Commit Graph
581 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 b6c6da31d8 TEL-10: two sentences that named assertions this file does not make
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
Both are review findings on the merged-in-spirit branch, and neither is in
executable code.

R6 - test_mqtt.py part 1's headline said "every one of release/1.0's NINE
messages is still byte-identical and still first". The assertion under it is
`announce(...)[:len(BASELINE) - 1] == BASELINE[:-1]`, which covers EIGHT: the
ninth, `goodwe_ctl/availability`, is byte-identical but deliberately moves to
last, so a prefix comparison cannot include it. Nothing was unguarded - the
`== SITE_NOW` on the next check pins it in its new position - but the sentence
was not the check. Part 3 carried the same mis-statement two lines from a check
that IS about all nine, and is corrected the same way.

R5 - M7's red count was decoration. Re-driven in the CI image on a `cp -a` of
the tree, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time, it is 10 reds in test_mqtt.py and
not 8, on this tree and on SAFETY-48's alike. The direction was right; the
number was inherited rather than re-measured, which is MUTATION.md's reporting
rule 3. A note beside the table now says that a red count is a property of the
SUITE as much as of the mutation and therefore has to name a tree.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, purged tree, `:ro` mount, one file at
a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:36:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 b548525d10 TEL-10: the loop's integrator stops being invisible
`self.i_w` has been a separate quantity from the command since SAFETY-04 and
has left the process nowhere at all - no entity, no MQTT attribute, no log
line. The investigation behind SAFETY-48 could only RECONSTRUCT it from the
grid trace plus a replay; the reconstruction reproduced about a third of the
engagements it was checked against and was discarded, so the card it was
gathered for had to be argued from a measurement nobody could stand behind.
It could not have been made to work either: `i_w` depends on every cycle
before it, including the ones where the arbiter overrode the loop and
`main.py` re-seeded `self.i_w = self.target`, and that re-seed is invisible in
the grid trace.

THREE SITE ROWS, APPENDED AFTER release/1.0's EIGHT. `loop_i` is
`Decision.i_w` - the accumulator after the cycle, before the output clamp, the
slew limit and quantisation. `loop_lead` is `decision.i_w - prev_w` against the
command `compute()` was HANDED, which is not a subtraction of the other two
published rows: `Setpoint` is the arbiter's output and is this cycle's, so on
any cycle the arbiter overrode the loop the two differ - and that is exactly
the cycle on which the integrator was re-seeded. `loop_reason` is
`compute()`'s own word; the arbiter's `explain()` prints the winning claim's
NAME and has never carried the claim's reason, so `slew-limited` appears in
neither the `Why` row nor `Controller status`. Measured on the same cycle:
arbiter `'loop -> -5000 W'`, loop `'i-clamped'`.

NOTHING IN THE CONTROL PATH MOVED. `app/control.py` is not in this diff.
`compute()`, its returned `Decision` and every constant it reads are identical
to release/1.0, and all nine of release/1.0's retained discovery messages are
byte-identical and still FIRST in the announcement.

Evidence: 30/30 suites green in the CI image. Nine mutations, ONE survivor,
reported as one: `decision.i_w - self.target` for the lead is +2 B and green
because `cycle()` has not reassigned `self.target` at that line - the name is
kept for the coupling, not for a behaviour it buys, and M2b (+8 B) is the
mutation that does change the value and is red.

AND TWO OF THIS CARD'S OWN CHECKS COULD NOT REACH THE FAILURE THEY NAMED.
"the published integrator reaches its bound" was GREEN under the card's named
mutation (publish `prev_w`, -3 B), because the command reaches the bound too -
twelve cycles later. It asserts the LEAD TIME now and is red on 5. "a stopped
controller publishes not-running" was GREEN under deleting that branch's
assignments (-45 B, -67 B), because the fixture STARTED stopped and `__init__`
writes the same values; it stops the controller part-way through a run that
has already wound the integrator to -5000 W. Both are MUTATION.md habit 4,
found by the battery rather than by review.

No CHANGELOG section: `test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## `
heading that is not config.yaml's `version:`, and opening one would mean
taking a packaging decision this card does not get to take. The operator
account is in DOCS.md and the release note belongs to the next PKG ticket.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-18 23:36:23 +02:00
admin 68c5ede7b9 Merge pull request 'PKG-14: cut 0.10.0, so fifteen merged tickets can reach an install' (#91) from PKG-14 into release/1.0
config.yaml said 0.9.0 while the live box runs 0.7.0 with 0.7.0's files, so it has never received 0.8.0 or 0.9.0 either. 28 runtime commits had landed since the 0.9.0 bump at 86bdf49 with no version to carry them.

MINOR, AND NOT BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF TICKETS. A config that is legal on 0.9.0 is REFUSED on 0.10.0: TARIFF-07 retires three price_provider ids and refuses them by name at startup (the ids stay in the schema enum precisely so validate.py's message is reachable rather than an opaque Supervisor rejection); TARIFF-18 moves price_taxes_eur_kwh 0.06 -> 0.11736, and the non-obvious half is the refusal that deliberately does NOT happen, because SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH keeps a taxes period table beside a stored 0.06 from becoming exit 78 on upgrade, with the rung measured un-weakened against a genuinely custom 0.1198; SAFETY-10 adds shadow_mode shipped `auto`, where an existing controlling install does not change by one watt and a fresh install comes up observing.

AND A 0.7.0 INSTALL CROSSES 0.8.0 ON THE WAY. `ha addons update` does not walk versions, so 0.8.0's rule 10 lands at the same moment: an explicit slew_w above SLEW_RAIL_FRAC x rail is refused, and 0.7.0's OWN shipped default of 1000 is refused against a 555.6 W ceiling. Measured red on this tree, with slew_w 400 measured green - which is what the live box carries. Someone reading only the newest section would otherwise miss the one release that can stop the add-on starting.

THE BOUNDARY WAS DRAWN HONESTLY RATHER THAN TIDILY. All 18 table rows in the top block merged after 86bdf49 - verified per row with git merge-base --is-ancestor - so the block is genuinely this run's work and was retitled as-is with its 18 `_this branch_` placeholders resolved to merge shas. But 0.10.0 ships MORE than that table lists: SAFETY-43 and TEST-21 are documented in a SECOND `## Unreleased` block sitting below 0.9.0, and SAFETY-44 - which changed app/main.py and app/store.py - is in CHANGELOG.md NOWHERE AT ALL. All three are named in the 0.10.0 preamble rather than moved, because re-filing is PKG-08. The second block is annotated, not rewritten or emptied: UX-02 in it shipped in 0.9.0 and is already in 0.9.0's own contents table, while the other three shipped here. Verified independently before merge: all 30 changelog deletions fall inside `## Unreleased` blocks and none in a released section.

THE BLOCK'S OWN STATED REASON FOR THE VERSION CHOICE WAS WRONG AND THE SECTION SAYS SO. It said the number depended on whether 0.9.0's image had been built and pulled, and that if it had not, this work belonged inside 0.9.0. That was written before 0.9.0's section was cut. It has been cut since 86bdf49 with 28 runtime commits behind it, so reusing 0.9.0 would make one version string name two different trees - and the Supervisor keys the built image on exactly that string, which is the PKG-06/07 no-op in its worst form.

Evidence: 29/29 green. predeploy_check.py --deployed-version 0.7.0 --options <live blob> clears at exit 0 both before and after, unchanged but for the shipped version line. No default was touched, so test_defaults_pin, test_price's mirror and test_version_gate stay green for the right reason. Eight mutations, no survivors, one at zero bytes. One was a SURVIVOR on the first draft - the slicer control was a sentinel only an EOF-running slicer could reach, so deleting a heading never got there; it asserts an invariant now, exactly one contents table per section.

Card numbers that did not reproduce, corrected in the report: the block is 1541 lines citing 31 ids rather than 5487 citing ~70 (those figures fit the whole file and the Detail notes block, which is PKG-08's subject); 28 runtime commits rather than 30; 18 tickets rather than fifteen. FCST-04 has a table row but no section body - pre-existing, left alone.
2026-09-16 02:58:28 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cb3f686555 PKG-14: cut 0.10.0, and say what an upgrade from 0.7.0 crosses
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m51s
`config.yaml` 0.9.0 -> 0.10.0, and the top `## Unreleased` block is closed
into `## 0.10.0` with a preamble that names the backward-incompatible
changes and who they reach.

MINOR, and NOT because eighteen tickets landed. A stored options blob the
previous version started on is REFUSED on this one:

  * TARIFF-07 retires three `price_provider` ids; a site set to one is
    refused BY NAME at startup. Measured on the reference blob, with a
    control on an accepted id so the refusals are about the ID.
  * TARIFF-18 moves `price_taxes_eur_kwh` 0.06 -> 0.11736. A site that
    STORED 0.06 is untouched, and - the non-obvious half - a taxes period
    table beside that stored 0.06 does NOT become a startup refusal on
    upgrade, because `SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH` reads it as
    untouched. Measured, with the counterfactual that the rung is not
    weakened (ORES's 0.1198 is still refused).
  * SAFETY-10 adds `shadow_mode`, shipped `auto`. An existing CONTROLLING
    install does not change by one watt and a FRESH one comes up observing.
    Measured cross-revision, 8f82dd4 -> e6da478, same stimulus through the
    shipped `Controller.cycle()`: byte-identical write streams, 13/13/25
    writes. Positive control: the same driver at `shadow_mode: on` gets 13
    writes to 5000 W on the older tree and one 0 W write on the newer.

And the one a reader of the newest section alone would miss: `ha addons
update` does not walk the versions, so a 0.7.0 install meets 0.8.0's and
0.9.0's rules at the same moment as 0.10.0's. Of those, SAFETY-39's rule 10
refuses 0.7.0's OWN shipped default `slew_w: 1000` against a 555.6 W
ceiling on a 5000 W rail. Measured red on this tree; the reference
install's `slew_w: 400` is measured green.

SCOPE, and it is drawn honestly rather than tidily. The top block's 18
entries all merged after the 0.9.0 bump `86bdf49`, so the block is closed
as-is and its `_this branch_` placeholders are resolved to merge shas.
⚠️ 0.10.0 SHIPS THREE MORE RUNTIME TICKETS THAT ARE NOT IN THAT TABLE -
SAFETY-43, TEST-21 and SAFETY-44 - and they are NAMED in the preamble
rather than moved, because re-filing this file's misplaced entries is
PKG-08. SAFETY-44 (`app/main.py`, `app/store.py`) is in the changelog
nowhere at all; that is said in both places. The second `## Unreleased`
block below `## 0.9.0` is ANNOTATED, not rewritten or emptied - UX-02 in it
shipped in 0.9.0, the other three in 0.10.0. No released section is
rewritten.

`test_version_gate.py` gains part 11: the bump and the closed section are
one act. PKG-09 refuses a deploy whose version did not move; nothing graded
the mirror failure, in which the version moves and the block is never
closed. Two sides from two files, a slicer with a synthetic positive
control run on every invocation, the retired ids read off `app/price.py` by
AST rather than transcribed, and the count of still-misfiled blocks frozen
so it can only shrink.

Mutations, all purged, tree bind-mounted :ro, backups at mktemp paths and
the revert fingerprinted:

  M1  `## 0.10.0` -> `## Unreleased`       +4 B    RED 2
  M2  version 0.10.0 -> 0.10.1             +0 B    RED 1   (ZERO-BYTE)
  M3  an id stripped from the NEWEST       +10 B   RED 1
      section only, left below
  M4  a 4th retired provider in price.py   +62 B   RED 1 here, 4 in
                                                   test_price.py
  M5  `## 0.9.0` heading lost              -3 B    RED 1
  M6  a 2nd `## Unreleased` left standing  +27 B   RED 1
  M7  the slicer never closes              -32 B   RED 3
  M8  SUPERSEDED_TAXES... emptied          -5 B    RED 2 on the evidence
                                                   instrument, plus
                                                   test_validate/test_price

⚠️ M5 WAS A SURVIVOR ON THE FIRST DRAFT. The slicer control was a sentinel
(`## 0.8.0`) that only a slicer running to EOF could reach, and deleting one
heading never gets there - ARCH-02's fifteenth instance, in a fresh costume.
11a now asserts the invariant instead: exactly one contents table per
section, which is what a lost heading breaks.

29/29 test files green. `tools/predeploy_check.py --deployed-version 0.7.0
--options <live blob>` CLEARED, exit 0, before and after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-16 02:48:27 +02:00
admin 587495e143 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-47: say what a shadow run can and cannot show' (#90) from SAFETY-47 into release/1.0
DOCS.md, app/shadow.py's header and DECISIONS/SAFETY-10 all claimed the strategies ask for a fixed power from inputs that do not depend on what the battery did, so a shadow run shows you the real trades. That was true when shadow mode was designed and false by the time it merged: SAFETY-45 landed hours earlier and made the buy leg min(asked, headroom), where headroom = (900/remaining) x (ceiling - projected) and `projected` reads the open quarter's accumulator - the meter, which is exactly a function of what the battery did. The strategy became closed-loop and the exemption went stale.

Measured at a binding cap, 1500/1200/2000, the same hour twice: live grid 1224-1506 W held at the ceiling against a flat 1200 W in shadow; SoC 50.000019 -> 51.856789 % against 50.000000 -> 50.000000; the two runs differ on 716 of 720 cycles; the final recorded figure is -302.4 W live against -2000.0 W in shadow, 6.61x. On a SAFETY-45-reverted tree the limit cycle is 28 onsets live against 1, guard engaged 410/720 against 0/720. Two of the three defects the card cites as motivation are closed-loop phenomena shadow cannot exhibit; TARIFF-14's half genuinely is visible, hour and price and spread identical 720/720.

THE CAVEAT'S DIRECTION WAS MEASURED RATHER THAN WRITTEN, and the ticket had it wrong. A draft saying a live run reaches a SMALLER number was checked pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five configurations: the shadow record is never below live - zero cycles below and 730 EXACTLY EQUAL, at the start of each quarter where the amplification is 1.0. `Smaller` would have been false on 730 rows. The shipped sentence says UPPER BOUND and the two-point arithmetic behind it is graded.

Caveated rather than re-computed, with the rejections recorded: re-computing would make the recorded decision no longer the decision the shipped path reached while arbiter, clamp, the SAFETY-28 gate, the log and MQTT all ran on the real one - a second controller everywhere except the wire; recording nothing blanks the row exactly when arbitrage trades, and the log's edge key IS the watts; recording the unsized ask beside it adds a second number with no warning, and at the shipped 3500/2000 both read 2000 W. The trap avoided: keying the caveat on `capped` would fire at the quarter's START, where the record is right, and go SILENT at the end, where it is 6.61x out. It keys on the headroom having been MEASURED.

AND THE TICKET'S OWN ANALYSIS WAS INCOMPLETE. I said the committed evidence table could not fail for two reasons. They are independent in the FIX direction too: widening the fixture to a binding cap still leaves the comparison passing, because it reads index zero and the first charging cycle is -300.0000 W in both runs. Fixing only the fixture closes nothing. Recorded in MUTATION.md as a new habit-4 shape - an INDEX, not a fixture - and the agreement at index zero is now graded as an expectation so nobody rebuilds on it.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Fourteen mutations, no survivors. One was a REAL survivor first - deleting the caveat from the action log left all 29 files green, because the sentence was an f-string in _shadow_settle() and the only suite that drives it runs with meter_source: off; it is shadow.log_line() now. One CORRECTLY survived and is reported as such: min -> max makes the record larger, which is still an upper bound, so it is not the inversion that matters. And the new section nearly shipped FCST-06's shape - a mutation made it raise on its first min() and report zero reds - so every check now carries the section's precondition.

Two design limits stated rather than smoothed: the caveat discloses but does not help, since an engineer still cannot obtain the real number without arming the battery - the fix for that is a rig mode replaying the site's own captured meter through the shipped decision path, filed separately and deliberately NOT by giving shadow mode a plant model, which is the one change that would break its safety argument. And SAFETY-10's takeaway still oversells `auto`, which this card did not rewrite.
2026-09-15 01:36:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e3ccd9f6ea SAFETY-47: what a shadow run can show, and the watts on its status row
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m48s
Not a leak and not a write-path defect. Shadow mode's safety is intact -
the substitution, the re-seed, the authorisation gate and the clamp are
untouched. What was wrong is what three merged documents SAY a shadow run
can show you, and a number on the status row that can be 6.61x what a live
controller would command.

SHADOW MODE CANNOT SURFACE A CLOSED-LOOP DEFECT, AND THE DOCUMENTS NOW SAY
SO. The battery is held at 0 W and the carried command is re-seeded to it,
so every measured input - the meter, the billed-quarter accumulator behind
it, the battery power, the SoC - describes a plant that did not respond. A
closed-loop defect is one whose stimulus IS that response. This is the same
property that makes shadow mode safe, so it is not a gap to close later:
the closed-loop answer comes from the closed-loop rig or from a live run.
SAFETY-10 §5 already conceded this for the grid-following loop. It was
never the loop leg's limitation; it is the general case.

THE "STRATEGIES ARE UNAFFECTED" EXEMPTION WAS TRUE UNTIL SAFETY-45 MERGED,
ONE COMMIT EARLIER. That card sizes the buy leg as min(asked, headroom)
with headroom = (900/remaining) x (ceiling - projected), and `projected`
reads the open quarter's accumulator - the meter - which is a function of
what the battery did earlier in that quarter. Measured on TEST-23 stage 3
at peak_cap_w 1500 / house 1200 / max_w 2000, one hour at 5 s:

  SAFETY-45's limit cycle  NOT visible. 28 onsets live vs 1; grid
                           -455.5..+3200.0 W vs flat at the 1200 W house;
                           guard engaged 410/720 cycles vs 0/720.
  SAFETY-46's SoC churn    NOT visible. The SoC moves 0.000000000 pp.
  TARIFF-14's wrong hour   VISIBLE, and it is the only one: which hour, at
                           what price, clearing what spread - identical on
                           720 of 720 charging cycles at a binding cap.

The exemption narrows to exactly what survives: WHICH hour a strategy picks
and WHY are unaffected; HOW HARD it trades is not. The peak guard's ceiling
and reasons are worth reading from a shadow run; its ENGAGEMENTS are not.

THE NUMBER IS CAVEATED, NOT RE-COMPUTED, AND THAT IS THE DECISION. The
arithmetic is not wrong - 900/remaining is correct for a meter genuinely
under the ceiling, and in shadow the meter genuinely is. It is the right
answer to a question nobody asked. Both surfaces now introduce the watts as
what would have been commanded ON THIS CYCLE, in every state, and carry
shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER whenever a measured billed quarter sized them.
Rejected, and recorded in the decision doc: re-computing it (the recorded
decision would no longer be the decision the shipped path reached, while the
arbiter, clamp, SAFETY-28 gate, log and MQTT all ran on the real one - a
second controller everywhere except the wire); recording nothing (blanks the
row exactly when arbitrage is trading, and the log's edge key is the watts);
and recording the unsized ask beside it (a second number, no warning, and at
the shipped 3500/2000 both figures read 2000 W).

"UPPER BOUND" AND NOT "SMALLER", AND THE DIFFERENCE WAS MEASURED. Charging
only adds offtake, so the shadow size is >= the live size with EQUALITY at
the start of every quarter. Pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five
configurations: 0 below, 730 exactly equal. The first draft said "smaller",
which would have been false on every one of those 730.

AND THE PREDICATE IS NOT KEYED ON WHETHER THE TRADE WAS CAPPED. arbitrage's
own sentence says "SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD" only when the
headroom came out below the ask - in a shadow run, the START of the quarter,
where the two runs agree to the float. By the end, 900/remaining has
multiplied the headroom past the ask, the trade is not capped, the sentence
is silent, and the record is at its most wrong. A caveat keyed on it would
be quietest exactly where it is needed loudest.

SAFETY-10 §6's COMMITTED EVIDENCE COULD NEVER HAVE FAILED, FOR TWO
INDEPENDENT REASONS, AND CLOSING EITHER ALONE CLOSES NOTHING. Its fixture is
peak_cap_w 15000 against a 350 W house, so the guard never engages and the
sizing is inert - the harness's own comment says so. AND every identity row
reads the FIRST charging sample, where at elapsed=0 the projection IS the
held level and the two runs agree to the float even at a cap that does bind.
Measured: widening the fixture alone leaves that comparison passing. That
second reason is a new shape for MUTATION.md's habit-4 list - an INDEX, not
a fixture - and it is recorded there as the twelfth instance. §6 is re-taken
at a binding cap across the whole run: 716 of 720 charging cycles differ,
headroom 300.0..54000.0 W in shadow against 299.9..307.8 W live, recorded
-2000.0 W against a live -302.4 W.

THE GRADER IS test_arbitrage.py PART 3d, beside SAFETY-45's own closed-loop
regression and built on the same s45_loop() harness, so the runs differ in
one argument. Three lines stand in for _write_unit()'s substitution and
_shadow_settle()'s record and re-seed, marked as a transcription;
test_clamp.py part 8 remains the check on the shipped placement. The section
carries its own precondition into every check: a mutation that stopped
either run trading made it raise on its first min(), kill the file and
report ZERO reds - FCST-06's shape, driven rather than imagined.

AND THE FIX'S OWN FIRST DRAFT CARRIED THE SAME DEFECT. Deleting the caveat
from the action-log line left all 29 files green, because the sentence was
an f-string inside _shadow_settle() and the only suite that drives it uses a
meter_source:off fixture where no arbitrage decision exists. It is
shadow.log_line() now, for the reason words() is a function.

14 mutations, no survivors; M13 and M14 are +0 B and were confirmed on disk
by sha256 with every run purged. M14's first form was aimed at the wrong
direction and correctly survived - min->max makes the shadow record larger,
which is still an upper bound. All 29 check files green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-15 01:26:57 +02:00
admin e6da478f87 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-10: shadow mode, and 0 W is a number rather than a silence' (#89) from SAFETY-10 into release/1.0
The closed-loop rig made the case for this: with arbitrage armed and a binding cap the loop ran 28 charge onsets an hour (SAFETY-45); the price lookup returned the wrong quarter-hour for 45 minutes in every 60 (TARIFF-14); the SoC ceiling churns 598 Wh to gain 310 (SAFETY-46). Every one was invisible from outside, and there was no way to watch what the optimiser WOULD do without letting it do it.

THE TICKET SAID DEFAULT-ON AND THE AGENT REFUSED IT, correctly. The Supervisor resolves options as {**config.yaml defaults, **stored user options}, so a NEW key with a new default reaches every EXISTING install on the next update - including the one regulating the author's battery. `shadow_mode: true` would have stopped it silently, and the only symptom would be a battery that stopped doing anything. There is no mechanism by which one key defaults differently for a new install and an existing one - `options:` IS the default and there is one of it.

So the default is a value the add-on RESOLVES: shadow_mode: list(auto|on|off), shipped `auto` = shadow while control is STOPPED, live once STARTED. A fresh install ships auto_start: false, so it comes up in shadow and observes before it ever commands - default-on delivered where it is safe. An existing install that is controlling does not change by one watt; verified before merge, `auto` resolves to `not control_started`.

SECOND PUSHBACK, ALSO RIGHT: commands nothing is a NUMBER, not a silence. The inverter holds its last command forever, so a shadow mode that stopped writing would leave whatever was standing STANDING, under a page saying nothing is commanded - the exact looks-healthy-but-is-inert failure this repo keeps finding - and would hold the ESP32's 30 s stale-input watchdog tripped for the whole run, an alarm used as a mode. The actuator is held at 0.0 W, refreshed on the ordinary heartbeat, by the ordinary single writer, as a substitution inside the existing single choke point. Not a second write path. It is the LAST substitution, below SAFETY-28's gate and SAFETY-03's clamp, so both still grade the number the decision produced.

Every failsafe's behaviour is decided and recorded rather than inherited. The sign watchdogs are INERT because they grade standing_w(), held at 0 W - feeding them the decision would have them disagree with a meter that never saw it and LATCH A TRIP SURVIVING INTO LIVE OPERATION AND A RESTART. Clamp, write gate, meter freeze and peak guard OBSERVE the real decision. Circulation and delivery may legitimately latch, because their evidence is measured power. The operator stop is enforced at the wire rather than as a P_SAFETY claim, which would make every recorded decision read `stopped`. A standing latch is named in the shadow banner and turns it red.

Graded on the writes and the rendered surface, never on the flag, with the precondition asserted first: the same stimulus at `off` produces 30 non-zero writes with a largest of 5000 W; at `on`, set(writes) == {0.0} and 26 of them. Closed loop over the same hour twice: live -2000 W throughout, SoC 50.000 -> 62.331 %, grid to 2350 W; shadow 0 W throughout, SoC 50.0 -> 50.0 exactly, grid = the house exactly - with the arbitrage decision identical in action, instant, signed power, reason verbatim and arbiter winner across 3600/3600 samples.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Twenty-two mutations, no survivors, including a write escaping, silence instead of 0 W, observers blinded, default-on-for-everyone, the stop claim refiled, and a re-seed moved one line earlier which blinds SAFETY-18. Two mutation findings recorded: one first read as a survivor and was not, because a TypeError killed the section and reported zero reds - FCST-06's shape; and one had to become a PAIR because two fields both hold the detector at 0 W - TEST-16's shape.

Recorded limitation rather than glossed: the re-seed makes the exit safe by construction, and the price is that the loop leg's shadow decision is one slew step rather than a trajectory. Graded by name. The strategies are unaffected, which is why all three motivating defects remain visible.
2026-09-14 17:44:26 +02:00
Claude 8fa4febfef SAFETY-10: the whole decision path runs and nothing reaches the inverter
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
Every optimiser defect this project has found was invisible from outside
while it was happening, and each was paid for at the meter first: SAFETY-45's
28 charge onsets an hour against a binding peak_cap_w, TARIFF-14's wrong
quarter-hour for 45 minutes in every 60, SAFETY-46's 598 Wh spent to gain
310 Wh. There was no way to watch what the optimiser WOULD do without letting
it do it.

`shadow_mode` runs strategies, arbiter, clamps and guards, records the
decision with its reason, and commands nothing.

⚠️ IT WRITES. It writes 0 W, on the ordinary heartbeat, through the ordinary
single writer. The inverter holds its last command forever - it has no meter
timeout - so "commands nothing" implemented as "stops writing" would leave
whatever was standing when shadow mode came on standing for as long as it was
left on, under a page saying nothing is being commanded. That is the failure
this repository keeps finding. Refreshing 0 W is also what
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml's 30 s stale-input watchdog requires of us; going
quiet would keep that board tripped for the whole run, which is an alarm being
used as a mode.

⚠️ IT IS NOT A SECOND WRITE PATH. No claim, no transport, no arithmetic of its
own. It is a substitution inside Controller._write_unit() - the single choke
point every write already reaches - in the same form as the three above it,
and it is the LAST of them, so SAFETY-28's gate and SAFETY-03's clamp still
grade the number the decision path produced.

⚠️ THE DEFAULT IS `auto`, NOT `true`, AND THAT IS THE CARD'S REAL CONTENT. The
Supervisor composes options as {**config.yaml defaults, **stored user
options}, so a new key with a new default reaches EVERY EXISTING INSTALL on
the next update - including the one regulating a real battery. A boolean
default-on would have stopped it silently. There is no mechanism by which one
key can default differently for a new install and an existing one, so
"default-on for new" is a value the add-on RESOLVES: `auto` is shadow while
control is STOPPED and live once it is STARTED. A fresh install ships
`auto_start: false` and comes up observing; an install that is controlling is
started and does not change by one watt.

THE FAILSAFES. Sign watchdogs (SAFETY-02/30): INERT - they grade
Inverter.standing_w(), which shadow mode holds at 0 W. Fed the shadow decision
they would disagree with a meter that never saw it and LATCH A TRIP THAT
SURVIVES INTO LIVE OPERATION AND A RESTART. Clamp (SAFETY-03), write gate
(SAFETY-28), meter freeze (SAFETY-18), peak guard: OBSERVE. Circulation
(SAFETY-31) and delivery (SAFETY-42): observe and may legitimately latch,
because their evidence is measured power. The operator stop is the one
deliberate change: enforced at the wire rather than as a P_SAFETY claim, which
would otherwise make every recorded decision read "stopped".

⚠️ RECORDED LIMITATION: _shadow_settle() re-seeds the carried command to what
stands on the wire, which makes the exit safe by construction - and therefore
the loop leg's shadow decision is ONE SLEW STEP, not a trajectory. A shadow
run answers "what would it command now", not "what would it have done next".
The strategies are unaffected; all three defects above are visible from one.

Graded on the writes and on the rendered surface, never on the flag: 22
mutations, no survivors, including one that lets a write escape and one that
goes silent instead of commanding 0 W. Closed loop on TEST-23 stage 3's rig,
same hour twice: live drives the pack to -2000 W and SoC 50.000 -> 62.331 %;
shadow commands 0 W throughout, SoC stays 50.0 exactly, and the arbitrage
decision is identical in action, instant, signed power, reason and arbiter
winner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-14 17:25:43 +02:00
admin 8f82dd4e06 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-45: size the trade to the headroom instead of interlocking against it' (#88) from SAFETY-45 into release/1.0
With arbitrage armed and a binding peak_cap_w, the loop did not settle: 28 charge onsets an hour, period 131 s, grid swinging -455 to +3200 W, and a billed quarter 59 W OVER the cap it had just spent fifteen minutes holding. Section 10.2 is explicit that an EMS which oscillates is worse than no EMS, for hardware wear and for the peak it is trying to avoid. Not reachable by any unit test in the repo - it needed the closed loop.

THE TICKET'S MECHANISM WAS WRONG AND THE AGENT DISPROVED IT. I wrote that the quarter boundary drives the cycle. Of the 27 gaps between the 28 onsets, 23 are 90-120 s entirely INSIDE one quarter; the four long gaps are exactly the four that SPAN a boundary, so the boundary lengthens the interval rather than causing it. A fix aimed at boundary handling would have removed 4 of 28.

The real cycle is a binary interlock keyed on a continuous quantity: the trade charges at max_w while `wanted = batt_w + excess` is still negative and the guard files nothing; `wanted` crosses zero; the guard engages on a FIVE WATT floor; that flips guard_state(), which cancels the WHOLE trade; the grid-following loop - which targets grid = 0, not grid = ceiling - takes the actuator, discharges to +1870 W and exports 420 W; the projection collapses; the trade re-arms at max_w.

So the fix sizes the buy leg rather than interlocking it. control.maintenance_charge_floor() already caps MAINTENANCE charging at the headroom under the site's cap, because a maintenance charge was the only thing big enough and long enough to set the peak - and that stopped being true when OPT-04 landed. peakguard.charge_headroom_w() publishes the same quantity off the MEASURED guard rather than the optional forecast entity, arbitrage.decide() takes it keyword-only and sizes the buy, main.py passes it. It is wanted_w read in the other direction: no new arithmetic and no new constant.

THE GUARD'S DECISION FUNCTION IS UNTOUCHED, and that is the proof 2026-08-20's bang-bang did not come back. peakguard.py is +139/-0 - zero deleted lines - and sha256(decide) is identical on both trees at 7252 bytes; replay_ac3.py reproduces 190/190 records, 110 engaged, 878 Wh identically. Verified independently before merge. Reverting that rung is red on eight named checks.

Rejected and recorded: a negative `lo`, because it creates a lo > hi contradiction against main.py's cheap-window maintenance shaping that resolves to 0 W - the battery parked in the billed quarter - and closing that would mean suspending maintenance shaping permanently on every affected site. And a backoff timer in arbitrage, because both modules' notes forbid inventing timers; the trade now re-arms at `ceiling - load`, which IS learning from the refusal.

After, on the same rig and the same command: onsets 28 -> 1, grid swing 3655 -> 282 W, and the billed quarters land at exactly 1500.0 W three times over. At the shipped defaults the two affected rows buy ~2% less energy and the worst quarter goes from 59 W over the cap to zero - which is section 10.1's ordering, since the tariff bills the month's single worst quarter. On an aggressive cap the sized trade buys 58% MORE. The non-binding control row is bit-identical.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Fourteen mutations, all red, two of them zero-byte. The regression closes the loop over the shipped guard, strategy, arbiter, control law and the real QuarterAverager, and asserts BOTH directions from one changed argument plus an inert-where-inert control.

TWO DEFECTS FOUND BY THE DISCIPLINE RATHER THAN BY REVIEW. The agent's own harness restored two edits to one file in list order and left one on disk - caught by the post-revert fingerprint, habit 18 biting a tool written the same afternoon. And test_peakguard.py part 1 formatted floor_w with a bare :.0f one line after the check that reverting the 2026-08-20 rung turns red, so the file ABORTED and parts 2-13 went ungraded: that mutation's coverage was one check and is now eight.
2026-09-14 16:20:39 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e1b9254626 SAFETY-45: a price-driven charge is SIZED by the capacity guard, not switched by it
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m42s
With arbitrage armed at the shipped defaults, arbitrage and the capacity-tariff
guard drove each other in a sustained limit cycle. Re-measured on TEST-23 stage
3's closed rig against 478ba93, metrics recomputed rather than taken from the
card: `peak_cap_w` 1500 / 1200 W house -> 28 charge onsets an hour, mean period
131.1 s, the grid swinging -455.5 to +3200.0 W; at the SHIPPED
`peak_cap_w: 3500` with an 1800 W house -> 8/h, with a 3000 W house -> 32/h.
The bite rule is `load + max_w > peak_cap_w`, i.e. any house over 1500 W in the
cheapest quarter. §10.2: "an EMS that oscillates is worse than no EMS, both for
hardware wear and - per §9.1 - for the peak it is trying to avoid." And it was
losing the argument it was having: EVERY billed quarter in the three affected
configurations finished OVER the cap.

⚠️ THE CARD'S STATED MECHANISM IS WRONG AND THE CORRECTION IS ON THE RECORD.
The card, and .cache/s45.md before it, say the loop is the quarter boundary
resetting the projection and arbitrage re-arming at full power. It is not. Of
the 27 gaps between the 28 onsets, 23 are 90-120 s (mean 111.5 s) and lie
ENTIRELY INSIDE one quarter; the four long gaps - 230, 240, 250, 255 s - are
exactly the four that SPAN a boundary, so the boundary LENGTHENS the interval
rather than causing an onset. The real cycle, off the recorded fields: the trade
charges at max_w while `wanted = batt_w + excess` is negative and the guard
files NOTHING; `wanted` crosses zero; the guard engages on a floor of 5.3 W;
that flips `arbitrage.guard_state()`, which cancels the WHOLE trade; the
grid-following loop - which targets grid = 0, not grid = ceiling - takes the
actuator and discharges to +1870 W, exporting 420 W; the projection collapses;
the guard releases; the trade re-arms at max_w. A binary interlock keyed on a
continuous quantity. A fix aimed at the boundary would have removed four of
twenty-eight onsets.

THE FIX IS A SHAPE THIS ADD-ON ALREADY HAD. `control.maintenance_charge_floor()`
caps a MAINTENANCE charge at "the headroom left under the site's cap", because
"a maintenance charge is the only thing this system does that is big enough and
long enough to set that peak". ⚠️ That sentence stopped being true when OPT-04
landed. `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` publishes the same quantity off the
MEASURED guard rather than off the optional `peak_forecast_entity` - the hole
SAFETY-25 had to close in `shaping_suspended()` - and `arbitrage.decide()` sizes
its BUY leg to it, keyword-only and with no default.

NO NEW ARITHMETIC AND NO NEW CONSTANT. The number is `wanted_w` read in the
other direction: `decide()` already computes the DISCHARGE that lands the
quarter on the ceiling, and a negative one is a permitted CHARGE of `-wanted`.
⚠️ `peakguard.decide()` IS UNCHANGED - sha256(decide) = 200090d0835a3a55, 7252 B
on this branch and on 478ba93 - so 2026-08-20's anti-bang-bang rung is exactly
where it was, and tools/replay_ac3.py reproduces 190/190 guarded quarters, 110
engaged cycles, 5 blind and 878 Wh on both trees.

TWO PROPERTIES MAKE IT SAFE TO HAND A STRATEGY, BOTH SWEPT RATHER THAN ARGUED.
It is INVARIANT IN THE BATTERY - raise the charge by dW, the meter rises by dW,
so `excess` rises by dW while `batt_w` falls by dW and `wanted` does not move:
1350.0 W at every point across batt_w -5000..+2000 W on one banked quarter,
while the `excess` those runs see takes six distinct values. It is feed-forward,
so consuming it adds no feedback path around the plant. And HOLDING IMPLIES ZERO
OR UNKNOWN: across 1080 swept combinations not one ENGAGED decision answers a
positive headroom.

AFTER, same rig, same command. 1500/1200: 28 onsets -> 1, grid swing 3655.5 ->
282.0 W, energy bought 180.0 -> 285.2 Wh (+58%, because a continuous 300 W trade
beats a 2000 W trade cancelled for 57% of the hour), billed quarters
1490/1497/1509 -> 1500.0/1500.0/1500.0. 3500/1800: 8 -> 1, 3511/3536/3559 ->
3500/3500/3500. 3500/3000: 32 -> 1, 3519/3542/3557 -> 3500/3500/3500. The two
shipped-default rows buy 2.2% and 1.6% LESS energy and in exchange the worst
quarter goes from 59 W over the cap to zero - which is the ordering §10.1 asks
for, since the capacity tariff bills the month's single worst quarter.
⚠️ AND THE NEGATIVE CONTROL: at peak_cap_w 5000 with a 1200 W house, where
`load + max_w` never reaches the cap, the two runs are BIT-IDENTICAL.

⚠️ A NEGATIVE `lo` WAS CONSIDERED AND REJECTED, AND THE REASON IS IN THE CODE.
Deleting `decide()`'s `wanted <= 0` gate and filing `lo = wanted` is the tidier
answer arithmetically. It creates a new `lo > hi` CONTRADICTION against
main.py's cheap-window maintenance shaping, which files a NEGATIVE `hi`;
arbiter.py clause 2 has no notion of one limit out-ranking another, so it
resolves to 0 W - the battery PARKED in the quarter that sets the bill - and the
only way to close that suspends the maintenance charge shaping PERMANENTLY on
every site this card is about. A backoff or cooldown in arbitrage was rejected
too: both modules' design notes say no timer is invented, and the trade now
re-arms at `ceiling - load` rather than at max_w, which is what learning from a
refusal means when the refusal is a measurement.

THE REGRESSION IS THE LOOP SETTLING, NOT A UNIT TEST ON decide().
test_arbitrage.py 3c closes the loop over the shipped guard, strategy, arbiter,
control law and QuarterAverager with a modelled plant, and asserts BOTH
directions: unsized it must run away (24 onsets, -414..+3200 W, a quarter over
the cap) and sized it must settle (1 onset, 303 W swing, three quarters at
exactly 1500.0 W). The two runs differ in one argument. A third pair asserts the
card is INERT where the defect is inert.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 14 mutations, every one RED on a named check, no
survivors; two are ZERO BYTES - `min()` -> `max()` on the sizing, and the
sized-trade sentence's two operands transposed - and both are red. M13 reverts
the 2026-08-20 rung and is red on EIGHT named checks in test_peakguard and three
in test_arbitrage. Every revert verified by a tree fingerprint AFTER the revert,
which is how a defect in the battery's own harness was found: two edits to one
file, restored in list order, left the first one on disk (MUTATION.md habit 18).
test_peakguard.py part 1 also gained a None-safe format, because the mutation it
exists to catch made it raise TypeError one line later and ABORT the file -
parts 2-13 were ungraded and M13's recorded coverage was one check instead of
eight.

Not fixed, and named: TEST-23 finding 1's export overshoot at the END of a trade
(356-938 W, ~0.37 x max_w) is a different card; a house whose load ALONE exceeds
the cap still has the trade refused outright and the loop drive to grid = 0
rather than to the ceiling, and no swept pair reaches that regime; the container
leg (hadrive.py) was not re-run because test23s3-addon is deliberately stopped
as a second writer on the setpoint entity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-14 16:10:34 +02:00
admin 478ba93710 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-16: the injection leg gets its own coefficients' (#87) from TARIFF-16 into release/1.0
export_price_eur_kwh() modelled injection as one scalar. Eneco publishes 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 on the same card as its consumption formula, identical on the January and September 2026 cards; ENGIE publishes (B x eSpot_15) - A; Aspiravi uses 0,07 against ~0,10 on its own consumption leg. Reproduced against the shipped readers over one real BELPEX day: the published formula gives 24 distinct prices with a spread of 0.16710 EUR/kWh, the scalar gives 0.00000, and 5 of 24 hours are NEGATIVE - down to -0.03008 EUR/kWh - which are the midday hours a PV household exports in. The 6% VAT asymmetry is not wrong in the scalar, it is unstateable.

THE CARD'S BEFORE-STATE WAS WRONG AND THE AGENT CORRECTED IT. I wrote that this affects what the operator is shown. It did not: export_price_eur_kwh() had ZERO callers under app/ - not arbitrage, not the status page, not MQTT. Verified independently before merge; the only references are its own definition, the defaults entry, FRAMEWORK_KEYS and two comments. So the honest before-state is weaker than the card claimed: the scalar was not a misleading display, it was an UNREAD OPTION. DOCS, CHANGELOG and the startup line say so, and a check grades it. An operator actually seeing their injection price is a separate ticket.

Machinery reused rather than copied, which is TARIFF-17's move applied a second time: parse_export_formula() is parse_price_formula() with ONE argument moved, selecting a row of a _LEGS table, so everything that differs between the legs is a string and the units table, NaN rule, closed enumerations, unknown-key refusal, card comparison and DST handling are one implementation. Pinned by a check that parses every file under app/ and asserts all 32 grammar names are defined in exactly one module, plus an AST pin on the wrapper's body, plus twelve refusal sentences DERIVED from the consumption leg's own.

A NEGATIVE INJECTION PRICE IS ACCEPTED AND AN IMPLAUSIBLE ONE IS STILL REFUSED, and the bound had to move to achieve it: implausible_all_in() floors consumption at +0.02 EUR/kWh of energy, which is fatal on a leg that is legitimately negative. The bound is now off the PRICE and onto the COEFFICIENTS, where it is index-free and sign-free - a pass-through band (0.10-10x; Eneco 1.00x, Aspiravi 0.70x) and an offset-magnitude bound (0.20 against published 0.01188 and 0.02). One spec is put through both bands and the answers printed: the consumption band refuses -0.03008, the injection band accepts it.

The missing printed estimate is stated, not worked around. Eneco's injection line has no worked example beside it, so `card` is optional on this leg and unchanged on the other; where an estimate exists the self-check runs at the same tolerance, and where it does not validate.py logs that the coefficients are UNGRADED and names the two bounds that ran instead. A check MEASURES the resulting gap: a factor of 0.070 where the contract says 0.100 - 30% of every export payment - passes both bounds, because 0.70x is a pass-through somebody really publishes.

The scalar path is genuinely unchanged: the function body is pinned on the AST and seven option dicts are compared against the pre-TARIFF-16 expression with ==.

Evidence: 29/29 green, CI green. Twenty mutations, every one red on a named check. Giving the injection band TARIFF-15's floor is red in test_price.py and GREEN IN THE OTHER 28 FILES; so are the second-grammar and ignore-the-formula mutants. One is a single byte, one is ZERO bytes and moves no decision - legs transposed in the VAT banner, caught by an ordered-pair check. One is recorded for its SHAPE rather than its result: rerouting the scalar through the seam recurses, so the suite dies naming nothing, and a second mutation of the same property exists so a check can name it.

Two sharp edges flagged rather than smoothed: `index` and `resolution` on the injection leg name a series nobody fetches, which an operator could misread as a promise to fetch it; and the coefficient bands are materially weaker than a card check, catching the factor-of-10 class and nothing else.
2026-09-13 18:51:25 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 995da777ce TARIFF-16: the injection leg stops being one number
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m42s
`price.py` modelled what a site is PAID for export as ONE scalar. The market
publishes a line, and the cards say so in their own words: Eneco Zon & Wind
Dynamisch `0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188` c EUR/kWh - "het injectietarief is dynamisch
en kan per uur wijzigen", identical on the January and the September 2026 cards;
ENGIE Dynamic `(B x eSpot_15) - A`; Aspiravi `0,07 x Belpex - 2`.
`price_export_formula` carries that line with its OWN coefficients.

⚠️ THIS IS NOT A WRONG-TRADE FIX, AND SAYING SO IS PART OF SHIPPING IT.
`arbitrage.py` does not read `export_price_eur_kwh` at all - its own comment
says so, citing §9.3's near-zero Belgian injection price as the reason the
economically sound trade on this market is charge-cheap-to-displace-expensive-
IMPORT. Both hours it compares are all-in CONSUMPTION prices. No trade this
add-on takes today is decided by an injection price and nothing here changes
one. What it changes is what an operator is told, and what a future
export-aware strategy rests on: OPT-06 and any export logic would otherwise
inherit a scalar that cannot represent the market, and the 6% VAT asymmetry
would be invisible in the arithmetic. test_price.py 17h parses every module
under app/ and goes red the day something calls an injection reader, so that
sentence is graded rather than attested.

FOUR PROPERTIES A SCALAR CANNOT HOLD. Its own factor (Eneco 0,102 consumption
against 0,100 injection; Aspiravi 0,07 against ~0,10 - not the consumption B
with a sign flip). A negative offset, which `price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)`
cannot express at all. VAT-exemption - "injectietarieven zijn vrijgesteld van
btw" - against 6% on consumption, representable only because `vat_pct` is PER
SPEC. And a price that goes below zero with no floor, under 11,88 EUR/MWh of
BELPEX-H, which is the middle of a sunny day.

⚠️ A NEGATIVE INJECTION PRICE IS ACCEPTED, AND THAT NEEDED A DIFFERENT BAND
RATHER THAN A LOWER FLOOR. `implausible_all_in()` floors the consumption leg at
+0.02 EUR/kWh of energy; applied to injection that refuses the real market in
the hours it matters most. Measured rather than argued: 17c puts ONE spec
through BOTH bands and prints that the consumption band refuses -0.03008
EUR/kWh while the injection band accepts it. The floor was not decoration - it
is what catches a card read a hundred times too small, the one unit error the
card self-check cannot see because it cancels out of a comparison between the
two sides - so the bound moves OFF the price and ONTO the coefficients, where
it is index-free and sign-free: a pass-through band (Eneco's injection leg is
1.00x, Aspiravi's 0.70x; the band is 0.10-10x) and an offset magnitude bound
(0.20 EUR/kWh against published 0.01188 and 0.02). Two rungs that can both
answer a hundredfold error, so each is graded on its REASON, each gets a
stimulus the other cannot reach with the precondition asserted as its own
check, and they are mutated TOGETHER (TEST-16).

⚠️ THE CARD SELF-CHECK APPLIES WHERE THERE IS A CARD, AND WHERE THERE IS NOT
THAT IS STATED RATHER THAN WORKED AROUND. `price_formula` can require a `card`
block because a Belgian card prints the consumption formula, the reference
index AND the resulting price. Eneco's INJECTION formula is printed with no
price beside it. Requiring a block would make the published line inexpressible;
inventing the estimate would grade the coefficients against arithmetic done
with the same coefficients. So the block is OPTIONAL on this leg and unchanged
on the other, the self-check runs at the same tolerance wherever a printed
estimate exists, and validate.py says at startup - "its coefficients are
UNGRADED" - when it does not, naming the two bounds that ran instead. This is
TARIFF-15 demonstrating two tariffs end to end rather than three, one card
later. 17e also MEASURES the size of that gap: a factor of 0.070 where the
contract says 0.100 - 30% of every export payment - passes both bounds, because
0.70x is a pass-through somebody really publishes.

ONE PARSER, NOT TWO. `parse_export_formula()` is `parse_price_formula()` with
its OPTION NAME as an argument - TARIFF-17's move on `parse_static_profile()`,
exactly - and everything that differs between the legs is a string in one
`_LEGS` table. A second copy would be a second unit table, a second NaN rule, a
second unknown-key rule and a second `to_resolution()`, diverging first on the
23- and 25-hour days. test_price.py 17b pins it two ways: all 32 grammar names
are defined in exactly ONE module under app/, with the scope COMPUTED by
parsing every file rather than listed; and twelve refusal sentences for the new
option are DERIVED from the old option's own sentence rather than transcribed.
The four sentences that deliberately differ are named, with what differs, and
asserted to differ.

NOTHING CHANGES FOR A SITE THAT DOES NOT SET IT. The option ships "";
`export_price_eur_kwh()`'s body is byte-identical, pinned on the AST rather
than on the source text; `export_price_at()` falls through to it for every
index value. 17f compares seven option dicts x five index values against the
pre-TARIFF-16 expression with `==`.

`price_export_formula` joins FRAMEWORK_KEYS, BANNED_IN_PLUGIN_CODE is derived
from that set, and `code_leaks()` refuses a plugin that names it with nothing
else edited.

ALSO CORRECTED HERE: config.yaml's comment beside `export_price_eur_kwh` still
read "no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve". TARIFF-07
struck that claim from app/price.py and DOCS.md and did not reach config.yaml,
where it has been shipping since.

20 mutations, every one red on a named check, ledger in test_price.py below
section 17 - including a ZERO-byte one (the two legs transposed in the
VAT-asymmetry banner: no decision moves, only the sentence) and a ONE-byte one
(`card_required=True` on the injection leg). Three run over all 29 files and
red on test_price.py alone. 29/29 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 18:41:06 +02:00
admin 4dcd9b0fc6 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-18: the taxes default is half the real Flemish figure' (#86) from TARIFF-18 into release/1.0
price_taxes_eur_kwh shipped at 0.06 against a real Flemish 0.11736 - Fluvius Antwerpen 5,35 + bijzondere accijns 4,876 + groene stroom/WKK 1,51 + energiebijdrage 0, incl. 6% VAT, from the Eneco residential card for September 2026. Across the eight Fluvius DSOs the range is 0.117-0.131, so the shipped default was roughly half. The components ship as rows in the code, and the exact unrounded sum is used so the check asserts an EQUALITY against them rather than a tolerance. The energiebijdrage is a ZERO ROW, not an absence - it went to 0 EUR/MWh on 2026-08-01 and was merged into the excise, so anyone hand-computing this from an older guide double-counts it; deleting the row changes no sum, so its PRESENCE is graded separately.

AN UPGRADE HAZARD THE TICKET DID NOT NAME, found and closed. App.options is a deepmerge of config.yaml's defaults over the stored options, so the moment the default moves, every site STORING 0.06 becomes non-default with nobody having edited anything. Combined with TARIFF-17's new rung - a taxes period table beside a non-default scalar is a startup refusal - a working Walloon or Brussels site with a table would have hit SystemExit(78) on the upgrade, over an inert number the table overrides anyway. Closed with SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH: validate.py reads a superseded default as untouched too. The rung is NOT weakened - a genuinely custom 0.1198 beside a table is still refused by name, and the refusal now names both figures.

AND THE TICKET'S FRAMING WAS WRONG. I wrote that a site which took the default silently gets a different number. That is not what the deepmerge does: an existing install keeps its stored 0.06 and sees nothing change. The new default reaches a FRESH install, and an existing one only when its options are re-saved. Said plainly in the CHANGELOG, flagged as not re-measured on this branch (the 70-of-71-keys figure is 0.9.0's), with predeploy_check.py --options named as what would confirm it.

THE FIGURE IS THE BOTTOM OF THE BAND, DELIBERATELY, and the argument is the agent's rather than the ticket's: the error directions are not symmetric. Set too high, a genuinely negative hour reads positive and the add-on exports into paid disposal - section 17's own regression case. Set too low, it only declines a trade that would have paid. One default standing in for eight DSOs belongs at the bottom, and Antwerpen's 0.11736 is a real card row there rather than a synthesised minimum.

A CHECK HAD TO BE REWRITTEN RATHER THAN RE-POINTED. test_price.py section 0 justified its own constants by '0.06 is exactly twice 0.03'. This card ends that coincidence, so the sentence is false and is gone; it now asserts per figure that neither shipped default equals the fixture, which is stronger than the tuple compare it replaced. Recorded rather than quietly dropped, along with three other now-false claims the change created in test_price.py's docstring, MUTATION.md and DECISIONS/TARIFF-15 - which had predicted this card and is annotated as shipped.

Evidence: baseline 29/29 before any edit, 29/29 on the committed tree. Ten mutations, all red, every revert sha256-verified and every grade taken in a container with the tree :ro so no .pyc can exist. Two are zero-byte. The interesting one moves the component rows AND the default AND config.yaml together into a coherent West-Vlaanderen card - caught only by the literal typed in the test file and the band check, which is why the sum is graded from two independent sides. What the suite cannot see is stated in the PR: it grades the default against the card as a number, never the card against Belgium.
2026-09-13 16:33:37 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9c65ac2cf8 TARIFF-18: price_taxes_eur_kwh stops shipping at half the real figure
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m48s
`price_taxes_eur_kwh` shipped at 0.06 EUR/kWh with no recorded provenance -
no card, no date, no component list - and roughly HALF the true Flemish
all-in non-energy figure. It now ships at 0.11736, and the rows it is made
of are in the code rather than in this message:

  Fluvius distribution (Antwerpen)              5,35   c EUR/kWh
  Bijzondere accijns, "Alle verbruik"           4,876
  Bijdrage groene stroom en WKK Vlaanderen      1,51
  Energiebijdrage (0 EUR/MWh since 2026-08-01)  0
                                               ------
                                               11,736 c EUR/kWh = 0.11736

Eneco residential card for Flanders, September 2026, incl. 6 % VAT.
`app/price.py`'s FLEMISH_TAXES_COMPONENTS_EUR_KWH carries the rows and
test_price.py section 1b re-adds them - and also compares the total against
the card's own figures typed in the test file, so an edit that moved the
rows and the default together is still caught.

WHAT THIS IS NOT. It is not an arbitrage-correctness fix and it cannot be.
This scalar is a LEVEL component: an additive constant cancels exactly in
`max - min` and leaves the argmin where it was. TARIFF-17 shipped that proof
and it is unchanged - test_price.py 16b drives six flat scalars spanning and
exceeding the whole per-DSO range and gets the identical cheapest hour and
the identical spread to the last digit. DOCS and the CHANGELOG say so in
those words.

WHAT IT IS. A display and guard fix:

  * every number an operator reads, which at half the true value made the
    add-on look considerably better than it is; and
  * §17's negative-price guard in arbitrage.py - the one rung that tests an
    ABSOLUTE all-in price rather than a difference. It fires when
    `spot < -(markup + taxes)`, so its boundary moves -0.09 -> -0.14736
    EUR/kWh of spot. test_arbitrage.py section 2c drives both sides through
    the shipped decide() and pins the boundary from below as well.

The default is Antwerpen's real row, near the LOW end of the 0.117-0.131
per-DSO band, and that is deliberate: the error directions are not
symmetric. Too high carries a genuinely negative hour above zero and the
add-on exports into paid-for disposal - §17's own case. Too low only
declines a discharge that would have paid.

TARIFF-17's INTERACTION, WHICH HAD TO BE DECIDED. Nothing in that rung
hardcoded 0.06; it read PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, so moving the default moves
what it refuses. The Supervisor sets `App.options = deepmerge(config.yaml
defaults, stored options)`, so a saved blob carries the key whether it was
typed or not - every stored 0.06 became "non-default" with nobody editing
anything, and a working Walloon or Brussels site with a taxes table would
have met SystemExit(78) on the upgrade over an inert number. price.py now
carries SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH = (0.06,) and validate.py reads a
superseded default as untouched too. The rung is NOT weakened: 0.1198 beside
a table is still refused by name, and the refusal now names both figures.

config.yaml and PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS moved together; CFG-03's tripwire
(test_price.py section 1, test_defaults_pin.py) stayed green by agreeing.
test_price.py section 0's fourth check was REWRITTEN rather than re-pointed:
it used to justify the file's own grading constants by observing that the
shipped pair was degenerate (0.06 is exactly twice 0.03). TARIFF-18 ends
that coincidence, so the sentence is no longer true and is not kept.

29/29 test files green. Mutation ledger on the PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 16:24:56 +02:00
admin 7796f168a9 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-17: a charge that varies by hour gets somewhere to live' (#85) from TARIFF-17 into release/1.0
price.py modelled taxes as one flat scalar. In Flanders that is correct - Fluvius distribution is a single rate - but the Walloon DSOs publish day/night bands on the same card: ORES 13,27 vs 7,39, AIESH 15,17 vs 8,21, ORES IMPACT 16,578 vs 5,090 c EUR/kWh. The bands are ANTI-CORRELATED with what the battery wants to do - cheap network hours coincide with cheap spot hours - so flattening them systematically UNDERSTATES the spread and declines cycles that are genuinely profitable.

The flat scalar was never a wrong number. It sits in the additive bucket and provably cannot change which hour is cheapest; the defect was that a component belonging in the order-changing bucket had nowhere to live. That framing is the ticket, and it is what the regression grades.

Reproduced on one ordinary Belgian winter Thursday, same feed, same markup, taxes the only argument differing: five flat scalars spanning AND exceeding the table's own range - 0.0000 / 0.0739 / 0.1198 / 0.1327 / 1.0000 - all give cheapest hour 13 and spread 0.1500 to the last digit, while the ORES table gives hour 03 and 0.1788. Asserted through the shipped decision, static_tariff.arbitrage().cheapest, not through assemble()'s output. Before this existed the shipped tree answered assemble(..., <table>) -> TypeError.

The fixture differs in exactly ONE way and that is its own precondition - same caps object, same RawPoint list, same markup, by identity - and the flat arm is a FAMILY rather than a single scalar, so what the comparison measures cannot be a level effect. That closes the shape that produced a whole-suite survivor in TARIFF-11, where a fixture varied two things at once.

GRAMMAR REUSED, NOT DUPLICATED. parse_taxes_profile() is parse_static_profile() with option= and means= as default arguments, so every pre-existing call site and sentence is byte-identical. Graded two ways: one check parses every module under app/ and asserts the 14 grammar names are defined in exactly one of them, with an AST pin that the wrapper's whole body is one call; another DERIVES all thirteen refusal sentences for the new option from the old option's own sentence. Copying the tiling check into price.py is red.

A WHOLE CARD TYPED IN CENTS IS ITS OWN RUNG, and not a restatement of the parser's plausibility bound. ORES's 13,27 trips that bound - but SIBELGA'S ENTIRE BRUSSELS CARD (9,39 / 7,10) IS UNDER IT and would have started as a 9.39 EUR/kWh levy. Graded by its own reason, and the mutation is red on the Sibelga line only.

Malformed tables are refused at STARTUP by validate.py across three rungs. If one ever gets past, load_prices() returns a section 11.4 no-data read naming the key and logs an error - no silent fall back to the scalar, no traceback into the tick.

Both plugins that need the framework to add taxes move 13 -> 03 (custom_formula {ENERGY,MARKUP} and generic_dayahead {ENERGY}); manual_csv, which is all-in, stays at 13. Enumerated from PROVIDERS rather than typed.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Thirteen mutations, all red, and no row is an edit-and-revert - each gets a fresh rsync'd copy with no __pycache__, mounted :ro, then deleted, which closes habit 18 structurally rather than by discipline. Hoisting the lookup out of assemble()'s loop (+17 B) keeps the number right while stopping it varying by hour: red on six named checks in test_price.py and GREEN IN THE OTHER 28 FILES.

Three things named rather than rounded off: one mutant is equivalent and unseparable by any fixture, because StaticProfile.at() calls brussels() on whatever instant it is given; DOCS' bucket table is prose that nothing asserts, though the numbers it quotes are printed by the checks on every run; and the card's own 0.2240/0.2422 figures were NOT verified and were not repeated - replaced with a claim that is derivable from the contract price, that the spread is proportional to factor and the offset drops out.

One design point is explicitly the owner's, not the agent's: a table beside a NON-DEFAULT price_taxes_eur_kwh is a refusal, so an operator adopting the table must set that key back to 0.06. The alternative - warn, table wins - is the silent-loser shape this repo refuses everywhere else, so the refusal was taken and flagged rather than quietly chosen.
2026-09-13 15:40:17 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 2fac0aaf06 TARIFF-17: a price component that varies by hour has somewhere to live
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m25s
`price.py` modelled the whole non-energy part of a Belgian bill as ONE flat
scalar. This adds `price_taxes_profile`, which carries the TAXES component as
a period table, and makes `assemble()` evaluate it at each point's own instant.

⚠️ THE FLAT SCALAR WAS NOT A WRONG NUMBER, AND THIS IS NOT A CORRECTION OF ONE.
The optimiser reads exactly two quantities off a series - the spread
`max - min` over the firm points, and which hour is cheapest - and an additive
constant identical in every hour cancels out of the first and leaves the second
where it was. It is provably inert. Measured, and printed by test_price.py 16b
on every run: with a flat taxes figure of 0.00, 0.0739, 0.1198, 0.1327 or 1.00
EUR/kWh the same 24-hour feed is cheapest at 13:00 in all five cases and its
spread is 0.1500 EUR/kWh in all five cases. What was missing is anywhere for an
HOUR-VARYING non-energy component to live. This is a missing capability, not a
bad constant.

Belgium has one. Fluvius distribution is a single rate - its tariff-card row
reads `Normaal | Uitsl. nacht`, where exclusive night is a separate physical
circuit and not a night register - so nothing changes for the reference site in
Flanders. The Walloon DSOs and Sibelga are on the same card with four columns,
`Enkelvoudig | Dag | Nacht | Uitsl. nacht`, and the gap is real money (c/kWh):
ORES 13,27 / 7,39; AIESH 15,17 / 8,21; Tecteo RESA 12,20 / 7,01; Sibelga
9,39 / 7,10; ORES IMPACT 2026 16,578 / 5,090.

⚠️ AND THE BANDS ARE ANTI-CORRELATED WITH WHAT THE BATTERY WANTS TO DO. The
cheap network hours are the cheap spot hours, so flattening them does not shift
the curve - it UNDERSTATES the spread and declines cycles that would have paid.
Same feed, same markup, the only difference being the taxes argument:

    flat 0.0000 / 0.0739 / 0.1198 / 0.1327 / 1.0000
                                       -> cheapest hour 13, spread 0.1500
    ORES dag 0.1327 / nacht 0.0739     -> cheapest hour 03, spread 0.1788

The regression check grades WHICH HOUR IS CHEAPEST, not the spread: an
implementation that reads the table once and adds one number to every point is
the LEVEL bucket wearing a period table - right magnitude, wrong shape - and a
spread assertion passes on it. Measured: hoisting the lookup out of
`assemble()`'s loop (+17 B) is red on six named checks in test_price.py and
GREEN in the other 28 files.

ONE GRAMMAR, NOT TWO. `static_tariff.py` already shipped the periods, the day
selectors, the tiling rule and the DST handling, so `parse_taxes_profile()` is
the same parser with the option name and the "what this number means" clause as
arguments. A second tiling rule would be a second set of 23- and 25-hour-day
bugs. test_static_tariff.py section 10 pins that two ways: by parsing every
module under `app/` and asserting the grammar is defined in exactly one of
them, and by deriving each of thirteen refusal sentences for the new option
from the old option's own sentence rather than transcribing them.

`Component.TAXES` semantics, `code_leaks()` and the double-counting guarantee
are untouched. The new key joins FRAMEWORK_KEYS, BANNED_IN_PLUGIN_CODE is
derived from that set, and a plugin that names it is refused at `register()`.
It reaches both plugins that take taxes - `custom_formula` ({ENERGY, MARKUP})
and `generic_dayahead` ({ENERGY}) - and not `manual_csv`, which is all-in: the
table is routed through `capabilities().adds`, exactly as the scalar is.

⚠️ A MALFORMED TABLE IS REFUSED AT STARTUP, NOT AT THE NEXT FETCH. It is read
on the ~30 s planning path, and a table that first fails at 03:00 is a site
that stops pricing at 03:00, which §11.4 turns into a quiet fallback
indistinguishable from a healthy fixed-tariff day. validate.py refuses three
things: a table that does not tile the day; a table set beside a NON-DEFAULT
`price_taxes_eur_kwh`, because the table wins and the scalar would then be a
number the operator typed that decides nothing; and a whole card typed in
CENTS, which is how these figures are printed. That last rung is not a
restatement of the parser's +-10 EUR/kWh bound - ORES's 13,27 trips the parser,
but Sibelga's entire card, 9,39 and 7,10, is under it and would otherwise have
started as a 9.39 EUR/kWh levy. Both rungs are graded by the REASON each gives,
and mutating them together (TEST-16) moves three rows.

NOTHING CHANGES FOR A SITE THAT DOES NOT SET IT. The option ships "", and the
scalar path is unchanged arithmetically rather than merely in intent:
test_price.py 16f reproduces the pre-TARIFF-17 expression and compares 12
capability/scalar combinations point for point with `==`.

13 mutations, every one red on a named check, ledger in test_price.py below
section 16k with byte deltas and the one equivalent mutant named. 29/29 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 15:31:15 +02:00
admin c518007caf Merge pull request 'TARIFF-11: the add-on stops flattering itself' (#84) from TARIFF-11 into release/1.0
Four places where the add-on's account of itself was wrong, every one in the direction that flatters it, and none of them pinned by any check because nothing graded the strings a human reads.

TariffPlan.words counted points and called them hours - 192 h for 192 quarter-hourly points, which is 48 hours; measured across a 40-hour soak the error ranged 1.79x to 5.33x with the firm/carried mix, and horizon_h was 48.0 at every sample while words never said 48. The section 8.3 refusal did the same and reached the status page through arb.explain(): 'only 1 of 96 hours carry a published price' for 96 points spanning 24. The plan's shape reached no HTTP surface at all - rows['Tariff'] was static_status()'s own sentence and read 'no static profile' at all 802 soak samples, while the plan was provisional for 76% of them and carried mixed 900/3600 s spacing for 70%. And main.py's 'if and only if' comment was false: cycle() returns on missing inputs before self.arb = None, so a site with trading ON rendered 'off (arbitrage_enabled)' - naming an option that was on.

A FIFTH instance was found that the card did not list, in price_forecast.py's '%d of %d hours' - carried hours over points - which DOCS quotes verbatim, so leaving it would have re-broken the doc.

THE CHECK IS THE DELIVERABLE, not the fixes. It renders Controller.status_payload()['rows'], parses each number out of its OWN slot, and compares it against a figure computed from the fixture's two construction parameters - never from the property the row was built out of. The slot parser is calibrated first against a correct row AND against a row wrong exactly as the defect was. Fixtures are a SET of four plan shapes and the check computes and prints the table of field pairs no fixture separates. origin and product are graded by disagreement over identical point lists, the Arbitrage row's states by inequality, the end-to-end row against the captured document's own length.

The two Tariff sources stay distinguishable: one row, two explicitly timestamped halves, with the age taken from tariff_at - which TARIFF-12 deliberately does not move on a kept plan - and measured by the caller rather than by a second clock inside the renderer. The same plan object at 0 s and 4000 s must render differently, and hardcoding the age to 0 is red.

FCST-04's Tariff-to-DOCS pin was honoured rather than routed around: wiring the plan in took test_price_history.py red until DOCS carried the pinned sentence, the row's five facts, the two-clock warning and a four-row table of the Arbitrage renderings. The trap fired exactly as designed.

Evidence: 29/29 green, re-verified after merging TARIFF-13. Sixteen mutations, no survivors; one is a zero-byte edit transposing firm and carried, and it is red.

TWO MUTATIONS BIT THE AGENT'S OWN CHECKS AND BOTH WERE CLOSED. One was a survivor of the whole suite at -190 B: the origin fixture gave the fallback plan a distinct provider string as well as a distinct origin, so the rows differed for two reasons and dropping origin entirely changed nothing observable - habit 4, occurring inside the fix for habit 4. The provider string is now held equal as its own precondition. The other produced a traceback and no named red, because a datetime comparison raised inside an f-string OPERAND rather than inside the condition - FCST-06's finding, one layer over.

Left for its own card, named rather than folded in: TARIFF-09's price_feed_url override warning still predicts the wrong degraded state - on a cold store the unpublished hours are ABSENT, not carried and flagged - and absence is the worse state.
2026-09-13 14:07:07 +02:00
admin a11597e0b3 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/release/1.0' into TARIFF-11
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m20s
# Conflicts:
#	goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md
2026-09-13 13:51:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 610725bed9 TARIFF-11: the plan's account of itself, corrected and put on the page
Four defects of one shape - the add-on's report of its own tariff plan was
wrong, always in the direction that flattered it - and one check, which is
the deliverable.

1. `TariffPlan.words` counted POINTS and called them HOURS. The live add-on
   logged `dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 132 h` for 132
   quarter-hourly points = 33 hours. Belgium moved to a 15-minute MTU on
   2025-10-01, so this was wrong every time it was printed, and NOT by a
   constant factor: a 40-hour soak measured 1.79x .. 5.33x, because §8.3's
   carried points are hourly while the firm ones are quarter-hourly.
   `words` now reports both quantities, plus the firm/carried split and the
   spacing, in FCST-04's *Price history* wording so the two rows can be
   compared.

2. §8.3's firm-pair refusal and the flat-tariff refusal did the same, and
   they reach an operator through `self.arb.explain()`. This is exactly the
   point<->hour conflation TARIFF-14 removed from `at()`, left standing in
   the prose. `price_forecast.py`'s §8.3 carry-forward log line carried the
   third instance - a carried-HOUR count over a POINT count - and DOCS
   quotes it verbatim, so it is corrected here too.

3. The plan reached no HTTP surface at all. `rows["Tariff"]` was
   `static_status()`'s 30 s-tick sentence and never saw the provider plan -
   it read 'no static profile' at all 802 soak samples on a site whose feed
   was answering. It now carries the plan's shape. ⚠️ The two sources are
   kept distinguishable: the plan half is stamped with its own age, measured
   from `tariff_at`, because it can be up to TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S (5400 s) old.
   FCST-04 pins that row to DOCS as a pair; DOCS moves in this commit.

4. `main.py`'s "if and only if" was false. `cycle()` returns at the input
   hold before `self.arb = None`, so an armed site read
   `off (arbitrage_enabled)` - naming an option that is on - and, after one
   completed cycle, showed a decision up to 15 s stale as a current one. The
   row now reads the OPTION and separates three facts; `cycle_at` and
   `arb_at` make "this cycle reached no decision" an observation.

THE DELIVERABLE IS THE CHECK. All four survived 29 green suites because
nothing graded the strings a human is shown. `test_price.py` section 12
renders through the shipped `status_payload()`, parses each number out of
its OWN SLOT and compares it against a figure computed from the fixture's
construction parameters - not from the property the row was built out of
(habit 4), and not as a substring of a sentence the same file wrote (habit
14). The fixture set is four plan shapes and the check computes and prints
the field pairs no fixture separates. The *Arbitrage* row's states are
driven through real cycles with a sensor answering None and graded by
INEQUALITY.

No behaviour changed: no threshold, refusal rung, claim or setpoint moved.

MUTATIONS: 16, no survivors, one at +0 B (the risky delta) and red. Two were
found by the battery INSIDE THIS CARD'S OWN CHECK: a -190 B survivor whose
fixture varied two things at once (habit 4), and a mutation whose red was a
TRACEBACK in an f-string operand and therefore named nothing (FCST-06). Both
closed; the table is on the PR.

All 29 test files green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 13:51:05 +02:00
admin b4a3801f68 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-13: the count of what was measured is as durable as the measurement' (#83) from TARIFF-13 into release/1.0
A 40-hour soak drove a restart and caught the capacity-tariff row asserting '0 quarter(s) banked' for a month in which 120 quarters had been measured. The peak and its attributed quarter persisted; the count did not. It is the count, not the peak, that tells an operator how much of the billing month the measurement actually covers - a peak of 365 W over 120 quarters and the same peak over 0 quarters are very different claims about the same number, and after a restart the page made the weaker claim while displaying the stronger one's value.

Reproduced through a real Controller and P1Ingest with a real restart, never by reading code: 12 -> 0 with the store still holding 12 rows. Fixed durable rather than removed - the count is the useful half of the row. PeakStore.banked_count(month) queries quarter_blocks and `recorded` became a property over it. After the fix the printed count matches the store on both sides, 12 -> 13, and 13 is CORRECT: the restart's restore() banks the stale open block, which the old process-wide counter never saw.

TWO DEFECTS THE TICKET DID NOT NAME, both closed by the same change: the count was never month-scoped, so a fresh October reported a quarter banked from September; and it missed blocks banked by restore(). An unreadable store now returns None and renders 'an unreadable number of quarter(s) banked' - rendering it as 0 was rejected because it reads as a real zero, which is TARIFF-01's own disarming-value argument applied to the coverage figure beside the peak.

THE TICKET'S SECOND FINDING WAS FALSE AND THE AGENT DISPROVED IT. I wrote that ties at the same wattage are re-attributed to the most recent matching quarter. The upsert is strictly '>', so an exact tie never writes at all - six exactly-equal 365.0 W quarters re-attributed zero times. The soak's drift was a real new maximum below the row's whole-watt display resolution: 365.0000001 W is a new peak to the database and the same '365 W' to the reader. A plausible diagnosis, checked rather than implemented.

Tie attribution is nevertheless decided deliberately - EARLIEST wins - on what the row is for rather than on money: wattage is what is billed, and an operator investigating one event needs a stable answer. It is also what recompute_month() already did, and the two readers genuinely diverged: fed newest-first, monthly_peak answered 09:45 and the recompute 09:00, breaking the invariant part 8 exists to prove. peak_w is untouched and SAFETY-07 reads identical watts.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Eleven mutations, all red, purged before each with the fingerprint verified after every revert. One was a REAL SURVIVOR at -3 B: banked_count() has two None paths and the first battery reached only one, because a never-opened handle short-circuits before any SQL. Closed by dropping the table out from under an OPEN store, behind a precondition asserting the same call answered 4 first.

main.py is untouched - the row picks the fix up unedited because `recorded` is now a property. The residual is named rather than hidden: `recorded` answers for now() while the peak follows checks(when=...). Production has exactly one call site, self.checks() with no argument, where both are the same month, so the live page is correct and durable; they part only under the suite's when= affordance, and that mismatch is strictly smaller than the process-wide counter it replaces. recorded_in(when) is shipped and the row's move onto it is one token.
2026-09-13 13:03:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a991438e40 TARIFF-13: the coverage figure beside the peak stops resetting at a restart
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m27s
The capacity-tariff status row printed a peak read from SQLite next to a count
of banked quarters read from PROCESS MEMORY - `PeakTracker.recorded`, an `int`
set to 0 in `__init__` and counted up inside `sync()`. A 40-hour soak caught
what that means at a driven restart, on both instances independently:

  before: 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-11T18:45:00+00:00
          - 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 120 quarter(s) banked
  after : 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-11T18:45:00+00:00
          - 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit;   0 quarter(s) banked

Reproduced here before anything changed, through the real Controller and a real
restart - a second Controller object against the same file on disk - at 12 -> 0
with 12 rows standing in `quarter_blocks`.

The peak is durable and was never wrong. The COUNT is what says how much of the
billing month that peak covers, and 365 W over 120 quarters and 365 W over 0
quarters are different claims about the same number. Mid-month, after every
restart, the page made the weaker claim while displaying the stronger one's
value. That is TARIFF-01's own argument - an unreadable store must not read as a
zero peak, because a zero peak is disarming - one column over.

`PeakStore.banked_count(month)` asks the database, and `recorded` is a property
over it. Two more defects in the same variable fell out once it was driven, and
neither was in the ticket: it was never scoped to a MONTH (on 1 October the row
still showed September's tally beside October's empty month - measured), and it
missed the block `restore()` banks from the checkpoint, which never passes
through `sync()`.

⚠️ NOT 0, AND NOT None, WHEN THE STORE WILL NOT ANSWER. `banked_count()` returns
None and the row renders `an unreadable number of quarter(s) banked`.
`f"{None} quarter(s) banked"` was rejected because it reads as the same zero.
`0 quarter(s) banked` stays true and reachable - it is what a month nothing has
been written to says, and the two are asserted to be different text.

⚠️ THE DEDUPE IS NOT REMOVED WITH THE COUNTER. `_seen` still stops `cycle()`'s
once-a-second `sync()` re-banking a block `P1Ingest.blocks` keeps for a day. The
check that graded it asserted `recorded == 1` - the dedupe and the figure
reporting it were the same variable - and now grades `sync()`'s RETURN, because
counting rows cannot see a re-bank at all (PRIMARY KEY no-op).

THE TIE RULE, DECIDED RATHER THAN EMERGENT: at equal wattage the EARLIEST
quarter keeps the attribution. No bill and no guard moves - `peak_w` is still
only ever raised, the `>` term is untouched, SAFETY-07 reads the same watts.
The two readers DID disagree: the upsert's strict `>` kept whichever tied block
was WRITTEN first while `recompute_month()` has always kept the earliest, the
same only while blocks arrive in time order, and measured to diverge (09:45
against 09:00) fed newest-first.

⚠️ AND THE SOAK'S DRIFTING QUARTER WAS NOT A TIE. Six exactly equal 365.0 W
quarters re-attributed zero times on the shipped tree - `>` is strict. What
moved it was a real new maximum BELOW THE ROW'S OWN RESOLUTION: the row renders
whole watts, so 365.0000001 W is a new peak to the database and the same 365 W
to the reader. Left alone deliberately, and pinned so it is not re-diagnosed.

test_tariff.py parts 11 and 12. 12 mutations, all red, listed on the PR; M2 -
`banked_count()`'s sqlite3.Error arm returning 0 - was a SURVIVOR at -3 B on the
first battery, because a handle that never opened short-circuits before any SQL
runs and nothing reached the except arm. Closed with an open store whose table
is dropped under it, with a precondition that the same call answered 4 first.

main.py is NOT touched - TARIFF-11 holds its status rows. The row picks this up
without editing because `recorded` is an attribute access and is now a property.
The residual is stated in DECISIONS §3: `recorded` answers for now() while the
peak follows `checks(when=...)`, and the shipped install has exactly one call
site - `self.checks()` with no argument, main.py:4359 - where they are the same
month, so the live page is correct and durable. `recorded_in(when)` is shipped
and the row's move onto it is one token, for whoever holds main.py next; part 10
pins the present behaviour against a row count taken from `quarter_blocks` so
the gap cannot be quietly forgotten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 12:54:15 +02:00
admin 068b83f57c Merge pull request 'TARIFF-15: custom_formula, graded against the card it was copied from' (#82) from TARIFF-15 into release/1.0
The owner asked for a custom formula for exotic suppliers. TARIFF-07's research established why it is the only shape that can work: there is no machine-readable source of Belgian tariff coefficients anywhere - CREG's tariff-card pages 404, VREG was unreachable, and every coefficient found came from a supplier's own PDF, one image-only. Coefficients are per-contract and live behind a klantenzone login. So no scraping and no per-supplier plugin can work; the customer is the only party who can see their own numbers, and the card they read them from is the only artefact that can grade them.

The shape is the market's published arithmetic rather than our approximation: both readable cards print the formula, the reference index assumed, AND the resulting price. Through shipped code, Eneco (0.102 x 133.9905 + 1) x 1.06 = 15.54705 against a card printing 15,55; ENGIE (0.1 x 61.96 + 0.9) x 1.06 = 7.52176 against 7,522.

That is also the safety mechanism. validate.py recomputes the card's own worked example at startup and REFUSES TO START unless it matches to 0.01. An offset inflated by network charges cannot pass, because the card's printed estimate is by construction the energy component alone. The refusal names how far out, in which direction, by what ratio, and then names the expensive cause: network charges folded into `offset` bills you for it twice, which is why the check cannot be switched off.

NO EXPRESSION EVALUATION, guaranteed three structural ways - coefficients must be numbers, an unknown field is refused rather than ignored, and there is no evaluator in the module - and checked by an AST walk rather than a grep, because the module's own docstring contains the text eval(s, {"__builtins__": {}}) explaining why that is not a sandbox, and a text scan would fire on the documentation it mandates. That is code_leaks()'s lesson applied to a second file. A mutation plants a real eval in the shipped module and turns it red.

TWO CORRECTIONS TO THE TICKET, both the agent's and both right. The plausibility band's floor was specified on the all-in figure; the shipped 0.06 of taxes is 3x the 0.02 floor, so a hundredfold error (0.0016 -> 0.0616) sails over it. The floor now sits on the ENERGY figure and the ceiling on the all-in. And the ticket claimed the card check catches 10x/100x/1000x errors: it catches a MISMATCH between the two sides, and a unit error applied to both cancels out of a comparison between them. The wording was narrowed everywhere rather than restated, and the band added as a separate refusal on a separate quantity.

Stated limits rather than glossed: the check grades the coefficients against the card, not the card against reality - a consistent-but-wrong pair, both numbers from the wrong product, passes, and DOCS says so in the same sentence as the claim. Only TWO real tariffs could be reproduced end to end, not three: the repo's third real formula (Eneco injection) has no printed price beside it, so there is nothing to grade it against and none was fabricated.

Evidence: 29/29 green, 347 checks in test_price.py. 22 mutations, no survivors. One was a -13 B SURVIVOR on the first attempt - the check graded the preview's heading rather than the row, the third instance this week of a check anchored to something it does not own - and is now graded on a rendered row built from the capture. One mutation passes the all-in check by declaring ALL_IN, exactly as trap 1 says no code can catch; what goes red is the declaration-agreement check plus the card reproductions.

The riskiest edit is flagged rather than buried: test_price.py's summary block had to move, because a section appended after `if fails: sys.exit(1)` would have left every new check's failure unreported with exit 0. Verified on the base that sections 13 and 14 were always before it, so no earlier evidence is affected.
2026-09-13 03:58:46 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 ac9854886b TARIFF-15: your own tariff card, as two coefficients the card itself grades
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m14s
A Belgian dynamic contract prices energy as `B x index + A`, and the two
coefficients exist on exactly one artefact: the customer's own tariff card.
There is no machine-readable source for them anywhere - CREG's consumer
tariff-card pages 404, CREG Scan is a JS wizard, the annual report has the
supplier list without per-product coefficients, VREG was unreachable, and
every coefficient found in research came off a supplier's own PDF, one
image-only. So nothing can be scraped and a per-supplier plugin would have no
source for its numbers, which is why TARIFF-07 withdrew three of them. The
customer is the only party who can see their own coefficients; they type them.

New provider `custom_formula`, one new option `price_formula` (a JSON string,
the `static_profile` precedent exactly), and a new module
`app/custom_formula.py`. The index path is `generic_dayahead`'s, not a second
one: the URL/override decision is now one shared `dayahead_feed_url()` both
plugins call, same feed, same Brussels-calendar range, same columnar parser,
same declared egress hosts.

It declares {ENERGY, MARKUP}, NOT ALL_IN. A card's Tariefformule line is the
energy component alone - Eneco tabulates network tariffs and levies
separately, ENGIE states the formula excludes network, distribution,
transport, levies and excise - so ALL_IN would lie for every operator who
typed what their card says and would drop the taxes from every hour
(0.2125 -> 0.1555 EUR/kWh, measured).

THE CARD IS THE GRADER, and that is why this is safe to ship. The framework
already mechanises that a PLUGIN cannot double-count. This introduces a risk
none of those guards can see because it is config, not code: the OPERATOR
double-counting, by folding network charges into `offset` while
price_taxes_eur_kwh carries them too. So validate.py recomputes the card's own
printed price from the operator's coefficients at startup and refuses to start
unless the two agree to within 0.01, naming the discrepancy. An inflated
offset cannot pass: 15.55 becomes 28.27. The same check catches VAT omitted,
VAT doubled, a transposed digit and a unit mismatch between the two sides.

And the limit, in the same sentence as the claim: it grades the coefficients
against the card, NOT the card against reality. A consistent-but-wrong pair
passes. A second refusal covers the one unit error the first cannot see - the
one applied to both sides at once - by bounding the card's own point to
0.02-1.00 EUR/kWh. Its FLOOR is applied to the energy figure rather than the
all-in one because the shipped 0.06 of taxes is three times that floor and
would carry a hundredfold error over it alone; found by writing the mutation,
not by review (M10, +0 B).

The market's own arithmetic, reproduced through the shipped code:

  Eneco (0.102 x 133.9905 + 1) x 1.06 = 15.5471   card prints 15,55
  ENGIE (0.1   x  61.96   + 0.9) x 1.06 = 7.5218  card prints 7,522

NO EXPRESSION EVALUATION OF ANY KIND. The string is settable over HTTP through
the add-on's own ingress page, so eval on it is RCE in a root container
holding SUPERVISOR_TOKEN and driving an inverter over RS485 - but the deciding
argument is that an expression is UNVERIFIABLE: two coefficients can be graded
against the card, an arbitrary expression cannot be graded against anything,
so it would make the invisible-wrong-coefficient problem strictly worse. An
unknown field is REFUSED rather than ignored, so `"expr"` is told it does not
exist. Future shapes become named fields, never a grammar. test_price.py 15f
walks the module's AST for eval/exec/compile/__import__/literal_eval and
exercises the scanner's red direction on every run.

Refused at startup: card absent or out by >0.01; `units` absent (no default);
factor == 0 (every spread 0, arbitrage silently never fires - the message
points at static_profile); factor < 0 (inverts the market); vat_pct outside
0-30 (0 stays legitimate); non-finite or non-numeric; unknown field, index or
resolution; the plausibility band. A card older than ~6 months WARNS and does
not refuse - ENGIE freezes coefficients for a contract's duration. Negative
output prices are not refused anywhere.

A startup preview logs the next 24 h as `index EUR/MWh -> all-in EUR/kWh` with
min/median/max and the day's spread, through a new default-silent
`PriceProvider.startup_preview()` hook - only the plugin knows what went in to
its own arithmetic. Emitted once per process, and a preview that raises cannot
cost the site its prices.

`custom_formula` joins the config.yaml enum through the DERIVED set
PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {"off"}, not a hardcoded list. Both
translations describe the option and the new id. DOCS.md replaces the
"planned" sentence with the shape, a worked example from a real card, a real
startup transcript and the limit of the check stated beside the claim.

22 mutations, one per check added, no survivors - MUTATION.md carries the
ledger. M13 (the preview's index column) was a -13 B survivor of the whole
suite on the first attempt because the check graded the HEADING and not the
row; it is graded on a rendered row now. All 29 suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 03:49:08 +02:00
admin aade2c79fd Merge pull request 'TARIFF-07: withdraw three plugins that never fetched a price' (#81) from TARIFF-07 into release/1.0
engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic and eneco_eddy had fabricated endpoints. Re-verified before deletion, 2026-09-13: api.engie.be/dynamic/be answers 404 from a Kong gateway with no route; api.totalenergies.be presents a certificate for CN=pge-apigee-dev.direct-energie.com with the host absent from its SAN, so TLS closes before a request is sent; api.eneco.be/eddy/prices answers 404 with a one-byte body. And 'Eddy' is not an Eneco product at all - theirs is 'Zon & Wind Dynamisch', indexed to Belpex/EPEX DAY-AHEAD rather than imbalance.

They are structurally impossible, not merely unfinished: supplier coefficients are per-contract and live behind the customer's klantenzone login, so no public unauthenticated endpoint could ever return a given customer's price. There is no regulator index either - CREG's tariff-card pages 404, VREG was unreachable, and every coefficient found in research came from a supplier's own PDF, one of them image-only. The three invented URLs are the predictable failure mode of a task with no canonical index to fall back on.

THE SCHEMA ENUM KEEPS ALL SIX IDS ON PURPOSE. config.yaml's price_provider is a list(...) enum validated by the Supervisor BEFORE the add-on starts, so removing the three would make an existing config schema-invalid, produce an opaque 'expected one of ...', and validate.py would never run - the refusal would never be seen on exactly the sites it exists for. PROVIDERS is two; the enum stays six; both translations label them withdrawn; the schema check is derived from PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {off}; and register() refuses to re-register a retired id so the registry and the retired table cannot both claim one.

The refusal tells a stranded operator the truth rather than aliasing them somewhere: that this is not a typo - the add-on offered the id, accepted it, and said nothing at every startup since; that it has never fetched a price anywhere, with the endpoint and its observed response named; that section 11.4 turned every failure into a silent fallback, so what the site has actually been running is the static profile, or nothing at all when none is set; and what to do instead, stating plainly that generic_dayahead APPROXIMATES a Belgian dynamic tariff and cannot reproduce a supplier's B x spot + A formula. There is deliberately no alias, because aliasing would require the contract's own two coefficients - which are in no public index, so the add-on would have to invent the numbers it prices a battery against.

False claims corrected across DOCS.md, price_forecast.py, price_history.py, static_tariff.py, DECISIONS/FCST-04 and CHANGELOG.md: eneco_eddy was described as a 'Belgian imbalance product' in all of them and is not. The quarter-hourly examples now cite Belgian day-ahead, which genuinely settles per quarter since the 15-minute MTU of 2025-10-01 - the mechanism was right, only the example was invented. export_price_eur_kwh's docstring claimed no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve; Eneco publishes 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 on the same card as its consumption formula, identical on the January and September 2026 cards, and it is VAT-exempt while consumption is at 6%. _points_from_json() is deleted: it read a shape no reachable feed publishes and was graded only against fixtures built from the same guess.

PriceProduct.REALTIME and the widening machinery are KEPT although eneco_eddy was their sole declarer, with a DECISIONS note recording that no shipped plugin declares it until one does - otherwise a later reviewer finds a mechanism with zero callers and reasonably deletes the AC2 seam.

ONE CHECK HAD QUIETLY STOPPED BEING ONE. test_price.py 4b proved code_leaks()'s docstring strip is load-bearing by using a real shipped docstring that a raw scan false-positives on - and that docstring belonged to engie_dynamic. Deleting the plugin would have left the check PASSING on a tree with the strip removed. The stimulus is rebuilt inside the test file and the shipped set asserted clean separately.

BACKWARD-INCOMPATIBLE: a config legal on the current version is refused on the next. That is the point of the refusal, and the CHANGELOG says so in the shape PKG-07 established for slew_w.

Evidence: 29/29 green, with the baseline established at 8d09b30 before any edit. Nine mutations, nine red, two of them zero-byte edits; two counts are lower bounds because the run hit a traceback mid-suite.
2026-09-13 02:54:59 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 f620f7cf80 TARIFF-07: three plugins that never fetched a price are withdrawn, and a site configured on one is told so
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m12s
engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic and eneco_eddy are removed from PROVIDERS
and from every surface that listed them. They did not stop working - they never
worked. Re-verified by hand on 2026-09-13 before deleting anything: 404 with
Kong's "no Route matched with those values"; a TLS handshake that fails because
api.totalenergies.be is absent from the certificate's SAN list; 404 with an
empty body. All three are also structurally impossible - the coefficients are
per-contract and behind a customer login, there is no regulator index, and
"Eddy" is not an Eneco product at all.

⚠️ BACKWARD-INCOMPATIBLE. A config legal on the current version is refused on
the next. That is the point of the change: §11.4 turned every failed fetch into
a silent fall back, so a site on one of these ids has been running on
static_profile - or on nothing - since the day it was set, with nothing on its
status page ever differing from a working provider that never found a cheap
hour. validate.py now refuses a retired id with a message naming the id, the
endpoint, what that endpoint answers, which tariff has really been in force,
and what to set instead. No version number is picked here; that depends on a
fact about the live box.

⚠️ config.yaml's price_provider enum deliberately KEEPS all three ids. The
Supervisor validates the options file against that enum before the add-on
starts, so removing them would make an existing config schema-invalid and the
refusal above would never be reached on exactly the sites that need it.
PROVIDERS is two; the enum stays six; test_price.py asserts the schema offers
exactly PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {"off"}, derived rather than typed, and
register() refuses to re-register a retired id.

PriceProduct.REALTIME, _WIDE, Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT and WIDEN_FACTOR's
2.5 are KEPT with no shipped declarer - it is the AC2 seam, and a reviewer
finding a mechanism with zero callers would reasonably delete it. Recorded in
DECISIONS/TARIFF-07-withdrawing-three-plugins.md and pinned by a check.

False claims corrected: every "Belgian imbalance product" claim about
eneco_eddy (DOCS.md, price_forecast.py, price_history.py, static_tariff.py,
FCST-04, CHANGELOG - the two released entries annotated in place rather than
rewritten); the quarter-hourly examples now cite Belgian day-ahead, which
really does settle per quarter since the 15-minute MTU; and
export_price_eur_kwh's "no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection
curve", which is false - Eneco publishes 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 and ENGIE
(B x eSpot_15) - A, same two-coefficient shape with its own coefficients and
its own VAT treatment, so the scalar is a simplification and not the market.

DOCS.md's provider table is two rows and now says honestly what a Belgian
dynamic customer should do today, including that generic_dayahead cannot
express B x spot + A and that price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1) could not hold a
negative offset. The formula provider is referenced as planned, not built.

_points_from_json() went with the plugins it served: it read a shape no feed
anybody here has ever reached publishes. The one place it survives is a
negative stimulus, named row_shape_body().

Nine mutations driven, all red; table in the decision record. 29/29 suites
green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 02:46:15 +02:00
admin 8d09b30f16 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-14: the window a point covers is the point's, not an assumed hour' (#80) from TARIFF-14 into release/1.0
_Series.at() hardcoded a one-hour coverage window and returned the FIRST point whose start fell inside it. Belgium moved to a 15-minute MTU on 2025-10-01 and the live feed returns 96 points at 900 s, so on the real series at() answered with the wrong point for 45 of every 60 minutes - and then drifted, because from the second hour on the first match was an earlier point still inside its own one-hour window. Reproduced against shipped code: asking for 03:00 returned the 02:15 point.

It reached the trade decision directly. arbitrage._act() calls _point_at(plan, now) -> series.at(now), then tests here.start == cheapest.start / == dearest.start to decide whether this interval is the buy or the sell one. With a stale and drifting point that identity test almost never matches the extremum, so the strategy idled through exactly the interval it exists to trade. It also tested here.provisional and the section 17 negative-price guard on the wrong point's price.

Nothing caught it because no test drove at() on a sub-hourly series: the DST tests count points on 23- and 25-hour days but never ask for a quarter-hour, and every price fixture before TARIFF-08 was the invented hourly row shape. static_tariff.py emits hourly points, so static sites are immune - the defect was reachable only by the dynamic path TARIFF-08/09 had just made work.

Each point's window now runs to the next point's start, CAPPED AT ONE HOUR. The cap is not cosmetic: uncapped, the rule would have stretched the point before a three-hour FCST-04 hole across the whole hole, introducing hole-filling as a side effect of fixing a lookup. The last point takes the span of the point before it, because a flat one-hour tail answers at(00:30) tomorrow with today's 23:45 price - reaching for a neighbour across a day boundary, which section 11.4 forbids.

That tail choice was independently validated by TARIFF-12, which merged during this work. A served plan can now be up to TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S (5400 s) old, and price_horizon_h permits a 1 h horizon - so now can walk past the end of a short series. Under the shipped rule at() raises Absence and the site falls to the static profile; under the rejected flat tail the same stale plan would have gone on trading against an expired :45 quarter for up to 45 minutes. Re-read the rule if TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S is ever widened.

covers() shared the bug exactly - it has no rule of its own and delegates to at() - so one change fixes both. window() did not: it grades a start against a half-open range and never asks how long a point lasts. at() now depends on sortedness AND ESTABLISHES IT ITSELF, sorting once in _Series.__init__, because nothing else guaranteed it: _validate_raw() covers only the load_prices() path, _parse_points() only the store read, and PriceRead.series() never enforced anything. A series handed its points reversed now answers identically, as a check.

Evidence: 29/29 green on the merged tree. Eight mutations, all red. The killing one restores the shipped rule (+68 B) and is red on 24 named checks across both files, including the one named THE PROPERTY THE DEFECT BROKE - an arbitrage-level check driving the shipped decide() over a 96-point day whose cheapest is a :45 and dearest a :15, asserting as its own check that the old and new rules return different points. The tail mutation is a ZERO-BYTE edit and is caught. It is stated honestly that five of the eight leave test_arbitrage.py green, because those are at()-level properties no arbitrage fixture reaches.

Named and not fixed: price_forecast._walk() steps section 8.3's gate in whole hours, so on a sub-hourly series it reads one point per hour and never sees the :15/:30/:45 flags. Unreachable today - FCST-04 carries whole hours and the feed publishes whole days - but that is an assumption about producers, not a property of the gate.
2026-09-13 01:56:04 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 028c3e53fb Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-12) into TARIFF-14
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m13s
Second base move while this card was open: 559f0eb -> a6e64fb. Only
CHANGELOG.md conflicted; test_arbitrage.py auto-merged (TARIFF-12 used
section 8b, this card uses 10, so the two do not collide).

CHANGELOG: both entries under the single ## Unreleased in MERGE ORDER -
TARIFF-12's row and section precede this branch's, because it landed
first. No version number is picked; PKG-06/07's note stands untouched.

WHAT TARIFF-12 CHANGES FOR THIS CARD - written out in decision note §8
rather than left silent, because the question is a fair one.

A served plan can now be up to TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S = 3 * TARIFF_REFRESH_S
= 5400 s old, where before it was at most one refresh interval, and
at() is what answers "what does it cost right now" out of that older
plan.

* PER-POINT SPAN: unaffected, structurally. Every window is derived
  from the neighbours' ABSOLUTE start instants - datetimes in a frozen
  dataclass in a tuple, which cannot move - and _cover_table() runs
  once at construction over data that cannot change. A plan's AGE is a
  property of fetched_at/tariff_at, never of a window. The index cannot
  go stale, which is a small positive under TARIFF-12: a kept plan now
  lives longer and there is nothing in it that needed recomputing.

* ONE-HOUR CAP: unaffected. It bites only at a hole; walking further
  into a series crosses more windows, each resolved on its own
  neighbours.

* THE TAIL: reachable for the first time, and §2's choice survives it.
  At the shipped 48 h horizon the tail is ~46.5 h beyond anything a
  90-minute-stale plan can be asked about. But price_horizon_h is
  int(1,72), so a 1 h horizon is a SUPPORTED configuration, and a
  90-minute serve-stale window against a 1 h series puts `now` past the
  end. Under the chosen rule a quarter-hourly 1 h series ends at :45,
  its window closes on the hour, at() raises Absence, _act() idles and
  §11.4 sends the site to the static profile. Under the REJECTED flat
  one-hour tail the same stale plan would have traded against the :45
  print for up to 45 minutes after the interval it describes had ended.
  So TARIFF-12 does not weaken the decision - it is the first thing
  that makes it reachable, and it selects the same answer. The rule
  should be re-read if TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S is ever widened again.

* TariffPlan.from_feed is a pure predicate on `origin` and TARIFF-12
  keeps or replaces a WHOLE PLAN OBJECT. It never splices two reads
  into one series, so it cannot hand at() an unsorted or duplicated
  point list.

RE-GRADED ON THIS BASE, not carried over: all 29 test files green;
app/price.py byte-identical to the TARIFF-10 merge (90d8ca31f7c0109d,
85953 B) because TARIFF-12 does not touch it; M1 re-driven at +68 B,
red on the same 24 named checks across both files; M3 re-driven at
ZERO BYTES, red on the same 4. Each purged before the run and reverted
with the fingerprint re-checked, from a card-specific harness at
/home/homelab/.cache/t14-mut/ with a mktemp backup inside it.

This branch contributes zero diff to app/main.py and app/static_tariff.py.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-13 01:47:17 +02:00
admin a6e64fb66e Merge pull request 'TARIFF-12: a degradation is not a refresh' (#79) from TARIFF-12 into release/1.0
run_tariff_refresh()'s docstring promised 'A FAILURE DOES NOT CLEAR THE PLAN' and guarded the wrong thing. resolve_tariff() deliberately never raises on a feed failure - load_prices() returns no_data rather than letting a traceback into the planning tick - so a dead feed returned a degraded TariffPlan, the try SUCCEEDED, and the good plan was overwritten. The except branch that promised otherwise was reachable only by unexpected exceptions; a supplier outage, the case the docstring names first, never reached it. With static_profile unset - the shipped default for a dynamic site - a complete 48-hour plan was replaced by origin='none', 0 points.

A 40-hour soak drove a 90-minute outage and measured it: the plan was gone at the FIRST failed fetch, ~27 min after the last good one, with TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S (5400 s) governing nothing. There was no serve-stale window; a transient blip had the same effect as a long outage.

The fix keeps a plan that is still fresh, via fresh_tariff_plan() - reused rather than transcribed, and pinned on the AST. The §11.4 static fallback does NOT replace a fresh provider plan: every point _degrade() builds is provisional, so firm_points() is empty and arbitrage and cheap_now are already off, while a day-ahead price for a given hour does not change once published - a 30-minute-old observation is exactly as true about 19:00 as one fetched now. The fallback is strictly less actionable and no more current. Deliberately NOT symmetrical: a standing plan that is itself a degradation IS replaced, or a static site's plan would freeze at the window it was first generated for. tariff_at does not move on a kept plan, so TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S now genuinely governs and a kept plan stays distinguishable from a fresh one.

Rebased onto TARIFF-10 and re-verified rather than assumed. The interaction was confirmed by driving it: nothing on this path reads arbitrage_enabled, and the static-profile case was driven twice consecutively because a guard that latched there would freeze a site's plan for the life of the install. One honesty fix followed from TARIFF-10 - the kept-plan log said 'arbitrage stops with it', which is false on a site that fetches without trading, and now reads 'arbitrage, where it is armed, stops with it'.

Evidence: 29/29 green on the merged tree, including TARIFF-10's new reachability section. Eleven mutations, all re-driven on the merged tree because cached reds from the old base are not evidence about the new one; eleven red, no survivors, every revert fingerprinted after the run as well as before.

Two process findings recorded rather than quietly fixed. Two drafts of one check were red against a CORRECT tree because they substring-matched the docstring that states the property - a text search over a function grades its prose as much as its behaviour, which is habit 4 in a third costume; the check now scans AST symbols and non-docstring constants, with positive controls. And the mutation harness was overwritten mid-session by a concurrent agent's harness sharing the scratchpad, pointing it at a different worktree - MUTATION.md habit 18's second bullet almost verbatim. It surfaced as an error rather than a silent wrong result, and the per-run revert fingerprints are what prove the worktree was never left mutated.
2026-09-12 21:39:24 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 435e1b6f7c Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-10) into TARIFF-14
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
CI on PR #80 was NOT a test failure. The workflow's "grade the merge, not
the branch" step refused the PR because it does not apply, and said so
itself: "REFUSED: refs/pull/80/head does not merge into release/1.0.
NOTHING HAS BEEN TESTED. This is not a test failure - no test ran."
Conflicts were CHANGELOG.md and test_price.py; app/price.py auto-merged.

CONFLICTS RESOLVED

* CHANGELOG.md - both entries belong under ## Unreleased. TARIFF-10's
  table row and section come first because it landed first. No version
  number is picked here; PKG-06/07's note stands untouched.

* test_price.py - BOTH cards appended a section "13". Nothing is
  dropped: TARIFF-10's stays 13, this card's is renumbered 14, and
  TARIFF-10's temp-directory teardown stays at the end of the file. The
  two share no fixture, option dict or helper name.

WHAT TARIFF-10 CHANGES FOR THIS CARD - nothing in the reasoning, and the
check is recorded rather than asserted (decision note §7).

In app/price.py the two do not meet: TARIFF-10 added provider_id() and
provider_configured() beside price_option() and routed load_prices()
through them - the option-reading layer, touching nothing in _Series,
at(), covers(), window() or _cover_table(). The merged at() is
byte-identical to the one the mutations were driven against.

Behaviourally TARIFF-10 makes run_tariff_refresh() run with arbitrage
OFF, so a provider-configured site now has a standing plan - and
therefore a _Series - where before it had none. It does NOT add an at()
consumer to the 30 s tick: static_status() builds a STATIC plan (hourly,
immune), main.py calls only plan.words on the fetched plan, and
price_forecast.price_permits()/begin_phase() have no caller in main.py
at all. So TARIFF-10 neither creates nor closes any exposure this card
is about - it enlarges the defect's reach the moment such a site arms
trading, which strengthens the fix without changing it.

RE-GRADED ON THE MERGED TREE, not carried over

* all 29 test files green;
* all EIGHT mutations re-driven, purged before each run, each reverted
  with the fingerprint re-checked. Same verdicts and same red-check
  counts as before the merge: M1 (the shipped one-hour scan, +68 B) red
  on 24 named checks across both files; M3 (the ZERO-BYTE tail rule) red
  on 4; M2/M4/M6 on 1 each, M5 on 2, M7 on 16, M8 on 14.
* Clean app/price.py on the merged tree: 90d8ca31f7c0109d, 85953 B.
* None of TARIFF-10's 650 new lines of checks moves under any of the
  eight - they grade resolve_tariff()'s reachability from a
  configuration, not the lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 21:38:28 +02:00
Claude f5ea39784d Merge release/1.0 (TARIFF-10) into TARIFF-12
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m16s
CHANGELOG.md was the only conflict: both entries belong under the same
`## Unreleased` heading, TARIFF-10's first because it merged first. No
version number picked.

app/main.py auto-merged, and was re-read because of it. TARIFF-10 changed
WHICH installs run `run_tariff_refresh()` (`arbitrage.enabled(opts)` ->
`tariff_refresh_wanted(opts)`); this card changed what that task does on
a failed fetch. Nothing in the keep/replace reasoning changed, and the
two newly reachable configurations are now DRIVEN in test_arbitrage.py
8b rather than reasoned about:

  * a provider configured with trading DISARMED is the case the guard
    was designed for, and needs no second fixture because nothing on
    this path reads `arbitrage_enabled` at all - asserted over the AST's
    symbols and non-docstring constants, after two drafts of that check
    went red on a CORRECT tree for matching the word "arbitrage" in a
    docstring and in a log line;
  * `price_provider: off` + a `static_profile` resolves to the
    CONFIGURED product (`origin: "static"`), so `standing.from_feed` is
    false on every refresh and the guard never latches - driven twice in
    a row, because a guard that latched there would freeze a static
    site's plan at its first window for the life of the install.

Also: the kept-plan log line said "arbitrage stops with it", which after
TARIFF-10 is false on a site that fetches without trading; it now says
"arbitrage, where it is armed, stops with it". The keep decision is
strictly downstream of `resolve_tariff()`, so the §8.3 carry into
price_history - TARIFF-10's whole point - is unaffected either way.

All 29 suites green on the merged tree, including TARIFF-10's new
test_price.py section 13. All eleven mutations RE-DRIVEN on the merged
tree rather than carried over: eleven red, no survivors, every revert
fingerprinted. M11 is new - making the guard conditional on
`arbitrage.enabled(self.o)` (+86 B) is red on five named checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 21:31:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 7f2c4e20e1 TARIFF-14: the point whose own interval covers the instant
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 2s
`_Series.at()` asked `s <= u < s + 1 h` of every point IN LIST ORDER and
returned the FIRST match. On the hourly shape every fixture in this
repository carried before TARIFF-08 that is right by accident. Belgium
moved to a 15-minute MTU on 2025-10-01 and the live day-ahead feed
returns 96 points at 900 s, where it is wrong twice over - measured
against the shipped code at 5059e28:

    series: 02:00=0.10  02:15=0.11  02:30=0.12  02:45=0.13  03:00=0.14

    ask +15min -> 02:00  0.10   <-- WRONG (wanted 02:15)
    ask +60min -> 02:15  0.11   <-- WRONG (wanted 03:00)
    ask +75min -> 02:30  0.12   <-- WRONG (wanted 03:15)

Inside the first hour the :00 point wins because its hour has not run
out. From the second hour on the answer is not even the top of the hour
- the first point still inside its own hour wins - so the error
compounds with depth into the series.

`arbitrage._act()` tests `here.start == v.cheapest.start` /
`== v.dearest.start` to decide whether this interval is the buy one or
the sell one. That identity almost never held, so the strategy idled
through exactly the interval it exists to trade, and read §8.3's
`here.provisional` and §17's `price < 0` off the same wrong point.
`static_tariff.py` emits hourly points, so static sites were never
affected; this is reachable only down the dynamic path TARIFF-08/09
made work.

THE RULE: a point covers from its own start until the next point's
start, and never more than one hour. Quarter-hourly takes 900 s,
hourly is unchanged, and a MIXED series - FCST-04's carry-forward puts
hourly carried points beside quarter-hourly firm ones, spacing
[900, 3600] in 70 % of soak samples - takes each point's OWN gap.

The one-hour cap is load-bearing: FCST-04 leaves an hour OUT when
nothing published it and yesterday has no value, and `at()` raising
Absence for it is what sends the caller to the static profile (§11.4).
Uncapped, "until the next point's start" would stretch the point before
a three-hour hole across the whole hole and answer every instant in it
with a stale price.

THE LAST POINT is given the same span as the point before it (one hour
when it is the only point). A flat one-hour tail would answer 00:30
TOMORROW with today's 23:45 price. The cost - a mixed series ending at
the firm/carried seam loses its last 45 minutes to Absence - is argued
in DECISIONS/TARIFF-14-the-window-a-point-covers.md §2 rather than
buried; the direction is the safe one.

`at()` now reads a point's NEIGHBOURS, so it would depend on
sortedness. It establishes that itself: the lookup index is sorted by
UTC start once, at construction, so no caller's list order reaches it.
A series handed its 96 points in reverse answers identically, and that
is a check. `covers()` shared the defect exactly - it has no rule of
its own, it asks `at()` - and is fixed by the same change; `window()`
did not, and its docstring now says why.

Nothing about §9.3 or a point's `start` changed. PricePoint still has
three fields; the span is derived from the neighbours, never stored.

Graded by test_price.py section 13 (900 s, 3600 s, mixed, holes, the
tail, caller order, duplicate starts, covers()/window(), the no-data
contract) and end to end by test_arbitrage.py section 10, which drives
decide() over a 96-point quarter-hourly day whose cheapest and dearest
quarters are deliberately NOT on a whole hour, plus §17, §8.3 and the
mixed series. Eight mutations, all red, including a ZERO-BYTE one on
the tail rule; byte deltas and what the arbitrage file could not see
are in the decision note §6. All 29 test files green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 21:22:28 +02:00
admin 559f0eb022 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-10: a configured provider fetches prices, whether or not trading is armed' (#78) from TARIFF-10 into release/1.0
run_tariff_refresh() was created only under `if arbitrage.enabled(opts)`, and it is the sole caller of resolve_tariff(), which is the sole caller of price_history.carry(). arbitrage_enabled defaults to false, so on a shipped install with a provider configured nothing was ever fetched, no plan resolved, /data/price_history.json never written, FCST-04's Price history row read `empty` forever, and TARIFF-09's warning never fired. Every price check constructs its own resolve_tariff() call, so the suites exercised a path production never reached.

Measured, not inferred: a 40-hour soak ran two instances side by side - the shipped default made zero feed requests and never created its store across all 802 samples, while an identical instance with arbitrage armed resolved a 132-point plan from the same feed. DOCS.md:1348 has claimed the fixed behaviour all along.

The product owner's decision is Option A: a configured provider fetches. Trading stays separately gated, and that is graded directly rather than inferred - the real control loop is driven on a resolved provider plan with arbitrage_enabled the only option moving: off gives +180 W self-consumption, on gives -5000 W at the cheapest hour and +5000 W elsewhere. The armed rows are what make the unarmed row evidence.

ONE ACCEPTANCE CRITERION WAS DELIBERATELY NOT IMPLEMENTED LITERALLY, and the deviation is right. The criterion said no fetch task at all when price_provider is off, whatever arbitrage_enabled says. That breaks a configuration validate.py explicitly accepts - provider off, static_profile set, arbitrage armed - by leaving tariff_plan at None forever, silently disarming a strategy the UI reports as running. Driven both ways. The guard is therefore `provider_configured(opts) or arbitrage.enabled(opts)`; the criterion's stated harm is still fully met, because with the provider off resolve_tariff() answers out of the static profile and opens no socket, and the true shipped default starts no task at all. DECISIONS section 3 records the trade.

cheap_now() is NOT wired, deliberately. On a provider-only site static_status() returns False on every cycle, so adopting it would take the maintenance cycle's paid grid top-up from never to sometimes - a change to what spends money, and it needs its own decision rather than riding along on this one.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 13 mutations over 14 runs, each on a fresh tree copy, purged, :ro, -B. The shipped defect at -4 B is red on 7 named checks. The reachability check grades reachability from a CONFIGURATION rather than from the `if` statement - the `if` is exactly what someone meant to write. The instrument itself was mutated too, both +0 B, both red. One real survivor was found and closed in the same commit: provider_id() dropping .strip() left four price suites green. And one fixture defect was found and fixed - five minutes of P1 telegrams made the peak guard blind depending on where the wall clock sat in the billing quarter, so the armed baseline failed to trade on some runs.
2026-09-12 21:07:55 +02:00
Claude c81289527f TARIFF-12: a returned degradation is not a refresh
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m12s
`run_tariff_refresh()` promised in its own docstring that "a failure does
not clear the plan", and enforced it with `except Exception` - a branch a
supplier outage never reaches. `load_prices()` states the reason in its
own words: it "RETURNS, NEVER RAISES, for every failure a site can
actually have", because a degradation arriving as a traceback into the
planning tick would stop the controller regulating over an expired
certificate. So a dead feed RETURNS a §11.4 plan, the `try` succeeds, and
the assignment below it overwrote the good plan unconditionally. With
`static_profile` unset - the shipped default, and the normal state of a
dynamic-tariff site - `_degrade()` returns `TariffPlan(no_data, None,
"none")`: a complete 48-hour plan replaced by nothing, at the FIRST
failed fetch, ~27 minutes after the last good one. `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`
(5400 s) never governed anything and there was no serve-stale window at
all.

Fourth card in one family: FCST-04's M4 (`not ok` only), FCST-05's HIGH
(`(JSONDecodeError, OSError)` only), FCST-06 (`not self.ok` only), and
now `except Exception` only, for a path that never raises.

The question is now asked once, after the attempt, from the evidence
that exists - FCST-06's answer, one module over. The evidence is
`TariffPlan.from_feed` (did this resolution observe the configured feed)
and the shipped `fresh_tariff_plan()`, reused rather than transcribed. A
degradation replaces a standing observation only once that observation
has aged out, so `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` is now the serve-stale window it
reads like.

A §11.4 static fallback does not replace a fresh provider plan either,
although it carries real prices: every point `_degrade()` builds is
`provisional=True`, so `firm_points()` is empty, `arbitrage()` refuses
and `cheap_now()` is False - everything a consumer may act on is already
off - while a day-ahead price for a given hour does not change once
published. The rule is deliberately not symmetrical: a standing plan
that is itself a degradation IS replaced, or an outage would freeze the
operator's static profile at the window it was first generated for.

`tariff_at` does not move on a kept plan. It is the moment of the fetch
that produced the plan standing, `fresh_tariff_plan()` judges the age
from it, and an unmoved timestamp is the only thing that tells a kept
plan from a freshly fetched one.

test_arbitrage.py section 8b drives the whole chain with nothing stubbed
but the socket: the transport raises the way aiohttp does, load_prices()
returns no_data, _degrade() builds the §11.4 plan, and the shipped
run_tariff_refresh() decides. A check that patched resolve_tariff to
RAISE would have passed against the defect. Ten mutations, ten reds, no
survivors; 29/29 suites green.

Out of scope and unchanged: the persisted price store still does not
back the plan during an outage (FCST-03), and the status banner and the
Arbitrage row's lag are separately carded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 21:06:45 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 e6c45a61e7 TARIFF-10: configuring a price provider is what fetches prices
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m19s
amain() started the background tariff refresh only when arbitrage_enabled was
on, and that option ships false. run_tariff_refresh is the only caller of
resolve_tariff(), which is the only caller of price_history.carry() - so on a
shipped install with a price provider configured nothing was ever fetched: no
plan resolved, /data/price_history.json never created, the Price history status
row reading `empty` for the life of the install, and TARIFF-09's short-horizon
warning unable to fire because there was no fetch to warn about. Measured over
a 40 h two-instance soak on one feed: 0 requests and `present: false` across all
802 samples, against a resolved 132-point plan on the instance with arbitrage
armed.

git log -S puts the refresh task, its arbitrage.enabled() guard AND the DOCS.md
sentence saying a configured provider still fetches in the same commit - OPT-04,
bdd7f18; config.yaml has carried the claim since TARIFF-02, 852fc7c. The prose
and the code disagreed from the moment both existed and nothing compared them.
config.yaml and both translations additionally carried a claim that had rotted
the other way - "nothing consumes the price series yet", untrue since OPT-04
shipped the consumer. All four surfaces now say what the add-on does, and a
check pairs DOCS against the DRIVEN behaviour so they cannot drift again.

The gate is tariff_refresh_wanted() = provider_configured(opts) or
arbitrage.enabled(opts), and the `or` is a STRICT WIDENING: every configuration
that started the task before still starts it. The second term is not there for
symmetry. price_provider: off + a static_profile + arbitrage_enabled: true is a
configuration validate.py explicitly ACCEPTS and it trades - measured, at
cycle_cost_threshold_eur 0.05 on a 0.20/0.284 day/night profile,
ARBITRAGE_CHARGE -5000 W. Gating on the provider alone would leave that site's
tariff_plan at None forever and answer "no tariff plan has been resolved yet" on
every cycle, silently disarming a strategy the UI says is running.

Nothing acquires a periodic HTTPS call. With price_provider off, resolve_tariff()
answers out of the static profile without opening a socket (driven and counted:
0 requests), and the true shipped default - no provider, no trading - starts no
task at all. What decides whether a request leaves the machine is price_provider
and only that. The literal reading of the ticket's AC2 - drop the `or` - is one
token and is recorded in DECISIONS §3 with what it costs, for the owner.

AND NOTHING TRADES THAT DID NOT TRADE BEFORE. cycle()'s
`if arbitrage.enabled(self.o):` is untouched, and that is graded directly rather
than inferred from the gate having moved: Controller.cycle() is driven on a
resolved provider plan with the peak guard asserted clear, and arbitrage_enabled
is the only option that moves between the rows - false/false give +180 W
("loop -> 180 W") on both the cheap-now and dear-now plans, true/true give
-5000 W and +5000 W ("arbitrage -> ...").

TariffPlan.cheap_now() is deliberately NOT wired, decided rather than inherited
(DECISIONS §4). A provider-backed plan now exists on every configured site, so
Cheap window could read it - and Cheap window feeds the maintenance cycle's grid
top-up, the one place a price moves energy without trading being armed. On a
provider-only site static_status() returns False on every cycle, so adopting it
would take a paid grid top-up from never to sometimes. self.cheap stays on
static_status(); what adoption would take is listed rather than left implied.

THE CHECK THAT WOULD HAVE CAUGHT THIS is test_price.py section 13, and it grades
REACHABILITY FROM A CONFIGURATION rather than the shape of an `if` - the `if` was
exactly what somebody meant to write. amain()'s guards are EVALUATED against real
option dicts, whatever they are spelled as; the call graph under app/ is walked
to see whether the tasks those guards start arrive at resolve_tariff(), wherever
it has moved to; and then the fetch is DRIVEN with a counting transport, because
a graph is an argument and a counted request is an observation. What the
instrument cannot see is printed on every run, largest hole first.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 13 mutations in 14 runs - M10 re-run as M10b once it was
closed - each applied to a fresh cp -a of the clean worktree rather than
reverted (MUTATION.md habit 18), purged, :ro, -B. The
shipped defect - the gate back at arbitrage.enabled(opts), -4 B - is red on
seven named checks. Dropping the `or` (-27 B) is red on the strict-widening row;
removing cycle()'s trading gate (+8 B) is red on both AC3 rows. The instrument
is mutated too (habit 16): _reaches() always True and _task_sites() returning []
are both +0 B and both red.

Two findings are recorded rather than rounded off. provider_id() dropping
.strip() (-8 B) was a real SURVIVOR across four price suites - nothing fed a
padded provider id - and is closed in this commit by the padded-id pair; and the
first draft of the AC3 fixture fed five minutes of P1 telegrams, so whether the
peak guard was blind depended on where the wall clock sat inside the billing
quarter and the armed baseline failed to trade on some runs. It is 900 s now,
and the guard's clear state is a check rather than an assumption.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-12 20:58:48 +02:00
admin 88c59a9918 Merge pull request 'TARIFF-09: ask the feed for the horizon the operator configured' (#77) from TARIFF-09 into release/1.0
generic_dayahead.fetch() accepted since and until and ignored both, requesting the bare URL - so the feed returned one Brussels day against a 48 h horizon. Everything past today was carry-forward, provisional, and dropped from the trade set by 8.3, which means the optimiser never saw tomorrow as firm at any hour of the day. That is not what FCST-04's fill was built for: it covers the pre-publication window until the ~13-14 h CET auction, after which a healthy feed should hand over tomorrow in full.

Measured before, 2026-09-10T09:00+02:00 on the live feed: 15 firm hours and 33 carried of 48, firm local days = [2026-09-10] only, buy and sell both on the same day. After, against a real two-day body: 39 firm and 9 carried, firm local days = two, buy 13:45 on 09-09 and sell 19:45 on 09-10. At 23:00 the difference is the whole verdict - before, 1/47 and arbitrage REFUSED at spread 0.0464; after, 25/23 and allowed. The 9 hours still carried are the tail running into a third Brussels day, which no day-ahead market publishes.

The range is derived on the BRUSSELS calendar, both ends graded and both driven red by mutation - the API takes dates while since/until are instants, so deriving either end from the UTC date loses the last one or two hours of every day. That is _bdate()'s lesson from FCST-04 one layer up, except that here the hours are never fetched at all rather than misfiled.

price_feed_url is an EXACT URL, used verbatim, nothing appended - and the deciding argument came from the codebase rather than from taste: generic_dayahead declares a second egress host, web-api.tp.entsoe.eu, whose date parameters are not start/end. An override to the other DECLARED host is exactly where merging would append parameters that host ignores and produce the short horizon anyway. The cost is made visible by a fetch-time WARNING naming the consequence and the start..end it would have asked for, with a control asserting the default path stays silent, and dated_feed_url() refuses to append to a base that already carries a query string, so blind appending is structurally unreachable.

The plugin contract is deliberately NOT enforced yet. Obliging the three unverified-endpoint plugins of TARIFF-07 to pass a range would be satisfied by an invented parameter name - TARIFF-08's defect moved from the response to the request and shipped as a guarantee. The roster of plugins that consume the range is pinned as a literal instead, so the next supplier has to decide.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 11 mutations, no survivors, each applied to a fresh copy of the clean tree rather than reverted. Includes the Brussels/UTC boundary pair, one at +1 B, and one at +0 B that changes a single price digit inside the committed capture and is caught by the re-derived sha256. Two live fetches only, 66 s apart, respecting the feed's rate limit; the second returned bytes identical to TARIFF-08's capture, so the pre-publication case is a second recorded URL for the same bytes with the identity re-derived rather than asserted.

MUTATION.md habit 20: a fixture grades the response, and nothing about the REQUEST is reachable from one. canned() had recorded the URL since TARIFF-02 and no check ever asserted on it, which is how a plugin that never asked for a date range went unnoticed for four tickets.
2026-09-10 10:44:15 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 17b7b447c4 TARIFF-09: ask the day-ahead feed for the horizon it was handed
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
`generic_dayahead.fetch()` accepted `since` and `until` and requested the
bare `?bzn=BE`, which answers ONE Brussels day. Everything past today was
then filled from yesterday's profile by FCST-04, flagged provisional, and
§8.3 drops provisional hours from the trade set -- so the optimiser never
saw tomorrow as firm, at any hour of any day, and nothing reported it.

Measured on 4257e38 at 2026-09-10T09:00+02:00, 48 h horizon, live feed,
yesterday seeded through the shipped read path:

    60 firm points (15 whole hours) + 33 carried hours of 48 requested
    carried: 24 h on 2026-09-11, 9 h on 2026-09-12
    arbitrage(0.10): buy 11:45 and sell 19:45 -- BOTH on 2026-09-10
    firm local days = [2026-09-10]

The ceiling was structural: with a one-day window, at hour H a 48 h horizon
is at most 24-H firm and 24+H carried. At 23:00 that is 1 and 47, and the
remaining firm spread (0.0464 EUR/kWh) no longer clears the default 0.10
threshold, so arbitrage is refused outright. FCST-04's fill covers the
window until the ~13:00-14:00 CET auction; it was never meant to cover
every hour of every day.

The data exists and the endpoint serves it: verified 2026-09-10T07:45:49Z,
`?bzn=BE&start=2026-09-09&end=2026-09-10` returns 192 quarter-hours across
two local days. Committed unmodified beside TARIFF-08's captures, with the
URL, retrieval time and sha256 recorded and RE-DERIVED by the replay.

THE RANGE IS DERIVED ON THE BRUSSELS CALENDAR, not the UTC one. 22:30 UTC
in summer is already tomorrow in Belgium, so a UTC-derived start asks for
the day the controller has just left and drops the day it is standing in,
for the last one or two hours of every day. That is `_bdate()`'s lesson one
layer up with a worse consequence: `_bdate()` misfiles an hour, this never
fetches it. `until` is exclusive, so local midnight belongs to the day
before it; an inverted window collapses to one day rather than a backwards
range. Both ends are graded and both are driven red by mutation.

After, same code path and window, a feed serving both days: 39 firm hours
and 9 carried (was 15 and 33), firm across TWO Brussels days, and the
permitted cycle buys on one day and sells on the next.

`price_feed_url` IS THE EXACT URL AND THE PLUGIN APPENDS NOTHING. `start`/
`end` are this feed's spelling and the provider declares a second host
whose parameters are different, so merging would produce a request nobody
typed and the short horizon anyway. The cost is real, so it is not silent:
a WARNING on the shipped logger at fetch time names the consequence and the
start..end that would otherwise have been asked for. `dated_feed_url()`
refuses to append to a base that already carries a query string, so the
blind-append shape cannot come back by edit.
DECISIONS/TARIFF-09-the-range-and-the-override.md argues the alternative.

Before publication nothing regresses and it is graded, not assumed: at
09:46 CEST the two-day request came back byte-identical to the one-day
body, and that stays a `series` of what exists with FCST-04 filling the
rest. A `no_data` there would switch a working site's arbitrage off every
morning -- the mutation that adds that rule is red by name.

The plugin contract is still NOT enforced: three shipped plugins point at
endpoints nobody has verified, and a rule obliging them to pass a range
would be satisfied by an invented parameter name -- TARIFF-08's defect
moved from the response to the request. Which plugins consume the range is
pinned as a literal instead.

11 mutations, all red, no survivors; each applied to a fresh copy of the
tree rather than reverted, through tools/mutation_run.sh. One is +0 B (a
single price digit inside the committed capture) and the re-derived sha256
catches it. MUTATION.md habit 20 records why a fixture could never have
reached this: a captured body is the answer to a URL, and no property of a
body says which URL was asked for. All 29 suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 10:35:12 +02:00
admin 4257e38e5a Merge pull request 'TARIFF-08: read the feed the add-on actually ships pointed at' (#76) from TARIFF-08 into release/1.0
_points_from_json() expected doc['data'] to be a list of {start, price_eur_mwh}. api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE returns a columnar document - parallel unix_seconds and price arrays - so the shipped parser raised SourceUnavailable('the feed carried no data list') against every real response. generic_dayahead had never parsed one. With the three fabricated supplier URLs of TARIFF-07, that left manual_csv as the only working provider in a five-provider table.

It survived to release because every fixture fed the invented shape: test_price.py, test_price_history.py and test_static_tariff.py all built {'data':[{'start':...,'price_eur_mwh':...}]}, so the suite validated the parser against the parser's own assumption - a closed loop that cannot notice the assumption is wrong. Section 11.4 then made the failure silent: a parse error degrades to the static profile, which is correct and says nothing about the cause.

Verified live 2026-09-10, end to end: fetch -> parse -> assemble() -> TariffPlan returns 96 quarter-hourly points at 900 s, origin provider, product DAY_AHEAD, arbitrage allowed with a firm spread of 0.4645 EUR/kWh. First time the pipeline has completed against a real feed. Belgium moved to a 15-minute MTU on 2025-10-01, so FCST-04's H1 fix - the fill was decimating sub-hourly points to one per hour - was never theoretical; it is the shape of the live feed, and it is what makes this deliverable.

The columnar shape is read by a SECOND function, not a sniff, and feeding the row shape to generic_dayahead is now a graded no_data so the sniff cannot return quietly. Equal length refused in both directions with both lengths in the reason; the unit refused if not EUR/MWh, because MAX_PLAUSIBLE_EUR_KWH only bounds prices that are too large and a EUR/kWh switch would otherwise be invisible; nulls dropped with a count, an all-null body named as no_data; a deprecated feed warns while it still works.

Two real bodies captured as fixtures - unmodified bytes, with URL, retrieval time, unit, licence-as-returned and sha256 recorded, and the checksums RE-DERIVED by the replay rather than asserted. The invented fixtures are renamed synthetic_row_feed at every call site so the closed loop cannot re-form. Only one of four network providers has a capture, and a registry-derived check says so in its own sentence: the other three have nothing to capture, which is TARIFF-07.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 12 mutations, no survivors, purged tree and -B per TEST-15. One first-draft line was decoration and the mutation said so - the parser called brussels() per instant while assemble() already renders, so removing it changed nothing. The line was deleted rather than fenced with a check, and the mutation re-aimed at assemble() where the rule lives. MUTATION.md habit 19.

Follow-up filed as TARIFF-09: generic_dayahead ignores the since/until it is handed, so the feed supplies 24 h of a 48 h horizon and tomorrow is never firm.
2026-09-10 09:14:50 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 7a5281e97f Merge release/1.0 (FCST-06) into TARIFF-08
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
One conflict, in CHANGELOG.md's `## Unreleased` block, exactly as expected
from two branches landing beside each other: both `_this branch_` table rows
and both sections are kept, FCST-06's first. Nothing else conflicted -
FCST-06's `test_price_history.py` section 5d and this branch's columnar
`feed_body()` merged cleanly - and all 29 test files are green on the result.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 09:06:39 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 6eba18968c TARIFF-08: the day-ahead feed is read in the shape it actually publishes
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
`generic_dayahead` could not read one byte of `api.energy-charts.info`, and
never had been able to. `_points_from_json()` asks for `doc["data"]`, a list of
`{start, price_eur_mwh}` objects; that document does not exist. Fetched live on
2026-09-10 the feed returns COLUMNAR parallel arrays and no `data` key at all -
`unix_seconds` (96 UTC epoch seconds, 900 s apart), `price` (96 floats),
`unit: 'EUR / MWh'`. Driving the shipped parser against that body:
`SourceUnavailable: the feed carried no 'data' list`. It is the only shipped
provider whose endpoint anybody has reached, so dynamic pricing did not work.

AND §11.4 MADE IT SILENT, which is why it survived to release: a parse error
becomes no_data, becomes the static profile, becomes arbitrage off - the
CORRECT degradation, saying nothing about the cause. A site would have sat on
the fallback indefinitely.

AND THE SUITE COULD NOT SEE IT, because every fixture was built from the
parser's own assumption. test_price.py, test_price_history.py and
test_static_tariff.py each built `json.dumps({"data": [...]})`, a shape invented
here and published by nobody, so the checks graded the parser against the
parser's guess - a closed loop no coverage inside it could ever have escaped.
MUTATION.md habit 19 records it as the fourteenth instance of habit 4 and the
first where the fixture and the code under test shared a SHAPE, not a number.

WHAT CHANGED

* `_points_from_columnar_json()` - a SECOND function, not a sniff. A parser that
  decides which document it received is one that can decide wrong, and a
  wrong-but-parseable response then becomes a price. Feeding the row shape to
  `generic_dayahead` is now a graded no_data.
* Unequal arrays are refused in both directions, with the two lengths in the
  reason. `zip()` stops at the shorter list silently, and a truncated `price`
  array would have produced a real series missing the evening peak - traded on
  as complete, where no data at all switches arbitrage off.
* A unit that is not EUR/MWh is refused. The plugin converts with a fixed
  0.001, and `MAX_PLAUSIBLE_EUR_KWH` only bounds prices that are too LARGE.
* `unix_seconds` are read as UTC instants explicitly; §9.3's Brussels rendering
  stays in `assemble()` rather than being copied into the plugin, where a
  mutation could not tell it from a no-op (M4 proved exactly that on a first
  draft, and the line was removed rather than fenced).
* A published null is dropped and logged with a count; an all-null body is
  no_data named by this parser rather than by the boundary validator.

FIXTURES

Two unmodified response bodies under `scenarios/`, captured by hand on
2026-09-10: quarter-hourly (2026-09-10, 96 points at 900 s) and hourly
(2025-09-10, 24 at 3600 s - the same endpoint before Belgium's 15-minute MTU).
`energy-charts-be-price-captures.json` records the URL, retrieval time, unit,
licence-as-returned and a sha256 of each, and the replay RE-DERIVES the
checksums, so a fixture edited to make a check pass stops being a capture. Data
CC BY 4.0, Bundesnetzagentur | SMARD.de, via Energy-Charts (Fraunhofer ISE),
published without changes - the same BE-zone licence check DATA-02 established.

The surviving invented fixtures are renamed `synthetic_row_feed` at every call
site. `engie_dynamic`, `totalenergies_dynamic` and `eneco_eddy` are untouched
and have no capture: their URLs are unverified and withdrawing them is
TARIFF-07's open decision. Nothing should read their green checks as evidence
that those feeds parse.

MUTATIONS - 12, all red, no survivors. Purged tree, mounted `:ro`, `python3 -B`
(TEST-15). M1 drop the equal-length refusal; M2 make it one-sided; M3 drop the
unit check; M4 `assemble()` stops rendering at the Brussels offset; M5 read
`unix_seconds` as a naive local clock; M6 zero-fill a null instead of dropping
it; M7 drop the all-null refusal; M8 sniff for the row shape; M9 drop the
deprecated warning; M10 drop the dropped-nulls warning; M11 edit one price in
the committed capture; M12 point `generic_dayahead` back at the row parser -
red across all three price suites.

END TO END, LIVE, 2026-09-10: `resolve_tariff()` returns a `TariffPlan`,
`origin='provider'`, 96 quarter-hourly points, spacing [900] s, no decimation,
first point 2026-09-10T00:00:00+02:00 at 0.30608 EUR/kWh all-in. FCST-04's H1
fix was never theoretical. All 29 test files green.

STILL OPEN: `generic_dayahead` asks for no date range, so the default URL
returns one published day - a full 48 h horizon is reached only through §8.3's
carry-forward fill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 08:57:32 +02:00
admin 958f5cd218 Merge pull request 'FCST-06: cannot-persist is one question, asked after the attempt' (#75) from FCST-06 into release/1.0
The module claimed 'a store that cannot persist records nothing' and enforced it against `not self.ok` only. A store with ok=True whose _save() fails - a full volume, a read-only remount - kept answering yesterday() from memory until the next restart, which is the silently-forgetting cache the docstring rejects, reached by the condition the rule did not name.

Reproduced against real volumes rather than a monkeypatch: /data bind-mounted read-only (EROFS) and a full tmpfs (ENOSPC), with a healthy-/data control asserted either side. Before: yesterday() returned a 24-point series while the disk held {}.

Fixed in the code, not the docstring - weakening the doc would have documented a cache that forgets without saying so as intended.

The design answer is the part worth keeping: 'can this store persist' CANNOT be answered before the attempt, because a directory that was writable a moment ago is not a write that completed, so os.access or a probe write is a third symptom test wearing a predicate's name. It is answered after, once: _save() -> bool, true only if the file now holds what memory holds. The `not self.ok` test in _remember() is GONE rather than joined by a second one, and a check asserts its absence from the source. This is the same shape as FCST-04's M4 and FCST-05's HIGH - a rule enforced on the conditions someone thought of - and it is the first of the three to be closed by removing a test rather than adding one.

What is undone is the MERGE, not the store: a volume that fills at 14:00 leaves the yesterday written at 13:30 still answering. The snapshot is a deepcopy - measured, a shallow copy let a store holding 12 persisted points answer 24.

Evidence: 29/29 green. Six mutations, no survivors, purged tree each run with the mutated line greped off disk. One of them exposed an instrument defect now recorded in MUTATION.md: it printed 1 FAIL when the true figure was 3, because an f-string operand called len(read.points) and .points on a no_data raises Absence by design, killing the harness mid-section. One check earlier and it would have read as a survivor. A mutation's red count is a lower bound until the run is seen to reach the end of its section.
2026-09-10 08:52:09 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 c45893ffad FCST-06: "cannot persist" becomes one question, asked once, about the outcome
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m14s
price_history.py's docstring states its rule unconditionally - "A store that
cannot persist now records nothing, and both of its answers say the same
thing" - and FCST-04 enforced it against `not self.ok` only, which is one
SYMPTOM: the durable volume is missing. `ok` is about the DIRECTORY, and a
read-only remount and a full disk both leave it True. Reproduced on 5059e28
against two real volumes, a /data bind-mounted read-only and a full tmpfs:

    last_error = 'could not write ([Errno 30] Read-only file system)'
    words      = '2026-01-14 (24 points over 24 h); 2026-01-15 (24 points
                  over 24 h) [could not write (...)]'
    yesterday()= series, 24 points
    ON DISK    = {}

`words` and `yesterday()` were describing two different stores, and the 24
points were gone on the next restart with nothing saying so - the
silently-forgetting cache that rule exists to refuse, reached by the condition
it did not name. No shipped path reaches it: /data is the Supervisor's durable
volume and this module is its only writer. The defect is that a guarantee the
module states about itself did not hold in one condition.

Route taken: `_remember()` refuses to retain what it could not write, and the
docstring's claim stands as written. It is now ONE derived predicate rather
than two places testing two symptoms. "Can this store persist?" cannot be
answered BEFORE the attempt - a directory that existed and was writable a
moment ago is not a write that completed - so it is answered after it, once,
by the only thing holding the evidence: `_save()` returns whether the file now
holds what memory holds. No volume is one False, an OSError is another.
`_remember()` keeps only what that one answer says was kept, and the
`not self.ok` test in `_remember()` is GONE rather than joined by a second one.
FCST-04's M4 and FCST-05's HIGH were the same shape, so a third cause now needs
no third branch.

What is undone is the MERGE, not the store. The state restored is the last one
that IS on disk, so a site whose volume fills at 14:00 goes on answering the
yesterday it wrote at 13:30 - that record survives a restart, so answering it
is not a promise the store cannot keep. It stops adding to it. The snapshot is
copy.deepcopy: a one-level copy shares the day record the merge rebinds
`points` on, and measured with one, a store holding 12 persisted points
answered 24 after a failed merge.

Not fatal, deliberately: §6 and this module's opening - a broken cache must not
be a broken controller, and an add-on that will not start because /data filled
up is a worse defect than this one. `_save()` reports and returns; the shipped
resolve_tariff() path still gives a provider plan with no §11.4 degradation.
What changed is that the failure is now acted on rather than only logged.

test_price_history.py section 5d drives it on two REAL failures with different
syscalls and different errnos - a directory where the file goes (os.replace,
EISDIR) and a volume moved out from under an open store (mkstemp, ENOENT) -
because the rule is enforced on the outcome and one cause would grade a
coincidence. DOCS.md's "where there is no /data" sentence is widened to the
condition the code now holds to.

MUTATION.md gains what M4 exposed: a mutation whose red is a TRACEBACK reports
however many checks ran before it and grades none after it. M4 first printed
1 FAIL; the true figure is 3. An f-string operand read `len(read.points)`, and
`.points` on a no_data raises `Absence` by design - why()'s rule arriving in
what a check PRINTS rather than in what it asserts. `npts()` is now beside
why(), and a red count is a lower bound until the run is seen to reach the end
of its section.

6 mutations, purged tree, every one RED on named checks, no survivors:
M1 self._days = before -> dict(self._days)          +10 B  9 red
M2 _save() OSError handler returns True             -1 B   9 red
M3 _save() returns True on `not self.ok`            -1 B   3 red
M4 self._days = before -> self._days = {}           -4 B   3 red
M5 copy.deepcopy -> dict                            -9 B   3 red
M6 `if not self.ok: return` back in _remember()     +43 B  1 red

All 29 test files green. Nothing deployed; no option added; config.yaml and
app/ behaviour on a healthy /data untouched. No version number picked - that
is the open decision the Unreleased block names.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 08:43:17 +02:00
admin 5059e28860 Merge pull request 'FCST-05: one byte stops stopping the add-on, and the write path gets the read path's standard' (#74) from FCST-05 into release/1.0
Both defects were found by the QA pass on merged FCST-04, and both are the same shape: a corrupt price cache taking the controller with it.

HIGH: _load() caught (JSONDecodeError, OSError) and UnicodeDecodeError is neither - it is a ValueError. One non-UTF-8 byte in /data/price_history.json escaped to Controller.__init__, which is unguarded, and the add-on did not start. The except is now (ValueError, OSError) - the content family beside the bytes family - rather than the two members known today, because a third ValueError subclass nobody thought of is exactly how this arrived. The new fixture writes real bytes and asserts the old fixture's string IS valid UTF-8, so the pair cannot collapse back into one.

MEDIUM: a malformed `start` under the day the feed was writing raised out of _remember() on every refresh forever - the add-on stayed up while the plan retired after 90 min and arbitrage stayed off, with no self-heal, and `words` reported the store healthy throughout. Read and write paths now share one validator, and the merge key is the validated instant (which also fixes a lexicographic sort putting the 25-hour day's second 02:00 first).

Also: the row counts what it says it counts, and two false claims of strengthening in _audit's docstring are corrected - a differential over the realisable domain returns 0 weaker, 0 stronger, and that differential is now a committed check with FCST-03's audit frozen beside it. PROC-01: a right decision with a fabricated reason is still a defect.

_audit completeness was NOT attempted, and the reason is measured rather than asserted: the rule as stated takes the horizon checks red on the shipped fill and a healthy feed, because `published` is the whole read while the fill emits only [since, until). The rule is wrong, not merely absent; making it right needs the window in the signature. Separate card.

Evidence: 29/29 green. 12 mutations, all red, each on a fresh tree copy fingerprinted against clean. One survivor was found and closed during the work - two rungs reported into one last_error, so a -1 byte deletion on the half of the fix that tells an operator the cache self-healed survived the whole suite. TEST-16's masking pattern, inside a check written to close a false-health defect. Recorded in MUTATION.md.
2026-09-10 01:13:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 375a1e29d2 FCST-05: one byte stops stopping the add-on, and the write path gets the read path's standard
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
HIGH - a non-UTF-8 byte in /data/price_history.json stopped the add-on
from starting. `_load()` caught `(json.JSONDecodeError, OSError)`.
`UnicodeDecodeError` is `ValueError -> UnicodeError -> UnicodeDecodeError`:
neither of those, and `issubclass(UnicodeDecodeError, OSError)` is False. So
it escaped `_load()` -> `_open()` -> `PriceHistory.__init__`, which
`Controller.__init__` does not guard - breaking `_load()`'s own stated
contract, "a corrupt cache must not stop the controller". The handler now
names the ValueError FAMILY (the file's content) beside OSError (its bytes),
because a third subclass nobody has thought of is how this arrived the first
time. The suite could not see it: its "unreadable file" fixture writes
"{ this is not json", which is valid UTF-8 and fails one step later, in
`json`. A fixture holding a genuinely undecodable byte is now beside it,
with the difference between the two asserted as a precondition.

MEDIUM - a malformed `start` under the day the feed is writing to killed the
tariff plan permanently. `_remember()` merged with `{q["start"]: q ...}` and
sorted on `q["start"]`, trusting a value read off /data to be a hashable,
sortable string. An int, null, a dict or a list raised TypeError out of
`carry()` -> `resolve_tariff()` -> `run_tariff_refresh`, which catches
Exception - so the add-on stayed UP while every refresh raised forever, the
plan retiring after TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S with arbitrage and the cheap window off
for good, and no self-heal because `_remember()` raised before `_save()`.
The read path was properly defensive throughout, which is why `yesterday()`
survived and the existing fixture passed - it files its malformed rows under
a day the feed is NOT writing to. Both paths now share one validator,
`_point_of()`. A row that is not a point is dropped, reported, and written
back out clean.

...and the status row said the store was healthy while the plan was dead:
`words` read '2026-01-15 (1 h)'. `_load()` now counts the rows inside a kept
record as well as the record itself, so the store stops reporting plain
health from the moment it is opened; the note names what was FOUND at open
and what was DROPPED by the refresh, and clears once the file is rewritten.

...and the merge key is the validated INSTANT rather than its spelling,
which is what rule 4 already said. The lexicographic sort beside the string
key also put the second 02:00 of the 25-hour October day (+01:00) before the
first (+02:00); stored order only, since `_parse_points()` re-sorts.

LOW - the status row counted POINTS and printed them under the HOUR's name:
'2026-01-13 (96 h)' for a 24-hour day on the quarter-hourly feed this add-on
already supports. It is now '96 points over 24 h' - two facts, each under
its own unit.

LOW - two stated reasons were false. `_audit`'s "WHY IT IS STRICTER" claimed
the rework refused the same published point emitted twice and a carried
point sharing a published hour, "which the old count never looked at". A
differential over the whole domain the audit can express finds ZERO
divergence in both directions: the old `seen` count already refused the
first (one point twice is one hour twice) and the old IDENTITY rule already
refused the second. The reworked audit is EQUAL to FCST-03's, not stronger;
the only behavioural change is the intended relaxation, and it stays. The
differential is committed as a check rather than left as prose.

...and the audit's real limit is named: it does not check COMPLETENESS. Fed
the decimation defect FCST-04 was raised for it ACCEPTS, and it accepts an
empty output. So `_audit` is not what stops that recurring - the count and
identity checks are, and the text now points at them. Not made complete:
`published` is the whole read while the fill emits only [since, until), so
the rule as stated is wrong, and building it takes the 1/12/48 h horizon
checks red on a healthy feed. Measured, not assumed.

12 mutations, purged tree, every one RED, no survivors. All 29 test files
green. Nothing deployed; no option added; config.yaml untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-10 01:04:30 +02:00
admin c2787da539 Merge pull request 'FCST-04: the carry-forward fill reaches the plan, and the day it carries survives a restart' (#73) from FCST-04 into release/1.0
Review found 2 HIGH, 4 MEDIUM, 12 LOW - all driven to a concrete failure, all fixed on the branch.

H1 was a regression this PR introduced: fill_from_yesterday keyed the published set as {_utc_hour(p): p}, so a sub-hourly feed lost three points in four. eneco_eddy is the Belgian imbalance product and settles per quarter. Measured on 96 quarter-hourly firm points: 96 -> 15 points, spread 0.143 -> 0.014 EUR/kWh. The fix passes every published point through by identity and carries only whole hours with no coverage at all; _audit's one-per-hour rule became two rules that subsume it, so it caught MORE after the change than before - a repeated published point and a carried point sharing an hour with a real print both now raise, and neither was checked before.

H2 falsified the branch's own 'a broken cache is not a broken controller': a day record that parsed but was not a dict raised out of words(), which is unguarded in Controller.__init__, so the add-on did not start and could not self-heal.

Two of the branch's own checks were decoration and are recorded as such in DECISIONS rather than quietly repaired: the prune mutation survived because the fixture seeded one day and never reached the code it graded, and the AST ordering check compared ast.walk BFS depth rather than source order - shipped and reversed scored identically. Both are now driven by behaviour.

Evidence: 29/29 test files green. 20 mutations driven across the rework, fresh tree copy and __pycache__ purge before each per MUTATION.md/TEST-15. No survivors.
2026-09-10 00:03:08 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 b59f5ce31b FCST-04: the carry-forward stops decimating a quarter-hourly feed, and a broken cache stops stopping the add-on
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m22s
Rework of the FCST-04 branch against review. Every finding below was proven by
a runnable script before it was touched and re-run after; every check added or
repaired was driven red by a mutation, `__pycache__` purged first (MUTATION.md,
TEST-15). 29/29 test files green.

⚠️ H1 - A SUB-HOURLY FEED WAS DECIMATED TO ONE POINT AN HOUR, AND THE SPREAD
WENT WITH IT. `fill_from_yesterday()` keyed the published set as
`{_utc_hour(p.start): p for p in r.points}` - LAST POINT OF THE HOUR WINS, the
other three dropped. `eneco_eddy` is the Belgian imbalance product and settles
per QUARTER, and `_validate_raw()` accepts any strictly-increasing spacing, so
this is a shape the product supports today. Measured on a 96-point quarter-hourly
feed - ALL FIRM, FULLY PUBLISHED, nothing to carry: the plan reached the
optimiser as 15 points, the arbitrage spread fell from 0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh,
and the cheapest "hour" became a `:45` point whose `at()` window runs into the
next one. Not the windowing effect this card is about; a feed losing 84 % of its
own prints, with no flag anywhere reporting it. The fill now decides only WHICH
WHOLE HOURS NEED CARRYING: every published point inside the window passes
through BY IDENTITY, and a carried point is added only for a whole hour with no
published coverage at all. Same feed, same fixture: 60 of 60 firm points kept,
spread 0.134 over the hours still ahead.

⚠️ AND `_audit()` GOT STRICTER, NOT LOOSER - that was the condition on doing it
at all. The old post-condition refused any repeated `_utc_hour`, a count that
cannot express four points in one hour. Two rules replace it and SUBSUME it: a
published point must BE one of that hour's published points by identity and may
be emitted only once; a carried point may stand only in an hour absent from the
published set, must be flagged True, and may not repeat. So the duplicated
carried hour it existed to catch still raises, the same published point emitted
twice now raises, and a carried point sharing an hour with a real print now
raises too - which the count never looked at. Three mutations, three reds.

⚠️ H2 - A DAY RECORD THAT WAS NOT A RECORD STOPPED THE ADD-ON FROM STARTING.
`_load()` validated `version` and that `days` is a dict, never that each VALUE
is one. `{"version": 1, "days": {"2026-01-14": "oops"}}` loaded as ok=True,
last_error=None, and then `rec.get(...)` raised AttributeError out of `words`,
`yesterday()` and `resolve_tariff()` alike. `PriceHistory(...)` and `.words` are
both unguarded in `Controller.__init__`, so the controller did not come up - and
it never self-healed, because `_remember()` raised on the same record before it
could reach `_save()`. That falsifies the CHANGELOG's "A BROKEN CACHE IS NOT A
BROKEN CONTROLLER" in the one direction that matters. The asymmetry that
produced it is visible in the file: `_parse_points()` is carefully defensive
about every field of a POINT and `_load()` was not defensive about the record
holding them. Unusable records are now dropped and REPORTED (`words` says how
many and why), and `words` is total by construction as a second line.

M3 - `yesterday()` WAS OFF BY ONE DAY FOR 00:00-00:59 AFTER SPRING-FORWARD.
`brussels()` renders at the FIXED offset for that instant, so `brussels(stamp) -
timedelta(days=1)` subtracts 24 ABSOLUTE hours - and the Brussels day before the
March transition is 23 hours long. At 2026-03-30T00:30+02:00 it returned
2026-03-28's prices as "yesterday", or `no_data` naming a date that is not
yesterday. The arithmetic is now on the local DATE, which has no offset to lose,
and both transitions have a check - the module's headline claim had none.

M4 - WITH NO /data THE STORE STILL FILLED, IN MEMORY. `_save()` short-circuited
on `not ok` while `_remember()` populated `self._days` anyway: `words` said
"unavailable" and `yesterday()` answered A SERIES that is gone on the next
restart. The module docstring rejects exactly that ("a yesterday that silently
forgets") as its reason for not calling makedirs, so the code now matches the
docstring rather than contradicting it.

M5 - THE PRUNE MUTATION SURVIVED BECAUSE THE STIMULUS WAS DEGENERATE. §8's
clock-jump check seeded ONE day, so `if len(self._days) <= KEEP_DAYS: return`
fired and the body it is named after never ran: pruning by arithmetic against
the clock - which empties the store on exactly the morning the fill is for -
passed the whole 29-file suite. The fixture is now written to a file and
reopened (`_load()` does not prune, which is how a store legitimately holds more
than the cap) with KEEP_DAYS + 2 days, and the mutant is red.

M6 - THE AST ORDERING CHECK COULD NOT CATCH A REVERSAL, AND TWO DOCUMENTS CITED
IT AS A GUARANTEE. `_calls.index("_remember") < _calls.index("yesterday")` grades
`ast.walk` BFS DEPTH: `self._remember(...)` is a statement and
`self.yesterday(...)` is an ARGUMENT of the fill, one level deeper, so
`_remember` came out first whichever statement was written first - shipped and
reversed both scored True. It is now line numbers AND, the half that matters,
the behaviour: a feed carrying yesterday alongside today into an EMPTY store
must fill the whole horizon; reversed, the lookup finds nothing and the plan is
only the published hours. Reversing the two statements is red on both.

L14/L9 - KEEP_DAYS = 3 IS THE STEADY STATE EXACTLY, so a newest-N cap has no
slack: a feed publishing to D+2, or ONE stray point in the wrong year - which
sorts LAST and can never age out - pushes yesterday out for good. `_prune()` now
PINS the two days a lookup can actually ask for on top of the cap. Pinning is
additive, so it can only RETAIN and the WITNESS-03 property (nothing is deleted
by clock arithmetic) is preserved by construction; `stamp` stops being a dead
parameter; the store is bounded at KEEP_DAYS + 2.

L8 - the horizon end was not floored while `since` was, so a 48 h request made
at any instant off the hour returned 49 points. §1's count was green only
because its NOW was exactly :00:00, a shape production never has; the fixture
now sits at :17:43. L10 - a failed `_save()` leaked its temp file; at 48 writes
a day a persistent write failure leaked 48 inodes a day onto the volume that was
already the problem. L15 - `{"version": 1.0}` passed, since `1.0 == 1`. L16 -
the `_remember` tree walk scanned `app/*.py` only and matched a bare string; it
now parses `app/`, `tools/`, `scenarios/` and `estop/` and looks for the NAME,
so a comment does not fail it and a call in `tools/` cannot pass unseen.

CLAIM-ACCURACY DEFECTS, WHICH THIS REPO TREATS AS REAL:

* L7. DOCS said "*Tariff* on the status page reads `provisional` through the
  morning". FALSE - `tariff_words` is assigned only from the HA price-entity
  branch and from `static_status()`, both on the 30 s tick, and the plan's own
  sentence reaches `_LOG.info`. The doc now says what an operator can see (the
  Price history row, the Arbitrage row's own refusal sentence, the refresh log
  line) and a check pins the PAIRING - wiring the plan into the row is fine,
  correcting the doc is fine, doing one without the other is red.
* L11. "fills EVERY unpublished hour" is conditional: a partial yesterday leaves
  the local hours it never held out of the series (§11.4 for those hours, and
  `at()` raises rather than answering). Correct behaviour, overclaimed wording,
  and untested - all three fixed.
* L12. DECISIONS §1 leaned on `TariffPlan.cheap_now()`, which has NO PRODUCTION
  CALLER on the provider plan (`self.cheap` comes from `static_status()`, which
  builds its own). The conclusion holds on `arbitrage()`'s firm-pair refusal
  alone, which does reach control; the evidence is now stated at the reach it
  has.
* L13. §1's "passed through by identity" check compared `eur_per_kwh` between
  two SEPARATE `resolve_tariff()` calls, where `is` could never have held. The
  value comparison is kept and now says what it grades; identity is graded on a
  read the file constructs and still holds.
* L17. `PriceHistory.words` and the new status row had no check at all - and
  `words` is one of the two things H2 crashed. Both now have one.
* L18. main.py's inline note carried the "widens what the optimiser can SEE,
  never what it may act on" guarantee without the windowing caveat that the
  CHANGELOG, DOCS and `resolve_tariff()`'s docstring all carry. It is the one
  place a maintainer reads it unqualified.

EVIDENCE. All eight reviewer proofs re-run: p1/p1b return 29 March, p4 keeps
60 of 60 firm points at spread 0.134, p5 starts and reports, p6 D leaves no
temp, p6 E refuses 1.0, p6 F records nothing, p7 returns 48 for 48. p2's script
still scores True/True because it re-implements the OLD algorithm - the
reversal is now driven as a mutation instead, and is red. p3's script always
showed the shipped code correct; what was wrong was the fixture, and its mutant
is now red. Twenty mutations driven, no survivors, tree fingerprinted and
`__pycache__` purged before each: decimation (2 suites red), audit x3, unfloored
`until` (2), unvalidated day records (7 checks), instant-subtraction yesterday,
in-memory fill on a volume-less store, clock-arithmetic prune, cap without the
pin, leaked temp, loose schema type, empty `words` (5), reversed `carry()` (2),
a `_remember` leak in tools/ spelled two ways, a neighbour-filling fallback, a
copy instead of identity (2), the DOCS claim in both directions, and the caveat
removed from main.py. Baseline and the unmutated tree both green.

No option added, config.yaml untouched, and the CHANGELOG entry still picks no
version: PKG-07's rule, and only the deployer knows whether 0.9.0's image has
been pulled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-09 23:54:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0618194d9c FCST-04: the carry-forward fill reaches the plan, and the day it carries survives a restart
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m11s
FCST-03 shipped `fill_from_yesterday()` complete and checked, and shipped the
consumers written for it - `TariffPlan.firm_points()`, `cheap_now()`'s refusal
of a provisional hour, and `arbitrage()`'s refusal 3, which drops provisional
hours from the trade set rather than refusing the whole series. It shipped NO
CALLER. Nothing in `app/` named the fill, so no series ever contained a carried
point and every one of those consumers was exercising its all-firm branch.

⚠️ THE DEFECT THAT PRODUCED WAS NOT AN ERROR ANYWHERE. `load_prices()` returns
what the feed published and nothing widened it to the requested horizon, so on
a dynamic site between midnight and the 14-16 h CET publication the plan
covered the rest of today and nothing more - measured on the fixture here, 24 h
against a 48 h request. `arbitrage()` then took `max - min` over that truncated
window and reported a spread. The number was real, the window was half the one
configured, and nothing said so: tomorrow evening's peak, the hour a morning
charge would be sold into, was not in the series to be compared against
anything. A missing hour is not a wrong price - it is an hour the optimiser
never learns exists.

WHAT THIS ADDS. `app/price_history.py` keeps the PUBLISHED prices of the last
KEEP_DAYS Brussels days in /data/price_history.json; `resolve_tariff()` gains a
required keyword-only `history` and fills every unpublished hour of the horizon
from yesterday's same-wall-clock hour, flagged. Persistence rather than a
variable on the refresh task, because the window the fill exists for is
midnight -> publication and an add-on restarted at 08:00 would otherwise spend
all of it on the truncated series. Not in state.json: the refresh runs every
1800 s and that file holds the maintenance history and SAFETY-02's latch.

⚠️ ONE CHANGE HERE MOVES ENERGY, AND IT IS NOT THE ONE THE CARD IS NAMED FOR.
Carried hours are provisional, so §8.3 keeps them out of the trade set: the
fill widens what the optimiser can SEE, never what it may DO, and
test_price_history.py checks that so it cannot be overclaimed later. What does
change a trade is that the filled series is windowed to [since, until), so
hours that have ALREADY ELAPSED are no longer in the spread. Before, a cheap
night that had gone sat in the series as the day's cheapest hour - and a cycle
cannot buy in an hour that is past, so the trade was quietly never taken.
Section 2 grades this by finding the cheapest firm hour with and without the
fill and showing it MOVES, from 02:00 UTC to 08:00 UTC on the fixture.

⚠️ A DEAD FEED IS STILL §11.4, NOT YESTERDAY. The fill runs only on a `series`
read. The two are indistinguishable to the optimiser - both 100 % provisional,
so arbitrage refuses on the firm-pair rung and `cheap_now()` is False - so
preferring yesterday's feed over the `static_profile` an operator configured
FOR that case would change a documented degradation for a difference only the
status page can see. That, and two more, in
DECISIONS/FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried.md.

⚠️ THE ANTI-DECAY RULE IS AN ORDERING, NOT A VALIDATION, and saying so is more
useful than a guarantee that would not hold. Feeding the filled series back in
is how this rots - day 2 carries day 1's guesses, day 3 carries day 2's carry
of them, behind a `provisional` flag that stays TRUE while the NUMBER decays.
No value-level check can catch it: a carried point and `eneco_eddy`'s
published-provisional quarter are the same three fields with the same flag. So
`carry()` is the only public entry, it records BEFORE it fills, the filled
series exists only as a return value the object never sees again, and
test_price_history.py walks app/ for any other module naming `_remember` and
reads `carry()`'s AST to pin the order.

EVIDENCE. 29/29 test files pass in the CI image. Eight mutations driven against
app/price_history.py and app/static_tariff.py, __pycache__ purged before each
run per MUTATION.md/TEST-15: newest-record lookup (5 red), recording the filled
series (1), replace-instead-of-merge (10), UTC-date keying (10), removing the
fill call entirely (12), a lost price field defaulting to 0.0 (2), prune by
clock arithmetic (1), a degraded reason that stops naming its cause (1). No
survivors; baseline and revert both green. Three of those first crashed the
harness instead of reporting a FAIL - "it was refused" and "it broke on the way
to being refused" must not grade the same - so `why()` and `_priced()` were
added and the run repeated.

No option added, config.yaml untouched, and the CHANGELOG entry deliberately
picks no version: PKG-07's rule, and only the deployer knows whether 0.9.0's
image has been pulled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-09 19:37:45 +02:00
admin 587751b115 Merge pull request 'INSTR-01: grade diff()'s suppression rule at the level it is written at, one case per clause' (#72) from INSTR-01 into release/1.0 2026-09-09 01:05:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 3de4453956 INSTR-01: match the finding KIND, because M12 was not holding this file to its own rule
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m7s
Review APPROVED f6f3f22 plainly. Three LOW notes, all applied - the first is a
real gap and the other two are one line each.

⚠️ M12's ASSERTION WAS KIND-BLIND. It matched on the key and ignored the
finding kind, so renaming `diff()`'s `"VANISHED STORE KEY"` to
`"GONE STORE KEY"` left M12 GREEN - review measured it. A vanished latch
quietly downgraded to a softer heading is exactly what part 3 of this same file
requires every mutation to be graded against ("the SPECIFIC finding it should
produce"), so the file was not holding itself to its own doctrine. Inherited
from SAFETY-44's original M12, not introduced here, and fixed now:

    ("VANISHED STORE KEY", "unit/shed/sign_tripped") in _m12_new

Driven: the kind rename is exit 1 and M12 is among the reds where it was green
before, and C5's removal still turns M12 red, so the strengthening did not cost
the discrimination it exists for.

C4 IS NAMED IN THE CLAUSE MAP. It has no 5e row deliberately - part 3's M9
reaches `vanished_unit is not None` end-to-end and a synthetic row would
duplicate that rather than add separability - but C5 lives in the same `if`,
and listing one guard while omitting the other reads as an oversight rather
than a boundary. Review's own recommendation was not to add the row.

AND THE PRINTED SET SAYS WHAT IT LOSES. The finding regex captures the first
TOKEN of each text, so two findings of one kind collapse into one tuple; the
line now says "first token only" so nobody reads it as an inventory. Harmless
for M12 - the difference is one-directional and the pair it asserts on is exact
- but the display was lossier than it looked. Unused `_m12_out` dropped.

28/28 files pass. `rehearse_roster.py` is untouched by this round; review
confirmed its AST is identical between 91b0d5e and f6f3f22, so every
measurement made against the shipped rule still stands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-09 00:58:03 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 f6f3f227c1 INSTR-01: restore M12 on the leg I generalised past, and measure the clause that had no row
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m6s
Review found two things this PR asserted about itself that were false. Both are
mine and both are worse than the defect the card was filed for.

⚠️ "NO FIXTURE CAN RESTORE IT, MEASURED BOTH WAYS" WAS NOT TRUE, AND TWO
MEASUREMENTS ARE NOT AN IMPOSSIBILITY PROOF. I deleted M12 - SAFETY-44's
working end-to-end control for the off-roster narrowing - on the argument that
the provenance clause made it unrestorable. The structural claim behind it,
that `run()` builds both snapshots from one state file so "already latched" and
"made by this transition" are incompatible, IS TRUE OF SAME-STEP AND FALSE OF
STAGED: `snapshot_over()` starts the after-leg over the file the BEFORE-leg
wrote, so a transition-made destination is available there. Both arrangements I
measured were same-step shaped. Review found the third.

RESTORED, and it discriminates with all six clauses in:

    staged leg, legacy+shed, shipped     _m12_new = VANISHED unit/shed/sign_tripped
    ...C5 narrowing removed              _m12_new = []          ⚠️ suppressed

⚠️ AND MY FIRST RESTORATION DIDN'T DISCRIMINATE EITHER, for a reason worth
recording: `data.pop(k, False)` RETURNS the value, so shed lost the KEY and
kept the LATCH - `_grade_store_migration()` saw `on_roster_latched`, never
re-armed garage, and there was no transition-made destination. The finding was
reported whether or not C5 existed and the control looked restored. `and False`
is the difference between "the key is gone" and "the LATCH is gone", and only
the second reaches the re-arm this arrangement needs.

⚠️ WHAT ACTUALLY BROKE WAS M12's exit-0 PRECONDITION, NOT M12. A legacy-shaped
fixture is never clean. That precondition is the one SAFETY-44's own commit
called "belt-and-braces, load-bearing only if the exit-0 requirement is ever
relaxed", saying what closed the gap is `_m12_new` BEING A SET DIFFERENCE - and
a stable dirty baseline is fine for a set difference. So I deleted a control on
the strength of a precondition the same commit had already called not
load-bearing. That is removing coverage rather than failing to add it, which is
the worse of the two directions.

⭐ AND THE BARE-KEY CLAUSE HAD NO ROW AT ALL. Review deleted
`k.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] == bare` and the whole 28-file suite stayed GREEN. 5e
mutated five clauses; the comprehension carries more, and this one is
load-bearing: a vanished SAFETY-02 `sign_tripped` was suppressed by a SAFETY-42
`delivery_tripped` on a roster unit - a DIFFERENT FAILSAFE's key. The rule's own
comment says "THE TEST IS NOT 'the name appears somewhere'. It is: the SAME bare
key", and nothing measured that sentence. `unit/*/delivery_tripped` is
machine-read, so it is reachable on any real two-latch store. R7 added; C2 now
flips exactly R7.

All six clause-removals now flip exactly their own row:

    C1 machine_read   -> ['R6-machine-read']    C5 off-roster  -> ['R2-narrowing']
    C2 same bare key  -> ['R7-bare-key']        C6 injectivity -> ['R5-injectivity']
    C3 same value     -> ['R4-value']           C7 provenance  -> ['R3-provenance']

THREE DANGLING CITATIONS TO A CONTROL THIS PR HAD DELETED, one of them in the
shipped tool eight lines below the paragraph condemning exactly that ("a
citation is the worst possible carrier, because it reads as having been
checked"). The tool no longer names a check; it states the property - every
clause has a row, and each removal flips its own.

A STALE SAFETY-44 BLOCK saying both fixes were "REVERTED OUT OF THIS CARD,
because THIS SUITE CANNOT MEASURE EITHER ONE" - describing a tree this PR
replaced. Rewritten as a map of where each clause is now measured. A comment
that outlives its subject is the same defect as a citation that outlives its
check.

AND A SELF-CONTRADICTION about the driver, in the file and in the last commit
message: "THE DRIVER IS WRITTEN INTO THE TREE UNDER TEST" eight lines above
"THE DRIVER GOES IN A TEMPDIR, NOT IN THE TREE". The code does the tempdir; the
first sentence stated the read-only-CI bug the same commit says it fixed, as if
it were the design. It now says the driver IMPORTS the tree and is WRITTEN to a
tempdir.

ONE HOLE REMAINS OPEN AND IS STATED AS UNMEASURED: attribution. `sorted()`
decides which vanished key claims a destination, so a deleted key can sort
first and be named as the one that migrated while the key that really moved is
reported VANISHED. Review measured that `sorted(` -> `list(` leaves the suite
green - every 5e case has at most one candidate, so no row can see ordering.
Still exit 1, so a wrong sentence rather than a hidden loss. Recorded rather
than left looking guarded.

28/28 files pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-09 00:29:00 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 91b0d5e4dc INSTR-01: grade the suppression rule at the level it is written at, one case per clause
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m4s
SAFETY-44 produced THREE inert controls for this one rule, each inert
differently, and split the two remaining fixes out rather than ship them
unmeasured. This is that card, and the first thing it did was explain why the
end-to-end route could never have worked.

⚠️ `moved_to` IS ONE COMPREHENSION CARRYING FIVE CONDITIONS WITH FIVE DIFFERENT
REASONS TO EXIST, AND `run()` BUILDS BOTH SNAPSHOTS FROM ONE STATE FILE. So
"the destination was already latched" and "the destination was made by this
transition" are the same file answering two incompatible questions: the
arrangement that reaches one forecloses the other. That is why rebuilding a
fixture to reach clause N kept moving the others, and it is not a fixture
problem.

⭐ SO THE RULE IS GRADED WHERE IT IS WRITTEN - `diff()` on constructed
Snapshots, ONE CASE PER CLAUSE. Six rows, and on the SHIPPED tree before any
fix they already separated the two known defects:

    R1 rename (legitimate)   migrated                      correct
    R2 narrowing             vanished                      correct
    R3 provenance            MIGRATED                      ⚠️ the defect
    R4 same value            vanished                      correct
    R5 injectivity           BOTH migrated                 ⚠️ the defect
    R6 machine_read          vanished                      correct

The two one-line fixes SAFETY-44 reverted are back, and R3/R5 flip while
R1/R2/R4/R6 do not - so the legitimate rename is still suppressed and this is
not an over-correction.

⭐ AND EACH CLAUSE REMOVAL FLIPS **EXACTLY ITS OWN ROW**, which is the
acceptance criterion this card was filed with:

    C1 machine_read  removed -> ['R6-machine-read']
    C3 same value    removed -> ['R4-value']
    C5 off-roster    removed -> ['R2-narrowing']
    C6 injectivity   removed -> ['R5-injectivity']
    C7 provenance    removed -> ['R3-provenance']

A removal that flips nothing is an unmeasured clause; a removal that flips
someone else's row means the cases are not separable after all. Neither
happened.

⚠️ AND M12 IS DELETED, WHICH IS THE MOST USEFUL THING THIS CARD FOUND. M12 was
SAFETY-44's end-to-end control for the narrowing and it was a REAL control -
red when the narrowing was removed. Adding the provenance clause disarmed it,
and NO FIXTURE CAN RESTORE IT, measured both ways: with the sibling latched in
its own right, C7 rejects the destination before C5 is consulted, so the
mutation is reported whether or not C5 exists; making the destination
transition-made means a flat latch, which makes the shipped run dirty and
breaks M12's own precondition. The second half of the card's acceptance
criterion - "M12 still turns red with the new clauses in" - is therefore
UNSATISFIABLE, and the honest answer is to remove the control rather than keep
one that has become inert. R2 measures C5 strictly better. Part 5 keeps the
end-to-end coverage; discrimination lives in 5e.

`state-both-latched.json` goes with it. Nothing referenced it once M12 was
gone, and the first draft of that paragraph said it was "kept, because 5e's
R2/R3 are derived from the arrangements it represents" - a nice sentence and
not a reference. An unused fixture a comment calls load-bearing is an inert
check one directory over.

TWO THINGS THE DRIVER GETS RIGHT ON PURPOSE:
  - it is written to a TEMPDIR, not beside the tool. `checks / unit` mounts the
    checkout READ-ONLY, so writing into the tree works on a dev box and is
    `OSError: Read-only file system` in CI - green for whoever wrote it and red
    on every PR. Caught by running it in the check image before committing.
  - the TABLE stays in the test file and the driver goes into the tree under
    test, so a mutation to the tool cannot also move the answer it is graded
    against.

28/28 files pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-08 23:51:35 +02:00