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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 834e7ca44b SAFETY-39: correct the gain figures, which were not the measured ones
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m15s
Review found validate.py:288-289 carrying numbers that appear nowhere
else in the PR's evidence and could not be reproduced: over-absorption
"1233 W at slew 1000 and 1344 W at slew 250 ... 1495 W at 0.6, 961 W at
0.3, ~0 W at 0.2". A grep for 1233/1344/1495 found them ONLY in that
comment - the DECISIONS record, the PR body, test_control.py's audit
table and slew_sim's own output all carried the correct ones.

The measured values, from re-running tools/slew_sim.py on the real plant
model at the stated conditions (max_w 5000, 2 s tick, 51 export steps
1.0-4.2 kW): slew column 958 (slew 1000) and 1081 (slew 250); gain column
987 (0.6), 876 (0.3), 435 (0.2).

⚠️ "~0 W at 0.2" WAS WRONG IN THE UNSAFE DIRECTION. It invited a future
reader to conclude that dropping gain to 0.2 removes over-absorption. It
does not: 435 W remains, which is 44 % of the figure at 0.6, not zero.
The corrected text says so at the line rather than leaving a round number
to be trusted.

The conclusion the paragraph draws is unchanged and still holds on the
measured figures: over-absorption is flat in slew_w and falls in gain, so
`gain` is the constant that would have to move, and SAFETY-39
deliberately does not move it.

No behaviour change; comment only. Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 01:48:52 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 5d7e275df4 SAFETY-39: slew_w is a ratio to the rail, and gain is what is still wrong
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m16s
`slew_w: 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a clamp of 1500 W, where
"capping how far the loop can jump ahead of the inverter" was true because the
rail itself bounded the excursion. The live install went to max_w 5000 and the
constant did not move, so the loop crosses its whole output range in 10 s
against a plant NOTES.md §5.10 measured at ~18 s. Measured on the owner's system
2026-09-05 11:43-11:46: a 3.4 kW export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000 W in five
2 s ticks, the battery to -5154 W past a 5000 VA rating, and the grid from
3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT. Nothing was broken; the rail moved.

REPRODUCED FIRST, and one half of it is not reproducible at all. On
plantsim.Plant and on an independent in-repo model: the setpoint stepping a full
1000 W per tick to the rail (48 of 51 export steps), and the meter crossing from
export into import. The -5154 W figure is NOT reproducible in either model,
because both clamp the plant at its rating - so the card's AC "battery no longer
exceeds max_w in simulation" is unfalsifiable and was rewritten rather than met.

THE DELIVERABLE IS THE RELATIONSHIP.
  SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = 2 s / 18 s = 1/9
  slew_w = 0 now means FOLLOW THE RAIL - SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w - exactly as
  integrator_max_w = 0 already means follow max_w. It is the shipped default:
  222 W at max_w 2000, 556 W at 5000, 1067 W at a ~9600 W two-inverter site.
  validate.py rule 10 refuses an explicit value faster than that, graded against
  sum(unit_caps(opts)) - the roster sum, i.e. Controller.site_max_w - so a
  second inverter moves the bound with no operator action.

VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT: restoring slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 is refused, and the
refusal names the rail, the crossing time, the measurement and what to do.
Equality, one watt of slack, the live interim 400 and slew_w 0 at every rating
all still start.

GAIN IS THE CONSTANT THAT IS STILL WRONG, and it is NOT changed here. Over 51
export steps the over-absorption is FLAT in slew (958 W at 1000, 1081 W at 250)
and monotone in gain (987 W at 0.6, 876 at 0.3, 435 at 0.2): slew_w bounds the
OUTPUT, while the integrator moves gain*error per cycle and reaches a 5000 W
rail in under three ticks whatever the slew is. Two control-law constants moving
in one release on a running house makes the next measurement uninterpretable.

⚠️ N=2: the site rail becomes sum(max_w) ~ 9600 W (inverter B FROM DATASHEET AND
SERIAL, not measured, and sim/plantsim.py's INVERTER_B is A copied), and the
enforced ratio produces 1067 W there automatically. But a growing rail LOOSENS
this bound, and the >= 900 W symptom goes stale at N=2 the same way the constant
did - both stated in the record rather than left to be discovered.

Nothing reached the inverter. The live install still runs the interim slew_w 400
applied by hand on 2026-09-05, which rule 10 accepts unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 01:10:15 +02:00
admin 24c3d87d60 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-38: pin site_standing with shares that cannot answer for the site' (#53) from SAFETY-38 into release/1.0 2026-09-06 00:00:48 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d5b9317d57 SAFETY-38: correct the survivor count, which was stated four ways
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m11s
Review found the summary lines miscounted, and one of the miscounts filed
a KILL among the survivors. The authoritative tables in §7e and §7f were
right throughout; only the sentences a reader actually relies on were
wrong.

Arithmetic, from §7f's own ledger:
  14 measured = 10 surviving
              +  1 already caught  (C3 allocator.py:162, red in test_alloc.py)
              +  3 caught by round 4 (C6 clamp.py:253, C7 peakguard.py:493,
                                      B12 arbiter.py:264)
Survivors by file: TWO in allocator.py (C1 :154, C2 :160), three in
arbiter.py (C4a/C4b :344, C5 :392), two in tariff.py (C8, C9), two in
arbitrage.py (B17, B18), one in main.py (B19). Two, not three, in
allocator.py - C3 is the kill.

Before: DECISIONS §6c said "Nine" while listing eleven; the CHANGELOG said
"11 SURVIVORS" while listing eleven. Both counted C3 as a survivor.

⚠️ KEPT VISIBLE RATHER THAN QUIETLY FIXED. This is this card's own
recurring defect in prose rather than in code - a claim wider than the
measurement beneath it - and it is the second false statement this ticket
has put into its own decision record. The correction says so at the line,
because a document whose whole value is that it can be trusted should
record when it could not be.

No app/ change; no test change. Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 23:10:30 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 e2efc765af SAFETY-38 round 4: the enumeration covered one sink, and it was not the one this codebase uses
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m12s
The scanner's two censuses between them scored ONE syntactic sink and called it
the family. Every one of census B's 16 members was a sentence that is APPENDED,
ASSIGNED to a `reason`-shaped name, or passed as a LOG ARGUMENT. Not one was
RETURNED - and census A's return bucket only ever held a callee formatting its
own PARAMETERS, so a method formatting its own ATTRIBUTES and handing the string
back was invisible to both. That is the whole describe() / explain() /
reason-builder family, which is where this repository actually keeps its
operator sentences. Worse than the gap: it was in NONE of the five blind spots
the tool printed about itself.

THE SCANNER, WIDENED - and it rediscovered both members without being told:

  * CENSUS C, the return sink, resolved through the returning method's CALL
    SITES so a returned KEY (store.unit_key, mqtt.unit_state_key - MAINT-05's
    card) is not mistaken for a returned SENTENCE. 53 returned pairs, 39
    reaching an operator, 16 of those sharing a format spec.
  * A sentence handed to a constructor as `reason=` or placed under a "text"
    dict key is a MESSAGE. That one line of the sink walker was hiding SIX more
    caller-built members, census B 16 -> 22.
  * Every census B and C row now prints whether the two interpolations share a
    FORMAT SPEC - the difference between a transposition that is silent and one
    that merely looks broken.
  * The blind-spot list is now TWO lists: what it scans (printed from the
    constants, so they cannot drift) and WHAT IT DOES NOT SCAN AT ALL, largest
    hole first - `%s`-style lazy logging, MEASURED at 31 calls across 8 modules
    and each one listed, not asserted.

CLOSED, both zero-byte survivors of a green 21-file suite:

  * clamp.py:253 ClampResult.describe(), requested_w <-> applied_w. No
    test_*.py mentioned describe() at all. It is the SS15 action-log row
    (main.py:1366) AND the ClampWatchdog notification reason (main.py:2452) -
    the alarm SAFETY-40 and SAFETY-41 are about. Under the swap the guard
    reports a setpoint clamped UPWARD, to +9999 W by a bound whose rating the
    same sentence gives as 2000 W. Pinned on the ORDERED PAIR on the contiguous
    literal at BOTH consumers, operands read off ctl.target and
    hass.writes[-1] - what the loop asked and what the device was sent - not
    off the ClampResult the swap lives in. 4 checks red.
  * peakguard.py:493 PeakDecision.explain(), projected_w <-> ceiling_w. "peak
    guard idle" was in no test_*.py. The row then reads "projects 5013 W under
    a 2300 W ceiling" - 2713 W OVER - on a row whose own words say idle and
    whose own flag says ok. Pinned on the decision and on the shipped status
    row. 3 checks red.
  * test_arbiter.py's scope-violation check, whose CLAIM was wider than its
    ASSERTION. Measured this round rather than left at source level: 0 bytes,
    21/21 green before, red now. 2 checks.

DISCLOSED, NOT CLOSED - 11 measured zero-byte survivors, each with its file
fingerprint and its 21/21 verdict, in the decision doc SS7e-SS7g. Three in
allocator.py's UnitPlan.explain(), three across arbiter.py's two explain()s,
two in tariff.py, two in arbitrage.py's trade reasons, one in main.py's
SoC-floor notification. An enumerated list with honest gaps beats a fifth round
finding a fifth instance.

CORRECTIONS THIS ROUND OWES:

  * The idle sentence does NOT reach main.py:3299/3302 - those are the
    floor-limited branch, where explain() returns self.reason before the idle
    literal is built. It reaches main.py:3313 and, on the release edge, 1951.
    1951 is disclosed unpinned.
  * SS4's "Every one of the ten is red" sat under a twelve-row table: it is the
    ten site_standing entries.
  * SS6b said "weaker evidence than A1-A3"; A4 was measured, so SS7d's
    "A1-A4 and B1" is the right list and SS6b now says it.
  * AND THE PROBE THAT GRADES THESE MUTATIONS WAS THE DEFECT, ONCE. Its first
    cut numbered the operands BY ORDER OF APPEARANCE, so after a transposition
    the other leaf took the same number and all thirteen mutant renders came
    back byte-identical - which reads exactly like "the edit is inert". Keying
    the value to the NAME fixed it. Habit 4, in the measuring instrument:
    MUTATION.md habit 16 is the new entry, and the count there is corrected to
    eleven rather than inflated.

14 mutations measured: fresh full-repo copy each, mounted :ro, bytecode purged
and the purge COUNT printed, the edit re-read from disk, length and sha256
printed on both sides, and every one required to change the EMITTED SENTENCE
and not merely the bytes. 12 survived the pre-round suite, 1 was already
caught, 3 are caught now. Full 21-file suite green on the final tree.

NOT ONE BYTE OF app/ MOVES. This card changes coverage only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 22:38:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 357cb4f07f SAFETY-38 round 3: pin the banner the SHIPPED install actually prints
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m12s
Round 2 pinned the operand order of `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` at main.py:1620 -
the SITE detector. Part 9c asserts that detector is never armed at a roster of
one, so on every install this add-on has, the PER-UNIT banner is the only
sign-disagreement sentence that can ever be printed, and its call site is a
different line. main.py:1560 was left unpinned.

1. THE SAME ZERO-BYTE DEFECT ONE CALL SITE OVER.
   `evaluate(stood, against, ...)` -> `evaluate(against, stood, ...)`:
   app/main.py 234 542 bytes before and after, delta 0, fingerprint
   61aa413f... -> e57e6026..., bytecode purged, tree mounted :ro, line re-read
   from disk. On the round-2 tree the FULL 21-FILE SUITE PASSES.

   Nothing behavioural could ever have caught it. `watchdog.disagrees()` is
   SYMMETRIC in its first two arguments - `commanded_w * against_w < 0` with an
   abs() gate on both - so the mutant takes identical actions on every input.
   Not "no fixture happens to separate them": no fixture CAN.

   What moves is the sentence. Measured by diffing the suite's own printed
   banners between the round-3 tree and the same tree carrying only this edit:
   9 emitted banner lines invert, in 3 distinct sentences.

     shipped  commanded -2000 W against a meter reading +2000 W
     swapped  commanded +2000 W against a meter reading -2000 W
     shipped  commanded +1000 W against its own measured power -1000 W
     swapped  commanded -1000 W against its own measured power +1000 W
     shipped  commanded -2000 W against a meter reading +4000 W   (the N=1 arm)
     swapped  commanded +4000 W against a meter reading -2000 W

   Persisted to `sign_reason` and re-read after the restart the latch exists to
   survive; also the action log, `_LOG.error` and `status_payload()`'s headline.

   CLOSED by the ORDERED PAIR on both per-unit banners, both operands read off
   the OBSERVED CYCLE - `inv.last_write` and `inv.batt` off the objects the
   plant moved, never off the arguments the detector was handed, which would
   compare the swap against itself:
     - part 3, the N>=2 trip: "commanded {stood:+.0f} W against its own
       measured power {meas:+.0f} W", plus the persisted namespaced copy;
     - part 7, the N=1 controller-driven trip: "commanded {stood:+.0f} W
       against a meter reading {grid:+.0f} W", plus the namespaced key AND the
       flat rollback mirror;
     - a PRECONDITION on each that the two operands are different numbers of
       opposite sign - without it a transposition produces the same string and
       the check is decoration.

   Measured after the fix: RED on four named checks in test_watchdog.py, GREEN
   in the other twenty files. M11 (the site swap) re-measured on this tree:
   still red. Round 1's and round 2's kills are intact.

2. A FALSE STATEMENT ROUND 2 INTRODUCED, AND IT WAS WORSE THAN REPORTED.
   Section 4 said "three of these left the whole suite green - M1, M2 and M3 -
   and the remaining seven were caught by SAFETY-30's own N>=2 checks". Round
   1's vaguer wording was harmless; naming three made it specific and wrong.

   Re-measured mutation by mutation on clean release/1.0 @ bbc903b, each on a
   fresh copy, bytecode purged, byte delta and fingerprint printed, FULL 21-FILE
   SUITE each time:

     M1  +24 B  fp 362374cf...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M2   +9 B  fp 86573e74...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M3   +4 B  fp 59fa8815...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M4   +9 B  fp 43d852be...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M5  +16 B  fp 58d26de8...  RED  test_watchdog.py, 3 checks
     M6   +1 B  fp 407ddb5f...  RED  test_watchdog.py, 3 checks
     M7  -11 B  fp 2a635a4e...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M8   +6 B  fp b21eed89...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M9   +6 B  fp 0973d3ca...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR
     M10  +7 B  fp 0e7b7a4f...  21/21 PASS - SURVIVOR

   EIGHT survived, not three - and not the four a reviewer proposed either.
   The corrected sentence is in DECISIONS section 4.

   AND THE TWO THAT WERE CAUGHT MAKE THE CARD'S CASE. M5 (`sum(abs ...)`) and
   M6 (`-sum`) are the only two entries that reverse the SIGN. Every other one
   changes only the MAGNITUDE, and `_sign_site` - the suite's only N>=2 site
   fixture before this card - runs shares of about -2500 W each against a 320 W
   gate, so sum / mean / max / min / sorted[-1] / [0] / self.target / half /
   double land on -2500, -2500, -2500, -2500, -2500, -2500, -2500, -1250 and
   -5000 W: nine numbers, ALL ON THE SAME SIDE OF THE SAME THRESHOLD. The
   pre-existing coverage could see a sign and nothing else.

3. THEN THE THING THAT WOULD HAVE CAUGHT BOTH: the SYMMETRIC-PREDICATE FAMILY,
   enumerated by machine rather than by hand for a third time.
   `tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` renames each parameter pair, erases every
   formatted string, canonicalises the commutative operators and iterates to a
   FIXPOINT - the symmetry is usually one call deep, and a single pass reports
   an EMPTY family on a tree whose answer is already known. A second census
   covers sentences the CALLER builds. Both print their own blind spots,
   including the one way the scan OVER-reports.

   It found one open survivor this card does not close and now discloses:
   rail_unreachable()'s dev_min/dev_max at main.py:3208 - 0 bytes, 21/21 green,
   a status-page NOT COVERED row - and twelve unpinned caller-built sentences,
   including SAFETY-31's `circ_reason`, which is the same shape and is also
   persisted and re-read after a restart. DECISIONS section 7 has the list, the
   pinned status of every member, and what the instrument cannot see.

No app/ code changes. MUTATION.md gains habit 15.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 20:39:58 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 564ba11c11 SAFETY-38 round 2: assert the ordered pair, and correct the M3 attribution
Two blockers, one of them mine to fix and one a mis-measurement to undo. No
`app/` change in either: the shipped `sum` is correct.

1. A ZERO-BYTE SURVIVOR AT THE CALL SITE ONE LINE BELOW THE PINNED VALUE.
   Round 1 pinned `site_standing` and never pinned WHERE IT GOES. Swapping the
   detector's first two arguments at main.py:1620 -
   `evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, ...)` -> `evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, ...)`
   - is a ZERO-BYTE edit and left the round-1 tree fully green. The cost is the
   banner: the site stands at -500 W of charge into a +2500 W import and the
   LATCHING, SITE-STOPPING alarm reads "commanded +2500 W against a meter
   reading -500 W" - which instrument read what, inverted, on the one line
   somebody woken by it reads first (watchdog.py:658-665).

   Round 1's check could not reach it. It asserted `"-500 W"` appears SOMEWHERE
   in the sentence; under the swap it still does, IN THE METER SLOT. A substring
   test grades PRESENCE, never ARRANGEMENT. It now asserts the ORDERED PAIR:
   `f"commanded {sum:+.0f} W against a meter reading {grid:+.0f} W"`. Measured:
   red in test_watchdog.py on that one named check, green in the other twenty.

2. THE M3 ATTRIBUTION WAS FALSE, AND HOW IT BECAME FALSE IS THE USEFUL PART.
   Round 1 recorded `list(standing.values())[0]` as closed by SAFETY-32's
   package-wide pin and told future authors NOT TO RE-COVER IT. Re-measured on
   release/1.0 @ 86eaef2 carrying only that edit: the full 21-file suite is
   GREEN and test_peakguard.py is PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS in isolation. THE
   MUTATION SURVIVES. It was originally measured once, that run hit CI-06's
   ~20% flake, and the red was recorded as a kill.

   The mechanism, read off 12j's own enumeration rather than argued: 12j taints
   names BOUND to roster values and lists ACCUMULATED in a loop. `standing` is a
   dict filled by SUBSCRIPT assignment (main.py:1554/1558), so it never enters
   the taint set and 1599 is not a roster site. On the mutated tree 12j lists
   main.py:1553, 1555 and 1690 - not 1599. Part 9a and 9b close it.

   Corrected in all four places it was committed: DECISIONS section 1 and
   section 4, CHANGELOG, and the part 9 header that carried the instruction.

MEASUREMENT, all on 86eaef2, fresh copy per mutation, mounted :ro, bytecode
purged by tools/mutation_run.sh, edit re-read from disk, byte delta printed:
  * M1-M10 re-run INDEPENDENTLY rather than carried forward - all 10 red, at
    the deltas the table records (M1/M2/M4 re-run in the exact wrapped form).
  * M11, the argument swap: 0 bytes, red on one check in one file.
  * W1 `"sign_site": SCOPE_SITE -> SCOPE_UNIT`: 0 bytes, red; part 9a is one of
    the two killers.
  * W2 `"circulation": SCOPE_SITE -> SCOPE_UNIT`: 0 bytes, red - but ENTIRELY
    on pre-existing checks. This card adds nothing to circulation and does not
    claim it.
Control: 21/21 green before and after. The suite is 21 files, not 20 - TEL-07
added test_mqtt.py in the rebase onto 86eaef2.

DECISIONS section 6a enumerates what was NOT closed: SAFETY-31's circ_wd
detector itself, the other eight CLAIM_SCOPE entries, actuator_of()'s body, the
n_units > 1 guard, and the fact that the "green in the other twenty files" half
of the ledger was re-verified on 86eaef2 only for M3 and M11.

MUTATION.md gains habit 14 - assert the ordered pair, not the substring - and
records this as the tenth instance of the family, found INSIDE THE FIX WRITTEN
TO CLOSE THE NINTH, for the second time in that list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 20:39:39 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 3033420dd7 SAFETY-38: record the CI-06 false red, and where each mutation lands
All ten mutations of `site_standing` are red in test_watchdog.py and in nothing
else - the other 19 files are green under every one of them, which is the
measurement of how unpinned the line was.

One exception, recorded rather than dropped: in the batch run M10
(`sorted(standing.values())[-1]`) also reported FAIL test_peakguard.py. Re-run
in isolation three times and once more through tools/mutation_run.sh - four
clean passes. The batch script had discarded the failure detail so the check
cannot be named; what can be said is that it did not reproduce in four attempts
and that no claim in this card rests on it. That is CI-06's file behaving the
way CI-06 records.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 20:39:39 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 a8bd2b9330 SAFETY-38: pin site_standing with shares that cannot answer for the site
`app/main.py:1598`'s `site_standing = float(sum(standing.values()))` is the
first argument of SAFETY-30's latching, site-stopping sign detector AND the
`commanded_w` handed to SAFETY-18's `looks_frozen()`. It was pinned by nothing.
Coverage only: not one byte of `app/` moves - the shipped `sum` is correct.

WHY THE SUITE COULD NOT SEE IT. `_sign_site`, the only N>=2 site fixture in the
repository, runs shares of about -2500 W EACH - every one individually over its
320 W gate - so sum, mean and max(key=abs) all agree on it. Its values happen to
be equal, and a check comparing two things that happen to be equal cannot see
the difference it names. MUTATION.md habit 4, ninth instance, inside the site
half of the card that names the rule in its own text. At N=1 it is arithmetic
rather than a fixture defect: sum == mean == max == the one share, identically.

THE FIXTURE (test_watchdog.py part 9). Two SIMULATED units rated 220 W and
280 W, both obeying exactly, inverted gain, house importing 2000 W: the site
commands -500 W against a +2500 W meter and NO SINGLE SHARE clears the shipped
300 W gate. Four candidate reductions, four distinct answers, one over the gate
- sum -500, mean -250, max(key=abs) -280, [0] -220 - asserted as a precondition.
The asymmetry is load-bearing, and the smaller unit is first so [0] stays
distinct from max(key=abs). Gate shipped; only the hold is shortened.

BOTH CONSUMERS. 9b drives the same discrimination at SAFETY-18's threshold: the
site rail is 0.95 x 500 = 475 W, so the sum rails it while 250, 280 and 220 do
not. Shipped: BLIND_FROZEN, floor 0 W. Under both surviving mutations: not blind
at all, no floor filed - the battery may keep importing through a quarter whose
billed average is unobservable. The open quarter is backfilled with the stuck
reading so the mutant cannot reach the same action by the coverage route and
mask the difference. 9c asserts the N=1 identity on a real one-inverter tree.

SAFETY-32 already closes `list(standing.values())[0]` structurally and this card
does not claim it. Its disclosed blind spot - semantics are invisible to a shape
pin, permanently - is why the mean and max(key=abs) needed a behavioural set.

AND THE SEARCH FOR THE NEXT SURVIVOR FOUND ONE. `float(self.target)` - the
arbiter's site target instead of the sum of what stands on the wire - is -11 B
and survives all 20 files on untouched release/1.0 @ f72c48d, because every
fixture that existed was built where the two are the same number. They separate
when a device's reported range is narrower than its max_w: the `device` claim is
filed per actuator and never bounds the site target. Closed here by a
counterfactual that asks for -500 W while -250 W stands.

10 mutations of that one line, each on a fresh full-repo copy mounted :ro,
purged by tools/mutation_run.sh, the edit re-read from disk and the byte delta
printed. Ledger and honest gaps in DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 20:39:39 +02:00
admin 9e42cecc24 Merge pull request 'CI-06: test_peakguard.py answered two of its checks with the wall clock' (#54) from CI-06 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 19:45:38 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 9b270a66a5 CI-06: test_peakguard.py answered two of its checks with the wall clock
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m56s
`test_peakguard.py` is flaky on the required `checks / unit (pull_request)`
context. Reproduced, measured and removed - not widened, and nothing skipped:
the file still carries all of SAFETY-07 and SAFETY-25, and gains a check.

TWO MECHANISMS, both the control law's own gain `900 / remaining` applied to a
wall-clock gap this file never meant to have.

1. THE CROSS-TIME PROJECTION (the "one cycle of the intent form..." check).
   `_proj3` was a SECOND `PeakTracker.project(b3.p1.averager, datetime.now())`
   taken after the real cycle had already returned, and its result was compared
   against a floor decided from the FIRST projection - while the comment three
   lines above says both forms run "against the same frozen projection".
   `excess = 900 x (projected - ceiling) / remaining` moves at `excess /
   remaining` W/s, so at a 1500 W floor the 1.5 W tolerance bought exactly
   `remaining / 1000` seconds: 333 ms with 880 s left in the quarter and 6 ms
   with 10 s left (measured by bisection, probe in the PR). The gap between the
   two statements measured 12.7-39.5 ms over 26 instrumented runs, so the check
   was decided by WHERE IN THE QUARTER it ran, about `gap_ms / 900` of the time.
   FIX: `_recording_decide` keeps the Projection OBJECT the real cycle graded.
   Both forms are now decided from it, the clock is out of the comparison, and
   the tolerance is EXACT rather than 1.5 W. Measured on a real cycle: the
   delivered form re-decided from that object reproduces the controller's own
   floor to 0.000000000000 W, and the identity holds to 0.000000000000 W.
   It also gains a check - that re-decide now pins `_kw` as main.py's actual
   call rather than an approximation of it.

2. THE FIXTURE'S OWN ROOM (the three `wired_over_limit` checks named on the
   card: "the real cycle files the peak claim...", "...and the number written to
   the inverter is the guard's floor", "the STATUS PAGE row for a floor-limited
   guard..."). `range(0, span + 1, 5)` leaves 0-5 s of the open block uncovered
   by construction, and `excess` multiplies an uncovered second back up by
   `900 / remaining`:

       floor ~ want x (1 - uncovered/900) - net_w x uncovered / remaining

   Measured on this tree, shipped: at 12 s of remaining a fixture that asked for
   a 1500 W floor delivered 613 W (-59 %), and at 2 s the guard did not engage
   at all - which fails all three of those checks together. The four-attempt
   retry cannot help, because four attempts take ~40 ms and all land in the same
   dying quarter.
   FIX: one telegram stamped at `now` (which is what a real meter does and what
   the docstring already claimed), plus FIXTURE_ROOM_S - the helper waits out
   the tail of a quarter it cannot size a fixture in. 24 s is DERIVED from the
   1 % accuracy the helper promises, at this file's smallest fixture and the
   measured 0.1 s worst-case lag, not picked:
       net_w x lag / (remaining x want) <= 0.01 - lag/900
       remaining >= 3500 x 0.1 / (1500 x 0.00989) = 23.6 s
   Same probe after the fix: -0.3 % at 12 s, -0.5 % at 8 s, still engaged at 2 s.

NO TIMEOUT WAS WIDENED, no check skipped, no xfail. One tolerance was made
STRICTER (1.5 W -> exact) because removing the clock made exactness possible.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 19:40:34 +02:00
admin bbc903b2b4 Merge pull request 'PKG-06: bump 0.6.0 -> 0.7.0, because the schema changed and nobody bumped' (#55) from PKG-06-version-0.7.0 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 19:23:16 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d8e02ad3f8 PKG-06: bump 0.6.0 -> 0.7.0, because the schema changed and nobody bumped
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m2s
Six merges landed since 0.6.0 was deployed and the version never moved.
Disk and box both read 0.6.0, so `ha apps update` would have been a
NO-OP: Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, and the update path
installs `version_latest`, which cannot differ from `version` without a
bump. Found while pre-checking the deploy, not after it silently did
nothing.

⚠️ MINOR RATHER THAN PATCH, BECAUSE THE SCHEMA CHANGED. SAFETY-32 added
`bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` as a REQUIRED per-entry key on the `inverters`
roster - no trailing `?` - so a config declaring a roster and omitting it
on any entry is refused at startup. Verified against the deployed
2d025ee: the per-entry schema went from 6 keys to 7. Top-level options
and schema are unchanged at 63 each.

An install running `inverters: []` is unaffected, which is every
single-inverter install including the reference one: the flat
`bms_soc_floor` still describes the one pack. But CFG-04 recorded the
rule this follows - "a schema change without a bump is a schema nobody
reads" - and this is exactly that shape.

The CHANGELOG gains a 0.7.0 section listing the six merges by SHA. It
also records, rather than papers over, that 0.6.0 was never sectioned:
its content sits below the new heading because the earlier bump shipped
without cutting a section. Splitting it retroactively would mean guessing
a boundary; the deployed 0.6.0 is 2d025ee and the table says what is new
since it.

Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 18:38:41 +02:00
admin 4482cd8201 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-41: raise the clamp alarm's re-assert 30 s -> 150 s' (#52) from SAFETY-41-reassert into release/1.0 2026-09-05 18:31:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 3527c8a04c SAFETY-41: escalate a sustained engagement, so a runaway is never held
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m59s
Review found the case I asked it to construct, and it is not a corner
case. The rate limit alone DELAYS A RUNAWAY: a benign one-cycle clamp
that spends the budget, then a continuous §10.3-shaped runaway, held the
runaway's first notification for up to 140 s - one REASSERT_S minus a
cycle. On the live install, where ordinary railing spends the budget
essentially all the time, a runaway arriving during normal operation
would be delayed with near-certainty. That is the "benign noise
suppresses the bug signal" shape this module's docstring is written
against, and the family the first attempt at this card died of.

THE ESCALATION. An episode that has not yet spoken because an EARLIER,
unrelated episode spent the budget speaks anyway once it has engaged
SUSTAINED_CYCLES = 3 times in a row. The discriminator is run length and
the two populations genuinely differ: the live flood was runs of length
ONE (engage, de-assert, engage), while a runaway engages every cycle.

Measured, and it costs nothing it was protecting:
  live scatter flood (305 cycles, 1-in-6)   11 -> 11 notifications
  chatter 1-engaged/3-clean over 8000 s     50 -> 50 notifications
  pinned 900 s quarter (floor is 5)          6 ->  6 alarms
  runaway delay after a benign episode     140 s -> 10 s

⚠️ MY COUNTERFACTUAL CHECK COULD NOT FAIL FOR THE DEFECT IT NAMED, and
review caught that too. It read `ClampWatchdog().note(True, ...) is True`
- a FRESH object, which only exercises the `last_alarm is None` branch,
the trivially-true one. A fresh watchdog has no earlier episode to be
held back BY. It now SPENDS THE BUDGET FIRST: benign clamp, gap past
CLEAR_CYCLES, then a continuous runaway, and asserts the delay is well
under REASSERT_S. That is the third instance in this file of the family
recorded at line 216 and at the 224 s sweep, and it was guarding the most
safety-critical property in the change.

Also pinned: `last_alarm` SURVIVING the de-assert. Review built the
mutation - if the de-assert also refreshed it, chatter collapses from 50
notifications to 1 and the alarm never fires again, with the suite green.
That is the "alarm that never fires" class, a different bug from one that
fires later. Now caught.

Both new checks verified against the mutations they name: removing the
escalation -> 1 FAILED; refreshing last_alarm on de-assert -> 1 FAILED.

Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 18:13:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8790c4d38f SAFETY-41: rate-limit the RISING EDGE, which is where the flood came from
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m9s
Review falsified the first version of this change, and the correction is
the substance of it.

Raising REASSERT_S 30 -> 150 removed NONE of the owner's notifications.
The re-assert interval governs only the still-engaged path; the rising
edge fired unconditionally. At the measured ~5 s cycle the live pattern -
48 engagements in ~25 minutes, about one cycle in six - leaves ~25 s of
clean cycles between engagements, past CLEAR_CYCLES x 5 s = 15 s. So the
alarm DE-ASSERTED between almost every engagement and each one returned
as a fresh rising edge. Measured on the shipped class over that window:
48 episodes, 48 notifications at REASSERT_S = 30, and still 48 at 150.

The interval now bounds the NOTIFICATION RATE rather than the repeat rate
within one episode: `last_alarm` survives a de-assert, and a new episode
speaks only if the interval has elapsed. Same window afterwards: 51
episodes, 51 engagements, 11 notifications.

⚠️ NOTHING IS DROPPED, AND THE TWO PROPERTIES THAT MATTER ARE PINNED:
  - a PINNED loop still speaks 6 times in the 900 s billing quarter,
    against a floor of 5 (part 2, unchanged);
  - a rising edge from a COLD watchdog still fires IMMEDIATELY, so a
    runaway beginning from quiet is never held back by a budget spent on
    an earlier, unrelated episode. That check is the counterfactual and it
    is the half that would go red if the limit ignored elapsed silence.
Every engagement is still counted, every episode still increments, and
the action-log row is still written on every engaged cycle. The budget is
on notifications, never on evidence.

The new pin is written in wall-clock seconds and in the shape the field
produced, so it does not move when the constant does. Verified by
reverting the rising edge to unconditional: 2 checks go RED naming it.

Full suite: 21 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 17:06:29 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 1d393ced22 SAFETY-41: correct the comment, and fix the check it cites
Review found two false statements in the comment and one weak check. All
three are fixed here; the constant itself is unchanged at 150 s and was
never in question.

1. "That caps this constant at 900/5 = 180 s" was FALSE ABOUT THE CHECK IT
   CITED. test_clamp.py part 2 sweeps i = 0..899 and the rising edge at
   i=0 is free, so it measured `1 + floor(899/R)` - one alarm more than a
   real quarter earns. Measured: 224 s was GREEN across the whole suite.
   Anyone raising this to 200 s would have had a green board and a
   requirement quietly unmet - the same defect recorded at
   test_clamp.py:216, one notch weaker.

   The check now grades floor(QUARTER_S / REASSERT_S) directly, so it
   enforces the ceiling the comment claims for it. Verified: 150 PASS,
   180 PASS, 181 FAIL, 224 FAIL. 180 is also the true requirement edge -
   on the worst sliding 900 s window 180 earns 5 alarms and 181 earns 4.

2. The "60 cycles of the §10.3 runaway" note was attributed to this module
   and truncated. It is main.py:2479 and reads "60 cycles of the §10.3
   runaway produce 0 write-path engagements and 2 loop-side ones". Quoted
   in full, attributed correctly.

3. "48 engagements in 25 minutes" was left implying a pinned rail. It is
   roughly one cycle in six - real, and far above the 2-in-60 the guard
   was sized for, but not continuous. Restated, and labelled as a live-log
   reading rather than a measurement in this repo.

Also recorded: the 1500 W tuning derivation is in the OTHER repo
(admin/goodwe NOTES.md, "Simulated 2 kW load step (gain 0.6, clamp
1500)"), so this repo cannot corroborate it and a reader should not go
looking here; and MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5 is a test-local integer, not a spec
figure - the 900 s quarter is system-wide but the 5 is not, so the 180 s
ceiling rests on one number a test author chose.

Full suite: 20 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 16:53:46 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 3516947b5e SAFETY-41: raise the clamp alarm's re-assert 30 s -> 150 s
The owner reported the OUTPUT_CLAMP notification as a persistent
annoyance on the live install. It re-asserted every 30 s, all day.

⚠️ THIS IS A REGIME CHANGE, NOT A CHANGE OF MIND ABOUT THE ALARM. 30 s
was chosen when a loop-side engagement was rare - clamp.py's own note
records "60 cycles of the §10.3 runaway produce 2 loop-side engagements".
The live install produced 48 IN 25 MINUTES of ordinary operation, because
`max_w` is 5000 W where the loop's tuning was derived at a 1500 W clamp
(SAFETY-39). The integrator therefore reaches its bound constantly and
the alarm narrated it every 30 s. An alarm that speaks that often about
the normal case is how an operator learns to ignore the one that matters,
which is the exact failure clamp.py's docstring is written against.

⚠️ 150 s IS THE REQUIREMENT'S OWN EDGE WITH ONE STEP OF MARGIN, not a
comfort choice. test_clamp.py part 2 pins the cadence in WALL-CLOCK terms
rather than against this constant: a loop pinned on the rail must speak
at least MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5 times inside the 900 s quarter that bills
the capacity tariff. That caps the constant at 900/5 = 180 s. Measured:
  180 s -> 5 alarms per quarter (exactly the required 5, no margin)
  150 s -> 6 alarms per quarter
  300 s -> 3, and the floor check goes RED
180 s would sit on the boundary, so any later change to the firing logic
would tip it red for a reason unrelated to that change. The FLOOR is the
thing that must not move, and it does not.

⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO. It changes how often the alarm repeats. It does
NOT make the alarm correct: the message still calls the integrator bound
a BUG SIGNAL and still pairs a request from one moment with a `self.target`
read at another. That is SAFETY-40. And it does not stop the loop railing
in the first place; that is SAFETY-39. This is a stop-gap and says so at
the line.

Nothing was suppressed: every engagement is still counted, the action-log
row is unchanged, and the §10.3 runaway still raises the alarm - an
earlier attempt at this that split the alarm so only `clamped` notified
was REVERTED because test_clamp.py:398 proved it would have disabled
runaway detection entirely (a runaway presents as `i_clamped`, and
control.py:78-81 says `clamped` is unreachable on a default install).

Full suite: 20 passed, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 16:53:46 +02:00
admin 86eaef2517 Merge pull request 'TEL-07: a second MQTT device for inverter B, and A keeps the one it has' (#51) from TEL-07 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 15:51:54 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 26c5ee8adc TEL-07: a second MQTT device for inverter B, and A keeps the one it has
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m58s
MQTT discovery announced ONE device and hung every entity off one unique_id
prefix, so at two inverters B's per-unit telemetry had nowhere to go. It has
somewhere now, and not one entity that already exists moved.

⚠️ THE ASYMMETRY IS DELIBERATE. The first roster entry's per-unit rows are
announced on THE DEVICE IT ALREADY HAS; every later entry gets its own device,
via_device the controller. "One device per inverter" is tidier and is the change
that renames every entity on the live install - and because HA keeps the id it
composed at FIRST discovery, a rename produces a NEW entity beside a DEAD one:
the history stays behind and every dashboard, template and automation naming it
goes on pointing at a sensor that quietly stopped updating, including the three
live watchdog automations. The composed ids come out symmetric anyway
(sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power / ..._inverter_b_...), so the tidy
design's only real benefit is bought here without its cost.

  * four per-unit rows - setpoint, battery power, SoC, SAFETY-02 sign latch -
    announced only from a roster of two. At N=1 nothing is announced and
    nothing is published: no second device, no renamed entity, no added topic.
  * grid and p1_sample_age_s stay SITE-scoped and are announced ONCE, at every
    roster length 1-6. One P1, one grid connection, and p1_sample_age_s is a
    watchdog input - a second copy is a second answer to "is the meter fresh?".
  * inverter.roster_names() is the one answer to what the units are called,
    read by build_roster() and by the publisher, which must know the roster
    before a Controller exists because announcing happens on the CONNACK.
  * DECISIONS/TEL-07-second-mqtt-device.md records the two designs side by side.

VERIFIED BY DIFFING THE ANNOUNCED PAYLOADS, not by reading the code. The
release/1.0 baseline in test_mqtt.py was generated by running that commit's
module, not transcribed. Roster of one: 9 topics, 0 missing, 0 changed, 0 added.
Roster of two: 0 missing, 0 changed, 8 added.

MEASURED, NOT ASSERTED. Sixteen mutations through tools/mutation_run.sh; twelve
are in the file as a running table, each named with the property it breaks.
Three of those properties exist because the table found their ABSENCE - dropping
the unit from the state topic, moving `grid` into the per-unit set, and
`units=()` in main()'s publisher call were all GREEN on the first run, as was a
roster fallback naming two nameless entries `inverter-a`. Part 9 enumerates what
the file still cannot see, with sizes.

⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12). Every roster of two here
is SIMULATED, from the datasheet and serial in NOTES.md §1.1b. Nothing about B
has been measured and no entity described here has been seen on a broker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 14:14:53 +02:00
admin f72c48dbfd Merge pull request 'UX-01: translations and task ordering for the add-on Configuration tab' (#50) from UX-01 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 13:11:51 +02:00
Claude Opus 5 fef6ef20a4 UX-01: translate the add-on config, and order it by task
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m1s
The add-on had NO translations/ directory, so Home Assistant fell back to
rendering the raw option KEYS. An operator opening Configuration read
`unit_sign_disagree_w`, `saturation_cycles`, `integrator_max_w` - seventy of
them, in file order, with no description and no way to tell a constant derived
from 1890 closed-loop test runs from their own inverter's rating.

⚠️ PRESENTATION ONLY. Not one default, not one schema range and not one line of
behaviour moved. The 175 non-comment lines of config.yaml are byte-identical to
release/1.0's, reordered; the only comment lines that changed are the group
banners and five sentences whose "above"/"below" the reorder made false.

* translations/en.yaml and translations/nl.yaml: a name and a description for
  all 70 options and all 7 per-entry keys of the `inverters:` repeatable
  section. The Dutch is written for a Flemish homeowner - afname/injectie,
  kwartierpiek, capaciteitstarief - not transliterated from the English.
* ⭐ Every derived constant says WHERE IT CAME FROM and whether to touch it.
  `unit_sign_disagree_s` cites its 1890 closed-loop runs (SAFETY-30);
  `circulation_w` its 924 runs and the measured 400 W knee (SAFETY-31);
  `meter_freeze_s` its 2399 s capture (SAFETY-18); `bms_soc_floor` register
  0x0560. The two numbers that are the operator's - max_w and peak_cap_w - say
  "THIS IS YOUR NUMBER". `cycle_cost_threshold_eur`, which is neither, says it
  is an open product question (OPT-08).
* config.yaml reordered into task order in BOTH halves, comments carried with
  their keys: hardware -> meter -> ratings and limits -> tariff -> maintenance
  -> safety -> advanced.
  ⚠️ test_inverter.py:1788's trap is PRESERVED: the nested per-entry `max_w:`
  still precedes the flat one under `schema:`, and `inverters: []` still ships
  in the `options:` half. Moving the nested block below the flat one is a 1-byte
  edit; it was run and goes red in test_inverter.py and test_translations.py.
* tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section F MEASURES the result against
  ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 - Supervisor's own
  _read_app_translations(), its own UiOptions, and the frontend's label
  resolution transcribed from the shipped bundle - and prints every rendered row
  in both languages. `all cases passed`, exit 0.
* ⚠️ ONE MEASURED NEGATIVE RESULT, NOT GLOSSED: the per-entry keys inside the
  `inverters:` section still render RAW on frontend 20250925.1, because a
  list-of-objects goes to ha-selector-object and the converter sets no `label`
  and no `translation_key`. The `fields:` translations are shipped and validated
  - that is Supervisor's own shape for this - but this card does not claim they
  reach the screen. The `inverters` label and description do.
* test_translations.py: a translation naming a non-existent option, or an option
  with no translation, fails CI - both directions, both languages, top level and
  per entry. Mutation-tested BOTH WAYS: eleven in-process mutations each
  required to NAME the key they broke, plus a negative control; six more run on
  disk through the purge-and-re-read protocol. Two of the eleven are the ones
  that cost the WHOLE FILE rather than one label - an unrecognised top-level
  block, and a `network:` value that is not a string. Supervisor drops a file
  that fails SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS with only a log warning, so those silently
  return the entire tab to raw keys; neither is reachable through the
  `configuration:` coverage, which is why they were hunted for and closed.
* tools/translations_lint.py is the hand parser CI needs (no PyYAML in the
  add-on image) and the probe grades it, key by key and string by string,
  against Supervisor's own loader. It is strict and RAISES rather than skipping;
  nine malformed shapes prove it.

Full 20-file suite green (19 existing + test_translations.py).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 12:02:56 +02:00
admin 3993f9f32b Merge pull request 'SAFETY-32: bms_soc_floor per pack, rule 8 per unit' (#48) from SAFETY-32 into release/1.0 2026-09-05 08:10:51 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 19decf433f SAFETY-32 round 5: stop closing sites, build an instrument that finds its own scope
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m59s
Rounds 2, 3 and 4 each closed exactly the survivor they were handed and each time
the reviewer found the same shape one step over: the reduction, the call site, the
sibling argument, and now the sibling MODULE. Round 4's enumeration stopped at the
`Controller` class boundary; round 5's four blockers were reductions in validate.py,
over a list DERIVED from the roster three calls away from it. Closing four more sites
by hand would have produced a fifth rejection, so this round widens the instrument
instead and lets it enumerate.

⚠️ THE BLOCKERS ARE NOT EQUIVALENT MUTANTS - a safety refusal disappears, verified by
calling the shipped validator both ways on the real tree:

  roster max_w 5000 (inverter-a) beside 2000 (inverter-b), sign_disagree_w 3000
    clean                        -> 1 problem, "...max_w (inverter-b) is 2000 W, so the
                                    SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement watchdog can never fire"
    min(caps[:1])          +4 B  -> 0 problems. The site STARTS.
    caps_ix[:1]            +4 B  -> 0 problems.
  the SAME roster with the small cap FIRST (2000, 5000)
    clean                        -> 1 problem, naming inverter-a
    min(caps[-1:])         +5 B  -> 0 problems.

⚠️ AND THE ONE-ROSTER FIXTURE COULD NOT HAVE SEEN THAT. On [5000, 2000] the `[-1:]`
mutant still refuses, because last IS min there. A fixture of N members cannot separate
two reductions that agree on N members - which is why the behavioural half below is a
SET and not a roster.

THE INSTRUMENT (test_peakguard.py part 12j, widened past `Controller`)

Every `.py` under app/ is read off disk and parsed - NO MODULE IS NAMED IN THE CHECK -
and the roster is found by transitive closure from ONE seed, the `inverters` option key:
through returns, through lists ACCUMULATED in a loop over a roster (which is exactly
what `caps`, `roster` and `problems` are, and what round 4's rule could not express),
through attributes and properties, and THROUGH CALL ARGUMENTS, which is how it walks
into peakguard, arbiter, allocator, circulation, maintenance and store without being
told they exist. A slice of a roster stays a roster so a mutation cannot cut the taint;
an index is one unit and does not.

  183 roster reductions across 9 modules, out of 23 files parsed:
  main 96, allocator 24, validate 19, arbiter 14, circulation 10, maintenance 10,
  peakguard 4, inverter 3, store 3.  14 modules reduce over no roster at all.

⚠️ THE HAND-WRITTEN MODULE LIST WOULD HAVE BEEN WRONG IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. It named
watchdog.py, which reduces over no roster at all (SAFETY-30's sign watchdogs are
strictly per-unit), and omitted maintenance.py and store.py, which both do. A vacuous
claim about one module and no claim at all about two others - which is the argument for
computing the scope, made with data.

The pin rediscovers ALL FOUR blockers without being told where to look, and finds a
FIFTH beside them (validate.py:783, rule 5's own message) that no review round named.
Its counterfactual runs at two depths: every enumerated site's expression mutated with
each of the four cuts this card has been defeated by (183 x 4 = 732 spellings, all
reported), and `[:1]` written into app/validate.py at each blocker position with the
WHOLE analysis re-run over the mutated source.

THE SWEEP, AND THE NUMBER THAT MUST NOT BE QUOTED ALONE

All 183 sites mutated to `[:1]`, +4 B each, against the full 19-file suite in
goodwe-addon-ci (:ro, -B, fresh rsync per mutant, 0 .pyc before and after - a read-only
mount cannot write one): 183/183 RED. ⚠️ That is TAUTOLOGICAL on its own, because the
pin makes every slice red. So the 51 whose first red was test_peakguard.py were re-run
with the pin NEUTRALISED:

  145 of 183   a behavioural fixture separates the site from a slice of itself
   38 of 183   ONLY the structural claim. Behaviourally UNGRADED.

All 38 are listed by site with what a `[:1]` there would cost, in the DECISIONS record
and in part 12j itself: 15 are rows and counts on the operator's page, 3 are
`len(targets)` arithmetic beside a write path that IS graded, 6 are allocator internals
ALLOC-01 reaches but not with enough units to separate. NONE of the 38 is closed
behaviourally by this card and none is counted as covered.

THE BEHAVIOURAL HALF, because a shape pin grades an identity and never a meaning

test_validate.py grows a ROSTER SET for the three rules that reduce over
`unit_caps_indexed()`: widths 2, 3, 4, 5 with the one small cap at EVERY position,
14 rosters x 3 rules = 42 runs of the real validator, each asserting the refusal fires
AND names the unit the number came off. Beside it a COMPUTED family table of twelve
candidates - max, first, last, the mean, [:1], [-1:], [:2], [:3], [1:], [:-1], [::2] -
each compared against what the shipped validator actually answered on the same roster.
Only `min` agrees everywhere; a member no roster kills is printed as a NAMED SURVIVOR.

⚠️ A THIRD RULE WAS READING THE FLAT `max_w`, AND IT IS SAFETY-30's

Found by reading the three branches side by side, NOT by the pin - and said that way
because it is the shape of what the pin cannot see. `unit_sign_disagree_w` was graded
against `_number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)`, three lines under a branch that had already
stopped doing that. Both directions were measured before the fix:

  two 2000 W units + a leftover `max_w: 5000` + unit_sign_disagree_w 3000 -> 0 problems.
  The site started, the status page said `armed`, and the per-inverter watchdog could
  not trip on EITHER unit. Identical sentence to the blocker, one branch over.
  two 5000 W units with NO flat key -> REFUSED against a 2000 W default the operator
  never wrote, for a threshold both units can reach.

It takes the same `weakest` the branch above takes and names the same unit. At a roster
of one `unit_caps()` is `[max_w]`, so the shipped single-inverter refusal is the same
comparison, the same boundary and the same sentence.

MUTATION PROOF (each: bytecode purged and counted 0 before and 0 after, the edit
re-read FROM DISK with the new text present and the old absent, byte delta printed)

  B1  validate min(caps)     -> min(caps[:1])        +4 B  RED test_validate.py
  B2  validate min(caps)     -> min(caps[-1:])       +5 B  RED test_validate.py
  B3  validate caps_ix       -> caps_ix[:1]          +4 B  RED test_validate.py
  B4  validate rule 6 min    -> min(caps_ix[-1:])    +5 B  RED test_validate.py
  B5  validate rule 5 msg    -> min(caps_ix[:1])     +4 B  RED test_validate.py
  B6  validate rule 5b msg   -> min(caps_ix[-1:])    +5 B  RED test_validate.py
  B7  CONTROL: weakest -> max(0.0, weakest)         +10 B  GREEN, as intended
  R3a peakguard max(floors)  -> min(floors)           0 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R3b peakguard max(floors)  -> max(floors[-2:])     +5 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R3c main call site packs   -> self.packs[:2]       +4 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R4a main pack_floor_soc    -> vals[:2]             +4 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R4b main pack_floor_soc    -> vals[-2:]            +5 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R4c main pack_floor_soc    -> vals[:3]             +4 B  RED test_peakguard.py
  R4d main cycle() any(...)  -> self.inverters[:1]   +4 B  RED test_watchdog.py

B1-B6 are caught by the BEHAVIOURAL set in test_validate.py, before the pin is reached.
B7 is a deliberate no-op control: `max(0.0, weakest)` is `weakest` for weakest > 0, and
it stays green, so the battery is not merely red for everything.

R3a is a ZERO-byte delta, so the shipped function was called both ways as well:
  packs floors [15.0, 30.0, 20.0], peak_soc_floor 15
  binding_soc_floor(...) = 30.0   the 0-byte mutant would answer 15.0   (+15.0 pp)
  -> the site would discharge to 15 % while pack-b's own BMS cuts out at 30 %.

⚠️ PRODUCTION IS DEGENERATE ON THE FLOOR AXIS. SPIKE-04: pack A and pack B BOTH floor
at 10 %, so a differing floor exists ONLY in the fixtures. That is the argument for
keeping them, not for simplifying them - collapsing them deletes the only data in this
repository that can see the reduction at all. Restated in config.yaml's example, in the
probe and in the fixtures.

⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12). Every second-unit figure here -
4600 W FROM ITS DATASHEET, 15 % illustrative, the whole roster SET - is SIMULATED and
labelled. Only inverter A's 10 % is read off hardware.

REBASED onto 67e649a. Two conflicts with SPIKE-04a, both in the blocks this card had
rewritten (config.yaml's roster example and the probe's C/D sections). Resolved to carry
BOTH claims, and the probe was RE-RUN rather than hand-merged: `all cases passed` on
ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0, transcript updated with the
date. MUTATION.md habit 8 - a committed transcript stitched together out of two runs is
not a measurement.

Suite: 19/19 green in goodwe-addon-ci, mounted :ro, bytecode purged and verified 0
before and after. CI-06: test_peakguard.py run four times in isolation, green each time
(288 ok lines); test_validate.py three times, green each time.

MUTATION.md gains habits 12 and 13: build the instrument once the same shape has been
found twice AND make it discover its own scope, and say what the instrument cannot see
with sizes in the same breath.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 05:36:16 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 8beba0a3e7 SAFETY-32 round 4: the same family at the SIBLING ARGUMENT, and the family enumerated
Rounds 2 and 3 hardened the FLOOR axis - the max inside binding_soc_floor(),
the roster handed to it, Controller.packs, pack_floor_pct()'s conjunction.
peakguard.decide() is handed a SECOND reduction over the same roster beside it,
soc=self.pack_floor_soc, and peakguard.py's own docstring names the two as a
pair. Three rewrites of Controller.pack_floor_soc were green across all 19 files
on 52380c0 and again after the rebase onto 3934ad7:

    min(float(v) for v in vals)  ->  ... vals[:2]   +4 bytes
                                 ->  ... vals[-2:]  +5 bytes
                                 ->  ... vals[:3]   +4 bytes

while [:1], [-1:], [1:], [:-1], max() and the mean were all red. The suite's
separating power on the SoC axis stopped at exactly N=2 - the state the floor
axis was in before round 3.

It changes a real answer: three packs at 50/60/11 %, emptiest THIRD, answers
11.0 shipped and 50.0 mutated. The site is then graded for discharge PERMISSION
against a pack 39 points fuller than the emptiest and spends a pack its own BMS
stops, through sim/inject.py which runs no validator rule.

Round 3's machinery transfers directly. New test_peakguard.py part 12i:
- six REAL Controller.cycle()s, emptiest pack at every position of a three-pack
  roster and both positions of a two-pack one, observable read off
  PeakDecision.soc; cut-outs held flat so the floor axis cannot move the answers
- computed slice and non-slice tables, printed, red naming any live survivor
- a LENGTH SWEEP over the real property, 78 rosters of 1..12 real inverters,
  closing head/tail widths 1-11 and asserting width 12 is unreached
- a NONE-GUARD sweep over the same 78
- THREE exact structural pins: the vals comprehension iterates the bare
  self.inverters, and both any() and min() reduce the whole vals - closing every
  slice width at every roster length, which no bounded fixture can

SPIKE-04: pack B is 4 x Dyness DL5.0C, DoD 90 -> floor 10 % [FROM DATASHEET AND
SERIAL - inverter B does not exist and nothing about it is measured]. Pack A is
DoD 90 -> 10 % and that one IS measured. So production is DEGENERATE on the
floor axis and a differing floor exists ONLY in the fixtures - which is the
argument for keeping them, not for simplifying them. Recorded in CHANGELOG and
DECISIONS so nobody later collapses them to one number. The SoC axis has no such
degeneracy.

AND THE FAMILY, not the member. Every reduction over self.inverters/self.packs
in Controller was found from the AST and mutated to a slice against the full
suite. Eighteen were already graded. FOUR were not, and three of them are
SAFETY-30's, all any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in self.inverters), each +4 bytes
and green across 19 files - because the only fixture that reached them was a
roster of ONE, where self.inverters[:1] IS self.inverters:

- cycle()'s stale-input hold: a LATCHED unit must take the roster past it or its
  failsafe SET stops being re-filed the moment a poll is missed
- publish()'s status vocabulary: a site holding an inverter at 0 W published
  "running"
- status_payload()'s banner: the one headline on the page

New test_watchdog.py part 8 grades all three with the latch at EACH position
plus a no-latch counterfactual. New part 12j pins all 26 roster comprehensions
in Controller to iterating the roster WHOLE, so a reduction added over a slice
anywhere in the class is red on the line it is written, with no fixture needed.

Two rows reported OPEN rather than closed: _grade_store_migration()'s second
disjunct (now red on 12j, argued equivalent because a unit tripped at startup
implies its namespaced key is set) and cycle()'s undeliverable-unit LOG LINE,
where sorted(...)[:1] is still green - it truncates names in one event message;
the refusal itself is a different expression and is graded.

MUTATION.md gains habits 10 and 11: a fixture of N members cannot separate two
reductions that agree on N, and mutate the SIBLINGS of anything you harden.

No shipped behaviour changed - tests and documentation only. 19/19 green;
all three named survivors and all round-3 mutations verified RED.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 03:01:57 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a4c95f83ce SAFETY-32 round 3: a fixture of N packs cannot separate reductions that agree on N
Both blockers were the recurring defect sitting inside the fix written to close
it: a check whose TEXT claims more than its FIXTURE can observe. Both survived a
green 19-file suite on 8501e05.

  max(floors) -> max(floors[-2:])   +5 bytes.  12c2's only counterfactual raised
  the LAST pack, and every window ending at the roster's end follows the last
  pack. The check said "the reduction reads every entry"; the data reached "it
  reads the last entry".

  self.packs -> self.packs[:2]      +4 bytes.  All three 12g runs drove a TWO-pack
  roster, where [:2] IS the roster. The check said "what is reduced is the ROSTER
  and not a POSITION in it"; the true claim was the narrower "no SINGLE-POSITION
  slice passes all three runs".

The prose is cut back to what the old data reaches, and new data added for the
rest. No app/ file is touched - app/peakguard.py and app/main.py are byte-identical
to 8501e05.

12c2 - the pure function:
  * a ROSTER SET: the same four simulated cut-outs with the deepest moved to each
    of the four positions.
  * a computed FAMILY TABLE of fourteen rewrites, printed, with the roster that
    kills each. A member with an empty kill list takes the check RED naming it.
  * a LENGTH SWEEP: 78 rosters, lengths 1-12, deepest at every position of each.
    Closes every head window max(floors[:w]) and tail window max(floors[-w:]) of
    width 1-11 in one property.

12g - the call site:
  * _floor_reaching_decide() takes *floors; extra units join through the same
    second_inverter() hook.
  * THREE-pack runs with the deep cut-out at index 0, 1 and 2. Every positional
    slice of a three-pack roster drops a position, and the run whose deep pack
    sits there answers the option where the roster answers the cut-out.
  * a POSITIONAL-SLICE TABLE computed against the REAL Controller.packs each of
    the six cycles ran and the REAL PeakDecision.soc_floor it produced.
  * an EXACT STRUCTURAL PIN on the roster argument's identity. Not the substring
    test round 2 removed: "self.packs" in expr is TRUE of every slice;
    ast.unparse(arg) == "self.packs" is FALSE of all of them.

THE GENERAL LAW, and why the pin is there: a fixture of N packs cannot separate
two reductions that agree on N packs, and the regress does not terminate in a
fixture. [:1] needed two packs, [:2] three, [:3] four. This round's own battery
found self.packs[:3] (+4) and self.packs[-3:] (+5) surviving all six behavioural
runs; the structural pin is what closes them, and one more pack would only have
moved the hole.

Battery: 46 mutations over the reduction, the call site, Controller.packs and
pack_floor_pct()'s conjunction. Bytecode purged and counted 23 -> 0 for each.
43 red, 3 survivors, all three recorded:
  max(floors[:12]) / max(floors[-12:])  NOT CAUGHT - needs a 13-pack roster,
                                        reported with its size, row 27.
  max(set(floors))                      EQUIVALENT - max is duplicate-invariant.
(list(reversed(self.packs)) is equivalent too and is red on the structural pin.)

In-process mutation rows 24-27 record all of it, including the not-caught one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 03:01:57 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 ffbabea8ce SAFETY-32 fix round: grade the reduction on packs whose floors DIFFER
AC 6 was not met for the reduction main.py actually hands decide(). The
reviewer removed the per-pack grading twice and the 19-file suite stayed green
both times. No shipped behaviour changes here - app/ is untouched. What changes
is what observes it.

WHY BOTH SURVIVED, and it is this repository's recurring defect landing on this
card's own Decision 2: under any rule-8-valid config every pack's
pack_floor_pct() equals peak_soc_floor, so `floors` is a list of IDENTICAL
numbers and max/min/first/last are four spellings of one answer. The only check
using a cut-out ABOVE the EMS floor - 12c's `_n1_deep` - ran on a roster of ONE,
where every reduction agrees. So no check ever evaluated binding_soc_floor() on
two packs whose floors differ. And the degeneracy is not a defence: this PR's own
argument ("unreachable is a claim about today's rule ordering, and
validate_startup_config() is also sim/inject.py's entry point") justifies writing
the reduction and equally obliges grading it.

  * test_peakguard.py part 12c2 - NEW. binding_soc_floor() on a roster whose
    per-pack floors ALL DIFFER: four SIMULATED cut-outs 30/25/40/35 %, each
    strictly above peak_soc_floor, so max (40), min (25), first (30), last (35)
    and the mean (32.5) are five different numbers and the extremes sit at
    INTERIOR roster positions. Two packs structurally cannot separate those -
    there max==last and min==first - and neither can three; four is the smallest
    roster that can. Precondition is its own check (habit 1); the counterfactual
    raises ONE pack - the last, neither extreme - past the old maximum and the
    answer follows (habit 7); peak_soc_floor is then lifted above every cut-out
    to grade the other side of the conjunction.
  * test_peakguard.py part 12g - REWRITTEN as behaviour (habit 4). The old
    assertion was `"self.packs" in <the unparsed call site>`, which `self.packs[:1]`
    still satisfies. It now drives REAL Controller.cycle()s on a two-pack roster,
    both packs at the same SoC, and reads PeakDecision.soc_floor - the argument,
    echoed back by the shipped decide(). The cut-outs are the only thing varied,
    and the SAME PAIR is carried in BOTH ORDERS.
  * ⚠️ TWO MORE SURVIVORS, found by this round's own battery and recorded rather
    than quietly repaired. (a) The first cut of 12g varied only pack B's cut-out,
    so `self.packs[-1:]` (+5 bytes) agreed with the roster on both runs and stayed
    green across all 19 files; the swapped pair closes it, and between the two
    directions no single-position slice passes all three runs. (b)
    binding_soc_floor()'s EMPTY-roster branch rewritten to `return None`
    (-43 bytes) was green too - a defensive branch nothing in the suite reached.
    Both directions of it are pinned now.
  * wired_over_limit() gained a prepare(ctl) hook, inside its retry loop so every
    attempt grades the same site.
  * In-process mutation rows 22, 22b and 23 record all four survivors.

Nine further source mutations went through the harness on the fixed tree
(binding_soc_floor -> floors[0] / floors[-1], pack_floor_pct conjoining with
min, pack_permissions grading against packs[0], `any` -> `all` on the unknown
floor, Controller.packs reversed, decide(soc=) taking inverters[0].soc, and the
two survivors above). Seven were red on first run; the two survivors are now red
as well. Three of the nine have a ZERO byte delta and still went red, which is
the direction stale bytecode cannot fabricate - and the harness purged anyway.

MANDATORY PROOF, all in the CI image over a tree rsynced to a plain path and
bind-mounted :ro, bytecode entry count printed before and after the purge:
each of the four mutations now takes test_peakguard.py RED, and the unmutated
tree is 19/19 green (twice, plus test_peakguard.py five times in isolation -
card CI-06's flake did not reappear). The zero-byte one was proved to have RUN rather than
assumed: dis.get_instructions LOAD_GLOBALs were [float, pack_floor_pct, any,
min] and binding_soc_floor() returned 25.0 on the 12c2 roster where the shipped
code returns 40.0.

No measurement of inverter B appears anywhere. It does not physically exist.
Every second-pack and fourth-pack figure added here is SIMULATED and labelled at
its definition; only inverter A's 10 % is read off hardware. No hardware was
touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 03:01:57 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 f9e7fbf86d SAFETY-32: bms_soc_floor per pack, rule 8 per unit
`bms_soc_floor` describes A BATTERY, not a site. At two packs of different
models the cut-outs differ, and one number for both graded the shallower pack
against the deeper one's BMS - so a site with cut-outs of 10 % and 30 % under
`peak_soc_floor: 20` STARTED, and the guard would command a forced discharge
that pack B's BMS, not the operator's floor, is the thing that stops. That is
rule 8's own failure mode, reached through rule 8.

Scoped to the card's third bullet, per its PM PROOFREAD: the aggregate
anti-windup (DEV-02) and per-instance `achievable_w` (CFG-04) were verified as
already shipped and are untouched.

* config.yaml: `bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` REQUIRED per `inverters:` entry.
  Nothing is inherited; the flat key stays the single-inverter shape's own
  cut-out. A per-entry DEFAULT was declined - a default is one number for every
  pack, which is this card's defect - and the decision is recorded.
* inverter.py: `Inverter.bms_soc_floor`; an entry that states none gets None,
  not a borrowed number and not 0.0 (the most permissive value the key has).
* peakguard.py: `Pack`, `pack_floor_pct()`, `pack_permissions()`,
  `binding_soc_floor()`. `discharge_permitted()` is unchanged and is still the
  one place the question is answered.
* validate.py: `unit_bms_floors_indexed()` carries the ROSTER index; rule 8
  grades EVERY unit and NAMES the one it refuses. Graded with the offender
  SECOND and with the same two numbers in the other order.
* main.py: `Controller.packs`; `decide(soc_floor=...)` is the per-pack
  reduction of the same option; the floor-limited notification names the pack
  that stopped the site. `pack_floor_soc` - the emptiest pack, and its
  None-on-missing behaviour - is untouched.
* tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py: RE-RUN and repaired. The required key broke
  §C and left §D printing PASS on a refusal about a different key. §D is now an
  isolated counterfactual over an accepted merged baseline, one key varied,
  asserting the key name. `all cases passed` on 2026.08.0.

Stated rather than hidden: under any config rule 8 accepts the per-pack FLOOR
reduces to `peak_soc_floor` for every pack. The reduction is written for
`unit_caps_indexed()`'s reason and graded on both sides - 1775 rule-8-valid
pairs answer the option, the pair rule 8 refuses answers the cut-out.
`peak_soc_floor` is still one number for the site, so the "deeper pack
needlessly withheld" half is filed as an open question, not closed.

Full 19-file suite green. Twelve source mutations through
tools/mutation_run.sh: eleven red, one argued survivor. The battery also found
`_flat_bms_floor()` defaulting in two places, each covering for the other.

No measurement of inverter B appears anywhere: it does not exist yet. Every
second-pack figure is simulated and labelled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-05 03:01:57 +02:00
admin 67e649ad6b Merge pull request 'SPIKE-04a: inverter B is 4600 W FROM ITS DATASHEET, and the three documented copies are pinned' (#49) from SPIKE-04a into release/1.0 2026-09-05 02:55:24 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a9993aeda2 SPIKE-04a: inverter B is 4600 W FROM ITS DATASHEET, and the copies are pinned
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m51s
The desk half of SPIKE-04. No control behaviour changes; this is documentation
and the check that stops it drifting again.

Three places stated inverter B's rating - config.yaml's commented roster
example, DOCS.md's, and tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py's "a blob an operator
would POST" - and all three said 3000 W, a number nobody had measured or read
off anything. The owner supplied B's model and serial on 2026-09-04: a GoodWe
GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, max charging and discharging power
4600 W. Serial characters 6-8 are `ESU`, platform 105 / AA55, so SPIKE-01 does
not gate this site. All three copies now read 4600.

⚠️ 4600 W IS FROM A DATASHEET AND IS NOT A MEASUREMENT, and the one ambiguity
is recorded rather than guessed. The datasheet prints it under BATTERY INPUT
DATA, so it is probably DC, while max_w is graded against 0x0518 - the
inverter's own AC power. If it is DC the AC ceiling is nearer 4324 W. Neither
reading is written in as fact; SAFETY-20's min(max_w, dev_max) already bounds
it correctly under either, once dev_max is read off the unit, so `max_w: 4600`
is what an operator should configure today. goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b carries the
full record with the date and the method on every figure.

A NEW CHECK, BECAUSE A DOCUMENTATION FIX WITHOUT ONE DRIFTS AGAIN.
test_validate.py now pins all three documented rosters: findable, in agreement,
and equal to 4600 - with an explicit len(...) == 3 guard so that a regex which
stopped matching cannot leave "they all agree" green on the two sites still
read. It also grades the PROVENANCE beside the number (the datasheet, the
0x0518 it is graded against, and the 4324 W the DC reading would make it)
WITHIN 2500 characters of the roster rather than file-wide.

⚠️ The first version of that provenance check searched whole files and was
ALREADY VACUOUS on two of them: 0x0518 appeared once in config.yaml and once in
DOCS.md before this card, for unrelated reasons, so `"0x0518" in src` was green
no matter what happened next to B's rating. That is a check whose data cannot
reach the failure it names, in the file that exists to complain about them. It
is fixed, and the window is what fixes it - deleting the caveat beside the
number now goes red even where the same token survives elsewhere in the file.
The windowed version immediately found that the DOCS.md caveat did not name
0x0518 at all; DOCS.md now says it.

Four mutations, bytecode purged and counted at 0 before and after each, all
RED (two of them 0-byte deltas that change a printed answer):
  M1  probe's operator blob 4600 -> 3000        0 B   RED (value + agreement)
  M2  DOCS.md's DC/AC caveat deleted         -157 B   RED (provenance)
  M3  config.yaml alone 4600 -> 4324            0 B   RED (agreement)
  M4  probe entity renamed, regex finds nothing       RED (the vacuity guard)
Restored, green again. The probe itself was re-run against Supervisor
2026.08.0's own AppOptions validator with the 4600: all cases passed, exit 0.

⚠️ THE TEST FIXTURES KEEP 3000 W ON PURPOSE AND NOW SAY WHY AT THE LINE.
test_inverter.py, test_maintenance.py, test_peakguard.py and test_watchdog.py
build a second inverter at 3000 W against A's 5000 W. The only property those
checks consume is that B's number is unmistakably not A's, and the real pair is
a 400 W gap - narrower than slew_w, inside the range where an off-by-one-unit
bug and ordinary control arithmetic produce indistinguishable numbers.
Collapsing them onto the real values would buy realism those checks do not use
and cost them their separating power, which is exactly what test_peakguard.py's
own §10g PRECONDITION exists to prevent. Their comments no longer call 3000 W a
hypothesis about B's rating; they call it illustrative, and not a placeholder
either - the placeholder era ended on 2026-09-04.

Also recorded in the changelog for the cards that own them: 94 % battery-to-AC
=> ~88 % round trip => ~360 W burned continuously to circulate 3 kW, which is
the number SAFETY-31 argues its threshold from without having one; < 13 W night
self-consumption per unit, which nothing accounts for; and the A/B asymmetry in
opposite directions (~33 % more energy, ~8 % less power), which means MAINT-05's
12 h drain timeout was derived on A and should be re-checked against B.

⚠️ Honest survivors:
- goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b, where all of this is actually recorded, is graded by
  nothing here. Rewriting its 16 occurrences of 4600 to 3000 and turning every
  FROM DATASHEET label into MEASURED ON THE UNIT leaves all 19 files GREEN.
  This CI cannot fetch admin/goodwe - private, and GITHUB_TOKEN is minted for
  this repository only, as .gitea/workflows/checks.yml already states - so the
  cross-repo check is not buildable here.
- No check can see whether 4600 is the RIGHT number. Everything above pins a
  datasheet reading against itself. Only the bench half of SPIKE-04 can say
  whether the unit agrees, and the DC-vs-AC ambiguity is the live example.
- The constant is still named B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS in four test files, which
  reads as a hypothesis about B's rating when it is now an illustrative
  fixture. It is left alone deliberately: renaming ~20 sites across
  test_peakguard.py and test_inverter.py would collide hard with the open
  SAFETY-32 pull request, which rewrites 1255 lines of the first. The comment
  directly above each definition says what the value is and is not.

Suite: 19/19 green in goodwe-addon-ci, mounted :ro, bytecode purged and
verified 0 before and after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 22:19:31 +02:00
admin 3934ad7ea5 Merge pull request 'MAINT-05: one recalibration per pack, and only one pack moves power at a time' (#47) from MAINT-05 into release/1.0 2026-09-04 21:39:25 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 905b6fd2b3 MAINT-05 fix round 2: the refusal has to survive the NEXT start, and both marker guards have to be visible
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m14s
REJECTED because the fix round's own load-bearing sentence was FALSE, and the
whole suite was blind to that. `_verify_moves()` produced the red the reviewer
reproduced - that half stood - but DECISIONS §2 claimed "`ok` gates the marker,
so a misdirected migration is not stamped and the next start runs it again ...
a re-run is recoverable". THE REFUSAL LASTED EXACTLY ONE START.

MEASURED, Controller level, ONE persisted store, roster ["garage","shed"], flat
last_completed 2026-08-07, call site still handing `inverter-a` on both starts:

    construction 1: ok=False misdirected=4 moved=4 kept=0   marker=<absent>
    construction 2: ok=True  misdirected=0 moved=0 kept=4   marker=1
    history parked under unit/inverter-a/...; marker stamped after ONE restart.

WHY. `_verify_moves()` graded only `rep.moved`. On start 2 the same wrong call
site finds the four keys already present, so rule 1 routes every one of them to
`rep.kept`, `rep.moved` is EMPTY, the roster loop iterates over nothing,
`misdirected` is empty and `ok` is True. Start 3 then takes the
`from_version >= MAINT_SCHEMA_VERSION` early return FOREVER - including after
the call site is fixed. Loud-and-recoverable became silent-and-permanent after
one restart: the exact state store.py's header says must never happen, reached
by the fix written to prevent it.

WHY THE CHECK MISSED IT - the recurring defect, this time INSIDE the remedy.
Part 9b's recovery check was `migrate_maint_keys(_m5, ROSTER[0], ROSTER)` - the
CORRECTED name. It measures recovery along the one path where the operator has
ALREADY fixed the bug. Nothing in the 19 files called `migrate_maint_keys()`
twice with the SAME WRONG `unit`. The check was true and passed for the wrong
reason.

WHAT CHANGED

1. app/store.py `_verify_moves()` grades `set(rep.moved) | set(rep.kept)`.
   Sound by construction: every entry in both lists is a `unit_key(unit,
   legacy)` built from the SAME `unit` argument, so grading `kept` grades the
   same namespace decision `moved` does. A correct call site's `kept` entries
   sit under a roster name and pass; a wrong one cannot launder its namespace by
   having already written it. `migrate_unit_keys()` passes `roster=None` and
   returns before the loop, so it is untouched.

2. test_maintenance.py part 9c - THE CHECK THAT WAS MISSING. Two starts, SAME
   wrong unit, ONE store: the marker is still withheld on the second, the
   refusal names the same roster, the flat history is still there to recover
   from, and a third start with the CORRECTED name still gets a run (which a
   stamped marker would have made impossible). Its PRECONDITION asserts the
   SHAPE of the second report - `moved` empty, `kept` full - so it cannot
   quietly revert to grading 9b's path. Counterfactual beside it: the same two
   calls with the right name are accepted, then skipped as `already at schema`.

3. test_maintenance.py part 9d - THE OTHER GUARD ON THE SAME LINE, and a
   survivor nothing in the repository could see. `if rep.ok:` is
   `not lost and not misdirected`; every check that reached the marker did so on
   a store whose `kept` was empty, so

       if rep.ok:        ->      if rep.ok or rep.kept:        (+12 B)

   stamped the marker on a migration that LOST A MONTH OF HISTORY - defeating
   the older, settled `lost` guard as well as the new one - and ALL 19 SUITES
   WERE GREEN on it (measured at 65cddf3, purged, :ro). 9d's fixture is the one
   shape that separates the guards: two keys already namespaced (`kept`
   non-empty, the mutant's `or` fires) and two whose write the store drops
   (`lost` non-empty), `misdirected` empty throughout.

4. FOUND HERE AND CLOSED: THE SAME MUTATION ONE FUNCTION UP. `migrate_unit_keys()`
   - SAFETY-02's LATCH migration - gates its own marker the same way, and every
   check that reached it ran on a store with an empty `kept`. `if rep.ok or
   rep.kept:` at store.py:307 SURVIVED ALL 19 FILES. It stamps `schema_version`
   on a migration that DROPPED THE LATCH: the guard is off, the file still reads
   `sign_tripped: true`, and the store now says the migration finished, so the
   next start skips the one thing that would re-arm it. test_inverter.py part 10
   now drops the `sign_tripped` write BESIDE an already-namespaced
   `sign_reason`, with the accepted-baseline counterfactual. No source change -
   the shipped gate was right; nothing could see it. Mutation table 34 -> 35.

5. DECISIONS/MAINT-05 §2 CORRECTED. The paragraph that stated the false
   guarantee now states what was measured, why grading `moved` alone could not
   hold, and why the union is sound. §7 records the marker-gate hole found in
   `migrate_unit_keys()` and that it was closed. MUTATION.md gains habit 9 -
   "exercise a refusal a SECOND time with the SAME wrong input, not the
   corrected one" - and two survey rows.

MUTATION LEDGER - 11 mutations, ALL RED on the final tree, every run on a fresh
copy with the bytecode cache purged (entry count printed before and after) and
the tree mounted :ro so none could be written. Two were survivors BEFORE this
commit and both are recorded as such. Full transcript on the PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 19:40:51 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 65cddf35f1 MAINT-05 fix round: grade the migration against the ROSTER, not against the name it was handed
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m47s
REJECTED because a survivor undoes AC 5, and it survived for the recurring
reason: two fixture values that must be distinguishable were EQUAL.

THE SURVIVOR. app/main.py:282 mutated from `self.inverters[0].name` to `UNIT_A`
left the full 19-file suite green. `inverter.UNIT_A == "inverter-a"`, and every
two-pack fixture in test_maintenance.py named its first roster entry
"inverter-a" - so the two expressions were the same string in every check that
existed. main.py's own comment made the distinction load-bearing and nothing in
the repository could see whether that comment was true.

THE FAILURE IS REAL. `build_roster()` names a declared roster's entries from the
config and numbers a nameless one POSITIONALLY (`inverter-1`), so "inverter-a"
is not even the fallback. On ["garage","shed"] with a flat last_completed of
2026-08-07 the mutant migrates into unit/inverter-a/, pack 0 reads back None,
and both packs come up believing they have never been recalibrated.

AND IT FAILED SILENTLY, which was the worse half: `_verify_moves()` read back
the keys it had just WRITTEN, under the namespace it had just been HANDED, was
satisfied, and MAINT_SCHEMA_KEY was stamped - so the next start skipped the
migration too. A postcondition that reads back the namespace it was handed
cannot detect being handed the wrong one.

WHAT CHANGED

1. THE POSTCONDITION IS GRADED AGAINST THE ROSTER. `_verify_moves()` takes the
   names the MACHINES read and reports a namespace that is not among them as
   `misdirected` - a new, differently-named failure from `lost`:
     * `lost` is "the store took the write and dropped it" - a storage fault,
       with a harmless-default case (a dropped `last_completed: None` loses
       nothing, because absent and never-recalibrated are the same statement);
     * `misdirected` is "the store did exactly as it was told, by a caller that
       was wrong". There is no harmless-default version of it - a write nobody
       reads is not information whatever its value - so it fails `ok` alone.
   `ok` gates the marker, so a misdirected migration is NOT stamped and the next
   start re-runs it. Asymmetric on purpose: a re-run is recoverable (rule 1
   makes it a no-op, rule 2 left the flat keys to recover from), a silent skip
   is not. Part 9b MEASURES the recovery rather than asserting it.

2. `migrate_maint_keys()` TAKES THE ROSTER IN PLACE OF AN `n_units` COUNT. The
   count was `len(self.inverters)` at the only call site, so the roster carries
   it, and a count beside the names is a second opinion about how many packs
   there are.

3. THE FIXTURES CAN NOW REACH THE FAILURE THEY NAME. Parts 9 and 11 run on
   ["garage","shed"], each behind a PRECONDITION check that the first name is
   not UNIT_A - so an edit that makes them equal again goes red instead of
   making the claims vacuous. Part 11's fixture date is relative to `now`, not
   a literal, so "history preserved" and "history lost" cannot converge as the
   file ages past `interval_days`.

MUTATION LEDGER - all red, purged tree, none at +0 B, full detail on the PR:
   M1  main.py  inverters[0].name -> UNIT_A            -16 B  4 checks red
   M2  store.py drop `roster=names` from _verify_moves -14 B  5 checks red
   M3  store.py drop the misdirected.append            -37 B  5 checks red
   M4  store.py ok: drop `and not self.misdirected`    -25 B  3 checks red
   M5  fixture  garage -> inverter-a (the trap itself)  +4 B  5 checks red
   M6  store.py parts[1] -> parts[-1]                   +1 B  1 check red

FOUND AND NOT FIXED - `migrate_unit_keys()` HAS THE SAME HOLE AND IT IS A LATCH.
It runs BEFORE `build_roster()` (each Inverter restores its latch in its
constructor), so it is handed the constant UNIT_A with no roster to grade
against. On a declared roster a pre-DEV-02 `sign_tripped: true` lands under
unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped, which no unit reads - and
`_grade_store_migration()`, whose whole job is to re-arm exactly this, is
DEFEATED BY THE KEY THE DEFECT WROTE: its "is anything namespaced latched" test
is satisfied by the misdirected value itself. Measured, with the flat-config
counterfactual, and pinned as a running check (test_maintenance.py part 13)
whose assertions state the WRONG behaviour on purpose. It wants its own card:
the remedy is in inverter.py and SAFETY-02's semantics, and a silent expansion
into a safety latch is how a rejected PR becomes a broken one.

Suite: 19/19 PASS, purged tree, bind-mounted :ro in goodwe-addon-ci.
No hardware was touched; every fixture here is SIMULATED and pack B's 3000 W
remains a marked hypothesis.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 16:18:34 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 1aef19e995 MAINT-05: one recalibration per pack, and only one pack moves power at a time
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m48s
§12's monthly cycle drains a pack to empty and refills it to true its coulomb
counter. There was exactly one `Maintenance` and one un-namespaced history, so
at two packs only the first was ever recalibrated - and nothing prevented the
cycle draining pack A while the loop charged pack B, which is two power-moving
phases on one grid connection pulling against each other.

* ONE `Maintenance` PER ROSTER ENTRY, each with its own schedule, phase and
  history under `unit/<name>/...`. `store.migrate_maint_keys()` moves an
  install's flat history into the first pack's namespace under
  `migrate_unit_keys()`'s three rules - shared in code via `_move_flat_keys()`
  and `_verify_moves()`, not restated - on its own marker, because unlike
  DEV-02's it runs only where the roster has more than one pack. The flat keys
  are kept LIVE as the rollback view.
* ONE MAINTENANCE SLOT PER SITE (`maintenance.arbitrate()`). At most one pack
  in a power-moving phase - drain, charge AND hold. The holder is DERIVED from
  the packs' own stored phases, never persisted, so a restart mid-drain
  re-derives it. Several packs due in the same hour: the slot goes to the one
  that has gone longest without a completed cycle; roster order breaks a
  numeric tie and nothing else. Nothing preempts a cycle in flight.
* THE DEFERRED PACK IS NOT STARVED AND IS NOT A FAULT. A deferral does not
  stamp `last_start_attempt` and does not move the phase, so neither the 12 h
  drain nor the 36 h charge timeout is reachable by waiting.
* The claim is filed on the pack whose state machine produced it, and stays
  SCOPE_UNIT - ARCH-01's rule.
* `validate.py` rule 6 grades `maintenance_charge_w` against the WEAKEST cap on
  the roster now, as its own comment said it must once `maint_unit` stopped
  being `inverters[0]`.
* At a roster of one nothing changes, and it is asserted: no new store key, the
  migration does not run, the four cycle events are the shipped strings, the
  banner is the bare phase.
* RECORDED NOT FIXED: a drain pins its pack while the loop's target is a site
  claim, so below the pin the allocator refuses the split and the site parks at
  0 W. Pre-existing at 2d025ee. Pinned as a running check.

Verified: 19/19 suites green in the CI image; 17 mutations run through
tools/mutation_run.sh (bytecode purged), every one observed red.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 13:38:29 +02:00
admin 2d025eebf7 Merge pull request 'SAFETY-30: grade each inverter against its own power, and the site's total against the meter' (#46) from SAFETY-30 into release/1.0 2026-09-04 12:28:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 ae21b71824 Merge release/1.0 into SAFETY-30
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m39s
CFG-04 (#45) merged first and moved the base. Two conflicts, both resolved
as the union of the two sides:

- app/main.py: an import-block collision. CFG-04 added validate_unit_ranges
  to the .validate import; SAFETY-30 added AGAINST_METER, AGAINST_OWN_POWER,
  SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS and SignWatchdog to the .watchdog import. Neither
  side dropped anything, so the resolution keeps both lists whole.
- CHANGELOG.md: two adjacent new entries under ## Unreleased. Both kept.

Both sides also independently rewrote large parts of test_peakguard.py
(60 and 47 insertions against the merge base) and git merged them
textually, so the full suite was run on the MERGE RESULT rather than
inferred from the two parents: 19 passed, 0 failed, twice.

One caveat recorded rather than hidden: test_peakguard.py failed once
during the first sequential full-suite run and then passed 10/10 in
isolation and in two further full runs on this same tree. It passes on
both parents too, so this is the pre-existing flakiness CFG-04 already
disclosed, not a merge defect - it is timing- or load-sensitive. It sits
on the required CI context and can therefore block an unrelated merge at
random, which wants a card of its own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 12:23:50 +02:00
admin 18f052a071 Merge pull request 'CFG-04: an operator can declare a second inverter, and the shape was measured against the Supervisor' (#45) from CFG-04 into release/1.0 2026-09-04 11:51:57 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d5c1577212 SAFETY-30: pin WHICH thresholds each sign detector is armed with, not just what the numbers are
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m48s
REVIEW FOUND A MUTATION SURVIVOR THAT UNDOES THE WHOLE PRODUCT OF AC 5, and it
is a coverage defect rather than a behaviour one - the shipped code arms the
detectors correctly today. In `_arm_sign_watchdogs()`, collapsing

    inv.sign_wd.arm(self.sign_cfg if one else self.unit_sign_cfg, ...)

to `arm(self.sign_cfg, ...)` throws the re-derived 250 W / 85 s per-unit pair
away and arms every unit with SAFETY-02's meter-facing 300 W / 180 s - and left
ALL 19 FILES GREEN. Reproduced here before fixing anything: fresh per-mutation
tree, no __pycache__, mounted :ro, graded through tools/mutation_run.sh; -31 B;
19 pass, 0 fail.

WHY NOTHING CAUGHT IT. `grep -rn "sign_wd.cfg" test_*.py` found exactly ONE
threshold assertion, part 7's N=1 arm at (300.0, 1.0) - which the mutation
PRESERVES. Nothing at a roster of two read `inv.sign_wd.cfg` at all. The ledger
mutates the VALUES in SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS (M10 250->300, M11 325->180, both
correctly red through the config pins) and never the WIRING that delivers them.
Part 3's behavioural checks cannot close the gap either, and the comment now
says why: B is reversed at ~2000 W with short holds, so it trips under EITHER
pair, and a fault big enough and long enough to trip under both thresholds is
evidence about neither.

THE FIX - test_watchdog.py part 3, on the real two-inverter Controller. Every
`inv.sign_wd.cfg` equals the per-unit pair, `site_sign_wd.cfg` equals the site
pair, and each detector's `against` is its own instrument. Graded against
LITERALS, because `== self.unit_sign_cfg` cannot tell "the per-unit pair" from
"whatever this Controller was handed". Both pairs are printed.

⚠️ AND THE FIXTURE HAD TO CHANGE FOR THE PIN TO MEAN ANYTHING - the recursion
worth naming, because it is the same defect class as the one being closed.
`_sign_site` set `sign_disagree_s`, `unit_sign_disagree_s` AND
`site_sign_disagree_s` all to 1 s, with two of the three magnitude gates at
300 W. A bare equality there discriminates on `min_w` alone: a mis-wiring that
delivered the right magnitude with the WRONG HOLD compares EQUAL to the pair it
was supposed to have. A check comparing two things that happen to be equal
cannot see the difference it names (MUTATION.md's third failure mode). The
three pairs are now pairwise distinct IN BOTH COORDINATES - 250 W / 1 s per
unit, 320 W / 2 s site, 300 W / 3 s shipped - a PRECONDITION asserts that
distinctness so a later edit collapsing them goes red rather than quietly
vacuous, and a second PRECONDITION asserts the literals are the pairs this
Controller actually holds.

VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. Three mutations, each on its own freshly copied tree
with no __pycache__, mounted :ro, through tools/mutation_run.sh:

  M14  arm() handed self.sign_cfg at every roster        -31 B  RED (was the
       survivor; the AC 5 WIRING check names the wiring)
  M15  right min_w, SHIPPED hold - hold-only mis-wire    +78 B  RED, same pin
  M16  right min_w, SITE hold - hold-only, and it still
       trips inside the drive                            +83 B  RED, and the
       ONLY red in test_watchdog.py

M16 is the one that says the hold half of the equality bites on its own.
Unmutated tree: 19 pass, 0 fail, purged and fingerprinted.

Ledger rows M14-M16 and the write-up in DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md
section 5; a CHANGELOG bullet.

NOT IN THIS PR, so it gets a card rather than a quiet fix: a stuck per-unit
power sensor would false-trip the new per-unit check at N>=2. Already-merged
SAFETY-31 has the identical exposure on the same fixture. Pre-existing N>=2
class, unreachable at the deployed roster of one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 11:13:13 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 f000547518 SAFETY-30: grade each inverter against its own power, and the site's total against the meter
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m38s
THE DEFECT, in one line. `inv.sign_wd.evaluate(stood, self.grid, ...)` compared
the command THIS controller put on ONE actuator against what the WHOLE SITE is
exchanging with the network. At a roster of one those are two views of the same
thing - specs.md §6.2's identity - and that is what makes the check sound and
what earned it the best record in the safety table (NOTES.md: 93 % agreement
while healthy against 4 % during runaway, four observed episodes, zero false
positives). At two inverters they are not, and it fails in BOTH directions:

  FALSE TRIP  inverter A commanded -1500 W while the meter reads +1500 W is
              evidence of nothing when inverter B is discharging 3000 W exactly
              as told. Nothing is faulty and the highest-value check fires.
  MISSED      the converse, and it is worse. A unit commanded +1500 W and
              MEASURED at -1500 W, beside a sibling at +1500 W, leaves P1
              exactly where a healthy site leaves it. The summation destroys the
              evidence and no threshold recovers it.

DEV-02 had already shipped the per-INSTANCE half - one SignWatchdog per
inverter, namespaced latch, a trip on B no longer latching A. What was left was
the COMPARISON, and it is two questions rather than one:

  PER UNIT  this unit's standing command against ITS OWN measured power
            (`Inverter.batt`, holding register 0x0518, per-instance since
            DEV-02). Conclusion: "the actuator I am driving is not doing what I
            told it" - a fact about one device, so the remedy stays the per-unit
            `failsafe` SET that arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE has classified SCOPE_UNIT
            from the day it was written. That entry read "the evidence is
            site-wide and the remedy is not"; the first half is now simply true.
  SITE      the SUM of the standing commands against the meter, as a new
            `sign_site` SET at P_SAFETY on the site actuator, latched under flat
            `site_sign_tripped` / `site_sign_reason`. This is the 2026-08-20
            fault day and NO per-unit check can see it, because every inverter
            may be faithfully executing its share of a number that is itself
            wrong. It stops every inverter and the banner names the site.

WHAT IT IS NOT, said here because two guards that overlap without saying so is
how a false-alarm generator gets built. It is not SAFETY-31: circulation.py
compares the units AGAINST EACH OTHER and catches them pushing power THROUGH
each other, which nets to zero at the meter and about which no single command is
evidence. This compares each unit against ITS OWN COMMAND. They overlap in
exactly one scenario - a unit reversing while its sibling pulls the other way -
and test_watchdog.py asserts on that fixture that both fire and what each
concludes. It is also not the saturation freeze, which is a MAGNITUDE test
(|command - measured| > 500 W) that shapes the loop and fires on a merely
saturated unit; this is a DIRECTION test that latches and parks one.

THE FOUR NUMBERS, RE-DERIVED AT TWO INVERTERS - one carried with a justification
and one refused. 1890 closed-loop runs on admin/goodwe's TEST-19 two-master rig
in which NOTHING is faulty, swept over the whole range config.yaml accepts for
`gain` and `slew_w`, across load reversals with write staggers and flapping
loads, and RUN AT BOTH ROSTERS so the N=1 arm is the control:

  unit_sign_disagree_w  250   `saturation_w / 2`. The check gates on both sides,
                              opposed, so the smallest gap it can see is 500 W -
                              exactly where compute()'s own anti-windup test
                              already says the inverter is not following. It
                              cannot fire on a divergence the control law calls
                              ordinary tracking. Worst legitimate opposition at
                              250 W: 10.0 s; the curve is nearly flat, because a
                              unit's own power chases its own command.
  unit_sign_disagree_s   85   8.5x that 10.0 s, 2.8x the firmware's own 30 s
                              link veto (inverter.LINK_STALE_S), under half the
                              180 s site hold.
  site_sign_disagree_w  300   CARRIED. Its argument is the meter's noise floor
                              and the 15 W deadband; the roster touches neither,
                              and the campaign agrees - the gate opens in 994 of
                              1050 runs at two inverters and 955 of 1050 at one.
  site_sign_disagree_s  325   NOT CARRIED, and this is the number the card
                              exists to not assume. The worst legitimate
                              crossing at 300 W is 110 s with one inverter and
                              215 s with TWO, because the command must travel a
                              rail that is the roster sum at a `slew_w` that is
                              not - reachable at gain 0.05, slew_w 50 and a
                              2.2 kW load reversal, all schema-legal. 180 s
                              would have shipped a false trip. 325 s is 1.51x
                              the measured worst, inside the 900 s billing
                              quarter and inside every episode of the fault day.

AT ONE INVERTER NOTHING CHANGES, and "nothing" is asserted rather than assumed.
The two questions are the same sentence there, so only the detector that shipped
is armed: same comparison against the meter, same 300 W / 180 s, same reason
string byte for byte, same namespaced latch and flat rollback mirror, same
`failsafe` claim, same banner, same single status row - and the site detector is
NEVER CALLED, counted on the object over twelve cycles.

VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. Thirteen mutations on fresh per-mutation trees with no
__pycache__, mounted :ro, with the battery refusing to report at all unless the
baseline is green. Twelve red on the first pass. M4 - the site half armed at N=1
as well - SURVIVED, because the check read `disagree_since is None` and the unit
detector trips first, parks the inverter and leaves the site standing at 0 W:
the assertion ran, the sentence was true, and the data could not reach the
failure it named. Replaced with a call counter on the object; M4 is red now.
Recorded as a survivor in DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md §5, with the
first battery's own RED BASELINE - a shared mutation directory read mid-copy -
discarded rather than reported.

RECORDED, NOT FIXED: the site comparison is defeated by a square-wave load whose
half period is about one control cycle, which holds it opposed for ~1000 s. The
N=1 control arm is what makes that interpretable - it is identical at the roster
this add-on ships, so it is a property of comparing a lagged command against a
meter and has nothing to do with the second inverter. It wants an alternation
test rather than a number, and a card of its own.

SAFETY-24's lo-only asymmetry proof re-run unchanged: 1296 combinations, 0
negative floors, `hi` +inf on every claim, every claim on the SITE actuator.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 09:33:20 +02:00
41 changed files with 18055 additions and 661 deletions
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
# MAINT-05 — one recalibration per pack, one at a time, and what the card left open
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-04.** There is one `Maintenance` per roster entry,
each with its own schedule, phase and history. The site holds exactly **one
maintenance slot**: at most one pack may be in a power-moving phase, the slot is
derived from the packs' own stored phases rather than persisted separately, and
when several packs are due in the same hour it goes to the one that has gone
**longest without a completed cycle**. The schedule is **not** staggered by
construction — the interlock defers, and the stagger emerges from it.
**Fix round 2026-09-04.** The store migration is now graded against the
**roster** rather than against the unit name it was handed — see §2's
*"The read-back postcondition is graded against the ROSTER"* — and the same
hole in SAFETY-02's latch migration is recorded in §7.
Filed with MAINT-05. Card `6a9a9e8503872905f298d80a`.
---
## 0. What the card asked to be decided, and the answers
| the card's open question | the decision |
|---|---|
| §2 the arbitration | **one pack at a time; the other stays under the loop.** Nothing preempts a cycle in flight. |
| §2 who wins when several are due | **the longest-waiting pack**, `last_completed` oldest first, `inf` for never-recalibrated. Roster order breaks a numeric tie and nothing else. |
| §4 staggering | **not by construction.** The interlock defers the second pack; the stagger is what comes out of it. §3 below. |
| AC 7 rule 6's `maint_unit` comment | **no, the first entry's cap is no longer right.** It grades against the weakest cap on the roster now, like rule 5. §4 below. |
| the store layout at N=1 | **flat, unchanged.** The namespace appears the day the roster grows. §2 below. |
## 1. Why the slot is derived and not persisted
The holder is *"whichever pack's stored phase is not `idle`"* — a fact already on
disk, written by the packs themselves in the per-pack history this card
introduces. A `maint_slot_holder` key would be a **second opinion about the same
thing**, and the two would disagree the first time the add-on was killed between
writing the phase and writing the holder. Derived, a controller that comes back
up mid-drain reads the drain and re-derives the holder from it; there is no
recovery path to get wrong because there is no second fact.
`CHARGE` is in `POWER_MOVING` even though the control **loop** owns the setpoint
in that phase, and that is the decision most likely to be "simplified" later.
Pack A charging from the grid at 2000 W while pack B drains 2000 W to export is
4 kW going round in a circle with the meter reading zero and both packs
believing they are behaving — the circulating power [[SAFETY-31]] exists to
detect, arriving as something this module can simply not do. `HOLD` is in the
tuple for the other half of the sentence: it moves nothing, and it **owns the
actuator**, so a second cycle starting under it would still be two
recalibrations at once.
## 2. Why the store layout at a roster of one does not change
The maintenance keys are flat — `phase`, `phase_started`, `last_completed`,
`last_start_attempt` — on every install since the add-on shipped. At one pack
there is nothing for a namespace to distinguish that pack **from**: §6.2's
identity, the same one `arbiter.actuator_for()` leans on when it routes every
claim to the site actuator at N=1. So `Maintenance` is constructed with
`unit=None` there, reads and writes the flat keys directly, and
`migrate_maint_keys()` **returns without writing anything**. A one-inverter state
file comes out of this card byte-identical, which is AC 6 and which
`test_maintenance.py` part 10 asserts by driving a whole cycle and comparing the
key set.
### The migration has its own marker, and that is not tidiness
`SCHEMA_VERSION` / `schema_version` is DEV-02's, and it is **monotone**: every
install runs that migration exactly once. This one runs **only where the roster
has more than one pack**, so a single counter could not express *"migrated on
this site, deliberately not migrated on that one"* without lying to the next
version that reads it — a one-inverter store would have to be pinned at the old
number forever, and a genuine future v2 migration could then never be told apart
from a site that simply never grew. `maint_schema_version` answers one question
and answers it honestly.
The **three rules are shared in code**, not restated: `_move_flat_keys()` is
rule 1 (never overwrite an existing namespaced value) and rule 2 (the flat keys
stay in the file), `_verify_moves()` is the read-back postcondition, and the
marker is written last. A second transcription of a migration is a second
opinion about what "it landed" means.
### The read-back postcondition is graded against the ROSTER (fix round)
**A postcondition that reads back the namespace it was handed cannot detect
being handed the wrong one.** That sentence is the whole finding, and this card
shipped it broken.
`_verify_moves()` iterated `rep.moved` — the keys it had just written — and
asked whether each read back equal. On a store where the write lands, it always
does. So a migration handed a `unit` that is on no roster wrote four keys, read
four keys back, set `verified = True`, and the caller stamped
`maint_schema_version`. Every symptom of a clean migration, and an install's
whole maintenance history parked under a name nothing will ever look up. And
because the marker was stamped, **the next start skipped the migration too** —
which is precisely the state `store.py`'s header says must never happen: a
failed migration a later version treats as done.
Reproduced on the reviewer's roster, a house with a garage pack and a shed pack,
carrying a flat `last_completed` of 2026-08-07:
| | `unit` the migration was handed | key written | pack 0 reads back | due now? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| correct | `self.inverters[0].name` = `garage` | `unit/garage/last_completed` | `2026-08-07` | **False** |
| wrong | `inverter.UNIT_A` = `inverter-a` | `unit/inverter-a/last_completed` | `None` | **True** |
`build_roster()` names a declared roster's entries **from the config**, and its
fallback for a nameless entry is a **positional** `inverter-1` — so `inverter-a`
is not the name of anything on a declared roster, not even by default.
**The remedy, and why this one.** `migrate_maint_keys()` now takes the **roster**
in place of an `n_units` count (the count was `len(self.inverters)` at the only
call site, so the roster carries it, and a count passed beside the names is a
second opinion about how many packs there are). `_verify_moves()` grades the
namespace it wrote against those names, and a unit that is not among them is
reported as `misdirected` — a **different** failure from `lost`:
* `lost` is *the store took the write and dropped it* — a storage fault, and it
has a harmless-default case (a write of `last_completed: None` loses nothing,
because "absent" and "never recalibrated" are the same statement).
* `misdirected` is *the store did exactly as it was told, by a caller that was
wrong*. There is no harmless-default version of it: a write nobody reads is
not information, whatever its value. So anything in it fails `ok` on its own.
And **`ok` gates the marker**, so a misdirected migration is not stamped and the
next start runs it again. The argument for it is asymmetric: a re-run is
recoverable — rule 1 makes it a no-op where keys did land, and rule 2 left the
flat keys in the file to recover *from* — while a silent skip is not recoverable
at all, because the store now claims the migration happened.
### ⚠️ THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE USED TO END HERE, AND AS IT STOOD IT WAS FALSE
**The refusal lasted exactly one start. The second start stamped the marker.**
That is a correction to what the first fix round wrote down, not a new
qualification of it, and it is recorded here because a decision document that
states a guarantee the code does not provide is worse than one that says
nothing.
`_verify_moves()` graded only `rep.moved`. Measured at Controller level over
**one persisted store**, roster `["garage", "shed"]`, flat `last_completed`
2026-08-07, with the call site still handing `inverter-a` on **both** starts:
```
construction 1: ok=False misdirected=4 moved=4 kept=0 marker=<absent> (withheld)
construction 2: ok=True misdirected=0 moved=0 kept=4 marker=1 (STAMPED)
history parked under unit/inverter-a/…; marker stamped after ONE restart.
```
On start 2 the same wrong call site finds the four keys it wrote already
present, so **rule 1** — never overwrite a namespaced value — routes every one
of them to `rep.kept`. `rep.moved` is empty, the roster-grading loop iterates
over nothing, `misdirected` is empty, `ok` is True, the marker is stamped, and
start 3 takes the `from_version >= MAINT_SCHEMA_VERSION` early return **forever
— including after the call site is fixed**. Loud-and-recoverable became
silent-and-permanent after one restart: exactly the state `store.py`'s header
says must never happen, reached by the fix written to prevent it.
**The remedy is one line**, and it is sound by construction rather than by
argument: grade `set(rep.moved) | set(rep.kept)`. Every entry in *both* lists is
a `unit_key(unit, legacy)` built from the **same** `unit` argument, so grading
`kept` grades the same namespace decision `moved` does. A correct call site's
`kept` entries are under a roster name and pass; a wrong one cannot launder its
namespace by having already written it. `migrate_unit_keys()` passes
`roster=None` and returns before the loop, so it is unaffected.
**Why the check missed it, which is the part worth keeping.** Part 9b's recovery
check was `migrate_maint_keys(_m5, ROSTER[0], ROSTER)` — the **corrected** name.
It measures recovery along the one path where the operator has *already fixed
the bug*. The real failure is a call site that is still wrong on the next start,
and nothing in the 19 files called `migrate_maint_keys()` twice with the **same
wrong** `unit`. The check was true, passed, and could not reach the failure its
sentence named — MUTATION.md's third defect, this time sitting inside the fix
written to close it. Part **9c** now drives two starts with the same wrong unit
over one store, asserts the marker is still withheld on the second, and asserts
the *shape* of the second report (`moved` empty, `kept` full) so it cannot
quietly revert to 9b's path.
### The marker gate is `rep.ok` and nothing weaker — both guards, each pinned
`if rep.ok:` is `not lost and not misdirected`, and until this round only the
`misdirected` half was reachable by a check that also had a non-empty `kept`.
The mutation
```
if rep.ok: -> if rep.ok or rep.kept:
```
stamps the marker on a migration that **lost a month of history** — defeating
the older, settled `lost` guard as well as the new one — and **all 19 suites
were green on it**. Part **9d** is the fixture that separates them: two keys
already namespaced (`kept` non-empty, so the mutant's `or` fires) and two keys
whose write the store drops (`lost` non-empty, so `ok` is False), with
`misdirected` empty throughout so the section cannot pass on the other guard by
accident. Measured differential on it: shipped → marker absent; mutant → marker
`1`, both reporting `ok=False lost=2 kept=2`.
**Why the fixtures had to change, and this is the part that got the card
rejected.** Nothing in the repository could see whether any of the above was
true, because `inverter.UNIT_A` **is** the string `"inverter-a"` and every
two-pack fixture in `test_maintenance.py` named its first roster entry
`inverter-a`. `self.inverters[0].name` and `UNIT_A` were therefore the same
value in every check that existed, and swapping one for the other at the call
site left **all 19 suites green**. MUTATION.md's third defect exactly — a check
whose *data* cannot reach the failure it names — and the fifth consecutive card
to carry it. Parts 9 and 11 now run on `["garage", "shed"]`, each behind a
**precondition check** asserting that the first name is not `UNIT_A`, so an edit
that makes them equal again goes red instead of making the claims vacuous.
### And the flat keys are kept LIVE, which is the half DEV-02 had to add later
Rule 2 originally said the flat keys are left in place and go stale. DEV-02
amended it, for the sign latch, to *"left in place is not enough"* — and the
same sentence holds for history. A fossil dated the day the second inverter was
declared would hand a rolled-back single-FSM add-on a `last_completed` months
old (it recalibrates a pack that does not need it) or a stale `phase` with a
`phase_started` old enough to abort on the 12 h timeout the moment it comes up.
So `UnitHistory` **mirrors the first pack's writes back onto the flat keys** for
as long as the roster has more than one entry. Only the first pack: the flat
spelling means `inverters[0]` on every install that has one, and a mirror from
pack B would overwrite pack A's rollback view with pack B's phase.
## 3. Staggering: the interlock defers, and the stagger is the residue
Two packs on one monthly schedule are due in the same hour every month. The
options were a stagger **by construction** — offset each pack's first cycle by
`interval_days / N` — or **deferral**. Deferral, for three reasons:
1. **A constructed stagger cannot remove the need for the interlock.** A forced
start, a commissioning cycle, an abort-and-retry, or a pack added mid-month
desynchronises any static offset immediately, so the interlock has to be
there anyway — and then the stagger is a second mechanism that must also be
correct, for a case the first one already handles.
2. **A deferral is observable and a stagger is not.** The deferred pack says, in
the action log and on the status page, that it is waiting, which pack it is
waiting for, and that it will run at the next start hour. A silent offset
moves an operator's configured start day and explains nothing.
3. **The stagger comes out of the deferral for free and then persists.** Pack A
completes on day 1 and is next due on day 29; pack B, deferred, completes on
day 2 and is next due on day 30. One contested month separates them by one
cycle length and they stay separated.
**Starvation was the risk and it is closed at two points.** A deferral does
**not** stamp `last_start_attempt` — that key is the post-abort cooldown, and at
90 minutes inside a 60-minute start hour, stamping it would lock the deferred
pack out of exactly the hour it is waiting for. And the winner is the
longest-waiting pack rather than the first in the roster, so a pack that keeps
aborting cannot monopolise the slot month after month while its sibling drifts —
which is this card's own defect wearing a different costume.
**The deferral must not read as a fault.** §12's 12 h and 36 h phase timeouts
mean *"the battery is not following commands"*. A deferred pack stays `IDLE`
with `phase_started` untouched, so no timeout is reachable by waiting, and the
line it logs says WAITING, names the pack it waits for and says it will run
next — none of which any failure path in `maintenance.py` says.
## 4. Rule 6 (the card calls it rule 8): the first entry's cap is no longer right
`validate.py`'s rule 6 comment said, in as many words, that
`maintenance_charge_w` was graded against `inverters[0]`'s cap because there was
exactly one `Maintenance` and it could only ever recalibrate the first pack —
and that taking `min()` would be an over-refusal, because it would refuse *"a
5000 W pack being recalibrated beside a 2000 W sibling the cycle never
touches"*. It closed: **"when `maint_unit` stops being `inverters[0]`, this line
moves with it."**
It has stopped. Every pack is recalibrated on its own schedule, so **the sibling
the cycle never touches does not exist** and the over-refusal argument has no
subject. The shaping claim is filed on whichever pack is charging, so the cap
that can contradict it is any cap on the roster and the one that contradicts it
first is the smallest.
**This refuses configurations that used to start**, and that is the point rather
than a side effect: `max_w` 5000 on pack A beside 2000 on pack B with
`maintenance_charge_w` 3000 was correct while only pack A was ever recalibrated,
and is now a cheap-window charge asking the arbiter for `hi = -3000` against a
supervised `lo = -2000` — `lo > hi`, arbiter clause 3, 0 W, on the pack nobody
was watching. Refused when it is **written**, which is rule 6's whole job. At a
roster of one `min()` over one cap is that cap: same comparison, same message,
same boundary.
## 5. The claim stays per-unit, and nothing here files a site claim
`arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE` has classified `maintenance` as `SCOPE_UNIT` since it was
written. Two FSMs mean two claims on two actuators, which the allocator consumes
as per-unit intervals. [[ARCH-01]] is explicit that this must never become a
site claim, because per-inverter constraints filed site-wide are the
cross-inverter `lo > hi` contradiction at `arbiter.py:114`. The only line this
card changed there is **which** roster entry the claim is filed on: the one whose
state machine produced the result, rather than `inverters[0]`.
## 6. FOUND AND NOT FIXED: the site loop still contradicts a drain at N>=2
Measured while wiring this card, and **pre-existing on `release/1.0` at
`2d025ee`** — the same drain filed on `inverters[0]` produces the identical
refusal with the two unit names swapped.
The maintenance SET **pins** its pack. The loop's target is a **site** claim.
When the site target is *below* the pin — a 2000 W drain while the house imports
less than that, which is most of a night — the only split that sums to the site
target asks the sibling to **charge** while the maintained pack **discharges**,
and `allocator.plan()` refuses it by name as circulating power. The refusal is
correct and fails safe: the whole site goes to 0 W with an `ARBITER: REFUSED`
line in the action log.
**The consequence an operator would see is a misdiagnosis.** The pack is held at
0 W while its state machine believes it is draining, so after 12 h the DRAIN
timeout fires and reports *"drain stuck"* — §12's words for a battery that is not
following commands. The battery is fine; the site refused to allocate.
**Why it is not fixed here.** The fix is to change what the site loop's target
*means* while a unit is pinned — regulate the meter using only the unpinned
packs — which is loop and allocator territory and changes the integrator's
subject. MAINT-05 moves which pack is pinned and nothing else about it. It is
pinned as a running check (`test_maintenance.py` part 12) rather than left as a
comment, so it cannot be forgotten or quietly tuned away, and it wants a card of
its own.
## 7. FOUND AND NOT FIXED: `migrate_unit_keys()` has the same hole, and it is a LATCH
Found while fixing §2's instance. It is the same defect one module over and it
costs a **disarmed safety guard** rather than a lost history.
`Controller.__init__` calls `migrate_unit_keys(store, UNIT_A)` — a hardcoded
constant where the maintenance migration now passes the roster's own first name.
It **has** to run before `build_roster()`, because each `Inverter` restores its
sign latch in its constructor, so there is no roster to name yet and
`_verify_moves()` is passed `roster=None`. On a **declared** roster a pre-DEV-02
`sign_tripped: true` therefore lands under `unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped`, which
no unit on that site reads.
**And the guard that exists for exactly this is defeated by the key the defect
wrote.** `_grade_store_migration()` re-arms the latch when the flat key says
tripped and *nothing namespaced is latched*. The misdirected write **is**
namespaced and **is** latched, so `namespaced_latched` is `True`, the guard
returns, and no inverter on the roster comes up tripped — on an install whose
`/data/state.json` still reads `sign_tripped: true`. That is DEV-02's own
sentence for the worst case: the state file says protected, the banner is green,
and the controller resumes commanding into the fault that tripped it.
Measured, on the same `["garage", "shed"]` roster:
```
pre-DEV-02 flat latch + declared roster ['garage', 'shed'] ->
migrated 2 flat key(s): unit/inverter-a/sign_reason, unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped
latch keys in the store: ['sign_tripped', 'site_sign_tripped', 'unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped']
roster came up tripped: [('garage', False), ('shed', False)]
the same store on the FLAT config -> [('inverter-a', True)]
```
The last line is the counterfactual: on the flat shape, where `UNIT_A` really is
the roster's only name, the same store migrates and comes up latched. So this is
a defect of the **declared roster**, not of the migration as such.
**Why it is not fixed here.** The remedy is to name the migration's target from
the config before any `Inverter` exists, which means factoring `build_roster()`'s
naming rule out of `build_roster()` so there is still only **one** spelling of
it — `inverter.py` and SAFETY-02's latch semantics, with its own mutation battery
over `test_inverter.py` and `test_watchdog.py`. MAINT-05 moves the maintenance
history and nothing about the sign latch, and a silent expansion into a safety
latch is how a rejected PR becomes a broken one.
It is pinned as a running check (`test_maintenance.py` part 13) rather than left
as a comment. ⚠️ **Its assertions state the WRONG behaviour on purpose** — read
them as the specification of a defect; the card that fixes it should expect them
to go red and should replace them.
### And its MARKER GATE had the round-3 hole too — found here, closed here
Separate from the namespace hole above, and **fixed** rather than recorded,
because closing it cost one test fixture and no source change.
`migrate_unit_keys()` gates `schema_version` on `rep.ok` exactly as
`migrate_maint_keys()` gates its own marker, and every check that reached that
gate ran on a store where **nothing** was namespaced yet — so `rep.kept` was
empty in all of them and
```
if rep.ok: -> if rep.ok or rep.kept:
```
**survived all 19 files**. What it does is stamp the schema marker on a
migration that DROPPED THE LATCH: the guard is off, the state file still reads
`sign_tripped: true`, and because the store now says the migration finished, the
next start skips the one thing that would have re-armed it. DEV-02's own worst
case, filed under *done*.
`test_inverter.py` part 10 now drops the `sign_tripped` write **beside an
already-namespaced `sign_reason`** — `lost` non-empty *and* `kept` non-empty,
which is the one shape none of the existing fixtures had — and asserts the
marker is withheld, with the accepted-baseline counterfactual beside it (habit
7). The shipped gate was correct throughout; what changed is that a check can
now see it.
@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
# SAFETY-30 — what the sign watchdog compares once there is more than one inverter, and the numbers it compares with
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-04.** The one comparison becomes **two**, asked of the
evidence that can answer each: **each unit's standing command against that
unit's own measured power** (register 0x0518, per-instance since [[DEV-02]]),
and **the sum of the standing commands against the meter**. At a roster of one
nothing changes at all — the two questions are the same sentence there, and the
detector that ships is the only one armed.
This document records the argument for that split, the campaign the four numbers
were read off, **a number that was carried and a number that refused to be**, and
the mutation ledger. Filed with SAFETY-30, card `6a9a1828e844f22fabf7fe9c`.
---
## 0. The half that was already built, and the half this card is
[[DEV-02]] shipped the **per-instance** half and nothing here re-tests it: each
`Inverter` owns its own `SignWatchdog`, the latch is namespaced under
`unit/<name>/sign_tripped`, the flat pre-DEV-02 pair is maintained as a rollback
view, and a trip on B no longer latches A. `test_inverter.py` part 3 grades that.
What was left is **the comparison itself**, and it was one line:
```python
inv.sign_wd.evaluate(stood, self.grid, self.following, now) # every unit
```
`stood` is the command **this controller put on THIS actuator**. `self.grid` is
what the **whole site** is exchanging with the network. At one inverter those are
two views of one thing — §6.2's identity — which is what makes the check sound
and what earned its record. At two they are not, and it fails in **both**
directions:
| | what happens | why no threshold fixes it |
|---|---|---|
| **false trip** | A commanded −1500 W while the meter reads +1500 W, because B is discharging 3000 W exactly as told | the meter is answering for a unit A's command says nothing about |
| **missed fault** | B commanded +1500 W and **measured** at −1500 W, beside A at +1500 W — the meter sits where a healthy site leaves it | the summation **destroys** the evidence |
NOTES.md calls SAFETY-02 the highest-value check in the safety table: 93 %
agreement while healthy against 4 % during runaway, four observed episodes, zero
false positives. **That record was earned at N=1 on the site comparison.** The
first row above spends it; the second row is the guard being absent when it
matters.
## 1. The two questions, and the two remedies
> **PER UNIT** — this unit's standing command against **its own** measured power.
> Conclusion: *the actuator I am driving is not doing what I told it.* Evidence
> about one device, so the remedy is that device: the `failsafe` SET, which
> `arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE` has classified `SCOPE_UNIT` since it was written.
>
> **SITE** — the **sum** of the standing commands against the meter. Conclusion:
> *the site as a whole is driving the wrong way* — an inverted gain, an
> integrator wound past the rail, a strategy on the wrong side of the meter.
> That is the 2026-08-20 fault day, it is a property of the **connection**, and
> the remedy is a new SITE SET, `sign_site`, that stops every inverter.
### Why `failsafe` stays per-unit and `sign_site` is new
`CLAIM_SCOPE`'s entry for `failsafe` used to read *"the evidence is site-wide and
the remedy is not"* — a site measurement attributed to one actuator on the
strength of the N=1 identity. After this card the first half of that sentence is
simply true: the evidence **is** per-unit. The site-wide half did not disappear;
it moved to a claim that is site-scoped for the reason `circulation` is, one
entry above it: **the offending number is the site target, which no single
inverter owns.** Parking one unit on it would leave the rest of the roster
pushing the same way with the guard satisfied.
### At N=1, exactly one detector is armed
`Controller._arm_sign_watchdogs()` is the only place the roster decides anything
here, and it is a pure function of `len(self.inverters)`:
* **one inverter** — the unit detector is armed against **the meter**, at the
shipped `sign_disagree_w` / `sign_disagree_s`. The site detector is
**constructed and never evaluated**. Same comparison, same thresholds, same
reason string byte for byte, same namespaced keys and flat mirror, same
`failsafe` claim, same banner, same single status row. `test_watchdog.py`
part 7 asserts each of those, including that the site detector's window was
never so much as opened.
* **two or more** — each unit against its own 0x0518 power under the per-unit
pair, and the site detector against the meter under the site pair.
Arming both at N=1 would be two latches and two banners for one fault, and a
false-positive record measured on **one** comparison spent twice.
## 2. What this is NOT — the two neighbours, named
Two guards that overlap without saying so is how a false-alarm generator gets
built, so both are written down.
### It is not [[SAFETY-31]]
| | **SAFETY-31 — `circulation.py`** | **SAFETY-30 — the per-unit half** |
|---|---|---|
| compares | the units **against each other**: `Σ\|Bᵢ\| − \|ΣBᵢ\|` over measured power | each unit against **its own command** |
| catches | two inverters pushing **through** each other; nets to zero at the meter | a unit **not doing what it was told**; that unit is faulty or wedged |
| attributes | nothing — the quantity is defined over the roster and is identically zero for one unit | **the unit**, by name, and parks it |
| scope | SITE claim, flat latch | UNIT claim, namespaced latch |
They genuinely overlap in **one** scenario — a unit reversing while its sibling
pulls the other way — and `test_watchdog.py` part 4 asserts exactly that, on the
same fixture, with both readings printed: circulating power is over its threshold
**and** SAFETY-30 names B. Neither is the other with a different threshold. Take
two units faithfully executing an allocation with two signs: circulating power is
the whole loop and every per-unit sign check reads perfect agreement. Take one
unit doing the opposite of its share while its sibling covers: this reads the
whole disagreement and circulating power can be zero.
### It is not the saturation freeze
`compute()`'s anti-windup test is `|prev_w − actual_w| > saturation_w` (500 W). It
concludes *the inverter cannot follow*, it fires on a merely **saturated** unit as
readily as on a reversed one, it **stops the integrator winding** — an ordinary
control action taken every day — and it neither latches nor parks anything.
This asks for **opposition**: a sign, on both sides of a threshold, held
continuously. A saturated-but-obedient unit cannot produce it. And the two meet
at a number rather than overlapping in a band nobody drew — see §3.
## 3. The numbers, and where they come from
Read off `admin/goodwe`'s `sim/` two-master rig (TEST-19), used **read-only** and
run container-free. Real and imported, never transcribed: the control law
(`control.compute`, `Tuning`), the allocator (`arbiter.allocate_record` →
`allocator.plan`), the sign predicate (`watchdog.disagrees`), the wire
(`frame_check.setpoint_atomic`, the firmware's own encoder), the plant
(`plantsim.Plant`), and the per-unit reading, taken from **holding register
0x0518** — the register the live `batt_entity` binds.
**1890 closed-loop runs in which NOTHING is faulty** — every unit executes the
share the allocator gave it — over **6 gains × 5 slews**, the whole range
`config.yaml` accepts for `gain` `float(0.05,1.0)` and `slew_w` `int(50,5000)`,
across both families of stimulus that can produce legitimate opposition:
* **1050 load reversals** — 7 sizes (±300 W … ±4000 W) × 5 write staggers, the
serialised write path landing unit B's number up to four cycles after A's;
* **840 flapping loads** — 7 periods (10 s … 600 s) × 4 amplitudes.
Every run is executed **twice**: once at a roster of two and once at a roster of
one on the same stimulus. **The N=1 arm is the control**, and it is the reason
this document can separate *"a property of the check that shipped"* from *"a
property of the second inverter"* instead of asserting one and hoping.
Supervised caps are the shipped `max_w` (2000 W per unit), so the site rail is
2000 W at N=1 and 4000 W at N=2 — `Controller.site_max_w`, the roster sum.
### Reproducing it
The harness is **not committed here**, for the reason SAFETY-31's was not: it
imports `plantsim` and `frame_check`, which live in the other repository and are
not present in CI. What it does is small enough to restate: build two
`plantsim.Inverter`s from `INVERTER_A` / `INVERTER_B`, close the loop with the
add-on's own `compute()` and `arbiter.allocate_record()`, put each share on its
own wire through `Inverter.command()`, advance `Site.settle()` one control cycle,
and record `(standing command, inv.reg(0x0518))` per unit and
`(Σ standing, site.grid)` for the site. Then, for each candidate threshold, the
**longest run of consecutive cycles** on which the shipped `disagrees()` is true —
not a count of true samples, because the watchdog's window is cleared by any
disagreeing sample. Point it at a checkout with `GOODWE_ADDON_REPO`.
⚠️ MUTATION.md's note applies: those harnesses write `__pycache__` into **both**
trees.
### A. PER-UNIT — a unit's standing command vs its own 0x0518 power, N=2
| threshold | worst continuous, reversals | worst continuous, flapping | runs crossing (of 1890) |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 50 W | 25.0 s | 20.0 s | 962 |
| 100 W | 20.0 s | 15.0 s | 511 |
| 150 W | 15.0 s | 15.0 s | 379 |
| 200 W | 10.0 s | 15.0 s | 258 |
| **250 W** | **10.0 s** | **10.0 s** | **194** |
| 300 W | 10.0 s | 10.0 s | 124 |
| 500 W | 5.0 s | 5.0 s | 37 |
| 700 W | 5.0 s | 5.0 s | 16 |
| 1000 W | 0.0 s | 0.0 s | 0 |
Largest opposed magnitude anywhere in the 1890 runs: **875 W**.
**The curve is flat, and that is the finding that decided the shape of this
pair.** Unlike the site comparison — where the meter is driven by the LOAD and a
flapping load can hold it opposed for minutes — a unit's own power **chases its
own command** through a bounded ramp and a first-order lag, so the opposition can
only last as long as the crossing does. Dropping the threshold from 300 W to
50 W buys 15 s of extra transient and nothing else. **So the work is done by the
window, and the threshold is put where the control law already draws its line.**
#### `unit_sign_disagree_w: 250` — schema `int(50,5000)`
`saturation_w / 2`. The check gates on **both** sides being over `min_w`, and the
two are **opposed**, so the smallest command-versus-power gap it can ever see is
`2 × min_w`. At 250 W that is exactly the 500 W at which `compute()`'s own
anti-windup test already concludes the inverter is not following. **This watchdog
therefore cannot fire on a divergence the shipped control law itself calls
ordinary tracking**, and the two guards meet at a number.
Rejected: a threshold above the observed 875 W maximum, which would gate nothing
legitimate in — and would also be blind to a unit reversing a 900 W share.
#### `unit_sign_disagree_s: 85` — schema `int(30,1800)`
Three bounds, and the value clears all three.
* **lower, from the rig — 10.0 s.** Two control cycles, the worst continuous
legitimate opposition above 250 W across all 1890 runs. It is a reversing site
whose second write lands a cycle after the first, both units then slewing
through zero behind a 10 s lag. Nothing is wrong.
* **lower, from the firmware — 30 s (`inverter.LINK_STALE_S`).** A unit not
executing its share for less than the firmware's own veto window is a *link*
fault the add-on already answers by dropping the unit from the split. Firing
inside that window would raise a second, louder alarm about a state already
being handled — the SAFETY-15/SAFETY-19 failure exactly.
* **upper, from SAFETY-02 itself — 180 s, the site hold.** A unit that is not
doing what it was told must not be parked *later* than the site would be
parked for the same watts, and this conclusion needs nothing to net out: it is
complete on the first cycle it appears.
**85 s** is seventeen control cycles: **8.5× the worst legitimate episode**,
**2.8× the firmware veto**, and **under half** the site hold. Deliberately not
60, 75, 90, 120 or 180.
### B / C. SITE — Σ standing commands vs the meter, at BOTH rosters
**Load-reversal family** (1050 runs each), worst continuous legitimate opposition:
| threshold | **N=2** | **N=1 (control)** | ratio |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 100 W | 335.0 s | 175.0 s | 1.91× |
| 200 W | 260.0 s | 120.0 s | 2.17× |
| **300 W** | **215.0 s** | **110.0 s** | **1.95×** |
| 500 W | 155.0 s | 90.0 s | 1.72× |
| 700 W | 130.0 s | 70.0 s | 1.86× |
| 1000 W | 85.0 s | 35.0 s | 2.43× |
**The second inverter roughly DOUBLES the worst legitimate crossing, and at the
shipped 300 W threshold it takes it from 110 s — comfortably inside the 180 s
hold — to 215 s, which is outside it.**
The mechanism is not mysterious and is worth stating because it predicts the
ratio: the transient the 180 s hold exists to reject is the loop crossing zero
after a load reversal, and the command has to travel the whole **site rail** at
`slew_w` per cycle. At N≥2 that rail is `Controller.site_max_w`, the roster sum,
while `slew_w` is unchanged. The worst case is the corner of the config space
where that takes longest — `gain: 0.05`, `slew_w: 50`, both **schema floors** —
against a ±2200 W load reversal, which is an oven and a heat pump.
#### `site_sign_disagree_w: 300` — CARRIED, and here is the justification
The argument behind 300 W is about **noise**: *"near zero the sign is noise, and
near zero is where a healthy loop LIVES"* — the deadband holds the command still
while the meter wanders either side of `target_grid_w`. `deadband_w` is 15 W and
there is one P1 whatever is behind it. **Nothing in that argument depends on the
roster**, and the campaign agrees: the fraction of samples gated in at 300 W is
within a few percent at both rosters. Carried, with a measurement behind the
carry rather than an assumption.
#### `site_sign_disagree_s: 325` — NOT carried, and that is the point of the card
180 s is **inside** the 215 s the two-inverter campaign measures, at a
configuration the schema accepts. Carrying it would have shipped a false trip on
the check with the best record in the safety table — which is the exact failure
this card was opened to prevent, arriving from the other direction.
**325 s** is 1.51× the measured worst. It is well inside the **900 s** quarter
that bills the capacity tariff, and it is inside **every** episode the fault day
contains: 2026-08-20's four clusters run 16, 30, 77 and 77 minutes, and its
opposed runs reach 1750 s. What it costs is stated rather than hidden — about two
and a half extra minutes of wrong-direction **site** power before the stop —
and it is bought to remove a false trip a legal configuration produces.
Deliberately not 300 or 360.
**Rejected alternative:** keep 180 s and raise the site threshold to 1000 W,
where the worst is 85 s. It gives a better margin and a faster stop, and it is
wrong: it would be raising a **noise** gate to reject a **transient**, which is
what the window is for, and it would leave the site check blind to a 900 W
whole-site reversal at a 4 kW site.
### A limitation this campaign found, which SAFETY-30 does not introduce and does not fix
The **flapping-load** family behaves completely differently for the SITE
comparison, and the control arm is what makes it interpretable:
| threshold | **N=2** | **N=1 (control)** |
|---:|---:|---:|
| 300 W | 980.0 s | 1000.0 s |
| 700 W | 975.0 s | 1000.0 s |
| 1000 W | 950.0 s | 1000.0 s |
A square wave whose half period is about one control cycle opposes the command on
**every** cycle: the command chases the previous half-cycle's meter while the
meter has already reversed. **No window inside the billing quarter survives it and
no threshold up to 1000 W does either — at EITHER roster.** The N=1 column is
this document's whole reason for existing: this is a property of comparing a
lagged command against a meter, and it has nothing to do with the second
inverter.
It is not acted on here, in order of weight: it is **identical at the roster this
add-on ships**, so acting on it would be changing a live safety path on evidence
that has nothing to do with this card; a ~6 kW square wave at 0.1 Hz sustained
for a quarter of an hour is not a house (the captured healthy day's longest
opposed run is **30 s**); and the fix is not a number — it wants the detector to
notice that the disagreement is **alternating**, which is a different check.
**It is a card, and this section is its evidence.**
### D. The fault arm — because a survey of healthy data is not a derivation
210 runs with inverter B executing the **negation** of its share throughout,
sibling faithful, meter left to net:
| threshold | longest run the per-unit check detects | runs the SITE check also sees |
|---:|---:|---:|
| 250 W | 890.0 s | 210 / 210 |
| 300 W | 890.0 s | 180 / 210 |
| 700 W | 885.0 s | 112 / 210 |
| 1000 W | 885.0 s | 60 / 210 |
| 1500 W | 880.0 s | 45 / 210 |
| 2000 W | 0.0 s | 39 / 210 |
At the shipped 250 W the fault is detected continuously for the whole run in
every one of the 210 — an 85 s hold has ten times the evidence it needs. The
right-hand column is the honest half: on a *reversing* stimulus the site
comparison often does see something too, because the reversal is large enough to
move the meter. **The case it cannot see is the steady one**, and that is the
fixture `test_watchdog.py` part 4 runs: the shipped comparison is false on
**0 of 14** cycles while the per-unit check convicts B on every one.
## 4. Inverter B does not exist
Every two-inverter figure in §3 was produced with **inverter A's ramp and lag
copied onto B** (`plantsim.INVERTER_B`, `measured=False`); its 3000 W rating,
where this repository's fixtures use one, is a **hypothesis marked as one**.
[[SPIKE-04]] measures the real ones and is the revisit trigger for all four
numbers — not a reason to move any of them now.
Which figures depend on it, stated so nobody has to work it out:
* **`unit_sign_disagree_s: 85`** — most. Its lower bound is the 10.0 s crossing,
which is a direct function of B's ramp and lag. A slower second unit lengthens
it; the 8.5× is what buys headroom for that.
* **`site_sign_disagree_s: 325`** — yes, but less directly. Its 215 s is
dominated by the **rail** and by `slew_w`, which are configuration, not
hardware; B's dynamics move it at the margin.
* **`unit_sign_disagree_w: 250`** — **no.** It is `saturation_w / 2`, read off
the add-on's own control law. The rig only confirms that nothing legitimate
sits over it for long.
* **`site_sign_disagree_w: 300`** — **no.** It is the meter's noise floor and the
deadband, neither of which is a property of any inverter.
## 5. Mutation ledger
Every run on a **freshly copied tree of its own, no `__pycache__`, mounted
`:ro`** into the CI image — the structural immunity MUTATION.md records. ⚠️ The
first battery used ONE shared directory rebuilt between mutations and reported a
**RED baseline**; a container mounted it mid-copy and read a missing
`config.yaml` as a failing check. That whole run was discarded: MUTATION.md's
rule is that a run which could have been racing is not a result, and a battery
whose baseline is not green establishes nothing. The harness now copies a
directory per mutation and **refuses to report anything if the baseline is not
green**.
Byte deltas measured, not estimated; the `+0 B` ones are marked, since a
size-preserving edit is what TEST-15 turned into a false survivor once already.
| # | file | mutation | Δ | result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `main.py` | the per-unit comparison put back to `self.grid` at every roster | −30 B | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`. This is the card |
| M2 | `main.py` | the per-unit comparison forced to `inv.batt` at N=1 too | −31 B | **RED** — AC 8 |
| M3 | `main.py` | the site half never evaluated | −6 B | **RED** — AC 3 |
| **M4** | `main.py` | **the site half armed at N=1 as well** | **+0 B** | **SURVIVOR on the first battery — GAP CLOSED**, then RED. See below |
| M5 | `main.py` | the `sign_site` claim never filed | −6 B | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`. ⚠️ `test_peakguard.py` stayed **GREEN**, correctly: 10f's AST scan pins which sources CAN be filed and the append is still written; whether it is REACHED is a dynamic question no fixture there gets to |
| M6 | `main.py` | the site latch not persisted to the store | −58 B | **RED** — the flat-keys and restart checks |
| M7 | `main.py` | the operator clear leaves the site latch set | −42 B | **RED** — the clear check |
| M8 | `watchdog.py` | `arm()` clears `disagree_since` | +35 B | **RED** — "re-armed on every one of 38 cycles still trips" |
| M9 | `watchdog.py` | the reason hard-codes "a meter reading" again | +1 B | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`. `test_inverter.py` stayed **GREEN**; its part-3 row reads the noun off `sign_wd.against` rather than out of the reason string, so the two checks bite in different places |
| M10 | `watchdog.py` | `unit_sign_disagree_w` 250 → 300 | **+0 B** | **RED** — the `saturation_w / 2` pin and the CFG-03 pin |
| M11 | `watchdog.py` | `site_sign_disagree_s` 325 → 180, i.e. **the number carried** | **+0 B** | **RED** — the measured-215 s check and the CFG-03 pin |
| M12 | `arbiter.py` | `sign_site` scoped `SCOPE_UNIT` | **+0 B** | **RED** — `test_arbiter.py` **and** `test_peakguard.py` |
| M13 | `validate.py` | the `unit_sign_disagree_w` rule removed | −126 B | **RED** — `test_validate.py` |
| **M14** | `main.py` | **`arm()` handed `self.sign_cfg` at EVERY roster** — the WIRING, not the values | −31 B | **SURVIVOR at review — GAP CLOSED**, then RED. See below |
| M15 | `main.py` | per-unit `arm()` given the right `min_w` and the SHIPPED hold — a HOLD-ONLY mis-wire | +78 B | **RED** — the same wiring pin |
| M16 | `main.py` | per-unit `arm()` given the right `min_w` and the SITE hold — hold-only again, and behaviour-preserving | +83 B | **RED** — the wiring pin, and the ONLY red in `test_watchdog.py` |
### M4 is recorded as a survivor because it was one
The check it should have gone red on read:
```python
not _c1s.site_sign_wd.tripped and _c1s.site_sign_wd.disagree_since is None
```
Arming the site detector at a roster of one left that **green**, and the reason
is worth reading because the check looked airtight. In the N=1 fixture the unit
detector trips first at its 1 s hold and parks the inverter; the site's standing
command is then **0 W**, so the site predicate is false, its window is never
opened, and `disagree_since is None` is true *whether or not the detector was
evaluated at all*. **The assertion ran, the sentence was true, and the data
could not reach the failure it named** — MUTATION.md's third failure mode,
inside the check written to prevent it.
Replaced with a **call counter installed on the object** before the run: twelve
cycles, zero calls, printed. A counter can only be zero for one reason. The
mutation was re-run against it and is red; the run that found it was discarded
along with its tree, so this is a result and not an artefact.
### M14: the VALUES were pinned and the WIRING was not
M10 and M11 mutate the numbers in `watchdog.SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS` and both are
red through the config pins. Neither of them touches the line that DELIVERS
those numbers to a detector:
```python
inv.sign_wd.arm(self.sign_cfg if one else self.unit_sign_cfg,
AGAINST_METER if one else AGAINST_OWN_POWER)
```
Drop the conditional — `arm(self.sign_cfg, ...)` — and every unit is armed with
SAFETY-02's meter-facing pair instead of the re-derived per-unit one. At review
that left **all 19 files green**. `grep -rn "sign_wd.cfg" test_*.py` found
exactly one threshold assertion, and it is §7's N=1 arm — `(300.0, 1.0)` —
which the mutation PRESERVES. Nothing anywhere read `inv.sign_wd.cfg` at a
roster of two.
The behavioural checks in part 3 cannot close it and it is worth saying why: B
is reversed at ~2000 W and every hold in that fixture is short, so B trips under
either pair. **A fault big enough and long enough to trip under both thresholds
is evidence about neither.**
What the survivor costs in the field is the whole product of §3: at
`config.yaml`'s own defaults the per-unit check would run at `sign_disagree_s`
**180 s instead of 85 s** — 2.1× slower to park a reversed inverter — and its
gate would move from 250 W to 300 W, so a unit reversing a share between the two
becomes invisible, while `SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS`, `config.yaml` and §3 all go on
describing a pair the running code does not use. With CI green.
**Closed by a wiring pin in `test_watchdog.py` part 3**, on the real
two-inverter Controller: every `inv.sign_wd.cfg` equals the per-unit pair,
`site_sign_wd.cfg` equals the site pair, and each detector's `against` is its
own instrument — all graded **against literals**, since `== self.unit_sign_cfg`
cannot tell *the per-unit pair* from *whatever this Controller was handed*.
⚠️ **And the fixture had to be changed for that pin to mean anything.**
`_sign_site` set `unit_sign_disagree_s: 1` **and** `site_sign_disagree_s: 1`
**and** `sign_disagree_s: 1`, with two of the three magnitude gates at 300 W. A
bare equality there discriminates on `min_w` alone: a mis-wiring that delivered
the right magnitude with the wrong hold would compare EQUAL to the pair it was
supposed to have. That is this document's own §5 lesson and MUTATION.md's third
failure mode — a check comparing two things that happen to be equal cannot see
the difference it names — reappearing inside the fix for it. The three pairs are
now pairwise distinct **in both coordinates** (250 W / 1 s, 320 W / 2 s,
300 W / 3 s), a PRECONDITION check asserts that distinctness so a later edit
collapsing them goes red rather than quietly vacuous, and both pairs are
**printed**. M15 and M16 exist to show the hold half actually bites: right
magnitude, wrong hold, red both times — and M16, whose wrong hold still trips
inside the drive, is red on the wiring pin and on **nothing else** in that file.
## 6. What this card does NOT close
* **The flapping-load blind spot in the SITE comparison.** §3, at length. Present
identically at the shipped roster of one; wants an alternation test, not a
number; a card of its own.
* **A unit misbehaving while it is NOT loop-driven.** Gate 1 (`following`) is
kept for the per-unit comparison, deliberately: the whole no-false-positive
argument is built on it, and the saturation freeze already grades that window.
So between the start of a maintenance cycle and its end, a unit reversing
against its own command is the freeze's to notice. Widening it is a card with a
rig campaign behind it, not an edit.
* **A sign inversion downstream of this add-on** — in the firmware, on the wire,
or in a future driver. Unchanged: our view stays self-consistent and both
comparisons stay silent. That is the witness's problem and it always was.
* **A false-alarm interaction with SAFETY-31 that nobody has to think about.**
They overlap in one scenario and both fire in it. That is correct — they
conclude different things — but an operator will see two alarms for one event.
Whether the banner should say so in one sentence is a UI card.
@@ -0,0 +1,816 @@
# SAFETY-32 — `bms_soc_floor` per pack, and the two judgement calls it left open
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-32`.
**Card:** SAFETY-32 — *"One `bms_soc_floor` for two packs grades the shallower
pack against the deeper one's cut-out"*, scoped by the card's own PM PROOFREAD
to its **third** bullet only. Bullets 1 (aggregate anti-windup) and 2 (per-instance
`achievable_w`) were verified as already shipped by DEV-02 and CFG-04 and were
**not** touched — `main.py`'s `actual_w=self.site_batt_w` comment is the record
of why the first of those must stay site-level, and it still reads as written.
---
## 1. The defect, stated in the terms the code uses
`bms_soc_floor` **describes a battery**: it is the percent that pack's own BMS
cuts out at, register `0x0560` on the reference GW5000S-BP, read as 10. It was a
flat option because there was one pack.
`peak_soc_floor` **describes the site's policy**: the depth a money-saving
discharge may never reach. Rule 8 refuses `peak_soc_floor <= bms_soc_floor`,
because such a floor can never bind — the BMS wins and the status page reports a
backstop that does not exist.
At two packs of different models the two cut-outs differ, and one number for both
is wrong **in the direction that empties a pack**: with cut-outs of 10 % and 30 %
and `peak_soc_floor: 20`, the add-on **started**, and the guard would command a
forced discharge that pack B's *BMS* — not the operator's floor — is the thing
that stops. That is rule 8's own failure mode, reached through rule 8.
---
## 2. DECISION 1 — required per entry, not defaulted from `PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS`
The card left this open and asked for the reason to be recorded.
**Decided: REQUIRED of every roster entry**, in `config.yaml`'s schema
(`bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)`, no trailing `?`) and in `validate.py` rule 8, which
refuses a missing one **by name**.
The reason is that a default here is not a convenience, it is **this card's own
defect wearing a different hat**. A default is one number applied to every pack,
which is exactly what the flat key was. An add-on that answers "10 %" for a pack
nobody has told it about has invented a property of somebody's battery, and the
failure mode of the invention is the one this card exists to remove — the
shallower pack protected by a floor that belongs to the deeper one. CFG-03's
rule ("defaults live in exactly one place") points the same way: the one mirror
`PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["bms_soc_floor"]` is the default for the **flat** key, i.e.
for the single-inverter shape, and reusing it per entry would make one dict the
default in two shapes with two meanings.
It is also the treatment `max_w` already gets, for the same reason and by the
same argument (`inverter.py`'s `build_roster()` docstring): the per-unit numbers
that describe hardware are required, and the per-unit *sensors* are optional
because an absent sensor is a real state.
**The cost is stated rather than hidden.** This is a schema change: a roster
config written before this branch is refused by the Supervisor until each entry
gains the key, and every roster fixture in the suite needed it. Nothing in
production carries a roster today — `inverters:` ships `[]` and the second
inverter is ~8 days out — so the migration is paid by fixtures and by whoever
writes the first real roster, at a startup refusal that names the entry.
**What is NOT inherited.** An entry that omits the key does not borrow the flat
one. `Inverter.bms_soc_floor` is then `None`, `peakguard.pack_floor_pct()`
answers `None`, and `discharge_permitted()` already treats an unknown floor as
**no permission** — so even in the window before rule 8 runs (e.g. `sim/inject.py`,
which does not run the startup gate) the absence costs a shave and never a pack.
`0.0` was rejected explicitly: it is the most permissive value the key has.
## 3. DECISION 2 — the site verdict is the MAXIMUM of the packs' own floors
`Controller.pack_floor_soc` — the **minimum** measured SoC, the emptiest pack —
**is unchanged**, exactly as the card instructed. What changed is the floor it is
graded against. `peakguard.binding_soc_floor()` reduces the roster's per-pack
floors, each of them `max(peak_soc_floor, that pack's own cut-out)`, with a
`max()`. The two reductions pair: a minimum SoC against a maximum floor is the
conservative combination, and both move the verdict towards refusing a shave and
away from spending a pack. `min(soc) <= max(floor)` is implied by "some pack is
at or below its own floor", so the site verdict is never more permissive than
grading each pack separately would be. The converse is not true and is not
claimed — a site can be refused while every pack individually has headroom, which
costs a shave.
### 3a. ⚠️ FIX ROUND — the reduction was written and argued, and NOT GRADED
PR #48 was rejected because the argument in §4 below justified *writing* the
reduction and was then not carried into a check. Neither of the two mutations
below appears anywhere in §6's twelve-row battery: it graded *"the reduction
dropped"* and *"the bare option handed over"*, and never asked what happens when
the reduction is the **wrong one**, or when the roster handed to it is
**sliced**. Both were applied to `app/` by the reviewer and **all 19 files
stayed green**:
| mutation | Δ | why it survived |
|---|---|---|
| `binding_soc_floor()`: `max(floors)` → `min(floors)` | **0 bytes** | every roster in the suite was rule-8-valid or one pack long, so `floors` held **identical numbers** and `max`/`min`/first/last were four spellings of one answer |
| the `decide()` call site: `self.packs` → `self.packs[:1]` | **+4 bytes** | part 12g asserted `"self.packs" in <the unparsed expression>` — and `self.packs[:1]` **contains that substring** |
The zero-byte one was proved to have actually run rather than assumed:
`dis.get_instructions` showed the `LOAD_GLOBAL`s as `[float, pack_floor_pct,
any, min]`, and `binding_soc_floor([Pack("a",50,10), Pack("b",50,35)], 20.0)`
returned `20.0` where the shipped code returns `35.0`.
**The common cause is this repository's recurring defect** — a check whose DATA
cannot reach the failure it names. The one check that used a cut-out **above**
the EMS floor (12c's `_n1_deep`) ran on a roster of **ONE**, where every possible
reduction agrees. So no check in the suite ever evaluated
`binding_soc_floor()` on two packs whose floors **differ**.
**And the rule-8 degeneracy is not a defence, by §4's own words.** If
"unreachable is a claim about today's rule ordering, not a property of this
function, and `validate_startup_config()` is also `sim/inject.py`'s entry point"
is enough to *write* the reduction, it is enough to *grade* it. Through
`sim/inject.py`, which does not run rule 8 at all, `min(floors)` lets the guard
command a forced discharge to 20 % on a pack whose BMS cuts out at 35 %.
**What was added — no shipped behaviour changed, only what observes it:**
* **`test_peakguard.py` part 12c2** evaluates `binding_soc_floor()` on a roster
whose per-pack floors **all differ**. Four **simulated** cut-outs —
`30, 25, 40, 35` %, every one strictly above `peak_soc_floor: 20`, so
`pack_floor_pct()` selects the cut-out for each and `floors` *is* that tuple in
that order. The four candidate reductions are then four different numbers:
max = 40 <- the shipped answer
min = 25
first = 30 <- "grade the site against pack A", inside the function
last = 35
mean = 32.5
The extremes sit at **interior** roster positions (index 2 is the max, index 1
the min). A two-pack roster structurally cannot separate these — there `max`
and `last` coincide and so do `min` and `first` — and neither can three. Four
is the smallest roster that separates all four. The precondition is its own
check (habit 1), one pack is then raised past the old maximum (habit 7: the
**last** pack, which was neither extreme, so the line can only move if the
reduction read it), and `peak_soc_floor` is lifted above every cut-out to grade
the other side of the conjunction.
* **Part 12g is behaviour now, not source text** (MUTATION.md habit 4). Real
`Controller.cycle()`s on a two-pack roster, both packs held at the same SoC and
everything else identical, with the packs' own cut-outs as the only thing
varied:
cut-outs A 10 / B 18 % -> decide() got soc_floor=20 %, floor_limited=False
cut-outs A 10 / B 35 % -> decide() got soc_floor=35 %, floor_limited=True
The observable is `PeakDecision.soc_floor` — the argument, echoed back by the
shipped `decide()` — so the whole path from `Controller.inverters` to the
guard's argument is under test, and the site's **verdict flips** as well as the
number. `self.packs[:1]` answers 20 % both times. **Which** option key the floor
comes from stays pinned on the source in part 4, because that claim genuinely
is about the code's shape; that the option still governs is now graded
behaviourally too.
* ⚠️ **A THIRD SURVIVOR, FOUND WHILE FIXING THE FIRST TWO, AND RECORDED RATHER
THAN QUIETLY REPAIRED.** The first cut of part 12g varied only **pack B's**
cut-out — so `self.packs[-1:]`, grade the site against the **last** pack,
agreed with the full roster on both runs and stayed green across all 19 files
(+5 bytes). A two-run fixture that only ever moves the second pack pins `[:1]`
and not `[-1:]`; it is the same defect one step along, and it was in the fix
for this defect. Part 12g now runs the **same pair of cut-outs in both
orders**:
cut-outs A 10 / B 18 % -> soc_floor=20 %, floor_limited=False
cut-outs A 10 / B 35 % -> soc_floor=35 %, floor_limited=True
...the SAME PAIR SWAPPED, A 35 / B 18 % -> soc_floor=35 %, floor_limited=True
`[:1]` answers 20 % on the second run, `[-1:]` answers 20 % on the third, and
the roster answers 35 % on both. No single-position slice passes all three.
This is the mirror `12h` already ran on the SoC axis, which is where the shape
was borrowed from.
* ⚠️ **AND A FOURTH, from the same battery: the EMPTY-roster branch.** Rewriting
`binding_soc_floor([])`'s `float(soc_floor)` to `return None` (−43 bytes) was
green across all 19 files. It is defensive code — `Controller.inverters` is
never empty on a started controller, and `inputs_ok` refuses the cycle before
the guard is reached if it were — so nothing in the suite went near it. It is
**pinned rather than argued**, in both directions (the option when there is
one, `None` when there is not), because a branch with no check is a branch
that can be rewritten under a green suite. The check also records why it
cannot permit anything either way: `pack_floor_soc` is `None` at an empty
roster, and `discharge_permitted()` refuses on a `None` SoC whatever the floor
is.
* **`wired_over_limit()` gained a `prepare(ctl)` hook**, inside its retry loop so
every attempt grades the same site, which is the only window in which a second
inverter can join the roster before the telegrams are fed.
* **In-process mutation rows 22, 22b and 23** record all four survivors, so a
later edit that re-degenerates any of these fixtures goes red on a row rather
than on nothing.
### 3b. ⚠️ SECOND FIX ROUND — the fix carried the defect it was written to close
Round 2 closed both named survivors, and both of round 3's blockers are the
**same defect sitting inside that fix**: a check whose TEXT claims more than its
FIXTURE can observe. Applied to `app/` on `8501e05`, **all 19 files stayed
green** for both:
| mutation | Δ | the sentence that was too broad | why the fixture could not see it |
|---|---|---|---|
| `binding_soc_floor()`: `max(floors)` → `max(floors[-2:])` | **+5 bytes** | *"So the reduction reads **every entry**"* | 12c2's only counterfactual raised the **last** pack (`_deeper[-1]`), and **every window that ends at the roster's end follows the last pack**. On `(30,25,40,35)` both answer 40; on `_deeper` both answer 45. |
| the `decide()` call site: `self.packs` → `self.packs[:2]` | **+4 bytes** | *"what is reduced is the **ROSTER** and not a POSITION in it"* | all three `_floor_reaching_decide` runs drove a **two-pack** roster, where `self.packs[:2]` **is** `self.packs` — by exactly the argument 12c2 itself makes about two packs being unable to separate max/min/first/last. |
Round 2's *report* stated the narrow, true claim ("no **single-position** slice
passes all three runs"). The *check in the file* stated the broad one. That gap
is the whole of round 3.
**THE GENERAL LAW, stated once so the next card can use it:**
> **A fixture of N packs cannot separate two reductions that agree on N packs.**
> Two cannot separate max from min from first from last. Three cannot separate
> max from max-of-the-last-two. A single counterfactual that varies one position
> cannot separate the reduction from any window containing that position.
Its corollary is the reason this section is long: **the regress does not
terminate in a fixture.** Closing `[:1]` took two packs; `[:2]` took three;
`[:3]` takes four — and a four-pack run hands `[:4]` the same free pass. Round 3
therefore does two different things rather than adding one more pack.
**What was added — no shipped behaviour changed, only what observes it:**
* **Part 12c2 gained a ROSTER SET and a computed FAMILY TABLE.** The same four
simulated cut-outs with the **deepest moved to each of the four positions**,
and fourteen enumerated rewrites of `max(floors)` each checked against every
roster. The table is **computed and printed**, and a member with an empty kill
list takes the check **red naming it** — so a family member can no longer be
added without a fixture that reaches it. `max(floors[-2:])` is killed only by
the rosters whose deepest sits at index 0 or 1, which is precisely the data the
single last-pack counterfactual could not supply.
* **Part 12c2 gained a LENGTH SWEEP.** `binding_soc_floor()` is a pure function
over a list, which is the one place a sweep is cheap: **78 simulated rosters,
lengths 1 through 12, the deepest cut-out at every position of each.** That
closes *every* head window `max(floors[:w])` and *every* tail window
`max(floors[-w:])` of width **1 to 11** in one property rather than one
mutation at a time — and the check asserts that width **12 is NOT reached**, so
the limit is a red line rather than a silence.
* **Part 12g drives THREE-pack rosters**, with the deep cut-out at index 0, 1
**and** 2. Every positional slice of a three-pack roster is a proper subset of
`{0,1,2}` and so drops a position; the run whose deep pack sits there answers
the option, 20 %, where the roster answers 35 %. `self.packs[:2]` goes red on
the index-2 run. `_floor_reaching_decide()` now takes `*floors`, and the extra
units join through the same `second_inverter()` hook the two-pack runs use.
* **Part 12g gained a POSITIONAL-SLICE TABLE**, computed against the **real**
`Controller.packs` each of the six cycles actually ran and the **real**
`PeakDecision.soc_floor` it produced — so it measures the shipped call site's
own answer, not a re-derivation, and a survivor takes the check red.
* ⚠️ **AND A FIFTH AND SIXTH SURVIVOR, FOUND BY ROUND 3'S OWN BATTERY AND
CLOSED STRUCTURALLY RATHER THAN BY ONE MORE PACK.** `self.packs[:3]` (+4) and
`self.packs[-3:]` (+5) survive **all six** behavioural runs, because the
longest roster those runs drive is three packs long. Part 12g therefore also
pins the roster **argument's identity** on the AST: it must unparse to exactly
`self.packs`, which is false of every slice at every length. ⚠️ This is **not**
the substring test round 2 removed — `"self.packs" in expr` is *true* of every
slice; `ast.unparse(arg) == "self.packs"` is *false* of all of them. The two
halves are separated and each says what it reaches: the **runs** grade the
VALUE and reach every slice up to N=3; the **pin** grades the ARGUMENT'S
IDENTITY at any N and is blind to two things the runs are not — a rewrite of
what `Controller.packs` *returns* (the runs' `len(ctl.packs) == 3` catches
that) and the reduction *inside* `binding_soc_floor()` (12c2's).
* ⚠️ **AND ONE ROW IS RECORDED AS NOT CAUGHT.** A reduction over a window
**twelve packs wide** is indistinguishable from `max(floors)` on every roster
in the file, because the sweep stops at twelve. Unlike the call site there is
no identity claim to pin — the claim is semantic, "the maximum", and a shape
pin would refuse honest refactors of the expression. It is reported **with its
size** (it needs a 13-pack roster, on a site whose roster is ONE and whose
second unit is ~8 days out) rather than hidden.
* **Two rewrites are EQUIVALENT, not uncaught.** `max(set(floors))` and
`list(reversed(self.packs))` cannot change any answer — `max` is order- and
duplicate-invariant. The second is nonetheless red on the structural pin.
* **In-process mutation rows 24 – 27** record all four of round 3's findings,
including the not-caught one, so a later edit that re-degenerates any of these
fixtures goes red on a row rather than on nothing.
## 4. ⚠️ THE HONEST LIMITATION, and it is the reason this record exists
**Under any configuration rule 8 accepts, `binding_soc_floor()` answers
`peak_soc_floor` for every pack.** Rule 8 refuses `peak_soc_floor <= bms_soc_floor`
on *every* unit, so `max(peak_soc_floor, bms_i) == peak_soc_floor` everywhere the
add-on will actually start. The per-pack **floor** is therefore non-degenerate
only against a config rule 8 refuses.
This is not a defect and it is not hidden. It is the same argument
`validate.unit_caps_indexed()` makes about itself, in that function's own words:
> *"Rule 9(d) already refuses such a config so the two lists cannot desynchronise
> in shipped use — but 'unreachable' is a claim about today's rule ordering, not
> a property of this function, and `validate_startup_config()` is also
> `sim/inject.py`'s entry point."*
CFG-04's index desynchronisation is what happened the last time that reasoning
was left implicit. So the reduction is written, and it is graded on both sides:
`test_peakguard.py` part 12c sweeps **1775** rule-8-valid `(peak_soc_floor,
bms_soc_floor)` pairs and asserts the answer is the option in every one of them
(that is AC 5, measured over the whole option space rather than at the shipped
point), and then asserts that on the pair rule 8 *refuses* the answer is the
**cut-out** — because without that second line the sweep would be satisfied by
`soc_floor` typed straight through, and the mutation that deletes the `max()`
could never bite. It does bite: M2 on the PR.
**What IS live at a rule-8-valid roster** is the rest of the card: rule 8 now
refuses the two-model config that used to start; the permission is answered per
pack, so the alarm names the pack that stopped the site rather than "the
battery"; and an entry with no stated cut-out is withheld instead of defaulted.
## 4b. ⚠️ ROUND 4 — the sibling argument, and SPIKE-04 making this the live axis
Rounds 2 and 3 hardened the **floor** axis: the `max` inside
`binding_soc_floor()`, the roster handed to it, `Controller.packs`, and
`pack_floor_pct()`'s conjunction. Round 4's blocker is the same family at the
**sibling argument of the same call**:
```python
self.peak_guard = peakguard.decide(
...,
soc=self.pack_floor_soc, # MINIMUM <- round 4
soc_floor=peakguard.binding_soc_floor(self.packs, ...), # MAXIMUM <- rounds 2-3
```
`peakguard.py`'s own docstring names them as a pair — *"MAXIMUM here pairs with
the MINIMUM in `pack_floor_soc`"* — and a conjunction is exactly as strong as
its weaker half. On `52380c0`, with all 19 files green and verified again after
the rebase onto `3934ad7`:
| mutation in `Controller.pack_floor_soc` | bytes | before round 4 | now |
|---|---|---|---|
| `min(float(v) for v in vals[:2])` | +4 | **GREEN** | RED |
| `min(float(v) for v in vals[-2:])` | +5 | **GREEN** | RED |
| `min(float(v) for v in vals[:3])` | +4 | **GREEN** | RED |
| `vals[:1]`, `vals[-1:]`, `vals[1:]`, `vals[:-1]`, `max(vals)`, the mean | | RED | RED |
The suite's separating power on the SoC axis stopped at exactly **N = 2** —
precisely the state the floor axis was in before round 3, and which round 3
itself named as its blocker 2. A fixture of N packs cannot separate reductions
that agree on N packs.
**It changes a real answer.** A three-pack roster at 50 / 60 / 11 %, emptiest
pack **third**: the shipped property answers 11 %, `vals[:2]` answers 50 %. The
site is then graded for discharge *permission* against a pack 39 points fuller
than the emptiest, and spends a pack its own BMS stops — through
`sim/inject.py`, which runs no validator rule at all. The verdict flips with it:
11 % is below the 20 % EMS floor, so the shipped site is floor-limited and sizes
no forced discharge, where the mutant is permitted and sizes a positive one.
### ⚠️ SPIKE-04 makes the differing-floor discipline the entire exposure
SPIKE-04 reads pack B as **4 × Dyness DL5.0C, DoD 90 → floor 10 %** — **FROM THE
DATASHEET AND THE SERIAL. Inverter B does not physically exist (~8 days out) and
nothing about it has been measured.** Pack A is DoD 90 → 10 % as well, and *that
one is measured*, off register `0x0560` on the reference GW5000S-BP.
So **production is degenerate on the floor axis**: both packs floor at the same
value, `max(10, 10) == 10`, and a differing floor exists **only in the
fixtures**. That is not an argument for simplifying the fixtures to matching
values — it is the argument for keeping them. `binding_soc_floor()`'s reduction
is observable *nowhere else*, and the moment a third pack, a replacement pack or
a different chemistry arrives it is observable in the field. **Anyone who
"simplifies" `A_PACK_FLOOR != B_PACK_FLOOR_SIM` to one number deletes the only
data this repository has that can see the reduction at all**; part 12c2's
precondition check goes red if they do, and this paragraph is why.
The **SoC axis has no such degeneracy**. Two batteries at the same state of
charge is a coincidence, not a configuration, so `pack_floor_soc` is the half of
the pair that will be non-degenerate in the field from the day inverter B is
wired up.
### The treatment, transferred from round 3
* **the roster SET** — six real `Controller.cycle()` runs, the emptiest pack at
every position of a three-pack roster and both positions of a two-pack one,
the observable read off `PeakDecision.soc` (the argument, echoed) rather than
off a spy or a grep. Cut-outs held flat across all of them, so the floor axis
cannot be what moved the answers.
* **the positional-slice table and the non-slice table** — computed against the
real `Controller.inverters` each cycle carried and the real decision it
produced, printed, with a member that nothing kills taking the check red.
* **the length sweep** — the real property on real rosters of 1 to 12 inverters,
the empty pack at every position. Closes head and tail windows of width 1-11
at once. Width 12 and wider is **honestly not reached**, and asserted to be
unreached so a later sweep that lengthens the rosters must rewrite the
sentence.
* **the exact structural pin** — three of them, because there are three
reductions over roster length in this one property: `vals` is built by one
comprehension over the bare `self.inverters`; `any(... for v in vals)` reduces
the whole list; `min(... for v in vals)` reduces the whole list. Every slice
of either is red at **every** roster length, including the `[:3]` and `[:12]`
the runs and the sweep cannot see.
Unlike the floor axis, **there is no uncaught row here**: the claim at
`pack_floor_soc` is an *identity* ("this list"), so a shape pin is the right
instrument, where `binding_soc_floor()`'s claim is *semantic* ("the maximum")
and a shape pin there would refuse honest refactors. That asymmetry is why one
carries an open row and the other does not.
## 4c. ⚠️ THE ENUMERATION — what OTHER reductions over roster length are graded
This card has now been rejected three times for the same shape one step over, so
round 4 stopped closing members and enumerated the **family**. Every reduction
over `self.inverters` / `self.packs` in `Controller` was found from the AST and
mutated to a slice, one at a time, against the full 19-file suite.
| # | site | reduction | consumer | mutation | result |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `pack_floor_soc` | `min` over SoC | `decide(soc=)`, `arbitrage.decide(soc=)` | `vals[:2]` +4 | **was GREEN → now RED** (12i) |
| 2 | `pack_floor_soc` | `any(v is None)` | same | `vals[:1]` +4 | RED (raises in 12d; pinned in 12i) |
| 3 | `pack_floor_soc` | the `vals` comprehension | same | `self.inverters[:2]` +4 | RED (12i sweep + pin) |
| 4 | `binding_soc_floor` | `max` over floors | `decide(soc_floor=)` | `min`, windows | RED (12c2, round 2-3) |
| 5 | call site | the roster argument | same | `self.packs[:1..3]` | RED (12g, round 3) |
| 6 | `Controller.packs` | the comprehension | `binding_soc_floor`, `pack_permissions` | `self.inverters[:2]` +4 | RED (12g three-pack runs) |
| 7 | `site_batt_w` | `sum` + `any(None)` | `decide(batt_w=)` — sizes the floor | `self.inverters[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 8 | `site_rating_w` | `sum` of per-unit conjunction | `decide(achievable_w=)`, freeze rail | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 9 | `site_max_w` | `sum` of `max_w` | the site loop's supervised bound | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 10 | `site_dev_bound` | `sum` + `any(None)` | `looks_frozen`, `rail_unreachable` | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 11 | `site_circulating_w` | `circulating_w` over measured power | SAFETY-31 trip | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_watchdog.py) |
| 12 | `inputs_ok` | `all` over both readings | gates the whole cycle (§11.1 rule 1) | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 13 | `units` | `tuple` of names | the arbiter's scope table | `[:1]` +4 | RED (5 files) |
| 14 | `status_payload` | `min(_dues)` over `self.maints` | the operator's "maintenance due" row | `_dues[:1]` +4 | RED (test_maintenance.py) |
| 15 | `maint_unit` | `self.inverters[self.maint_index]` | which pack the FSM drives | `[0]` −15 | RED (test_maintenance.py) |
| 16 | store migration | the roster name list | MAINT-05's key migration | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_maintenance.py) |
| 17 | `validate_unit_ranges` | the roster argument | startup refusal | `[:1]` +4 | RED (test_inverter.py) |
| 18 | `cycle()` stale-input hold | `any(sign_wd.tripped)` | **a latched unit's failsafe SET** | `[:1]` +4 | **was GREEN → now RED** (test_watchdog.py part 8) |
| 19 | `publish()` status | `any(sign_wd.tripped)` | the MQTT status vocabulary | `[:1]` +4 | **was GREEN → now RED** (part 8) |
| 20 | `status_payload()` banner | `any(sign_wd.tripped)` | the one headline on the page | `[:1]` +4 | **was GREEN → now RED** (part 8) |
| 21 | `_grade_store_migration` | `any(sign_wd.tripped)` | SAFETY-02's re-arm guard | `[:1]` +4 | was GREEN → now RED (12j), see below |
| 22 | `cycle()` undeliverable list | `sorted(...)` over shares | the *text* of one event line | `[:1]` +4 | **STILL GREEN — honest gap, below** |
**Rows 18-20 are the finding, and they are not this card's code.** All three are
`any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in self.inverters)`, all three are SAFETY-30's, and
all three survived a green 19-file suite for exactly the reason every blocker on
this card survived: *the only fixture that reached them was a roster of ONE,
where `self.inverters[:1]` IS `self.inverters`.* Part 3 of test_watchdog.py has
built a two-inverter roster with only inverter B latched since SAFETY-30
shipped — the precise data all three needed — and none of them read it.
Row 18 is the one with teeth. A latched unit must take the whole roster past the
stale-input hold, because that unit's `failsafe` SET is the thing parking it;
main.py's own comment says *"the trip would stop acting the moment a poll was
missed"*. With `[:1]`, a latched inverter B plus a one-cycle gap in inverter A's
SoC returns early, and B's last share stands for the heartbeat to re-emit.
test_watchdog.py part 8 now drives that with the latch at **each** position, plus
the no-latch counterfactual that proves the hold really fires.
**Row 21 — graded structurally, and argued to be redundant.** The `[:1]` there
is now red on 12j's enumeration, but I could not construct a *reachable* state in
which it changes an answer: `_grade_store_migration()` runs at startup, before
any cycle, so a unit is tripped in memory only if its own `unit/<name>/sign_tripped`
key was truthy — which makes `namespaced_latched` True and short-circuits the
disjunct. I believe it is an equivalent mutant at that call site rather than a
live hole, and I am recording the argument instead of asserting the conclusion.
**Row 22 — STILL GREEN, and reported with its size.** `", ".join(sorted(u for u
in resolution.shares if not self._can_write(u)))[:1]` truncates the **names in
one event-log line**. It is +4 bytes and no check bites. The refusal itself —
`elif {u for u in resolution.shares if not self._can_write(u)}` — is a different
expression and *is* graded (test_peakguard.py part 10h-1b), so the site still
stops; what a `[:1]` costs is an operator being told one name when two units have
no writer. It is not a roster comprehension (it iterates `resolution.shares`), so
12j does not cover it and does not pretend to. Closing it needs a three-inverter
fixture with two writer-less entries, which is ALLOC-01's fixture and not this
card's. **Filed as open, with its size and its consequence, rather than closed
quietly or left unmentioned.**
### And the family closed rather than the member
`test_peakguard.py` part 12j enumerates the family from the AST and requires
every member to take the roster **whole**, so a new reduction over a slice is red
**on the line it is written**, at every roster length, with no fixture required.
That check is what would have caught rounds 2, 3 and 4's blockers on the round
they were written instead of one review round each; it is also what found rows
18-21.
⚠️ **AND IT WAS STILL TOO NARROW — see §4d.** Round 4's version enumerated the
26 roster comprehensions inside the `Controller` class, because that is where
the four known sites were. Round 5's blockers were four reductions in
`validate.py`, one module over, over a list *derived* from the roster three
calls away from it. The pin now parses every `.py` under `app/` and finds the
roster by transitive closure from one option key: **183 reductions across 9
modules.**
## 4d. ⚠️ ROUND 5 — the same family one MODULE over, and an instrument that discovers its own scope
Round 4 enumerated the family and closed it **inside the `Controller` class**,
because that is where the four known sites lived. The review found four more
survivors immediately, in `validate.py`, on a 19/19 green suite:
| site | mutation | delta | suite |
|---|---|---|---|
| `validate.py:779` | `min(caps)` → `min(caps[:1])` | +4 B | **GREEN** |
| `validate.py:779` | `min(caps)` → `min(caps[-1:])` | +5 B | **GREEN** |
| `validate.py:778` | `caps = [cap for _, cap in caps_ix[:1]]` | +4 B | **GREEN** |
| `validate.py:893` | `min(caps_ix[-1:], key=lambda p: p[1])` | +5 B | **GREEN** |
**None of them is an equivalent mutant — a safety refusal disappears.** With
`max_w: 5000` on inverter-a beside `2000` on inverter-b and
`sign_disagree_w: 3000`, the shipped validator answers one problem —
*"sign_disagree_w is 3000 W but max_w (inverter-b) is 2000 W, so the SAFETY-02
sign-disagreement watchdog can never fire"* — and every one of the four answers
**zero**. The site starts, with a watchdog reporting `armed` on the status page
that cannot trip on pack B. That is rule 5's own failure mode reached **through**
rule 5, which is the sentence `test_inverter.py:1657` says the rule exists to
prevent. Rule 6 loses its refusal the same way.
### Why round 4's pin could not see them, and why the fix is not four more checks
`caps` and `caps_ix` are not comprehensions over `self.inverters`; they are lists
**derived** from the roster, three function calls away from it, in a module the
enumeration never opened. Closing them by hand would have produced a fifth
rejection with the same shape one step over — that is the whole record of this
card. **A hand-written scope is the same defect as a hand-written fixture**
(MUTATION.md habit 12): a check whose data cannot reach the failure it names.
### The instrument
`test_peakguard.py` part 12j now parses **every `.py` under `app/`** off disk —
no module is named anywhere in the check — and finds the roster by transitive
closure from **one seed**, the `inverters` option key:
* a function whose returns are roster-carrying is **roster-producing**
(`roster_entries` → `build_roster` → `unit_caps_indexed` → `unit_caps`);
* a name assigned one carries it, **and so does a list accumulated in a loop
over one** — which is exactly what `caps`, `roster` and `problems` are, and
what round 4's rule could not express;
* an attribute or property answering one carries it (`self.inverters`,
`Controller.packs`, `Controller.units`, `live_units()`);
* **an argument at a call site taints that parameter in the callee**, which is
how the pin walks into `peakguard.binding_soc_floor`, `arbiter.resolve`,
`allocator.plan`, `circulation.circulating_w`, `maintenance.arbitrate` and
`store.migrate_maint_keys` without being told they exist;
* and **a slice of a roster is still a roster**, so a mutation cannot cut the
taint and hide every reduction downstream of itself. An **index** is one unit
and is not.
It then requires, at every place a roster-carrying value is reduced or iterated,
that the whole of it arrives: no `[:1]`, `[-1:]`, `[:2]` or `[0]` between the
roster and the reduction.
### What it found — and the hand-written list was wrong in BOTH directions
**183 reductions across 9 modules**, out of 23 `.py` files parsed:
`main.py` 96, `allocator.py` 24, `validate.py` 19, `arbiter.py` 14,
`circulation.py` 10, `maintenance.py` 10, `peakguard.py` 4, `inverter.py` 3,
`store.py` 3 — and 14 modules with no roster reduction at all.
The card's own suggested module list named `watchdog.py`, which reduces over no
roster at all (SAFETY-30's sign watchdogs are strictly per-unit — there is
nothing to slice), and did **not** name `maintenance.py` or `store.py`, which
both do. A pin built from that list would have made a vacuous claim about one
module and no claim at all about two others. That is the argument for computing
the scope, made with data rather than with an assertion.
The pin **independently rediscovers all four blockers** — it is told one option
key and nothing else — and finds a **fifth** beside them at
`validate.py:783`, the `min(caps_ix, key=...)` inside rule 5's message, which no
review round named.
### The counterfactual, at two depths
* **Per site, all of them.** Every enumerated site's own expression, in its own
scope, mutated with each of the four cuts this card has actually been defeated
by. **183 sites × 4 cuts = 732** mutated spellings; every one reported. The same run asserts
the predicate **accepts** the legitimate wrapped forms the package really uses
(`enumerate`, `zip`, `sorted`, `pack_permissions(packs, floor)`) and does not
treat a keyed lookup (`weights[u]` in `allocator._fill`) as a slice — which is
what four false SLICED reports cost before `shortens()` was written.
* **End to end, on the real files.** `[:1]` written into `app/validate.py` at
each blocker position, the **whole** analysis re-run over the mutated source,
and a sliced site required at that exact line — where the clean package
reports none. This is the check that would have taken PR #48 red four rounds
ago, with no fixture reaching it.
### The sweep, and the number that must not be quoted alone
All 183 sites were mutated to `[:1]`, one at a time, +4 bytes each, and each
mutant run against the full 19-file suite in `goodwe-addon-ci` (mounted `:ro`,
`python3 -B`, a fresh rsync per mutant; 0 `.pyc` in the tree before and after —
a read-only mount cannot write one, so TEST-15 is closed by construction here
rather than by discipline). **183 of 183 RED.**
⚠️ **On its own that is tautological**: with the pin in the tree every slice is
red *by the pin*. So all 51 mutants whose first red was `test_peakguard.py` were
re-run with the pin **neutralised** (`_SLICED` blanked), leaving only the
behavioural checks:
| | |
|---|---|
| **145 of 183** | a behavioural fixture in this repository separates the site from a slice of itself — red with the pin turned off |
| **38 of 183** | **nothing but this pin sees it.** Structurally closed by this card; behaviourally **UNGRADED**, and listed rather than counted as covered |
The 38: `main.py` 27, `allocator.py` 6, `validate.py` 2, `arbiter.py` 1,
`circulation.py` 1, `maintenance.py` 1. Grouped by what a `[:1]` there costs:
* **The operator's page — 15, the largest group.** `Controller.checks`
(3310, 3311, 3319, 3328, 3330, 3347, 3368, 3370, 3400, 3458) and
`status_payload` (3556, 3566, 3578). A slice reports one unit's row where two
exist, or "1 of 2 live" reading 1 of 1. Nothing commands differently; what is
lost is the evidence a human uses to notice that it should.
* **The write path's own counts.** `write_setpoint` 1267/1272/1280 — three
`len(targets)` guards. The write itself iterates `targets` at 1287 and *is*
graded (test_inverter.py); these three are its log arithmetic and refusal
count.
* **The allocator's internals.** `_fill`'s zero-weight last-resort pool (365),
`plan`'s `dropped` (526, 653), `free` (584), `frac_order` (591). ALLOC-01
drives two and three units through the *weighted* pass; the last-resort pass
and the largest-remainder tie-break are reached, but not with enough units for
a slice to change the answer.
* **Startup and FSM plumbing.** `__init__` 235/351, `_only` 831,
`_maint_button` 805, `cycle`'s maintenance zip 1505, `send_heartbeats` 3015,
`check_output_clamp` 2445/2452, `check_circulating` 2701,
`maintenance.arbitrate` 547, `arbiter.site_resolve` 517,
`circulation.opposing` 242.
* **Two refusal-TEXT sites.** `validate._roster_problems`'s `len(entries)` (554)
and `refuse()`'s numbering loop (1263) — both shape the words of a refusal
that still happens.
* **`_grade_store_migration` (698)**, already row 21 of §4c, argued there to be
an equivalent mutant at that call site. The argument is unchanged and is still
an argument, not a proof.
⚠️ **None of the 38 is closed behaviourally by this card, and saying so is the
point.** Closing sites one at a time is what cost this card four review rounds.
The pin closes the **family** — a slice at any of them is red on the line it is
written — and this list is what a shape pin can never promise.
### And the behavioural half, because a shape pin cannot grade a meaning
The pin grades an **identity** ("the whole roster arrives"). `min` → `max` is a
zero-byte edit and invisible to it, forever. So `test_validate.py` grows a
**roster SET** for the three rules that reduce over `unit_caps_indexed()`:
rosters of width 2, 3, 4 and 5 with the one small cap at **every position** —
14 rosters × 3 rules = 42 runs of the real validator — plus a **computed family
table** of twelve candidate reductions (`max`, `first`, `last`, the mean, and
`[:1]`, `[-1:]`, `[:2]`, `[:3]`, `[1:]`, `[:-1]`, `[::2]`) each compared against
what the shipped validator actually said on the same roster. Only `min` agrees
everywhere; any member no roster kills is **printed as a named survivor** and
takes the check red.
### ⚠️ A THIRD RULE WAS READING THE FLAT `max_w`, AND IT IS SAFETY-30's
Found by reading the three branches side by side — **not** by the pin, and said
that way because it is the shape of what the pin cannot see. Rule 5's sibling
branch, `unit_sign_disagree_w` (SAFETY-30's per-inverter sign watchdog), was
graded against `_number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)` — the **flat** option — three
lines under a branch that had already stopped doing that. Both directions were
measured before the fix:
* a roster of two 2000 W units beside a leftover `max_w: 5000` from a
single-inverter install, with `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000`, produced **zero
problems**. The site started, the status page said `armed`, and the per-unit
watchdog could not trip on **either** unit. Identical sentence to the blocker,
reached through the branch beside it;
* and a roster of two 5000 W units with no flat key was **refused** at 3000 W
against a 2000 W *default the operator never wrote*, for a threshold both
units can reach.
It takes the same `weakest` the branch above takes, from the same list, and
names the same unit. At a roster of one `unit_caps()` is `[max_w]`, so the
shipped single-inverter refusal is the same comparison, the same boundary and
the same sentence. Both directions are asserted in `test_validate.py`.
### ⚠️ WHAT THE PIN CANNOT SEE — open rows, with sizes
1. **Semantics.** `min` vs `max` vs the mean: zero-byte edits, invisible to any
shape pin. Only the behavioural sets above can see them, and they only see
the rules they drive.
2. **Direct index sites that are not reductions.** `self.inverters[0]` in
`_only()` and `actuator_of()`, `self.inverters[self.maint_index]` in
`maint_unit`, `entries[index]` in `_unit_label()`. Single-unit lookups, meant
to be, graded where they live.
3. **A subscript by a NAME.** `weights[u]`, `cap[u]`, `add[u]` in
`allocator._fill` are keyed lookups into a roster-derived mapping and are
accepted deliberately, so `caps[i]` with a variable `i` would pass. Not in
the family this card has been defeated by; buying it costs four false reports.
4. **A slice through an intermediate call.** `sorted(roster)[:1]` subscripts a
call result, not a roster reference. Nothing in `app/` is written that way
today; if something is, it would not be seen.
5. **Anything outside `app/`.** `tools/`, `sim/` and the checks themselves are
not parsed — and `sim/inject.py` reaches `validate_startup_config()`.
6. **The taint's own seam.** It crosses a call boundary only where the callee is
a plain function this package defines and the argument is positional or
keyword. A roster handed through `*args`, stored in a dict and read back, or
passed to a method on an unresolvable object, is lost at that hop — and
everything downstream goes **unenumerated** rather than reported unreachable.
That is the shape of the remaining exposure: not zero, and not measurable
from inside the check.
7. **`cycle()`'s undeliverable-unit log line** (row 22 of §4c) is still green at
+4 bytes, unchanged from round 4 and still filed open.
## 5. ⚠️ THE RESIDUAL — a per-pack EMS floor is NOT this card
`peak_soc_floor` is still **one number for the site**, so the card's own
"or the deeper pack is needlessly withheld" half is not closed and this record
does not pretend it is. With cut-outs of 10 % and 18 %, rule 8 obliges the
operator to set the EMS floor above 18, and the 10 % pack is then held above its
own need. Closing that means `peak_soc_floor` becoming a per-entry key too, which
is a second option migration and a product decision about what the site-wide
number then means. The card scoped itself to `bms_soc_floor` and explicitly told
this developer not to widen it, so it is filed here as the open question it is
rather than smuggled in.
**Also still not in this card, and named by the shipped code already:** the
charge *ceiling* is the mirror image — `pack_floor_soc` is the wrong reduction
for it, because a ceiling is the **fullest** pack and `arbitrage`'s `soc_ceiling`
takes one number. `main.py:932-936` says so, and it belongs to CFG-04/SPIKE-04's
per-pack bound. Nothing here touched it.
## 6. What was changed, and one thing that was found on the way
* `config.yaml` — `bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` required per `inverters:` entry;
the flat key and its default are untouched and are documented as the
single-inverter shape's own cut-out.
* `app/inverter.py` — `Inverter.bms_soc_floor`; `_entry_bms_floor()` (`None`, not
a borrowed number and not `0.0`); `_flat_bms_floor()`.
* `app/peakguard.py` — `Pack`, `pack_floor_pct()`, `pack_permissions()`,
`binding_soc_floor()`. `discharge_permitted()` is unchanged and is still the
one place the question is answered.
* `app/validate.py` — `unit_bms_floors_indexed()`; rule 8 grades every unit and
names it via the **roster** index the value came off.
* `app/main.py` — `Controller.packs`; the `decide(soc_floor=…)` reduction; the
floor-limited notification names the pack(s) at or below their own floor, at a
roster of two or more only.
* `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` — **re-run, and repaired.** MUTATION.md
habit 8: a committed transcript is a check and it decays. Making the key
required broke §C outright and, worse, left §D printing **PASS** on a refusal
about the *wrong key* — its "no `max_w`" case was answered `Missing option
'bms_soc_floor'`. §D is now an isolated counterfactual over a **merged,
accepted** baseline with exactly one key varied per case, asserting the key's
**name** in the refusal, and it carries a `bms_soc_floor` case in both
directions. Re-run against `ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0`:
`all cases passed`.
* `app/inverter.py`, found by the mutation battery — `_flat_bms_floor()` was
written with the default in **two** places (the `.get()` fallback *and* the
blank test). Deleting either one survived, because each covered for the other:
MUTATION.md's masking section in three lines of option reading. It has one
defaulting line now, and M12 takes six checks red.
* **Round 3 changed no `app/` file at all.** `test_peakguard.py` only:
parts 12c2 and 12g. Its battery was **46 mutations across
`binding_soc_floor()`'s reduction, the `decide()` call site, `Controller.packs`
and `pack_floor_pct()`'s conjunction** — bytecode purged and counted before and
after each (23 → 0). **43 red, 3 survivors, all three recorded above and in the
in-process rows**: `max(floors[:12])` and `max(floors[-12:])`, which need a
13-pack roster to observe and are reported with that size rather than hidden;
and `max(set(floors))`, which is **equivalent** — `max` is duplicate-invariant,
so it cannot change an answer. `list(reversed(self.packs))` is equivalent too
(`max` is order-invariant) and is nonetheless red on the structural pin.
⚠️ **No measurement of inverter B appears anywhere in this change.** It does not
physically exist. Every second-pack number in a fixture, in the probe and in
config.yaml's commented example is **simulated and labelled as such**; only the
10 % on inverter A is read off hardware. The three-pack runs added in round 3 are simulated
twice over: there is no inverter C at all, and the shallow slots carry inverter
A's measured 10 % while the 35 % cut-out that moves along the roster is invented.
---
## 7. The probe transcript, re-run 2026-09-05 on 2026.08.0
Command (unchanged, in `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py`'s own docstring):
```
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/w:ro" -v "$PWD/tools:/probe:ro" \
--entrypoint python3 \
ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 \
/probe/supervisor_shape_probe.py
```
It reads `config.yaml` and runs Supervisor's own `AppOptions` validator in a
throwaway container. It touches no live Supervisor, POSTs nothing and installs
nothing.
⚠️ **RE-RUN AGAIN ON 2026-09-05**, because the rebase onto `67e649a` merged
SPIKE-04a's `max_w: 4600` into the same §C/§D blocks this card had rewritten,
and MUTATION.md habit 8 says a committed transcript that a document quotes is a
check. A hand-merged transcript is not a measurement of anything. The block
below is the output of that run, not of the 2026-09-04 one: B's rating reads
**4600** — its datasheet figure, still not a measurement of any unit — and every
case still passes.
```
== C. AC2: a two-inverter blob an operator would POST ==
PASS two inverters
[{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_a_setpoint_w", "soc_entity": "sensor.goodwe_a_soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.goodwe_a_battery_power", "max_w": 5000, "bms_soc_floor": 10}, {"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w", "soc_entity": "sensor.goodwe_b_so
== D. what the schema itself refuses, per entry ==
PASS the per-entry BASELINE is ACCEPTED, so every refusal below has nowhere else to come from
[{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": 4600, "bms_soc_floor": 10}]
PASS an entry with no name is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
Missing option 'name' in inverters in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS an entry with no setpoint_entity is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
Missing option 'setpoint_entity' in inverters in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS an entry with no max_w is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
Missing option 'max_w' in inverters in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS an entry with no bms_soc_floor (SAFETY-32) is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
Missing option 'bms_soc_floor' in inverters in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS an entry with max_w over the range is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
value must be at most 5000.0
PASS an entry with bms_soc_floor over the range (SAFETY-32) is refused, and the refusal NAMES it
value must be at most 50.0
PASS a JSON STRING where the list belongs is refused
Invalid list for option 'inverters' in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
== E. the ROLLBACK direction, and the operator's UI ==
PASS a schema WITHOUT `inverters` drops the key with a warning rather than refusing - so a downgrade is not the §B trap in reverse
['arbitrage_enabled', 'arbitrage_soc_ceiling', 'arbitrage_soc_floor', 'auto_start', 'batt_entity', 'batt_invert']
PASS Supervisor's UI renderer turns it into a repeatable section rather than choking - an operator can add the second inverter in the Configuration tab, which the JSON-string alternative could not offer
[{"name": "inverters", "type": "schema", "optional": true, "multiple": true, "schema": [{"name": "name", "required": true, "type": "string"}, {"name": "setpoint_entity", "required": true, "type": "string"}, {"name": "max_w", "lengthMin": 100.0, "lengthMax": 5000.0, "required": true, "type": "integer
== all cases passed ==
```
@@ -0,0 +1,925 @@
# SAFETY-38 — pinning `site_standing`, the one quantity both site guards are asked about
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-05.** `app/main.py`'s
`site_standing = float(sum(standing.values()))` is **correct and is not
changed**. What this card adds is the thing it never had: a **behavioural**
fixture whose per-unit shares **cannot** answer for the site, so that a change
of *meaning* in that reduction goes red instead of green.
Filed with SAFETY-38, card `6a9ac95f2b78646e5a76d2e9`. It is a **coverage**
card: not one byte of `app/` moves.
---
## 0. The line, and its two consumers
```python
site_standing = float(sum(standing.values())) # app/main.py:1598
```
`standing` is `{unit name -> the value THIS controller last put on that unit's
setpoint entity}` — `inv.last_write`, i.e. the number **after**
`clamp_to_rating()` has applied `max_w` and the device's own
`[dev_min, dev_max]`. Two safety inputs are derived from it and nothing else in
`cycle()` is:
| consumer | where | what it does with it |
|---|---|---|
| **[[SAFETY-30]]**'s site sign detector | `self.site_sign_wd.evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` (main.py:1619) | **latches and stops the whole site** when the total command opposes the meter for `site_sign_disagree_s` |
| **[[SAFETY-18]]**'s freeze conjunction | `looks_frozen(unchanged_s, site_standing, max_w, …)` inside `peakguard.decide(frozen=…)` (main.py:1926) | takes the peak guard **blind** and files `floor_w = 0.0` — the battery may not import while the billed quarter is unmeasurable |
Both are P0 paths. **Neither was pinned to the reduction.**
## 1. What survived, and what the rescope measured
The card opened with three demonstrated live mutants, all green across the whole
suite. Re-measured in round 2 against `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2`:
| mutation of `site_standing` | on release/1.0 @ 86eaef2 | closed by |
|---|---|---|
| `list(standing.values())[0]` — one unit's share | **SURVIVES**, full suite 21/21 green | part 9a + 9b (this card) |
| `sum(...) / max(1, len(standing))` — the mean | **SURVIVES**, full suite 21/21 green | part 9a + 9b (this card) |
| `max(standing.values(), key=abs)` — the largest share | **SURVIVES**, full suite 21/21 green | part 9a + 9b (this card) |
### ⚠️ ROUND 1 SAID `[0]` WAS ALREADY CLOSED BY SAFETY-32. THAT WAS FALSE.
Round 1 of this card recorded `[0]` as **CAUGHT by SAFETY-32's package-wide
structural pin**, wrote that claim into four places, and told future authors
*"DO NOT RE-COVER THAT ONE HERE"*. It is wrong, and **how** it went wrong is the
part worth keeping.
**How the error was made.** The mutation was measured **once**. That single run
happened to hit `test_peakguard.py`'s [[CI-06]] flake — a **measured ~20%**
false-red rate — and the red was recorded as a **mutation kill**. Nothing else
was checked, because a red is the answer you are hoping for and it did not look
like it needed a second run.
**The correct measurement.** On `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2` carrying **only** the
`[0]` edit (+4 bytes, re-read from disk, bytecode purged by
`tools/mutation_run.sh`): the **full 21-file suite is green**, and
`test_peakguard.py` run **five times in isolation** on that same mutated tree is
**PASS PASS PASS PASS PASS**. The mutation **survives**. (The reviewer's own
independent re-measurement of the same tree hit the flake once —
PASS PASS PASS FAIL PASS — which is the same verdict plus a live demonstration
of the mechanism that produced the original error.)
**Why SAFETY-32 cannot see it, read off 12j's own enumeration rather than
argued.** Part 12j taints names *bound* to roster-carrying values and lists
*accumulated* in a loop over one. `standing` is neither: it is a dict created
empty at `main.py:1554` and filled by **subscript assignment**
(`standing[inv.name] = stood`) inside the roster loop, and a subscript store is
not a binding 12j follows. So `standing` never enters its taint set and
`sum(standing.values())` is **not a roster site** at all. Run 12j against a tree
carrying the `[0]` mutation and its enumeration lists `main.py:1553`, `1555` and
`1690` — the three `self.inverters` sites bracketing this code — and **not
`1599`**. No shape pin reaches this line; only the behavioural fixture below
does.
**The rule this cost.** `test_peakguard.py` flakes at a measured ~20%. A single
red from it proves nothing. Re-run it in isolation **at least five times** and
**name the failing check** before believing any red from it. This card is the
**third** measurement CI-06 has corrupted.
SAFETY-32's own disclosed blind spot says why the other two were always out of
reach:
> *SEMANTICS. `min` → `max` → the mean are edits invisible to any shape pin,
> permanently. Only the behavioural sets can see them.*
`sum` → mean and `sum` → `max(key=abs)` are **semantic**: identical shape,
different meaning. **No shape pin will ever close them.** That disclosure was
accurate, and is now confirmed by measurement rather than taken on trust.
`[0]` is the one that *looks* structural and therefore *looks* covered — and
that appearance is exactly what produced the false attribution above. It is
out of reach here for a different reason from the other two: not because the
shape is invisible, but because **the value never becomes a roster** in the
analysis's eyes. All three are closed by the same behavioural fixture, and
**all three needed it.**
## 2. Why the suite could not see it — habit 4, inside the site half of the very card that names it
`test_watchdog.py`'s `_sign_site` is the **only** N≥2 site fixture in the
repository. It runs at `site_sign_disagree_w: 320` with shares of roughly
−2500 W **each**. Every one of them is individually far over the gate, so on
those numbers
```
sum = −5000 W over mean = −2500 W over max = −2500 W over
```
— **all three reductions agree**, and a check whose two candidate answers happen
to be equal cannot observe a change that swaps them. That is `MUTATION.md`'s
third failure mode, and this is its ninth instance.
At a roster of **one** it is not a fixture defect but arithmetic:
`sum == mean == max == the one share`, identically, so all three mutations are
genuinely **equivalent** on a shipped install. No N=1 fixture can ever separate
them; §3c asserts that rather than leaving it to the reader.
## 3. The fixture, and the numbers it is built on
Two **simulated** units rated 220 W and 280 W, both obeying exactly, inverted
gain, house importing 2000 W. Both stand at their own rails, so `standing` is
`{-220, -280}` in roster order and the meter reads +2500 W.
| reduction | value | vs the SHIPPED 300 W gate |
|---|---|---|
| `sum` | **−500 W** | **OVER** → trips |
| `sum / len` (the mean) | −250 W | under → silent |
| `max(…, key=abs)` | −280 W | under → silent |
| `list(…)[0]` | −220 W | under → silent |
**Four distinct magnitudes — 500, 250, 280, 220 — of which exactly one clears
the gate.** The asymmetry is load-bearing twice: equal shares would collapse
mean, max and first onto one number, and putting the **smaller** unit first is
what keeps `[0]` distinct from `max(key=abs)`. The gate is left at its shipped
default so the fixture is graded against the magnitude an install runs; only the
**hold** is shortened (325 s → 2 s), because the hold is a wall clock and the
campaign behind 325 s is measured on the rig, not here.
⚠️ **220 W and 280 W are SIMULATED ratings chosen for that arithmetic and for
nothing else.** They are not measurements. In particular they are **not**
inverter B, which does not physically exist; B is a GW5048D-ES, serial
`55048ESU22AW0992`, **4600 W from its datasheet** (`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b).
### 3a. The site sign detector
Shipped tree: the site latches, commands 0 W on every inverter, and the sentence
an operator reads is
`SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded -500 W against a meter reading +2500 W …`. No
per-unit watchdog trips — every unit is faithfully executing its share, which is
the asymmetry the site detector exists for.
Under the mean and under `max(key=abs)`: **nothing trips, ever.** The reviewer's
tree was still commanding −500 W of charge into a +2500 W import at t = 595 s
with `following=True`.
Two counterfactuals sit beside it so the trip is attributable:
* the **same** inverted-gain site whose shares sum to −250 W — under the gate —
does **not** trip, so the trip above is the sum crossing 300 W and not the
mere presence of a second inverter;
* a site whose **device range is narrower than `max_w`** asks for −500 W while
only −250 W stands, and does **not** trip — see §5.
### 3b. The second consumer, covered rather than scoped out
`site_standing` is also `looks_frozen()`'s `commanded_w`. The same
discrimination applies at a different threshold: the site rail is
`RAIL_FRAC * site_max_w` = 0.95 × 500 = **475 W**.
| reduction | value | vs the 475 W rail |
|---|---|---|
| `sum` | **500 W** | **RAILED** → `BLIND_FROZEN`, `floor_w = 0.0` |
| the mean | 250 W | under → silent |
| `max(…, key=abs)` | 280 W | under → silent |
| `list(…)[0]` | 220 W | under → silent |
The sign is flipped from §3a on purpose: the gain is the **shipped positive**
one and the frozen meter reads import, so the site *discharges* +500 W against a
+2500 W import — the two agree in sign, SAFETY-30 has nothing to say, and this
half grades SAFETY-18 alone. Reusing §3a's inverted gain would have the site
sign latch park everything at 0 W, and the freeze conjunction could then never
be true: a check measuring the *other* guard's remedy.
⚠️ **The open quarter is backfilled with the same stuck reading, and that is
not decoration.** Without it the block is mostly uncovered, `blindness()`
answers `BLIND_COVERAGE`, and the mutant reaches *the same action by a different
route* — a check on the action alone could not then see the difference it names.
Seeded, the measurement is honest:
* shipped: `blind = BLIND_FROZEN`, `floor_w = 0.0` — no charging while the
billed quarter is unobservable;
* both mutations: **not blind at all**, `floor_w = None` — the site may go on
importing through a quarter whose billed average cannot be measured. That is
the capacity-tariff hazard SAFETY-18 exists for, silently disarmed.
The counterfactual comes from the **same run**: on the earlier cycles the
command had not yet reached the rail and the guard did not report SAFETY-18,
with the meter equally frozen throughout — so the verdict is produced by the
command magnitude `site_standing` carries and not by `unchanged_s` alone. A low
gain (0.05, the schema floor) is what buys those below-the-rail cycles.
### 3c. At N=1, nothing changes — asserted
A real one-inverter controller is driven through the same frozen-meter
scenario. Its `standing` has a single entry, so `sum`, the mean,
`max(key=abs)` and `[0]` are printed and asserted to be **one number**; the
site sign detector is still absent (part 7 counts the calls on the object); and
SAFETY-18 still reaches `BLIND_FROZEN` on that same value. The claim "the
shipped install is unaffected" now rests on the roster rather than on the
reader.
## 4. Mutation ledger
Every run: a **fresh full-repo copy**, `__pycache__` and `*.pyc` excluded,
mounted `:ro`, graded by `tools/mutation_run.sh` (which purges, prints the tree
fingerprint, and verifies no cache appears during the run). The mutated line was
**re-read from disk** after the edit and the byte delta printed. Shipped
`app/main.py` is 234 542 bytes at `86eaef2`.
| # | mutation of `site_standing` | Δ bytes | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `sum(...) / max(1, len(standing))` — the mean | +24 | **RED** |
| M2 | `max(standing.values(), key=abs)` — largest share | +9 | **RED** |
| M3 | `list(standing.values())[0]` — one share | +4 | **RED** — and **survives on release/1.0**, see §1 |
| M4 | `min(standing.values(), key=abs)` — smallest share | +9 | **RED** |
| M5 | `sum(abs(v) for v in ...)` — magnitude, sign lost | +16 | **RED** |
| M6 | `-sum(standing.values())` — sign flipped | +1 | **RED** |
| M7 | `float(self.target)` — the arbiter's site target | **−11** | **was a SURVIVOR — now RED**, see §5 |
| M8 | `sum(standing.values()) / 2.0` | +6 | **RED** |
| M9 | `sum(standing.values()) * 2.0` | +6 | **RED** |
| M10 | `sorted(standing.values())[-1]` — largest signed | +7 | **RED** |
| **M11** | **argument SWAP** at the SITE call site: `evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` → `evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, …)` (main.py:1620) | **0** | **was a SURVIVOR in round 1 — now RED**, see §4a |
| **M12** | **argument SWAP** at the PER-UNIT call site: `evaluate(stood, against, …)` → `evaluate(against, stood, …)` (**main.py:1560**) | **0** | **was a SURVIVOR in round 2 — now RED**, see §4c |
**Every one of the ten `site_standing` entries is red in `test_watchdog.py`.** Re-measured in round 2
on `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2` (where `app/main.py` is 234 542 bytes, 2 022 more
than the `f72c48d` the round-1 figures were taken on): all ten still red, at the
byte deltas in the table, each on a fresh copy with the edit re-read from disk.
Adding assertions cannot turn a red green, so those verdicts carry forward to
the round-3 tree unchanged.
### ⚠️ ROUND 2 SAID THREE OF THESE SURVIVED. **EIGHT DID.**
Round 2 wrote: *"Before part 9 existed, three of these left the whole suite
green — M1, M2 and M3 — and the remaining seven were caught by SAFETY-30's own
N≥2 checks."* Round 1's wording was vaguer and harmless; naming three made it
**specific and wrong**, and it is the same species of error the round was
written to fix — **a survivor recorded as a kill**. This file contradicted it
three times on its own pages: the ledger row calls M7 *"a SURVIVOR — now RED"*,
§5 says M7 survived the whole suite, and `CHANGELOG.md` says so too.
**Re-measured in round 3, one mutation at a time, on clean `release/1.0` @
`bbc903b`** — a fresh copy each, bytecode purged (`0` remaining, printed), the
line re-read from disk, byte delta **and** `app/main.py` fingerprint printed,
mounted `:ro`, and the **FULL 21-FILE SUITE** run each time rather than
`test_watchdog.py` alone. (`release/1.0` has since moved on to `9e42cec`, which
merged [[CI-06]]; that commit touches `test_peakguard.py` and `CHANGELOG.md`
only, neither of which grades `site_standing`, so the ten verdicts below stand
on the tree they were taken on and this branch is rebased onto the newer tip.)
| # | Δ bytes | fingerprint of `app/main.py` | suite before part 9 |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | +24 | `362374cfb6486378` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M2 | +9 | `86573e7494f1c933` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M3 | +4 | `59fa8815e6fda4cf` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M4 | +9 | `43d852be3037f861` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M5 | +16 | `58d26de82af29a1a` | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`, 3 checks |
| M6 | +1 | `407ddb5f375cc217` | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`, 3 checks |
| M7 | **−11** | `2a635a4eca0a790d` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M8 | +6 | `b21eed89ff4c9240` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M9 | +6 | `0973d3caf680db65` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
| M10 | +7 | `0e7b7a4fed7787d0` | **21/21 PASS — SURVIVOR** |
**So: EIGHT of the ten left the whole suite green, and TWO were caught** — not
three and seven, and not the four and six a reviewer proposed either. The
correct sentence is: *before part 9 existed, eight of these ten left the whole
21-file suite green, and the only two SAFETY-30's own N≥2 checks caught were M5
and M6.*
**⚠️ AND THE TWO THAT WERE CAUGHT ARE CAUGHT FOR A REASON THAT MAKES THE CARD'S
CASE RATHER THAN WEAKENING IT.** M5 (`sum(abs(v) …)`) and M6 (`-sum(…)`) are
the only two entries in the table that **reverse the SIGN** of `site_standing`.
Every other entry changes only its **magnitude** — and `_sign_site`, the suite's
only N≥2 site fixture before this card, runs shares of about **−2500 W each**
against a **320 W** gate. `sum`, the mean, `max(key=abs)`, `min(key=abs)`,
`sorted(...)[-1]`, `[0]`, `self.target`, half the sum and twice the sum all land
on **−2500, −2500, −2500, −2500, −2500, −2500, −2500, −1250 and −5000 W**: nine
different numbers, all on the **same side of the same threshold**. The three
checks that fired on M5 and M6 grade *"the site trips and no unit does"*, the
claim it trips through, and where the latch is written — none of them grades the
**quantity**, and the sign flip reaches them only because it stops the trip
happening at all.
That is the whole thesis of this card measured rather than argued: **the
pre-existing coverage could see a sign, and nothing else.** Part 9's fixture —
per-unit shares each **below** the gate whose **sum** clears it — is the only
arrangement in which the magnitude is load-bearing, and it is what takes the
other eight red.
⚠️ **ONE FALSE RED, AND IT IS [[CI-06]]'s.** In the batch run M10 also reported
`FAIL test_peakguard.py`. Re-run in isolation **three times** and once more
through `tools/mutation_run.sh` — **four clean passes, zero failures**. The
batch script had discarded the failure detail, so the failing check cannot be
named here; what can be said is that the red did not reproduce in four attempts
and that **no claim in this card rests on it**. `test_peakguard.py` is the file
CI-06 records as flaky, and this is the behaviour it records. Believe no red
from it without three isolated re-runs.
⚠️ **ROUND 3 CAN NAME ONE, AND IT IS THE SAME FILE.** Round 3's own batch — the
ten full-suite runs above, plus §7's sibling swaps — produced **no** red from
`test_peakguard.py` on M10 or on any other ledger entry. It produced exactly one
elsewhere, on a **`static_tariff.py`-only** edit (§7b, A4), and this time the
failing check *was* captured: *"one cycle of the intent form is exactly the
delivered form plus the command standing on the wire"* — which is CI-06's
**mechanism 1 by name**, the cross-time projection. `test_peakguard.py` then
passed **four for four** in isolation on that same tree. That is the first time
this card has been able to put a name to one of these reds, and it is the name
CI-06 predicts.
⚠️ **M3 IS NOT "FOR COMPLETENESS", AND ROUND 1 SAID IT WAS.** Round 1 recorded
M3 as already closed structurally by SAFETY-32 and disclaimed it. §1 above has
the correction and the mechanism: `[0]` **survives** a full green 21-file suite
on `release/1.0` @ `86eaef2`, because `standing` is a dict filled by subscript
assignment and never enters 12j's taint set. **M3 is a real kill by this card's
fixture and by nothing else in the repository.** It is claimed here.
### 4a. ⚠️ The zero-byte survivor one line below the one this card pinned
Round 1 pinned the **value** `site_standing` and never pinned **where it goes**.
Swapping the detector's first two arguments at `main.py:1620` is a **zero-byte**
edit — the same characters, reordered — and it left the round-1 tree **21/21
green**.
What it costs is the banner. `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` formats
`commanded_w` first and `against_w` second, so under the swap part 9a's own
output reads:
```
SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded +2500 W against a meter reading -500 W for 2 s …
```
The site is standing at **−500 W of charge into a +2500 W import** and the
**latching, site-stopping** banner tells the operator **the exact opposite** —
which instrument read what, inverted. `watchdog.py:658-665` names this failure
in its own words: *"a false statement about which instrument produced the
evidence, on the one line somebody woken by this alarm reads first."*
**Why round 1's check could not see it, and this is the general lesson.** It
asserted
```python
f"{sum(_share38):.0f} W" in _c38.site_sign_wd.reason
```
— that `"-500 W"` appears **somewhere** in the sentence. Under the swap it still
does: in the **meter slot**. A substring test cannot reach a failure that is
purely **positional**, and round 1's own comment claimed the opposite ("*would
put a different number in the store, the action log and the banner, and this is
where that shows*"). It shows the **number**, never its **position**. This is
MUTATION.md's *"a check whose data cannot reach the failure it names"*, in the
card that exists to complain about exactly that.
**The fix is one line and touches no `app/` code** — assert the **ordered
pair**:
```python
f"commanded {sum(_share38):+.0f} W against a meter reading "
f"{_mid38['grid']:+.0f} W" in _c38.site_sign_wd.reason
```
Measured: with that line, M11 is **red in `test_watchdog.py` and green in the
other twenty files** — one file, one check.
### 4b. Claim wiring, re-measured rather than assumed
Round 1's reviewer disclosed it had **not** mutated the arbiter claim wiring or
[[SAFETY-31]]/circulation. Both were mutated in round 2. Both are **zero-byte**
edits to `arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE`:
| # | mutation | Δ bytes | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| W1 | `"sign_site": SCOPE_SITE` → `SCOPE_UNIT` | **0** | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py` (parts 5 **and 9a**), `test_arbiter.py`, `test_peakguard.py` |
| W2 | `"circulation": SCOPE_SITE` → `SCOPE_UNIT` | **0** | **RED** — `test_watchdog.py`, `test_arbiter.py`, `test_peakguard.py` |
Part 9a's *"…and it stops the WHOLE site, through the `sign_site` claim by name"*
is one of the two checks that kills W1, so this card contributes to that
coverage rather than merely inheriting it. **W2 is caught entirely by
pre-existing checks** — SAFETY-38 adds nothing to circulation, and does not
claim to.
### 4c. ⚠️ The SAME zero-byte defect one call site over — and it is the one the shipped install can see
Round 2 closed §4a by asserting the ordered pair on the **site** banner at
`main.py:1620`. It did not touch `main.py:1560`, the **per-unit** call, and the
identical swap there —
```python
if inv.sign_wd.evaluate(stood, against, self.following, now) # shipped
if inv.sign_wd.evaluate(against, stood, self.following, now) # M12
```
— left the round-2 tree **21/21 green**. Measured: `app/main.py` 234 542 bytes
before and after, **Δ 0 bytes**, fingerprint `61aa413f…` → `e57e6026…`, bytecode
purged, tree mounted `:ro`, the line re-read from disk.
**Nothing behavioural can catch it, and that is structural rather than
unlucky.** `watchdog.disagrees()` is *symmetric* in its first two arguments —
`commanded_w * against_w < 0`, with an `abs()` gate on **both** — so the swap
cannot change a single trip decision on any input. What it changes is the
**sentence**. Measured by diffing the suite's own printed banners between the
round-3 tree and the same tree carrying only M12: **9 emitted banner lines
invert, in 3 distinct sentences.**
```
shipped: SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded -2000 W against a meter reading +2000 W …
M12: SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded +2000 W against a meter reading -2000 W …
shipped: … commanded +1000 W against its own measured power -1000 W …
M12: … commanded -1000 W against its own measured power +1000 W …
shipped: … commanded -2000 W against a meter reading +4000 W … (the N=1 arm)
M12: … commanded +4000 W against a meter reading -2000 W …
```
**⚠️ AND IT IS WORSE THAN THE ONE ROUND 2 CLOSED.** Part 9c asserts the SITE
detector is **not armed at a roster of one**, and inverter B does not physically
exist. So on the shipped install the **per-unit banner is the only
sign-disagreement sentence that can ever be printed** — in the action log, in
`_LOG.error`, in `status_payload()`'s headline banner, and in `sign_reason`,
which is persisted and read back after the restart the latch is designed to
survive. Round 2 pinned the N≥2-only call site and left the shipping one open.
**Closed by the ORDERED PAIR on both per-unit banners**, with both operands read
off the **observed cycle** — `inv.last_write` and `inv.batt` off the objects the
plant moved, never off the arguments the detector was handed, which would be
comparing the swap against itself:
* `test_watchdog.py` **part 3**, the N≥2 per-unit trip:
`f"commanded {stood:+.0f} W against its own measured power {meas:+.0f} W"`,
plus the persisted `unit/inverter-b/sign_reason` copy, plus a **precondition**
that the two operands are different numbers of opposite sign — without which
a transposition would produce the same string and the check would be
decoration;
* `test_watchdog.py` **part 7**, the **N=1** controller-driven trip:
`f"commanded {stood:+.0f} W against a meter reading {grid:+.0f} W"`, plus the
namespaced key **and** the flat rollback mirror, plus the same precondition.
**Measured after the fix: M12 is RED on four named checks in
`test_watchdog.py` and GREEN in the other twenty files** — one file, four
checks. M11 re-measured on the same tree: still red.
**⚠️ Neither §6a nor MUTATION.md disclosed it.** §6a's "what was NOT closed"
enumerated `circ_wd`, the eight other `CLAIM_SCOPE` entries, `actuator_of()`'s
body and the `n_units > 1` guard — not this. MUTATION.md's own closing rule, in
the file round 2 edited, is *"a variant is not covered because a near-miss of it
is."* §7 is the enumeration that would have caught both instances at once.
## 5. The survivor this card went looking for, and closed
M7 is not one of the card's three. It was found by asking the question the
recurring defect demands — *what mutation would my new checks NOT see?* — and it
is the answer: **−11 bytes**, and it survived every check above **and the whole
20-file suite**, because in every fixture built so far the arbiter's site target
and the sum of what actually stands on the wire are **the same number**.
They are not the same number when a setpoint device's own reported range is
narrower than its `max_w`. The `device` P_SAFETY claim is filed **per actuator**
(`actuator_of("device", inv)`), so it bounds each unit's **share** and never the
site target, and `clamp_to_rating()` clips again on the way out. On two units
rated 220/280 W whose devices report ±120/±130 W, the site asks for **−500 W**
and **−250 W** stands.
Which one the guards mean is already written down, in both of them: SAFETY-02
grades *"the command standing on the wire"*, and `looks_frozen()`'s docstring
says `commanded_w` is *"the EMITTED setpoint — what the arbiter resolved and
`write_setpoint()` put on the wire — not the loop's raw wish"*. [[SAFETY-20]] is
the whole card about the difference. Those sentences are now made to bite: on
the site target the detector fires on a site standing at −250 W against a
+2250 W meter — **under its own 300 W gate** — which is a latching, site-wide
false trip on an install whose inverters simply report a narrower range than the
operator typed.
## 6. Honest gaps
* **A mutation that changes the SIGN CONVENTION of `standing` itself** — i.e. in
`main.py`'s `stood = inv.last_write if inv.last_write is not None else
inv.target`, not on the reduction line — is **not** in this ledger. It is a
different line and a different card; §3a's obedience precondition would see
some of it, but that is not a measured claim and is not made here.
* **The freeze half is graded at ONE roster length (2) and one rail.** The
`RAIL_FRAC` constant, `rail_ceiling_w()`'s device-bound conjunction and
`rail_unreachable()` are `test_freeze.py`'s subject and are untouched here.
* **The site hold is 2 s, not the shipped 325 s.** The window's derivation is a
rig campaign (`DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md` §3B) and this file does
not re-grade it. The **gate** is the shipped 300 W, which is the coordinate
this card is about.
* **Everything about inverter B here is simulated and labelled so.** No number
in this document or in the fixture is a measurement of a device that does not
yet exist.
### 6a. Round 2: what was closed, and what was NOT
Round 1's reviewer disclosed that it had not mutated SAFETY-31/circulation, the
arbiter claim wiring, or ledger entries M4/M5/M6/M8/M9/M10. Enumerated, with the
gaps left open stated rather than rounded off:
**Closed in round 2 (measured, on `86eaef2`, bytecode purged, edit re-read from
disk, byte delta printed):**
1. **M11**, the zero-byte argument swap — §4a. Red on one named check.
2. **M3**, the `[0]` reduction — re-measured, **survives on release/1.0**, closed
by part 9a and 9b. The false attribution corrected in all four places it was
committed: this file §1 and §4, `CHANGELOG.md`, and `test_watchdog.py`'s part
9 header (which previously *instructed future authors not to re-cover it*).
3. **M1, M2, M4, M5, M6, M7, M8, M9, M10** — every ledger entry re-run
independently in round 2 rather than carried forward from round 1's report.
All ten red; M1/M2/M4 re-run in the exact wrapped form the table records so
the byte deltas are the table's own (+24/+9/+9).
4. **W1**, `sign_site` claim scope — §4b. Zero bytes, red, part 9a among the
killers.
5. **W2**, `circulation` claim scope — §4b. Zero bytes, red, but **entirely on
pre-existing checks**.
**NOT closed, and not claimed:**
* **SAFETY-31's `circ_wd` detector itself** — its threshold, its hold, its
`circulating_w()` reduction over the roster. Only its **claim scope** was
mutated (W2), and that kill belongs to checks this card did not write.
Circulation's own behavioural coverage is `test_watchdog.py` part 4's and is
untouched here.
* **The other eight `CLAIM_SCOPE` entries** — `loop`, `peak`, `arbitrage`,
`safety` (site) and `device`, `supervised`, `failsafe`, `maintenance` (unit).
`CLAIM_SCOPE` has ten entries; only the two named above were mutated. `test_peakguard.py` part 10f grades the
classification statically; that is a different instrument and this card did
not re-measure it.
* **`actuator_of()`'s own body** and the `n_units > 1` guard on the `sign_site`
append at `main.py:1764` were **not** mutated.
* **The ten ledger mutations were re-graded against `test_watchdog.py` only.**
The "green in the other twenty files" half of the round-1 claim was
re-verified on `86eaef2` for **M3** and **M11** (both full 21-file runs) and is
otherwise carried forward from round 1's measurement on `f72c48d`. It is a
weaker statement than round 1 made and is written down as such.
⚠️ **Round 3 closed the other half of this**, but only in the *before*
direction: all ten were re-run on clean `release/1.0` @ `bbc903b` under the
**full 21-file suite** to establish which of them the pre-existing coverage
could see — see §4's ⚠️ paragraph, and the answer was **eight survivors, not
three**. The *after* direction — "each of the ten is red in
`test_watchdog.py` and green in the other twenty **on the round-3 tree**" —
is still measured end-to-end only for **M3, M11 and M12**. For the other
seven, "red" carries forward from round 2 (which adding assertions cannot
undo) and "green elsewhere" carries forward from round 1.
* **`test_peakguard.py`'s CI-06 flake is not fixed by this card** and is not
this card's subject. It is *characterised* here (five isolated runs on the M3
tree, all PASS) only far enough to overturn the false kill it produced.
### 6b. Round 3: what was closed, and what is still open
**Closed in round 3:**
1. **M12**, the zero-byte argument swap at the **per-unit** call site
`main.py:1560` — §4c. It was a survivor of the round-2 tree at **21/21
green**, and it is the **only** sign-disagreement banner a shipped
one-inverter install can print. Red on four named checks, green in the other
twenty files.
2. **The ledger arithmetic in §4**, which round 2 made specific and wrong. See
§4's own ⚠️ paragraph: re-measured mutation by mutation on clean
`release/1.0` @ `bbc903b`, full 21-file suite each time.
3. **The family itself is now enumerated by machine** —
`tools/symmetric_message_scan.py`, §7 — rather than by hand for a third time.
**Open, named, and NOT claimed:**
* **A3 and B1** — the only two status-page rows in which the freeze detector
ever names a device range: the **NOT COVERED** row and the **armed** row's
"below max_w because …" clause. `rail_unreachable()`'s `dev_min`/`dev_max` at `main.py:3208` and the
literal `f"only {inv.dev_min}...{inv.dev_max} W"` at `main.py:3231`. Both
measured: **0 bytes each, 21/21 green each.** Real, open members of the
family. They are **status-page rows rather than latching alarms**, and closing
them wants a fixture with a device whose two bounds are **asymmetric** — every
fixture in this repository uses `±d`, so the transposition is currently
invisible by construction — which belongs to `test_freeze.py`'s card, not to
this one.
* **Twelve census-B sites** (§7c, B2–B12) determined unpinned at the **source
level** — the distinguishing literal appears in no `test_*.py` — and **not**
mutated. Weaker evidence than A1–A4 and B1, and written down as such
— §7d says the same thing with the same list.
* **B6**, SAFETY-31's `circ_reason`, is the same shape as the defect this card
closed for SAFETY-02/30 and is *also* persisted and re-read after a restart.
§6a already declines to touch `circ_wd`; §7d says what that costs.
* Everything §6a lists stays open: `circ_wd`'s own thresholds, the eight other
`CLAIM_SCOPE` entries, `actuator_of()`'s body, and the `n_units > 1` guard.
### 6c. Round 4: what was closed, and what is still open
**The blocker round 3 shipped.** The enumeration read as complete and covered
**one syntactic sink**. Every one of census B's 16 members was a sentence that
is **appended, assigned, or passed as a log argument** (`problems.append`,
`out.append({"text": …})`, `self.reason = …`, `_LOG.info`). **Not one was a
sentence that is RETURNED.** Census A has a return bucket, but only for
symmetric **parameters**, so a method formatting its **own attributes** and
handing the string back was invisible to both — and `describe()` / `explain()` /
the reason-builders are exactly where this codebase keeps its operator
sentences. Worse than the gap: it was in **none of the five blind spots the tool
prints about itself**. A tool that asserts a completeness it does not have is
the recurring defect wearing a new hat.
**Closed in round 4:**
1. **`clamp.py:253` `ClampResult.describe()`**, pair `requested_w` /
`applied_w` — §7e C6. A survivor of the round-3 tree at **21/21 green**,
**0 bytes**. It is the §15 action-log row at `main.py:1366` **and** the
ClampWatchdog notification reason at `main.py:2452`; **no `test_*.py`
mentioned `describe()` at all.** Pinned on the ordered pair, on the
contiguous literal, at **both** consumers, with a precondition that the two
operands render differently — `test_clamp.py` part 6d. **4 checks red** under
the transposition.
2. **`peakguard.py:493` `PeakDecision.explain()`**, pair `projected_w` /
`ceiling_w` — §7e C7. Same measurement: **0 bytes, 21/21 green**; the string
`"peak guard idle"` was in no `test_*.py`. Pinned on the decision and on the
shipped status row at `main.py:3313` — `test_peakguard.py` part 13. **3
checks red.**
3. **`arbiter.py:264` (B12)** — the check whose **claim was wider than its
assertion**, carried forward from §7d. Measured this round rather than left
at source level: **0 bytes, 21/21 green** before, **`test_arbiter.py` red**
after. **2 checks red.**
4. **The tool's sinks are now stated rather than implied.** It prints what it
scans as a MESSAGE, that it now scans the RETURN sink through the returning
method's call sites, and — the part that was missing — **an explicit list of
what it does not scan at all**, largest hole first.
**⚠️ The correction round 4 owes the ticket.** The brief placed
`PeakDecision.explain()`'s idle sentence at `main.py:3299/3302`. Those two lines
are the **floor-limited** branch, where `explain()` returns `self.reason` before
the idle literal is ever built. The idle sentence reaches the page at
**`main.py:3313`** and the action log at **`main.py:1951`** (edge-logged, so it
is the RELEASE edge that writes it). The pin is on 3313; 1951 is disclosed
below, unpinned.
**Open, named, and measured — see §7f for the ledger:**
* **TEN further zero-byte survivors** found by the widened scan, each measured
at 21/21 green on this tree: **two** in `allocator.py`'s `UnitPlan.explain()`
(C1 :154, C2 :160), three in `arbiter.py`'s two `explain()`s (C4a, C4b :344,
C5 :392), two in `tariff.py` (C8, C9), two in `arbitrage.py`'s trade reasons
(B17, B18) and one in `main.py`'s SoC-floor notification (B19).
None is a control decision; every one is a sentence an operator reads.
⚠️ **CORRECTED after review, and the error is worth keeping visible.** This
bullet first said "Nine" while listing eleven, and the CHANGELOG said eleven
while listing eleven — and BOTH counted `allocator.py:162` (C3) among the
survivors when §7f records it as a KILL, red in `test_alloc.py`. The
authoritative tables in §7e and §7f were right throughout; only the summary
sentences a reader actually relies on were wrong. That is this card's own
recurring defect in prose rather than in code: a claim wider than the
measurement beneath it. Arithmetic, from §7f: 14 measured = 10 surviving +
1 already caught (C3) + 3 caught by this round (C6, C7, B12).
* **The action-log surface of the peak-guard idle line** (`main.py:1951`) is
not pinned. The status row (3313) is, and both come off the same `explain()`,
so the *sentence* is closed and the *second call site* is not — which is
precisely the distinction §4c was written about, recorded rather than assumed.
* Everything §6a and §6b list stays open.
## 7. The symmetric-predicate family — every call whose argument order is load-bearing for a MESSAGE
**Why this section exists, and it is the most useful thing in the card.** Round 2
pinned the operand order of `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` at `main.py:1620`. Round 3
found the **identical zero-byte defect at `main.py:1560`**, one call site over —
and that one is worse, because `test_watchdog.py` part 9c asserts the site
detector is **never armed at
a roster of one**, so on the shipped install the per-unit banner is the **only**
sign-disagreement sentence that can ever be printed. Twice in one card the
enumeration was written by hand and twice it was short. MUTATION.md habit 12: *a
hand-written scope is the same defect as a hand-written fixture.* So the family
is now **computed**, by `tools/symmetric_message_scan.py`.
### 7a. What makes this family invisible, and why it is not a fixture problem
Every other defect in this document is a fixture problem: *no fixture happens to
separate the mutant from the shipped code.* Build the right fixture and it goes
red. This one is not that.
Where a callee is **symmetric** in two arguments, a swap at a call site cannot
change **any** action on **any** input. `watchdog.disagrees()` is
`commanded_w * against_w < 0` with an `abs()` gate on **both** sides: the
product commutes and the two gates are the same gate. There is nothing for a
behavioural check to observe, ever — **not "no fixture separates them" but no
fixture *can*.** The only surface that moves is the **sentence**, and the only
check that can see it is one asserting the **ordered pair** (MUTATION.md habit
14) at **that** call site.
Two consequences the earlier rounds got wrong:
* **The unit of coverage is the CALL SITE, not the function.** `evaluate()`'s
operand order was pinned and the defect still shipped, because the pin was on
the *other* call.
* **A behavioural suite is not weak evidence here, it is NO evidence.** "21/21
green" is what this mutation is *guaranteed* to produce. Measured, twice: M11
at `main.py:1620` on the round-1 tree, and M12 at `main.py:1560` on the
round-2 tree.
### 7b. Census A — the callee formats its own parameters
`tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` renames each parameter pair, erases every
formatted string, canonicalises the commutative operators (`*`, `+`, `and`,
`or`, `==`, `min`/`max`, iterated tuple literals) and compares the **bodies**;
it iterates to a **fixpoint**, because the symmetry is usually one call deep —
`evaluate()` is symmetric only *through* `disagrees()`, and a single pass
reports an empty family on a tree whose answer is already known. It then
classifies each sentence by **where it goes**.
Fixpoint on this tree: **3 rounds, 17 interchangeable positional and 5 keyword
pairs across 14 functions**. 45 parameter pairs reach a sentence; **8** are
symmetric — **5** whose sentence goes only to an operator, and **3** whose
sentence is the **return value** and therefore has to be classified by hand,
because a returned string is sometimes a KEY and sometimes a SENTENCE.
| # | scan row | pair | called at | swap costs | reaches an operator via | pinned? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **A1** | `watchdog.py:613` `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` | `(commanded_w, against_w)` | **`main.py:1560`** — per-unit, **and the N=1 detector** | **0 B** | `sign_reason` (persisted), the action log, `_LOG.error`, `status_payload()`'s headline banner | **YES — round 3.** `test_watchdog.py` part 3 (`its own measured power`) and part 7 (`a meter reading`), on the contiguous literal with both operands read off the observed cycle. **Measured: 0 B, red on 4 named checks, green in the other 20 files.** |
| **A2** | same row, second call site | `(commanded_w, against_w)` | **`main.py:1620`** — site | **0 B** | `site_sign_reason`, the action log, the status page | **YES — round 2**, part 9a. Re-measured on the round-3 tree: still red. |
| **A3** | `freeze.py:405` `FreezeWatchdog.evaluate()` and `freeze.py:311` `rail_unreachable()` — both symmetric through `rail_ceiling_w()`'s `for bound in (dev_min, dev_max)` | `(dev_min, dev_max)` | **`main.py:3208`** (and 1928, 2755, 3196, 3219) | **0 B** | the status page's `freeze detector: NOT COVERED — the setpoint device reports a range of …` row | **NO.** Measured: swapped at `main.py:3208-3209`, **0 bytes**, `main.py` fingerprint `61aa413f…` → `2305b560…`, **21/21 green**. Disclosed in §7d, not closed. ⚠️ `rail_unreachable()` is the row the scan puts in its **RETURN** bucket: its returned string is a **sentence**, not a key, so it is a family member after all — which is exactly why that bucket says *read by hand*. |
| **A4** | `static_tariff.py:522` `_raise_gap()` | `(start, end)` | `static_tariff.py:509`, `:513` | **0 B** | the `ProfileInvalid` refusal an operator reads at startup | **YES — pre-existing.** Measured: both call sites swapped, **0 bytes**, `static_tariff.py` fingerprint `caef7fde…` → `50e9a768…`, **red in `test_static_tariff.py` on two named checks** (*"…and names the uncovered range so the operator can fix it"*, *"…and the refusal names the uncovered range"*), because `_hhmm(start)}-{_hhmm(end)` is asserted as the contiguous literal `"22:00-23:00"`. ⚠️ That batch run also reported `FAIL test_peakguard.py` on a `static_tariff.py`-only edit; the failing check is *"one cycle of the intent form is exactly the delivered form plus the command standing on the wire"*, which is [[CI-06]]'s **mechanism 1 by name**, and `test_peakguard.py` passes **four for four** in isolation on that same tree. No claim here rests on it. |
| A5–A6 | `static_tariff.py:522` `_raise_gap()` | `(start, weekday)`, `(end, weekday)` | — | — | — | **not real — the scan's one over-report.** It erases the sentence, so it cannot see that `DAY_NAMES[start]` with `start = 1320` raises `IndexError`. A mixed-type pair fails loudly, which is the opposite of this family. |
| A7–A8 | `store.py:177` `unit_key()`, `mqtt.py:222` `unit_state_key()` | `(unit, key)`, `(slug, key)` | many | 0 B | — | **not this family.** The formatted string is the **return value and it is a KEY**: a swap renames a store key and an MQTT topic, which is behaviour every ordinary check can see. MAINT-05 is the card about it. |
### 7c. Census B — the caller builds the sentence
Census A only sees a callee formatting its **own** parameters, which was gap 2
of its own honest-gap list. The other half never crosses a function boundary:
an operator sentence built where it is printed, interpolating two values that
are **interchangeable by shape**. No predicate is involved at all, so census A's
symmetry test has nothing to test. The scan pairs interpolated expressions that
are **one leaf apart** — `inv.dev_min` / `inv.dev_max`, `cfg.min_w` /
`cfg.hold_s` — which is exactly what a transposition swaps, and it keeps only
sentences whose sink is a **message**: an f-string that becomes a URL or a store
key is data, and a swap there is an ordinary behavioural change. **16 candidates** in round 3, every one of them a **zero-byte** edit — and **22** after round 4 widened the sink classifier (B17–B22 below):
| # | site | pair | reaches an operator as | pinned? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **B1** | `main.py:3231` | `inv.dev_min` / `inv.dev_max` | status page, `… accepts only −120…130 W` | **NO — MEASURED.** Transposed in place, **0 bytes**, `main.py` fingerprint `61aa413f…` → `ac36a97b…`, purged, `:ro`, **21/21 green**. The row then tells the operator the device accepts `130…−120 W`. |
| **B2** | `main.py:3362` | `inv.dev_min` / `inv.dev_max` | status page, `setpoint … (range −120…130 W)` | **NO** — the literal `setpoint … (range` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B3** | `main.py:3435` | `sign_wd.cfg.hold_s` / `.cfg.min_w` | status page, `sign watchdog: armed (trips after 180 s opposed, both over 300 W)` | **NO** — `s opposed` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B4** | `main.py:3460` | `site_sign_wd.cfg.hold_s` / `.min_w` | status page, the site sign row | **NO** — `armed against the sum` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B5** | `main.py:3491` | `circ_wd.cfg.hold_s` / `.min_w` | status page, the circulation row | **NO** — `circulation watchdog: armed` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B6** | `circulation.py:317` | `cfg.min_w` / `cfg.hold_s` | **`circ_reason` — persisted, and re-read after a restart** | **NO** — `test_watchdog.py` asserts only `"CIRCULATING_POWER" in reason`. **This is SAFETY-31's twin of the exact defect this card just closed for SAFETY-02/30**, on a string with the same persistence. |
| **B7** | `main.py:2454` | `self.site_max_w` / `self.target` | the clamp action-log line | **NO** — `was clamped to` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B8** | `main.py:3386` | `clamp_wd.engagements` / `.episodes` | status page, `engaged N time(s) in M episode(s)` | **NO** — `time(s) in` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B9–B11** | `main.py:3169` (three pairs) | `p1.net_w` / `.samples` / `.parse_errors` | status page, the P1 row | **NO** — `P1 meter (` is in no `test_*.py`. |
| **B12** | `arbiter.py:264` | `c.source` / `c.actuator` | `scope_errors`, the arbiter's mis-routing refusal | **ROUND 4: MEASURED, THEN CLOSED.** Round 3 left it at source level; the transposition is **0 bytes**, `arbiter.py` `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `9111f627ef639ecc`, and it was **21/21 green**. Now red in `test_arbiter.py` on 2 checks. Round 3's reasoning was right: `test_arbiter.py:452` says it *"names the source and the actuator it does not belong on"* and then asserts `"peak" in r_mis.scope_errors[0]`. Under the swap the sentence becomes `"inverter-b: a SITE claim filed on unit 'peak'"` — and `"peak" in …` is **still true**. A claim wider than its assertion, which is habit 14's own shape. |
| **B13** | `validate.py:723` | `meter_phases` / `meter_max_age_s` | the startup refusal | **NO** for the ordered pair. |
| **B14** | `validate.py:1211` | `arbitrage_soc_floor` / `arbitrage_soc_ceiling` | the startup refusal | **NO** for the ordered pair. |
| **B15** | `watchdog.py:667` | `cfg.min_w` / `cfg.hold_s` | the `SIGN_DISAGREEMENT` sentence's `(limits: both over 300 W, held over 180 s)` clause | **YES**, and it is worth naming because it shows the habit works. `test_watchdog.py`'s SAFETY-30 section asserts the site instance's **whole sentence with `==` against a literal**, the `(limits: …)` clause included. Full-string equality is habit 14 taken to its limit. |
| B16 | `main.py:237` | `i.name` / `i.max_w` | the roster log line | **not real** — a `str` beside a `:.0f` format. The same over-report as A5–A6: a mixed-type transposition raises rather than lying. |
| **B17** | `arbitrage.py:377` | `v.spread_eur_kwh` / `v.required_spread_eur_kwh` | the DISCHARGE decision's `reason` | **ROUND 4, NEW, and MEASURED: 0 bytes, 21/21 green.** Not visible to round 3 at all — the sentence is handed to a constructor as `reason=`, and the sink walker scored only *assignments*. The row then reads *"0.0400 above the cheapest and clear of the 0.1200 this cycle had to cover"* with the two swapped: a trade justified by a spread it did not clear. |
| **B18** | `arbitrage.py:393` | same pair, CHARGE branch | the CHARGE decision's `reason` | **ROUND 4, NEW, MEASURED: 0 bytes, 21/21 green.** |
| **B19** | `main.py:2652` | `g.reason` / `g.soc_floor_reason` | the `goodwe_peak_soc_floor` notification body | **ROUND 4, NEW, MEASURED: 0 bytes, 21/21 green.** The alarm then opens with the *reason the floor bound* and closes with the *guard's own conclusion*, i.e. both halves of a two-part explanation in the wrong order, in the one message SAFETY-24/25 exist to send. |
| B20–B22 | `main.py:2558`, `main.py:2652` (two more pairs) | `g.reason` / `g.ceiling_w`, `g.ceiling_w` / `g.soc_floor_reason` | the same two notifications | **new in round 4, NOT measured** — mixed types (`str` beside `:.0f`), the same over-report class as B16. |
**⚠️ Six of these twenty-two were invisible to round 3, and the reason is one
line of the sink classifier.** It scored a sentence a MESSAGE when it was
appended, logged, raised, or assigned to a `reason`-shaped **name**. This
codebase mostly builds operator sentences as `Decision(…, reason=f"…")` and
`out.append({"text": f"…"})` — a **keyword argument** and a **dict key**, which
that walker stepped straight past. Both are message sinks now.
### 7d. What this enumeration does NOT close, with sizes
* **A3 is a measured, open survivor.** `dev_min`/`dev_max` transposed in
`rail_unreachable()`'s NOT COVERED row: **0 bytes, 21/21 green.** It is
disclosed here rather than fixed, because closing it wants a `test_freeze.py`
or status-page fixture with a device whose two bounds are **asymmetric** —
every fixture in the repository uses `±d` — and that is a different file's
card. It is a **status-page row**, not a latching alarm.
* **B1 is a second measured, open survivor.** `inv.dev_min` and `inv.dev_max`
transposed in `main.py:3231`'s status row: **0 bytes**, fingerprint
`61aa413f…` → `ac36a97b…`, **21/21 green**. The page then tells the operator
the device accepts `130…−120 W`. Same disposition as A3: **A3 is the row the
freeze detector prints when the rail is UNREACHABLE, B1 the clause the ARMED
row prints when the device is what set the rail** — the two rows in which that
detector ever names a device range, and neither one's operand order is
asserted anywhere.
* **Thirteen further census-B sites are unpinned and UNMEASURED.** B2–B14 above
are determined at the **source level** — the distinguishing literal appears in
no `test_*.py`, or the check that exists asserts a substring wider than its
own claim — and were **not** mutated. That is a weaker statement than A1–A4
and B1, and is written down as one.
* **B12 is a check whose CLAIM is wider than its ASSERTION**, which is habit
14's own shape one module over. `test_arbiter.py:452` says
`scope_violations` *"names the source and the actuator it does not belong
on"* and then asserts `"peak" in r_mis.scope_errors[0]`. Swap `c.source` and
`c.actuator` in `arbiter.py:264` and the sentence becomes
*"inverter-b: a SITE claim filed on unit 'peak'"* — and the substring is still
found. Source-level, not mutated, and not fixed here.
* **B6 is the closest thing to a repeat.** SAFETY-31's `circ_reason` is
persisted and re-read after a restart, exactly like `sign_reason`, and its
two limits are graded by a bare `"CIRCULATING_POWER" in reason`. This card
does not fix it; §6a already declines to touch `circ_wd`, and this is the
precise shape of what that declining costs.
* **The instrument's own blind spots** are printed by the instrument, every
run: semantic symmetry it cannot spell (it under-reports), census B pairs
that are the same *kind* but not the same *shape*, `%s`-style logging and
non-f-string payloads, anything outside `app/`, and the one way it
**over-reports** — it erases the sentence, so a swap that would make the
formatting itself raise is scored as changing no decision (A5–A6 above).
### 7e. Census C — the sentence an object returns about itself (round 4)
**Why there is a third census.** A and B between them covered **one syntactic
sink**. Everything either of them reported was a sentence that is appended,
assigned, or logged; **none was returned**. Census A's RETURN bucket only ever
held a callee formatting its own **parameters**, so a method formatting its own
**attributes** and handing the string back fell between them — and that is the
whole `describe()` / `explain()` / reason-builder family, which is where the
operator sentences in this codebase actually live.
**The test** is census B's — one f-string, two interpolations **one leaf apart**
— run over the RETURN sink, plus one thing B never needed: **a returned string
is not yet a message.** `store.unit_key()` and `mqtt.unit_state_key()` return
f-strings too, and swapping there renames a store key and an MQTT topic, which
every ordinary check can see (MAINT-05). So the sink of a returned sentence is
**resolved through its call sites**: it is in this family only when some caller
in `app/` hands it to an operator. That resolution matches on the **bare method
name**, which over-collects — at least four unrelated classes have an
`explain()` — so every verdict is printed **with the sites that produced it**,
and a MESSAGE verdict is a prompt to read them, not a proof.
The scan reports **53 returned pairs, 39 reaching an operator, 16 of those
sharing a format spec** (two values rendered alike, so a transposition is silent
rather than visibly broken). It **rediscovered both members this round was sent
to fix without being told where to look**, which is the only reason to trust the
rest of the list.
| # | site | pair | reaches an operator as | Δ bytes | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **C6** | `clamp.py:253` `ClampResult.describe()` | `requested_w` / `applied_w` | §15 action log (`main.py:1366`) **and** the ClampWatchdog notification reason (`main.py:2452`) | **0** | **was a SURVIVOR at 21/21 — now RED**, `test_clamp.py` part 6d, 4 checks |
| **C7** | `peakguard.py:493` `PeakDecision.explain()` | `projected_w` / `ceiling_w` | status row `main.py:3313`; action log `main.py:1951` on the release edge | **0** | **was a SURVIVOR at 21/21 — now RED**, `test_peakguard.py` part 13, 3 checks |
| C1 | `allocator.py:154` `UnitPlan.explain()` | `self.span` / `self.why` | the arbiter/allocator log line | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C2 | `allocator.py:160` | `self.span` / `self.why` | the ENVELOPE VIOLATED line | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C3 | `allocator.py:162` | `self.span` / `self.why` | the ordinary in-envelope line | **0** | **RED** — `test_alloc.py` already asserts that whole literal. The one member of this census the suite could already see, and it says the habit works. |
| C4a | `arbiter.py:344` `UnitBounds.explain()` | `self.lo` / `self.hi` | `CONTRADICTION within the unit (device lo=… > peak hi=…)` | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C4b | `arbiter.py:344` | `self.lo_src` / `self.hi_src` | the same sentence, the two SOURCE names | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C5 | `arbiter.py:392` `Resolution.explain()` | `self.winner` / `self.bound_by` | `main.py:2236`'s `ARBITER:` action-log row and `self.reason` at `main.py:2329` | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** — the winner and the limiter swap names, on the line §10.1 exists to make legible |
| C8 | `tariff.py:279` `PeakReading.explain()` | `self.month` / `self.detail` | the PEAK UNREADABLE row | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** |
| C9 | `tariff.py:528` `Projection.explain()` | `self.projected_w` / `self.elapsed_s` | the projection line | **0** | **SURVIVOR, 21/21 green** — watts printed as seconds and seconds as watts, both `:.0f` |
**Not in the family, and the scan says why rather than dropping them silently:**
`inverter.py:338` `__repr__()` and `static_tariff.py:378` `words` are reported
**UNRESOLVED — no call site inside `app/`** (a `__repr__` is called by the
interpreter, not by a name the scan can match); `price_forecast.py:421/428` and
`tariff.py:214` `month_key()` resolve to **OTHER** — `month_key` is a **store
key**, which is MAINT-05's case and a swap there is behaviour every check sees.
### 7f. Round 4's mutation ledger
Same protocol as §4: a fresh full-repo copy per mutation, `:ro`, bytecode
purged **and the purge count printed** before the edit, the edited file
**re-read from disk**, both sides' length and sha256 printed, and the full
**21-file** suite via `tools/mutation_run.sh`. Every row is a pure
transposition, so **every Δ is 0 bytes** — verified, not assumed: `len(old) ==
len(new)` is asserted before the write and `len(after) == len(before)` after it.
**⚠️ And every row was also required to change the ANSWER.** A byte delta says
the file moved; it does not say the sentence did. Each mutated tree is rendered
through a scratch probe that evaluates the shipped f-string with **distinct
operands** and diffs it against the same render of the clean tree. **The first
cut of that probe numbered the operands by ORDER OF APPEARANCE** — so after a
transposition the other leaf took the same number and all thirteen diffs came
back **empty**, which reads exactly like "the edit is inert". Keying the value
to the **name** fixed it. That is the same defect as everything else in this
card, in the instrument this time: a measurement comparing the swap against
itself.
| mutation | file, before → after (sha256, 16) | Δ | verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 `allocator.py:154` span↔why | `10c1b26ed0099654` → `ac0c174de1ec28ad` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C2 `allocator.py:160` span↔why | `10c1b26ed0099654` → `9b10730f4659befd` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C3 `allocator.py:162` span↔why | `10c1b26ed0099654` → `07097bf5da31f0c6` | 0 | **RED** — `test_alloc.py` |
| C4a `arbiter.py:344` lo↔hi | `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `009820de7ef0eff0` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C4b `arbiter.py:344` lo_src↔hi_src | `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `04cb8cf69dfc7432` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C5 `arbiter.py:392` winner↔bound_by | `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `9238c3db920da8ad` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| **C6** `clamp.py:253` requested↔applied | `0153133741497fa5` → `47e4e371043e3201` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21 before — RED after**, `test_clamp.py`, 4 checks |
| **C7** `peakguard.py:493` projected↔ceiling | `d95df61a51716c26` → `2d2ee3d0bcd51251` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21 before — RED after**, `test_peakguard.py`, 3 checks |
| C8 `tariff.py:279` month↔detail | `82790523dd5227c9` → `4b2147ca17a28425` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| C9 `tariff.py:528` projected↔elapsed | `82790523dd5227c9` → `517e9148d26a243a` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| B17 `arbitrage.py:377` spread↔required | `67fbf949b2938349` → `cddd8045bdeb5e29` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| B18 `arbitrage.py:393` spread↔required | `67fbf949b2938349` → `04a4f3ad3d255de1` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| B19 `main.py:2652` reason↔soc_floor_reason | `61aa413fb890433e` → `bbcbb28f476a98d0` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21** |
| **B12** `arbiter.py:264` source↔actuator | `fdb4ed0520eeb721` → `9111f627ef639ecc` | 0 | **SURVIVED 21/21 before — RED after**, `test_arbiter.py`, 2 checks |
**14 measured, 12 survived the full suite before this round's checks, 1 was
already caught, 3 are caught now.** The tree these were taken on is
`SAFETY-38` @ `357cb4f` rebased on `release/1.0` @ `9e42cec`; `app/main.py` is
234 542 bytes.
### 7g. What round 4 does NOT close, with sizes
* **Eleven measured zero-byte survivors are left open** — C1, C2, C4a, C4b, C5,
C8, C9, B17, B18, B19 and the three already open from round 3 (A3, B1, and the
B2–B11/B13–B14 source-level set). Each is a sentence an operator reads and
none is a control decision. They are disclosed with their measurement rather
than pinned because pinning each one wants a fixture in the file that owns the
module — `test_alloc.py`, `test_arbiter.py`, `test_tariff.py`,
`test_arbitrage.py` — and this card has now spent four rounds inside
`test_watchdog.py`'s subject. **An enumerated list with honest gaps beats a
fifth round finding a fifth instance**; what would NOT be honest is a fifth
round finding one that is **not on this list**.
* **`main.py:1951`, the action-log surface of the peak-guard idle line,** is
unpinned. The status row off the same `explain()` is pinned; the second call
site is not, and §4c is the card about exactly that costing a round.
* **The largest remaining hole is not in any census: `%s`-style lazy logging.**
`_LOG.error("… %s … %s", a, b)` puts the two operands in *arguments*, not in
an f-string, so nothing here looks at them and the transposition is the same
zero-byte edit. The tool now says so first in its NOT-SCANNED list, **with
the size measured rather than asserted: 31 such calls across 8 modules in
`app/`, each one listed**.
* **The tool's own blind-spot list was the round-4 blocker and is now two
lists.** "What this scans, and what it does not" enumerates its message sinks
from the constants themselves and then names, in order, what it never looks at:
`%s`-style logging, `.format()`/`%`/`+`/`.join()` sentences, a sentence that
leaves through a dict or dataclass and is rendered elsewhere, `yield`ed
sentences, attributes outside the `reason`-shaped set, and everything outside
`app/`. "What it can see but gets wrong" keeps the five gaps round 3 printed,
with the over-report gap now backed by a **printed format-spec column** so a
reader can tell a silent same-typed transposition from a noisy mixed-type one.
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
# SAFETY-39 — `slew_w` is a ratio to the rail, and `gain` is the constant that is still wrong
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-39`.
**Card:** SAFETY-39 — *"`slew_w` was derived at a 1500 W clamp and runs at 5000,
so the loop outruns the plant"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** The live install still runs the interim
`slew_w: 400` applied by hand on 2026-09-05 12:00, which this branch's new rule
accepts unchanged.
---
## 0. The three things a reader should take away
1. **The overshoot is reproduced in simulation, and one half of it is not
reproducible at all.** The setpoint stepping to the rail and the meter
crossing from export into import are both reproduced, on two independent
plant models. The **−5154 W battery figure is not reproducible in either**,
because both clamp the plant at its rating. An acceptance criterion written
on it would pass on the broken configuration too, so none is. §2.
2. **The deliverable is the relationship, not the number.** `slew_w: 0` now
means *follow the rail* and resolves to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`;
`validate.py` rule 10 refuses an explicit value faster than that against the
**site** rail. Verified by breaking it. §4, §5.
3. ⚠️ **`slew_w` does not own the over-absorption. `gain` does, and `gain` was
not changed.** Re-deriving the slew removes the ≥ 900 W step — the symptom
that escalated 2 → 1 → 13 → 43 per 30 min on the morning of the excursion —
and removes nothing else. Anyone reading this card as "the overshoot is
fixed" is reading more than was delivered. §6.
---
## 1. The defect, stated in the terms the code uses
`slew_w: 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a **clamp of 1500 W**
(goodwe/`NOTES.md`, *"Simulated 2 kW load step (gain 0.6, clamp 1500)"*). Its
stated justification:
> `slew: 1000` is the default because it puts most of the correction in the first
> cycle **while still capping how far the loop can jump ahead of the inverter**.
At 1500 W that sentence is true, and the reason is the rail rather than the
number: 1000 W/cycle reaches the rail in two cycles, so the excursion is bounded
by 1500 W whatever the loop does.
The live install then went to `max_w: 5000` and the constant did not move.
`DRIVER-07` ("raise actuator power cap to full inverter rating") is still in To
Do; the cap was raised ahead of it and `slew_w` was never revisited. **Nothing
in the code is broken.** The rail moved and the derivation did not.
| | derived at | shipped default | live install |
|---|---|---|---|
| `max_w` | **1500** | 2000 | **5000** |
| `slew_w` | 1000 | 1000 | **1000** |
Measured on the owner's system, 2026-09-05 11:43–11:46:
```
11:43:55 grid -3385 W a real 3.4 kW export
11:43:56 SP 380 → 1380 → 2380 → 3380 → 4380 → 5000 +1000 per 2 s tick
11:44:47 batt -5154 W ABOVE the 5000 VA rating
11:45:55 grid +2831 W flipped to 2.8 kW IMPORT
SP 5000 → 2930 → 3840 → 3750 hunting
```
Large (≥ 900 W) setpoint steps per ~30 min that morning: `2 → 1 → 13 → 43`.
---
## 2. ⭐ Reproduced first — and what could not be
`tools/slew_sim.py --repro`, against admin/goodwe's `plantsim.Plant`, the real
`compute()`, and the firmware's own encoder on the wire. Gain 0.6, `max_w` 5000,
`slew_w` 1000, 2 s tick, one 3385 W export step at t = 10 s:
```
t grid in setpoint battery grid out reason
10 -3739 -280 290 -3675 slew-limited
12 -3675 -1280 57 -3442 slew-limited
14 -3442 -2280 -316 -3069 slew-limited
...
34 -1012 -5000 -2823 -562 i-clamped ← the rail
38 -167 -5000 -3541 156 saturated-freeze ← EXPORT → IMPORT
44 562 -4310 -4018 633 saturated-freeze
50 544 -3210 -3804 419 tracking
```
Reproduced: the setpoint stepping a full 1000 W per tick to the rail, the loop
absorbing ~640 W more than the site needed, and the meter crossing from **3.7 kW
of export to +633 W of import** — the loop manufacturing the error it then
chases. Over a family of 51 export steps (1.0–4.2 kW × 3 phases), **48 of 51**
runs contain a ≥ 900 W setpoint step.
### ⚠️ What is NOT reproducible, and why no criterion is written on it
`plantsim.Plant.limit()` clamps the plant at `p_max`. The modelled battery
**cannot exceed its rating by one watt, at any tuning, on any step, ever.**
Neither can `test_control.py`'s independent model. So:
* the **−5154 W excursion is not reproducible in simulation at all**, and this
is a property of the models rather than of the tuning;
* the card's AC *"battery power no longer exceeds `max_w` on a step of the size
observed"* is **unfalsifiable in simulation** — it passes identically on the
configuration that produced the excursion. It is the one acceptance criterion
this card had to **rewrite rather than meet**, per the board's own rule that a
third review round means the AC is wrong.
What replaced it, and what is graded in CI: **the ≥ 900 W step is gone from
every member of the family**, and **the meter excursion and the over-absorption
are measured and reported rather than claimed to be fixed.**
### The two models agree
`test_control.py`'s in-repo first-order lag and admin/goodwe's ramp-plus-lag
`plantsim.Plant` are independent, and they agree on every sign and rank:
| | in-repo model | `plantsim.Plant` |
|---|---|---|
| ≥ 900 W steps at `slew_w` 1000 | 48/51 | 48/51 |
| ≥ 900 W steps at the derived value | 0/51 | 0/51 |
| over-absorption, slew 1000 → 250 | 1005 → 1330 W | 958 → 1081 W |
| over-absorption, gain 0.6 → 0.2 | 1109 → 393 W | 987 → 435 W |
---
## 3. The derivation
The constraint, in words, and it is the 2026-08-22 sentence made checkable:
> **The loop must not traverse its full output range faster than the plant takes
> to settle.**
Three measured quantities, and each is named where it came from:
| | value | where it was measured |
|---|---|---|
| plant settling time | **18 s** | goodwe/`NOTES.md` §5.10, 2026-08-22 — a 1.78 kW kettle step driven from HA off a plug that meters its own draw. ~18 s up to the deadband, ~23 s down. **18 is taken because it is the shorter and therefore the looser bound**; this is a refusal boundary, and rules 5 and 6 refuse the impossible case only, never "close to the rail". |
| control tick | **2 s** | the live install, measured 2026-09-05 — the setpoint stepped +1000 W every 2 s. `run_control()` runs a cycle on a changed meter value or on `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes first, so the tick is the *meter's* rate. |
| output range | `max_w` | `main.py` builds `Tuning(max_w=self.site_max_w)`, the **roster sum**. |
```
SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = 2 s / 18 s = 0.1111 (9 ticks)
slew_w ≤ SLEW_RAIL_FRAC × max_w
```
| rail | derived `slew_w` | ticks to cross | seconds to cross |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 (where the original was derived) | 167 W | 9 | 18 s |
| 2000 (shipped default) | 222 W | 9 | 18 s |
| **5000 (the live install)** | **556 W** | 9 | 18 s |
| 9600 (with inverter B — **datasheet, not measured**) | 1067 W | 9 | 18 s |
And the configuration that was measured failing: `slew_w` 1000 at `max_w` 5000
crosses the rail in **5.0 ticks = 10 s**, against a plant that takes 18 s.
### ⚠️ The tick is the weak term and it is not wrong in the safe direction
A **slower** meter makes this bound conservative — it refuses configurations that
would have been fine, which is visible immediately and costs one edit. A meter
**faster** than 2 s makes it loose by exactly that ratio and nothing in this
add-on would say so. `run_control()`'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)` bounds the tick
below at 1 s, so the worst case is a factor of two — but if a faster meter is
ever fitted, `LOOP_TICK_S` has to be **re-derived, not merely re-read**. Compare
`validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S`, which carries the same kind of copy and can
only ever be wrong the other way; that difference is why both numbers are
written out in `control.py` rather than their quotient.
### ⚠️ The rig cannot pick 556 out of the table, and is not asked to
`tools/slew_sim.py --slew`, worst case over 51 export steps:
```
slew_w 1000 ← 2026-09-05 live pair step 1000 W 48/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 958 W
slew_w 800 step 800 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1107 W
slew_w 700 step 700 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1133 W
slew_w 600 step 600 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1058 W
slew_w 555 ← the derived value step 560 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 987 W
slew_w 500 step 500 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1029 W
slew_w 400 ← the live interim step 400 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1150 W
slew_w 300 step 300 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1143 W
slew_w 250 step 250 W 0/51 ≥900 W over-absorbed 1081 W
```
The ≥ 900 W step disappears at 800 and stays gone. Below that the table is
**flat and slightly non-monotone**, and 800 is *better* than 556 on
over-absorption. So the rig does not choose the number — **the constraint
chooses it, and the rig says what the constraint does and does not buy.** That
is the same relationship the 2026-08-22 table had to its own three columns.
⚠️ **A single step is not evidence here.** The deadband, the 10 W quantisation
and the phase of the step against the tick move the result by hundreds of watts,
non-monotonically. The first cut of this derivation was a single step and ranked
gain 0.3 as *worse* than 0.6, which the family shows is backwards. Every number
above is a worst case over a family, which is how admin/goodwe grades the same
kind of quantity (`config.yaml`'s "1890 closed-loop runs", "924 runs").
---
## 4. What ships — the relationship, not the number
**`slew_w: 0` means FOLLOW THE RAIL.** `control.slew_limit_w()` resolves it to
`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`. It is the shipped default and it is the only value
that cannot be left behind when the rail moves. This is the idiom
`integrator_max_w: 0` has carried in the same options block since it was added —
not a new concept, the same one, applied to the key that needed it.
An explicit number is still accepted **and is never silently reduced**: the live
install runs 400, and silently reducing an operator's stated bound is case (a)
in `validate.py`'s own docstring — the defect that whole module exists to
prevent.
**`validate.py` rule 10** refuses an explicit `slew_w` above
`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC × site rail`. Graded against **`sum(unit_caps(opts))`**, the
roster sum — the same number `Controller.site_max_w` builds — and *not* against
the flat `max_w` and *not* against the weakest unit. Rules 5, 6 and 8 take
`min()` because each grades one watchdog, one shaping claim, one pack. `slew_w`
is not a per-unit quantity at all: `compute()` emits the **site** target and the
allocator divides it afterwards.
⚠️ `config.yaml`'s note on `site_sign_disagree_w` says there is deliberately no
rule pairing a site quantity with `max_w`, "because … `validate_startup_config()`
is handed options rather than a roster". That objection is to grading a site
quantity against the **flat key**, and it is answered rather than ignored:
`unit_caps()` already reads the roster the add-on will build, so the roster sum
*is* available at startup, and `site_rail_w()` is that number.
---
## 5. ⭐ Verified by breaking it
`test_validate.py`, section 10 — the acceptance criterion written as a test:
```
restoring slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 -> 1 problem(s)
slew_w is 1000 W against a site rail of 5000 W, so the loop crosses its
whole output range in 5.0 cycles - 10 s at the 2 s tick this site was
measured running - while the plant takes 18 s to settle …
```
and the four things the refusal has to say, each graded separately: which rail
it used, how long the crossing takes, which measurement it is graded against,
and what to do about it (including `0`, which cannot go stale). Plus:
* **equality starts** — at exactly the derived value the crossing takes exactly
the settling time, which is the constraint met, not violated (rule 6's case,
not rule 5's; getting it backwards would refuse the recommended value);
* **one watt of slack starts** — a boundary that is not meaningful to one watt
must not refuse on one watt;
* **the live interim `slew_w: 400` starts**, and so does the schema floor —
there is no such thing as too slow here, and refusing it would refuse the
mitigation that is holding;
* **`slew_w: 0` starts at every rating from 100 W to 15 kW.**
`test_control.py` grades the same boundary from the law's side, so the rule can
only ever refuse what the ratio says is too fast, and the two cannot drift apart.
---
## 5b. What the change found in this repository's own tests
Five files moved, and **none of them moved because a number was rounded
differently**. Each is worth reading as a finding.
**Two fixtures encoded the defect.** `test_inverter.py`'s `BASE_OPTS` paired
`slew_w: 1000` with `max_w: 5000` — the 2026-09-05 configuration exactly — and
`test_loop.py`'s `BASE` paired 1000 with 2000. Both were typed when those rails
were new; nothing in either file had noticed. Rule 10 refused them on its first
run, so those fixtures **would not start**. That is what a rule about a
*relationship* is for, and it is the clearest evidence the rule is not a
formality.
**Two reproductions depended on a default they never named.**
`test_alloc.py`'s `close_loop` and `test_freeze.py`'s "make both terms
reachable" case reached `slew_w: 1000` through `Tuning`'s default. ARCH-01's
4000 W broadcast limit cycle and SAFETY-18's proof-of-capability alarm would
both have gone quiet — reporting a measured finding as *absent* because a
default moved underneath them. Both now write the number beside the measurement
it belongs to.
**One harness had a latent off-by-one that only a ramping loop could expose.**
`test_watchdog.py` graded SAFETY-02's banner by pairing `c.grid` with
`last_write` sampled **after** `cycle()`, while the detector is evaluated
**inside** `cycle()` against the *standing* command from the previous one. At
`slew_w: 1000` the loop reached its rail in two cycles and consecutive commands
were identical, so the wrong pair and the right pair were the same numbers. At a
rail-following slew they differ by one step and the check went red. `_drive()`
now has a `pre` hook that reads the operands the detector will actually use, and
the check reads the **latching** cycle rather than the one before it. The
assertion is strictly stronger than it was.
**One tripwire had two assertions that were exact by coincidence.**
`test_peakguard.py` part 10c read `limited_discharging == limited` (49/49) and
`min_soc <= bms_soc_floor + 0.05`. At the slower slew the loop drains that pack
~82 Wh less over the same two hours and no longer touches the cut-out *inside
that window*: 48/49, low-water 10.57 % against a 10 % cut-out, 0 cycles at the
BMS limit instead of 190. **The finding is unchanged and is sharper on the
measure that carries it** — 162 cycles of granted discharge below the EMS floor,
up from 138. The two exact equalities were artefacts of one tuning, the old and
new numbers are tabulated in the file beside the checks, and the assertions now
grade the substance. ⚠️ *Loosening an assertion to get a branch green is the
first thing a reviewer should suspect here; the table is there so the suspicion
can be settled rather than argued.*
---
## 6. ⚠️ `gain: 0.6` — measured, and deliberately NOT changed
The card asks whether `gain` still holds at this clamp. **It does not, and here
is the measurement.**
`tools/slew_sim.py --gain`, `slew_w` at the derived 556 W, same 51-step family:
```
gain 0.6 ← shipped over-absorbed 987 W meter driven to +987 W
gain 0.5 over-absorbed 941 W
gain 0.4 over-absorbed 977 W
gain 0.3 over-absorbed 876 W
gain 0.2 over-absorbed 435 W
gain 0.1 over-absorbed 66 W
```
Against the slew column in §3, which is flat. The mechanism is visible in
`control.py` and is structural rather than empirical:
* **`slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT.**
* **The integrator accumulates `gain × error` per cycle** and is bounded only by
`integrator_max_w`. At gain 0.6 into a 3.4 kW error it moves **~2040 W per
tick** and reaches a 5000 W rail in **under three ticks, whatever `slew_w`
is**.
So the 2026-08-22 derivation's own sentence — *"the gain, not the slew, is the
limit by then"* — has become literally true, and `gain` is the term that owns
the over-absorption at this rail. It is written about a 1500 W rail, where
`gain × 1500 = 900 W` and the clamp caught it in two cycles; at 5000 there is
3.3× more room to wind before the clamp binds.
**Why nothing was changed:**
* `gain` is a live control-law constant on a running house. Two of them moving
in one release makes the next measurement uninterpretable — and the interim
`slew_w: 400` has been in service since 2026-09-05 12:00, so there is a clean
baseline to measure the next change against and it would be destroyed.
* A validator rule pairing `gain` with a rail would be **inventing a
relationship nobody has measured.** The bound would have to be
`gain × error_max ≤ SLEW_RAIL_FRAC × max_w`, and `error_max` is the
disturbance, which is not config and is not bounded.
* `integrator_max_w` is **not** the lever it looks like: it bounds the output as
well as the accumulator (`target = clamp(i_w, ±max_w)`), which is why setting
it to 2000 on the live system on 2026-09-05 capped the inverter to 2000 W of
its 5000 and was reverted the same day.
This is named in `validate.py`'s *"deliberately not refused"* list so that it is
a known open item rather than an omission, and it is asserted in
`test_control.py` so that nobody can quietly read this card as having fixed it.
**It wants its own ticket.**
---
## 7. N = 1 → N = 2: the rail is what moved
⚠️ **Inverter B does not exist on site** (SPIKE-04, ≈ 2026-09-12). Its figures
are from its **datasheet and serial**, not a measurement: GW5048D-ES, serial
`55048ESU22AW0992`, 4600 W, pack 4 × Dyness DL5.0C = 20.48 kWh, floor 10 %
(goodwe/`NOTES.md` §1.1b) — and the 4600 W is printed under *battery input data*,
so it may be DC, in which case the AC ceiling is nearer 4324 W.
⚠️ **And `sim/plantsim.py`'s `INVERTER_B` is inverter A copied**, carrying
`measured=False`. **Every two-inverter row below is a result about two copies of
A on a 10000 W rail, not about the ~9600 W site B implies.**
**The site rail becomes `sum(max_w)` ≈ 9600 W while `slew_w` is per-site.** The
derived value there is `0.1111 × 9600 = 1067 W` per tick, which at an even split
is 533 W per unit against each unit's own 5000/4600 W rating — ARCH-01's
split-invariance holding, as its `two_master_gain_sweep` already shows.
**Does the enforced relationship produce it automatically? Yes.** Rule 10 reads
`sum(unit_caps(opts))` and `slew_limit_w()` reads `Tuning.max_w`, which
`main.py` sets from `Controller.site_max_w`. Declaring inverter B moves both,
with no operator action and no second derivation. That is the property that
makes this a fix rather than a re-tune, and `test_validate.py` asserts the
9600 W arithmetic directly.
⚠️ **But the direction of the rule is not the one the ticket assumed, and it
must be said.** A rail that **grows loosens** this bound: `slew_w: 1000`
crosses 9600 W in 19.2 s and **passes**, while the same 1000 at 5000 W is the
configuration measured failing. That is what the constraint says and it is
correct — the bound is on how long the crossing *takes*. What the rule protects
against is the constant being left behind when the rail moves, in either
direction. **It is not a bound on how much power the site may command** (that is
each unit's own `max_w` through the arbiter's `supervised` claim) **and it does
not bound the over-absorption** (§6).
⚠️ **The ≥ 900 W symptom goes stale at N = 2 the same way the constant did.**
On the two-copies-of-A rows, 48/51 runs contain a ≥ 900 W step *at the derived
value*, because at a 10000 W rail the derived step **is** 1111 W. A check
written on the absolute 900 W would report the correct tuning as broken.
Anything grading this symptom at N ≥ 2 has to grade it as a **fraction of the
rail** too — which is this whole card, one layer out.
---
## 8. `max_w: 5000` — a recommendation, not a change
The battery reached **5154 W against a 5000 VA inverter**, so the configured cap
left no headroom for the overshoot that the loop was going to produce anyway.
Three things are worth writing down and none of them is changed here:
1. **The cap is the rating, so the overshoot has nowhere to go but past it.**
`compute()` bounds the *command* to `±max_w`; nothing bounds the plant's
response to a command at the rail, and §6 shows the loop asks for the rail on
any large step at gain 0.6. Recommend **`max_w` at 4500–4750 W**, i.e. 90–95 %
of the 5000 VA nameplate, leaving 250–500 W for the overshoot the loop still
has. This is `freeze.py`'s `RAIL_FRAC` argument applied to the cap itself.
2. **The −5154 W may not be an AC figure at all.** `batt_entity` is the pack
sensor and `max_w` is graded against `0x0518`, the inverter's **AC** power —
`config.yaml`'s roster comment already records exactly this ambiguity for
inverter B. If the battery reading is DC, 5154 W DC is ~4900 W AC and the
inverter was never over its nameplate. **Nobody has measured which**, and the
recommendation above is worth making either way.
3. **It is the owner's number.** `translations/en.yaml` marks `max_w` "THIS IS
YOUR NUMBER" precisely so it is not confused with a derived constant, and
changing it unilaterally in a pull request would undo that distinction.
`SAFETY-20`'s `min(max_w, dev_max)` settles the device side once ESPHome has
answered; the *headroom* question is a policy choice and belongs to the owner.
---
## 9. What was deliberately not done
* **`saturation_w` and the deadband were not touched.** The card forbids it and
it is right to: widening either hides the symptom. The loop is following its
command correctly; the command is wrong.
* **`gain` was not changed.** §6.
* **`max_w` was not changed.** §8.
* **`control.py`'s slew *limit* was not clamped to the bound.** An explicit
value above it is refused at startup, not quietly reduced — silently reducing
an operator's stated bound is case (a) in `validate.py`'s docstring.
* **Nothing in admin/goodwe was modified**, and nothing reached the inverter.
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
# TEL-07 — why inverter A does not get a device of its own, and B does
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-05.** MQTT discovery announces **two** devices at a
roster of two: the existing one, unchanged, plus one for the second inverter.
It does **not** announce one per inverter. This document exists because the
symmetrical design is the obvious one, is tidier, and would destroy the live
system's recorded history — so the next person to read `app/mqtt.py` needs the
reason written down where they will find it before they "fix" it.
Filed with TEL-07. Card `6a9bfa75f0a3550275ba4888`.
---
## 1. The mechanism, in one paragraph
`app/mqtt.py`'s own note records the finding, tested on HA 2026.8: Home
Assistant composes an entity id from the **device name plus the entity name**,
and `object_id` in the discovery payload does **not** override it. So the device
name is half of every entity id.
The second half of the mechanism is the half that makes it silent. Home
Assistant keeps the entity id it composed at **first** discovery. Re-scoping the
device therefore does not rename an entity in place; it creates a **new** entity
beside the old one. The recorded history stays on the old id, the old id stops
updating, and nothing errors. Every dashboard card, template and automation that
names it — including `goodwe_master_watchdog_held_*` and
`goodwe_master_parked_at_0_w_*`, which are live — keeps pointing at a sensor
that has quietly gone flat.
`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age` is the sharp end of it: the ESP32's stale-input
watchdog subscribes to that composed name, and its own comment calls this the
failure that "FAILS SILENTLY AND LOOKS CORRECT".
## 2. The two designs
| | **one device per inverter** | **what shipped** |
|---|---|---|
| A's device | new: `inverter-a` | **the one it already has** |
| B's device | new: `inverter-b` | new: `goodwe_rs485_controller_inverter_b` |
| A's existing entity ids | **all renamed** | **byte-identical** |
| A's recorded history | **stranded on dead ids** | kept |
| watchdog automations | **silently broken** | untouched |
| composed per-unit ids | `sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_*` / `..._b_*` | **the same** |
| reads as | symmetrical and tidy | asymmetrical, and needs this file |
The last two rows are the whole argument. The tidy design's only real benefit is
a pair of symmetric, predictable entity ids — and the shipped design produces
**exactly the same ids** by putting the unit's name in the *entity* name for the
first roster entry and in the *device* name for the others. There is nothing
left to buy, and the price was the live system's history.
## 3. What is per-unit and what is site
**Per-unit:** setpoint (this unit's share of the site target, the number its own
heartbeat re-emits), battery power (`Inverter.batt`, register `0x0518`, this
unit's own reading), SoC (`Inverter.soc` — **this** pack; the site row is the
*emptiest* pack, which at N≥2 may be the other one), and the SAFETY-02 sign
latch, which is one instance per actuator by construction.
**Site:** `grid` and `p1_sample_age_s`. There is one P1 meter and one grid
connection, so a per-inverter copy invents two of a thing there is one of — and
`p1_sample_age_s` is a **watchdog input**, so a second copy is a second answer to
"is the meter fresh?", one of which is always the one nobody is looking at.
Circulating power is site because it *is* a property of the set
(`sum(|Bᵢ|) − |sum(Bᵢ)|`); so are the controller status, the maintenance phase
and the capacity-tariff peak.
**Named as absent rather than left looking finished:** the card also lists
"inverter AC power" and per-unit heartbeats as per-unit. Neither has a source in
the add-on today — nothing reads an AC-power register per unit, and
`Inverter.last_beat` is a monotonic loop clock with no wall-clock age published
anywhere. Announcing them would create entities nothing ever feeds, which is the
hazard the `omit` note in `mqtt.py` exists to refuse. They are gaps.
## 4. Why a roster of one announces nothing
Every install running today is a roster of one, and at N=1 the site rows **are**
that unit's rows: `battery` is its power, `soc` is its pack. Four extra entities
would be four new rows carrying numbers already on the dashboard, on a live
system, for no information. `announced_units()` answers `[]` below
`PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER`, and `Controller.publish()` reads **that same list** —
the empty list is the gate on both halves, rather than a predicate written twice
that could later disagree.
## 5. How it was verified, and what that does not cover
The claim is a **diff of the announced payloads** against `release/1.0`,
generated by running that commit's module rather than transcribed from it:
`9 topics, 0 missing, 0 changed, 0 added` at a roster of one, and
`0 missing, 0 changed, 8 added` at a roster of two. `test_mqtt.py` part 2 shows
`_announce()` publishes exactly what is diffed, so the comparison is against the
bytes paho is handed.
Sixteen mutations were run. Twelve are in the file as a running table, each
named with the property it breaks. Three properties in that table exist only
because the table found their absence — dropping the unit from the state topic,
moving `grid` into the per-unit list, and `units=()` in main()'s publisher call
were all green on the first run, as was a roster fallback that named two
nameless entries `inverter-a`.
**What it does not cover is listed in `test_mqtt.py` part 9, with sizes.** The
largest item: Home Assistant itself is not in the loop. The entity-id
composition is a **model**, anchored on exactly one measured id
(`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, verified against the live system 2026-08-26).
Closing that needs a broker, an HA and the owner present, and this card is not
allowed near the live install.
## 6. ⚠️ Inverter B does not exist
Not until ~2026-09-12. Every roster of two in this repository's checks is
**simulated**; B's `max_w: 4600` is the datasheet's figure for a GW5048D-ES
(serial `55048ESU22AW0992`), recorded in `goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b, and nothing
about B has ever been measured. No entity described here has been seen on a
broker. When the second inverter is installed, the first thing to check is that
the eight ids in §1 are still updating — not that the new ones appeared.
+126 -3
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,30 @@ hardware holds it there.
## Configuration
### What the Configuration tab actually shows you (UX-01)
Since **UX-01** the add-on ships `translations/en.yaml` and `translations/nl.yaml`,
so Home Assistant's *Configuration* tab renders human labels and a description
for every option instead of the raw option keys. What that does and does not buy
you is worth stating plainly, because it was **measured against the Supervisor
image this site runs** (`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0`)
rather than assumed — `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` section F prints the
whole rendered list, in both languages.
| | |
|---|---|
| **All 70 options are always shown** | The frontend keeps a field when `name in options \|\| required`, and every key is in `options:`. There is no "advanced" fold |
| **Order comes from `schema:`** | `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(...)(data["schema"])`, so the **schema half** of `config.yaml` decides the order the tab renders in — not the `options:` half |
| **There are no section headers** | Add-on options are a flat list: no header primitive, no per-option advanced flag, no units on the input, no sliders. Grouping is approximated by **order** plus the `Group · ` prefix in each label, and by nothing else |
| **Groups, in task order** | Hardware → Meter → Limits → Tariff → Maintenance → Safety → Advanced |
| **The description says whether to touch it** | A number that was **derived** names the campaign it came from and says not to change it without re-deriving; a number that is genuinely yours (`max_w`, `peak_cap_w`) says **"THIS IS YOUR NUMBER"**; and `cycle_cost_threshold_eur`, which is neither, says it is an open product question |
| **Dutch falls back per key** | `translations[your language]?.name \|\| translations["en"]?.name \|\| the raw key`. A key missing from `nl.yaml` degrades to English; a key present but wrong does not degrade at all |
| **⚠️ The per-entry keys inside `inverters:` still render raw** | Measured, and negative. A list-of-objects becomes an `object` selector with `multiple: true`, and `ha-selector-object` labels its fields `fields[name].label \|\| name` — the converter sets no `label` and no `translation_key`. The `fields:` translations are shipped and validated (they are the shape Supervisor's own schema defines) but on frontend 20250925.1 they do **not** reach the screen. The `inverters` label and description themselves do |
`test_translations.py` is what stops this rotting: a translation naming an
option that does not exist, or an option with no translation, fails CI — in
either direction, and the check is mutation-tested both ways.
### Sources
| option | required | meaning |
@@ -78,9 +102,20 @@ inverters:
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_soc
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power
max_w: 3000
max_w: 4600
```
⚠️ **The 4600 W is inverter B's *datasheet* figure, not a measured one.** B is a
GoodWe GW5048D-ES (serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, identified 2026-09-04) whose
datasheet gives max charging and discharging power as 4600 W; with nothing
connected to its PV inputs the battery path is the ceiling, not the 5000 VA AC
nameplate. The datasheet prints that number under *Battery Input Data*, so it
may be a DC figure, while `max_w` is graded against register `0x0518` — the
inverter's own **AC** power. If it is DC the AC-side ceiling is nearer 4324 W.
`max_w: 4600` is still the right thing to configure, because the freeze rail is
`min(max_w, dev_max)` and the device range read off the unit is what binds.
`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b records both readings and picks neither.
| per-entry key | required | meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `name` | yes | Short identifier. It namespaces this unit's SAFETY-02 latch, heartbeat and write bookkeeping in the add-on's state file, so **two units may not share one** |
@@ -131,6 +166,53 @@ in the log rather than silent, but it is an outage until someone puts the
single-inverter entity back in that field. **Before downgrading, write down the
`setpoint_entity` of the unit you want to keep running.**
### What appears in Home Assistant at two inverters
**Nothing you already have changes.** The eight entities this add-on has always
published — `Setpoint`, `Grid power`, `Battery power`, `Battery SoC`,
`Circulating power`, `Maintenance phase`, `Controller status`, `P1 sample age` —
keep their device, their `unique_id`s and therefore their **entity ids and their
whole recorded history**. At a roster of one, nothing new is announced at all:
no second device, no renamed entity, not one added topic.
Declare a second inverter and **four rows per unit** appear beside them:
| per-unit row | what it is |
|---|---|
| `Setpoint` | this unit's own share of the site target — the number its heartbeat re-emits |
| `Battery power` | this unit's own reading, `+` = discharging |
| `Battery SoC` | **this** pack. The site `Battery SoC` row is the *emptiest* pack, which may be the other one |
| `Sign latch` | this unit's SAFETY-02 latch: `tripped` or `clear` |
⚠️ **The devices are deliberately asymmetric, and it is not an oversight.** The
first inverter's rows are added to the **existing** *GoodWe* device; every later
inverter gets its **own** device (*GoodWe Inverter B*), shown in Home Assistant
as connected via the controller. Home Assistant composes an entity id from the
**device name plus the entity name**, so giving the first inverter a device of
its own would rename every entity you already have — and because HA keeps the id
it composed at first discovery, you would get a new entity beside a dead one:
the history stays on the old id and every dashboard, template and automation
naming it silently stops updating. The entity ids come out symmetric anyway —
`sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power` beside
`sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power`.
**Do not rename the device.** Not in this add-on, and not in Home Assistant's
device page. It is half of every entity id, including
`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, which the ESP32's stale-input watchdog subscribes
to; a rename disarms that guard by leaving it waiting for a state that never
arrives, and it fails silently and looks correct.
**`Grid power` and `P1 sample age` stay site-scoped and are announced once.**
There is one P1 meter and one grid connection; a per-inverter copy would invent
two of a thing there is one of, and `P1 sample age` is a safety input. Same for
`Circulating power` (it is a property of the *set* of inverters), the controller
status, the maintenance phase and the capacity-tariff peak.
⚠️ **Two roster names that differ only in punctuation or case** — `inverter-b`
and `Inverter B` — are two names to the validator and one id once slugged. The
add-on gives the second one a `_2` suffix so nothing collides, but the ids you
get then depend on roster order. Give your inverters plainly different names.
### P1 meter ingestion
`meter_entity` above expects one signed sensor, which usually means a template
@@ -350,7 +432,7 @@ behind it would trip the firmware watchdog on a system that is working fine.
|---|---|---|
| `max_w` | 2000 | Hard limit on what may be commanded. Start low, raise after commissioning. **Not read when `inverters` is declared** — each entry carries its own, and the site ceiling is their sum |
| `gain` | 0.6 | Correction per cycle. **At the limit — do not raise** |
| `slew_w` | 1000 | Maximum change per cycle |
| `slew_w` | 0 | Largest change in one cycle. **0 means follow the rail** - `max_w / 9`, i.e. the loop takes the plant's own measured ~18 s settling time to cross its whole output range at the 2 s tick the live install runs. 222 W at `max_w: 2000`, 556 W at 5000, 1067 W at a ~9600 W two-inverter site. A fixed number is accepted and never silently reduced, but one FASTER than the rail implies is refused at startup (SAFETY-39): `slew_w: 1000` against `max_w: 5000` crossed the rail in 10 s against an 18 s plant, and on 2026-09-05 drove the meter from 3.4 kW of export to 2.8 kW of import |
| `deadband_w` | 15 | Ignore errors smaller than this |
| `target_grid_w` | -10 | What the meter should rest at. Negative = a slight export |
| `step_w` | 10 | Quantisation |
@@ -363,6 +445,10 @@ behind it would trip the firmware watchdog on a system that is working fine.
| `auto_start` | false | Start controlling on boot (only after commissioning) |
| `sign_disagree_w` | 300 | Both the command and the meter must exceed this before a sign difference counts. Must stay **below `max_w`** or the watchdog can never fire, and the add-on refuses to start |
| `sign_disagree_s` | 180 | How long they must stay opposed, continuously, before the failsafe trips |
| `unit_sign_disagree_w` | 250 | **Two or more inverters only.** Both a unit's own share and its own measured power must exceed this before their sign difference counts. It is `saturation_w / 2`, so the smallest divergence it can see is exactly the gap at which the loop already calls the inverter "not following". Must stay **below `max_w`** or it can never fire, and the add-on refuses to start |
| `unit_sign_disagree_s` | 85 | **Two or more inverters only.** How long one unit's command and its own power must stay opposed before that unit is parked |
| `site_sign_disagree_w` | 300 | **Two or more inverters only.** Threshold for the site-wide check - the sum of the commands against the meter. The same 300 W as `sign_disagree_w`, for the same reason: near zero the sign is noise |
| `site_sign_disagree_s` | 325 | **Two or more inverters only.** How long the site's total command and the meter must stay opposed before every inverter is parked. Longer than `sign_disagree_s` because the command has to cross zero over a rail that is the sum of the roster, at a `slew_w` that is not - measured at 110 s with one inverter and 215 s with two |
#### The sign-disagreement failsafe
@@ -374,6 +460,43 @@ there. The banner reads `FAILSAFE`, the commissioning list says which two
numbers disagreed and for how long, and the `Controller status` entity reports
`failsafe`.
#### ⚠️ At two or more inverters this is TWO checks, not one (SAFETY-30)
The paragraph above describes what a **one-inverter** install does, and it is
unchanged: there is one meter, one actuator, and comparing the command against
the meter is comparing a thing with a view of itself.
With a second inverter that stops being true. The meter answers for **both**
units, so a command put on one of them can be opposed to it with nothing wrong
(inverter A charging while inverter B discharges more), and - the worse
direction - a unit genuinely driving the wrong way can be **hidden**, because its
sibling's watts arrive at the meter and the sum looks healthy. So the check
splits in two, and they are different faults:
- **Per inverter** — that unit's own share against **its own measured power**
(the `batt_entity` reading, register 0x0518). This catches *"this inverter is
not doing what it was told"*. Only that inverter is parked; the site keeps
running on the one that works. Thresholds: `unit_sign_disagree_w` /
`unit_sign_disagree_s`.
- **Site-wide** — the **sum** of what every inverter has standing, against the
meter. This catches *"the site as a whole is pushing the wrong way"*, which no
per-inverter check can see because every unit may be faithfully executing its
share of a number that is itself wrong. **Every** inverter is parked and the
banner names the site rather than an inverter. Thresholds:
`site_sign_disagree_w` / `site_sign_disagree_s`, latched under flat
`site_sign_tripped` in `/data/state.json`.
Both latch, both are cleared by the same *stop, then start*, and both survive a
restart. **On a one-inverter install neither pair does anything at all** - the
two questions are the same question there, and only the check described above is
armed.
This is **not** the circulating-power alarm further down: that one compares the
inverters *against each other* and catches them pushing power through each other,
which nets to zero at the meter and which no command is evidence about. It is
also not the saturation freeze, which is a *magnitude* test that shapes the loop
rather than a *direction* test that parks an inverter.
**It does not clear itself, and restarting the add-on does not clear it either.**
Pressing *Start / stop control* twice — stop, then start — is the only thing that
does. That is deliberate on both counts:
@@ -513,7 +636,7 @@ help - see "Why the tuning is what it is".
| `peak_forecast_entity` | Quarter-hour demand forecast, for capacity-tariff markets. Empty = no cap |
| `peak_cap_w` | The site's capacity-tariff target |
| `peak_soc_floor` (20) | **The percent below which the capacity-peak guard will not discharge the battery.** ⚠️ It bounds **the peak guard only** — it is **not a pack-wide reserve**, and ordinary self-consumption discharges straight past it (SAFETY-25, see below). Not optional and not the same thing as `maintenance_soc_floor` |
| `bms_soc_floor` (10) | The pack's **own** cut-out percent, the number the BMS enforces whatever you set above. `peak_soc_floor` must be **strictly above** it or the add-on refuses to start |
| `bms_soc_floor` (10) | The pack's **own** cut-out percent, the number the BMS enforces whatever you set above. `peak_soc_floor` must be **strictly above** it or the add-on refuses to start. ⚠️ **At a declared `inverters:` roster this key moves INTO each entry and is REQUIRED there** (SAFETY-32): it describes a battery, and two packs of different models have different cut-outs, so one number for both protects the shallower pack with the deeper pack's BMS. Nothing is inherited — an entry that omits it is refused **by name** at startup, and the flat key below is then not read at all |
| `price_now_entity`, `price_avg_entity` | Dynamic tariff. Empty = never force a paid grid top-up |
On a capacity-tariff site the maintenance charge is capped by the headroom left
+309 -3
View File
@@ -135,11 +135,31 @@ manufactures them from a **fixture**: the check runs, the assertion is
evaluated, the sentence above it is true — and the numbers it compares are
arranged so that the failure it describes could not have changed the answer.
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. Six instances in two weeks; three
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. ELEVEN instances in two weeks; four
were found by review, two - CFG-04's fixture pair - by an author's own mutation
battery, which is the cheaper place, and the sixth by review again, in the one
battery, which is the cheaper place, one by review again, in the one
place nobody had thought to point the rule at: not a check in the suite, but a
COMMITTED EVIDENCE ARTIFACT four documents cite.
COMMITTED EVIDENCE ARTIFACT four documents cite - the eighth INSIDE THE FIX
WRITTEN TO CLOSE THE SEVENTH, the ninth inside the SITE HALF of the card
that names the rule in its own text - and the TENTH INSIDE THE FIX WRITTEN TO
CLOSE THE NINTH, for the second time in this list. See SAFETY-38 below: the
check that closed it asserted a NUMBER and not the number's POSITION.
⚠️ AND THE ELEVENTH IS IN A MEASURING INSTRUMENT RATHER THAN IN A CHECK, which
is where the seventh was too. SAFETY-38 round 4's render probe - the thing that
decides whether a mutation changed the SENTENCE and not merely the bytes -
numbered each interpolated operand BY ORDER OF APPEARANCE. After a transposition
the other operand takes the same number, so all thirteen mutant renders came back
BYTE-IDENTICAL to the clean tree: the probe compared the swap against itself, and
its output read exactly like "the edit is inert". Keying the value to the
operand's NAME fixed it. Habit 16.
⚠️ **AND IT HAS NOW APPEARED IN SIX CONSECUTIVE CARDS.** The seventh instance,
MAINT-05's, is the one that says why: the defect is not carelessness about
fixtures, it is that **a check and the thing it checks were built from the same
constant**. Ask of every difference-claim not "is this assertion true" but
"where did each side of this comparison come from" - and if the answer is the
same place twice, the check is decoration.
* **ARB-03** shipped a call-site scan asserting that every `claims.append` in
`cycle()` routes through `actuator_of()`. Its own parse **saw 3 of the 8
@@ -167,6 +187,44 @@ COMMITTED EVIDENCE ARTIFACT four documents cite.
than against its behaviour. It now drives the shipped `run_control()` on a
two-inverter config, **under a deadline**, because the mutation's real symptom
is that the controller enters its loop and never returns.
* **MAINT-05** shipped `Controller.__init__` calling
`migrate_maint_keys(store, self.inverters[0].name, ...)` under a comment
saying *"it targets `self.inverters[0].name` and NOT `UNIT_A` ... writing
`UNIT_A` here would deposit an install's whole maintenance history under a
name that is not on the roster at all"*. `inverter.UNIT_A` **is** the string
`"inverter-a"`, and every two-pack fixture in `test_maintenance.py` named its
first roster entry `inverter-a` — so the two expressions were the same value
in every check that existed, and swapping them left **all 19 files green**
while losing a real install's whole maintenance history. Two-pack fixtures are
now `["garage", "shed"]`, each behind a precondition check (habit 1) that the
first name is not `UNIT_A`.
⚠️ **AND THE POSTCONDITION HAD THE SAME SHAPE AS THE FIXTURE.**
`store._verify_moves()` read back the keys it had just written, under the
namespace it had just been handed — so it verified clean, and the caller
stamped the schema marker, on a migration nothing would ever read. *A check
that reads back the namespace it was handed cannot detect being handed the
wrong one*: it compared a thing against itself, exactly as DEV-02's fixture
compared `(-5000, 5000)` against `(-5000, 5000)`. The habit-2 fix is the same
one — grade against something the thing under test did not supply, here the
ROSTER the machines read.
⚠️ **AND THE FIX ITSELF CARRIED THE DEFECT, WHICH IS THE SIXTH CARD IN A ROW
AND THE FIRST TIME IT HAS APPEARED *INSIDE* A REMEDY.** The fix round's
recovery check was `migrate_maint_keys(_m5, ROSTER[0], ROSTER)` — the
**corrected** name. It measures recovery along the one path where the operator
has *already fixed the bug*, and nothing in the 19 files called
`migrate_maint_keys()` twice with the **same wrong** `unit`. So the refusal
the card was rejected twice to obtain lasted **exactly one start**: measured
at Controller level over one persisted store, roster `["garage", "shed"]` —
construction 1 `ok=False misdirected=4 moved=4 kept=0 marker=<absent>`,
construction 2 `ok=True misdirected=0 moved=0 kept=4 marker=1`. On start 2
rule 1 routes the wrongly-written keys to `rep.kept`, `rep.moved` is empty,
the roster loop iterates over nothing, and the marker is stamped on a
migration that reached no readable key — after which the early return skips it
forever, *including after the call site is fixed*. The check was true and
passed for the wrong reason. Habit **9** below is what falls out of it.
* **CFG-04's `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §B** — and this one is the rule
reaching outside the suite. The probe is the committed evidence that
`config.yaml`'s `inverters: []` default is load-bearing, and four documents
@@ -188,6 +246,65 @@ COMMITTED EVIDENCE ARTIFACT four documents cite.
assertion cannot fail is exactly the thing this section is about. Two habits
follow, and both are habit 5 and 6 below.
* **SAFETY-38** — `main.py`'s
`site_standing = float(sum(standing.values()))`, the first argument of
SAFETY-30's latching site sign detector *and* SAFETY-18's `looks_frozen()`
input. `test_watchdog.py`'s `_sign_site` is the suite's **only** N≥2 site
fixture, and it runs shares of about **−2500 W each** — every one
individually over the 320 W gate it is configured with. On numbers like those
`sum`, the mean and `max(key=abs)` **all agree**, so the reduction could be
swapped for either of the other two and the site guard went **blind with the
whole suite green** — still commanding −500 W of charge into a +2500 W import at
t = 595 s with `following=True`. At a roster of **one** it is worse and it is
not a fixture defect at all: `sum == mean == max == the one share`
*identically*, so every such mutation is genuinely **equivalent** there and no
N=1 fixture could ever separate them. The fixture that separates them is the
one the detector exists for — **per-unit shares EACH BELOW the gate whose SUM
clears it** — and it is now `test_watchdog.py` part 9, at asymmetric ratings
so that all four candidate reductions give four **distinct** answers.
⚠️ **AND THE CARD'S OWN SEARCH FOR ITS NEXT SURVIVOR FOUND ONE, WHICH IS THE
POINT OF ASKING.** Having built the fixture, the question *what mutation would
this NOT see?* produced `float(self.target)` — the arbiter's site target
instead of the sum of what stands on the wire — at **−11 B**, green across the
whole suite, because every fixture in the repository was built where the two
are the same number. They separate only when a device's reported range is
narrower than its `max_w`, since the `device` claim is filed **per actuator**
and never bounds the site target. Closed in the same commit, by a
counterfactual that asks for −500 W while −250 W stands.
⚠️ **AND THEN THE FIX ITSELF WAS THE TENTH INSTANCE — A SUBSTRING WHERE THE
FAILURE WAS POSITIONAL.** The check written to pin the banner asserted
`f"{sum(...):.0f} W" in reason`: that **"−500 W" appears somewhere** in the
sentence. Swapping the detector's first two arguments
(`evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` → `evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, …)`)
is a **ZERO-BYTE** edit that leaves both numbers in the string and moves each
into the other's slot — so the substring is still found, **in the meter
slot**, and the whole suite stayed green while the latching site-stopping
banner told the operator which instrument read what **exactly backwards**.
The fix is to assert the **ORDERED PAIR**,
`f"commanded {sum:+.0f} W against a meter reading {grid:+.0f} W"`.
⚠️ **AND THE ELEVENTH WAS THE SAME DEFECT ONE CALL SITE OVER — THE ONE A
SHIPPED INSTALL CAN ACTUALLY SEE.** Round 2 pinned the operand order of
`SignWatchdog.evaluate()` at `main.py:1620`. That call site is the **site**
detector, and `test_watchdog.py` part 9c asserts it is **never armed at a
roster of one** — which is every install this add-on has. The **per-unit**
call at `main.py:1560` was left unpinned, and swapping its first two
arguments is the same **ZERO-BYTE** edit: `disagrees()` is symmetric in them
(`commanded_w * against_w < 0` with an `abs()` gate on both), so **no trip
decision can change** and the full 21-file suite stays green — measured. What
moves is five banner lines, including the one persisted to `sign_reason` and
re-read after a restart: *"commanded −1000 W against its own measured power
+1000 W"*, operands inverted, on the only sign-disagreement sentence a
one-inverter install can ever print. Closed in round 3 by the ordered pair on
**both** per-unit banners — the N≥2 `its own measured power` one and the N=1
`a meter reading` one — red on four named checks, green in the other twenty
files. **Habit 15 is what falls out of finding the same shape twice in the
same card.**
The general habits are **14** and **15** below.
Note what these have in common with a masked rung: the mutation *runs*, and the
suite is *honestly* green. Nothing in a purge, a fingerprint or a disassembly
can see it, because the code under test really did behave identically on the
@@ -241,6 +358,193 @@ Cheap habits fall out of it, and all of them are now used in this repository:
red. `inverters: []` was deleted from `config.yaml` and the probe re-run
against `ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0` for
exactly that reason.
9. **Exercise a refusal a SECOND time with the SAME wrong input — not the
corrected one.** A guard that refuses once and then admits the same bad
caller is not a guard, it is a delay, and the second call is a *different
code path* whenever the first call left state behind. MAINT-05's roster
grading iterated the keys it had just **written**; on the second start the
same wrong caller found them already present, they moved to the
`already namespaced` list, and the loop graded an empty set. Re-running with
the **fixed** argument — which is what the check did — measures the operator's
recovery, never the persistence of the refusal. Ask of every refusal: *what
does this do when the caller has not been fixed and simply runs again?* And
assert the **shape** of that second report, not only its verdict, so the
check cannot silently revert to grading the first path.
10. **A fixture of N members cannot separate two reductions that agree on N
members — so grade the FAMILY, and grade it from the SOURCE.** This is the
only lesson SAFETY-32 cost four review rounds to learn, and it generalises
past packs to every roster, list and window in this repository. Two packs
cannot tell `max` from `min` from first from last. Three cannot tell `max`
from `max(x[-2:])`. **The regress does not terminate in a fixture**: `[:1]`
needs two members, `[:2]` three, `[:3]` four, and adding one more member
moves the hole rather than closing it. Three things follow, and all three
are now in `test_peakguard.py` parts 12c2, 12g, 12i and 12j:
* the fixture is a **SET** — the extreme at every position of the roster,
not one roster with the extreme somewhere;
* the family table is **COMPUTED and PRINTED**, so a member no fixture kills
shows up as a named survivor and takes the check red, instead of being
absent from a list nobody re-derived;
* where the claim is an **IDENTITY** ("this roster", "this list"), pin it
**exactly on the AST** — `ast.unparse(arg) == "self.packs"` is false of
every slice, where `"self.packs" in src` is true of all of them. Where the
claim is **SEMANTIC** ("the maximum"), a shape pin would refuse honest
refactors, so report the unreached width **with its size** instead.
11. **When a check of this shape is found, mutate its SIBLINGS before shipping
the fix.** SAFETY-32 was rejected three times for the same defect one step
over: the reduction, then the roster handed to it, then the reduction handed
to the *other argument of the same call*. Enumerating the family from the
AST and mutating each member took one afternoon and found **four more
survivors in code the card never touched** — three of SAFETY-30's
`any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in self.inverters)` reductions, invisible
because the only fixture that reached them was a roster of ONE, where
`self.inverters[:1]` **is** `self.inverters`. Ask of every fix: *what is the
sibling of the thing I just hardened, and does any fixture separate it from
a slice of itself?*
12. **When the same shape has been found twice, STOP CLOSING SITES AND BUILD
THE INSTRUMENT — and make it DISCOVER its own scope.** SAFETY-32 was
rejected four times, and each round closed exactly the site it was handed:
the reduction, then the roster handed to it, then the *sibling argument* of
the same call, then the same family one *module* over, in validate.py.
Round 4 did enumerate — and enumerated inside the `Controller` class,
because that is where the four known sites lived. **A hand-written scope is
the same defect as a hand-written fixture**: it is a check whose data cannot
reach the failure it names, and it goes on passing while the thing it was
supposed to cover sits in the file nobody added to the list. Round 5's pin
parses every `.py` under `app/`, seeds itself from ONE option key, and
propagates through returns, accumulator loops, attributes and *call
arguments* to find the roster wherever it went — 183 reductions across 9
modules. It rediscovered all four blockers without being told where to look,
and it named two modules the hand-written list would not have contained
(`maintenance.py`, `store.py`) while *omitting* one the list did contain
(`watchdog.py`, which is strictly per-unit and reduces over no roster at
all). **The list was wrong in both directions**, which is exactly what a
computed scope is for.
13. **Say what the instrument CANNOT see, with sizes, in the same breath.** A
structural pin grades an **identity** ("this whole roster arrives"); it can
never grade a **meaning** (`min` vs `max` is a zero-byte edit and invisible
to it). Ship the pin AND the behavioural set, name the gap, and give every
unreached case its byte delta — `cycle()`'s undeliverable-unit log line
(+4 B, still green), a subscript by a *variable* rather than a constant, a
slice taken through an intermediate call, anything outside `app/`. **An
enumerated list with an honest gap is worth more than a claim of
completeness a reviewer falsifies in ten minutes**, and every round of this
card that claimed the latter was rejected for it.
14. **An `in` test against a formatted sentence grades PRESENCE, never
ARRANGEMENT — so assert the ORDERED PAIR.** SAFETY-38 pinned the banner of a
latching, site-stopping alarm with
`f"{sum(_share38):.0f} W" in ...reason` — that `"-500 W"` appears
*somewhere*. Swapping the detector's first two arguments at the call site
(`evaluate(site_standing, self.grid, …)` →
`evaluate(self.grid, site_standing, …)`) is a **ZERO-BYTE** edit: both
numbers are still in the string, each in the other's slot. The substring was
still found — **in the meter slot** — the whole suite stayed green, and the
banner told the operator which instrument read what **exactly backwards**.
Whenever the property you mean is "**this** value went in **this** slot" — a
reason string, a log line, a notification, an MQTT payload — assert the
surrounding **literal text with the value embedded in its own position**
(`f"commanded {x:+.0f} W against a meter reading {y:+.0f} W"`), or assert
the fields **before** they are formatted. Two values that both appear in one
sentence can always be transposed by an edit that costs **nothing**, and
that no byte delta, no fingerprint and no shape pin can see. ⚠️ Note where
this one was found: **inside the fix written to close the previous instance
of the same family**, which is the second time in this list.
⚠️ **AND THE FIX FOR IT WAS ONE CALL SITE WIDE, WHICH IS THE HALF WORTH
KEEPING.** The ordered pair went onto `main.py:1620`, the **site** detector
— armed only at N≥2, and part 9c asserts it is **absent at a roster of
one**. The identical swap at `main.py:1560`, the **per-unit** detector, was
still **ZERO BYTES**, still changed no decision, still left the 21-file
suite green — and it is the **only** sign-disagreement sentence a shipped
one-inverter install can ever print: *"commanded −1000 W against its own
measured power +1000 W"*, backwards, in the log, on the status page and in
`sign_reason` after the restart the latch is designed to survive. Measured
size: **main.py:1560, 0 bytes, 21/21 green.** So habit 14 is not "pin the
banner", it is **"pin every call site of the banner, and say which one the
shipped roster reaches"** — and habit 15 is how you find them all.
15. **A SYMMETRIC PREDICATE MAKES ARGUMENT ORDER A PROPERTY OF THE MESSAGE
ALONE — so ENUMERATE THAT FAMILY BY MACHINE, and grade the CALL SITES, not
the function.** Where a callee is symmetric in two arguments, a swap at any
call site is invisible to every behavioural check **by construction**: not
"no fixture happens to separate them" but *no fixture can*. There is
nothing for a mutation battery to find, because the mutant and the shipped
tree take identical actions on every input. The only surface that moves is
the sentence, and the only check that can see it is one asserting the
**ordered pair** (habit 14) at **that** call site.
Three consequences, and all three are why this is its own habit:
* **The unit of coverage is the CALL SITE.** SAFETY-38 pinned
`evaluate()`'s operand order and still shipped the defect, because the
pin was on the call two lines below the one that matters. Ask of every
banner: *how many places call this, and which does the shipped roster
reach?*
* **The scope must be COMPUTED** — habit 12's argument, and SAFETY-38 is
its proof: the family was enumerated by hand twice and was short both
times. `tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` renames each parameter pair,
erases every formatted string, canonicalises the commutative operators
and iterates to a **fixpoint** over `app/` (the symmetry is usually one
call deep — `evaluate()` is symmetric only *through* `disagrees()`), then
classifies each sentence by where it GOES. A returned string may be a
**key** — swapping `store.unit_key(unit, key)` renames a store key, which
is behaviour and is MAINT-05's card — or a **sentence**, which is this
family.
* **Say what the instrument cannot see, with shapes** (habit 13). That scan
under-reports semantic symmetry no canonicaliser on its finite list can
spell; its second census, for sentences the CALLER builds, pairs only
expressions **one leaf apart** and never sees `%s`-style logging; it
covers only `app/`; and it **over-reports in exactly one way** — it
erases the sentence, so a swap that would make the FORMATTING itself
raise is scored as changing no decision. It prints all of that on every
run. The family, every member's call sites, and which of them are pinned
are in `DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md` §7 — **with two
measured, still-open survivors named there rather than rounded off**,
both zero bytes and both 21/21 green.
* ⚠️ **AND THE SINK IS HALF THE SCOPE, WHICH IS HOW THE FIRST THREE ROUNDS
OF THIS SCAN MISSED THE PLACE THE CODEBASE ACTUALLY KEEPS ITS SENTENCES.**
The scan classified a sentence as operator-facing when it was **appended,
assigned to a `reason`-shaped name, or logged** — and every one of its 16
reported members was one of those. **None was RETURNED.** A method
formatting its own **attributes** and handing the string back —
`ClampResult.describe()`, `PeakDecision.explain()`, every reason-builder
in the tree — was outside all of it, and so were sentences handed to a
constructor as `reason=` or placed under a `"text"` dict key. Four
zero-byte survivors of a green 21-file suite were sitting there, two of
them on the alarm SAFETY-40 and SAFETY-41 are about. **The general form:
an enumeration is scoped by a SINK as much as by a PREDICATE, and a sink
list is a hand-written list like any other (habit 12).** Ask of any such
scan: *which syntactic forms does this call a message, and what does the
code under it actually use?*
16. ⚠️ **AN INSTRUMENT THAT ASSERTS A COMPLETENESS IT DOES NOT HAVE IS WORSE
THAN NO INSTRUMENT, AND ITS BLIND-SPOT LIST IS PART OF THE CODE UNDER
REVIEW.** `tools/symmetric_message_scan.py` printed five honest gaps and a
census count, and a reader — including its author, twice — took the count
for the family. The gap that mattered, the RETURN sink, was **in none of the
five**. A gap list is not a disclaimer; it is a claim, and it is the claim
most likely to be believed because nothing else in the output argues with
it. Two consequences:
* **State what is NOT scanned, largest hole first, as a list of forms** —
not "this under-reports". The tool now names `%s`-style lazy logging
(`_LOG.error("… %s … %s", a, b)`, where the operands are *arguments*, so
no f-string census can ever see them), `.format()`/`%`/`+`/`.join()`
sentences, sentences that leave through a dict or dataclass, `yield`,
message attributes outside its own constant set, and everything outside
`app/`. Where the list is derived from a constant in the file, it is
**printed from that constant**, so the two cannot drift.
* **AND THE PROBE THAT GRADES THE MUTATIONS IS SUBJECT TO EVERY HABIT
ABOVE.** Round 4's render probe gave each interpolated operand a value by
**order of appearance** — so after a transposition the other operand took
the same number and **all thirteen mutant renders came back
byte-identical**, which reads exactly like *the edit changed nothing*.
Keying the value to the operand's **NAME** fixed it. That is habit 4, in
the measuring instrument: the fixture's own values were arranged so the
failure it was built to see could not change the answer. **Eleventh
instance of habit 4 in this file, and the second one in an instrument
rather than in a check.**
And the mutation-table consequence: **a variant is not covered because a
near-miss of it is.** DEV-02's table listed the *actuator* variant of the
@@ -297,6 +601,8 @@ commit and PR bodies.
| **TARIFF-01** reviewer survivor: `record_block()` ignoring its `policy` argument (0dbd485) | **re-verified — still a survivor** | re-run here through `tools/mutation_run.sh` against the 15 suites that were on the record, all green with `billed_w(block, policy)` mutated to `billed_w(block, POLICY_NET)`. The recorded diagnosis holds: every block reaching the store is single-phase, where NET, SUM and MAX collapse. **Now CLOSED by TEST-13** (`test_tariff.py` section 7), which round-trips section 7's own unbalanced `(3000, 500, -200) W` block THROUGH the store under each policy - three distinct banked figures, so a hardcoded policy takes at least two of them red. Third instance of "a stimulus evaluated where the quantity it grades is degenerate", after WITNESS-02's span normalisation and TARIFF-01's own DST window. |
| **SAFETY-25** 8 mutations against `test_peakguard.py` part 10, then 9 more after review, all red | **not at risk** | each run against a tree copied fresh with `__pycache__` excluded and mounted `:ro`, so no `.pyc` existed to go stale - the same structural immunity recorded for CI above. Byte deltas recorded on the PR; none is `+0 B`. All are **reds**, which is the direction this defect cannot fabricate. ⚠️ The second round exists because the first round's mutations were all aimed at DISARMING the guard, and the claim part 10 actually made was about the guard being FIXED - the reviewer built the fix and the suite stayed green. Bytecode was never the issue there; an unaimed battery was. |
| **SAFETY-03** reviewer survivor: `abs()` dropped from `clamp_to_rating`'s limit (6aabb83) | **re-verified — still a survivor** | re-run the same way, all 15 green. Also as recorded: unreachable under the `int(100, 5000)` schema. |
| **MAINT-05 round 3**, `migrate_maint_keys()` marker gate `if rep.ok:` → `if rep.ok or rep.kept:` (`+12 B`) | **was a survivor — now CLOSED** | measured against head `65cddf3` under the purge, tree mounted `:ro`, `19/19 PASS`. It stamps the schema marker on a migration that LOST state, defeating the older `lost` guard as well as the new `misdirected` one, because every check that reached the marker did so on a store whose `kept` list was empty. Closed by `test_maintenance.py` **9d**; the mutation is now red on three named checks. |
| **MAINT-05 round 3**, `migrate_unit_keys()` marker gate `if rep.ok:` → `if rep.ok or rep.kept:` (`+12 B`) | **found here — SAFETY-02's half, now CLOSED** | the SAME mutation one function up, on the LATCH migration rather than the history one. Measured a survivor against this branch under the purge, `:ro`, `19/19 PASS`, then closed by `test_inverter.py` part 10's new fixture — a store with `unit/inverter-a/sign_reason` already present (so `kept` is non-empty) whose `sign_tripped: true` write is dropped. Shipped: marker withheld. Mutant: marker stamped on a **disarmed latch**, and the next start skips the migration that would have re-armed it. |
| **TARIFF-01**'s other three survivors, **SAFETY-03**'s `describe()` survivor, **TARIFF-02**'s M3/M5/M7, **SAFETY-18**'s three | **still unverified** | recorded before the purge discipline, with no byte delta on the record, so a `+0 B` same-second revert cannot be excluded. All are survivors, which is the direction this defect fabricates. TARIFF-02's and SAFETY-18's were **closed by later commits whose claims are reds**, so what is unverified is the *diagnosis*, not the current state of the code. |
**Nothing here says a past result is wrong.** The two survivors re-run above
+40 -7
View File
@@ -151,6 +151,30 @@ CLAIM_SCOPE = {
# other went on feeding the loop. The evidence is site-level and so is the
# remedy: stop commanding, everywhere, and say why.
"circulation": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `Claim.set("sign_site", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "site sign disagreement")`.
# SAFETY-30, and it is the twin of `failsafe` below rather than a duplicate
# of it - the two exist BECAUSE the same words describe two different
# measurements once there is more than one inverter.
#
# `failsafe` grades ONE unit's standing command against THAT UNIT'S OWN
# measured power (register 0x0518). Its conclusion is "the actuator I am
# driving is not doing what I told it", which is a fact about one device,
# so it parks one device.
#
# This one grades the SUM of the standing commands against P1. Its
# conclusion is "the site as a whole is driving the wrong way" - an inverted
# gain, an integrator wound past the rail, a strategy on the wrong side of
# the meter - and there is nothing per-unit about it: the quantity is a sum
# over the roster and the offending number is the site target, which no
# single inverter owns. Parking one unit on that evidence would leave the
# rest of the site pushing the same way with the guard satisfied.
#
# ⚠️ AT N=1 IT IS NEVER FILED, and that is the identity rather than a
# special case: with one inverter the sum of the commands IS that unit's
# command and `failsafe` already carries exactly this trip, under the keys,
# the banner and the claim an install has had since SAFETY-02 shipped.
# `Controller.cycle()` does not even arm the site detector there.
"sign_site": SCOPE_SITE,
# --- UNIT: about one pack, one inverter, one device -------------------
# main.py: `Claim.limit("device", P_SAFETY, self.dev_min, self.dev_max,
@@ -164,13 +188,22 @@ CLAIM_SCOPE = {
# same reason, so it is scoped like `device`.
"supervised": SCOPE_UNIT,
# main.py: `Claim.set("failsafe", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "sign disagreement")`.
# ⚠️ THE EVIDENCE IS SITE-WIDE AND THE REMEDY IS NOT, and that is why this
# entry needs its reasoning written down. SAFETY-02 compares P1 - a site
# measurement - against `standing`, THE COMMAND THIS CONTROLLER PUT ON THIS
# ACTUATOR. What it concludes is "the unit I am driving is pushing power the
# wrong way", and what it does is park that unit. At N>=2 the same evidence
# cannot be attributed to a sibling nobody here commands, so a site-wide
# remedy would be this watchdog stopping an inverter it never graded.
# ⚠️ THE EVIDENCE IS PER-UNIT AND SO IS THE REMEDY - AND SINCE SAFETY-30 THE
# FIRST HALF OF THAT SENTENCE IS TRUE. It used to read "the evidence is
# site-wide and the remedy is not", because the watchdog compared THIS
# unit's standing command against P1: a site measurement, attributed to one
# actuator on the strength of §6.2's N=1 identity. That identity does not
# survive a second inverter - at N>=2 the meter answers for a sibling this
# unit's command says nothing about, in both directions (a false trip when
# the sibling covers the meter, and a missed one when the sibling MASKS a
# unit that really is reversed).
#
# So at N>=2 the comparison behind this claim is THIS unit's command against
# THIS unit's own measured power - register 0x0518, per-instance since
# DEV-02 - and the scope that was already right for the wrong reason is now
# right for the right one. The site-wide half moved to `sign_site` above.
# At N=1 the two are the same comparison and this claim is the one filed,
# exactly as it shipped.
"failsafe": SCOPE_UNIT,
# main.py: `Claim.set("maintenance", P_MAINTENANCE, ...)` when the cycle owns
# the setpoint, and `Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=...)` when
+12
View File
@@ -122,6 +122,18 @@ CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
# 200 W -> 445.0 s 350 W -> 10.0 s 1000 W -> 5.0 s
# 250 W -> 40.0 s 400 W -> 5.0 s 1700 W -> 0.0 s
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39 MOVED THAT SCHEMA FLOOR FROM 50 TO 0, AND THE CAMPAIGN ABOVE
# WAS NOT RE-RUN. It does not have to be, and here is the argument rather
# than the assurance. What these windows are about is how long the command
# takes to CROSS ITS RAIL - the swept worst case is the SLOWEST crossing,
# which is `slew_w` at its floor, 5000/50 = 100 cycles. `slew_w: 0` means
# "follow the rail" and resolves to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, which is
# exactly 9 cycles at EVERY rail by construction. So the new value can never
# be the slowest crossing at any `max_w`, and it is strictly inside the
# envelope this campaign measured. An explicit number still spans 50..5000
# and is unchanged. If `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is ever loosened past 1/100, this
# paragraph stops being true and the campaign has to be re-run.
#
# THE KNEE IS AT 400 W and it is sharp. Below ~250 W a flapping load holds
# the sensor above the threshold for MINUTES at a time - 505 s at 100 W -
# and no window shorter than the 900 s billing quarter could tell that from
+135 -5
View File
@@ -145,14 +145,94 @@ from datetime import datetime
# nothing else in this add-on uses it. See "DISTINCT FROM SATURATION".
REASON_CODE = "OUTPUT_CLAMP"
# Re-assert the notification this often while the clamp stays engaged. 30 s is
# the planning cadence (2.3), i.e. slow enough not to flood and fast enough
# that a pinned loop is never quiet for a whole billing quarter.
REASSERT_S = 30.0
# Re-assert the notification this often while the clamp stays engaged.
#
# ⚠️ RAISED 30 s -> 150 s on 2026-09-05, and the reason is a REGIME CHANGE, not a
# change of mind about the alarm. 30 s was the planning cadence (2.3), chosen
# when a loop-side engagement was a rare event: `main.py`'s note at the action
# log records "60 cycles of the §10.3 runaway produce 0 write-path engagements
# and 2 loop-side ones". On the live install the counter reached 48 loop-side
# ENGAGEMENTS in ~25 minutes of ordinary operation - roughly one cycle in six,
# not a pinned rail, but far more often than a guard sized for 2-in-60 assumed -
# and the owner received a persistent notification about it all day. ⚠️ NOT
# because of the 30 s re-assert - see the block below; those notifications never
# consulted this constant at all.
#
# ⚠️ BOTH FIGURES ARE ENGAGEMENT COUNTS; only the regime differs - 2-in-60 was
# measured over a §10.3 RUNAWAY, 48-in-305 was ordinary running on the live
# install. The 48 is read off the live log, not measured in this repo.
#
# ⚠️ AND RAISING THIS CONSTANT ALONE DID NOT FIX THAT FLOOD - review found it
# and the first version of this change was wrong. At ~5 s cycles a 1-in-6
# engagement leaves ~25 s of clean cycles between engagements, past
# CLEAR_CYCLES x 5 s = 15 s, so the alarm DE-ASSERTED between almost every one
# and came back as a fresh rising edge. The rising edge used to fire
# unconditionally, so those notifications never consulted this constant at all:
# 48 notifications at 30 s, and still 48 at 150 s. The fix was to rate-limit the
# RISING EDGE too and let `last_alarm` survive a de-assert, so this interval
# bounds the notification rate across episodes rather than only within one.
# Measured on that same window afterwards: 51 episodes, 11 notifications.
#
# WHY the loop reaches its integrator bound so much more often than the guard's
# author saw: `max_w` on the live install is 5000 W, while the loop's slew was
# derived against a 1500 W clamp - admin/goodwe `NOTES.md` §"Simulated 2 kW load
# step (gain 0.6, clamp 1500)". ⚠️ THAT DERIVATION IS IN THE OTHER REPO; nothing
# in this one corroborates it, so do not go looking here. SAFETY-39 is the ticket
# that re-derives it, and fixing that is what would stop the railing; this
# constant only changes how often the alarm repeats.
#
# ⚠️ 150 s IS THE REQUIREMENT'S EDGE WITH MARGIN, AND THE CHECK NOW ENFORCES THAT
# EDGE. `test_clamp.py` part 2 grades the cadence in wall-clock terms - a pinned
# loop must speak at least MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5 times inside the 900 s quarter
# that bills the capacity tariff - which caps this constant at 900/5 = 180 s.
# Measured on the worst sliding 900 s window: 180 s earns 5 alarms, 181 s earns
# 4. 150 s earns 6.
#
# ⚠️ THAT CHECK USED TO PERMIT 224 s, AND THE FIX SHIPPED WITH THIS COMMIT. Its
# sweep starts at i=0, where the rising edge is free, so it measured one alarm
# more than a real quarter earns. A later editor raising this to 200 s would have
# had a green suite and a requirement quietly unmet. `test_clamp.py` now grades
# floor(QUARTER_S / REASSERT_S) directly.
#
# ⚠️ MIN_PER_QUARTER = 5 IS A TEST-LOCAL INTEGER, not a spec figure - it exists
# only in `test_clamp.py` and the CHANGELOG entry that introduced it. The 900 s
# quarter IS system-wide (`tariff.py`, `freeze.py`, `DOCS.md`). So the 180 s
# ceiling rests on one number a test author chose; if that number is ever
# revisited, this constant moves with it.
#
# ⚠️ THIS IS A STOP-GAP AND DOES NOT MAKE THE ALARM CORRECT. The message still
# calls the integrator bound a BUG SIGNAL and still pairs a request from one
# moment with a `self.target` read at another - SAFETY-40. Nothing here is
# suppressed: every engagement is still counted, the action-log row is written on
# every engaged cycle regardless, and the rising edge of every episode alarms
# unconditionally, so no alarm is DROPPED - only delayed.
REASSERT_S = 150.0
# Consecutive clean cycles before the alarm de-asserts (10.2 hysteresis).
CLEAR_CYCLES = 3
# ⚠️ SAFETY-41. Consecutive ENGAGED cycles after which an episode speaks even if
# the notification budget is spent. THE ESCALATION EXISTS BECAUSE THE RATE LIMIT
# ALONE DELAYS A RUNAWAY, and review measured it: a benign one-cycle clamp
# followed by a continuous runaway held the runaway's first notification for up
# to 140 s - one REASSERT_S minus a cycle. On the live install, where ordinary
# railing spends the budget essentially all the time, a runaway arriving during
# normal operation would be delayed with near-certainty. That is the "benign
# noise suppresses the bug signal" shape this module's docstring is written
# against.
#
# THE DISCRIMINATOR IS RUN LENGTH, and the two populations genuinely differ: the
# live flood was runs of length ONE (engage, de-assert, engage), while a §10.3
# runaway engages on EVERY cycle. So a sustained run speaks regardless of budget,
# and scattered chatter does not.
#
# Measured, shipped-without vs shipped-with - it costs nothing it was protecting:
# live scatter flood (305 cycles, 1-in-6) 11 -> 11 notifications
# chatter 1-engaged/3-clean over 8000 s 50 -> 50 notifications
# pinned 900 s quarter (floor is 5) 6 -> 6 alarms
# runaway delay after a benign episode 140 s -> 10 s
SUSTAINED_CYCLES = 3
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ClampResult:
@@ -258,6 +338,10 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
self.last_alarm: datetime | None = None
self.reason = ""
self.clean_cycles = 0
# SAFETY-41. Consecutive engaged cycles, and whether THIS episode has
# spoken yet - the two the escalation clause needs.
self.run_len = 0
self.spoken = False
def note(self, engaged: bool, reason: str, now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Advance one cycle. True when the caller should raise the alarm.
@@ -269,26 +353,72 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
self.engagements += 1
self.clean_cycles = 0
self.reason = reason
self.run_len += 1
if not self.active:
self.active = True
self.since = now
self.episodes += 1
self.spoken = False
# ⚠️ SAFETY-41. THE RISING EDGE IS RATE-LIMITED TOO, and it did
# not used to be. It fired unconditionally, so a condition that
# engages and clears repeatedly raised one notification PER
# EPISODE no matter how fast the episodes came - and
# `REASSERT_S` never entered into it, because it only governs
# the still-engaged path below.
#
# That is the shape the live install actually produced: 48
# engagements in 25 minutes, scattered roughly one cycle in six.
# At a ~5 s cycle the gaps are ~25 s of clean cycles, which
# exceeds CLEAR_CYCLES x 5 s = 15 s, so the alarm DE-ASSERTED
# between almost every engagement and each one came back as a
# fresh rising edge. Measured on this class over that window:
# 48 episodes and 48 notifications at REASSERT_S = 30 - and
# still 48 at REASSERT_S = 150. Raising the re-assert removed
# NONE of them, because none of them came from the re-assert.
#
# So the interval now bounds the NOTIFICATION RATE rather than
# the repeat rate within one episode: `last_alarm` survives a
# de-assert, and a new episode speaks only if the interval has
# elapsed. ⚠️ NOTHING IS DROPPED. Every engagement is still
# counted, every episode still increments, the action-log row is
# still written on every engaged cycle, and a genuine runaway -
# which by definition keeps engaging - is picked up by the
# re-assert path within REASSERT_S. Delay, not loss.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
return False
# ⚠️ THE ESCALATION. An episode that has not yet spoken because the
# budget was spent by an EARLIER, unrelated episode speaks anyway
# once it has engaged SUSTAINED_CYCLES times in a row. A runaway
# engages every cycle and reaches it; the scattered one-cycle
# railing that produced the live flood never does.
if not self.spoken and self.run_len >= SUSTAINED_CYCLES:
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
# Still engaged: re-assert on the slow cadence, not every cycle.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
return False
self.run_len = 0
if not self.active:
return False
self.clean_cycles += 1
if self.clean_cycles >= CLEAR_CYCLES:
self.active = False
self.since = None
self.last_alarm = None
# ⚠️ `last_alarm` DELIBERATELY SURVIVES THE DE-ASSERT. Clearing it
# here is what made the next rising edge speak immediately however
# soon it arrived, which is the flood described at the rising edge
# above. The episode ends; the notification budget does not reset
# with it.
self.reason = ""
self.clean_cycles = 0
return False
+105 -2
View File
@@ -18,12 +18,92 @@ exists because its absence produced a specific, observed failure.
from dataclasses import dataclass
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-39. THE ONE RELATIONSHIP IN THIS FILE THAT IS NOT A NUMBER.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT WENT WRONG, because the shape of it is the reason this is a ratio and
# not a constant. `slew_w: 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a clamp of
# 1500 W (goodwe/NOTES.md, "Simulated 2 kW load step (gain 0.6, clamp 1500)"),
# and its stated justification was that it "puts most of the correction in the
# first cycle WHILE STILL CAPPING HOW FAR THE LOOP CAN JUMP AHEAD OF THE
# INVERTER". At 1500 W that sentence was true: 1000 W/cycle reaches the rail in
# two cycles and the rail itself bounds the excursion.
#
# The rail then moved to 5000 W on the live install and the constant did not.
# 1000 W per 2 s tick is 500 W/s, so the loop traverses its WHOLE OUTPUT RANGE
# in 10 s against a plant NOTES.md §5.10 measured at ~18 s up / ~23 s down for a
# 1.78 kW step. It commands its entire range before it can observe its answer to
# the first step. Measured on the owner's system 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46: a real
# 3.4 kW export, the setpoint ramping 380 -> 5000 in five ticks, the battery at
# -5154 W against a 5000 VA inverter, and the grid pushed from 3.4 kW of EXPORT
# to 2.8 kW of IMPORT - the loop manufactured the error it then chased.
#
# ⚠️ SO THE FIX IS NOT A NEW NUMBER. A number is what went stale. What is
# written here is the RELATIONSHIP the 2026-08-22 sentence was really asserting:
#
# THE LOOP MUST NOT TRAVERSE ITS FULL OUTPUT RANGE FASTER THAN THE PLANT
# TAKES TO SETTLE.
#
# slew_w <= max_w * LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S
#
# `max_w` here is the SITE rail (main.py builds `Tuning(max_w=site_max_w)`, the
# roster sum), so the bound moves with the roster and a second inverter cannot
# re-open this by arriving. validate.py rule 10 refuses a configuration that
# breaks it; `slew_w = 0` below means "follow the rail" and is the shipped
# default, exactly as `integrator_max_w = None` already means "follow max_w".
#
# ⚠️ BOTH NUMBERS ARE WRITTEN OUT RATHER THAN THEIR QUOTIENT, AND THAT IS NOT
# TIDINESS. The quotient is only meaningful in the regime the two were measured
# in, and one of them is NOT a property of this code:
#
# PLANT_SETTLE_S is the inverter and the pack. goodwe/NOTES.md §5.10,
# 2026-08-22, a 1.78 kW kettle step driven from HA with a
# plug that meters its own draw: ~18 s from the step to the
# deadband going up, ~23 s coming down. 18 is taken because
# it is the SHORTER of the two and therefore the LOOSER
# bound - this is a refusal boundary, and rules 5 and 6 in
# validate.py refuse the impossible case only, never "close
# to the rail".
#
# LOOP_TICK_S is the METER, not this loop. `run_control()` runs a cycle on
# a changed meter value or on `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes
# first, so the tick is the meter's own update rate. 2.0 s is
# what the live install measured on 2026-09-05 (the setpoint
# stepped +1000 W every 2 s), and it is the fastest meter this
# project has ever run.
#
# ⚠️ AND THIS ONE IS NOT WRONG IN THE SAFE DIRECTION, WHICH IS WHY IT IS SAID
# HERE. A SLOWER meter makes this bound conservative - it refuses some
# configurations that would have been fine, which is visible immediately and
# costs one edit. A meter FASTER than 2 s makes it loose by exactly that ratio,
# and nothing in this add-on would say so. The tick cannot go below 1 s
# (`run_control()`'s `await asyncio.sleep(1)` bounds the loop body), so the
# worst case is a factor of two - but if a faster meter is ever fitted, this
# constant has to be RE-DERIVED and not merely re-read. Compare
# validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, which carries the same kind of copy and can
# only ever be wrong the other way.
PLANT_SETTLE_S = 18.0
LOOP_TICK_S = 2.0
SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S # 0.111..., i.e. 9 ticks
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Tuning:
gain: float = 0.6
max_w: float = 2000.0
slew_w: float = 1000.0
# SAFETY-39. How far the command may move in one cycle. ⚠️ 0 MEANS "FOLLOW
# THE RAIL" - `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w` - and it is the default and the
# recommended setting, for the reason written at the top of this file: a
# fixed number here is a constant that outlives the rail it was derived
# against, and that is the defect measured on the live system on
# 2026-09-05. Read `slew_limit_w()`, never this field.
#
# It stays settable, because slower than the rail implies is a legitimate
# and sometimes necessary choice - the live install has run an explicit
# 400 W since 2026-09-05 12:00 - and because `slew_w` is an option an
# operator already has. FASTER than the rail implies is what validate.py
# rule 10 refuses.
slew_w: float = 0.0
deadband_w: float = 15.0
step_w: int = 10
saturation_w: float = 500.0
@@ -83,6 +163,28 @@ class Decision:
clamped: bool = False
def slew_limit_w(tuning: Tuning) -> float:
"""How far the command may move this cycle, in W. Always positive.
⚠️ THE ONE READER OF `Tuning.slew_w`, and everything else must come through
here. `slew_w = 0` means "follow the rail" and resolves to
`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, which is the whole of SAFETY-39: the limit is a
RATIO to the rail, so raising `max_w` moves it and cannot leave it behind.
A caller that read the field directly would see 0 and apply no limit at all
- the exact opposite of the setting's meaning - which is why this exists as
a function rather than as a comment telling people to remember.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT CLAMPED TO THE BOUND. An explicit `slew_w` above the rail
fraction is refused at STARTUP by validate.py rule 10, not silently reduced
here. Silently reducing it is the failure this whole module's docstring is
about - an operator's stated number quietly meaning something else - and
validate.py's own docstring calls it case (a).
"""
if tuning.slew_w:
return abs(float(tuning.slew_w))
return SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * abs(float(tuning.max_w))
def compute(
prev_w: float,
grid_w: float,
@@ -231,7 +333,8 @@ def compute(
if clamped:
reason = "clamped"
slewed = max(prev_w - tuning.slew_w, min(prev_w + tuning.slew_w, target))
slew = slew_limit_w(tuning)
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
target = slewed
+119 -13
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ The scalars, and what each one was silently asserting:
SAFETY-24's pack floor and arbitrage's bounds. An
average lets the emptier pack be driven below its own
floor; a maximum parks the fuller one.
`bms_soc_floor` SAFETY-32. ONE cut-out percent for every pack, and it
describes A BATTERY. Two packs of different models
have different cut-outs, so the flat key graded the
shallower pack against the deeper one's BMS - wrong
in the direction that empties a pack.
`batt` ONE battery power into the anti-windup saturation
detector - see the SITE/UNIT note at the bottom of
this docstring, because this one goes the OTHER WAY.
@@ -117,6 +122,12 @@ import math
from datetime import datetime
from .clamp import ClampResult
# CFG-03's ONE in-code mirror of config.yaml's SAFETY-24 defaults. Imported
# rather than retyped: the flat-keys path below needs `bms_soc_floor`'s
# shipped default and a literal here would be the fourth defaults site that
# ticket exists to prevent. peakguard imports arbiter/control/tariff and none
# of those imports this module, so the direction is one-way.
from .peakguard import PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS
from .store import unit_key
from .watchdog import SignWatchdog, SignWatchdogConfig
@@ -170,7 +181,7 @@ class Inverter:
def __init__(self, name, *, setpoint_entity="", soc_entity="",
batt_entity="", batt_invert=False, max_w=2000.0,
store=None, sign_cfg=None):
bms_soc_floor=None, store=None, sign_cfg=None):
self.name = str(name)
self.setpoint_entity = str(setpoint_entity or "")
self.soc_entity = str(soc_entity or "")
@@ -179,6 +190,19 @@ class Inverter:
# The supervised cap on what may be written to THIS setpoint entity.
# See the module docstring on why this is a number and not a `Tuning`.
self.max_w = float(max_w)
# SAFETY-32. THIS PACK'S OWN BMS CUT-OUT, in percent, or None when the
# roster entry did not state one.
#
# ⚠️ NOT DEFAULTED HERE, AND None RATHER THAN A NUMBER. A cut-out is a
# property of the battery in the cupboard; inventing one for a pack that
# did not state it is precisely this card's defect - a pack graded
# against a floor that belongs to a different battery - rebuilt in the
# constructor. `peakguard.pack_floor_pct()` treats None as an unknown
# floor and `discharge_permitted()` treats an unknown floor as NO
# permission, so the absence costs a shave; validate.py rule 8 refuses
# the config by name long before that, at startup.
self.bms_soc_floor = (None if bms_soc_floor is None
else float(bms_soc_floor))
# --- the device's own reported range, read from its own entity -------
# None until `hass.limits()` has answered. NOT guessed at: ESPHome is
@@ -333,14 +357,46 @@ def roster_entries(opts: dict) -> list:
return list(entries)
def roster_names(opts: dict) -> list:
"""The unit names, in roster order. THE one answer, for two callers.
⚠️ IT EXISTS BECAUSE MQTT DISCOVERY CANNOT WAIT FOR A ROSTER. TEL-07 gives
every unit past the first its own MQTT device, and `MqttPublisher` is
constructed in `main()` BEFORE `Controller.__init__` builds the roster -
announcing happens on the broker's CONNACK, which can land first. Building a
second roster there would construct a second set of `Inverter`s off the same
Store; transcribing the naming rule there would be a third spelling of it.
So the naming rule lives here, `build_roster()` reads it, and the two cannot
drift.
⚠️ THE FALLBACK NAME IS POSITIONAL, NOT `UNIT_A`. Two nameless entries both
called `inverter-a` would share one Store namespace, so one unit's SAFETY-02
latch would be the other's - a fault on B latching A is the exact failure
DEV-02's namespaced keys removed. Rule 9 refuses a nameless entry outright;
this only decides what the refusal is allowed to call it in the meantime.
An EMPTY `inverters:` is the flat-key shape and its one unit is `UNIT_A`,
which is what every install running today reads.
"""
entries = roster_entries(opts)
if not entries:
return [UNIT_A]
names = []
for i, entry in enumerate(entries):
entry = entry if isinstance(entry, dict) else {}
names.append(str(entry.get("name") or "").strip() or f"inverter-{i + 1}")
return names
def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None) -> list:
"""The site's inverters, in roster order.
TWO SHAPES, AND WHICH ONE IS IN FORCE IS DECIDED BY ONE TEST: is
`inverters:` empty?
EMPTY the five flat keys - `setpoint_entity`, `soc_entity`,
`batt_entity`, `batt_invert`, `max_w` - describe the ONE inverter,
EMPTY the six flat keys - `setpoint_entity`, `soc_entity`,
`batt_entity`, `batt_invert`, `max_w`, `bms_soc_floor` (SAFETY-32)
- describe the ONE inverter,
exactly as the shipped scalars did. This is what every install
that upgrades into this version reads, without an operator
touching anything, and it is byte-identical to what DEV-02
@@ -353,8 +409,8 @@ def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None) -> list:
`soc_entity` has no SoC sensor; it does NOT borrow the flat one,
because "this unit's number came from somewhere else" is the
defect DEV-02 spent a card removing and a fallback here would
rebuild it in three lines. `name`, `setpoint_entity` and `max_w`
are required of every entry - the schema enforces it on the
rebuild it in three lines. `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and
`bms_soc_floor` (SAFETY-32) are required of every entry - the schema enforces it on the
Supervisor path, `validate.py` rule 9 enforces it for sim/inject.py
and the checks, which reach this function with any dict at all.
@@ -380,18 +436,24 @@ def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None) -> list:
batt_entity=opts.get("batt_entity", ""),
batt_invert=bool(opts.get("batt_invert")),
max_w=float(opts.get("max_w", 2000)),
# SAFETY-32. THE FLAT KEY, because this IS the single-inverter shape
# - the one pack the flat options describe is the one pack whose
# cut-out `bms_soc_floor` states. Defaulted from CFG-03's single
# mirror exactly as validate.py rule 8 defaults it, so an install
# that never set the key reads the same 10 % in both places.
bms_soc_floor=_flat_bms_floor(opts),
store=store, sign_cfg=sign_cfg)]
roster = []
for i, entry in enumerate(entries):
names = roster_names(opts)
# ⚠️ NAMES COME FROM `roster_names()`, NOT FROM A SECOND READING OF THE
# ENTRIES. TEL-07 announces one MQTT device and one `unique_id` per unit off
# these names, and it has to build them BEFORE a `Controller` exists - so a
# second spelling of the fallback here would be an entity announced under a
# name no unit answers to. `zip` pairs them positionally, which is what
# `roster_names()` is defined to be.
for entry, name in zip(entries, names):
entry = entry if isinstance(entry, dict) else {}
# ⚠️ THE FALLBACK NAME IS POSITIONAL, NOT `UNIT_A`. Two nameless entries
# both called `inverter-a` would share one Store namespace, so one
# unit's SAFETY-02 latch would be the other's - a fault on B latching A
# is the exact failure DEV-02's namespaced keys removed. Rule 9 refuses
# a nameless entry outright; this only decides what the refusal is
# allowed to call it in the meantime.
name = str(entry.get("name") or "").strip() or f"inverter-{i + 1}"
roster.append(Inverter(
name,
setpoint_entity=entry.get("setpoint_entity", ""),
@@ -401,10 +463,54 @@ def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None) -> list:
# ⚠️ NOT `opts["max_w"]`. See the docstring: a rating an entry did
# not state is not the flat one, it is a rating rule 9 refuses.
max_w=_entry_max_w(entry),
# ⚠️ NOT `opts["bms_soc_floor"]`, FOR `max_w`'S REASON AND THIS
# CARD'S. An entry that omits its cut-out has NOT got the flat one;
# it has none, and rule 8 refuses it by name. Borrowing here would be
# SAFETY-32's own defect written in three lines - the shallower pack
# graded against the deeper pack's BMS.
bms_soc_floor=_entry_bms_floor(entry),
store=store, sign_cfg=sign_cfg))
return roster
def _flat_bms_floor(opts: dict):
"""The single-inverter shape's own cut-out, or None if it is unparseable.
Defaulted from `PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS` when the key is absent or blank, which
is `validate._number()`'s behaviour on the same key - the two have to agree
or the validator would grade a number the roster does not build.
"""
# ⚠️ ONE defaulting line, not two. The first cut wrote the fallback into the
# `.get()` AND into the blank test below it, and a mutation that deleted
# either one survived - each was covering for the other, which is
# MUTATION.md's masking section in three lines of configuration reading.
raw = opts.get("bms_soc_floor")
if raw is None or raw == "":
return float(PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["bms_soc_floor"])
try:
return float(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def _entry_bms_floor(entry: dict):
"""One entry's OWN cut-out, or None when it did not state a usable one.
None rather than a borrowed number and rather than 0.0 - `_entry_max_w()`
can answer 0.0 because a zero rating commands nothing, but a zero FLOOR is
the most permissive value the key has and would read as "this pack may be
emptied". Rule 8 refuses the missing key by name; until it does, None
withholds.
"""
raw = entry.get("bms_soc_floor")
if raw is None or raw == "":
return None
try:
return float(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
def _entry_max_w(entry: dict) -> float:
"""One entry's supervised cap, or 0.0 when it did not state a usable one.
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+309 -16
View File
@@ -18,16 +18,47 @@ OWNERSHIP, not priority. Exactly one thing writes the setpoint at any moment:
The loop is never "disabled" - it yields. The heartbeat to the inverter keeps
running in every phase, so the hardware watchdog stays fed and a crash here
still ends with the inverter at 0 W rather than latched.
ONE PACK AT A TIME (MAINT-05). There is now one `Maintenance` per roster entry,
each with its own schedule, its own phase and its own history under its own
Store keys - and therefore, for the first time, two of them able to move power
on ONE grid connection at once. Read `arbitrate()` before touching any of it:
the site holds exactly ONE maintenance slot, a pack that is not IDLE holds it,
and every other pack is held at IDLE under the loop until it is released. That
is not a scheduling nicety. A drain of pack A against a charge of pack B is two
power-moving phases pulling opposite ways across the meter - the circulating
power SAFETY-31 exists to DETECT, arriving here as something this module can
simply not do.
"""
import logging
import math
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from .store import MAINT_UNIT_KEYS, unit_key
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.maint")
IDLE, DRAIN, CHARGE, HOLD = "idle", "drain", "charge", "hold"
# ⚠️ THE PHASES THAT MOVE POWER, WHICH IS NOT THE SAME LIST AS "owns the
# setpoint". The table above is about WHO WRITES the number; this is about
# whether the pack is being pushed. DRAIN and HOLD own the setpoint. CHARGE does
# NOT - the loop owns it - and CHARGE is in here anyway, because the charge-only
# clamp plus the cheap-window floor is what pulls a second pack full while the
# first is being emptied. Leaving CHARGE out is precisely the interlock hole
# this card is about: pack A charging from the grid at 2000 W while pack B
# drains 2000 W to export is 4 kW going round in a circle with the meter at
# zero, and both packs believing they are behaving.
#
# HOLD commands 0 W and moves nothing, and it is in here for the other half of
# the sentence: it OWNS the actuator - the pack is parked at the top for the BMS
# and is deliberately not available to the loop - so a second cycle starting
# under it would still be two recalibrations at once, which is the thing whose
# value is a clean uninterrupted coulomb count.
POWER_MOVING = (DRAIN, CHARGE, HOLD)
# A drain of a 13.8 kWh usable pack (300 Ah x 51.2 V, DoD 90) at the shipped
# 2000 W is ~6.9 h even with no house load helping - and less in practice, since
# house load drains alongside the export and soc_floor stops short of empty.
@@ -153,17 +184,102 @@ class MaintResult:
setpoint_w: float | None = None
charge_only: bool = False
events: list = field(default_factory=list)
# ⚠️ WHY A DEFERRAL IS A FIELD AND NOT JUST A LOG LINE. A pack that is due
# and is not starting looks, from every surface an operator has, exactly
# like a pack whose schedule has quietly stopped firing - §12's opening
# sentence, the failure this whole module exists because of. It is carried
# so the status page can SAY "waiting for the other pack" rather than
# showing an idle machine and a due date in the past. Empty on every path
# that is not deferring, so a roster of one never sees it.
deferred: str = ""
class UnitHistory:
"""One pack's maintenance history in the Store, under one spelling.
⚠️ THE NAMESPACE IS A CONSTRUCTOR ARGUMENT AND `None` IS A REAL VALUE, NOT
AN OMISSION. `unit=None` means the FLAT keys - `phase`, `phase_started`,
`last_completed`, `last_start_attempt` - which is what every install has
written since the add-on shipped and what a one-inverter site keeps writing
after MAINT-05. §6.2's identity: with one pack there is nothing for a
namespace to distinguish it FROM, and adding one would change the layout of
a live state file to say something it already said. `arbiter.actuator_for()`
makes the same move for the same reason and its docstring argues it.
⚠️ `mirror_flat` IS THE ROLLBACK VIEW AND IT IS ONLY EVER THE FIRST PACK'S.
At N>=2 pack A's history has been migrated into its namespace and is written
there; the flat keys are ALSO kept in step, so an operator who rolls the
add-on back to a single-FSM version finds a CURRENT history rather than one
dated the day the second inverter was declared. store.migrate_maint_keys()
carries the argument, and it is DEV-02's rule 2 applied to history instead
of to a latch: "left in the file" is not the same promise as "still true".
Pack B has no flat spelling to mirror to - the flat keys mean pack A on
every install that has them - so it is constructed with mirroring off, and
a mirror from B would OVERWRITE A's rollback view with B's phase.
"""
def __init__(self, store, unit: str | None = None, mirror_flat: bool = False):
self.store = store
self.unit = unit
self.mirror_flat = bool(mirror_flat)
def key(self, name: str) -> str:
"""The Store key this pack's `name` lives under."""
return name if self.unit is None else unit_key(self.unit, name)
def get(self, name: str, default=None):
return getattr(self.store, "data", {}).get(self.key(name), default)
def set(self, name: str, value) -> None:
self.store.set(self.key(name), value)
if self.mirror_flat:
self.store.set(name, value)
def get_time(self, name: str):
return self.store.get_time(self.key(name))
def set_time(self, name: str, when) -> None:
self.store.set_time(self.key(name), when)
if self.mirror_flat:
self.store.set_time(name, when)
class Maintenance:
def __init__(self, cfg: MaintConfig, store):
"""ONE pack's recalibration cycle: its schedule, its phase, its history.
⚠️ ONE PER ROSTER ENTRY SINCE MAINT-05, AND THE SLOT IS NOT ITS OWN. This
object decides WHEN ITS PACK would like to start; `arbitrate()` decides
which of them may, because the constraint is a property of the grid
connection and no single FSM can see it. Never call `tick()` in a loop
without passing the `blocked_by` that `arbitrate()` returned for it: that is
the two-packs-at-once bug with the interlock present but not wired.
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: MaintConfig, store, unit: str | None = None,
name: str = "", mirror_flat: bool = False):
self.cfg = cfg
self.store = store
# ⚠️ `self.store` IS THE VIEW, NOT THE Store. Everything in this class
# names an UNQUALIFIED key - "phase", "last_completed" - and the view is
# the one place that turns it into the key this pack owns. A raw
# `store.set("phase", ...)` anywhere below would write pack A's history
# from pack B's state machine, which is the shared-state bug this card
# is about, and there would be nothing to see at a roster of one.
self.store = UnitHistory(store, unit, mirror_flat)
self.unit = unit
# What an event or a refusal calls this pack. At a roster of one it is
# never rendered - a single machine cannot be deferred - so the shipped
# one-inverter reason strings are untouched.
self.name = str(name or unit or "the pack")
# Edge-memo for the deferral note. The action log holds 40 lines and a
# deferral lasts as long as the other pack's cycle - hours - so a line
# per cycle would flush the very context that explains it. Same pattern
# as `Controller._arb_action` and `_maint_shape_suspended`.
self._deferred = ""
# -- state ---------------------------------------------------------------
@property
def phase(self) -> str:
return self.store.data.get("phase", IDLE)
return self.store.get("phase", IDLE)
def _enter(self, phase: str, now: datetime, events: list, msg: str) -> None:
self.store.set("phase", phase)
@@ -185,14 +301,60 @@ class Maintenance:
last = self.store.get_time("last_completed")
return None if last is None else last + timedelta(days=self.cfg.interval_days)
def waited_days(self, now: datetime) -> float:
"""Days since this pack last COMPLETED a cycle; `inf` if it never has.
⚠️ THE ARBITRATION KEY, AND IT IS DELIBERATELY NOT `due()`. `due()` is a
yes/no and two packs that are both due are indistinguishable by it -
which is how a roster-order tie-break gets written and how the first
entry then wins every contested month forever while the second drifts.
This is an ORDERING: the pack whose coulomb counter has gone longest
without a recalibration goes first. `inf` for never-recalibrated is the
same statement `due()` makes about an absent `last_completed`, kept as
one so a fresh pack cannot lose to one that ran last month.
"""
last = self.store.get_time("last_completed")
return math.inf if last is None else (now - last).total_seconds() / 86400.0
def _cooled(self, now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Is the post-abort cooldown over?"""
last_try = self.store.get_time("last_start_attempt")
return (last_try is None
or (now - last_try) >= timedelta(minutes=RESTART_COOLDOWN_MIN))
def wants_start(self, now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Would this pack begin a cycle on this tick if the site let it?
⚠️ THE SAME PREDICATE `tick()` USES, NOT A COPY OF IT. `arbitrate()` has
to know who is asking before anybody moves, and a second transcription
of "enabled, in the start hour, due and cooled down" is a second opinion
about who was asking - so the IDLE branch of `tick()` calls this one.
"""
return (self.phase == IDLE and self.cfg.enabled
and now.hour == self.cfg.start_hour and self.due(now)
and self._cooled(now))
# -- operations ----------------------------------------------------------
def force_start(self, now: datetime) -> list:
def force_start(self, now: datetime, blocked_by: str = "") -> list:
"""Start a cycle regardless of the calendar.
Commissioning uses this: a cycle must be proven end to end before a site
is signed off, and nobody waits a month to find out the schedule never
fires.
⚠️ REGARDLESS OF THE CALENDAR, NOT REGARDLESS OF THE INTERLOCK. The
calendar is a preference and an operator may overrule it; "one pack
moves power at a time" is a property of the grid connection and an
operator pressing a button does not add a second one. A forced start
against a busy site is REFUSED, by name, and the phase machine does not
move - the refusal is returned as an event so the operator reads it in
the action log rather than watching nothing happen.
"""
if blocked_by:
msg = (f"maintenance: forced start REFUSED on {self.name} - "
f"{blocked_by}")
_LOG.warning("%s", msg)
return [msg]
events = []
self.store.set_time("last_start_attempt", now)
self._enter(DRAIN, now, events, "maintenance: forced start -> drain")
@@ -203,23 +365,80 @@ class Maintenance:
self._enter(IDLE, now, events, f"maintenance: ABORT ({why})")
return events
def _defer_note(self, why: str, events: list) -> list:
"""Say once, not every second, that this pack is waiting its turn.
⚠️ THE WORDING IS DELIBERATELY NOT AN ABORT AND NOT A TIMEOUT. §12's
notes are explicit that a 12 h phase timeout means "the battery is not
following commands - a FAULT, not a slow day", and the one thing that
must not happen here is an operator reading a deferral as that. This
line says the pack is WAITING, names the pack it is waiting for, and
says it will run next - none of which any failure path in this module
says.
"""
if self._deferred != why:
self._deferred = why
msg = (f"maintenance: {self.name} is due and is WAITING its turn - "
f"{why}. It is idle under the control loop and will "
f"recalibrate at the next start hour once the slot is free; "
f"this is not a stalled phase.")
_LOG.info("%s", msg)
events.append(msg)
return events
# -- the machine ---------------------------------------------------------
def tick(self, now: datetime, soc: float | None) -> MaintResult:
def tick(self, now: datetime, soc: float | None,
blocked_by: str = "") -> MaintResult:
"""One cycle of this pack's state machine.
`blocked_by` is `arbitrate()`'s answer for THIS pack: empty when the
site's one maintenance slot is available to it, otherwise the reason it
is not. It gates two things and nothing else - a start, and a phase that
is already moving power on a pack that does not hold the slot.
"""
events: list = []
phase = self.phase
# ⚠️ THE SLOT IS CHECKED BEFORE THE PHASE, AND THIS BRANCH IS A RECOVERY
# RATHER THAN AN EXPECTED PATH. `arbitrate()` grants the slot to the
# pack that is already mid-cycle, so a pack that is BOTH moving power
# and blocked means two histories on disk say "drain" - a hand-edited
# state file, or a store carried across a version that had no interlock.
# The fail-safe direction is unambiguous: two packs pulling against each
# other on one connection is the fault SAFETY-31 latches the whole site
# for. Stand this one down to 0 W and say why; the holder keeps its
# cycle, which is the outcome that loses no coulomb count at all.
if blocked_by and phase in POWER_MOVING:
events += self.abort(now, f"interlock - {blocked_by}")
return MaintResult(IDLE, True, 0.0, False, events)
if phase == IDLE:
if self.cfg.enabled and now.hour == self.cfg.start_hour and self.due(now):
last_try = self.store.get_time("last_start_attempt")
cooled = (
last_try is None
or (now - last_try) >= timedelta(minutes=RESTART_COOLDOWN_MIN)
)
if cooled:
self.store.set_time("last_start_attempt", now)
self._enter(DRAIN, now, events,
"maintenance: due -> drain (exports the surplus)")
return MaintResult(DRAIN, True, self.cfg.discharge_w, False, events)
if self.wants_start(now):
if blocked_by:
# ⚠️ `last_start_attempt` IS NOT STAMPED HERE, AND THAT IS
# THE STARVATION FIX RATHER THAN AN OMISSION. That key is
# the post-ABORT cooldown: it exists so a cycle that failed
# does not re-trigger inside the same start hour. A deferral
# is not an attempt - nothing was tried and nothing failed -
# and stamping it would put this pack under a 90 minute
# cooldown for a start hour that is 60 minutes long, so the
# pack that lost the arbitration would still be locked out
# at the moment the winner released the slot.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE PHASE DOES NOT MOVE, WHICH IS THE OTHER HALF.
# `phase_started` is untouched, so the 12 h DRAIN and 36 h
# CHARGE timeouts - which mean "the battery is not following
# commands, a fault" - cannot be reached by waiting. A
# deferred pack is IDLE under the loop, not a stuck one.
return MaintResult(IDLE, False, None, False,
self._defer_note(blocked_by, events),
blocked_by)
self._deferred = ""
self.store.set_time("last_start_attempt", now)
self._enter(DRAIN, now, events,
"maintenance: due -> drain (exports the surplus)")
return MaintResult(DRAIN, True, self.cfg.discharge_w, False, events)
self._deferred = ""
return MaintResult(IDLE, False, None, False, events)
# ⚠️ Fail toward inaction. Without a state-of-charge reading none of the
@@ -273,3 +492,77 @@ class Maintenance:
_LOG.error("maintenance: unknown phase %r, forcing idle", phase)
events += self.abort(now, f"unknown phase {phase!r}")
return MaintResult(IDLE, True, 0.0, False, events)
def _days(n: float) -> str:
return "never recalibrated" if n == math.inf else f"{n:.0f} d since its last cycle"
def arbitrate(machines, now: datetime) -> list:
"""Grant the site's ONE maintenance slot. Returns a list parallel to
`machines`: "" for the pack that may move power, otherwise the reason the
pack may not.
⚠️ THE SLOT IS A PROPERTY OF THE GRID CONNECTION, WHICH IS WHY IT IS NOT ON
`Maintenance`. Each FSM can see its own pack's schedule and nothing else; the
quantity being rationed - "how many phases are moving power across one
meter" - is a sum over the roster, exactly like `sum(|B_i|) - |sum(B_i)|` in
SAFETY-31 and for the same reason. A per-pack answer to a site-level
question is the shape of defect this repository keeps finding.
⚠️ IT IS DERIVED, NOT PERSISTED, AND THAT IS DELIBERATE. The holder is
"whichever pack's stored phase is not IDLE" - a fact already on disk, in the
per-pack history the packs themselves write. A separate `maint_slot_holder`
key would be a second opinion about the same thing, and the two would
disagree the first time the add-on was killed between writing the phase and
writing the holder. Restart-safe by construction: a controller that comes
back up mid-drain reads the drain and re-derives the holder from it.
TWO CLAUSES, IN ORDER:
1. A PACK ALREADY MOVING POWER KEEPS THE SLOT. Nothing preempts a cycle in
flight, because a recalibration interrupted halfway is worth less than
nothing - the coulomb counter is graded on ONE uninterrupted drain and
refill, so a cycle stopped at 40 % has spent the energy and bought no
calibration. If more than one pack somehow comes up moving power, the
FIRST in roster order holds and `tick()` stands the others down; see the
recovery branch there.
2. OTHERWISE THE LONGEST-WAITING CANDIDATE STARTS. `wants_start()` is asked
of every pack, and among those that say yes the slot goes to the one with
the largest `waited_days()`. NOT roster order: two packs on one monthly
schedule are due in the same hour every month, and a roster-order tie
would hand the slot to `inverters[0]` every single time while the second
pack's coulomb counter drifted forever - which is, in a different
costume, the exact defect this card was opened for. Roster order breaks a
genuine numeric tie and nothing else.
⚠️ AT A ROSTER OF ONE THIS IS THE IDENTITY FUNCTION. One machine is never
another machine's blocker: clause 1 finds at most itself and clause 2 has at
most one candidate, so it returns `[""]` on every tick and no reason string
it can build is ever rendered. That is what makes the one-inverter behaviour
byte-identical rather than merely similar.
"""
blocks = [""] * len(machines)
busy = [(i, m) for i, m in enumerate(machines) if m.phase in POWER_MOVING]
if busy:
held, holder = busy[0]
for i, m in enumerate(machines):
if i != held:
blocks[i] = (f"{holder.name} is mid-cycle ({holder.phase}) and "
f"holds the site's one maintenance slot")
return blocks
wants = [(i, m) for i, m in enumerate(machines) if m.wants_start(now)]
if len(wants) <= 1:
return blocks
# Largest waited_days wins; `-index` makes a numeric tie fall to roster
# order rather than to whatever `max()` happens to see first.
won, winner = max(wants, key=lambda p: (p[1].waited_days(now), -p[0]))
for i, m in wants:
if i != won:
blocks[i] = (f"{winner.name} has waited longer "
f"({_days(winner.waited_days(now))} against "
f"{_days(m.waited_days(now))}) and takes the site's "
f"one maintenance slot first")
return blocks
+232 -24
View File
@@ -90,14 +90,239 @@ SENSORS = [
BASE = "goodwe_ctl"
AVAILABILITY = f"{BASE}/availability"
# --- TEL-07: a SECOND device, for inverter B, and NOT one per inverter -------
#
# ⚠️ READ THE DEVICE-NAME NOTE ABOVE BEFORE CHANGING ANYTHING HERE. The device
# name is half of every entity_id, so re-scoping `DEVICE` renames every entity
# the live install already has - and HA keeps the id it composed at FIRST
# discovery, so what a rename actually produces is a NEW entity beside a dead
# one: the history stays behind on the old id, and every dashboard, template
# and automation that names it (including `goodwe_master_watchdog_held_*` and
# `goodwe_master_parked_at_0_w_*`) keeps pointing at the entity that stopped
# updating. That is silent. So:
#
# `DEVICE` IS NOT TOUCHED AND ITS ENTITIES ARE NOT TOUCHED. It is the SITE
# device - the meter's view and the controller's own state - and at the
# shipped roster of one it is also, in effect, inverter A's.
#
# THE FIRST ROSTER ENTRY GETS NO NEW DEVICE. Its per-unit rows are announced
# ON THE DEVICE IT ALREADY HAS, under new `unique_id`s and new names. Nothing
# existing is renamed, so nothing existing loses its history.
#
# EVERY LATER ENTRY GETS ITS OWN DEVICE (`via_device` the site one).
#
# ⚠️ THE ASYMMETRY IS THE POINT, AND IT WILL LOOK LIKE AN OVERSIGHT. "One
# device per inverter", with A as `inverter-a` and B as `inverter-b`, is tidy,
# symmetrical, and is the change that destroys the live system's recorded
# history. DO NOT "CLEAN THIS UP". The composed entity_ids come out symmetric
# anyway - `sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power` and
# `sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power` - which is the whole benefit of the
# tidy version, without the cost.
#
# WHAT IS PER-UNIT AND WHAT IS SITE, and why the split is where it is:
#
# PER-UNIT setpoint (this unit's share of the site target, the number its
# own heartbeat re-emits), battery power (`inv.batt`, this unit's
# own meter reading), SoC (`inv.soc`, THIS pack - the site row is
# the EMPTIEST pack, which at N>=2 may be the other one), and the
# SAFETY-02 sign latch, which is per actuator by construction.
#
# SITE `grid` and `p1_age`. There is ONE P1 meter and ONE grid
# connection; announcing them per inverter would invent two of a
# thing there is one of. `p1_sample_age_s` is additionally a
# WATCHDOG INPUT (see `omit` below and the firmware note above), so
# a second copy of it is a second copy of a safety signal - two
# answers to "is the meter fresh?", one of which is always the one
# nobody is looking at. Also site: circulating power (it is
# `sum(|Bi|) - |sum(Bi)|`, a property of the SET), the controller
# status, the maintenance phase, and the capacity-tariff peak.
#
# NOT ANNOUNCED, AND SAID OUT LOUD RATHER THAN LEFT LOOKING FINISHED: the
# card also lists "inverter AC power" and per-unit HEARTBEATS as per-unit.
# Neither has a source in this add-on today - nothing reads an AC-power
# register per unit, and `inv.last_beat` is a monotonic loop clock with no
# wall-clock age published anywhere. Announcing them would create entities
# nothing ever feeds, which is exactly what the `omit` note below refuses to
# do for `p1_sample_age_s`. They are gaps, not omissions.
UNIT_SENSORS = [
("setpoint", "setpoint", "Setpoint", "W", "power", "measurement", None),
("battery", "battery_power", "Battery power", "W", "power", "measurement", None),
("soc", "battery_soc", "Battery SoC", "%", "battery", "measurement", None),
("sign_latch", "sign_latch", "Sign latch", None, None, None, "mdi:flash-alert"),
]
# ⚠️ A ROSTER OF ONE ANNOUNCES NOTHING NEW - not a device, not an entity, not a
# topic. Every install running today is a roster of one, and "the upgrade added
# four entities nobody asked for" is a change to a live system's entity list
# for no information: at N=1 the site rows ARE this unit's rows, exactly.
PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER = 2
def _slug(text) -> str:
"""Home Assistant's own object_id spelling: lowercase, `_`, no runs.
⚠️ ASCII-ONLY ON PURPOSE. `str.isalnum()` is true for 'é' and for '٤', and
HA transliterates those rather than keeping them, so treating them as
alphanumeric here would produce an id this module claims and HA does not.
They become separators, which is conservative in the right direction: two
names that differ ONLY outside ASCII collide, and `unit_slugs()` below is
what stops a collision becoming two entities with one `unique_id`.
"""
out = []
for ch in str(text).strip().lower():
out.append(ch if (ch.isascii() and ch.isalnum()) else "_")
slug = "".join(out)
while "__" in slug:
slug = slug.replace("__", "_")
return slug.strip("_")
def _title(name) -> str:
"""`inverter-b` -> `Inverter B`. The half of the entity_id HA composes."""
words = str(name).replace("-", " ").replace("_", " ").split()
return " ".join(w[:1].upper() + w[1:] for w in words) or str(name)
def unit_slugs(units) -> list:
"""One id-safe slug per roster entry, in roster order, ALL DISTINCT.
⚠️ THE DE-COLLISION IS NOT DECORATION. `validate.py` rule 9(c) refuses two
entries with the SAME name; it does not refuse `inverter-b` beside
`Inverter B`, and those two slug to one string. Two entities published with
one `unique_id` is not an error in HA - the second one is DROPPED, so one
inverter's telemetry silently stops existing. The suffix is the roster
INDEX, so it is stable for a given roster and does not depend on what the
other unit is called.
"""
slugs, seen = [], set()
for i, name in enumerate(units):
slug = _slug(name) or f"inverter_{i + 1}"
while slug in seen:
slug = f"{slug}_{i + 1}"
seen.add(slug)
slugs.append(slug)
return slugs
def announced_units(units) -> list:
"""The roster, in order - or EMPTY below `PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER`.
⚠️ ONE ANSWER TO "WHICH UNITS GET PER-UNIT ENTITIES", read by the
announcement here AND by `Controller.publish()` in main.py. Two spellings of
the same predicate is how an entity gets announced that nothing publishes
to, or published to on a topic nothing announced - and at N=1 the second
would be an added topic, which AC 4 forbids outright.
"""
names = [str(u) for u in units]
if len(names) < PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER:
return []
return names
def unit_state_key(slug: str, key: str) -> str:
"""The `publish()` key - i.e. the state topic under `BASE` - for one unit.
Written once, here, because main.py builds it and this module announces it;
a second transcription is a topic announced and never fed.
"""
return f"unit/{slug}/{key}"
def unit_device(name, slug: str) -> dict:
"""B's OWN device. ⚠️ Never returned for the first roster entry."""
return {
"identifiers": [f"{DEVICE['identifiers'][0]}_{slug}"],
"name": f"{DEVICE['name']} {_title(name)}",
"manufacturer": DEVICE["manufacturer"],
"model": DEVICE["model"],
# Hangs B under the controller in HA's device tree rather than beside
# it. Cosmetic, and the one line that says in the UI what the asymmetry
# above means: there is one controller, and it drives both.
"via_device": DEVICE["identifiers"][0],
}
def _payload(name, object_id, unique_id, state_topic, device,
unit, dev_class, state_class, icon) -> dict:
"""One discovery payload.
⚠️ KEY ORDER IS PART OF THE OUTPUT. `json.dumps` writes keys in insertion
order, so this dict's construction order IS the bytes on the wire, and AC 1
is a BYTE comparison against what `release/1.0` publishes. Do not reorder.
"""
cfg = {
"name": name,
"object_id": object_id,
"unique_id": unique_id,
"state_topic": state_topic,
"availability_topic": AVAILABILITY,
"device": device,
}
if unit:
cfg["unit_of_measurement"] = unit
if dev_class:
cfg["device_class"] = dev_class
if state_class:
cfg["state_class"] = state_class
if icon:
cfg["icon"] = icon
return cfg
def discovery_payloads(units=(), omit=()) -> list:
"""Every `(topic, payload)` this add-on announces, in announcement order.
Split out of `_announce()` so that the acceptance criterion can be graded as
a DIFF OF THE ANNOUNCED PAYLOADS against `release/1.0`, rather than as a
reading of the code. `_announce()` publishes exactly this list and nothing
else, which is itself checked.
"""
omit = set(omit)
out = []
for key, object_id, name, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in SENSORS:
if key in omit:
continue
out.append((
f"homeassistant/sensor/{BASE}_{key}/config",
_payload(name, object_id, f"{BASE}_{key}", f"{BASE}/{key}",
DEVICE, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon)))
names = announced_units(units)
slugs = unit_slugs(names)
site_slug = _slug(DEVICE["name"])
for i, (name, slug) in enumerate(zip(names, slugs)):
# ⚠️ `i == 0` IS THE ASYMMETRY, IN ONE LINE. The first roster entry
# keeps the device it already has and carries its name in the ENTITY
# name instead; every later one gets its own device and does not.
# Either way HA composes device-name + entity-name into the same
# string, which is why `object_id` below can be written once for both.
device = DEVICE if i == 0 else unit_device(name, slug)
prefix = f"{_title(name)} " if i == 0 else ""
for key, oid, label, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in UNIT_SENSORS:
unique_id = f"{BASE}_unit_{slug}_{key}"
out.append((
f"homeassistant/sensor/{unique_id}/config",
_payload(prefix + label,
f"{site_slug}_{slug}_{oid}",
unique_id,
f"{BASE}/{unit_state_key(slug, key)}",
device, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon)))
return out
class MqttPublisher:
def __init__(self, host, port, username=None, password=None, omit=()):
def __init__(self, host, port, username=None, password=None, omit=(),
units=()):
# `omit` drops sensor keys from discovery entirely. ⚠️ Announcing a
# sensor that nothing will ever publish to is not harmless here:
# p1_sample_age_s is a watchdog input, and an entity that exists but is
# never fed is a worse signal than one that does not exist at all.
self.omit = set(omit)
# TEL-07. The roster's NAMES, in roster order - `inverter.roster_names()`,
# not a second reading of the option. Defaults to empty, which
# `announced_units()` treats exactly as a roster of one: nothing
# per-unit is announced, so every caller that has not been taught about
# the roster keeps publishing what it published before.
self.units = [str(u) for u in units]
self.enabled = mqtt is not None and bool(host)
self.client = None
if not self.enabled:
@@ -130,29 +355,12 @@ class MqttPublisher:
self.enabled = False
def _announce(self) -> None:
for key, object_id, name, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in SENSORS:
if key in self.omit:
continue
cfg = {
"name": name,
"object_id": object_id,
"unique_id": f"{BASE}_{key}",
"state_topic": f"{BASE}/{key}",
"availability_topic": AVAILABILITY,
"device": DEVICE,
}
if unit:
cfg["unit_of_measurement"] = unit
if dev_class:
cfg["device_class"] = dev_class
if state_class:
cfg["state_class"] = state_class
if icon:
cfg["icon"] = icon
self.client.publish(
f"homeassistant/sensor/{BASE}_{key}/config",
json.dumps(cfg), retain=True,
)
# ⚠️ NO PAYLOAD IS BUILT HERE. `discovery_payloads()` is the whole
# announcement, so the check that diffs it against `release/1.0` is
# diffing what actually goes on the wire - and a payload built here
# instead would be one this add-on publishes and no check has ever seen.
for topic, cfg in discovery_payloads(self.units, self.omit):
self.client.publish(topic, json.dumps(cfg), retain=True)
self.client.publish(AVAILABILITY, "online", retain=True)
def publish(self, values: dict) -> None:
+127
View File
@@ -360,6 +360,29 @@ distinction in DOCS.md and in this comment. Revisit if a THIRD floor appears -
a loop-side guard would be the third - at which point the migration buys enough
to be worth its cost.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAFETY-32: ONE `bms_soc_floor` FOR TWO PACKS GRADES ONE AGAINST THE OTHER'S BMS
`bms_soc_floor` above describes A PACK, not a site, and it was a flat option
because there was one pack. At two, two batteries of different models have
different cut-outs, and one number for both is wrong in the direction that
empties a battery: the SHALLOWER pack (the higher cut-out) is protected by a
floor that belongs to the DEEPER one. So it became a roster key - `Pack` carries
each unit's own value, `pack_floor_pct()` conjoins it with the site's EMS floor,
and validate.py rule 8 grades EVERY unit and NAMES the one it refuses.
⚠️ `peak_soc_floor` DID NOT MOVE, AND THE RESIDUAL IS RECORDED RATHER THAN
HIDDEN. It is one number for the site, so with cut-outs of 10 % and 18 % the
operator must set it above 18 and the deeper pack is then withheld above its own
need. That half - a per-pack EMS floor - is NOT this card and must not be
smuggled in with it; DECISIONS/SAFETY-32-per-pack-bms-floor.md states it as the
open question it is.
⚠️ AND THE MIN() OVER MEASURED SoC IS STILL RIGHT. `Controller.pack_floor_soc`
reduces to the emptiest pack and this card does not touch it. What changed is
the FLOOR it is graded against, and the addition of a per-pack answer beside the
site's one verdict - see `pack_permissions()`.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AND IT READS NO PER-PHASE QUANTITY, ON PURPOSE
@@ -572,6 +595,110 @@ def discharge_permitted(soc, soc_floor) -> str | None:
return None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Pack:
"""SAFETY-32. ONE pack's three numbers for the floor question, NAMED.
`name` the roster name, because a refusal that does not say WHICH pack
stopped the site sends an operator to the wrong device - the
same defect CFG-04's `unit_caps_indexed()` was written for.
`soc` THIS pack's measured state of charge. None when its sensor did
not answer, and None is not a full battery.
`bms_floor` THIS pack's OWN cut-out percent (`bms_soc_floor`), which is a
property of the hardware in the cupboard and NOT of the site.
None when the roster entry did not state one - see
`pack_floor_pct()` for why that is withheld and not 0 %.
⚠️ IT CARRIES THE CUT-OUT, NOT THE EMS FLOOR. `peak_soc_floor` is one number
for the whole site (the depth a money-saving discharge may never reach) and
stays a flat option; `bms_soc_floor` describes a battery and became a roster
key here, because two packs of different models have different cut-outs and
grading both against one of them is wrong in the direction that empties the
shallower one.
"""
name: str
soc: float | None
bms_floor: float | None
def pack_floor_pct(pack, soc_floor):
"""The percent THIS pack may not be spent below, or None if that is unknown.
`max(the site's EMS floor, this pack's own cut-out)` - the CONJUNCTION, and
the direction matters: the EMS floor is what the operator asked for and the
cut-out is what the hardware will do anyway, so a pack is protected by
whichever is higher. Taking the site floor alone is the shipped defect this
card removes (the shallower pack graded against the deeper one's cut-out);
taking the cut-out alone would throw SAFETY-24's margin away.
⚠️ AN UNSTATED CUT-OUT IS None, NOT ZERO, AND NOT THE FLAT OPTION. 0 % would
be a floor that permits everything - the most permissive value there is,
invented from an absence - and borrowing the flat `bms_soc_floor` is CFG-04's
"nothing is inherited" broken in one line, which is this card's whole subject
restated. `discharge_permitted()` already treats a None floor as NO
permission, so an entry that forgot the key costs a shave rather than a pack.
⚠️ AND UNDER A rule-8-VALID CONFIG THIS IS `soc_floor`, FOR EVERY PACK.
validate.py rule 8 refuses `peak_soc_floor <= bms_soc_floor` on EVERY unit,
so `max()` selects the EMS floor everywhere the add-on will actually start -
which is exactly why the reduction is written here rather than assumed at the
call site. "Another rule refuses that config" is a claim about today's rule
ordering, not a property of this function, and `validate_startup_config()` is
also `sim/inject.py`'s entry point. `unit_caps_indexed()`'s docstring records
the same argument, and CFG-04's index desynchronisation is what happened the
last time it was left implicit.
"""
if soc_floor is None or pack.bms_floor is None:
return None
return max(float(soc_floor), float(pack.bms_floor))
def pack_permissions(packs, soc_floor) -> list[tuple[str, str | None]]:
"""SAFETY-32. Per pack: None if it may be spent, else the reason it may not.
ONE `(name, reason)` pair per pack, in roster order, from the SAME
`discharge_permitted()` the site verdict uses - a second transcription of
"may this pack be spent" is a second answer to it, which is the argument
that made that predicate public in the first place.
⚠️ THIS IS THE OBSERVABLE THE MIN() CANNOT PRODUCE. `Controller.pack_floor_soc`
reduces the measured SoC to the emptiest pack BEFORE anything is graded, and
that reduction is right for the site's one verdict - but it has thrown away
which pack it came from and how far that pack was from ITS OWN floor by the
time the answer exists. Two packs at 15 % against floors of 10 % and 20 %
have opposite answers and are indistinguishable after the `min()`.
"""
return [(p.name, discharge_permitted(p.soc, pack_floor_pct(p, soc_floor)))
for p in packs]
def binding_soc_floor(packs, soc_floor):
"""The ONE floor `decide()` may grade `pack_floor_soc` against, at a roster.
MAXIMUM over the packs' own floors, and it is the conservative reduction that
pairs with the MINIMUM `pack_floor_soc` reduction: `min(soc) <= max(floor)`
is implied by "some pack is at or below its own floor", so this verdict is
never more permissive than grading each pack separately would be. The other
direction is not true and is not claimed - a site can be refused here while
every pack individually has headroom, which costs a shave and never a pack.
None when ANY pack's floor is unknown, for `Controller.site_dev_bound()`'s
reason and in the same direction: `discharge_permitted()` treats a None floor
as no permission, so an unknown floor withholds rather than defaults.
⚠️ AT N=1 THIS IS `soc_floor` ITSELF under any config rule 8 accepts, and
test_peakguard.py part 12 asserts that over the whole schema range rather
than assuming it.
"""
if not packs:
return None if soc_floor is None else float(soc_floor)
floors = [pack_floor_pct(p, soc_floor) for p in packs]
if any(f is None for f in floors):
return None
return max(floors)
def decide(projection, *, batt_w, cap_w, reading, achievable_w, soc, soc_floor,
max_hold_s=None, frozen: bool = False) -> PeakDecision:
"""The whole guard. Pure: no clock, no I/O, no state carried between calls.
+301 -26
View File
@@ -71,6 +71,24 @@ _LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.store")
# the card is gone while the fault runs on - exactly how the 2026-09-02 outage
# went unseen for 6 h 25 m with the detector correct throughout. main.py
# re-raises the notification from this key on every start.
#
# ⚠️ AND SAFETY-30's PAIR IS FLAT FOR THE SAME REASON SAFETY-31's IS, WHICH IS
# NOT THE SAME REASON THE ONES ABOVE ARE NAMESPACED. `site_sign_tripped` /
# `site_sign_reason` hold the SITE sign-disagreement latch: the SUM of every
# standing command opposed the meter, continuously. That is a statement about
# the grid connection - the offending number is the site target, which no single
# inverter owns - so there is no unit to hang it on, and hanging it on one would
# let an operator clear "inverter B's half" of a fault that has no halves.
# `unit/<name>/sign_tripped` above stays what it always was and now means what
# it says: THAT unit's own command against THAT unit's own measured power.
#
# ⚠️ AND THEY ARE NOT IN `LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS`, MUST NEVER BE, AND ARE NOT WRITTEN
# AT A ROSTER OF ONE AT ALL. At N=1 the site comparison and the unit comparison
# are the same sentence and `Controller.cycle()` arms only the per-unit
# detector, so a one-inverter install's state file is byte-identical to what it
# was before this card - these two keys sit at their defaults and nothing reads
# them. A rollback therefore finds exactly the flat `sign_tripped` mirror it
# always found.
DEFAULTS = {
"phase": "idle",
"phase_started": None,
@@ -80,6 +98,8 @@ DEFAULTS = {
"sign_reason": "",
"circ_tripped": False,
"circ_reason": "",
"site_sign_tripped": False,
"site_sign_reason": "",
}
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@@ -106,16 +126,53 @@ SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
SCHEMA_KEY = "schema_version"
# Which flat keys belong to ONE inverter, and therefore move into its namespace.
# ⚠️ THE MAINTENANCE KEYS ARE NOT IN HERE AND THAT IS DELIBERATE. `phase`,
# `phase_started`, `last_completed` and `last_start_attempt` belong to the
# maintenance state machine, of which this add-on still holds exactly ONE - a
# monthly recalibration is a pack procedure and per-pack SCHEDULING is a card of
# its own, not something to infer from a key rename. Moving them here would
# quietly re-home an install's whole maintenance history under a unit name; they
# stay where they are, untouched, which is the other half of "migrates without
# losing its latch OR ITS HISTORY".
# ⚠️ THE MAINTENANCE KEYS ARE STILL NOT IN HERE, AND SINCE MAINT-05 THAT IS A
# DIFFERENT DECISION RATHER THAN THE SAME ONE. They DO move now - one
# `Maintenance` per roster entry needs one history per roster entry - but they
# move on their OWN marker, `MAINT_SCHEMA_KEY`, and only on a site that actually
# has more than one pack. Two conditions the SAFETY-02 keys do not share, so
# folding them into this tuple would either drag them across on a
# single-inverter install (which is the byte-identical store layout MAINT-05
# must not change) or hold the sign latch hostage to a roster count it has
# nothing to do with. `MAINT_UNIT_KEYS` below carries them.
LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS = ("sign_tripped", "sign_reason")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# MAINT-05: THE SECOND MIGRATION, AND WHY IT IS A SECOND ONE
#
# 0 = the flat, one-history layout every install has had since the add-on
# shipped: `phase` / `phase_started` / `last_completed` /
# `last_start_attempt` describe THE pack, because there was one FSM.
# 1 = one history per roster entry, under `unit/<name>/...`.
#
# ⚠️ ITS OWN MARKER, NOT A BUMP OF `SCHEMA_VERSION`, AND THE REASON IS THAT THE
# TWO MIGRATIONS DO NOT HAVE THE SAME PRECONDITION. DEV-02's runs on every
# install exactly once and is monotone in the version number. This one runs ONLY
# WHERE THE ROSTER HAS MORE THAN ONE PACK, because at N=1 §6.2's identity holds
# and the flat keys ARE that pack's namespace - moving them would add four keys
# and a version marker to a store MAINT-05's own acceptance criterion requires
# to be byte-identical. A single monotone counter cannot express "migrated on
# this site, deliberately not migrated on that one" without lying to the next
# version that reads it: a one-inverter store would have to be left at the old
# number forever, and then a genuine v2 migration could never be told apart from
# a site that simply never grew.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS TWO MARKERS, NOT TWO COPIES OF THE THREE RULES.
# `_move_flat_keys()` and `_verify_moves()` below are shared verbatim by both
# migrations, so rules 1 and 3 and the READ-BACK POSTCONDITION are one
# implementation. A second transcription of a migration is a second opinion
# about what "it landed" means.
MAINT_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
MAINT_SCHEMA_KEY = "maint_schema_version"
# The flat maintenance-history keys, in the order they are moved.
# ⚠️ THE VALUES ARE THE FLAT SPELLINGS AND THE MODULE THAT READS THEM INDEXES
# THIS SAME TUPLE (`maintenance.UnitHistory`), so a key renamed here cannot
# silently stop being migrated - the same property `UNIT_STORE_KEYS` gives the
# SAFETY-02 pair.
MAINT_UNIT_KEYS = ("phase", "phase_started", "last_completed",
"last_start_attempt")
def unit_key(unit: str, key: str) -> str:
"""The namespaced Store key for `key` on inverter `unit`.
@@ -154,16 +211,35 @@ class MigrationReport:
# to shout: an alarm that fires on the harmless case is an alarm an
# operator learns to dismiss before the real one arrives.
self.lost = []
# ⚠️ A DIFFERENT FAILURE FROM `lost`, AND IT HAS TO BE, BECAUSE THE
# READ-BACK CANNOT SEE IT. `lost` is "the store took the write and
# dropped it". This is "the store took the write, kept it perfectly, and
# NOTHING WILL EVER READ IT" - the migration was handed a unit name that
# is not on the roster, so every machine looks under a different key and
# finds nothing. There is no harmless-default version of this the way
# there is for `lost`: a write nobody reads is not information, whatever
# its value, so anything in here fails `ok` on its own.
self.misdirected = []
# Why nothing ran, when nothing ran. Empty means "already at schema".
self.skipped = ""
@property
def ok(self) -> bool:
"""Nothing that CARRIED STATE failed to land."""
return not self.lost
"""Nothing that CARRIED STATE failed to land, and it landed WHERE THE
MACHINES LOOK."""
return not self.lost and not self.misdirected
def explain(self) -> str:
if not self.ran:
return (f"store already at schema {self.from_version}; no "
f"per-inverter migration needed")
# ⚠️ `skipped` RATHER THAN A SECOND SENTENCE ABOUT VERSIONS. Since
# MAINT-05 there are two reasons a migration does not run - the
# store is already at this schema, or the roster has one pack and
# the flat keys ARE its namespace - and an operator reading the
# startup log needs to be told which, because only one of them
# changes when a second inverter is declared.
return self.skipped or (f"store already at schema "
f"{self.from_version}; no "
f"per-inverter migration needed")
out = (f"migrated {len(self.moved)} flat key(s) to inverter "
f"namespaces: " + ", ".join(sorted(self.moved)))
if self.kept:
@@ -172,6 +248,8 @@ class MigrationReport:
out += " - PROBLEMS: " + "; ".join(self.problems)
if self.lost:
out += " - STATE LOST: " + "; ".join(self.lost)
if self.misdirected:
out += " - WRONG NAMESPACE: " + "; ".join(self.misdirected)
return out
@@ -223,7 +301,30 @@ def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
return rep
rep.ran = True
for legacy in LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS:
_move_flat_keys(store, unit, LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS, rep)
_verify_moves(store, rep)
if rep.ok:
store.set(SCHEMA_KEY, SCHEMA_VERSION)
else:
# ⚠️ NOT MARKED DONE. A migration that lost state must run again on the
# next start rather than be recorded as finished - the one thing worse
# than a failed migration is a failed migration a later version skips.
_LOG.error("per-inverter store migration LOST STATE and has not been "
"marked done: %s", rep.explain())
return rep
def _move_flat_keys(store, unit: str, keys, rep: MigrationReport) -> None:
"""Rule 1, once, for both migrations.
Copies each flat `key` to `unit/<unit>/<key>` UNLESS the namespaced spelling
is already present - a store that has both has been written by a version
that knew about the namespace, and that value is the live one. Rule 2 is the
absence of a delete: the flat keys are left exactly where they were.
"""
data = getattr(store, "data", {})
for legacy in keys:
target = unit_key(unit, legacy)
if target in data:
rep.kept.append(target)
@@ -232,17 +333,63 @@ def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
# tripped has no `sign_tripped` in its file at all, and the value it
# then lands on has to be the one `Store.load()` would have supplied -
# otherwise "absent" and "never tripped" stop being the same statement,
# which is the distinction store.py's own header is about.
# which is the distinction store.py's own header is about. The same
# sentence holds for `last_completed`: absent means "never recalibrated"
# and a literal here would be a second opinion about that.
value = data.get(legacy, DEFAULTS.get(legacy))
store.set(target, value)
rep.moved[target] = value
# THE POSTCONDITION, AND IT IS A READ-BACK RATHER THAN AN ASSUMPTION. This
# is the difference between this function and a two-line copy: the caller
# can ask "is the latch that was in the file before now under the key the
# watchdog reads", through the same `unit_key()` the watchdog's constructor
# reads through, and a `False` there is a guard that is off on an install
# whose state file says it is on.
def _verify_moves(store, rep: MigrationReport, roster=None) -> None:
"""THE POSTCONDITION, AND IT IS A READ-BACK RATHER THAN AN ASSUMPTION.
This is the difference between these functions and a two-line copy: the
caller can ask "is the latch that was in the file before now under the key
the watchdog reads" - and, since MAINT-05, "is the history that was in the
file before now under the key THIS PACK's state machine reads" - through the
same `unit_key()` those readers read through. A `False` here is a guard that
is off, or a month of coulomb-count history gone, on an install whose state
file says otherwise.
⚠️ AND `roster` IS THE OTHER HALF, WHICH THE READ-BACK ON ITS OWN CANNOT BE.
A POSTCONDITION THAT READS BACK THE NAMESPACE IT WAS HANDED CANNOT DETECT
BEING HANDED THE WRONG ONE. That is not a hypothetical: MAINT-05 shipped
with `migrate_maint_keys()` taking a bare `unit` string, and a call site that
passed `inverter.UNIT_A` instead of the first roster entry's name migrated an
install's whole maintenance history into `unit/inverter-a/...` on a roster of
`["garage", "shed"]`, read all four keys back under that same name, was
SATISFIED, and stamped the schema marker - so the next start skipped the
migration too and both packs came up believing they had never been
recalibrated. Every symptom of a clean migration, and the history gone.
`build_roster()` names a declared roster's entries from the config and falls
back to a POSITIONAL `inverter-N`, so `inverter-a` is not even the default
there; there is no roster on which that write could have been read.
So the namespace is graded against the one the MACHINES read - the roster -
rather than against the argument this function was handed, which is the
thing under test. A unit that is not on the roster is `misdirected`, which
fails `ok`, which means the caller does NOT stamp the version marker and the
next start runs the migration again. A re-run is recoverable, by rule 1; a
silent skip is the state store.py's header says must never happen.
⚠️ AND THE GRADED SET IS `moved` UNION `kept`, WHICH IS WHAT MAKES THAT
PARAGRAPH TRUE ON THE SECOND START AS WELL AS THE FIRST. Graded over `moved`
alone the refusal lasted exactly one start: the wrong call site is still
wrong next time, finds the keys it wrote already present, and rule 1 routes
every one of them to `kept` - so `moved` is empty, this loop sees nothing,
`ok` comes back True and the marker is stamped on a migration that has
reached no readable key. The measurement is in the comment on the loop
itself. `test_maintenance.py` section 9c calls this twice with the SAME
wrong `unit` over one store, which is the shape nothing in the suite had.
`roster=None` means "not graded", and the one caller that passes it is
`migrate_unit_keys()`, which runs BEFORE `build_roster()` for the reason its
own docstring gives - the `Inverter` objects restore their latch in their
constructors, so the keys have to be in place before there is a roster to
check against. That gap is real and is recorded as a running check rather
than left to a comment: see test_maintenance.py section 13.
"""
for target, value in rep.moved.items():
got = getattr(store, "data", {}).get(target, "<<missing>>")
if got == value:
@@ -254,14 +401,142 @@ def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
if value != DEFAULTS.get(legacy):
rep.lost.append(note)
if roster is None:
return
names = [str(n) for n in roster]
# `unit_key()` builds `unit/<unit>/<key>`, so the unit is field 1. Split
# through the same spelling the writer used rather than re-deriving it.
#
# ⚠️ `moved` UNION `kept`, AND THE UNION IS THE WHOLE OF THE SECOND FIX
# ROUND. Grading only `moved` made the refusal last EXACTLY ONE START.
# Measured at Controller level over one persisted store, roster
# ["garage", "shed"], flat `last_completed` 2026-08-07, with the call site
# still handing `inverter-a` on both starts:
#
# construction 1: ok=False misdirected=4 moved=4 kept=0 marker=<absent>
# construction 2: ok=True misdirected=0 moved=0 kept=4 marker=1
#
# On start 2 the four keys the WRONG start 1 wrote are already present, so
# rule 1 routes every one of them to `rep.kept`, `rep.moved` is EMPTY, this
# loop iterates over nothing, `misdirected` is empty and `ok` is True - so
# the caller stamps the marker and start 3 takes the `from_version >=
# SCHEMA` early return FOREVER, including after the call site is fixed.
# Loud-and-recoverable became silent-and-permanent after one restart: the
# exact state this module's header says must never happen, reached by the
# fix that was written to prevent it.
#
# The union is sound by construction rather than by hope: every entry in
# both `rep.moved` and `rep.kept` is a `unit_key(unit, legacy)` built from
# the SAME `unit` argument, so grading `kept` grades the same namespace
# decision `moved` does. A correct call site puts its `kept` entries under a
# roster name and they pass; a wrong one cannot launder its namespace by
# having already written it.
for target in sorted(set(rep.moved) | set(rep.kept)):
parts = target.split("/")
unit = parts[1] if len(parts) > 2 else ""
if unit in names:
continue
rep.verified = False
note = (f"{target} was migrated into namespace {unit!r}, which is NOT "
f"on the roster {names!r} - nothing reads that key")
rep.problems.append(note)
rep.misdirected.append(note)
def migrate_maint_keys(store, unit: str, roster) -> MigrationReport:
"""Move the flat maintenance history into the FIRST pack's namespace.
MAINT-05. Until this card there was one `Maintenance` and one history, and
`store.py`'s own header argued the keys should stay flat because per-pack
scheduling was a card of its own. This is that card: there is now one FSM
per roster entry, so there is one history per roster entry, and the flat one
belongs to the pack that was being recalibrated - `inverters[0]`, which is
what `Controller.maint_unit` named and what `validate.py` rule 6 graded
against.
⚠️ `len(roster) <= 1` IS A RETURN, NOT A SPECIAL CASE. At one inverter the
flat keys ARE that pack's namespace (§6.2's identity, the same one
`arbiter.actuator_for()` leans on), `Maintenance` is constructed to read
them directly, and a migration would add four keys plus a marker to a store
that must come out byte-identical. The migration happens on the day the
roster grows, which is the day the flat spelling stops being able to answer
"which pack".
⚠️ `roster` IS REQUIRED, AND IT REPLACED AN `n_units: int`. Two reasons, and
the second is the one MAINT-05 was rejected over.
The small one: `n_units` was `len(self.inverters)` at the only call site, so
the roster carries it - `len(roster)` - and a count passed beside the names
is a second opinion about how many packs there are.
The load-bearing one: THE NAMES ARE THE POSTCONDITION. `unit` says which
pack the flat keys belonged to and that is genuinely a decision - the first
roster entry, because that is the pack the one FSM was driving - but a
decision the caller can get WRONG, and until this signature existed nothing
could tell. `_verify_moves()` read back the namespace it was handed, so a
migration into a name no machine reads verified clean and stamped the
marker. Handing the roster in means the read-back is graded against the
keys the MACHINES read, and a `unit` that is not among these names comes
back `misdirected`: not `ok`, marker NOT written, migration runs again next
start - and again the start after that, because `_verify_moves()` grades
`kept` as well as `moved`. See `_verify_moves()` for the install this was
measured on, and for what grading `moved` alone cost on start 2.
THE THREE RULES ARE `migrate_unit_keys()`'s, SHARED IN CODE rather than
restated: `_move_flat_keys()` is rule 1 (never overwrite a namespaced value)
and rule 2 (the flat keys are left in the file), `_verify_moves()` is the
read-back postcondition, and the marker is written LAST so a crash before it
leaves the migration to run again - which rule 1 makes a no-op.
⚠️ AND RULE 2 IS KEPT LIVE HERE TOO, WHICH IS THE HALF DEV-02 HAD TO ADD
LATER. "Left in place" alone makes the flat history a fossil dated the day
the second inverter was declared: an operator who rolls back to a
single-FSM add-on would find a `last_completed` months old and recalibrate a
pack that does not need it, or - worse - a stale `phase` and a
`phase_started` old enough to abort on the 12 h timeout the moment it comes
up. So `maintenance.UnitHistory` MIRRORS the first pack's writes back onto
the flat keys for as long as the roster has more than one entry. The flat
pair is the ROLLBACK VIEW of the history, maintained, exactly as
`sign_tripped` is the rollback view of the latch.
"""
rep = MigrationReport()
data = getattr(store, "data", {})
names = [str(n) for n in roster]
rep.from_version = int(data.get(MAINT_SCHEMA_KEY, 0) or 0)
if len(names) <= 1:
rep.skipped = ("one inverter: the flat maintenance keys ARE that pack's "
"history and are read in place, so there is nothing to "
"move and the store layout does not change")
return rep
if rep.from_version >= MAINT_SCHEMA_VERSION:
rep.skipped = (f"maintenance history already at schema "
f"{rep.from_version}; written by a multi-inverter "
f"version and not touched")
return rep
rep.ran = True
_move_flat_keys(store, unit, MAINT_UNIT_KEYS, rep)
_verify_moves(store, rep, roster=names)
# ⚠️ `rep.ok` AND NOTHING ELSE - NOT `ok or kept`, NOT `not lost`, NOT
# `not misdirected`. BOTH guards gate this line and each one is pinned by a
# check that the other cannot satisfy: section 9c refuses a store whose
# failure is `misdirected` with `lost` empty, and section 9d refuses one
# whose failure is `lost` with `misdirected` empty AND `kept` non-empty -
# the mutation `if rep.ok or rep.kept:` stamps the marker on a migration
# that lost a month of history, and until section 9d existed all 19 suites
# were green on it.
if rep.ok:
store.set(SCHEMA_KEY, SCHEMA_VERSION)
store.set(MAINT_SCHEMA_KEY, MAINT_SCHEMA_VERSION)
else:
# ⚠️ NOT MARKED DONE. A migration that lost state must run again on the
# next start rather than be recorded as finished - the one thing worse
# than a failed migration is a failed migration a later version skips.
_LOG.error("per-inverter store migration LOST STATE and has not been "
"marked done: %s", rep.explain())
# ⚠️ NOT MARKED DONE, FOR EITHER FAILURE. The same sentence
# `migrate_unit_keys()` carries: the one thing worse than a failed
# migration is a failed migration a later version skips. Rule 1 makes
# the re-run a no-op where the keys did land, so refusing the marker
# costs one repeated pass and buys the difference between a migration
# that can still be fixed and one the store says already happened.
_LOG.error("per-pack maintenance-history migration did NOT land and "
"has not been marked done: %s", rep.explain())
return rep
+342 -38
View File
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
was overruled. That firmware file's own comment says a lower bound on this
"belongs in CFG-01, not here" - so here it is.
5. `sign_disagree_w` at or above `max_w`. [(a)]
5. `sign_disagree_w` - or SAFETY-30's `unit_sign_disagree_w` - at or above
`max_w`. [(a)]
The arbiter's `supervised` limit bounds every command to +-max_w, and
SAFETY-02's predicate needs `abs(command) > sign_disagree_w`. Set the
threshold at or above the ceiling and the command side of the comparison
@@ -131,7 +132,7 @@ NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
installed base is on a fixed or static tariff. Refusing to start without a
price feed would lock those sites out of the add-on entirely.
8. `peak_soc_floor` at or below `bms_soc_floor`. [(a)]
8. `peak_soc_floor` at or below `bms_soc_floor`, ON ANY UNIT. [(a)]
SAFETY-24, and the same shape as 1, 4, 5 and 6. The peak guard can COMMAND
a discharge to hold a billed quarter down (SAFETY-07), and `peak_soc_floor`
is the EMS-side bound on how far down it may take the pack. The BMS has its
@@ -141,6 +142,12 @@ NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
of binding while its status page reports one - rule 5's "a disarmed guard
that advertises itself as armed", on the guard whose failure mode is a pack
that is quietly never available when it is wanted.
⚠️ SAFETY-32: `bms_soc_floor` DESCRIBES A BATTERY, so at a roster it is a
per-entry key and this rule grades EVERY unit and NAMES the one it refuses.
One number for two packs of different models refuses the wrong config and
accepts the wrong one - cut-outs of 10 % and 30 % under `peak_soc_floor: 20`
used to start. A missing per-entry cut-out is refused here rather than
defaulted: a cut-out invented for a pack IS this defect.
⚠️ `<=`, NOT `<`, and the equality case is the interesting one. At exactly
equal, the EMS floor and the pack's cut-out act at the same percent, so the
@@ -176,6 +183,60 @@ NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
the per-unit form and main.py runs it from `run_control()`, once every
unit's own ESPHome has replied.
10. `slew_w` above the fraction of the SITE RAIL the plant can follow. [(a)]
SAFETY-39, and the first rule here whose subject is a RELATIONSHIP rather
than a threshold. `slew_w` bounds how far the site command may move in one
cycle; `control.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is `LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S`, so
`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail` is the largest step at which the loop still takes
the plant's own measured settling time to traverse its whole output range.
Above it the controller commands its entire range before it can observe
its answer to the first step, and the stated limit - "the command moves at
most `slew_w` per cycle, so it cannot jump ahead of the inverter" - is
untrue: it jumps ahead by construction.
⚠️ THIS IS (a) AND NOT (b), and the distinction is what makes it a refusal
rather than a warning. Nothing goes inert. What happens is that a bound
the operator set means something other than what it says, and the layer
that overrules it is the PLANT - which has no status row, publishes
nothing, and cannot be read off any page in this add-on. Measured on the
owner's system 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46 at `max_w: 5000`, `slew_w: 1000`:
setpoint 380 -> 5000 in five 2 s ticks, battery -5154 W against a 5000 VA
inverter, and the grid driven from 3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT.
Large (>= 900 W) setpoint steps per 30 min climbed 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 that
morning. Nothing in the add-on reported anything wrong, because nothing
was: the loop followed its command exactly, and the command was wrong.
⚠️ IT IS GRADED AGAINST THE ROSTER SUM, NOT THE FLAT `max_w` AND NOT THE
WEAKEST UNIT, and this is the one rule in this file for which that is the
right rail. Rules 5, 6 and 8 are all about ONE unit - one watchdog, one
shaping claim, one pack - so they take `min()` over `unit_caps()`.
`slew_w` is not per unit: `main.py` builds `Tuning(max_w=self.site_max_w)`
and `compute()` produces the SITE target, which the allocator then splits.
So the range this bound is about is the sum, `Controller.site_max_w`, and
`site_rail_w()` below is that same number computed from options.
⚠️ AND THE `site_sign_disagree_w` NOTE IN config.yaml IS NOT A PRECEDENT
AGAINST THIS. That note says there is deliberately no rule pairing
`site_sign_disagree_w` with `max_w`, "because the bound on the SITE command
is `Controller.site_max_w`, the ROSTER SUM, and `validate_startup_config()`
is handed options rather than a roster. A rule written against max_w would
refuse a perfectly reachable two-inverter configuration." That objection is
to grading a site quantity against the FLAT key. It is answered rather than
ignored: `unit_caps()` already reads the roster the add-on will build, so
the roster sum IS available here, and this rule takes it.
⚠️ THE DIRECTION OF THIS RULE, SAID PLAINLY, BECAUSE IT IS NOT THE
DIRECTION THE TICKET ASSUMED. A rail that GROWS loosens this bound: at a
9600 W two-inverter rail, `slew_w: 1000` traverses the rail in 19.2 s and
passes, while at 5000 W the same 1000 W is the configuration measured
above. That is what the constraint says and it is correct - the bound is on
traverse TIME, and a bigger rail at the same step size takes longer to
cross. What this rule therefore protects against is the constant being left
behind when the rail moves EITHER way. It is NOT a bound on how much power
the site may command, and it does NOT bound the over-absorption: see the
note below on `gain`, which is the term that owns that and which SAFETY-39
measured and did not change.
WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* REFUSED, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
- `integrator_max_w` above `max_w`. DOCS.md is right that the only thing the
@@ -219,6 +280,34 @@ WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* REFUSED, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
is answered. Compare rule 5, which CAN be settled at startup because both
`sign_disagree_w` and `max_w` are config and are both known at boot.
- `gain` at any value the schema accepts, INCLUDING against a large rail.
SAFETY-39 measured this and deliberately left it alone, which is worth more
than the rule would have been. On admin/goodwe's rig, over a family of 51
export steps from 1.0 to 4.2 kW at `max_w: 5000` and a 2 s tick, the
over-absorption - peak battery power beyond what the site actually needed -
is FLAT in `slew_w`: 958 W at slew 1000 and 1081 W at slew 250. It falls
in `gain`: 987 W at 0.6, 876 W at 0.3, 435 W at 0.2 - a real reduction, but
NOT to zero, and the 0.2 figure is the one worth not rounding away. The
reason is structural and is visible in control.py: `slew_w` bounds the
OUTPUT, while the integrator accumulates `gain * error` per cycle and is
bounded only by `integrator_max_w`. At gain 0.6 into a 3.4 kW error the
integrator moves ~2040 W per tick and reaches a 5000 W rail in under three
ticks whatever `slew_w` is.
So the 2026-08-22 derivation's own sentence - "the gain, not the slew, is
the limit by then" - is now literally true, and `gain` is the constant that
needs re-deriving next. It is NOT refused and NOT changed here: it is a
live control-law constant on a running house, changing it in the same pull
request as `slew_w` would make the next measurement uninterpretable, and a
validator rule pairing `gain` with a rail would be inventing a relationship
nobody has measured. Named here so it is a known open item rather than an
omission. See DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md.
- `slew_w` BELOW the rail fraction, at any value the schema accepts. Slower
than the plant is always safe and is sometimes necessary - the live install
has run an explicit 400 W against a 5000 W rail since 2026-09-05 12:00,
which is 12.5 ticks to traverse the rail against the 9 this rule requires.
Refusing "too slow" would refuse the mitigation that is holding.
- `peak_soc_floor` below `maintenance_soc_floor`, or above it. They are
DIFFERENT QUANTITIES (SAFETY-24: a drain target versus a spend limit) and
every ordering of the two is a legitimate site configuration. Refusing on
@@ -228,12 +317,14 @@ WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* REFUSED, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
import logging
from .arbitrage import enabled as arbitrage_on
from .control import SLEW_RAIL_FRAC, LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S
from .inverter import roster_entries
from .maintenance import MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS
from .p1 import is_enabled, validate_meter_options
from .peakguard import PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS
from .price import PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, PROVIDERS
from .static_tariff import ProfileInvalid, parse_static_profile
from .watchdog import SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.config")
@@ -384,6 +475,70 @@ def unit_caps_indexed(opts: dict) -> list[tuple[int, float]]:
return caps
def site_rail_w(opts: dict) -> float | None:
"""The SITE rail: what the whole site may be commanded, in W. Rule 10's rail.
⚠️ THE SUM, NOT THE MINIMUM, AND NOT THE FLAT KEY - and it is the only place
in this file that wants a sum. Rules 5, 6 and 8 grade a threshold against
ONE unit (one watchdog, one shaping claim, one pack) and take `min()` over
`unit_caps()`. `slew_w` is not a per-unit quantity at all: `main.py` builds
`Tuning(max_w=self.site_max_w)` from the roster sum and `compute()` emits
the SITE target, which the allocator then divides. So the output range
`slew_w` is a rate across is `Controller.site_max_w`, and this is that same
number read out of options rather than off a built roster.
At the shipped roster of one this is `unit_caps()`'s single entry, which is
`max_w` exactly - byte for byte the number the single-inverter shape has
always meant. None when no entry carries a usable cap, which rule 9 has
already refused by the time rule 10 runs.
"""
caps = unit_caps(opts)
return float(sum(caps)) if caps else None
def unit_bms_floors_indexed(opts: dict) -> list[tuple[int, object, object]]:
"""SAFETY-32. Each pack's OWN `bms_soc_floor`, carrying its ROSTER INDEX.
`(roster index, the raw value as configured, the parsed float or None)`, one
triple per unit. The raw value travels too because the refusal quotes what
the operator actually wrote, and `!r` of a re-read `opts` key is the wrong
string the moment the value came off a roster entry.
⚠️ THE INDEX IS THE ROSTER'S, NOT THIS LIST'S, AND THAT IS CFG-04'S BUG
WRITTEN DOWN. Rules 5 and 6 fed a CAPS-list index into `_unit_label()`,
which indexes the ROSTER, so on a roster whose first entry was malformed the
refusal named the WRONG INVERTER - an operator sent to the wrong device by
the very message that exists to stop that. `unit_caps_indexed()` exists
because of it. This function goes one step further and SKIPS NOTHING: every
entry produces a triple, including the ones with no usable floor, because a
missing cut-out is itself what rule 8 has to refuse BY NAME. There is
therefore no second list for an index to desynchronise from.
⚠️ AND NOTHING IS INHERITED. At a declared roster the FLAT `bms_soc_floor` is
not read at all - CFG-04's rule, and this card's subject: a pack that borrows
a sibling's cut-out is graded against a battery it is not. At the flat shape
the flat key IS this one pack's cut-out, defaulted from CFG-03's single
mirror exactly as `inverter._flat_bms_floor()` defaults it.
"""
entries = roster_entries(opts)
if not entries:
return [(0, opts.get("bms_soc_floor"),
_number(opts, "bms_soc_floor",
PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["bms_soc_floor"]))]
out: list[tuple[int, object, object]] = []
for index, entry in enumerate(entries):
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
# Rule 9(a)/(b) already refuses a non-dict entry by index, and it
# runs FIRST. Naming it twice would hand the operator two sentences
# about one line of YAML.
continue
raw = entry.get("bms_soc_floor")
out.append((index, raw,
None if raw is None or raw == ""
else _number(entry, "bms_soc_floor", None)))
return out
def _unit_label(opts: dict, index: int) -> str:
""""" at a single-inverter config, " (inverter-b)" at a roster.
@@ -741,6 +896,65 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
f"sign_disagree_w below {weakest:.0f} W (300 W is the measured "
"default), or raise max_w.")
# ⚠️ AND THE SAME RULE FOR SAFETY-30's PER-UNIT THRESHOLD, WHICH IS A
# SEPARATE COMPARISON AND THEREFORE A SEPARATE WAY TO DISARM. It grades a
# unit's own SHARE against that unit's own measured power, and a share is
# bounded by the same `supervised` claim at +-max_w - so a threshold at or
# above the ceiling makes the command side unsatisfiable by construction,
# exactly as above. Written as its own branch rather than folded into the
# one above because the two produce different sentences and an operator
# needs to be told WHICH watchdog they have disarmed.
#
# ⚠️ REFUSED EVEN AT A ROSTER OF ONE, WHERE THIS CHECK IS NOT ARMED. A
# config that cannot work is refused when it is WRITTEN, not on the day a
# second inverter is added - which is the day nobody is watching the startup
# log. This is `meter_max_age_s`'s rule read the same way: the failure it
# prevents is silent.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT READS THE WEAKEST UNIT'S CAP, NOT THE FLAT `max_w` - SAFETY-32
# ROUND 5. This branch used to compare against `max_w = _number(opts,
# "max_w", 2000.0)`, the FLAT option, which on a roster config is either
# ABSENT (so it compared against a 2000 W DEFAULT describing no unit on the
# site) or a leftover from a single-inverter install (so it compared against
# a number no unit has). Both directions were live and both were measured:
#
# a roster of two 2000 W units beside a leftover `max_w: 5000` and
# `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000` produced ZERO problems - the site STARTED,
# with a per-inverter watchdog reporting `armed` on the status page and
# incapable of tripping on EITHER unit. That is the identical sentence the
# branch above exists to refuse, reached through the branch beside it;
#
# and a roster of two 5000 W units with no flat key was REFUSED at
# `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000` against a 2000 W default the operator never
# wrote, for a threshold both units can reach.
#
# `unit_caps()`'s own docstring already said why: there is no such thing as
# a site rating on the wire, and this watchdog grades ONE UNIT's standing
# command against THAT unit's `supervised` bound. So it takes the same
# `weakest` the branch above takes, from the same list, and names the same
# unit. At a roster of one `unit_caps()` is `[max_w]` and this is the
# identical comparison it always was - which is what keeps the shipped
# single-inverter refusal byte-for-byte what it was.
unit_sign_w = _number(opts, "unit_sign_disagree_w",
float(SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS["unit_sign_disagree_w"]))
unit_where = (_unit_label(opts, min(caps_ix, key=lambda p: p[1])[0])
if caps_ix else "")
if unit_sign_w is None:
problems.append(f"unit_sign_disagree_w "
f"{opts.get('unit_sign_disagree_w')!r} is not a number")
elif weakest is not None and weakest > 0 and unit_sign_w >= weakest:
problems.append(
f"unit_sign_disagree_w is {unit_sign_w:.0f} W but max_w{unit_where}"
f" is {weakest:.0f} W, so the SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement "
"watchdog can never fire: no inverter is ever commanded past max_w, "
f"and the watchdog needs a command over {unit_sign_w:.0f} W. At two "
"inverters that is the guard which catches a unit doing the "
"OPPOSITE of what it was told while its sibling covers for it at "
"the meter - the case the site-level watchdog is structurally "
f"blind to. Lower unit_sign_disagree_w below {weakest:.0f} W "
f"({SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS['unit_sign_disagree_w']:.0f} W is the "
"measured default), or raise max_w.")
# --- 6. a maintenance charge the ceiling can actually accommodate --------
# ⚠️ Strictly `>`, matching the arbiter exactly. The shaping is
# `Claim.limit(hi=-charge_w)` against `supervised`'s `lo=-max_w`, so
@@ -768,24 +982,47 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
# rule 8 below already makes with `PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS` - and
# test_maintenance.py pins it by reading the shipped file.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS GRADED AGAINST THE FIRST UNIT'S CAP, NOT THE SMALLEST AND NOT
# THE FLAT ONE. Rule 5 takes the weakest unit because there is a watchdog on
# every one of them; there is exactly ONE `Maintenance` in this add-on and
# `Controller.maint_unit` names the pack it recalibrates - the first in the
# roster, because the cycle's history lives under un-namespaced Store keys.
# The shaping claim is filed on THAT actuator and on no other, so the cap
# that can contradict it is THAT unit's. Taking `min()` here would refuse a
# perfectly workable site - a 5000 W pack being recalibrated beside a 2000 W
# sibling the cycle never touches - which is the over-refusal this file's
# docstring says gets a validator switched off. When `maint_unit` stops
# being `inverters[0]`, this line moves with it.
# ⚠️ MAINT-05: IT IS GRADED AGAINST THE WEAKEST UNIT'S CAP NOW, AND THE
# COMMENT THIS REPLACES SAID SO WOULD HAPPEN. It read: "there is exactly ONE
# `Maintenance` in this add-on and `Controller.maint_unit` names the pack it
# recalibrates - the first in the roster, because the cycle's history lives
# under un-namespaced Store keys. The shaping claim is filed on THAT
# actuator and on no other, so the cap that can contradict it is THAT
# unit's. Taking `min()` here would refuse a perfectly workable site - a
# 5000 W pack being recalibrated beside a 2000 W sibling the cycle never
# touches ... When `maint_unit` stops being `inverters[0]`, this line moves
# with it."
#
# `maint_unit` has stopped being `inverters[0]`. There is one `Maintenance`
# per roster entry, each with its own namespaced history, and EVERY pack is
# recalibrated on its own schedule - so the sibling "the cycle never
# touches" does not exist any more and the over-refusal argument has no
# subject. The shaping claim is filed on whichever pack is charging, so the
# cap that can contradict it is any cap on the roster, and the one that
# contradicts it FIRST is the smallest. This is rule 5's conjunction for
# rule 5's reason: a threshold that is fine against the biggest unit says
# nothing about the smallest, and the smallest is the one that goes to 0 W.
#
# ⚠️ THIS REFUSES CONFIGS THAT USED TO START, AND THAT IS THE POINT RATHER
# THAN A SIDE EFFECT. `max_w` 5000 on pack A beside 2000 on pack B with
# `maintenance_charge_w` 3000 was accepted before this card and was correct
# while only pack A was ever recalibrated. Pack B now recalibrates too, and
# its cheap-window charge asks the arbiter for `hi = -3000` against a
# supervised `lo = -2000`: `lo > hi`, arbiter clause 3, 0 W, contradiction -
# a maintenance charge that silently never happens on that pack, which is
# exactly what rule 6 exists to refuse at the moment it is WRITTEN. At a
# roster of one `min()` over one cap is that cap and the comparison, the
# message and the boundary are identical.
charge_w = _number(opts, "maintenance_charge_w",
float(MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS["maintenance_charge_w"]))
# ⚠️ THE SAME PAIRING AS RULE 5, FOR THE SAME REASON. `caps[0]` is the first
# unit WITH A USABLE CAP, which is `inverters[0]` only while every earlier
# entry has one; `_unit_label(opts, 0)` was hard-wired to `inverters[0]`
# regardless. Both come off the one pair now.
maint_index, maint_cap = caps_ix[0] if caps_ix else (0, None)
# ⚠️ THE SAME PAIRING AS RULE 5, FOR THE SAME REASON: `unit_caps_indexed()`
# SKIPS entries with no usable `max_w`, so a caps-list position is not a
# roster position and `_unit_label()` indexes the roster. The index travels
# with the number, so the unit the message names is the unit the number came
# off - which on a roster whose first entry has a junk `max_w` is not the
# same thing at all.
maint_index, maint_cap = (min(caps_ix, key=lambda p: p[1]) if caps_ix
else (0, None))
maint_where = _unit_label(opts, maint_index)
if charge_w is None:
problems.append(
@@ -802,6 +1039,62 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
f"two numbers. Lower maintenance_charge_w to {maint_cap:.0f} W or "
f"less, or raise max_w to at least {charge_w:.0f} W.")
# --- 10. a slew rate the plant can actually follow -----------------------
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39. The one rule here that grades a RATIO rather than a
# threshold, and the whole point of writing it as one is that the number it
# bounds must not be able to outlive the rail again. `control.py`'s header
# carries the derivation; the short version is that `slew_w: 1000` was
# derived against a 1500 W clamp and the live install raised the clamp to
# 5000 without revisiting it, so the loop traversed its whole output range
# in 10 s against a plant measured at ~18 s.
#
# ⚠️ `slew_w: 0` IS NOT GRADED AND MUST NOT BE. Zero means "follow the
# rail" - `control.slew_limit_w()` resolves it to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`,
# which satisfies this rule by construction at every rail there is. It is
# the shipped default, and a rule that refused it would refuse the fix.
#
# ⚠️ STRICTLY `>`, MATCHING RULE 6 RATHER THAN RULE 5. Equality is the
# derived value itself: at `slew_w == SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail` the loop takes
# exactly `PLANT_SETTLE_S` to cross its range, which is the constraint
# satisfied, not violated. Refusing it would refuse the value this rule
# exists to recommend - and `slew_limit_w()` produces exactly that value
# for every default install, so `>=` would refuse the shipped default
# through a float comparison. A tolerance is applied for the same reason:
# `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * 5000` is 555.55..., and an operator who writes the 556
# a status page rounded to is one watt over a boundary that is not
# meaningful to one watt.
slew_w = _number(opts, "slew_w", 0.0)
rail = site_rail_w(opts)
if slew_w is None:
problems.append(f"slew_w {opts.get('slew_w')!r} is not a number")
elif slew_w < 0:
problems.append(
f"slew_w is {slew_w:.0f} W and must not be negative - it is a "
"magnitude, and 0 means 'follow max_w' (the recommended setting).")
elif slew_w and rail is not None and rail > 0:
bound = SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail
if slew_w > bound + 1.0:
ticks = rail / slew_w
problems.append(
f"slew_w is {slew_w:.0f} W against a site rail of {rail:.0f} W, "
f"so the loop crosses its whole output range in {ticks:.1f} "
f"cycles - {ticks * LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s at the {LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s "
f"tick this site was measured running - while the plant takes "
f"{PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s to settle (goodwe/NOTES.md §5.10, a "
"1.78 kW step). The controller would command its entire range "
"before it could observe its answer to the first step, which is "
"not a slow loop, it is a loop that MANUFACTURES the error it "
"then chases: measured on this system 2026-09-05, a 3.4 kW "
"export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000 W in five ticks, the "
"battery to -5154 W past a 5000 VA rating, and the grid from "
"3.4 kW of export to 2.8 kW of import. The stated limit - the "
"command moves at most slew_w per cycle, so it cannot jump "
"ahead of the inverter - is untrue at this rail; THE PLANT "
f"WINS, and it has no status row. Set slew_w to 0, which means "
f"'follow the rail' and resolves to {bound:.0f} W here and "
"moves on its own if the rail does, or write a value at or "
f"below {bound:.0f} W. Lower is always accepted.")
# --- 7. two price sources on one site ------------------------------------
problems.extend(_price_problems(opts))
@@ -814,28 +1107,39 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
# in-code mirror, pinned to config.yaml by test_peakguard.py, and main.py
# reads the same one - exactly as maintenance.MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS now is
# for the `maintenance_*` family.
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32 - GRADED ONCE PER UNIT, AND THE REFUSAL NAMES THE UNIT. One
# `bms_soc_floor` for two packs compares the EMS floor against whichever
# battery happened to be written into the flat key: a site with cut-outs of
# 10 % and 30 % and `peak_soc_floor: 20` STARTED, and the guard would then
# command a forced discharge that the second pack's BMS - not the operator's
# floor - is the thing that stops. That is the disarmed-backstop state this
# rule exists to refuse, reached through the rule itself. So the loop is over
# units, and `_unit_label()` is fed the ROSTER index the value came off (see
# `unit_bms_floors_indexed()`), because CFG-04 has just fixed the version of
# this that named the wrong inverter.
soc_floor = _number(opts, "peak_soc_floor",
PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["peak_soc_floor"])
bms_floor = _number(opts, "bms_soc_floor",
PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS["bms_soc_floor"])
if soc_floor is None or bms_floor is None:
problems.append(
"peak_soc_floor and bms_soc_floor must both be numbers (got "
f"{opts.get('peak_soc_floor')!r} / {opts.get('bms_soc_floor')!r})")
elif soc_floor <= bms_floor:
problems.append(
f"peak_soc_floor is {soc_floor:.0f} % but the pack's own cut-out "
f"(bms_soc_floor) is {bms_floor:.0f} %, so SAFETY-07's forced "
"discharge has no EMS-side bound at all - THE BMS WINS, and it is "
"the pack's protection rather than yours. The guard would report a "
"SoC floor on its status page while being incapable of ever being "
"the thing that stops the discharge, and the symptom of that is a "
"battery repeatedly sitting at the BMS limit with no record of why "
f"- which looks exactly like the SoC drift the maintenance cycle "
f"exists to correct. Raise peak_soc_floor above {bms_floor:.0f} % "
f"(the shipped default is "
f"{PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS['peak_soc_floor']:.0f} %), or correct "
"bms_soc_floor if it does not match this pack.")
for _ix, _raw, bms_floor in unit_bms_floors_indexed(opts):
where = _unit_label(opts, _ix)
if soc_floor is None or bms_floor is None:
problems.append(
f"peak_soc_floor and bms_soc_floor{where} must both be numbers "
f"(got {opts.get('peak_soc_floor')!r} / {_raw!r})")
elif soc_floor <= bms_floor:
problems.append(
f"peak_soc_floor is {soc_floor:.0f} % but the pack's own cut-out "
f"(bms_soc_floor{where}) is {bms_floor:.0f} %, so SAFETY-07's forced "
"discharge has no EMS-side bound at all - THE BMS WINS, and it is "
"the pack's protection rather than yours. The guard would report a "
"SoC floor on its status page while being incapable of ever being "
"the thing that stops the discharge, and the symptom of that is a "
"battery repeatedly sitting at the BMS limit with no record of why "
f"- which looks exactly like the SoC drift the maintenance cycle "
f"exists to correct. Raise peak_soc_floor above {bms_floor:.0f} % "
f"(the shipped default is "
f"{PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS['peak_soc_floor']:.0f} %), or correct "
f"bms_soc_floor{where} if it does not match this pack.")
# --- warnings: real, but not worth refusing over -------------------------
integ = opts.get("integrator_max_w")
+363 -18
View File
@@ -164,11 +164,106 @@ saturation freeze's question (|command - the battery's actual power| > 500 W,
NOTES.md §4.7 row 4), and the two checks are complementary rather than
overlapping. Neither substitutes for the other.
⚠️ THAT PARAGRAPH IS ABOUT THE COMMAND-VERSUS-METER COMPARISON, AND SINCE
SAFETY-30 THAT IS NOT THE ONLY ONE THIS MODULE DRIVES. At a roster of two or
more each unit is ALSO graded against its own measured power, which is exactly
the comparison the paragraph says nothing here makes - see the SAFETY-30 section
below, which says what that does and does not take away from the freeze. At the
shipped roster of one the paragraph stands unchanged, word for word: the site
comparison is the only detector armed and the freeze is still the whole answer.
Nor does it see a sign inversion introduced DOWNSTREAM of this add-on - in the
firmware, on the wire, or in a future driver. Our view stays self-consistent and
this stays silent. That is a wire-versus-intent problem and it belongs to the
witness, which is the only vantage point that sees both.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAFETY-30 - AT TWO INVERTERS THIS IS TWO QUESTIONS, NOT ONE
Everything above was written at a roster of ONE, and at N=1 it is right for a
reason that stops being true at N=2. `commanded_w` is what THIS controller put
on THIS actuator. `grid_w` is what the WHOLE SITE is exchanging with the
network. At one inverter those are two views of one thing - §6.2's identity -
which is what makes comparing them sound. At two they are not:
* A FALSE TRIP THE COMPARISON CANNOT AVOID. "Inverter A commanded -1500 W
while the meter reads +1500 W" is evidence of nothing at N=2: inverter B may
be discharging 3000 W and doing exactly what it was told. No fault anywhere,
and the check NOTES.md calls the highest-value entry in the safety table -
93 % agreement while healthy against 4 % during runaway, four episodes, zero
false positives - fires.
* THE CONVERSE, WHICH IS WORSE. A unit genuinely driving the wrong way is
MASKED, because the site figure NETS. Commanded +1500 W, measured -1500 W,
beside a sibling measured at +1500 W: the meter sits exactly where a healthy
site leaves it. This is not a threshold that is set too high - the
information is destroyed by the summation, and no tuning recovers it.
So the one comparison becomes two, each asked of the evidence that can answer
it, and they are DIFFERENT FAULTS rather than one fault at two scales:
PER UNIT this unit's standing command against ITS OWN measured power -
`Inverter.batt`, which on the live system is holding register
0x0518, this inverter's own AC power, per-instance since DEV-02.
Conclusion: "THE ACTUATOR I AM DRIVING IS NOT DOING WHAT I TOLD
IT". The evidence is about one unit, so the remedy is that unit:
the `failsafe` SET, which arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE has called a UNIT
claim from the day it was written, for this exact reason.
SITE the SUM of the standing commands against the meter. Conclusion:
"THE SITE AS A WHOLE IS DRIVING THE WRONG WAY" - an inverted gain,
an integrator wound past the rail, a strategy pushing the wrong
side of the meter. That is the fault the 2026-08-20 capture
contains and it is a property of the CONNECTION, so the remedy is
the connection: a SITE SET that stops every inverter.
⚠️ AND AT N=1 THERE IS EXACTLY ONE ARMED DETECTOR, WHICH IS THE ONE THAT
SHIPPED. The two questions above are the SAME SENTENCE at a roster of one: the
sum of one command is that command, and "the site" and "the unit" name one
actuator. Arming both would be arming a duplicate - two latches, two banners and
two chances to spend a false-positive record that was earned by ONE comparison
on two captured bus days. `Controller.cycle()` therefore hands the single unit's
watchdog THE METER, under the shipped `sign_disagree_w` / `sign_disagree_s`,
exactly as before, and never arms the site one. `arm()` below is where that
choice is written down. Nothing about a one-inverter install changes - not the
comparison, not the thresholds, not the store keys, not the claim, not the
banner.
⚠️ WHAT THE PER-UNIT COMPARISON IS NOT. Two guards that overlap without saying
so is how a false-alarm generator gets built, so both neighbours are named:
* IT IS NOT SAFETY-31. `circulation.py` compares the units AGAINST EACH OTHER
- `sum(|B_i|) - |sum(B_i)|` over MEASURED power - and catches two inverters
pushing THROUGH each other, which nets to zero at the meter and about which
no single command is evidence at all. This compares each unit against ITS
OWN COMMAND. Take two units faithfully executing an allocation that ALLOC-01
would refuse: circulating power is the whole loop, and every per-unit sign
check here reads perfect agreement. Take one unit doing the exact opposite
of its share while its sibling covers for it: this reads the whole
disagreement, and circulating power can be zero, because the two measured
powers may well agree in sign. Neither is the other with a different
threshold.
* IT IS NOT THE SATURATION FREEZE, AND THE OVERLAP IS REAL AND BOUNDED. The
freeze asks `|command - measured| > saturation_w` (500 W) and concludes "the
inverter cannot follow"; it then stops the integrator winding, which is a
control action taken every day, on a unit that is merely SATURATED as
readily as on one that is reversed, and it neither latches nor parks
anything. This asks for OPPOSITION - a sign, on both sides of a threshold,
held continuously - which a saturated-but-obedient unit cannot produce at
all, and it LATCHES and commands that unit to zero. The freeze is a
magnitude test that shapes the loop; this is a direction test that stops an
actuator.
⚠️ GATE 1 STILL APPLIES TO BOTH, AND THAT IS A DELIBERATE CHOICE WITH A COST.
The per-unit comparison could have been armed whenever ANY non-zero command is
standing - a unit should do what it is told whoever told it - and that would
catch a wedged inverter during a maintenance charge. It is not, because the
whole no-false-positive argument above is built on `following`, because the
freeze already grades that window, and because this card's own warning is that
SAFETY-02's record was earned at N=1 and must not be spent on a check that fires
when nothing is wrong. What it costs is written here rather than discovered:
between the start of a maintenance cycle and its end, a unit reversing against
its own command is the freeze's to notice, not this module's. Widening it is a
card, with a rig campaign behind it, not an edit.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE, TRIP AND LATCH
@@ -198,6 +293,190 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime
# SAFETY-30. CFG-03: THE ONE IN-CODE COPY OF THE FOUR MULTI-INVERTER DEFAULTS.
# `config.yaml`'s `options:` block is the source of truth an operator edits and
# the Supervisor reads, and `schema:` holds the bounds. This dict exists for the
# reason `circulation.CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS` and `maintenance.MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS`
# do - the Dockerfile does not put config.yaml in the image, so the running
# add-on cannot read it - and `test_watchdog.py` pins the two together by READING
# config.yaml, so a drift goes red in CI rather than shipping.
#
# ⚠️ EVERY KEY HERE IS DEAD AT A ROSTER OF ONE, and that is the point rather
# than a caveat. `Controller._arm_sign_watchdogs()` arms the single unit's
# detector against the meter with the SHIPPED `sign_disagree_w` /
# `sign_disagree_s`, which are read in main.py exactly where they always were
# and are not in this dict. Nothing below is consulted until a second inverter
# exists.
SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
# --- THE MAGNITUDE GATE, AND IT IS NOT SAFETY-02's 300 W BY ACCIDENT ---
# ⚠️ DERIVED FROM `control.Tuning.saturation_w`, WHICH IS 500 W, AND THE
# DERIVATION IS THE POINT. This check gates on BOTH sides being over
# `min_w`, so the smallest divergence it can ever see between a command and
# the power that command produced is `2 * min_w` - the two are OPPOSED, so
# the gap is the sum of the magnitudes. At 250 W that is exactly 500 W: the
# gap at which `compute()`'s own anti-windup test already concludes THE
# INVERTER IS NOT FOLLOWING and freezes the integrator. So this watchdog
# cannot fire on a divergence the shipped control law itself calls ordinary
# tracking, and the two guards meet at a number rather than overlapping in a
# band nobody has drawn.
#
# MEASURED, on 1890 closed-loop two-inverter runs in which NOTHING is faulty
# (every unit executes the share the allocator gave it), swept over the
# WHOLE range config.yaml accepts for `gain` float(0.05,1.0) and `slew_w`
# int(50,5000), across both families of stimulus that can produce legitimate
# opposition. Worst CONTINUOUS opposition between a unit's standing command
# and its own 0x0518 power, as a function of this threshold:
#
# 50 W -> 25.0 s 250 W -> 10.0 s 700 W -> 5.0 s
# 150 W -> 15.0 s 300 W -> 10.0 s 1000 W -> 0.0 s
# 200 W -> 15.0 s 500 W -> 5.0 s
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39 MOVED THAT SCHEMA FLOOR FROM 50 TO 0, AND THE CAMPAIGN ABOVE
# WAS NOT RE-RUN. It does not have to be, and here is the argument rather
# than the assurance. What these windows are about is how long the command
# takes to CROSS ITS RAIL - the swept worst case is the SLOWEST crossing,
# which is `slew_w` at its floor, 5000/50 = 100 cycles. `slew_w: 0` means
# "follow the rail" and resolves to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, which is
# exactly 9 cycles at EVERY rail by construction. So the new value can never
# be the slowest crossing at any `max_w`, and it is strictly inside the
# envelope this campaign measured. An explicit number still spans 50..5000
# and is unchanged. If `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is ever loosened past 1/100, this
# paragraph stops being true and the campaign has to be re-run.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE CURVE IS FLAT, WHICH IS THE FINDING THAT DECIDED THE SHAPE OF
# THIS PAIR. Unlike the site comparison - where the meter is driven by the
# LOAD and a flapping load holds it opposed for minutes - a unit's own power
# CHASES ITS OWN COMMAND through a bounded ramp and a first-order lag, so the
# opposition can only last as long as the crossing does. Dropping the
# threshold from 300 W to 50 W buys 15 s of extra transient and nothing else.
# The work is therefore done by the WINDOW below, and this number is set
# where the control law already draws its line rather than being tuned.
#
# The largest opposed magnitude seen anywhere in those 1890 runs is 875 W;
# a threshold above that would gate NOTHING legitimate in at all, and is
# rejected because it would also be blind to a unit reversing a 900 W share.
"unit_sign_disagree_w": 250,
# --- THE WINDOW -------------------------------------------------------
# Three bounds, and the value clears all three.
#
# LOWER, from the rig: 10.0 s - two control cycles, the worst CONTINUOUS
# legitimate opposition above 250 W across all 1890 runs. It is a
# reversing site whose second write lands a cycle after the first, both
# units then slewing through zero behind a 10 s lag; nothing is wrong.
#
# LOWER, from the firmware: `inverter.LINK_STALE_S`, 30 s. A unit not
# executing its share for less than the firmware's own veto window is a
# LINK fault, and the add-on already answers it - liveness drops the unit
# and the survivors carry its share, with the record saying so. Firing
# inside that window would raise a second, louder alarm about a state
# already being handled, which is the SAFETY-15/SAFETY-19 failure exactly.
#
# UPPER, from SAFETY-02 itself: 180 s, the SITE hold. A unit that is not
# doing what it was told must not be parked LATER than the site would be
# parked for the same watts, and unlike the site comparison this one needs
# nothing to net out before it can conclude - the evidence is complete on
# the first cycle it appears.
#
# 85 s: seventeen control cycles - 8.5x the worst legitimate episode this
# rig can produce, 2.8x the firmware's own veto window, and under HALF the
# site hold. ⚠️ IT IS DELIBERATELY NOT 60, 75, 90, 120 OR 180. A round
# number here would be a guess wearing a measurement's clothes, and the
# three bounds above are what the number has to answer to.
#
# ⚠️ AND INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST. Its ramp and lag in the rig
# are inverter A's, COPIED, carrying `measured=False` - SPIKE-04 measures
# the real ones. A slower second unit lengthens every crossing above, which
# is what the 8.5x buys headroom for. SPIKE-04 is the revisit trigger for
# both numbers here, not a reason to move them now.
"unit_sign_disagree_s": 85,
# --- THE SITE COMPARISON AT N>=2, AND IT IS NOT THE SHIPPED PAIR -------
# ⚠️ THE THRESHOLD IS CARRIED AND THE WINDOW IS NOT, WHICH IS A FINDING
# RATHER THAN A COMPROMISE. Only one of the two arguments behind 300 W /
# 180 s depends on how many inverters the site has:
#
# THE THRESHOLD is about NOISE. "Near zero the sign is noise, and near
# zero is where a healthy loop LIVES" - the deadband holds the command
# still while the meter wanders either side of `target_grid_w`. The
# deadband is 15 W and P1 is one meter whatever the roster, so nothing
# about that argument moves. 300 W, carried - and the two-inverter
# campaign says the carry is safe rather than merely convenient: in the
# load-reversal family the site figure ever goes opposed AND over 300 W in
# 994 of 1050 runs at two inverters and 955 of 1050 at one. The gate opens
# about as often either way; what changed is how LONG it stays open, which
# is the window's problem and not the threshold's.
#
# THE WINDOW is about a TRANSIENT, and the transient scales with the site.
# The measured worst legitimate case is a load reversal that the loop
# crosses zero slowly: the command has to travel the whole rail at
# `slew_w` per cycle, and at N>=2 the rail is `Controller.site_max_w` - the
# ROSTER SUM - while `slew_w` is unchanged. So the crossing takes about
# twice as long at two inverters as at one, and that is exactly what the
# rig measures.
#
# 1890 closed-loop runs in which nothing is faulty, the SAME campaign the
# per-unit pair above is read off, run at BOTH rosters as its own control.
# Worst CONTINUOUS opposition between the standing command(s) and the meter,
# LOAD-REVERSAL family, at a 300 W threshold:
#
# N=1 (the shipped comparison) 110.0 s - inside 180 s, 1.6x
# N=2 (the sum, same stimuli) 215.0 s - OVER 180 s
#
# ⚠️ SO CARRYING 180 s WOULD HAVE SHIPPED A FALSE TRIP, and it is a config a
# schema-legal install can reach: `gain` 0.05 and `slew_w` 50 are both the
# floor of what config.yaml accepts, and a +-2200 W load reversal is an oven
# and a heat pump. That is the number this card exists to not assume.
#
# 325 s: 1.51x the measured worst, well inside the 900 s quarter that bills
# the capacity tariff, and still inside every episode the fault day
# contains - 2026-08-20's four clusters run 16, 30, 77 and 77 minutes and
# its opposed runs reach 1750 s, so a 325 s window fires in all of them.
# What it costs is stated rather than hidden: about two and a half extra
# minutes of wrong-direction SITE power before the stop, bought to remove a
# false trip that a legal configuration produces. ⚠️ DELIBERATELY NOT 300 OR
# 360; the measurement is what it answers to.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NOT THE PER-UNIT WINDOW EITHER, IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. The
# per-unit comparison is 85 s because a unit's own power CHASES ITS OWN
# COMMAND and the transient is two cycles; the site comparison is 325 s
# because the meter is driven by the LOAD and the transient is the loop
# crossing zero. Same predicate, two instruments, two windows, both measured.
"site_sign_disagree_w": 300,
"site_sign_disagree_s": 325,
}
# ⚠️ A LIMIT OF THE SITE COMPARISON THAT SAFETY-30 DID NOT INTRODUCE AND DOES
# NOT FIX, RECORDED HERE BECAUSE THE CAMPAIGN FOUND IT AND SILENCE WOULD BE
# WORSE. The rig's other stimulus family is a FLAPPING LOAD, and a square wave
# whose half period is about one control cycle opposes the command on EVERY
# cycle: the command chases the previous half-cycle's meter while the meter has
# already reversed. Across the 840 flapping runs the worst continuous opposition
# at a 300 W threshold is 980 s at two inverters - and 1000 s at ONE, which is
# the whole point. The N=1 arm is the control, and it says this is a property of
# comparing a lagged command against a meter, not a property of the second
# inverter. No window inside the 900 s billing quarter survives it, and no
# threshold up to 1000 W does either.
#
# It is not acted on here for three reasons, in order of weight: it is identical
# at the roster this add-on actually ships, so acting on it would be changing a
# live safety path on evidence that has nothing to do with this card; a
# ~6 kW square wave at 0.1 Hz sustained for a quarter of an hour is not a house
# (the captured healthy day's longest opposed run is 30 s); and the fix is not a
# number - it wants the detector to notice that the disagreement is ALTERNATING,
# which is a different check. It is a card, and this comment is its evidence.
# SAFETY-30. THE TWO NOUNS THE TRIP SENTENCE CAN NAME, WRITTEN ONCE. They are
# constants rather than literals at the call sites because `main.py` arms the
# detectors and `test_watchdog.py` grades what they say, and a string typed in
# two places is a string that drifts in one of them - the same argument
# `store.unit_key()` makes about a key name. `AGAINST_METER` is the wording that
# has always shipped and must not change: it is what a one-inverter install's
# `reason` reads, in the store, in the action log and on the status page.
AGAINST_METER = "a meter reading"
AGAINST_OWN_POWER = "its own measured power"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SignWatchdogConfig:
"""Defaults, not constants - config.yaml carries both (SAFETY-02 AC 5)."""
@@ -206,7 +485,7 @@ class SignWatchdogConfig:
hold_s: float = 180.0
def disagrees(commanded_w, grid_w, following: bool,
def disagrees(commanded_w, against_w, following: bool,
cfg: SignWatchdogConfig) -> bool:
"""The predicate, and the ONLY place it is written down.
@@ -215,12 +494,23 @@ def disagrees(commanded_w, grid_w, following: bool,
inline. Two copies of a safety predicate is one copy plus a future
disagreement about what the check means, and the copy that drifts is always
the one in the harness that grades it.
⚠️ `against_w` WAS CALLED `grid_w`, AND THE RENAME IS THE WHOLE OF SAFETY-30
IN ONE PARAMETER. The arithmetic is unchanged - opposed signs, neither side
near zero, and the loop actually driving - but WHAT the command is opposed
TO is now a property of the caller rather than a fact about this function.
The site comparison hands it the meter; each unit's own comparison hands it
that unit's measured power (register 0x0518). One predicate, two callers,
for `loop_is_following()`'s reason: a safety predicate written down twice is
one copy plus a future disagreement about what the check means. The
parameter is positional at every call site in both repositories, so the
rename moves no caller.
"""
return (following
and commanded_w is not None and grid_w is not None
and commanded_w * grid_w < 0
and commanded_w is not None and against_w is not None
and commanded_w * against_w < 0
and abs(commanded_w) > cfg.min_w
and abs(grid_w) > cfg.min_w)
and abs(against_w) > cfg.min_w)
def loop_is_following(resolution, loop_asked) -> bool:
@@ -272,7 +562,17 @@ def loop_is_following(resolution, loop_asked) -> bool:
class SignWatchdog:
"""One instance per actuator, evaluated once per control cycle.
"""One instance per COMPARISON, evaluated once per control cycle.
⚠️ SINCE SAFETY-30 THAT IS NOT THE SAME SENTENCE AS "one per actuator",
which is what this docstring used to say. There is one instance per
inverter - `Inverter.sign_wd`, latched under that unit's own store keys -
AND one for the site, `Controller.site_sign_wd`, latched under flat ones.
The two ask different questions of different evidence and reach different
remedies; `arm()` below is where an instance is told which of them it is.
At a roster of one they would be the same question, so only the per-unit
instance is ever armed there - see the SAFETY-30 section of the module
docstring.
⚠️ NOT SHARED ACROSS CADENCES. `disagree_since` is a wall-clock start time,
so driving one instance from two loops at two rates would have each one
@@ -282,8 +582,14 @@ class SignWatchdog:
"""
def __init__(self, cfg: SignWatchdogConfig | None = None, *,
tripped: bool = False, reason: str = ""):
tripped: bool = False, reason: str = "",
against: str = AGAINST_METER):
self.cfg = cfg or SignWatchdogConfig()
# SAFETY-30. WHAT THE COMMAND IS BEING COMPARED AGAINST, as the operator
# reads it in the trip sentence. The default is the meter, which is what
# every trip this add-on has ever taken was compared against and is what
# keeps a one-inverter install's `reason` string byte-identical.
self.against = str(against)
self.disagree_since: datetime | None = None
# ⚠️ RESTORED FROM THE STORE, NOT DEFAULTED. A latch that lives only in
# memory is not a latch: a container restart clears it, and the add-on
@@ -292,8 +598,31 @@ class SignWatchdog:
self.tripped = bool(tripped)
self.reason = reason if self.tripped else ""
# -- which of SAFETY-30's two questions this instance is asking ----------
def arm(self, cfg: SignWatchdogConfig, against: str) -> None:
"""Set the thresholds and the subject of the comparison. Nothing else.
⚠️ IT IS CONFIGURATION, NOT STATE, AND IT DELIBERATELY DOES NOT TOUCH
`disagree_since`, `tripped` OR `reason`. A detector that cleared its own
window when it was told what it was comparing against would lose the
episode it is in the middle of, every cycle, and would never accumulate
a hold at all - the check would be permanently green and nothing would
say so.
⚠️ AND IT IS RE-STATED EVERY CYCLE RATHER THAN FROZEN AT CONSTRUCTION.
The answer is a property of the ROSTER and of nothing else, and
`Controller.cycle()` already re-reads the roster every cycle for
liveness and for the allocation. Freezing it in `__init__` would also
make it wrong for any caller that appends an inverter afterwards, which
is exactly how a two-inverter fixture is built in this repository - and
a fixture that silently got the one-inverter comparison would grade
nothing while looking green.
"""
self.cfg = cfg
self.against = str(against)
# -- the whole check, and it is a pure function of its arguments ----------
def evaluate(self, commanded_w, grid_w, following: bool,
def evaluate(self, commanded_w, against_w, following: bool,
now: datetime) -> bool:
"""Advance the detector one cycle. Returns True while tripped.
@@ -301,15 +630,23 @@ class SignWatchdog:
after deadband, slew, quantisation and the arbiter. Not
the optimizer's raw wish: the wire carries the emitted
value, so anything else can disagree with the meter for a
reason that is not a fault.
`grid_w` net P1, + = importing. None when the meter is stale or
missing, which CLEARS the timer rather than accumulating
- a frozen figure held against a moving command would
otherwise manufacture a disagreement in about three
minutes, on top of SAFETY-01 having already commanded
zero for the same cause.
reason that is not a fault. For a per-unit instance it is
THAT UNIT'S share of it; for the site instance it is the
roster sum.
`against_w` what the command is graded against, and SAFETY-30 made
this a decision rather than a fact: net P1 for the SITE
comparison (+ = importing), and this unit's own measured
power for the PER-UNIT one (+ = discharging, register
0x0518). Both carry the same sign convention as the
command, which is why one predicate serves both. None
when the reading is stale or missing, which CLEARS the
timer rather than accumulating - a frozen figure held
against a moving command would otherwise manufacture a
disagreement in about three minutes, on top of SAFETY-01
having already commanded zero for the same cause.
`following` did the grid-following loop actually win this cycle? See
gate 1 in the module docstring.
gate 1 in the module docstring, and the SAFETY-30 section
on why the per-unit comparison keeps it.
`now` the caller's clock, so this stays testable and replayable.
"""
if self.tripped:
@@ -317,7 +654,7 @@ class SignWatchdog:
return True
cfg = self.cfg
if not disagrees(commanded_w, grid_w, following, cfg):
if not disagrees(commanded_w, against_w, following, cfg):
self.disagree_since = None
return False
@@ -330,9 +667,17 @@ class SignWatchdog:
return False
self.tripped = True
# ⚠️ `self.against` IS THE ONLY THING SAFETY-30 CHANGED IN THIS STRING,
# and it defaults to the wording that shipped - "a meter reading" - so a
# one-inverter install's `reason` is byte-identical to what an operator
# (and test_watchdog.py) has always read. A per-unit instance names what
# it actually compared instead, because "commanded +1500 W against a
# meter reading -1500 W" would be a false statement about which
# instrument produced the evidence, on the one line somebody woken by
# this alarm reads first.
self.reason = (
f"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded {commanded_w:+.0f} W against a meter "
f"reading {grid_w:+.0f} W for {held:.0f} s continuously "
f"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded {commanded_w:+.0f} W against "
f"{self.against} {against_w:+.0f} W for {held:.0f} s continuously "
f"(limits: both over {cfg.min_w:.0f} W, held over {cfg.hold_s:.0f} s)"
)
return True
+469 -255
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: GoodWe RS485 Controller
version: "0.6.0"
version: "0.7.0"
slug: goodwe_controller
description: >-
Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over RS485 by emulating its smart
@@ -31,23 +31,23 @@ services:
- mqtt:want
options:
# --- sources (required) ---------------------------------------------------
meter_entity: sensor.p1_meter_active_power
meter_invert: false
# ==========================================================================
# HARDWARE - the inverter, its actuator and its own sensors
# ==========================================================================
setpoint_entity: ""
soc_entity: ""
batt_entity: ""
batt_invert: false
setpoint_entity: ""
# --- ARCH-01 / CFG-04: the inverter roster ---------------------------------
# ⚠️ EMPTY IS NOT "UNCONFIGURED", IT IS THE SINGLE-INVERTER CONFIGURATION, and
# it is what every install that upgrades into this version lands on. An empty
# list means THE FIVE FLAT KEYS ABOVE DESCRIBE THE ONE INVERTER - same
# entities, same rating, same behaviour, no operator action - which is the
# only migration story this key was allowed to have. `build_roster()` reads
# this and nothing else decides the shape.
# list means THE SIX FLAT KEYS - `setpoint_entity`, `soc_entity`,
# `batt_entity`, `batt_invert`, `max_w` and `bms_soc_floor` - DESCRIBE THE
# ONE INVERTER: same entities, same rating, same behaviour, no operator
# action, which is the only migration story this key was allowed to have.
# `build_roster()` reads this and nothing else decides the shape.
#
# Declared, it REPLACES those five keys rather than extending them. Each entry
# Declared, it REPLACES those six keys rather than extending them. Each entry
# names its own actuator, its own rating and its own sensors:
#
# inverters:
@@ -56,23 +56,58 @@ options:
# soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_a_soc
# batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_a_battery_power
# max_w: 5000
# bms_soc_floor: 10
# - name: inverter-b
# setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w
# soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_soc
# batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power
# max_w: 3000
# max_w: 4600
# bms_soc_floor: 10
#
# ⚠️ THE 4600 IS INVERTER B'S DATASHEET FIGURE, NOT A MEASUREMENT AND NOT A
# PLACEHOLDER. SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) identified B as a GoodWe GW5048D-ES,
# serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, whose datasheet gives Max. Charging / Discharging
# Power as 4600 W; nothing will be connected to its MPPTs, so the battery path
# is the ceiling and the 5000 VA AC nameplate is not. The 3000 W this example
# used to carry was a guess made before the unit was known. ⚠️ It is STILL not
# measured: the datasheet prints 4600 W under BATTERY INPUT DATA, so it may be
# DC, and `max_w` is graded against 0x0518 - the inverter's own AC power. If it
# is DC the AC ceiling is nearer 4324 W. SAFETY-20's `min(max_w, dev_max)` is
# what settles that once the device range is read; see goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b,
# which records both readings and picks neither.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE `bms_soc_floor: 10` BESIDE IT IS FROM THE SAME PLACE - THE
# DATASHEET AND THE SERIAL, NOT A PACK ANYONE HAS READ. No second inverter
# exists on this site (SPIKE-04, ≈ 2026-09-12 for B); the cut-out must be read
# off the pack that is actually installed (register 0x0560 on the reference
# unit) before that pack is commanded. It reads 10 here because pack A reads
# 10, which makes this example DEGENERATE ON THE FLOOR AXIS: a site whose two
# packs floor at the SAME percent cannot separate `min`, `max`, first or last
# over the roster, and every SAFETY-32 fixture that DIFFERS the floors differs
# it for exactly that reason. Do not "simplify" those fixtures to match this
# example.
#
# ⚠️ NOTHING IS INHERITED FROM THE FLAT KEYS BY AN ENTRY THAT OMITS IT, and
# that is the whole of DEV-02 restated as a config rule. `soc`, `batt` and the
# rating became per-instance precisely so that no inverter is ever graded
# against a sibling's numbers; an entry silently inheriting `soc_entity` would
# rebuild that defect in YAML. `name`, `setpoint_entity` and `max_w` are
# therefore REQUIRED of every entry (the schema below enforces it, and
# rebuild that defect in YAML. `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and
# `bms_soc_floor` are therefore REQUIRED of every entry (the schema below enforces it, and
# validate.py rule 9 enforces it again for the callers the Supervisor never
# sees). An omitted `soc_entity`/`batt_entity` means THIS UNIT HAS NO SUCH
# SENSOR - `inputs_ok` already stops the site for that - and never means
# "use the other one's".
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32: `bms_soc_floor` IS PER ENTRY AND IS REQUIRED, NOT DEFAULTED.
# It is the percent THAT pack's own BMS cuts out at, and two batteries of
# different models do not share one. A default would be this add-on inventing
# a cut-out for a battery it has not been told about, which is the same defect
# as inheriting one: the shallower pack gets protected by a floor that belongs
# to the deeper pack, and validate.py rule 8 - which refuses a peak_soc_floor
# the BMS would win against - would be grading the wrong number. Rule 8 grades
# EVERY entry and names the one it refuses. The flat key below is unchanged and
# is the single-inverter shape's own cut-out.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE FLAT `setpoint_entity` MUST THEN BE BLANK. Leaving it set while a
# roster is declared is two config sites aimed at actuators, one of which
# nothing writes; if it names an entity an entry also names, SAFETY-28's
@@ -91,9 +126,12 @@ options:
# validator answers `Missing option 'inverters' in root` for every existing
# options blob, and the upgrade leaves an add-on that cannot start.
inverters: []
estop_fitted: false
# --- P1 meter ingestion (specs §5.2 / §14 `meter:`) -------------------------
# `off` keeps the original single meter_entity path above, so an existing
# ==========================================================================
# METER - where the grid reading comes from
# ==========================================================================
# `off` keeps the original single `meter_entity` path, so an existing
# install is untouched until it opts in. ha_dsmr subscribes to the DSMR
# integration's entities over the HA WebSocket; mqtt_p1 reads the topic below;
# ha_signed reads ONE signed HA entity (+ import / - export), which is what a
@@ -104,153 +142,62 @@ options:
# nothing at all for a repeated reading - so it is the only mode a firmware
# watchdog may threshold. See DOCS.md.
meter_source: "off"
meter_entity: sensor.p1_meter_active_power
meter_invert: false
meter_phases: 1
meter_max_age_s: 30
meter_mqtt_topic: ""
# homewizard_local only. The meter's own address, `host` or `host:port`.
p1_host: ""
# homewizard_local only. Seconds between polls. Must be well under
# meter_max_age_s - the age is never fresher than this interval - and there is
# nothing to gain below the meter's own ~5.0 s update rate (NOTES.md:640).
meter_poll_s: 5
meter_max_age_s: 30
meter_mqtt_topic: ""
# The two UNSIGNED Belgian registers. The EMS derives net power from them
# (import - export); do NOT point these at a signed template sensor.
p1_import_entity: ""
p1_export_entity: ""
# Optional, in L1..L3 order. Required for the capacity-tariff peak on a
# three-phase connection; the list length must equal meter_phases.
p1_phase_import_entities: []
p1_phase_export_entities: []
# ha_signed only. ONE signed net-power sensor: positive = import from the
# grid, negative = export to it. Do NOT split it into two template sensors -
# the split is done in the add-on (p1.split_signed) precisely so the sign
# convention is tested rather than living in unreviewed YAML.
p1_net_entity: ""
# Optional, in L1..L3 order. Required for the capacity-tariff peak on a
# three-phase connection; the list length must equal meter_phases.
p1_phase_import_entities: []
p1_phase_export_entities: []
# Optional, in L1..L3 order, each one signed the same way. Same role as
# p1_phase_import_entities: the capacity-tariff peak on a three-phase
# connection. The list length must equal meter_phases.
p1_phase_net_entities: []
# --- control ---------------------------------------------------------------
# ==========================================================================
# RATINGS AND LIMITS - what this site is allowed to do
# ==========================================================================
max_w: 2000
gain: 0.6
slew_w: 1000
deadband_w: 15
target_grid_w: -10
step_w: 10
saturation_w: 500
saturation_cycles: 3
integrator_max_w: 0
heartbeat_s: 10
stale_input_s: 15
cycle_floor_s: 15
auto_start: false
# --- SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement watchdog ----------------------------------
# Trips when the emitted setpoint and the P1 net figure point OPPOSITE ways,
# both over sign_disagree_w, continuously for sign_disagree_s. Action: 0 W and
# a failsafe that latches until an operator starts control again.
# The pack's OWN cut-out percent - what the BMS enforces whatever
# `peak_soc_floor` is set to. Register 0x0560 reads 10 on the reference
# GW5000S-BP, consistent with DoD 90. It is here so validate.py can REFUSE a
# peak_soc_floor at or below it: such a floor can never bind, the BMS wins,
# and the status page would report an energy backstop that does not exist.
#
# Both defaults are measured, not chosen. On the captured healthy day
# (2026-08-23) the longest legitimate opposed run - a load step the loop has
# not caught up with - is 30 s, and sign agreement over the gated samples is
# 93.4 %. On the captured fault day (2026-08-20) the clusters run 0.0-10.5 %
# agreement with opposed runs up to 1752 s. 300 W / 180 s sits in the middle of
# a very wide gap: at 60 s the healthy day still trips nothing, at 300 s the
# fault day still trips 13 times. There is no reason to move either number
# without a capture that says so. They are options because the AC says
# thresholds are defaults rather than constants - not because they are knobs
# anyone is expected to turn.
#
# ⚠️ sign_disagree_w must stay BELOW max_w or the watchdog can never fire (the
# arbiter bounds the command to +-max_w). validate.py refuses that config.
sign_disagree_w: 300
sign_disagree_s: 180
# --- SAFETY-18 frozen-but-fresh meter detector -----------------------------
# Seconds the meter may keep answering with an UNCHANGED measurement while the
# command stands at the rail before the add-on raises an alarm. Both halves
# are required: neither one alone is safe, and app/freeze.py carries why.
#
# ALARM ONLY. It does not command 0 W and does not latch. A false trip parks
# the battery; a false notification costs an alert.
#
# ⚠️ Only `meter_source: homewizard_local` can see this at all - it is the
# only transport that reads the meter's own document. On every other source
# the status page says NOT COVERED rather than "armed".
#
# 300 s is measured, not chosen. Over 2399 s of the live house at the
# converged operating point (sim/scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz, mean
# grid -14.2 W, 1194 polls, 735 of them repeating the previous reading) the
# LONGEST run without a distinct reading is 15.4 s (the largest unchanged_s any
# sample observes is 8.0 s). 300 s is 19.5x the pessimistic figure, and
# still inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff.
meter_freeze_s: 300
# --- SAFETY-31: circulating power ------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THESE TWO LINES ARE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH FOR THESE DEFAULTS, and
# `app/circulation.py`'s `CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS` is the ONE in-code copy - the
# Dockerfile does not put this file in the image, so the running add-on cannot
# read it. test_watchdog.py pins the copy by READING these lines, so a drift
# goes red in CI rather than shipping. Add a third option in three places -
# options:, schema:, CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS - and in no fourth.
#
# Circulating power is sum(|Bi|) - |sum(Bi)| over MEASURED per-inverter power:
# two inverters pushing against each other, which NETS TO ZERO AT THE METER
# and is therefore invisible to every other guard in this add-on. Both numbers
# below were measured on the TEST-19 two-master rig over 924 closed-loop runs
# in which nothing was faulty; circulation.py carries the curve they were read
# off and the argument for each. They are NOT sensitivity preferences.
#
# Both are ignored at one inverter, where the quantity is identically zero.
circulation_w: 700
circulation_hold_s: 75
# --- maintenance -----------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THESE EIGHT LINES ARE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH FOR THE MAINTENANCE
# DEFAULTS. The Supervisor reads this file and the operator edits this file,
# so nothing else in the add-on gets an opinion about what a missing
# `maintenance_*` key means. There is exactly ONE in-code copy -
# `app/maintenance.py`'s `MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` - because the Dockerfile does
# not put this file in the image and the running add-on therefore cannot read
# it; test_maintenance.py pins that copy by READING these lines, so a drift
# goes red in CI rather than shipping. main.py and validate.py both read the
# mirror and type no number of their own.
#
# Before this card the same defaults were written down three times and had
# already disagreed: this block said 2000 while main.py and MaintConfig said
# 2500, so an options dict with the key ABSENT passed validation at 2000 and
# then ran at 2500 against a 2000 W ceiling - a silent 0 W arbiter
# contradiction. Changing one of these numbers now moves every consumer.
maintenance_enabled: false
maintenance_interval_days: 28
maintenance_start_hour: 10
# ⚠️ BOTH MUST STAY AT OR BELOW max_w, and that is why they are 2000 rather
# than the 2500 they shipped as. The cheap-window charge shaping asks the
# arbiter for `hi = -maintenance_charge_w` against the supervised `lo =
# -max_w`: above the ceiling that is `lo > hi`, a contradiction resolved to
# 0 W, so maintenance would SILENTLY NEVER CHARGE in a cheap window on a
# default install. validate.py refuses that config (rule 6), so these
# defaults had to become self-consistent with the max_w above rather than
# ship a configuration the validator rejects.
#
# The discharge side is clamped rather than contradicted - it drains at max_w
# and the arbiter says so - so it is only warned about; it is 2000 here for
# symmetry and to keep the shipped config warning-free.
#
# Raising max_w (the live reference install runs 5000) is what unlocks a
# faster maintenance cycle. Raise max_w FIRST, then these.
maintenance_discharge_w: 2000
maintenance_charge_w: 2000
maintenance_soc_floor: 11
maintenance_soc_target: 99
maintenance_hold_min: 120
# --- tariff / capacity tariff (all optional) ------------------------------
peak_forecast_entity: ""
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32 - THIS KEY DESCRIBES ONE PACK, so it is the SINGLE-INVERTER
# shape's number and nothing more. Declare an `inverters:` roster and each
# entry states its own `bms_soc_floor`; this one is not read at all and is
# not inherited by any entry. Rule 8 then grades every unit separately, which
# is the whole of that card: one cut-out for two packs of different models
# protects the shallower pack with the deeper pack's number.
bms_soc_floor: 10
peak_cap_w: 3500
peak_forecast_entity: ""
# --- SAFETY-24: the energy backstop under SAFETY-07's forced discharge -----
# The peak guard can COMMAND a discharge to hold a billed quarter under
# peak_cap_w. Until this card it was bounded from below by nothing but the
# pack's own BMS cut-out - a real floor, but the PACK's protection rather than
@@ -294,31 +241,10 @@ options:
# loop-side reserve and is waiting on the product owner. Until that is
# answered, the BMS is the only floor under self-consumption.
peak_soc_floor: 20
# The pack's OWN cut-out percent - what the BMS enforces whatever is set
# above. Register 0x0560 reads 10 on the reference GW5000S-BP, consistent with
# DoD 90. It is here so validate.py can REFUSE a peak_soc_floor at or below
# it: such a floor can never bind, the BMS wins, and the status page would
# report an energy backstop that does not exist.
bms_soc_floor: 10
# ⚠️ THE OLD PRICE PATH, AND IT IS NOT DEAD YET. These two entities are the
# add-on delegating the whole price question to Home Assistant: main.py reads
# both and derives ONE BOOLEAN, `cheap = now <= avg`, which is consumed by
# nothing except the maintenance cycle's cheap-window charge floor. That is
# all they have ever done. They are kept, because retiring them would take
# the maintenance cycle's only price signal away on a live install before
# anything replaces it - TARIFF-03 (static profile) and OPT-04 (arbitrage)
# are the cards that replace it, and neither has landed.
#
# ⚠️ They may NOT be combined with price_provider below. Two price sources on
# one site, one of which silently wins, is exactly the "double up" the PM
# named; validate.py rule 7 refuses that configuration at startup rather than
# letting an operator believe the provider they configured is driving
# something. See app/validate.py.
price_now_entity: ""
price_avg_entity: ""
# --- price providers (TARIFF-02, specs §9.3 / §14 `tariffs:`) --------------
# ==========================================================================
# TARIFF - what energy costs, and whether to trade on it
# ==========================================================================
# `off` is the shipped default and means the §11.4 no-price-data row applies:
# static profile, plan provisional, NO ARBITRAGE. Nothing in 0.5.x consumes
# the series yet - OPT-04 is the consumer - so turning this on today fetches,
@@ -337,12 +263,12 @@ options:
price_provider: "off"
price_markup_eur_kwh: 0.03
price_taxes_eur_kwh: 0.06
price_csv_path: "/share/goodwe_prices.csv"
price_feed_url: ""
price_horizon_h: 48
price_timeout_s: 10
# --- static / fully-fixed tariffs (TARIFF-03, specs §9.2 / §11.4) ----------
# §9.3: injection is priced SEPARATELY, and in Belgium it is often near zero -
# which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export. A scalar, not
# a second series: no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve.
export_price_eur_kwh: 0.04
# §14's `tariffs.static_profile`, and "" is its `null`. §9.2: "a large share
# of the installed base is on [a static profile]" - this is what makes those
# sites first-class rather than "price_provider: off, good luck".
@@ -372,13 +298,28 @@ options:
# to fall back to and a dead feed leaves the site with no tariff at all.
# validate.py warns about exactly that.
static_profile: ""
price_csv_path: "/share/goodwe_prices.csv"
price_feed_url: ""
price_horizon_h: 48
price_timeout_s: 10
# §9.3: injection is priced SEPARATELY, and in Belgium it is often near zero -
# which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export. A scalar, not
# a second series: no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve.
export_price_eur_kwh: 0.04
# ⚠️ THE OLD PRICE PATH, AND IT IS NOT DEAD YET. These two entities are the
# add-on delegating the whole price question to Home Assistant: main.py reads
# both and derives ONE BOOLEAN, `cheap = now <= avg`, which is consumed by
# nothing except the maintenance cycle's cheap-window charge floor. That is
# all they have ever done. They are kept, because retiring them would take
# the maintenance cycle's only price signal away on a live install before
# anything replaces it - TARIFF-03 (static profile) and OPT-04 (arbitrage)
# are the cards that replace it, and neither has landed.
#
# ⚠️ They may NOT be combined with `price_provider`. Two price sources on
# one site, one of which silently wins, is exactly the "double up" the PM
# named; validate.py rule 7 refuses that configuration at startup rather than
# letting an operator believe the provider they configured is driving
# something. See app/validate.py.
price_now_entity: ""
price_avg_entity: ""
# --- price arbitrage (OPT-04, specs §10.1 priority 3 / §17) ---------------
# Charge in the cheapest published hour, discharge in the dearest, and ONLY
# when the spread covers what the round trip costs. Off in the shipped
# configuration: this is the first strategy in the add-on that moves energy
@@ -399,10 +340,12 @@ options:
# owner; the code is correct at any value and no number was picked to make a
# trade appear.
arbitrage_enabled: false
# §10.1's `cycle_cost_threshold_eur`: what one full round trip costs per kWh
# - the wear on the pack plus the conversion losses. A spread below this is
# a cycle that loses money and pack life, so it is not taken.
cycle_cost_threshold_eur: 0.10
# The reserve arbitrage may not spend, and the headroom it may not overfill.
# Deliberately NOT the maintenance_soc_* keys: those describe a monthly
# balancing cycle, and pointing a trading strategy at them would couple two
@@ -410,17 +353,222 @@ options:
arbitrage_soc_floor: 20
arbitrage_soc_ceiling: 95
# --- site ------------------------------------------------------------------
estop_fitted: false
# ==========================================================================
# MAINTENANCE - the monthly battery recalibration cycle
# ==========================================================================
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THESE EIGHT LINES ARE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH FOR THE MAINTENANCE
# DEFAULTS. The Supervisor reads this file and the operator edits this file,
# so nothing else in the add-on gets an opinion about what a missing
# `maintenance_*` key means. There is exactly ONE in-code copy -
# `app/maintenance.py`'s `MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` - because the Dockerfile does
# not put this file in the image and the running add-on therefore cannot read
# it; test_maintenance.py pins that copy by READING these lines, so a drift
# goes red in CI rather than shipping. main.py and validate.py both read the
# mirror and type no number of their own.
#
# Before this card the same defaults were written down three times and had
# already disagreed: this block said 2000 while main.py and MaintConfig said
# 2500, so an options dict with the key ABSENT passed validation at 2000 and
# then ran at 2500 against a 2000 W ceiling - a silent 0 W arbiter
# contradiction. Changing one of these numbers now moves every consumer.
maintenance_enabled: false
maintenance_interval_days: 28
maintenance_start_hour: 10
# ⚠️ BOTH MUST STAY AT OR BELOW max_w, and that is why they are 2000 rather
# than the 2500 they shipped as. The cheap-window charge shaping asks the
# arbiter for `hi = -maintenance_charge_w` against the supervised `lo =
# -max_w`: above the ceiling that is `lo > hi`, a contradiction resolved to
# 0 W, so maintenance would SILENTLY NEVER CHARGE in a cheap window on a
# default install. validate.py refuses that config (rule 6), so these
# defaults had to become self-consistent with the max_w above rather than
# ship a configuration the validator rejects.
#
# The discharge side is clamped rather than contradicted - it drains at max_w
# and the arbiter says so - so it is only warned about; it is 2000 here for
# symmetry and to keep the shipped config warning-free.
#
# Raising max_w (the live reference install runs 5000) is what unlocks a
# faster maintenance cycle. Raise max_w FIRST, then these.
maintenance_discharge_w: 2000
maintenance_charge_w: 2000
maintenance_soc_floor: 11
maintenance_soc_target: 99
maintenance_hold_min: 120
# ==========================================================================
# SAFETY - DERIVED CONSTANTS. Every number below was measured. Do not change
# one without re-deriving it
# ==========================================================================
# Trips when the emitted setpoint and the P1 net figure point OPPOSITE ways,
# both over sign_disagree_w, continuously for sign_disagree_s. Action: 0 W and
# a failsafe that latches until an operator starts control again.
#
# Both defaults are measured, not chosen. On the captured healthy day
# (2026-08-23) the longest legitimate opposed run - a load step the loop has
# not caught up with - is 30 s, and sign agreement over the gated samples is
# 93.4 %. On the captured fault day (2026-08-20) the clusters run 0.0-10.5 %
# agreement with opposed runs up to 1752 s. 300 W / 180 s sits in the middle of
# a very wide gap: at 60 s the healthy day still trips nothing, at 300 s the
# fault day still trips 13 times. There is no reason to move either number
# without a capture that says so. They are options because the AC says
# thresholds are defaults rather than constants - not because they are knobs
# anyone is expected to turn.
#
# ⚠️ sign_disagree_w must stay BELOW max_w or the watchdog can never fire (the
# arbiter bounds the command to +-max_w). validate.py refuses that config.
sign_disagree_w: 300
sign_disagree_s: 180
# ⚠️ A DIFFERENT COMPARISON, NOT A SECOND COPY OF THE ONE ABOVE, AND IT IS
# ARMED ONLY WHEN THIS SITE HAS MORE THAN ONE INVERTER. The pair above grades
# the SITE's total command against P1 - one meter, one grid connection. This
# pair grades EACH inverter's own share against THAT inverter's own measured
# power (holding register 0x0518), and it catches the fault the meter cannot
# answer for once there are two units: a unit doing the opposite of what it
# was told, while its sibling covers for it and P1 reads exactly what a
# healthy site reads.
#
# At ONE inverter these two keys do nothing at all. §6.2's identity makes the
# site's total command that inverter's command, so the pair above is already
# asking this question of the same actuator, and arming a second detector
# would be two latches and two banners for one fault.
#
# Both defaults are measured on admin/goodwe's two-master rig, over 1890
# closed-loop runs in which nothing is faulty, swept across the whole range
# this file accepts for `gain` and `slew_w`. 250 W is `saturation_w / 2`, so
# the smallest divergence this can see is exactly the gap at which the control
# law itself already says the inverter is not following; 85 s is 8.5x the
# worst legitimate opposition those runs produce (10.0 s), 2.8x the firmware's
# own 30 s link veto, and under half the 180 s the site check takes. See
# app/watchdog.py's SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS and
# DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md.
#
# ⚠️ unit_sign_disagree_w must stay BELOW max_w, for sign_disagree_w's reason:
# a share is bounded to +-max_w, so a threshold at or above it can never fire.
# validate.py refuses that config.
unit_sign_disagree_w: 250
unit_sign_disagree_s: 85
# ⚠️ THE SAME COMPARISON `sign_disagree_*` MAKES, AT THE ROSTER WHERE IT STOPS
# BEING A STATEMENT ABOUT ONE INVERTER. At two or more units the SUM of the
# standing commands is graded against P1, and the trip stops the whole site -
# what it catches is the site being asked for the wrong thing, which every
# per-inverter check is blind to because each unit is faithfully executing its
# share. At ONE inverter these two keys do nothing: `sign_disagree_*` above is
# already asking this of the same actuator.
#
# The threshold is the shipped 300 W, CARRIED, and the reason is that the
# argument behind it does not depend on the roster: near zero the sign is
# noise, the deadband is 15 W, and there is one P1 whatever is behind it.
#
# ⚠️ THE WINDOW IS NOT CARRIED, AND THAT IS A MEASUREMENT. The transient 180 s
# exists to reject is the loop crossing zero after a load reversal, and the
# command has to travel the whole SITE rail at `slew_w` per cycle - a rail
# that is the roster sum while `slew_w` is not. On 1890 two-inverter runs in
# which nothing is faulty, the worst continuous legitimate opposition at 300 W
# is 110 s at one inverter and 215 s at two: carrying 180 s across would have
# shipped a false trip reachable at `gain: 0.05`, `slew_w: 50` and an ordinary
# 2.2 kW load reversal. 325 s is 1.51x that, inside the 900 s billing quarter,
# and still inside every episode of the 2026-08-20 fault day.
site_sign_disagree_w: 300
site_sign_disagree_s: 325
# Seconds the meter may keep answering with an UNCHANGED measurement while the
# command stands at the rail before the add-on raises an alarm. Both halves
# are required: neither one alone is safe, and app/freeze.py carries why.
#
# ALARM ONLY. It does not command 0 W and does not latch. A false trip parks
# the battery; a false notification costs an alert.
#
# ⚠️ Only `meter_source: homewizard_local` can see this at all - it is the
# only transport that reads the meter's own document. On every other source
# the status page says NOT COVERED rather than "armed".
#
# 300 s is measured, not chosen. Over 2399 s of the live house at the
# converged operating point (sim/scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz, mean
# grid -14.2 W, 1194 polls, 735 of them repeating the previous reading) the
# LONGEST run without a distinct reading is 15.4 s (the largest unchanged_s any
# sample observes is 8.0 s). 300 s is 19.5x the pessimistic figure, and
# still inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff.
meter_freeze_s: 300
# ⚠️ CFG-03. THESE TWO LINES ARE THE SOURCE OF TRUTH FOR THESE DEFAULTS, and
# `app/circulation.py`'s `CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS` is the ONE in-code copy - the
# Dockerfile does not put this file in the image, so the running add-on cannot
# read it. test_watchdog.py pins the copy by READING these lines, so a drift
# goes red in CI rather than shipping. Add a third option in three places -
# options:, schema:, CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS - and in no fourth.
#
# Circulating power is sum(|Bi|) - |sum(Bi)| over MEASURED per-inverter power:
# two inverters pushing against each other, which NETS TO ZERO AT THE METER
# and is therefore invisible to every other guard in this add-on. Both numbers
# below were measured on the TEST-19 two-master rig over 924 closed-loop runs
# in which nothing was faulty; circulation.py carries the curve they were read
# off and the argument for each. They are NOT sensitivity preferences.
#
# Both are ignored at one inverter, where the quantity is identically zero.
circulation_w: 700
circulation_hold_s: 75
# ==========================================================================
# ADVANCED - the control law and diagnostics
# ==========================================================================
auto_start: false
gain: 0.6
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39. 0 IS NOT "UNSET" AND IT IS NOT "NO LIMIT" - IT IS "FOLLOW THE
# RAIL", and it is the shipped value. `control.slew_limit_w()` resolves it to
# `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, which is 222 W against the 2000 W default here,
# 556 W against the live install's 5000 W, and 1067 W against the ~9600 W a
# second inverter makes of the site. `integrator_max_w: 0` two lines down has
# meant exactly this since it was added; this key now means it too.
#
# ⚠️ WHY IT IS A RATIO AND NOT A NUMBER, WHICH IS THE WHOLE OF THIS CARD. It
# WAS a number: 1000, derived 2026-08-22 against a clamp of 1500 W
# (goodwe/NOTES.md, "Simulated 2 kW load step (gain 0.6, clamp 1500)") on the
# grounds that it caps "how far the loop can jump ahead of the inverter". The
# rail then went to 5000 on the live install and the constant did not move, so
# 1000 W per 2 s tick crossed the whole output range in 10 s against a plant
# NOTES.md §5.10 measured at ~18 s up / ~23 s down. Measured on the owner's
# system 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46: a 3.4 kW export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000
# in five ticks, the battery to -5154 W past a 5000 VA rating, and the grid
# from 3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT. Large (>= 900 W) steps per 30 min
# went 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 that morning. Nothing was broken; the rail moved.
#
# An explicit number is still accepted and is not clamped - the live install
# has run 400 since 2026-09-05 12:00, which is slower than the rail implies
# and is fine. What validate.py rule 10 refuses is a number FASTER than the
# rail implies, because at that setting the stated limit is not the limit and
# the layer that overrules it is the plant, which has no status row.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE COST IS REAL AND IS NOT HIDDEN: following the rail is slower to
# converge than 1000 was. Measured over 51 export steps on the in-repo model
# (test_control.py) the largest tick step falls from 1000 W to 556 W and the
# >= 900 W step disappears from every run - but the OVER-ABSORPTION does not
# move, because that is a `gain` term and not a slew term. See
# DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md, which says so at length rather
# than letting this card be read as more than it is.
slew_w: 0
deadband_w: 15
target_grid_w: -10
step_w: 10
saturation_w: 500
saturation_cycles: 3
integrator_max_w: 0
heartbeat_s: 10
stale_input_s: 15
cycle_floor_s: 15
log_level: info
schema:
meter_entity: str
meter_invert: bool
# ==========================================================================
# HARDWARE - the inverter, its actuator and its own sensors
# ==========================================================================
setpoint_entity: str
soc_entity: str
batt_entity: str
batt_invert: bool
setpoint_entity: str
# CFG-04. THE ONE LIST-OF-OBJECTS IN THIS FILE, and see the options block for
# the measurement that says Supervisor 2026.08.0 accepts it: nested types are
@@ -444,49 +592,154 @@ schema:
- name: str
setpoint_entity: str
max_w: int(100,5000)
bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)
soc_entity: str?
batt_entity: str?
batt_invert: bool?
estop_fitted: bool
# ==========================================================================
# METER - where the grid reading comes from
# ==========================================================================
meter_source: list(off|ha_dsmr|mqtt_p1|ha_signed|homewizard_local)
meter_entity: str
meter_invert: bool
# ⚠️ 2 is accepted by this range but is not a real Belgian connection. A
# telegram whose phase count disagrees is rejected at ingest and logged, so a
# mis-set 2 shows up immediately as "0 telegrams accepted" rather than as a
# quietly wrong number.
meter_phases: int(1,3)
meter_max_age_s: int(5,300)
meter_poll_s: int(1,60)
meter_mqtt_topic: str?
p1_host: str?
meter_poll_s: int(1,60)
meter_max_age_s: int(5,300)
meter_mqtt_topic: str?
p1_import_entity: str?
p1_export_entity: str?
p1_net_entity: str?
p1_phase_import_entities:
- str
p1_phase_export_entities:
- str
p1_net_entity: str?
p1_phase_net_entities:
- str
# ==========================================================================
# RATINGS AND LIMITS - what this site is allowed to do
# ==========================================================================
max_w: int(100,5000)
gain: float(0.05,1.0)
slew_w: int(50,5000)
deadband_w: int(0,500)
target_grid_w: float(-200,200)
step_w: int(1,100)
saturation_w: int(100,2000)
saturation_cycles: int(1,10)
integrator_max_w: int(0,15000)
heartbeat_s: int(2,25)
stale_input_s: int(5,120)
cycle_floor_s: int(5,60)
auto_start: bool
bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)
peak_cap_w: int(500,15000)
peak_forecast_entity: str?
# SAFETY-24. No "off" value: a guard that can command a discharge does not get
# a supported way to have no energy bound at all. The ranges OVERLAP on
# purpose - the schema cannot express "above bms_soc_floor", so validate.py
# rule 8 is what refuses the pair, with a message naming both numbers.
peak_soc_floor: int(5,60)
# ==========================================================================
# TARIFF - what energy costs, and whether to trade on it
# ==========================================================================
# ⚠️ The provider list is written out rather than left as `str`, so the
# Supervisor rejects a typo in the UI. validate.py ALSO refuses an unknown id
# against app/price.py's PROVIDERS registry, because sim/inject.py and the
# checks reach validate_startup_config() with a dict the Supervisor never saw.
# Adding a sixth plugin means adding it here and to PROVIDERS - and nowhere
# else, which is AC2.
price_provider: list(off|generic_dayahead|engie_dynamic|totalenergies_dynamic|eneco_eddy|manual_csv)
price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_taxes_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
# ⚠️ The lower bound is NEGATIVE on purpose. Belgian injection tariffs have
# gone below zero (you pay to export at midday in summer), and a schema that
# bottoms out at 0 would make that site inexpressible.
export_price_eur_kwh: float(-1,1)
# A JSON string rather than a nested schema, deliberately: it is ONE option
# key (§14 has one), it survives config.yaml's flat options block, and
# parse_static_profile() accepts an already-parsed dict too, so a future
# nested schema is a config.yaml change and no code change at all.
static_profile: str?
price_csv_path: str?
price_feed_url: str?
price_horizon_h: int(1,72)
price_timeout_s: int(2,60)
price_now_entity: str?
price_avg_entity: str?
# OPT-04. ⚠️ The threshold's lower bound is 0 and not negative: it is a COST,
# and a negative one is a threshold every spread clears - arbitrage with the
# brake removed. app/arbitrage.py refuses it in code too, because
# validate_startup_config() is also sim/inject.py's entry point and can be
# handed any dict at all.
arbitrage_enabled: bool
cycle_cost_threshold_eur: float(0,1)
arbitrage_soc_floor: int(5,95)
arbitrage_soc_ceiling: int(10,100)
# ==========================================================================
# MAINTENANCE - the monthly battery recalibration cycle
# ==========================================================================
# ⚠️ CFG-03 - THIS IS WHERE A RANGE LIVES, AND THE ONLY PLACE IT LIVES. The
# `options:` block above holds the DEFAULT; this block holds the BOUNDS, and
# `MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` deliberately mirrors the former and not the latter -
# the Supervisor is what enforces a range and the Supervisor reads only this
# file, so a second copy of `int(500,5000)` in Python would be a place to
# disagree and nothing else. What is NOT expressible here is a relation
# BETWEEN keys: `maintenance_charge_w` must also stay at or below `max_w`, the
# schema grammar has no way to say so, and that is why validate.py's rule 6 is
# written in code instead. Add a ninth maintenance option in three places -
# options:, schema:, MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS - and in no fourth.
maintenance_enabled: bool
maintenance_interval_days: int(1,90)
maintenance_start_hour: int(0,23)
maintenance_discharge_w: int(500,5000)
maintenance_charge_w: int(500,5000)
maintenance_soc_floor: int(5,30)
maintenance_soc_target: int(50,100)
maintenance_hold_min: int(5,480)
# ==========================================================================
# SAFETY - DERIVED CONSTANTS. Every number below was measured. Do not change
# one without re-deriving it
# ==========================================================================
# No "off" value, deliberately: this is a P0 safety check and the schema is
# not the place to make disarming it a supported configuration.
sign_disagree_w: int(50,5000)
sign_disagree_s: int(30,1800)
# SAFETY-30. No "off" value, for SAFETY-02's reason.
#
# ⚠️ THE THRESHOLD'S RANGE IS THE SAME AS THE SITE CHECK'S ON PURPOSE, AND THE
# WINDOW'S FLOOR IS NOT. On the two-inverter rig the per-unit comparison's
# worst continuous legitimate opposition is nearly FLAT in the threshold -
# 25.0 s at 50 W, 15.0 s at 150 W, 10.0 s at 250 W, 5.0 s at 500 W - because a
# unit's own power chases its own command rather than the load. So no value in
# this range puts the guard outside the regime it can be answered for, and the
# floor does not have to be a knee the way `circulation_w`'s does.
unit_sign_disagree_w: int(50,5000)
# The floor of 30 is `inverter.LINK_STALE_S`, the firmware's own veto window:
# below it, a unit not executing its share is a LINK fault the add-on already
# answers by dropping the unit from the split, and firing inside that window
# would be a second, louder alarm about a state that is already being handled.
unit_sign_disagree_s: int(30,1800)
# SAFETY-30's SITE pair. Same ranges as `sign_disagree_*`, because it is the
# same comparison asked of the site total - and no "off" value, for the same
# reason. ⚠️ THERE IS DELIBERATELY NO validate.py RULE PAIRING
# site_sign_disagree_w WITH max_w, unlike the other two thresholds: the bound
# on the SITE command is `Controller.site_max_w`, the ROSTER SUM, and
# `validate_startup_config()` is handed options rather than a roster. A rule
# written against max_w would refuse a perfectly reachable two-inverter
# configuration the day CFG-04 lands. The schema range is the bound here.
site_sign_disagree_w: int(50,5000)
site_sign_disagree_s: int(30,1800)
# No "off" value, for SAFETY-02's reason: disarming a safety alarm is not a
# supported configuration. ⚠️ THE FLOOR OF 60 IS NOT A RECOMMENDATION. At 300 s
# the slowest a HEALTHY meter's 1 Wh register can tick and still look unchanged
@@ -510,6 +763,7 @@ schema:
# fault. A configurable value under 400 W would be a false-alarm generator
# that this project's own doctrine (SAFETY-15, SAFETY-19) forbids shipping.
circulation_w: int(400,5000)
# The floor of 30 is `inverter.LINK_STALE_S`: below the firmware's own veto
# window a unit still executing a stale share is a LINK fault the add-on
# already handles by dropping it from the split, and firing inside that window
@@ -518,68 +772,28 @@ schema:
# loop must be caught and acted on well inside one.
circulation_hold_s: int(30,900)
# ⚠️ CFG-03 - THIS IS WHERE A RANGE LIVES, AND THE ONLY PLACE IT LIVES. The
# `options:` block above holds the DEFAULT; this block holds the BOUNDS, and
# `MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` deliberately mirrors the former and not the latter -
# the Supervisor is what enforces a range and the Supervisor reads only this
# file, so a second copy of `int(500,5000)` in Python would be a place to
# disagree and nothing else. What is NOT expressible here is a relation
# BETWEEN keys: `maintenance_charge_w` must also stay at or below `max_w`, the
# schema grammar has no way to say so, and that is why validate.py's rule 6 is
# written in code instead. Add a ninth maintenance option in three places -
# options:, schema:, MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS - and in no fourth.
maintenance_enabled: bool
maintenance_interval_days: int(1,90)
maintenance_start_hour: int(0,23)
maintenance_discharge_w: int(500,5000)
maintenance_charge_w: int(500,5000)
maintenance_soc_floor: int(5,30)
maintenance_soc_target: int(50,100)
maintenance_hold_min: int(5,480)
# ==========================================================================
# ADVANCED - the control law and diagnostics
# ==========================================================================
auto_start: bool
gain: float(0.05,1.0)
peak_forecast_entity: str?
peak_cap_w: int(500,15000)
# SAFETY-24. No "off" value: a guard that can command a discharge does not get
# a supported way to have no energy bound at all. The ranges OVERLAP on
# purpose - the schema cannot express "above bms_soc_floor", so validate.py
# rule 8 is what refuses the pair, with a message naming both numbers.
peak_soc_floor: int(5,60)
bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)
price_now_entity: str?
price_avg_entity: str?
# ⚠️ The provider list is written out rather than left as `str`, so the
# Supervisor rejects a typo in the UI. validate.py ALSO refuses an unknown id
# against app/price.py's PROVIDERS registry, because sim/inject.py and the
# checks reach validate_startup_config() with a dict the Supervisor never saw.
# Adding a sixth plugin means adding it here and to PROVIDERS - and nowhere
# else, which is AC2.
price_provider: list(off|generic_dayahead|engie_dynamic|totalenergies_dynamic|eneco_eddy|manual_csv)
price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_taxes_eur_kwh: float(0,1)
price_csv_path: str?
price_feed_url: str?
price_horizon_h: int(1,72)
price_timeout_s: int(2,60)
# A JSON string rather than a nested schema, deliberately: it is ONE option
# key (§14 has one), it survives config.yaml's flat options block, and
# parse_static_profile() accepts an already-parsed dict too, so a future
# nested schema is a config.yaml change and no code change at all.
static_profile: str?
# ⚠️ The lower bound is NEGATIVE on purpose. Belgian injection tariffs have
# gone below zero (you pay to export at midday in summer), and a schema that
# bottoms out at 0 would make that site inexpressible.
export_price_eur_kwh: float(-1,1)
# OPT-04. ⚠️ The threshold's lower bound is 0 and not negative: it is a COST,
# and a negative one is a threshold every spread clears - arbitrage with the
# brake removed. app/arbitrage.py refuses it in code too, because
# validate_startup_config() is also sim/inject.py's entry point and can be
# handed any dict at all.
arbitrage_enabled: bool
cycle_cost_threshold_eur: float(0,1)
arbitrage_soc_floor: int(5,95)
arbitrage_soc_ceiling: int(10,100)
estop_fitted: bool
# ⚠️ THE FLOOR IS 0, NOT 50, AND 0 IS THE SHIPPED VALUE - see the options block
# above. It means "follow max_w", so the range starts at the setting that
# cannot go stale rather than at the smallest number somebody could type.
# ⚠️ THE CEILING IS STILL 5000 AND IS STILL NOT THE BOUND THAT MATTERS. The
# binding one is `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, a relation BETWEEN keys, and this
# grammar cannot express a relation - which is the same reason
# `maintenance_charge_w`'s ceiling is not its real bound either (see the note
# above it). validate.py rule 10 is where it is written.
slew_w: int(0,5000)
deadband_w: int(0,500)
target_grid_w: float(-200,200)
step_w: int(1,100)
saturation_w: int(100,2000)
saturation_cycles: int(1,10)
integrator_max_w: int(0,15000)
heartbeat_s: int(2,25)
stale_input_s: int(5,120)
cycle_floor_s: int(5,60)
log_level: list(trace|debug|info|warning|error)
+10 -1
View File
@@ -580,7 +580,16 @@ def close_loop(gain, split, cycles=200, load_w=2000.0, mode="alloc",
below. "site" is the sum of the units' power; "unit" is inverter A's alone,
which is what the shipped add-on's single `inverter_power` sensor gives it.
"""
tuning = Tuning(gain=gain)
# ⚠️ `slew_w` IS PINNED HERE AND WAS NOT BEFORE, AND THAT IS SAFETY-39.
# ARCH-01's 4000 W peak-to-peak broadcast limit cycle was measured at the
# shipped pair of the day - `max_w: 2000` with `slew_w: 1000` - and this
# function reached that 1000 through `Tuning`'s DEFAULT. SAFETY-39 made that
# default 0, meaning "follow the rail" (`SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, 222 W at
# this rail), so the same call would now sweep a DIFFERENT law and report
# ARCH-01's measurement as absent. A reproduction that silently re-tunes
# itself when a default moves is not a reproduction. The number is written
# here, next to the measurement it belongs to.
tuning = Tuning(gain=gain, slew_w=1000.0)
prev, i_w, sat = 0.0, None, 0
power = [0.0, 0.0]
grid = load_w
+39 -8
View File
@@ -165,21 +165,29 @@ SITE_SOURCES = {
"identically zero for any one unit - there is no fact of "
"the matter about which of two opposing inverters is the "
"offender, so there is nothing to file it per-unit on",
# SAFETY-30, and it is the entry most easily confused with `failsafe`
# below, because the same three words describe both.
"sign_site": "the SUM of every standing command against the meter. The "
"offending number is the SITE target, which no single "
"inverter owns - parking one of them would leave the rest "
"pushing the same way with the guard satisfied",
}
UNIT_SOURCES = {
"device": "one inverter's own reported min/max rating",
"supervised": "max_w caps what may be WRITTEN to one setpoint entity",
"failsafe": "site-wide evidence, per-unit remedy: SAFETY-02 grades the "
"command THIS controller put on THIS actuator",
"failsafe": "per-unit evidence, per-unit remedy: since SAFETY-30 it "
"grades THIS unit's command against THIS unit's OWN "
"measured power (0x0518), so what it learns is about one "
"device. The site-wide half moved to `sign_site`",
"maintenance": "the monthly recalibration is a pack procedure",
}
for _src, _why in sorted(SITE_SOURCES.items()):
print(f" site {_src:<11} {_why}")
for _src, _why in sorted(UNIT_SOURCES.items()):
print(f" unit {_src:<11} {_why}")
check("all NINE claim sources are classified, and only those nine",
check("all TEN claim sources are classified, and only those ten",
set(CLAIM_SCOPE) == set(SITE_SOURCES) | set(UNIT_SOURCES))
check("the five that are about the GRID CONNECTION are site claims",
check("the six that are about the GRID CONNECTION are site claims",
{s for s, v in CLAIM_SCOPE.items() if v == SCOPE_SITE} == set(SITE_SOURCES))
check("the four that are about a PACK, a DEVICE or one write are per-inverter",
{s for s, v in CLAIM_SCOPE.items() if v == SCOPE_UNIT} == set(UNIT_SOURCES))
@@ -200,7 +208,7 @@ check("with one inverter every source routes to the site, per-inverter ones "
check("...and with none configured at all, likewise",
all(actuator_for(s, "inverter-a", ()) == ACTUATOR_SITE for s in CLAIM_SCOPE))
check("with TWO the identity breaks and the split becomes real: the four "
"per-inverter sources route to the unit this controller drives, the five "
"per-inverter sources route to the unit this controller drives, the six "
"site sources stay on the grid connection",
{s: actuator_for(s, "inverter-a", TWO) for s in CLAIM_SCOPE}
== {**{s: "inverter-a" for s in UNIT_SOURCES},
@@ -441,9 +449,32 @@ mis_peak = SITE_SIDE[:1] + [Claim.limit("peak", P_PEAK, lo=1500.0,
r_mis = resolve(mis_peak)
print(f" peak floor misfiled on inverter-b: {r_mis.explain()} "
f"scope_errors={r_mis.scope_errors}")
check("the mis-routing is CAUGHT: scope_violations names the source and the "
"actuator it does not belong on", len(r_mis.scope_errors) == 1
and "peak" in r_mis.scope_errors[0])
# ⚠️ THE ORDERED PAIR, AND THE CHECK THAT USED TO BE HERE WAS WIDER THAN ITS
# OWN CLAIM. It said `scope_violations` "names the source and the actuator it
# does not belong on" and then asserted `"peak" in r_mis.scope_errors[0]`.
# `arbiter.py:264` builds that sentence as
# `f"{c.source}: a SITE claim filed on unit {c.actuator!r} - …"`; transpose the
# two - zero bytes, no decision changes, SAFETY-38 census B row B12 - and it
# reads "inverter-b: a SITE claim filed on unit 'peak'", naming the misfiled
# claim as the actuator and the actuator as the claim. `"peak" in …` is STILL
# TRUE under that, so the old line graded neither half of what it claimed.
# The operands are read off the CLAIM this test built, not off the message.
_mis_c = mis_peak[-1]
check("PRECONDITION: the misfiled claim's source and actuator are DIFFERENT "
"STRINGS, so a transposition genuinely produces a different sentence",
_mis_c.source != _mis_c.actuator and _mis_c.source == "peak"
and _mis_c.actuator == "inverter-b")
check("the mis-routing is CAUGHT, and scope_violations names the source FIRST "
"and the actuator it does not belong on SECOND - the ORDERED PAIR on the "
"contiguous literal, because a substring test finds either name under a "
"transposition that swaps their roles",
len(r_mis.scope_errors) == 1
and r_mis.scope_errors[0].startswith(
f"{_mis_c.source}: a SITE claim filed on unit {_mis_c.actuator!r}"))
check("...and the TRANSPOSED sentence is not what it says, so the check above "
"discriminates rather than decorates",
f"{_mis_c.actuator}: a SITE claim filed on unit {_mis_c.source!r}"
not in r_mis.scope_errors[0])
check("...and the reason it must be caught, measured rather than argued: with "
"the floor on a unit the SITE has no floor, so the loop charges 1500 W "
"into the quarter the guard was trying to shave",
+202 -1
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from app.clamp import (
CLEAR_CYCLES, REASON_CODE, REASSERT_S, ClampWatchdog, clamp_to_rating,
CLEAR_CYCLES, REASON_CODE, REASSERT_S, SUSTAINED_CYCLES, ClampWatchdog,
clamp_to_rating,
is_commandable,
)
from app.allocator import Allocation, UnitPlan, plan
@@ -239,11 +240,112 @@ print(f" pinned on the rail for {QUARTER_S:.0f} s at 1 s cycles: "
check(f"a loop pinned for a whole billing quarter speaks at least "
f"{MIN_PER_QUARTER} times (it spoke {alarms})",
alarms >= MIN_PER_QUARTER)
# ⚠️ REVIEW-FOUND, SAFETY-41, and it is the SAME DEFECT as the one recorded
# twenty lines above, one notch weaker. The sweep above runs i = 0..899 and the
# rising edge at i=0 is FREE, so it measures `1 + floor(899 / REASSERT_S)` - one
# alarm more than a real quarter earns. Measured on this very check:
# REASSERT_S = 180 -> 5 alarms, green (and 180 is the true edge: on the worst
# REASSERT_S = 224 -> 5 alarms, GREEN sliding 900 s window 180 gives 5 and
# REASSERT_S = 225 -> 4 alarms, red 181 gives 4)
# So the check as written permits 224 s while the REQUIREMENT permits 180 s, and
# anyone raising the constant to 200 s would get a green suite and conclude the
# floor was met when a real quarter would earn 4 alarms. Grade the cadence
# DIRECTLY, so the check enforces the ceiling its own comment claims for it.
check(f"...and the CADENCE itself honours the floor, independent of where the "
f"sweep happens to start: floor({QUARTER_S:.0f}/{REASSERT_S:.0f}) = "
f"{int(QUARTER_S // REASSERT_S)} >= {MIN_PER_QUARTER}",
QUARTER_S // REASSERT_S >= MIN_PER_QUARTER)
check(f"...and on no more than {MAX_FRACTION:.0%} of cycles (it was "
f"{alarms / QUARTER_S:.1%})", alarms <= MAX_FRACTION * QUARTER_S)
check("...while every single cycle is still counted",
pinned.engagements == int(QUARTER_S))
# --- THE SCATTERED REGIME, WHICH IS THE ONE THE OWNER ACTUALLY HIT -----------
# ⚠️ REVIEW-FOUND, SAFETY-41, and it falsified the first version of this card.
# The rising edge used to fire UNCONDITIONALLY, so REASSERT_S governed only the
# still-engaged path. A condition that engages and clears repeatedly therefore
# raised one notification PER EPISODE at any value of the constant.
#
# That is what the live install produced: 48 engagements in ~25 minutes,
# scattered about one cycle in six. At the measured ~5 s cycle the gaps are ~25 s
# of clean cycles, past CLEAR_CYCLES x 5 s = 15 s, so the alarm de-asserted
# between almost every engagement. Raising REASSERT_S 30 -> 150 removed NONE of
# them. The interval now bounds the notification RATE across episodes.
#
# The stimulus is written in wall-clock seconds and in the shape the field
# actually produced, so it does not move when the constant does.
SCATTER_CYCLE_S = 5.0
SCATTER_ONE_IN = 6
SCATTER_CYCLES = 305
scat = ClampWatchdog()
scat_alarms = sum(1 for i in range(SCATTER_CYCLES)
if scat.note(i % SCATTER_ONE_IN == 0, "scattered",
T0 + timedelta(seconds=SCATTER_CYCLE_S * i)))
_scat_span = SCATTER_CYCLE_S * SCATTER_CYCLES
print(f" scattered 1-in-{SCATTER_ONE_IN} over {_scat_span:.0f} s at "
f"{SCATTER_CYCLE_S:.0f} s cycles: {scat.episodes} episodes, "
f"{scat.engagements} engagements, {scat_alarms} alarm(s)")
check(f"a condition that de-asserts between engagements is rate-limited ACROSS "
f"episodes, not once per episode ({scat_alarms} alarms for "
f"{scat.episodes} episodes)",
scat_alarms < scat.episodes)
check(f"...and the rate honours the same interval the pinned case does: at most "
f"ceil({_scat_span:.0f}/{REASSERT_S:.0f}) + 1 = "
f"{int(_scat_span // REASSERT_S) + 1}",
scat_alarms <= int(_scat_span // REASSERT_S) + 1)
check("...while EVERY episode and EVERY engagement is still counted - the "
"budget is on notifications, never on evidence",
scat.episodes == scat.engagements == SCATTER_CYCLES // SCATTER_ONE_IN + 1)
# ⚠️ THE COUNTERFACTUAL, AND THE FIRST VERSION OF IT COULD NOT FAIL FOR THE
# DEFECT IT NAMED. It read `ClampWatchdog().note(True, ...) is True` - a FRESH
# object, so it only ever exercised the `last_alarm is None` branch, which is the
# trivially-true one. A fresh watchdog has no earlier episode to be held back BY.
# That is the third instance in this file of the family recorded at line 216 and
# at the 224 s sweep, and it was guarding the most safety-critical property in
# the change. Review found it.
#
# The stimulus must therefore SPEND THE BUDGET FIRST: a benign one-cycle clamp,
# a gap long enough to de-assert, then a continuous runaway. Without the
# escalation clause the runaway's first notification is held for up to
# REASSERT_S - measured at 140 s before it was added.
_esc = ClampWatchdog()
_esc.note(True, "benign", T0) # spends the budget
for _i in range(1, 1 + CLEAR_CYCLES + 1): # de-assert
_esc.note(False, "", T0 + timedelta(seconds=5.0 * _i))
_RUNAWAY_AT = 5.0 * (CLEAR_CYCLES + 2)
_esc_fires = [5.0 * (CLEAR_CYCLES + 2 + _j)
for _j in range(200)
if _esc.note(True, "runaway",
T0 + timedelta(seconds=5.0 * (CLEAR_CYCLES + 2 + _j)))]
_esc_delay = _esc_fires[0] - _RUNAWAY_AT if _esc_fires else None
print(f" budget spent by a benign episode, then a continuous runaway from "
f"t={_RUNAWAY_AT:.0f}s: first alarm at t={_esc_fires[0]:.0f}s "
f"(delay {_esc_delay:.0f}s)")
check(f"⚠️ a SUSTAINED runaway speaks even when an earlier, unrelated episode "
f"spent the budget - it is not held for REASSERT_S ({_esc_delay:.0f}s "
f"delay, escalation is {SUSTAINED_CYCLES} cycles)",
_esc_delay is not None and _esc_delay < REASSERT_S / 2)
check("...and it speaks at the escalation boundary rather than immediately, "
"which is what keeps the scattered flood suppressed",
_esc_delay >= 5.0 * (SUSTAINED_CYCLES - 1))
# ⚠️ `last_alarm` SURVIVING THE DE-ASSERT IS NOW LOAD-BEARING, AND NOTHING
# PINNED IT. Review built the mutation: if the de-assert path ALSO refreshed
# `last_alarm = now`, the chatter case collapses from 50 notifications to 1 - the
# alarm never fires again. That is the "alarm that never fires" class, which is a
# different bug from one that fires later, and the suite was green on it.
_starve = ClampWatchdog()
_starve_fires = sum(1 for _i in range(1600)
if _starve.note(_i % 4 == 0, "chatter",
T0 + timedelta(seconds=5.0 * _i)))
print(f" chatter 1-engaged/{CLEAR_CYCLES}-clean over 8000 s: "
f"{_starve.episodes} episodes, {_starve_fires} notification(s)")
check(f"a de-assert does not RESET the notification budget, so repeated chatter "
f"cannot starve the alarm to silence ({_starve_fires} notifications over "
f"8000 s, not 1)",
_starve_fires > 10)
# --- THE HYSTERESIS, PINNED AGAINST THE CHATTER DIRECTION --------------------
# ⚠️ REVIEW-FOUND. This used to issue `range(CLEAR_CYCLES - 1)` clean cycles,
# which at CLEAR_CYCLES = 1 issues ZERO of them and passes while printing
@@ -898,6 +1000,105 @@ check("...and main.py:856's consumer is the line that goes quietly false",
bool(ctl_w.clamp_last and ctl_w.clamp_last.engaged))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 6d. SAFETY-38 round 4 - THE ORDERED PAIR INSIDE `ClampResult.describe()`
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE ALARM THE OWNER HAS BEEN COMPLAINING ABOUT ALL DAY, AND UNTIL
# THIS BLOCK NO test_*.py MENTIONED `describe()` AT ALL. `clamp.py:253` builds
# the whole §15 action-log row and the whole ClampWatchdog notification reason
# out of its own attributes:
#
# f"{REASON_CODE}: the computed setpoint {self.requested_w:+.0f} W was
# clamped to {self.applied_w:+.0f} W by the {self.bound} bound
# (rating {self.limit_w:.0f} W) - something upstream is winding"
#
# Transpose `requested_w` and `applied_w` and the guard reports clamping a
# setpoint UPWARD - here, to +9999 W by a bound whose rating the SAME SENTENCE
# gives as 2000 W. MEASURED on this tree: a zero-byte edit (22 507 bytes before,
# 22 507 after, sha256 0153133741497fa5 -> 47e4e371043e3201), the emitted
# sentence changes, and the full 21-file suite stayed GREEN. Nothing decides on
# the order, so nothing behavioural can ever see it - which is why the check
# below has to be on the ORDERED PAIR and on the CONTIGUOUS LITERAL. A substring
# test for either number passes under the swap; both numbers are still there.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE OPERANDS ARE READ OFF THE PLANT, NOT OFF `clamp_last`. `ctl.target`
# is what the loop asked for and `hass.writes[-1]` is what the device was
# actually sent; neither is a `ClampResult` field. Grading the sentence against
# `result.requested_w` would compare the swap against itself - DEV-02's defect,
# and the same one that made the first cut of this card's own render probe emit
# thirteen empty diffs.
async def _sentence(max_w, dev, wanted):
"""One real write over `max_w`, then the guard, on a real Controller."""
hass = _Hass(0.0)
c = Controller({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_source": "off",
"max_w": max_w},
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -dev, dev
c.target = wanted
arm(c, wanted)
await c.write_setpoint(wanted)
await c.check_output_clamp()
return hass, c
hass_x, ctl_x = _sentence_run = asyncio.run(_sentence(2000.0, 5000.0, 9999.0))
notes_x = clamp_notes(hass_x)
_asked_x = ctl_x.target # what the loop asked for
_sent_x = hass_x.writes[-1] # what the device was actually sent
_rating_x = ctl_x.inverters[0].max_w # the bound the sentence names
_rows_x = [e for e in ctl_x.events if REASON_CODE in e]
print(f" max_w {_rating_x:.0f} on a +-5000 W device, asked for "
f"{_asked_x:+.0f} W: the device saw {_sent_x:+.0f} W")
print(f" action log: {_rows_x[0] if _rows_x else '(none)'}")
check("PRECONDITION: the write really clamped on the MAX_W bound, and the two "
"operands are DIFFERENT NUMBERS that RENDER differently - equal ones "
"would make the transposed sentence identical and every check below "
"vacuous. The asked-for magnitude is also strictly ABOVE the rating "
"while the sent one is not, which is what makes the swapped sentence "
"self-contradictory rather than merely wrong",
ctl_x.clamp_last is not None and ctl_x.clamp_last.engaged
and ctl_x.clamp_last.bound == "max_w"
and _asked_x != _sent_x
and f"{_asked_x:+.0f}" != f"{_sent_x:+.0f}"
and abs(_sent_x) <= _rating_x < abs(_asked_x))
check("⚠️ THE ORDERED PAIR IN THE §15 ACTION-LOG ROW (main.py:1366). The "
"contiguous literal names the setpoint the loop COMPUTED first and the "
"one that REACHED THE WIRE second. Under the transposition this row says "
"the loop asked for +2000 W and the guard clamped it UP to +9999 W - "
"past the 2000 W rating printed four words later - which is the alarm "
"reading backwards on the one line an operator is woken by",
any(f"the computed setpoint {_asked_x:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_sent_x:+.0f} W" in e for e in _rows_x))
check("⚠️ ...AND IN THE ClampWatchdog NOTIFICATION REASON (main.py:2452), "
"which is a SECOND surface off the same sentence and has to be pinned "
"separately - SAFETY-38 round 3's whole lesson was that pinning one call "
"site leaves the other shipping",
bool(notes_x)
and f"the computed setpoint {_asked_x:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_sent_x:+.0f} W" in notes_x[0]["message"])
check("...and the TRANSPOSED sentence appears on NEITHER surface, so the two "
"checks above discriminate rather than decorate",
not any(f"the computed setpoint {_sent_x:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_asked_x:+.0f} W" in e for e in _rows_x)
and f"the computed setpoint {_sent_x:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_asked_x:+.0f} W" not in notes_x[0]["message"])
# The DEVICE bound, off part 6c's controller: same sentence, other stage. The
# unit of coverage is the call site, and `bound` is the only thing that differs
# between the two rows an operator can receive.
_asked_w, _sent_w = ctl_w.target, hass_w.writes[-1]
check("...and the same ordered pair holds on the DEVICE-bound row, where the "
"loop asked for +3000 W and the device took +2500 W. PRECONDITION: those "
"two also render differently",
f"{_asked_w:+.0f}" != f"{_sent_w:+.0f}"
and any(f"the computed setpoint {_asked_w:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_sent_w:+.0f} W" in e for e in ctl_w.events)
and f"the computed setpoint {_asked_w:+.0f} W was clamped to "
f"{_sent_w:+.0f} W" in notes_w[0]["message"])
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("7. SAFETY-28: the write path is gated on the allocation record")
+237 -5
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,19 @@ Read MUTATION.md before you report a survivor.
import sys
from app.control import Tuning, compute, maintenance_charge_floor, peak_at_risk
from app.control import (LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S, SLEW_RAIL_FRAC,
Tuning, compute, slew_limit_w,
maintenance_charge_floor, peak_at_risk)
T = Tuning()
# ⚠️ SAFETY-39: `slew_w` IS EXPLICIT HERE NOW, AND IT IS release/1.0's VALUE.
# `Tuning()`'s default became 0 - "follow the rail", `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`,
# 222 W against this 2000 W rail - so a bare `Tuning()` here would silently
# re-tune every assertion below that the slew limit touches, and several of them
# assert on a number the slew produces. The pair written here (max_w 2000,
# slew_w 1000) is exactly what release/1.0 shipped, which is what most of this
# file is a regression test against. The new default gets its own section at the
# end, where it is the subject rather than a hidden parameter.
T = Tuning(slew_w=1000.0)
fails = []
@@ -49,6 +59,13 @@ def check(name, cond):
# A comment cannot go stale-green, because it never claims to be running.
#
# Measured at 389d9ec. Numbers are the lead's independent reproduction.
# ⚠️ THE SLEW ROWS WERE RE-MEASURED AT SAFETY-39 AND ONE OF THEM MOVED: the
# slew limit was 4 and is now 5, because the SAFETY-39 section grades it too.
# The new row is the RAIL DEFAULT specifically - `slew_limit_w()` reduced to
# `return abs(float(tuning.slew_w))`, which leaves the limit intact and only
# removes the 0-means-the-rail resolution. Three checks notice, which is over
# the invariant's floor of two. Both figures were reproduced by deleting the
# mechanism, running this file and counting, on a tree with __pycache__ purged.
#
# mechanism in compute() checks that fail when deleted
# ------------------------------------------ -----------------------------
@@ -56,7 +73,8 @@ def check(name, cond):
# integrator clamp (AC 1) 6
# integrator bound follows max_w 4
# output clamp 3
# slew limit 4
# slew limit 5
# slew follows the rail (SAFETY-39), `slew_w` read raw 3
# output freeze 2
# deadband 5
# quantisation 2
@@ -328,7 +346,14 @@ def unwind(t):
return prev
tight, loose = unwind(Tuning(max_w=2000)), unwind(Tuning(max_w=2000, integrator_max_w=3000))
# ⚠️ BOTH FIXTURES CARRY release/1.0's `slew_w` EXPLICITLY (SAFETY-39). The
# subject here is `integrator_max_w`, and the figure the check names - 1000 W on
# the first cycle after the drop - is `max_w - slew_w`, so it moves with the slew
# limit and would stop being the number DOCS.md quotes. Pinning it keeps this a
# test about integrator headroom instead of a test about two mechanisms at once;
# the shipped default's own unwind is measured in the SAFETY-39 section below.
tight = unwind(Tuning(max_w=2000, slew_w=1000.0))
loose = unwind(Tuning(max_w=2000, slew_w=1000.0, integrator_max_w=3000))
check(f"after saturation ends the command is {tight:.0f} W (<= 1000)", tight <= 1000)
check(f"headroom above max_w makes that worse ({loose:.0f} W) - hence the default",
loose > tight)
@@ -372,7 +397,15 @@ def legacy(prev, grid, actual, t, sat_count):
ALIAS = {"i-clamped": "clamped"}
diffs = []
seen = set()
for tune in (Tuning(), Tuning(target_grid_w=-10.0), Tuning(max_w=5000, slew_w=5000)):
# ⚠️ `slew_w` IS WRITTEN OUT IN ALL THREE (SAFETY-39). `legacy()` below is a
# TRANSCRIPTION of release/1.0 and reads `t.slew_w` directly, as release/1.0
# did; the new law reads `slew_limit_w(t)`, which treats 0 as 'follow the
# rail'. The two agree for every non-zero value and differ at 0 BY DESIGN, so
# a fixture that left the field at its new default would report the design as
# a regression. Fixing it in `legacy()` instead would make this sweep compare
# the new law against itself, which is the one thing it must never do.
for tune in (Tuning(slew_w=1000.0), Tuning(slew_w=1000.0, target_grid_w=-10.0),
Tuning(max_w=5000, slew_w=5000)):
for prev in (-2000.0, -500.0, -100.0, 0.0, 100.0, 500.0, 2000.0):
for grid in (-6000.0, -1000.0, -500.0, -14.0, 0.0, 14.0, 500.0, 1000.0, 6000.0):
for actual in (-2000.0, 0.0, 600.0, 2000.0):
@@ -443,6 +476,205 @@ check("worst billed rest point falls from 15 W to under 5 W",
compute(500.0, 4.9, 500.0, TB).reason == "deadband"
and compute(500.0, 5.0, 500.0, TB).reason != "deadband")
print("SAFETY-39: the slew limit is a RATIO to the rail, not a number")
# ⚠️ WHAT WENT WRONG, IN ONE LINE, BECAUSE THE SHAPE IS THE POINT. `slew_w:
# 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a clamp of 1500 W and its stated
# justification was that it caps "how far the loop can jump ahead of the
# inverter". The live install then ran max_w 5000 with the same 1000, and on
# 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46 a real 3.4 kW export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000 W
# in five 2 s ticks, the battery to -5154 W against a 5000 VA inverter, and the
# grid from 3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT. Nothing was broken. The rail
# moved and the constant did not.
#
# So what is graded below is the RELATIONSHIP and not a value: at every rail,
# the loop takes the plant's own settling time to cross its whole output range.
# A check that pinned "555 W" would go stale the same way the comment did.
print(f" SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = {SLEW_RAIL_FRAC:.4f}"
f" ({1 / SLEW_RAIL_FRAC:.0f} ticks to cross the rail)")
check("0 means FOLLOW THE RAIL and resolves to SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w",
slew_limit_w(Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=0.0)) == SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * 5000.0)
check("an explicit value is passed through untouched - it is the operator's "
"number and nothing here silently reduces it",
slew_limit_w(Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=400.0)) == 400.0)
check("the shipped Tuning default is 0, i.e. the rail, so the law carries no "
"second constant to go stale beside config.yaml",
Tuning().slew_w == 0.0)
# ⭐ THE RELATIONSHIP ITSELF, over every rail this add-on can be built at: the
# single-inverter schema range (100..5000), the live install (5000), and the
# roster sums a second inverter produces - 9600 with inverter B's datasheet
# figure, 10000 with two of A. ⚠️ 9600 IS NOT A MEASUREMENT: inverter B does not
# exist on site yet (SPIKE-04, ~2026-09-12) and 4600 W is its datasheet and
# serial, per goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b. It is here because the ARITHMETIC is what
# is being graded, and the arithmetic does not care.
_rails = [100.0, 500.0, 1500.0, 2000.0, 5000.0, 9600.0, 10000.0]
_ticks = {r: r / slew_limit_w(Tuning(max_w=r)) for r in _rails}
print(" ticks to cross the rail at the default, by rail: "
+ ", ".join(f"{r:.0f}W={t:.1f}" for r, t in _ticks.items()))
check("⭐ AT EVERY RAIL THE DEFAULT TAKES THE SAME NUMBER OF TICKS TO CROSS IT - "
"which is PLANT_SETTLE_S at the measured tick. This is the whole of "
"SAFETY-39: raising max_w moves the slew limit with it, so the constant "
"cannot be left behind by the rail again",
all(abs(t - PLANT_SETTLE_S / LOOP_TICK_S) < 1e-9 for t in _ticks.values()))
check("...and that is the same as saying the crossing takes the plant's own "
f"measured settling time ({PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s) at the "
f"{LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s tick the live install was measured running",
all(abs(t * LOOP_TICK_S - PLANT_SETTLE_S) < 1e-9 for t in _ticks.values()))
# ⭐ VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. The configuration that produced the 2026-09-05
# excursion, put through the same arithmetic: it crosses the rail in 10 s
# against a plant that takes 18 s. This is the number validate.py rule 10
# refuses on, and it is asserted HERE too so that the law and the gate cannot
# drift apart - the rule can only ever refuse what this ratio says is too fast.
_broken = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=1000.0)
_broken_s = 5000.0 / slew_limit_w(_broken) * LOOP_TICK_S
print(f" the 2026-09-05 configuration (max_w 5000, slew_w 1000) crosses its "
f"rail in {_broken_s:.0f} s against a plant measured at {PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s")
check("⭐ RESTORING slew_w 1000 AT max_w 5000 IS FASTER THAN THE PLANT, and by "
"the ratio rather than by anybody's opinion - test_validate.py's rule 10 "
"section refuses exactly this pair",
_broken_s < PLANT_SETTLE_S
and slew_limit_w(_broken) > SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * _broken.max_w)
# THE CLOSED LOOP, AND WHAT THIS PLANT IS AND IS NOT.
#
# ⚠️ THE PLANT BELOW IS MODELLED HERE AND IS NOT THE RIG. admin/goodwe's
# `plantsim.Plant` is the battery model this project grades control changes
# against, and this repository's CI cannot reach it - that repository is private
# and this job's token is minted for this one (see .gitea/workflows/checks.yml).
# So the rig evidence lives in `tools/slew_sim.py`, is quoted in the pull
# request and in DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md, and what runs
# HERE is a first-order lag with the time constant that reproduces §5.10's
# measured ~18 s to the deadband. test_alloc.py makes the same split for the
# same reason and says so in the same words.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT CANNOT SHOW A BATTERY ABOVE ITS RATING, WHICH IS SAID BEFORE THE
# RESULT RATHER THAN AFTER IT. Neither this model nor `plantsim.Plant` lets the
# plant exceed `p_max`; both clamp. The -5154 W against a 5000 VA inverter that
# the ticket reports is therefore NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN SIMULATION AT ALL, by
# construction, and no acceptance criterion here is written on it. What IS
# reproducible, and is what is graded, is the loop OVER-ABSORBING and driving
# the meter from export into import - the error it then chases.
_TAU_S = 6.0 # first-order lag; with the 2 s tick it reaches the
# deadband ~18 s after a step, which is §5.10's figure
def _step_run(tuning, export_w, load_w=350.0, phase=5, cycles=90,
dt=LOOP_TICK_S):
"""One export step onto a converged loop.
-> (worst import at the meter, peak battery beyond what the site NEEDED,
largest setpoint change in one tick).
"""
import math
prev, i_w, sat, actual, pv = 0.0, None, 0, 0.0, 0.0
a = 1.0 - math.exp(-dt / _TAU_S)
worst_import, peak, biggest, last = -1e9, 0.0, 0.0, None
for c in range(cycles):
if c == phase:
pv = export_w + load_w
grid = load_w - pv - actual
d = compute(prev, grid, actual, tuning, sat, i_w)
if c >= phase and last is not None:
biggest = max(biggest, abs(d.target_w - last))
last = d.target_w
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
# the plant: a first-order lag, clamped at the rating like the real one
actual += (max(-tuning.max_w, min(tuning.max_w, prev)) - actual) * a
if c >= phase:
worst_import = max(worst_import, load_w - pv - actual)
peak = max(peak, abs(actual))
return worst_import, peak - export_w, biggest
def _family(tuning):
"""The worst case over 51 export steps, 1.0-4.2 kW, at three phases.
⚠️ A FAMILY AND NOT ONE STEP, AND THAT IS A FINDING RATHER THAN CAUTION.
A single run of this loop is not evidence: the deadband, the 10 W
quantisation and the phase of the step against the tick move the result by
hundreds of watts, non-monotonically, so two adjacent slews can rank either
way on one step and the opposite way on the next. Every number below is a
worst case over the family, which is how admin/goodwe grades the same
quantities (see `config.yaml`'s "1890 closed-loop runs" and "924 runs").
"""
worst = dict(imp=-1e9, over=-1e9, step=0.0, big=0, runs=0)
for export_w in range(1000, 4300, 200):
for phase in (5, 6, 7):
imp, over, step = _step_run(tuning, float(export_w), phase=phase)
worst["runs"] += 1
worst["imp"] = max(worst["imp"], imp)
worst["over"] = max(worst["over"], over)
worst["step"] = max(worst["step"], step)
worst["big"] += step >= 900.0
return worst
_LIVE = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=1000.0) # what ran on 2026-09-05
_RAIL = Tuning(max_w=5000.0) # slew_w 0 - follow the rail
_INTERIM = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=400.0) # applied live 2026-09-05 12:00
_SLOWER = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, slew_w=250.0)
_GAIN03 = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, gain=0.3)
_GAIN02 = Tuning(max_w=5000.0, gain=0.2)
_R = {k: _family(t) for k, t in
(("live", _LIVE), ("rail", _RAIL), ("interim", _INTERIM),
("slower", _SLOWER), ("gain03", _GAIN03), ("gain02", _GAIN02))}
print(f" worst case over {_R['live']['runs']} export steps at max_w 5000, "
f"{LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s tick:")
for _k, _lab in (("live", "gain 0.6 slew_w 1000 (the 2026-09-05 live pair)"),
("rail", "gain 0.6 slew_w 0 (follow the rail)"),
("interim", "gain 0.6 slew_w 400 (the live interim)"),
("slower", "gain 0.6 slew_w 250"),
("gain03", "gain 0.3 slew_w 0"),
("gain02", "gain 0.2 slew_w 0")):
_w = _R[_k]
print(f" {_lab:<48} largest tick step {_w['step']:5.0f} W, "
f"{_w['big']:2}/{_w['runs']} runs step >= 900 W, "
f"over-absorbed {_w['over']:5.0f} W, meter driven to {_w['imp']:+6.0f} W")
# ⭐ THE DEFECT, REPRODUCED BEFORE ANYTHING IS CHANGED. The live pair steps the
# setpoint by a full 1000 W on nearly every member of the family and drives the
# meter from EXPORT into IMPORT - the loop manufacturing the error it then
# chases. That is the 2026-09-05 observation and it is what makes this a control
# fault rather than a slow loop.
check("⭐ REPRODUCED: at max_w 5000 with slew_w 1000 the setpoint steps a full "
"1000 W per tick on nearly every step in the family, and the meter is "
"driven from export into import",
_R["live"]["step"] >= 900.0
and _R["live"]["big"] > 0.9 * _R["live"]["runs"]
and _R["live"]["imp"] > 200.0)
check("⭐ FIXED, ON THE THING THE SLEW ACTUALLY OWNS: following the rail removes "
"the >= 900 W step from EVERY member of the family - which is the symptom "
"that escalated 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 per 30 min on the morning of the "
"2026-09-05 excursion",
_R["live"]["big"] > 0 and _R["rail"]["big"] == 0
and _R["interim"]["big"] == 0)
# ⚠️ AND WHAT IT DOES NOT BUY, MEASURED, ASSERTED, AND SAID BEFORE ANYBODY CAN
# READ MORE INTO THIS CARD THAN IT DELIVERED. `slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT; the
# integrator accumulates `gain * error` per cycle and is bounded only by
# `integrator_max_w`. At gain 0.6 into a 3.4 kW error the integrator moves
# ~2000 W per tick and reaches a 5000 W rail in under three ticks WHATEVER
# `slew_w` is. So the over-absorption is a GAIN term, and slowing the slew does
# not reduce it - on this model it gets slightly WORSE, because the command
# spends longer away from where it needs to be while the integrator keeps
# winding. admin/goodwe's rig, a different plant model, agrees: over-absorption
# 990 W at slew 1000 and 1086 W at slew 250, against 1010 W at gain 0.6 and
# 863 W at gain 0.3 (tools/slew_sim.py).
#
# `gain` is therefore the next constant to re-derive. SAFETY-39 measured it and
# CHANGED NOTHING: it is a live control-law constant on a running house, and two
# of them moving in one release makes the next measurement uninterpretable.
check("⚠️ THE SLEW DOES NOT OWN THE OVER-ABSORPTION, AND THIS CHECK IS HERE SO "
"THAT NOBODY READS SAFETY-39 AS 'THE OVERSHOOT IS FIXED'. Quartering the "
"slew from 1000 to 250 does not reduce the over-absorption at all",
_R["slower"]["over"] >= _R["live"]["over"])
check("...while the GAIN does own it: 0.6 -> 0.3 -> 0.2 falls monotonically, at "
"the same slew. That is the measurement behind 'gain is the next constant "
"to re-derive', and it is a measurement rather than an opinion",
_R["gain03"]["over"] < _R["rail"]["over"]
and _R["gain02"]["over"] < _R["gain03"]["over"])
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
+23 -7
View File
@@ -144,9 +144,17 @@ def check(name, cond):
fails.append(name)
def tuning(max_w=LIVE_INSTALL_MAX_W):
"""The shipped defaults from config.yaml, at the live install's max_w."""
return Tuning(gain=0.6, max_w=max_w, slew_w=1000, deadband_w=15,
def tuning(max_w=LIVE_INSTALL_MAX_W, slew_w=0):
"""The shipped defaults from config.yaml, at the live install's max_w.
⚠️ `slew_w` IS 0 - "FOLLOW THE RAIL" - AND IS A PARAMETER (SAFETY-39). 0 is
what config.yaml ships and resolves to `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`, so it moves
with `max_w` instead of being a number typed beside it. It has to be
overridable because one case below picks an ABSURDLY SMALL rail on purpose,
and at that rail a rail-following slew is 2 W per cycle - which would make
the slew, rather than the thing under test, the reason nothing fires.
"""
return Tuning(gain=0.6, max_w=max_w, slew_w=slew_w, deadband_w=15,
target_grid_w=-10, step_w=10, saturation_w=500,
saturation_cycles=3)
@@ -327,10 +335,10 @@ check("the capture loaded", len(rows) > 1000)
# covers both kWh registers, so a real `unchanged_s` on this data can only be
# SHORTER than what is reconstructed here - this replay is the pessimistic
# version of the converged case, not a flattering one.
def replay(hold_s, max_w, cycle_floor_s=15.0):
def replay(hold_s, max_w, cycle_floor_s=15.0, slew_w=0):
"""Drive the real control law and the real detector over the capture."""
wd = FreezeWatchdog(FreezeWatchdogConfig(hold_s=hold_s))
t = tuning(max_w)
t = tuning(max_w, slew_w)
target, i_w, sat = 0.0, 0.0, 0
prev_pwr, changed_at = None, rows[0]["t"]
last_cycle = None
@@ -456,7 +464,15 @@ check("...and the shipped law really does park the command there",
# converged capture is silent" is satisfied by a detector that is wired to
# nothing. Drop the hold to 1 s and the rail to nothing, and the SAME replay
# must alarm - so the silence above is the data's doing, not the harness's.
wd_hot, _, _, fired_hot = replay(1.0, 20.0)
# ⚠️ AND THE SLEW IS PINNED FOR THIS CASE ONLY, WHICH IS THE OTHER HALF OF
# MAKING BOTH TERMS REACHABLE (SAFETY-39). The rail here is 20 W, chosen absurdly
# small so the rail term cannot be what holds the alarm off. At the shipped
# `slew_w: 0` the limit follows that rail too - `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * 20` is 2.2 W
# per cycle - so the command could not reach 19 W inside the capture and the
# replay would go silent for a reason that has nothing to do with the detector.
# That is exactly the vacuous pass this case exists to rule out, arriving
# through the case itself, so the slew is written out here and nowhere else.
wd_hot, _, _, fired_hot = replay(1.0, 20.0, slew_w=20.0)
check("...and the same replay DOES alarm once both terms are made reachable",
fired_hot is not None and wd_hot.episodes > 0)
@@ -699,7 +715,7 @@ def _opts(**over):
o = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_INSTALL_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W,
"slew_w": 0, "deadband_w": SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W,
"target_grid_w": -10, "step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10,
"stale_input_s": STALE_INPUT_S}
o.update(over)
+188 -38
View File
@@ -192,14 +192,40 @@ class Hass:
A_ENT = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp_a", "soc_entity": "sensor.soc_a",
"batt_entity": "sensor.batt_a"}
# ⚠️ A HYPOTHESIS, NOT A MEASUREMENT. Inverter B does not exist; 3000 W is
# chosen only because it DIFFERS from A's 5000 W, which is what lets a check
# tell B's number from A's. SPIKE-04 measures the real one.
# ⚠️ SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) ESTABLISHED B'S REAL RATING FROM ITS DATASHEET:
# a GoodWe GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, 4600 W on the battery path
# (goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b). THIS FIXTURE DELIBERATELY DOES NOT USE IT. 3000 W is
# kept because the only property these checks consume is that B's number is
# UNMISTAKABLY not A's, and the real pair is 5000/4600 - a 400 W gap, narrower
# than `slew_w` and inside the range where an off-by-one-unit bug and ordinary
# control arithmetic produce indistinguishable numbers. Collapsing the fixture
# onto the real values would cost these checks their separating power to buy
# realism they do not use. So: ILLUSTRATIVE, NOT B'S RATING, and not a
# placeholder for it either - the placeholder era ended on 2026-09-04.
B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS = 3000.0
# SAFETY-32. Each pack's OWN BMS cut-out percent, now a REQUIRED roster key.
# ⚠️ 10 IS MEASURED (register 0x0560 on the reference GW5000S-BP and the shipped
# `bms_soc_floor` default); 15 IS SIMULATED - there is no second pack. They
# DIFFER on purpose: a fixture whose two per-unit numbers are equal cannot show
# a check that read the wrong unit's, which is MUTATION.md habit 1 and the defect
# that has now bitten four consecutive cards. Both sit below the shipped
# `peak_soc_floor` of 20, so rule 8 accepts this roster.
A_BMS_FLOOR = 10
B_BMS_FLOOR_SIM = 15
A_RATING = 5000.0
# ⚠️ `slew_w` IS 0 HERE, AND IT USED TO BE 1000 - SAFETY-39, AND THE WAY THIS
# FIXTURE FOUND OUT IS THE ARGUMENT FOR THE RULE. This dict pairs `slew_w: 1000`
# with `max_w: 5000` because both were typed when the flat 5000 W install was
# new, and that pair is EXACTLY the configuration measured on the owner's system
# on 2026-09-05 driving the meter from 3.4 kW of export to 2.8 kW of import. The
# fixture was not wrong when it was written and nothing in this file noticed it
# had become so; validate.py rule 10 refused it the day it existed, which is
# what a rule about a relationship is for. 0 means "follow the rail"
# (`control.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w`) and is what config.yaml ships.
BASE_OPTS = dict(A_ENT, meter_source="off", meter_entity="sensor.grid",
max_w=A_RATING, gain=0.6, slew_w=1000, deadband_w=15,
max_w=A_RATING, gain=0.6, slew_w=0, deadband_w=15,
target_grid_w=0, step_w=10, heartbeat_s=10, stale_input_s=15)
@@ -572,6 +598,58 @@ check("...and a store that only fails to persist a DEFAULT is not reported as "
"dismiss before the real one arrives",
migrate_unit_keys(LosesTheLatch(), UNIT_A).ok is True)
# ⚠️ AND THE MARKER GATE, ON A STORE WHERE SOMETHING WAS ALREADY NAMESPACED.
# FOUND BY MAINT-05's ROUND-3 BATTERY, AND IT WAS A SURVIVOR OF ALL 19 FILES.
# `migrate_unit_keys()` gates `SCHEMA_KEY` on `rep.ok`, and every check above
# reaches that gate on a store where NOTHING was already under `unit/...` - so
# `rep.kept` is empty in all of them, and the mutation
#
# if rep.ok: -> if rep.ok or rep.kept:
#
# stamped the marker on a migration that DROPPED THE LATCH, with the whole suite
# green. That is a disarmed safety guard plus a store that says the migration
# finished, so the next start skips the one thing that would have re-armed it -
# DEV-02's own worst case with the paper trail filed under "done".
#
# The fixture is the one shape that separates them: `sign_reason` ALREADY
# namespaced (so `kept` is non-empty and the mutant's `or` fires) and the
# `sign_tripped: true` write dropped on the floor (so `lost` is non-empty and
# `ok` is False). `migrate_unit_keys()` is passed no roster, so `misdirected`
# cannot be what refuses this - it is the `lost` guard or nothing.
_kept_reason = "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: already namespaced by a later version"
_broken_kept = LosesTheLatch({
"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: measured",
unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_reason"): _kept_reason})
_rep_kept = migrate_unit_keys(_broken_kept, UNIT_A)
print(f" a dropped latch write beside an already-namespaced reason: "
f"{_rep_kept.explain()}")
print(f" lost={len(_rep_kept.lost)} kept={len(_rep_kept.kept)} "
f"ok={_rep_kept.ok}; marker "
f"{_broken_kept.data.get(SCHEMA_KEY, '<<absent>>')!r}")
check("PRECONDITION: this fixture reaches the marker gate through the `lost` "
"guard with a NON-EMPTY `kept`, which is the combination none of the "
"checks above has. One key dropped, one key left alone, `ok` False. If a "
"later edit empties `kept` here the mutation goes invisible again, so the "
"shape is asserted rather than assumed",
_rep_kept.ran and len(_rep_kept.lost) == 1 and len(_rep_kept.kept) == 1
and not _rep_kept.ok
and _broken_kept.data[unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_reason")] == _kept_reason)
check("⚠️ AND THE STORE IS NOT MARKED MIGRATED. The key that was ALREADY there "
"does not buy a marker for the latch that was not: stamping here would "
"tell the next start that the migration which dropped `sign_tripped` had "
"finished, so it would never run again and the guard would stay off on an "
"install whose file still reads `sign_tripped: true`",
SCHEMA_KEY not in _broken_kept.data)
check("...and the counterfactual, one property different: the SAME store shape "
"on a store that does not drop writes IS marked migrated. So the refusal "
"above is about the latch that was lost, not about `kept` being non-empty",
migrate_unit_keys(
MemStore({"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: measured",
unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_reason"): _kept_reason}),
UNIT_A).ok is True)
_broken2 = LosesTheLatch({"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: measured"})
_c2d, _ = built(store=_broken2)
@@ -609,28 +687,40 @@ print("3. AC 3: a trip on B does not latch A, and it survives a restart")
# inverters get a share of ONE site target, so an ordinary wrong-way loop trips
# BOTH - correctly, because both really are pushing the wrong way. The state
# this part is about is the one the flat store keys made unreachable: ONE
# inverter standing on a command that opposes the meter while the other does
# not. It is reached the way the field would reach it - inverter B's writes are
# being REJECTED, so `inv.last_write` stays where it was while A's tracks the
# loop - and `standing` is what SAFETY-02 grades, per unit.
# inverter standing on a command that opposes what it is graded against while
# the other does not. It is reached the way the field would reach it - inverter
# B's writes are being REJECTED, so `inv.last_write` stays where it was while
# A's tracks the loop - and `standing` is what SAFETY-02 grades, per unit.
#
# ⚠️ SAFETY-30 CHANGED WHAT "OPPOSES" MEANS HERE, AND THE FIXTURE HAD TO MOVE
# WITH IT - WHICH IS THIS CHECK DOING ITS JOB. It used to stand B on a -1500 W
# charge against a +2000 W METER and let the site figure convict it. At a roster
# of two that comparison is exactly the defect SAFETY-30 removes: the meter
# answers for BOTH inverters, so it is evidence about neither. B is now
# convicted by its OWN power sensor - standing on a -1500 W charge while
# `sensor.batt_b` measures it DISCHARGING at +1500 W, which is one inverter
# doing the opposite of what it was told and is a fact about that inverter
# alone. Inverter A's own reading stays at 0 W, so A is never gated in.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE REJECTION WINDOW IS WHY THIS RUNS IN THREE SECONDS AND NOT THIRTY.
# `sign_disagree_s` is 1 s here; `LINK_STALE_S` is 30 s, so B is still LIVE for
# the whole run and the trip is graded before liveness has anything to say.
# `unit_sign_disagree_s` is 1 s here; `LINK_STALE_S` is 30 s, so B is still LIVE
# for the whole run and the trip is graded before liveness has anything to say.
def _tripping_site():
hass = Hass(
{"sensor.grid": 2000.0, "sensor.soc_a": 50.0, "sensor.batt_a": 0.0,
"sensor.soc_b": 50.0, "sensor.batt_b": 0.0},
"sensor.soc_b": 50.0, "sensor.batt_b": 1500.0},
{"number.sp_a": (-A_RATING, A_RATING, 1.0),
"number.sp_b": (-B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, 1.0)},
reject={"number.sp_b"})
store = MemStore()
c, _ = built({"sign_disagree_w": 300, "sign_disagree_s": 1,
"unit_sign_disagree_w": 300, "unit_sign_disagree_s": 1,
"auto_start": True}, store=store, hass=hass)
c.inverters.append(inverter_b(store, sign_cfg=c.inverters[0].sign_wd.cfg))
c.auto = True
# B is standing on a charge command while the house imports 2000 W. Its
# writes are rejected, so this is what it goes on standing at.
# B is standing on a charge command while its own sensor says it is
# discharging. Its writes are rejected, so this is what it goes on
# standing at.
c.inverters[1].last_write = -1500.0
return c, hass, store
@@ -681,10 +771,12 @@ check("⚠️ ...AND THE TRIP IS MIRRORED ONTO THE PRE-DEV-02 FLAT PAIR, WHICH I
# THE RESTART, which is the whole reason the latch is persisted at all.
_h3b = Hass({"sensor.grid": 2000.0, "sensor.soc_a": 50.0,
"sensor.batt_a": 0.0, "sensor.soc_b": 50.0, "sensor.batt_b": 0.0},
"sensor.batt_a": 0.0, "sensor.soc_b": 50.0,
"sensor.batt_b": 1500.0},
{"number.sp_a": (-A_RATING, A_RATING, 1.0),
"number.sp_b": (-B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, 1.0)})
_c3r, _ = built({"sign_disagree_w": 300, "sign_disagree_s": 1,
"unit_sign_disagree_w": 300, "unit_sign_disagree_s": 1,
"auto_start": True}, store=_s3, hass=_h3b)
_c3r.inverters.append(inverter_b(_s3,
sign_cfg=_c3r.inverters[0].sign_wd.cfg))
@@ -703,12 +795,32 @@ check("a brand new Controller against the same store comes back with B "
check("...and A goes on carrying the site target across the restart too",
_c3r.allocation.shares.get("inverter-a") == _c3r.allocation.sum_w
and _c3r.allocation.sum_w != 0)
check("...and the status page shows BOTH rows - one latched, one armed. A "
"single row would have to pick one inverter to describe, and 'the sign "
"watchdog is armed' printed over a latched sibling is the page lying",
len([r for r in _c3r.checks() if "sign watchdog" in r["text"]]) == 1
check("...and the status page shows BOTH per-inverter rows - one latched, one "
"armed. A single row would have to pick one inverter to describe, and "
"'the sign watchdog is armed' printed over a latched sibling is the page "
"lying",
len([r for r in _c3r.checks()
if r["text"].startswith("sign watchdog [")]) == 1
and len([r for r in _c3r.checks()
if "SIGN-DISAGREEMENT FAILSAFE" in r["text"]]) == 1)
if "SIGN-DISAGREEMENT FAILSAFE [" in r["text"]]) == 1)
check("⚠️ AND SAFETY-30's SITE ROW IS THERE BESIDE THEM, EXACTLY ONCE. At two "
"inverters there are three sign questions on this page and they are three "
"rows: is A doing what it was told, is B, and is the SITE'S TOTAL "
"pointing the right way. The last one is not derivable from the other "
"two - both units can execute their shares perfectly while the number "
"they were given is itself wrong - so a page that showed only the "
"per-unit rows would be advertising two guards where the install has "
"three",
len([r for r in _c3r.checks()
if r["text"].startswith("site sign watchdog:")]) == 1)
check("...and the per-inverter rows now say WHAT the unit was compared "
"against, because at a roster of two it is no longer the meter. A row "
"still reading 'the command opposed the meter' would send an operator to "
"look at P1 for a fault that is visible only on one inverter's own power "
"sensor",
all("its own measured power" in r["text"] for r in _c3r.checks()
if r["text"].startswith(("sign watchdog [",
"SIGN-DISAGREEMENT FAILSAFE ["))))
# The operator's clear, which is one button and has to reach every latch.
run(_c3r.handle_action("auto_toggle")) # -> stopped
@@ -728,8 +840,9 @@ check("...and the same press cleared the flat rollback view, so a downgrade "
"- and neither does the next start, which now reads that key on EVERY "
"boot rather than only on the one that migrates",
_s3.data["sign_tripped"] is False and _s3.data["sign_reason"] == "")
_c3r2, _ = built({"sign_disagree_w": 300, "sign_disagree_s": 1}, store=_s3,
hass=_h3b)
_c3r2, _ = built({"sign_disagree_w": 300, "sign_disagree_s": 1,
"unit_sign_disagree_w": 300, "unit_sign_disagree_s": 1},
store=_s3, hass=_h3b)
check("⚠️ AND THE RESTART AFTER THAT CLEAR COMES UP UNLATCHED. This is the "
"'re-arm forever' hazard the every-start guard would have if the clear "
"did not reach both spellings, driven through the real button and a real "
@@ -1324,13 +1437,16 @@ _TWO_OPTS.pop("batt_entity")
_TWO_OPTS["inverters"] = [
dict(name="inverter-a", setpoint_entity="number.sp_a",
soc_entity="sensor.soc_a", batt_entity="sensor.batt_a",
max_w=A_RATING),
max_w=A_RATING, bms_soc_floor=A_BMS_FLOOR),
# ⚠️ 3000 W IS A HYPOTHESIS AND IS MARKED AS ONE WHEREVER IT APPEARS. It is
# here because it DIFFERS from A's 5000 W, which is the only property any
# check below uses. SPIKE-04 measures the real device.
# ⚠️ AND SO IS ITS 15 % CUT-OUT (SAFETY-32). There is no second pack to read
# register 0x0560 off; the value is SIMULATED, and it differs from A's 10 %
# for MUTATION.md habit 1's reason and no other.
dict(name="inverter-b", setpoint_entity="number.sp_b",
soc_entity="sensor.soc_b", batt_entity="sensor.batt_b",
max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS),
max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, bms_soc_floor=B_BMS_FLOOR_SIM),
]
_c9, _hass9 = built(_TWO_OPTS)
print(f" the roster built from `inverters:` -> {[repr(i) for i in _c9.inverters]}")
@@ -1406,14 +1522,19 @@ _decl9 = dict(ln.strip().lstrip("- ").split(": ", 1)
for ln in _entry9.splitlines()[1:] if ": " in ln)
print(f" the shipped per-entry schema: {_decl9}")
check("...and the schema half declares it as a LIST OF OBJECTS whose `name`, "
"`setpoint_entity` and `max_w` are REQUIRED - no trailing `?` - so the "
"Supervisor refuses a half-written entry before the add-on sees it, and "
"an entry can never fall back on a sibling's rating because there is no "
"entry without one",
set(_decl9) == {"name", "setpoint_entity", "max_w", "soc_entity",
"batt_entity", "batt_invert"}
"`setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and `bms_soc_floor` are REQUIRED - no "
"trailing `?` - so the Supervisor refuses a half-written entry before the "
"add-on sees it, and an entry can never fall back on a sibling's rating "
"or on a sibling's BMS cut-out because there is no entry without one. "
"⚠️ SAFETY-32 ADDED THE FOURTH ONE AS REQUIRED RATHER THAN AS "
"`int(0,50)?`, and the difference is the whole of that card: an optional "
"per-pack cut-out is a DEFAULTED one, and a default is one number for "
"two batteries - the shallower pack protected by the deeper pack's BMS",
set(_decl9) == {"name", "setpoint_entity", "max_w", "bms_soc_floor",
"soc_entity", "batt_entity", "batt_invert"}
and not any(_decl9[k].endswith("?")
for k in ("name", "setpoint_entity", "max_w"))
for k in ("name", "setpoint_entity", "max_w",
"bms_soc_floor"))
and all(_decl9[k].endswith("?")
for k in ("soc_entity", "batt_entity", "batt_invert")))
@@ -1495,9 +1616,11 @@ check("...and two inverters on two DIFFERENT entities are accepted, because "
"that is the configuration this card exists for and a validator that "
"fires on the legitimate case gets switched off",
validate_startup_config(_opts(setpoint_entity="", inverters=[
dict(name="inverter-a", setpoint_entity="number.sp_a", max_w=A_RATING),
dict(name="inverter-a", setpoint_entity="number.sp_a", max_w=A_RATING,
bms_soc_floor=A_BMS_FLOOR),
dict(name="inverter-b", setpoint_entity="number.sp_b",
max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS)])) == [])
max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS,
bms_soc_floor=B_BMS_FLOOR_SIM)])) == [])
# --- the rest of rule 9 -------------------------------------------------------
_p_flat = validate_startup_config(_opts(inverters=[
@@ -1594,11 +1717,28 @@ check("⚠️ RULE 5 NAMES THE UNIT THE NUMBER CAME OFF. The weakest cap is "
"is inverter-B. The refusal says inverter-c",
_why(_p_skew, "max_w (inverter-c) is 1000 W")
and not _why(_p_skew, "max_w (inverter-b) is 1000 W"))
check("⚠️ RULE 6 TOO. `caps[0]` is the first entry WITH a usable cap - "
"inverter-b - while `_unit_label(opts, 0)` was hard-wired to inverter-a, "
"so the maintenance refusal quoted B's rating under A's name",
_why(_p_skew, "max_w (inverter-b) is 2000 W")
and not _why(_p_skew, "max_w (inverter-a) is 2000 W"))
# ⚠️ MAINT-05 MOVED RULE 6's SUBJECT, AND THIS CHECK MOVED WITH IT. It used to
# assert the refusal named inverter-b, because rule 6 graded the FIRST entry
# with a usable cap - `Controller.maint_unit` was `inverters[0]` and the shaping
# claim could be filed nowhere else. There is now one `Maintenance` per roster
# entry, so the shaping claim can be filed on ANY pack and the cap that
# contradicts it first is the SMALLEST - inverter-c's 1000 W. The property this
# check exists for is unchanged and is the reason it is still here: the index
# has to travel with the cap, or the message quotes one unit's rating under
# another unit's name.
check("⚠️ RULE 6 TOO, AND SINCE MAINT-05 IT IS THE WEAKEST PACK IT NAMES. "
"inverter-c's 1000 W sits at caps index 1, and `_unit_label(opts, 1)` is "
"inverter-B - so a caps index leaking into a roster index would say "
"inverter-b here. The refusal says inverter-c, with inverter-c's number",
_why(_p_skew, "maintenance_charge_w is 3000 W but max_w (inverter-c) is "
"1000 W")
and not _why(_p_skew, "maintenance_charge_w is 3000 W but max_w "
"(inverter-b)"))
check("...and it is no longer graded against the FIRST usable cap at all, which "
"is the behaviour change MAINT-05 makes here: inverter-b's 2000 W was the "
"pre-card answer and appears nowhere in the maintenance refusal now",
not _why(_p_skew, "maintenance_charge_w is 3000 W but max_w "
"(inverter-b) is 2000 W"))
check("...and the counterfactual, so this is not a check that would pass on a "
"validator that named nothing: the OLD expressions still evaluate, on "
"this same config, to the wrong names",
@@ -2097,6 +2237,16 @@ MUTATIONS = [
("validate.py allowing two roster entries with the SAME name",
"part 10: 'two entries with the SAME name are refused' - one Store "
"namespace for two units is DEV-02's defect rebuilt in YAML"),
("`migrate_unit_keys()`'s marker gate `if rep.ok:` -> `if rep.ok or "
"rep.kept:` - the schema marker stamped on a migration that DROPPED THE "
"LATCH, because one key happened to be namespaced already",
"part 10: 'AND THE STORE IS NOT MARKED MIGRATED'. ⚠️ THIS ONE SURVIVED "
"ALL 19 FILES and was found by MAINT-05's round-3 battery, not by this "
"card: every migration check here reached the gate on a store where "
"NOTHING was namespaced yet, so `rep.kept` was empty in all of them and "
"the `or` never fired. Stamping there disarms the latch AND tells the "
"next start the migration finished, so it never re-arms - DEV-02's own "
"worst case filed under 'done'"),
]
# ⚠️ FOUR OF THESE SURVIVED THE FIRST TIME AND THE CHECKS WERE CHANGED, NOT THE
# TABLE - two in DEV-02, two more in CFG-04, and the CFG-04 pair are recorded in
@@ -2115,7 +2265,7 @@ for what, caught in MUTATIONS:
check(f"all {len(MUTATIONS)} defeats of this card are caught by a named check "
f"above. A guard whose checks survive its own defeat is not a guard, and "
f"this repository has three separate records of exactly that",
len(MUTATIONS) == 34)
len(MUTATIONS) == 35)
print()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ class _Pub:
BASE = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": 0.6, "slew_w": 1000,
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": 0.6, "slew_w": 0,
"deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": -10, "step_w": 10,
"heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+800
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,800 @@
"""Runnable check for TEL-07 - the SECOND MQTT device, and A's history.
`python3 test_mqtt.py`
WHAT THIS FILE IS FOR, in one sentence: to prove by DIFFING THE ANNOUNCED
PAYLOADS - not by reading the code - that giving inverter B its own MQTT device
changes nothing about inverter A's.
⚠️ WHY THAT IS THE WHOLE CARD. `app/mqtt.py`'s own note records the finding:
Home Assistant composes an entity_id from the DEVICE name plus the ENTITY name,
and `object_id` in the discovery payload did NOT override it (tested on HA
2026.8). So re-scoping the device renames every entity - and because HA keeps
the id it composed at FIRST discovery, what a rename actually produces is a NEW
entity beside a DEAD one. The recorded history stays behind on the old id, and
every dashboard, template and automation that names it - including the three
live watchdog automations `goodwe_master_watchdog_held_*` and
`goodwe_master_parked_at_0_w_*` - goes on pointing at an entity that has quietly
stopped updating. Nothing errors. That is the failure this file exists to make
impossible to ship.
⚠️ AND THE TEMPTING DESIGN IS THE DESTRUCTIVE ONE. "One device per inverter" -
A becomes `inverter-a`, B becomes `inverter-b` - is symmetrical and tidy and is
exactly the change described above. A KEEPS THE DEVICE IT ALREADY HAS; only B
gets a new one. Part 8 below writes that tidy version and shows it going red.
THE SHAPE OF THE EVIDENCE. Part 1 records what `release/1.0` actually publishes -
generated by running THAT commit's module, not transcribed - and every later
part is a diff against it, reported as `N topics, M missing, C changed, A added`.
Part 1 The recorded baseline, and the diff at a roster of one and of none.
Part 2 `_announce()` publishes EXACTLY `discovery_payloads()` and nothing
else, so parts 1 and 3-8 are diffing what goes on the wire.
Part 3 A roster of two: A's nine messages byte-identical, eight added.
Part 4 Zero overlap between A's entities and B's - topics, unique_ids,
object_ids, state topics, and devices.
Part 5 Site-scoped sensors stay site-scoped, at every roster length 1-6.
Part 6 The composed entity_ids, modelled INDEPENDENTLY of `app/mqtt.py`, and
anchored on the one composed id that was verified against the live
system (`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, mqtt.py's own note).
Part 7 ⚠️ THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE PUBLICATION AGREE, on a real `Controller`,
with the two units carrying DIFFERENT numbers - so a swap is visible.
Part 8 ⚠️ VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. Twelve mutations of the shipped module,
re-executed from mutated source, each one named with the property it
breaks. A property nothing breaks is a property nothing is watching.
Part 9 What these checks CANNOT see, enumerated and sized.
⚠️ THE FIXTURE GIVES A AND B DIFFERENT NAMES, DIFFERENT RATINGS, DIFFERENT SoC,
DIFFERENT BATTERY POWER AND DIFFERENT LATCH STATES, ON PURPOSE. A fixture whose
two units are equal cannot observe a bug that swaps them - MUTATION.md habit 4,
and the defect this repository has now shipped six cards in a row.
⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12). Every number attributed
to it below is SIMULATED, from the datasheet and serial recorded in NOTES.md
§1.1b (GW5048D-ES, serial 55048ESU22AW0992, max_w 4600 W). Nothing here is
measured, and nothing here should ever be quoted as if it were.
⚠️ MUTATING THE MODULE THIS FILE GRADES? PURGE `__pycache__` FIRST - or run
`tools/mutation_run.sh`, which does. `python3 -B` alone does NOT save you: it
stops bytecode being WRITTEN, not a stale one being READ. Read MUTATION.md.
Part 8 sidesteps the whole problem by exec'ing mutated SOURCE into a fresh
namespace, so no `.pyc` is involved at any point.
"""
import ast
import asyncio
import hashlib
import json
import re
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from app import mqtt
from app.inverter import build_roster, roster_names
from app.main import Controller
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
MQTT_SRC = (HERE / "app" / "mqtt.py").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
fails = []
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The recorded baseline. ⚠️ GENERATED, NOT TRANSCRIBED. Reproduce it with:
#
# git show release/1.0:goodwe_controller/app/mqtt.py > /tmp/mqtt_base.py
# python3 - <<'EOF'
# import sys; sys.path.insert(0, "/tmp"); import mqtt_base as M
# class F:
# def __init__(self): self.m = []
# def publish(self, t, p=None, retain=False): self.m.append((t, p, retain))
# p = M.MqttPublisher.__new__(M.MqttPublisher)
# p.omit, p.client, p.enabled = set(), F(), True
# p._announce()
# for row in p.client.m: print(row)
# EOF
#
# A transcription would be a check that grades this branch against MY MEMORY of
# release/1.0 rather than against release/1.0.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_DEV = ('{"identifiers": ["goodwe_rs485_controller"], "name": "GoodWe", '
'"manufacturer": "GoodWe (via RS485 meter emulation)", '
'"model": "ES/BP series"}')
BASELINE = [
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_setpoint/config',
'{"name": "Setpoint", "object_id": "goodwe_setpoint", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_setpoint", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/setpoint", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "W", "device_class": "power", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_grid/config',
'{"name": "Grid power", "object_id": "goodwe_grid_power", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_grid", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/grid", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "W", "device_class": "power", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_battery/config',
'{"name": "Battery power", "object_id": "goodwe_battery_power", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_battery", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/battery", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "W", "device_class": "power", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_soc/config',
'{"name": "Battery SoC", "object_id": "goodwe_battery_soc", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_soc", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/soc", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "%", "device_class": "battery", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_circulation/config',
'{"name": "Circulating power", "object_id": "goodwe_circulating_power", '
'"unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_circulation", "state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/circulation", '
'"availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", "device": ' + _DEV + ', '
'"unit_of_measurement": "W", "device_class": "power", "state_class": "measurement", '
'"icon": "mdi:sync-alert"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_phase/config',
'{"name": "Maintenance phase", "object_id": "goodwe_maintenance_phase", '
'"unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_phase", "state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/phase", '
'"availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", "device": ' + _DEV + ', '
'"icon": "mdi:battery-sync"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_status/config',
'{"name": "Controller status", "object_id": "goodwe_controller_status", '
'"unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_status", "state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/status", '
'"availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", "device": ' + _DEV + ', '
'"icon": "mdi:heart-pulse"}', True),
('homeassistant/sensor/goodwe_ctl_p1_age/config',
'{"name": "P1 sample age", "object_id": "p1_sample_age_s", "unique_id": "goodwe_ctl_p1_age", '
'"state_topic": "goodwe_ctl/p1_age", "availability_topic": "goodwe_ctl/availability", '
'"device": ' + _DEV + ', "unit_of_measurement": "s", "device_class": "duration", '
'"state_class": "measurement"}', True),
('goodwe_ctl/availability', 'online', True),
]
class FakeClient:
"""Captures what `_announce()` actually hands paho."""
def __init__(self):
self.msgs = []
def publish(self, topic, payload=None, retain=False):
self.msgs.append((topic, payload, retain))
def announce(units=(), omit=(), module=mqtt):
"""The messages `_announce()` publishes, through the SHIPPED method.
⚠️ Not `discovery_payloads()` directly. Part 2 proves the two agree; every
other part goes through this one, so what is diffed is what paho is told.
"""
pub = module.MqttPublisher.__new__(module.MqttPublisher)
pub.omit = set(omit)
pub.units = [str(u) for u in units]
pub.enabled = True
pub.client = FakeClient()
pub._announce()
return pub.client.msgs
def diff(got, want=BASELINE):
"""`(missing, changed, added)` between two announcement lists, by topic."""
g, w = dict((t, (p, r)) for t, p, r in got), dict((t, (p, r)) for t, p, r in want)
missing = [t for t in w if t not in g]
changed = [t for t in w if t in g and g[t] != w[t]]
added = [t for t in g if t not in w]
return sorted(missing), sorted(changed), sorted(added)
def report(label, got, want=BASELINE):
m, c, a = diff(got, want)
print(f" {label}: {len(want)} topics, {len(m)} missing, {len(c)} changed, "
f"{len(a)} added")
for t in m:
print(f" MISSING {t}")
for t in c:
print(f" CHANGED {t}")
for t in a:
print(f" ADDED {t}")
return m, c, a
def cfgs(msgs):
"""The discovery payloads, parsed, without the availability message."""
return [json.loads(p) for t, p, _ in msgs if t.startswith("homeassistant/")]
# The roster this card exists for. ⚠️ SIMULATED: inverter B does not physically
# exist. Its rating is the datasheet's (NOTES.md §1.1b, GW5048D-ES, serial
# 55048ESU22AW0992) and has never been measured.
OPTS2 = {
"meter_source": "off",
"inverters": [
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp_a",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc_a", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt_a",
"max_w": 2000, "bms_soc_floor": 10},
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp_b",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc_b", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt_b",
"max_w": 4600, "bms_soc_floor": 10},
],
}
NAMES2 = roster_names(OPTS2)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n1. the recorded baseline, and a roster of one")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# AC 1 and AC 4. ⚠️ THE COMPARISON IS BYTE-FOR-BYTE ON THE PAYLOAD STRING, not
# on a parsed dict. `json.dumps` writes keys in insertion order, so a reordered
# payload is a different retained message on the broker even though the parsed
# dicts compare equal - and a reordered payload is a re-announcement of every
# entity on a live install.
m, c, a = report("roster of one (`inverters:` empty, i.e. every install today)",
announce(units=roster_names({})))
check("⭐ AT THE SHIPPED ROSTER OF ONE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS BYTE-IDENTICAL TO "
"release/1.0: same topics, same unique_ids, same payload bytes, same "
"retain flags, in the same order - no second device, no renamed entity, "
"no added topic",
(m, c, a) == ([], [], []) and announce(units=roster_names({})) == BASELINE)
check("...and the roster-of-one path is the one every install actually reads: "
"an empty `inverters:` names exactly one unit",
roster_names({}) == ["inverter-a"])
check("...and a publisher told NOTHING about the roster announces the same "
"thing, so a caller that has not been taught about units cannot change "
"what a live install sees",
announce(units=()) == BASELINE)
m, c, a = report("roster of one, P1 off (`omit=('p1_age',)`)",
announce(units=roster_names({}), omit=("p1_age",)),
[row for row in BASELINE if "p1_age" not in row[0]])
check("...and the `omit` path is unchanged too: with P1 ingestion off the "
"watchdog input is still not announced, and nothing else moved",
(m, c, a) == ([], [], []))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n2. what is diffed is what goes on the wire")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ WITHOUT THIS PART, PARTS 1 AND 3-8 GRADE A FUNCTION THE ADD-ON MIGHT NOT
# USE. `_announce()` used to build its payloads inline; if it still did, every
# diff here would be a diff of a second implementation that happens to sit in
# the same file. This is the join.
_direct = [(t, json.dumps(cfg), True)
for t, cfg in mqtt.discovery_payloads(NAMES2)] + \
[(mqtt.AVAILABILITY, "online", True)]
check("`_announce()` publishes EXACTLY `discovery_payloads()`, in order, with "
"retain set, plus the availability message - so every diff in this file "
"is a diff of the bytes paho is handed",
announce(units=NAMES2) == _direct)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n3. a roster of two: A untouched, B added")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TWO = announce(units=NAMES2)
m, c, a = report("roster of two (inverter-a + inverter-b, SIMULATED)", TWO)
check("⭐ AC 1: AT A ROSTER OF TWO, EVERY ONE OF A's NINE MESSAGES IS STILL "
"BYTE-IDENTICAL - nothing missing, nothing changed. This is the criterion "
"the live install's recorded history depends on, and it is a diff of the "
"payloads, not a reading of the code",
(m, c) == ([], []))
check("...and the eight additions are all B's and A's own per-unit rows, and "
"all of them are NEW topics", len(a) == 8)
check("...and A's nine messages are still the FIRST nine, in the same order, "
"so a broker replaying retained messages sees them unchanged",
TWO[:len(BASELINE) - 1] == BASELINE[:-1])
site_ids = {c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(BASELINE)}
unit_cfgs = [c_ for c_ in cfgs(TWO) if c_["unique_id"] not in site_ids]
a_cfgs = [c_ for c_ in unit_cfgs if "inverter_a" in c_["unique_id"]]
b_cfgs = [c_ for c_ in unit_cfgs if "inverter_b" in c_["unique_id"]]
check("A's per-unit rows stay on THE DEVICE A ALREADY HAS - no new device is "
"created for the first roster entry, which is the whole asymmetry",
len(a_cfgs) == 4
and all(c_["device"] == mqtt.DEVICE for c_ in a_cfgs))
check("⭐ AC 2: B's rows are on B's OWN device, with its own identifiers",
len(b_cfgs) == 4
and all(c_["device"]["identifiers"] == ["goodwe_rs485_controller_inverter_b"]
for c_ in b_cfgs))
check("...and B's device hangs off the controller's via `via_device`, so HA "
"shows one controller driving two inverters rather than two strangers",
all(c_["device"].get("via_device") == mqtt.DEVICE["identifiers"][0]
for c_ in b_cfgs))
check("...and B's device carries the SAME manufacturer and model as the site "
"device - it is the same installation, not a second product",
all(c_["device"]["manufacturer"] == mqtt.DEVICE["manufacturer"]
and c_["device"]["model"] == mqtt.DEVICE["model"] for c_ in b_cfgs))
# A regression pin on the NEW payloads. ⚠️ THIS IS NOT EVIDENCE OF CORRECTNESS -
# it is generated from this branch, so it can only say "these bytes have not
# changed since the PR was reviewed". It exists because B's payloads have no
# released version to be diffed against, and a later edit that quietly changes
# a per-unit `device_class` or state topic should have to be deliberate.
_pin = hashlib.sha256(
json.dumps(unit_cfgs, sort_keys=False).encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
print(" the eight per-unit payloads, in announcement order:")
for c_ in unit_cfgs:
print(f" {c_['unique_id']:<40} {c_['object_id']:<34} "
f"{c_['state_topic']}")
print(f" regression pin (sha256 of the eight payloads): {_pin}")
check("the per-unit payloads are the ones this PR was reviewed with "
"(REGRESSION PIN, not a correctness claim - see the comment)",
_pin == "eb5022b0455158d7")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n4. zero overlap between A's entities and B's")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def field(rows, key):
return [r[key] for r in rows]
for key in ("unique_id", "object_id", "state_topic"):
av, bv = set(field(a_cfgs, key)), set(field(b_cfgs, key))
sv = set(field(cfgs(BASELINE), key))
check(f"⭐ AC 2: no `{key}` is shared between A's entities and B's, and "
f"none of B's collides with a SITE entity that already exists",
len(av) == 4 and len(bv) == 4 and not (av & bv) and not (bv & sv)
and not (av & sv))
all_ids = field(cfgs(TWO), "unique_id")
check("...and across the WHOLE announcement every unique_id is distinct - an "
"HA discovery collision is not an error, it DROPS the second entity, so "
"one inverter's telemetry would silently stop existing",
len(all_ids) == len(set(all_ids)) == 16)
all_topics = [t for t, _, _ in TWO]
check("...and so is every topic", len(all_topics) == len(set(all_topics)) == 17)
# ⚠️ THE SLUG COLLISION rule 9(c) DOES NOT REFUSE. `inverter-b` and `Inverter B`
# are two different names by the validator's test and one string once slugged.
COLLIDE = announce(units=["inverter-b", "Inverter B"])
col_ids = field(cfgs(COLLIDE), "unique_id")
print(" two names that slug alike ('inverter-b', 'Inverter B') ->",
[c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(COLLIDE) if c_["unique_id"] not in site_ids])
check("two roster names that differ only in case and punctuation - which "
"`validate.py` rule 9(c) accepts, because it refuses only EXACT "
"duplicates - still get distinct unique_ids",
len(col_ids) == len(set(col_ids)))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n5. site-scoped sensors stay site-scoped")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ `p1_sample_age_s` IS A WATCHDOG INPUT (mqtt.py's `omit` note and the ESP32
# firmware's ingest guard). A second copy of it is a second answer to "is the
# meter fresh?", one of which is always the one nobody is looking at. `grid` is
# the same argument without the safety edge: there is ONE grid connection.
SITE_ONLY = ("goodwe_ctl_grid", "goodwe_ctl_p1_age", "goodwe_ctl_circulation",
"goodwe_ctl_phase", "goodwe_ctl_status")
rows = []
for n in range(1, 7):
names = [f"inverter-{chr(ord('a') + i)}" for i in range(n)]
ids = field(cfgs(announce(units=names)), "unique_id")
rows.append((n, [ids.count(s) for s in SITE_ONLY], len(ids)))
print(f" roster of {n}: {len(ids)} entities, "
+ ", ".join(f"{s}x{ids.count(s)}" for s in SITE_ONLY))
check("⭐ AC 3: `grid` and `p1_sample_age_s` are announced EXACTLY ONCE at every "
"roster length from 1 to 6 - announcing them per inverter would invent "
"two of a thing there is one of, and would duplicate a safety signal",
all(counts == [1] * len(SITE_ONLY) for _n, counts, _t in rows))
check("...and the site set does not grow with the roster while the per-unit "
"set does: 8 site entities always, 4 more per unit past the first",
[t for _n, _c, t in rows] == [8, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32])
site_devices = {json.dumps(c_["device"], sort_keys=True)
for c_ in cfgs(announce(units=NAMES2))
if c_["unique_id"] in site_ids}
check("...and every site entity is still on the SITE device, at a roster of two",
site_devices == {json.dumps(mqtt.DEVICE, sort_keys=True)})
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n6. the composed entity_ids")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ THIS SLUGIFIER IS DELIBERATELY NOT `mqtt._slug`. Importing the module's own
# spelling would make the model and the subject move together, so a mutation in
# the slugifier would change both sides equally and be invisible - "a check
# whose data cannot reach the failure it names", written in one import.
def compose(device_name, entity_name):
"""HA's entity_id for a discovery payload, per mqtt.py's own note."""
s = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "_", f"{device_name} {entity_name}".lower())
return "sensor." + s.strip("_")
# The ONE anchor there is: mqtt.py records that the live entity is
# `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, verified against the live system 2026-08-26,
# and that the firmware subscribes to that composed name. If this model does not
# reproduce that id, the model is wrong and every claim below it is worthless.
p1 = [c_ for c_ in cfgs(BASELINE) if c_["unique_id"] == "goodwe_ctl_p1_age"][0]
check("the model reproduces the ONE composed entity_id that was verified "
"against the live system - `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, which the ESP32 "
"ingest guard subscribes to - from the device name and the entity name",
compose(mqtt.DEVICE["name"], p1["name"]) == "sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age")
check("...and that id is NOT the `object_id` in the payload "
"(`p1_sample_age_s`), which is the whole reason the device name is "
"load-bearing and mqtt.py says so in capitals",
p1["object_id"] != "goodwe_p1_sample_age")
composed = [compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"]) for c_ in cfgs(TWO)]
print(" every composed entity_id at a roster of two:")
for c_, eid in zip(cfgs(TWO), composed):
print(f" {eid:<46} <- device {c_['device']['name']!r} + "
f"name {c_['name']!r}")
check("⭐ every composed entity_id at a roster of two is DISTINCT: no per-unit "
"entity can land on top of a site entity that already has history",
len(composed) == len(set(composed)) == 16)
base_composed = [compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"]) for c_ in cfgs(BASELINE)]
check("...and the eight ids that exist today are unchanged by adding B, which "
"is AC 1 restated in the units HA actually uses",
composed[:8] == base_composed)
check("...and the per-unit ids come out SYMMETRIC even though the devices are "
"not - sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power beside "
"sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power - which is the entire benefit of "
"the 'one device per inverter' design, without its cost",
"sensor.goodwe_inverter_a_battery_power" in composed
and "sensor.goodwe_inverter_b_battery_power" in composed)
check("...and for every per-unit entity `object_id` equals the composed id, so "
"the two mechanisms agree and an HA that DID honour object_id would "
"produce the same ids as one that does not",
all("sensor." + c_["object_id"] == compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"])
for c_ in unit_cfgs))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n7. the announcement and the publication agree")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ THE HAZARD mqtt.py's `omit` NOTE NAMES: an entity that exists and is never
# fed is a worse signal than one that does not exist. So the set of per-unit
# topics ANNOUNCED and the set `Controller.publish()` actually writes have to be
# the same set - and, because a matching set of KEYS is not a matching set of
# VALUES, the two units carry DIFFERENT numbers here so that a swap is red.
class _Store:
data = {}
def set(self, *a):
pass
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
class _Pub:
def __init__(self):
self.last = {}
self.units = []
def publish(self, values):
self.last = dict(values)
def close(self):
pass
def controlled(opts, soc, batt, tripped):
"""A real Controller with per-unit readings planted. SIMULATED values."""
# ⚠️ `stop` is a REQUIRED keyword (CFG-01): a Controller that cannot stop
# itself used to be the default one. These cases only call publish(), so any
# Event will do - but they may not skip it.
pub = _Pub()
ctl = Controller(dict(opts), None, _Store(), pub, stop=asyncio.Event())
for inv, s, b, t in zip(ctl.inverters, soc, batt, tripped):
inv.soc, inv.batt, inv.target = s, b, -1.0 * b
inv.sign_wd.tripped = t
ctl.publish()
return ctl, pub.last
# A 41 / 88 %, A discharging 1200 W, B charging 300 W, and B latched, not A.
# Every one of those six numbers differs from its sibling, which is what makes
# the assertions below able to see a swap.
ctl2, vals2 = controlled(OPTS2, [41.0, 88.0], [1200.0, -300.0], [False, True])
announced_unit_topics = {c_["state_topic"] for c_ in unit_cfgs}
published_unit_topics = {f"{mqtt.BASE}/{k}" for k in vals2 if k.startswith("unit/")}
print(f" announced per-unit topics {len(announced_unit_topics)}, "
f"published {len(published_unit_topics)}, "
f"announced-but-never-fed {sorted(announced_unit_topics - published_unit_topics)}, "
f"fed-but-never-announced {sorted(published_unit_topics - announced_unit_topics)}")
check("⭐ every per-unit entity announced is one the controller actually "
"publishes to, and every per-unit topic published is one that was "
"announced - no entity that nothing feeds, no topic nothing declared",
announced_unit_topics == published_unit_topics)
check("⭐ AND THE VALUES LAND ON THE RIGHT UNIT: A's 41 % on A's topic and B's "
"88 % on B's, not the other way round",
vals2["unit/inverter_a/soc"] == 41.0
and vals2["unit/inverter_b/soc"] == 88.0)
check("...and the same for battery power, whose SIGNS differ between the two "
"units here (A discharging, B charging) so a swap cannot hide in a "
"magnitude",
vals2["unit/inverter_a/battery"] == 1200.0
and vals2["unit/inverter_b/battery"] == -300.0)
check("...and the SAFETY-02 sign latch is per unit: B is latched and A is not, "
"and the two rows say so separately",
vals2["unit/inverter_a/sign_latch"] == "clear"
and vals2["unit/inverter_b/sign_latch"] == "tripped")
check("...and each unit's setpoint row is its OWN share, not the site target",
vals2["unit/inverter_a/setpoint"] == -1200.0
and vals2["unit/inverter_b/setpoint"] == 300.0)
check("...and the SITE rows still mean what they meant: `soc` is the EMPTIEST "
"pack (41 %, not 88 and not the mean) and `battery` is the SUM (900 W), "
"so this card added rows beside them and did not re-point them",
vals2["soc"] == 41.0 and round(vals2["battery"]) == 900)
_, vals1 = controlled({"meter_source": "off", "setpoint_entity": "number.sp"},
[55.0], [700.0], [False])
print(f" roster of one publishes keys: {sorted(vals1)}")
check("⭐ AC 4 on the PUBLISH side: at a roster of one not one `unit/...` topic "
"is written either, so the live install's broker sees no new topic at all",
not [k for k in vals1 if k.startswith("unit/")])
# --- 7b. the wiring, which nothing above reaches -----------------------------
# ⚠️ FOUND BY MUTATION, NOT BY DESIGN. `units=()` in main()'s `MqttPublisher(...)`
# call survived every check in this file: parts 1-7 build the publisher
# themselves, so a controller publishing eight per-unit topics beside a
# publisher announcing none of them was GREEN. That is this repository's
# recurring defect - a check whose data cannot reach the failure it names - in
# the one line that joins the two halves together.
check("`roster_names()` and `build_roster()` give the same names in the same "
"order, on every shape - the flat keys, a declared roster, a nameless "
"entry and a non-dict entry - so the names the publisher is handed are "
"the names the units answer to",
all([inv.name for inv in build_roster(o, None)] == roster_names(o)
for o in ({}, {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp"}, OPTS2,
{"inverters": [{}, {}]},
{"inverters": [{"name": "roof west"}, "junk"]})))
check("...and a nameless entry gets a POSITIONAL name, not `inverter-a` twice: "
"two units under one name share one Store namespace, so one unit's "
"SAFETY-02 latch would be the other's",
roster_names({"inverters": [{}, {}]}) == ["inverter-1", "inverter-2"])
_call = [n for n in ast.walk(ast.parse((HERE / "app" / "main.py").read_text()))
if isinstance(n, ast.Call) and isinstance(n.func, ast.Name)
and n.func.id == "MqttPublisher"]
_kw = [k for c_ in _call for k in c_.keywords if k.arg == "units"]
print(f" main.py builds MqttPublisher {len(_call)} time(s); "
f"units= is " + (ast.unparse(_kw[0].value) if _kw else "ABSENT"))
check("⚠️ A SOURCE READ, AND THE WEAKEST CHECK IN THIS FILE - said so rather "
"than dressed up. main()'s one `MqttPublisher(...)` hands it "
"`roster_names(opts)`; nothing else here can reach that line, because "
"main() opens a broker, a web server and a control loop",
len(_call) == 1 and len(_kw) == 1
and ast.unparse(_kw[0].value) == "roster_names(opts)")
# --- 7c. a name that is not ASCII -------------------------------------------
# HA transliterates before it slugs; this module cannot, so it treats anything
# outside ASCII as a separator. Either way the id must be an id.
_odd = announce(units=["caf\u00e9-a", "caf\u00e9-b"])
_odd_unit = [c_ for c_ in cfgs(_odd) if c_["unique_id"] not in site_ids]
print(" a roster named with non-ASCII ->",
sorted({c_["unique_id"] for c_ in _odd_unit}))
check("every unique_id, object_id and state topic this module produces is "
"lowercase ASCII, even from a roster name that is not - an id HA would "
"not have composed is an entity nothing can subscribe to",
_odd_unit
and all(re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9_]+", c_[k])
for c_ in _odd_unit for k in ("unique_id", "object_id"))
and all(re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9_/]+", c_["state_topic"])
for c_ in _odd_unit))
# The topics the SHIPPED controller actually feeds at a roster of two. Part 8
# grades every mutant announcement against this, which is what turns "the
# announcement changed" into "the announcement now claims an entity nothing
# will ever publish to".
FED = set(published_unit_topics)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n8. verified by breaking it")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ MUTATED SOURCE, EXEC'D INTO A FRESH NAMESPACE. No file is edited and no
# `.pyc` is consulted, so TEST-15's stale-bytecode failure cannot produce a
# false survivor here. `app/mqtt.py` imports nothing from this package, which is
# what makes exec'ing it standalone honest rather than a stub.
def load(pairs):
"""`app/mqtt.py` with `pairs` applied, executed into a fresh module.
⚠️ EVERY ANCHOR MUST OCCUR EXACTLY ONCE. A mutation whose anchor has drifted
out of the file would otherwise apply to nothing and be reported as a
survivor - a false red on the instrument rather than on the module.
"""
src = MQTT_SRC
for old, new in pairs:
if src.count(old) != 1:
raise AssertionError(f"mutation anchor not unique: {old!r}")
src = src.replace(old, new)
mod = type(sys)("mqtt_mutant")
exec(compile(src, "<mutant>", "exec"), mod.__dict__)
return mod
def properties(mod):
"""Every claim this file makes, as booleans, over ONE module."""
out = {}
try:
base = announce(units=["inverter-a"], module=mod)
two = announce(units=["inverter-a", "inverter-b"], module=mod)
none = announce(units=(), module=mod)
col = announce(units=["inverter-b", "Inverter B"], module=mod)
tc = cfgs(two)
uc = [c_ for c_ in tc if c_["unique_id"] not in site_ids]
bc = [c_ for c_ in uc if "inverter_b" in c_["unique_id"]]
ac = [c_ for c_ in uc if "inverter_a" in c_["unique_id"]]
comp = [compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"]) for c_ in tc]
out["A byte-identical at N=1"] = base == BASELINE
out["A byte-identical at N=2"] = diff(two)[:2] == ([], [])
out["N=1 adds no topic"] = len(base) == len(none) == len(BASELINE)
out["unique_ids all distinct"] = (
len(set(c_["unique_id"] for c_ in tc)) == len(tc))
out["slug-alike names still distinct"] = (
len(set(c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(col))) == len(cfgs(col)))
out["no composed entity_id collision"] = len(set(comp)) == len(comp)
out["object_id == composed id"] = all(
"sensor." + c_["object_id"] == compose(c_["device"]["name"], c_["name"])
for c_ in uc)
out["A keeps the device it has"] = bool(ac) and all(
c_["device"] == mqtt.DEVICE for c_ in ac)
out["B has its own device"] = bool(bc) and all(
c_["device"]["identifiers"] != mqtt.DEVICE["identifiers"] for c_ in bc)
out["B is via_device the site"] = bool(bc) and all(
c_["device"].get("via_device") == mqtt.DEVICE["identifiers"][0]
for c_ in bc)
out["site sensors announced once"] = all(
[c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(announce(units=[f"i{j}" for j in range(n)],
module=mod))].count(s) == 1
for n in (1, 2, 3) for s in SITE_ONLY)
# ⚠️ TWO PROPERTIES THAT WERE MISSING, AND THE INSTRUMENT FOUND THEIR
# ABSENCE ITSELF: on the first run of this table, "the unit is dropped
# from the state topic" and "`grid` is moved to the per-unit set" were
# both GREEN. The first collapses A's and B's four topics onto one set
# of four, so both inverters read one number; the second announces a
# per-inverter grid sensor, which is the exact thing AC 3 forbids. The
# ids stayed distinct through both, so every property above missed them.
out["per-unit state topics all distinct"] = (
len({c_["state_topic"] for c_ in uc}) == len(uc))
# ⚠️ GRADED AGAINST THE SHIPPED `Controller.publish()`, on purpose. An
# announcement is only honest if something feeds it - mqtt.py's `omit`
# note - so a per-unit entity the controller will never publish to is a
# defect however tidy its id looks. (A rename applied to BOTH halves at
# once is invisible here and is disclosed in part 9; a rename applied to
# one half is what actually happens, and is red.)
out["every announced per-unit topic is fed"] = (
{c_["state_topic"] for c_ in uc} == FED)
except Exception as err: # a mutation that CRASHES proves nothing; say so
out["did not raise"] = False
out["__error__"] = repr(err)[:70]
return out
SHIPPED = properties(mqtt)
check("the shipped module satisfies every property this instrument grades - "
"so a red below is the mutation and not the instrument",
all(v is True for k, v in SHIPPED.items()))
MUTATIONS = [
("⭐ RE-SCOPE A's DEVICE NAME (the destructive change, AC 5)",
[('"name": "GoodWe",', '"name": "GoodWe Inverter A",')]),
("⭐ RE-SCOPE A's DEVICE IDENTIFIERS",
[('"identifiers": ["goodwe_rs485_controller"],',
'"identifiers": ["goodwe_inverter_a"],')]),
("⭐ THE TEMPTING TIDY DESIGN: one device per inverter, A included",
[("device = DEVICE if i == 0 else unit_device(name, slug)",
"device = unit_device(name, slug)"),
('prefix = f"{_title(name)} " if i == 0 else ""', 'prefix = ""')]),
("B's rows land on A's device instead of B's own",
[("device = DEVICE if i == 0 else unit_device(name, slug)",
"device = DEVICE")]),
("A's per-unit entity names lose the unit prefix",
[('prefix = f"{_title(name)} " if i == 0 else ""', 'prefix = ""')]),
("per-unit entities announced at a roster of ONE",
[("PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER = 2", "PER_UNIT_MIN_ROSTER = 1")]),
("the unit is dropped from the unique_id",
[('unique_id = f"{BASE}_unit_{slug}_{key}"',
'unique_id = f"{BASE}_unit_{key}"')]),
("the unit is dropped from the state topic",
[('return f"unit/{slug}/{key}"', 'return f"unit/{key}"')]),
("the slug de-collision is removed (rule 9(c) does not cover this)",
[("while slug in seen:", "while False and slug in seen:")]),
("every unit takes the FIRST unit's slug",
[("for i, (name, slug) in enumerate(zip(names, slugs)):",
"for i, (name, slug) in enumerate(zip(names, [slugs[0]] * len(slugs))):")]),
("`grid` is moved to the per-unit set (site sensor announced per inverter)",
[(' ("setpoint", "setpoint", "Setpoint", "W", "power", "measurement", None),\n',
' ("setpoint", "setpoint", "Setpoint", "W", "power", "measurement", None),\n'
' ("grid", "grid_power", "Grid power", "W", "power", "measurement", None),\n')]),
("B's device drops `via_device`",
[(' "via_device": DEVICE["identifiers"][0],\n', "")]),
]
survivors = []
for label, pairs in MUTATIONS:
got = properties(load(pairs))
broke = sorted(k for k, v in SHIPPED.items()
if v is True and got.get(k) is not True)
if not broke:
survivors.append(label)
print(f" {'RED ' if broke else 'GREEN'} {label}")
if broke:
print(f" breaks: {', '.join(broke)}")
elif got.get("__error__"):
print(f" raised: {got['__error__']}")
check(f"⭐ ALL {len(MUTATIONS)} MUTATIONS ARE RED, each on a NAMED property: "
"re-scoping A's device, the tidy one-device-per-inverter design, B "
"landing on A's device, per-unit entities at a roster of one, a unit "
"dropped from an id or a topic, two units sharing a slug, and a site "
"sensor announced per inverter. A mutation nothing catches is a claim "
"nothing is watching",
not survivors)
if survivors:
print(" SURVIVED:", "; ".join(survivors))
# ⚠️ AC 6, THE FIXTURE'S OWN NON-VACUITY. If A and B were given the same name
# the whole of part 4 would still be green and would be observing nothing.
same = announce(units=["inverter-a", "inverter-a"])
swapped = announce(units=["inverter-b", "inverter-a"])
check("...and the fixture's two units are genuinely distinguishable: swapping "
"their order changes the announcement, and a roster of two IDENTICAL "
"names - which rule 9(c) refuses, and which this file therefore never "
"relies on - would still not collide",
swapped != TWO
and len({c_["unique_id"] for c_ in cfgs(same)}) == len(cfgs(same)))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print("\n9. what this file CANNOT see, enumerated and sized")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
for line in [
"1. HA ITSELF IS NOT IN THE LOOP. `compose()` in part 6 is a MODEL of how "
"HA 2026.8 builds an entity_id, anchored on exactly ONE measured id "
"(sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age, mqtt.py's note, verified 2026-08-26). If HA "
"changes that rule, or if it differs for a device with `via_device`, every "
"id claim here moves with it and this file stays green. SIZE: the 8 "
"per-unit ids at N=2. It cannot be closed from this repository - it needs a "
"broker, an HA, and the owner present.",
"2. THE TICKET AND THE MODULE DISAGREE ABOUT THE LIVE IDs. The card quotes "
"`sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_soc`; mqtt.py records "
"`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`. Those cannot both come from one composition "
"rule - the first is the id an EARLIER device name composed, and HA keeps "
"whatever it composed at first discovery. This card does not need to "
"resolve it, because it renames no device and no entity, and the byte-diff "
"protects both spellings equally. SIZE: unresolved, 8 live entity ids; it "
"wants one look at the live registry, which this branch must not take.",
"3. THE PER-UNIT PAYLOADS HAVE NO RELEASED BASELINE. A's are diffed against "
"release/1.0; B's can only be diffed against this branch (the sha256 pin in "
"part 3). A wrong `device_class` or unit on a per-unit sensor is therefore "
"caught as a CHANGE from review, not as an error. SIZE: 4 sensors x 4 "
"optional fields.",
"4. NO CHECK HERE RUNS A BROKER. `_announce()` is graded through a fake "
"paho client, so QoS, retain semantics on a real broker, and what HA does "
"with a retained config for a device it has never seen are all out of "
"scope. SIZE: the whole transport.",
"5. THE SLUG DE-COLLISION IS ORDER-DEPENDENT. `inverter-b` before "
"`Inverter B` gives the SECOND one the `_2` suffix; reordering the roster "
"swaps which unit's ids move. Rule 9(c) does not refuse slug-alike names, "
"so this is reachable from a config an operator can write. SIZE: 4 ids on "
"one unit, and only when two names slug alike. Filed as a follow-up rather "
"than fixed in validate.py here, because a new refusal at startup on a "
"LIVE install is a bigger change than this card is allowed to be.",
"7. PART 8 MUTATES `app/mqtt.py` ONLY. `Controller.publish()`'s four "
"per-unit lines are graded by part 7 - with different SoC, different "
"battery sign and different latch states on the two units, so a swap or a "
"mis-paired slug is red - but no automated table mutates main.py here. "
"Those mutations were run by hand through `tools/mutation_run.sh` and are "
"recorded in the PR. SIZE: 4 lines. Also invisible: a rename of "
"`unit_state_key()` applied to BOTH halves at once, which is harmless "
"(the topics are internal) but would move every per-unit state topic "
"silently.",
"6. `inverter AC power` AND PER-UNIT HEARTBEAT AGE ARE NOT ANNOUNCED. The "
"card lists both as per-unit; neither has a source in the add-on today "
"(nothing reads an AC-power register per unit, and `inv.last_beat` is a "
"monotonic loop clock). Announcing them would create entities nothing "
"feeds. SIZE: 2 sensors x N units, deliberately absent, named in the PR.",
]:
print(" " + line)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED:")
for f in fails:
print(" -", f)
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+369
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@@ -0,0 +1,369 @@
"""UX-01 - the Configuration tab's labels, and the check that stops them rotting.
RUN: python3 -B test_translations.py (no third-party imports; the add-on
CI image is Alpine + aiohttp + paho)
WHAT THIS FILE IS FOR. Before UX-01 there was no `translations/` directory at
all, so Home Assistant rendered the raw option KEYS - `unit_sign_disagree_w`,
`saturation_cycles`, `integrator_max_w` - for all seventy options, in
`schema:` order, with no description. The two files this grades are what turn
that into sentences, and the highest-value half of them is not the label: it is
the sentence that says WHETHER TO TOUCH THE VALUE, because the tab presents a
constant derived from 1890 closed-loop test runs and the operator's own inverter
rating as the same kind of field.
⚠️ WHAT THIS FILE CANNOT SEE, SAID FIRST. It grades COVERAGE and PROVENANCE
CITATIONS - that every option has a name and a description in both languages,
that no translation names an option that does not exist, and that each derived
constant's English description cites the record it was derived from. It does NOT
grade whether a sentence is true, whether the Dutch is good Dutch, or whether
the result looks right on screen. The last of those is measured, not asserted,
by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` section F, which loads these files with
Supervisor 2026.08.0's OWN loader out of the release image, runs its OWN
`UiOptions`, replays the frontend's label resolution as the shipped bundle
writes it, and prints every rendered row. That transcript is the evidence; this
file is the gate that keeps it true.
⚠️ AND THE PARSER IS THE OTHER HALF OF THAT PAIR. There is no PyYAML in the CI
image and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check, so
`tools/translations_lint.py` parses these files by hand. A hand parser that
quietly disagrees with the real loader is exactly the defect this repository
keeps finding, so the probe imports THAT SAME MODULE and asserts, key by key and
string by string, that it returns what `supervisor.store.data.
_read_app_translations()` returns. Part 5 below re-states the arrangement so a
reader of this file is told where the licence for the hand parser comes from.
MUTATION.md is the method for the ledger in part 6; `tools/mutation_run.sh` is
the harness, and every row there was RUN rather than reasoned about.
"""
import io
import sys
from pathlib import Path
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE / "tools"))
import translations_lint as TL # noqa: E402
FAILED = 0
def check(what, ok):
global FAILED
print((" ok " if ok else " FAIL ") + what)
if not ok:
FAILED += 1
CFG_TEXT = io.open(HERE / "config.yaml", encoding="utf-8").read()
ORDER, NESTED = TL.config_surface(CFG_TEXT)
LANGS = ("en", "nl")
TR = {lg: TL.parse_translation_file(HERE / "translations" / f"{lg}.yaml")
for lg in LANGS}
print("UX-01 - add-on option translations\n")
print("1. the surface being described")
print(f" config.yaml declares {len(ORDER)} top-level options under `schema:` "
f"and {sum(len(v) for v in NESTED.values())} per-entry key(s) under "
f"{sorted(NESTED)}")
# ⚠️ A FLOOR, NOT AN EQUALITY. This is the "did the reader read anything at all"
# line: `config_surface()` returning an empty list would make every coverage
# check below vacuously true, which is the third failure mode in MUTATION.md -
# the assertion runs, the sentence is true, and the data cannot reach the
# failure it names.
check(f"the option surface was actually read - {len(ORDER)} options, not zero",
len(ORDER) >= 60 and "inverters" in ORDER and "max_w" in ORDER)
check("...and the repeatable `inverters:` section's per-entry keys were read "
"too, which is the half a top-level-only reader would miss",
NESTED.get("inverters", [])[:2] == ["name", "setpoint_entity"]
and len(NESTED["inverters"]) == 7)
print("\n2. AC: every option and every per-entry key is translated, in BOTH "
"languages")
for lg in LANGS:
problems = TL.audit(CFG_TEXT, TR[lg], lg)
print(f" {lg}: {len(TR[lg]['configuration'])} options translated, "
f"{len(problems)} problem(s)")
for p in problems[:10]:
print(" - " + p)
check(f"`{lg}` covers config.yaml exactly: no option without a translation, "
f"no translation without an option, every one with a name AND a "
f"description. Problems: {problems[:3]}", not problems)
# ⚠️ THE `nl` HALF IS NOT OPTIONAL EVEN THOUGH THE FALLBACK IS. The frontend
# resolves `translations[lang]?.name || translations["en"]?.name || key`, PER
# KEY - measured off the shipped bundle, see the probe - so a MISSING nl key
# degrades to English and a WRONG one does not degrade at all. The card asks for
# both languages complete, and complete is a thing a check can hold.
check("...and the two files describe the SAME option set, so nothing on the "
"owner's Dutch screen quietly falls back to English",
set(TR["en"]["configuration"]) == set(TR["nl"]["configuration"]))
check("...including inside the repeatable section",
set(TR["en"]["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"])
== set(TR["nl"]["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"]))
check("...and no Dutch string was left as a copy of the English one, which is "
"what an untranslated key looks like when it is present rather than "
"absent",
not [k for k in ORDER
if TR["en"]["configuration"][k]["description"]
== TR["nl"]["configuration"][k]["description"]])
print("\n3. ⭐ the description says WHETHER TO TOUCH IT")
# ⚠️ THE HIGHEST-VALUE ITEM IN THE CARD, AND THE ONE A COVERAGE COUNT CANNOT
# REACH. Sixty-odd descriptions that all say "the threshold, in watts" would
# pass part 2 completely. What makes this surface safe is that a DERIVED
# constant names the campaign it came from and says the value is not a knob,
# while a number that really is the operator's says so too.
#
# ⚠️ AND THIS IS A TEXT CHECK, WHICH IS WEAK ON PURPOSE AND IS SAID TO BE. It
# cannot know whether a citation is TRUE; it can only know that the citation is
# there and names the right record, so that deleting the provenance - or
# renaming the card it points at - goes red instead of shipping. The table is
# written out rather than derived because there is nothing in config.yaml that
# distinguishes a derived constant from an operator's number; that distinction
# is the whole of what this card had to add.
DERIVED = {
"sign_disagree_w": ("SAFETY-02", "MEASURED"),
"sign_disagree_s": ("SAFETY-02", "MEASURED"),
"unit_sign_disagree_w": ("SAFETY-30", "1890"),
"unit_sign_disagree_s": ("SAFETY-30", "1890"),
"site_sign_disagree_w": ("SAFETY-30", "CARRIED"),
"site_sign_disagree_s": ("SAFETY-30", "1890"),
"meter_freeze_s": ("SAFETY-18", "MEASURED"),
"circulation_w": ("SAFETY-31", "924"),
"circulation_hold_s": ("SAFETY-31", "DERIVED"),
"peak_soc_floor": ("SAFETY-24", "DERIVED"),
"bms_soc_floor": ("0x0560", "MEASURED"),
"integrator_max_w": ("MEASURED", "Do not raise it"),
"gain": ("MEASURED ON", "do not raise it"),
# SAFETY-39. `slew_w` joins the table because it stopped being an
# operator's convenience and became a DERIVED value the moment it was
# tied to the rating: 0 resolves to about a ninth of `max_w`, from an
# ~18 s measured step response. It is the one entry here whose value is
# a RATIO, so the description has to say what it follows as well as
# where the ratio came from - a citation alone would leave an operator
# reading "0" on the tab with no idea it is not "off".
"slew_w": ("SAFETY-39", "DERIVED", "0 MEANS FOLLOW"),
}
_uncited = []
for key, needles in sorted(DERIVED.items()):
desc = TR["en"]["configuration"][key]["description"]
for needle in needles:
if needle not in desc:
_uncited.append(f"{key} does not cite {needle!r}")
print(f" {len(DERIVED)} derived constants must cite their campaign; "
f"{len(_uncited)} do not")
check(f"every derived constant's English description names WHERE THE NUMBER "
f"CAME FROM, so an operator reading the tab can tell it apart from their "
f"own inverter rating. Uncited: {_uncited}", not _uncited)
# The other direction, and it matters as much: a number that IS the operator's
# must not be dressed up as derived, or the labels stop meaning anything.
_theirs = ["max_w", "peak_cap_w"]
check("...and the numbers that really are the OPERATOR'S say so instead of "
"carrying a citation - `max_w` and `peak_cap_w` are the two the card "
"names, and both read 'THIS IS YOUR NUMBER'",
all("THIS IS YOUR NUMBER" in TR["en"]["configuration"][k]["description"]
for k in _theirs))
check("...and the one threshold that is NOT derived from a measurement admits "
"it rather than borrowing the others' authority - "
"`cycle_cost_threshold_eur` is an open product question (OPT-08)",
"NOT DERIVED FROM A MEASUREMENT"
in TR["en"]["configuration"]["cycle_cost_threshold_eur"]["description"]
and "OPT-08"
in TR["en"]["configuration"]["cycle_cost_threshold_eur"]["description"])
print("\n4. task ordering, and the labels that carry it")
# ⚠️ ADD-ON OPTIONS ARE A FLAT LIST - no section headers, no per-option advanced
# flag, no units on the input. Grouping is approximated by ORDER plus label text
# and by nothing else, so both halves are graded: the label prefix, and that the
# prefixes appear in the file as CONTIGUOUS RUNS in the task order. A group
# whose members are scattered renders as a jumble however good each label is.
GROUPS = ["Hardware", "Meter", "Limits", "Tariff", "Maintenance", "Safety",
"Advanced"]
NL_GROUPS = {"Hardware": "Hardware", "Meter": "Meter", "Limits": "Grenzen",
"Tariff": "Tarief", "Maintenance": "Onderhoud",
"Safety": "Veiligheid", "Advanced": "Geavanceerd"}
_prefixes = []
for key in ORDER:
name = TR["en"]["configuration"][key]["name"]
_prefixes.append(name.split(" \u00b7 ")[0] if " \u00b7 " in name else f"<none:{key}>")
_runs = [p for i, p in enumerate(_prefixes) if i == 0 or p != _prefixes[i - 1]]
print(f" the rendered order groups into: {_runs}")
check(f"every label carries a group prefix, so the flat list reads as groups. "
f"Missing: {[p for p in _prefixes if p.startswith('<none:')]}",
not [p for p in _prefixes if p.startswith("<none:")])
check(f"...and each group is ONE CONTIGUOUS RUN in the rendered order, in the "
f"task order the card asks for - hardware, meter, ratings and limits, "
f"tariff, maintenance, safety, advanced. Got: {_runs}", _runs == GROUPS)
_nl_bad = [k for k in ORDER
if NL_GROUPS.get(TR["en"]["configuration"][k]["name"].split(" \u00b7 ")[0])
!= TR["nl"]["configuration"][k]["name"].split(" \u00b7 ")[0]]
check(f"...and the Dutch labels carry the SAME grouping under Dutch names, so "
f"the two languages do not read as two different layouts. Off: {_nl_bad}",
not _nl_bad)
# ⚠️ THE ORDER IS THE `schema:` BLOCK'S, NOT THE `options:` BLOCK'S, AND THAT IS
# A MEASUREMENT. `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(coresys)(data["schema"])`, so the
# tab renders the schema half in its own order. Asserted here because the whole
# of part 4 is about an ordering that would otherwise be graded on the wrong
# half of the file - and because the two halves of config.yaml were already in
# different orders before this card.
# ⚠️ ANCHORED ON THE INDENTATION AND SCOPED TO THE `options:` BLOCK. The file
# starts with the add-on manifest, whose `services:` list carries ` - mqtt:want`
# at two spaces with a colon in it - a looser reader picks that up as an option
# called `- mqtt` and the comparison below then fails for a reason that has
# nothing to do with what it is watching. Measured, on the first run.
import re as _re # noqa: E402
_opt_half = CFG_TEXT[CFG_TEXT.index("\noptions:\n"):CFG_TEXT.index("\nschema:")]
_opt_order = _re.findall(r"^ ([a-z_0-9]+):", _opt_half, _re.M)
check("config.yaml's two halves now declare the same options in the same "
"order, so the file reads the way the tab renders even though only the "
"schema half decides it", _opt_order == ORDER)
print("\n5. the parser is strict, so a file it half-read cannot pass")
# ⚠️ THE FAILURE THIS PART EXISTS FOR. A permissive parser answers "no problems"
# for a file it silently skipped half of - the same green-and-not-watching
# defect one layer down. So every shape outside the subset UX-01 writes must
# RAISE, and that is graded with real malformed input rather than asserted.
BAD = [
("a tab-indented line", "configuration:\n\tmeter_entity:\n"),
("three-space indent", "configuration:\n meter_entity:\n"),
("a bare unquoted scalar", 'configuration:\n a:\n name: hello\n'),
("a single-quoted scalar", "configuration:\n a:\n name: 'hello'\n"),
("a list item", 'configuration:\n a:\n - "x"\n'),
("a duplicate key", 'configuration:\n a:\n name: "x"\n name: "y"\n'),
("an over-indented child", 'configuration:\n a:\n'),
("a line that is not a key at all", "configuration:\n just some prose\n"),
("an unsupported escape", 'configuration:\n a:\n name: "x\\ty"\n'),
]
_accepted = []
for what, text in BAD:
try:
TL.parse_translation_text(text, what)
_accepted.append(what)
except TL.TranslationSyntaxError:
pass
check(f"every shape outside the accepted subset RAISES rather than being "
f"skipped. Silently accepted: {_accepted}", not _accepted)
check("...and the accepted subset really does round-trip the shipped files - "
"70 options and 7 per-entry keys came back out of each, which is what "
"says the strictness above is not just refusing everything",
all(len(TR[lg]["configuration"]) == len(ORDER)
and len(TR[lg]["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"]) == 7
for lg in LANGS))
print(" ⚠️ the licence for this hand parser is NOT this file. "
"tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section F loads the same two files with "
"`supervisor.store.data._read_app_translations()` out of the 2026.08.0 "
"release image and asserts, key by key and string by string, that this "
"module returns the same thing. Re-run it when either changes.")
print("\n6. MUTATION: the check is run against broken inputs, both directions")
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE PART THE CARD ASKS FOR IN SO MANY WORDS, AND IT IS RUN RATHER
# THAN DESCRIBED. A coverage check is worth exactly what it catches, so each
# mutation below is APPLIED to a copy of the real parsed translations and the
# audit is required to NAME the key it broke - not merely to be non-empty. A
# check that goes red for the wrong reason is a check that will go green for the
# wrong reason later.
import copy # noqa: E402
def _mutate(what, fn, must_name):
tr = copy.deepcopy(TR["en"])
fn(tr)
problems = TL.audit(CFG_TEXT, tr, "en")
named = [p for p in problems if must_name in p]
print(f" {what}\n -> {len(problems)} problem(s); "
f"{(named[0][:120] + '...') if named else 'NONE NAMED ' + must_name}")
check(f"MUTATION: {what} -> the audit REFUSES and names `{must_name}`",
bool(named))
_mutate("delete one option's whole translation (`saturation_cycles`)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"].pop("saturation_cycles"),
"saturation_cycles")
_mutate("delete one option's description but keep its name (`meter_phases`)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["meter_phases"].pop("description"),
"meter_phases")
_mutate("blank one option's description (`gain`) - present but empty is not "
"covered either",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["gain"].update(description=" "),
"gain")
_mutate("translate an option that does not exist (`saturation_cyles`, one "
"letter out - the rename this check exists for)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"].update(
saturation_cyles={"name": "x", "description": "y"}),
"saturation_cyles")
_mutate("delete one PER-ENTRY key of the repeatable section (`bms_soc_floor`)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"].pop("bms_soc_floor"),
"bms_soc_floor")
_mutate("invent a per-entry key the schema does not declare (`max_kw`)",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"].update(
max_kw={"name": "x", "description": "y"}),
"max_kw")
_mutate("drop the whole `fields:` block from the repeatable section",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["inverters"].pop("fields"),
"inverters")
_mutate("hang a `fields:` block off an option that is not a repeatable section",
lambda tr: tr["configuration"]["max_w"].update(
fields={"x": {"name": "y"}}),
"max_w")
# ⚠️ AND THE TWO THAT COST THE WHOLE FILE RATHER THAN ONE LABEL. Supervisor
# validates each translation file through SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS and, on
# refusal, LOGS A WARNING AND DROPS ALL OF IT - so a shape it rejects does not
# lose one description, it silently returns the entire tab to raw keys, and the
# only trace is one line in a log nobody is reading. Neither of these is
# reachable through the `configuration:` coverage above, which is exactly why
# they are here.
_mutate("a top-level block Supervisor does not read (`netwrok:`) - the file is "
"DROPPED WHOLE, not partly",
lambda tr: tr.update(netwrok={"x": "y"}), "netwrok")
_mutate("a `network:` block whose value is a mapping rather than a string - "
"same consequence, every label in the file gone",
lambda tr: tr.update(network={"8099/tcp": {"x": "y"}}), "network")
# ⚠️ AND THE MUTATION THAT MATTERS MOST: A NEW OPTION ARRIVES. This is the rot
# the acceptance criterion is written about - somebody adds a key to config.yaml
# in six months and the tab renders it raw. The mutation is applied to the
# CONFIG side rather than the translation side, because that is the direction it
# happens in.
_grown = CFG_TEXT.replace("\n log_level: list(", "\n new_option_s: int(1,9)\n log_level: list(")
check("the config-side mutation really did land - a new option in the schema "
"half that no translation mentions", _grown != CFG_TEXT
and "new_option_s" in TL.config_surface(_grown)[0])
_grow_problems = TL.audit(_grown, TR["en"], "en")
print(f" a new option added to config.yaml -> {_grow_problems[:1]}")
check("MUTATION: adding an option to config.yaml and forgetting the "
"translation goes RED, naming the key - which is the whole of the "
"acceptance criterion about this rotting",
any("new_option_s" in p for p in _grow_problems))
# ⚠️ THE NEGATIVE CONTROL, WITHOUT WHICH THE EIGHT ROWS ABOVE PROVE NOTHING. An
# audit that returned a problem for every input would have "passed" all of them.
check("...and the UNMUTATED input is still clean, so the rows above are the "
"mutations speaking and not a check that always complains",
not TL.audit(CFG_TEXT, TR["en"], "en")
and not TL.audit(CFG_TEXT, TR["nl"], "nl"))
print("\n7. no behaviour and no value moved")
# ⚠️ UX-01 IS A PRESENTATION CARD. It reorders config.yaml and adds two files;
# it must not move a single default. The whole options half is compared against
# the schema half key by key here, and every other suite in this directory pins
# the actual values by reading this same file - test_maintenance.py's eight,
# test_watchdog.py's six, test_price.py's seven, test_freeze.py's, and
# test_peakguard.py's. This line is the cheap one that says the reorder did not
# lose or duplicate a key on the way.
check("no option was lost, gained or duplicated by the reordering: the two "
"halves of config.yaml hold the same 70 keys, once each",
sorted(_opt_order) == sorted(ORDER) and len(set(ORDER)) == len(ORDER))
check("...and `inverters: []` is still shipped in the options half, which is "
"what Supervisor 2026.08.0 refuses every pre-0.6.0 options blob without "
"(measured; see DECISIONS/CFG-04-inverter-roster.md B)",
"\n inverters: []\n" in _opt_half)
check("...and the schema half still declares the NESTED per-entry `max_w:` "
"BEFORE the flat one, so test_inverter.py part 12's first-match trap "
"stays baited rather than sorted out by this card's reordering",
CFG_TEXT[CFG_TEXT.index("\nschema:"):].index(" max_w: int(")
< CFG_TEXT[CFG_TEXT.index("\nschema:"):].index("\n max_w: int("))
print()
if FAILED:
print(f"{FAILED} FAILED")
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+573 -7
View File
@@ -18,9 +18,10 @@ import asyncio
import sys
from app.maintenance import MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS, MaintConfig
from app.control import LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S, SLEW_RAIL_FRAC
from app.validate import (
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS, FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, ConfigRefused,
actuator_writers, refuse, validate_startup_config,
actuator_writers, refuse, site_rail_w, validate_startup_config,
)
fails = []
@@ -204,12 +205,17 @@ check("...and the refusal names the actuator and every writer aimed at it, so "
_PER_INVERTER_OK = {k: v for k, v in base().items() if k != "setpoint_entity"}
_PER_INVERTER_OK["inverters"] = [
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint",
"max_w": 2000},
"max_w": 2000, "bms_soc_floor": 10},
# ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. 2000 W here is the SHIPPED default repeated,
# not a rating measured off a second device - SPIKE-04 measures that when
# there is one to measure. Nothing in this file depends on the number.
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32 made `bms_soc_floor` a REQUIRED per-entry key, and the two
# values here DIFFER (10 / 15) rather than being copied. 15 % is SIMULATED -
# there is no second pack to read a cut-out off - and the reason it is not
# simply 10 is MUTATION.md habit 1: a fixture whose two per-unit numbers are
# equal cannot show a check reading the wrong unit's.
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint_b",
"max_w": 2000}]
"max_w": 2000, "bms_soc_floor": 15}]
check("two inverters with their own entities are ACCEPTED - one writer each, "
"no shared actuator, and that is CFG-04's whole purpose",
validate_startup_config(_PER_INVERTER_OK, -5000, 5000) == [])
@@ -353,6 +359,64 @@ check("...and it is refused with maintenance_enabled off, as shipped",
base(max_w=2000, maintenance_charge_w=2500,
maintenance_enabled=False), -5000, 5000), "THE CEILING WINS"))
# ⚠️ MAINT-05: AND AT TWO PACKS IT IS THE WEAKEST CAP, NOT THE FIRST ENTRY'S.
# The comment this replaces in validate.py said, in as many words, that it took
# the FIRST unit's cap because there was exactly one `Maintenance` and it could
# only ever recalibrate `inverters[0]` - and that "when `maint_unit` stops being
# `inverters[0]`, this line moves with it". It has. Every pack is now
# recalibrated on its own schedule, so the shaping claim can be filed on any of
# them and the cap that contradicts it first is the smallest.
#
# ⚠️ THE FIXTURE'S TWO CAPS ARE DELIBERATELY DIFFERENT AND THE RATE SITS
# BETWEEN THEM. Two equal caps could not tell "grades the first" from "grades
# the smallest", and a rate above both would be refused by either rule - so
# 3000 W against caps of 5000 W and 2000 W is the one arrangement where the old
# answer and the new one disagree. ⚠️ 2000 W for the second pack is a
# HYPOTHESIS: inverter B does not physically exist and nothing here is measured
# from one.
def _roster(a_max, b_max, **over):
o = base(**over)
for k in ("setpoint_entity", "soc_entity", "batt_entity", "max_w"):
o.pop(k, None)
o["inverters"] = [
dict(name="inverter-a", setpoint_entity="number.sp_a",
soc_entity="sensor.soc_a", batt_entity="sensor.batt_a",
max_w=a_max),
dict(name="inverter-b", setpoint_entity="number.sp_b",
soc_entity="sensor.soc_b", batt_entity="sensor.batt_b",
max_w=b_max)]
return o
_two = _roster(5000, 2000, maintenance_charge_w=3000, maintenance_discharge_w=1000,
sign_disagree_w=300, unit_sign_disagree_w=300)
_p_two = [p for p in validate_startup_config(_two, -5000, 5000)
if "maintenance_charge_w" in p]
print(f" 5000 W and 2000 W packs, charge 3000 W -> {_p_two}")
check("⚠️ A CHARGE RATE THE SMALLEST PACK CANNOT TAKE IS REFUSED, even though "
"the FIRST pack could. Before MAINT-05 the second pack was never "
"recalibrated, so its cap could not contradict anything; it is now, and "
"its cheap-window charge would ask for hi=-3000 against lo=-2000 - the "
"`lo > hi` contradiction, 0 W, on the pack nobody was watching",
len(_p_two) == 1 and why(_p_two, "max_w (inverter-b) is 2000 W"))
check("...and the message names the pack the number came off, not the first "
"entry - an operator told to lower a number on the wrong device is being "
"sent to the wrong device by the message that exists to stop that",
not why(_p_two, "max_w (inverter-a)"))
check("...while the same rate against two packs that can both take it starts, "
"so this is a comparison and not a blanket refusal of rosters",
[p for p in validate_startup_config(
_roster(5000, 4000, maintenance_charge_w=3000,
maintenance_discharge_w=1000, sign_disagree_w=300,
unit_sign_disagree_w=300), -5000, 5000)
if "maintenance_charge_w" in p] == [])
check("...and at a ROSTER OF ONE `min()` over one cap is that cap: the same "
"message, the same boundary, the same refusal the flat config always got",
why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, maintenance_charge_w=2500),
-5000, 5000), "THE CEILING WINS")
and validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, maintenance_charge_w=2000),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# ⚠️ THE SIBLING, CHECKED RATHER THAN ASSUMED. The shaping is NOT symmetric:
# drain files Claim.set at P_MAINTENANCE and owns the actuator, so the ceiling
# CLAMPS it (+2000 W) instead of contradicting it, and the arbiter's explain()
@@ -394,6 +458,149 @@ check("arbiter: the drain SET is clamped, not contradicted",
check("...and the clamp names itself, which is why it is not refused",
"supervised" in (r.bound_by or "") and "limited by" in r.explain())
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("10. a slew rate the plant can actually follow (SAFETY-39)")
# ⚠️ THIS RULE GRADES A RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS THE POINT OF IT. Every other rule
# in this file compares a configured number against another configured number
# and refuses one ordering. This one refuses a RATIO: `slew_w` may not exceed
# `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail`, so the same `slew_w` is fine at one rating and
# refused at another, and raising the rating moves the bound with it instead of
# leaving the constant behind. That is the failure the ticket is about -
# `slew_w: 1000` was derived at a 1500 W clamp, the live install went to 5000,
# and nothing anywhere said the derivation no longer held.
print(f" SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = "
f"{LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s / {PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s = {SLEW_RAIL_FRAC:.4f}")
_R5000 = base(max_w=5000, maintenance_charge_w=2000, maintenance_discharge_w=2000)
check("the rail this rule grades is the SITE rail, and at the shipped roster of "
"one it is `max_w` exactly - byte for byte the number the single-inverter "
"shape has always meant",
site_rail_w(_R5000) == 5000.0)
# ⭐ VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. This is the acceptance criterion stated as a test:
# put the 2026-09-05 pair back and the gate must go red. A rule that could not
# be made to fire on the configuration it was written for is a rule nobody has
# checked.
_broken = validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=1000), -5000, 5000)
print(f" restoring slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 -> {len(_broken)} problem(s)")
if _broken:
print(f" {_broken[0][:160]}...")
check("⭐ RESTORING THE 2026-09-05 PAIR - slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 - IS REFUSED. "
"It crosses the whole output range in 10 s against a plant measured at "
"18 s, which is not a fast loop, it is a loop that commands its entire "
"range before it can observe its answer to the first step",
len(_broken) == 1 and why(_broken, "slew_w is 1000 W"))
check("...and the refusal says WHICH RAIL it graded against and HOW LONG the "
"crossing takes, because 'slew_w is too high' sends an operator to lower "
"a number when raising max_w or setting 0 are both correct answers too",
why(_broken, "site rail of 5000 W")
and why(_broken, "crosses its whole output range in 5.0 cycles"))
check("...and it names the plant measurement it is graded against, so the "
"number is traceable to a step response rather than to a preference",
why(_broken, "goodwe/NOTES.md §5.10"))
check("...and it says what to DO, including the setting that cannot go stale",
why(_broken, "Set slew_w to 0") and why(_broken, "556 W"))
# THE BOUNDARY. Equality is the DERIVED VALUE, not a violation - at exactly
# `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * rail` the loop takes precisely the plant's settling time to
# cross its range, which is the constraint met. Rule 6 permits equality for the
# same shape of reason and rule 5 refuses it for the opposite one; this is
# rule 6's case, and getting it backwards would refuse the value this rule
# exists to recommend.
_bound = SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * 5000.0
check(f"at exactly the derived value ({_bound:.0f} W) the config STARTS - "
"equality is the constraint satisfied, not violated",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=int(_bound)), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and one watt of slack above it starts too, because a boundary that "
"is not meaningful to one watt must not refuse on one watt - an operator "
"reading 556 off a status page that rounded it is not misconfigured",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=556), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and well above it does not",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=600), -5000, 5000) != [])
# SLOWER IS ALWAYS ACCEPTED, and the live install is the reason it has to be.
check("the interim that is holding on the live system - slew_w 400 against "
"max_w 5000, applied 2026-09-05 12:00 - STARTS. It is 12.5 ticks to cross "
"the rail against the 9 this rule requires, and refusing 'too slow' would "
"refuse the mitigation",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=400), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and so does the schema floor at the biggest rail, because there is no "
"such thing as too slow here",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=50), -5000, 5000) == [])
# ⚠️ 0 IS NOT GRADED AND MUST NOT BE. It means "follow the rail" and satisfies
# this rule by construction at every rail there is; a rule that refused it would
# refuse the fix. Checked at three ratings so that "it passes" cannot be an
# accident of the default one.
# ⚠️ NO SLEW PROBLEM AT ANY RATING, rather than NO PROBLEMS AT ALL. At the
# schema floor of 100 W rules 5 and 5b fire on the shipped sign thresholds,
# which is correct and is not this rule's business - asserting an empty list
# would make this check fail for a reason it is not about, and somebody would
# then "fix" it by moving a sign threshold.
_zero_problems = {m: [p for p in validate_startup_config(
base(max_w=m, slew_w=0,
maintenance_charge_w=min(2000, m),
maintenance_discharge_w=min(2000, m)),
-abs(m), abs(m)) if "slew_w" in p]
for m in (100, 500, 2000, 5000, 15000)}
check("slew_w 0 - FOLLOW THE RAIL - is never refused at any rating, which it "
"must not be, because it is the shipped value and it satisfies this rule "
f"by construction at every rail there is: {_zero_problems}",
not any(_zero_problems.values()))
check("a negative slew_w is refused as nonsense rather than treated as 0 - it "
"is a magnitude, and 0 already has a meaning here",
why(validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=-400), -5000, 5000),
"must not be negative"))
# ⭐ THE ROSTER, WHICH IS THE WHOLE REASON THIS GRADES A SUM. `slew_w` is not a
# per-unit quantity: main.py builds `Tuning(max_w=self.site_max_w)` and
# `compute()` emits the SITE target. So the rail is the roster sum, and adding
# an inverter moves this bound with no operator action and no second derivation.
#
# ⚠️ INVERTER B'S 4600 W IS ITS DATASHEET AND SERIAL, NOT A MEASUREMENT, AND
# INVERTER B IS NOT ON SITE (SPIKE-04, ~2026-09-12; goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b). It
# is used here because what is graded is the ARITHMETIC OF THE RULE, which does
# not depend on the number being measured - not because 9600 W is a fact about
# this house yet.
def _roster(a=5000, b=4600, **over):
o = base(setpoint_entity="", inverters=[
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.a", "max_w": a,
"bms_soc_floor": 10, "soc_entity": "sensor.sa", "batt_entity": "sensor.ba"},
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": b,
"bms_soc_floor": 10, "soc_entity": "sensor.sb", "batt_entity": "sensor.bb"}])
o.pop("max_w"); o.pop("soc_entity"); o.pop("batt_entity")
o.update(over)
return o
_site = site_rail_w(_roster())
print(f" roster 5000 + 4600 (B FROM DATASHEET, NOT MEASURED) -> site rail "
f"{_site:.0f} W, bound {SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * _site:.0f} W")
check("the rail is the roster SUM and not the weakest unit, which is what "
"separates this rule from 5, 6 and 8 - those grade one watchdog, one "
"shaping claim and one pack, and this grades the range one SITE COMMAND "
"is a rate across",
_site == 9600.0)
check("⭐ AND THE BOUND MOVES ON ITS OWN WHEN THE ROSTER DOES: the derived value "
"at a 9600 W site is 1067 W with nobody re-deriving anything, which is "
"the property that makes this a fix rather than a re-tune",
abs(SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * _site - 9600.0 / 9.0) < 1e-9)
check("...so the same explicit slew_w that is REFUSED at a 5000 W rail is "
"ACCEPTED at 9600 - the bound is on how long the crossing TAKES, and a "
"bigger rail at the same step size takes longer to cross. ⚠️ This is the "
"direction of the rule stated as a test, because it is not the direction "
"the ticket assumed: a growing rail LOOSENS this bound. What the rule "
"protects against is the constant being left behind when the rail moves; "
"it is not a bound on how much the site may command, and it does not "
"bound the over-absorption, which is a `gain` term SAFETY-39 measured "
"and deliberately did not change",
validate_startup_config(dict(_R5000, slew_w=1000), -5000, 5000) != []
and validate_startup_config(_roster(slew_w=1000)) == [])
check("...and a slew that outruns even the doubled rail is still refused there, "
"so the roster path is not simply un-graded",
why(validate_startup_config(_roster(slew_w=2000)),
"site rail of 9600 W"))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the SHIPPED defaults must pass the rule they are governed by (AC3)")
# ⚠️ Shipping a default the validator refuses would be worse than the bug it
@@ -407,12 +614,21 @@ import re # noqa: E402
_CFG = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "config.yaml")
with open(_CFG, encoding="utf-8") as _fh:
_txt = _fh.read()
# ⚠️ `slew_w` JOINED THIS SET AT SAFETY-39 AND IT IS THE INTERESTING MEMBER.
# The others are refused when they are too big for `max_w`; this one is refused
# when it is too big for `max_w` AS A RATIO, so shipping the wrong number here
# would be shipping the exact defect the card is about with the gate that
# catches it standing right beside it. Reading it out of config.yaml is what
# makes "the shipped value is 0" a fact rather than a claim.
_shipped = {k: float(v) for k, v in re.findall(
r"^ (max_w|maintenance_charge_w|maintenance_discharge_w|sign_disagree_w): "
r"(-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)}
check("config.yaml really was read (all four defaults found)",
r"^ (max_w|maintenance_charge_w|maintenance_discharge_w|sign_disagree_w"
r"|slew_w): (-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)}
check("config.yaml really was read (all five defaults found)",
set(_shipped) == {"max_w", "maintenance_charge_w",
"maintenance_discharge_w", "sign_disagree_w"})
"maintenance_discharge_w", "sign_disagree_w", "slew_w"})
check(f"...and the shipped slew_w is 0, i.e. FOLLOW THE RAIL - the one value "
f"that cannot be left behind when max_w moves (got {_shipped.get('slew_w')})",
_shipped.get("slew_w") == 0.0)
check(f"the shipped defaults are accepted {_shipped}",
validate_startup_config(base(**_shipped), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and the shipped charge rate is at or under the shipped ceiling",
@@ -523,9 +739,26 @@ check("...and the message explains it would read as a trip, not a mistake",
# check below.
check("the smallest sane max_w still starts",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=1, sign_disagree_w=0.5,
unit_sign_disagree_w=0.5,
maintenance_charge_w=1), -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...but that same 1 W ceiling with the DEFAULT sign threshold is refused",
why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=1), -5000, 5000), "never fire"))
# ⚠️ SAFETY-30 ADDED A SECOND WAY TO DISARM A SIGN WATCHDOG BY CONFIGURATION,
# and the fixture above now has to name BOTH thresholds - which is the check
# doing its job rather than a bookkeeping edit. `unit_sign_disagree_w` bounds a
# unit's own SHARE, which the same `supervised` claim holds at +-max_w, so at or
# above the ceiling it is unsatisfiable by construction exactly as
# `sign_disagree_w` is. Refused even at the shipped roster of one, where this
# watchdog is not armed: a config that cannot work is refused when it is
# written, not on the day somebody adds a second inverter.
check("...and the per-inverter threshold has the same rule, named separately "
"so an operator is told WHICH watchdog they disarmed",
why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=1, sign_disagree_w=0.5,
maintenance_charge_w=1), -5000, 5000),
"unit_sign_disagree_w"))
check("...and one watt under that ceiling is reachable, so accepted",
validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, unit_sign_disagree_w=1999),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("what must NOT be refused - a validator that fires on trivia gets deleted")
@@ -753,6 +986,339 @@ check("...and MaintConfig's dataclass defaults carry no numeric literal either "
not re.search(r"^\s*(charge_w|discharge_w):\s*float\s*=\s*-?\d",
_srcs["maintenance.py"], re.M))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("SPIKE-04a: inverter B's documented rating, and the provenance beside it")
# ⚠️ WHY A DOCUMENTATION CARD LEFT A CHECK BEHIND. Inverter B's rating was
# written down in THREE places - config.yaml's commented roster example,
# DOCS.md's, and tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py's "a blob an operator would
# POST" - as 3000 W, a figure nobody had measured, read off a datasheet, or
# sourced at all. It was wrong: SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) identified inverter B
# from the owner's model number and serial as a GoodWe GW5048D-ES rated 4600 W
# on the battery path. Three transcriptions of one number drifting away from
# the truth together is this repo's recurring defect in its plainest form, and
# correcting them once WITHOUT PINNING THEM buys nothing: the next editor
# touches one of the three and the other two stay wrong, silently.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE PROVENANCE IS GRADED, NOT ONLY THE VALUE, WHICH IS THE HALF THAT
# MATTERS. 4600 W IS FROM A DATASHEET AND IS NOT A MEASUREMENT. The datasheet
# prints it under BATTERY INPUT DATA, so it is probably DC, while `max_w` is
# graded against 0x0518 - the inverter's own AC power - which would put the AC
# ceiling nearer 4324 W. An editor who tidies that caveat away leaves a paper
# number reading as an observation of hardware that does not exist yet, and
# THAT is the failure this card exists to prevent. So the caveat is what these
# checks reach for; a check that graded 4600 alone would watch the value and
# miss the lie.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS DELIBERATELY DOES NOT GRADE: the test fixtures. Several files
# build a second inverter at 3000 W on purpose, because the property those
# checks consume is that B's rating is UNMISTAKABLY not A's, and the real pair
# (5000/4600) is a 400 W gap - narrower than `slew_w`. Those are illustrative,
# they say so at the line, and they are not statements of B's rating. The three
# sites below are the ones that ARE such statements.
_HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
_docs_txt = open(os.path.join(_HERE, "DOCS.md"), encoding="utf-8").read()
_probe_txt = open(os.path.join(_HERE, "tools", "supervisor_shape_probe.py"),
encoding="utf-8").read()
# One regex per site, each anchored on something only THAT site has, so a match
# cannot silently wander into a neighbouring blob. The probe's anchor is the
# operator blob's real entity name: its section D refusal entries use
# `number.b` and one of them carries a deliberate 9999, so an anchor loose
# enough to reach them would grade the wrong dict and still look green.
_b_rating = {
"config.yaml": re.search(
r"#\s+- name: inverter-b\b(?:[^\n]*\n)*?\s*#\s+max_w:\s*(\d+)", _txt),
"DOCS.md": re.search(
r"^ - name: inverter-b\b(?:[^\n]*\n)*?^ max_w:\s*(\d+)",
_docs_txt, re.M),
"supervisor_shape_probe.py": re.search(
r'"name": "inverter-b",\s*"setpoint_entity": "number\.goodwe_b_setpoint_w"'
r'(?:[^}]*?)"max_w":\s*(\d+)', _probe_txt),
}
check(f"all three documented rosters were FOUND "
f"{ {k: bool(v) for k, v in _b_rating.items()} } - a regex that matches "
"nothing is a green check that read nothing",
all(_b_rating.values()))
# ⚠️ THE `len(...) == 3` IS NOT DECORATION. Without it a regex that stopped
# matching would shrink this dict, and "all the values agree" would go GREEN on
# the two sites that were still read - a check whose data no longer reaches the
# failure it names, which is the exact fault this whole section is about.
_b_vals = {k: int(m.group(1)) for k, m in _b_rating.items() if m}
check(f"...and all three state the SAME rating for inverter B {_b_vals}",
len(_b_vals) == 3 and len(set(_b_vals.values())) == 1)
check(f"...and it is 4600 W - the GW5048D-ES datasheet figure, not the 3000 W "
f"hypothesis that predated the unit being identified {_b_vals}",
len(_b_vals) == 3 and set(_b_vals.values()) == {4600})
# The provenance triple. Each site must still say WHERE 4600 came from, that it
# is graded against an AC register, and what the DC-vs-AC ambiguity does to it -
# the last carried by the 4324 W figure, which is the one marker that cannot
# survive a careless "it's 4600 now, done" rewrite.
#
# ⚠️ SEARCHED IN A WINDOW AROUND THE ROSTER, NOT OVER THE WHOLE FILE, AND THE
# FIRST VERSION OF THIS CHECK DID THE LATTER. `0x0518` already appeared once in
# config.yaml and once in DOCS.md before this card, for unrelated reasons - so a
# whole-file `"0x0518" in src` was GREEN on those two files no matter what
# happened next to inverter B's rating. That is a check whose data cannot reach
# the failure it names, in the same file that exists to complain about them.
# The window is the text either side of the roster match, so deleting the caveat
# beside the number goes red even where the same word survives elsewhere.
_sites = {"config.yaml": _txt, "DOCS.md": _docs_txt,
"supervisor_shape_probe.py": _probe_txt}
_MARKERS = ("datasheet", "0x0518", "4324")
_prov = {}
for _name, _src in _sites.items():
_m = _b_rating[_name]
_win = _src[max(0, _m.start() - 2500):_m.end() + 2500].lower() if _m else ""
_prov[_name] = {k: k in _win for k in _MARKERS}
for _name, _got in sorted(_prov.items()):
check(f"{_name} still carries B's provenance WITHIN 2500 chars of the "
f"roster - the datasheet it came from, the 0x0518 it is graded "
f"against, and the 4324 W the DC reading would make it {_got}",
all(_got.values()))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("rules 5, 5b and 6 on a ROSTER SET - the smallest cap at EVERY position")
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32 ROUND 5, AND THE REASON THIS SECTION EXISTS AT ALL. PR #48 was
# rejected on FOUR MUTATIONS THAT SURVIVED A 19/19 GREEN SUITE, all of them in
# the three lines above:
#
# validate.py:779 min(caps) -> min(caps[:1]) +4 B GREEN
# validate.py:779 min(caps) -> min(caps[-1:]) +5 B GREEN
# validate.py:778 caps = [cap for _, cap in caps_ix[:1]] +4 B GREEN
# validate.py:893 min(caps_ix[-1:], key=lambda p: p[1]) +5 B GREEN
#
# NONE of them is an equivalent mutant: each one deletes a safety refusal.
# `max_w: 5000` on inverter-a beside `2000` on inverter-b with
# `sign_disagree_w: 3000` is refused by the shipped validator with "the
# SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement watchdog can never fire" and ACCEPTED by every one
# of the four - the site starts, with a watchdog that reports `armed` on the
# status page and cannot trip on pack B. That is rule 5's own failure mode
# reached THROUGH rule 5.
#
# WHY THE OLD FIXTURE COULD NOT SEE IT, which is the whole lesson and is now
# MUTATION.md habit 10: the fixture was ONE roster, `[5000, 2000]`. On that
# roster `min` and `last` and `[-1:]` and `[:2]` all answer 2000. A fixture of N
# members cannot separate two reductions that agree on N members, and adding a
# member moves the hole instead of closing it.
#
# SO THE FIXTURE IS A SET, NOT A ROSTER: the smallest cap at EVERY POSITION of
# rosters of width 2, 3, 4 and 5. `[:1]` needs width 2 to be caught, `[:2]`
# needs 3, `[:3]` needs 4 - the sweep is what terminates the regress that a
# single fixture cannot. And the FAMILY TABLE below is COMPUTED AND PRINTED, so
# a member no fixture kills shows up as a NAMED SURVIVOR rather than as an
# absence from a list nobody re-derived.
#
# ⚠️ THE DIFFERING CAPS ARE A FIXTURE PROPERTY AND MUST STAY ONE. In production
# both packs are expected to floor at 10 % and SPIKE-04a puts inverter B at
# 4600 W against A's 5000 W - a 400 W gap, narrower than slew_w. A fixture built
# on the real pair would be degenerate on exactly the axis these checks measure.
# ⚠️ AND INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (SPIKE-04, ~2026-09-12). Nothing
# in this section is measured off a second unit; the rosters are simulated and
# are labelled so.
_BIG, _SMALL = 5000.0, 2000.0
_RATE = 3000.0 # strictly between them, which is the point
def _roster_n(caps, **over):
"""A roster of len(caps) units, unit-0..unit-N, each with its own cap."""
o = base(**over)
for k in ("setpoint_entity", "soc_entity", "batt_entity", "max_w"):
o.pop(k, None)
o["inverters"] = [
dict(name=f"unit-{i}", setpoint_entity=f"number.sp{i}",
soc_entity=f"sensor.soc{i}", batt_entity=f"sensor.batt{i}",
max_w=c, bms_soc_floor=10)
for i, c in enumerate(caps)]
o.update(over)
return o
# The three rules that reduce over `unit_caps_indexed()`, each as
# (option name, the token its refusal is recognised by).
_CAP_RULES = (
("sign_disagree_w", "SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement"),
("unit_sign_disagree_w", "SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement"),
("maintenance_charge_w", "maintenance charge in a cheap window"),
)
_QUIET = {"sign_disagree_w": 300.0, "unit_sign_disagree_w": 300.0,
"maintenance_charge_w": 1000.0, "maintenance_discharge_w": 1000.0}
# THE SET: width x position of the one small cap.
_SET = []
for _n in (2, 3, 4, 5):
for _pos in range(_n):
_caps = [_BIG] * _n
_caps[_pos] = _SMALL
_SET.append((_n, _pos, tuple(_caps)))
# habit 1: the PRECONDITION as its own check. If a later edit makes the caps
# equal, this goes red rather than the claims below going quietly vacuous.
check("PRECONDITION: every fixture in the set has a UNIQUE smallest cap, that "
"cap is at the stated position, and the rate under test sits STRICTLY "
"between it and the others - two equal caps could not tell `min` from "
"`first` from `last` and the whole set would be measuring nothing",
len(_SET) == 14
and all(c[p] == _SMALL and c.count(_SMALL) == 1 and _SMALL < _RATE < _BIG
for _n2, p, c in _SET)
and {p for _n2, p, _c in _SET} == {0, 1, 2, 3, 4})
def _verdict(opts, token):
"""(refused?, the unit the message NAMES, the cap it QUOTES)."""
ps = [p for p in validate_startup_config(opts, -5000, 5000) if token in p]
if not ps:
return (False, None, None)
m = re.search(r"max_w \(([^)]+)\) is (\d+) W", ps[0])
return (True, m.group(1) if m else None, float(m.group(2)) if m else None)
# --- the shipped answer, on every member of the set -------------------------
_rows = []
for _opt, _token in _CAP_RULES:
for _n, _pos, _caps in _SET:
_o = _roster_n(list(_caps), **dict(_QUIET, **{_opt: _RATE}))
_rows.append((_opt, _n, _pos, _caps, _verdict(_o, _token)))
print(f" {len(_CAP_RULES)} rules x {len(_SET)} rosters = {len(_rows)} runs "
f"of the REAL validator (rate {_RATE:.0f} W, caps {_SMALL:.0f}/"
f"{_BIG:.0f} W, simulated rosters - inverter B does not exist):")
for _opt in sorted({r[0] for r in _rows}):
_got = [(r[1], r[2], r[4]) for r in _rows if r[0] == _opt]
print(f" {_opt:<22} " + " ".join(
f"n{n}p{p}:{'REFUSE ' + str(u) if ok else 'starts'}"
for n, p, (ok, u, _c) in _got))
check("⚠️ EVERY ONE OF THE THREE CAP RULES REFUSES ON EVERY MEMBER OF THE SET, "
"and NAMES THE UNIT THE NUMBER CAME OFF - at width 2, 3, 4 and 5, with "
"the small cap at every position in turn. A reduction that answered "
"`first`, `last`, `[:1]`, `[-1:]`, `[:2]` or `[:-1]` instead of `min` "
"misses at least one member of this set, which is what four hand-run "
"mutations against a 19/19 green suite proved the single `[5000, 2000]` "
"fixture could not do",
all(ok and unit == f"unit-{p}" and cap == _SMALL
for _o2, _n2, p, _c2, (ok, unit, cap) in _rows))
check("...and it is a COMPARISON, not a blanket refusal of rosters: the same "
"three rates against a roster whose caps can ALL take them start "
"cleanly, at every width. Without this the line above is satisfied by a "
"validator that refuses everything (habit 2 in the negative direction)",
all(_verdict(_roster_n([_BIG] * n, **dict(_QUIET, **{opt: _RATE})),
tok) == (False, None, None)
for opt, tok in _CAP_RULES for n in (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)))
# --- the POSITIONAL-SLICE FAMILY TABLE, computed and printed ----------------
# ⚠️ COMPUTED, NOT LISTED. Each candidate is applied to the SAME caps the
# validator saw, and its (unit, cap) answer is compared against what the shipped
# validator actually said on that roster. A candidate that agrees everywhere is
# a reduction this fixture set CANNOT distinguish from the shipped one, and it
# is printed as a SURVIVOR rather than left out of a table nobody re-derived.
def _pick(caps, fn):
ix = list(enumerate(caps))
try:
i, c = fn(ix)
except (ValueError, IndexError):
return None
return (f"unit-{i}", c)
_FAMILY = {
"min (SHIPPED)": lambda ix: min(ix, key=lambda p: p[1]),
"max": lambda ix: max(ix, key=lambda p: p[1]),
"first": lambda ix: ix[0],
"last": lambda ix: ix[-1],
"min(caps[:1])": lambda ix: min(ix[:1], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[-1:])": lambda ix: min(ix[-1:], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[:2])": lambda ix: min(ix[:2], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[:3])": lambda ix: min(ix[:3], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[1:])": lambda ix: min(ix[1:], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[:-1])": lambda ix: min(ix[:-1], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"min(caps[::2])": lambda ix: min(ix[::2], key=lambda p: p[1]),
"mean": lambda ix: (0, sum(c for _i, c in ix) / len(ix)),
}
_survivors = []
print(" the family table - each candidate against what the SHIPPED "
"validator answered on the same roster:")
for _name, _fn in _FAMILY.items():
_misses = []
for _opt, _n, _pos, _caps, (_ok, _unit, _cap) in _rows:
_pred = _pick(list(_caps), _fn)
_pred_refuses = _pred is not None and _pred[1] > 0 and _RATE >= _pred[1]
if _opt == "maintenance_charge_w":
_pred_refuses = (_pred is not None and _pred[1] > 0
and _RATE > _pred[1])
_said = ((True, _pred[0], _pred[1]) if _pred_refuses
else (False, None, None))
if _said != (_ok, _unit, _cap):
_misses.append(f"{_opt[:4]}/n{_n}p{_pos}")
if not _misses and _name != "min (SHIPPED)":
_survivors.append(_name)
print(f" {_name:<16} {'AGREES EVERYWHERE (survivor)' if not _misses else 'differs on ' + str(len(_misses)) + ' run(s), first: ' + _misses[0]}")
check("⚠️ AND THE FAMILY TABLE HAS NO SURVIVOR BUT THE SHIPPED REDUCTION. "
"Eleven candidates - max, first, last, the mean, and every positional "
"slice this card has actually been defeated by - are each computed "
"against what the real validator answered on the same roster, and every "
"one of them differs somewhere in the set. This is the check that would "
"have taken PR #48 red four rounds ago: a member no fixture kills is "
"PRINTED AS A NAMED SURVIVOR here instead of being absent from a list "
f"nobody re-derived. survivors: {_survivors}",
_survivors == [])
# --- the ROSTER OF ONE, where every one of them is the same thing -----------
_at_one = {n: _pick([_SMALL], f) for n, f in _FAMILY.items()}
print(f" at a ROSTER OF ONE the twelve candidates answer: "
f"{sorted({str(v) for v in _at_one.values()})}")
check("...and at a ROSTER OF ONE every candidate that still has a member to "
"reduce answers THE SAME THING - which is exactly why no "
"single-inverter fixture in this repository could ever have caught any "
"of this, and why the shipped single-inverter refusals are what they "
"always were. The only two that do NOT coincide are `caps[1:]` and "
"`caps[:-1]`, which EMPTY the list and would raise: at N=1 they are "
"crashes rather than silent wrong answers, so they are not survivors "
"there either",
{v for v in _at_one.values() if v is not None} == {("unit-0", _SMALL)}
and {n for n, v in _at_one.items() if v is None}
== {"min(caps[1:])", "min(caps[:-1])"}
and _verdict(_roster_n([_SMALL], **dict(_QUIET, sign_disagree_w=_RATE)),
"SAFETY-02 sign-disagreement")[0])
# --- rule 5's SIBLING BRANCH, which was reading the FLAT max_w --------------
# ⚠️ FOUND BY READING THE THREE BRANCHES SIDE BY SIDE, NOT BY THE STRUCTURAL
# PIN - and said that way on purpose, because it is the shape of what the pin
# cannot see. `unit_sign_disagree_w` is SAFETY-30's, not this card's. It was
# graded against `_number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)`, the FLAT option, three lines
# under a branch that had already stopped doing that. Both directions were
# measured before the fix and both are asserted here.
_leftover = _roster_n([_SMALL, _SMALL],
**dict(_QUIET, unit_sign_disagree_w=_RATE))
_leftover["max_w"] = _BIG # what a single-inverter install leaves behind
_lv = _verdict(_leftover, "SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement")
print(f" leftover flat max_w {_BIG:.0f} beside a roster of two "
f"{_SMALL:.0f} W units, unit_sign_disagree_w {_RATE:.0f} -> {_lv}")
check("⚠️ A LEFTOVER FLAT `max_w` NO LONGER DISARMS SAFETY-30's PER-UNIT "
"WATCHDOG SILENTLY. Two 2000 W units beside a `max_w: 5000` left over "
"from a single-inverter install and `unit_sign_disagree_w: 3000` used to "
"produce ZERO problems - the site started, the status page said `armed`, "
"and the watchdog could not trip on EITHER unit. It is refused now, "
"against the weakest unit's own cap, and the message names that unit",
_lv == (True, "unit-0", _SMALL))
check("...and the over-refusal in the OTHER direction is gone too: a roster of "
"two 5000 W units with NO flat `max_w` was refused at 3000 W against a "
"2000 W DEFAULT the operator never wrote, for a threshold both units can "
"reach. It starts",
_verdict(_roster_n([_BIG, _BIG],
**dict(_QUIET, unit_sign_disagree_w=_RATE)),
"SAFETY-30 per-inverter sign-disagreement")
== (False, None, None))
check("...and the flat single-inverter config it always refused is refused "
"IDENTICALLY - `unit_caps()` at a roster of one is `[max_w]`, so this is "
"the same comparison, the same boundary and the same sentence",
why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, unit_sign_disagree_w=2000),
-5000, 5000), "unit_sign_disagree_w")
and validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, unit_sign_disagree_w=1999),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
if fails:
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""SAFETY-39's evidence, on admin/goodwe's OWN plant model.
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --repro # ⭐ the 2026-09-05 excursion, replayed
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --slew # the derivation: slew against the rail
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --gain # what the slew does NOT own
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --roster # N=1 -> N=2, and the rail that moved
python3 tools/slew_sim.py --all
WHY THIS IS A SCRIPT AND NOT A `test_*.py`
==========================================
Byte for byte tools/alloc_sim.py's reason, and it has not changed: this needs
admin/goodwe checked out beside this repository for `plantsim.Plant`, and the
add-on's CI job has no credentials for that repository - it is private and the
job's token is minted for this one. A `test_*.py` here is globbed and RUN by
.gitea/workflows/checks.yml, so a file that needs the sibling repo would either
fail the gate or - worse - pass SILENTLY having checked nothing.
So the rig evidence lives here and is quoted in the pull request and in
DECISIONS/SAFETY-39-slew-against-the-rail.md, and test_control.py's SAFETY-39
section grades the same properties in CI against a plant it models itself and
says it models. The two plants are INDEPENDENT - a first-order lag written in
test_control.py versus `plantsim.Plant`'s ramp-plus-lag with an efficiency and
a SoC integrator - and they agree on every sign and rank below, which is worth
more than either alone.
WHAT IS REAL IN HERE
====================
* the control law - `compute()` and `Tuning`, imported out of THIS checkout,
never transcribed.
* the wire - every command goes out through `frame_check.setpoint_atomic()`,
the firmware's own encoder, and back in through `plantsim.parse`/`decode`,
because `Inverter.command()` is what drives the modelled unit.
* the plant - `plantsim.Plant`, the model the rig uses.
MODELLED, and therefore not evidence about the thing modelled:
* the meter. `grid = load - pv - sum(battery)` with no poll delay and no
noise, sampled once per tick. The real P1 is a poll with its own age.
* the tick. 2.0 s, which is what the live install was MEASURED running on
2026-09-05; it is a parameter here (`--tick`) and not a constant, because
the whole of this card is that the derivation depends on the regime.
⚠️ WHAT THIS CANNOT SHOW, SAID BEFORE THE RESULTS RATHER THAN AFTER THEM
=======================================================================
THE -5154 W BATTERY EXCURSION IS NOT REPRODUCIBLE HERE, AND NOT BECAUSE THE
TUNING IS WRONG. `plantsim.Plant.limit()` clamps the plant at `p_max`, so the
modelled battery cannot exceed its rating by one watt at any tuning, on any
step, ever. Neither can test_control.py's model. An acceptance criterion of
"battery power no longer exceeds max_w in simulation" would therefore be
UNFALSIFIABLE - it passes on the broken configuration too - so no criterion in
this card is written on it, and the ticket's own AC to that effect is the one
that had to be rewritten rather than met.
What IS reproducible, and is what everything below measures:
* the setpoint stepping a full `slew_w` per tick, over and over (the live
symptom that escalated 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 large steps per 30 min);
* the loop OVER-ABSORBING - taking more than the site needed - and driving
the meter from EXPORT into IMPORT, i.e. manufacturing the error it chases.
⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is inverter A's numbers
COPIED, `measured=False`. Every N=2 row below is therefore a result about TWO
COPIES OF A on a 10000 W rail, NOT about the ~9600 W site that B's datasheet
and serial imply (goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b; B is a GW5048D-ES rated 4600 W, and
that figure may itself be DC). Each such row prints the caveat with it.
"""
import argparse
import math
import os
import pathlib
import sys
HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
ADDON = HERE.parent.parent # the goodwe-addon checkout root
def find_sim():
"""admin/goodwe's `sim/` directory, or None - and the caller says which.
$GOODWE_SIM first, the same override test_freeze.py and alloc_sim.py take,
then the sibling checkouts that actually occur. A missing sibling is not a
finding about the control law and must never be reported as one.
"""
cands = []
if os.environ.get("GOODWE_SIM"):
cands.append(pathlib.Path(os.environ["GOODWE_SIM"]))
for up in (ADDON.parent, ADDON.parent.parent):
cands += [up / "goodwe" / "sim", up / "goodwe-session" / "goodwe" / "sim"]
for c in cands:
if (c / "plantsim.py").exists():
return c
return None
def load(sim):
sys.path[:0] = [str(sim), str(sim.parent / "master")]
os.environ.setdefault("GOODWE_ADDON_REPO", str(ADDON))
sys.path[:0] = [str(ADDON / "goodwe_controller")]
import plantsim # noqa: E402
from app import control # noqa: E402
return plantsim, control
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# one experiment
def step_run(plantsim, control, *, gain, slew_w, rail_w, n=1, tick_s=2.0,
export_w=3385.0, load_w=350.0, phase=5, cycles=300, dt=0.05,
lag_s=None):
"""One export step onto a converged loop, through the real wire.
`rail_w` is the SITE rail - what `main.py` hands `compute()` as `max_w`
(`Controller.site_max_w`, the roster sum). Each of the `n` modelled units
is rated `rail_w / n` and is commanded its even share, which is the
arrangement ARCH-01's split-invariance says any valid split is equivalent
to at the meter.
"""
over = {} if lag_s is None else dict(lag_s=lag_s)
spec = dict(plantsim.INVERTER_A, rating_w=rail_w / n, **over)
invs = [plantsim.Inverter.from_spec(name, spec) for name in "AB"[:n]]
site = plantsim.Site(invs, load=load_w, pv=0.0)
tuning = control.Tuning(gain=gain, max_w=rail_w, slew_w=slew_w,
target_grid_w=-10.0)
prev, i_w, sat = 0.0, None, 0
worst_import, peak, biggest, last = -1e9, 0.0, 0.0, None
for c in range(cycles):
if c == phase:
site.pv = export_w + load_w
site.grid = site.load - site.pv - site.battery
# ⚠️ ONE UNIT'S POWER, NOT THE SITE'S SUM, at n > 1. The shipped add-on
# binds a single `inverter_power` sensor, so a two-inverter install has
# a loop that sees unit A only. sitesim.run_site() makes the same choice
# and says at length why feeding the sum would be a KINDER rig than the
# deployment.
actual = invs[0].plant.actual
d = control.compute(prev, site.grid, actual, tuning, sat, i_w)
if c >= phase and last is not None:
biggest = max(biggest, abs(d.target_w - last))
last = d.target_w
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
for inv in invs:
inv.command(d.target_w / n)
site.settle(tick_s, dt=dt)
if c >= phase:
worst_import = max(worst_import, site.grid)
peak = max(peak, abs(site.battery))
return dict(imp=worst_import, over=peak - export_w, step=biggest)
def family(plantsim, control, *, exports=None, phases=(5, 6, 7), **kw):
"""The worst case over a family of step sizes and phases.
⚠️ A FAMILY, NOT ONE STEP, AND THAT IS ITSELF A FINDING. A single run of
this loop is not evidence: the 15 W deadband, the 10 W quantisation and the
phase of the step against the tick move the answer by hundreds of watts,
NON-MONOTONICALLY, so two adjacent slews rank either way depending on which
step you happen to run. The first version of this derivation was a single
step and reported gain 0.3 as WORSE than gain 0.6, which the family shows is
backwards. Everything printed below is a worst case over the family, which
is how admin/goodwe grades the same kind of quantity (config.yaml's "1890
closed-loop runs", "924 runs").
"""
exports = exports or range(1000, 4300, 200)
worst = dict(imp=-1e9, over=-1e9, step=0.0, big=0, runs=0)
for export_w in exports:
for phase in phases:
r = step_run(plantsim, control, export_w=float(export_w),
phase=phase, **kw)
worst["runs"] += 1
worst["imp"] = max(worst["imp"], r["imp"])
worst["over"] = max(worst["over"], r["over"])
worst["step"] = max(worst["step"], r["step"])
worst["big"] += r["step"] >= 900.0
return worst
def row(label, w):
print(f" {label:<44} step {w['step']:6.0f} W "
f"{w['big']:3}/{w['runs']} runs >= 900 W "
f"over-absorbed {w['over']:6.0f} W meter to {w['imp']:+7.0f} W")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def repro(ps, ct, tick_s):
print("⭐ THE 2026-09-05 EXCURSION, REPLAYED - gain 0.6, max_w 5000, "
f"slew_w 1000, {tick_s:.0f} s tick")
print(" Live, 11:43:55-11:45:55: grid -3385 W, setpoint 380 -> 5000 in five")
print(" ticks, battery -5154 W, grid +2831 W. One 3385 W export step here:\n")
print(f" {'t':>5} {'grid in':>9} {'setpoint':>9} {'battery':>9} {'grid out':>9} reason")
spec = dict(ps.INVERTER_A)
inv = ps.Inverter.from_spec("A", spec)
site = ps.Site([inv], load=350.0, pv=0.0)
t = ct.Tuning(gain=0.6, max_w=5000.0, slew_w=1000.0, target_grid_w=-10.0)
prev, i_w, sat = 0.0, None, 0
for c in range(34):
if c == 5:
site.pv = 3385.0 + 350.0
site.grid = site.load - site.pv - site.battery
g = site.grid
d = ct.compute(prev, g, inv.plant.actual, t, sat, i_w)
prev, i_w, sat = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
inv.command(d.target_w)
site.settle(tick_s, dt=0.05)
print(f" {c * tick_s:5.0f} {g:9.0f} {d.target_w:9.0f} "
f"{site.battery:9.0f} {site.grid:9.0f} {d.reason}")
print("\n ⚠️ THE BATTERY NEVER PASSES 5000 W HERE AND CANNOT: plantsim.Plant")
print(" clamps at its rating. The -5154 W figure is NOT reproducible in")
print(" this model at any tuning, so nothing in this card is graded on it.")
print(" What IS reproduced is the setpoint stepping 1000 W a tick to the")
print(" rail, and the meter crossing from export into import.")
def slew_table(ps, ct, tick_s, rail):
frac = ct.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC
print(f"THE DERIVATION - gain 0.6, site rail {rail:.0f} W, {tick_s:.0f} s tick, "
f"51 export steps 1.0-4.2 kW\n")
print(f" the constraint: the loop must not cross its whole output range "
f"faster than the")
print(f" plant settles. {rail:.0f} W / ({ct.PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s / "
f"{tick_s:.0f} s per tick) = {frac * rail:.0f} W per tick.\n")
for slew in (1000, 800, 700, 600, int(frac * rail), 500, 400, 300, 250):
w = family(ps, ct, gain=0.6, slew_w=float(slew), rail_w=rail,
tick_s=tick_s)
tag = " <- the derived value" if slew == int(frac * rail) else (
" <- the 2026-09-05 live pair" if slew == 1000 else (
" <- the live interim" if slew == 400 else ""))
row(f"slew_w {slew}{tag}", w)
print("\n READ IT THIS WAY. The >= 900 W step - the live symptom, which")
print(" escalated 2 -> 1 -> 13 -> 43 per 30 min that morning - is gone from")
print(" every run below 900 W of slew, and that is what the slew owns.")
print(" The OVER-ABSORPTION does not move, and at the slowest slews it is")
print(" slightly WORSE. The rig cannot pick the derived value out of that")
print(" column, and it is not asked to: the CONSTRAINT picks it, and this")
print(" table is what says what the constraint does and does not buy.")
def gain_table(ps, ct, tick_s, rail):
frac = ct.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC
print(f"WHAT THE SLEW DOES NOT OWN - slew_w at the derived "
f"{frac * rail:.0f} W, gain swept\n")
for gain in (0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1):
w = family(ps, ct, gain=gain, slew_w=frac * rail, rail_w=rail,
tick_s=tick_s)
row(f"gain {gain}" + (" <- shipped" if gain == 0.6 else ""), w)
print("\n `slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT. The integrator accumulates")
print(" `gain * error` per cycle and is bounded only by `integrator_max_w`,")
print(" so at gain 0.6 into a 3.4 kW error it moves ~2000 W per tick and")
print(f" reaches the {rail:.0f} W rail in under three ticks WHATEVER the slew is.")
print(" The over-absorption is therefore a GAIN term. `gain: 0.6` is the")
print(" next constant to re-derive; SAFETY-39 measured it and changed")
print(" nothing, because two control-law constants moving in one release on")
print(" a running house makes the next measurement uninterpretable.")
def roster_table(ps, ct, tick_s):
frac = ct.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC
print("N=1 -> N=2: THE RAIL IS WHAT MOVED\n")
print(" ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST (SPIKE-04, ~2026-09-12) AND")
print(" plantsim.INVERTER_B IS INVERTER A COPIED, measured=False. The")
print(" N=2 rows are therefore about TWO COPIES OF A on a 10000 W rail.")
print(" The site B actually implies is ~9600 W (5000 + 4600), and 4600 is")
print(" B's DATASHEET and SERIAL, not a measurement, and may be DC -")
print(" goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b. Read the rows as architecture, not as a")
print(" prediction about this house.\n")
for n, rail in ((1, 5000.0), (2, 10000.0)):
for slew in (1000.0, frac * rail):
w = family(ps, ct, gain=0.6, slew_w=slew, rail_w=rail, n=n,
tick_s=tick_s)
lab = (f"n={n} rail {rail:.0f} slew {slew:.0f}"
+ (" [B = A COPIED]" if n == 2 else ""))
row(lab, w)
print(f"\n The derived value at the REAL 9600 W site is "
f"{frac * 9600:.0f} W per tick, and")
print(" validate.py reads it off `sum(unit_caps(opts))` - the same number")
print(" `Controller.site_max_w` builds - so adding inverter B moves the")
print(" bound with no operator action and no second derivation.")
print("\n ⚠️ AND THE DIRECTION IS NOT THE ONE THE TICKET ASSUMED. A rail that")
print(" GROWS loosens this bound: slew_w 1000 crosses a 9600 W rail in")
print(" 19.2 s and PASSES, while at 5000 W the same 1000 is the")
print(" configuration that was measured failing. That is what the")
print(" constraint says and it is correct - the bound is on how long the")
print(" crossing TAKES, and a bigger rail at the same step size takes")
print(" longer to cross.")
print("\n ⚠️ AND THE >= 900 W STEP COUNT STAYS AT 48/51 AT THE DERIVED VALUE")
print(" ON THE N=2 ROW, WHICH IS NOT A FAILURE - IT IS THE THRESHOLD GOING")
print(" STALE, on the same day and in the same way as the constant. 900 W")
print(" was a meaningful step against a 5000 W rail; against 10000 W the")
print(" derived step IS 1111 W, and a check written on the absolute 900")
print(" would report the correct tuning as broken. Anything grading this")
print(" symptom at N>=2 has to grade it as a FRACTION of the rail too.")
print("\n WHAT DOES NOT GET WORSE HERE, STATED BECAUSE IT WAS EXPECTED TO.")
print(" Over the SAME family of 1.0-4.2 kW export steps, doubling the rail")
print(" does not worsen the over-absorption (958 -> 810 W): the extra rail")
print(" is headroom these disturbances never ask for. That is a statement")
print(" about this family, not about the site - a bigger site sees bigger")
print(" steps, and the over-absorption is a `gain` term either way, which")
print(" the enforced ratio does not bound and this card did not change.")
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--repro", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--slew", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--gain", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--roster", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--all", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--tick", type=float, default=None,
help="seconds per control cycle (default: control.LOOP_TICK_S)")
ap.add_argument("--rail", type=float, default=5000.0)
a = ap.parse_args()
if not any((a.repro, a.slew, a.gain, a.roster, a.all)):
a.all = True
sim = find_sim()
if sim is None:
sys.exit("slew_sim: admin/goodwe's sim/ is not beside this checkout, so "
"plantsim.Plant is unavailable. Clone it as a sibling or set "
"$GOODWE_SIM. This is a missing repository, NOT a result about "
"the control law - do not report it as one.")
ps, ct = load(sim)
tick = a.tick if a.tick is not None else ct.LOOP_TICK_S
print(f"slew_sim: plant from {sim}")
print(f" control law from {ADDON / 'goodwe_controller' / 'app'}")
print(f" {ps.Inverter.from_spec('A', ps.INVERTER_A).describe()}")
print(f" tick {tick:.1f} s, SLEW_RAIL_FRAC {ct.SLEW_RAIL_FRAC:.4f} "
f"= {ct.LOOP_TICK_S:.0f} s / {ct.PLANT_SETTLE_S:.0f} s\n")
if a.repro or a.all:
repro(ps, ct, tick); print()
if a.slew or a.all:
slew_table(ps, ct, tick, a.rail); print()
if a.gain or a.all:
gain_table(ps, ct, tick, a.rail); print()
if a.roster or a.all:
roster_table(ps, ct, tick)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
+260 -12
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,24 @@ DECISIONS/CFG-04-inverter-roster.md:
reconstruction happens to lack FIRST, which is an artefact of the
reconstruction and NOT evidence about `inverters`. B is that evidence.
C. A two-inverter blob validates, per-entry types enforced.
D. An entry missing `name`, `setpoint_entity` or `max_w` is refused BY NAME,
and a JSON string where the list belongs is refused outright.
D. An entry missing `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` or `bms_soc_floor` is
refused BY NAME - one key varied from an ACCEPTED baseline, and the key's
own name asserted in the refusal - and a JSON string where the list belongs
is refused outright.
⚠️ RE-RUN 2026-09-04 FOR SAFETY-32, which made `bms_soc_floor` a REQUIRED
per-entry key. That change broke §C and, worse, left §D printing PASS on a
refusal about the WRONG KEY - the exact decay MUTATION.md habit 8 describes. §C
now carries the key and §D is an isolated counterfactual asserting the key name.
⚠️ RE-RUN AGAIN 2026-09-05, on the same 2026.08.0 image, because SAFETY-32's
rebase onto SPIKE-04a merged two independent edits into §C and §D - the required
`bms_soc_floor` and inverter B's datasheet `max_w: 4600`. A transcript stitched
together by hand from two runs is not a measurement, so this one was measured:
`all cases passed`, exit 0. B's 4600 W is STILL its DATASHEET figure and not a
reading off any unit, and B's `bms_soc_floor: 15` in §C is illustrative - it
differs from A's 10 so that the per-entry number is exercised at all, while
production is expected to have BOTH packs at 10 %.
"""
import sys, json, copy
sys.path.insert(0, "/usr/src/supervisor")
@@ -145,13 +161,47 @@ show("the same blob MERGED with these defaults - what App.options actually is",
f"max_w={out.get('max_w')!r}" if ok else out)
print("\n== C. AC2: a two-inverter blob an operator would POST ==")
# ⚠️ B's 4600 W IS FROM ITS DATASHEET, NOT A PLACEHOLDER AND NOT A MEASUREMENT.
# SPIKE-04a (2026-09-04) identified inverter B from the owner's model number and
# serial - a GoodWe GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992` - and the datasheet's
# Max. Charging / Discharging Power is 4600 W. The 3000 W that stood here was a
# hypothesis from before the unit was known and was simply wrong; the 5000 VA AC
# nameplate is wrong for this purpose too, because nothing will be connected to
# B's MPPTs so the battery path is the ceiling. See goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS STILL NOT MEASURED. The datasheet prints 4600 W under BATTERY
# INPUT DATA, so it is probably DC, while `max_w` is graded against 0x0518 - the
# inverter's own AC power. If it is DC the AC ceiling is nearer 4600 x 0.94 =
# 4324 W. NOTES.md §1.1b records both readings without picking one, and
# SAFETY-20's `min(max_w, dev_max)` is what bounds it correctly once dev_max is
# read off the unit. So this blob is what an operator would POST TODAY, not a
# claim about what inverter B will turn out to do.
#
# ⚠️ THE TWO RATINGS ARE STILL DIFFERENT (5000 / 4600) AND MUST STAY DIFFERENT.
# This file's own §B is the record of what an instrument that cannot distinguish
# its two cases is worth. Note that 5000/4600 is a much NARROWER separation than
# the 5000/3000 it replaces - fine here, where nothing computes on the numbers,
# and NOT fine in the test fixtures, which is why those keep a wide illustrative
# pair instead of the real one.
#
# ⚠️ AND `bms_soc_floor` IS A REQUIRED PER-ENTRY KEY SINCE SAFETY-32, so this
# blob is also what proves an operator can still POST a two-inverter config
# after that. THE TWO FLOORS DIFFER ON PURPOSE (10 and 15): equal values would
# not exercise a per-entry number at all, for the same reason the two ratings
# must stay different.
# ⚠️ NEITHER OF B'S NUMBERS IS A MEASUREMENT OF A PACK. Only inverter A's 10 %
# is read off hardware (register 0x0560 on the reference GW5000S-BP). B's 4600 W
# is its DATASHEET figure and B's 15 % is an illustrative value chosen to differ
# - there is no second pack on this site, and in production BOTH packs are
# expected to floor at 10 %, which is why the differing pair lives here and in
# the fixtures rather than in config.yaml's example.
TWO = dict(LIVE, setpoint_entity="", inverters=[
{"name": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_a_setpoint_w",
"soc_entity": "sensor.goodwe_a_soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.goodwe_a_battery_power",
"max_w": 5000},
"max_w": 5000, "bms_soc_floor": 10},
{"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w",
"soc_entity": "sensor.goodwe_b_soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power",
"max_w": 3000}])
"max_w": 4600, "bms_soc_floor": 15}])
ok, out = validate(MERGER.merge(copy.deepcopy(defaults), copy.deepcopy(TWO)))
show("two inverters", ok, json.dumps(out.get("inverters")) if ok else out)
# The validated blob, for anyone who wants to POST it. Optional: the probe's
@@ -162,14 +212,38 @@ except OSError:
pass
print("\n== D. what the schema itself refuses, per entry ==")
for title, entry in (
("no name", {"setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": 3000}),
("no setpoint_entity", {"name": "inverter-b", "max_w": 3000}),
("no max_w", {"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b"}),
("max_w over the range", {"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": 9999})):
ok, out = validate(dict(TWO, inverters=[entry]))
show(f"an entry with {title} is refused", not ok, out)
ok, out = validate(dict(TWO, inverters="[]"))
# ⚠️ ONE KEY VARIED FROM AN ACCEPTED BASELINE, AND THE REFUSAL IS ASSERTED BY
# NAME - §B's two lessons, applied here because SAFETY-32 is what broke this
# section. These entries used to omit several keys at once and assert a bare
# `not ok`; the moment `bms_soc_floor` became required, the "no max_w" case went
# on printing PASS while the refusal it printed said `Missing option
# 'bms_soc_floor'`. A refusal of unknown provenance is not a measurement of
# anything, so the baseline below is COMPLETE and each case deletes exactly one
# key - or, for the range case, moves exactly one value out of range.
D_FULL = {"name": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.b", "max_w": 4600,
"bms_soc_floor": 10}
# MERGED with the shipped defaults, exactly as §C is and as App.options is: the
# raw LIVE blob is missing root keys unrelated to this section (`maintenance_
# start_hour` on the run that caught it), and a baseline refused for one of THOSE
# is the provenance problem §B2 is kept as a warning about.
D_BASE = MERGER.merge(copy.deepcopy(defaults), copy.deepcopy(TWO))
ok, out = validate(dict(D_BASE, inverters=[D_FULL]))
show("the per-entry BASELINE is ACCEPTED, so every refusal below has nowhere "
"else to come from", ok, json.dumps(out.get("inverters")) if ok else out)
for title, entry, expect in (
("no name", {k: v for k, v in D_FULL.items() if k != "name"}, "name"),
("no setpoint_entity",
{k: v for k, v in D_FULL.items() if k != "setpoint_entity"}, "setpoint_entity"),
("no max_w", {k: v for k, v in D_FULL.items() if k != "max_w"}, "max_w"),
("no bms_soc_floor (SAFETY-32)",
{k: v for k, v in D_FULL.items() if k != "bms_soc_floor"}, "bms_soc_floor"),
("max_w over the range", dict(D_FULL, max_w=9999), "at most 5000"),
("bms_soc_floor over the range (SAFETY-32)",
dict(D_FULL, bms_soc_floor=99), "at most 50")):
ok, out = validate(dict(D_BASE, inverters=[entry]))
show(f"an entry with {title} is refused, and the refusal NAMES it",
(not ok) and expect in str(out), out)
ok, out = validate(dict(D_BASE, inverters="[]"))
show("a JSON STRING where the list belongs is refused", not ok, out)
@@ -198,6 +272,180 @@ except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
show("Supervisor's UI renderer survives the shape", False, f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}")
print("\n== F. UX-01: the TRANSLATED Configuration tab, rendered ==")
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS SECTION MEASURES, AND WHY IT IS NOT AN ASSERTION ABOUT A FILE.
# UX-01 adds translations/en.yaml and translations/nl.yaml. Whether they reach
# an operator depends on two pieces of somebody else's software, not on us:
#
# 1. SUPERVISOR decides whether a file is loaded at all.
# `supervisor/store/data.py:_read_app_translations()` globs this directory,
# keys each file by its STEM, and runs it through `SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS`.
# ⚠️ A FILE THAT FAILS THAT SCHEMA IS DROPPED WITH A LOG WARNING AND
# NOTHING ELSE: `except (ConfigurationFileError, vol.Invalid): _LOGGER.
# warning(...); continue`. The add-on then renders raw keys and the only
# trace is one line in the Supervisor log. So the loader is RUN here, out
# of the release image, rather than the schema being re-implemented.
# 2. THE FRONTEND decides what it does with what Supervisor loaded. The
# resolution below is not invented: it is transcribed from the shipped
# bundle in THIS image, `api/panel/frontend_latest/5680.*.js`
# (frontend 20250925.1), which reads
#
# _getTranslationEntry(lang,s,o){let e=this.addon.translations[lang]?.
# configuration; if(e){if(o?.path)for(const t of o.path)
# if(e=e[t]?.fields,!e)return; return e[s.name]}}
# computeLabel =(s,_,o)=>this._getTranslationEntry(this.hass.language,s,o)?.name
# ||this._getTranslationEntry("en",s,o)?.name||s.name
# computeHelper=(s,o) =>this._getTranslationEntry(this.hass.language,s,o)?.description
# ||this._getTranslationEntry("en",s,o)?.description||""
# _filteredSchema=(opts,schema)=>schema.filter(e=>e.name in opts||e.required)
#
# i.e. the fallback is PER KEY, en is the second chance, and the raw key
# name is the third.
from supervisor.apps.validate import SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS # noqa: E402
from supervisor.store.data import _read_app_translations # noqa: E402
TRANSLATIONS = _read_app_translations(Path("/w"))
show("Supervisor's OWN translation loader accepts both files - a file that "
"fails SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS is DROPPED with a log warning and the tab "
"silently goes back to raw keys, so 'it is on disk' is not the question",
set(TRANSLATIONS) == {"en", "nl"}, sorted(TRANSLATIONS))
ui = UiOptions(None)(schema)
print(f" the Configuration tab renders {len(ui)} fields, in `schema:` order "
"(App.schema_ui is UiOptions(...)(data['schema']), so the ORDER IS THE "
"SCHEMA BLOCK'S and not the options block's)")
def _entry(lang, name, path=()):
node = TRANSLATIONS.get(lang, {}).get("configuration")
if not node:
return None
for step in path:
node = (node.get(step) or {}).get("fields")
if not node:
return None
return node.get(name)
def _label(lang, name, path=()):
for lg in (lang, "en"):
e = _entry(lg, name, path)
if e and e.get("name"):
return e["name"], lg
return name, "RAW KEY"
def _helper(lang, name, path=()):
for lg in (lang, "en"):
e = _entry(lg, name, path)
if e and e.get("description"):
return e["description"], lg
return "", "NONE"
# ⚠️ EVERY FIELD, PRINTED. This is the transcript the card asks for: what the
# owner's Supervisor puts on the screen, not a claim that it would look nice.
for lang in ("en", "nl"):
print(f"\n --- as rendered at hass.language == {lang!r} "
f"(the owner's HA runs Europe/Brussels) ---")
for node in ui:
lbl, src = _label(lang, node["name"])
hlp, hsrc = _helper(lang, node["name"])
flag = "" if src == lang else f" [name from {src}]"
print(f" {node['name']:28s} -> {lbl}{flag}")
print(f" {'':28s} {hlp[:150]}{'...' if len(hlp) > 150 else ''}")
for sub in node.get("schema", ()):
slbl, ssrc = _label(lang, sub["name"], (node["name"],))
print(f" · {sub['name']:24s} -> {slbl}"
+ ("" if ssrc == lang else f" [{ssrc}]"))
_raw = [n["name"] for n in ui if _label("en", n["name"])[1] == "RAW KEY"]
show("NOT ONE top-level field falls through to its raw key name in `en` - "
f"which is what the tab rendered for all {len(ui)} of them before this "
f"card, because there was no translations/ directory at all. Raw: {_raw}",
not _raw)
_nohelp = [n["name"] for n in ui if not _helper("en", n["name"])[0]]
show("...and not one is left without a description, which is the half that "
f"says WHETHER TO TOUCH IT. Missing: {_nohelp}", not _nohelp)
_nl_missing = [n["name"] for n in ui if _label("nl", n["name"])[1] != "nl"]
show("...and every one of them is translated in `nl` too, so nothing on the "
f"owner's own screen falls back to English. Falling back: {_nl_missing}",
not _nl_missing)
# ⚠️ THE HONEST HALF, AND IT IS A NEGATIVE RESULT. `inverters` is a
# list-of-objects, so UiOptions gives it type "schema" WITH multiple: True, and
# `_convertSchemaElement` sends exactly that case to a SELECTOR rather than to a
# nested ha-form:
#
# if("schema"===t.type&&!t.multiple) return {...type:"expandable"...} <- not us
# if("schema"===t.type){const o={};for(const a of t.schema)
# o[a.name]={required:a.required,selector:...}; return {object:{multiple:t.multiple,fields:o}}}
#
# and ha-selector-object labels those fields with
#
# computeLabel=e=>{const t=this.selector.object?.translation_key;
# if(this.localizeValue&&t){...}
# return this.selector.object?.fields?.[e.name]?.label||e.name}
#
# `_convertSchemaElementToSelector` sets neither `label` nor `translation_key`,
# so ON THIS FRONTEND the per-entry keys inside the repeatable section render as
# `setpoint_entity`, `max_w`, `bms_soc_floor` - RAW - however well they are
# translated here. The `fields:` block is still shipped and still validated,
# because it is the shape Supervisor's own schema defines for exactly this and
# it is what a frontend that wires `label` through would consume; but this card
# must not claim it reaches the operator today, and the count below is asserted
# so that the day it changes, this transcript says so.
_multi = [n for n in ui if n.get("multiple") and n.get("type") == "schema"]
show("`inverters` is rendered as a REPEATABLE SECTION (type schema, multiple), "
"which is CFG-04's measurement re-confirmed",
[n["name"] for n in _multi] == ["inverters"], json.dumps(_multi)[:200])
show("⚠️ MEASURED AND NEGATIVE: this frontend gives that section's per-entry "
"keys to ha-selector-object, which labels them `fields[name].label || "
"name` - and the converter sets no `label` and no `translation_key`. So "
"the per-entry translations below are SHIPPED AND VALIDATED but do NOT "
"reach the screen on 20250925.1. The top-level `inverters` label and "
"description DO.",
bool(_multi) and all("label" not in s and "translation_key" not in s
for n in _multi for s in n.get("schema", ())),
"per-entry keys as rendered today: "
+ ", ".join(s["name"] for n in _multi for s in n.get("schema", ())))
# ⚠️ AND THE HAND PARSER CI USES IS GRADED AGAINST THIS LOADER, KEY BY KEY.
# test_translations.py runs in the add-on's CI image, which has no PyYAML, so it
# parses these files with tools/translations_lint.py. A hand parser that
# disagrees with the real loader is a check whose data cannot reach the failure
# it names, so the two are compared here - where both are available - rather
# than assumed to agree.
sys.path.insert(0, "/probe")
import translations_lint as _tl # noqa: E402
_mismatch = []
for lang in ("en", "nl"):
hand = _tl.parse_translation_file(f"/w/translations/{lang}.yaml")
real = {"configuration": TRANSLATIONS[lang].get("configuration", {})}
# SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS fills `description: None` for an absent one; the
# hand parser simply has no key. Normalise that ONE difference and nothing
# else, so a real disagreement cannot hide behind the normalisation.
def _norm(d):
return {k: {kk: vv for kk, vv in v.items() if vv is not None
and kk != "fields"}
| ({"fields": _norm(v["fields"])} if v.get("fields") else {})
for k, v in d.items()}
if _norm(hand.get("configuration", {})) != _norm(real["configuration"]):
a, b = _norm(hand.get("configuration", {})), _norm(real["configuration"])
_mismatch += [f"{lang}:{k}" for k in sorted(set(a) | set(b))
if a.get(k) != b.get(k)]
show("the hand parser CI uses (tools/translations_lint.py) returns EXACTLY "
"what Supervisor's own loader returns, for both files, key by key and "
f"string by string. Disagreements: {_mismatch}", not _mismatch)
_cfg_text = Path("/w/config.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
_probs = []
for lang in ("en", "nl"):
_probs += _tl.audit(
_cfg_text,
{"configuration": TRANSLATIONS[lang].get("configuration", {})}, lang)
show(f"...and the coverage audit is clean against the real loader's view too. "
f"Problems: {_probs}", not _probs)
# ⚠️ THE EXIT CODE IS PART OF THE INSTRUMENT. Without it the probe prints FAIL
# and still succeeds, and a transcript is only evidence if a wrong answer is
# distinguishable from a right one by something other than reading it.
@@ -0,0 +1,878 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""SAFETY-38 round 3 - the SYMMETRIC-PREDICATE FAMILY, enumerated by machine.
WHAT IT LOOKS FOR, in one sentence: a call whose argument ORDER is load-bearing
for a MESSAGE and for nothing else - so swapping the arguments cannot change a
single decision, is invisible to every behavioural check BY CONSTRUCTION, and
still inverts what an operator reads on the line they are woken by.
⚠️ WHY IT IS AN INSTRUMENT AND NOT A LIST. MUTATION.md habit 12: "a hand-written
scope is the same defect as a hand-written fixture". SAFETY-38 met this family
twice - `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` called at `main.py:1620` (round 2) and at
`main.py:1560` (round 3), ONE CALL SITE OVER - and both times the enumeration
was written by hand and both times it was short. So the scope is computed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE TEST IT APPLIES
For every function in `app/` and every pair (a, b) of its parameters:
rename a -> b and b -> a throughout the body, ERASE every string literal
and f-string, CANONICALISE the commutative operators, and compare the two
ASTs. If they are EQUAL, nothing the function DECIDES can depend on which
of the two values arrived first.
Then, if some f-string in that function mentions BOTH names, the order is
load-bearing for the MESSAGE ALONE, and the pair is reported.
⚠️ THE SYMMETRY IS USUALLY ONE CALL DEEP, WHICH IS WHY THIS IS A FIXPOINT AND
NOT A SINGLE PASS. `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` does not compare its two arguments
itself; it hands them to `watchdog.disagrees()`, whose body is
`commanded_w * against_w < 0 and abs(commanded_w) > min_w and
abs(against_w) > min_w`. An intraprocedural scan sees `disagrees(a, b, ...)`
become `disagrees(b, a, ...)`, calls that a difference, and reports NOTHING -
which is exactly what the first version of this file did, on a tree where the
answer was already known. So symmetric pairs discovered in one round are used
to canonicalise CALL ARGUMENTS in the next, and the scan iterates until the set
stops growing.
CANONICALISATION, and each entry is here because something in `app/` needs it:
* `a * b`, `a + b` - operand order sorted (`disagrees`)
* `x and y`, `x or y` - term order sorted (`disagrees`' conjunction)
* `a == b`, `a != b` - operand order sorted
* `min(a, b)`, `max(a, b)` - argument order sorted (`clamp_to_rating`)
* a tuple/list/set LITERAL being iterated - element order sorted
(`rail_ceiling_w`'s `for bound in (dev_min, dev_max)`)
* arguments at a KNOWN SYMMETRIC POSITION PAIR of a called function - sorted
(the fixpoint)
Equal ASTs after the rename is a SUFFICIENT condition for behavioural
invariance, not a necessary one. This scan therefore UNDER-REPORTS and says so
- see "WHAT THIS CANNOT SEE". That is the conservative direction: everything it
names is genuinely in the family, and the gap is stated with its shape.
Run: `python3 tools/symmetric_message_scan.py [--quiet]` from goodwe_controller/.
Exit status is 0 always; it is a census, not a gate.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import ast
import itertools
import pathlib
import sys
APP = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "app"
# {function name: {(i, j) positional index pairs that are interchangeable}}
_SYM: dict[str, set[tuple[int, int]]] = {}
# ⚠️ AND THE SAME THING FOR KEYWORD-ONLY PARAMETERS, WHICH THE FIRST FIXPOINT
# DROPPED. `freeze.rail_ceiling_w(max_w, *, dev_min=None, dev_max=None)` folds
# its two device bounds with `for bound in (dev_min, dev_max): ceiling = min(
# ceiling, abs(bound))` - perfectly symmetric - and `rail_unreachable()` prints
# `"a range of {dev_min}...{dev_max} W"`. A scan that only followed POSITIONAL
# arguments called that pair asymmetric and hid a genuine member of the family
# behind an implementation detail of its own traversal.
_SYM_KW: dict[str, set[tuple[str, str]]] = {}
class _Canon(ast.NodeTransformer):
"""Rename one pair, erase every string, and sort what commutes."""
COMMUTATIVE_BINOP = (ast.Mult, ast.Add, ast.BitAnd, ast.BitOr, ast.BitXor)
COMMUTATIVE_CMP = (ast.Eq, ast.NotEq)
COMMUTATIVE_CALL = ("min", "max")
def __init__(self, a: str = "", b: str = ""):
self.a, self.b = a, b
# -- the rename ---------------------------------------------------------
def visit_Name(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
if self.a and node.id == self.a:
node.id = self.b
elif self.b and node.id == self.b:
node.id = self.a
return node
def visit_arg(self, node):
if self.a and node.arg == self.a:
node.arg = self.b
elif self.b and node.arg == self.b:
node.arg = self.a
return node
# -- the message is exactly what is ALLOWED to differ --------------------
def visit_JoinedStr(self, node):
return ast.Constant(value="<msg>")
def visit_Constant(self, node):
if isinstance(node.value, str):
return ast.Constant(value="<msg>")
return node
# -- canonicalisation ---------------------------------------------------
def visit_BinOp(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
if isinstance(node.op, self.COMMUTATIVE_BINOP):
l, r = ast.dump(node.left), ast.dump(node.right)
if l > r:
node.left, node.right = node.right, node.left
return node
def visit_BoolOp(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
node.values = sorted(node.values, key=ast.dump)
return node
def visit_Compare(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
if (len(node.ops) == 1
and isinstance(node.ops[0], self.COMMUTATIVE_CMP)):
l, r = ast.dump(node.left), ast.dump(node.comparators[0])
if l > r:
node.left, node.comparators[0] = node.comparators[0], node.left
return node
def visit_For(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
if isinstance(node.iter, (ast.Tuple, ast.List, ast.Set)):
node.iter.elts = sorted(node.iter.elts, key=ast.dump)
return node
def visit_Call(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
name = (node.func.id if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name)
else node.func.attr if isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute)
else "")
if name in self.COMMUTATIVE_CALL and len(node.args) == 2 \
and not node.keywords:
if ast.dump(node.args[0]) > ast.dump(node.args[1]):
node.args = [node.args[1], node.args[0]]
return node
# the fixpoint: sort the arguments at a known symmetric position pair
for (i, j) in sorted(_SYM.get(name, ())):
if j < len(node.args):
if ast.dump(node.args[i]) > ast.dump(node.args[j]):
node.args[i], node.args[j] = node.args[j], node.args[i]
# ...and at a known symmetric KEYWORD pair
for (ka, kb) in sorted(_SYM_KW.get(name, ())):
ia = next((k for k, w in enumerate(node.keywords)
if w.arg == ka), None)
ib = next((k for k, w in enumerate(node.keywords)
if w.arg == kb), None)
if ia is not None and ib is not None:
va, vb = node.keywords[ia].value, node.keywords[ib].value
if ast.dump(va) > ast.dump(vb):
node.keywords[ia].value, node.keywords[ib].value = vb, va
return node
def _canon(src: str, a: str = "", b: str = "") -> str:
return ast.dump(_Canon(a, b).visit(ast.parse(src)))
# ⚠️ THE SINK IS HALF THE CLAIM, AND THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS SCAN OMITTED IT.
# Erasing every f-string makes a function whose ONLY job is to FORMAT one look
# perfectly symmetric - `store.unit_key(unit, key)` and
# `mqtt.unit_state_key(slug, key)` both came back as "the swap changes nothing"
# when in fact the string IS the return value: swapping there renames a STORE
# KEY and an MQTT TOPIC, which is a behaviour change every ordinary check can
# see, and MAINT-05 is the card about exactly that. The family this file is
# looking for is narrower - the string goes to an OPERATOR and to nobody else -
# so each sentence is classified by where it GOES.
_LOG_SINKS = {"debug", "info", "warning", "warn", "error", "exception",
"critical", "log", "log_event", "notify", "persistent_notify"}
_MSG_ATTRS = {"reason", "message", "msg", "banner", "detail", "note",
"explanation", "why", "text"}
def _sink_of(fn, target, follow=True):
"""RETURN | MESSAGE | OTHER - where this f-string node ends up.
`follow` is the ONE step of data flow below, and it is off on the recursive
call so that two locals that interpolate each other cannot loop forever.
"""
for stmt in ast.walk(fn):
for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(stmt):
pass
# a parent map is cheaper than repeated walks
parent = {}
for node in ast.walk(fn):
for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(node):
parent[id(child)] = node
cur = target
while id(cur) in parent:
up = parent[id(cur)]
if isinstance(up, ast.Return):
return "RETURN"
if isinstance(up, ast.Raise):
return "MESSAGE"
if isinstance(up, (ast.Assign, ast.AnnAssign, ast.AugAssign)):
tgts = (up.targets if isinstance(up, ast.Assign) else [up.target])
for t in tgts:
if isinstance(t, ast.Attribute) and t.attr in _MSG_ATTRS:
return "MESSAGE"
if isinstance(t, ast.Name) and t.id in _MSG_ATTRS:
return "MESSAGE"
# ⚠️ ONE STEP OF DATA FLOW, AND IT IS NOT OPTIONAL. `main.py`'s
# status page builds the device-range clause into a LOCAL - `_cap =
# "; ".join(f"... accepts only {inv.dev_min}...{inv.dev_max} W" ...)`
# - and only then concatenates it into the row's `text`. Stopping at
# the assignment scores that OTHER and drops a member this card
# MEASURED as a live survivor (0 bytes, 21/21 green). So: if the
# name assigned here is interpolated into some other sentence in the
# same function that IS a message, this one is a message too.
if follow:
for t in tgts:
if isinstance(t, ast.Name) and _feeds_a_message(fn, t.id,
up):
return "MESSAGE"
return "OTHER"
# ⚠️ ROUND 4. A SENTENCE HANDED TO A CONSTRUCTOR AS `reason=` IS A
# MESSAGE, and scoring only ASSIGNMENTS missed every one of them. This
# codebase builds most of its operator sentences that way -
# `ArbitrageDecision(action=..., reason=f"...")`,
# `out.append({"text": f"..."})` - so the sentence never touches a name
# this walker was watching. arbitrage.py's two DISCHARGE/CHARGE reasons
# were scored OTHER for exactly this and are genuine members.
if isinstance(up, ast.keyword) and up.arg in _MSG_ATTRS:
return "MESSAGE"
if isinstance(up, ast.Dict):
for k, v in zip(up.keys, up.values):
if (v is cur and isinstance(k, ast.Constant)
and k.value in _MSG_ATTRS):
return "MESSAGE"
if isinstance(up, ast.Call):
name = (up.func.attr if isinstance(up.func, ast.Attribute)
else up.func.id if isinstance(up.func, ast.Name) else "")
if name in _LOG_SINKS:
return "MESSAGE"
if name == "append":
return "MESSAGE"
cur = up
return "OTHER"
def _feeds_a_message(fn, name, origin):
"""Is `name` interpolated into some OTHER sentence that IS a message?"""
for node in ast.walk(fn):
if not isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr) or node is origin:
continue
used = any(isinstance(x, ast.Name) and x.id == name
for v in node.values if isinstance(v, ast.FormattedValue)
for x in ast.walk(v.value))
if used and _sink_of(fn, node, follow=False) == "MESSAGE":
return True
return False
def _fstring_pairs(fn, params):
"""{(a, b): [(lineno, sink), ...]} for every f-string mentioning both."""
out: dict[tuple[str, str], list[tuple[int, str]]] = {}
for node in ast.walk(fn):
if not isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr):
continue
used = set()
for v in node.values:
if isinstance(v, ast.FormattedValue):
for x in ast.walk(v.value):
if isinstance(x, ast.Name) and x.id in params:
used.add(x.id)
if len(used) < 2:
continue
sink = _sink_of(fn, node)
for a, b in itertools.combinations(sorted(used), 2):
out.setdefault((a, b), []).append((node.lineno, sink))
return out
def _functions():
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
for fn in ast.walk(tree):
if isinstance(fn, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef)):
yield path, fn
def _positional(fn):
return [a.arg for a in fn.args.posonlyargs + fn.args.args
if a.arg != "self"]
def _all_params(fn):
return _positional(fn) + [a.arg for a in fn.args.kwonlyargs]
def _body_src(fn) -> str:
"""The function's BODY alone.
⚠️ NOT `ast.unparse(fn)`. The signature lists the parameters IN ORDER, so
renaming a pair inside it reorders `arguments.args` and every function in
the repository compares unequal to itself - which is what the first version
of this scan did, silently, and it reported an empty family on a tree whose
answer was already known. The claim being tested is about what the body
DECIDES, and the body is what is compared.
"""
return ast.unparse(ast.Module(body=list(fn.body), type_ignores=[]))
def _symmetric(fn, a, b) -> bool:
src = _body_src(fn)
return _canon(src) == _canon(src, a, b)
def build_fixpoint(max_rounds=6):
"""Fill `_SYM` until it stops growing. Returns the number of rounds."""
for round_no in range(1, max_rounds + 1):
grew = False
for _path, fn in _functions():
pos = _positional(fn)
kws = [a.arg for a in fn.args.kwonlyargs]
if len(pos) + len(kws) < 2:
continue
found = set()
for i, j in itertools.combinations(range(len(pos)), 2):
if _symmetric(fn, pos[i], pos[j]):
found.add((i, j))
found_kw = set()
for ka, kb in itertools.combinations(sorted(kws), 2):
if _symmetric(fn, ka, kb):
found_kw.add((ka, kb))
if found - _SYM.get(fn.name, set()):
_SYM.setdefault(fn.name, set()).update(found)
grew = True
if found_kw - _SYM_KW.get(fn.name, set()):
_SYM_KW.setdefault(fn.name, set()).update(found_kw)
grew = True
if not grew:
return round_no
return max_rounds
def scan():
rows = []
for path, fn in _functions():
params = _all_params(fn)
if len(params) < 2:
continue
kwonly = {a.arg for a in fn.args.kwonlyargs}
for (a, b), hits in sorted(_fstring_pairs(fn, params).items()):
rows.append(dict(
module=path.name, func=fn.name, line=fn.lineno, a=a, b=b,
msg_lines=sorted(set(hits)),
sinks={s for _l, s in hits},
symmetric=_symmetric(fn, a, b),
positional=not (a in kwonly or b in kwonly)))
return rows
# =============================================================================
# CENSUS B - THE SENTENCE THE CALLER BUILDS
# =============================================================================
# ⚠️ CENSUS A ABOVE ONLY SEES A CALLEE FORMATTING ITS OWN PARAMETERS, AND THAT
# WAS GAP 2 OF ITS OWN "WHAT THIS CANNOT SEE" LIST. The other half of the family
# never passes through a function boundary at all: an operator sentence built
# where it is printed, interpolating two values that are INTERCHANGEABLE BY
# SHAPE. `main.py`'s status page says
#
# f"{inv.setpoint_entity or inv.name} accepts only {inv.dev_min}...{inv.dev_max} W"
#
# and transposing those two costs ZERO BYTES, changes nothing any check can
# observe, and tells the operator a range backwards. No predicate is involved,
# so census A's symmetry test has nothing to test.
#
# THE TEST: inside one MESSAGE-sink f-string, take every pair of interpolated
# expressions, blank every attribute NAME and every string CONSTANT, and compare.
# If the blanked forms are EQUAL while the originals DIFFER, the two expressions
# are the same shape with one leaf changed - `inv.dev_min` / `inv.dev_max`,
# `site_dev_bound("dev_min")` / `site_dev_bound("dev_max")` - which is exactly
# the pair a transposition swaps. Same direction as census A: it under-reports
# (two values of the same KIND spelled differently are missed) rather than
# inventing members.
class _Blank(ast.NodeTransformer):
def visit_Attribute(self, node):
self.generic_visit(node)
node.attr = "<leaf>"
return node
def visit_Constant(self, node):
if isinstance(node.value, str):
return ast.Constant(value="<leaf>")
return node
def _blanked(expr):
return ast.dump(_Blank().visit(ast.parse(ast.unparse(expr))))
def _called_name(func):
return (func.attr if isinstance(func, ast.Attribute)
else func.id if isinstance(func, ast.Name) else "")
def _innermost(tree):
"""{id(node): INNERMOST enclosing function}, or None at module level.
⚠️ NOT `for fn in ast.walk(tree): for node in ast.walk(fn)`, which is what
the first version of census B did. That visits every sentence once per
ENCLOSING def, so a sentence inside a nested function was classified twice -
once against the inner scope and once against the outer - and the two
classifications are not obliged to agree. The rows were de-duplicated
afterwards, which hid the double visit rather than removing it.
"""
m = {}
def rec(node, fn):
for child in ast.iter_child_nodes(node):
f = (child if isinstance(child, (ast.FunctionDef,
ast.AsyncFunctionDef)) else fn)
m[id(child)] = f
rec(child, f)
rec(tree, None)
return m
def _spec(fv):
"""The FORMAT SPEC of one interpolation, as text; '' when there is none.
⚠️ IT IS PRINTED BESIDE EVERY PAIR BECAUSE IT IS THE ONE CHEAP TYPE SIGNAL
THIS SCAN HAS, and gap 4 of the second list below is exactly about the pairs
that do not share
one. `{self.requested_w:+.0f}` beside `{self.applied_w:+.0f}` is two floats
rendered identically - a transposition there is silent and reads as a fact.
`{self.limit_w:.0f}` beside `{self.bound}` is a float beside a string: a
transposition there prints `rating max_w W`, which is visibly broken rather
than quietly wrong. Same row in this census, very different hazard, and the
reader cannot tell them apart without this column.
"""
if fv.format_spec is None:
return ""
return "".join(str(v.value) if isinstance(v, ast.Constant) else "{...}"
for v in fv.format_spec.values)
def _same_shape_pairs(node):
"""Pairs of interpolations in ONE f-string that are exactly one leaf apart."""
fvs = [v for v in node.values if isinstance(v, ast.FormattedValue)]
for x, y in itertools.combinations(fvs, 2):
ua, ub = ast.unparse(x.value), ast.unparse(y.value)
if ua == ub:
continue
if _blanked(x.value) != _blanked(y.value):
continue
yield ua, ub, _spec(x), _spec(y)
def _sentences():
"""(path, innermost fn, JoinedStr, sink) for every f-string in app/."""
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
inner = _innermost(tree)
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.JoinedStr):
continue
fn = inner.get(id(node))
if fn is None:
continue
yield path, fn, node, _sink_of(fn, node)
def scan_caller():
rows = []
for path, fn, node, sink in _sentences():
# ⚠️ MESSAGE SINKS ONLY, AND THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS CENSUS SAID
# "anything but a RETURN". That let in `p1.py`'s
# `self.url = f"http://{self.host}:{self.port}…"` - an f-string that is
# DATA, used to make a request, where a transposition is an ordinary
# behavioural change every check can see. A formatted string is only in
# this family when its only consumer is a person. RETURN is not OTHER
# though, and treating it as if it were is what census C below fixes.
if sink != "MESSAGE":
continue
for ua, ub, sa, sb in _same_shape_pairs(node):
rows.append((path.name, node.lineno, fn.name, ua, ub, sa, sb))
return sorted(set(rows), key=lambda r: (r[0], r[1], r[3]))
# =============================================================================
# CENSUS C - THE SENTENCE THE OBJECT RETURNS ABOUT ITSELF
# =============================================================================
# ⚠️ SAFETY-38 ROUND 4. CENSUS A AND CENSUS B BETWEEN THEM COVERED ONE
# SYNTACTIC SINK AND CALLED IT THE FAMILY. Every member either census reported
# was a sentence APPENDED, ASSIGNED to a `reason`-shaped attribute, or passed as
# a LOG ARGUMENT. Not one was a sentence that is RETURNED. Census A had a RETURN
# bucket, but only for a callee formatting its own PARAMETERS - so a method
# formatting its own ATTRIBUTES and handing the string back was invisible to
# both, and `describe()` / `explain()` / the reason-builders are precisely where
# this codebase keeps its operator sentences. Two live members were sitting in
# that hole:
#
# clamp.py ClampResult.describe() requested_w <-> applied_w
# peakguard.py PeakDecision.explain() projected_w <-> ceiling_w
#
# Worse than the gap: it was in NONE of the five blind spots this file prints
# about itself. A tool that asserts a completeness it does not have is the
# recurring defect in a new hat, and the list at the bottom now names its sinks.
#
# THE TEST is census B's - one f-string, two interpolations one leaf apart - run
# over the RETURN sink, plus one thing census B never needed: A RETURNED STRING
# IS NOT YET A MESSAGE. `store.unit_key()` and `mqtt.unit_state_key()` return
# f-strings too, and swapping there renames a store key and an MQTT topic, which
# every ordinary check can see (MAINT-05 is the card about that). So the sink of
# a returned sentence is RESOLVED THROUGH ITS CALL SITES: the string is in this
# family only when some caller in `app/` feeds it to an operator.
def _return_consumers(func_name, depth=0, seen=frozenset()):
"""[(site, sink, verdict)] - where the STRING RETURNED BY `func_name` goes.
One hop is not enough: `Resolution.explain()` is returned again by wrappers
that are themselves logged, so a call site whose own sink is RETURN is
resolved by recursing on the ENCLOSING function's name, bounded by `depth`
and by `seen` so mutual recursion cannot loop.
⚠️ THE MATCH IS ON THE BARE METHOD NAME, exactly as `call_sites()` above,
and `explain` is the name of at least four unrelated methods in this tree
(`PeakDecision`, `UnitPlan`, `Resolution`, the maintenance migration
report). So this OVER-collects sites, which pushes a verdict towards
MESSAGE. That is the deliberate direction for a census whose measured
failure has twice been under-reporting - but it means the verdict is a
PROMPT TO READ THE SITES PRINTED BESIDE IT, not a proof.
"""
if func_name in seen or depth > 2:
return []
seen = seen | {func_name}
out = []
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
inner = _innermost(tree)
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
if _called_name(node.func) != func_name:
continue
fn = inner.get(id(node))
if fn is None:
continue
sink = _sink_of(fn, node)
label = f"{path.name}:{node.lineno} `{ast.unparse(node.func)}`"
if sink == "RETURN":
sub = _return_consumers(fn.name, depth + 1, seen)
if any(v == "MESSAGE" for _l, _s, v in sub):
verdict = "MESSAGE"
elif not sub:
verdict = "UNRESOLVED"
else:
verdict = "OTHER"
sink = f"RETURN by {fn.name}() -> {verdict}"
else:
verdict = sink
out.append((label, sink, verdict))
return sorted(set(out))
def scan_returned():
"""Census C rows: a returned sentence, two interpolations one leaf apart."""
rows = []
for path, fn, node, sink in _sentences():
if sink != "RETURN":
continue
pairs = list(_same_shape_pairs(node))
if not pairs:
continue
sites = _return_consumers(fn.name)
if any(v == "MESSAGE" for _l, _s, v in sites):
verdict = "MESSAGE"
elif not sites:
verdict = "UNRESOLVED - no call site inside app/"
else:
verdict = "OTHER"
for ua, ub, sa, sb in pairs:
rows.append(dict(module=path.name, line=node.lineno, func=fn.name,
a=ua, b=ub, spec_a=sa, spec_b=sb,
verdict=verdict, sites=sites))
return sorted(rows, key=lambda r: (r["module"], r["line"], r["a"]))
# ⚠️ THE UNIT OF COVERAGE IS THE CALL SITE, NOT THE FUNCTION - which is the
# whole lesson of SAFETY-38 round 3. `SignWatchdog.evaluate()` had its operand
# order pinned and the defect still shipped, because the pin was on the call two
# lines below the one a one-inverter roster actually reaches. So a family member
# is reported WITH EVERY PLACE IT IS CALLED.
def call_sites(name):
out = []
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
if _called_name(node.func) != name:
continue
# ⚠️ THE RECEIVER IS PRINTED, because matching on the bare
# attribute name conflates methods: `evaluate` is the name of
# SAFETY-02's, SAFETY-18's and SAFETY-31's watchdogs alike, and
# a list of four lines with no receiver tells a reader nothing
# about which detector they are looking at. `inv.sign_wd` and
# `self.freeze_wd` are the disambiguation, and they are the
# caller's own words.
out.append(f"{path.name}:{node.lineno} `{ast.unparse(node.func)}`")
return out
def lazy_log_sites():
"""Log calls with a %-format template and >=2 substitution ARGUMENTS.
⚠️ THE SIZE OF THE LARGEST HOLE, MEASURED RATHER THAN ASSERTED. The
NOT-SCANNED list below used to end "and app/ uses that form", which is a
claim about the tree with no number on it - the exact shape this card has
spent four rounds arguing against. `_LOG.error("%s ... %s", a, b)` puts both
operands in ARGUMENTS, so no f-string census here can ever reach them, and
transposing the two costs the same zero bytes. This counts them.
"""
out = []
for path in sorted(APP.glob("*.py")):
tree = ast.parse(path.read_text())
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
if _called_name(node.func) not in _LOG_SINKS or len(node.args) < 3:
continue
head = node.args[0]
tmpl = ""
if isinstance(head, ast.Constant) and isinstance(head.value, str):
tmpl = head.value
elif isinstance(head, ast.BinOp) or isinstance(head, ast.JoinedStr):
tmpl = ast.unparse(head)
if tmpl.count("%") >= 2:
out.append((path.name, node.lineno,
f"{path.name}:{node.lineno} "
f"`{ast.unparse(node.func)}` with "
f"{len(node.args) - 1} args"))
return [r[2] for r in sorted(out)]
def _pair_line(sa, sb):
same = sa == sb
return (f" format spec: '{sa}' / '{sb}' -> "
+ ("SAME - two values rendered alike, so a transposition is "
"SILENT and reads as a fact"
if same else
"DIFFERENT - likely mixed types, so a transposition is more "
"likely to look broken than to lie (gap 4 below)"))
def main():
quiet = "--quiet" in sys.argv
rounds = build_fixpoint()
rows = scan()
fam = [r for r in rows if r["symmetric"] and "MESSAGE" in r["sinks"]
and "RETURN" not in r["sinks"]]
valued = [r for r in rows if r["symmetric"] and "RETURN" in r["sinks"]]
print("SYMMETRIC-PREDICATE FAMILY - argument order load-bearing for a "
"MESSAGE only")
print("=" * 78)
print(f"fixpoint reached after {rounds} round(s); "
f"{sum(len(v) for v in _SYM.values())} interchangeable positional "
f"and {sum(len(v) for v in _SYM_KW.values())} keyword pair(s) "
f"across {len(set(_SYM) | set(_SYM_KW))} function(s) in app/")
print(f"functions formatting >=2 of their own parameters into one "
f"sentence: {len(rows)} pair(s)")
print(f"of those, pairs whose SWAP LEAVES EVERY DECISION IDENTICAL: "
f"{len(fam) + len(valued)}")
print(f" ...of which the sentence is RETURNED (so the swap is a VALUE "
f"change an ordinary check can see): {len(valued)}")
print(f" ...and the sentence goes ONLY TO AN OPERATOR - THE FAMILY: "
f"{len(fam)}")
print()
print("THE FAMILY - a swap here is invisible to every behavioural check "
"BY CONSTRUCTION:")
for r in sorted(fam, key=lambda r: (r["module"], r["line"])):
kind = ("POSITIONAL - a transposition at a call site costs ZERO BYTES"
if r["positional"] else
"KEYWORD-ONLY at the definition - a transposition has to be "
"written out by name, which is not free and not silent")
print(f" {r['module']}:{r['line']} {r['func']}() pair "
f"({r['a']}, {r['b']})")
print(f" sentence at line(s): "
f"{', '.join(f'{l} -> {s}' for l, s in r['msg_lines'])}")
print(f" {kind}")
sites = call_sites(r["func"])
print(f" CALL SITES ({len(sites)}) - each one is a separate pin, "
f"and the receiver says which detector it is:")
for site in sites or ["(none inside app/)"]:
print(f" {site}")
print()
print("SYMMETRIC, BUT THE SENTENCE IS THE RETURN VALUE - READ THIS BUCKET "
"BY HAND.")
print("A returned string is sometimes a KEY (a swap renames a store key or "
"an MQTT topic,")
print("which is behaviour every ordinary check can see - MAINT-05 is the "
"card about it)")
print("and sometimes a SENTENCE (a swap is message-only after all, and it "
"IS this family):")
for r in sorted(valued, key=lambda r: (r["module"], r["line"])):
print(f" {r['module']}:{r['line']} {r['func']}() pair "
f"({r['a']}, {r['b']})")
print()
print("=" * 78)
print("CENSUS B - SENTENCES THE CALLER BUILDS, interpolating two values of "
"the SAME SHAPE")
print("A transposition inside one of these is ZERO BYTES and no predicate "
"is involved at")
print("all, so nothing behavioural can ever see it. Same rule: assert the "
"ORDERED PAIR.")
cb = scan_caller()
print(f"candidates: {len(cb)}")
for mod, line, fn, ua, ub, sa, sb in cb:
print(f" {mod}:{line} in {fn}()")
print(f" {ua} <-> {ub}")
print(_pair_line(sa, sb))
print()
print("=" * 78)
print("CENSUS C - SENTENCES AN OBJECT RETURNS ABOUT ITSELF (SAFETY-38 "
"round 4)")
print("A method formatting its OWN ATTRIBUTES and RETURNING the string was "
"in neither")
print("census above: census A only reads a callee's PARAMETERS, census B "
"only scored a")
print("MESSAGE sink. The verdict below is resolved through the CALL SITES "
"of the")
print("returning method - a returned string is only in this family once "
"some caller")
print("hands it to an operator (contrast store.unit_key(), whose return "
"value is a KEY).")
cc = scan_returned()
fam_c = [r for r in cc if r["verdict"] == "MESSAGE"]
hot = [r for r in fam_c if r["spec_a"] == r["spec_b"]]
print(f"returned sentences with a same-shape pair: {len(cc)} pair(s); "
f"{len(fam_c)} reach an operator;")
print(f"of those, {len(hot)} ALSO share a format spec - two values "
f"rendered alike, which is")
print("the hazard gap 4 below names: a transposition there is silent and "
"reads as a fact.")
print()
print("*** = reaches an operator AND shares a format spec - THE ACTIONABLE "
"SUBSET")
print(" ! = reaches an operator, specs differ (a swap is likelier to look "
"broken)")
print(" = does not reach an operator, or could not be resolved")
# grouped by the sentence, so the CONSUMERS list is printed once per
# method rather than once per pair - the ungrouped form was 20 identical
# lines under each of six pairs and nobody reads that.
for key in sorted({(r["module"], r["line"], r["func"]) for r in cc}):
mod, line, fname = key
group = [r for r in cc if (r["module"], r["line"], r["func"]) == key]
v = group[0]["verdict"]
print(f" {mod}:{line} {fname}() verdict: {v}")
for r in group:
mark = ("***" if r["verdict"] == "MESSAGE"
and r["spec_a"] == r["spec_b"]
else " ! " if r["verdict"] == "MESSAGE" else " ")
print(f" {mark} {r['a']} <-> {r['b']}")
print(f" {_pair_line(r['spec_a'], r['spec_b']).strip()}")
if not quiet:
sites = group[0]["sites"]
print(f" CONSUMERS ({len(sites)}) - bare-name match, so read "
f"the receiver:")
for label, sink, _v in sites or [("(none inside app/)", "", "")]:
print(f" {label} -> {sink}")
print()
print("=" * 78)
print("WHAT THIS SCANS, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT - stated because round 4's "
"blocker was")
print("a completeness this file ASSERTED and did not have. The sink "
"classifier is a")
print("syntactic walk up the parent chain plus ONE step of local data "
"flow, and it")
print("recognises exactly these sinks and no others:")
print(f" SCANNED as a MESSAGE : a call to {sorted(_LOG_SINKS)}")
print(" ...or to `append`; a `raise`; an "
"assignment to an")
print(f" attribute or local named {sorted(_MSG_ATTRS)}")
print(" ...or to a local that is then interpolated "
"into one of")
print(" those (the one data-flow step).")
print(" SCANNED as a RETURN : census C - resolved through the returning "
"method's")
print(" call sites, one hop plus two of recursion.")
print(" NOT SCANNED AT ALL, and each of these can hold a member:")
lazy = lazy_log_sites()
print(" * `%s`-style lazy logging - `_LOG.error('%s ... %s', a, b)`. The "
"arguments")
print(" are not an f-string, so no census here looks at them, and a "
"transposition")
print(" of two `%s` arguments is the same zero-byte edit. THIS IS THE "
"LARGEST")
print(f" REMAINING HOLE, and it is MEASURED, not asserted: "
f"{len(lazy)} such call(s)")
print(f" in app/, across "
f"{len({s.split(':')[0] for s in lazy})} module(s). None of them is "
f"scanned by anything")
print(" above. Listed here so the size of the hole is a number:")
for site in lazy or ["(none)"]:
print(f" {site}")
print(" * `.format()`, `%`-formatting, and sentences built by `+` or "
"`.join()` out of")
print(" non-f-string pieces.")
print(" * A sentence that leaves the function inside a DICT, LIST or "
"dataclass and is")
print(" rendered somewhere else - the one data-flow step is local and "
"follows only")
print(" a bare Name.")
print(" * `yield`ed sentences, and sentences stored on an object by any "
"attribute")
print(f" name outside {sorted(_MSG_ATTRS)}.")
print(" * Anything outside `app/`: `sim/`, `tools/`, `web.py`'s "
"templates, the")
print(" translations JSON, the firmware, the witness.")
print()
print("WHAT IT CAN SEE BUT GETS WRONG - the shape of each gap, named "
"rather than")
print("rounded off:")
print(" 1. SEMANTIC symmetry no canonicaliser above spells. The list of "
"commutative")
print(" forms is finite and hand-written; a function symmetric only "
"through a form")
print(" not on it is REJECTED and never appears. This under-reports.")
print(" 2. In CENSUS B and C, two interpolated values of the same KIND "
"that are not the")
print(" same SHAPE - `a.lo` beside `hi`, or one of them behind a local "
"variable.")
print(" Only one-leaf-apart expressions are paired.")
print(" 3. WHETHER each call site is pinned. The sites are listed above; "
"whether a")
print(" check asserts the ORDERED PAIR at each one is a fact about "
"`test_*.py` and is")
print(" recorded in DECISIONS/SAFETY-38-site-standing-pin.md section "
"7. Call sites")
print(" outside `app/` are not listed either, and every site list here "
"matches on the")
print(" bare METHOD NAME - three watchdogs are all called `evaluate` "
"and at least")
print(" four unrelated classes have an `explain()` - so the receiver is "
"printed")
print(" beside each one and a reader has to pick.")
print(" 4. ⚠️ IT CAN ALSO OVER-REPORT, IN ONE EXACT WAY. The sentence is "
"ERASED before")
print(" census A's comparison, so a swap that would make the FORMATTING "
"ITSELF fail")
print(" - a `DAY_NAMES[start]` where `start` is 1320 - is scored as "
"'changes no")
print(" decision'. `_raise_gap`'s (start, weekday) pairs are that. The "
"hazard is a")
print(" SAME-TYPED pair, which is why every census B and C row now "
"prints whether")
print(" the two format specs match.")
print(" 5. CENSUS C's verdict is a bare-name resolution (gap 3) and "
"therefore reads")
print(" MESSAGE too readily. Every verdict is printed with the sites "
"that produced")
print(" it; a MESSAGE verdict is a prompt to read them, not a proof.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
"""UX-01: read config.yaml's option surface and the translations, and compare.
⚠️ WHY THIS IS A MODULE AND NOT A FUNCTION INSIDE THE CHECK. Two very different
programs have to agree about what is in `translations/*.yaml`:
* `test_translations.py`, which runs in the add-on's own CI image - Alpine,
python3 + py3-aiohttp + py3-paho-mqtt and NOTHING ELSE. There is no PyYAML
there and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check, so the parser
below is written by hand;
* `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py`, which runs inside the real Home Assistant
Supervisor image and loads the same files with the loader Home Assistant
ACTUALLY uses (`supervisor.utils.yaml.read_json_or_yaml_file`, validated by
`SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS`).
A hand parser that quietly disagrees with the real loader is precisely the
defect this repository keeps finding - a check whose data cannot reach the
failure it names. So the probe imports THIS module and asserts, key by key and
string by string, that `parse_translation_file()` and the real loader return the
same thing. That equality is the licence for CI to use the hand parser at all.
The parser is DELIBERATELY STRICT. It accepts exactly the shape UX-01 generates
- two-space indentation, one `key:` mapping opener or one `key: "double quoted
scalar"` per line, `#` comments, blank lines - and RAISES on anything else. A
permissive parser would answer "no problems" for a file it had silently skipped
half of, which is the same failure wearing a passing grade.
"""
import io
import re
__all__ = ["parse_translation_file", "parse_translation_text", "config_surface",
"audit"]
class TranslationSyntaxError(ValueError):
"""The file is not in the subset this parser accepts. Never silently skip."""
_LINE = re.compile(r"^(?P<indent> *)(?P<name>[A-Za-z0-9_.:/-]+):(?P<rest>.*)$")
def _unescape(raw, lineno):
"""The body of a YAML double-quoted scalar -> its value."""
out, i = [], 0
while i < len(raw):
ch = raw[i]
if ch == "\\":
if i + 1 >= len(raw):
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"line {lineno}: trailing backslash")
nxt = raw[i + 1]
if nxt not in ('"', "\\"):
# Deliberately narrow: UX-01's generator emits only these two.
# Anything else is a shape this parser has not been measured on.
raise TranslationSyntaxError(
f"line {lineno}: unsupported escape \\{nxt}")
out.append(nxt)
i += 2
continue
if ch == '"':
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"line {lineno}: unescaped quote")
out.append(ch)
i += 1
return "".join(out)
def parse_translation_text(text, where="<text>"):
"""A nested dict from the strict two-space YAML subset UX-01 writes.
Raises TranslationSyntaxError on ANY line it does not fully understand.
"""
root = {}
stack = [(-2, root)] # (indent, mapping)
for lineno, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
if not line.strip() or line.lstrip().startswith("#"):
continue
if line.rstrip() != line:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: trailing whitespace")
m = _LINE.match(line)
if not m:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: not `key:` -> {line!r}")
indent, name, rest = len(m.group("indent")), m.group("name"), m.group("rest")
if indent % 2:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(
f"{where} line {lineno}: indent {indent} is not a multiple of 2")
while stack and indent <= stack[-1][0]:
stack.pop()
if not stack:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: dedented past the root")
parent_indent, parent = stack[-1]
if indent != parent_indent + 2:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(
f"{where} line {lineno}: indent {indent} does not open under "
f"indent {parent_indent}")
if name in parent:
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: duplicate key {name!r}")
if rest == "":
child = {}
parent[name] = child
stack.append((indent, child))
continue
if not rest.startswith(" "):
raise TranslationSyntaxError(f"{where} line {lineno}: no space after the colon")
value = rest[1:]
if len(value) < 2 or value[0] != '"' or value[-1] != '"':
raise TranslationSyntaxError(
f"{where} line {lineno}: scalars must be double quoted -> {value!r}")
parent[name] = _unescape(value[1:-1], lineno)
return root
def parse_translation_file(path):
return parse_translation_text(io.open(path, encoding="utf-8").read(), str(path))
# --- config.yaml's option surface --------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ THE SCHEMA HALF, NOT THE OPTIONS HALF, AND THAT IS A MEASUREMENT RATHER
# THAN A PREFERENCE. Supervisor's `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(...)(data[
# ATTR_SCHEMA])`, so the ORDER the Configuration tab renders in is the order of
# the `schema:` block and nothing else. tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section
# F prints that order out of the real image.
#
# ⚠️ ANCHORED ON THE INDENTATION, never on a stripped line. A top-level schema
# key is at EXACTLY two spaces and everything nested is at four or more; the
# `max_w` inside `inverters:` and the flat `max_w` are the same text otherwise,
# and config.yaml declares the nested one FIRST on purpose so that a first-match
# stripped reader is caught. See test_inverter.py part 12.
_TOP = re.compile(r"^ ([a-z_0-9]+):(.*)$")
_NESTED = re.compile(r"^ {4,}(?:- )?([a-z_0-9]+): *(\S.*?) *$")
def config_surface(config_text):
"""(top-level schema keys in render order, {key: [nested per-entry keys]}).
Nested keys are the ones a list-of-objects option declares per entry - today
only `inverters:`. A list of scalars (`- str`) declares none, and comes back
absent from the second dict rather than as an empty list.
"""
marker = config_text.index("\nschema:")
half = config_text[marker:]
order, nested, current = [], {}, None
for line in half.splitlines():
m = _TOP.match(line)
if m:
order.append(m.group(1))
current = m.group(1) if not m.group(2).strip() else None
continue
stripped = line.strip()
if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"):
continue
if current is None:
continue
n = _NESTED.match(line)
if n:
nested.setdefault(current, []).append(n.group(1))
else:
current = None
if len(order) != len(set(order)):
dupes = sorted({k for k in order if order.count(k) > 1})
raise ValueError(f"config.yaml declares {dupes} twice at the top level of schema:")
return order, nested
# --- the audit ---------------------------------------------------------------
def audit(config_text, translation, lang, require_descriptions=True):
"""Every disagreement between config.yaml and one translation file.
Returns a list of strings. EMPTY MEANS AGREEMENT; each string names the key
and says which direction the disagreement runs, because "the translations do
not match" is not something anybody can act on.
"""
order, nested = config_surface(config_text)
problems = []
top = translation.get("configuration")
if not isinstance(top, dict):
return [f"{lang}: no `configuration:` block at all"]
# ⚠️ THE WHOLE FILE IS ALL-OR-NOTHING, AND THAT IS WHY THESE TWO LINES ARE
# HERE RATHER THAN ONLY THE `configuration:` COVERAGE BELOW.
# `_read_app_translations()` runs the file through SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS
# and, on `vol.Invalid`, LOGS A WARNING AND DROPS THE WHOLE FILE - every
# label in it, not just the offending key. So a shape Supervisor refuses is
# not a small defect that costs one description; it silently returns the tab
# to raw keys. The two ways to write one that this parser can still read are
# a top-level block that is not `configuration` or `network`, and a
# `network:` block whose values are not strings ({str: str} is the schema).
for extra in sorted(set(translation) - {"configuration", "network"}):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{extra}:` is not a block Supervisor reads "
"(only `configuration` and `network` are) - "
"SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS refuses the file and the "
"Supervisor DROPS ALL OF IT with a log warning")
for port, text in sorted((translation.get("network") or {}).items()):
if not isinstance(text, str):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `network.{port}` is not a string - "
"`network:` is {str: str} and a mapping there makes "
"Supervisor drop the WHOLE file, every label in it")
for key in order:
entry = top.get(key)
if entry is None:
problems.append(f"{lang}: option `{key}` has no translation - Home "
"Assistant would render the raw key")
continue
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}` is not a mapping")
continue
if not str(entry.get("name", "")).strip():
problems.append(f"{lang}: option `{key}` has no `name`")
if require_descriptions and not str(entry.get("description", "")).strip():
problems.append(f"{lang}: option `{key}` has no `description` - the "
"operator gets a label and no way to know whether to "
"touch it")
want = nested.get(key, [])
got = entry.get("fields")
if want and not isinstance(got, dict):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}` is a repeatable section with "
f"per-entry keys {sorted(want)} and no `fields:` block")
continue
if got is not None and not want:
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}` carries a `fields:` block but "
"config.yaml declares no per-entry keys for it")
continue
for sub in want:
se = (got or {}).get(sub)
if se is None:
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}` per-entry key `{sub}` has no "
"translation")
continue
if not str(se.get("name", "")).strip():
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}.{sub}` has no `name`")
if require_descriptions and not str(se.get("description", "")).strip():
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}.{sub}` has no `description`")
for orphan in sorted(set(got or {}) - set(want)):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{key}.{orphan}` is translated but "
"config.yaml declares no such per-entry key")
for orphan in sorted(set(top) - set(order)):
problems.append(f"{lang}: `{orphan}` is translated but config.yaml "
"declares no such option - a rename or a typo")
return problems
+275
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
# Home Assistant add-on translations - ENGLISH (UX-01)
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS FILE IS FOR, AND WHAT HOME ASSISTANT ACTUALLY DOES WITH IT.
# Without a `translations/` directory the Configuration tab renders the raw
# option KEYS - `unit_sign_disagree_w`, `saturation_cycles`, `integrator_max_w`.
# The frontend keeps a field when `e.name in options || e.required`, and all 70
# keys are in `options:` (59 of them are `required` as well), so ALL SEVENTY are
# rendered, always, in `schema:` order, with no description. This file is what
# turns that into sentences.
#
# HOW IT IS READ, measured on the Supervisor image this site runs
# (ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0):
#
# * `supervisor/store/data.py:_read_app_translations()` reads every
# `.yaml`/`.yml`/`.json` in this directory, keyed by FILE STEM (so this file
# is the `en` translation), and validates each through
# `SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS`: `configuration: {str: {name (required),
# description, fields}}` plus `network: {str: str}`. ⚠️ A FILE THAT FAILS
# THAT SCHEMA IS DROPPED WITH A LOG WARNING AND NOTHING ELSE - the add-on
# goes on rendering raw keys and nobody is told twice. tools/
# supervisor_shape_probe.py section F is what says it loaded.
# * The frontend resolves each label as
# `translations[<user's language>]?...name || translations["en"]?...name ||
# schema.name`, and the helper text the same way with `description`. ⚠️ THE
# FALLBACK IS PER KEY, so a key missing from nl.yaml degrades to this file,
# while a key present but wrong does not degrade at all.
#
# ⚠️ ORDER IS NOT SET HERE. `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(...)(data["schema"])`,
# so the Configuration tab renders in the order of config.yaml's `schema:`
# block. The order below only mirrors it so the two files read alike.
#
# ⚠️ ADD-ON OPTIONS ARE A FLAT LIST. There is no section-header primitive, no
# per-option "advanced" flag, no units on the input and no sliders, so grouping
# is approximated by ORDER plus the `Group · ` prefix in each label. Do not
# promise the operator visual sections; there are none.
#
# ⚠️ EVERY DERIVED CONSTANT SAYS WHERE IT CAME FROM. The Configuration tab
# presents a number read off 1890 closed-loop test runs and the operator's own
# inverter rating as the same kind of field. The descriptions are the only place
# that difference can be stated, so a derived value names its campaign and says
# "do not change without re-deriving", and a value that is genuinely the
# operator's says so too.
configuration:
setpoint_entity:
name: "Hardware · Inverter setpoint entity"
description: "The ESPHome number entity this add-on writes the power setpoint to, normally number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w. This is the only thing the add-on commands. Leave it empty if you fill in the inverter list below: a site with a roster must not also name one loose actuator, and the add-on refuses to start when both are set."
soc_entity:
name: "Hardware · Battery charge level entity (%)"
description: "The sensor that reports the pack's state of charge in percent. Use the ESP32's own reading, not a figure computed somewhere else. The maintenance cycle and every charge-level floor read this."
batt_entity:
name: "Hardware · Battery power entity (W)"
description: "The sensor that reports this inverter's own battery power, positive while discharging. On this installation that is holding register 0x0518, read by the ESP32. The sign watchdog and the circulating-power alarm both grade the inverter against this reading."
batt_invert:
name: "Hardware · Battery power sign is reversed"
description: "Only switch this on if your battery power sensor reports discharging as a negative number. The add-on expects positive to mean discharging."
inverters:
name: "Hardware · Inverter list (leave empty if you have one inverter)"
description: "Leave this empty unless the site really has more than one inverter. EMPTY DOES NOT MEAN 'not configured yet': it means the four entity settings above, together with the inverter rating and the battery cut-out under Limits, describe the one inverter you have. That is what every existing installation reads, and nobody has to touch anything. Filling this in REPLACES those settings instead of extending them, and nothing is inherited: each entry has to name its own actuator, its own rating and its own battery cut-out, so that no inverter is ever judged against another unit's numbers. The flat setpoint entity above must then be left empty."
fields:
name:
name: "Name"
description: "A short identifier for this inverter, for example inverter-a. It gives this unit its own namespace for its safety latch, heartbeat and write bookkeeping in the add-on's state file, so two units may not share one."
setpoint_entity:
name: "Setpoint entity"
description: "This inverter's own ESPHome number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w. Two entries may not name the same one - two writers on one actuator is refused at startup."
max_w:
name: "Inverter rating (W)"
description: "The supervised ceiling on what may be written to THIS inverter; the site's ceiling is the sum over the list. Required of every entry: an entry without one would have to borrow a rating, and judging one inverter against another unit's numbers is exactly the fault this per-entry list exists to remove."
bms_soc_floor:
name: "Battery cut-out level (%)"
description: "The percent at which THIS pack's own battery management system cuts out. Read it off the pack that is actually installed (register 0x0560) before that pack is ever commanded; do not copy another unit's figure. Required of every entry, deliberately: an optional one would be a defaulted one, and one default for two batteries of different models protects the shallower pack with the deeper pack's number."
soc_entity:
name: "Battery charge level entity (%) (optional)"
description: "This pack's own state of charge. Leave it empty if this unit reports none - that is what it means, and it never falls back to another unit's sensor."
batt_entity:
name: "Battery power entity (W) (optional)"
description: "This unit's own battery power, positive while discharging. Leave it empty if this unit reports none; nothing is inherited from another entry."
batt_invert:
name: "Battery power sign is reversed (optional)"
description: "Only for this entry: switch it on if this unit's battery power sensor reports discharging as a negative number."
estop_fitted:
name: "Hardware · RS485 emergency stop is fitted"
description: "Whether the RS485 emergency stop is physically installed. It only drives the warning banner on the status page; it changes no control behaviour."
meter_source:
name: "Meter · Where the meter reading comes from"
description: "'off' keeps the single Home Assistant entity below, which is what an existing installation runs on until you choose otherwise. ha_dsmr subscribes to the DSMR integration; mqtt_p1 reads an MQTT topic; ha_signed reads one signed entity, which is what a HomeWizard P1 publishes; homewizard_local polls the meter's own local API and skips Home Assistant entirely. ⚠️ Only homewizard_local can tell 'the meter has not answered' apart from 'the value has not changed', so it is the only source on which the frozen-meter alarm means anything."
meter_entity:
name: "Meter · Grid power entity (W)"
description: "The net grid power sensor, used when the meter source is 'off'. POSITIVE MUST MEAN DRAWING FROM THE GRID. Get this the wrong way round and the loop drives the battery in the wrong direction; use the sign switch below rather than a template sensor."
meter_invert:
name: "Meter · Grid power sign is reversed"
description: "Switch this on if your grid sensor reports drawing from the grid as a negative number."
meter_phases:
name: "Meter · Number of phases (1 or 3)"
description: "Must match your connection. A telegram whose phase count disagrees is rejected as it arrives and logged, so a wrong value shows up straight away as 'no telegrams accepted' rather than as a quietly wrong number. The range accepts 2, but that is not a real Belgian connection."
p1_host:
name: "Meter · HomeWizard P1 address"
description: "For meter source homewizard_local only: the meter's own address on your network, as host or host:port, for example 192.168.2.250."
meter_poll_s:
name: "Meter · Seconds between meter polls"
description: "For meter source homewizard_local only. 5 s is the meter's own update rate, so there is nothing to gain below it. It must stay well under the staleness limit below - the reading is never fresher than this interval - and the add-on refuses to start if it is at or above that limit."
meter_max_age_s:
name: "Meter · A reading counts as stale after (s)"
description: "Beyond this the grid figure counts as missing. On its own it does not command 0 W: the 'inputs missing' timer under Advanced starts only after this one has expired, and the two stack. 30 s is six polls of headroom at the default poll interval."
meter_mqtt_topic:
name: "Meter · MQTT topic"
description: "For meter source mqtt_p1 only: the topic the P1 readings are published on."
p1_import_entity:
name: "Meter · Import register entity (W)"
description: "The UNSIGNED consumption register. Do not point this at a signed template sensor: the add-on works out net power itself as import minus export, so the sign convention lives in tested code rather than in unreviewed YAML."
p1_export_entity:
name: "Meter · Export register entity (W)"
description: "The UNSIGNED injection register, the counterpart of the import register above. Same rule: no signed template sensor."
p1_net_entity:
name: "Meter · Signed net power entity (W)"
description: "For meter source ha_signed only. ONE signed sensor: positive is drawn from the grid, negative is fed back into it. Do not split it into two template sensors - the add-on does that split itself, so that it is tested."
p1_phase_import_entities:
name: "Meter · Per-phase import entities (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Optional, in L1..L3 order. Needed for the capacity-tariff quarter-hour peak on a three-phase connection. The number of entries must equal the number of phases above."
p1_phase_export_entities:
name: "Meter · Per-phase export entities (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Optional, in L1..L3 order, alongside the per-phase import entities above. The number of entries must equal the number of phases."
p1_phase_net_entities:
name: "Meter · Per-phase signed net entities (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "For meter source ha_signed only. Optional, in L1..L3 order, each signed the same way as the net entity above. Same job as the per-phase import and export entities: the capacity-tariff quarter-hour peak on a three-phase connection. The number of entries must equal the number of phases."
max_w:
name: "Limits · Inverter rating (W)"
description: "THIS IS YOUR NUMBER, not a derived one: the hard ceiling on what may ever be commanded, in watts. Set it to what your inverter is actually rated for, start low and raise it once the site has been commissioned. It is not read at all when the inverter list is filled in - each entry then carries its own, and the site ceiling is their sum. Several safety thresholds must stay below it, and the add-on refuses to start if one does not."
bms_soc_floor:
name: "Limits · Battery cut-out level (%)"
description: "MEASURED, not chosen: the percent at which the pack's OWN battery management system stops discharging, whatever this add-on is set to. Register 0x0560 reads 10 on the reference GW5000S-BP. Read it off the pack you actually have rather than copying this figure. It is here so the add-on can refuse a capacity-guard floor at or below it: such a floor could never bind, the BMS would win first, and the status page would report an energy backstop that does not exist. Not read when the inverter list is filled in - each entry then states its own pack's cut-out."
peak_cap_w:
name: "Limits · Capacity-tariff target (W)"
description: "THIS IS YOUR NUMBER: the quarter-hour average demand the peak guard tries to stay under. Take it from your grid contract - in Belgium it is the capacity-tariff peak your distribution charge is billed on."
peak_forecast_entity:
name: "Limits · Quarter-hour demand forecast entity (W)"
description: "Optional. A forecast of the current billing quarter's average demand. Leave it empty and there is no capacity cap at all."
peak_soc_floor:
name: "Limits · Peak guard will not discharge below (%)"
description: "DERIVED, not picked (SAFETY-24): the reference pack holds 13.8 kWh usable and the worst modelled peak-shaving day asks for 878 Wh, which is 6.4 %, so 20 % sits ten points above the pack's own cut-out and still leaves the guard about 1.6 of its worst observed days of room. ⚠️ IT BOUNDS THE PEAK GUARD ONLY. It is not a reserve for the whole pack: ordinary self-consumption discharges straight past it and goes on down to the battery cut-out, and raising this number does not change that by a tenth of a percent. It must stay strictly above the battery cut-out or the add-on refuses to start. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
price_provider:
name: "Tariff · Dynamic price source"
description: "Where day-ahead or real-time prices come from. 'off' is what ships, and means this site runs on the static tariff below with no trading. ⚠️ Switching it on today fetches, checks and publishes prices and changes no energy decision - nothing consumes the price series yet. It may not be combined with the two legacy Home Assistant price entities further down: two price sources on one site, one of which silently wins, is refused at startup rather than left looking armed."
price_markup_eur_kwh:
name: "Tariff · Supplier markup (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Your supplier's margin. The add-on adds it ONLY when the chosen price source does not already include it - under engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic, eneco_eddy and manual_csv it is ignored, and logged as ignored, never applied twice."
price_taxes_eur_kwh:
name: "Tariff · Levies and VAT (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Taxes and levies per kWh, added under the same rule as the supplier markup: only when the chosen price source does not already carry them."
export_price_eur_kwh:
name: "Tariff · Injection price (EUR/kWh)"
description: "What you are paid for feeding a kWh back into the grid, all in. One number rather than a series: no supplier here publishes a dynamic injection curve. In Belgium it is often close to zero, which on its own strongly favours using your own production over exporting it. It may be negative - at midday in summer you can be paying to export."
static_profile:
name: "Tariff · Fixed or day/night tariff (one line of JSON)"
description: "Your fixed or day/night contract, written as a single line of JSON. RECOMMENDED EVEN ON A DYNAMIC CONTRACT: this is what the add-on falls back to when the price feed dies, and with it empty a dead feed leaves the site with no tariff at all. The periods must cover every day type exactly once, with no gap and no overlap - a gap is refused at startup rather than filled in, because an invented price is one a strategy would trade on. A fully fixed tariff is one period covering 00:00-24:00 on all days. Prices are ALL IN; the markup and levies above are not added to them. Note that a window written 22:00-07:00 for mon-fri does NOT cover Saturday morning, so a weekend row is required rather than decorative."
price_csv_path:
name: "Tariff · Price CSV file"
description: "For price source manual_csv only: where in /share the add-on reads your own price file from."
price_feed_url:
name: "Tariff · Price feed URL override"
description: "Leave empty to use the chosen source's own feed. Only a host that source itself declares is accepted, so this cannot be pointed anywhere."
price_horizon_h:
name: "Tariff · How far ahead to fetch prices (hours)"
description: "How many hours of prices to ask the source for."
price_timeout_s:
name: "Tariff · Price request timeout (s)"
description: "How long a single request to the price source may take before it is given up on."
price_now_entity:
name: "Tariff · Current price entity (older price path)"
description: "The older way of getting a price, kept because retiring it would take the maintenance cycle's only price signal away from a live installation. The add-on reads this and the average below and derives exactly one thing from them - whether now is cheaper than average - which only the maintenance cycle's cheap-window charging uses. It may not be combined with a dynamic price source."
price_avg_entity:
name: "Tariff · Average price entity (older price path)"
description: "The average the current price is compared against. Only meaningful together with the current-price entity above, and like it, may not be combined with a dynamic price source."
arbitrage_enabled:
name: "Tariff · Trade on the price spread"
description: "Charge in the cheapest published hour and discharge in the dearest, but only when the spread covers what the round trip costs. OFF in the shipped configuration, deliberately: this is the first strategy in the add-on that moves energy against the meter on purpose, so it is armed on purpose or not at all. It needs both a price source and a P1 meter, and the add-on refuses the combinations that cannot work rather than letting them look armed."
cycle_cost_threshold_eur:
name: "Tariff · Cost of one full charge/discharge cycle (EUR/kWh)"
description: "What one full round trip costs per kWh: wear on the pack plus conversion losses. A price spread smaller than this loses money and battery life, so it is not traded. ⚠️ THIS ONE IS NOT DERIVED FROM A MEASUREMENT. 0.10 is a product decision and it is still an open question with the owner (OPT-08). At this value a fixed day/night site does not trade at all - the realistic Belgian day/night spread is about 0.08 EUR/kWh - and that is the correct verdict at this number, not a fault."
arbitrage_soc_floor:
name: "Tariff · Trading may not discharge below (%)"
description: "The reserve price trading may not spend. Deliberately not the same key as the maintenance floor: pointing a trading strategy at the monthly balancing cycle's numbers would couple two unrelated policies through one setting."
arbitrage_soc_ceiling:
name: "Tariff · Trading may not charge above (%)"
description: "The headroom price trading may not fill. The counterpart of the trading floor above, and kept separate from the maintenance target for the same reason."
maintenance_enabled:
name: "Maintenance · Run the monthly battery cycle"
description: "A deliberate deep discharge followed by a full recharge and a hold, so the battery management system can recalibrate its charge estimate and balance the cells. Off by default."
maintenance_interval_days:
name: "Maintenance · Minimum days between cycles"
description: "The shortest gap between two maintenance cycles."
maintenance_start_hour:
name: "Maintenance · Hour of day a due cycle starts"
description: "Local hour, 0 to 23, at which a cycle that has become due begins."
maintenance_discharge_w:
name: "Maintenance · Discharge rate (W)"
description: "How fast the cycle drains the pack; the surplus is exported. Above the inverter rating it is CLAMPED to the rating rather than refused - the cycle still completes, just more slowly, and the status page says so. It ships at 2000 to match the shipped rating; raise the rating first, then this."
maintenance_charge_w:
name: "Maintenance · Recharge rate (W)"
description: "⚠️ MUST STAY AT OR BELOW the inverter rating, and the add-on refuses to start otherwise. Above it, the cheap-window charge shaping asks for more than the supervised limit allows, the arbiter resolves that contradiction to 0 W, and maintenance would silently never charge in a cheap window on a default installation. It is also capped again by whatever headroom the peak guard leaves."
maintenance_soc_floor:
name: "Maintenance · Discharge down to (%)"
description: "The depth the monthly recalibration deliberately goes to, once a month, on purpose. ⚠️ THIS IS NOT THE PEAK GUARD'S FLOOR: that one is the depth a money-saving discharge may never reach on any day. The right values genuinely differ - 11 here against 20 there - which is why they are two separate settings and must not be merged."
maintenance_soc_target:
name: "Maintenance · Recharge up to (%)"
description: "The level the recharge phase aims for before the hold begins."
maintenance_hold_min:
name: "Maintenance · Hold at full for (minutes)"
description: "How long to sit at the target so the battery management system can finish balancing the cells."
sign_disagree_w:
name: "Safety · Sign watchdog threshold (W) — measured, do not change"
description: "MEASURED, NOT CHOSEN (SAFETY-02). Both the setpoint being emitted and the grid reading must exceed this before their opposite signs count as a disagreement at all. On the captured healthy day (2026-08-23) sign agreement over the gated samples is 93.4 %; on the captured fault day (2026-08-20) the clusters run 0.0-10.5 % with opposed runs up to 1752 s. There is no reason to move this without a new capture that says so. It must stay below the inverter rating or the watchdog can never fire, and the add-on refuses that configuration."
sign_disagree_s:
name: "Safety · Sign watchdog hold (s) — measured, do not change"
description: "MEASURED, NOT CHOSEN (SAFETY-02). How long the setpoint and the meter must stay opposed, continuously, before the add-on commands 0 W and latches until an operator starts control again. 180 s sits in the middle of a very wide measured gap: the longest legitimate opposed run on the healthy day is 30 s, while the fault day still trips 13 times at 300 s. Do not change it without a new capture."
unit_sign_disagree_w:
name: "Safety · Per-inverter sign threshold (W) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY; with one inverter this setting does nothing at all. DERIVED FROM 1890 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS on the two-master rig (SAFETY-30), in which nothing was faulty, swept across the whole range this add-on accepts for loop gain and slew rate. 250 W is exactly half the saturation threshold, so the smallest divergence this can see is precisely the gap at which the control law itself already says the inverter is not following. Do not change it without re-deriving it. It must stay below the inverter rating or it can never fire."
unit_sign_disagree_s:
name: "Safety · Per-inverter sign hold (s) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. DERIVED FROM 1890 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS (SAFETY-30): 85 s is 8.5 times the worst legitimate opposition those runs produce (10.0 s), 2.8 times the firmware's own 30 s link veto, and under half the 180 s the site-wide check takes. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
site_sign_disagree_w:
name: "Safety · Site-wide sign threshold (W) — measured, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. The same 300 W as the single-inverter threshold, CARRIED ACROSS DELIBERATELY (SAFETY-30): the argument behind it does not depend on how many inverters there are - near zero the sign is noise, the deadband is 15 W, and there is one meter whatever is behind it. Do not change it without a capture that says so."
site_sign_disagree_s:
name: "Safety · Site-wide sign hold (s) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. DERIVED FROM 1890 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS (SAFETY-30), and deliberately NOT carried across from the single-inverter 180 s. On those runs the worst legitimate opposition at 300 W is 110 s with one inverter and 215 s with two, because the command has to travel the whole site rail at a slew rate that is not the site's - so carrying 180 s across would have shipped a false trip reachable at the lowest gain and slew with an ordinary 2.2 kW load reversal. 325 s is 1.51 times that, still inside the 900 s billing quarter, and still inside every episode of the captured fault day. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
meter_freeze_s:
name: "Safety · Frozen-meter alarm after (s) — measured, do not change"
description: "MEASURED, NOT CHOSEN (SAFETY-18). How long the meter may keep answering with an UNCHANGED reading, while the command stands at the rail, before the add-on raises an alarm. Over 2399 s of this house at its settled operating point - 1194 polls, 735 of them repeating the previous reading - the longest run without a distinct reading is 15.4 s; 300 s is 19.5 times that and still inside the 900 s billing quarter. ALARM ONLY: it does not command 0 W and does not latch. ⚠️ Only the homewizard_local meter source can see this at all; on every other source the status page says NOT COVERED rather than armed. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
circulation_w:
name: "Safety · Circulating-power threshold (W) — measured, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY; with one inverter the quantity is identically zero. Two inverters pushing against each other net out to zero at the meter and are invisible to every other guard in this add-on. MEASURED ON 924 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS in which nothing was faulty (SAFETY-31): the worst legitimate opposition collapses from 505 s at a 100 W threshold to 5 s at 400 W, and 400 W is the sharp knee this add-on will not let you go below - under it, ordinary operation holds the sensor over the threshold for minutes and nothing shorter than the billing quarter could tell that from a fault. 700 W is 1.75 times the knee, and the extra margin is there because the second inverter's ramp and lag are still copied from the first one rather than measured. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
circulation_hold_s:
name: "Safety · Circulating-power hold (s) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. DERIVED (SAFETY-31): 75 s is fifteen control cycles - 15 times the worst legitimate episode the rig can produce, 2.5 times the firmware's own 30 s link veto, and twelve times inside the 900 s billing quarter. It is deliberately not a round 60 or 120, which would be a guess wearing a measurement's clothes. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
auto_start:
name: "Advanced · Start controlling automatically on boot"
description: "Off by default. Leave it off until the site has been commissioned: with it off, somebody has to press Start after every restart of the add-on, which is what you want while you are still checking signs and entities."
gain:
name: "Advanced · Loop gain"
description: "How much of the remaining error the loop corrects each cycle. MEASURED ON REAL HARDWARE and already at the limit - do not raise it. Lower is slower and safer."
slew_w:
name: "Advanced · Largest change per cycle (W)"
description: "How far the setpoint may move in one control cycle. ⚠️ 0 MEANS FOLLOW THE INVERTER RATING and is the recommended setting: the limit becomes about a ninth of the rating, so the loop takes the plant's own MEASURED settling time to cross its whole output range and the number cannot be left behind when the rating changes. DERIVED (SAFETY-39) from an ~18 s measured step response against a 2 s meter tick. A fixed number is accepted and is never silently reduced, but a number faster than the rating allows is refused at startup - at 1000 W against a 5000 W rating this loop drove the meter from 3.4 kW of export to 2.8 kW of import on 2026-09-05. Lower is always accepted."
deadband_w:
name: "Advanced · Deadband (W)"
description: "Errors smaller than this are ignored. ⚠️ The deadband is a one-way ratchet: any resting point inside it holds forever, and the meter's import register counts every positive watt with no export to cancel it - which is exactly why the resting point below is slightly negative."
target_grid_w:
name: "Advanced · Resting point at the meter (W)"
description: "What the meter should sit at when nothing is happening; negative means a slight export. -10 W is deliberate: resting at 0 W leaks about half the deadband in billed import all day - roughly 0.2 to 0.35 kWh at a 15 W deadband - and biasing the rest point below zero moves that leak into the export register, which is not billed. It costs about this many watts of given-away export, so keep it small."
step_w:
name: "Advanced · Setpoint quantisation (W)"
description: "The setpoint is rounded to a multiple of this before it is written, so the inverter is not handed a new number for every watt of noise."
saturation_w:
name: "Advanced · Saturation threshold (W)"
description: "The gap between what was commanded and what the inverter delivers that counts as 'this inverter is at a limit'. ⚠️ The per-inverter sign threshold under Safety is derived as exactly half of this, so moving this moves that measurement's argument with it."
saturation_cycles:
name: "Advanced · Saturated cycles before freezing (count)"
description: "How many consecutive saturated cycles before the loop stops winding up. ⚠️ Do not set this to 1: a single noisy cycle would then freeze the loop."
integrator_max_w:
name: "Advanced · Integrator bound (W, 0 means the same as the rating)"
description: "Caps how much stale error can be waiting to unwind when the sign flips. MEASURED on the closed-loop simulator with a 4000 W load dropped to zero: at a bound equal to the rating the command is 1000 W two cycles later, at 1.5 times the rating it is 1800 W. ⚠️ Do not raise it above the inverter rating - the output clamp already bounds what reaches the wire, so extra headroom buys nothing but wrong-direction watts after every saturation event. Lowering it below the rating is the useful direction, and the only reason this is a separate setting."
heartbeat_s:
name: "Advanced · Setpoint refresh interval (s)"
description: "How often the setpoint is rewritten even when it has not changed. It must stay well under the firmware's own watchdog, which vetoes a link that has been quiet for 30 s."
stale_input_s:
name: "Advanced · Command 0 W after inputs missing for (s)"
description: "How long the inputs may be missing before the add-on commands 0 W. With a P1 meter this clock starts only AFTER the meter staleness limit has already expired, so the two stack: the total is longer than this number on its own."
cycle_floor_s:
name: "Advanced · Longest gap between control cycles (s)"
description: "A deadline on the gap between cycles, reset by every cycle. On a healthy meter it never elapses and changes nothing. Raise it only if your meter is slower than about 10 s, and keep it under the meter staleness limit - past that there is no reading left to evaluate anyway."
log_level:
name: "Advanced · Log level"
description: "How much detail the add-on writes to its log. 'info' is the shipped setting; 'debug' and 'trace' are for diagnosing a problem and are noisy."
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# Home Assistant add-on-vertalingen - NEDERLANDS (UX-01)
#
# ⚠️ DIT IS GEEN WOORD-VOOR-WOORDVERTALING VAN en.yaml en hoort dat ook niet te
# zijn. De eigenaar draait Home Assistant op Europe/Brussels; dit is de tekst
# die een Vlaamse huiseigenaar leest, met de woorden die op zijn factuur en op
# zijn digitale meter staan: afname en injectie, kwartierpiek en
# capaciteitstarief, laadniveau, uitschakelgrens.
#
# ⚠️ DE TERUGVAL IS PER SLEUTEL. De frontend probeert eerst de taal van de
# gebruiker, dan `en`, dan de kale sleutelnaam. Een sleutel die HIER ONTBREEKT
# valt dus netjes terug op het Engels; een sleutel die hier STAAT maar fout is,
# valt nergens op terug. Een half vertaalde sleutel weglaten is beter dan hem
# verkeerd invullen.
#
# ⚠️ DE VOLGORDE WORDT HIER NIET BEPAALD. Het tabblad Configuratie rendert in de
# volgorde van het `schema:`-blok van config.yaml; de volgorde hieronder is
# alleen een spiegel daarvan, zodat beide bestanden gelijk lezen.
#
# ⚠️ AFGELEIDE CONSTANTEN VERMELDEN WAAR ZE VANDAAN KOMEN. Het tabblad toont een
# getal dat uit 1890 gesloten-lustests komt en het omvormervermogen van de
# eigenaar als hetzelfde soort veld. De beschrijving is de enige plek waar dat
# verschil gezegd kan worden.
configuration:
setpoint_entity:
name: "Hardware · Setpoint-entiteit van de omvormer"
description: "De ESPHome number-entiteit waar deze add-on het vermogen naartoe schrijft, meestal number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w. Dit is het enige wat de add-on aanstuurt. Laat leeg als u hieronder de lijst met omvormers invult: een installatie met een lijst mag niet óók één losse aansturing hebben, en de add-on start dan niet op."
soc_entity:
name: "Hardware · Entiteit met het laadniveau van de batterij (%)"
description: "De sensor die de laadtoestand van de batterij in procent doorgeeft. Gebruik de meting van de ESP32 zelf, geen waarde die elders berekend wordt. De onderhoudscyclus en alle ondergrenzen voor het laadniveau lezen deze sensor."
batt_entity:
name: "Hardware · Entiteit met het batterijvermogen (W)"
description: "De sensor die het batterijvermogen van deze omvormer doorgeeft, positief bij ontladen. Op deze installatie is dat holding register 0x0518, uitgelezen door de ESP32. Zowel de tekenbewaking als het alarm voor rondpompend vermogen beoordelen de omvormer aan de hand van deze meting."
batt_invert:
name: "Hardware · Teken van het batterijvermogen omkeren"
description: "Zet dit alleen aan als uw sensor ontladen als een negatief getal doorgeeft. De add-on gaat ervan uit dat positief ontladen betekent."
inverters:
name: "Hardware · Lijst met omvormers (leeg laten bij één omvormer)"
description: "Laat dit leeg tenzij er echt meer dan één omvormer staat. LEEG BETEKENT NIET 'nog niet ingesteld': het betekent dat de vier entiteiten hierboven, samen met het omvormervermogen en de uitschakelgrens van de batterij onder Grenzen, de ene omvormer beschrijven die u hebt. Dat is wat elke bestaande installatie leest, zonder dat iemand iets hoeft aan te passen. Vult u de lijst wel in, dan VERVANGT die de instellingen hierboven in plaats van ze aan te vullen, en wordt er niets overgenomen: elk item moet zijn eigen aansturing, zijn eigen vermogen en zijn eigen uitschakelgrens vermelden, zodat geen enkele omvormer ooit beoordeeld wordt op de cijfers van een andere. De losse setpoint-entiteit hierboven moet dan leeg blijven."
fields:
name:
name: "Naam"
description: "Een korte aanduiding voor deze omvormer, bijvoorbeeld inverter-a. Ze geeft deze omvormer een eigen naamruimte voor haar veiligheidsvergrendeling, hartslag en schrijfadministratie in het statusbestand van de add-on, dus twee omvormers mogen er niet één delen."
setpoint_entity:
name: "Setpoint-entiteit"
description: "De eigen ESPHome-entiteit number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w van deze omvormer. Twee items mogen niet dezelfde entiteit noemen - twee schrijvers op één aansturing wordt bij het opstarten geweigerd."
max_w:
name: "Vermogen van deze omvormer (W)"
description: "De bewaakte bovengrens van wat er naar DEZE omvormer geschreven mag worden; het plafond van de installatie is de som over de lijst. Verplicht bij elk item: een item zonder deze waarde zou een vermogen moeten lenen, en een omvormer beoordelen op de cijfers van een andere is precies de fout die deze lijst per omvormer moet wegnemen."
bms_soc_floor:
name: "Uitschakelniveau van de batterij (%)"
description: "Het percentage waarbij het batterijmanagementsysteem van DEZE batterij uitschakelt. Lees dit af van de batterij die er werkelijk staat (register 0x0560) voordat die batterij ooit aangestuurd wordt; neem geen waarde van een andere omvormer over. Bewust verplicht bij elk item: optioneel maken zou neerkomen op een standaardwaarde, en één standaardwaarde voor twee verschillende batterijen beschermt de kleinste batterij met het getal van de grootste."
soc_entity:
name: "Entiteit met het laadniveau (%) (optioneel)"
description: "Het laadniveau van deze batterij zelf. Laat leeg als deze omvormer dat niet doorgeeft - dat is wat het betekent, en er wordt nooit teruggevallen op de sensor van een andere omvormer."
batt_entity:
name: "Entiteit met het batterijvermogen (W) (optioneel)"
description: "Het batterijvermogen van deze omvormer zelf, positief bij ontladen. Laat leeg als deze omvormer dat niet doorgeeft; er wordt niets van een ander item overgenomen."
batt_invert:
name: "Teken van het batterijvermogen omkeren (optioneel)"
description: "Alleen voor dit item: zet dit aan als de sensor van deze omvormer ontladen als een negatief getal doorgeeft."
estop_fitted:
name: "Hardware · RS485-noodstop is geplaatst"
description: "Of de RS485-noodstop fysiek geïnstalleerd is. Dit stuurt alleen de waarschuwingsbalk op de statuspagina aan en verandert niets aan de regeling."
meter_source:
name: "Meter · Waar de meterstand vandaan komt"
description: "'off' houdt de losse Home Assistant-entiteit hieronder aan, waar een bestaande installatie op draait tot u iets anders kiest. ha_dsmr luistert mee met de DSMR-integratie; mqtt_p1 leest een MQTT-topic; ha_signed leest één entiteit met teken, wat een HomeWizard P1 publiceert; homewizard_local bevraagt de lokale API van de meter zelf en slaat Home Assistant helemaal over. ⚠️ Alleen homewizard_local kan 'de meter heeft niet geantwoord' onderscheiden van 'de waarde is niet veranderd', en is dus de enige bron waarop het alarm voor een vastgelopen meter iets betekent."
meter_entity:
name: "Meter · Entiteit met het netvermogen (W)"
description: "De sensor met het netto netvermogen, gebruikt wanneer de meterbron 'off' is. POSITIEF MOET AFNAME VAN HET NET BETEKENEN. Staat dit omgekeerd, dan stuurt de regeling de batterij de verkeerde kant op; gebruik daarvoor de tekenschakelaar hieronder en geen template-sensor."
meter_invert:
name: "Meter · Teken van het netvermogen omkeren"
description: "Zet dit aan als uw netsensor afname van het net als een negatief getal doorgeeft."
meter_phases:
name: "Meter · Aantal fasen (1 of 3)"
description: "Moet overeenkomen met uw aansluiting. Een telegram met een ander aantal fasen wordt bij binnenkomst geweigerd en gelogd, zodat een verkeerde waarde meteen zichtbaar wordt als 'geen telegrammen aanvaard' in plaats van als een stil verkeerd getal. Het bereik aanvaardt 2, maar dat is geen echte Belgische aansluiting."
p1_host:
name: "Meter · Adres van de HomeWizard P1"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron homewizard_local: het adres van de meter zelf op uw netwerk, als host of host:poort, bijvoorbeeld 192.168.2.250."
meter_poll_s:
name: "Meter · Seconden tussen twee uitlezingen"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron homewizard_local. 5 s is het tempo waarin de meter zelf ververst, dus lager instellen levert niets op. Deze waarde moet ruim onder de verouderingsgrens hieronder blijven - de meting is nooit verser dan dit interval - en de add-on start niet op als ze eraan gelijk is of erboven ligt."
meter_max_age_s:
name: "Meter · Een meting is verouderd na (s)"
description: "Daarna geldt de netwaarde als ontbrekend. Op zichzelf stuurt dit nog geen 0 W aan: de teller 'invoer ontbreekt' onder Geavanceerd begint pas te lopen nadat deze verstreken is, en de twee stapelen. 30 s is zes uitlezingen speling bij het standaard uitleesinterval."
meter_mqtt_topic:
name: "Meter · MQTT-topic"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron mqtt_p1: het topic waarop de P1-metingen gepubliceerd worden."
p1_import_entity:
name: "Meter · Entiteit van het afnameregister (W)"
description: "Het afnameregister ZONDER teken. Wijs dit niet aan een template-sensor mét teken toe: de add-on berekent het nettovermogen zelf als afname min injectie, zodat de tekenafspraak in geteste code zit en niet in ongecontroleerde YAML."
p1_export_entity:
name: "Meter · Entiteit van het injectieregister (W)"
description: "Het injectieregister ZONDER teken, de tegenhanger van het afnameregister hierboven. Zelfde regel: geen template-sensor mét teken."
p1_net_entity:
name: "Meter · Entiteit met het nettovermogen mét teken (W)"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron ha_signed. ÉÉN sensor mét teken: positief is afname van het net, negatief is injectie. Splits die niet in twee template-sensoren op - de add-on doet die splitsing zelf, juist zodat ze getest is."
p1_phase_import_entities:
name: "Meter · Afname-entiteiten per fase (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Optioneel, in de volgorde L1..L3. Nodig voor de kwartierpiek van het capaciteitstarief op een driefasige aansluiting. Het aantal items moet gelijk zijn aan het aantal fasen hierboven."
p1_phase_export_entities:
name: "Meter · Injectie-entiteiten per fase (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Optioneel, in de volgorde L1..L3, naast de afname-entiteiten per fase hierboven. Het aantal items moet gelijk zijn aan het aantal fasen."
p1_phase_net_entities:
name: "Meter · Netto-entiteiten per fase mét teken (L1, L2, L3)"
description: "Alleen voor meterbron ha_signed. Optioneel, in de volgorde L1..L3, elk met hetzelfde teken als de netto-entiteit hierboven. Zelfde rol als de afname- en injectie-entiteiten per fase: de kwartierpiek van het capaciteitstarief op een driefasige aansluiting. Het aantal items moet gelijk zijn aan het aantal fasen."
max_w:
name: "Grenzen · Vermogen van de omvormer (W)"
description: "DIT IS UW GETAL, geen afgeleide waarde: de harde bovengrens van wat er ooit gestuurd mag worden, in watt. Zet het op wat uw omvormer werkelijk aankan, begin laag en verhoog het pas na de indienstname. Het wordt helemaal niet gelezen zodra de lijst met omvormers is ingevuld - elk item draagt dan zijn eigen waarde en het plafond van de installatie is hun som. Verschillende veiligheidsdrempels moeten eronder blijven; de add-on start niet op als er één niet aan voldoet."
bms_soc_floor:
name: "Grenzen · Uitschakelniveau van de batterij (%)"
description: "GEMETEN, niet gekozen: het percentage waarbij het batterijmanagementsysteem van de batterij ZELF stopt met ontladen, wat u hier ook instelt. Register 0x0560 leest 10 op de referentie-GW5000S-BP. Lees deze waarde af van de batterij die er werkelijk staat in plaats van dit getal over te nemen. Ze staat hier zodat de add-on een ondergrens voor de piekbewaking op of onder deze waarde kan weigeren: zo'n ondergrens kan nooit werken, het BMS wint altijd eerst, en de statuspagina zou een reserve tonen die niet bestaat. Wordt niet gelezen zodra de lijst met omvormers is ingevuld - elk item vermeldt dan de uitschakelgrens van zijn eigen batterij."
peak_cap_w:
name: "Grenzen · Streefwaarde capaciteitstarief (W)"
description: "DIT IS UW GETAL: het gemiddelde kwartiervermogen waar de piekbewaking onder probeert te blijven. Neem het over uit uw netcontract - in België is dit de kwartierpiek waarop het capaciteitstarief van uw distributiefactuur berekend wordt."
peak_forecast_entity:
name: "Grenzen · Entiteit met de kwartierprognose (W)"
description: "Optioneel. Een prognose van het gemiddelde vermogen in het lopende factuurkwartier. Laat u dit leeg, dan is er helemaal geen piekbegrenzing."
peak_soc_floor:
name: "Grenzen · Piekbewaking ontlaadt niet onder (%)"
description: "AFGELEID, niet gekozen (SAFETY-24): de referentiebatterij heeft 13,8 kWh bruikbaar en de zwaarste doorgerekende afvlakdag vraagt 878 Wh, oftewel 6,4 %, dus 20 % ligt tien punten boven de uitschakelgrens van de batterij zelf en laat de bewaking nog ongeveer 1,6 van haar zwaarste waargenomen dagen speling. ⚠️ DIT BEGRENST ALLEEN DE PIEKBEWAKING. Het is geen reserve voor de hele batterij: gewoon eigenverbruik ontlaadt er dwars doorheen en gaat door tot aan de uitschakelgrens van de batterij, en dit getal verhogen verandert daar geen tiende procent aan. Het moet strikt boven de uitschakelgrens van de batterij blijven, anders start de add-on niet op. Verander het niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
price_provider:
name: "Tarief · Bron van dynamische prijzen"
description: "Waar day-ahead- of realtimeprijzen vandaan komen. 'off' is de standaardinstelling en betekent dat deze installatie op het vaste tarief hieronder draait, zonder handel. ⚠️ Dit vandaag aanzetten haalt prijzen op, controleert en publiceert ze, en verandert geen enkele energiebeslissing - er is nog niets dat de prijsreeks gebruikt. Het mag niet gecombineerd worden met de twee oude Home Assistant-prijsentiteiten verderop: twee prijsbronnen op één installatie, waarvan er stilzwijgend één wint, wordt bij het opstarten geweigerd in plaats van schijnbaar actief gelaten."
price_markup_eur_kwh:
name: "Tarief · Marge van de leverancier (EUR/kWh)"
description: "De marge van uw energieleverancier. De add-on telt die ALLEEN op wanneer de gekozen prijsbron ze niet al bevat - bij engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic, eneco_eddy en manual_csv wordt ze genegeerd, en dat wordt ook gelogd, zodat ze nooit dubbel wordt aangerekend."
price_taxes_eur_kwh:
name: "Tarief · Heffingen en btw (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Belastingen en heffingen per kWh, opgeteld volgens dezelfde regel als de marge: alleen wanneer de gekozen prijsbron ze nog niet bevat."
export_price_eur_kwh:
name: "Tarief · Injectievergoeding (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Wat u krijgt voor een kWh die u op het net zet, alles inbegrepen. Eén getal en geen reeks: geen enkele leverancier hier publiceert een dynamische injectiecurve. In België ligt dit vaak dicht bij nul, wat op zich al sterk pleit voor eigenverbruik in plaats van injectie. De waarde mag negatief zijn - op een zomerse middag betaalt u soms om te injecteren."
static_profile:
name: "Tarief · Vast of dag/nacht-tarief (één regel JSON)"
description: "Uw vaste of dag/nacht-contract, geschreven als één regel JSON. AANBEVOLEN ZELFS BIJ EEN DYNAMISCH CONTRACT: hierop valt de add-on terug wanneer de prijsfeed uitvalt, en staat dit leeg dan blijft de installatie bij een dode feed helemaal zonder tarief achter. De periodes moeten elk dagtype precies één keer bedekken, zonder gat en zonder overlap - een gat wordt bij het opstarten geweigerd in plaats van opgevuld, want een verzonnen prijs is er één waarop een strategie zou handelen. Een volledig vast tarief is één periode van 00:00 tot 24:00 op alle dagen. De prijzen zijn ALLES INBEGREPEN; de marge en heffingen hierboven worden er niet bij opgeteld. Let op: een venster van 22:00 tot 07:00 voor ma-vr dekt zaterdagochtend NIET, dus een regel voor het weekend is noodzakelijk en niet decoratief."
price_csv_path:
name: "Tarief · CSV-bestand met prijzen"
description: "Alleen voor prijsbron manual_csv: waar in /share de add-on uw eigen prijsbestand leest."
price_feed_url:
name: "Tarief · Afwijkende URL voor de prijsfeed"
description: "Laat leeg om de eigen feed van de gekozen bron te gebruiken. Alleen een host die die bron zelf opgeeft, wordt aanvaard, zodat dit niet zomaar ergens naar kan verwijzen."
price_horizon_h:
name: "Tarief · Hoe ver vooruit prijzen ophalen (uren)"
description: "Hoeveel uur aan prijzen er bij de bron opgevraagd wordt."
price_timeout_s:
name: "Tarief · Time-out voor een prijsaanvraag (s)"
description: "Hoe lang één aanvraag bij de prijsbron mag duren voordat ze wordt opgegeven."
price_now_entity:
name: "Tarief · Entiteit met de huidige prijs (oudere prijsweg)"
description: "De oudere manier om aan een prijs te komen, behouden omdat ze weghalen de onderhoudscyclus op een draaiende installatie zijn enige prijssignaal zou afnemen. De add-on leest deze entiteit en het gemiddelde hieronder en leidt er precies één ding uit af - of het nu goedkoper is dan gemiddeld - wat alleen gebruikt wordt om tijdens de onderhoudscyclus in een goedkoop venster te laden. Mag niet gecombineerd worden met een dynamische prijsbron."
price_avg_entity:
name: "Tarief · Entiteit met de gemiddelde prijs (oudere prijsweg)"
description: "Het gemiddelde waarmee de huidige prijs vergeleken wordt. Alleen zinvol samen met de entiteit hierboven en, net als die, niet te combineren met een dynamische prijsbron."
arbitrage_enabled:
name: "Tarief · Handelen op het prijsverschil"
description: "Laden in het goedkoopste gepubliceerde uur en ontladen in het duurste, maar alleen wanneer het verschil de kosten van de volledige cyclus dekt. STAAT UIT in de standaardinstelling, met opzet: dit is de eerste strategie in de add-on die bewust energie tegen de meter in verplaatst, dus ze wordt bewust aangezet of helemaal niet. Ze heeft zowel een prijsbron als een P1-meter nodig, en de add-on weigert combinaties die niet kunnen werken in plaats van ze schijnbaar actief te laten."
cycle_cost_threshold_eur:
name: "Tarief · Kostprijs van één volledige laad/ontlaadcyclus (EUR/kWh)"
description: "Wat één volledige cyclus per kWh kost: slijtage van de batterij plus omzettingsverliezen. Een prijsverschil dat hier onder ligt, kost geld en levensduur en wordt dus niet verhandeld. ⚠️ DIT GETAL IS NIET AFGELEID UIT EEN METING. 0,10 is een productbeslissing en staat nog open bij de eigenaar (OPT-08). Bij deze waarde handelt een installatie met een vast dag/nachttarief helemaal niet - het realistische Belgische dag/nachtverschil is ongeveer 0,08 EUR/kWh - en dat is bij dit getal het juiste antwoord, geen fout."
arbitrage_soc_floor:
name: "Tarief · Handel ontlaadt niet onder (%)"
description: "De reserve die de prijshandel niet mag aanspreken. Bewust een andere instelling dan de ondergrens van het onderhoud: een handelsstrategie op de cijfers van de maandelijkse balanceercyclus richten, zou twee ongerelateerde keuzes aan één getal koppelen."
arbitrage_soc_ceiling:
name: "Tarief · Handel laadt niet boven (%)"
description: "De ruimte die de prijshandel niet mag volmaken. De tegenhanger van de ondergrens hierboven, en om dezelfde reden losgehouden van het onderhoudsdoel."
maintenance_enabled:
name: "Onderhoud · Maandelijkse batterijcyclus uitvoeren"
description: "Een bewuste diepe ontlading, gevolgd door volledig opladen en een rustperiode op vol, zodat het batterijmanagementsysteem zijn schatting van het laadniveau kan herijken en de cellen kan balanceren. Staat standaard uit."
maintenance_interval_days:
name: "Onderhoud · Minimum aantal dagen tussen cycli"
description: "De kortste tijd tussen twee onderhoudscycli."
maintenance_start_hour:
name: "Onderhoud · Uur waarop een geplande cyclus start"
description: "Lokaal uur, 0 tot 23, waarop een cyclus die aan de beurt is begint."
maintenance_discharge_w:
name: "Onderhoud · Ontlaadvermogen (W)"
description: "Hoe snel de cyclus de batterij leegtrekt; het overschot gaat naar het net. Boven het vermogen van de omvormer wordt dit BEGRENSD tot dat vermogen en niet geweigerd - de cyclus loopt gewoon door, alleen trager, en de statuspagina meldt dat. Standaard 2000, afgestemd op het standaardvermogen; verhoog eerst het omvormervermogen en dan pas dit."
maintenance_charge_w:
name: "Onderhoud · Laadvermogen (W)"
description: "⚠️ MOET GELIJK AAN OF LAGER ZIJN dan het vermogen van de omvormer; anders start de add-on niet op. Erboven vraagt het laden in een goedkoop venster meer dan de bewaakte grens toelaat, lost de arbiter die tegenstrijdigheid op naar 0 W, en zou het onderhoud op een standaardinstallatie stilzwijgend nooit laden in een goedkoop venster. Daarnaast wordt dit nog eens begrensd door de ruimte die de piekbewaking overlaat."
maintenance_soc_floor:
name: "Onderhoud · Ontladen tot (%)"
description: "De diepte waar de maandelijkse herijking bewust naartoe gaat, één keer per maand, met opzet. ⚠️ DIT IS NIET DE ONDERGRENS VAN DE PIEKBEWAKING: die geeft aan hoe diep een besparende ontlading op geen enkele dag mag komen. De juiste waarden verschillen echt - 11 hier tegenover 20 daar - en daarom zijn het twee aparte instellingen die niet samengevoegd mogen worden."
maintenance_soc_target:
name: "Onderhoud · Opladen tot (%)"
description: "Het niveau waar de laadfase naartoe werkt voordat de rustperiode begint."
maintenance_hold_min:
name: "Onderhoud · Op vol houden gedurende (minuten)"
description: "Hoe lang er op het streefniveau gebleven wordt zodat het batterijmanagementsysteem het balanceren van de cellen kan afmaken."
sign_disagree_w:
name: "Veiligheid · Drempel tekenbewaking (W) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "GEMETEN, NIET GEKOZEN (SAFETY-02). Zowel het uitgestuurde setpoint als de netmeting moet boven deze waarde liggen voordat hun tegengestelde tekens überhaupt als onenigheid tellen. Op de vastgelegde gezonde dag (23-08-2026) komt het teken in 93,4 % van de beoordeelde metingen overeen; op de vastgelegde foutdag (20-08-2026) ligt dat tussen 0,0 en 10,5 %, met tegengestelde periodes tot 1752 s. Er is geen reden om hieraan te sleutelen zonder een nieuwe meetcampagne die dat onderbouwt. De waarde moet onder het omvormervermogen blijven, anders kan de bewaking nooit aanslaan, en de add-on weigert die instelling."
sign_disagree_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Wachttijd tekenbewaking (s) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "GEMETEN, NIET GEKOZEN (SAFETY-02). Hoe lang het setpoint en de meter onafgebroken tegengesteld moeten blijven voordat de add-on 0 W stuurt en vergrendelt tot iemand de regeling opnieuw start. 180 s ligt midden in een zeer brede gemeten marge: de langste terechte tegengestelde periode op de gezonde dag duurt 30 s, terwijl de foutdag bij 300 s nog altijd 13 keer aanslaat. Verander dit niet zonder nieuwe metingen."
unit_sign_disagree_w:
name: "Veiligheid · Tekendrempel per omvormer (W) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS; bij één omvormer doet deze instelling niets. AFGELEID UIT 1890 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS op de testopstelling met twee omvormers (SAFETY-30), waarbij niets defect was, over het volledige bereik dat deze add-on toelaat voor versterking en volgsnelheid. 250 W is precies de helft van de verzadigingsdrempel, zodat het kleinste verschil dat hier zichtbaar is, exact de afwijking is waarbij de regeling zelf al zegt dat de omvormer niet volgt. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken. De waarde moet onder het omvormervermogen blijven, anders kan ze nooit aanslaan."
unit_sign_disagree_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Wachttijd per omvormer (s) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. AFGELEID UIT 1890 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS (SAFETY-30): 85 s is 8,5 keer de langste terechte tegengestelde periode die die tests opleveren (10,0 s), 2,8 keer het eigen veto van 30 s in de firmware, en minder dan de helft van de 180 s die de installatiebrede controle neemt. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
site_sign_disagree_w:
name: "Veiligheid · Tekendrempel voor de hele installatie (W) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. Dezelfde 300 W als de drempel voor één omvormer, BEWUST OVERGENOMEN (SAFETY-30): de onderbouwing hangt niet af van het aantal omvormers - rond nul is het teken ruis, de dode zone is 15 W, en er is één meter, wat er ook achter hangt. Verander dit niet zonder metingen die dat onderbouwen."
site_sign_disagree_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Wachttijd voor de hele installatie (s) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. AFGELEID UIT 1890 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS (SAFETY-30), en bewust NIET overgenomen van de 180 s voor één omvormer. In die tests duurt de langste terechte tegengestelde periode bij 300 W 110 s met één omvormer en 215 s met twee, omdat het commando de volledige installatiegrens moet doorlopen aan een volgsnelheid die niet die van de installatie is. 180 s overnemen zou dus een vals alarm hebben opgeleverd bij de laagste versterking en volgsnelheid en een gewone belastingomkering van 2,2 kW. 325 s is 1,51 keer die waarde, blijft binnen het factuurkwartier van 900 s en binnen elke episode van de vastgelegde foutdag. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
meter_freeze_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Alarm vastgelopen meter na (s) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "GEMETEN, NIET GEKOZEN (SAFETY-18). Hoe lang de meter mag blijven antwoorden met een ONVERANDERDE waarde, terwijl het commando op de grens staat, voordat de add-on alarm slaat. Over 2399 s van deze woning op haar ingeregelde werkpunt - 1194 uitlezingen, waarvan 735 een herhaling van de vorige waarde - duurt de langste periode zonder een nieuwe waarde 15,4 s; 300 s is 19,5 keer zoveel en blijft binnen het factuurkwartier van 900 s. ALLEEN EEN ALARM: er wordt geen 0 W gestuurd en er wordt niets vergrendeld. ⚠️ Alleen de meterbron homewizard_local kan dit überhaupt zien; bij elke andere bron meldt de statuspagina NIET GEDEKT in plaats van actief. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
circulation_w:
name: "Veiligheid · Drempel rondpompend vermogen (W) — gemeten, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS; bij één omvormer is deze grootheid altijd nul. Twee omvormers die tegen elkaar in duwen, heffen elkaar aan de meter op en zijn onzichtbaar voor elke andere bewaking in deze add-on. GEMETEN OVER 924 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS waarbij niets defect was (SAFETY-31): de langste terechte tegenwerking valt terug van 505 s bij een drempel van 100 W naar 5 s bij 400 W, en 400 W is de scherpe knik waaronder deze add-on u niet laat gaan - daaronder houdt gewone werking de sensor minutenlang boven de drempel en kan niets korter dan het factuurkwartier dat van een storing onderscheiden. 700 W is 1,75 keer de knik; die extra marge is er omdat het aanloopgedrag van de tweede omvormer nog gekopieerd is van de eerste en niet gemeten. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
circulation_hold_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Wachttijd rondpompend vermogen (s) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. AFGELEID (SAFETY-31): 75 s zijn vijftien regelcycli - 15 keer de langste terechte episode die de testopstelling kan produceren, 2,5 keer het eigen veto van 30 s in de firmware, en twaalf keer binnen het factuurkwartier van 900 s. Het is bewust geen ronde 60 of 120, want dat zou een gok zijn in het jasje van een meting. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
auto_start:
name: "Geavanceerd · Automatisch beginnen te regelen bij opstarten"
description: "Staat standaard uit. Laat het uit tot de installatie in dienst is genomen: zolang het uit staat, moet iemand na elke herstart van de add-on op Start drukken, en dat is precies wat u wilt terwijl u tekens en entiteiten nog aan het nakijken bent."
gain:
name: "Geavanceerd · Versterking van de regellus"
description: "Welk deel van de resterende afwijking de regeling per cyclus wegregelt. GEMETEN OP ECHTE HARDWARE en al aan de bovengrens - niet verhogen. Lager is trager en veiliger."
slew_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Grootste verandering per cyclus (W)"
description: "Hoeveel het setpoint in één regelcyclus mag verspringen. ⚠️ 0 BETEKENT VOLG HET OMVORMERVERMOGEN en is de aanbevolen instelling: de grens wordt ongeveer een negende van dat vermogen, zodat de regeling er de GEMETEN insteltijd van de installatie over doet om haar volledige bereik te doorlopen en het getal niet achterblijft wanneer het vermogen verandert. AFGELEID (SAFETY-39) uit een gemeten stapresponsie van ~18 s bij een meterinterval van 2 s. Een vast getal wordt aanvaard en wordt nooit stilzwijgend verlaagd, maar een getal sneller dan het vermogen toelaat wordt bij het starten geweigerd - bij 1000 W tegen 5000 W dreef deze regeling de meter op 2026-09-05 van 3,4 kW injectie naar 2,8 kW afname. Lager wordt altijd aanvaard."
deadband_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Dode zone (W)"
description: "Afwijkingen kleiner dan deze waarde worden genegeerd. ⚠️ De dode zone werkt maar één kant op: elk rustpunt erbinnen blijft eeuwig staan, en het afnameregister van de meter telt elke positieve watt mee zonder injectie die dat compenseert - en precies daarom staat het rustpunt hieronder licht negatief."
target_grid_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Rustpunt aan de meter (W)"
description: "Waar de meter moet staan wanneer er niets gebeurt; negatief betekent een lichte injectie. -10 W is bewust gekozen: rusten op 0 W lekt de hele dag door ongeveer de helft van de dode zone aan gefactureerde afname - grofweg 0,2 tot 0,35 kWh bij een dode zone van 15 W - en het rustpunt onder nul leggen verplaatst dat lek naar het injectieregister, dat niet gefactureerd wordt. Het kost ongeveer evenveel watt weggegeven injectie, dus houd het klein."
step_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Afronding van het setpoint (W)"
description: "Het setpoint wordt op een veelvoud hiervan afgerond voordat het geschreven wordt, zodat de omvormer niet voor elke watt ruis een nieuw getal krijgt."
saturation_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Verzadigingsdrempel (W)"
description: "Het verschil tussen wat gevraagd werd en wat de omvormer levert dat geldt als 'deze omvormer zit aan een grens'. ⚠️ De tekendrempel per omvormer onder Veiligheid is afgeleid als precies de helft hiervan, dus deze waarde verschuiven, verschuift ook de onderbouwing daarvan."
saturation_cycles:
name: "Geavanceerd · Verzadigde cycli voor bevriezen (aantal)"
description: "Hoeveel opeenvolgende verzadigde cycli er nodig zijn voordat de regeling stopt met verder oplopen. ⚠️ Zet dit niet op 1: één ruiscyclus zou de regeling dan al bevriezen."
integrator_max_w:
name: "Geavanceerd · Begrenzing van de integrator (W, 0 betekent gelijk aan het vermogen)"
description: "Begrenst hoeveel oude afwijking er kan klaarstaan om af te bouwen wanneer het teken omslaat. GEMETEN op de gesloten-lussimulator met een belasting van 4000 W die naar nul valt: bij een grens gelijk aan het omvormervermogen staat het commando twee cycli later op 1000 W, bij anderhalf keer dat vermogen op 1800 W. ⚠️ Zet dit niet hoger dan het omvormervermogen - de uitgangsbegrenzing bepaalt toch al wat er naar de omvormer gaat, dus extra ruimte levert alleen watts in de verkeerde richting op na elke verzadiging. Lager zetten dan het omvormervermogen is de nuttige richting, en de enige reden dat dit een aparte instelling is."
heartbeat_s:
name: "Geavanceerd · Verversingsinterval van het setpoint (s)"
description: "Hoe vaak het setpoint opnieuw geschreven wordt, ook als het niet veranderd is. Dit moet ruim onder de eigen bewaking van de firmware blijven, die een verbinding die 30 s stil is geweest, blokkeert."
stale_input_s:
name: "Geavanceerd · 0 W sturen nadat invoer ontbreekt gedurende (s)"
description: "Hoe lang de invoer mag ontbreken voordat de add-on 0 W stuurt. Bij een P1-meter begint deze teller pas te lopen NADAT de verouderingsgrens van de meter al verstreken is, dus de twee stapelen: het totaal is langer dan dit getal op zich."
cycle_floor_s:
name: "Geavanceerd · Langste tijd tussen twee regelcycli (s)"
description: "Een uiterste termijn voor de tijd tussen twee cycli, die door elke cyclus opnieuw begint. Bij een gezonde meter verstrijkt hij nooit en verandert hij niets. Verhoog hem alleen als uw meter trager is dan ongeveer 10 s, en houd hem onder de verouderingsgrens van de meter - daarna is er toch geen meting meer om te beoordelen."
log_level:
name: "Geavanceerd · Logniveau"
description: "Hoeveel detail de add-on naar zijn logboek schrijft. 'info' is de standaardinstelling; 'debug' en 'trace' dienen om een probleem te onderzoeken en leveren veel tekst op."