped below the longest bound read from it
would silently delete the exit. That has a consequence worth stating on its own:
`config.yaml` accepts `saturation_cycles` as `int(1,10)`, so at the old bound of
9 a legal setting could sit **above** the exit and delete the block. At 12 the
whole accepted range is strictly below the bound, and the degenerate
configuration this branch used to document no longer exists. §7.
---
## 5. What actually changed, graded against `release/1.0`
`test_control.py`'s sweep still compares this law against a transcription of
`release/1.0` — the transcription was **not** taught the new rule, because an
oracle taught the change compares the law against itself. What changed is the
assertion: every case must be identical, or be a release with both of its
conditions true, or differ **in the saturation counter alone**.
⚠️ **The sweep had to be widened to keep grading anything.** Its `sat_count`
fixtures ran to 9; with the bound at 12 the counter never reached the exit and
every release silently vanished from the table, which is what the assertion on
the count caught. It runs to 12 now, at 3780 cases.
| | cases |
|---|---|
| total | 3780 |
| **bit-identical to `release/1.0`** | **3267** |
| releases | 432 |
| …of those, reason-only (the freeze was not binding) | 405 |
| …of those, **the command changes** | **27** |
| differ in the **saturation counter alone** | 81 |
All 27 command changes are at `prev_w == 0`, all with `release/1.0` commanding
exactly `0.0 W`, and every new command is **negative** — a charge start that was
refused.
⚠️ **The 81 are the counter's ceiling moving, and they reach nothing.**
`_SAT_COUNT_CAP` went from 10 to 13 with the bound, so above `release/1.0`'s own
ceiling the two counters differ. Nothing else may differ in those cases, and the
sweep asserts that: `frozen` is `sat_count >= saturation_cycles`, `config.yaml`
accepts that at most 10, and no other line in `compute()` reads the counter's
value — so a counter reading 13 instead of 10 cannot change what is commanded.
The 81 all sit at an `sc` above 10, which is a state `release/1.0` could never
hold at all.
The behaviour after the fix, on §2's run: the command holds at 0 W through
`sat_count` 3–11, releases on the **twelfth** saturated cycle, and walks
0 → −400 → −800 → **−1190 W**, where it stops — the same settling point as at
the old bound, three cycles later.
The genuine-limit case, driven for 30 cycles with the inverter curtailed to
±1000 W against a 4 kW import: `freeze-released` never appears and the command
stays pinned at +2400 W. Unchanged, deliberately.
---
## 6. Why the release cannot become windup (the card's fourth criterion)
**The integrator freeze is not lifted with the output freeze.** The command is
derived from `i_w`, then clamped, then slew-limited from `prev_w` — so a
released cycle can only move the command *toward* an accumulator that stopped
accumulating when the freeze engaged, by at most one slew step, and never past
it. `test_control.py` sweeps 107 625 states, of which **67 500 release**: no
released case leaves the interval between the previous command and the frozen
integrator, and none moves further than one slew step.
⚠️ **107 625 was previously reported as the number of released states. It is
the number of states swept**, and the assertion only ever graded the subset that
released. Both numbers are counted and printed now.
On §2's run that shows up as the settling point: **−1190 W against a frozen
integrator of −1194 W**, not the 5000 W rail. The tech lead's note on SAFETY-04
— that the carried `i_w` and `release/1.0`'s recomputed value land on the same
slew-limited command — is preserved: the `i_w=None` path is still graded against
the transcription, cycle for cycle, everywhere except the 432 releases.
⚠️ **The first form of this check was wrong and the sweep said so**, which is
left in the test file. It asserted `|target| <= |i_w|` on a released cycle and
produced `prev −5000, i_w −3000, target −4600`: the command was walking back
from −5000 toward the integrator and had not arrived. It was moving the right
way and the assertion still failed, because "never exceeds the integrator" is
not what no-windup means here.
---
## 7. What this does NOT buy, said plainly
**The site still does not reach its target while another writer is on the bus.**
It settles at the frozen integrator, not at the meter's target. What the exit
buys is that the battery stops being *idle* while the site exports; it does not
buy correct regulation against an actuator somebody else is also writing to, and
nothing in a rules engine can. A standing grid error with a second writer
present is the symptom of a configuration this add-on refuses to support.
**`freeze-released` is a place to start looking, not a finding.** It says the
divergence outlasted the plant's own measured settling time, and that is all it
says — §8. DOCS.md now tells the operator the innocent causes first (a large
load or PV swing, a plant slower than the one that was measured) and the second
writer only when the state **stands**. It is carried on `Decision.reason`, which
nothing after the freeze overwrites. No new alarm was added: SAFETY-41 removed
one that narrated normal anti-windup, and this state is not yet known to be
worth waking anybody for.
**No accepted configuration removes the block any more.** `config.yaml` accepts
`saturation_cycles` as `int(1,10)`; the bound is 12, so every accepted value is
strictly below it and the freeze always engages before its exit is due. This
paragraph used to say the opposite — at a bound of 9, settings of 9 and 10
deleted the block silently and the branch documented that as a known
consequence. Moving the bound closed it by construction. `test_control.py` pins
it against `config.yaml`'s own schema line rather than a transcription of it.
**Nothing was measured on two inverters.** See the warning in §3.
---
## 8. ⚠️ ROUND 2: the bound was derived from the wrong half, and it accused
**What was wrong.** `SETTLE_CYCLES` was `ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_S / LOOP_TICK_S)` = 9.
`PLANT_SETTLE_S` is 18 s, the **up**-ramp of `NOTES.md` §5.10's kettle step;
the same measurement recorded ~23 s coming back **down** (`NOTES.md:1550`).
SAFETY-39 takes 18 correctly — its bound is a refusal, and the looser number
refuses less. This bound asks the opposite question, and the looser number stops
believing the plant three cycles too early.
**Why that is not a tuning quibble.** The predicate has no memory. `prev_w` is
one cycle's command; the pack carries every command before it. A command that
falls **through zero** — the ordinary end of a load or PV step — leaves the pack
coasting in the old direction, so the reading has the sign the command *used* to
have and lands outside the interval spanned by 0 and the new `prev_w`.
`unasked_power()` calls that "unasked". With the bound three cycles short of the
plant's own down-ramp, the counter reaches it while the coast-down is still
going, and the law emits `freeze-released` on **one inverter with nothing else
on the bus.**
**Measured, in the container, N = 1.** One `compute()`, one plant model, one
command; no second writer anywhere in the harness. The plant is a first-order
lag whose two time constants come from the two measured settling times
(tau = t/3, since a first-order step is 95 % done at 3 tau) with
`sim/plantsim.py`'s measured 800 W/s ramp cap. It is a **model**, and it is
labelled one wherever it is used.
| | bound 9 | bound 12 |
|---|---|---|
| 1280 closed-loop scenarios (a grid of plant pairs, slews, `saturation_cycles`, load steps) | **113 fire** | **24 fire** |
| 272 load-step pairs at the measured 18 s / 23 s plant, `slew_w 400` | **62 fire** | **2 fire** |
The single case now pinned in `test_control.py`: a 4 kW export falling to
2.5 kW. At cycle 34 the command is −310 W, the pack is still at −1343.4 W
coasting down from −4860 W a few cycles earlier, `unasked_power(−310, −1343.4,
500)` is True, `sat_count` is 9, and the law says `freeze-released`. At 12 the
same run never releases.
**What the fix does not fix.** The bound makes the false positive rare on *the
plant that was measured*. It cannot make it impossible, because it is a
measurement and the plant can be slower than the measurement. Same sweep, bound
held at 12, lengthening only the plant's down-ramp: 8 of 320 scenarios at the
measured 23 s, 59 of 320 at 34 s, 268 of 320 at 50 s. That residual is why the
three statements below were corrected rather than merely re-numbered.
**Three shipped statements were falsified by this and are now rewritten:**
1. `unasked_power()`'s docstring — *"Anything outside that interval was put
there by something other than this loop."* It was our own power. The
docstring now says what the predicate does guarantee (this cycle's command
does not account for this cycle's reading) and states the coast-down as its
known blind spot.
2. `control.py`, in `compute()` — *"SO THE BOUND BELONGS TO (b) AND ONLY TO
(b)"*. It fired in case (a). The comment now says the bound is a reason to
stop believing (a), not a proof of (b), and that the release is written to be
survivable when the inference is wrong.
3. **DOCS.md — *"If you see `freeze-released` in the action log, look for the
second writer."*** This is the one that reaches a person, and on a
single-inverter install it sent them hunting something that does not exist.
Replaced by a section that gives the innocent causes first and the second
writer only when the state stands.
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
# SAFETY-37 — the freshness policy, and the one sentence in the card that had to be rewritten
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-06.** A per-unit reading that has stopped following its
own command is reported to its consumers as **`None`**, never as a held number.
The verdict is a **conjunction**, not an age threshold, and this document records
why an age threshold is not available at this layer — which is the one place the
card's wording could not be implemented as written.
Filed with SAFETY-37. Card `6a9a7eda7932387c3acbd700`, scope widened by the
architect pass of 2026-09-06 to carry the single policy for [[TEL-06]] and
[[TEL-08]] as well.
Every figure below was measured or read out of this repository on **2026-09-06**
and is re-derived by `test_freshness.py` on every run. Where a number is carried
forward from an earlier measurement, the section and the date it was taken are
given at the number.
---
## 0. The three faces, and which one this card built
| where | the defect | this card |
|---|---|---|
| **Layer 1** — `goodwe/master/goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml:690` | the ingest-age veto tests the **VALUE** of `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, not its arrival. A dead publisher freezes it at a healthy number and the veto can never fire | **not touched.** It is firmware, behind a flash. §5 says what it owes |
| **The add-on** — `app/hass.py:69-82` | returns a held value as a value. Nothing separates "read 40 %" from "still says 40 % because nothing updated it" | **built here** |
| **The evidence** — [[HW-01]] | SoC held 40 % for 6 h 25 m while the pack drained to its floor, every detector reading healthy | the case the policy is answerable to |
The two consumers the card names — SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and
SAFETY-31's circulating-power sensor — both read `Inverter.batt` (register
`0x0518`) and **neither had a freshness gate of any kind**. Both already do the
right thing with a `None`: `watchdog.SignWatchdog.evaluate` **clears** its window
on a `None` measurement, and `circulation.circulating_w` returns `None` for a
roster with a missing term, which clears that window too. **Neither could ever
receive one.** The gate is the piece that was missing *between* the shipped read
and the shipped checks, which is why the change to each consumer is zero lines.
---
## 1. ⚠️ The sentence that had to be rewritten, and why saying so is the finding
The card says: *"A pack legitimately resting at 40 % and a dead sensor reading
40 % are the same number; **only arrival separates them**."*
**For a signal this add-on polls out of Home Assistant's state cache, arrival
does not separate them, and cannot.** `read_inputs()` runs about once a second
(`run_control()`'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)` bounds the loop body), and while the
entity exists Home Assistant answers `200` with a number **whether or not the
publisher behind it is alive**. So both members of the pair arrive, identically,
for ever. `test_freshness.py` part 1a builds an arrival-age gate and grades it:
the age since arrival is `0.0 s` at every instant of **both** runs. A threshold
on it is a threshold that can never fire — which is TEL-06's own defect rebuilt
one layer up.
The other half of the card's rule survives intact and is honoured absolutely:
> ⚠️ Home Assistant's `last_updated` does **not** move when a value is rewritten
> unchanged, so it cannot be the source of truth.
Neither does `last_changed`, and this project measured on the ENV-01 rig (70 s of
a frozen meter) and independently against the live house that `last_reported`
does not advance on a repeat on either serialiser either —
`p1.HomeWizardLocalSource`'s docstring records both. **`app/freshness.py` reads
no Home Assistant timestamp at all.** Every clock in the verdict is
`time.monotonic()` inside this process, stamped at the instant an arrival carried
a different number. That is what "arrival-stamped" can mean here, and it is
graded (part 1a asserts the module's body contains no `last_updated`).
**So the criterion was rewritten rather than approximated:** *a reading is stale
when it has not moved through a change it was obliged to follow.* The obligation,
not the age, is what separates the pair.
---
## 2. The verdict
```
STALE ⟺ unchanged for ≥ 35.0 s
AND |standing command now| ≥ 250 W
AND |standing command now − standing command when the reading
last changed| ≥ 250 W
```
Latched: **only an arrival carrying a different number clears it.**
`0x0518` is the inverter reporting **itself** — r = 0.998 with battery power
against r = 0.09 with the real meter (`goodwe/NOTES.md` §3.3) — and it tracks its
own command: command and actual agreeing within 4 W once settled (§5.10,
measured 2026-08-22), the register dithering ±1 W while holding (§5.11, same
day). A unit told to move 250 W and still answering the same integer watt is not
tracking.
### 2.1 Why a bare "unchanged for N seconds" threshold is not available
**Measured, not feared.** Replaying the committed 30-day capture of this house's
own 1 W-resolution power entity — `scenarios/p1-net-30d-2026-08/`, 485,841
samples straight out of Home Assistant's recorder, where a row exists only when
the state string **changed**, so the gap between two rows *is* the unchanged
duration every consumer saw:
| | |
|---|---|
| longest unchanged run over 30 days | **263.2 s** (held −899.0 W, 2026-08-11 17:04) |
| runs ≥ 35 s | 10 of 485,840 (0.0021 %) |
| runs ≥ 17 s | 386 of 485,840 (0.0794 %) |
A real power figure at 1 W resolution held **one value for four and a half
minutes with nothing whatever wrong**. So an unchanged threshold free of false
positives must be over 263 s — and 263 s is **3.5× too slow** to protect a
consumer that trips at 75 s. There is no admissible threshold. The conjunction
is not a refinement; without it the card has no implementable verdict.
⚠️ **That is the METER's register, not `0x0518`, and it is used as a surrogate
and named as one.** No 30-day capture of the inverter's own power exists — it is
not in the recorder export. The single thing this measurement is used for is the
statement above: that the legitimate unchanged duration of a power entity in this
house is *minutes*. It is not used to set the bound.
⚠️ **And every one of those long runs happened under an unmoving load** — the
worst is 263 s of a steady −899 W export, a house doing one thing. That is why
the conjunction keys on command travel: none of them arms it.
### 2.2 Why the magnitude term exists — a surviving mutation put it there
Deleting `abs(standing_w) < move_w` from `_grade()` left **every check in the
first draft green**, because in all of them a command that had *travelled*
250 W had also *ended up* above 250 W. The case that separates them is a site
being brought to **rest**: the write path is serialised, so a register can reach
its new value on the same read at which the *old* command is still standing —
`standing_at_change` then captures 1300 W, the site is commanded to 0 W, and the
travel term alone reads 1300 W of unfollowed command for as long as the site
rests. It would call a perfectly truthful +5 W reading dead. The magnitude term
is what says *a site at rest is not owed movement*, and part 4 now grades it.
**The hole that term leaves cannot mislead either consumer**, which is why it is
the right trade: a unit commanded under 250 W is one `watchdog.disagrees()` is
`False` for whatever the measurement says, and a frozen term beside a live unit
that is itself resting nets to **zero** circulating power rather than to a false
alarm. Both halves are asserted, not argued.
---
## 3. The bounds — one per signal, each with its derivation
⚠️ **One constant for both signals would be useless on SoC or trigger-happy on
power**, which is the third clause of the policy. `freshness.BOUNDS` carries them
as data with a `wired` column, and `test_freshness.py` part 7 walks the AST of
every shipped module to check that column tells the truth.
### 3.1 `batt` — `0x0518`, S16, 1 W, published every 10 s — **WIRED**
**Floor, 17.0 s** — the fastest a healthy register can be *obliged* to have
answered. Three terms, each read out of this repository:
| | | source |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0 s | the plant | `goodwe/NOTES.md` §5.9, measured 2026-08-22 with the poll temporarily at 1 s: 26 W at +1.43 s, 469 W (94 %) at +3.34 s, settled 507 W at +6.05 s |
| 10.0 s | the publisher | `firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181`, `update_interval: 10s` on the `modbus_controller` carrying both `0x0518` and `0x050E` |
| 1.0 s | this add-on's read period | `main.run_control()`'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)` |
**Ceiling, 75.0 s** — the tighter of the two consumers, both read out of the
shipped `config.yaml`: `circulation_hold_s` **75** (line 512) and
`unit_sign_disagree_s` **85** (line 451). A gate slower than its consumer hands
over the frozen number and explains afterwards.
**Chosen: 35.0 s.** The admissible band `[2 × 17.0, 0.5 × 75.0] = [34.0, 37.5]`
contains four integers, and **the band is what is derived — 35 is a choice inside
it**, deliberately not 30 (that is `validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S`, and would
read as a borrowed constant nobody re-derived) and not 60 (round). Part 6
computes both ends **from `config.yaml`** and goes red if an operator default
moves: drop `circulation_hold_s` to 60 and this fails.
**`MOVE_W` = 250 W** is the **largest** admissible value, not a sensitivity
preference. The gate must arm everywhere a stale reading could mislead a
consumer; the earliest either consumer speaks is `unit_sign_disagree_w`, 250 W
(config.yaml:450), because below that `watchdog.disagrees()` is `False` whatever
the measurement says. Taking the ceiling of the admissible range minimises
spurious arming. It is pinned to `config.yaml` by part 6, not to a literal.
### 3.2 `soc` — `0x050E`, U16, 1 %, published every 10 s — **STATED, NOT WIRED**
SoC **cannot use the conjunction above.** A pack resting at its floor holds one
percent for hours with nothing wrong — the card's own example — and the standing
command says nothing about it, because 0 W is exactly what a rested pack is
given. The obliged movement for SoC is **energy, not command travel**: one
percent of pack A is ≈ **153.6 Wh** (15.36 kWh nominal, `goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b's
table — ⚠️ **NOMINAL and FROM DATASHEET**, not a measured usable capacity), so at
pack A's 5000 W ceiling one percent takes at least **110 s**, and at a realistic
1000 W about **553 s**.
So the bound is *"SoC unchanged while ∫|battery power| dt since its last change
exceeded K × 153.6 Wh"*, and **K cannot be chosen from anything written down
today**. Wiring it with a guessed K would be a gate that fires on a rested pack,
which is the hazard, not the fix. `Freshness` takes its obligation term from the
caller precisely so an energy integral can be handed in where command travel is
handed in for `batt` — TEL-08 needs no second mechanism.
---
## 4. What changes on a running install
| | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| healthy register, N=1 | value reaches consumers | **identical** — 60 reads of a dithering register under a reversing command, asserted in part 5 |
| healthy register, N≥2 | value reaches consumers | identical |
| **frozen register, N=1** | reads as a healthy measurement, for ever | **site stops**: `inputs_ok` False → `stale_input_s` hold → 0 W, and keeps commanding |
| **frozen register, N≥2** | per-unit sign check false-trips at 85 s and parks a healthy inverter; circulation sensor reports a loop that is not happening | both consumers get `None`, both windows **clear** |
⚠️ **The N=1 row is a behaviour change on the roster that is running in a house
today, and it is named rather than hidden.** It is also the point of the card:
HW-01 was a one-inverter site. The direction it fails in is the safe one — a
false verdict commands 0 W and keeps commanding (§11.1 rule 1), behind the
existing `stale_input_s` hold, and clears itself on the register's next move.
The counterfactual is run, not argued. `test_freshness.py` part 3 drives real
`cycle()` calls at N=2 with A's register frozen at −1200 W and B's live at
+900 W, the command travel produced by the shipped `compute()` and allocator:
```
standing on A: [0, 445, 890, 1335, 1335, ...] (the shipped control law)
gated : sign trip tick=None circulating_w=[1800, 1800, 1800, None, None, ...]
counterfact : sign trip tick=11 circulating_w=[1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, 1800, ...]
```
---
## 5. What TEL-06 and TEL-08 still owe
**[[TEL-06]] — layer 1, Blocked, and nothing in this card can reach it.** The
ESPHome veto tests the *value* of `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`. This policy
lives in the add-on, on the other side of a flash, and cannot help. What TEL-06
owes is the same mechanism **inside the firmware**: a `millis()` stamp taken when
the setpoint/age entity is *written*, and a veto on `millis() − last_write_ms`
rather than on the published number. It is narrowed to that one substitution —
the policy question ("arrival, not value") is answered here; the remaining work
is a firmware stamp and a flash, which is a supervised human step.
**[[TEL-08]] — stale SoC.** It owes exactly three things, and no mechanism:
1. a **measured** usable capacity for pack A (or a defensible bound on it) — the
153.6 Wh per percent above is nominal and from the datasheet;
2. the **energy integral** since the reading last changed;
3. the constant **K** — how many percent-equivalents of throughput must pass
before an unmoved SoC is a fault.
It should consume `freshness.Freshness` with `BOUNDS["soc"]` filled in, not
restate the policy. The row is already in the table with `wired=False` and the
reason, and part 7 goes red the day that column stops being true.
**⚠️ Neither of them, and not this card, closes HW-01's whole class.** See §6.
---
## 6. Known survivors, with their size
Graded in `test_freshness.py` part 9, so they are residuals rather than
surprises.
| # | kind | what survives | size |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **false positive** | an inverter physically unable to follow — saturating, thermally derating, or a BMS refusing a charge — is declared stale while telling the truth | one spurious **site stop**, behind `stale_input_s`, self-clearing the moment the register moves. It cannot drive the battery anywhere |
| 2 | **miss** | a register frozen under a command that never travels 250 W is never detected, for 400 s or for ever | ⚠️ scoped for ONE consumer, NOT both, and the earlier claim here was wrong. TRUE for the per-unit sign check: no such check can speak about that unit (`unit_sign_disagree_w` = 250 W). **FALSE for circulation.** "Contributing at most 250 W" bounds the COMMAND; once the register is frozen its REPORTED value is unrelated to the command, which is exactly HW-01's shape - commanded ~0 W, register stuck on the last large number. Measured: a unit frozen at −1200 W beside a healthy +900 W sibling yields `circulating_w` = **1800 W against the 700 W floor, 2.6× over**, with no gate armed. Found in review; part 9's S2 check asserts only `not stale` and part 4 pairs the frozen unit with a RESTING sibling, so neither graded the sentence |
| 3 | **miss — the largest** | a dead publisher whose last values **alternate**, or a cache replaying two old samples, never starts the unchanged clock at all | **this gate detects a value that STOPPED; it cannot detect a value that is WRONG.** Nothing in this add-on can. TEL-06's arrival stamp inside the firmware is the only layer that could |
Recorded because it looks like a survivor and is not: a publisher failure that
freezes **both** registers is caught on both units independently, on each unit's
own command travel and each unit's own number.
---
## 7. Mutation record — 2026-09-06
`tools/mutation_run.sh`'s rule, honoured on every run: purge first (count printed,
`0` remaining), tree mounted `:ro`, `python3 -B`, fingerprint the tree, **and
fingerprint again after the revert**. Clean tree `app/freshness.py`
`sha256:f40fa3e8819014ce` / 20,065 B, `app/inverter.py` `7e760c6e8cdfa5b7` /
30,778 B, `app/main.py` `7d7ff4ba0697ea64` / 238,535 B. Each mutant graded by
`test_freshness.py` + `test_inverter.py`.
| # | mutation | file | Δ B | result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M0 | none (control) | freshness | +0 | **green** — the harness is not red on everything |
| M1 | `reading()` returns `self.last` unconditionally | freshness | −24 | red, 3 named checks |
| M2 | drop the command-travel term | freshness | −59 | red |
| M3 | drop the magnitude term | freshness | −54 | **SURVIVED**, then red — §2.2. This is the finding |
| M4 | latch never holds | freshness | +13 | red, 3 named checks |
| M5 | bound 90 s (slower than both consumers) | freshness | **+0** | red |
| M6 | bound 10 s (under the physical floor) | freshness | **+0** | red |
| M7 | `MOVE_W` 700 W | freshness | **+0** | red, on part 6's `config.yaml` pin |
| M8 | the wiring in `_read_unit` removed | main | −5 | red, 3 named checks |
| M9 | reset the unchanged clock on every arrival (value-stamped) | freshness | −43 | red |
| M10 | `standing_w()` drops `last_write` | inverter | −73 | red, and takes `test_inverter.py` with it |
| M11 | `standing_at_change` refreshed on every arrival | freshness | +121 | ⚠️ **DISCOUNTED — the mutant does not parse** |
| M11b | the same defect, written parseably | freshness | +105 | red |
| M12 | `BOUNDS["soc"].wired = True` — the table lies | freshness | −1 | red |
| M13 | the wrong signal submitted (`inv.soc` for `inv.batt`) | main | +4 | red, and `test_inverter.py` too |
| M14 | one `Freshness` shared by every unit | inverter | +29 | red |
| M15 | latch cleared by a failed read | freshness | +31 | **SURVIVED**, then red — see below |
⚠️ **M5, M6 and M7 are `+0 B`, which MUTATION.md names as the risky delta.** All
three are **reds**, which is the direction stale bytecode cannot fabricate, and
every run purged with the count printed and graded a `:ro` tree that physically
cannot hold a cache.
⚠️ **M11 IS NOT A RESULT AND IS NOT COUNTED.** Its edit dedents a statement into
the middle of an `if` body, so the module raises `IndentationError` at line 312
and both files go red without a single check being evaluated. Verified by
`ast.parse` rather than assumed. **M11b** is the same defect written so it
parses, and it is a real red.
### The two survivors, and what each one taught
**M3, the magnitude term** — see §2.2. Two terms of a conjunction that move
together in every fixture are one term as far as the checks are concerned.
Recorded as `MUTATION.md` **habit 17**, twelfth instance of "a check whose DATA
cannot reach the failure it names".
**M15, the latch cleared by a failed read** — found only because the sweep went
looking for what the checks would NOT see. No fixture had ever injected a read
failure *while latched*, and it matters: a stale verdict stops the site, the site
is then commanded 0 W, and one unreachable-Home-Assistant read would drop the
latch into a state where the conjunction is no longer armed — so the held
−1200 W would come back to the consumers on the very next successful read. Part 4
now grades exactly that and M15 is red.
### And one process defect worth more than the ledger
One mutation's container run overran a two-minute command budget and the wrapper
was killed **between the edit and the revert**, leaving `app/freshness.py`
mutated on disk. Nothing announced it; the next mutation's harness cheerfully
fingerprinted and graded the mutant *plus* a second mutation. It was caught by
comparing the tree fingerprint against the recorded clean one, restored, and
verified back to byte and `sha256` before anything else ran. Same defect as stale
bytecode, different cause. Recorded as `MUTATION.md` **habit 18**: *fingerprint
after the revert, not only before the run.*
### A third, in this file's own fixture
M2 originally reported "red" with **no named check behind it**. The mutant makes
the FRESH run stale, so `test_freshness.py`'s own diagnostic
`print(f"… {sorted(set(_fresh_read))}")` raised `TypeError` comparing `None` with
a float **before check one ran**. MUTATION.md's reporting rule is *"which suite
went red, and on which named check"*, and a print that can crash first destroys
exactly that. Sorted with `key=str` now; M2 reports its check.
### Re-verified at the committed head
The 16-row sweep above graded `test_freshness.py` as it stood when each mutation
ran; the two closures (M3's part-4 check, M15's failed-read check), the `key=str`
fix and the wall-clock hardening all landed afterwards. So six mutations were
re-run against **the exact tree that is committed** —
`test_freshness.py sha256:a62f3e1f1ac856cf`, 44,913 B:
| # | result at head |
|---|---|
| M0 control | **green** |
| M2 drop the command-travel term | red, on part 1's "FRESH AND UNCHANGED is not stale" |
| M3 drop the magnitude term | red, on part 4's magnitude check |
| M8 wiring removed | red, on three named checks in parts 2 and 3 |
| M11b `standing_at_change` drifts | red, on three named checks in part 1 |
| M15 latch cleared by a failed read | red, on part 4's failed-read check |
The other ten are unaffected by those edits: each is red on a check in parts 1,
2, 4, 6, 7 or 9 that none of them touches, and a mutation red on one check
cannot be made green by adding another.
### The wall clock, which part 3 cannot avoid and therefore measures
The freshness verdict runs on an injected monotonic clock and is deterministic.
The sign watchdog inside `cycle()` cannot be injected, so part 3 runs against the
real one — which is CI-06's failure mode exactly (`test_peakguard.py` answered
two checks with the wall clock, flaked at ~20 %, and cost a wrong merge
diagnosis). So the margin is measured and asserted rather than assumed:
gate closed after 0.61 s of WALL clock, against the 2 s watchdog window (3.3x margin)
If a loaded machine ever narrows that, the check fails **naming the number**,
which is the difference between "the box was slow" and "the code is broken".
+125 -1
View File
@@ -295,6 +295,42 @@ the P1 sample already went stale. Size the pair together: the ESP32's own
watchdog commands 0 W after ~30 s of silence from this add-on regardless, and
that layer is unaffected by either option.
#### How long a FROZEN inverter power register takes to reach 0 W
A third clock, and it is a different failure from the one above: the entity is
still there and still answering — it has simply stopped changing. Before
SAFETY-37 that read as a healthy measurement for ever, which is what happened on
2026-09-02 (HW-01): a value held for 6 h 25 m while the pack drained to its
floor, and every detector read healthy throughout.
`Inverter.batt` — the inverter's own AC power, register `0x0518` — is now
withheld from the control path when **all three** of these are true:
| | |
|---|---|
| the reading has not changed for | **35 s** |
| **and** the command standing on that inverter is over | **250 W** |
| **and** that command has travelled, since the reading last moved, over | **250 W** |
All three, because a converged site legitimately repeats one power figure for
minutes — measured at up to **263 s** over 30 days of this house's own meter —
and a site at rest is not owed movement. It is only when the controller has
*asked the inverter to move* and the register has not answered that the reading
is treated as missing.
**A withheld reading is a MISSING INPUT**, so it joins the `stale_input_s` clock
above: 35 s to withhold, then 15 s of hold, then 0 W. It clears itself the
instant the register reports a different value — one watt is enough, and this
register dithers ±1 W while holding — so a working inverter clears it on its
next 10 s publish. There is **no option to configure**: the 35 s is derived from
the ESPHome publish interval and the two watchdog windows it has to stay inside,
and the add-on's own checks refuse a value that does not.
⚠️ **What this does NOT catch: a register whose value is WRONG rather than
STOPPED**, including a dead publisher whose last two samples happen to
alternate. Detecting that needs an arrival stamp inside the ESP32 firmware
itself, which is TEL-06.
There is **no fallback to an inverter-side power figure**, deliberately. The
inverter's own AC power tracks its battery almost perfectly and the real meter
hardly at all, so a controller that failed over to it would be regulating
@@ -437,7 +473,7 @@ behind it would trip the firmware watchdog on a system that is working fine.
| `target_grid_w` | -10 | What the meter should rest at. Negative = a slight export |
| `step_w` | 10 | Quantisation |
| `saturation_w` | 500 | Divergence that counts as "the inverter is at a limit" |
| `saturation_cycles` | 3 | How many consecutive cycles before freezing. A cycle is one meter update or `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes first - see the note below. **Do not set to 1** |
| `saturation_cycles` | 3 | How many consecutive cycles before freezing. A cycle is one meter update or `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes first - see the note below. **Do not set to 1**. Every value this file accepts (1-10) is below the freeze's own release bound of 12 cycles, so no accepted setting can stop the block engaging - see SAFETY-13, below |
| `integrator_max_w` | 0 | Bound on the loop's accumulator, and 0 means "same as `max_w`". Caps how much stale error can be waiting to unwind when the sign flips. **Do not raise it above `max_w`** - the output clamp already bounds what is commanded, so the only thing extra headroom buys is more cycles of wrong-direction power after every saturation event. Lowering it below `max_w` is the useful direction |
| `heartbeat_s` | 10 | Refresh interval; must stay well under the firmware watchdog |
| `cycle_floor_s` | 15 | The longest the loop may go without evaluating. A deadline on the gap between cycles, reset by every cycle — on a healthy meter it never elapses and changes nothing. Raise it only if your meter is slower than ~10 s; it must stay under `meter_max_age_s`, past which there is no reading to evaluate anyway |
@@ -592,6 +628,94 @@ correct toward that wrong value instead of holding a stale command. It is bounde
happened to a lying meter whose value merely jittered — bit-exact repetition was never a
safety property.
#### When the freeze lets go, and when it deliberately never does (SAFETY-13)
While the loop is frozen the command's **magnitude may fall but never rise**. That is
the anti-windup rule, and at `prev_w == 0` it reads as a refusal to *start*: with
nothing commanded there is no magnitude left to fall, so a charge cannot begin. That
refusal is deliberate. Commanding 0 W while the inverter reports hundreds of watts
means something is driving the actuator that this add-on did not ask, and starting to
push power the other way into it is how two controllers end up fighting over one
actuator — the configuration §1.5 of the specification rules out.
**What was missing was an end to it.** Nothing cleared the block: not the error growing,
not the integrator moving, not time. The exit is now explicit, and *which* freezes get
one is the decision:
| the inverter is… | can it clear itself? | what happens now |
|---|---|---|
| doing **less** than the command, in the command's own direction — a cold pack, a curtailment, an export cap | **yes.** The command is pinned at something the inverter can reach, so it catches up and the freeze clears | unchanged: frozen for as long as it lasts, with no exit |
| doing something **outside** what the command can explain — overshooting it, or the opposite sign | **not necessarily.** If another writer is on the actuator, clearing the freeze needs the inverter to track *our* command and the other writer is what stops it, so nothing ends it | the freeze releases once the divergence has outlasted the plant that could otherwise have explained it — see *what `freeze-released` actually tells you*, below, because this row is also where our own ramp lands |
The second row's threshold is the plant's own measured settling time — **the slower of
the two directions it was measured in.** The 2026-08-22 step test timed the same 1.78 kW
step both ways: about 18 s to settle going up, about 23 s coming back down. 23 s is the
one that belongs here, because the question this bound answers is *how long may the plant
still be the explanation*, and the safe answer is to keep believing the plant for as long
as the plant has ever been seen to take. At the measured 2 s meter tick that is
**12 cycles** (`control.py`, `SETTLE_CYCLES`).
⚠️ **The first version of this feature used 18 s, and 9 cycles was wrong in the direction
that accuses.** Nine cycles is three short of the plant's own down-ramp, so an ordinary
load step on a **single** inverter — the command falling through zero while the pack is
still coasting the old way — could produce `freeze-released` with nothing else on the bus
at all. Driven in the container against a model of the measured plant, one inverter and
no second writer anywhere: over 272 load-step pairs the 9-cycle bound produced a release
in 62 of them and the shipped 12-cycle bound in 2.
**Releasing the output freeze does not unfreeze the loop.** The *integrator* freeze is
untouched, so the command is free to move only as far as an accumulator that stopped
accumulating cycles ago, one slew step per cycle. Measured on the simulator at the live
install's shape (`max_w 5000`, `slew_w 400`, `target_grid_w -10`), with another writer
holding the pack at +700 W and 2 kW of export standing: the command holds at 0 W while
the counter climbs, starts on the **twelfth** saturated cycle, walks 0 → −400 → −800, and
settles at **−1190 W** against a frozen integrator of −1194 W — not at the 5000 W rail.
Before this change the same run held 0.0 W on every cycle, for as long as the other
writer stayed.
⚠️ **The site still does not reach its target in that state, and it is not supposed
to.** What the exit buys is that the battery stops being idle while the site exports;
what it does not buy is correct regulation against an actuator somebody else is also
writing to. A standing grid error with another writer on the bus is the symptom of a
configuration this add-on refuses to support, not a tuning problem.
#### What `freeze-released` in the action log actually tells you
**It says: the inverter's power did not match the command for longer than this plant has
ever been measured to take to settle.** That is all it says. It is a reason to go
looking; it is not a finding, and in particular it is **not** proof that a second writer
exists.
The test behind it compares the reading against **one cycle's** command, and the pack
carries more than one cycle of history. So our own power, arriving late, can look like
somebody else's:
- **A big, fast load step is the ordinary innocent cause.** The command falls through
zero while the pack is still coasting in the old direction, and for a few cycles the
reading has the sign the command *used* to have. Measured, one inverter, nothing else
on the bus: eight cycles after a +1990 W command the command was 0 and the pack still
read +522.3 W.
- **A plant slower than the one that was measured does it too.** The 12-cycle bound is
derived from a 23 s down-ramp. A colder or larger pack that takes longer than that will
produce releases on its own, and no constant read off the 2026-08-22 measurement can
prevent it. In the same container sweep, holding the bound at 12 and lengthening only
the plant's down-ramp, single-inverter releases went from 8 of 320 scenarios at the
measured 23 s to 59 of 320 at 34 s and 268 of 320 at 50 s.
**So, in order:** if you see `freeze-released` **once, during or just after a large load
or PV swing**, that is most likely the loop's own ramp and needs nothing. If you see it
**standing** — cycle after cycle, at a steady load, with a standing grid error the
battery is not correcting — then look for the second writer: another controller, a
scheduler in the inverter's own app, or an installer tool left connected. That is the
configuration §1.5 of the specification rules out, and it is the one this exit exists to
stop the loop stalling on forever.
⚠️ **No `saturation_cycles` you can set removes the block.** This file accepts 1-10, and
all of those are below the 12-cycle release bound, so the freeze always engages before
its own exit is due. (The first version of this feature had the bound at 9, where a
setting of 9 or 10 *did* silently delete the block; moving the bound to 12 closed that
by construction rather than by warning about it.)
#### Why `target_grid_w` is not zero
The deadband is a one-way ratchet: any resting point inside it holds until
+40
View File
@@ -546,6 +546,46 @@ Cheap habits fall out of it, and all of them are now used in this repository:
instance of habit 4 in this file, and the second one in an instrument
rather than in a check.**
17. ⚠️ **TWO TERMS OF A CONJUNCTION THAT MOVE TOGETHER IN EVERY FIXTURE ARE
ONE TERM AS FAR AS THE CHECKS ARE CONCERNED - TWELFTH INSTANCE OF HABIT 4,
and the third found by an author's own battery rather than by review.**
SAFETY-37's freshness gate is `unchanged >= 35 s AND |standing| >= 250 W
AND |travel| >= 250 W`. Deleting the MIDDLE term left every check in the
first draft green, because in all of them a command that had *travelled*
250 W had also *ended up* above 250 W: the fixture never separated the two,
so one of them was decoration as far as the suite could tell. The case that
separates them is a site being brought to REST - the register reaches its
new value on the same read at which the OLD command is still standing, so
the travel term alone reads 1300 W of unfollowed command while the site
sits truthfully at +5 W. Ask of every conjunction: **is there a fixture in
which each term is the ONLY one that is false?** If not, the suite cannot
tell an AND from an OR.
18. ⚠️ **AN UNVERIFIED REVERT IS THE SAME DEFECT AS STALE BYTECODE, AND TWO
HARNESSES SHARING ONE BACKUP PATH IS THE WORST VERSION OF IT.** SAFETY-37's
sweep hit this twice, in ascending order of nastiness.
* A mutation's container run overran a two-minute command budget and the
wrapper was killed **between the edit and the `cp` that puts the file
back**, leaving `app/freshness.py` mutated on disk. Nothing announced it;
the next mutation's harness cheerfully fingerprinted and graded the mutant
*plus* a second mutation.
* Then two copies of the sweep were started - a scheduling mistake, not a
tool defect - and the harness kept its backup at the FIXED path
`/tmp/mut.bak`. One copy saved `app/main.py` there; the other restored it
**over `app/freshness.py`**. The result was a 238 KB `freshness.py` that
still parsed as Python, plus `main.py` left holding a live mutation. No
error, no warning, and the only reason it was noticed is that the tree
fingerprint did not match the recorded clean one.
Two rules, and the first is the cheap one:
* **Fingerprint after the revert, not only before the run.**
`tools/mutation_run.sh` prints the tree it is about to grade for exactly
this reason; the revert deserves the same treatment, and a mismatch is a
stop-everything result rather than a note.
* **A harness's scratch file must be unique per invocation** (`mktemp`), so
that two of it cannot silently overwrite each other's work. A fixed path
in a tool that edits source is a shared mutable global with a filename.
And the mutation-table consequence: **a variant is not covered because a
near-miss of it is.** DEV-02's table listed the *actuator* variant of the
per-unit claim defect (`device`/`supervised` filed without `inv`), which the
+234 -3
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ the short version is in the comments below. Do not "clean this up" - each rule
exists because its absence produced a specific, observed failure.
"""
import math
from dataclasses import dataclass
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -65,6 +66,17 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
# validate.py refuse the impossible case only, never "close
# to the rail".
#
# ⚠️ AND THAT CHOICE IS LOCAL TO THIS BOUND. §5.10 MEASURED THE STEP IN BOTH
# DIRECTIONS, so "the plant's settling time" is a PAIR and not a number, and
# which half is the safe one depends on which way being wrong hurts. Taking
# 18 for a REFUSAL is right: the looser number refuses less. Taking 18 for a
# question of the form "how long does the plant remain a candidate
# explanation" is WRONG, because the looser number stops believing the plant
# too early - and there the answer is a false accusation. SAFETY-13 asks that
# second question and so reads PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S below, deliberately not
# this constant. Anything else added here has to say which of the two it
# means and why.
#
# LOOP_TICK_S is the METER, not this loop. `run_control()` runs a cycle on
# a changed meter value or on `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes
# first, so the tick is the meter's own update rate. 2.0 s is
@@ -86,6 +98,99 @@ PLANT_SETTLE_S = 18.0
LOOP_TICK_S = 2.0
SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S # 0.111..., i.e. 9 ticks
# The other half of the same measurement: the descent of the same 1.78 kW step,
# ~23 s from a -1784 W export excursion back into the deadband (goodwe/NOTES.md
# §5.10, the same run, the same day, the same plug). It is slower than the ramp
# up, which is the ordinary asymmetry of a pack that is pushed one way and
# coasts the other. Nothing above this line reads it; SAFETY-13 below does.
PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S = 23.0
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-13. HOW LONG THE PLANT STAYS A CANDIDATE EXPLANATION.
#
# The output freeze below stops the command growing while the inverter is not
# following. Two completely different things produce that divergence and the
# freeze cannot tell them apart on magnitude alone:
#
# (a) THE PLANT HAS NOT CAUGHT UP YET, or it is at a limit - a cold pack, a
# curtailment, an export cap. Asking for more is pointless, and the
# freeze is right to hold. It also CLEARS ITSELF: the command is pinned
# at something the inverter can do, so the inverter catches up to it and
# `saturated_now` goes false.
#
# ⚠️ AND (a) INCLUDES THE CASE `unasked_power()` BELOW CANNOT SEE AS (a):
# the command has fallen THROUGH ZERO and the pack is still coasting in
# the old direction, so the reading has the sign the command used to have
# and not the one it has now. That is this loop's own power, arriving
# late. It is the reason the time bound is what does the work here and
# the predicate alone is not enough.
#
# (b) SOMETHING ELSE IS DRIVING THE ACTUATOR - the §1.5 non-goal, two writers
# on one actuator. The freeze CANNOT clear itself here, because clearing
# it needs the inverter to track OUR command and the other writer is what
# stops it. Nothing ends this but the other writer going away.
#
# ⚠️ SO THE BOUND IS ONLY EVER A REASON TO STOP BELIEVING (a). It does not
# establish (b) and nothing below claims it does: what it says is that the
# plant has run out of alibi, and (b) is then the only explanation this loop
# has left - not the only one there is. Everything downstream of the release is
# written to be safe when that inference is wrong, because sometimes it is.
#
# Case (a) is bounded by the plant, and the plant was measured:
#
# SETTLE_CYCLES = ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S)
#
# ⚠️ THE **DOWN** NUMBER, AND THE DIRECTION IS THE WHOLE POINT. §5.10 measured
# the same step both ways - 18 s up, 23 s down - and SAFETY-39 takes 18 because
# 18 is the LOOSER bound for a REFUSAL. This is the opposite job. Here the
# question is "how long may the plant still be the explanation", and the
# conservative answer is the LONGER of the two: believe the plant for as long
# as the plant has ever been observed to take. Deriving this from 18 gives 9,
# which is three cycles SHORT of the plant's own measured down-ramp - and being
# short here does not refuse anything, it ACCUSES. Measured, single inverter,
# no second writer anywhere, 1280 closed-loop scenarios: at 9 the exit fires in
# 113 of them and at 12 in 24. The direction of that error is why the pair is
# now two named constants instead of one.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NO LONGER THE RECIPROCAL OF SLEW_RAIL_FRAC. It was, at 9, and
# that coincidence read as a derivation - two different questions that happened
# to share an answer while both were being asked of the same half of a two-
# sided measurement. They are 9 and 12 now. If they ever coincide again it is
# arithmetic, not agreement.
#
# ⚠️ IT INHERITS SAFETY-39's CAVEAT ABOUT LOOP_TICK_S, in the opposite
# direction, which is why it is repeated rather than cross-referenced. A meter
# SLOWER than 2 s makes these 12 cycles cover MORE than 23 s, so the freeze
# holds longer than the plant needs: that costs energy - see the case in
# DOCS.md - and never safety. A meter FASTER than 2 s makes them cover LESS,
# so the freeze can release while the plant is genuinely still moving. That one
# is bounded twice over and by neither this constant nor luck: the INTEGRATOR
# freeze is not released with the output freeze, so the command can only reach
# the integrator's frozen value, and the output clamp bounds that in turn.
#
# ⚠️ AND A PLANT SLOWER THAN THE ONE THAT WAS MEASURED DOES THE SAME THING,
# which no constant derived from a measurement can fix. In the same 1280
# scenarios, holding the bound at 12 and lengthening only the plant's down-ramp
# past the measured 23 s, the exit starts firing again on a single inverter:
# 8/320 at 23 s, 59/320 at 34 s, 268/320 at 50 s. A re-measured plant means a
# re-derived constant here, exactly as for the two above it.
SETTLE_CYCLES = math.ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) # 12
# The saturation counter's ceiling, one above the longest bound read from it. A
# counter capped BELOW that bound would silently make the bound unreachable -
# i.e. delete the exit condition - so it is written against SETTLE_CYCLES and
# not as a literal, and it moves when SETTLE_CYCLES moves.
#
# ⚠️ IT WAS 10, WHICH IS ALSO config.yaml's MAXIMUM FOR `saturation_cycles`,
# AND THAT COLLISION IS GONE. At a bound of 9 the largest accepted
# `saturation_cycles` (10) sat ABOVE the exit, so a legal configuration could
# push the freeze's engagement past its own release and the no-start block
# stopped existing. At 12 every accepted value 1..10 is strictly below the
# bound, so the freeze always engages before its exit is due and no accepted
# configuration can delete the block. `test_control.py` pins that at the schema
# edge rather than in prose, because it is a property of two files agreeing.
_SAT_COUNT_CAP = SETTLE_CYCLES + 1 # 13
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Tuning:
@@ -185,6 +290,71 @@ def slew_limit_w(tuning: Tuning) -> float:
return SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * abs(float(tuning.max_w))
def unasked_power(prev_w: float, actual_w: float, saturation_w: float) -> bool:
"""True when `actual_w` cannot be explained by THIS cycle's command not being met.
SAFETY-13. The one question the saturation magnitude test cannot answer:
is the inverter FAILING TO REACH what we asked, or is it doing something
the command in front of it does not account for?
⚠️ THE ANSWER IS PHYSICAL, NOT STATISTICAL, WHICH IS WHY IT IS A PREDICATE
AND NOT A THRESHOLD. A limit can only make the inverter do LESS than the
command, in the command's own direction. It cannot make it overshoot the
command, and it cannot make it produce power of the OPPOSITE sign. So the
whole set of readings a limit can produce is the closed interval spanned by
0 and `prev_w`, widened by `saturation_w` for measurement noise, ramp lag
and the inverter's own idle draw.
⚠️ WHAT IT DOES NOT SAY - AND AN EARLIER VERSION OF THIS DOCSTRING DID -
IS THAT ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE INTERVAL WAS PUT THERE BY SOMETHING OTHER THAN
THIS LOOP. THAT IS FALSE AND IT WAS MEASURED FALSE. This predicate has no
memory: `prev_w` is one cycle's command, while the plant carries every
command before it. Drive ONE inverter, with nothing else on the bus, from a
discharge down through zero, and the pack is still coasting in the old
direction after the command has crossed. Measured in the container, one
`compute()` against one plant: eight cycles after a +1990 W command the
command is 0 and the pack still reads +522.3 W, so
`unasked_power(0, 522.3, 500)` is True - and every watt of that 522.3 was
asked for by this loop. In 1280 single-inverter closed-loop scenarios with
no second writer in them at all, the exit built on this predicate fires in
24 of them.
So what it guarantees is exactly the sentence at the top: this cycle's
command does not account for this cycle's reading. What it CANNOT do is
tell "somebody else is writing" from "we are". That gap is the reason
SETTLE_CYCLES is derived from the plant's slower direction, why the caller
checks both, and why the reason string it produces is a place to start
looking rather than a finding.
Worked, at `saturation_w = 500`:
prev +2000, actual +700 -> inside [0, 2000] a limit. False.
prev -5000, actual -700 -> inside [-5000, 0] a limit. False.
prev 0, actual +700 -> outside [-500, 500] unasked. True.
prev -800, actual +700 -> outside [-1300, 500] unasked. True.
⚠️ AT `prev_w == 0` THIS IS EXACTLY `saturated_now`, and that is not a
coincidence to be tidied away - it is the reason the freeze's zero case is
the one the card was written about. With nothing commanded there is no
interval left for a LIMIT to live in, so at zero this test cannot be
answered by "the inverter is not reaching what we asked" at all. It can
still be answered by "the inverter has not finished leaving what we asked
for LAST time", which is the coast-down above and is why zero needs the
time bound as much as any other `prev_w` does.
⚠️ IT IS NOT A DETECTOR AND MUST NOT BE ALARMED ON. A saturated inverter
whose reading is stale, wrong-signed or simply noisy lands outside the
interval too, and so does our own ramp, above. All this predicate decides
is whether the output freeze gets an EXIT; being wrong about it costs at
most a bounded command that the frozen integrator and the output clamp both
still bound. SAFETY-30's `unit_sign_disagree_w` is the thing that alarms on
sign, and it is deliberately a different test with a different threshold.
"""
lo = min(0.0, float(prev_w)) - abs(float(saturation_w))
hi = max(0.0, float(prev_w)) + abs(float(saturation_w))
return not (lo <= float(actual_w) <= hi)
def compute(
prev_w: float,
grid_w: float,
@@ -232,7 +402,7 @@ def compute(
# clockless; the remaining ceiling is that saturation_cycles expresses a
# bound in seconds rather than an exact number of them.
saturated_now = abs(prev_w - actual_w) > tuning.saturation_w
sat_count = min(sat_count + 1, 10) if saturated_now else 0
sat_count = min(sat_count + 1, _SAT_COUNT_CAP) if saturated_now else 0
frozen = sat_count >= tuning.saturation_cycles
# --- deadband ----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -346,8 +516,69 @@ def compute(
# implementation: commanding 0 while the inverter reports >500 W means
# something else is driving the bus, and that is not the moment to
# start pushing power the other way.
target = min(target, prev_w) if prev_w > 0 else max(target, prev_w)
reason = "saturated-freeze"
#
# --- SAFETY-13: ...AND IT IS NOT THE MOMENT FOREVER EITHER ----------
# Everything above stands. What was missing is an END. Held at
# `prev_w == 0` this is a refusal to START, and nothing in this
# function or above it clears it - not the error growing, not the
# integrator moving, not time. Measured on release/1.0 @ c8dcb38, at
# the live install's shape (max_w 5000, slew_w 400, target_grid_w -10):
# a site resting in the deadband with another writer holding the pack
# at +700 W reaches sat_count 3 with the command at 0, and 0 W is then
# a FIXED POINT - a 2 kW export arriving afterwards leaves the command
# at exactly 0.0 W on every subsequent cycle, with the integrator
# standing at -1194 W the whole time.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE ZERO CASE IS NOT SPECIAL, WHICH IS WHY THE FIX IS NOT
# SPECIAL EITHER. The same run pinned at prev_w == -800 W, against its
# own integrator standing at -2388 W, for as long as it ran.
# `prev_w == 0` is only the instance where the pinned magnitude happens
# to be zero - i.e. where the standing cost is the whole of what the
# battery could have done.
# A rule written for the zero case alone would have left the other
# instances exactly as unbounded as it found them.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT DECIDES IS NOT HOW LONG, IT IS WHETHER THE FREEZE CAN EVER
# END ON ITS OWN. See SETTLE_CYCLES and `unasked_power()` at the top:
# a divergence a LIMIT could produce clears itself once the inverter
# catches up to the pinned command, so it needs no exit and gets none -
# unbounded, exactly as shipped. A divergence a limit CANNOT produce
# does not clear itself by being waited on, so it gets one.
#
# ⚠️ AND THAT IS NOT THE SAME SENTENCE AS "THE OTHER WRITER". An
# earlier version of this comment said the two conditions below fire
# only in case (b); they do not, and the sweep says so. Our own plant
# coasting through a command that has just crossed zero satisfies
# `unasked_power()` too, because that predicate compares against ONE
# cycle's command and the pack remembers more than one - measured, a
# single inverter with nothing else on the bus reaching this branch in
# 24 of 1280 closed-loop scenarios. `SETTLE_CYCLES` is what keeps that
# rare rather than routine (113 of the same 1280 at the old bound of
# 9), and it does it by believing the plant for as long as the plant
# has ever been measured to take. It is a bound on how long we wait,
# not a proof about what we found.
#
# ⚠️ SO THE RELEASE IS WRITTEN TO BE SURVIVABLE WHEN IT IS WRONG, and
# that is the paragraph below, not this one: what a false release costs
# is one slew step per cycle toward a frozen integrator. If it ever has
# to cost less than that, the thing to change is what happens after the
# release, not the confidence of the sentence before it.
#
# ⚠️ RELEASING IS NOT UNFREEZING. The INTEGRATOR freeze above is not
# lifted, and that is what makes this bounded rather than merely
# different: the command is free to move, but only as far as an
# integrator that stopped accumulating cycles ago, through the same
# slew limit as any other cycle. It buys back the standing error, not
# the rail.
#
# `reason` is authoritative here in a way it is not elsewhere in this
# function: nothing after this line writes it.
if unasked_power(prev_w, actual_w, tuning.saturation_w) \
and sat_count >= SETTLE_CYCLES:
reason = "freeze-released"
else:
target = min(target, prev_w) if prev_w > 0 else max(target, prev_w)
reason = "saturated-freeze"
# --- quantise ----------------------------------------------------------
# 10 W. The register is 1 W and the inverter reports at 1 W, but its
+385
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
"""SAFETY-37 - a reading that holds its last value and reads healthy.
THE DEFECT, in one sentence: `hass.number()` returns a held value as a value,
and nothing anywhere in this add-on distinguishes "the inverter reports 40 %"
from "the entity still says 40 % because nothing has updated it since Tuesday".
The architect pass of 2026-09-06 put three cards on one mechanism. This module
is that mechanism; the other two are its consumers.
LAYER 1 `goodwe/master/goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml:690` - the
(TEL-06) ingest-age veto tests the VALUE of `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`.
A dead publisher leaves the entity frozen at a healthy number and
the veto can never fire. NOT FIXED HERE - it is firmware, it is on
the other side of a flash, and nothing in this module can reach
it. What it owes is written at the bottom of this docstring.
THIS ADD-ON `app/hass.py:69-82`, consumed by SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check
(SAFETY-37) and SAFETY-31's circulating-power sensor. Both read `Inverter.batt`
(register 0x0518) and NEITHER had a freshness gate of any kind.
THE EVIDENCE HW-01, 2026-09-02: SoC held 40 % for 6 h 25 m while the pack
drained to its floor. Every detector read healthy throughout.
⚠️ AT N>=2 EVERY ONE OF THOSE READINGS DOUBLES, which is why this card is the
one that had to build it: the per-unit sign check and the circulation sensor
only exist at N>=2, and both are fed straight from `Inverter.batt`.
WHAT CANNOT BE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH, AND IT IS NOT A DETAIL
==========================================================
Home Assistant's `last_updated` DOES NOT MOVE when a value is rewritten
unchanged. Neither does `last_changed`, and this project measured that
`last_reported` does not advance on a repeat on either serialiser either - see
`p1.HomeWizardLocalSource`'s docstring, which records the ENV-01 rig measurement
over 70 s of a frozen meter and an independent one against the live house.
So a value-side timestamp out of Home Assistant is a "time since the number
changed" sensor wearing an arrival sensor's name. Thresholding it is how a
detector ends up unable to fire, which is TEL-06's defect exactly. That trap
produced two false diagnoses on 2026-09-05, both by a reader who already knew
about it, which is why it is written here in full rather than referenced.
⚠️ AND THE CONVERSE TRAP IS THE ONE THIS MODULE HAD TO SOLVE. The add-on polls
Home Assistant's state cache roughly once a second (`run_control()`'s
`await asyncio.sleep(1)` bounds the loop body and `read_inputs()` runs every
pass). While the entity exists, HA answers 200 with a number whether or not the
publisher behind it is alive. So AN ARRIVAL AT THE ADD-ON IS NOT AN ARRIVAL FROM
THE INVERTER, and an arrival age alone cannot see HW-01 at all.
What IS arrival-stamped here, and what makes this module honest, is the clock
the verdict is measured on: `changed_mono` is the MONOTONIC INSTANT OF THE
ARRIVAL THAT LAST CARRIED A DIFFERENT NUMBER. Every term below is a fact about
arrivals this process observed, on its own clock. Nothing is read out of a Home
Assistant timestamp, and nothing would change if Home Assistant stopped
publishing timestamps altogether.
THE VERDICT, AND WHY IT IS A CONJUNCTION
========================================
A bare "unchanged for N seconds" threshold is not available, and that is
MEASURED rather than feared. Over the committed 30-day capture of this house's
own 1 W-resolution power entity - `scenarios/p1-net-30d-2026-08/`, 485,841
samples straight out of Home Assistant's recorder, where a row exists only when
the state string CHANGED, so the gap between two rows IS the unchanged duration
every consumer saw:
longest unchanged run, 30 days 263.2 s (held -899.0 W, 2026-08-11 17:04)
runs >= 35 s 10 of 485,840 (0.0021 %)
runs >= 17 s 386 of 485,840 (0.0794 %)
Measured on 2026-09-06 by replaying that capture. A real power figure at 1 W
resolution held ONE value for four and a half minutes with nothing whatever
wrong. ⚠️ That is the METER's register, not 0x0518, and it is named as a
surrogate rather than passed off as the thing: no 30-day capture of 0x0518
exists, because that register is not in the recorder export. What it does
establish - and this is all it is used for - is that the LEGITIMATE unchanged
duration of a power entity in this house is minutes, so an unchanged threshold
alone must be minutes, and minutes is three times too slow to protect consumers
that trip at 75 s and 85 s. The conjunction is not a refinement; without it
there is no admissible threshold at all.
⚠️ AND EVERY ONE OF THOSE LONG RUNS HAPPENED UNDER AN UNMOVING LOAD. That is
the way out, and it is the same shape `freeze.looks_frozen()` already uses for
the meter (unchanged AND the command pinned at the rail). A reading is stale
when it has not moved THROUGH A CHANGE IT WAS OBLIGED TO FOLLOW:
STALE <=> unchanged for >= UNCHANGED_S
AND |standing command now| >= MOVE_W
AND |standing command now - standing command when the reading
last changed| >= MOVE_W
0x0518 is the inverter reporting ITSELF and it tracks its own command: r = 0.998
with battery power against r = 0.09 with the real meter (goodwe/NOTES.md §3.3),
command and actual agreeing within 4 W once settled (§5.10, 2026-08-22), and the
register dithering +/-1 W while holding (§5.11, same day). A unit told to move
250 W and still answering the same integer watt cannot be tracking.
THE BOUNDS - ONE PER SIGNAL, EACH WITH ITS DERIVATION
=====================================================
⚠️ ONE CONSTANT FOR BOTH SIGNALS WOULD BE USELESS ON SoC OR TRIGGER-HAPPY ON
POWER, which is the third clause of the policy. They are separated here, and
only one of them is WIRED - see `BOUNDS` below and the note on SoC.
`batt` / 0x0518, S16, 1 W, published every 10 s
----------------------------------------------
LOWER BOUND, 17.0 s, the fastest a healthy register can be OBLIGED to have
answered. Three terms, each read out of this repository on 2026-09-06:
6.0 s the plant. goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22 with the poll
temporarily at 1 s and a 0 -> +500 W step: 26 W at +1.43 s, 469 W
(94 %) at +3.34 s, settled 507 W at +6.05 s.
10.0 s the publisher. `firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181`,
`update_interval: 10s` on the `modbus_controller` that carries both
0x0518 and 0x050E. A command that moves right after a poll is not
visible until the next one.
1.0 s this add-on's own read period - `run_control()`'s
`await asyncio.sleep(1)`, which bounds the loop body that calls
`read_inputs()`.
UPPER BOUND, 75.0 s, the tighter of the two consumers this card must protect,
both read from `config.yaml` on 2026-09-06:
75 s `circulation_hold_s` (config.yaml:512) - SAFETY-31 trips here.
85 s `unit_sign_disagree_s` (config.yaml:451) - SAFETY-30's per-unit sign
check trips here.
A gate slower than either is a gate that hands its consumer the frozen number
and then explains afterwards. ⚠️ AND THAT INEQUALITY IS GRADED, NOT ASSERTED -
`test_freshness.py` part 6 reads BOTH ends out of the shipped `config.yaml`
and goes red if an operator's default moves under this bound.
35.0 s IS THE CHOSEN VALUE, and the admissible band is narrow enough that it
is nearly forced: at least 2x the 17.0 s floor (34.0) and at most half the
75.0 s consumer window (37.5) leaves [34.0, 37.5]. 35 is the integer in it.
⚠️ DELIBERATELY NOT 30 AND NOT 60. 30 is `validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S` and
would read as a borrowed constant nobody re-derived; 60 is round, and a round
number here would be a guess wearing a measurement's clothes.
WHAT IT COSTS, stated rather than absorbed: a frozen 0x0518 on a unit that is
never asked to move 250 W is not detected by this module at all.
⚠️ THAT COST IS BOUNDED FOR ONE CONSUMER AND NOT FOR THE OTHER, and an earlier
version of this note claimed both. TRUE for the per-unit sign check: no such
check can speak about that unit either, since `unit_sign_disagree_w` is 250 W.
FALSE for circulation. "Contributing at most 250 W" bounds the COMMAND - but a
frozen register's REPORTED value is unrelated to its command, and that is
precisely HW-01's shape: commanded ~0 W, register stuck on the last large
number. Measured in review: a unit frozen at -1200 W beside a healthy +900 W
sibling gives `circulating_w` = 1800 W against a 700 W floor, 2.6x over, with
no gate armed. So this gate is scoped to where the SIGN consumer can be misled;
the circulation consumer keeps an unbounded exposure below MOVE_W and that is
a known, stated gap rather than a covered one.
`soc` / 0x050E, U16, 1 %, published every 10 s - STATED, NOT WIRED
-----------------------------------------------------------------
⚠️ THIS ROW IS THE POLICY'S ANSWER FOR TEL-08 AND IT IS NOT CONNECTED TO
ANYTHING. It is here because the third clause of the policy is "state each
bound and its derivation", and because a reader who finds only `batt` wired
would reasonably conclude SoC was forgotten. It was not; it needs a
corroborator this card cannot derive.
SoC CANNOT USE THE CONJUNCTION ABOVE. A pack resting at its floor holds one
percent for hours with nothing wrong - the card's own example - and the
standing command says nothing about it, because a command of 0 W is exactly
what a rested pack is given. The physically obliged movement for SoC is
ENERGY, not command travel: one percent of pack A is about 153.6 Wh (15.36 kWh
nominal, goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b's table - ⚠️ NOMINAL and FROM DATASHEET, not a
measured usable capacity), so at pack A's 5000 W ceiling one percent takes at
least 110 s and at a realistic 1000 W about 553 s. The bound TEL-08 needs is
therefore "SoC unchanged while the integral of |battery power| since its last
change exceeded K x 153.6 Wh", and K cannot be chosen from anything written
down today: nobody has measured this pack's usable capacity, its BMS reporting
granularity, or how far its reported percent lags true state of charge.
So TEL-08 owes: that capacity measurement (or a defensible bound on it), the
integrator, and K. It does NOT owe a second freshness mechanism - `Freshness`
below takes its obligation term from the caller precisely so that an energy
integral can be handed in where command travel is handed in here.
"""
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
# --- the three terms of the lower bound, each read out of this repository ----
# See the module docstring for where each one is measured. They are separate
# names rather than a literal 17.0 so that a reader who changes the firmware's
# `update_interval` can find this file by grepping for the number they moved.
PLANT_SETTLE_S = 6.0 # goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22
PUBLISH_PERIOD_S = 10.0 # firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181
READ_PERIOD_S = 1.0 # main.run_control()'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)`
BATT_OBLIGED_S = PLANT_SETTLE_S + PUBLISH_PERIOD_S + READ_PERIOD_S # 17.0
# The unchanged bound for register 0x0518. See the derivation above; the band is
# [2 * BATT_OBLIGED_S, 0.5 * circulation_hold_s] = [34.0, 37.5].
BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35.0
# How far the standing command must have travelled for the register to be
# OBLIGED to have followed it.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS THE LARGEST ADMISSIBLE VALUE, NOT A SENSITIVITY PREFERENCE, and that
# is what makes it a derivation. The gate has to arm everywhere a stale reading
# could mislead a consumer; the earliest either consumer speaks is
# `unit_sign_disagree_w`, 250 W (config.yaml:450), because below that
# `watchdog.disagrees()` is False whatever the measurement says. Taking the
# ceiling of the admissible range is what minimises spurious arming. A smaller
# number would arm the gate in states where nothing downstream can be misled,
# and every such arming is a spurious site stop bought for nothing.
#
# ⚠️ NOT A CONFIG KEY. CFG-03 tracks the places a default has to be kept in
# step and this does not earn another one - it is derived from a default
# `config.yaml` already carries, and `test_freshness.py` part 6 READS that file
# and goes red if the two drift.
MOVE_W = 250.0
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Bound:
"""One signal's freshness bound, and whether anything consumes it."""
signal: str
unchanged_s: float
move_w: float
wired: bool
derivation: str
# ⚠️ THE POLICY AS DATA, AND THE `wired` COLUMN IS LOAD-BEARING. A reader must be
# able to tell, without reading main.py, which of these bounds is actually
# gating a consumer today. `test_freshness.py` part 7 greps the shipped app/ for
# each row and refuses a row that claims to be wired and is not - and a row that
# claims not to be and is.
BOUNDS = {
"batt": Bound(
signal="batt (0x0518, AC power, S16, 1 W, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=BATT_UNCHANGED_S,
move_w=MOVE_W,
wired=True,
derivation="settle 6.0 + publish 10.0 + read 1.0 = 17.0 s floor; "
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]"),
"soc": Bound(
signal="soc (0x050E, pack SoC, U16, 1 %, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=float("inf"),
move_w=float("inf"),
wired=False,
derivation="TEL-08. Command travel is the WRONG obligation term for "
"SoC - a rested pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W "
"command. The term is energy: >= K x 153.6 Wh through the "
"pack since the reading last changed. K needs a measured "
"usable capacity nobody has taken."),
}
class Freshness:
"""One signal's arrival record, and the stale verdict it supports.
⚠️ ARRIVAL-DRIVEN THROUGHOUT. Every clock reading this object ever makes is
handed to `submit()` by the caller at the moment a value arrived; nothing
here reads a clock of its own and nothing here reads a Home Assistant
timestamp. That is what makes the verdict replayable - `test_freshness.py`
drives real seconds through it without sleeping - and it is the difference
between this and the value-stamped veto TEL-06 is blocked on.
⚠️ THE VERDICT LATCHES, AND WITHOUT THAT IT OSCILLATES AT ABOUT 1 Hz.
Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False, which
commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1), which drops the standing command below
`MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction, which would return the held number
to the consumers - and round again every read. So the ONLY thing that clears
the latch is an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number, which is exactly the
evidence the verdict was about. A register that is working clears it on its
next 10 s publish; a register that is not, does not.
"""
def __init__(self, bound: Bound):
self.bound = bound
# The last number that ARRIVED, or None if the most recent read did not
# produce one. This is what `reading()` hands back when the gate is open,
# so a read failure is still an immediate None exactly as it is today.
self.last = None
# The number the reading is currently HOLDING, and the monotonic instant
# of the arrival that last carried a different one. `held` survives a
# failed read; the unchanged clock is about the value, not about our
# ability to fetch it.
self.held = None
self.changed_mono = None
# The standing command at that same instant. The conjunction compares
# against THIS, not against the previous cycle's command: what matters
# is whether the register has followed anything since it last moved.
self.standing_at_change = None
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.arrivals = 0
def submit(self, value, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""One READ of this signal. `value` None means nothing arrived.
`value` the number `hass.number()` produced, or None.
`standing_w` what this controller currently has standing on this unit's
wire, signed, + = discharge. None when nothing is known.
`now_mono` the caller's monotonic clock, in seconds.
⚠️ A FAILED READ IS NOT AN ARRIVAL AND IS NOT AN AGE EITHER. It clears
`last` immediately - which is byte-for-byte what shipping code does
today, a missing reading being a missing reading - and it leaves the
unchanged clock running, because the value has not changed and our
inability to fetch it is not evidence that it has.
"""
if value is None:
self.last = None
return
value = float(value)
self.arrivals += 1
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
self.held = value
self.changed_mono = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_change = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
# Movement is the ONLY thing that clears the latch. See the class
# docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation this prevents.
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.last = value
self._grade(standing_w, now_mono)
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""The conjunction. Sets the latch; never clears it."""
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
return
held_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
if held_s < self.bound.unchanged_s:
return
# ⚠️ BOTH None GUARDS ARE FOR A CALLER THAT DOES NOT KNOW ITS OWN
# OBLIGATION YET, WHICH IS NOT `_read_unit`. `Inverter.standing_w()`
# always answers a float, so neither branch is reachable from the wired
# consumer today. They are here for TEL-08, whose obligation term is an
# energy integral that has nothing to say until it has a window - and
# "nothing to say" must withhold the verdict, not manufacture one.
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_change is None:
return
standing_w = float(standing_w)
if abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w:
return
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_change)
if moved_w < self.bound.move_w:
return
self.stale = True
self.reason = (
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {held_s:.0f} s "
f"while the standing command moved {moved_w:.0f} W to "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W - the reading is not following, so it is "
f"reported as MISSING rather than as a measurement (limits: "
f"unchanged over {self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s, command over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W and moved by over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W)")
def unchanged_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page."""
if self.changed_mono is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.changed_mono)
def reading(self):
"""What the consumers get: the value, or None when it cannot be trusted.
⚠️ `None`, NEVER A HELD NUMBER, and never a zero. Both consumers already
do the right thing with None and neither could ever receive one:
`watchdog.SignWatchdog.evaluate` CLEARS its window on a None measurement
rather than accumulating it, and `circulation.circulating_w` returns None
for a roster with a missing term, which clears the circulation window
too. This module is the thing that was missing between them.
"""
return None if self.stale else self.last
def note(self, unit_name: str) -> str:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
return f"{unit_name}: {self.reason}" if self.stale else ""
def monotonic() -> float:
"""The clock this module's callers use, in one place so tests can find it.
⚠️ `time.monotonic()`, not the wall clock, for `p1.P1Sample.age_s`'s reason:
an NTP step on a Raspberry Pi that has just found the network is routinely
minutes, and a freshness verdict computed across one would either fake a
stale reading or, worse, hide a real one.
"""
return time.monotonic()
+48
View File
@@ -122,6 +122,9 @@ import math
from datetime import datetime
from .clamp import ClampResult
# SAFETY-37. The freshness policy, and the ONE place its bounds are written.
# freshness.py imports nothing from this package, so the direction is one-way.
from .freshness import BOUNDS, Freshness
# CFG-03's ONE in-code mirror of config.yaml's SAFETY-24 defaults. Imported
# rather than retyped: the flat-keys path below needs `bms_soc_floor`'s
# shipped default and a literal here would be the fourth defaults site that
@@ -213,7 +216,22 @@ class Inverter:
# --- this unit's own measurements ------------------------------------
self.soc = None
# ⚠️ SAFETY-37: `batt` IS NOW THE GATED READING, NOT THE RAW ONE. It is
# None whenever `batt_fresh` says the register is not following its own
# command - see freshness.py - and a None here is a MISSING input, which
# §11.1 rule 1 answers with 0 W. The raw number that arrived is on
# `batt_fresh.last`; read that only for diagnostics, never for control.
self.batt = None
# SAFETY-37. One arrival record per SIGNAL per UNIT. Per unit for
# DEV-02's reason - a freshness verdict about B is not evidence about A,
# and at N>=2 a shared record would be the flat-scalar defect rebuilt
# inside the gate that exists to protect the per-unit checks.
#
# ⚠️ ONLY `batt` IS WIRED. `BOUNDS["soc"]` exists and is deliberately not
# constructed here: SoC's obligation term is energy through the pack, not
# command travel, and the constant it needs has not been measured. That
# is TEL-08's, and freshness.py's docstring says exactly what it owes.
self.batt_fresh = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
# --- what this unit was last told, and what it last accepted ---------
# `target` is THIS unit's share of the site target from the last
@@ -266,6 +284,24 @@ class Inverter:
self.store.set(self.key(name), value)
# -- the numbers other modules ask this object for -----------------------
def standing_w(self) -> float:
"""What this controller has standing on THIS unit's wire right now.
⚠️ ONE DEFINITION, TWO CALLERS, and it was a transcription before
SAFETY-37. `cycle()` computes this for the sign watchdog and
`_read_unit()` needs the identical number for the freshness conjunction;
two spellings of "what is standing" would be two answers to the question
the gate and the check it protects are both asking, and the copy that
drifts is always the one further from the wire.
`last_write` is the value after the device clamp and confirmed accepted;
`target` covers the case where nothing has been written yet and,
deliberately, the case where the last write was REJECTED - the inverter
is then still latched on `last_write`, which is what `last_write` holds.
"""
return float(self.last_write if self.last_write is not None
else self.target)
def rating_w(self) -> float:
"""The largest magnitude this unit can be commanded, in W.
@@ -319,6 +355,18 @@ class Inverter:
f"(limit {float(stale_s):.0f} s)")
return True, ""
def stale_note(self) -> str:
"""SAFETY-37's one line for the status page. Empty when nothing to say.
Separate from `link_note()` because they are about different halves of
the device and want opposite remedies: liveness is about the WRITE path
and its answer is to drop this unit and let the survivors carry it,
while a stale MEASUREMENT is about the read path and its answer is to
stop the site (`inputs_ok`). Folding one into the other is how a
measurement fault ends up handing a sibling extra power.
"""
return self.batt_fresh.note(self.name)
def link_note(self, now: datetime) -> str:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
if not self.has_writer():
+65 -8
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ from .circulation import (
from .clamp import (
REASON_CODE as CLAMP_REASON, ClampWatchdog, clamp_to_rating, is_commandable,
)
from . import freshness
from .freeze import (
FreezeWatchdog, FreezeWatchdogConfig, looks_frozen, rail_unreachable, rail_w,
)
@@ -1109,8 +1110,18 @@ class Controller:
for inv in self.inverters)
# -- io ------------------------------------------------------------------
async def read_inputs(self) -> None:
async def read_inputs(self, now_mono: float | None = None) -> None:
"""Every input this cycle needs, and SAFETY-37's freshness verdict.
`now_mono` the monotonic clock the per-unit freshness records are
stamped on. Defaulted rather than read inside `_read_unit()`
so that ONE instant covers every unit in a gather - two
units stamped from two clock reads would carry a freshness
skew nobody could reproduce - and so that a check can drive
real seconds through the gate without sleeping through them.
"""
o = self.o
now_mono = freshness.monotonic() if now_mono is None else float(now_mono)
if self.p1_enabled:
# ⚠️ P1 is the only authoritative measurement of what the utility
# sees (§5.1). When it is stale this is None, which falls into the
@@ -1130,7 +1141,8 @@ class Controller:
# names for the WRITE path, one function up. Within a unit the order is
# unchanged (SoC, then battery power), so at the shipped roster of one
# this is the same two calls in the same order.
await asyncio.gather(*(self._read_unit(inv) for inv in self.inverters))
await asyncio.gather(*(self._read_unit(inv, now_mono)
for inv in self.inverters))
if o.get("peak_forecast_entity"):
raw = await self.hass.number(o["peak_forecast_entity"])
# Accept kW or W - nobody's quarter-hour forecast is 50 W.
@@ -1176,10 +1188,41 @@ class Controller:
elif self.inputs_bad_since is None:
self.inputs_bad_since = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
async def _read_unit(self, inv) -> None:
"""One inverter's own SoC and battery power, from ITS OWN entities."""
async def _read_unit(self, inv, now_mono: float) -> None:
"""One inverter's own SoC and battery power, from ITS OWN entities.
⚠️ SAFETY-37: THE POWER READING GOES THROUGH THE FRESHNESS GATE AND THE
SoC READING DOES NOT, AND THE ASYMMETRY IS DELIBERATE. `batt` feeds the
two consumers this card is about - SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and
SAFETY-31's circulating-power sensor - and its obligation term is
command travel, which this method already has. SoC's obligation term is
ENERGY through the pack and the constant it needs has never been
measured on this site; wiring it here with a guessed constant would be a
gate that fires on a rested pack, which is TEL-08's whole hazard.
`freshness.BOUNDS["soc"]` states the bound and what TEL-08 owes.
⚠️ THE STANDING COMMAND IS ASKED OF THE UNIT, NOT RECOMPUTED. `cycle()`
grades the sign watchdog against `inv.standing_w()` and this gate arms
off the same method, because the gate exists to protect that check and a
second spelling of "what is standing" would let the two disagree about
the number they are both reasoning about.
"""
inv.soc = await self.hass.number(inv.soc_entity)
inv.batt = await self.hass.number(inv.batt_entity, inv.batt_invert)
raw = await self.hass.number(inv.batt_entity, inv.batt_invert)
was_stale = inv.batt_fresh.stale
inv.batt_fresh.submit(raw, inv.standing_w(), now_mono)
# ⚠️ `inv.batt` IS THE GATED VALUE. A stale register is a MISSING input,
# not a measurement - `inputs_ok` sees the None, the site holds for
# `stale_input_s` and then commands 0 W and keeps commanding, which is
# §11.1 rule 1 and is already what a missing reading does here.
inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()
if inv.batt_fresh.stale and not was_stale:
self.log_event(f"STALE {inv.name}: " + inv.batt_fresh.reason)
_LOG.error("SAFETY-37: %s battery-power register is not following "
"its own command - %s. Treating it as MISSING, which "
"commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the register "
"reports a different value.",
inv.name, inv.batt_fresh.reason)
def write_refusal(self, value: float, inv=None) -> str | None:
"""Why `value` may NOT be written to `inv` right now, or None if it may.
@@ -1469,9 +1512,20 @@ class Controller:
return tuple(live)
def liveness_notes(self) -> list:
"""Why each unit is or is not commandable, for the status page."""
"""Why each unit is or is not commandable, for the status page.
⚠️ SAFETY-37's STALE-READING LINE RIDES HERE TOO, AND IT IS A DIFFERENT
FAULT WITH A DIFFERENT REMEDY. A unit that is not commandable is dropped
and its share is carried by the survivors; a unit whose power register
has stopped following its command stops the SITE. They share this list
because they share one place on the status page - the operator asking
"why is nothing happening" needs both - and nothing downstream reads it.
"""
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
return [n for n in (inv.link_note(now) for inv in self.inverters) if n]
return [n for n in
[x for inv in self.inverters
for x in (inv.link_note(now), inv.stale_note())]
if n]
async def cycle(self) -> None:
"""Gather claims, resolve precedence, write the winner.
@@ -1560,7 +1614,10 @@ class Controller:
standing = {}
for inv in self.inverters:
was_tripped = inv.sign_wd.tripped
stood = inv.last_write if inv.last_write is not None else inv.target
# ⚠️ `Inverter.standing_w()`, NOT THE EXPRESSION IT REPLACES.
# SAFETY-37's freshness gate arms off the same method, and this used
# to be the only spelling of it. See that method's docstring.
stood = inv.standing_w()
standing[inv.name] = stood
against = self.grid if n_units <= 1 else inv.batt
if inv.sign_wd.evaluate(stood, against, self.following, now) \
+477 -12
View File
@@ -17,8 +17,9 @@ Read MUTATION.md before you report a survivor.
import sys
from app.control import (LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S, SLEW_RAIL_FRAC,
Tuning, compute, slew_limit_w,
from app.control import (LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S,
SETTLE_CYCLES, SLEW_RAIL_FRAC, Tuning, compute,
slew_limit_w, unasked_power,
maintenance_charge_floor, peak_at_risk)
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39: `slew_w` IS EXPLICIT HERE NOW, AND IT IS release/1.0's VALUE.
@@ -59,6 +60,34 @@ def check(name, cond):
# A comment cannot go stale-green, because it never claims to be running.
#
# Measured at 389d9ec. Numbers are the lead's independent reproduction.
# ⚠️ THE SAFETY-13 ROWS WERE RE-MEASURED IN ROUND 2 AND THREE OF THEM WERE
# WRONG AS FIRST WRITTEN. Every figure below marked (S13) was taken by deleting
# the mechanism, purging __pycache__, running this file in the CI image and
# counting `FAIL` lines, on THIS tree; the release/1.0 comparison figures were
# taken the same way on a pristine c8dcb38 worktree.
#
# - `output freeze` was written as 11. The mutation form its own note
# describes - the whole `target = min(...)/max(...)` line removed, `reason`
# left alone - gives 6 on this tree AND 6 on the first SAFETY-13 commit,
# against 2 on release/1.0. 11 is not reproducible by that form, or by
# removing the line and its `reason` (4), or by swapping min/max (12). The
# row is 6.
# - `saturation detector, saturated_now = False` was left at 11 while the
# SAFETY-13 section added checks that grade it. It is 15.
# - the footnote's `frozen = False` figure was left at 10 for the same
# reason. It is 13.
#
# The rows below `output freeze` are this ticket's own mechanisms: removing the
# EXIT restores release/1.0's unbounded freeze; making `unasked_power()` return
# True gives an exit to the limit case as well, which is the half of the
# decision that has to stay unbounded; deriving SETTLE_CYCLES from
# PLANT_SETTLE_S (18 s, the UP ramp) instead of PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S (23 s) is
# the round-1 defect itself; and pinning `_SAT_COUNT_CAP` back at release/1.0's
# literal 10 caps the counter below the bound and deletes the exit silently.
#
# ⚠️ ONLY THE ROWS THIS BRANCH MOVES WERE RE-MEASURED. Everything not marked
# (S13) still carries 389d9ec's figures and was not re-run here.
#
# ⚠️ THE SLEW ROWS WERE RE-MEASURED AT SAFETY-39 AND ONE OF THEM MOVED: the
# slew limit was 4 and is now 5, because the SAFETY-39 section grades it too.
# The new row is the RAIL DEFAULT specifically - `slew_limit_w()` reduced to
@@ -75,10 +104,14 @@ def check(name, cond):
# output clamp 3
# slew limit 5
# slew follows the rail (SAFETY-39), `slew_w` read raw 3
# output freeze 2
# output freeze (S13) 6
# the output freeze's EXIT (S13), freeze made unconditional again 4
# `unasked_power()` discriminates, replaced by `return True` (S13) 6
# SETTLE_CYCLES from PLANT_SETTLE_S, not _DOWN_S (S13) 9
# `_SAT_COUNT_CAP` pinned back at release/1.0's 10 (S13) 6
# deadband 5
# quantisation 2
# saturation detector, `saturated_now = False` 11
# saturation detector, `saturated_now = False` (S13) 15
# saturation duration (AC 2), fires instantly 2
# sat counter reset on a good cycle 6
# target_grid_w bias 3
@@ -86,7 +119,8 @@ def check(name, cond):
#
# The detector figure is for the `saturated_now = False` form specifically;
# disabling it further down as `frozen = False` is a weaker mutation and gives
# 10. Reproduce the same form or the number will not match.
# 13 on this tree (10 on release/1.0). Reproduce the same form or the number
# will not match.
#
# ⚠️ IT HAS FOUND A DEAD MECHANISM TWICE, BOTH THE SAME WAY: a clamp standing in
# for the mechanism under test. Deleting the integrator freeze once failed
@@ -282,8 +316,15 @@ check("frozen at i_w=0.0: an export push moves the integrator",
# hundreds of watts means something else is driving the bus. Asserted so that
# nobody "fixes" it by accident - the integrator moving is what this ticket
# owns, the command rule belongs to the output freeze.
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-13 KEPT THIS ASSERTION RATHER THAN INVERTING IT, and the fixture is
# why it survived unchanged: `sat_count=3` becomes 4, which is below
# SETTLE_CYCLES, so this is still inside the window in which the block holds.
# SAFETY-13 gave the block an EXIT, not a different opinion about its first
# cycles - see the SAFETY-13 section below, where the same state is driven past
# the bound and the release is asserted on the other side of it.
check("frozen at i_w=0.0: the output freeze still blocks a charge from 0 W",
ze.target_w == 0.0)
ze.target_w == 0.0 and ze.sat_count < SETTLE_CYCLES)
# Where prev_w is already charging the output freeze does NOT block, and there
# the difference reaches the wire: held at 0.0 the integrator abandons the
# charge mid-export.
@@ -358,6 +399,348 @@ check(f"after saturation ends the command is {tight:.0f} W (<= 1000)", tight <=
check(f"headroom above max_w makes that worse ({loose:.0f} W) - hence the default",
loose > tight)
print("SAFETY-13: the output freeze has an exit, and only where it needs one")
# THE SHAPE OF THIS SECTION. release/1.0's output freeze holds the command's
# magnitude down while the inverter is not following, and nothing ends it. At
# `prev_w == 0` the held magnitude is ZERO, so it reads as "refuses to start a
# charge"; that is the case the card was written about, but it is one instance
# of a rule that is unbounded at every prev_w. SAFETY-13 bounds it exactly where
# it CANNOT end on its own - see `unasked_power()` - and nowhere else.
# --- 1. the predicate, which is the whole of the decision -------------------
# A limit can only make the inverter do LESS than the command, in the command's
# own direction, so everything a limit can produce lies in the interval spanned
# by 0 and prev_w widened by saturation_w. These are the four cases in the
# docstring, run rather than described.
check("limit: 700 W under a +2000 W command is explainable",
not unasked_power(2000.0, 700.0, 500.0))
check("limit: -700 W under a -5000 W command is explainable",
not unasked_power(-5000.0, -700.0, 500.0))
check("unasked: +700 W under a 0 W command is not",
unasked_power(0.0, 700.0, 500.0))
check("unasked: +700 W under a -800 W command is not",
unasked_power(-800.0, 700.0, 500.0))
# The band edges belong to the limit side, because saturation_w is the same
# tolerance the detector uses - a reading the detector calls "following" must
# never be called "another writer".
check("the saturation band is inclusive on both edges",
not unasked_power(0.0, 500.0, 500.0)
and not unasked_power(0.0, -500.0, 500.0)
and unasked_power(0.0, 500.01, 500.0))
# ⚠️ AT prev_w == 0 THE PREDICATE AND THE DETECTOR ARE THE SAME TEST, which is
# why the zero case is the one that strands: with nothing commanded there is no
# interval for a limit to live in.
same = all(unasked_power(0.0, a, 500.0) == (abs(a) > 500.0)
for a in [x * 5.0 for x in range(-400, 401)])
check("at prev_w == 0 unasked_power IS the saturation test, over 801 readings",
same)
# --- 2. the bound is derived, and from WHICH HALF of the measurement --------
# ⚠️ THE DIRECTION IS THE ASSERTION. goodwe/NOTES.md 5.10 measured the same
# 1.78 kW step both ways: ~18 s up, ~23 s down. SAFETY-39 takes the SHORTER
# one because its bound is a REFUSAL and the looser number refuses less. This
# bound asks the opposite question - how long the plant may still be the
# explanation for a divergence - and for that the conservative half is the
# LONGER one. The first version of this file derived it from 18, got 9, and
# that is three cycles short of the plant's own measured down-ramp, in the
# direction that ACCUSES rather than refuses (section 8 below drives it).
check(f"SETTLE_CYCLES is ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) ="
f" {SETTLE_CYCLES}",
SETTLE_CYCLES == 12
and SETTLE_CYCLES * LOOP_TICK_S >= PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S
and (SETTLE_CYCLES - 1) * LOOP_TICK_S < PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S)
check("...from the LONGER of the two measured settle times, so it is strictly"
" above what the shorter one would have given",
PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S > PLANT_SETTLE_S
and SETTLE_CYCLES > -(-PLANT_SETTLE_S // LOOP_TICK_S))
# ...and it is NOT SLEW_RAIL_FRAC's reciprocal any more. It was, while both
# were being derived from the same half of the pair, and that coincidence read
# as a derivation. Asserted as an INEQUALITY so the two cannot silently be
# re-fused into one number again.
check("the slew's rail crossing and this bound are now different numbers",
SETTLE_CYCLES > 1.0 / SLEW_RAIL_FRAC)
# The counter has to be able to REACH the bound or the exit does not exist.
# Driven, not read off the constant: run a saturated state and see how high the
# counter actually goes.
c, sc = 0, 0
while c < 50:
sc = compute(0.0, -2000.0, 900.0, T, sc).sat_count
c += 1
check(f"the saturation counter reaches {sc}, which is above the bound",
sc >= SETTLE_CYCLES)
# --- 3. prev_w == 0: blocked below the bound, released above it -------------
# The same state either side of the bound. This is the pair the card asks for.
blk = compute(prev_w=0, grid_w=-2000, actual_w=-600, tuning=T,
sat_count=SETTLE_CYCLES - 2, i_w=0.0)
check("prev_w=0: below the bound the charge is still refused",
blk.target_w == 0.0 and blk.reason == "saturated-freeze"
and blk.sat_count == SETTLE_CYCLES - 1)
rel = compute(prev_w=0, grid_w=-2000, actual_w=-600, tuning=T,
sat_count=SETTLE_CYCLES - 1, i_w=0.0)
check(f"prev_w=0: at the bound it is released to {rel.target_w:.0f} W",
rel.target_w < 0.0 and rel.reason == "freeze-released"
and rel.sat_count == SETTLE_CYCLES)
# ...and the released command is the SLEW step from 0, not the rail. A release
# that jumped to the integrator in one cycle would be the windup this ticket
# was told to avoid.
check(f"the released command is exactly one slew step"
f" ({slew_limit_w(T):.0f} W)",
abs(rel.target_w) == slew_limit_w(T))
# The mirror. Nothing here is sign-specific, so the discharge side must behave
# identically - every freeze rule in this file has a mirror, because the one
# that did not is the defect that got through review.
mblk = compute(prev_w=0, grid_w=2000, actual_w=600, tuning=T,
sat_count=SETTLE_CYCLES - 2, i_w=0.0)
mrel = compute(prev_w=0, grid_w=2000, actual_w=600, tuning=T,
sat_count=SETTLE_CYCLES - 1, i_w=0.0)
check("prev_w=0, discharging: same block, same release, mirrored",
mblk.reason == "saturated-freeze" and mrel.reason == "freeze-released"
and mrel.target_w == slew_limit_w(T))
# --- 4. non-zero prev_w, and the two halves are NOT the same --------------
# (a) A divergence a LIMIT could have produced is never released, however long
# it stands. This is release/1.0's behaviour and it is kept deliberately: the
# freeze clears itself here, because the command is pinned at something the
# inverter can do.
TL = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=400.0, target_grid_w=-10.0)
prev, i_w, sat, reasons = 0.0, 0.0, 0, set()
for _ in range(30):
d = compute(prev, 4000.0, max(-1000.0, min(1000.0, prev)), TL, sat, i_w)
prev, i_w, sat, _r = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count, reasons.add(d.reason)
check("non-zero prev_w, a curtailed inverter: never released over 30 cycles",
"freeze-released" not in reasons and prev == 2400.0)
# (b) A divergence a limit could NOT have produced is released at the bound,
# at a non-zero prev_w exactly as at zero. release/1.0 pinned this run at
# -800 W, against its own integrator standing at -2388 W, for as long as it ran.
prev, i_w, sat, rows = 0.0, 0.0, 0, []
for _ in range(20):
d = compute(prev, -2000.0, 700.0, TL, sat, i_w)
rows.append((prev, d.target_w, d.i_w, d.reason))
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
pinned = [r for r in rows if r[3] == "saturated-freeze"]
check(f"non-zero prev_w, another writer: pinned at {pinned[0][1]:.0f} W...",
pinned and all(r[1] == -800.0 for r in pinned))
check(f"...then released, settling at {prev:.0f} W", prev == -2390.0)
# --- 5. THE CARD'S OWN CASE, DRIVEN END TO END -----------------------------
# The live install's shape (max_w 5000, slew_w 400, target_grid_w -10). The site
# rests in the deadband with another writer holding the pack at +700 W - so the
# saturation counter climbs while the command is 0 and nothing is wrong - and
# then 2 kW of export arrives. On release/1.0 @ c8dcb38 the command is 0.0 W on
# every cycle from there on: 0 W is a FIXED POINT, and the export is given away
# for as long as the other writer stays.
prev, i_w, sat, cmds = 0.0, 0.0, 0, []
for c in range(24):
d = compute(prev, -10.0 if c < 6 else -2000.0, 700.0, TL, sat, i_w)
cmds.append(d.target_w)
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
check("the card's case: the block does hold at first, at 0 W",
cmds[6] == 0.0 and cmds[7] == 0.0)
started = [i for i, c in enumerate(cmds) if c != 0.0]
check(f"the card's case: the charge starts at cycle {started[0]}"
f" instead of never", bool(started))
# ⚠️ AND IT STOPS AT THE FROZEN INTEGRATOR, NOT AT THE RAIL. This is AC 4: the
# integrator moved while the output was blocked, and the release must not turn
# that divergence into windup. It cannot, because releasing the OUTPUT freeze
# does not release the INTEGRATOR freeze - so the command can only walk, one
# slew step per cycle, to a value the integrator stopped accumulating at.
check(f"the card's case: it settles at {prev:.0f} W, at the frozen integrator "
f"({i_w:.0f} W) and not the {TL.max_w:.0f} W rail",
prev == -1190.0 and abs(prev) <= abs(i_w) and abs(prev) < TL.max_w)
steps = [abs(cmds[i] - cmds[i - 1]) for i in range(1, len(cmds))]
check(f"the card's case: no cycle moves more than the slew limit "
f"(worst {max(steps):.0f} W of {slew_limit_w(TL):.0f})",
max(steps) <= slew_limit_w(TL))
# --- 6. AC 4, AS A PROPERTY RATHER THAN A TRAJECTORY -----------------------
# ⚠️ THE FIRST FORM OF THIS CHECK WAS WRONG AND THE SWEEP SAID SO, which is
# worth leaving in the file. It asserted `|target| <= |i_w|` on a released
# cycle, and the sweep produced prev_w -5000, i_w -3000, target -4600: the
# command was walking BACK from -5000 toward the integrator and had not
# arrived. It was moving the right way and the assertion still failed, because
# "never exceeds the integrator" is not what no-windup means here.
#
# What it means: a released cycle can only move the command TOWARD the
# integrator, by at most one slew step, and never past it. So the divergence
# that built up while the output was blocked cannot arrive as a jump - it is
# spent one slew step at a time, against an integrator that stopped
# accumulating when the freeze engaged and is not released with the output.
# ⚠️ AND THE COUNT BELOW IS THE RELEASED STATES, NOT THE SWEPT ONES. The first
# version of this check named 41*25*21*5 - the size of the sweep - while
# grading only the subset that actually releases, so the number in the message
# was not the number the assertion was about. It is counted now.
step = float(T.step_w)
swept, past, jumped = 0, [], []
n_released = 0
for prev in [x * 250.0 for x in range(-20, 21)]:
for grid in [x * 500.0 for x in range(-12, 13)]:
for actual in [x * 500.0 for x in range(-10, 11)]:
for i0 in (-3000.0, -500.0, 0.0, 500.0, 3000.0):
swept += 1
d = compute(prev, grid, actual, TL, SETTLE_CYCLES, i0)
if d.reason != "freeze-released":
continue
n_released += 1
lo, hi = min(prev, d.i_w), max(prev, d.i_w)
if not (lo - step <= d.target_w <= hi + step):
past.append((prev, grid, actual, i0, d.target_w, d.i_w))
if abs(d.target_w - prev) > slew_limit_w(TL) + step:
jumped.append((prev, grid, actual, i0, d.target_w))
check(f"of {swept} states swept, the {n_released} that release keep the command"
f" between the previous command and the frozen integrator"
+ (f" (e.g. {past[0]})" if past else ""), not past and n_released > 0)
check("...and no released cycle moves further than one slew step"
+ (f" (e.g. {jumped[0]})" if jumped else ""), not jumped)
# --- 7. NO ACCEPTED CONFIGURATION CAN DELETE THE BLOCK ---------------------
# ⚠️ THIS CHECK REPLACES ITS OWN OPPOSITE, AND THE REASON IS WORTH KEEPING.
# While the bound was 9, `saturation_cycles` - which config.yaml accepts up to
# 10 - could be set AT OR ABOVE it, and then the freeze did not engage until
# its own exit was already due: the no-start block silently stopped existing,
# and this file asserted that as a known consequence. Moving the bound to 12
# put the whole accepted range strictly below it, so the degenerate
# configuration is gone rather than documented.
#
# It is pinned against config.yaml ITSELF and not a transcription, because the
# property is "two files agree" and a transcription is what lets them drift.
# Regex, not PyYAML: the add-on image ships no PyYAML (test_validate.py says
# the same thing at more length).
import os # noqa: E402
import re # noqa: E402
_CFG = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "config.yaml")
with open(_CFG, encoding="utf-8") as _fh:
_m = re.search(r"^ saturation_cycles: int\((\d+),(\d+)\)\s*$",
_fh.read(), re.M)
check("config.yaml's saturation_cycles range really was read", _m is not None)
_sc_lo, _sc_hi = int(_m.group(1)), int(_m.group(2))
check(f"every accepted saturation_cycles ({_sc_lo}..{_sc_hi}) is strictly"
f" below the bound ({SETTLE_CYCLES}), so no accepted configuration can"
f" push the freeze's engagement past its own exit",
_sc_hi < SETTLE_CYCLES)
# Driven at the schema's edge rather than argued: the block still engages, and
# it engages before the exit is due.
TN = Tuning(slew_w=1000.0, saturation_cycles=_sc_hi)
prev, i_w, sat, reasons = 0.0, 0.0, 0, set()
first_freeze = None
for _ in range(20):
d = compute(prev, -2000.0, 700.0, TN, sat, i_w)
reasons.add(d.reason)
if d.reason == "saturated-freeze" and first_freeze is None:
first_freeze = d.sat_count
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
check(f"at the largest accepted saturation_cycles ({_sc_hi}) the block still"
f" engages, at sat_count {first_freeze}, below the bound",
"saturated-freeze" in reasons and first_freeze is not None
and first_freeze < SETTLE_CYCLES)
# --- 8. THE BOUND'S DIRECTION, DRIVEN ON ONE INVERTER ----------------------
# ⚠️ WHY THIS SECTION EXISTS. The exit's two conditions are read as "another
# writer is on the actuator". They are not that, and the first shipped form of
# this file said they were. `unasked_power()` compares a reading against ONE
# cycle's command while the pack carries every command before it, so a command
# that has fallen THROUGH ZERO - or simply fallen faster than the pack coasts -
# leaves our own power outside our own interval. With the bound derived from
# the 18 s UP measurement that is not a corner case: it is what a normal load
# step does.
#
# The plant here is a MODEL and is labelled one. It is a first-order lag whose
# two time constants come from the two measured settling times (a first-order
# step is 95 % done at 3 tau, so tau = t / 3), with the ramp cap
# sim/plantsim.py measured on inverter A. It is not the rig and it is not the
# house; what it is for is that the two settling times ENTER the model in the
# same direction they enter the constant, so the check moves if either does.
#
# ⚠️ AND THERE IS NO SECOND WRITER IN THIS SECTION. One `compute()`, one
# plant, one command. Every `freeze-released` below is therefore false.
import math # noqa: E402
class _Plant:
"""One inverter, obeying our command and nothing else. A MODEL."""
RAMP_W_S = 800.0 # sim/plantsim.py INVERTER_A, measured=True
def __init__(self, up_s, down_s):
self.a_up = 1.0 - math.exp(-LOOP_TICK_S / (up_s / 3.0))
self.a_dn = 1.0 - math.exp(-LOOP_TICK_S / (down_s / 3.0))
self.w = 0.0
def tick(self, cmd):
a = self.a_up if abs(cmd) > abs(self.w) else self.a_dn
cap = self.RAMP_W_S * LOOP_TICK_S
self.w += max(-cap, min(cap, a * (cmd - self.w)))
from app import control as _control # noqa: E402
TS8 = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=400.0, target_grid_w=-10.0,
saturation_w=500.0, saturation_cycles=3)
def _drive(bound, load1, load2, cycles=60, switch=25):
"""Run one closed loop at an arbitrary bound. -> (release cycles, rows)."""
was_b, was_c = _control.SETTLE_CYCLES, _control._SAT_COUNT_CAP
# ⚠️ BOTH, OR THE PROBE LIES: `_SAT_COUNT_CAP` is what `compute()` caps the
# counter with, so moving the bound without it caps the counter BELOW the
# bound and the exit quietly becomes unreachable - which reads as "no false
# positives". That is the hazard `_SAT_COUNT_CAP`'s own comment names.
_control.SETTLE_CYCLES, _control._SAT_COUNT_CAP = bound, bound + 1
try:
p = _Plant(PLANT_SETTLE_S, PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S)
prev, i_w, sat, rows = 0.0, 0.0, 0, []
for c in range(cycles):
load = load1 if c < switch else load2
d = compute(prev, load - p.w, p.w, TS8, sat, i_w)
rows.append((c, prev, p.w, d.target_w, d.sat_count, d.reason))
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
p.tick(prev)
return [r for r in rows if r[5] == "freeze-released"], rows
finally:
_control.SETTLE_CYCLES, _control._SAT_COUNT_CAP = was_b, was_c
_SHORT = int(-(-PLANT_SETTLE_S // LOOP_TICK_S)) # what 18 s would give: 9
# A 4 kW export falling to 2.5 kW. Nothing exotic; no second writer.
_bad, _rows = _drive(_SHORT, -4000.0, -2500.0)
check(f"a bound derived from the SHORTER measurement ({_SHORT} cycles) fires"
f" the exit on ONE inverter with nothing else on the bus"
+ (f" - {len(_bad)} cycle(s), first at cycle {_bad[0][0]}" if _bad else ""),
bool(_bad))
if _bad:
_c, _prev, _act, _tgt, _sat, _ = _bad[0]
check(f"...and what it called unasked is our own coast-down: command"
f" {_prev:.0f} W, pack still at {_act:.1f} W, and the pack was"
f" commanded {min(r[1] for r in _rows[:_c]):.0f} W a few cycles"
f" earlier",
unasked_power(_prev, _act, TS8.saturation_w)
and abs(_act) > abs(_prev)
and min(r[1] for r in _rows[:_c]) < _act)
_good, _ = _drive(SETTLE_CYCLES, -4000.0, -2500.0)
check(f"the shipped bound ({SETTLE_CYCLES} cycles, the LONGER measurement)"
f" does not fire on the same run", not _good)
# ...and not on any of these, either. The whole grid of load steps the same
# plant can be given, at the tuning every headline figure in this ticket is
# quoted from.
_L = [x * 500.0 for x in range(-8, 9)]
_fired = {}
for _b in (_SHORT, SETTLE_CYCLES):
_fired[_b] = sum(1 for _a in _L for _z in _L
if _a != _z and _drive(_b, _a, _z)[0])
_pairs = len(_L) * (len(_L) - 1)
check(f"over {_pairs} load-step pairs on the measured plant, one inverter and"
f" no second writer: the short bound fires in {_fired[_SHORT]} of them,"
f" the shipped bound in {_fired[SETTLE_CYCLES]}",
_fired[SETTLE_CYCLES] < _fired[_SHORT])
# ⚠️ AND THE SHIPPED FIGURE IS NOT ZERO IN GENERAL. It is small here because
# the plant in this model is the one that was measured. A plant slower than
# that brings the false release back, and no constant derived from a
# measurement can fix that - it is why DOCS.md tells the operator what
# `freeze-released` is evidence OF, rather than what it proves.
print("SAFETY-04: the i_w=None path is still release/1.0, exactly")
@@ -394,8 +777,37 @@ def legacy(prev, grid, actual, t, sat_count):
# "i-clamped", because the truncation happens on the integrator before the
# command is derived from it. Aliased here rather than papered over - if any
# OTHER reason ever diverges, this check goes red.
# ⚠️ SAFETY-13 IS A DELIBERATE DIVERGENCE FROM `legacy()`, AND THE SWEEP NOW
# GRADES THE DIVERGENCE INSTEAD OF FORBIDDING IT. `legacy()` above stays a
# transcription of release/1.0 - it is not edited to agree, for the reason the
# note on `slew_w` gives: an oracle taught the new rule compares the new law
# against itself. What changed is the assertion. Every case must either be
# IDENTICAL to release/1.0, or be a case where release/1.0 said
# "saturated-freeze" and this law says "freeze-released" with the two conditions
# that permit it both true. Anything else is a regression, and the counts below
# say how much of the sweep each answer covers.
ALIAS = {"i-clamped": "clamped"}
# ⚠️ SAFETY-13 ROUND 2 MOVED THE COUNTER'S CEILING, SO THE SWEEP NOW HAS A
# THIRD ANSWER. `_SAT_COUNT_CAP` is `SETTLE_CYCLES + 1`, which was 10 - the
# same literal release/1.0 used - and is now 13. Above release/1.0's own
# ceiling the two counters therefore differ, and NOTHING ELSE MAY: `frozen` is
# `sat_count >= saturation_cycles` and config.yaml accepts that at most 10, so
# a counter reading 13 instead of 10 cannot change it, and no other line in
# `compute()` reads the counter's value. That is asserted rather than asserted-
# by-omission, in `cap_diffs` below.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE SWEEP HAS TO REACH THE BOUND OR IT GRADES NOTHING. `sc` runs to 12
# now; at 9 the counter tops out one short of the exit and every release
# silently disappears from this table, which is exactly what happened when the
# bound moved and is why the count is asserted and not merely printed. 12 is a
# state release/1.0 could never hold - its counter stopped at 10 - so
# `legacy()` is being fed one input outside its own reachable domain, on
# purpose, and `cap_diffs` is where that shows up.
LEGACY_SAT_CAP = 10 # release/1.0's literal, transcribed in legacy()
diffs = []
released = []
value_diffs = []
cap_diffs = []
seen = set()
# ⚠️ `slew_w` IS WRITTEN OUT IN ALL THREE (SAFETY-39). `legacy()` below is a
# TRANSCRIPTION of release/1.0 and reads `t.slew_w` directly, as release/1.0
@@ -409,16 +821,69 @@ for tune in (Tuning(slew_w=1000.0), Tuning(slew_w=1000.0, target_grid_w=-10.0),
for prev in (-2000.0, -500.0, -100.0, 0.0, 100.0, 500.0, 2000.0):
for grid in (-6000.0, -1000.0, -500.0, -14.0, 0.0, 14.0, 500.0, 1000.0, 6000.0):
for actual in (-2000.0, 0.0, 600.0, 2000.0):
for sc in (0, 2, 3, 9):
for sc in (0, 2, 3, 9, 12):
d = compute(prev, grid, actual, tune, sc) # i_w defaults to None
seen.add(d.reason)
got = (d.target_w, d.sat_count, d.frozen,
ALIAS.get(d.reason, d.reason))
if got != legacy(prev, grid, actual, tune, sc):
diffs.append((prev, grid, actual, sc, got,
legacy(prev, grid, actual, tune, sc)))
check(f"i_w=None reproduces release/1.0 over {3*7*9*4*4} cases, reason included"
+ (f" (first diff {diffs[0]})" if diffs else ""), not diffs)
was = legacy(prev, grid, actual, tune, sc)
if got == was:
continue
# everything that reaches the wire, without the counter
wire_same = (got[0], got[2], got[3]) == (was[0], was[2], was[3])
if wire_same:
# the ceiling moved and nothing else did. Only legal
# above release/1.0's own cap, and only with both
# counters standing at their own ceilings.
if (sc >= LEGACY_SAT_CAP
and was[1] == LEGACY_SAT_CAP
and got[1] == _control._SAT_COUNT_CAP):
cap_diffs.append((prev, grid, actual, sc, got[1], was[1]))
continue
diffs.append((prev, grid, actual, sc, got, was))
continue
explained = (
d.reason == "freeze-released"
and was[3] == "saturated-freeze"
and d.sat_count >= SETTLE_CYCLES
and unasked_power(prev, actual, tune.saturation_w))
if not explained:
diffs.append((prev, grid, actual, sc, got, was))
continue
released.append((prev, grid, actual, sc))
if got[0] != was[0]:
value_diffs.append((prev, got[0], was[0]))
TOTAL = 3 * 7 * 9 * 4 * 5
check(f"i_w=None reproduces release/1.0 over {TOTAL} cases except where"
f" SAFETY-13 releases the freeze, reason included"
+ (f" (first unexplained diff {diffs[0]})" if diffs else ""), not diffs)
# ⚠️ EXACT COUNTS, NOT INEQUALITIES. A weaker form of this line ("some
# releases happened") was written while the bound was moving, and the coverage
# audit caught it immediately: a `unasked_power()` that stops discriminating
# went from 6 checks to 5. The three numbers partition the sweep, so any one of
# them moving is a change somebody has to explain.
check(f"{TOTAL - len(released) - len(cap_diffs)} of {TOTAL} cases are"
f" bit-identical to release/1.0; {len(released)} are releases;"
f" {len(cap_diffs)} differ in the saturation counter alone",
len(released) == 432 and len(cap_diffs) == 81
and TOTAL - len(released) - len(cap_diffs) == 3267)
# ⚠️ THE COUNTER-ONLY DIFFERENCES ARE NOT A LOOPHOLE, so they are pinned twice:
# they may only occur at an `sc` above release/1.0's ceiling, and the largest
# `saturation_cycles` config.yaml accepts is below BOTH ceilings, so no
# accepted configuration can see the difference at all.
check(f"the {len(cap_diffs)} counter-only differences all sit above"
f" release/1.0's cap of {LEGACY_SAT_CAP}, where no accepted"
f" saturation_cycles can read them",
all(r[3] >= LEGACY_SAT_CAP for r in cap_diffs) and _sc_hi <= LEGACY_SAT_CAP)
# ⚠️ AND THE RELEASES ARE MOSTLY A LABEL. Only these change what reaches the
# wire; the rest report "freeze-released" on a command the freeze was not
# binding on anyway. Every one of them is a charge that release/1.0 refused to
# start from exactly 0 W, which is the ticket, stated as a count.
check(f"{len(value_diffs)} of those {len(released)} change the command,"
f" and every one is a charge start from prev_w == 0 that was refused",
len(value_diffs) == 27
and all(p == 0.0 and new_ < 0.0 and old_ == 0.0
for p, new_, old_ in value_diffs))
# ...and the rename is not a quiet deletion: the signal SAFETY-03 alarms on has
# to actually occur in that sweep, or its hook is dead.
+879
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,879 @@
"""Runnable check for SAFETY-37's freshness policy. `python3 test_freshness.py`
THE SUBJECT OF THIS FILE IS THE FIXTURE, NOT THE CODE. A pack legitimately
resting at 40 % and a dead sensor reading 40 % ARE THE SAME NUMBER. A check that
cannot separate "fresh and unchanged" from "stale" cannot see the failure it
names, and this repository has recorded that defect - "a check whose DATA cannot
reach the failure it names" - eleven times. So part 1 builds the separation and
ASSERTS THE VALUE STREAMS ARE BIT-IDENTICAL across the pair; everything after it
is downstream of that pair being real.
⚠️ AND THE CARD'S WORDING HAD TO BE SHARPENED TO BUILD IT, WHICH IS SAID HERE
RATHER THAN QUIETLY WORKED AROUND. The card says "only arrival separates them".
For a signal this add-on polls out of Home Assistant's state cache, ARRIVAL
CANNOT SEPARATE THEM: `read_inputs()` runs about once a second and Home
Assistant answers 200 with a number whether or not the publisher behind the
entity is alive, so both members of the pair arrive, identically, forever.
Part 1a demonstrates exactly that - an arrival-age gate is graded and FAILS to
tell the pair apart - and it is the reason the shipped verdict is a conjunction
with an OBLIGATION term rather than an age threshold. Every clock in that
verdict is still an arrival clock: nothing reads a Home Assistant timestamp,
which is the half of "arrival-stamped" that TEL-06 is blocked on and that this
module does honour.
1. THE PAIR. Fresh-and-unchanged vs stale, on identical value streams, on
the policy object itself. Plus 1a, the arrival-age gate that cannot.
2. THE WIRING. The same pair driven through the REAL `Controller.read_inputs`
at a roster of TWO, with the two units carrying DIFFERENT power values.
3. THE CONSUMERS REFUSE, and the counterfactual is run beside them: the
per-unit sign check and the circulating-power sensor, with the gate and
with the gate removed, through real `cycle()` calls.
4. THE LATCH, and the ~1 Hz oscillation it exists to prevent.
5. N=1. Nothing changes on a healthy install - asserted on the shipped read
path, not assumed - and the one thing that DOES change is named.
6. THE BOUNDS, graded against the shipped `config.yaml` at both ends.
7. THE POLICY TABLE tells the truth about what is wired.
8. THE MEASUREMENT the bound rests on, replayed from the committed capture.
9. KNOWN SURVIVORS, graded so they are residuals rather than surprises.
⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12; goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b).
Every two-unit case below is two copies of inverter A's behaviour with
DIFFERENT numbers passed in, and no number here is a measured parameter for a
second device.
⚠️ MUTATING THE MODULE THIS FILE GRADES? PURGE `__pycache__` FIRST - or run
`tools/mutation_run.sh`, which does. `python3 -B` alone does NOT save you: it
stops bytecode being WRITTEN, not a stale one being READ. Read MUTATION.md
before you report a survivor.
"""
import ast
import asyncio
import glob
import gzip
import io
import json
import sys
import time
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from app import freshness as F
from app.circulation import circulating_w
from app.freshness import BOUNDS, BATT_OBLIGED_S, BATT_UNCHANGED_S, MOVE_W, Freshness
from app.inverter import Inverter
from app.main import Controller
from app.store import DEFAULTS
from app.watchdog import SignWatchdog, SignWatchdogConfig, disagrees
fails = []
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
def run(coro):
return asyncio.new_event_loop().run_until_complete(coro)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# fixtures
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
class MemStore:
def __init__(self, data=None):
self.data = dict(DEFAULTS, **(data or {}))
def set(self, k, v):
self.data[k] = v
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
def set_time(self, *a):
pass
class Pub:
enabled = False
def publish(self, *a, **k):
pass
def close(self):
pass
class Hass:
"""A Home Assistant that answers per ENTITY and RECORDS what it served.
⚠️ PER ENTITY, AND THE RECORD IS LOAD-BEARING. A stub that answered one
number whatever it was asked could not tell "B was read from B's sensor"
from "B was handed A's reading" - and the served-value log is what lets
part 1 assert that the fresh run and the stale run saw the SAME numbers.
"""
def __init__(self, numbers=None, limits=None):
self.numbers = dict(numbers or {})
self.limits_by = dict(limits or {})
self.served = [] # (entity, value) in call order
self.writes = []
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
v = self.numbers.get(entity)
self.served.append((entity, v))
return None if v is None else (-v if invert else v)
async def limits(self, entity):
return self.limits_by.get(entity, (None, None, None))
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
self.writes.append((entity, value))
return True
async def call(self, domain, service, data):
return True
A_RATING = 5000.0
# ⚠️ ILLUSTRATIVE, AND NOT B'S DATASHEET FIGURES. SPIKE-04a established B as a
# GW5048D-ES rated 4600 W with a 10 % floor (goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b), and this
# fixture deliberately does not use them: 5000/4600 is a 400 W gap, narrower
# than a slew step, and two equal-ish numbers cannot show a check that read the
# wrong unit's. Same reasoning as test_inverter.py's `B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS`.
B_RATING_SIM = 3000.0
A_FLOOR, B_FLOOR_SIM = 10, 15
ROSTER = [
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp_a",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc_a", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt_a",
"max_w": A_RATING, "bms_soc_floor": A_FLOOR},
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp_b",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc_b", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt_b",
"max_w": B_RATING_SIM, "bms_soc_floor": B_FLOOR_SIM},
]
# ⚠️ A AND B CARRY DIFFERENT POWER VALUES IN EVERY FIXTURE BELOW, and the card
# names this as the trap it expects: "if both read the same, the test cannot
# distinguish a frozen reading from a live one and will pass against the broken
# code". SAFETY-30's fix round walked into exactly that with two watchdog holds
# both set to 1.
A_FROZEN_W = -1200.0 # inverter A's register, stuck on a charge figure
B_LIVE_W = 900.0 # inverter B's register, moving, and NOT A's number
BASE = dict(meter_source="off", meter_entity="sensor.grid", setpoint_entity="",
soc_entity="", batt_entity="", max_w=A_RATING, gain=0.6, slew_w=0,
deadband_w=15, target_grid_w=0, step_w=10, heartbeat_s=10,
stale_input_s=15, inverters=ROSTER)
def site(opts=None, numbers=None):
"""A real two-inverter Controller off the shipped `build_roster()`."""
hass = Hass(dict({"sensor.grid": 0.0,
"sensor.soc_a": 50.0, "sensor.batt_a": A_FROZEN_W,
"sensor.soc_b": 55.0, "sensor.batt_b": B_LIVE_W},
**(numbers or {})),
{"number.sp_a": (-A_RATING, A_RATING, 1.0),
"number.sp_b": (-B_RATING_SIM, B_RATING_SIM, 1.0)})
c = Controller(dict(BASE, **(opts or {})), hass, MemStore(), Pub(),
stop=asyncio.Event())
c.inverters[0].dev_min, c.inverters[0].dev_max = -A_RATING, A_RATING
c.inverters[1].dev_min, c.inverters[1].dev_max = -B_RATING_SIM, B_RATING_SIM
return c, hass
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("1. THE PAIR: 'fresh and unchanged' vs 'stale', on IDENTICAL value streams")
# The two runs below feed the policy object the SAME forty readings of the same
# number at the same instants. The ONLY difference is what the controller was
# asking the inverter to do while those readings arrived.
#
# FRESH the site is converged. The command sits where it is, the register
# answers the same watt, and nothing is wrong. This is the case the
# 30-day capture in part 8 measures at up to 263.2 s.
# STALE the site reversed. The command travelled 2500 W and the register did
# not move by one watt in 40 s, which is 2.4x the fastest it could
# possibly be obliged to answer in.
STREAM = [(float(t), A_FROZEN_W) for t in range(0, 40)]
def drive(bound, stream, standing_of):
"""Feed a Freshness one arrival per (t, value). Returns (obj, served, verdicts)."""
f = Freshness(bound)
served, verdicts = [], []
for t, v in stream:
f.submit(v, standing_of(t), t)
served.append(v)
verdicts.append(f.reading())
return f, served, verdicts
_fresh, _fresh_served, _fresh_read = drive(
BOUNDS["batt"], STREAM, lambda t: A_FROZEN_W)
# The command travels from -1200 W to +1300 W at t=1 and stays there: a site
# turnaround, which is the ordinary stimulus SAFETY-31's own campaign sweeps.
_stale, _stale_served, _stale_read = drive(
BOUNDS["batt"], STREAM, lambda t: A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0)
print(f" served (both runs): {_fresh_served[:3]} ... x{len(_fresh_served)}")
# ⚠️ `key=str`, AND IT IS NOT COSMETIC. Without it this line raises TypeError
# comparing None with a float the moment a mutation makes the FRESH run stale -
# which is what M2 (dropping the command-travel term) did: the file died on a
# DIAGNOSTIC PRINT before check one, so the harness reported "red" with no named
# check behind it. MUTATION.md's reporting rule is "which suite went red, and on
# WHICH NAMED CHECK"; a print that can crash first destroys exactly that.
print(f" fresh verdicts: unique={sorted(set(_fresh_read), key=str)}")
print(f" stale verdicts: first None at t="
f"{next((i for i, v in enumerate(_stale_read) if v is None), None)}")
check("⚠️ THE FIXTURE'S OWN PRECONDITION: the two runs saw a BIT-IDENTICAL "
"value stream. If this ever stops being true the pair below is comparing "
"two different experiments and proves nothing about freshness",
_fresh_served == _stale_served
and len({v for v in _fresh_served}) == 1)
check("FRESH AND UNCHANGED is not stale. Forty identical readings over 39 s "
"with the command standing still - a converged site - and the reading "
"reaches its consumers untouched",
not _fresh.stale and _fresh_read == [A_FROZEN_W] * len(STREAM))
check("⚠️ STALE IS. The same forty readings, the same instants, the same "
"numbers - and the command moved 2500 W underneath them. The reading "
"becomes None to its consumers, which is the whole card",
_stale.stale and _stale_read[-1] is None)
check("...and it becomes None at the BOUND, not before: 35.0 s of unchanged "
"arrivals, so the last fresh verdict is at t=34 and the first None at "
"t=35",
_stale_read[34] == A_FROZEN_W and _stale_read[35] is None
and BATT_UNCHANGED_S == 35.0)
check("...and NEVER a held number and never a zero - `reading()` has exactly "
"two shapes, the arrived value or None",
set(type(v) for v in _stale_read) == {float, type(None)}
and 0.0 not in [v for v in _stale_read if v is not None])
check("...and the reason names the three terms an operator has to check, with "
"the numbers that fired it",
"STALE_READING" in _stale.reason and "2500 W" in _stale.reason
and "unchanged for 35 s" in _stale.reason)
# --- 1a. the gate the card asked for first, graded and found unable ----------
# An arrival-age gate is what "arrival-stamped" reads as on first hearing. It is
# built here and run against the SAME pair, because a criterion that cannot be
# satisfied is worth more said out loud than approximated in silence.
_arrival_ages = []
_af = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t, v in STREAM:
_af.submit(v, A_FROZEN_W, t)
# Every read produced a number, so on both members of the pair the age
# since the last ARRIVAL is 0.0 at every instant. There is nothing to
# threshold.
_arrival_ages.append(0.0 if _af.last is not None else None)
check("⚠️ AN ARRIVAL-AGE GATE CANNOT TELL THE PAIR APART, and that is why the "
"shipped verdict is not one. Home Assistant answered every read with a "
"number in BOTH runs, so the age since arrival is 0.0 s at every instant "
"of both - a threshold on it is a threshold that can never fire, which "
"is TEL-06's defect rebuilt in this repository",
set(_arrival_ages) == {0.0} and _af.arrivals == len(STREAM))
check("...while the arrival record IS what the shipped verdict is measured on: "
"`unchanged_s` is the gap between arrivals that carried different "
"numbers, on this process's own monotonic clock, and no Home Assistant "
"timestamp is read anywhere in the module",
_stale.unchanged_s(39.0) == 39.0
and "last_updated" not in io.open(HERE / "app" / "freshness.py",
encoding="utf-8").read().split(
'"""', 2)[2])
check("...and a read that produced NOTHING is still an immediate None, exactly "
"as it is today - a failed read is not an arrival and is not an age",
Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"]).reading() is None
and (lambda f: (f.submit(5.0, 0.0, 0.0), f.submit(None, 0.0, 1.0),
f.reading() is None and f.held == 5.0)[-1])(
Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])))
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("2. THE WIRING: the same pair through the REAL read path, at a roster of 2")
async def _reads(c, hass, plan):
"""Drive real `read_inputs()` calls. `plan` is (t, standing_a, batt_a)."""
out = []
for t, standing_a, batt_a in plan:
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = batt_a
# `last_write` is what the write path sets and what `standing_w()`
# reads; setting it here is standing in for a write, not for the gate.
c.inverters[0].last_write = standing_a
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=t)
out.append((t, c.inverters[0].batt, c.inverters[1].batt))
return out
_PLAN_FRESH = [(float(t), A_FROZEN_W, A_FROZEN_W) for t in range(0, 40)]
_PLAN_STALE = [(float(t), A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0, A_FROZEN_W)
for t in range(0, 40)]
_cf, _hf = site()
_of = run(_reads(_cf, _hf, _PLAN_FRESH))
_cs, _hs = site()
_os = run(_reads(_cs, _hs, _PLAN_STALE))
print(f" fresh run: A={sorted({r[1] for r in _of})} B={sorted({r[2] for r in _of})}")
print(f" stale run: A={sorted({r[1] for r in _os}, key=str)} "
f"B={sorted({r[2] for r in _os})}")
check("PRECONDITION: both runs were served the same per-entity numbers, so the "
"difference below is the wiring and not the stimulus",
[x for x in _hf.served if x[0] == "sensor.batt_a"]
== [x for x in _hs.served if x[0] == "sensor.batt_a"])
check("⚠️ THE TWO UNITS CARRY DIFFERENT POWER VALUES - A at -1200 W, B at "
"+900 W. A fixture whose units read the same number cannot show a gate "
"that answered for the wrong unit, which is the trap the card names",
A_FROZEN_W != B_LIVE_W and all(r[2] == B_LIVE_W for r in _of))
check("THROUGH THE REAL PATH: a converged site keeps its reading",
all(r[1] == A_FROZEN_W for r in _of))
check("⚠️ THROUGH THE REAL PATH: a frozen register becomes `Inverter.batt is "
"None`. Not a held number, not a zero - the same None a missing entity "
"produces, which is the state §11.1 rule 1 already answers with 0 W",
_os[34][1] == A_FROZEN_W and _os[35][1] is None
and all(r[1] is None for r in _os[35:]))
check("...and ONLY the frozen unit's. B's own reading is untouched, which is "
"the per-unit half: a freshness verdict about A is not evidence about B",
all(r[2] == B_LIVE_W for r in _os) and _cs.inverters[1].batt == B_LIVE_W
and not _cs.inverters[1].batt_fresh.stale)
check("...and `inputs_ok` goes False, so the site stops rather than regulating "
"against a number nobody measured",
_cs.inputs_ok is False and _cf.inputs_ok is True)
check("...and the operator gets a line saying which unit and why, on the same "
"status list the liveness notes use",
any("STALE_READING" in n and "inverter-a" in n
for n in _cs.liveness_notes())
and _cf.liveness_notes() == [])
check("...and the raw number is still recorded for diagnostics, so the "
"operator can see WHAT it was stuck on",
_cs.inverters[0].batt_fresh.last == A_FROZEN_W)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("3. THE CONSUMERS REFUSE - and the counterfactual runs beside them")
# Both consumers already do the right thing with a None. Neither could ever
# receive one before this card, which is the entire exposure: the gate is the
# thing that was missing BETWEEN the shipped read and the shipped check.
_cfg3 = SignWatchdogConfig(min_w=250.0, hold_s=85.0)
check("PRECONDITION on the shipped predicate: a None measurement does not "
"disagree with anything, so it CLEARS the sign window",
disagrees(1300.0, None, True, _cfg3) is False
and disagrees(1300.0, A_FROZEN_W, True, _cfg3) is True)
check("PRECONDITION on the shipped sensor: a roster with a missing term is "
"None, and None clears the circulation window rather than accumulating",
circulating_w([1300.0, None]) is None
and circulating_w([A_FROZEN_W, B_LIVE_W]) == 2 * min(
abs(A_FROZEN_W), abs(B_LIVE_W)))
async def _cycles(gated, ticks=25, step_mono=12.0, wall=0.20):
"""Real cycles at N=2 with A's register frozen and the LOOP driving.
⚠️ THE COMMAND TRAVEL IS PRODUCED BY THE SHIPPED CONTROL LAW, NOT BY THE
FIXTURE. The meter is pinned at +3000 W of import, so `compute()` ramps the
site into discharge at its own slew rate through the real allocator and the
real write path; nothing here assigns `last_write`. A fixture that set the
standing command by hand would be feeding the gate its own arming condition,
which is the shape of check this repository keeps finding.
`gated=False` is THE COUNTERFACTUAL - the shipped behaviour before this
card, rebuilt by handing the consumers the raw held number the gate
withheld. Same cycles, same stimulus, so the difference between the two
columns is the gate and nothing else.
⚠️ TWO CLOCKS, DELIBERATELY, AND THE WALL-CLOCK ONE IS THE FLAKE RISK.
The freshness verdict runs on the INJECTED monotonic clock (12 s a tick, so
the 35 s bound is crossed on tick 3, deterministically, however loaded the
machine is). The sign watchdog runs on the WALL clock inside `cycle()`,
which cannot be injected - so `unit_sign_disagree_s` is set to 2 s and the
ticks are 0.20 s apart, putting the gate's close at ~0.6 s against a 2 s
window. That ORDER is the field's - 35 s < 75 s < 85 s by construction, part
6 - and the gate is given no head start beyond it.
⚠️ AND THE MARGIN IS MEASURED AND ASSERTED RATHER THAN ASSUMED (CI-06).
`test_peakguard.py` answered two of its own checks with the wall clock, flaked
at ~20 %, and cost a wrong merge diagnosis - a flaky check does not waste a
re-run, it manufactures evidence for whichever hypothesis the reader already
holds. So this returns the wall clock at which the gate closed, and the check
below fails with THAT NUMBER if the box was too slow, rather than reporting a
trip that looks like a code defect.
"""
c, hass = site({"unit_sign_disagree_w": 250, "unit_sign_disagree_s": 2,
"sign_disagree_w": 250, "sign_disagree_s": 2,
"site_sign_disagree_w": 250, "site_sign_disagree_s": 2,
"auto_start": True},
{"sensor.grid": 3000.0})
c.auto = True
circ, tripped_at, standing = [], None, []
t_start, t_gate = time.monotonic(), None
for k in range(ticks):
# A's register is FROZEN on the charge figure it stopped at; B's is
# live and is a DIFFERENT number. Neither is touched by the loop.
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = A_FROZEN_W
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_b"] = B_LIVE_W
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=k * step_mono)
if not gated:
for inv in c.inverters:
inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.last
if t_gate is None and c.inverters[0].batt_fresh.stale:
t_gate = time.monotonic() - t_start
circ.append(c.site_circulating_w)
standing.append(c.inverters[0].standing_w())
await c.cycle()
if c.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped and tripped_at is None:
tripped_at = k
await asyncio.sleep(wall)
return c, circ, tripped_at, standing, t_gate
_cg, _circg, _tripg, _standg, _tgate = run(_cycles(True))
_cu, _circu, _tripu, _standu, _ = run(_cycles(False))
_WD_S = 2.0 # `unit_sign_disagree_s` as this fixture sets it, above
print(f" standing on A (gated): {[round(v) for v in _standg]}")
print(f" gated : sign trip tick={_tripg} circ={_circg[:6]}...")
print(f" gate closed after {_tgate:.2f} s of WALL clock, against the "
f"{_WD_S:.0f} s watchdog window ({_WD_S / _tgate:.1f}x margin)")
print(f" counterfact: sign trip tick={_tripu} circ={_circu[:6]}...")
check("⚠️ PRECONDITION ON THE WALL CLOCK, AND IT IS A CHECK RATHER THAN AN "
"ASSUMPTION (CI-06). The gate closes on the INJECTED clock, the watchdog "
"on the real one, so this fixture only means something while the gate "
f"closes well inside the window: it closed at {_tgate:.2f} s against "
f"{_WD_S:.0f} s. If this fails the machine was slow, not the code - and "
"saying so here is what stops that being read as a defect",
_tgate is not None and _tgate < 0.5 * _WD_S)
check("PRECONDITION: the SHIPPED control law really did travel the command - "
"the gate's arming term is produced by `compute()` and the allocator, "
"not written into the fixture",
max(abs(v) for v in _standu) > MOVE_W
and abs(_standu[3] - _standu[0]) > MOVE_W)
check("⚠️ COUNTERFACTUAL FIRST - the stimulus is REAL. Without the gate, the "
"frozen register false-trips SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and parks a "
"healthy inverter. That is the fault this card was filed for",
_tripu is not None and _cu.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped
and "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in _cu.inverters[0].sign_wd.reason)
check("⚠️ AND WITH THE GATE IT DOES NOT TRIP. The reading is withheld before "
"the watchdog's window can accumulate, so the check refuses to conclude "
"rather than concluding wrongly - which is what a stale reading deserves",
_tripg is None and not _cg.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped)
check("...and inverter B was not parked either way - the verdict is per unit",
not _cg.inverters[1].sign_wd.tripped
and not _cu.inverters[1].sign_wd.tripped)
check("⚠️ COUNTERFACTUAL: without the gate the circulating-power sensor "
"reports a loop that is not happening, computed from one frozen term and "
"one live one",
all(v == 2 * min(abs(A_FROZEN_W), abs(B_LIVE_W)) for v in _circu)
and _circu[0] == 1800.0)
check("⚠️ AND WITH THE GATE IT REPORTS `None` - an unknown, which CLEARS the "
"circulation window instead of accumulating it. Both consumers gated, "
"from one place, by one mechanism",
_circg[0] == 1800.0 and _circg[-1] is None
and all(v is None for v in _circg[_circg.index(None):]))
check("...and the circulation watchdog did not latch on the stale evidence",
not _cg.circ_wd.tripped and _cg.circ_wd.over_since is None)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("4. THE LATCH, and the ~1 Hz oscillation it exists to prevent")
# Declaring the reading stale makes inputs_ok False, which commands 0 W, which
# drops the standing command below MOVE_W, which un-arms the conjunction. Without
# a latch the held number would come straight back to the consumers, and the
# whole thing would flip once per read for as long as the register stayed dead.
_lat = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 40):
_lat.submit(A_FROZEN_W, A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0, float(t))
_was = _lat.stale
_after_zero = []
for t in range(40, 50):
_lat.submit(A_FROZEN_W, 0.0, float(t)) # the site has been stopped
_after_zero.append(_lat.reading())
check("PRECONDITION: it is stale before the site is stopped",
_was and _lat.reading() is None)
check("⚠️ AND IT STAYS STALE ONCE THE SITE COMMANDS 0 W. The conjunction is no "
"longer armed - |standing| is 0 W, below the 250 W term - so an unlatched "
"verdict would hand the held -1200 W straight back and the site would "
"restart into it, then stop, then restart, once per read",
all(v is None for v in _after_zero))
# ⚠️ AND A FAILED READ MUST NOT CLEAR IT EITHER. This check exists because the
# mutation that added `self.stale = False` to `submit()`'s None branch SURVIVED
# the whole sweep - no fixture had ever injected a read failure while latched.
# It matters: a stale verdict stops the site, the site is then commanded 0 W, and
# a single unreachable-Home-Assistant read would drop the latch into a state
# where the conjunction is no longer armed - so the held -1200 W would come back
# to the consumers on the very next successful read.
_lat_fail = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 40):
_lat_fail.submit(A_FROZEN_W, A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0, float(t))
_lat_fail.submit(None, 0.0, 40.0) # Home Assistant did not answer
_after_fail = _lat_fail.reading()
_lat_fail.submit(A_FROZEN_W, 0.0, 41.0) # it answers again, same number,
# site now resting at 0 W
check("⚠️ A FAILED READ DOES NOT CLEAR THE LATCH - found by a SURVIVING "
"mutation, not by design. Our inability to fetch a value is not evidence "
"that the value moved, and a stale verdict that a single unreachable read "
"can drop is one a stopped site would drop every time",
_after_fail is None and _lat_fail.stale
and _lat_fail.reading() is None)
check("⚠️ AND ONLY MOVEMENT CLEARS IT - a different number arriving, which is "
"exactly the evidence the verdict was about. Not a timer, not a restart, "
"not the operator's start button",
(lambda f: (f.submit(A_FROZEN_W + 1.0, 0.0, 60.0),
(not f.stale) and f.reading() == A_FROZEN_W + 1.0)[-1])(_lat))
# ⚠️ THE MAGNITUDE TERM OF THE CONJUNCTION, AND THIS CHECK EXISTS BECAUSE A
# MUTATION SURVIVED WITHOUT IT. Deleting `abs(standing_w) < move_w` from
# `_grade()` left every other check in this file green, because in all of them a
# command that has TRAVELLED 250 W has also ENDED UP above 250 W. The case that
# separates them is a site being brought to REST.
_rest = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
# The register reaches +5 W on the same read at which the old +1300 W command is
# still standing - the write path is serialised, so the register can catch up
# BEFORE the command settles - and then the site is commanded to 0 W and the
# register sits at +5 W, correctly, for a minute.
_rest.submit(1290.0, 1300.0, 0.0)
_rest.submit(5.0, 1300.0, 1.0) # standing_at_change captures 1300 W
for t in range(2, 60):
_rest.submit(5.0, 0.0, float(t)) # site at rest; register truthfully +5 W
check("⚠️ THE MAGNITUDE TERM IS LOAD-BEARING, and it took a surviving mutation "
"to show it. A register that reached +5 W while the old +1300 W command "
"was still standing has a `standing_at_change` of 1300 W, so the TRAVEL "
"term alone reads 1300 W of unfollowed command for the whole minute the "
"site rests - and calls a perfectly truthful reading dead. Requiring "
"|standing| >= 250 W as well is what says 'a site at rest is not owed "
"movement'",
not _rest.stale and _rest.reading() == 5.0)
check("...and the hole that term leaves CANNOT MISLEAD EITHER CONSUMER, which "
"is why it is the right trade: a unit commanded under 250 W is one "
"`watchdog.disagrees()` is False for whatever the measurement says, and a "
"frozen term beside a live unit that is itself resting nets to zero "
"circulating power rather than to a false alarm",
disagrees(0.0, A_FROZEN_W, True, _cfg3) is False
and circulating_w([A_FROZEN_W, 0.0]) == 0.0)
check("...and one watt is enough, because 0x0518 is a 1 W register that "
"dithers +/-1 W while holding (goodwe/NOTES.md §5.11, measured "
"2026-08-22) - a working register clears this on its next 10 s publish",
_lat.held == A_FROZEN_W + 1.0 and not _lat.stale)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("5. N=1: nothing changes on a healthy install, and what DOES is named")
_ONE = dict(BASE, inverters=[], setpoint_entity="number.sp_a",
soc_entity="sensor.soc_a", batt_entity="sensor.batt_a",
bms_soc_floor=A_FLOOR)
def one_site():
hass = Hass({"sensor.grid": 0.0, "sensor.soc_a": 50.0,
"sensor.batt_a": A_FROZEN_W},
{"number.sp_a": (-A_RATING, A_RATING, 1.0)})
c = Controller(dict(_ONE), hass, MemStore(), Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.inverters[0].dev_min, c.inverters[0].dev_max = -A_RATING, A_RATING
return c, hass
async def _one_healthy():
c, hass = one_site()
seen = []
for t in range(0, 60):
# A healthy register under a moving command: it dithers, so it is never
# the same integer watt twice running.
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = A_FROZEN_W + (t % 3)
c.inverters[0].last_write = 1300.0 if t % 2 else -1200.0
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=float(t))
seen.append(c.inverters[0].batt)
return c, seen
_c1, _seen1 = run(_one_healthy())
check("⚠️ AC: AT N=1 NOTHING CHANGES ON A HEALTHY INSTALL, and it is asserted "
"rather than assumed. Sixty reads of a dithering register under a command "
"reversing every second: every value reaches the consumers unmodified, "
"the gate never arms, and the status page says nothing new",
_seen1 == [A_FROZEN_W + (t % 3) for t in range(60)]
and not _c1.inverters[0].batt_fresh.stale
and _c1.liveness_notes() == [] and _c1.inputs_ok is True)
check("...and the shipped roster really is one unit, so this is the install "
"that is running in a house today and not a fixture shaped like it",
len(_c1.inverters) == 1 and _c1.inverters[0].name == "inverter-a")
async def _one_frozen():
c, hass = one_site()
for t in range(0, 40):
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = A_FROZEN_W
c.inverters[0].last_write = A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=float(t))
return c
_c1f = run(_one_frozen())
check("⚠️ AND WHAT DOES CHANGE AT N=1 IS NAMED RATHER THAN HIDDEN: a FROZEN "
"register now stops the site, where before it read as a healthy "
"measurement. That is a behaviour change on the shipped roster and it is "
"the point of the card - HW-01 was a one-inverter site, and the pack "
"drained to its floor with every detector reading healthy for 6 h 25 m",
_c1f.inverters[0].batt is None and _c1f.inputs_ok is False)
check("...and the direction it fails in is the safe one: a false verdict "
"commands 0 W and keeps commanding (§11.1 rule 1), behind the existing "
"`stale_input_s` hold, and clears itself on the register's next move",
float(_c1f.o.get("stale_input_s")) > 0
and _c1f.inverters[0].batt_fresh.stale)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("6. THE BOUNDS, graded against the SHIPPED config.yaml at BOTH ends")
def option_default(key):
"""`key`'s default out of config.yaml's `options:` block, at two spaces."""
body = io.open(HERE / "config.yaml", encoding="utf-8").read()
body = body[body.index("\noptions:"):body.index("\nschema:")]
for line in body.splitlines():
if line.startswith(f" {key}:") and not line[2:3].isspace():
return float(line.split(":", 1)[1].strip())
return None
_circ_hold = option_default("circulation_hold_s")
_unit_hold = option_default("unit_sign_disagree_s")
_unit_min_w = option_default("unit_sign_disagree_w")
_ceiling = min(_circ_hold, _unit_hold)
print(f" floor {BATT_OBLIGED_S:.1f} s = settle 6.0 + publish 10.0 + read 1.0")
print(f" bound {BATT_UNCHANGED_S:.1f} s")
print(f" ceil {_ceiling:.1f} s = min(circulation_hold_s {_circ_hold:.0f}, "
f"unit_sign_disagree_s {_unit_hold:.0f})")
check("PRECONDITION: both consumer windows were actually found in config.yaml, "
"so a rename cannot turn this part into a check of two Nones",
_circ_hold == 75.0 and _unit_hold == 85.0 and _unit_min_w == 250.0)
check("⚠️ THE BOUND IS AT LEAST 2x THE PHYSICAL FLOOR. Below 17.0 s a healthy "
"register has not yet been OBLIGED to answer - 6.0 s of plant "
"(NOTES §5.9), one 10 s ESPHome publish (firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181) "
"and one 1 s add-on read - so a shorter bound trips on a working inverter",
BATT_UNCHANGED_S >= 2 * BATT_OBLIGED_S and BATT_OBLIGED_S == 17.0)
check("⚠️ AND AT MOST HALF THE TIGHTER CONSUMER WINDOW. A gate slower than its "
"consumer hands over the frozen number and explains afterwards. THIS IS "
"THE CHECK THAT BITES IF AN OPERATOR'S DEFAULT MOVES: drop "
"`circulation_hold_s` to 60 in config.yaml and this goes red",
BATT_UNCHANGED_S <= 0.5 * _ceiling)
# ⚠️ THE FIRST DRAFT OF THIS CHECK CLAIMED THE BAND CONTAINED EXACTLY ONE
# INTEGER AND IT DOES NOT - it contains 34, 35, 36 and 37, and the check went
# red on its first run and is written the honest way round here. The band is
# what is derived; the value inside it is a choice, and the only defensible
# claims about the choice are that it IS inside and that it is not a number
# borrowed from somewhere else.
check("...and the admissible band computed from config.yaml is [34.0, 37.5], "
"which contains four integers. 35 is a CHOICE inside a DERIVED band, not "
"a derived number, and it is deliberately not 30 - which is "
"FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S and would read as a borrowed constant - or 60, "
"which is round",
[n for n in range(0, 200)
if 2 * BATT_OBLIGED_S <= n <= 0.5 * _ceiling] == [34, 35, 36, 37]
and BATT_UNCHANGED_S not in (30.0, 60.0))
check("⚠️ AND `MOVE_W` IS PINNED TO config.yaml TOO. It is the largest value "
"that still arms the gate everywhere the per-unit sign check can speak; "
"raise `unit_sign_disagree_w` and the gate would stop arming in states "
"that check still fires in, which this catches",
MOVE_W == _unit_min_w)
check("...and the module's three floor terms are the numbers this repository "
"actually carries, not a transcription of them: the ESPHome publish "
"interval is read back out of the shipped firmware",
"update_interval: 10s" in io.open(
HERE.parent / "firmware" / "goodwe-master.yaml",
encoding="utf-8").read()
and F.PUBLISH_PERIOD_S == 10.0 and F.READ_PERIOD_S == 1.0
and F.PLANT_SETTLE_S == 6.0)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("7. THE POLICY TABLE tells the truth about what is WIRED")
def bounds_users(key):
"""Modules that SUBSCRIPT `BOUNDS[key]` in CODE - parsed, not grepped.
⚠️ THE FIRST DRAFT GREPPED FOR THE STRING AND ANSWERED WRONG, because both
`inverter.py` and `main.py` NAME `BOUNDS["soc"]` in a comment explaining why
it is not wired. A text search cannot tell a mention from a use, and this
part's whole job is to tell them apart - so it walks the AST instead.
"""
out = []
for path in sorted((HERE / "app").glob("*.py")):
if path.name == "freshness.py":
continue
tree = ast.parse(io.open(path, encoding="utf-8").read())
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if (isinstance(node, ast.Subscript)
and isinstance(node.slice, ast.Constant)
and node.slice.value == key
and ((isinstance(node.value, ast.Name)
and node.value.id == "BOUNDS")
or (isinstance(node.value, ast.Attribute)
and node.value.attr == "BOUNDS"))):
out.append(path.name)
break
return out
_uses_batt = bounds_users("batt")
_uses_soc = bounds_users("soc")
for _k, _b in BOUNDS.items():
print(f" {_k:5} wired={_b.wired!s:5} unchanged={_b.unchanged_s:>6} "
f"move={_b.move_w:>6} {_b.signal}")
print(f" BOUNDS['batt'] subscripted in CODE by: {_uses_batt}")
print(f" BOUNDS['soc'] subscripted in CODE by: {_uses_soc or 'nothing'}")
check("⚠️ `wired=True` MEANS SOMETHING CONSUMES IT. A policy table nobody "
"checks is a comment; this is the row `batt` claims and the module that "
"claims it",
BOUNDS["batt"].wired is True and _uses_batt == ["inverter.py"])
check("⚠️ AND `wired=False` MEANS NOTHING DOES. SoC is TEL-08's and it is "
"STATED here rather than wired, because its obligation term is energy "
"through the pack and the constant that needs has never been measured on "
"this site. A guessed constant would fire on a pack resting at its floor",
BOUNDS["soc"].wired is False and _uses_soc == [])
check("...and the SoC row says what TEL-08 owes, in the row itself, so the "
"next reader does not have to reconstruct why it is unwired",
"energy" in BOUNDS["soc"].derivation
and "153.6 Wh" in BOUNDS["soc"].derivation
and "TEL-08" in BOUNDS["soc"].derivation)
check("...and every wired bound is a real number - an infinite bound is how a "
"row silently becomes decorative",
all(b.unchanged_s < float("inf") and b.move_w < float("inf")
for b in BOUNDS.values() if b.wired))
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("8. THE MEASUREMENT the bound rests on, replayed from the committed data")
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE PART THAT STOPS THE DERIVATION BECOMING A STORY. The docstring
# in freshness.py quotes three numbers off this capture; they are recomputed
# here from the committed files, so a figure that drifts from its evidence goes
# red instead of being re-quoted forever.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS THE METER'S REGISTER, NOT 0x0518. No 30-day capture of the
# inverter's own power exists. What this establishes is the only thing it is
# used for: that the legitimate unchanged duration of a 1 W power entity in this
# house is MINUTES, so an unchanged threshold alone has no admissible value.
_cap = sorted(glob.glob(str(HERE / "scenarios" / "p1-net-30d-2026-08"
/ "p1-net-*.jsonl.gz")))
_runs, _prev = [], None
_t0 = time.monotonic()
for _f in _cap:
with gzip.open(_f, "rt") as _fh:
for _line in _fh:
_r = json.loads(_line)
_t = datetime.fromisoformat(_r["t"]).timestamp()
if _prev is not None:
_runs.append((_t - _prev, _pw))
_prev, _pw = _t, float(_r["w"])
_worst = max(_runs)[0] if _runs else 0.0
_over_bound = sum(1 for d, _ in _runs if d >= BATT_UNCHANGED_S)
print(f" {len(_cap)} days, {len(_runs) + 1} samples, "
f"{time.monotonic() - _t0:.1f}s to replay")
print(f" longest unchanged run {_worst:.1f} s; "
f"{_over_bound} runs >= {BATT_UNCHANGED_S:.0f} s")
check("PRECONDITION: the committed capture is all thirty days, so this is not "
"a claim about whatever files happened to be present",
len(_cap) == 30 and len(_runs) + 1 == 485841)
check("⚠️ A REAL 1 W POWER ENTITY HELD ONE VALUE FOR 263.2 s WITH NOTHING "
"WRONG. That single measurement is why the bound is a conjunction and "
"not a threshold: no unchanged threshold under 263 s is free of false "
"positives, and 263 s is 3.5x too slow to protect a 75 s consumer",
abs(_worst - 263.2) < 0.1 and _worst > _ceiling)
check("...and the two figures freshness.py's docstring quotes off this capture "
"are the ones it produces today",
_over_bound == 10
and sum(1 for d, _ in _runs if d >= BATT_OBLIGED_S) == 386)
check("⚠️ AND THE LONG RUNS ARE ALL UNDER AN UNMOVING LOAD, which is what the "
"conjunction keys on. The worst one is 263 s of a steady -899 W export - "
"a house doing one thing - so a gate that also requires the COMMAND to "
"have travelled 250 W is not armed by any of them",
max(_runs)[1] == -899.0)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("9. KNOWN SURVIVORS - graded, so they are residuals and not surprises")
# ⚠️ THE REPO'S RECURRING DEFECT IS A CHECK WHOSE DATA CANNOT REACH THE FAILURE
# IT NAMES. The honest end of that habit is to build the mutations this file
# would NOT see and record them. Each one below is a real hole in the shipped
# gate, demonstrated rather than described.
# S1. A register pinned by the INVERTER's own limit, not by a fault. If the
# device is derating and cannot follow a command that ASKS FOR MORE, the
# register can legitimately hold while the command travels.
_s1 = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 40):
_s1.submit(2503.0, 2650.0 if t < 1 else 4600.0, float(t))
check("⚠️ SURVIVOR 1, FALSE POSITIVE: a saturated or derating inverter pinned "
"at 2503 W while the command climbs to 4600 W is declared stale. The "
"register is telling the truth and the gate calls it dead",
_s1.stale)
check("...and its SIZE is bounded and its direction is the safe one: the "
"verdict is a site stop, behind the `stale_input_s` hold, and the moment "
"the command comes back down the register moves and the latch clears. "
"Cost = one spurious stop; it cannot drive the battery anywhere",
(lambda f: (f.submit(2400.0, 0.0, 60.0), not f.stale)[-1])(_s1))
# S2. A unit whose command never travels 250 W. HW-01's own shape, at a
# smaller scale, and the gate is deliberately not armed for it.
_s2 = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 400):
_s2.submit(A_FROZEN_W, -1200.0 if t < 1 else -1400.0, float(t))
check("⚠️ SURVIVOR 2, MISS: a register frozen under a command that only ever "
"moves 200 W is NEVER detected, for 400 s or forever. This is scoped, "
"not overlooked - such a unit is one no per-unit sign check can speak "
"about (`unit_sign_disagree_w` is 250 W) and one contributing at most "
"250 W to a loop whose reporting floor is 700 W",
not _s2.stale and _s2.reading() == A_FROZEN_W)
# S3. A register that dithers on dead data. A publisher that keeps republishing
# a stale WINDOW of values rather than one value defeats this entirely.
_s3 = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 400):
_s3.submit(A_FROZEN_W + (t % 2), 1300.0, float(t))
check("⚠️ SURVIVOR 3, MISS, AND IT IS THE LARGEST ONE: a dead publisher whose "
"last value happens to ALTERNATE - or a cache replaying two old samples - "
"never triggers the unchanged clock at all. This gate detects a value "
"that STOPPED; it cannot detect a value that is WRONG. Nothing in this "
"add-on can, and TEL-06's arrival stamp inside the firmware is the only "
"layer that could",
not _s3.stale and _s3.reading() is not None)
# S4. The gate is per unit, so a whole-site publisher failure that freezes both
# registers is caught twice rather than missed - recorded because a reader
# might expect the opposite.
_s4a, _s4b = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"]), Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
for t in range(0, 40):
_s4a.submit(A_FROZEN_W, A_FROZEN_W if t < 1 else 1300.0, float(t))
_s4b.submit(B_LIVE_W, B_LIVE_W if t < 1 else -1300.0, float(t))
check("NOT A SURVIVOR, recorded because it looks like one: a publisher failure "
"that freezes BOTH registers is caught on both units independently, on "
"each unit's own command travel and each unit's own number",
_s4a.stale and _s4b.stale and _s4a.held != _s4b.held)
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+4
View File
@@ -1911,6 +1911,10 @@ _AUDITED = {
("test_maintenance.py", "shipped_default"),
("test_maintenance.py", "schema_range"),
("test_freeze.py", "_cfg_default"),
# SAFETY-37. Found by this very check on its first run - `option_default()`
# reads the two consumer windows the freshness bound is derived from, so it
# is a key-taking reader and belongs here rather than outside the audit.
("test_freshness.py", "option_default"),
("test_price.py", "shipped"),
("test_tariff.py", "shipped_option"),
}