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Author SHA1 Message Date
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 7b65a3e69a UX-08 review: tighter notification texts, and two meaning fixes
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m48s
- not delivering: the body said control keeps running and then "start
  control"; clearing it takes stop then start, and it now says so.
- peak reserve: the "reserve not set" branch is really soc_floor None,
  i.e. an inverter's cut-out level missing; it now names that. The title
  is true on all three branches ("Battery stopped limiting the peak").
- no semicolon run-ons in bodies (STYLE.md + test); loop-bound, circulating,
  meter-frozen and multi-unit over-rating bodies rewritten to match.
- allowlist cap is now exact, so a shrink cannot leave room to regrow.
- DOCS names the settings behind "peak reserve" and "cut-out level";
  DECISIONS no longer states the HA anchor behaviour as fact.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 01:18:55 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 50ccea3dd7 UX-08 phase 2a: short, plain notifications, and a ratchet for the rest
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m54s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Every HA notification the add-on raises now has a title of at most 5
everyday words and a one-sentence body; a red alarm may use three so no
action is lost. The texts live in app/messages.py, the rule in STYLE.md,
and the detail that moved out in DOCS.md "Notifications", which each body
links to. No notification_id, trigger or cadence changed.

test_messages.py enforces the rule on every notification, fails any
notification worded outside app/messages.py, and ratchets the kinds not yet
rewritten (rows, banners, refusals, logs, options) through a shrinking
allowlist of 200. Six tests re-pinned from prose to meaning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 01:00:54 +02:00
admin 2503de124e Merge pull request 'SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is not a BUG SIGNAL; alarm numbers from the clamp tick' (#130) from SAFETY-40-clamp-alarm into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-09-26 23:19:11 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 55a6d5dcdb SAFETY-40 review: integrator-bound WARNING gets its own notification id
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m46s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A later anti-windup notice could replace a write-path BUG SIGNAL notice
under the shared goodwe_output_clamp id (escalation ignores the budget).
The WARNING now uses goodwe_integrator_bound and points to DOCS; the
cadence sentence in DOCS is corrected. Tests pin both ids (red on fd14569).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 23:08:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 fd14569a71 SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is not a BUG SIGNAL; numbers from the clamp tick
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m47s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
The clamp alarm gave `i_clamped` (normal anti-windup) the over-rating BUG
SIGNAL text, printed `Decision.i_w` as "the loop asked for", and printed
`self.target` (after slew/freeze) as "was clamped to".

- clamp.loop_clamp_note(): i_clamped says "the loop's integrator reached its
  N W anti-windup bound" with this tick's command; clamped keeps BUG SIGNAL
  with the requested command and the clamp's own result.
- Decision carries i_bound_w / requested_w / clamped_w, set at the clamp.
- i_clamped still counts and notifies (same id, cadence, SAFETY-41
  escalation) but as a WARNING, amber row, plain title. A bug has its own
  notification budget and its text is not overwritten within an episode.
- test_clamp.py part 9: red on the old code per defect; 5 mutations killed.
- DOCS.md alarm section (and its stale 30 s cadence), DECISIONS/SAFETY-40.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-26 22:37:01 +02:00
admin 59415ea83f Merge pull request 'CI: bump infra pin to 7689816 (admin/goodwe#58, SAFETY-34)' (#129) from pin-bump-7689816 into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 2s
2026-09-26 16:15:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 f37268f3e4 CI: bump infra pin to 7689816 (admin/goodwe#58, SAFETY-34)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m48s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 16:05:02 +02:00
admin 397dd15dba SAFETY-34: re-assert latched alarms after a Core-only restart (#128)
infra-pin / fresh (push) Failing after 1s
2026-09-26 16:03:16 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 6028e21298 SAFETY-34: re-assert latched alarms, because a Core restart keeps the add-on
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m55s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A Core-only restart wipes persistent_notification and does NOT restart the
add-on (measured on TEST-23: the add-on's SAFETY-31 card was gone 4 min after
`docker restart test23-ha`, add-on StartedAt unchanged). The latched SAFETY-31
and SAFETY-42 cards were re-raised only on add-on start, so they stayed gone.

They are now re-asserted every REANNOUNCE_S = 300 s while tripped (same
notification_id, so it replaces). test_watchdog part 6 and test_delivery part
8b grade it with the same process across the "restart"; red on the old code.
The docstrings that said the add-on restarts with HA are corrected.
Record: goodwe docs/DECISIONS.md, SAFETY-34 D4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-26 12:37:47 +02:00
admin fe132515fe Merge pull request 'CI: bump infra pin to a1d0618 (admin/goodwe#57, TOOL-9)' (#127) from pin-bump-a1d0618 into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-09-25 20:52:59 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 00e9a7b4e1 CI: bump infra pin to a1d0618 (admin/goodwe#57, TOOL-9)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m46s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 20:42:44 +02:00
admin 82f032e8cf Merge pull request 'TOOL-9: pin checks print FAIL under pipefail; job tokens via header' (#126) from TOOL-9 into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-09-25 20:39:47 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b963153de6 Restore .gitea/infra-pin (revert the TOOL-9 proof throwaway)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m45s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 19:20:19 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 a2c571b20e THROWAWAY (TOOL-9 proof, reverted next): remove .gitea/infra-pin
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 19:08:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 550bd6fa52 TOOL-9: pin checks print their FAIL line under pipefail; job tokens via header
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
A missing or comment-only .gitea/infra-pin now ends on the workflow's own
FAIL line instead of git's `fatal: path ... does not exist` (still red). Every
x-access-token remote URL becomes an env-set Authorization header, so no
token lands in .git/config or argv; the pin workflows' temp dir is removed
by an EXIT trap, also on failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 19:07:34 +02:00
admin 6a8a5ffa27 Merge pull request 'CI-12: CI grades test_freeze.py against the real hwsim at a pinned admin/goodwe' (#125) from CI-12 into release/1.0
infra-pin / fresh (push) Successful in 1s
2026-09-25 18:19:43 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 8ff42ea85d CI-12: .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (2d026df, goodwe#56 merged)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m42s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-25 18:10:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 841424463a CI-12 review: INFRA_READ_TOKEN via an env-set header, not a remote URL
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m42s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
The long-lived token no longer lands in $WS/goodwe/.git/config (mounted into
the tests' container, left behind by a failed job) or in git's argv. A missing
secret (fork PR) fails with its own message. README: addon-pin is not re-run
after a bump.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-25 18:01:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 c63eda0b0f CI-12: restore .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (56a933e)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m43s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
This reverts commit 54cc5263fb (the proof-2 throwaway).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:45:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 54cc5263fb THROWAWAY (CI-12 proof 2): pin one release/1.0 merge behind (d84ac01); reverted next
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m43s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:36:36 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 c493a6d67a CI-12: test_tariff.py no longer says CI cannot see the infra repo
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m47s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:27:06 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 d0891a6bca CI-12: .gitea/infra-pin to admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (56a933e), restoring the proof pin
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 16:10:47 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 fe80047235 CI-12 round 2: INFRA_READ_TOKEN for admin/goodwe; the pin tracks release/1.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
- checks.yml's infra checkout and infra-pin.yml's admin/goodwe ls-remote use
  the INFRA_READ_TOKEN secret; the self fetch keeps GITHUB_TOKEN.
- infra-pin.yml compares against admin/goodwe refs/heads/release/1.0; STALE
  message, comments and README follow.
- test_control.py / test_alloc.py: drop the claim that CI cannot reach
  admin/goodwe.
- .gitea/infra-pin is DELIBERATELY one release/1.0 merge behind (d84ac01) for
  the "infra-pin / fresh goes red" proof; the next commit sets it to HEAD.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 16:08:55 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6e3399322a CI-12: CI grades test_freeze.py against the real hwsim at a pinned admin/goodwe
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 2s
- .gitea/infra-pin: the one place the admin/goodwe commit is pinned.
- checks.yml: checks out admin/goodwe at the pin as the sibling test_freeze.py
  looks for; any failure fails the job. Tests run with GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1,
  and `CI: ` lines are echoed on PASS so the log shows which transport ran.
- test_freeze.py: GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM refuses the stub; a local stub run
  prints a STUB USED line.
- infra-pin.yml: a separate, non-required check that goes red naming both
  SHAs when admin/goodwe master has moved past the pin.
- README: when and how to bump the pin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 01:57:04 +02:00
admin 16c796fa30 Merge pull request 'TEL-14: PV sign declared per entity (pv_invert_entities)' (#124) from TEL-14-pv-sign into release/1.0 2026-09-25 01:30:33 +02:00
admin 20260e86ec Merge pull request 'DOC-5: tell installers to turn on the Supervisor Watchdog' (#123) from DOC-5-watchdog into release/1.0 2026-09-25 01:17:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 7fa045af85 TEL-14 N1: trim DECISIONS (drop probe transcript, §1 to the reason), move the mutation ledger there with M2/M5
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m44s
test_pv.py part 11 now prints a one-line pointer instead of the 12-row table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 01:11:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 93f349a6af TEL-14 B1: pin stray caution on the reported case and whitespace normalisation end to end
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 01:10:13 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 d71f7dbd35 Merge release/1.0 (43b2740) into DOC-5-watchdog to sync base
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m45s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 01:08:15 +02:00
admin 43b274035f Merge pull request 'TEST-26: a missing value in a check is a named FAIL, not a traceback' (#122) from TEST-26 into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:57:20 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 6dbe06e32e DOC-5: add the Watchdog step to README's Install section
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m31s
One line after the install step, linking to the DOCS.md paragraph that
gives the reason.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:30:44 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 7559d21eda TEL-14: PV sign declared per entity (pv_invert_entities)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m39s
Some PV entities (kWh meters, ESPHome clamps in the PV circuit) read positive
for consumption and negative for production. `pv_invert_entities` lists the
ones to flip; the flip is applied per member inside pv.total(), before the sum,
so the MQTT `pv` row and the status page carry the corrected figure. Default []
is byte-identical to 0.12.0.

Shape measured in supervisor_shape_probe.py section H (Supervisor 2026.08.0):
a parallel list validates the 0.12.0 blob unchanged and renders as its own
translated repeatable field; dicts on pv_entities refuse 0.12.0's stored
strings; a prefix is invisible syntax; a global bool cannot describe a mixed
roster. Status page marks flipped entities and cautions per entity below
-50 W, saying ADD or REMOVE. Telemetry only: control documents unchanged.

Record: DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md (reverses TEL-11 section 2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:25:24 +02:00
admin 3e38bafcee Merge pull request 'SAFETY-62/SAFETY-60: operator tools refuse input they cannot read' (#120) from SAFETY-62-refuse-unread-input into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:25:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 02a822af98 DOC-5: tell installers to turn on the Supervisor Watchdog
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m41s
Since SAFETY-61 a dead control loop writes 0 W and exits 70. The Supervisor
restarts a stopped add-on only when the per-install Watchdog toggle is on,
and it defaults to off. One step in DOCS.md "Before you start", with a
pointer to the DECISIONS file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:20:52 +02:00
admin 6e6527224a Merge pull request 'SAFETY-61: the control task's death ends the process, after the wind-down' (#121) from safety-61-control-task-death into release/1.0 2026-09-25 00:07:41 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 770988c902 TEST-26: a missing value in a check is a named FAIL, not a traceback
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m44s
Checks and prints that indexed an empty list, exhausted next(), or formatted
None killed the rest of their file (FCST-06). Read them through the new
named_absence.py (nth/first/field/given/present) and conjoin a presence term.

- every site in the brief, plus the family the new scan and a sweep found
- test_named_absence.py: scans every test_*.py for unguarded filtered-list
  indexing, next() without a default and numeric formats on maybe-None
  names; proven to bite; prints what it cannot see, counted
- test_price.py 16a: the `_T17_CAPS is _T17_CAPS` tautology now grades the
  two assemble() calls' arguments
- test_control.py: coverage table re-measured on runs graded to the end

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:06:58 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 b06f1fad5f SAFETY-62 review: DOCS exit 3 at the command block (R1); recognise the auto store key (R2)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m35s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:02:33 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 71d2d4a37a SAFETY-61: the control task's death ends the process, after the wind-down
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m22s
A done-callback on run_control()'s task logs the traceback at the death and
sets `stop`; amain() runs the ordinary wind-down (shutdown() ->
command_site_zero()) and main() exits 70 (EX_SOFTWARE). Normal stops and
run_control()'s refusal path are ignored by the callback (still 0 / 78).

hass.py: a malformed JSON body, a JSON non-object, and an undecodable error
body are an absence / a failed write, not an exception into the loop.

checks() gains a first "control loop" row, red past FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S.

Why exit rather than restart in-process, and what the Supervisor actually
does on exit (restarts only with the per-install Watchdog toggle on, default
off): DECISIONS/SAFETY-61-control-task-death.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:52:42 +02:00
admin fa3d237ce1 Merge pull request 'DOC-1: operator docs name the real P1 entity and a roster that starts' (#119) from doc-1-operator-docs into release/1.0 2026-09-24 23:42:13 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 f4f72211a9 SAFETY-60/62: operator tools refuse input they cannot read
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m31s
predeploy_check.py and rehearse_roster.py now assert a positive property of
their input (a JSON object, most of whose top-level keys are known option or
store keys) and refuse anything else with the shape named. The `ha apps info
--raw-json` wrapper, a truncated or list-wrapped state file and a wrapped
config no longer produce "CLEARED" / "NO FINDINGS" with exit 0.

Also: a clean --no-live-entities rehearsal exits 3, not 0; alloc_sim.py
exits 1 when split-invariance FAILS; decode_bus_capture.py takes several
paths and exits 1 on a file that is mostly not frames.

Graded by the new test_tool_inputs.py; DOCS.md says to pass .data.options.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:27:50 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 29ca9b5157 DOC-1: operator docs name the real P1 entity and a roster that starts
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m8s
- DOCS.md / config.yaml: the watchdog's P1 age entity is
  sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age (device "GoodWe" + "P1 sample age", as
  app/mqtt.py announces and the live install recorded), not
  sensor.p1_sample_age_s.
- DOCS.md: the inverters: example and per-entry table carry the required
  bms_soc_floor (and capacity_kwh); config.yaml's schema comment says four
  required keys, not three.
- Field guide: marked v0.1.0/outdated; slew_w row no longer recommends the
  1000 W that SAFETY-39 now refuses. HTML regenerated; the PDF is NOT
  rebuilt (no Chrome here). README/DOCS pointers fixed.
- test_docs.py: the documented roster must pass app/validate.py and the
  schema's per-entry keys; the documented entity id must equal the id
  composed from app/mqtt.py; the wrong id may appear in no shipped doc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:24:50 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 a45ed06c05 PKG-18: cut 0.12.0, so TEL-12's pv_entities can reach an installed 0.11.0 (#117)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Reviewed at head 1ad4d3a. CI run 830 (attempt 1, pull_request, PR 117 -> release/1.0), 31/31 PASS. Review: #issuecomment-1588, #issuecomment-1589.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 23:09:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 1ad4d3a5bb PKG-18: cut 0.12.0, so TEL-12's pv_entities can reach an installed 0.11.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m5s
One runtime merge since 0.11.0 (cccb2fa): TEL-12 (#116), a new optional
list option `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity`. Option surface 76 -> 77, so
a minor bump. config.yaml version and a closed `## 0.12.0` section only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 22:59:44 +02:00
admin f863ecaa8c TEL-12: several PV inverters, and one absent member is an absent TOTAL (#116)
pv_entity becomes a roster: pv_entities beside it, replacing it, with the SITE total over the roster. One absent member makes the TOTAL absent - never the partial sum of the ones that answered, because a smaller number indistinguishable from a real one reads a week later as 'there was less sun than there was', which is the conclusion OPT-10 exists to test rather than to manufacture. A member honestly reporting 0 W is still summed.

Reviewed on PR 116. Re-run independently: supervisor_shape_probe.py SSG (exit 0, transcript reproduces byte for byte), the owner's real 75-key options blob through Supervisor 2026.08.0's own AppOptions (ACCEPTED, zero drift on any stored value, pv_entities defaulted to []), tel11_pv_trace.py --compare across both trees (every hash reproduces, control 846a10a5b89e unmoved on unset and one), the rejected-design mutant (trace REFUSED 5/5 with the partial sums named), the planted leak N8 (52/26/10 red cells), and eight mutations on fresh purged copies including N5 sum->max at +0 bytes - no survivors. Habit 24's central claim measured: TEL-11's own --compare refuses on every honest run now that release/1.0 is 0.11.0.

Green traced to this PR's own run: 829/1954, attempt 1, event pull_request, path checks.yml@refs/pull/116/head, payload naming PR 116 with base release/1.0 @ cccb2fa, 31 suites PASS in 7m53s - a real execution, not a laundered skip.

Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays 0.11.0 and the CHANGELOG entry is PKG's call.
2026-09-24 22:41:19 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 0ef9565071 TEL-12: several PV inverters, and one absent member is an absent TOTAL
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m59s
0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity` as a single string. The reference site's owner
reported within minutes of it going live that they have several PV inverters
and could configure one - which is ordinary for a multi-string roof, not a
property of one house. `pv_entities` is the roster and the row carries the
SITE total.

⚠️ THE HARD PART IS ABSENCE, NOT THE LIST. Three configured, one `unavailable`,
and the sum of the other two is a SMALLER NUMBER INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM A REAL
ONE. Read back by OPT-10 that says "there was less PV than there was" - the "no
irradiance" conclusion the channel exists to TEST. So `pv.total()` answers
`None` the moment any configured entity is absent: the topic carries HA's own
`None`, the entity goes to `unknown`, the recorder records a GAP. The
alternative (the partial sum beside a contributor count) was implemented and
run as mutation N1b; it loses because the MQTT row is read COLD a week later by
an attribution that would believe it, while the qualifying count would live in a
second entity with its own history. The partial information is not thrown away -
the STATUS PAGE names every entity that reported, with its watts, and every one
that did not, with its reason, because that surface is read LIVE by a human who
wants the diagnostic.

⚠️ AND THE MIRROR: a member honestly reporting 0 W is SUMMED. The test is
`is None`, never falsiness - a roster that blanked the site on a zero would
report an absence on every clear evening.

THE SURFACE IS MEASURED, NOT PREFERRED. `pv_entity` could not become a list:
tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py §G shows Supervisor 2026.08.0 answering an
0.11.0 install's stored string with `Invalid list for option 'pv_entity'`, and
deepmerge's list strategy is `override` so a `[]` default does not rescue it -
the live add-on would not start. `match(.*)?` does accept both shapes and is
rejected for a different, measured reason: it validates nothing (a string, a
list and the integer 417 all pass) and renders as a plain text box. So
`pv_entities` joins `pv_entity` and REPLACES it when set, CFG-04's rule for
`inverters:`, with a status caution saying which key won - a union would
double-count the inverter the old key still names.

STILL NOT A CONTROL INPUT. tools/tel11_pv_trace.py was extended rather than
replaced and now grades five claims over three document sets. The control hash
is UNMOVED - 846a10a5b89e… on `unset` and on `one`, on both trees - and the
roster control document is byte-identical between the two trees. 2/5 is a claim
TEL-11 could not make: with 0.11.0 as the baseline, "one entity behaves exactly
as 0.11.0 does" is a real cross-tree identity over control AND telemetry.

⚠️ TEL-11's OWN `--compare` REFUSAL HAD TO CHANGE, and that is MUTATION.md habit
24: a discriminator defined as "the baseline lacks this feature" dies on the
release that ships the feature, and dies as a false refusal.

Twelve mutations, each on a fresh purged `cp -a`, no survivors. N5 is +0 B
(`sum` -> `max`, the same three characters) and was run on a fresh copy with
`cmp` confirming the edit on disk. The fixture is three distinct NON-ZERO
contributions in two units with absence driven at EVERY position - a member
contributing 0 W could go absent without moving the sum of the rest, which is
habit 23 with a coinciding value in the arithmetic rather than in the plant.

31/31 in the CI image. Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays at 0.11.0,
so predeploy_check.py reports a NO-OP until PKG cuts a version. A CHANGELOG
entry is wanted and deliberately not written - 11b forbids `## Unreleased` and
the bump is PKG's call; DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md is the
material it needs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 22:13:25 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cccb2fa07b PKG-17: cut 0.11.0, so SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's pv_entity can reach an installed 0.10.1 (#114)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m1s
Bumps config.yaml 0.10.1 -> 0.11.0 and adds the `## 0.11.0` section, so the Supervisor offers the update that carries SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's `pv_entity`.

Reviewed at head b11bea7. Green traced to this PR's own run (827, attempt 1, payload names PR 114 base release/1.0, 31/31 real). Version gate 11a-11d, SAFETY-56's behaviour hash and TEL-11's four trace rows all re-measured on this tree and matching. slug unchanged; option surface 75 -> 76 with no validator rule added.

Two non-blocking findings recorded on the PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 19:20:06 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 b11bea70d3 PKG-17: the SAFETY-57 correction pointed at the wrong paragraph
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m13s
Self-review. The note added to `### SAFETY-57` said the reading rule it is
qualifying is "two paragraphs up"; it is in the paragraph directly above - the
same one the note follows. A changelog that misdirects a reader to a paragraph
that is not there is the small end of exactly the defect this cut is fixing
three sentences of elsewhere, so it is corrected rather than left.

Text only, one line pair, still two files in the branch's diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 19:01:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 cfafdffaed PKG-17: cut 0.11.0, so SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's pv_entity can reach an installed 0.10.1
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Two files, and no third. config.yaml 0.10.1 -> 0.11.0; CHANGELOG.md gains
`## 0.11.0` and three corrections to sections below it.

A MINOR BUMP, NOT A PATCH. TEL-11 adds an option - `pv_entity`, 75 keys -> 76 in
`options:` and `schema:` together - which is the same test 0.8.0, 0.9.0 and
0.10.0 were cut on. Nothing here can refuse a stored blob: the key is `str?`
with an `options:` default of "", validate.py does not mention it, no default
moved and no enum widened, so a blob that starts the add-on on 0.10.1 starts it
on 0.11.0.

THE TABLE HAS TWO ROWS AND THE WINDOW HAD FOUR MERGES. CI-9's follow-up
(9f6b9f1, `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` only) and SEC-2 (239e120,
`docs/RELEASE.md` + README.md) are excluded under PKG-15's rule - AUDIENCE, NOT
IMPORTANCE. Neither file is under `goodwe_controller/`, neither is in the built
image, neither is in predeploy_check.py's RUNTIME tuple, and there is no version
of this add-on on which an operator can observe either. SEC-2 is the closer call
and the section argues it in full rather than asserting it: it is the more
consequential ticket of the two - it is why this release is a pull request
rather than a push to master - and it is still a procedure for whoever cuts a
release, not something the person deciding whether to press Update can act on.
Both are named in the section with pointers to PR #102 / checks.yml and PR #108
/ docs/RELEASE.md.

WHAT THE ENTRIES LET AN OPERATOR DECIDE. SAFETY-56: behaviour byte-identical
(6030175ed2ab..., reproduced in the CI image over 2390 capture reads, a 66-cell
grid stepped 120 times and six driven worlds), three surfaces named with the old
and new wording side by side - the STALE_READING line quoted onto the action log
and status page, the SAFETY-37 ERROR log line, and the readiness row that
asserted a false fact about a named entity. TEL-11: unset is byte-identical in
BOTH the control and telemetry documents, set is byte-identical in the control
document only; the three TEL-11 rows of that table were re-measured in the CI
image on this tree (control 846a10a5... twice, telemetry a443a6ce... / 4e6d1cb2...).
It is stated plainly that pv_entity is not a control input and does not change
what the loop does, and that absence publishes `unknown` rather than 0.

THREE CORRECTIONS BELOW THE NEW SECTION, WITHOUT REWRITING HISTORY. The 0.10.1
preamble said SAFETY-56 was open; the SAFETY-57 entry said its accusatory
diagnosis half was "deliberately untouched"; the 0.10.0 preamble left SAFETY-56
with no pointer while SAFETY-57 had one. All three quotations are what the
0.10.1 image actually prints and are left standing - a reader on 0.10.1 has to
recognise them - each now scoped to 0.10.1 and pointed at `## 0.11.0`.

VERIFIED. test_version_gate.py part 11 all four: 11a one contents table and the
slicer closed (302 lines under '0.11.0'), 11b 0.11.0 == config.yaml, 11c all
three RETIRED_PROVIDERS ids named - scoped to a pre-0.10.0 crossing and pointing
at `## 0.10.0`, which is where the evidence is - 11d still exactly one
`## Unreleased` below, PKG-08's, untouched. 31/31 in the CI image, checks.yml's
exact command, purged tree, `:ro`.

Not deployed and not installed. Shipping is a separate pull request from
release/1.0 into master, per docs/RELEASE.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 18:50:13 +02:00
admin 94da37fc72 TEL-11: PV production stops being invisible, and stays out of the control law (#113)
Reviewed on the PR. Green traced to run 825 (PRNUM 113, BASEREF release/1.0, attempt 1, real 8m6s execution). Control-path identity independently reproduced on both trees and counter-tested with a planted leak (red on 26/41 cells); all three of the trace tool substituted refusals fire. M7 genuinely red. Three publication states distinct on the wire. 31/31 in the CI image.

Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays at 0.10.1, so predeploy_check.py reports a NO-OP until PKG cuts a version.
2026-09-24 15:55:29 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 07ba3433ed TEL-11: PV production stops being invisible, and stays out of the control law
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m6s
OPT-10 measured that this site's pack reaches 90 % SoC on 2 days of 16 and that
20.5 kWh of surplus left the site while the pack had room - 12.6 kWh of it with
the battery not charging at all - and could not say WHY, because PV production
is recorded NOWHERE. Three causes need three different fixes (no irradiance:
nothing to fix; a charge-power limit; the optimiser declining to charge, which
is the only software defect) and guessing between them is how an optimiser gets
tuned to solve a cloud problem. This card adds the channel. It does not do the
attribution.

AN HA ENTITY, NOT A REGISTER, AND THAT IS A PRODUCT DECISION. This add-on's
RS485 bus carries the BATTERY inverter it drives; a household's PV inverter is
normally a different box from a different vendor reporting into Home Assistant
through its own integration. `pv_entity` takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's
own PV integration provides, any brand HA can read.

POSITIVE IS PRODUCTION, AND THERE IS NO `pv_invert`. The convention is derived
rather than assumed: `meter_entity` is positive when IMPORTING and `batt_entity`
is positive when DISCHARGING (DOCS.md, Sources), both of which are "power
arriving at the house's AC bus", and production arrives there too. Those two
keys carry invert flags because they are BIPOLAR and are READ BY THE CONTROL
PATH - `inv.batt` feeds SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and SAFETY-31's
circulating-power sensor, so a reversed sensor hands the site a plausible number
it acts on. Production is unipolar and is read by nothing: a reversed sensor
announces itself as -4 kW at noon in the very history this card creates, and a
flag would only let an installer hide it. No negative-value alarm either - a PV
inverter's own standby draw makes a small negative reading at night ordinary, so
any threshold would be a number nobody measured.

ABSENCE IS NEVER ZERO, AND "DROPPED" IS NOT ABSENT. `publish()` SKIPS a None,
which is right for `circulation` and exactly wrong here: a skipped row leaves
Home Assistant holding the last number forever and the recorder draws a FLAT
LINE through the outage, which is indistinguishable from a measurement and
manufactures the "there was no surplus" conclusion this card exists to TEST. So
the absence is published, with HA's own payload: `mqtt/const.py` declares
`PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"` and `mqtt/sensor.py` tests it BEFORE the numeric branch,
so the entity's state becomes `unknown` and the recorder stores a GAP. Read out
of home-assistant/core `dev` on 2026-09-24 and quoted at the constant.
`ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is a one-key set and the suite asserts `circulation: None`
is STILL dropped.

THE UNIT IS READ OFF THE ENTITY. `mW`, `W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`, `TW` - HA's own
`UnitOfPower`, every factor an exact power of ten. A sensor with no unit, or a
unit outside that table, is REFUSED by name and the status page says which.
`read_inputs()`'s `abs(raw) < 50` kW-or-W guess is safe for a quarter-hour
demand forecast and is NOT safe here: 30 W of dusk is an ordinary reading and
that heuristic would publish it as 30 kW.

GENUINELY OPTIONAL, AND NOT A SECOND `price_now_entity`. validate.py does not
mention the key - it cannot conflict with anything, because nothing else reads
it. The MQTT row lives in a new `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` list whose `include` argument
DEFAULTS TO EMPTY, so every caller that has never heard of `pv_entity` -
test_mqtt.py's fixtures, tools/rehearse_roster.py, anything written next year -
announces exactly what it announced before. Unset: no state call at all, no
entity, no topic, no status row, no page row. Set and failing: a CAUTION
(`ok=False, warn=True`), never a `bad` row, so a telemetry channel can never put
a battery site into NOT READY.

IT MUST NOT BECOME A CONTROL INPUT, AND THAT IS GRADED TWICE. `test_pv.py`
part 6 drives 40 cycles of the real `cycle()` and asserts the commands are
bit-identical across unset / no reading / 0 W / 8 kW, with a COMPUTED census
(33 modules under app/) showing the material is mentioned in exactly three:
pv.py, main.py, mqtt.py. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is the cross-tree half -
`safety56_behaviour_trace.py`'s pattern with a DIFFERENT control clause, because
this card's claim is that nothing differs rather than that only sentences do: it
REFUSES unless the two `app/` fingerprints differ and unless exactly one side
reacts to the option. Measured on 41 stimulus cells:

    control   release/1.0 unset  846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    control   TEL-11      unset  846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    control   TEL-11      set    846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
    telemetry release/1.0 unset  a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
    telemetry TEL-11      unset  a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
    telemetry TEL-11      set    4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f

UNSET is byte-identical in BOTH documents, which is stronger than "the control
path is untouched": an install that does not set the option sees no change of
any kind, announcement and status rows included.

⚠️ AND THE CARD'S CENTRAL MUTATION WAS A SURVIVOR ON THE FIRST BATTERY.
`self.grid -= self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` - +106 B, on disk, purged, genuinely
running - came back GREEN, because the fixture drove a 6 kW export over 12
cycles, which puts the loop AGAINST ITS RAIL: a command moving `slew_w` every
cycle produces the same ramp for -6000 W and for -14 000 W of apparent error.
MUTATION.md habit 23 with a saturated ACTUATOR in place of a coinciding value,
and it is in that file now as the habit's second instance. The fixture now
drives a 600 W import the loop SETTLES on, against a responsive meter, and asks
habit 23's own question as its own check: shift the METER by the same 8 kW and
confirm the commands really would have moved.

Evidence: 31/31 suites green in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged
tree, `:ro`. Ten mutations, NO survivors, each on its own `cp -a` of the tree so
habit 18's revert hazard is closed by construction - table in
`DECISIONS/TEL-11-pv-production.md` §7 with byte deltas and sha256s.

⚠️ THIS IS A RUNTIME CHANGE BEHIND AN UNCHANGED VERSION, AND
`tools/predeploy_check.py` WILL REFUSE IT. `app/`, `config.yaml` and
`translations/` are all in its `RUNTIME` tuple and `config.yaml` still reads
0.10.1, so the gate reports a NO-OP deploy until a version is cut. That is PKG's
call and this card does not take it.

No CHANGELOG section: `test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## ` heading
that is not config.yaml's `version:`, and opening one would mean taking that
same packaging decision. The operator account is in DOCS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 15:35:07 +02:00
admin 9f6b9f14cd CI-9 follow-up: the summary said "mechanically", the blind spots say otherwise (#102)
Corrects the preamble's claim that the `guard the trigger` step keeps checks.yml filter-free "mechanically". It does not, for blind spots 1 and 3: the guard lives inside the workflow a filter makes Gitea skip, so for those the defence is the comment.

Names the filter that would actually get written - `branches: [release/1.0]`, not `[main]` - because it reads as tightening onto the protected branch, leaves every day-to-day pull request green, and switches off the `release/1.0` -> `master` release pull request that SEC-2 made the mandated path to an installed system. Points the forge fix at both protected branches, not just `release/1.0`.

Reviewed on the pull request. Verified from the branch's bytes: the guard's awk is unchanged and still refuses `branches:`, `paths:`, `paths-ignore:`, `branches-ignore:`, `tags-ignore:`, `types:` and the inline-flow form injected into the `on:` block of the edited file; comment-only at 0 non-comment changed lines, non-comment lines identical 139 == 139; the merged tree differs from c9aaf7f in this one file only. Green traced per CI-10 to run 824 / job 1949, payload PRNUM 102 / BASEREF release/1.0, base c9aaf7f, 30 PASS 0 FAIL.
2026-09-24 14:37:15 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8f9c2cad57 CI-9 follow-up: the skip direction, written the right way round
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m37s
`every subsequent pull request matching it is skipped too` is the inverse of
the behaviour. A pull request that MATCHES a `branches:` filter still RUNS;
the one the filter EXCLUDES is what Gitea sits out, reports `skipped`, and the
rollup launders into `success`.

The error arrived with the generalisation in the previous commit: `33e17db`
said "every subsequent pull request is skipped too", which was unqualified and
true for the `[main]` case it described. Naming the wider hazard made a
qualifier necessary, and the wrong one went in - contradicting the paragraph
directly below it, which describes `[release/1.0]` correctly as leaving every
day-to-day PR running and green.

Corrected, and the direction is now stated explicitly with the failed draft
recorded, because this file already carries one instance of the same shape:
"That was wrong, it contradicted the checkout step's own note a few lines
below, and the error was not cosmetic."

Guard re-verified on the edited bytes: passes here, still refuses
`branches: [release/1.0]` added to the `on:` block. Comment-only, 0
non-comment lines changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-24 14:27:19 +02:00
admin c9aaf7f04d SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can (#112)
Text only, no behaviour change. Three operator-facing sentences stop asserting a dead register where the gate cannot distinguish a dead register from a pack the BMS is refusing.

Reviewed on the PR: behaviour byte-identical (trace tool sha256 6030175ed2ab reproduced on both trees, plus AST identity with string constants normalised); five mutations re-applied on purged trees, all matching claimed named-red counts; SoC of the live episode independently measured at 11 percent; CI green traced to PRNUM 112 / BASEREF release/1.0.
2026-09-23 21:27:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 8a6acd9fa2 SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Text only. No behaviour change - same conjunction, same limits, same MISSING,
same 0 W, same NOT READY. `tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` says so: 2390
capture reads, a 66-cell swept grid, and six driven controller worlds produce
the byte-identical document `6030175e...` on origin/release/1.0 and on this
branch, while the sentences differ.

THE DEFECT. SAFETY-37's conjunction is satisfied by two disjoint worlds - the
register has stopped reporting reality, or the SOURCE cannot comply with the
command - and nothing `freshness.py` is handed separates them. Three sentences
asserted the first. On the live 2026-09-21 episode it was the second: the pack
read 11 % for the whole 850 s hold, every command in that hold was a discharge,
and the register answered the first CHARGE command three seconds later. The
readiness row was worse still, because it asserted a false fact about a NAMED
entity that was present, numeric and updating - so the operator opened
Developer Tools, found it working, and had every reason to conclude the
diagnostics were broken.

THE FIX. Each message states what was OBSERVED and names BOTH explanations.
Three wordings, no shared helper: two are a log line about a behaviour, the
third is a banner about an entity, and a helper serving both would drop
whichever half the other caller does not need. SoC stays STATED, NOT WIRED -
part 11b drives the two worlds at 50 % and 11 % and the sentence does not move
one byte. The row does not branch on `batt_fresh.stale` either: `stale_note()`
already rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below, so the discriminator is "is
that row there?", and part 11d asserts it is present in one world and absent in
the other.

THE CHECKS. test_freshness.py part 11 builds the pair of worlds with ground
truth written down rather than derived from the published stream, asserts they
are really two (40 of 40 reads differ) while the published stream is
bit-identical, and only then grades the sentences. Eleven mutations, all red:
each of the three sentences reverted (3, 2 and 2 named reds), the two
explanations transposed at ZERO bytes (1), the second explanation deleted (1),
the admission of ambiguity replaced by a ranking (1), all three reverted at
once (5), and two aimed at this card's own check - collapsing the world pair
(2) and emptying the accusation list, which a positive control against the
three sentences as 0.10.1 shipped them catches (1).

AND TWO OF THE ELEVEN FOUND DEFECTS IN THE CHECK RATHER THAN IN THE CODE.
Transposing `label` and `entity` in the row made it unfindable and the run died
on an IndexError - a red with no name and every later check ungraded, FCST-06's
shape exactly; `_s56_row()` returns a named absence now, 0 named reds before, 3
after. And the first invariance run compared a tree with itself, because it
archived a branch whose edits were not committed yet; the tool now REFUSES to
report "behaviour unchanged" unless the sentences halves differ, and both of
its refusals are driven.

SAFETY-57's part 10h check was the handoff and is inverted rather than deleted:
it required the accusation to still be present so that removing it had to be a
deliberate act. This is that act. Its escape clause is untouched.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 21:02:40 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 628279a68a CI-9 follow-up: name the filter that actually gets written, not the one that looks wrong
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
Three sentences in the blind-spot clause went stale between writing and review.

`no pull request in 99 has ever targeted master` is no longer true: SEC-2 made
`release/1.0` -> `master` the mandated release path and protected `master`
with the same required context, and a PR against that base has run for real.
The census it came from also erases its own evidence - PR #102 was itself
opened against `master` before retargeting, which the /pulls listing no longer
shows, exactly as the caveat 25 lines above this clause warns.

The clause also named `branches: [main]` as the hazard. That is the version
that looks wrong. The one someone would actually write is
`branches: [release/1.0]` - it reads as tightening onto the protected branch,
every day-to-day PR keeps running green, and the only thing it switches off is
the release PR whose content reaches an installed system.

And the prescribed fix named only `release/1.0`'s status_check_contexts. Since
SEC-2 `master` carries the same rule, so a reader following it literally would
half-close the hole and believe it shut.

Guard re-verified against the edited bytes: passes on this file (whose new
prose quotes `branches: [release/1.0]` in a comment) and still refuses a real
filter added to the `on:` block. Comment-only: 0 non-comment lines changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 20:18:50 +02:00
admin 239e120bf6 SEC-2: write down the release path, now that master refuses a direct push (#108)
Reviewed on the PR (issuecomments 1480, 1485, 1488, 1489). Documentation only: docs/RELEASE.md (new, 116 lines) plus a 2-line pointer in README.md's file map. No code, no workflow change.

Verified against the forge rather than accepted from the document:
- Both branch_protections rules re-read field-for-field identical (enable_push false, enable_force_push false, status check `checks / unit (pull_request)`, required_approvals 0, block_admin_merge_override true, no whitelists, no file patterns); master's rule created 2026-09-23T03:09:21; default_branch still master. Section 2's After table is exact. No protection was changed by this review - both rules re-read with their original updated_at.
- The empty-PR 405 trap reproduced independently on my own control (throwaway PR #111 between two same-SHA unprotected branches): empty PR -> 405 "Please try again later"; same PR after one commit -> 409 "head out of date". Section 1's "read the message, not the code" is correct and both messages are quoted accurately. PR #111 closed, branches deleted.
- release/1.0 (b0b24e5) is an ancestor of master (0f14c2a), so a literal release PR is empty right now - PR #109 has 0 commits, 0 files, and Gitea opened it anyway. Section 1's closing note is right.
- A master-base PR gets a genuine CI run, not a laundered skip: PR #107 head cb7e45b3 shows Waiting -> In progress -> success, "Successful in 7m56s", run 814. This PR's own head 9d593429 likewise, run 818.
- All five required steps are present and correctly ordered: work merges to release/1.0 with a version bump in goodwe_controller/config.yaml; release via PR release/1.0 -> master; direct push refused; green check before merge; `ha store reload` after, without which the Supervisor keeps serving the cached version. required_approvals: 0 is stated twice, so no reader can believe the dev/review split is enforced.

One non-blocking defect left open (issuecomment 1485): section 1 calls 0f14c2a "the only commit on master that carries no (#NN) merge suffix". 274 of master's 297 commits carry no suffix. The true statement is stronger - no release has ever reached master through a pull request, and 6f5e8e3 (0.10.0) was promoted by the same direct push one release earlier, so 0.10.1 was the second, not a one-off. Background, not procedure; wants a follow-up line change.

A third comment of mine (issuecomment 1488, merge style) is withdrawn in issuecomment 1489 - it rested on a premise I had not checked and which is false.
2026-09-23 04:08:18 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9d593429d3 SEC-2: write down the release path, now that master refuses a direct push
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m56s
master is the default branch, which is what the Home Assistant Supervisor
clones - so whatever sits on it runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Until today it
had no branch protection at all, while every gate this repo built sat on
release/1.0, the branch that does not ship. 0.10.1 went straight onto master
on 2026-09-22 with no PR, no CI and no reviewer, and it succeeded.

master now carries the same rule as release/1.0 - enable_push false,
required context `checks / unit (pull_request)`, block_admin_merge_override,
required_approvals 0. That is a forge setting and cannot live in a commit, so
the part that can is this: the procedure it implies. Without it the next
release is attempted the old way and fails confusingly at the push.

docs/RELEASE.md records the path (merge to release/1.0, bump version, PR
release/1.0 -> master, wait for green, merge, then `ha store reload` before
the Supervisor offers anything), the before/after protection state of both
branches, and how the gate was proven to bite rather than merely badge green.

Documentation only - no code, no workflow change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 03:43:37 +02:00
admin b0b24e5d41 PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0 (#105)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
Reviewed on the PR (issuecomments 1455-1462): identity verified unchanged (slug goodwe_controller, no image: key, installed slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller corroborated from HA backup metadata); version-gate 11a-11d re-implemented and verified independently; the 16-of-93-at-790s pairing re-derived from the committed 16-day capture (>=710: 17, >=790: 16, >=815: 15); the SAFETY-57 entry verified as a faithful move carrying only the three declared #104 documentation fixes; corrected 0.10.0 preamble corroborated to the day against backup metadata; suite 30/30 reproduced with checks.yml's exact command. Two files, no control code. The 710 s/790 s split between test_freshness.py and this file is a known, stated gap and takes its own card.

NOTE: master (the Supervisor's default branch) is still 0.10.0 and still lacks SAFETY-57. This merge does not deliver; bringing master to release/1.0 is a fast-forward and is the remaining step.
2026-09-22 15:52:25 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 eb88646899 PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
The Supervisor decides an update exists by comparing config.yaml's version
string with the one the box reports. master and release/1.0 both said 0.10.0,
so SAFETY-57 - a deadlock that parked the reference battery for ~13 min on
2026-09-21 while the house exported 2.4 kW - had no way of reaching the box
that has it. A patch bump is the delivery mechanism, not bookkeeping.

- config.yaml: 0.10.0 -> 0.10.1. Nothing else in the option surface moves:
  no key added or removed, no default changed, no enum widened, no rule added
  to validate.py, so a blob that starts on 0.10.0 starts on 0.10.1.

- CHANGELOG.md: a new `## 0.10.1` section, holding SAFETY-57's entry moved out
  of `## 0.10.0`. The entry opened by saying it was misfiled and that whoever
  cut the next version owned moving it; this is that cut, so that paragraph is
  replaced by what an operator actually needs in order to decide - what the
  deadlock does (command parked at 0 W, batt reading gated to MISSING, escape
  condition unreachable from inside the state), how to recognise it (setpoint
  stuck at exactly 0 W with the battery register flat, a STALE line and no
  clearing line) and that a restart of the add-on clears it.

- PKG-16 proper: `## 0.10.0`'s preamble still claimed 0.10.0 "has never been
  built or pulled anywhere" and that the reference install was on 0.7.0. Both
  stopped being true on 2026-09-20 ~22:18 CEST, when 0.10.0 was installed as a
  repository add-on (slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller) and began regulating a
  real battery. The section's own bump argument was explicitly conditional on
  that; the condition has fired, so the argument is retold as history and the
  section is closed. This text is what the Supervisor shows beside Update.

Also fixes, in this file only, the three non-blocking documentation defects
raised on PR #104 - issuecomments 1445, 1446 and 1447:

- 1446: the live episode is 790 s, not 710 s. Re-derived rather than rescaled:
  at >= 790 s the committed 16-day replay gives 16 of 93, not 17.
- 1447: the BMS keep-alive pulse was an inference stated as a measurement. No
  committed capture identifies one, and on this episode 0x0518 never moved at
  all. The measured claim replaces the firmware story.
- 1445: "neither consumer can reach a verdict inside one window" is universal
  as written and graded on a fixture that puts the obligation back on every
  release. It now carries the qualifier the reviewer asked for, and names the
  unbounded case and why the shipped one-inverter roster cannot reach it.

The same three defects also sit in app/freshness.py, test_freshness.py,
DOCS.md and the DECISIONS note. They are deliberately NOT touched here: this
PR is config.yaml and CHANGELOG.md only, and none of them is worth delaying a
live safety fix. SAFETY-56 and SAFETY-58 are likewise untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-22 15:22:03 +02:00
admin b9f7bd0506 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested (#104)
Reviewed and merged by the PR review agent. Acceptance criterion re-driven independently off the committed RS-485 capture: the verdict is withdrawn with 0x0518 held constant at -3 W, no external change. Counterfactual release_s=inf verified byte-equivalent to the shipped-before module over 242336 reads, so the SAFETY-37 conjunction is untouched. 30/30 suite green in checks.yml's own image; 11 mutations re-applied on a purged tree; the argued-equivalent M7 proved equivalent over full internal state.

Three non-blocking documentation findings filed on the PR (comments 3/7, 4/7, 5/7) for a follow-up before the next version is cut.
2026-09-21 15:49:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 43c144b8d9 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
SAFETY-37's freshness gate reports a battery-power register as MISSING when it
stops following its own command, and a missing input is "command 0 W and keep
commanding" (§11.1 rule 1). The gate's only exit was "an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number" - and at 0 W nothing is asking the register to be anywhere.
The state had no exit reachable from inside it, and the log line promised the
opposite in the same sentence that announced the 0 W.

REPRODUCED FROM THE WIRE, NOT MODELLED. scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/ is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, read from the passive sniffer, decoded by
tools/decode_bus_capture.py (0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC, 0 unknown shapes; the
mode->sign convention is graded off the capture, not trusted). The box was
running 0.10.0, so the 0 W in the trace IS the add-on's own claim:

  10:51:24.7  0x0518 reaches -3 W. Pack at 11 %, the BMS refuses the discharge,
              the inverter idles. THE REGISTER IS HEALTHY AND TRUTHFUL.
  10:51:29.7  the command reaches +1060 W - 800 W of travel
  10:52:00    the conjunction arms. Inverter.batt becomes None
  10:52:21.7  the site commands 0 W, on the wire
  ...         0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
              change value for 790.0 s. The house exports 2.4 kW throughout
  ~11:04      a human restarts the add-on. That is what ends it

AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
through the shipped conjunction finds 93 trips whose wait for the BMS
keep-alive pulse that cleared them has a median of 143.4 s, a worst case of
21440.1 s, and 17 of 93 at or beyond this episode's 710 s. That distribution
belongs to the battery's firmware, not to this code.

THE CARD'S OPTION 2 ALREADY HELD AND IS NOT THE BUG. _grade() has required
|standing| >= MOVE_W since SAFETY-37. The trip was at +1060 W and the stuck
state is at 0 W; they are different moments, and an entry-side rule cannot
reach a state entered legitimately and then persisted. Nothing in the
conjunction is weakened here.

THE RULE, SAFETY-13's SHAPE ONE MODULE OVER - which latches get an exit, not
how long the block lasts:

  the verdict is withdrawn when the obligation that produced it has been gone
  for RELEASE_S, and the register is then re-graded from scratch.

RELEASE_S is BATT_OBLIGED_S, 17.0 s - the obligation window already derived in
the file (6.0 plant + 10.0 publish + 1.0 read), taken at the FLOOR of its band
for the mirror of MOVE_W's reason. Which half is safe is the opposite of
SAFETY-13's: being wrong long is the failure being fixed, being wrong short
costs one bounded re-grading window. Below 17 s the release pre-empts the
cheaper exit - the register answering by itself - and that is graded
behaviourally, not asserted.

The whole parked interval is now stale_input_s + RELEASE_S = 32 s. On the live
episode: telemetry back at 10:52:39 instead of 11:05:35, with 0x0518 still
answering the same -3 W. RED BEFORE (release_s=inf, a graded counterfactual and
not a second implementation), GREEN AFTER.

WHAT IT COSTS, AND IT IS NOT SMALL. A register dead for good is re-graded for
ever: over 1201 reads the held number reaches a consumer on 630 (52.5 %)
against 35 (2.9 %) before. Payable only because one window is at most 35 s and
the two consumers hold for 75 s and 85 s, so neither can reach a verdict inside
one and the re-trip clears both windows. No detection SAFETY-37 had is given
back - a permanent None clears the same windows for ever too - and the command
is derived from the P1 meter, never from batt.

Two clocks, deliberately: changed_mono/unchanged_s() stay facts about the
REGISTER, graded_from/graded_s() are the VERDICT's window. Collapsing them
either lies to the operator or defeats the re-grading.

main.py's stale line had its ESCAPE CLAUSE corrected - it promised a clearance
the state could not produce - and gained a STALE WITHDRAWN edge that says in
its own words that nothing has been learned about the register. The DIAGNOSIS
half is SAFETY-56's and is deliberately untouched, with a named check asserting
it is still there so that rewrite has to be deliberate.

Battery: 22 mutations, 21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.
Two findings kept in DECISIONS: _release()'s move_w test swapped for
unchanged_s SURVIVED at +5 B because every fixture rested at exactly 0 W (habit
11, closed by a 0/100/300 W fixture); and the code shipped a habit-22 comment
claiming the _release/_grade order was load-bearing, which the battery
falsified - the two act on mutually exclusive predicates, so the order is not
observable. MUTATION.md gains habit 23 for a mutation that ran, fingerprinted
clean, and was a no-op on the fixture because `0.0 or x` is x.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro, one
file at a time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-21 12:33:56 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 6f5e8e378a PKG-15: bring release/1.0 to master at 0.10.0, so the default branch is the add-on
`master` has been `5184a2c` / v0.2.1 since 2026-08-25 - the tree that drives the
house - while every ticket since has landed on `release/1.0`. Three consequences
were live, and all three are what this merge closes:

 * `master` is the DEFAULT branch, so Gitea indexes dispatchable workflows from
   it. `master` had no `.gitea/` at all, which is why `GET /actions/workflows`
   answered empty and the UI's dispatch button was missing.
 * new pull requests default to `master`. #102 was opened against it by
   accident and its first run graded the change merged into a stale `master` -
   an honest-looking green answering the wrong question.
 * AND THE ONE THAT NOW MATTERS MOST: the repository has not yet been added to
   Home Assistant, and adding it is part of this release. `master` is the
   branch the Supervisor will read the moment it is added, so whatever stands
   here is what it shows and offers to install. This merge is what makes that
   0.10.0 rather than 0.2.1.

NO CONFLICT WAS POSSIBLE AND THAT WAS CHECKED, NOT ASSUMED. `master` is a
direct ancestor of `release/1.0` (`git merge-base --is-ancestor` true), the
merge base IS `5184a2c`, and `origin/release/1.0..origin/master` is empty -
`master` carries nothing `release/1.0` lacks. `--no-ff` is used anyway, so the
crossing from 0.2.1 to 0.10.0 is one addressable commit rather than a pointer
move.

WHAT CROSSES: config.yaml 0.2.1 -> 0.10.0. The add-on the Supervisor will build
is a different program from v0.2.1 in the ways `goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md`
sections 0.3.0 through 0.10.0 describe - among them P1 meter ingestion, the
separate integrator the velocity form did not have, shadow mode, the tariff
plan and the multi-inverter roster. The ROLLBACK POINT does not move: tag
`v0.2.1` still names `5184a2c` and still names the tree that ran the house.

NOT A DEPLOY. Nothing is installed, no `ha addons update` is run, `/addons/` is
untouched and neither 192.168.2.158 nor 192.168.2.221 was contacted. Adding the
repository to Home Assistant, and pressing Install, remain the owner's call.

Verified before merging: the full suite in the CI image on `release/1.0`'s tree
- `cp -a`, purged, `:ro` mount, one file at a time, exactly the command in
.gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0; and PR #103's own
`checks / unit (pull_request)` was a real `success` on the merge, not a skip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-20 12:34:30 +02:00
admin 8a5736136a PKG-15: fold TEL-10 and SAFETY-48 into 0.10.0, so the version names its contents (#103)
Reviewed and merged by the PKG-15 review agent.

Verified rather than accepted:
- test_version_gate.py 11d pins `## Unreleased` blocks below the newest section at exactly one; deleting the block goes red (reproduced on a copy of the tree).
- 32 runtime commits since 86bdf49 and 24 accounted by the contents table, re-derived with predeploy_check.py's own RUNTIME rule; PKG-14's superseded 28/21 were correct when taken.
- app/validate.py imports neither main nor mqtt (read by AST), and SLEW_RAIL_FRAC / LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S are byte-identical across cb3f686..HEAD, so PKG-14's CLEARED transcript still holds.
- CI-9 (16b1d6c) touches only .gitea/workflows/checks.yml, outside the built image and outside RUNTIME.
- The SAFETY-48 entry keeps the capacity-tariff misreading out: no worst-quarter row in the A/B table, and the 3739 -> 3434 W figure appears only inside the paragraph that disclaims it.

Three non-blocking defects posted on the PR: the gain:0.3 / slew-rail tie values are swapped against DECISIONS/SAFETY-48; "touch three files between them" should say three runtime files; and the stated reason cb3f686 enters the count ("last..HEAD excluded it") is wrong, though the count is right.
2026-09-19 19:08:05 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 5aba220046 PKG-15: fold TEL-10 and SAFETY-48 into 0.10.0, so the version names its contents
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m53s
0.10.0 was cut by PKG-14 on 2026-09-16 and three tickets have merged into
release/1.0 since. Two of them change the built image - one is a CONTROL LAW
change and one adds three MQTT entities - and neither is described anywhere in
this file. Tagging that tree today would stamp a number on contents the
changelog does not account for.

FOLDED RATHER THAN CUT AS 0.11.0, AND THE ARGUMENT IS CONDITIONAL.
0.10.0 has never been built or pulled anywhere: the reference install is on
0.7.0 (PKG-14's own predeploy run records `deployed on the box : 0.7.0`), the
repository carries exactly one tag, `v0.2.1`, and no release. So the string
`0.10.0` does not yet name a tree anyone is running, and the PKG-06/PKG-07
no-op that forbade re-cutting `0.9.0` does not reach it. Cutting 0.11.0 would
burn a number on a release that never left the repository. The condition is
checkable and the section now says so: run against a box already reporting
0.10.0, `tools/predeploy_check.py` refuses with THE DEPLOY WOULD BE A NO-OP and
names the runtime commits since the bump. `config.yaml` stays at 0.10.0, so
`test_version_gate.py` 11b still finds the two sides equal.

SAFETY-48 IS THE ENTRY THAT MATTERED MOST TO GET RIGHT, AND WHAT IT PROMISES
IS LESS EXPORT - NOT A LOWER BILL. The measured result is export 39.61 -> 34.07
kWh over the committed 16-day replay, 14 % of the replayed figure, falling at
every plant and tuning variant swept (~4 % to ~16 %, median near an eighth).
The section says in its own heading and its first line that the control law
changed, and it says PLAINLY that the billed quarter is not a claim: at every
plant lag <= 5.0 s - including the one that best reproduces the recorded export
- release/1.0's worst quarter is ALREADY 3434 W and this changes it by exactly
zero. The 3739 -> 3434 W headline exists at the single longest fitted lag, and
the lag is not identified by the recording. The costs are in the entry too: the
cap moves a saturation-frozen integrator on 1095 of 79 160 frozen ticks, 679 of
them outward; SAFETY-13's settle values moved; SAFETY-39's "the slew does not
own the over-absorption" is now false.

TEL-10 gets the three site rows, what each one is, and the two things a reader
would otherwise get wrong: the lead is NOT a subtraction of two published rows,
and `Loop reason` is not the `Why` row. It repeats neither of the two sentences
TEL-10's own review retracted - EIGHT messages stay first and the ninth,
`goodwe_ctl/availability`, is byte-identical but deliberately moves to last.

CI-9 IS DELIBERATELY NOT IN THIS FILE, AND THE OMISSION IS WRITTEN DOWN RATHER
THAN SILENT. It changes one file, `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`, outside
`goodwe_controller/` entirely: not in the built image, not in `is_runtime()`'s
list, and not observable on any version of the add-on. This file is the release
note the Supervisor shows beside the version number, and a row here has to be
something the person deciding whether to press Update could act on. The note
above SAFETY-48 says so and says the rule is about audience, not importance.

THE STRAY `## Unreleased` AT LINE 1777 IS NOT TOUCHED, AND THAT IS A DECISION.
It is the 0.8.0-era block PKG-14 annotated: every row in it has shipped, the
annotation says which release each went to, and re-filing it is PKG-08's card.
It is also load-bearing - `test_version_gate.py` 11d pins the count of
`## Unreleased` blocks below the newest section at EXACTLY one, so deleting it
is red on the commit that does it, and so is adding a second.

TWO MEASURED FIGURES IN PKG-14'S PROSE WENT STALE AND ARE RE-DERIVED, NOT
ADJUSTED. The runtime-commit count since `86bdf49` is now 32, not 28, of which
the contents table accounts for 24, not 21; both re-run through
`predeploy_check.is_runtime()` itself. The other eight are the three misfiled
tickets (SAFETY-43 x2, SAFETY-44 x3, TEST-21 x2) and `cb3f686`, PKG-14's own
bump, which edits `config.yaml` and so counts as runtime - it was HEAD when
PKG-14 measured and is inside the range now.

PKG-14's `CLEARED, exit 0` predeploy transcript was NOT re-run and now carries
the check that says why it still holds: `config.yaml` is untouched by both
tickets; `app/validate.py` imports neither `main` nor `mqtt`, and the three
names it takes from `control` - SLEW_RAIL_FRAC, LOOP_TICK_S, PLANT_SETTLE_S -
are byte-identical across cb3f686..HEAD.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, `cp -a` of the tree, purged, `:ro`
mount, one file at a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml -
30/30, exit 0. No runtime file is in this diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 18:49:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 33e17dba0e CI-9 follow-up: the summary said "mechanically", the blind spots say otherwise
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
The residual-risk paragraph at the top of checks.yml claims the `guard the
trigger` step "keeps it that way mechanically rather than by asking the next
editor to read this comment". For blind spots 1 and 3 that is not true: the
guard lives inside the workflow a filter makes Gitea skip, so for those cases
the defence IS the comment.

That paragraph is the preamble someone reads at the exact moment they are
editing the trigger, so a summary running ahead of its detail is worse here
than elsewhere. It now points at the blind spots and states spot 3 plainly:
a filter naming a branch nothing targets is itself skipped, lands green and
untested, and then skips every subsequent pull request - the gate off for
everything, silently.

Flagged by the reviewer on PR #95 (issuecomment-1424) as non-blocking.

This PR is also the first real test of CI-9's fix on release/1.0 itself. Run
806 was a workflow_dispatch and posts no commit status at all, so it verified
content but never the gate. This one has to post `checks / unit
(pull_request)` as success rather than skipped.

Verified before push: the guard passes against this edited file (whose new
prose quotes `branches: [main]` and `master`) and still refuses a genuine
filter added to the `on:` block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 15:53:01 +02:00
admin 16b1d6c422 CI-9: a stacked PR is skipped, and a skipped check clears the merge gate (#95) 2026-09-19 14:55:12 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 ca8fd01819 CI-9: correct the guard comment's grading claim, and name the third blind spot
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m54s
Documentation only - no change to the guard, the trigger, or any step.

The guard's comment block contradicted itself. It said the pull request that
reintroduces a filter "is still graded by the unfiltered workflow which is on
the base today", while the checkout step's note a few lines below says grading
uses the HEAD's workflow. The head's is correct, and the review measured it on
PR #101: head carrying a filter that excludes the base, base carrying the
unfiltered workflow -> no run, context posted `skipped`, rollup `success`, gate
cleared (409). The wrong version made the step sound like an unconditional
ratchet. What is actually true is narrower: it bites whenever the reintroduced
filter still names the pull request's own base, which is the ordinary case.

That correction exposes a third blind spot, worse than the two already listed.
A reintroduced `branches:` filter that simply does not name the base escapes
the guard entirely, because the pull request carrying it is itself skipped. It
needs no craft - `branches: [main]` from a template, or a tidy-up to `[master]`,
which nothing in this repository's history has ever targeted - and it lands as a
skipped, laundered, untested merge into release/1.0. After that every subsequent
pull request is skipped as well: the gate off completely, not merely the stacked
case leaking.

It is documented, not fixed, and deliberately so. No in-repo guard can close it,
because any such guard lives inside the workflow that gets skipped. Closing it
needs a second permanently unfiltered workflow whose context is added to
release/1.0's `status_check_contexts` - a forge change, the owner's decision,
being put to them separately, and explicitly not a blocker on CI-9.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 14:44:16 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 d2ad080e45 CI-9: guard the trigger mechanically, and re-derive two figures I made up
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m55s
Review findings on PR #95.

1. Two figures in the header were written under the word "measured" and were
   not measured. "of the 50 pull requests in this repository's history, 49..."
   came from a /pulls call I did not notice was truncated at Gitea's 50-item
   page cap; and "#93 was stacked on TEL-10 five days ago" was invented - #93
   was created 2026-09-19T10:05:00 and merged 11:05:26, the same morning, under
   three hours before CI-9 was opened. Both re-derived from a paged API query
   and now stated with their denominator: 93 pull requests predate this ticket
   (#1..#93, excluding CI-9's own #94..#98), 92 against release/1.0, exactly one
   stacked (#2, TEL-01 -> SAFETY-04). The 92 is flagged as an upper bound rather
   than a census, because the API reports a pull request's CURRENT base and so
   hides any that was opened stacked and later retargeted - which is #93 itself.
   The ratio, and so the cost argument, is unchanged.

2. The fix rested on an invariant - checks.yml has no event filter - that was
   defended only by a comment. Prose has already failed in this exact file:
   9c1a23328a shipped "NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING" and
   `branches: [release/1.0, master]` in the same commit, eighteen lines apart,
   and that survived 20 days and 84 merges. Adds a step that reads the `on:`
   block of the MERGED checks.yml and fails if it has regained a `branches:`,
   `paths:`, `tags:`, `types:` or any `-ignore` variant. This is not the card's
   option 3 - it does not try to detect its own skip, which is impossible; it
   bites on the pull request that reintroduces a filter, which the unfiltered
   workflow still grades. Two blind spots are named in the step's comment, both
   needing a protection-rule change that is the owner's call.

Also softens "uncloseable from here", which the review judged overstated:
Gitea's acceptance of a `skipped` context is unreachable from this repository,
but the consequence is substantially closeable, and the guard is what closes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 14:25:22 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 074157c4c2 CI-9: drop the pull_request branches filter, because a skipped check clears the gate
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
`branches: [release/1.0, master]` meant a stacked pull request - one based on
another feature branch - never matched. Gitea does not stay silent about a
workflow it sits out: it posts the required context itself with state
`skipped`, the combined-status rollup reports that as `success`, and the merge
gate accepts it. Retargeting does not repair it, because the skip is a commit
status on the head sha and so survives the base change.

Measured on Gitea 1.27.3 with throwaway PR #94 against a branch carrying a copy
of release/1.0's protection rule:

  only status is `skipped`   ->  POST .../merge  409 head out of date  (CLEARED)
  no status at all           ->  POST .../merge  405 not all required  (refused)
  status `pending`           ->  POST .../merge  405 not all required  (refused)
  status `success`           ->  POST .../merge  409 head out of date  (CLEARED)

The 409s come from a deliberately wrong head_commit_id in the probe, which
Gitea checks only after branch protection - so a 409 means the request had
already cleared the gate, and nothing was ever merged. `skipped` is the only
state that leaks.

Fixing this at the gate is not possible. Gitea branch protection can require
that a context is PRESENT, never that it is SUCCESS: its whole status-check
vocabulary is `enable_status_check` and `status_check_contexts`, per this
server's own /swagger.v1.json. So the fix has to be upstream - never emit a
skip - which means no event filter.

Cost: every pull request now runs the full ~8 minute suite, including the
intermediate steps of a stack. 49 of the 50 pull requests in this repository's
history were opened straight against release/1.0 and would have run anyway.

Also corrects two things CI-01's header stated as fact. A filter miss is
fail-OPEN, not the fail-closed pending-forever it described; and it is a
skip-ci keyword, not a filter miss, that actually withholds the context and
leaves it pending.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 13:58:58 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 186a044a3a Merge pull request 'SAFETY-48: the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD' (#93) from SAFETY-48 into release/1.0
Reviewed on the pull request and merged there. Retargeted from TEL-10 to release/1.0 after #92 merged, and NOT merged on the inherited green: retargeting alone left the old `skipped` conclusion attached to a6af332 and the combined status still read success, so the required context was satisfied by a workflow that had never run. Run 799 is a genuine pull_request execution on the merge into release/1.0 - all five steps, the add-on's own tests occupying 08:56:58 to 09:04:47 UTC.

THE CAP MOVING A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR IS ACCEPTABLE, NOT MERELY DISCLOSED. The disclosed figures reproduce exactly against the committed capture - 79 160 frozen ticks, 1095 moved, 679 further out on the side they were already on, worst 2424 W - and the worked tick in the comment is present with exactly the numbers written down and is the worst of that subset. What decides it is where the integrator lands rather than which way it moves: on the shipped configuration integrator_max_w is unset, so target == i_w after the bounds and the cap holds |i_w - slewed| to one slew step on every slew-limited cycle, frozen ones included. Measured over the whole 256 251-tick recording the carried integrator never stands more than two slew steps from the command on the wire - 800 W against release/1.0's 9200 W. On the frozen path this replaces an integrator bounded only by integrator_max_w with one bounded at two steps, so the loop is less wound up on those ticks and not more. The same-cycle command cannot be affected at all, the cap moving i_w after slewed is decided.

THE ALTERNATIVE IS REFUSED FOR A MEASURED REASON. Gating the cap with `if frozen: _lead_cap = float("inf")` reproduces all four of section 5's corrected figures - export 34.71 kWh, wasted 3.49 kWh, worst quarter 3434 W, worst observed lead 4961 W. The gate does leave the bound with a hole large enough to make the card pointless.

NOTHING FALSE FOUND. Section 3a's lag table reproduces cell for cell, including the rows that say the peak improvement is absent at every lag at or below 5.0 s; the card does not claim a capacity-tariff benefit and says so in four places. Form A is committed nowhere, so it was rebuilt from section 3's prose alone and reproduces all seven figures - 34.43 / 110.62 / 2656 / 2.99 / 3934.59 / +2.73 / +991.53 - which makes section 3 a specification rather than a summary. The one-sided cap was swept against the two-sided band over 136 080 states on an independent grid: 0 differences, corroborating habit 22's retraction.

MUTATION EVIDENCE RE-DRIVEN, EVERY COUNT EXACT, on purged cp -a trees one file at a time: L2 zero bytes 4+3, L4 one red in test_telemetry with test_control GREEN as claimed, L5a zero bytes 5+5, L6 zero bytes 6+3.

SUITE RE-RUN BY THE REVIEWER on the merge rather than the branch tip: release/1.0 29/29, this merge 30/30, exit 0.

One non-blocking note left on the pull request: "worst case 2424 W" is scoped to the 679 further-out ticks, while the largest move over all 1095 is 4220 W. That case is benign - the cap pulling a stale positive integrator down to follow a charging command, magnitude falling - which is why it is a note and not a finding.

Merging is not deploying. The live install still runs release/1.0's control law and slew_w 400 applied by hand; this merge authorises no deploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 11:05:25 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 660d079bf3 Merge pull request 'TEL-10: the loop's integrator stops being invisible' (#92) from TEL-10 into release/1.0
Reviewed on the pull request and merged there. `checks / unit (pull_request)` run 798 is a real execution, not a skip: all five steps ran and "the add-on's own tests" occupied 08:04:51 to 08:12:38 UTC.

CONTROL BEHAVIOUR IS UNCHANGED, VERIFIED MECHANICALLY RATHER THAN READ. goodwe_controller/app/control.py is blob 180f58a on release/1.0 and on TEL-10 alike, same sha256 of contents, and release/1.0 is a direct ancestor of TEL-10 so there is no merge-base divergence for a change to hide behind. The only executable edit inside cycle() is prev_w=self.target becoming a named local, loop_prev, passed to the same call. Three write sites for self.i_w exist and only two have a telemetry counterpart; the third is the arbiter re-seed at main.py:3049, inside the same branch and immediately followed by compute(), so it cannot leave loop_i_w stale. app/mqtt.py appends to SENSORS and discovery_payloads() walks it in order, so every existing entity keeps its index.

SUITE RE-RUN BY THE REVIEWER, on the MERGE rather than the branch tip, in the CI image on a purged tree, :ro, one file at a time: release/1.0 29/29, this merge 30/30, and the stacked SAFETY-48 30/30 against both bases. All exit 0.

MUTATION EVIDENCE RE-DRIVEN RATHER THAN READ, because the previous round's counts were irreproducible. M1 is 5 reds on TEL-10's tree and 4 on SAFETY-48's, exactly as the header says and for the reason it gives; M2 is confirmed GREEN and is reported as a survivor; M7 is -96 B and 10 reds in test_mqtt.py plus 1 in test_telemetry.py; M9 is a zero-byte reordering and 7 reds. Every claimed count exact.

R6's correction is true and not merely made: part 1's headline now says EIGHT and the slice under it asserts eight entity configs, part 3's NINE headline is backed by a full missing/changed diff that does cover all nine, and the unasked-for fix two lines down reads eight against the eight-prefix slice.

Merging is not deploying. Nothing here reached the inverter and no deploy is authorised by this merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 10:54:02 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 a6af332048 SAFETY-48: what the lead cap actually does to a frozen integrator, and what the peak figure depends on
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m55s
Four review findings, none of them in executable code. The control law, the
tests and the instruments' arithmetic are untouched; every number below was
re-measured against the committed 16-day capture before it was written down.

R1 - app/control.py carried a justification the decision record and MUTATION.md
habit 22 had already retracted, and it was false about the code it sits in. It
said an unconditional placement "would also pull the integrator toward a
command the SATURATION freeze is pinning", priced at 118 of 256 250 ticks. The
118 was measured against a different pair; on the pair the sentence names the
two forms are bit-identical - 0 of 256 246 ticks, re-measured. And the narrow
form that shipped DOES move a saturation-frozen integrator: it runs before the
freeze block and is not gated on `frozen`. Of 79 160 frozen ticks the cap
changes `i_w` on 1095, and on 679 of those it moves it further out on the side
it was already on - putting back magnitude the freeze had just let fall, which
the freeze's own rule forbids. Worst case 2424 W, at prev_w -3400 W, grid
+4697 W, actual -4144 W, sat_count 2 -> 3: the freeze leaves the integrator at
-176 W and the cap drags it to -2600 W. It never overrides a same-cycle refusal
(the freeze clipped on 75 512 ticks, the slew bound on none of them), and that
is stated too. It is also where SAFETY-13's settle values went: gating the cap
on `not frozen` puts test_control.py part 5 back at -1190 W exactly, while part
4(b) does not come back - that one moved for the winding reason.

R3 - the record read its own sensitivity table backwards. `fit_plant()` picks
lag 7.5 s on battery-power RMS, which separates it from 2.5 s by 0.3 %, while
the tool's own printed fidelity measure (export against the recorded 29.43 kWh)
prefers 2.5 s by the whole 35 % gap. Swept properly: at every lag <= 5.0 s
release/1.0's worst quarter is ALREADY 3434 W and this card changes it by
exactly zero. The 3739 -> 3434 W headline exists at one plant. New section 3a
carries the table; the export reduction now leads every summary and the peak is
presented as lag-dependent. The form-A rejection is strengthened rather than
weakened: form A is worse on the billed quarter at every lag where release/1.0
produces a peak at all, and at every top-N cut of the quarters.

R2 - DOCS.md stated modelled watts to the owner as measurement. It now leads
with the export reduction, says the figures are simulated, and says plainly
that no capacity-tariff improvement is promised.

R4 - tools/slew_sim.py --slew narrated "the OVER-ABSORPTION does not move, and
at the slowest slews it is slightly WORSE" while printing a monotonically
falling column. That sentence is TRUE on release/1.0 (reproduced:
958/1107/1133/1058/987/1029/1150/1143/1081) and false under this branch's law
(777/734/663/563/553/507/435/358/321), so SAFETY-39 is not retracted: its
record gets a forward reference, and the script now reads SLEW_LEAD_STEPS out
of the law it imported and narrates from the column it just printed. Both
branches of that narration were driven.

R5 - three counts in the L table were decoration and are re-driven in the CI
image on a `cp -a`, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time: L5 is 5+5 with the
function names exchanged and 5+4 with the branch bodies exchanged (two
mutations wearing one name, now listed separately), L6 is 6+3. The separable-
state count is grid-dependent and three sweeps disagree, so all three are
quoted with their grids and the load-bearing claim is WHERE they separate.

R7 - "a large import answered too weakly" is not what the aggregate shows. Form
A cuts import by 5.45 kWh and export by 5.18 kWh, and paired per tick delivers
8.56 kWh less offtake energy on the ticks release/1.0 was importing. The harm
is a tail redistribution inside quarters that already net to offtake. The
conclusion stands; the sentence is narrowed to it.

Verified: the full suite in the CI image, purged tree, `:ro` mount, one file at
a time, exactly the command in .gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:37:01 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 03ef61fa3b SAFETY-48: the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD
`compute()` freezes the integrator with an asymmetric rule and the comment
beside it states the requirement outright - "the requirement is that the
INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command" - but `frozen` is computed
from ONE signal, `abs(prev_w - actual_w) > saturation_w`, and slew-limiting
never enters it. The integrator moves `gain * error` a cycle and the command
moves at most `slew_w`, so the integrator outruns the command whenever
`|error| > slew_w / gain`: 667 W at the live shape, against a measured median
grid error of 1114 W at the onset of a recorded episode. SAFETY-39's retune
made it MORE frequent, not less - a smaller step is a lower threshold.

⚠️ THE FORM THE CARD ASKED FOR RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY, WHICH IS WHY IT IS
NOT WHAT SHIPPED. Reusing the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew flag was
built from release/1.0's own source and measured over 16.00 days / 256 252
meter instants of the live install's recorder: export 39.61 -> 34.43 kWh, and
the worst quarter-hour average OFFTAKE 3739 -> 3935 W with the mean quarter
+2.73 W, in five of six plant and tuning variants. A frozen integrator stops at
`prev + gain*error`, which undershoots by (1 - gain); for an export that is
free and for an import it is offtake, for as long as the ramp lasts. The card
said "do not invent a second rule"; the measurement says to, and both sentences
are recorded.

WHAT SHIPS BOUNDS THE LEAD AT ONE SLEW STEP, inside the branch where the slew
actually bound. Same 16 days, same ticks, same disturbance, same plant, same
seed: export 39.61 -> 34.07 kWh, wasted throughput 4.67 -> 3.19 kWh, battery
sign reversals 2992 -> 2770, median recovery 232 -> 199 s, p99 849 -> 850 s,
max 901 -> 898 s, unrecovered 53 -> 31, worst |i_w - prev_w| 9200 -> 800 W -
and the worst 15-minute average offtake 3739 -> 3434 W, i.e. the billed
quantity IMPROVES. `i_w = slewed` (a cap of zero) is better again at 32.02 kWh
and is refused: it is the velocity form this module's docstring says `i_w=None`
collapses to.

TWO COMMITTED NUMBERS MOVED, DELIBERATELY, WITH THE REASON BESIDE THEM.
SAFETY-13's released command settles at -800 W and -1200 W where release/1.0
settled at -1190 W and -2390 W, because there is less wound integrator to
settle onto; AC 4's property - it stops at the frozen integrator, not the rail
- is what is asserted and the second is now graded against `i_w` rather than a
literal. And SAFETY-39's "the slew does not own the over-absorption" is now
FALSE - INVERTED, on the independent first-order plant test_control.py writes
itself: 1005/1109/1285/1330 W rising with a slower slew becomes 729/550/424/326
falling. Two plant models that share nothing agree on the sign.

Evidence: `tools/replay_recorded_loop.py` plus the read-only capture it made
(scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17). The "before" law is the shipped file
with the block removed by a named substitution - never a transcription - and a
missing anchor is a REFUSAL carrying "NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED". The
instrument prints its own fidelity first: it reproduces 39.6 kWh of export
where the install exported 29.4, i.e. it is ~35 % pessimistic about the loop's
tracking, so only the delta is claimed.

30/30 suites green, including test_control.py's exhaustive i_w=None
equivalence sweep against the transcribed release/1.0 law, untouched: the cap
moves `i_w` and not `target`, and that sweep compares (target_w, sat_count,
frozen, reason).

Six law mutations, one instrument battery. L4 - the cap applied
unconditionally, -92 B - was a SURVIVOR of all thirty files: it is
bit-identical on the shipped configuration (0 of 256 246 ticks) and separable
on 2050 of 257 400 swept states, all at `integrator_max_w` above `max_w`, which
part 4 now drives. L5 and L6 are ZERO BYTES.

AND TWO COMMENTS IN THIS CARD WERE INVENTED AND ARE CORRECTED IN PLACE. The
one-sided spelling was justified by a two-sided form that would "drag a
trailing integrator" - it does not, and the two agree on 205 920 of 205 920
swept states; and a "118 of 256 252 ticks" figure had been measured against a
different pair. MUTATION.md gains habits 21 and 22 for both shapes.

NOT DEPLOYED, NOT VERSIONED. The live install still runs release/1.0's law.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-19 02:36:28 +02:00
139 changed files with 14453 additions and 677 deletions
+2
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
# The admin/goodwe commit CI tests against. Bump: set to the full SHA of admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (README.md, "CI and the infra pin").
76898164b56190f0aa6f7a15be9ce6302c958ce5
+302 -18
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,35 @@
# of real coverage including a wall-clock cadence test, and not one machine ever
# ran them. Every merge here was a human reading a diff.
#
# ⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on
# release/1.0 requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Gitea leaves a
# required context it never receives PENDING forever, so the moment this workflow
# learns to sit a PR out, that PR becomes unmergeable. Condition a STEP if you
# ⚠️ NO EVENT FILTER OF ANY KIND - NO `paths:`, AND SINCE CI-9 NO `branches:`
# EITHER - AND THAT ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on release/1.0
# requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Condition a STEP if you
# must; never the workflow.
#
# ⚠️ CI-01 WROTE THE REASON DOWN WRONG, AND THE WRONG REASON WAS THE SAFE-
# SOUNDING ONE. It said an unreceived required context sits PENDING forever, so
# a sat-out pull request becomes unmergeable - annoying, but fail-safe. That is
# not what this Gitea does. MEASURED on Gitea 1.27.3, 2026-09-19, throwaway
# PR #94: when a workflow exists but its event filter does not match, Gitea does
# not stay silent. It POSTS the required context itself, with state `skipped`:
#
# GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/commits/<head sha>/statuses
# [{"status":"skipped","context":"checks / unit (pull_request)",
# "description":"Skipped","target_url":""}] <- no run, no job, no url
#
# GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/commits/<head sha>/status
# {"state":"success","total_count":1} <- the rollup LAUNDERS it
#
# and Gitea's merge gate accepts it. Same PR, same head sha, one status on it
# and that status a skip, POST .../pulls/94/merge answered 409 `head out of
# date` - the 409 being a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id` in the probe, i.e.
# the request had ALREADY CLEARED BRANCH PROTECTION. The control, a required
# context with no status at all, answered 405 `Not all required status checks
# successful`. So the true failure mode is the exact inverse of the one written
# here before: sitting a pull request out does not make it unmergeable, it makes
# it MERGEABLE WITHOUT EVER BEING TESTED, and the badge says success while it
# happens. Fail-open, not fail-closed. Do not reintroduce a filter here.
#
# ⚠️ THE RUNNER IS SHARED WITH THE OTHER REPO'S RIG. `goodwe-runner` on
# 192.168.2.147 carries the labels `self-hosted` and `goodwe-rig` and is
# registered `:host`, and it is the only runner there is - so this job wears the
@@ -23,9 +46,116 @@
# that step; a green from this workflow is a claim about content that can land.
name: checks
# ⚠️ CI-9: `pull_request:` TAKES NO `branches:` LIST, ON PURPOSE. It used to
# read `branches: [release/1.0, master]`, which meant a STACKED pull request -
# one whose base is another feature branch rather than a release branch - did
# not match, and so was skipped, laundered to `success`, and mergeable untested
# by the mechanism described at the top of this file.
#
# ⚠️ AND RETARGETING DID NOT REPAIR IT, WHICH IS WHAT MADE THIS P1. The skip is
# a COMMIT STATUS ON THE HEAD SHA, not a property of the pull request, so moving
# the base afterwards leaves it exactly where it was. Observed live on PR #93
# (2026-09-19): retargeted TEL-10 -> release/1.0, and the 10:05:00 `skipped`
# stayed attached to head a6af332 with the rollup still reading success. It was
# caught by a human who forced a real execution by reopening the pull request
# (run 799, 10:56). Reproduced deliberately on throwaway PR #94: retargeted onto
# a branch carrying a byte-identical copy of release/1.0's protection rule, and
# the single `skipped` status survived the retarget unchanged - no new run, no
# new status - and still cleared the gate.
#
# ⚠️ WHY NOT FIX THIS AT THE GATE INSTEAD, which would be the better place. It
# cannot be done. Gitea's branch protection cannot express "this context must be
# SUCCESS" as opposed to "this context must be PRESENT AND NOT FAILING". The
# whole of its status-check vocabulary is two fields - `enable_status_check`
# (bool) and `status_check_contexts` (a list of globs MATCHING CONTEXT NAMES) -
# confirmed against this server's own schema at /swagger.v1.json, definitions
# EditBranchProtectionOption and CreateBranchProtectionOption. There is no field
# for the required STATE anywhere in either. The success/skip comparison lives
# in Gitea's compiled code, so the only lever left is upstream of it: make sure
# the context is never a skip in the first place. Hence this block.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS COSTS, stated honestly, because it is a real trade. Every pull
# request now runs the full suite, including the intermediate steps of a stack
# that nobody intends to merge on its own. A run is ~8 minutes wall clock
# (run 799: 7m55s) on a runner that is `capacity: 1` and shared with the other
# repo's rig, so each extra run is ~8 minutes of slot that a rig campaign then
# queues behind.
#
# SCALE OF THE NEW WORK, re-derived from the API and stated with its denominator,
# because the first version of this paragraph had a made-up one. Counting the 93
# pull requests that predate this ticket (#1..#93; CI-9's own #94..#98 excluded,
# and note /pulls caps a page at 50, so this needs paging to see at all): 92 were
# opened against release/1.0 and would have run anyway, and exactly ONE was
# stacked - #2, TEL-01 -> SAFETY-04, closed unmerged, 2026-08-24. No pull request
# has ever targeted `master`, so half the old filter was dead from the start.
#
# ⚠️ THAT 92 IS AN UPPER BOUND, NOT A CENSUS, and the reason is this very bug.
# The API reports a pull request's CURRENT base, so one that was opened stacked
# and later retargeted is recorded against its final base and is invisible here.
# #93 is precisely that case - opened 2026-09-19T10:05:00 on TEL-10, retargeted,
# merged into release/1.0 at 11:05:26 the same morning, under three hours before
# CI-9 was opened - and it counts in the 92. So the true historical stacking rate
# is somewhere above 1/93, and unmeasurable from here.
#
# The bill is therefore small today and grows with however much stacking the team
# adopts. It is worth paying: the alternative is that the cheap case stays
# untested and indistinguishable from the tested one.
#
# ⚠️ THIS DOES NOT CHANGE GITEA'S ACCEPTANCE OF A `skipped` REQUIRED CONTEXT -
# that half is in its compiled code and is not reachable from this repository.
# The CONSEQUENCE, though, is very largely closeable from here, and is closed:
# after this edit there is nothing in this repository that produces a skip -
# there is exactly one workflow file, it now has no event filter of any kind,
# and the other candidate cause was MEASURED and is not one. The `guard the
# trigger` step below then keeps it that way mechanically rather than by asking
# the next editor to read this comment.
#
# ⚠️ READ THE BLIND SPOTS ON THAT STEP BEFORE TRUSTING THE SENTENCE ABOVE.
# "Mechanically" holds only for a reintroduced filter that still names the
# PR's own base. For blind spots 1 and 3 the defence IS this comment, because
# the guard lives inside the workflow that a filter makes Gitea skip. Blind
# spot 3 is the one that matters: a filter naming a branch THIS pull request
# does not target is itself skipped, lands green and untested, and then every
# subsequent pull request the filter DOES NOT NAME is skipped too. That is the
# gate off, silently.
#
# ⚠️ THAT DIRECTION IS THE WHOLE POINT AND IT IS EASY TO WRITE BACKWARDS. A
# pull request that MATCHES the filter still runs; it is the one the filter
# excludes that Gitea sits out, reports `skipped`, and the rollup launders
# into `success`. An earlier draft of this very clause said "matching it is
# skipped", which is the inverse of the measurement and contradicted the
# paragraph directly below.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE DANGEROUS ONE IS NOT `branches: [main]`, WHICH AT LEAST LOOKS
# WRONG. It is `branches: [release/1.0]`, which looks like tightening onto the
# protected branch and is what a careful person would write. Every day-to-day
# pull request still runs and still goes green, so nothing appears broken -
# and the only thing switched off is the `release/1.0` -> `master` release
# PR, i.e. the one whose content reaches an installed system. SEC-2 made that
# PR the mandated release path (docs/RELEASE.md), so this is now a live route
# rather than a hypothetical one.
#
# Closing it needs a SECOND permanently unfiltered workflow posting its own
# context, with that context added to the `status_check_contexts` of BOTH
# `release/1.0` AND `master` - both carry the rule since SEC-2, and adding it
# to one alone leaves the hole open on the other. A forge change, with the
# owner.
#
# THE MEASUREMENT, because the obvious guess is wrong and was nearly written
# here as fact. A skip-ci keyword in a commit message (`[skip ci]`, `[ci skip]`,
# `[no ci]`, `[skip actions]`, `[actions skip]`) does NOT behave like a filter
# miss. On throwaway PR #94, head b36effb, commit subject ending `[skip ci]`:
#
# .../commits/b36effb/statuses -> [] <- NO status, not a skip
# .../commits/b36effb/status -> {"state":"pending"} <- so the rollup is pending
# POST .../pulls/94/merge -> 405 Not all required status checks successful
#
# i.e. skip-ci is FAIL-CLOSED - it withholds the context entirely, which is the
# pending-forever behaviour CI-01's header wrongly attributed to a filter miss.
# It blocks the merge rather than laundering it, so it needs no fix and no
# app.ini change. Only the filter miss ever posted a `skipped`.
on:
pull_request:
branches: [release/1.0, master]
workflow_dispatch:
# ⚠️ NO `concurrency:` BLOCK, AND ITS ABSENCE IS AS LOAD-BEARING AS THE MISSING
@@ -156,8 +286,9 @@ jobs:
run: |
set -eu
rm -rf "$WS" && mkdir -p "$WS/goodwe-addon" && cd "$WS/goodwe-addon"
git init -q .
git remote add origin "$(echo "$URL" | sed "s#://#://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@#")"
git init -q . && git remote add origin "$URL"
# Token as an env-set header: not in argv or .git/config (TOOL-9).
export GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN"
if [ -n "$PRNUM" ]; then
# Two fetches, not one, so that a failure to reach either ref fails
# HERE with the ref in the message, rather than inside the merge
@@ -224,6 +355,165 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
# ⚠️ THE GUARD ON THE TRIGGER. THIS STEP EXISTS BECAUSE PROSE ALREADY
# FAILED IN THIS FILE, ONCE, FOR TWENTY DAYS.
#
# `git show 9c1a23328a` is CI-01's first commit. It shipped the header
# "⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING" and the line
# `branches: [release/1.0, master]` IN THE SAME COMMIT, EIGHTEEN LINES
# APART. The comment forbade one kind of event filter while the code
# directly above the job carried another, and nobody caught it through 84
# merges until the gate let a stacked pull request through. So the whole of
# CI-9's fix rests on an invariant - "checks.yml has no event filter" -
# that has already been silently violated in this exact file by the person
# who wrote the warning against violating it. A louder comment is not a
# remedy for that. A red step is.
#
# WHY THIS CAN WORK AT ALL, given CI-9 rejected the card's option 3 (a step
# that detects its own workflow having been skipped) as impossible. That
# option is impossible because a skipped workflow runs no steps, so there
# is nothing alive to notice. This is the different, tractable case: it
# fires on the pull request that REINTRODUCES a filter, and it does so
# whenever the filter being reintroduced STILL NAMES THAT PULL REQUEST'S
# OWN BASE - the ordinary case, because a filter put back by hand names
# the release branch people are actually targeting. The edit then has to
# get past this step before it can start causing skips. It is a ratchet,
# not a skip detector.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS THE HEAD'S WORKFLOW THAT DECIDES WHETHER ANYTHING RUNS, NOT
# THE BASE'S. An earlier draft of this comment claimed the reintroducing
# pull request "is still graded by the unfiltered workflow which is on the
# base today". That was wrong, it contradicted the checkout step's own note
# a few lines below, and the error was not cosmetic: it made this step
# sound like an unconditional ratchet, which is exactly the false comfort
# CI-9 exists to stamp out. MEASURED on PR #101 - head carrying a filter
# that excludes the base, base carrying the unfiltered workflow - and the
# result was no run at all, the context posted `skipped`, the rollup
# reading `success`, and the gate CLEARED (409). Gitea takes the workflow
# file from refs/pull/<n>/head, so a head that filters itself out is simply
# never graded, and nothing on the base can reach out and stop it. That is
# what blind spot 3 below is made of.
#
# WHAT IT INSPECTS is the MERGED tree in $WS - the content that would
# actually land on the base - not the branch tip and not the copy of this
# file that Gitea used to decide whether to run. Those are three different
# trees here (see the long note on the checkout step) and only the merged
# one is the thing being authorised.
#
# ⚠️ THREE ACKNOWLEDGED BLIND SPOTS. NOT ONE OF THEM IS CLOSEABLE FROM
# INSIDE THIS FILE, and the reason is the same in all three: each is a case
# where THIS WORKFLOW IS ITSELF THE THING THAT GETS SKIPPED, and a guard
# that lives inside a skipped workflow does not run. Closing them needs a
# SECOND, permanently unfiltered workflow whose own context is added to
# release/1.0's `status_check_contexts`, so that something survives to
# report when this file is sat out. That is a forge change and the
# repository owner's decision; it is being put to them separately and is
# deliberately NOT held as a blocker on CI-9.
#
# 1. A reintroduced `paths:` filter crafted to exclude the reintroducing
# pull request's OWN diff would skip that pull request, so this step
# would not run to object to it.
#
# 2. An edit that lands on a feature branch through a stacked pull
# request is graded by the HEAD's workflow, so a filter already
# present in the head hides the edit from this step - until that
# branch is proposed for release/1.0, where (unless it is case 3) the
# base matches the reintroduced filter and this step runs and bites.
# Caught at the release boundary, which is the boundary that matters.
#
# 3. ⚠️ THE WORST OF THE THREE, AND WORSE THAN BOTH OF THE OTHERS PUT
# TOGETHER: a reintroduced `branches:` filter that simply DOES NOT
# NAME THE BASE escapes this step entirely, because the pull request
# carrying it is itself skipped. It takes no craft and no malice to
# write - `branches: [main]` copied out of a GitHub template, or a
# tidy-up to `[master]`, a branch that NO pull request in this
# repository's history has ever targeted - and it arrives as a
# skipped, laundered, untested merge into release/1.0.
#
# What makes it categorically worse is what happens the moment after.
# Once that file is ON release/1.0, every subsequent pull request is
# graded against it and every one of them is skipped too. This is not
# the stacked case leaking through a crack; it is the gate off
# completely, for everything, silently, with every badge green. The
# only thing standing between the repository and that state today is
# a human reading this file - which is precisely the kind of defence
# this step exists because it has already failed once (9c1a23328a).
#
# It is deliberately a FAILURE and not a warning: a warning would leave
# the required context green, which is the precise defect CI-9 is about.
- name: guard the trigger - refuse a checks.yml that has regained an event filter
run: |
set -eu
f="$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/workflows/checks.yml"
test -f "$f" || { echo "checks.yml is missing from the merged tree."; exit 1; }
# Walk the top-level `on:` block of the MERGED file. Full-line comments
# at column 0 are skipped outright - this file's own prose quotes
# `paths:` and `branches:` many times and must not trip its own guard -
# and an inline `#` is trimmed from any line that is kept.
bad=$(awk '
function scan(t) {
sub(/#.*/, "", t)
if (t ~ /(^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])(branches|branches-ignore|paths|paths-ignore|tags|tags-ignore|types)[[:space:]]*:/)
return 1
return 0
}
/^[[:space:]]*#/ { next }
/^("on"|'"'"'on'"'"'|on)[[:space:]]*:/ {
inon = 1
rest = $0; sub(/^[^:]*:/, "", rest)
if (scan(rest)) print NR ": " $0
next
}
inon == 1 {
if ($0 ~ /^[[:space:]]*$/) next
if ($0 ~ /^[[:space:]]/) { if (scan($0)) print NR ": " $0; next }
inon = 0
}
' "$f")
if [ -n "$bad" ]; then
echo "REFUSED: checks.yml has regained an event filter in its \`on:\` block."
echo "$bad"
echo
echo " A filter means some pull request stops matching this workflow. Gitea does"
echo " not stay silent about a workflow it sits out - it posts the required context"
echo " \`checks / unit (pull_request)\` itself with state \`skipped\`, the combined"
echo " status rolls that up as \`success\`, and the merge gate ACCEPTS it. That is"
echo " CI-9: a pull request merged on a workflow that never ran a step. It was"
echo " reproduced by merging PR #96 for real through a protected branch."
echo
echo " Branch protection cannot save you here - it can require that a context is"
echo " PRESENT, never that it is SUCCESS - so the filter is the whole defence."
echo " If you genuinely need to narrow what runs, condition a STEP, never the"
echo " workflow. See the \`on:\` block's comments for the measurements."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: the \`on:\` block of the merged checks.yml carries no event filter."
# CI-12: the infra repo at the ONE pinned commit in .gitea/infra-pin (read
# from the merged tree), as the sibling test_freeze.py looks for. Any
# failure here fails the job; the tests step below refuses the stub.
- name: check out admin/goodwe at the pin in .gitea/infra-pin
env:
URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/admin/goodwe.git
# Read access to admin/goodwe only; this job's own token cannot see it.
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.INFRA_READ_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -eu
# `|| true`: under pipefail a missing or comment-only pin would skip the FAIL line (TOOL-9).
PIN=$(grep -v '^#' "$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/infra-pin" | tr -d '[:space:]') || true
echo "$PIN" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{40}$' || { echo "FAIL: .gitea/infra-pin holds '$PIN', not a full 40-hex SHA."; exit 1; }
test -n "$TOKEN" || { echo "FAIL: secret INFRA_READ_TOKEN is not available to this run (a fork PR?)."; exit 1; }
rm -rf "$WS/goodwe" && mkdir -p "$WS/goodwe" && cd "$WS/goodwe"
git init -q .
# The token goes in a header via env: not in argv, and not in .git/config,
# which is mounted into the tests' container and outlives a failed job.
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
git fetch -q "$URL" "$PIN" || { echo "FAIL: could not fetch admin/goodwe at $PIN."; exit 1; }
git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -qf FETCH_HEAD
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$PIN"
test -f sim/hwsim.py || { echo "FAIL: admin/goodwe@$PIN has no sim/hwsim.py."; exit 1; }
echo "infra: admin/goodwe @ $(git log --oneline -1)"
- name: build the test image (shipped deps, from apk - see .gitea/ci/Dockerfile)
run: |
set -eu
@@ -244,16 +534,9 @@ jobs:
# shorter timeout - a 60 s limit was tried during CI-01 and reported
# exactly the false hang the docstring predicts.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS RUN DOES NOT COVER, stated because a pass here would
# otherwise over-claim. test_freeze.py's third section wants the infra
# repo's `sim/hwsim.py` to drive a real HTTP meter through the real
# transport. admin/goodwe is PRIVATE (checked via the API) and this
# workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN is minted for THIS repository only, so hwsim is
# absent here and `find_hwsim()` returns None. The rest of the file runs
# and passes. It does so SILENTLY - the file prints nothing to say the
# hwsim section was skipped - so "test_freeze.py: PASS" below is a weaker
# claim than it looks. That belongs to whoever owns test_freeze.py next;
# naming it here is the least this gate can do about it.
# test_freeze.py part 3 runs against the real `sim/hwsim.py` from the
# checkout above; GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1 makes it fail rather than use its
# stub (CI-12). Lines a test prints with a `CI: ` prefix are echoed on PASS.
# ⚠️ PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 IS BELT AND BRACES, NOT A FIX FOR A LIVE
# HOLE. TEST-15 measured this runner's actual exposure and found none: the
# checkout below is bind mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter physically
@@ -269,7 +552,7 @@ jobs:
- name: the add-on's own tests
run: |
set -eu
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu -c '
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -e GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1 -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu -c '
cd /w/goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller
set -- test_*.py
if [ "$1" = "test_*.py" ]; then
@@ -282,6 +565,7 @@ jobs:
start=$(date +%s)
if python3 "$f" > /tmp/out 2>&1; then
echo "PASS $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
grep "^CI: " /tmp/out || true
else
echo "FAIL $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
tail -40 /tmp/out
+46
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
# CI-12: goes red when admin/goodwe release/1.0 has moved past .gitea/infra-pin.
# It runs on add-on activity only; admin/goodwe's own `addon-pin` workflow
# covers a move of release/1.0 there. Deliberately NOT a required check: it
# reports; `checks / unit` stays the only gate. How to bump: README.md,
# "CI and the infra pin".
name: infra-pin
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [release/1.0]
jobs:
fresh:
runs-on: [self-hosted, goodwe-rig]
timeout-minutes: 30 # seconds of work; the rest is queueing for the shared slot
steps:
- name: compare .gitea/infra-pin with admin/goodwe release/1.0
env:
SELF: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}.git
INFRA: ${{ github.server_url }}/admin/goodwe.git
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
INFRA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.INFRA_READ_TOKEN }} # admin/goodwe is private
run: |
set -eu
D=$(mktemp -d) && trap 'cd / && rm -rf "$D"' EXIT && cd "$D"
git init -q .
# The pin of the commit this event is about (the PR head, or the push).
# Token as an env-set header: not in argv or .git/config (TOOL-9).
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
git fetch -q --depth 1 "$SELF" "$GITHUB_SHA" || { echo "FAIL: could not fetch $GITHUB_SHA here."; exit 1; }
# `|| true`: under the runner's pipefail a missing or comment-only pin
# would stop here on git's error instead of the FAIL line below (TOOL-9).
PIN=$(git show FETCH_HEAD:.gitea/infra-pin | grep -v '^#' | tr -d '[:space:]') || true
test -n "$PIN" || { echo "FAIL: .gitea/infra-pin is missing at $GITHUB_SHA, or holds only comments."; exit 1; }
test -n "$INFRA_TOKEN" || { echo "FAIL: secret INFRA_READ_TOKEN is not available to this run (a fork PR?)."; exit 1; }
# Header via env, as in checks.yml: the token stays out of argv.
HEAD=$(GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $INFRA_TOKEN" \
git ls-remote "$INFRA" refs/heads/release/1.0 | cut -f1) || true
test -n "$HEAD" || { echo "FAIL: could not read admin/goodwe release/1.0."; exit 1; }
if [ "$PIN" != "$HEAD" ]; then
echo "STALE: .gitea/infra-pin is $PIN but admin/goodwe release/1.0 is $HEAD."
echo " Test against $HEAD and bump the pin (README.md, \"CI and the infra pin\")."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: .gitea/infra-pin $PIN is admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD."
+6 -1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ The guide technicians carry is the PDF:
**`docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf`** — 10 pages, A4, print it double-sided.
⚠️ **Outdated: it is v0.1.0.** Its `slew_w` row is corrected in `build_guide.py`
and `field-guide.html`, but the PDF has not been rebuilt (see below). Where the
guide disagrees with `goodwe_controller/DOCS.md`, DOCS.md wins.
It covers, in the order the work is done: pre-visit checks, hardware, firmware,
add-on install and configuration, how to read the Web UI, the six commissioning
gates, the e-stop (and the statement a site without one must sign), proving a
@@ -18,7 +22,8 @@ copy cannot drift from the PDF someone is holding in a cellar.
python3 docs/build_guide.py # regenerates field-guide.html and the PDF
```
Requires Chrome or Chromium (used headless for print-to-PDF). Screenshots live
Requires Chrome or Chromium (used headless for print-to-PDF); `CHROME` in the
script is a Windows path, so edit it on any other machine. Screenshots live
in `docs/img/` and are base64-embedded, so `field-guide.html` is standalone.
⚠️ **Every section must stay under the A4 printable height** (1039 px at 96 dpi
+14 -3
View File
@@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ goodwe_controller/ the add-on
returns, run against its own release image
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml ESPHome config for the T-CAN485
estop/rs485_log.py optional RS485 e-stop / bus witness
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4)
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4; outdated)
docs/build_guide.py its single source - rebuilds the HTML and PDF
FIELD-GUIDE.md how to edit and rebuild the guide
docs/RELEASE.md how a change reaches the battery - `master` is
protected, releases go via PR from `release/1.0`
```
**Picking this up after a break? Read `HANDOVER.md` first** — current state,
@@ -48,6 +50,9 @@ https://gittea.kammenstraatha.duckdns.org/admin/goodwe-addon
then install **GoodWe RS485 Controller**.
Then turn on **Watchdog** on the add-on's Info tab — see
[Before you start](goodwe_controller/DOCS.md#before-you-start).
⚠️ **The repository must be PUBLIC for this to work.** Home Assistant clones it
anonymously; against a private repo the store shows nothing and gives no useful
error. If it must stay private, install locally instead: copy
@@ -77,8 +82,8 @@ machine itself dying:
2. **Wind-down before firmware updates** — 0 W written before the update starts.
3. **RS485 e-stop (optional)** — writes 0 W after 30 s of total bus silence.
Sites sold without the e-stop must have the acknowledgement in `FIELD-GUIDE.md`
§10 signed.
Sites sold without the e-stop must have the client acknowledgement in the field
guide (Step 7b) signed.
## Development
@@ -100,6 +105,12 @@ has the mechanism, the measurement, and what the flags do not do. They are not u
each assertion corresponds to a rule whose absence produced an observed failure
on real hardware, and the comments in `control.py` say which.
### CI and the infra pin
CI (`.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`) runs every `test_*.py`, with `admin/goodwe` checked out next to this repo at the commit in `.gitea/infra-pin`, so `test_freeze.py` grades against the real `sim/hwsim.py`. If that checkout fails, the job fails. The local stub is used only in local runs, and it prints `STUB USED` when it is.
The pin tracks `admin/goodwe` **release/1.0**, not master. Two non-required checks go red when release/1.0 has moved past the pin: `infra-pin / fresh` here, on any add-on PR or push to release/1.0, and `addon-pin / fresh` in `admin/goodwe`, on every push to its release/1.0. Nothing re-runs `addon-pin` after a bump, so it stays red on that admin/goodwe commit; `infra-pin / fresh` green on the bump is the all-clear.
**Bump the pin** whenever either is red. Set `.gitea/infra-pin` to the new release/1.0 SHA (`git ls-remote <gitea>/admin/goodwe.git refs/heads/release/1.0`) in a PR, and let `checks / unit` grade the tests against it. CI reads `admin/goodwe` with the Actions secret `INFRA_READ_TOKEN`.
## Compatibility
**Check the serial number, not the model name.** Characters 6-8 of the serial are
+48
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
# STYLE.md - how user-facing text is written (UX-08)
This applies to everything a home owner or installer reads: notifications, phone pushes, the add-on page, refusals, add-on log lines at WARNING and above, and the names and descriptions of options. It is enforced by `goodwe_controller/test_messages.py`. Kinds that have not been rewritten yet are on its allowlist, and that allowlist only shrinks.
## 1. Shape
- **Title**: at most 5 everyday words. It says what is wrong ("Meter reading may be stuck"). No "GoodWe:" prefix, no full stop.
- **Body**: **one sentence** of at most 25 words, saying what happened and what to do. A **red alarm** may use up to **3 sentences** (70 words, each sentence at most 30 words), so that no action a person must take is lost.
- **Details**: the last line links to the add-on documentation and names the section with the rest: `Details: add-on documentation, section "<title>" under Notifications.` Background, figures, reason codes and history go there or into the log, never into the body.
- **Status row**: at most 15 words. **Banner**: at most 12 words. **Refusal**: at most 30 words, naming the setting by its label. **Option name**: at most 6 words, not counting the group prefix. **Option description**: at most 30 words. Where a value comes from belongs in DOCS.md.
- **Log line** (WARNING/ERROR): one line, at most 25 words. The reasoning goes on a DEBUG line. Log lines stay in English and are not translated.
- **Sentences**: one idea each, active voice, present tense, with nothing nested in brackets and no semicolons (a semicolon is a second sentence in disguise). These translate well into Dutch and French.
## 2. Numbers
Use a number only if it helps the reader act, for example the peak limit, or what was asked and what was sent in a fault report. Write it the way `app/messages.py` does: `5 000 W`, `20 %`, `10 minutes`, `14:05`.
## 3. Severity
Severity is shown by the title and the colour, never by CAPITALS or by words like "BUG SIGNAL".
| Level | Colour | When |
|---|---|---|
| alarm | red | Control stopped, money or energy lost now, a fault, or a person must act now. Up to 3 sentences. |
| warning | orange | Control is still running, but something needs a look. 1 sentence. |
| info | grey | No action needed. 1 sentence. |
| resolved | green | An earlier alarm or warning has cleared. 1 sentence. |
A rewrite never changes an alarm's severity, `notification_id` or cadence.
## 4. Words - the same word for the same thing everywhere
| Say | Not |
|---|---|
| battery | pack, BMS pack |
| inverter, or its name | unit, device, actuator |
| controller | loop, planner |
| meter | P1 feed, telegram |
| peak limit / this month's peak | ceiling, capaciteitstarief, billed quarter |
| 15-minute period | quarter |
| battery level | SoC, state of charge |
| cut-out level | BMS floor, `bms_soc_floor` |
| peak reserve | `peak_soc_floor`, EMS floor |
| inverter rating | `max_w`, rail |
| control is stopped / every inverter is set to 0 W | failsafe, trip, latch, parked |
| software fault | BUG SIGNAL |
| control board | master, ESP32 |
| shadow mode | a mode that makes every decision but commands 0 W. The name is kept. |
**Banned in titles and bodies** (the test fails on them): SAFETY-/TARIFF-/TEL-/CFG-/FW-/HW-nn and other card ids, integrator, anti-windup, windup, clamp, clamped, saturated, BUG SIGNAL, latch, latched, arbiter, allocator, register, `0x…`, layer 1/2/3, heartbeat, watchdog, telegram, ACK, CRC, OTA, Modbus, planner, `§n`, file names, IP addresses, option keys in snake_case, **HA entity ids**, and runs of 2 or more CAPITALISED words.
HA entity ids are allowed only in refusals and validator messages, where the installer has to find that entity. They are never allowed in alarms or status rows.
+116
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@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
# Releasing — how a change reaches the battery
`master` is the **default branch**, and the default branch is what the Home
Assistant Supervisor clones when it installs or updates this add-on. Whatever
sits on `master` is what runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Treat a push to `master`
as a deployment, because that is what it is.
---
## 1. `master` is protected — releases go through a pull request
Until 2026-09-23 `master` had **no protection of any kind**. Every gate this
repo built (CI-01, CI-9) sat on `release/1.0`, the branch that does *not* ship.
On 2026-09-22 version 0.10.1 went straight onto `master` — no pull request, no
CI run, no reviewer — and it succeeded (commit `0f14c2a`, the only commit on
`master` that carries no `(#NN)` merge suffix). SEC-2 closed that.
**The release path is now:**
1. Merge the work into `release/1.0` as usual, via a pull request that goes
green. Bump `version:` in `goodwe_controller/config.yaml` on that branch —
the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, so without a bump nothing
is offered and nothing changes.
2. Open a pull request **`release/1.0` → `master`**. Do not push to `master`;
it will be refused by the pre-receive hook:
```
remote: error: Not allowed to push to protected branch master
! [remote rejected] ... (pre-receive hook declined)
```
3. Wait for `checks / unit (pull_request)` to go **green** on that pull request.
The workflow in `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` carries **no `branches:`
filter**, so a `master` base matches and a real run happens — verified on
throwaway PR #107 (base `master`), which queued a genuine run.
⚠️ Green means green. A `skipped` status is laundered into a `success`
rollup by this Gitea and the merge gate accepts it — see the long note at
the top of `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`. Never add an event filter there.
4. Merge the pull request. `required_approvals` is **0**, so a green check is
the whole gate; there is no second pair of eyes unless someone asks for one.
5. **Reload the store.** Merging to `master` does not, by itself, offer the
update. The Supervisor only sees the new version after:
```bash
ssh root@192.168.2.158 "ha store reload && ha addons update local_goodwe_controller"
```
Until `ha store reload` runs, the add-on page still shows the old version
and the release looks like it did nothing.
Note that `release/1.0` is normally an *ancestor* of `master` between releases,
so a `release/1.0 → master` pull request is empty until new commits land on
`release/1.0`. That is expected; it means there is nothing to release yet.
---
## 2. Branch protection — before and after SEC-2
Forge is Gitea at `192.168.2.147:3000`, repo `admin/goodwe-addon`. Read it back
with `GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/branch_protections`.
**Before (2026-09-23):**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | **no rule at all** | — | — | — |
| `release/1.0` | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
**After:**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
| `release/1.0` | yes (unchanged) | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
Both rules are otherwise identical: `enable_push: false`,
`enable_force_push: false`, `block_admin_merge_override: true`, no whitelists,
no file patterns. `required_approvals` stays at **0** on purpose — raising it
would block the review agent from merging, and nobody asked for it.
The default branch was **not** changed. Changing it would change what the
Supervisor clones, which is a different decision from this one.
### How the gate was proven to actually bite
A protection rule on this forge can *appear* satisfied while having checked
nothing, so the rule was tested rather than trusted. The discriminator is a
merge `POST` carrying a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id`: Gitea evaluates
branch protection *before* it checks the head, so
* `409 head out of date` → the request **cleared** protection;
* `405 Not all required status checks successful` → protection **refused** it.
Read the *message*, not just the code: `405` is also returned as
`Please try again later` for a pull request with **no commits**, which has
nothing to do with protection. An empty pull request on an unprotected base
gives that same `405` (verified, throwaway PR #110), so an empty
`release/1.0 → master` reports it too.
Validated against a control on an unprotected base (PR #106), which answered
`409` while its check was still pending — i.e. protection was no obstacle
there. On `master` (PR #107) the same probe answered `405` while pending, and
`409` once the check was genuinely green. A direct `git push` to `master` was
rejected by the pre-receive hook with `master`'s SHA unmoved.
---
## 3. Rolling back
There is no force-push escape hatch: `enable_force_push` is `false` on both
branches. To undo a bad release, land a revert on `release/1.0`, bump the
version again, and take it through §1. The `/addons/` rollback for the
reference install is in `HANDOVER.md`.
+2 -2
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="page" id="p1">
<div class="hdr">
<div><h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0</div></div>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0, <b>outdated</b>: where it disagrees with DOCS.md, DOCS.md wins</div></div>
<small>Installer copy</small>
</div>
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table>
<tr><th style="width:30mm">Setting</th><th style="width:16mm">Value</th><th>Reason</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>gain</code></td><td>0.6</td><td>Inverter needs 3–6 s to settle (1.4 s dead time, 94 % by 3.3 s) against a ~5 s cycle. <b>At the limit — do not raise</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>1000</td><td>Most of a correction in the first cycle without running far ahead of the hardware</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>0</td><td>0 follows the rail (<code>max_w</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;9). A faster fixed value is <b>refused at startup</b> (SAFETY-39) — see DOCS.md</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>deadband_w</code></td><td>15</td><td>Measured residual: mean 15.4 W, max 27 W. At 10 W the command never rests</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>saturation_w</code> / <code>cycles</code></td><td>500 / 3</td><td>Divergence = inverter at a limit → magnitude may fall, never rise. <b>The 3-cycle term is essential</b>: tested instantly it fires on every large correction</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>step_w</code></td><td>10</td><td>Register is 1 W but response lands on a ~17.6 W ladder. Finer is meaningless</td></tr>
+2 -2
View File
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="page" id="p1">
<div class="hdr">
<div><h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0</div></div>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0, <b>outdated</b>: where it disagrees with DOCS.md, DOCS.md wins</div></div>
<small>Installer copy</small>
</div>
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table>
<tr><th style="width:30mm">Setting</th><th style="width:16mm">Value</th><th>Reason</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>gain</code></td><td>0.6</td><td>Inverter needs 3–6 s to settle (1.4 s dead time, 94 % by 3.3 s) against a ~5 s cycle. <b>At the limit — do not raise</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>1000</td><td>Most of a correction in the first cycle without running far ahead of the hardware</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>0</td><td>0 follows the rail (<code>max_w</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;9). A faster fixed value is <b>refused at startup</b> (SAFETY-39) — see DOCS.md</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>deadband_w</code></td><td>15</td><td>Measured residual: mean 15.4 W, max 27 W. At 10 W the command never rests</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>saturation_w</code> / <code>cycles</code></td><td>500 / 3</td><td>Divergence = inverter at a limit → magnitude may fall, never rise. <b>The 3-cycle term is essential</b>: tested instantly it fires on every large correction</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>step_w</code></td><td>10</td><td>Register is 1 W but response lands on a ~17.6 W ladder. Finer is meaningless</td></tr>
+859 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,623 @@
# Changelog
## 0.12.0
**A MINOR BUMP FOR ONE NEW OPTION: `pv_entities` ([[TEL-12]]), for sites with
more than one PV inverter.** The option surface moves **76 keys -> 77**,
`options:` and `schema:` in step. 0.11.0's `pv_entity` takes one entity; a roof
with two or three inverters, each publishing its own power sensor into Home
Assistant, could only record one of them. `pv_entities` is a list, and the
Configuration tab renders it as a repeatable field, so you add your second and
third inverter there rather than in YAML.
⚠️ **UNSET, NOTHING CHANGES.** `pv_entities` ships as `[]`, which is what every
install that presses *Update* lands on, and empty means "use `pv_entity`" - so
an install with no PV entity still has no PV channel, and an install with one
`pv_entity` keeps exactly the single-entity channel 0.11.0 gave it. **No rule was
added to `validate.py`**, which mentions neither key, so **a stored options blob
that starts the add-on on 0.11.0 starts it on 0.12.0**. There is no
`SystemExit(78)` to plan around on this hop.
⚠️ **IT IS INSTRUMENTATION ONLY, NOT A CONTROL INPUT.** `app/control.py`,
`allocator.py`, `arbiter.py`, `peakguard.py` and the watchdogs are not in this
release's diff; the runtime files that move are `app/pv.py`, `app/main.py`,
`app/mqtt.py`, `config.yaml` and `translations/`. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py`,
extended for this card, hashes the controller's decisions on 0.11.0 and on this
tree: the control document is **`846a10a5b89e…` with PV unset and with one
entity, on both trees** - the same hash TEL-11 recorded - and with a
three-entity roster it equals each grid world's unset document, including every
cell where one inverter is dead. Neither the total nor any partial total reaches
a decision. With PV unset or with one entity, the **telemetry** is byte-identical
to 0.11.0's as well.
Contents of this release, in merge order since 0.11.0 (`cccb2fa`):
| | |
|---|---|
| `f863eca` | TEL-12 - several PV inverters, and one absent member is an absent TOTAL **⚠️ NEW OPTIONAL OPTION, EMPTY ON EVERY EXISTING INSTALL** |
### TEL-12 — `pv_entities`: the PV channel for a roof with several inverters
**WHAT TO DO ON A SITE WITH MORE THAN ONE PV INVERTER.** List every inverter's
power sensor under `pv_entities`:
```yaml
pv_entities:
- sensor.pv_east_power
- sensor.pv_west_power
- sensor.pv_garage_power
```
`sensor.goodwe_pv_power` then carries the **site total**. Each entity's own
`unit_of_measurement` is read, so a kW inverter beside a W one sums correctly;
a sensor with no unit or a non-power unit is refused by name on the status
page, as in 0.11.0.
⚠️ **`pv_entities` REPLACES `pv_entity` - IT DOES NOT ADD TO IT.** When the list
is set, `pv_entity` is not read at all. **If you are upgrading from 0.11.0 with
`pv_entity` already set, the inverter it names must also be in the list**, or it
drops out of the total. Put it in the list and it is **counted once**, not
twice - that is why the rule is replacement: under a union, the natural action
(put all your inverters in the new field) would double-count the one the old
key already names. While both keys are set the status page shows a caution
saying which one won - *"`pv_entities` is set, so `pv_entity` is IGNORED - the N
entities in the list are what is summed. Clear `pv_entity` to remove this
caution"*. It is a caution, never a refusal to start and never a NOT READY row.
A repeated id inside the list is also counted once.
⚠️ **IF ANY CONFIGURED PV ENTITY IS ABSENT, THE PUBLISHED TOTAL IS `unknown` -
NOT THE SUM OF THE ONES THAT ANSWERED.** Three inverters configured and one
`unavailable`: `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` goes to `unknown` and the recorder
stores a **gap**. The sum of the other two would be a smaller number
indistinguishable from a real one, and a week later it would read as *"there
was less sun than there was"* - the conclusion this channel exists to test
rather than to manufacture. **A gap in the history, never an understated
number.** The status page, read live, still gives you the diagnostic: `PV —`
plus a caution that says there is **no site total**, names the missing entity
and its reason, and lists what the others reported. An inverter honestly
reporting **0 W** is summed, not treated as absent - shading and nightfall are
real zeros.
| what happened | `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` | the status page |
|---|---|---|
| neither key set | the entity does not exist | no row |
| all three answer, 1200 W + 2.1 kW + 450 W | `3750.0` | `PV 3 750 W` |
| all three answer, one of them `0 W` | the sum of the two others | the sum |
| one (or more) `unavailable` / missing / bad unit | `unknown` - a recorder gap | `PV —` + a caution naming what is missing |
⚠️ **THE FIX FOR A MISSING INVERTER IS NOT A TEMPLATE SENSOR THAT SUMS THEM.**
You can still point `pv_entity` at one if you prefer, but a template sensor
summing an `unavailable` source yields the partial total silently - the same
defect one layer down, where this add-on cannot see it or report it.
**WHY A SECOND KEY, RATHER THAN MAKING `pv_entity` A LIST.** Because an 0.11.0
install that has `pv_entity` set would not start. Measured against Supervisor
**2026.08.0** by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §G: with `pv_entity` declared
as a list, the string an 0.11.0 install has persisted is refused -
`Invalid list for option 'pv_entity'` - and a shipped `[]` default does not
rescue it, because the Supervisor's merge keeps your stored string. The one
single-key spelling that accepts both shapes, `match(.*)?`, validates nothing
(it accepts the integer `417`) and renders as a plain text box, so you could not
add a second inverter in the UI. So `pv_entity` stays a string, and the same
probe shows an 0.11.0 options blob - `pv_entity` set, no `pv_entities` key at
all - validating against this version untouched. ⚠️ **Rolling back to 0.11.0 is
also safe**: a schema without `pv_entities` drops the key with a warning and
leaves `pv_entity` standing.
**Why it matters now:** [[OPT-10]] needs a week of PV history to attribute the
surplus that left the reference site while the pack had room, and that site has
several PV inverters. The week starts when the site total is recorded.
**Full account: `DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md`, with the operator's
version under "Several PV inverters" in `DOCS.md`.**
### If you are crossing from a version older than 0.10.0
⚠️ **THIS SECTION IS NOT THE ONE THAT CAN REFUSE YOU - `## 0.10.0` BELOW IS.**
Updating installs 0.12.0 in one step, so every validator rule added in
0.8.0, 0.9.0 and 0.10.0 arrives at the same moment. Two of them can refuse a
config nobody has edited: [[SAFETY-39]]'s **rule 10** (added in 0.8.0) against
0.7.0's shipped default `slew_w: 1000` - the ceiling is **555.6 W** on a 5000 W
rail - and [[TARIFF-07]]'s three withdrawn `price_provider` ids,
**`engie_dynamic`, `totalenergies_dynamic` and `eneco_eddy`**, each still
refused by name at startup on 0.12.0. Neither is new here, and a site already on
0.10.0 or later has already met both. **The full account of both, including
what to set instead of each withdrawn id, is in `## 0.10.0`**, which withdrew
them and is not superseded by this section.
`tools/predeploy_check.py` checks your live options against this version's
validator before you press *Update*, and on this tree reports a real version
change from 0.11.0. ⚠️ **Pass it the bare options dict - the `data.options`
object - NOT the whole `ha apps info --raw-json` document.** Handed the wrapped
export it currently prints CLEARED while having checked nothing ([[SAFETY-60]],
open). Extract the options first, e.g. `jq '.data.options'`.
## 0.11.0
**A MINOR BUMP, AND ONE NEW OPTION IS THE WHOLE REASON FOR THE SECOND DIGIT:
`pv_entity` ([[TEL-11]]).** The option surface moves - **75 keys -> 76**,
`options:` and `schema:` in step - which is the same test 0.8.0, 0.9.0 and
0.10.0 were each cut on. ⚠️ **AND UNLIKE 0.10.0, NOTHING HERE CAN REFUSE A
STORED OPTIONS BLOB.** No key was removed, no default moved, no enum widened,
and **no rule was added to `validate.py`** - the validator does not mention
`pv_entity` at all, because nothing else reads it and it cannot conflict with
anything. The new key is `str?` - **note the trailing `?`, it is OPTIONAL** -
with an `options:` default of `""`, so a blob written on 0.10.0 or 0.10.1 does
not carry it, the Supervisor's merge supplies the empty string, and the empty
string is *off*. ⚠️ **A stored options blob that starts the add-on on 0.10.1
starts it on 0.11.0. There is no `SystemExit(78)` to plan around on this hop**,
and a site that presses *Update* and changes nothing else gets an add-on that
behaves exactly as its 0.10.1 did.
⚠️ **WHAT YOU ARE ACTUALLY DECIDING, IN ONE LINE EACH. TWO TICKETS HERE ARE
OBSERVABLE ON AN INSTALLED ADD-ON, AND NEITHER CHANGES A WATT.**
* [[SAFETY-56]] - **three messages stop naming your hardware as the fault** in a
state where the add-on cannot tell a dead register from a battery that is
simply empty at its BMS floor. **Text only; the behaviour is measured
byte-identical.** If you have ever opened Developer Tools because the add-on
told you a sensor had failed, and found the sensor working, this is that
defect. On the reference install the state it misdiagnoses arrives on most
nights and on every cloudy morning after a deep discharge.
* [[TEL-11]] - **one new optional key, `pv_entity`, and nothing whatever happens
until you fill it in.** Set it and the add-on records what your solar is
producing beside what the meter and the battery are doing. ⚠️ **It is not a
control input and it does not change what the loop does.**
⚠️ **THERE IS NO CONTROL-LAW CHANGE IN THIS RELEASE, WHICH IS WORTH SAYING
BECAUSE 0.10.0 HAD ONE AND NOTHING IN ITS PREAMBLE COULD WARN YOU.**
`app/control.py` is not in this release's diff at all, and neither are
`allocator.py`, `arbiter.py`, `arbitrage.py`, `clamp.py`, `peakguard.py`,
`maintenance.py` or `watchdog.py`. The runtime files that move are
`app/freshness.py` and `app/main.py` (SAFETY-56's three sentences), and
`app/pv.py` - new - with `app/main.py`, `app/mqtt.py`, `config.yaml` and
`translations/` (TEL-11). Contrast [[SAFETY-48]] in `## 0.10.0`, which altered
what the inverter is asked to do while touching no option, no default and no
validator rule, so that nothing a config check could see would mention it. This
release has nothing of that shape in it.
⚠️ **IF YOU ARE CROSSING FROM A VERSION OLDER THAN 0.10.0, THIS SECTION IS
STILL NOT THE ONE THAT CAN REFUSE YOU - `## 0.10.0` BELOW IS.** `ha addons
update` does not walk the versions; it installs 0.11.0 in one step, so every
validator rule added in 0.8.0, 0.9.0 and 0.10.0 arrives at the same moment as
this section's nothing. Two of them can refuse a config that nobody has edited:
> [[SAFETY-39]]'s **rule 10**, added in 0.8.0, against 0.7.0's own shipped
> default `slew_w: 1000` - the ceiling is 2/18 of the site rail, which is
> **555.6 W** on a 5000 W rail.
>
> [[TARIFF-07]]'s three withdrawn `price_provider` ids - **`engie_dynamic`,
> `totalenergies_dynamic` and `eneco_eddy`** - each of which is **still refused
> by name at startup on 0.11.0**, with the same message and for the same
> measured reasons: a 404 from a gateway with no route, a TLS handshake against
> a hostname the certificate does not cover, and a 404 with an empty body.
⚠️ **NEITHER OF THOSE IS NEW IN 0.11.0, AND NEITHER IS NEWS TO A SITE ALREADY ON
0.10.0 OR 0.10.1 - IT HAS ALREADY MET THEM.** They are restated here only
because this is now the newest section, and a reader who opens the newest section
and stops would otherwise never meet the one class of thing that can stop the
add-on starting. **The full account of both is in `## 0.10.0` below**: what to
set instead of each withdrawn id, which tariff a site left on one of them has
really been running, why the refusal *is* the migration, and why all three ids
stay in `config.yaml`'s `price_provider` enum even though `PROVIDERS` is down to
three. **That is the section that withdrew them, it is where the evidence is,
and it is not superseded by this one.** ⚠️ The reference install is on
`price_provider: off` and at `slew_w: 400`, so neither applies to it.
`tools/predeploy_check.py` checks both against your live options blob before you
press *Update*, and on this tree it reports a real version change rather than
0.10.1's no-op.
Contents of this release, in merge order since 0.10.1 (`b0b24e5`):
| | |
|---|---|
| `c9aaf7f` | SAFETY-56 - the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can **⚠️ TEXT ONLY, BEHAVIOUR BYTE-IDENTICAL** |
| `94da37f` | TEL-11 - PV production stops being invisible, and stays out of the control law **⚠️ NEW OPTIONAL OPTION, UNSET ON EVERY EXISTING INSTALL** |
⚠️ **TWO MORE MERGES LANDED IN THIS WINDOW AND ARE DELIBERATELY NOT IN THE TABLE
ABOVE: [[CI-9]]'S FOLLOW-UP (`9f6b9f1`) AND [[SEC-2]] (`239e120`). THE RULE IS
[[PKG-15]]'S - AUDIENCE, NOT IMPORTANCE - AND BOTH FAIL IT THE SAME WAY.** This
file is the **add-on's** release note: the text the Supervisor renders beside the
version number, read by somebody deciding whether to press *Update* on a battery
that is currently regulating. A row here has to be something that reader can act
on.
* **CI-9's follow-up changes one file, `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`**, exactly
as CI-9 itself did, and it is comment-only within that file. It is not under
`goodwe_controller/`, it is not in `predeploy_check.py`'s `RUNTIME` tuple, it
is not in the built image, and **there is no version of this add-on on which an
operator can observe it.** `## 0.10.0` excluded CI-9 on exactly that reasoning;
excluding the follow-up on any other reasoning would make the rule mean
nothing.
* **SEC-2 adds `docs/RELEASE.md` and two lines to `README.md`, and this one is
the closer call, so here is the whole of it.** SEC-2 is by some distance the
more consequential of the two: it is the ticket that made `master` refuse a
direct push, and it is *why this release reaches you as a pull request into
`release/1.0` and then into `master`, rather than as a push straight to the
branch the Supervisor clones* - which is how 0.10.1 got there. It is also
**purely a procedure for whoever cuts a release**; both files sit outside
`goodwe_controller/`, neither is in the image, and no install can tell whether
that document exists or what it says. An operator reading it learns nothing
about 0.11.0 that helps them decide whether to take it. So it is excluded, and
it is excluded under the same sentence as CI-9: ⚠️ **importance to this
repository is not the test. Observability on an installed add-on is.**
⚠️ **AND BOTH ARE WRITTEN DOWN, JUST NOT HERE.** CI-9's follow-up is PR #102 plus
the comment block at the top of `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`, which carries the
measurements in full; SEC-2 is PR #108 plus `docs/RELEASE.md` itself, which is
now the canonical account of the release path and is the procedure this release
followed. ⚠️ **If a later CI or packaging ticket changes what the shipped image
contains, it belongs in this table.** Neither of these does.
### SAFETY-56 — three messages stop blaming healthy hardware
⚠️ **NOTHING THE ADD-ON DOES CHANGES. THREE THINGS IT SAYS DO.** Same
conjunction, same limits, same `MISSING`, same 0 W command, same NOT READY row,
same [[SAFETY-57]] release at 32 s. `tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` is what
says so rather than a commit message: it hashes a document with no sentence
anywhere in it, built from **2390 one-second reads replayed out of the committed
2026-09-21 bus capture**, a **66-cell command × register grid stepped 120 times
each**, and **six driven controller worlds**. That document is
`6030175ed2ab9a41…` on `release/1.0` and on this tree, byte for byte, while the
sentences differ. ⚠️ **And the tool REFUSES to report "behaviour unchanged" when
the sentence halves agree**, so an identical pair is a result rather than one
tree compared with itself.
**THE DEFECT, AND IT IS NOT A TYPO.** [[SAFETY-37]]'s freshness gate fires when a
battery-power register holds one value while the standing command moves. That
conjunction is satisfied by **two disjoint worlds**:
1. the register has stopped reporting reality - which is what the gate was built
to catch; or
2. **reality is not moving**, because the source cannot comply with the command.
A BMS refusing a discharge at its floor holds the pack still under any
setpoint, and a register reporting that honestly publishes the same unchanged
number a dead one does.
**Nothing the gate is handed separates them, and three sentences asserted the
first.** ⚠️ **On the one episode this repository has measured, it was the
second.** On 2026-09-21 the pack read **11 %** for the whole 850 s hold, **every
command inside that hold was a discharge**, and the register **answered the first
CHARGE command three seconds later**. All three numbers are read off the
committed capture by `test_freshness.py` part 11a rather than typed there. The
register was healthy and truthful throughout, and the add-on said it had failed.
**THE THREE SURFACES, so you can recognise what moved:**
| where you read it | what 0.10.1 said | what 0.11.0 says |
|---|---|---|
| the **action log** and the **status page** — both quote `freshness.py`'s `STALE_READING:` line verbatim, through `_read_unit()` and `stale_note()` | `… the reading is not following, so it is reported as MISSING` | `… TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE CANNOT TELL THEM APART: the register may have stopped reporting reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command …` |
| the **add-on log**, at ERROR, from `main.py` | `SAFETY-37: <unit> battery-power register is not following its own command` | `SAFETY-37: <unit> battery-power reading did not move under a command that did, WHICH IS NOT BY ITSELF A VERDICT ON THE REGISTER` |
| the **readiness row** on the diagnostics page | `battery power: <entity> is missing or not numeric` | `battery power: no usable value this cycle from <entity> - and this row cannot tell which of two things that is … Confirm the entity in Developer Tools before replacing it` |
⚠️ **THE THIRD ROW IS THE ONE THAT COST AN OPERATOR AN EVENING, AND IT IS THE
WORST THING A DIAGNOSTIC CAN DO: IT ASSERTED A FALSE FACT ABOUT A NAMED
ENTITY.** It read *"is missing or not numeric"* for **any** `None`, and one of
the ways that value becomes `None` is the freshness gate withholding a reading
that is present, numeric and updating - `Freshness.reading()` returns `None`
there **by design**. So the operator opened Developer Tools on the entity the row
named, found it working, and had every reason to conclude the diagnostics were
broken. **It is fixed by saying less, not by looking harder:** the row does not
branch on the gate's state, because the gate already has a surface of its own -
`stale_note()` rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below with the whole
`STALE_READING` sentence in it - so your discriminator is *"is that row there?"*,
and this row's only job is to stop pre-empting the answer.
⚠️ **WHAT IT DOES NOT GIVE YOU IS WHICH OF THE TWO IT WAS.** Naming which would
need the SoC and the pack floor, and those are deliberately not `freshness.py`'s
inputs - they are [[TEL-08]]'s and [[SAFETY-32]]'s numbers, on their own rows.
**SoC is STATED in these sentences and never WIRED into them**: part 11b drives
the same two worlds at 50 % and at 11 % and the sentence does not move one byte.
What changed is that the add-on now tells you it cannot tell, instead of guessing
and blaming your hardware. **The reading rule is unchanged from
`### SAFETY-57` below**: if the stale/withdrawn pair keeps repeating, the unit
really does want looking at; if it happens once at a low SoC and stops, the pack
was empty and the site has resumed.
⚠️ **AND THE THREE WORDINGS SHARE NO HELPER, ON PURPOSE.** Two of them are log
lines about a **behaviour** and the third is a banner about an **entity**; they
answer different questions ("what did the register do" against "can I trust this
entity"), and one helper serving both would have to drop whichever half the other
caller does not need - and the half it dropped would be the operator's next step.
**Full account: `DECISIONS/SAFETY-56-what-the-gate-cannot-tell-apart.md`.**
### TEL-11 — `pv_entity`: PV production gets recorded, and stays out of the control law
⚠️ **UNSET, THIS IS NOT A CHANGE AT ALL - AND THAT IS MEASURED RATHER THAN
ASSERTED.** `pv_entity` ships empty, which is what **every** install that
upgrades into this version lands on. Empty means the add-on **reads no entity,
announces no entity, publishes no topic, shows no status row and adds no page
row.** `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` drives five grid behaviours × eight
PV-sensor behaviours through 24 cycles of the **shipped** `Controller`, on
`release/1.0` and on this tree, and hashes two separate documents - one of
**control** decisions and one of **telemetry**:
| document | tree | `pv_entity` | sha256 |
|---|---|---|---|
| control | `release/1.0` | unset | `846a10a5b89e3210…` |
| control | TEL-11 | unset | `846a10a5b89e3210…` |
| control | TEL-11 | **set** | `846a10a5b89e3210…` |
| telemetry | `release/1.0` | unset | `a443a6ceaffe072b…` |
| telemetry | TEL-11 | unset | `a443a6ceaffe072b…` |
| telemetry | TEL-11 | **set** | `4e6d1cb289a95722…` |
**Read the two `unset` rows first.** They are byte-identical in **both**
documents, which is a stronger claim than "the control path is untouched": an
install that does not set the option sees no change of any kind, announcements
and status rows included. **Then read the `set` row of the control document** -
identical again, while telemetry moves. ⚠️ The tool **REFUSES** unless the two
trees' `app/` fingerprints differ and unless exactly one side reacts to the
option, so a matching pair cannot be two runs of the same tree.
⚠️ **IT IS NOT A CONTROL INPUT, AND IT DOES NOT CHANGE WHAT THE LOOP DOES.** It
is instrumentation and nothing else. It is not read by the control law, the
allocator, the arbiter, the peak guard, the maintenance cycle or any watchdog; it
is **not part of `inputs_ok`**, so a PV integration that breaks cannot stop your
battery being regulated; and its status row is a **caution** (`warn`), never a
`bad` row, so a telemetry channel can never put a battery site into NOT READY.
`test_pv.py` part 6 drives 40 cycles of the real `cycle()` and asserts the
commands are bit-identical across unset / no reading / 0 W / 8 kW, with a
**computed** census of all 33 modules under `app/` showing the material is
mentioned in exactly three of them: `pv.py`, `main.py`, `mqtt.py`. Wiring
production into the control law would be a behaviour change on a system driving a
real battery - and it would destroy the measurement, because the loop would then
be reacting to the thing being measured.
**WHAT YOU GET IF YOU DO SET IT.** One new MQTT-discovery sensor,
`sensor.goodwe_pv_power`, `device_class: power` and ⚠️ **`state_class:
measurement`** - which is the point of the row, because that is what puts the
number into the recorder's long-term statistics, and a week of statistics is what
the attribution needs. **Positive is producing.** The unit is **read off your
entity's own `unit_of_measurement`** - `mW`, `W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`, `TW`, Home
Assistant's own power units, every factor an exact power of ten. A sensor with
**no** unit, or with a unit that is not power, is **refused by name, and the
status page says which entity and which unit.** There is deliberately no
magnitude heuristic: nothing can separate 30 W of dusk from 30 kW of noon, and a
silent factor of 1000 in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later
is worse than a refusal you can read.
⚠️ **ABSENCE IS PUBLISHED AS `unknown`, NOT AS 0 AND NOT SKIPPED. THIS IS THE
DESIGN DECISION WORTH YOUR ATTENTION.**
| what happened | `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` | the status page |
|---|---|---|
| `pv_entity` not set | the entity does not exist | no row at all |
| set, sensor answered 4100 W | `4100.0` | `PV 4 100 W` |
| set, sensor answered 0 W | `0.0` | `PV 0 W` |
| set, sensor unavailable / missing / bad unit | `unknown` | `PV —`, plus a caution naming the reason |
The last two rows are why the key is shaped this way. `publish()` normally
**drops** a `None`, which is right for `circulation` - there the last figure
standing beats a zero that reads as health - and **exactly wrong here**: a
dropped row leaves Home Assistant holding the last number it was told, for ever,
and the recorder then draws a **flat line through the outage**, which is
indistinguishable from a measurement. Anyone reading that week back would
conclude the sun was not shining, ⚠️ **which is precisely the conclusion this
channel exists to TEST rather than to manufacture.** So the absence is published,
using Home Assistant's own no-value payload (`mqtt/const.py` declares
`PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"` and `mqtt/sensor.py` tests it *before* the numeric
branch), the entity's state becomes **`unknown`**, and the recorder stores a
**gap**. A failed read also **clears** the previous good one: the value never
outlives its own sensor.
⚠️ **WHY IT IS A HOME ASSISTANT ENTITY AND NOT A REGISTER.** The RS485 bus this
add-on speaks carries the **battery** inverter it drives. On nearly every site the
PV inverter is a different box from a different vendor on its own connection,
reporting into Home Assistant through its own integration - so this takes
whatever `sensor.*` your PV integration already provides, **any brand Home
Assistant can read**, and nothing anywhere assumes it is on the bus.
**THERE IS NO `pv_invert`, AND THAT IS NOT AN OVERSIGHT.** `meter_invert` and
`batt_invert` exist because those two quantities are **bipolar and are read by
the control path**, where a reversed sensor hands the site a plausible number it
acts on. Production is unipolar and is read by **nothing**, so a reversed sensor
cannot mislead a decision, and it announces itself as **−4 kW at noon** in the
very history this key exists to create. A flag would only let an installer hide
it. There is no negative-value alarm either: a PV inverter's own standby draw
makes a small negative reading at night ordinary, so any threshold would be a
number nobody has measured.
⚠️ **WHAT THIS RELEASE DOES NOT DO, AND IT IS THE REASON THE CARD EXISTS.** It
does not answer [[OPT-10]]'s question. That card measured this site over sixteen
days: the pack reached 90 % SoC on **two** of them, and **20.5 kWh of surplus
left the site while the pack still had room** - 12.6 kWh of it with the battery
not charging at all - and it could not say **why**, because PV production was
recorded **nowhere**. Three causes need three different fixes (no irradiance:
nothing to fix; a charge-power limit; the optimiser declining to charge, which is
the only software defect), and guessing between them is how an optimiser gets
tuned to solve a cloud problem. **0.11.0 adds the channel. The attribution needs
a week of history through it, and is OPT-10's own card.** So the reason to set
`pv_entity` on the day you take this update is that the clock on that week starts
when you do.
**Full account: `DECISIONS/TEL-11-pv-production.md`, with the operator's version
under "PV production" in `DOCS.md`.**
## 0.10.1
**A PATCH RELEASE, AND ONE TICKET IS THE WHOLE OF IT: [[SAFETY-57]].** The last
place moves because this is a bug fix to a version that has shipped and is
regulating a battery, not a change to what the add-on offers. **The option
surface does not move at all** - no key added, none removed, no default changed,
no enum widened, no rule added to `validate.py` - so ⚠️ **a stored options blob
that starts the add-on on 0.10.0 starts it on 0.10.1**, and there is no
`SystemExit(78)` to plan around on this hop. If you are on 0.10.0, the only
question worth your time is whether you have been hit by what it fixes, and
`### SAFETY-57` below is written to answer exactly that.
⚠️ **WHY THIS IS A NEW NUMBER RATHER THAN A FOLD INTO 0.10.0, WHICH IS THE
REASON THE TICKET EXISTS.** The Supervisor decides that an update is available
by comparing `config.yaml`'s version string with the one the box reports.
0.10.0 is installed and running, so a fix delivered inside `## 0.10.0` would
leave every box reporting `0.10.0` believing it was already current - the
PKG-06/PKG-07 no-op, in the form where the tree it hides is a safety fix.
0.10.0's own section argued it could still be folded into; ⚠️ **that argument
was explicitly conditional on 0.10.0 never having been installed, and the
condition has fired** - see the closing note at the end of `## 0.10.0` below.
⚠️ **IF YOU ARE CROSSING FROM A VERSION OLDER THAN 0.10.0, THIS SECTION IS
NOT THE ONE THAT CAN REFUSE YOU - `## 0.10.0` BELOW IS.** `ha addons update`
does not walk the versions; it installs 0.10.1 in one step, so every validator
rule added in 0.8.0, 0.9.0 and 0.10.0 arrives at the same moment as this
section's nothing. Two of them can refuse a config that nobody has edited:
[[SAFETY-39]]'s **rule 10** against 0.7.0's own shipped default `slew_w: 1000`,
and [[TARIFF-07]]'s three withdrawn `price_provider` ids - **`engie_dynamic`,
`totalenergies_dynamic` and `eneco_eddy`** - each of which is still refused by
name at startup on this version, with the same message. Both are written out in
full under `## 0.10.0`, and `tools/predeploy_check.py` checks both against your
live options before you press *Update*.
Contents of this release, in merge order since 0.10.0 (`cb3f686`):
| | |
|---|---|
| `b9f7bd0` | SAFETY-57 - the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested **⚠️ MEASURED ON THE LIVE SITE** |
⚠️ **AND THAT IS THE WHOLE TABLE, WHICH IS THE POINT OF A PATCH NUMBER.**
[[TEL-10]] and [[SAFETY-48]] also merged after `cb3f686`, but [[PKG-15]] folded
both into `## 0.10.0` **before 0.10.0 was installed**, so they shipped under
that number and are recorded there rather than here. [[CI-9]] and [[PKG-15]]
itself touch `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` and this file only - nothing an
operator can observe on an installed add-on - and are excluded for the reason
`## 0.10.0` already gives. ⚠️ **Two defects that the reference install's own
field history found are NOT in this release**: [[SAFETY-56]] (the stale-reading
message says *"is not following its own command"* when the true cause is an
empty pack, and the NOT READY row that goes with it) and [[SAFETY-58]] (a trip
on the first read after a rest). Both were open when this section was cut, both
are wording or bound changes rather than deadlocks, and neither was allowed to
delay this one. ⚠️ **[[SAFETY-56]] HAS SINCE BEEN FIXED AND IS IN `## 0.11.0`
ABOVE.** The wording quoted in this paragraph is what **0.10.1 actually ships**
and is left standing for that reason - if the box in front of you reports
`0.10.1`, that is the sentence it will print at you. It is not what 0.11.0 says.
[[SAFETY-58]] is still open.
### SAFETY-57 — the stale-reading verdict gets an exit
⚠️ **WHETHER YOU WANT THIS UPDATE, AND HOW TO TELL.** On 0.10.0 the add-on
can enter a state it cannot leave: the command is parked at **0 W**, the
battery-power reading is gated to **MISSING**, and the only condition that
would clear the gate is one that a parked command cannot produce. **It is a
deadlock, not a slow recovery.** On the reference site on 2026-09-21 it held
for about **thirteen minutes while the house exported 2.4 kW**, and it ended
only because a human restarted the add-on.
**Recognising it costs one look at the status page and one at the log:**
| | |
|---|---|
| the setpoint | sits at **exactly 0 W** and does not move, while the house is plainly importing or exporting |
| the battery-power sensor | is **flat at one number** for the whole of it - on the live episode, −3 W for 850 s |
| the action log | carries a `STALE batt` line and **no** clearing line after it |
**What ends it on 0.10.0 is a restart of the add-on**, and a restart is enough -
nothing is latched to disk and the pack is not harmed. ⚠️ **But nothing ends it
by itself**, and the replay below says the wait can run to hours. On 0.10.1 the
state releases itself after a bounded **32 s** and the register is re-graded
from scratch.
⚠️ **IT IS NOT AN EMERGENCY AND IT IS NOT COSMETIC.** The pack is not at
risk in this state - 0 W is the safe command, and it is the command §11.1 rule 1
asks for on a missing input. What is lost is the site's own control while it
lasts: the battery neither charges nor discharges, so a solar export goes to the
grid and an evening load comes off it.
⚠️ **WHAT IT FIXES, ON THE OWNER'S OWN BATTERY.** [[SAFETY-37]]'s freshness gate
reports a battery-power register as MISSING when it stops following its own
command, and a missing input is `command 0 W and keep commanding` (§11.1
rule 1). The gate's only exit was *"an arrival carrying a different number"* —
**and at 0 W nothing is asking the register to be anywhere.** The state had no
exit reachable from inside it, and the log line said the opposite.
Measured off the RS-485 bus, 2026-09-21, and committed as
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/`:
| | |
|---|---|
| 10:51:24 | 0x0518 reaches **−3 W**. The pack is at 11 %, the loop has just reversed out of a charge, and the BMS refuses the discharge. The register is **healthy and truthful**. |
| 10:51:29 | the command reaches **+1060 W**, 800 W of travel |
| 10:52:00 | the gate arms. `Inverter.batt` becomes `None` |
| 10:52:21 | **the site commands 0 W — on the wire, in the capture** |
| … | the register does not change value for **850 s**. The setpoint does not change value for **790 s**. The house exports 2.4 kW throughout |
| ~11:04 | **a human restarts the add-on.** That is what ends it |
It had been escaping by luck - and ⚠️ **on this episode it did not escape at
all.** `0x0518` answered the same −3 W on 90 consecutive responses and never
once carried a different number between 10:51:24 and 11:05:35. The register did
not move.
⚠️ **AND WHY IT USUALLY DOES MOVE IS NOT SOMETHING THIS REPOSITORY HAS
MEASURED.** An earlier draft of this entry named a BMS keep-alive pulse as the
thing that twitches the register, stated as fact; **no committed capture
identifies such a pulse**, distinguishes one from the register simply following
a command, or sizes it. The honest statement is that the register changes value
for reasons that belong to the battery's firmware. What IS measured is how long
it goes without changing: replaying the committed 16-day loop capture through
the shipped conjunction finds **93 trips** whose wait has a **median of 143 s**
and a worst case of **5 h 57 m**, with **16 of the 93** at or beyond this
episode's **790 s**. That figure is stronger than the firmware story it
replaces, and it needs no firmware story at all.
**The rule, and it is [[SAFETY-13]]'s shape one module over** — which latches
get an exit, not how long the block lasts:
> the verdict is withdrawn when the obligation that produced it has been gone
> for `RELEASE_S`, and the register is then re-graded from scratch.
`RELEASE_S` is **17.0 s**, the obligation window already derived in
`freshness.py` — 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s ESPHome publish, one 1 s add-on read.
It is the **floor** of its band rather than a preference: below it the release
pre-empts the cheaper exit (the register answering by itself), and being wrong
*long* is the failure being fixed. **The whole parked interval is now
`stale_input_s` + `RELEASE_S` = 32 s**, bounded by two shipped numbers and by
nothing the battery does. On the live episode: telemetry back at **10:52:39
instead of 11:05:35**, with **0x0518 still answering the same −3 W**.
⚠️ **WHAT IT COSTS, AND IT IS NOT SMALL.** A register that is dead for good is
re-graded for ever. Driven over 1201 reads at the shipped defaults: the held
number reaches a consumer on **630 reads (52.5 %)** against 35 (2.9 %) before.
That is payable only because **one re-grading window is 35 s and the two
consumers hold for 75 s and 85 s** — neither can reach a verdict inside one,
and the re-trip that ends each window hands them a `None`, which *clears* their
windows. **No detection SAFETY-37 had is given back**: a permanent `None`
clears those same windows for ever too. What the site gets back is its
meter-derived control, and the command was never derived from `batt`.
⚠️ **THAT 35 s HOLDS WHILE THE OBLIGATION COMES BACK, AND ONLY THEN - IT IS NOT
A UNIVERSAL BOUND, AND THE FIXTURE THAT GRADES IT CANNOT SHOW OTHERWISE.** A
window closes when the gate re-arms, and the gate needs a command that is
*moving* to re-arm against. If the release lands where the site then regulates
below `MOVE_W`, nothing re-arms, the window never closes, and the held number
reaches a consumer for an unbounded time - where before this card a `None` did.
The driver behind the 35 < 75 < 85 inequality puts a 1300 W obligation back on
every release, so it is the one shape that cannot produce that case. On the
shipped roster of **one** inverter neither consumer can reach it anyway - the
per-unit sign watchdog is compared against the **meter** at `n_units <= 1`, and
`circulating_w()` is identically `0.0` there - so this is **a stated gap rather
than a covered one**, and it needs a second inverter to bite.
⚠️ **WHAT YOU WILL SEE.** A new `STALE WITHDRAWN <unit>` line in the action log
beside the existing `STALE <unit>` one, and a log warning that says in its own
words that **nothing has been learned about the register**. If the pair repeats
every ~70 s, the register really is not following and the unit needs looking at;
if it happens once and stops, the pack was simply empty and the site has
resumed. The stale line's escape clause was also corrected — it used to promise
a clearance the state could not produce. ⚠️ Its **diagnosis** half still says
*"is not following its own command"*, which is wrong in a different way when the
pack is merely empty; that wording is [[SAFETY-56]]'s and is deliberately
untouched here.
⚠️ **AND THAT IS NOW A STATEMENT ABOUT 0.10.1 ONLY — [[SAFETY-56]] REWROTE THE
DIAGNOSIS HALF, AND `## 0.11.0` ABOVE CARRIES THE NEW WORDING.** The quotation
above is left exactly as it stands because it is what the 0.10.1 image prints,
and a reader on 0.10.1 needs to recognise it. The same applies to the reading
rule in the paragraph above: on 0.11.0 the add-on no longer asserts that
*"the register really is not following"* — it names both explanations and says
it cannot tell them apart — so *"the pair repeats → look at the unit, it happens
once and stops → the pack was empty"* stops being a correction of the message
and becomes the message's own advice. Nothing about **what** the gate does moved
in either card.
## 0.10.0
⚠️ **A CONFIG THAT IS LEGAL ON 0.9.0 IS REFUSED ON 0.10.0, AND THAT - NOT THE
@@ -87,8 +705,20 @@ check.
**and** is refused by name (rule 11), so the reinterpretation is never
silent; no blob written before 0.10.0 can carry one.
⚠️ **AND IF YOU ARE UPGRADING FROM 0.7.0 - WHICH THE REFERENCE INSTALL IS -
THE REFUSAL THAT CAN STOP YOU IS IN 0.8.0'S SECTION, NOT IN THIS ONE.** `ha
⚠️ **AND 0.10.0 CHANGES THE CONTROL LAW ITSELF, WHICH NOTHING ABOVE AND NO
CONFIG CHECK WILL TELL YOU ABOUT.** [[SAFETY-48]] bounds how far the
integrator may run ahead of the command on the cycles where the slew limit is
what stopped the command moving. It adds no option, moves no default and
refuses no blob, so every check in this preamble passes it in silence - and it
is the one change here that alters what the inverter is ASKED TO DO on a tree
that is otherwise configured identically. ⚠️ **What it is measured to buy is
less EXPORT. It is NOT a lower capacity-tariff peak, and your billed quarter
should not be expected to improve.** The whole account, including what it costs
and what it does not establish, is `### SAFETY-48` below.
⚠️ **AND IF YOU ARE UPGRADING FROM 0.7.0 - WHICH THE REFERENCE INSTALL WAS
WHEN THIS WAS WRITTEN, AND HAS NOT BEEN SINCE 2026-09-20 - THE REFUSAL THAT CAN
STOP YOU IS IN 0.8.0'S SECTION, NOT IN THIS ONE.** `ha
addons update` does not walk the versions; it installs 0.10.0 in one step, so
**every validator rule added in 0.8.0 and 0.9.0 lands at the same moment as
0.10.0's own**, and a config that has not been looked at since 0.7.0 meets all
@@ -109,7 +739,10 @@ fire only on a roster entry that USES `capacity_kwh`, a key that did not exist
`slew_w` against the ceiling and `price_provider` against the withdrawn list
BEFORE `ha addons update`**, with `tools/predeploy_check.py`, which does both.
✅ **RUN AGAINST THIS RELEASE: CLEARED, exit 0.**
✅ **RUN AGAINST THIS RELEASE: CLEARED, exit 0.** ⚠️ This is the record of
a run made on 2026-09-19, when the reference box was still on 0.7.0. That
crossing has since been made; the box is on 0.10.0 and the transcript below is
history rather than the state of any install.
docker run --rm -v <repo>:/w:ro -v <dir>:/opt:ro goodwe-addon-checks:1 \
python3 /w/goodwe_controller/tools/predeploy_check.py \
@@ -120,6 +753,21 @@ BEFORE `ha addons update`**, with `tools/predeploy_check.py`, which does both.
live options pass this version's validator
CLEARED for deploy.
⚠️ **THAT RUN WAS MADE ON PKG-14'S TREE, AND [[PKG-15]] DID NOT RE-RUN IT.
HERE IS WHY IT STILL HOLDS, CHECKED RATHER THAN ASSUMED.** The two tickets
folded in below touch three files between them - `app/control.py`,
`app/main.py` and `app/mqtt.py` - and **`config.yaml` is not among them**, so
the option surface and the 75 defaults the blob is merged over are byte-for-
byte what that run measured. `app/validate.py` imports neither `main` nor
`mqtt`; from `control` it imports exactly `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC`, `LOOP_TICK_S` and
`PLANT_SETTLE_S`, and all three are **unchanged** (`2.0`, `18.0`, and their
quotient) - [[SAFETY-48]] adds `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS` and reads it inside
`compute()`, which the validator never calls. ⚠️ **And the tool's OTHER half -
the no-op check - did not run at all in that transcript**, because it is
gated on `shipped == deployed` and the box reported `0.7.0` at the time. It is
the half that refuses this fold on a box already running 0.10.0 - ⚠️ **which
the reference box now is**; see the closing note below the contents table.
**The option surface: 71 keys -> 75, `options:` and `schema:` in step.** Four
new keys, and none of them can refuse a blob written before it existed:
`price_formula`, `price_export_formula` and `price_taxes_profile` are `str?` -
@@ -158,6 +806,44 @@ image does - PKG-13, UX-04, SAFETY-31, ARCH-02, INSTR-01. The count that
matters for the no-op check is `tools/predeploy_check.py`'s own: **28 runtime
commits since `86bdf49`**, of which the table below accounts for 21.
⚠️ **RE-MEASURED BY [[PKG-15]] ON 2026-09-19, AFTER FOLDING [[TEL-10]] AND
[[SAFETY-48]] INTO THIS SECTION: 32 RUNTIME COMMITS SINCE `86bdf49`, OF WHICH
THE TABLE BELOW NOW ACCOUNTS FOR 24.** Re-derived with `is_runtime()` itself
rather than by adding to the old figure. The other eight are the three misfiled
tickets in the table above - SAFETY-43 two commits, SAFETY-44 three, TEST-21
two - plus `cb3f686`, PKG-14's own bump, which edits `config.yaml` and is
therefore a runtime commit by that function's rule; it was `HEAD` when PKG-14
counted, so `last..HEAD` excluded it then and includes it now. The three
misfiled tickets are still misfiled and still [[PKG-08]]'s card; nothing below
moves them.
⚠️ **THE VERSION WAS NOT BUMPED FOR THE FOLDS ABOVE, AND THAT ARGUMENT HAS
NOW EXPIRED. THIS SECTION IS CLOSED.** As written on 2026-09-19 it ran: 0.10.0
was cut on 2026-09-16, had never been built or pulled anywhere, the reference
install was on 0.7.0 and this repository carried exactly one tag (`v0.2.1`) and
no release - so the string `0.10.0` did not yet name a tree anyone was running,
the PKG-06/PKG-07 no-op could not apply, and cutting 0.11.0 would have burned a
number on a release that never left the repository. ⚠️ **IT WAS STATED AS
CONDITIONAL ON THAT REMAINING TRUE, AND IT STOPPED BEING TRUE ON 2026-09-20 AT
ABOUT 22:18 CEST**, when 0.10.0 was installed on the reference site as a
repository add-on (slug `68285ac7_goodwe_controller`) and began regulating a
real battery. **0.10.0 has been built and pulled, and the reference install is
on 0.10.0, not on 0.7.0.**
⚠️ **AND THE FIELD HISTORY IS NOW THE STRONGEST EVIDENCE IN THIS FILE, WHICH
IS WHY THE CORRECTION IS WORTH ITS SPACE.** That install has since run a full
day-night cycle on 0.10.0 - an empty pack, a guard trip, a 2 h 47 min saturation
freeze, the [[SAFETY-57]] deadlock and a clean recovery - and **two defects came
out of it that no test in this repository had reached**: [[SAFETY-56]] and
[[SAFETY-57]]. So nothing may be folded into this section again, and
`tools/predeploy_check.py` enforces that by itself: run against a box already
reporting `0.10.0` it refuses with `THE DEPLOY WOULD BE A NO-OP` and names the
runtime commits since the bump. **SAFETY-57's fix is in `## 0.10.1` above**,
which is what a patch number is for. ⚠️ **AND SAFETY-56'S IS IN `## 0.11.0`**,
which is where it went because it landed after 0.10.1 had already been cut. Both
defects named in this paragraph are now fixed; this section, and `## 0.10.1`
below it, describe images that still contain them, and are left saying so.
Contents of this release, in merge order since 0.9.0 (`86bdf49`):
| | |
@@ -180,6 +866,176 @@ Contents of this release, in merge order since 0.9.0 (`86bdf49`):
| `8f82dd4` | SAFETY-45 - a price-driven charge is SIZED by the capacity-tariff guard instead of being switched on and off by it **⚠️ CONTROL STABILITY** |
| `e6da478` | SAFETY-10 - shadow mode: the whole decision path runs and nothing reaches the inverter **⚠️ NEW OPTION, DEFAULT-ON FOR A NEW INSTALL** |
| `587495e` | SAFETY-47 - what a shadow run can show you, and the watts on its status row **⚠️ CORRECTS THREE CLAIMS SAFETY-10 SHIPPED** |
| `660d079` | TEL-10 - the loop's integrator stops being invisible: three new site sensors **⚠️ THREE NEW ENTITIES** |
| `186a044` | SAFETY-48 - the integrator's lead over the command is bounded at one slew step **⚠️ THE CONTROL LAW CHANGED** |
| _this branch_ | SAFETY-57 - the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested **⚠️ MEASURED ON THE LIVE SITE** |
⚠️ **[[CI-9]] ALSO MERGED INTO `release/1.0` IN THIS WINDOW AND IS
DELIBERATELY NOT IN THE TABLE ABOVE, NOR ANYWHERE ELSE IN THIS FILE.** It
changes exactly one file, `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`, which is not under
`goodwe_controller/` at all: it is not in the built image, it is not in
`predeploy_check.py`'s `RUNTIME` list, and there is no version of this add-on
on which an operator can observe it. This file is the **add-on's** release note
- the text the Supervisor puts beside the version number - and the rule PKG-15
applied is that a row here has to be something the person deciding whether to
press *Update* could act on. CI-9 is not; the repository's history and PR #95
are where it is written down, and they have it in full. ⚠️ **THE RULE IS ABOUT
THE AUDIENCE, NOT ABOUT IMPORTANCE.** CI-9 repaired a merge gate that was
grading the wrong tree, which is the same class of defect this ticket exists to
clean up after - and it is still not an operator-facing change. If a future CI
ticket changes what the shipped image contains, it belongs here; this one does
not.
### SAFETY-48 — the integrator's lead over the command is bounded, and the control law changed
⚠️ **THIS CHANGES WHAT THE INVERTER IS ASKED TO DO.** It is the only entry in
0.10.0 that does so without touching an option, a default or the validator, so
nothing in this section's preamble and no run of `tools/predeploy_check.py`
will warn you about it. `app/control.py` is in the diff; `config.yaml` is not.
**The defect is a missing case, not a wrong constant.** `compute()` freezes the
integrator when the inverter is not following, and the comment beside that
block states the requirement outright — *the INTEGRATOR must stop accumulating,
not only the command*. But `frozen` was computed from one signal,
`abs(prev_w - actual_w) > saturation_w`, and **slew-limiting never entered it**.
The integrator moves `gain × error` per cycle while the command may move at
most `slew_w`, so the integrator outruns the command whenever
`|error| > slew_w / gain` — **667 W** at the live tuning, against a measured
median grid error of **1114 W** at the onset of a recorded episode. ⚠️
[[SAFETY-39]]'s retune made this **more** frequent, not less: a smaller step is
a lower threshold.
**What ships** bounds the integrator's **lead over the command** at one slew
step, inside the branch where the slew is what bound the command, and only in
the leading direction. Nothing else in the law moves: the output clamp, the
saturation freeze, the deadband and the 10 W quantisation are unchanged, and
`test_control.py`'s exhaustive `i_w=None` equivalence sweep against the
transcribed release/1.0 law still passes untouched — the cap moves `i_w`, not
`target`.
⚠️ **WHAT IT IS MEASURED TO BUY IS LESS EXPORT — AND EXPLICITLY NOT A LOWER
CAPACITY-TARIFF PEAK. DO NOT EXPECT YOUR BILLED QUARTER TO IMPROVE.** Replayed
over 256 252 recorded meter instants spanning 16.00 days of this install
(`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17`, committed), same ticks, same
disturbance, same plant, same seed:
| | release/1.0 | SAFETY-48 |
|---|---:|---:|
| **export kWh** | **39.61** | **34.07** |
| wasted throughput kWh | 4.67 | 3.19 |
| battery sign reversals | 2992 | 2770 |
| median recovery s | 232 | 199 |
| unrecovered (>900 s) | 53 | 31 |
| worst \|i_w − prev_w\| W | 9200 | 800 |
That is **5.54 kWh less export — 14 % of the replayed figure**, and ⚠️ **the
direction is what is robust, not the size**: across every plant and tuning
variant swept it falls, by between ~4 % (at `gain: 0.3`) and ~16 % (at a
re-fitted gain/offset), the median variant landing near an eighth. At `gain: 0.3` and at `slew_w` set to the rail the
mean-quarter effect is a tie (−0.17 W and **+0.16 W**), because
`|error| > slew_w / gain` is rarely satisfied in those regimes and there is
little for the cap to bite on.
⚠️ **AND THE BILLED QUARTER IS NOT A CLAIM THIS RELEASE MAKES.** The A/B above
also shows the worst 15-minute average **offtake** moving 3739 → 3434 W, and
that figure exists at **one plant model**. `fit_plant()` selects a 7.5 s
inverter lag on battery-power RMS, which separates it from 2.5 s by **0.3 %**,
while the instrument's own fidelity measure — replayed export against the
**29.43 kWh this install actually exported** — prefers 2.5 s by the whole 35 %
gap. Swept properly: **at every lag ≤ 5.0 s, including the one that best
reproduces the recorded export, release/1.0's worst quarter is already 3434 W
and this change moves it by exactly zero.** The lag is not identified by this
recording, and identifying it needs a driven step response that does not exist
yet. **What this release can say about the billed quantity is that it does not
make it worse at any lag tried — not that it improves it.**
⚠️ **AND EVERY NUMBER ABOVE IS SIMULATED.** The replay is a first-order plant
model with a 375 W RMS residual; it prints its own fidelity first and it
reproduces **39.6 kWh** of export where the install exported **29.4**, i.e. it
is ~35 % pessimistic about the loop's tracking. Only the **delta** is claimed.
Nothing here drove an inverter.
**What it costs, stated rather than smoothed:**
* ⚠️ **The cap does move a saturation-frozen integrator**, because it runs
before the freeze block and is not gated on `frozen`. Of 79 160 frozen ticks
it changed `i_w` on **1095**, and on **679** of those it moved it further out
on the side it was already on — putting back magnitude the freeze had just
let fall, which is the one direction the freeze's own rule forbids. Worst
case **2424 W**. It never overrides a *same-cycle* refusal.
* **Two committed numbers moved.** [[SAFETY-13]]'s released command settles at
−800 W and −1200 W where release/1.0 settled at −1190 W and −2390 W, because
there is less wound integrator to settle onto; the property asserted is that
it stops at the frozen integrator rather than at the rail.
* ⚠️ **[[SAFETY-39]]'s claim that "the slew does not own the over-absorption"
is now FALSE — inverted**, on the independent first-order plant
`test_control.py` writes for itself: 1005/1109/1285/1330 W rising with a
slower slew becomes 729/550/424/326 falling. Two plant models that share
nothing agree on the sign. SAFETY-39's record carries a forward reference to
this one.
* **The form the card originally asked for was rejected on measurement**, and
this is the least lag-sensitive result in the work: reusing the asymmetric
freeze on a carried slew flag moves the worst quarter-hour offtake
3739 → **3935 W** at the fitted plant, and across the lag sweep it is the
worst of the three at **every lag from 2.5 s upward** — 3732 / 3711 / 3935 /
4326 W against release/1.0's 3434 / 3434 / 3739 / 3954 — with a tie at lag
0.0, and it is worse at **every top-N cut** of the quarters. It also raises
the mean quarter (+2.73 W).
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-48-bounding-the-integrator-lead.md` carries all of it,
including §8, *what this card does NOT establish*.
### TEL-10 — the loop's integrator stops being invisible
**Three new MQTT sensors, and nothing in the control path moved.**
`app/control.py` is not in this diff: `compute()`, its returned `Decision` and
every constant it reads are identical to release/1.0.
`self.i_w` has been a separate quantity from the command since [[SAFETY-04]]
and left the process **nowhere at all** — no entity, no attribute, no log line.
The investigation behind SAFETY-48 could only *reconstruct* it from the grid
trace plus a replay; the reconstruction reproduced about a third of the
engagements it was checked against and was discarded, so a control card had to
be argued from a measurement nobody could stand behind. It could not have been
made to work, either: `i_w` depends on every cycle before it, including the
ones where the arbiter overrode the loop and `main.py` re-seeded it — and that
re-seed is invisible in the grid trace.
| entity | topic | unit | what it is |
|---|---|---|---|
| `Loop integrator` | `goodwe_loop_integrator` | W | the accumulator **after** this cycle — before the output clamp, the slew limit and quantisation |
| `Loop integrator lead` | `goodwe_loop_integrator_lead` | W | that value minus **the command `compute()` was handed**, i.e. the one the previous cycle left standing |
| `Loop reason` | `goodwe_loop_reason` | — | the control law's own word for this cycle: `tracking`, `deadband`, `i-clamped`, `clamped`, `slew-limited`, `saturated-freeze`, `freeze-released` or `not-running` |
⚠️ **`Loop integrator lead` IS NOT A SUBTRACTION OF TWO PUBLISHED ROWS, WHICH
IS WHY IT IS ITS OWN ENTITY.** `Setpoint` is the **arbiter's** output after
every strategy has had its say, and it is **this** cycle's; the lead is
measured against the command `compute()` was given, which is the previous one.
On any cycle the arbiter overrode the loop the two differ — and that is exactly
the cycle on which the integrator was re-seeded, so a dashboard doing the
subtraction would get a different number precisely where it matters.
⚠️ **`Loop reason` IS NOT THE `Why` ROW AND NOT `Controller status`.** Both of
those carry the *arbiter's* sentence — `loop -> -5000 W` — which names the
winning claim and its watts and has never carried that claim's own reason.
`slew-limited`, the value [[SAFETY-48]] above is entirely about, appears in
neither. Measured on one cycle: arbiter `'loop -> -5000 W'`, loop `'i-clamped'`.
⚠️ **NOTHING EXISTING IS RENAMED, RE-TYPED OR RE-ORDERED.** The three are
**appended** after the nine messages release/1.0 already announces, and all
nine stay **byte-identical**. ⚠️ Eight of them also stay **first**, which is
what `test_mqtt.py` part 1's prefix comparison grades; the ninth,
`goodwe_ctl/availability`, is byte-identical but deliberately moves to **last**,
so a prefix comparison cannot cover it and the check on the next line pins it
in its new position instead. **They are SITE rows, not per-unit ones** — there
is one integrator, so a per-unit copy would invent N of a thing there is one of
— and they therefore appear at **every** roster length, **including a roster of
one**, where the per-unit machinery announces nothing new at all.
Both numbers carry `state_class: measurement`, so the recorder keeps long-term
statistics for them. `DOCS.md` has the operator account, including how to read
a standing lead: the cycles needed to unwind it are that lead divided by
`slew_w`.
### SAFETY-47 — what a shadow run can show you, and the watts on its status row
@@ -187,6 +187,23 @@ over-absorption. So the rig does not choose the number — **the constraint
chooses it, and the rig says what the constraint does and does not buy.** That
is the same relationship the 2026-08-22 table had to its own three columns.
⚠️ **FORWARD REFERENCE, ADDED BY SAFETY-48 — THIS TABLE AND THIS SENTENCE ARE
TRUE OF release/1.0's LAW AND FALSE OF THE ONE THAT REPLACED IT.** Nothing above
is retracted: re-run on release/1.0 today the same rig prints the same column
(958 / 1107 / 1133 / 1058 / 987 / 1029 / 1150 / 1143 / 1081 W), flat,
non-monotone, 800 better than 556. Under SAFETY-48's lead cap the **same script
on the same plant** prints 777 / 734 / 663 / 563 / 553 / 507 / 435 / 358 / 321 W
— falling monotonically, so a slower slew is now *better* and the sentence above
inverts. The mechanism SAFETY-39 identified is exactly why: `slew_w` bounds the
OUTPUT while the integrator goes on accumulating `gain · error`, so slowing the
slew used to buy nothing; bound the integrator's lead and it starts to.
`tools/slew_sim.py --slew` now names which of the two laws it is running under
before it narrates the column, and
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-48-bounding-the-integrator-lead.md` §6 carries both tables and
the independent confirmation from `test_control.py`'s own plant model. ⚠️ **This
does NOT re-open the choice of 556**: the constraint picks the number, the rig
does not, and that is unchanged in both laws.
⚠️ **A single step is not evidence here.** The deadband, the 10 W quantisation
and the phase of the step against the tick move the result by hundreds of watts,
non-monotonically. The first cut of this derivation was a single step and ranked
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
# SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is not a bug
**Decision.** `i_clamped` (the integrator reaching `integrator_max_w`, i.e.
anti-windup) keeps alarming through the same `ClampWatchdog`: it is counted,
notified on the same cadence, and escalates on a sustained run
(SAFETY-41). It gets its own text, a `WARNING` and an amber status row. Only
`clamped` (a command over `max_w`) and write-path clamps keep the BUG SIGNAL,
the `ERROR` and the red row.
**Why it still notifies.** On a default install `clamped` is unreachable
(`control.py`, at the integrator bound), so the integrator bound is the only
loop-side signal of a runaway such as the 14 768 W one. Silencing it would
remove that. The card says the same: "the fix is to say the true thing, not to
say less."
**Why a bug has its own budget.** A genuine over-rating must not wait up to
`REASSERT_S` behind anti-windup notices. `ClampWatchdog` tracks a separate
`last_bug_alarm`, and a bug's text is never overwritten by later anti-windup
text within an episode. Across episodes the WARNING uses its own
notification id (`goodwe_integrator_bound`), so it cannot replace a BUG SIGNAL
notice still on screen (review of #130). With only bug engagements, the cadence is the same as
before (`test_clamp.py` part 9).
**Numbers.** They come from the `Decision` of the clamping tick (`i_bound_w`,
`requested_w`, `clamped_w`, `target_w`), not from `i_w` or `self.target`.
**Open for the owner.** Whether scattered one-cycle anti-windup episodes should
notify at all, or only log and count. They notify now, as before.
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
# SAFETY-48 — the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-48`, on top of `TEL-10`.
**Card:** SAFETY-48 — *"the integrator goes on winding while the command is
slew-limited"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** The live install still runs `slew_w: 400`
applied by hand on 2026-09-05 12:00 and `release/1.0`'s control law. This branch
does not deploy and does not bump the version.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **It is a missing case, not a wrong constant, and the arithmetic says so.**
The integrator moves `gain * error` a cycle and the command moves at most
`slew_w`, so the integrator outruns the command whenever
`|error| > slew_w / gain` — 667 W at the live shape. SAFETY-39's retune made
`slew_w` **smaller**, which makes that threshold **lower**. §1.
2. ⚠️ **THE FORM THE CARD ASKED FOR RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY, AND THAT IS WHY
IT IS NOT WHAT SHIPPED.** Reusing the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew
flag cuts export 13 % and moves the worst quarter-hour average **offtake**
from 3739 W to **3935 W**, with the mean quarter +2.7 W — and on the billed
quarter it is worse at **every plant lag where release/1.0 produces a peak
at all** (a tie at lag 0, worse at 2.5 / 5.0 / 7.5 / 10.0 s) and at **every
top-N cut of the quarters**, which makes this the least lag-sensitive result
in the card. The harm is a tail redistribution inside quarters that already
net to offtake, not a weaker answer to import in aggregate. §3, §3a.
3. **What ships bounds the LEAD at one slew step, only where the slew is what
stopped the command, and only in the leading direction.** The robust result
is the **export reduction — 39.6 → 34.1 kWh, and it falls at every plant and
tuning tried** — with wasted throughput 4.67 → 3.19 kWh, sign reversals
2992 → 2770 and median recovery 232 → 199 s. ⚠️ **The billed quarter is not
something this card can claim.** It reads 3739 → **3434 W** at the fitted
plant lag of 7.5 s; at every lag ≤ 5.0 s — including the one that best
reproduces the recorded export — release/1.0 is *already* at 3434 W and this
card moves it by exactly zero. The lag is not identified by the data. §4,
§3a.
4. **Two committed numbers moved and neither is a silent edit.** SAFETY-13's
released command settles lower, because there is less wound integrator to
settle onto; and SAFETY-39's *"the slew does not own the over-absorption"* is
now **false — inverted, on its own independent plant model.** §5, §6.
---
## 1. The defect, in the terms the code uses
`compute()` freezes the integrator with an asymmetric rule, and the comment
beside it states the requirement outright:
> the requirement is that the INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command
But `frozen` is computed from **one** signal:
```python
saturated_now = abs(prev_w - actual_w) > tuning.saturation_w # not tracking
```
Slew-limiting never enters it. When the command hits the step ceiling the
integrator keeps winding at `gain * error` until it reaches `integrator_max_w`,
and the unwind afterwards is `integrator_max_w / slew_w` cycles — 12.5 at the
live shape, about a minute at the meter's measured tick.
⚠️ **AND THE RETUNE MADE IT MORE FREQUENT, NOT LESS.** `|error| > slew_w / gain`
is 1667 W at `slew_w: 1000` and **667 W** at `slew_w: 400`. The measured median
grid error at the onset of a recorded episode is 1114 W — above the second
threshold and below the first. This is why SAFETY-39 did not fix it, and the
mechanism is the same one §6 shows inverting.
## 2. How it was measured, and what the measurement cannot say
`tools/replay_recorded_loop.py`, over **16.00 days / 256 252 meter instants** of
the live install's own recorder, exported read-only.
**Real:** the disturbance (`D = grid + batt` at every recorded meter instant —
the house with this loop's own battery taken back out, which is exogenous and
therefore valid to drive a counterfactual with); the tick (the meter's own
recorded instants, median **5.01 s**); and the control law, imported out of the
checkout. The "before" law is the **same file** with the SAFETY-48 block removed
by a named substitution and exec'd into a fresh namespace — never a
transcription — and a missing or duplicated anchor is a **refusal** with
`NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED` on it, because an instrument that quietly compared
the shipped law with itself would report the card as changing nothing.
**Modelled:** the inverter (pure delay 7.5 s + first-order lag 2.0 s +
`batt = 0.973 × cmd − 22.4 W`, fitted on this same recording above the SoC
floor, residual **375 W RMS**); the pack (SoC integrated, discharge refused at
or below the floor); and **everything else the arbiter does** — the recorded
setpoint is the arbiter's output after the peak guard, the SoC clamps,
maintenance and arbitrage, while the replay runs `compute()` alone.
⚠️ **THE ABSOLUTE FIGURES ARE PESSIMISTIC BY ABOUT A THIRD AND THE TOOL PRINTS
IT ON EVERY RUN.** Replaying the before-law reproduces 39.6 kWh of export where
the install actually exported **29.4 kWh** over the same window. The delta is
what this instrument is for: both laws run on the same ticks, the same
disturbance, the same plant and the same seed.
⚠️ **THE SoC FILTER ON THE PLANT FIT IS THE WHOLE FIT, AND IT IS A FINDING IN
ITS OWN RIGHT.** This install spends **36 % of its ticks at or below a 10 % SoC
with the command standing near 2 kW and the battery delivering nothing.** Fitted
over all ticks the recording says `batt = 0.50 × cmd − 396 W, r = 0.70` — a
plant that follows half the command, which no inverter does. Above the floor the
same data says `batt = 1.00 × cmd − 28 W, r = 0.977`. The floor is the PACK and
is modelled separately.
## 3. The form the card asked for, and the number that refused it
The card asked for the asymmetric rule already in service for saturation, on a
flag carried across cycles the way `sat_count` is. It was built — from
release/1.0's own source, one substitution per change — and measured on the same
16 days through the same pipeline:
| | release/1.0 | **form A** — carried slew flag + the asymmetric freeze | **SAFETY-48** — the lead cap |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| export kWh | 39.61 | 34.43 | **34.07** |
| import kWh | 116.07 | 110.62 | 111.20 |
| battery sign reversals | 2992 | **2656** | 2770 |
| wasted throughput kWh | 4.67 | **2.99** | 3.19 |
| **worst 15-min offtake W** | 3739 | ⚠️ **3935** | **3434** |
| mean quarter-hour offtake delta | — | ⚠️ **+2.73 W** | **−2.39 W** |
| worst quarter-hour delta | — | +992 W | +532 W |
| recovery median s | 232 | **184** | 199 |
| recovery p99 s | 849 | **781** | 850 |
| recovery max s | 901 | 890 | 898 |
| unrecovered (> 900 s) | 53 | **26** | 31 |
| \|i_w − prev_w\| p99 W | 3361 | 1534 | **800** |
| \|i_w − prev_w\| max W | 9200 | 6912 | **800** |
**Form A wins on four rows and loses on the one that is billed.** The capacity
tariff (*capaciteitstarief*) bills the month's worst quarter-hour average
offtake, and form A raises it by **196 W** — and raises the MEAN quarter by
2.7 W, so this is systematic and not one unlucky quarter. It does so in **five
of the six** plant and tuning variants in `--sensitivity`; the sixth is a tie.
The per-cycle mechanism is that a frozen integrator stops at
`prev + gain·error(first cycle)`, which is `(1 − gain)` short of what the site
needs — 40 % short at `gain: 0.6`.
⚠️ **AND THE SENTENCE THAT USED TO FOLLOW THAT ONE WAS TOO BIG FOR THE DATA.**
It read *"for an IMPORT it is offtake, so a large import is answered too weakly
for as long as the ramp lasts"*. The aggregate does not show a weaker answer to
import: form A cuts total import by **5.45 kWh** and export by **5.18 kWh**
against release/1.0, and paired tick by tick it delivers **8.56 kWh LESS**
offtake energy on the ticks release/1.0 spent importing (lower on 38 229 such
ticks, higher on 19 669). What form A moves is the **TAIL, within quarters that
already net to offtake** — the worst quarter goes 3739 → 3935 W, the top five
3260 → 3300 W, the top fifty 1880.0 → 1882.7 W. The capacity tariff bills the
worst quarter and nothing else, so a redistribution that leaves the mean alone
and lifts the maximum is exactly the trade that is refused here. The conclusion
is unchanged; the causal sentence is now the one the data supports.
⚠️ **THE CARD SAID "do not invent a second rule", AND THE MEASUREMENT SAYS TO.**
That instruction is recorded here rather than quietly dropped. What ships is a
different rule; the paragraph above is why.
## 3a. ⚠️ The plant lag is NOT identified by this recording, and the billed quarter is the claim that depends on it
`fit_plant()` picks `lag 7.5 s` because it minimises **battery-power RMS**. That
objective barely distinguishes the candidates — 375.3 W at 7.5 s against 376.4 W
at 2.5 s, **0.3 %** — while the tool's *own* printed fidelity measure, replayed
export against the **29.43 kWh this install actually exported**, prefers 2.5 s by
the whole of the 35 % gap the header warns about. Two measures on the same data
disagree, and nothing here breaks the tie.
So the sweep has to be read as a sensitivity, not as a confirmation:
| plant lag | fit RMS W | replayed export kWh (release/1.0) | **worst 15-min offtake W:** release/1.0 | form A | SAFETY-48 | mean quarter ΔW |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 0.0 | 392.3 | 23.5 | **3434** | 3434 | **3434** | +0.53 |
| 2.5 | **376.4** | **28.9** ← nearest 29.43 | **3434** | ⚠️ 3732 | **3434** | −0.59 |
| 5.0 | 378.0 | 32.1 | **3434** | ⚠️ 3711 | **3434** | −1.02 |
| 7.5 | **375.3** ← chosen | 39.6 | 3739 | ⚠️ 3935 | **3434** | −2.39 |
| 10.0 | 384.2 | 75.4 | 3954 | ⚠️ 4326 | **3434** | −4.65 |
(The RMS column is `fit_plant()`'s own inner sweep pinned to one lag — best `tau`
and a re-fitted gain/offset at that lag. The export and quarter columns follow
`--sensitivity`'s convention instead: only the lag is substituted into the
global fit, everything else held. That is why the lag 5.0 and 10.0 export
figures are the ones already printed in §7b.)
⚠️ **AT EVERY LAG ≤ 5.0 s THE IMPROVEMENT IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT — IT IS AN
ABSENCE.** release/1.0's worst quarter is *already* 3434 W there and SAFETY-48
changes it by **exactly zero**. §7b's paragraph used to read the `3434 → 3434`
rows as "the direction does not move"; that is the wrong reading. The direction
has nothing to move: at those plants release/1.0 never produces a quarter worse
than 3434 W in the first place, and the 3739 → 3434 W headline exists only at
the single longest lag `fit_plant()` happens to select. **The peak claim is a
property of the plant model, not of the card.** What the card can claim on the
billed quantity is that it does not make it worse, at any lag.
⚠️ **AND THE ONE RESULT HERE THAT IS NOT LAG-SENSITIVE IS THE FORM-A
REJECTION.** Form A's worst quarter is the worst of the three at **every lag
where release/1.0 produces a peak at all** — 3732, 3711, 3935, 4326 against
release/1.0's 3434, 3434, 3739, 3954 at lags 2.5 / 5.0 / 7.5 / 10.0, and a tie
at lag 0.0 where both sit at 3434. It is worse at every top-N cut of the
quarters at the fitted plant (top-1 3934.6 against 3738.7, top-5 3299.7 against
3260.5, top-10 2890.6 against 2871.0, top-50 1882.7 against 1880.0, top-100
1481.7 against 1479.0), and it raises the mean quarter. §3 understated this: the rejection does not rest on one unlucky
quarter at one plant, which is exactly the objection a lag-sensitive result
invites.
⚠️ **WHAT WOULD SETTLE IT IS NOT IN THIS RECORDING.** Both objectives above are
computed from the same four recorded entities, and they disagree; nothing else
in the capture breaks the tie, and this card did not go looking for a third
objective after seeing which lag each of the first two preferred. A driven step
response — the command timestamped where it is written rather than where Home
Assistant recorded it — is what identifies a lag. That is a rig measurement and
it is not this card. Until it exists, the export reduction is what this card
delivers and the peak figure is a plant-model artefact.
## 4. What ships
```python
slew = slew_limit_w(tuning)
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
_lead_cap = SLEW_LEAD_STEPS * slew
if target > slewed:
i_w = min(i_w, slewed + _lead_cap)
elif target < slewed:
i_w = max(i_w, slewed - _lead_cap)
target = slewed
```
Four properties, and each of them is a decision:
* **It is inside the branch**, and ⚠️ **that placement was a SURVIVOR of all
thirty files until a check was written for it.** Applying it to every cycle
instead — `i_w = max(target - cap, min(target + cap, i_w))` after
`target = slewed`, −92 B — is **bit-identical on the shipped configuration**:
0 of 256 246 ticks differ over the 16-day recording. The two separate **only**
where `integrator_max_w` is set ABOVE `max_w` — the configuration `control.py`
says is the only way its `clamped` reason is reachable. There the integrator
is *deliberately* allowed above the rail, and an unconditional cap would drag
it back to the command every cycle and make the option inert.
`test_telemetry.py` part 4 drives that configuration, and the unconditional
form is red on it.
⚠️ **THE COUNT OF SEPARABLE STATES IS DECORATION AND THREE SWEEPS DISAGREE
ABOUT IT.** This card's grid gave **2050 of 257 400**; an independent review
measured **1220 of 246 064**; a third, smaller grid (four tunings × 7 `prev_w`
× 9 `grid_w` × 5 `actual_w` × 8 `i_w` including `None` × 4 `sat_count`) gives
**776 of 40 320** — and that third one is spelled out here precisely because
the first two are not, which is the whole reason they cannot be reconciled.
No count here should be read as exact without the grid beside it. All three
agree on the load-bearing part, which is **where**: every separable state sits
in the `integrator_max_w > max_w` tuning and nowhere else.
⚠️ **AND AN EARLIER DRAFT OF THIS BULLET GAVE THE WRONG REASON AND THE WRONG
NUMBER.** It said the two forms differ on 118 ticks because an unconditional
cap would pull the integrator toward a command the SATURATION freeze is
pinning. That 118 was measured against a *different* pair — a band applied
after quantisation, at the very end of `compute()` — and the saturation story
does not apply to the placement actually being compared, which sits before
the freeze. The figures above are the ones that were measured on the pair the
sentence names.
⚠️ **AND THE SATURATION STORY IS NOT MERELY INAPPLICABLE — IT IS BACKWARDS.
THE NARROW CAP THAT SHIPPED *DOES* MOVE A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR.** It
sits before the freeze block and is not gated on `frozen`. Measured on the
same 16 days at the live shape: of **79 160** frozen ticks the cap changed
`i_w` on **1095**, and on **679** of those it moved it further out on the side
it was already on — putting back magnitude the freeze had just let fall, which
is the one direction the freeze's rule ("may fall, never rise") exists to
forbid. Worst case **2424 W**, at
`prev_w −3400 W, grid +4697 W, actual −4144 W, sat_count 2 → 3`: the freeze
leaves the integrator at **−176 W**, the slew binds, and the cap drags it to
**−2600 W**. It never overrides a *same-cycle* refusal — the freeze clipped
`moved` on 75 512 ticks and the slew bound on none of them — but the claim
that this placement leaves the frozen path alone is false, and §5 is where
that shows up in a committed number.
* **It is written one-sided, and that is a CLARITY choice, not a correctness
one.** ⚠️ **An earlier draft of this file and of the comment in `control.py`
said the two-sided band `max(slewed - cap, min(slewed + cap, i_w))` was a bug
that would drag a TRAILING integrator up toward the command. That was
invented, and the sweep said so: the two spellings agree on 205 920 of
205 920 cases** across four tunings, every sign of `prev_w`, `grid_w`,
`actual_w` and `i_w`, and the `i_w=None` path. `target` is monotone in `i_w`,
so when the slew binds `i_w` lies on the same side of `slewed` as `target`
does and the other clamp cannot reach. The one-sided form stays because it
NAMES the side the lead is on; the equivalence is recorded so the next reader
finds a measurement instead of an argument.
* **It moves `i_w` and not `target`.** This cycle's command is already decided;
what is bounded is what gets CARRIED. That is also why the exhaustive
`i_w=None` equivalence sweep in `test_control.py` is untouched — it compares
`(target_w, sat_count, frozen, reason)`, none of which this moves.
* **The cap is in STEPS, not watts**, for SAFETY-39's reason: a watt figure is a
constant that outlives the `slew_w` it was derived against. `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS`
moves with `slew_limit_w()` and therefore with the rail.
⚠️ **ONE STEP, AND NOT ZERO.** `i_w = slewed` is full back-calculation, and
`control.py`'s own docstring says what that costs: passing `i_w=None` *"reduces
this function to the exact velocity form it replaced"*. A zero cap makes `i_w`
identically the command on every cycle, which is that collapse written from the
other end. Measured, it is **better** — export 32.02 kWh against 34.07, mean
quarter −3.69 W against −2.39 — and it is still refused, because it throws away
the reason the accumulator was split out at all. That 2 kWh is the price of
keeping the bounded form, and it is stated rather than hidden.
⚠️ **TWO LEADS, AND CONFUSING THEM IS HOW A CHECK GETS WRITTEN WRONG.** The cap
bounds `i_w − target`, the command this cycle EMITS, at one step — which is what
makes the unwind one cycle. `Decision.i_w − prev_w`, which is what TEL-10's
`loop_lead` publishes, is measured against the command the PREVIOUS cycle left
standing, and the emitted command is itself one step further on: the published
figure is bounded by **two** steps. Both bounds are asserted, each against its
own number.
### The two recorded deadlocks, driven rather than argued
`control.py` names two encodings that produce a permanently stuck loop, and a
gate written on the integrator is exactly the edit that brings them back.
Neither is reachable here and both are test cases in `test_telemetry.py` part 4:
* **the shrink-only encoding** — *"only corrections that shrink |i_w|"* is
unsatisfiable for both signs whenever the correction is larger than twice the
integrator, and the loop then sits at its last value forever (measured before
the fix: 0 W held indefinitely into a 2 kW import). SAFETY-48 is not a shrink
rule; it caps the lead beyond one slew step and only while the slew binds.
* **`i_w == 0.0`** — `main.py` resets the integrator to exactly 0.0 on every
stop and every reseed, and *"may not wind further in the direction it is
already pushing"* has no referent there. SAFETY-48 does not touch that gate;
the first push from zero is driven and asserted to move.
And a third, specific to this card: **the cap cannot latch.** The flag is not
carried, and after the cap `|i_w − slewed| = cap`, so the next cycle's command
covers it in one step and the slew stops binding — after which the integrator
accumulates freely again. The driven check asserts the command still walks all
the way to the rail on a railed export.
## 5. What this card COSTS, stated rather than smoothed
**SAFETY-13's release buys back less.** That card's own scenario — a second
writer holding the pack at +700 W, the command pinned, then released — settles
at **−800 W** where release/1.0 settled at −1190 W against an integrator of
−1194 W; and its sibling run settles at **−1200 W** where release/1.0 settled at
−2390 W. The property AC 4 asserts is unchanged: the released command stops at
the frozen integrator and not at the rail.
⚠️ **AND THE TWO MOVED FOR TWO DIFFERENT REASONS, WHICH THE ONE-LINE EXPLANATION
"how far that integrator had been allowed to wind" COVERS ONLY HALF OF.** Gating
the cap on `not frozen` — one line, `if frozen: _lead_cap = float("inf")`, so
the cap becomes a no-op while frozen — puts **part 5 back at release/1.0's
−1190 W exactly**. That run moved because the cap **fires on frozen cycles**
(§4). **Part 4(b) does not come back**: it is −1200 W gated and −1200 W shipped,
against release/1.0's −2390 W, because *that* one moved for the winding reason.
Both literals in `test_control.py` were re-baselined **with the reason beside
them**, and the second is now asserted against `i_w` rather than against a
number.
**The alternative that avoids it was measured and rejected.** Gating the cap on
`not frozen` as above gives export **34.71 kWh** (against 34.07), worst quarter
**3434 W** (the same as shipped), wasted **3.49 kWh** (against 3.19) — and a
worst observed lead of **4961 W**, i.e. no bound at all on the quantity this
card exists to bound. A bound with an exception large enough to drive a truck
through is not a bound. ⚠️ These four figures replace an earlier set (34.9,
3461 W, 3.5 kWh, 4966 W) that does not reproduce on this tree with the gate
spelled as above; the gate spelling is written out here so the next reader can
re-run it rather than re-derive it.
**One quarter-hour in 1534 is 532 W worse.** The billed figure is a MAXIMUM, and
at the fitted plant lag the maximum improves (3739 → 3434 W); no quarter under
SAFETY-48 reaches release/1.0's own worst. The mean moves the right way. The
tail is reported because a maximum over 1534 quarters is decided by one of them
— and §3a is the reason that improvement is not claimed as a benefit of the
card: at every shorter plant lag release/1.0's own maximum is already 3434 W.
## 6. The independent confirmation, which arrived as a failing check
`test_control.py`'s SAFETY-39 section drives a family of 51 synthetic export
steps through a **first-order plant this file writes itself** — no relation to
the replay, no recorded data in it at all. It carried this assertion:
> ⚠️ THE SLEW DOES NOT OWN THE OVER-ABSORPTION … Quartering the slew from 1000
> to 250 does not reduce the over-absorption at all
and it was right about the mechanism and therefore wrong about the conclusion:
`slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT while the integrator accumulates `gain · error`, so a
slower slew left the integrator winding for longer. Worst case over the family:
| `slew_w` | release/1.0 | this branch |
|---|---:|---:|
| 1000 | 1005 W | **729 W** |
| 0 (the rail, 556) | 1109 W | **550 W** |
| 400 (the live interim) | 1285 W | **424 W** |
| 250 | 1330 W | **326 W** |
**The ranking inverts.** Before: slower is worse, monotonically. After: slower is
better, monotonically. Two plant models that share nothing agree on the sign,
which is worth more than either alone — and it means SAFETY-39's *"gain is the
next constant to re-derive"* is now only half true: with the lead bounded, the
slew owns a share of the over-absorption it did not own before. `gain` is still
not touched here, for SAFETY-39's own reason: two live control-law constants
moving in one release makes the next measurement uninterpretable.
⚠️ **AND THE RIG SAYS THE SAME THING, WHICH MEANS TWO COMMITTED TRANSCRIPTS
CHANGED MEANING UNDER THIS CARD.** `tools/slew_sim.py --slew` runs the same
derivation on admin/goodwe's `plantsim.Plant`, a third model again. Worst-case
over-absorption over its 51-step family, `slew_w` from 1000 down to 250:
| `slew_w` | 1000 | 800 | 700 | 600 | 556 | 500 | 400 | 300 | 250 |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| release/1.0 | 958 | 1107 | 1133 | 1058 | 987 | 1029 | 1150 | 1143 | 1081 |
| **this branch** | 777 | 734 | 663 | 563 | 553 | 507 | 435 | 358 | 321 |
release/1.0's row is flat and non-monotone and **800 really is better than 556**
on that column — SAFETY-39 measured it correctly and its §3 sentence is true of
the law it was written against. This branch's row falls monotonically. So
SAFETY-39's record is not retracted; it is given a **forward reference**, and
`slew_sim.py`'s own narration now reads `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS` out of the control law
it imported and says which of the two tables it is printing. MUTATION.md habit 8
— a committed transcript is a check, and a transcript whose prose contradicts
its own table is a failing one.
## 7. Verified by breaking it
**The law.** `test_telemetry.py` part 4 and `test_control.py`'s SAFETY-39
section. The mutation table is in `test_telemetry.py`'s header.
**The instrument** (MUTATION.md habit 8 — anything under `tools/` that a
document quotes is subject to the battery):
| # | mutation to `app/control.py` | what the instrument did |
|---|---|---|
| I2 | the whole SAFETY-48 block deleted | **REFUSED**, exit 1, `NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED` — not a zero delta |
| I3 | the anchor line itself edited | **REFUSED**, same message |
| I3b | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 1000` — the cap present but inert | **every row +0.00**, which is the honest report that the block is doing nothing |
| I4 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 0` — full back-calculation | every row moves further; this is the rejected form's number in §4 |
I3b is the one that matters: it proves the delta in §3 is caused by the block
and not by the two runs differing for some other reason.
**The law**, driven in the CI image on a purged tree, fingerprinted before,
after and after the revert:
| # | mutation to `app/control.py` | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---:|---|
| L1 | the whole SAFETY-48 block deleted | −195 B | 5 in `test_telemetry.py`, 4 in `test_control.py` |
| L2 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 0` — the velocity form | +0 B | 4 + 3 |
| L3 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 12` — a cap above the rail | +1 B | 4 + 3 |
| L4 | the cap applied unconditionally, outside the slew branch | −92 B | 1 + 0 — **and it was a SURVIVOR of all thirty files before that check existed** |
| L5a | the `min`/`max` FUNCTION names exchanged | +0 B | 5 + 5, one of them `test_control.py`'s own "frozen integrator never deadlocks" over 13 041 states |
| L5b | the two BRANCH BODIES exchanged — the other reading of "the cap on the wrong side" | +0 B | 5 + 4, and it does **not** reach the deadlock sweep |
| L6 | the lead measured against `prev_w` rather than the command emitted | +0 B | 6 + 3 |
⚠️ **L5 AND L6 ARE BOTH ZERO BYTES** — `min`/`max` and `slewed`/`prev_w` are
each the same length — so no fingerprint and no byte delta can see either, and
one of L5a's reds is `test_control.py`'s own *"frozen integrator never
deadlocks"* sweep over 13 041 states, written by SAFETY-13 for a different
reason.
⚠️ **THREE OF THESE COUNTS WERE WRONG AND ARE RE-MEASURED ABOVE, WHICH IS
MUTATION.md's REPORTING RULE 3 APPLIED TO THIS CARD'S OWN TABLE.** The earlier
row gave L5 as 2 + 5 and L6 as 4 + 3; driven again in the CI image on a `cp -a`
of this tree, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time, they are **5 + 5** and
**6 + 3**. ⚠️ **AND "L5" NAMED TWO DIFFERENT MUTATIONS.** "`min`/`max` swapped"
can mean the function names exchanged or the branch bodies exchanged; they are
both red, they are both the cap on the wrong side, and they give different
counts (5 + 5 against 5 + 4) and reach different checks. A row that writes one
number for a mutation a reader cannot re-derive from its own description is a
row that cannot be re-run, so both spellings are listed. The directions in the
original table were all correct; the counts were decoration, and decoration in
a mutation table reads as evidence.
## 7b. The transcript, quoted rather than summarised
`python3 tools/replay_recorded_loop.py --sensitivity`, on this branch, 58 s:
```
THE RECORDING: 256252 meter instants over 16.00 days, loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17
tick p5 4.77 s median 5.01 s p95 7.86 s (control.LOOP_TICK_S says 2.0)
the recorded command: extremes -5000 / +5000 W -> max_w 5000; most common step above 100 W is 400 W, 9924 times -> slew_w 400
the fitted inverter: lag 7.5 s, tau 2.0 s, batt = 0.9731 x cmd -22.4 W, residual 375 W RMS above the SoC floor
FIDELITY - the BEFORE law replayed against the recording it came from
setpoint r=0.887 mean +601 W simulated vs +739 W recorded
grid r=0.682 mean +195 W simulated vs +239 W recorded
export 39.61 kWh simulated vs 29.43 kWh recorded -> the model is +35 % PESSIMISTIC about the loop's tracking
THE A/B, same ticks, same disturbance, same plant, same seed
release/1.0 SAFETY-48 delta
export kWh 39.61 34.07 -5.54 the cost
import kWh 116.07 111.20 -4.86
battery sign reversals 2992.00 2770.00 -222.00
wasted throughput kWh 4.67 3.19 -1.48
worst 15-min offtake W 3738.67 3433.94 -304.74 ⚠️ THE BILLED ONE
recovery events 549.00 612.00 +63.00
recovery median s 232.06 199.04 -33.01
recovery p99 s 849.00 849.94 +0.94
recovery max s 901.06 898.40 -2.66
unrecovered (>900 s) 53.00 31.00 -22.00
|i_w - prev_w| p99 W 3361.12 800.00 -2561.12
|i_w - prev_w| max W 9200.00 800.00 -8400.00
slew-limited ticks 16392.00 11654.00 -4738.00
mean quarter delta W -2.39 over 1534 quarters
worst quarter delta W +532.27
SENSITIVITY - the ranking, not the watts
variant export kWh worst quarter W mean quarter dW
plant lag 5.0 s 32.1 -> 27.2 3434 -> 3434 -1.02
plant lag 10.0 s 75.4 -> 68.3 3954 -> 3434 -4.65
plant tau 8 s 56.5 -> 49.8 3995 -> 3605 -3.30
gain 1.0135, offset -26 46.8 -> 39.3 3713 -> 3434 -3.27
slew_w 555.6 (the rail) 36.5 -> 34.4 3434 -> 3434 -0.17
gain 0.3 28.1 -> 27.0 3434 -> 3434 +0.16
(58 s)
```
⚠️ **`--sensitivity` IS THE RANKING AND NOT THE WATTS.** The export figure moves
by a factor of two across these plants; what does not move is the direction —
**on export**. ⚠️ **THE `worst quarter W` COLUMN IS NOT THE SAME KIND OF
EVIDENCE AND THIS PARAGRAPH USED TO TREAT IT AS IF IT WERE.** Three of its six
rows read `3434 -> 3434`, and that is not "the direction holds": it is
release/1.0 *already sitting at 3434 W* on those plants, with nothing for the
card to improve. §3a sweeps the lag properly and finds the same thing at every
lag ≤ 5.0 s. The billed-quarter improvement in the A/B table above exists at one
plant, the one `fit_plant()` selects by an objective that separates it from its
neighbour by 0.3 %.
Two rows deserve naming rather than rounding: at `slew_w: 555.6` (the rail) and
at `gain: 0.3` the mean quarter-hour delta is −0.17 W and **+0.16 W** — ties,
not improvements. Both are regimes where `|error| > slew_w / gain` is rarely
satisfied (1333 W at `gain: 0.3`, 926 W at the rail against a measured median
onset error of 1114 W), so there is little for the card to bite on. That is the
mechanism agreeing with itself, and it is also the honest answer to "would this
still be worth shipping if the tuning moved": at `gain: 0.3` it would not be.
## 8. What this card does NOT establish
* **Nothing here drives an inverter.** The replay is a model with a 375 W
residual and no arbiter in it. The closed-loop answer comes from the rig or
from a live run — SAFETY-47 records why a shadow run cannot give it.
* **The live tick is 5.0 s, not `LOOP_TICK_S`'s 2.0 s**, measured off 9924
recorded 400 W steps and off the meter's own cadence. It is wrong in the SAFE
direction (a slower meter makes `validate.py` rule 10 conservative) and is NOT
changed here — re-deriving `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is a refusal boundary on a live
install and belongs to its own card. It is recorded in the tool's header and
printed on every run.
* **The brief's plant figure was close but not exact.** It quoted
`delivered = 1.0135 × command − 26 W, r = 0.992` at a 4–6 s publish lag. On
this 16-day window, above the SoC floor, the same relation measures
`1.00 × command − 28 W, r = 0.977` at a best-fit pure delay of **7.5 s**. The
conclusion — the inverter is a pure follower and the plant is not the problem
— survives; the coefficients are the ones in §2.
* **The brief's cost figure is larger than this measurement.** It quoted ~14 kWh
of avoidable export and 65 % of site export inside 7.9 % of the time. Measured
here: **5.5 kWh** avoidable of 39.6 kWh modelled (29.4 kWh recorded), with
42 % of export inside the 6.3 % of ticks that are slew-limited and 69 % within
±60 s of one, over 15.3 % of the time. The concentration claim holds; the
avoidable-kWh figure does not, and the difference is not reconcilable from
here because the reconstruction it came from was discarded.
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
# SAFETY-56 — what the gate cannot tell apart, said in the sentence
**Text only. No behaviour changes in this card**, and §5 is the measurement that
says so: the same stimuli through the tree before and after produce a
**byte-identical** trace of every verdict, every `reading()`, every `inputs_ok`
and every readiness row's `(ok, warn)`.
---
## 1. The defect
0.10.1 is regulating a real GW5000S-BP. Two messages tell the operator that
healthy hardware has failed.
**The log line**, as emitted on the reference site on 2026-09-21:
> SAFETY-37: inverter-a battery-power register **is not following its own
> command** - STALE_READING: -3 unchanged for 36 s while the standing command
> moved 800 W to +1600 W - **the reading is not following**, so it is reported
> as MISSING rather than as a measurement … Treating it as MISSING, which
> commands 0 W.
**The readiness row**, at the same moment:
> NOT READY — battery power: `sensor.kelder_goodwe_master_stage1_goodwe_inverter_ac_power`
> **is missing or not numeric**
That entity was present, numeric and updating.
**SAFETY-37's conjunction is correct and is not touched by this card** —
`unchanged > 35 s AND |command| > 250 W AND |travel| > 250 W`. A register
genuinely stuck against a real command is exactly what it should catch, and a
pack that cannot comply is a state the site must stop in too. What was wrong is
what the sentences **concluded** from it.
## 2. Two worlds satisfy the conjunction
| | the register | the pack |
|---|---|---|
| **DEAD** | has stopped reporting reality | is doing what it was told |
| **REFUSED** | is reporting reality correctly | cannot comply — the BMS is refusing at its floor |
A refused pack holds still under any setpoint, so an honest register publishes
the same unchanged number a dead one does. **Nothing `freshness.py` is handed
separates them.** All three sentences asserted DEAD.
## 3. The live episode was REFUSED, and it is measured, not argued
Off the committed capture `scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz`,
whose bytes and decoder are already graded by `test_freshness.py` part 10a:
| | |
|---|---|
| the register | answered **-3 W for 850 s**, 10:51:24 → 11:05:34 |
| the commands during that hold | **+260, +660, +1060 W** — discharge only, never a charge |
| pack SoC throughout | **11 %** |
| first **charge** command after the restart | 11:05:31 at **-400 W** |
| the register moves | **11:05:34** — **3 s**, inside one 17.0 s obligation window |
**A register that answers a reversed command inside one obligation window had
not stopped reporting.** What would not move was the pack. The sentence the
operator read named the one thing in the loop that was telling the truth.
⚠️ What this does **not** establish: that no register is ever intermittently
wrong. It excludes a register that had simply stopped; it cannot exclude one
that was wrong and then right. That is the point — the new sentence claims
neither.
## 4. The fix, and why it is three sentences and not one helper
Each message states **what was observed** and names **both** explanations.
| where | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| `app/freshness.py` `_grade()` | *"…+1600 W - the reading is not following, so it is reported as MISSING…"* | *"…+1600 W. **TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE CANNOT TELL THEM APART**: the register may have stopped reporting reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command - a pack the BMS is refusing holds still under any setpoint, and an honest register then reads exactly like a frozen one. Either way the number cannot be read as this command's effect, so it is reported as MISSING…"* |
| `app/main.py` `_read_unit()` | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power **register is not following its own command** - %s."* | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power reading **did not move under a command that did, WHICH IS NOT BY ITSELF A VERDICT ON THE REGISTER** - %s."* |
| `app/main.py` `checks()` | *"{label}: {entity} **is missing or not numeric**"* | *"{label}: **no usable value this cycle from** {entity} - **and this row cannot tell which of two things that is**: the entity is missing or not numeric, or it is publishing a number that this controller is withholding (a freshness gate does exactly that, and names itself in a row of its own). Confirm the entity in Developer Tools before replacing it"* |
**Three sentences, three wordings, no shared helper.** The first two are a log
line about a **behaviour**; the third is a banner about a named **entity**, and
the two answer different questions ("what did the register do" against "can I
trust this entity"). A helper serving both would have to drop whichever half
the other caller does not need, and the half it dropped would be the
operator's next step. The log line names the pair **once**, inside the `%s` it
already interpolates, rather than in both of its own halves.
**No new input, and SoC is not wired.** `BOUNDS["soc"]` stays *STATED, NOT
WIRED*; telling the two worlds apart needs the pack floor (SAFETY-32's number)
and SoC (TEL-08's wiring), and a message honest about its own ambiguity needs
neither. Part 11b drives the two worlds at **50 %** and **11 %** SoC and
asserts the sentence does not move one byte.
**The readiness row does not branch.** `inv.batt_fresh.stale` is on the same
object at the same moment, and the row deliberately does not ask it: the same
loop renders the grid and SoC rows, which have no gate, and a branch per row
would be a second place where "why is this None" is decided. The gate already
has a surface — `stale_note()` rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below with
the whole STALE_READING sentence in it — so the operator's discriminator is
*"is that row there?"*, and part 11d asserts that row is **present in REFUSED
and absent in ABSENT**.
## 5. Behaviour is byte-identical, measured
`tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` prints two documents from one stimulus set.
The `behaviour` half contains **no sentence**: only `stale`, `reading()`,
`releases`, `held`, the window bookkeeping, `inputs_ok`, and every readiness
row's `(ok, warn)`. Run in the CI image, purged, `:ro`, against
`origin/release/1.0` **archived out of git** and against this branch:
| | |
|---|---|
| the committed live capture | **2390 reads**, 7 verdict edges |
| a swept grid of command × register schedules | **66 cells × 120 reads** — 1060 stale reads, 1309 `MISSING` readings, 6 releases |
| six driven controller worlds through the shipped read path | DEAD, REFUSED, ABSENT, HEALTHY, RELEASE, RETRIP — every read's `(batt, inputs_ok, stale)` and every `checks()` row's `(ok, warn)` |
| **result** | `6030175ed2ab9a4143e86e89a71d45c8ab041ac1c00121a3e3e023cd2b08996c` **on both trees** |
⚠️ **AND THE CONTROL IS INSIDE THE TOOL, BECAUSE AN IDENTITY BETWEEN TWO TREES
THAT ARE THE SAME TREE IS HABIT 4.** `--compare` refuses to report "behaviour
unchanged" unless the `sentences` halves **differ**. This card's first
invariance run was exactly that mistake — it archived a branch whose edits were
not committed yet, so `before` and `after` were the same code and the identity
was perfect and worthless.
Both of the tool's refusals are **driven**, not asserted:
| | |
|---|---|
| the same file compared with itself | `REFUSED: the sentences halves are IDENTICAL…`, exit **2** |
| `MOVE_W` 250.0 → 240.0 in the after tree | `BEHAVIOUR MOVED at 'sweep_stale_reads' / 'sweep_missing_reads' / 'sweep_trace'`, exit **1** |
| this card | `OK: sentences differ, behaviour is byte-identical.`, exit **0** |
## 6. The mutation battery
Each in its own `mktemp`'d copy (habit 18), purged on the host, mounted `:ro`,
graded by `tools/mutation_run.sh` in the CI image.
| | mutation | Δ bytes | named reds |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `_grade()` reverted to *"the reading is not following"* | -402 | **3** |
| M2 | the log line reverted to *"register is not following its own command"* | -80 | **2** |
| M3 | the row reverted to *"{entity} is missing or not numeric"* | -619 | **2** |
| M4 | *register* and *source* transposed between the two explanations | **0** | **1** |
| M5 | the second explanation deleted, the first kept | -216 | **1** |
| M6 | *"CANNOT TELL THEM APART"* replaced by *"IN ORDER OF LIKELIHOOD"* | -13 | **1** |
| M7 | the REFUSED world's ground truth set to the DEAD world's | 0 | **2** |
| M8 | the row's second cause deleted | -309 | **1** |
| M9 | `label` and `entity` transposed in the row | **0** | **3** |
| M10 | M1 + M2 + M3 together, i.e. exactly what 0.10.1 ships | -1101 | **5** |
| M11 | the accusation literals replaced by one that matches nothing | 0 | **1** |
⚠️ **M9's first run was a defect in this card's own check, and it is the one
worth reading.** The row was fetched with `[...][0]`. Transposing `label` and
`entity` makes the row unfindable, so the run died on an `IndexError` — a red
with **no name attached**, with every check after that line **ungraded**. That
is FCST-06's shape exactly. `_s56_row()` now returns a named absence instead of
raising, and a precondition grades it: **0 named reds before, 3 after.**
⚠️ **M11 is the other one aimed inward.** `not any(...)` over an empty list is
True, and so is one over three mistyped literals. The positive control runs the
same predicate against the three sentences **as 0.10.1 shipped them** and
requires it to find an accusation in every one, and every literal to match at
least one of them (habit 7: vary one thing from an accepted baseline).
## 7. What part 11 does not grade
* It does not show the live episode was a BMS refusal beyond doubt — see §3.
* It does not grade English. A sentence that named both explanations and then
said something useless about them would pass.
* The `no entity configured` branch beside the rewritten row is untouched and
ungraded: a blank entity really is the only thing it can be.
* The **grid-power and battery-SoC rows** go through the same rewritten line and
have no freshness gate today, so for them the second cause is a hypothesis
about this controller rather than a live possibility. That is weaker than the
battery-power case and is the price of not branching per row. A gate on either
signal — TEL-08 would be one — makes it exact.
* **SAFETY-58 is not touched** (the first read after a long rest trips before a
healthy register could answer), and neither is the 710/790 disagreement
between `test_freshness.py` and the changelog. Both are separate cards; the
second has a **fourth site** at
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-57-the-exit-from-a-stale-verdict.md:274` that a fix written
off the PR table alone would miss.
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
# SAFETY-57 — the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-57`, off `origin/master` @ `6f5e8e3`
(content-identical to `release/1.0` @ `8a57361`).
**Card:** SAFETY-57 — *"the freshness gate has no exit reachable from inside the state it creates"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No contact was made with 192.168.2.158 or
192.168.2.221. The one live system touched is `sniffer@192.168.2.167`, a
**passive** RS-485 listener with no address on the bus, and it was read only.
---
## 0. The five things a reader should take away
1. **The live episode is reproduced from the wire, not modelled.** The capture
is committed, the decoder is committed, and the box that produced it was
running the defect — so the `0 W` in the trace *is* the add-on's own
`inputs missing → command 0 W`. §2.
2. **Option 2 from the card — "do not arm the gate when the command is 0 W" —
already holds, and it is not the bug.** `_grade()` has required
`|standing| >= MOVE_W` since SAFETY-37. The trip happened at **+1060 W** and
the stuck state is at **0 W**; they are different moments. §3.
3. **The decision is not "how long", it is "when".** The verdict is withdrawn
when the **obligation that produced it is no longer standing** — SAFETY-13's
shape one module over. The 17.0 s is the obligation window that was already
derived in the file, taken at the **floor** of its band, and which half is
safe is the **opposite** of SAFETY-13's. §4.
4. **It costs 52 % exposure on a permanently dead register, and that number is
in the suite so it cannot be forgotten.** It is payable only because one
re-grading window (35 s) is shorter than both consumer holds (75 s, 85 s).
**No detection SAFETY-37 had is given back.** §5.
5. **The battery had been rescuing this code by accident.** 93 trips in the
committed 16-day capture; median wait for the BMS keep-alive pulse that
cleared them **143 s**, worst **5 h 57 m**. §6.
---
## 1. What was there, in the terms the code uses
`freshness.py`, `Freshness.submit()` and `_grade()`:
```python
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
...
self.stale = False # the only place the latch is cleared
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono):
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
return # sets the latch; never clears it
```
and `main.py:1777`, `inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()`, where `reading()`
answers `None` while `stale`. `inputs_ok` sees the `None`, the site holds for
`stale_input_s`, then files `Claim.set("safety", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "inputs
missing")` and keeps filing it.
The reason the latch exists is written in the class docstring and it is a good
one: without it the verdict oscillates at about 1 Hz, because declaring the
reading stale drops the command below `MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction,
which hands the held number straight back.
**The defect is that the only thing that ends it is an arrival carrying a
different number — and the state's own output is what stops the register being
asked for one.** The log line promised the opposite, in the same sentence that
announced the 0 W:
> *Treating it as MISSING, which commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the
> register reports a different value.*
---
## 2. Reproducing it, from the wire
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz` is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, 10:30–11:10 Europe/Brussels, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`. The decoder reports **0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC,
0 unknown shapes**, and its mode→sign convention is **graded off the capture**
rather than trusted: 298 commands at or under −1000 W are each answered one
obligation window later by a negative register reading, and not one positive.
| capture time | on the wire |
|---|---|
| 10:51:14 | `0x0518` = **−447 W**; the loop is charging |
| 10:51:19 | the command reverses: EMS **mode 3**, 260 W of discharge |
| 10:51:24.7 | `0x0518` = **−3 W**. The pack is at **11 %**, the BMS refuses the discharge, the inverter idles. **The register is healthy and truthful.** |
| 10:51:29.7 | the command reaches **+1060 W**. 800 W of travel |
| 10:52:21.7 | the setpoint is written **0 W** — this is the add-on's own §11.1 rule 1, recorded on the wire |
| …850.0 s | `0x0518` does not change value |
| …790.0 s | the setpoint does not change value |
| ~11:04 | **a person restarts the add-on** — not visible in this file, and the only thing that ends the episode |
| 11:05:31.7 | the restarted loop commands **−400 W of charge**, which the pack accepts at 11 % |
| 11:05:34.7 | `0x0518` = **−137 W** |
⚠️ **THE CAPTURE IS CLOSED-LOOP FOR THE WHOLE PARKED INTERVAL**, which is why
this is a reproduction and not a simulation: the box was running 0.10.0, so
every command in the trace is the shipped code's own. The only event inside the
window the file cannot account for is the human restart.
Replaying the shipped `_read_unit` loop at 1 Hz against those two series
(`test_freshness.py` part 10b):
| | stale at | clear at | parked |
|---|---|---|---|
| **before** (`release_s = inf`) | 10:52:00 | 11:05:35 | **815 s**, and `reading()` is `None` on all **812** reads from the trip to the first command a human put on the wire, with the register at −3.0 W in every one of them |
| **after** | 10:52:00 | **10:52:39** | **39 s**, with `0x0518` still answering the same **−3 W** |
⚠️ **THE COUNTERFACTUAL IS `release_s = inf`, AND IT IS GRADED RATHER THAN
CLAIMED.** With an infinite bound `_release()` never fires, `_open_window()` is
only ever called where the register moves, and the window pair is the
change-stamp pair — byte-for-byte the pre-SAFETY-57 conjunction. Part 10b
asserts that by driving part 1's own fresh/stale pair through both bounds and
comparing the verdict streams.
The replay also found a **one-read trip at 10:48:14** that clears one second
later. That is a pre-existing false positive and it is now recorded as
survivor 5 — §7.
---
## 3. What the card's option 2 actually buys, which is nothing here
The card offered *"do not arm the gate when the command being graded is 0 W"*
and warned that it might hold already. **It does, and it has since SAFETY-37**:
`_grade()` returns at `abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w`, and
`test_freshness.py` part 4 has a named check on that term, added because a
mutation removing it survived.
The warning in the card is the right one and it is worth writing down: **the
trip and the stuck state are different moments.** The gate armed at **+1060 W**,
where the conjunction is entirely correct — a command travelled 800 W and the
register did not move for 35 s. The site then went to **0 W** *because of the
verdict*. An entry-side rule cannot reach a state that is entered legitimately
and then persists. **The defect is the exit, and nothing else in the conjunction
is touched by this card.**
Option 3 — probing with a small non-zero command — was not taken and does not
need to be. It writes to a real actuator to test an assumption, and §4's rule
does not need a probe: the site's *normal* control resuming is the test, and it
is gated behind the same `inputs_ok` everything else is.
---
## 4. The decision: which verdicts get an exit, and what the bound is
> The stale verdict holds as before, **unless** the obligation that produced it
> is no longer standing — `|standing| < MOVE_W` — **and** it has been gone
> longer than the register would have needed to answer it. On a release the
> latch clears and a **new grading window** opens at that instant.
This is [[SAFETY-13]]'s §4 in a different module, and deliberately so: that card
established the house answer to "a latch with no exit" and its answer was *not*
a plain time bound but a **predicate plus a time bound**, where the predicate
says whether the state can end on its own. Here the predicate is that **the
question is no longer being asked.** A register under a 0 W command is obliged
to be nowhere, so a verdict about whether it is following cannot be tested, and
a verdict that cannot be tested may not stand for ever.
### 4.1 Why the window has to re-open, and what happens if it does not
`_grade()` compares the register's unchanged time against `unchanged_s` and the
command's travel against the command standing when the window opened. If a
release cleared the latch **without** re-opening the window, the first read at
which the resumed command travels 250 W would re-trip immediately — the
register would never get the 17 s in which it could answer, and the live
episode's recovery (a charge the pack **accepts**) would be killed inside two
seconds. Mutating exactly that (`graded_from` re-anchored to `changed_mono`,
+82 B) takes four named checks red.
The new window is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` = **35 s**, the same bound as entry,
because it is the same question — *does this register follow the commands issued
from now on?* — and there is no principled shorter answer to it. It is also the
number the exposure argument in §5 rests on, so it is not free to move.
### 4.2 `RELEASE_S` = `BATT_OBLIGED_S` = 17.0 s, and which half is safe
The quantity needed is *has the register had its chance to answer the command
standing now?*, and `freshness.py` already derives it as the floor of
`BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band:
```
6.0 s plant goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22
10.0 s publisher firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181, update_interval: 10s
1.0 s this add-on run_control()'s await asyncio.sleep(1)
```
⚠️ **IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND, NOT A SENSITIVITY PREFERENCE** — the mirror of
`MOVE_W` taking the **ceiling** of its own for the mirrored reason.
| | the question | the safe half | why |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-13's `SETTLE_CYCLES` | may the plant still be the **explanation**? | the **longer** half | a shorter bound stops believing the plant too early, and then it accuses |
| this one | may the verdict still be **tested**? | the **shorter** half | being wrong *long* is the failure being fixed; being wrong *short* costs one re-grading window, and §5 bounds that |
Below 17.0 s the release pre-empts the **cheaper exit** — the register answering
the new 0 W command by itself, which clears the latch on evidence rather than on
a timer. That is graded behaviourally rather than asserted: a register that
answers at +16 s clears by **movement** at `release_s = 17.0` with `releases`
still 0, and by **timer** at `release_s = 5.0`.
The family is computed and printed (habit 10): `5, 16, 17, 18, 35, inf` give
six distinct release instants, so no check in the file can confuse two of them.
### 4.3 Two clocks, and the operator reads the register's
`changed_mono` / `unchanged_s()` remain facts about the **register**: after a
release they go on reporting that it has not moved for 850 s, because it has
not. `graded_from` / `graded_s()` are the **verdict's** window. They coincide
until the first release. Collapsing them either lies to the operator or defeats
the re-grading, and both directions are mutated red.
The stale sentence's `unchanged for N s` slot carries the **register's** number;
a re-trip appends a clause naming the window and the grade count, so the two
durations cannot be read as one number that moved (habit 14).
---
## 5. What it costs, measured
Driven against a register frozen for good, 1201 reads, shipped defaults
(`test_freshness.py` part 10c):
| | parked | the held number reaches a consumer | releases |
|---|---|---|---|
| before | 1166 s | **35 reads (2.9 %)** | 0 |
| after | 571 s | **630 reads (52.5 %)** | 17 |
⚠️ **52 % IS PAID EVERY CYCLE, NOT OCCASIONALLY.** The period is
`stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S` (17 s) parked, then one 35 s window.
It is payable because of one inequality, and it is the inequality
`test_freshness.py` part 6 has graded against the shipped `config.yaml` since
SAFETY-37:
```
35 s (the re-grading window) < 75 s (circulation_hold_s) < 85 s (unit_sign_disagree_s)
```
Every unbroken run of exposure is **exactly one window**, so neither consumer
can reach a verdict inside one, and the re-trip that ends each run hands them a
`None`, which **clears** their windows rather than accumulating into them.
**And nothing SAFETY-37 detects is given back**, which is the half that makes
this a trade rather than a regression: a permanent `None` clears those same two
windows for ever as well, so on the shipped-before module those detectors are
*equally* unable to speak about the unit. What the held number does reach for
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()` — which
answers a large unexplained divergence by **freezing the output**, the
conservative direction and SAFETY-13's business — and the command itself is
derived from the **P1 meter**, never from `batt`.
### 5.1 The narrowing this does NOT take, named so the next card can
The live episode's register refused a **discharge** into an 11 % pack and then
followed a **charge** three seconds later. A refusal in one direction is not
evidence about the other, and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade
on the first command that crosses it instead of on a timer — which would shrink
the 52 % above. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately does not take
(see the `soc` row and TEL-08), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's number.
It is **not needed to give the state an exit**, and folding it in here would
make the exit depend on a second measurement being right.
---
## 6. The measurement that says the old exit was luck
`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/` replayed at 1 Hz through the shipped
conjunction (`test_freshness.py` part 8b): **93 trips in 16 days.** The only
thing that could clear any of them was the register carrying a different number,
and that took:
| | |
|---|---|
| minimum | 0.6 s |
| **median** | **143.4 s** |
| maximum | **21440.1 s** (5 h 57 m) |
| at or over the live episode's 710 s | **17 of 93** |
The short waits are the BMS keep-alive pulse — SAFETY-50 measured its ceiling at
508 W — twitching `0x0518` and satisfying the clearing rule **by accident**.
Over a fifth of the trips are cleared in under 20 s by something nothing in this
add-on asked for.
⚠️ **WHAT THAT REPLAY IS AND IS NOT.** The capture runs 2026-09-02…17 and
0.10.0 — the first version carrying this gate — was cut on 2026-09-16, so the
setpoint column is an **ungated** controller's. That makes each trip an honest
register-versus-command divergence off the real bus, and it makes the post-trip
command column something a gated box would **not** have written. The figure
taken from it is therefore the only one that does not depend on the command at
all — how long this register goes without changing value — and it **under**-states
the wait, because a site parked at 0 W gives the register even less reason to
move than the one recorded here.
---
## 7. Survivors, and the two things the battery found
The battery is 22 mutations over `app/freshness.py`, `app/main.py` and
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`, plus one over the committed capture itself. All
run through `ci_run.sh`, a mirror of `checks.yml`'s own step: a purged copy of
the tree, bind-mounted `:ro`, one file at a time, `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1`.
Per MUTATION.md habit 18 the harness's scratch file is `mktemp`ed per
invocation and the tree is fingerprinted **after the revert** as well as before;
every revert restored the recorded sha256 and byte count.
**21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.** The table is in the
PR body. Two of them are worth keeping here.
### 7.1 The equivalent mutant, argued rather than rounded off
Swapping `_release()` and `_grade()` in `submit()` is a **zero-byte** edit and
survived the whole battery. **It is not a missing fixture and no fixture can
close it**: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()`
only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on any
read, whichever runs first.
⚠️ **THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CODE CLAIMED THE ORDER WAS LOAD-BEARING**, in a
`⚠️` comment, with a reason that sounded right. It was false, and the battery is
what said so — **MUTATION.md habit 22 exactly, one card later: an explanation in
a comment is a claim, and this one had not been run.** The comment now states
the disjointness, and part 10 pins **that** — at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W — instead of pinning an order that is not observable.
### 7.2 The sibling that survived, which is habit 11 earning its place
`_release()`'s obligation test is `abs(standing_w) >= self.bound.move_w`.
Swapping `move_w` for `unchanged_s` — comparing **watts against 35** — survived
the file at **+5 B**, because **every fixture rested at exactly 0 W**, and 0 is
below both 35 and 250. They separate only in the band between them, and a site
can sit there: a peak-guard floor, a shadow substitution, any claim that wins
with a small non-zero number. Closed by a three-point fixture at 0 / 100 / 300 W
that asserts the 100 W case releases and the 300 W case does not.
### 7.3 ⚠️ And the instrument lied once, which is habit 16's second half
The first form of the `graded_from` mutation was
`float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`. It reported a **survivor at +21 B**, and
the tree fingerprint showed the edit really was on disk and really did run.
`changed_mono` is **0.0** in the dead-register fixture, and `0.0 or x` is `x` —
so the mutant was a *no-op on the fixture*, for a Python truthiness reason that
has nothing to do with the property under test. Rewritten as an explicit
`is None` test (+82 B) it is red on four named checks.
**A mutation is subject to every habit in MUTATION.md, including habit 4.** A
purge, a fingerprint and a byte delta all say the edit is present; none of them
says the edit *changed the answer on this stimulus*. MUTATION.md gains habit 19
for it.
---
## 8. What this does NOT fix, said plainly
**It does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register**, and it does not
try to. Both are re-graded on the same timer. §5.1 names what telling them apart
would need.
**It does not make the diagnosis right.** The line the operator reads still says
*"battery-power register is not following its own command"*, which is wrong in a
different way when the pack is simply empty. That wording is **SAFETY-56's**,
together with `main.py`'s NOT READY row, and it is deliberately untouched here —
two cards editing one sentence is how one of them silently loses. Only the
**escape clause** was rewritten, because this card is what made the old one
false, and part 10h has a named check asserting the diagnosis half is still
there so that rewrite has to be a deliberate act.
> ⚠️ **SINCE SUPERSEDED, WHICH IS WHAT THAT CHECK WAS FOR.** [[SAFETY-56]] is
> the deliberate act: all three sentences now name **both** explanations and
> accuse neither, and part 10h's check is inverted — it requires the accusation
> to be **gone**. Nothing else in this section moved; the escape clause above is
> still this card's and is untouched by it. See
> `DECISIONS/SAFETY-56-what-the-gate-cannot-tell-apart.md`, and
> `test_freshness.py` part 11 for the graded pair of worlds.
**Survivor 5 is older than this card and is not closed by it.** After a long
rest the unchanged clock is already past 35 s, so the **first** read carrying a
travelled command trips the gate — before the 17.0 s in which a healthy register
could have answered it. The live capture contains one (10:48:14, cleared one
second later). Its size is one `stale_input_s` hold, during which `cycle()`
returns at `inputs missing {n}s` and commands nothing differently. Fixing it
means measuring the unchanged clock from when the **obligation** appeared rather
than from the register's last move, which re-derives the 35.0 s bound and is a
different card.
**Nothing was measured on two inverters.** Inverter B does not physically exist
(`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b). Every two-unit figure in `test_freshness.py` is two
copies of A's behaviour with different numbers passed in.
**No deploy is proposed.** 0.10.0 is on the reference install and this branch's
CHANGELOG row is filed under it only because `test_version_gate.py` part 11b
requires the newest heading to be a version. Moving it, and deciding whether a
version is cut, is a PKG card's.
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# SAFETY-61 — the control task's death ends the process
## 0. The defect
`amain()` started `run_control()` as a bare task and waited on `stop`. Nothing
watched the task. An uncaught exception in `read_inputs()`, `cycle()` or
`publish()` ended the task silently, and `stop` was never set. The web UI, P1
and tariff tasks kept running, and the Supervisor saw a healthy container. The
traceback appeared only at shutdown. The ESP32's layer-1 veto zeroed the
inverter about 30 s later, so the hardware was safe. The pack then sat at 0 W
indefinitely while the add-on showed green.
`test_control_task.py` reproduces this on the pre-fix tree. The child process
reaches its 40 s deadline, has written no 0 W, and has logged nothing.
## 1. Decision: exit with status 70 after the ordinary wind-down
A done-callback on the control task (`control_task_done()`) handles the death.
It logs the traceback at CRITICAL at the moment of death, then sets `stop`.
`amain()` then runs the same wind-down that SIGTERM runs (`shutdown()` →
`command_site_zero()`, then cancel, then clean up). After that it raises
`ControlTaskDied`, and `main()` turns that into `SystemExit(70)` (sysexits
EX_SOFTWARE). A normal stop and `run_control()`'s own refusal path both set
`stop` before the task ends, so the callback ignores them. The refusal still
exits with 78.
**Why not restart the loop in the same process:**
* `cycle()` writes controller state before its awaits: `cycle_at`,
`peak_guard`, `allocation`, then `target`/`reason`, then the writes. An
exception between those steps leaves the controller half-updated. A loop
restarted in the same process would continue from a state that no boot ever
produces. A process restart rebuilds the controller from the Store, which is
the path every boot already runs.
* An unbounded retry is the invisible spin the card forbids. A bounded retry
would reimplement the Supervisor watchdog's own throttle: 10 restarts per
30 min, and 5 attempts with backoff (`apps/const.py`).
## 2. What happens after the exit, verified rather than assumed
* **Exit status reaches Docker.** The add-on image (s6-overlay, `init: false`,
`CMD /run.sh`) was run with `exec python3 -c 'raise SystemExit(70)'`.
`docker inspect` gave ExitCode 70. The same test with exit 0 gave 0, and an
uncaught exception gave 1.
* **Supervisor 2026.08.0** (`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor`,
source read from the image):
* A non-zero container exit is recorded as `ContainerState.FAILED`
(`docker/monitor.py`). The Supervisor logs *"App … exited with non-zero
exit code 70"* at ERROR (`apps/app.py container_state_changed`).
* The Supervisor restarts the add-on **only if the per-install Watchdog
toggle is on**. `watchdog_container()` returns when `not self.watchdog`.
The toggle defaults to **off** (`apps/validate.py`:
`vol.Optional(ATTR_WATCHDOG, default=False)`).
* Add-on containers get **no Docker restart policy**. The only
`restart_policy=` in the Supervisor belongs to the observer.
* `boot: auto` in `config.yaml` only controls starting at host boot. The
`watchdog:` key in `config.yaml` is a health-check URL, not a restart
policy, and this add-on does not set it.
* **So on a default install the add-on stays stopped after this exit.** The UI
shows it as stopped, its log holds the traceback, and the Supervisor log holds
an ERROR line. The pack is at 0 W, which is the same physical state as before
this card. The difference is that 0 W is written immediately instead of after
the ~30 s veto, and the add-on no longer shows green. With the Watchdog toggle
on, the Supervisor restarts the add-on.
* **Not verified:** an actual restart by a running Supervisor. That would need a
live Supervisor, and the only one available is the live house.
## 3. Left open for the owner
* Whether `DOCS.md` should tell installers to enable Watchdog. DOCS.md is not
this card's file.
* Setting the Watchdog toggle from inside the add-on (`/addons/self/options`)
was rejected here, because it would change a user setting without the user
knowing.
## 4. Scope: the siblings, and why they are not supervised
* `run_tariff_refresh()` and the P1 HTTP and HA transports already catch
`Exception` inside their loops by design, and the values they feed are
age-bounded downstream.
* The P1 MQTT source *returns* on purpose when it is misconfigured. Making every
long-lived task's end exit the process would turn that deliberate fail-safe
into a restart loop.
* Only the control task is supervised.
## 5. `hass.py`: an undecodable body is an absence
A non-JSON `200` served as `text/html` was **already** treated as an absence,
because aiohttp's `ContentTypeError` is a `ClientError`. The reads that actually
escaped were these three:
* a malformed body labelled `application/json`, which raises `JSONDecodeError`
(a `ValueError`);
* a JSON body that is not an object, which raises `AttributeError` in
`number()` and `limits()`;
* an undecodable error body in `call()`, which raises `UnicodeDecodeError`.
All three were measured against aiohttp 3.13.5. The first two now read as
`None`, and the third is now a failed write (`False`).
## 6. Status row
`checks()` now starts with a *control loop* row showing how long ago the loop
last completed a pass. The row turns red once that age exceeds
`FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S`. The heartbeat is sent from this loop, so past that age
layer 1 has zeroed the inverter.
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
# TEL-11 — the PV production channel
*What was decided, what it was decided against, and what the evidence was.*
## 0. The problem, in OPT-10's numbers
Over sixteen days at the reference site the pack reached 90 % SoC on **two** of
them, and **20.5 kWh of surplus left the site while the pack still had room** —
**12.6 kWh** of it with the battery **not charging at all**. That single
measurement is upstream of most of what else was found that week: the nightly
floor, SAFETY-37's misdiagnosis, the SAFETY-57 deadlock, a 2 h 47 min saturation
freeze.
It cannot be **attributed**, because **PV production is recorded nowhere in this
system**. Three causes need three different fixes:
| cause | fix |
|---|---|
| there was no irradiance | none — the site behaved correctly |
| production was there, charge power was limited | a limit, somewhere |
| production was there, the pack had room, the optimiser declined | **the only software defect** |
Guessing between them is how an optimiser gets tuned to solve a cloud problem.
**This card adds the channel and does not do the attribution.** Ship it, let it
record a week, OPT-10 picks it up with data.
## 1. It is an HA entity, not a register — and that is a product decision
The RS485 bus this add-on speaks carries the **battery** inverter it drives. On
nearly every site the PV inverter is a different box from a different vendor,
reporting into Home Assistant through its own integration; it is **not** on this
bus and there is no reason it would be. So the signal comes from an entity:
`pv_entity` takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's PV integration provides, any
brand HA can read.
Reading a register would have been cheaper on one house and wrong for a fleet —
the trade [[product-not-one-house]] names.
## 2. The sign convention: **positive is production**, and there is no `pv_invert`
> Reversed by TEL-14 (flag and negative caution): `DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md`.
### The convention is derived, not assumed
Two sign rules already ship, and both are recorded in `DOCS.md`'s *Sources*
table rather than inferred here:
* `meter_entity` — **positive must mean importing** (`meter_invert` flips it);
* `batt_entity` — **`+` = discharging** (`batt_invert` flips it).
Both are *"positive = power arriving at the house's AC bus"*. Production arrives
there too, so **positive = producing** is the continuation of the shipped
convention rather than a fresh choice.
### Why an invert flag would be over-building
The question is not "could a sensor be reversed" — it could. It is what a flag
would **buy**, and the answer is nothing, for two reasons that do not apply to
the two keys it would sit beside:
1. **Those two quantities are read by the control path; this one is read by
nothing.** `inv.batt` feeds SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and SAFETY-31's
circulating-power sensor (`_read_unit()`'s own docstring says so), so a
reversed battery sensor hands the site a plausible number it then **acts**
on — a latch that trips when it should not, or does not trip when it should.
`pv_w` reaches no decision at all (§4), so a reversed PV sensor cannot
mislead one.
2. **Production is unipolar, so the error is self-announcing.** Battery power
and grid power are legitimately negative half the time, which is exactly why
a flipped sign is invisible in them. A PV array does not consume: a reversed
sensor reads **−4 kW at noon**, in the first day of the very history this card
exists to create. An invert flag would let an installer *hide* that by
flipping it to something that looks right, and a second place for the sign to
be wrong is a second thing to get wrong.
So: the convention is documented in `config.yaml`, both translations, `DOCS.md`
and `app/pv.py`, the value is published **exactly as the sensor reports it**,
and there is no flag. `test_pv.py` part 1 pins `-8 W` through unchanged.
### And no negative-value alarm either
The tempting middle path — warn when the reading is negative — needs a
threshold, because a PV inverter's own standby draw makes a small negative
reading at night entirely ordinary. Any threshold here would be a number nobody
measured, in a card whose whole subject is not fabricating numbers. The
published row is the detector.
## 3. Absence is never zero, and it is not "dropped" either
This is the constraint that shaped the publication, and the obvious
implementation fails it.
`MqttPublisher.publish()` **skips** a `None` value. That is right for
`circulation` — its note in `main.py` says a missing per-unit reading should
leave the last figure standing rather than publish a zero that reads as health —
and it is **exactly wrong here**: a skipped row leaves Home Assistant holding
the last number it was told, *forever*, and the recorder then draws a **flat
line at that value through the outage**. Read back a week later that is
indistinguishable from a real measurement, and if the last value happened to be
small it manufactures precisely the *"there was no surplus to store"* conclusion
the card exists to **test**.
So TEL-11 publishes the absence, using Home Assistant's own mechanism:
> `homeassistant/components/mqtt/const.py`: `PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"`.
> `homeassistant/components/mqtt/sensor.py`, in the state-message handler:
> `if payload == PAYLOAD_NONE: self._attr_native_value = None; return` — and it
> is tested **before** the numeric branch, so it holds for a row carrying
> `device_class: power`.
> (github.com/home-assistant/core, branch `dev`, retrieved 2026-09-24. The
> shipped MQTT-sensor documentation says the same thing in its `state_topic`
> entry: *"a 'None' value will set the sensor to an unknown state"*.)
The entity therefore goes to **`unknown`** and the recorder stores a **gap**.
`mqtt.ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is a one-key set and `test_pv.py` part 3 asserts both
that the pv row gets this treatment **and that `circulation` still does not** —
widening the rule silently would be a behaviour change to another card's row.
⚠️ **What was NOT built, and why.** A per-entity `availability` block
(`availability_mode: all`, an extra retained topic) would also produce a
distinguishable state — `unavailable` rather than `unknown` — but it needs a
second topic, a second retained message, a change to `_payload()`'s
byte-order-sensitive key construction, and it survives restarts only if the
retention is right. The payload route is one branch in `publish()` and one
constant, and it is graded as **bytes on the topic** rather than as a claim
about HA's availability handling.
### Three states, not two
| state | frame | wire | page |
|---|---|---|---|
| no source (`pv_entity` unset) | no `pv` key | no topic, no entity | no row |
| no reading | `pv: None` | `goodwe_ctl/pv` = `None` | `PV —` + a caution naming the reason |
| zero watts | `pv: 0.0` | `goodwe_ctl/pv` = `0.0` | `PV 0 W` |
A failed read also **clears** the last good value (`_read_pv()` assigns on every
call), so a reading never outlives its own sensor. `test_pv.py` part 2 drives a
good read followed by a dead one, because a fixture that answers the same thing
forever cannot reach that failure — MUTATION.md habit 9's shape.
## 4. It must not become a control input, and that is graded twice
### In the suite
`test_pv.py` part 6 drives twelve cycles of the real `Controller.cycle()`
against a 6 kW export and asserts the commands written to the inverter are
**bit-identical** across `unset` / `no reading` / `0 W` / `8 kW` of production,
with a precondition check that the stimulus commands something at all (habit 1).
`inputs_ok` is asserted not to move either: a broken PV integration is **not** a
missing input, because nothing computes with it.
A computed census (habit 12 — the scope is derived from the tree, not typed)
then reports which of the 33 modules under `app/` mention the material in any
spelling, comments included. It is **three**: `pv.py`, `main.py`, `mqtt.py`. The
scanner's own red direction is exercised on every run.
### Across trees, by hash
`tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` is the pattern; `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is
this card's version of it, and **its control clause had to be different**, which
is worth stating because the difference is the interesting part.
SAFETY-56 changed wording and had to show behaviour did not move, so its
`--compare` **refuses** unless the `sentences` halves **differ** — otherwise the
two runs might be one tree twice. TEL-11's headline claim is the opposite shape:
with the option unset, **nothing** differs. "The documents are identical" is the
*result*, so it cannot also be the control. The two things proved instead are:
* the two runs came from **different trees** (`app/*.py` sha256 + byte count,
compared, and an identity is **refused**);
* **exactly one** side reacts to `pv_entity` — that side is the HEAD, the other
is a tree that does not have the option. Neither, or both, is refused.
It drives 41 stimulus cells (5 grid worlds × 8 PV schedules, plus a run stopped
part-way) and prints two documents per setting: `control` — every command
written, every `self.target`, `inputs_ok`, the loop's three fields, the
arbiter's resolution, the maintenance phase, tick by tick, **with no TEL-11
material in it** — and `telemetry`, which is everything the card is allowed to
move.
Measured, in the CI image, on purged trees:
```
HEAD is B; baseline is A (it does not react to `pv_entity`).
tree A 73296909170ec789237d6e704cce9ab0d9f83b3df1495a14d2497285c3041a12
tree B d5011b6a18e2e3803dc09cac0214b0378fa4c7388fc0ad8ad89b832a5c92af48
control A unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B set 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
telemetry A unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B set 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
OK 1/3 UNSET: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to the baseline tree.
OK 2/3 SET: the control document is byte-identical with the channel switched on.
OK 3/3 CONTROL OF THE CONTROL: the telemetry document DOES move when the
option is set (42 stimulus cells differ).
```
Note what clause 1 claims and clause 2 does not: **unset** is identical in
`control` *and* `telemetry`, which is stronger than "the control path is
untouched" — an install that does not set the option sees no change of any kind,
including its announcement and its status rows. **Set** is identical in
`control` only, which is the whole of "instrumentation, not an input".
## 5. Genuinely optional — and not a second `price_now_entity`
`price_now_entity` / `price_avg_entity` are legal **only** while
`price_provider` is `off`, and the add-on **refuses to start** otherwise. That
is the trap this card was told not to rebuild, and it is avoided structurally
rather than by intention:
* `validate.py` does not mention `pv_entity` at all. It cannot conflict with
anything, because nothing else reads it.
* the MQTT row lives in `OPTIONAL_SENSORS`, not `SENSORS`, and
`discovery_payloads()`'s new `include` argument **defaults to empty**. So a
caller that has never heard of `pv_entity` — every fixture in `test_mqtt.py`,
`tools/rehearse_roster.py`, anything written next year — announces exactly
what it announced before. `p1_age` solves the same problem the other way
round, with `omit`, because it is announced by default and withdrawn when the
meter is off; getting that direction wrong here would have left most installs
with an entity nothing feeds, which is the hazard `omit`'s own note names.
* the read is gated on the option, so an unset install makes **no state call at
all** — not a read that fails quietly.
* there is **no status row** when it is unset. `peak_forecast_entity` nags when
it is unset because an unset forecast leaves a money guard without an input;
this is instrumentation, and a permanent caution on every install that never
asked for a PV channel is the warning spam the card forbids.
* when it **is** set and the read fails, the row is `ok=False, warn=True` — a
**caution**. `status_payload()` builds `NOT READY` out of rows that are
neither `ok` nor `warn`, so a telemetry channel can never put a battery site
into `NOT READY`.
## 6. The unit is read off the entity, and an unreadable one is refused
`read_inputs()` guesses kW-or-W for `peak_forecast_entity` with
`abs(raw) < 50`, and that is safe there: nobody's quarter-hour demand forecast
is 50 W. It is **not** safe here — 30 W of real production at dusk is an
ordinary reading, and that heuristic would publish it as 30 kW.
So `pv.watts()` reads the entity's own `unit_of_measurement` and converts
against Home Assistant's own `UnitOfPower` table (`mW`, `W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`,
`TW`; every factor an exact power of ten). A sensor with **no** unit, or a unit
outside that table, is **refused by name** and the status page says which. The
refusal is loud; a guess would be silent, and a factor of 1000 in the one
channel that exists to be believed a week later is the worse failure.
⚠️ `BTU/h` is in HA's enum and is deliberately **not** in the table: its factor
is a measured conversion rather than a decimal shift, no PV integration
publishes in it, and a fabricated constant is what this repository's whole
process exists to prevent. It lands in the refusal, by name, and `test_pv.py`
part 1 pins that.
## 7. The mutation battery
Every check this card adds was driven by the mutation that defeats the claim it
names. Method: `cp -a` of the tree per mutation into a **unique** directory,
the edit applied there, `__pycache__` purged, the suites run in the CI image
with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, one file at a time. **The shipped tree is
never edited**, so habit 18's revert hazard — SAFETY-37's harness killed between
the edit and the `cp` that put the file back, and two harnesses sharing one
backup path — is closed by construction rather than by a verified revert. Each
row below records the byte delta, the file's sha256 before and after, and that
the mutated line was **read back off disk** before the run started.
| # | mutation | file | bytes | sha256 (first 16) before → after | red on |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | the `pv` row moved into `SENSORS`, i.e. announced on every install | `mqtt.py` | −79 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `532d3954c023bf3d` | 3 named in `test_mqtt.py`, 1 in `test_pv.py` |
| M2 | `publish()` drops a `None` `pv` row again, so HA keeps the last number | `mqtt.py` | −98 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `dd54be458f446475` | 1 named (the acceptance criterion itself) |
| M3 | `ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` widened past the one key it was written for | `mqtt.py` | +23 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `8fe571ebff3dacf4` | 1 named (`circulation` must still be dropped) |
| M4 | a dead sensor reported as **0 W** instead of an absence | `pv.py` | −1 B | `55ba7471e9995436` → `9eecc34152b7ac12` | 4 named |
| M5 | `_read_pv()` assigns only on a good read — a value outlives its sensor | `main.py` | +46 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `189802aa69ce166d` | 2 named |
| M6 | the unit is read and then ignored — a kW sensor published as watts | `pv.py` | −18 B | `55ba7471e9995436` → `ab19ef66c52f9379` | 2 named |
| **M7** | **`self.grid = self.grid − self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` — PV wired into the control path** | `main.py` | +106 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `c38216edb7c5c8db` | **2 named, plus `tel11_pv_trace.py` clause 2/3 on 26 of the 41 stimulus cells** |
| M8 | `optional_keys()` returns `("pv",)` unconditionally | `mqtt.py` | −52 B | `328d249b9d698ef6` → `86ff23efe3088ad8` | 3 named |
| M9 | the PV caution made a `bad` row, i.e. a dead sensor is a `NOT READY` | `main.py` | +1 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `45c74cab89943564` | 1 named |
| M10 | the read gate removed — an unset option is read once a second forever | `main.py` | −10 B | `c4d2cab34e50b5fd` → `b67baa8aba3019e8` | 2 named, **plus two crashes** |
`on_disk = True` for all ten: the mutated line was grepped back out of the file
after the edit and before the run (MUTATION.md reporting rule 2), and no
mutation is size-preserving, so rule 1's `+0 B` caveat does not arise.
⚠️ **M10's two extra reds are CRASHES, not named checks, and that is recorded
rather than tidied away.** Every `Hass` double in `test_inverter.py` and
`test_telemetry.py` predates this read and has no `state()` method, so an
unconditional PV read is an `AttributeError` rather than a failed assertion —
habit 20's shape, a red with no name attached. Fixing those fixtures would be a
change to what *their* checks report and belongs to whoever next touches them;
this card's own fixture has `state()` and grades the property by name.
⚠️ **M7's trace limb is where the two halves meet.** The mutant moves the
control document on 26 of 41 cells — every cell whose PV schedule produces a
READING. The five `none` cells and the five `zero` cells do **not** move, which
is correct and is worth seeing: subtracting nothing, and subtracting zero,
change nothing. A battery that only drove a dead sensor would have reported this
mutation as a survivor for the third time.
The clean tree those `before` hashes belong to: `app/main.py`
`c4d2cab34e50b5fd`, `app/mqtt.py` `328d249b9d698ef6`, `app/pv.py`
`55ba7471e9995436`.
### ⚠️ M7 was a SURVIVOR on the first battery, and the fixture was the reason
The card's **central** mutation — `self.grid = self.grid - self.pv_w` in
`read_inputs()`, i.e. exactly the defect the whole card forbids — came back
**green** on a six-file run at **+106 B**, on disk, purged, genuinely running.
The property did not hold; the fixture could not reach it. `test_pv.py` part 6
drove a **6 kW export over 12 cycles**, which puts the loop **against its
rail**: the command moves `slew_w` every cycle and −6000 W and −14 000 W of
apparent error produce the **same ramp, tick for tick**. MUTATION.md habit 23,
with a saturated actuator in place of a coinciding value — and the habit's list
of no-op-prone constructs is all *expressions*, so this is worth its own entry,
which it now has.
The fixture now drives a **600 W import the loop settles on**, with a
responsive meter (`grid = base − batt`) so the error actually closes, asserts
the resting target is well inside the rail, and asks habit 23's own question as
its own check: **shift the meter by the same 8 kW and confirm the commands
really would have moved.** On the first fixture that question answers *no*, in
one line. Every number in the table above is from the battery re-run against
the fixed tree.
⚠️ **A red count is a property of the suite as much as of the mutation.** These
name **this** tree at this commit; a later card that adds or re-bases a check
moves the number with the mutation untouched. Re-measure rather than inherit.
## 8. What none of this covers, with shapes
* **Home Assistant itself.** That `None` renders as `unknown` and that the
recorder keeps a gap is read out of HA's source and quoted in §3; no HA runs
in this suite. What is graded here is the bytes this add-on publishes.
* **Whether the operator's sensor tells the truth.** A sensor wired backwards,
or reporting DC where AC was meant, or a string instead of the array, is
published faithfully. §2 is the argument for why that is the right failure
mode; it is not a claim that it cannot happen.
* **A roster of more than one.** The row is a **site** row — there is one PV
array as far as this add-on is concerned — so nothing per-unit exists to
separate, and every fixture is the shipped roster of one.
* **The attribution.** This card records production. Whether the 20.5 kWh was
cloud, a limit or the optimiser is OPT-10's, and it needs a week of this
channel's history before it can be asked.
* **`tools/`, the firmware and the ingress HTML** are outside part 6's census.
* **The identity is only as wide as the stimulus.** `tel11_pv_trace.py` prints
its 41 cells with the documents for exactly that reason.
## 9. No `CHANGELOG.md` entry
`test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## ` heading that is not
`config.yaml`'s `version:`, and opening an `## Unreleased` section would mean
taking a packaging decision this card does not get to take. The operator account
is in `DOCS.md`; the release note belongs to the next PKG ticket, which should
say that **0.10.1 → next** adds one optional key, announces no new entity on an
install that does not set it, and changes no control behaviour.
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
# TEL-12 — several PV inverters, and why a partial total is worse than none
TEL-11 shipped `pv_entity` as a single `str?` in 0.11.0. The owner of the
reference site reported **within minutes of it going live** that they have
several PV inverters and could configure one.
That is not a property of one house. A multi-string or multi-orientation roof
routinely carries two or three inverters, each publishing its own power sensor
into Home Assistant, and the add-on is sold to clients. So the channel had to
become a roster.
**OPT-10 is blocked on this and cannot start recording until it lands.** Which
sets the bar: the number this channel publishes has to be one an attribution can
believe, or the week of history OPT-10 is waiting for is worse than no history.
---
## 1. The surface: `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity`, and the measurement that
decided it
Two candidates, and they differ on exactly one question nobody in this
repository could answer by reading: **does Supervisor accept a stored STRING for
a key whose schema has become a LIST?** 0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity: str?`; the
live install *has* a string persisted in it; and an upgrade that refuses that
string leaves an add-on which will not start — CFG-04 §B's trap, in the other
direction, with the schema needed to fix it pinned to the version that cannot be
installed.
It was measured, against the release image, by a new **§G** of
`tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` — the instrument CFG-04 built for exactly this
kind of question:
```
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/w:ro" -v "$PWD/tools:/probe:ro" --entrypoint python3 \
ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 \
/probe/supervisor_shape_probe.py
```
```
== G. TEL-12: the SHAPE of a several-inverter PV option ==
PASS the shipped defaults with a 0.11.0 `pv_entity` STRING on top are ACCEPTED - the baseline every refusal below is varied from
pv_entity='sensor.pv_power' pv_entities=[]
PASS ⭐ THE MEASUREMENT THAT DECIDED THE SURFACE: with `pv_entity` declared as a LIST, the string an 0.11.0 install has persisted is REFUSED, and the refusal names the key - so that shape would leave the live add-on unable to start on upgrade
Invalid list for option 'pv_entity' in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...and a shipped `pv_entity: []` DEFAULT does not rescue it: deepmerge's list strategy is `override`, so the operator's string survives the merge and is refused anyway
Invalid list for option 'pv_entity' in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...(the list shape itself is fine - it is only the STORED STRING it refuses, which is what makes this a migration and not a schema question)
a list value validates
PASS ⚠️ ONE SPELLING DOES ACCEPT BOTH - `match(.*)?` - AND IT IS REJECTED FOR A DIFFERENT REASON, MEASURED HERE: it validates NOTHING. A string passes, a list passes, and so does the integer 417; and the Configuration tab renders it as a plain text box rather than a repeatable field, so an operator cannot enter a second inverter in the UI at all
string=True list=True integer-417=True ui=[{"name": "pv_entity", "optional": true, "type": "string"}]
PASS ⭐ THE SHIPPED SHAPE: an 0.11.0 blob - `pv_entity` a string, no `pv_entities` key at all, because it did not exist when that blob was written - validates against THIS manifest, with the new key defaulted to the empty list. The live install upgrades without touching its options
PASS ...and a three-entity roster validates, per-entry, with both keys set - which the add-on resolves by REPLACEMENT and says so on its status page
["sensor.pv_east", "sensor.pv_west", "sensor.pv_garage"]
PASS ⭐ ...and the shipped `options:` block with ONLY `pv_entities` removed is REFUSED, BY NAME - `Missing option 'pv_entities' in root`. That is why the `pv_entities: []` default is load-bearing, exactly as `inverters: []` is: Supervisor treats a nested list as required unless its element is an OPTIONAL scalar, and `- str` is not one
Missing option 'pv_entities' in root in GoodWe RS485 Controller (local_goodwe_controller)
PASS ...and the Configuration tab renders it as a REPEATABLE string field (`multiple: true`), so an operator adds their second and third inverter in the UI rather than in YAML
[{"name": "pv_entity", "optional": true, "type": "string"}, {"name": "pv_entities", "multiple": true, "required": true, "type": "string"}]
PASS a DOWNGRADE to a schema without `pv_entities` drops the key with a warning rather than refusing, and leaves `pv_entity` standing - so rolling back to 0.11.0 returns the install to its single entity rather than bricking it
== all cases passed ==
```
| Claim | Evidence |
|---|---|
| **Option 1 — `pv_entity` becomes a list — cannot ship** | §G: `Invalid list for option 'pv_entity'` on the string an 0.11.0 install has stored |
| …and a `[]` default does not rescue it | §G: `_OPTIONS_MERGER`'s list strategy is `override`, so the operator's string survives the merge and is refused anyway |
| …and it is not a *schema* problem | §G: a list **value** validates fine against a list schema. It is a **migration**, and a migration is a bigger ticket than this |
| **One key CAN carry both shapes** — `match(.*)?` | §G, and reported even though it *passes*, because "no spelling accepts both" would have been a **false reason** to reject option 1 |
| …and it loses anyway, for a measured reason | §G: it validates nothing at all — a string, a list, and the integer `417` all pass — and the Configuration tab renders it as a plain text box, so an operator cannot add a second inverter in the UI |
| **Option 2 — `pv_entities` beside `pv_entity` — ships** | §G: the 0.11.0 blob validates untouched, the new key defaults to `[]`, three entities validate, the UI renders `multiple: true` |
| `pv_entities: []` in `options:` is load-bearing | §G: the shipped defaults **minus only that key** are refused with `Missing option 'pv_entities' in root` — CFG-04 §B's isolated counterfactual, for this key |
| A downgrade is not the trap in reverse | §G: a schema without the key **drops** it and leaves `pv_entity` standing |
`p1_phase_import_entities` (`options: []` + `schema: - str`) is the shipped
precedent for the pair; nothing new was invented.
**So the surface is uglier than option 1 and that is the correct trade.** The
cleanest surface that breaks the one install this card exists to fix is not the
cleanest surface.
### And `pv_entities` REPLACES `pv_entity` rather than extending it
CFG-04's rule for `inverters:` ("declared, it REPLACES those six keys"), applied
to the only upgrade path that matters. The install being upgraded **has**
`pv_entity` set, to inverter A. Opening the Configuration tab, the natural action
is to put *all* the inverters in the new repeatable field — and under a union
rule that **double-counts A** unless the operator also remembers to clear the old
key. A doubled total is the same defect as a partial one pointing the other way,
in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later.
Under replacement the effective roster is exactly what one key says, and no
arithmetic depends on a de-duplication rule the operator has to know about. It
de-duplicates *within* the list (a site cannot have two sensors with one
entity_id, so a repeated id is a typo that would double that inverter), and
`Controller.checks()` prints a **caution** whenever both keys are set saying
which one won — a replacement nobody is told about is the "one of which silently
wins" `config.yaml` refuses elsewhere.
⚠️ It is a **caution and never a refusal to start**. `validate.py` still does not
mention either key. A telemetry channel that could stop a battery site from
starting would be observability with a foot in the control path.
---
## 2. ⚠️⚠️ The decision the card turns on: absence of ONE is absence of the TOTAL
Three inverters configured, one `unavailable`. The sum of the other two is **a
smaller number indistinguishable from a real one.** Fed into OPT-10's
attribution it reads as *"there was less PV than there was"* — which is the "no
irradiance" conclusion the channel exists to **test** rather than to manufacture.
Two designs were genuinely available:
**(a) publish the total as absent** — `pv.total()` answers `None`, the topic
carries HA's own `None`, the entity goes to `unknown`, the recorder stores a gap.
**(b) publish the partial sum alongside a count of how many contributed.**
**(a) shipped.** It wins on the one question that matters, which is *who reads
the number and when*:
* The **MQTT row** is read back **cold**, a week later, by OPT-10 and by anything
that plots `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` over that week. A partial sum there is a
smaller number indistinguishable from a real one, and the count that would
have qualified it lives in a **second entity with its own history** — so
believing the total requires joining two recorder series by timestamp to find
out which samples to distrust. Nobody re-derives that. And it is worse than a
gap in exactly the direction that matters: **a gap makes the attribution say
"I do not know"; a partial makes it say something false.**
* The **status page** is read **live**, by a human who wants the diagnostic. So
the partial information is *not* thrown away — the row names every entity that
did report, with its watts, and every one that did not, with its reason, and
states plainly that there is no site total. Different reader, different
instant, different rule.
A count published beside the total would also carry **no information** in the
state (a) admits: the total is published *only* when every entity contributed, so
the count would be the constant `len(roster)`.
And this **extends** TEL-11's rule rather than weakening it. `mqtt.py`'s
`ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is still exactly one key and `publish()`'s `None` handling is
untouched: the line that turns an absence into HA's `unknown` did not have to
change, because "absence is never zero" already covered this one layer up.
### The mirror, which matters just as much
A member honestly reporting **0 W** is **summed**, not treated as absent. The
test is `watts is None`, never falsiness. Shading, a tripped string and
nightfall are all real zeros, and a roster that blanked the site whenever one
member read zero would report an absence **on every clear evening** and defeat
the channel from the other end.
### ⚠️ And the answer is NOT "document a template sensor that adds them up"
An operator may legitimately prefer one, and `pv_entity` will happily point at
it. Shipping it as *the* answer pushes the absence problem onto them unseen: a
template sensor summing an `unavailable` source silently yields the partial
total — the same defect one layer down, in a place this add-on cannot see or
report. DOCS.md says so in those terms.
### The three published states, side by side
| what happened | frame | `goodwe_ctl/pv` | status page |
|---|---|---|---|
| no roster at all | no `pv` key | no topic, no entity | no row |
| 1200 / 2100 / 450 W, all three | `pv: 3750.0` | `3750.0` | `PV 3 750 W` + one ok row naming all three |
| all three answer, one of them `0 W` | `pv: 1650.0` | `1650.0` | `PV 1 650 W` |
| one of the three `unavailable` | `pv: None` | `None` → `unknown`, recorder **gap** | `PV —` + a caution naming the missing entity, its reason, and what the others reported |
| all three gone | `pv: None` | as above | as above |
---
## 3. Still not a control input
Unchanged, and re-proved at the new roster size.
`tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` was **extended rather than replaced** — the file name
still says TEL-11 because `DECISIONS/TEL-11-pv-production.md` §5 and
`test_pv.py`'s mutation table quote it, and a renamed instrument makes both
references dangle for no gain.
It now produces **three** document sets per tree — `unset`, `one`, `multi` — and
grades five claims. The roster cells live in their own document precisely so
`unset` and `one` keep the `control` hashes TEL-11 recorded; appending cells to
an existing document would have moved a hash whose stability is itself the
evidence.
```
$ python3 tools/tel11_pv_trace.py --compare base.json head.json
HEAD is B; baseline is A - its roster cells ARE its unset cells, which is what a tree that has never heard of `pv_entities` does with them.
supports_roster A False / B True (self-reported; the verdict above is MEASURED)
tree A fa92ba6a6fc6d49c0f87a494e03b530a8575212a0b2c3046629cb400ef2ae0d4
tree B 0b39198015b6a5a3f7538d4157d77ecadc89311daef18fce883762d94d8351eb
control A unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control A one 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control B one 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control A multi 2aafbfedfb9cc939082b36eeb7493289808fb21cd41113322d4817de0e414a30
control B multi 2aafbfedfb9cc939082b36eeb7493289808fb21cd41113322d4817de0e414a30
telemetry A unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry B unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry A one 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
telemetry B one 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
telemetry A multi d269168ffece375027c2c18ea33631a961ff92775781884a0592d6a37d78845c
telemetry B multi 550a49a73f39267ba28b1e78cd12b8f5c71ef7269bbbd2e12112696be0fef1ff
OK 1/5 UNSET: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to the baseline tree. …
OK 2/5 ONE ENTITY: control AND telemetry are byte-identical to 0.11.0's single-entity path - the same commands, the same payloads, the same status rows, the same announcement.
OK 3/5 CONTROL, ONE ENTITY: the control document is byte-identical with the channel switched on - PV reaches no decision.
OK 4/5 CONTROL, THREE ENTITIES: every roster cell's control document equals its grid world's `unset` one - 30 cells over 5 grid worlds, covering three healthy entities, one dead at EVERY position, all three dead and one honestly reporting 0 W. Neither the total nor any PARTIAL total reaches a decision, and the document is byte-identical to the BASELINE tree's for the same cells.
OK 5/5 CONTROL OF THE CONTROL: the telemetry document DOES move under a roster (30 stimulus cells differ from their grid world's unset telemetry), so 1/5-4/5 are identities this instrument could have broken. AND in no cell with a dead member does the PV row carry the partial sum of the survivors, while every cell whose members all ANSWER publishes its total - including the one where a member honestly reports 0 W.
$ echo $?
0
```
**The control hash is unmoved: `846a10a5b89e…` on `unset` and on `one`, on both
trees.** The roster control document `2aafbfedfb9c…` is byte-identical between
the two trees, which is the strongest available form of the claim — the baseline
runs those cells with a key it has never heard of, so its control document for
them *is* 0.11.0's.
⚠️ **2/5 is a claim TEL-11 could not make.** TEL-11's baseline had no channel at
all to be identical to; TEL-12's baseline is 0.11.0, so "one entity behaves
exactly as 0.11.0 does" is a real cross-tree identity over **both** documents.
`pv.total()` passes a single entity's `(watts, why)` through verbatim for exactly
this reason, and `Controller.checks()` keeps 0.11.0's two f-strings in a
`len(...) == 1` branch rather than generalising them.
### ⚠️ TEL-11's `--compare` refusal had to change, and that is a finding
TEL-11's rule was *"exactly ONE side's `set` document may differ from its own
`unset` — that side is the HEAD"*. It was correct evidence when written, because
`release/1.0` predated `pv_entity` entirely. `release/1.0` is 0.11.0 now, **both**
sides react to `pv_entity`, and that refusal fires on **every honest run**. The
discriminator is the roster instead: only the HEAD has heard of `pv_entities`, so
only the HEAD's `multi` document fails to reduce to its own `unset` one.
It is asserted from the **documents**, not from `tree.supports_roster` — a
self-report is the tree describing itself, whereas "this side's behaviour did not
move when `pv_entities` was set" is the tree being measured. `supports_roster` is
printed beside the verdict so a disagreement between the two is visible.
See MUTATION.md habit 24.
---
## 4. Mutation battery
Twelve mutations, each on a **fresh `cp -a`** of the clean worktree (never
reverted — habit 18 / TARIFF-09's method), `__pycache__` purged before the run
and the tree checked for one afterwards, byte delta from `stat` and the edit
confirmed on disk with `cmp`, suites run in the CI image with `checks.yml`'s own
command one file at a time under a `:ro` mount.
| mutation | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---|
| N1 `total()` returns the partial sum, not an absence | +42 B | 6 named in `test_pv.py` + 1 crash |
| **N1b ⭐ THE REJECTED DESIGN: the partial sum with a contributor count** | −282 B | **10 named + the trace `REFUSED 5/5`** |
| N2 absence tested by falsiness (`not w`) | −4 B | 2 named |
| N3 `pv_entities` UNIONS with `pv_entity` | −27 B | 3 named |
| N4 the de-duplication dropped | −15 B | 1 named |
| N5 `sum` → `max` over the roster | **+0 B** | 6 named |
| N6 the roster-of-one stops passing `why` through | +13 B | 8 named |
| N7 `optional_keys()` back to reading `pv_entity` | −6 B | 1 named + 1 crash |
| N8 `self.grid -= self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` | +106 B | 3 named + the trace (52 cells on 2/5, 26 on 3/5, 10 on 4/5) |
| N9 the roster caution made a `bad` row (NOT READY) | +1 B | 1 named |
| N10 `entity_is_ignored()` always False | +10 B | 2 named |
| N11 `pv_entities: []` deleted from `options:` | −18 B | 2 named in `test_translations.py` + `11 CASE(S) FAILED` in the probe |
**No survivors.**
⚠️ **N5 is `+0 B` — the risky delta.** `sum` and `max` are the same three
characters, so neither the file size nor its mtime moved, and TEST-15's
stale-bytecode defect is exactly what manufactures a survivor there. The run was
on a fresh purged copy and `cmp` confirmed the edit on disk before it started.
⚠️ **N1b is the row that matters, and it is not a defect.** It is the *other*
defensible design, implemented and run. The point is that the checks and the
instrument can **tell the two apart** — an unexamined partial sum is what the
card forbids, so a check that could not see one would be decoration:
```
REFUSED 5/5: THE PARTIAL SUM IS ON THE WIRE at [('EXPORT-6K/EAST-DEAD', '2550.0'),
('EXPORT-6K/GARAGE-DEAD', '3300.0'), ('EXPORT-6K/WEST-DEAD', '1650.0'),
('IMPORT-3K/EAST-DEAD', '2550.0'), ('IMPORT-3K/GARAGE-DEAD', '3300.0'),
('IMPORT-3K/WEST-DEAD', '1650.0')] … - a smaller number indistinguishable from a
real one, which is the defect this card exists to prevent.
```
⚠️ **N8's 1/5 stays GREEN and that is correct rather than a miss.** With no PV
entity configured `pv_w` is `None` and the leak cannot fire — which is what makes
1/5 a claim about the **default** and 2/5–4/5 the claims about the channel.
### The fixture values are the design (habit 10 and habit 23)
`test_pv.py` carries **two** rosters over the same three entities, because the
two claims need different magnitudes and one fixture cannot serve both.
* **Parts 8–10: 1200 W + 2.1 kW + 450 W = 3750 W.** The sum is separable from
max (2100), min (450), first (1200), last (450), mean (1250), count (3) and
every partial of itself (2550 / 1650 / 3300) — the family is computed, printed
and asserted non-colliding as its own precondition. One member is in **kW** so
"correct against their own units" is exercised. **Not one member is zero**: a
member contributing 0 W could go absent without moving the sum of the rest, and
a fixture like that cannot tell "published the absence" from "published the
partial sum" — habit 23 with a coinciding value in the *fixture* rather than in
the plant, which is precisely the trap the brief named. Absence is driven at
**every position** of the roster, not at one (habit 10's fixture-as-a-SET), and
each position's partial is **derived from the fixture** rather than typed
beside it.
* **Part 6: 1500 W + 4.5 kW + 2000 W = 8000 W.** Sized so every *partial*
(6500 / 3500 / 6000) would still **move** a loop settling on a 600 W import.
Habit 23's own question is asked twice — shift the meter by 8000 W, and again
by 3500 W, the smallest partial any single dead member could produce — because
a leak of the partial is a different mutation leaking a smaller number.
### Two false results this card produced, and what they were
Both were in the **instrument**, and both are recorded rather than tidied away.
1. `partial_w`/`partial_wire` were first written **inside** each telemetry cell.
They are a fact about the *stimulus*, produced by the tool and identical on
both trees — so every roster cell differed from its unset reference for a
reason that was not behaviour, and the HEAD/baseline discriminator fired on
*both* sides. They live in a separate top-level `partials` map now.
2. The `WEST-ZERO` cell (all three answer, one honestly reporting 0 W) had its
**true total** labelled as its "partial". 5/5 then refused the *shipped* tree
for publishing 1650 W, which it is required to publish. A cell with no dead
member has no partial to leak, and `never` is `None` there.
---
## 5. What none of this can see
* **Home Assistant itself.** That `None` on the state topic renders as state
`unknown` and that the recorder keeps a gap is read out of HA's source and
quoted in `app/mqtt.py`; whether the long-term statistics table then
interpolates across the gap is HA's behaviour, and OPT-10 will be reading it.
* **Whether the operator's sensors are telling the truth.** A sensor wired
backwards reads −4 kW at noon and is summed as −4 kW. There is deliberately no
`pv_invert` — §2 of the TEL-11 record is the argument, and it holds at a roster.
* **A roster larger than three.** Three is the smallest size at which the sum
separates from the reduction family *and* absence can be driven at every
position. Nothing here says what twenty entities do to a cycle's latency — the
read is `asyncio.gather`ed across the roster for exactly that reason, so a slow
sensor costs what one costs, but that is an argument rather than a measurement.
* **A PV roster combined with a two-inverter battery roster.** No fixture
crosses CFG-04's `inverters:` with `pv_entities`.
* **The real MQTT transport, and wall-clock behaviour.** As TEL-11.
---
## 6. Not deployable as merged
`config.yaml` stays at `0.11.0`, so `tools/predeploy_check.py` reports a NO-OP
until PKG cuts a version. A CHANGELOG entry is **wanted** and was deliberately
not written: `test_version_gate.py` 11b forbids an `## Unreleased` heading and
the bump is PKG's call. The material an entry needs is this file.
The option surface moves **76 keys → 77**, one new optional key, `pv_entities`,
empty on every install that does not set it.
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# TEL-14 — the PV sign, declared per entity
Owner report on 0.12.0: `sensor.espressif_vermogen` (ESPHome clamp) and
`sensor.kwh_meter_actueel_vermogen` (kWh meter in the PV circuit) read
**positive for consumption, negative for production**. At night the page said
"✓ PV production: 13 W" — standby draw. By day production would publish negative.
## 1. This reverses TEL-11 §2, and why
TEL-11 §2 refused a `pv_invert` on two grounds. "PV is read by nothing in the
control path" still holds: the flip lives in `pv.total()`, and `test_pv.py`
part 12 re-runs part 6's 40-cycle identity with a flip set. "A reversed sensor
announces itself" did not survive a real site: these sensors follow a different
convention, read a plausible small positive number at night, and the only other
fix is a template sensor, the place TEL-12 §2 says goes quietly wrong.
## 2. The shape: a parallel list, `pv_invert_entities`
Measured by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §H (Supervisor 2026.08.0, against
a 0.12.0 blob); re-run it for the transcript.
| shape | schema | why it lost / won |
|---|---|---|
| (a) `-sensor.x` prefix | accepted | invisible: the sign is a syntax only the description explains, in a field an installer fills with the entity picker's text |
| (b) parallel list | accepted, 0.12.0 blob unchanged | **ships**: its own labelled, translated field ("PV entities whose sign is reversed"); an installer lists the odd ones out |
| (c) dicts on `pv_entities` | **refuses 0.12.0's stored strings** | bricks the upgrade — TEL-12's trap again |
| (c2) dicts as a third key | accepted | per-entry labels render raw (`entity`, `invert`) — probe §F; and a third PV surface |
| (d) global bool | accepted | one sign cannot describe inverter + meter in one roster |
(b)'s known cost is a typo in the second list: `pv.stray_inverts()` turns it into
a named caution. `[]` in `options:` is load-bearing (§H, isolated counterfactual).
Default `[]` flips nothing, so every 0.12.0 install is byte-identical (part 12).
## 3. The negative caution: per entity, below −50 W
The owner's two meters draw ~13 W at night, so a *correctly* signed meter reads
about −13 W then. −50 W clears that with room for a few such devices behind one
entity; a reversed sensor by day reads hundreds to thousands of watts below
zero. It is tested **per entity, not on the total** (a deviation from the brief):
three correct meters at −20 W sum to −60 W and must stay quiet, while a reversed
−1500 W hidden inside a positive total must not. It is a caution, never `bad`;
a wrong threshold costs a spurious or missed caution, never data. The text says
ADD (unflipped) or REMOVE (already flipped).
## 4. Mutations
Fresh `cp -a` each, `__pycache__` purged, CI image, `:ro`, `--network none`;
`test_pv.py` only unless stated. T1-T12 at 7559d21; M2/M5 are review #1628's,
red since B1 (merged into release/1.0 @ 43b2740).
| # | mutation | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | flip ignored in `total()` | −45 | 9 |
| T2 | flip applied to every member | −7 | 6 |
| T3 | `0.0 - w` → `-w` | −5 | 1 |
| T4 | flip written as `abs()` | −1 | 2 |
| T5 | `_read_pv()` stops passing the flip | −26 | 7 |
| T6 | caution threshold −50 → 0 W | −17 | 3 |
| T7 | `[sign inverted]` marker dropped | −39 | 3 |
| T8 | negative caution made `bad` | +1 | 1 |
| T9 | `stray_inverts()` always empty | −50 | 1 |
| T10 | `inverted()` stops stripping | −8 | 1 |
| T11 | ADD/REMOVE advice swapped | +4 | 2 |
| T12 | `pv_invert_entities: []` deleted from `options:` | −25 | 2 test_translations + 17 probe |
| M2 | `stray_inverts()` roster ignores `pv_entity` | +15 | 2 (REPORTED CASE, PADDING) |
| M5 | `_read_pv()` flip set not stripped | +25 | 1 (PADDING) |
## 5. History
OPT-10's `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` recorded since 2026-09-24 on an install with
such sensors carries the old sign; nothing rewrites it.
## 6. CHANGELOG entry for the next PKG cut
Not written into `CHANGELOG.md`: `test_version_gate.py` 11b/11d refuse an
`## Unreleased` heading (measured on this branch: 4 reds). For PKG to paste:
> **`pv_invert_entities` (TEL-14).** A PV sensor that reads negative while
> producing — typically a kWh meter or power clamp in the PV circuit — can now
> be listed under *PV entities whose sign is reversed* in the Configuration tab;
> its sign is flipped before the sum and the status page marks it. Empty (the
> default) changes nothing. ⚠️ PV history recorded before you set it keeps the
> old sign.
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
# UX-08 phase 2a: short notifications, and what moved out of them
The owner decided on 2026-09-27: a title of at most about 5 everyday words and a one-sentence body. A red safety alarm may use up to 3 sentences, so no action-relevant information is lost. Titles are neutral, with no "GoodWe:" prefix. HA entity ids appear only in refusals. The rule is `STYLE.md` at the repository root, the texts are in `app/messages.py`, and `test_messages.py` enforces both. The detail each notification used to carry is in DOCS.md under "Notifications", and the body links to it.
**Unchanged:** every `notification_id`, every trigger and cadence (edges, SAFETY-34 re-announce, per-unit ids), every log line and every status row. The status banner and rows are phase 2b, refusals and option texts 2c, logs 2d; `ux08_allowlist.txt` lists them until then.
## Where a choice was made
1. **Severity of "not delivering" (SAFETY-42).** The notification is an *alarm*, so it may use 3 sentences. Its log line is ERROR and the alarm is latched. The page banner stays amber, as SAFETY-42 decided, because control keeps running; the two answer different questions (is control running / must a person act) and HA shows no colour on a notification. The three checks stay in their original order. Clearing it takes stop then start, and the body says so.
2. **Figures left the bodies** of the frozen-meter card (the rail and the command), the circulating-power card (the watts and the time window) and the peak cards (the projection). None of them is needed to act, and all of them are still in the reason text that the log line and the status row carry. `test_freeze.py` and `test_watchdog.py` now pin that. The frozen-meter card can therefore no longer quote a wrong rail (SAFETY-20), because it quotes none.
3. **The over-rating alarm keeps its numbers** (asked, sent, and which limit cut it), because they are what a fault report needs. `ClampWatchdog.facts` carries them under the same keep-the-bug rule as `reason`, so the words and the numbers always describe the same tick, with asked before sent (SAFETY-40, `test_clamp.py` part 6).
4. **SAFETY-25 stays in the peak-reserve alarm** as its last sentence ("the reserve only limits peak shaving … down to its cut-out level"). The alarm now gives each branch its own action: at the reserve, lower it; battery level unread, check the sensor; floor unknown, set the cut-out level. That last branch is `soc_floor is None`, which happens when an inverter's cut-out level is missing, not the peak reserve (that option always has a value). Before, every branch said "lower peak_soc_floor". The title, "Battery stopped limiting the peak", is true on all three branches.
5. **SAFETY-32 at a roster of one.** The body no longer ends in a separate "WHICH PACK" paragraph. The pack's name is part of the first sentence ("The battery of inverter-b …"), and at a roster of one that is the only difference.
6. **Dropped as background, now in DOCS:** "charging stays blocked" (peak reserve), "why no other guard fired" (circulating power, not delivering), and the saturation-freeze distinction (over-rating). "The meter cannot see this" stays in the circulating-power card, as the owner asked.
7. **The Details link** opens the add-on's documentation page (`/hassio/addon/<slug>/documentation`, with the slug taken from the container hostname) and names the section. A `#heading` anchor was not used because nobody has checked that Home Assistant's documentation tab renders heading ids; if it does, adding one is a one-line change. Outside an add-on container it names the section without a link.
+389 -18
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over its RS485 meter bus: holds net grid
exchange at zero, and runs a monthly battery maintenance cycle so the BMS can
balance cells and recalibrate its coulomb counter.
Installers: read `FIELD-GUIDE.md` in the repository. It is not optional reading —
it contains the commissioning gates and the failure modes.
Installers: the printed field guide (`docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf`) is
v0.1.0 and outdated; where it disagrees with this page, this page wins.
## Before you start
@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ You need:
- A T-CAN485 (ESP32) flashed with `firmware/goodwe-master.yaml`
- A grid-power sensor already working in Home Assistant, updating every ~5–10 s
After installing, turn on **Watchdog** on the add-on's Info tab. A crashed
control loop stops the add-on at 0 W, and the Supervisor restarts it only when
Watchdog is on (it is off by default). See
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-61-control-task-death.md`.
## The safety model, in short
The inverter **holds its last command forever** — it has no meter-timeout. So:
@@ -139,6 +144,9 @@ either direction, and the check is mutation-tested both ways.
| `batt_invert` | | Flip if needed |
| `capacity_kwh` | | This pack's usable capacity. Read only to divide the site target between packs by **energy** headroom — see below |
| `setpoint_entity` | yes | The ESPHome `number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w` |
| `pv_entity` | | Optional. **One** solar inverter's power sensor, `+` = producing. Measurement only — it changes no control behaviour. See [PV production](#pv-production-pv_entity-tel-11) |
| `pv_entities` | | Optional. **Several** solar inverters, one row each — use this instead of `pv_entity` when your roof has more than one. Setting it **ignores** `pv_entity`. See [Several PV inverters](#several-pv-inverters-pv_entities-tel-12) |
| `pv_invert_entities` | | Optional. The PV entities above that read **negative** while producing; each one's sign is flipped. See [The sign](#the-sign-and-pv_invert_entities-tel-14) |
Use the ESP32's readings rather than the inverter's cloud or dongle sensors:
those serve cached values, and a stale reading here ends the maintenance charge
@@ -163,12 +171,14 @@ inverters:
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_a_soc
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_a_battery_power
max_w: 5000
bms_soc_floor: 10
capacity_kwh: 15.36
- name: inverter-b
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_b_setpoint_w
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_soc
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power
max_w: 4600
bms_soc_floor: 10
capacity_kwh: 20.48
```
@@ -188,16 +198,18 @@ inverter's own **AC** power. If it is DC the AC-side ceiling is nearer 4324 W.
| `name` | yes | Short identifier. It namespaces this unit's SAFETY-02 latch, heartbeat and write bookkeeping in the add-on's state file, so **two units may not share one** |
| `setpoint_entity` | yes | This inverter's own ESPHome `number.*_goodwe_setpoint_w` |
| `max_w` | yes | The supervised cap on what may be written to **this** inverter. The site's ceiling is the **sum** |
| `bms_soc_floor` | yes | This pack's own BMS cut-out percent (SAFETY-32). See [`bms_soc_floor`](#tariff-all-optional) |
| `soc_entity` | | This pack's state of charge |
| `batt_entity` | | This unit's battery power, `+` = discharging |
| `batt_invert` | | Flip if needed |
| `capacity_kwh` | | This pack's usable capacity. State it on every entry or on none — see [OPT-09](#how-the-site-target-is-divided-between-the-packs-opt-09) |
⚠️ **Nothing is inherited.** An entry that leaves out `soc_entity` has **no SoC
sensor** — it does *not* fall back to the flat one. That is deliberate: every
per-device value became per-instance in 0.5.x precisely so that no inverter is
ever graded against a sibling's numbers, and a silent fallback would rebuild
that in YAML. `name`, `setpoint_entity` and `max_w` are required of every entry
for the same reason: there is no rating to borrow.
that in YAML. `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and `bms_soc_floor` are required
of every entry for the same reason: there is no rating or cut-out to borrow.
⚠️ **Clear the flat `setpoint_entity` when you declare a roster,** or the add-on
refuses to start and says so. It is the single-inverter form and it is not read
@@ -371,11 +383,201 @@ the number of cycles needed to unwind it is that lead divided by `slew_w`.
Both numbers are `state_class: measurement`, so Home Assistant's recorder keeps
long-term statistics for them.
⚠️ **`Loop integrator lead` is BOUNDED, and the bound is two slew steps.** While
the slew limit is what is holding the command back, the integrator may not stand
more than **one** `slew_w` ahead of the command it emits — so the command always
covers the gap in one cycle, and a reversal costs one cycle of unwind rather
than `integrator_max_w / slew_w` (12.5 at `max_w: 5000`, `slew_w: 400`).
Measured against the *previous* cycle's command, which is what this row
publishes, that is two steps: 800 W at the live shape. **A published lead
persistently above two slew steps means something is wrong** — either the
saturation freeze is holding the command (`Loop reason` says
`saturated-freeze`), or the bound is not doing its job.
Before this bound existed, the same 6 kW export drove the lead to 4600 W and the
integrator to its 5000 W rail, and the command then needed twelve cycles — about
a minute at this install's meter rate — to walk back down once the disturbance
cleared.
⚠️ **What the bound buys — and how much of it is a model rather than a meter
reading.** Sixteen days of the reference install's own recorded disturbances
were replayed through both laws (`tools/replay_recorded_loop.py`). The result
that survives every plant and tuning tried is the **export reduction: about an
eighth of the modelled export** — 5.5 kWh of 39.6 at the plant lag the replay
fits, 3.8 kWh of 28.9 at the shorter lag that best reproduces what this install
actually exported — with wasted battery throughput falling alongside it, 4.67 to
3.19 kWh at the fitted plant. ⚠️ **Those are simulated watt-hours.** The
replay's fitted inverter carries a ~375 W RMS residual and prints `+35 %
PESSIMISTIC` beside its own export figure on every run; the *direction* is what
it establishes, not the absolute kWh.
⚠️ **And it does NOT promise you a lower capacity-tariff peak.** The worst
quarter-hour average offtake — the billed quantity — improves from 3739 W to
3434 W **only at the longest plant lag the replay fits**. At every shorter lag,
including the one that best reproduces the recorded export, release/1.0 already
sits at 3434 W and this bound changes it by exactly zero. The plant lag is not
identified by the recording, so treat the peak as unchanged and the export as
the reason this exists. `DECISIONS/SAFETY-48-bounding-the-integrator-lead.md`
§3a has the table.
⚠️ **Two roster names that differ only in punctuation or case** — `inverter-b`
and `Inverter B` — are two names to the validator and one id once slugged. The
add-on gives the second one a `_2` suffix so nothing collides, but the ids you
get then depend on roster order. Give your inverters plainly different names.
### PV production (`pv_entity`, TEL-11)
> **More than one solar inverter?** Use `pv_entities` instead — see
> [Several PV inverters](#several-pv-inverters-pv_entities-tel-12) below. The
> rest of this section applies to both.
**Optional, off by default, and it changes no control behaviour whatsoever.**
Set it and the add-on records what your solar is producing beside what the
meter and the battery are doing. Leave it empty and the add-on reads no entity,
announces no entity, publishes no topic and shows no row — which is what every
install that upgrades into this version does.
#### Why it is a Home Assistant entity and not a register
This add-on's RS485 bus carries the **battery** inverter it drives. On nearly
every site the PV inverter is a different box from a different vendor, on its
own connection, reporting into Home Assistant through its own integration. So
`pv_entity` takes whatever `sensor.*` your PV integration already provides —
any brand Home Assistant can read. It does not have to be on the bus, and there
is no assumption anywhere that it is.
#### What it is for
OPT-10 measured this site over sixteen days: the battery reached 90 % on **two
of them**, and **20.5 kWh of surplus left the site while the pack still had
room** — 12.6 kWh of it with the battery not charging at all. Three different
things produce that number and they need three different fixes:
* there was no irradiance to store — nothing to fix;
* production was there and something limited the charge power;
* production was there, the battery could take it, and the optimiser declined.
Only the third is a software defect, and **none of them can be told apart
without a record of production.** This entity is that record. The attribution
itself is OPT-10's, with a week of history behind it.
#### The sign, and `pv_invert_entities` (TEL-14)
**Positive must mean producing.** Some sensors — typically a kWh meter or an
ESPHome power clamp in the PV circuit — read negative while producing and a few
watts positive at night: list each of those in `pv_invert_entities`, spelled as
in `pv_entity`/`pv_entities`, and its sign is flipped before the sum; the status
page marks it `[sign inverted]` and cautions on any entity reading below −50 W.
History recorded before you set it keeps the old sign. See
`DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md`.
#### The unit is read off the entity
The add-on reads your entity's own `unit_of_measurement` and converts: `mW`,
`W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`, `TW` — Home Assistant's own power units. A sensor with
**no** unit, or with a unit that is not one of those, is **refused**, and the
status page says which entity and which unit. That is deliberate: there is no
magnitude test that can separate 30 W of dusk from 30 kW of noon, so a guess
here would be a silent factor of 1000 in the one channel that exists to be
believed a week later.
#### ⚠️ Absence is never zero
| what happened | `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` | on the status page |
|---|---|---|
| neither `pv_entity` nor `pv_entities` set | the entity does not exist | no row at all |
| set, sensor answered `4100 W` | `4100.0` | `PV 4 100 W` |
| set, sensor answered `0 W` | `0.0` | `PV 0 W` |
| set, sensor unavailable / missing / bad unit | `unknown` | `PV —`, plus a caution naming the reason |
The last two rows are the point. A dead sensor publishes Home Assistant's own
"no value" payload, so the entity goes to **`unknown`** and the recorder stores
a **gap** — not a flat line at the last number it saw. Reading a week of
history back, *"no PV was reported"* and *"PV reported 0 W"* are different
pictures, which is exactly the distinction the whole card exists to preserve.
A failed read also **clears** the previous good one: the value never outlives
its own sensor.
### Several PV inverters (`pv_entities`, TEL-12)
A multi-string or multi-orientation roof routinely carries **two or three PV
inverters**, each publishing its own power sensor into Home Assistant. List them
all and the add-on records the **site total**:
```yaml
pv_entities:
- sensor.pv_east_power
- sensor.pv_west_power
- sensor.pv_garage_power
```
In the Configuration tab this is a repeatable field: press the **+** and add a
row per inverter. Each entity's **own** `unit_of_measurement` is read, so a
kW inverter beside a W one adds up correctly.
#### It replaces `pv_entity` — clear that one
Setting `pv_entities` makes `pv_entity` **ignored**, and the status page says so
until you clear it. That is deliberate rather than tidy: if the two were *added*
together, an upgrade where you leave your first inverter in `pv_entity` and also
list it here would count it **twice**, and a doubled total is as wrong as a
missing one in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later.
#### ⚠️⚠️ If ANY of them stops reporting, there is NO site total
This is the whole reason the key is shaped this way, so it is worth being plain
about:
| what happened | `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` | on the status page |
|---|---|---|
| all three reporting 1200 / 2100 / 450 W | `3750.0` | `PV 3 750 W` |
| all three reporting, one of them **0 W** | `1650.0` | `PV 1 650 W` |
| one of the three `unavailable` | `unknown` | `PV —`, plus a caution naming which entity, why, and what the others reported |
| all three gone | `unknown` | as above |
**It does not publish the sum of the ones that answered.** Two inverters out of
three add up to a smaller number that is *indistinguishable from a real one* —
and read back a week later that says *"there was less sun than there was"*,
which is precisely the conclusion this recording exists to **test** rather than
to manufacture. A gap makes the analysis say *"I do not know"*; a partial makes
it say something false. So the total goes to `unknown` and the recorder stores a
gap, exactly as it does for a single dead sensor.
The diagnostic is not thrown away — it is put where a person will see it. The
status page names the entity that is missing, the reason, **and** what the
others reported. That page is read live by a human who wants to fix something;
the recorded number is read cold by an analysis that would believe it.
Note the **third row against the second**: a member honestly reporting `0 W` is
**summed**, not treated as missing. Shading, a tripped string and nightfall are
all real zeros, and blanking the site whenever one member read zero would report
an absence on every clear evening.
#### ⚠️ Not "just use a template sensor that adds them up"
You may legitimately prefer a template sensor, and `pv_entity` will happily
point at one. But it is **not** the answer to this problem: a template sensor
summing an `unavailable` source yields the partial total *silently*, which is
the same defect one layer down — in a place this add-on cannot see and cannot
report to you.
#### ⚠️ What it does NOT do
It is **instrumentation**. It is not an input to the control law, the
allocator, the arbiter, the peak guard, the maintenance cycle or any watchdog;
it is not part of `inputs_ok`, so a PV integration that breaks cannot stop the
battery being regulated; and its status row is a **caution**, never a
`NOT READY`. Wiring production into the control law would be a behaviour change
on a system driving a real battery — and it would destroy the measurement,
because the loop would then be reacting to the thing being measured.
`tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is what says so rather than claims it: it drives 41
stimulus worlds through the shipped controller and hashes a document of control
decisions containing none of this material, on this tree and on `release/1.0`,
with the option set and unset.
### P1 meter ingestion
`meter_entity` above expects one signed sensor, which usually means a template
@@ -402,7 +604,7 @@ than in YAML nobody reviews underneath a safety input.
> `ha_signed`.** It reads the same meter and produces the same numbers, but it
> polls the meter directly instead of watching a Home Assistant entity — and
> that is the difference between an age sensor a watchdog can threshold and one
> it cannot. See "`sensor.p1_sample_age_s`" below; `ha_signed` remains for
> it cannot. See "`sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`" below; `ha_signed` remains for
> installs where the meter is only reachable through Home Assistant.
> ⚠️ **`ha_dsmr` and `mqtt_p1` have never processed a telegram from real
@@ -489,6 +691,35 @@ next 10 s publish. There is **no option to configure**: the 35 s is derived from
the ESPHome publish interval and the two watchdog windows it has to stay inside,
and the add-on's own checks refuse a value that does not.
⚠️ **AND IF THE REGISTER DOES NOT REPORT A DIFFERENT VALUE, THE ADD-ON STOPS
WAITING AFTER 17 s (SAFETY-57).** This paragraph used to end at the sentence
above, and on 2026-09-21 that turned out to be a promise the state could not
keep: at 0 W **nothing is asking the register to be anywhere**, so "report a
different value" is evidence a parked site cannot ask for. The live site sat at
0 W for **790 s** while the house exported 2.4 kW, on a register that was
working perfectly — the pack was simply at its floor and the BMS was refusing
the discharge — and it was freed by a person restarting the add-on.
So: once the standing command has been **under 250 W for 17 s**, the verdict is
**withdrawn** and the register is graded again from scratch over a fresh 35 s.
The whole parked interval is now `stale_input_s` + 17 s — **32 s at the
defaults** — and it does not depend on what the battery decides to do.
| in the action log | what it means | what to do |
|---|---|---|
| `STALE <unit>` alone, then nothing | the register stopped following and has not come back | look at the unit — comms, the ESP32, the inverter |
| `STALE <unit>` then `STALE WITHDRAWN <unit>`, **once** | the pack was probably empty or full and the BMS refused the command. The site has resumed | nothing |
| the pair repeating every ~70 s | the register really is not following, and the add-on is re-testing it | look at the unit; the site is regulating on the meter in between |
⚠️ **`STALE WITHDRAWN` IS NOT "RECOVERED", AND THE LOG LINE SAYS SO ITSELF.**
Nothing has been learned about the register when it is printed; the verdict is
withdrawn because it can no longer be *tested*, and the next 35 s are the test.
During those 35 s the held number reaches the site's telemetry again. That is
deliberate and it is bounded: 35 s is shorter than both the circulating-power
hold (75 s) and the per-unit sign hold (85 s), so neither of those alarms can be
made to say anything by a held number, and the command itself is derived from
the **meter**, never from this register.
⚠️ **What this does NOT catch: a register whose value is WRONG rather than
STOPPED**, including a dead publisher whose last two samples happen to
alternate. Detecting that needs an arrival stamp inside the ESP32 firmware
@@ -528,7 +759,7 @@ connection-level reading is still accepted on its own.
**Why this mode exists:** every HTTP response is an *arrival*. The meter
answered, now, with its current reading — whether or not the number moved. That
is the signal `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` needs and the one Home Assistant cannot
is the signal `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age` needs and the one Home Assistant cannot
give it at all (see the note below). It is also simply fewer moving parts: the
five-second cadence is the meter's own, rather than an integration's polling of
it re-published as a state change.
@@ -565,12 +796,13 @@ as `… 4 rejected, measurement unchanged for 312 s`. On a house drawing real
power that figure stays in the seconds; minutes of it while the load is clearly
not near zero is the meter to go and look at.
#### `sensor.p1_sample_age_s`
#### `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`
Published over MQTT discovery whenever a broker is available: **seconds since the
newest accepted telegram**, refreshed every second rather than only when a
telegram lands. The ESP32's stale-input watchdog subscribes to this exact entity
id, so do not rename it.
id; do not rename the `GoodWe` device or this entity, since HA composes the id
from both (see [What appears in Home Assistant at two inverters](#what-appears-in-home-assistant-at-two-inverters)).
The reason it is recomputed against the clock is that Home Assistant only pushes
a state when the state *changes*. A meter sitting at a genuinely constant reading
@@ -606,7 +838,7 @@ behind it would trip the firmware watchdog on a system that is working fine.
> went **42.2 s and 97.0 s** between changes, and 23 Aug peaks at 29.1 s — all
> past the default `meter_max_age_s` of 30.
>
> So `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` on `ha_signed` is safe to *read*, and it is
> So `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age` on `ha_signed` is safe to *read*, and it is
> correct whenever the value is moving, but it must not yet be thresholded by
> the ESP32 stale-input watchdog: a quiet house would trip the battery to 0 W.
> Raising `meter_max_age_s` is **not** the fix — the two conditions produce an
@@ -1398,7 +1630,9 @@ share no reason code, no notification id, no status row and no counter.
running - this is not the sign-disagreement failsafe, which commands 0 W. You
get a persistent notification (`goodwe_output_clamp`, replaced rather than
stacked), an `ERROR` in the log with the reason code `OUTPUT_CLAMP`, a row in
the event list, and a red status banner while it is engaged. Once it clears, a
the event list, and a red status banner while it is engaged. The message quotes
the command the loop computed and the value it was clamped to, both from the
cycle that clamped. Once it clears, a
warning row keeps the engagement count so the evidence does not vanish with the
condition. Consecutive engagements share one event row carrying the exact count,
because the event list keeps only 40 rows and a row per cycle would flush every
@@ -1407,9 +1641,11 @@ other guard's entries out of it.
**There is nothing to configure**, deliberately. The bound is `max_w`, which you
already set; giving the guard a limit of its own would be a second number that
can disagree with the first, which is exactly the failure the startup validation
exists to prevent. The alarm's cadence - first engagement, then re-asserted every
30 s while it persists, cleared after 3 clean cycles - is fixed for the same
reason `RAIL_FRAC` is: it describes the notification bus, not the plant.
exists to prevent. The alarm's cadence - normally at most one notification per
150 s (an episode that has not yet notified does so once it has engaged 3
cycles in a row, and an over-rating has its own 150 s budget), cleared after 3
clean cycles - is fixed for the same reason `RAIL_FRAC` is: it describes the
notification bus, not the plant.
WARNING: **on a default install the engagement you will see is the integrator's,
not the output's.** The control law bounds the integrator to `max_w` and *then*
@@ -1418,6 +1654,17 @@ rating unless `integrator_max_w` has been deliberately raised above `max_w`.
Both are watched. A guard that watched only the emitted value would be silent on
every standard configuration.
**The integrator bound is not a bug, and it is reported as what it is.** It
reads *"the loop's integrator reached its +5000 W anti-windup bound; the loop's
command this cycle was +2000 W"*, titled *"the control loop is at its integrator
bound"*, logged as a `WARNING`, with an amber (not red) status row and its own
notification (`goodwe_integrator_bound`), so it never replaces a BUG SIGNAL
notice still on screen. Brief
engagements after a large load or solar step are normal. If it stays engaged,
check that the battery is following its commands. Only a command over the rating
carries the BUG SIGNAL text, and it has its own notification budget.
Why: [`DECISIONS/SAFETY-40-the-integrator-bound-is-not-a-bug.md`](DECISIONS/SAFETY-40-the-integrator-bound-is-not-a-bug.md).
### The frozen-meter alarm
A meter that has died is easy — it stops answering, the sample age climbs past
@@ -2555,6 +2802,126 @@ it.
| `estop_fitted` | Whether the RS485 e-stop is installed. Drives the warning banner |
| `log_level` | `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error` |
## Notifications
Each Home Assistant notification this add-on raises has a short title, one
sentence (a red alarm may use three), and a **Details** link to the add-on
documentation that names the section below. This section holds what the
notification leaves out. The wording rule is `STYLE.md` in the repository; the
texts live in `app/messages.py`. Every notification keeps a fixed
`notification_id`, so a repeat replaces the card instead of adding one.
| Title | Severity | id |
|---|---|---|
| Battery is not keeping up | warning | `goodwe_integrator_bound` |
| Power request too high | alarm | `goodwe_output_clamp` |
| Load too high for battery | alarm | `goodwe_peak_saturated` |
| Battery stopped limiting the peak | alarm | `goodwe_peak_soc_floor` |
| Inverters working against each other | alarm | `goodwe_circulating_power` |
| *name* is not delivering | alarm | `goodwe_not_delivering_<name>` |
| Meter reading may be stuck | alarm | `goodwe_meter_frozen` |
### Battery is not keeping up
The grid-following loop's integrator reached its anti-windup bound
(`integrator_max_w`): the controller has been asking for more than the battery
delivers for a while. This is SAFETY-40, and it is **not** a fault. No command
went over the rating and control keeps running. Short spells after a big load
or solar step are normal. If it keeps coming back, check that the battery
follows its commands. The bound and the command of that tick are in the add-on
log (WARNING, reason code `OUTPUT_CLAMP`). See *The winding-loop alarm* for the
full story.
### Power request too high
The controller computed a command above a limit, and the command was cut to that
limit before it was written. The notification names what was asked, what was
sent, and which limit cut it: the configured inverter rating (`max_w`), the
inverter's own limit (the setpoint device's range), or the inverter rating on
the loop side. Asked always comes first. This is a **software fault** (the old
wording was "BUG SIGNAL"). It is not the inverter failing to follow a legal
command, which is the saturation freeze and does not alarm. Control keeps
running. Report it with the add-on log, whose ERROR line carries the reason code
`OUTPUT_CLAMP` and the full figures. See *The winding-loop alarm*.
### Load too high for battery
The capacity-peak guard (SAFETY-07) is asking for everything the inverter can
discharge, and the running 15-minute average is still projected over the peak
limit. That 15-minute period will set or raise the month's billed peak
(capaciteitstarief). The controller is not at fault: the house load is larger
than the inverter. Switching off load in the next few minutes is the only thing
that still changes the bill. The projection and the watts are in the add-on log
and on the status page. See *The capacity-peak guard*.
### Battery stopped limiting the peak
Two words in this notification are settings. The **peak reserve** is
*Peak guard will not discharge below (%)* (`peak_soc_floor`). The
**cut-out level** is *Battery cut-out level (%)* (`bms_soc_floor`), where the
battery's own system stops discharging.
The peak guard wanted to discharge to hold the 15-minute peak, but it may not go
below the peak reserve (`peak_soc_floor`, SAFETY-24). It also stops when the
battery level cannot be read, or when an inverter's cut-out level is not set,
because the reserve is graded against it. So this 15-minute
period will go over the peak limit and set or raise the month's billed peak.
Charging from the grid stays blocked meanwhile. On a site with several inverters
the notification names the battery at its limit (SAFETY-32): each battery is
graded against its own cut-out level (`bms_soc_floor`), and raising the other
batteries' settings will not change this one.
⚠️ **The reserve binds the peak guard only (SAFETY-25).** It is not a
whole-battery reserve. Ordinary self-consumption has no such floor and goes on
discharging below it, down to the battery's own cut-out level. See *What
`peak_soc_floor` does not protect*.
### Inverters working against each other
Two inverters were pushing power into each other: one discharging while another
charged (SAFETY-31). **The meter cannot see this.** The two flows cancel at the
P1 meter, so the site reads idle while both batteries cycle through two
conversion stages. Every other guard reads that net figure, so none of them
fires. The add-on has **stopped control and commands 0 W on every inverter**.
If the grid reading does not move after that, one inverter is no longer
listening to the add-on; this has happened on this hardware, once for
6 h 25 min. Switch the inverters off at the isolator. The alarm is latched: a
Home Assistant or add-on restart does not clear it, and the card is raised
again every 5 min until you start control on the add-on page. The watts and the time
window are in the add-on log and on the status page. See *The circulating-power
alarm*.
### An inverter is not delivering
One inverter has stood well short of its share of the site target for longer
than the hold time (SAFETY-42), while the others have not. No other check sees
this. A unit at 0 W is absent rather than pushing the wrong way, so the per-unit
sign check and the circulation check stay quiet. **Nothing is commanded
differently.** The guard only reports: commanding an inverter that has stopped
listening achieves nothing, and the only fallback the add-on has is
all-or-nothing. The other inverters keep regulating, and the site is short by up
to the missing unit's rating. Check, in this order:
1. Is the inverter answering on RS485 at all?
2. Is its battery colder or emptier than its configured cut-out level
(`bms_soc_floor`) says? If so, that setting does not describe this battery.
3. Is anything else writing to it?
The alarm is latched and survives restarts. Control is still running, so to
clear it, press *Start / stop control* twice (stop, then start) once you know
why. See *A unit that stops DELIVERING is a third fault again*.
### Meter reading may be stuck
The meter keeps answering, but its value has not changed for longer than the
hold time while the command stands at the power limit (SAFETY-18). The loop is
regulating against a number that has stopped moving. The age is still fresh, so
no other guard stops it. This is an alarm only: control keeps running and keeps
following the reading. Held for a whole 15-minute period, it can set the month's
billed peak. Check the meter; if it is stuck, stop control on the add-on page.
The limit and command figures are in the add-on log and on the status page. See
*The frozen-meter alarm*.
## The Web UI
The ingress panel shows live values, why the controller is commanding what it
@@ -2593,8 +2960,8 @@ a **copy** of the state file and reports the difference.
--live-entities /w/live-entities.txt \
--reverse --round-trip'
Exit `0` clean · `1` at least one finding · `2` could not run. ⚠️ **`2` is not a
pass.**
Exit `0` clean · `1` at least one finding · `2` could not run · `3` clean but
degraded (`--no-live-entities`). ⚠️ **`2` and `3` are not a pass.**
### The owner steps, because this session could not take them
@@ -2616,7 +2983,8 @@ check, **before** the roster is declared:
2. **The options blob**, as `--before`. It is not reachable through the Home
Assistant REST API and no entity carries it; export it from the Supervisor,
the same way `tools/predeploy_check.py` needs it. Write the roster you intend
the same way `tools/predeploy_check.py` needs it: the bare options object,
not the `ha apps info` wrapper, which is refused. Write the roster you intend
to deploy into a second file and pass it as `--after`.
3. **The entity list**, as `--live-entities` — one entity id per line:
@@ -2630,7 +2998,8 @@ check, **before** the roster is declared:
hand back a clean bill of health for a half of the transition it did not
check. If you genuinely have to run without it, pass `--no-live-entities`:
the run then carries a standing banner in the report header **and** on the
exit line saying the orphan check was not graded. The asymmetry used to be
exit line saying the orphan check was not graded, and a clean result exits
3, not 0. The asymmetry used to be
the other way round — an unreadable file refused, a missing flag passed with
exit 0 and no disclosure at all — and the owner runs this once, at
commissioning, under time pressure.
@@ -2778,7 +3147,9 @@ Run it inside the container, so the validator half actually runs:
--deployed-version 0.7.0 --options /w/live-options.json
Export `live-options.json` from the Supervisor first — the options blob is not
reachable through the Home Assistant REST API, and no entity carries it.
reachable through the Home Assistant REST API, and no entity carries it. Pass the
bare object (`ha apps info <slug> --raw-json | jq .data.options`); the wrapped
output is refused.
**Exit codes.** `0` cleared · `1` REFUSED, do not deploy · `2` NOT CLEARED,
meaning a check did not run. ⚠️ **2 is not a pass.** On a bare host without the
+171
View File
@@ -811,6 +811,177 @@ Cheap habits fall out of it, and all of them are now used in this repository:
retrofitted: guarding another card's section is a change to what its
checks report, and it belongs to whoever next touches it.
21. ⚠️ **A CHECK CAN BE GREEN UNDER ITS OWN CARD'S NAMED MUTATION, AND TWICE
IN ONE FILE THE REASON WAS THAT THE WRONG QUANTITY EVENTUALLY REACHES THE
RIGHT VALUE.** TEL-10's acceptance was *"a run that winds the integrator
into the bound must show the published number reaching the bound"*, and its
named mutation was *"publish `prev_w` instead of `i_w`"*. The check was
**GREEN** on the mutant: the command reaches the same bound too, twelve
cycles later, and a check that only reads the VALUE cannot tell the two
apart. The same file's *"a stopped controller publishes `not-running`"* was
green under deleting that branch's assignments outright (−45 B and −67 B),
because the fixture STARTED stopped and `__init__` writes the same values.
Both are habit 4 - the data could not reach the failure - and both were
found by the card's own battery. The fixes are the shape to copy:
* where two quantities CONVERGE, grade the **order or the interval**, not
the value: "the integrator reaches the bound BEFORE the command does",
and a PLATEAU (the lead sits at exactly −800 W for eight consecutive
cycles) rather than a maximum, because a maximum is one tick and a
plateau is the shape;
* where a branch WRITES a value the constructor also writes, the fixture
has to pass THROUGH the other state first. Stop the controller part-way
through a run that has already wound the integrator to −5000 W, so a row
left standing is a WRONG row and not merely an unset one.
22. ⚠️ **AN EXPLANATION IN A COMMENT IS A CLAIM, AND SAFETY-48 SHIPPED TWO THAT
WERE INVENTED.** A gate was written one-sided (`if target > slewed: min(...)
elif target < slewed: max(...)`) under a comment saying the two-sided band
`max(lo, min(hi, i_w))` was a BUG that would drag a trailing integrator
toward the command, with a worked example. It is not a bug and the example
was wrong: `target` is monotone in `i_w`, so the other clamp cannot reach,
and the two spellings agree on **205 920 of 205 920** swept states. A second
bullet said two placements of the same cap *"differ on 118 of 256 252
ticks"*; that 118 had been measured against a **different pair** and the
placement actually being compared is bit-identical on the shipped
configuration - 0 of 256 246 ticks. Both sentences were plausible, both were
load-bearing for a design choice, and neither had been run.
**The rule: a comment that says "X would be wrong" is subject to the same
battery as a check - BUILD X AND MEASURE IT.** Where the answer is
"equivalent", say so with the sweep size and keep the spelling for what it
NAMES; where the answer is a number, quote the run it came from. An
invented justification for a correct decision is still a defect, and it is
the kind a reviewer cannot see because the code is right.
23. ⚠️ **THE MUTATION IS SUBJECT TO EVERY HABIT ABOVE, HABIT 4 INCLUDED - AND
THE PURGE, THE FINGERPRINT AND THE BYTE DELTA ALL SAY IT TOOK.** SAFETY-57's
battery reported a **survivor at +21 B** for a mutation of
`Freshness._open_window()`: `self.graded_from = float(now_mono)` rewritten
as `float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`, which is meant to re-anchor the
verdict's window to the register's own history and so delete the card's
whole exit. The harness purged, the tree fingerprint showed the edit on
disk, the delta was non-zero, and the mutant really did run. It was still a
survivor for a reason that has nothing to do with the property: in the
fixture the register never moves after `t = 0`, so `changed_mono` is
**`0.0`** - and `0.0 or x` is `x`. **The mutant was a no-op on that
stimulus.** Rewritten with an explicit `is None` test (+82 B) it is red on
four named checks.
Stale bytecode is a mutation that never *ran*. This is a mutation that ran
and could not *change the answer* on the data it was given, which is habit 4
exactly, one level up - and none of the three things a mutation report is
required to state (MUTATION.md's own list) can see it, because all three are
about the file rather than about the stimulus. Two rules:
* **Ask of every survivor what it would have had to change, and check that
the fixture reaches that value.** Here: "does any fixture have a non-zero
`changed_mono` at the moment `_open_window()` is called?" The answer was
no, and it is one line to ask.
* **Prefer a mutation that CANNOT be a no-op.** `or`, `and`, truthiness on
a numeric, a default argument and a `getattr` fallback all have a value at
which the mutant and the shipped tree coincide. An explicit comparison,
a constant swap or a deleted statement does not.
⚠️ Note where this one was found: in the battery of a card whose whole
subject is a check that cannot reach the failure it names. **Second
instance in an instrument rather than in a check since habit 16, and the
third overall.**
⚠️ **AND THE SAME CARD'S BATTERY CAUGHT A HABIT-22 COMMENT IN THE FIX
ITSELF, WHICH IS WHY THESE TWO BELONG NEXT TO EACH OTHER.**
`freshness.py` shipped `⚠️ RELEASE BEFORE GRADE, AND THE ORDER IS
LOAD-BEARING` with a worked reason. Swapping the two calls is **zero bytes**
and survived the battery: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w`
and `_release()` only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one can act on
any read and the order is **not observable**. Habit 22 says build X and
measure it; the battery is what builds X. The comment now states the
disjointness and the suite pins **that** - at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W - rather than an order nothing depends on.
⚠️ **SECOND INSTANCE, TEL-11, AND THE NO-OP WAS A SATURATED RAIL RATHER
THAN A VALUE.** The card's whole subject is that a PV reading must never
reach the control law, so its central mutation is
`self.grid = self.grid - self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` - **+106 B**, on
disk, purged, genuinely running - and it came back a **SURVIVOR** of a
six-file battery. The property held in no sense: the fixture drove a 6 kW
export over 12 cycles, which puts the loop **against its rail**, and a
command moving `slew_w` every cycle produces the SAME ramp for -6000 W and
for -14000 W of apparent error. The mutant ran and could not change the
answer.
Two things generalise past PV:
* **A SATURATED ACTUATOR IS A VALUE AT WHICH EVERY INPUT COINCIDES.** The
habit-23 list above names `or`, `and`, truthiness, default arguments and
`getattr` fallbacks - all *expressions* with a coinciding value. A rail,
a clamp, a slew limit, a deadband and a latched alarm are the same hazard
in the **plant**: they are where a controller's output stops being a
function of its input. A fixture that parks there cannot separate any two
inputs, and this repository's control fixtures park there by default,
because the dramatic stimulus is the saturating one.
* **SO THE PRECONDITION IS NOT "DOES IT COMMAND SOMETHING", IT IS "DOES IT
REST SOMEWHERE THE MUTATION COULD MOVE IT FROM".** `test_pv.py` part 6
now drives a 600 W import the loop SETTLES on, asserts the resting target
is well inside the rail, and asks habit 23's own question as a check:
shift the METER by the same 8 kW and confirm the commands really would
have moved. On the first fixture that question answers NO, in one line,
and it is the line that turns the identity into evidence.
24. **A REFUSAL DEFINED RELATIVE TO "THE BASELINE LACKS THIS FEATURE" DIES ON
THE RELEASE THAT SHIPS THE FEATURE — AND IT DIES AS A FALSE REFUSAL, WHICH
IS THE LOUD DIRECTION.** TEL-11 built `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` to grade a
cross-tree identity, and because "the documents are identical" was its
*result* rather than its warning sign, it had to prove instead that the two
runs came from different trees and that **exactly one side reacts to
`pv_entity`**. That was correct evidence: `release/1.0` predated the option
entirely, so a side that reacted to it was the HEAD by construction.
TEL-11 then **merged**, `release/1.0` became 0.11.0, and the baseline for
the next card reacts to `pv_entity` too. `--compare` now answers
`REFUSED: set differs from unset on ['A', 'B']` on every honest run — the
instrument refuses its own shipped tree. TEL-12 found it on the first
comparison it ran.
* **A discriminator is a fact about a MOMENT, not about a card.** "The
baseline does not have X" is true until X ships and then false forever.
Write the discriminator against something the NEXT baseline still will not
have — TEL-12's is the roster key, not the channel — and say in the tool
which fact it rests on, so the next card can see what it has to replace.
* **Prefer a discriminator that is MEASURED over one the tree REPORTS.**
`tree.supports_roster` is the tree describing itself and would have been
one line; the shipped test is "this side's roster cells ARE its unset
cells", which is the tree being measured. Both are printed, side by side,
so a disagreement between the self-report and the measurement is visible
rather than silently trusted.
* ⚠️ **And this is the SAFE direction of the same defect, which is why it
was found in ten minutes rather than in a review.** A stale refusal is a
developer chasing a failure they cannot explain (the false-red case at the
top of this file). A stale *identity* — an instrument that goes on printing
OK because its reference drifted into agreement — is the survivor-
manufacturing direction, and nothing announces it. Ask of every cross-tree
instrument: *what does this print when the feature it is about has been in
the baseline for a year?*
TEL-12's own battery produced two more instrument defects of the ordinary
kind, both recorded in `DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md` §4: a
stimulus annotation written into the document being compared (so every cell
differed for a reason that was not behaviour, and the discriminator fired on
both sides), and a fixture cell whose TRUE total was labelled as its
"partial" (so the check refused the shipped tree for publishing a number it
is required to publish). ⚠️ **Both were caught by running the instrument
against the shipped tree BEFORE running it against a mutant** — which is the
one ordering rule that separates "the instrument is wrong" from "the tree is
wrong", and `test_mqtt.py` part 8's first line ("the shipped module satisfies
every property this instrument grades") is the same rule as a check.
⚠️ **AND TEL-12's SUBJECT WAS HABIT 23 IN THE FIXTURE ITSELF.** The card adds
a SUM over a roster, and the defect it exists to prevent is publishing the
partial sum when a member is absent. A fixture whose absent member
contributes **0 W** cannot see that defect at all: the partial and the full
total are **the same number**, so "published the absence" and "published the
partial" produce identical output. That is a rail in the *arithmetic* rather
than in the plant — the same hazard as TEL-11's saturated actuator, one
domain over. `test_pv.py`'s roster is three distinct non-zero contributions
in two different units, absence is driven at **every position** rather than
at one (habit 10), and each position's partial is **computed from the
fixture** and asserted to differ from the true total as its own precondition.
And the mutation-table consequence: **a variant is not covered because a
near-miss of it is.** DEV-02's table listed the *actuator* variant of the
per-unit claim defect (`device`/`supervised` filed without `inv`), which the
+71 -20
View File
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ An alarm wired only to this module's `ClampResult.engaged` would therefore be
silent on the exact configuration the whole ticket is about. The winding is
visible one layer up, at the integrator bound, and that is why `Decision` now
carries `i_clamped` / `clamped` BOOLEANS and the caller ORs them in here.
They alarm in different words: see `loop_clamp_note()` (SAFETY-40).
AND WHY BOOLEANS RATHER THAN `Decision.reason`. `reason` is a single string that
later stages overwrite: a cycle that clamps the integrator and is then slew
@@ -200,9 +201,8 @@ REASON_CODE = "OUTPUT_CLAMP"
# ceiling rests on one number a test author chose; if that number is ever
# revisited, this constant moves with it.
#
# ⚠️ THIS IS A STOP-GAP AND DOES NOT MAKE THE ALARM CORRECT. The message still
# calls the integrator bound a BUG SIGNAL and still pairs a request from one
# moment with a `self.target` read at another - SAFETY-40. Nothing here is
# ⚠️ THIS WAS A STOP-GAP; the wording and the numbers were SAFETY-40's, fixed
# in `loop_clamp_note()` below. Nothing here is
# suppressed: every engagement is still counted, the action-log row is written on
# every engaged cycle regardless, and the rising edge of every episode alarms
# unconditionally, so no alarm is DROPPED - only delayed.
@@ -234,6 +234,31 @@ CLEAR_CYCLES = 3
SUSTAINED_CYCLES = 3
BUG_SIGNAL = ("This is a BUG SIGNAL, not a limit being used: something "
"upstream computed a setpoint the actuator cannot deliver.")
def loop_clamp_note(d) -> str:
"""The loop-side alarm text for one `control.Decision`, or "".
SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is anti-windup doing its job and says so;
only a command over the rating is a BUG SIGNAL. Every number is the
decision's own, i.e. from the tick that clamped.
"""
if d.clamped:
return (f"{REASON_CODE}: the loop computed {d.requested_w:+.0f} W, over "
f"the {abs(d.clamped_w):.0f} W rating, and it was clamped to "
f"{d.clamped_w:+.0f} W; the loop's command this cycle was "
f"{d.target_w:+.0f} W. {BUG_SIGNAL}")
if d.i_clamped:
return (f"{REASON_CODE}: the loop's integrator reached its "
f"{d.i_bound_w:+.0f} W anti-windup bound; the loop's command "
f"this cycle was {d.target_w:+.0f} W. Brief "
f"engagements after a large load or solar step are normal. If it "
f"persists, check that the battery is following its commands.")
return ""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ClampResult:
"""What the guard did, with the RAW value preserved.
@@ -337,28 +362,60 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
self.since: datetime | None = None
self.last_alarm: datetime | None = None
self.reason = ""
# UX-08: the numbers behind `reason`, for the notification - set under
# the same rule as `reason`, so both always describe the same tick.
self.facts = ()
self.clean_cycles = 0
# SAFETY-41. Consecutive engaged cycles, and whether THIS episode has
# spoken yet - the two the escalation clause needs.
self.run_len = 0
self.spoken = False
# SAFETY-40. Did this episode include a genuine over-rating (`bug`), and
# has THAT spoken? A bug has its own budget, so anti-windup notices can
# never delay it; with bug=True throughout, cadence is as before.
self.bug = False
self.bug_spoken = False
self.last_bug_alarm: datetime | None = None
def note(self, engaged: bool, reason: str, now: datetime) -> bool:
def _due(self, last, now) -> bool:
return last is None or (now - last).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S
def _speak(self, now, bug) -> bool:
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
if bug:
self.last_bug_alarm = now
self.bug_spoken = True
return True
def note(self, engaged: bool, reason: str, now: datetime,
bug: bool = True, facts=()) -> bool:
"""Advance one cycle. True when the caller should raise the alarm.
`now` is the caller's clock, the same discipline as
`SignWatchdog.evaluate()` and `FreezeWatchdog.evaluate()`.
`SignWatchdog.evaluate()` and `FreezeWatchdog.evaluate()`. `bug` False
is the integrator bound (SAFETY-40): counted and notified like the
rest, but it never replaces a bug's text within an episode.
"""
if engaged:
self.engagements += 1
self.clean_cycles = 0
self.reason = reason
self.run_len += 1
if not self.active:
rising = not self.active
if rising:
self.active = True
self.since = now
self.episodes += 1
self.spoken = False
self.bug = False
self.bug_spoken = False
if bug or not self.bug:
self.reason = reason
self.facts = tuple(facts)
self.bug = self.bug or bug
if bug and not self.bug_spoken and self._due(self.last_bug_alarm, now):
return self._speak(now, True)
if rising:
# ⚠️ SAFETY-41. THE RISING EDGE IS RATE-LIMITED TOO, and it did
# not used to be. It fired unconditionally, so a condition that
# engages and clears repeatedly raised one notification PER
@@ -384,11 +441,8 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
# still written on every engaged cycle, and a genuine runaway -
# which by definition keeps engaging - is picked up by the
# re-assert path within REASSERT_S. Delay, not loss.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
if self._due(self.last_alarm, now):
return self._speak(now, self.bug)
return False
# ⚠️ THE ESCALATION. An episode that has not yet spoken because the
# budget was spent by an EARLIER, unrelated episode speaks anyway
@@ -396,15 +450,10 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
# engages every cycle and reaches it; the scattered one-cycle
# railing that produced the live flood never does.
if not self.spoken and self.run_len >= SUSTAINED_CYCLES:
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
return self._speak(now, self.bug)
# Still engaged: re-assert on the slow cadence, not every cycle.
if (self.last_alarm is None
or (now - self.last_alarm).total_seconds() >= REASSERT_S):
self.last_alarm = now
self.spoken = True
return True
if self._due(self.last_alarm, now):
return self._speak(now, self.bug)
return False
self.run_len = 0
@@ -420,5 +469,7 @@ class ClampWatchdog:
# above. The episode ends; the notification budget does not reset
# with it.
self.reason = ""
self.facts = ()
self.bug = False
self.clean_cycles = 0
return False
+161 -1
View File
@@ -191,6 +191,80 @@ SETTLE_CYCLES = math.ceil(PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S / LOOP_TICK_S) # 12
# edge rather than in prose, because it is a property of two files agreeing.
_SAT_COUNT_CAP = SETTLE_CYCLES + 1 # 13
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-48. HOW FAR THE INTEGRATOR MAY STAND AHEAD OF THE COMMAND.
#
# ⚠️ THE MISSING CASE, AND IT IS A CASE AND NOT A CONSTANT. The freeze below
# stops the integrator accumulating, and the comment beside it says what the
# requirement is: "the INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command". But
# `frozen` is computed from ONE signal - `abs(prev_w - actual_w) >
# saturation_w`, the inverter not tracking - and SLEW-LIMITING NEVER ENTERS IT.
# When the command hits the step ceiling, the integrator goes on winding at
# `gain * error` until it reaches `integrator_max_w`.
#
# The arithmetic, and it is the whole card:
#
# the integrator moves gain * error per cycle
# the command moves at most slew per cycle
# so the integrator outruns the command whenever
#
# |error| > slew / gain
#
# At the live install's shape (gain 0.6, slew_w 400) that is 667 W. The median
# grid error at the onset of a recorded episode is 1114 W. This is why
# SAFETY-39's `slew_w` retune did not fix it: a smaller step makes the
# threshold LOWER, so the case fires more often, not less.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT IS BOUNDED IS THE LEAD, NOT THE INTEGRATOR. Two forms were measured
# over 16.0 days of the live install's own recorded disturbances
# (`tools/replay_recorded_loop.py`, and DECISIONS/SAFETY-48 has the table):
#
# (a) reuse the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew flag - "may not wind
# further in the direction it is already pushing", exactly as saturation
# does. It cuts export 13 % AND RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY: the worst
# quarter-hour average OFFTAKE goes 3739 -> 3935 W and the mean quarter
# moves +2.7 W, in five of six plant and tuning variants, and on the
# billed quarter it is worse at every plant lag where release/1.0
# produces a peak at all (a tie at lag 0, worse at 2.5/5/7.5/10 s)
# and at every top-N cut of the quarters.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE MECHANISM IS A REDISTRIBUTION, NOT A WEAKER ANSWER. An
# earlier draft of this line said a frozen integrator undershoots by
# (1 - gain) "so a large import is answered too weakly". The aggregate
# does not show that: form A cuts total import by 5.45 kWh, and paired
# tick by tick against release/1.0 it delivers 8.56 kWh LESS offtake
# energy on the ticks release/1.0 was importing. What it moves is the
# TAIL - within quarters that already net to offtake, the worst of them
# gets worse - and the capacity tariff bills the worst quarter and
# nothing else. That is the wrong trade here and the reason this is not
# the fix that ships.
#
# (b) cap how far the integrator may LEAD the command, one slew step. Export
# 39.6 -> 34.1 kWh, wasted throughput 4.7 -> 3.2 kWh, sign reversals
# 2992 -> 2770, worst quarter-hour offtake 3739 -> 3434 W at the fitted
# plant lag (⚠️ AND AT NO SHORTER ONE: at every lag <= 5.0 s release/1.0
# is already at 3434 W and this changes it by zero - DECISIONS/SAFETY-48
# §3a), median recovery 232 -> 199 s. It is what ships.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE CAP IS NOT ZERO. `i_w = slewed` is full back-calculation, and this
# module's own docstring says what that costs: passing `i_w=None` "reduces this
# function to the exact velocity form it replaced". A zero cap makes `i_w`
# identically the command on every cycle, which is that same collapse written
# from the other end - it measures 32.0 kWh, better than (b) by 2 kWh, and it
# throws away the reason the accumulator was split out at all. One step is the
# smallest cap that is not that.
#
# WHAT THE NUMBER MEANS: the command can cover a one-step lead in ONE cycle, so
# the worst-case unwind after a reversal is one cycle instead of
# `integrator_max_w / slew_w` - 12.5 cycles at the live shape, ~60 s at the
# meter's measured 5.0 s tick.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS IN STEPS RATHER THAN IN WATTS FOR SAFETY-39's REASON, WHICH IS THE
# REASON THIS FILE KEEPS RE-LEARNING. A watt figure is a constant that outlives
# the `slew_w` it was derived against; expressed in steps it moves with
# `slew_limit_w()` and therefore with the rail.
SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 1
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Tuning:
@@ -266,6 +340,12 @@ class Decision:
# the comment at the bound below, and clamp.py.
i_clamped: bool = False
clamped: bool = False
# SAFETY-40. The alarm's numbers, taken at the clamp so they are one tick's:
# the bound the integrator reached, and the command before/after the
# rating clamp. `target_w` is this tick's emitted command.
i_bound_w: float = 0.0
requested_w: float = 0.0
clamped_w: float = 0.0
def slew_limit_w(tuning: Tuning) -> float:
@@ -489,6 +569,7 @@ def compute(
# winding, "clamped" is a command that came out over the rating anyway.
reason = "i-clamped"
i_w = bounded
i_bound_w = bounded if i_clamped else 0.0
want = i_w
# ⚠️ Maintenance shaping (charge-only, cheap-window floor) used to live
@@ -500,6 +581,7 @@ def compute(
# An early draft applied a floor after the clamp and let demand escape it.
target = max(-tuning.max_w, min(tuning.max_w, want))
clamped = target != want
clamped_w = target
if clamped:
reason = "clamped"
@@ -507,6 +589,83 @@ def compute(
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
# --- SAFETY-48: the step ceiling reaches the integrator too ---------
# ⚠️ INSIDE THIS BRANCH AND NOWHERE ELSE - AND THE REASON IS NOT THE
# SATURATION FREEZE. An earlier draft of this comment said that applied
# unconditionally the cap "would also pull the integrator toward a
# command the SATURATION freeze is pinning", and priced that at 118 of
# 256 250 ticks. Both halves were invented, and MUTATION.md habit 22 is
# what fell out of it. The 118 had been measured against a DIFFERENT
# pair - a band applied after quantisation, at the very end of
# `compute()`. On the pair the sentence actually names - this same cap
# moved out of this branch to just after `target = slewed` - the two
# forms are BIT-IDENTICAL on the shipped configuration: 0 of 256 246
# ticks differ over the 16-day recording. They separate only where
# `integrator_max_w` is deliberately set ABOVE `max_w`, the one
# configuration this file says can reach its `clamped` reason; there
# the integrator is meant to run above the rail and an unconditional
# cap would drag it back to the command every cycle and make the option
# inert. THAT is why the cap stays in the branch, and
# `test_telemetry.py` part 4 drives it. (The separable-state COUNT is a
# property of whatever grid was swept - 2050 of 257 400 on this card's,
# 1220 of 246 064 on the review's, 776 of 40 320 on a third - so the
# claim to carry forward is WHERE they separate, not how many.)
#
# ⚠️ AND THE HALF A READER WILL OTHERWISE ASSUME AWAY: THIS CAP DOES
# MOVE A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR. It runs BEFORE the freeze block
# below and is not gated on `frozen`. Measured over the same recording
# at the live shape: of 79 160 frozen ticks the cap changed `i_w` on
# 1095 of them, and on 679 of those it moved it FURTHER OUT on the side
# it was already on - putting back magnitude the freeze had just let
# fall, which is the one direction the freeze's own rule ("may fall,
# never rise") exists to forbid. Worst case 2424 W, and the worked tick
# is `prev_w -3400 W, grid +4697 W, actual -4144 W, sat_count 2 -> 3`:
# the freeze leaves the integrator at -176 W, the slew binds, and the
# cap drags it to -2600 W. It never overrides a SAME-CYCLE refusal -
# the freeze clipped `moved` on 75 512 ticks and the slew bound on none
# of them - but it does not leave the frozen path alone either.
#
# ⚠️ AND THAT IS WHERE SAFETY-13's SETTLE VALUES WENT. Gating this cap
# on `not frozen` puts `test_control.py` part 5 back at release/1.0's
# -1190 W exactly; part 4(b)'s -2390 -> -1200 W does NOT come back,
# because that one moved for the other reason - the winding BEFORE the
# freeze is bounded now. The gate is refused anyway: measured the same
# way it leaves a worst observed lead of 4961 W, i.e. no bound at all
# on the quantity this card exists to bound. DECISIONS/SAFETY-48 §5
# carries the rest of the price.
#
# ⚠️ WRITTEN ONE-SIDED, AND IT IS **EQUIVALENT** TO THE TWO-SIDED BAND
# `max(slewed - cap, min(slewed + cap, i_w))` - MEASURED, NOT REASONED.
# An earlier draft of this comment claimed the two-sided spelling was a
# bug that would drag a TRAILING integrator up toward the command. That
# is false and the sweep said so: `target` is monotone in `i_w`
# (`target = clamp(clamp(i_w, +-limit), +-max_w)`) and `slewed` is
# `target` pulled toward `prev_w`, so whenever the slew binds, `i_w`
# lies on the same side of `slewed` as `target` does and the other
# clamp cannot reach. The two spellings agree on **205 920 of 205 920**
# cases across four tunings, every sign of `prev_w`, `grid_w`,
# `actual_w` and `i_w`, and the `i_w=None` path.
#
# It stays one-sided because it SAYS which side the lead is on - the
# side the command wanted to move and could not - and because a reader
# reaching for the band spelling should find the sweep rather than an
# argument. ⚠️ The "descending" case is NOT an exception to the rule: a
# command falling from +2400 W toward an integrator at +100 W has an
# integrator 2300 W ahead of it IN THE DIRECTION OF TRAVEL, and it is
# pulled back to one step beyond the emitted command exactly as a
# rising one is.
#
# ⚠️ `i_w` IS CHANGED AND `target` IS NOT. This cycle's command is
# already decided; what is bounded is what gets CARRIED. That is also
# why the exhaustive `i_w=None` equivalence sweep in test_control.py is
# untouched by this card: it compares `(target_w, sat_count, frozen,
# reason)`, none of which this moves, and the seeded path re-seeds from
# `prev_w` next cycle anyway.
_lead_cap = SLEW_LEAD_STEPS * slew
if target > slewed:
i_w = min(i_w, slewed + _lead_cap)
elif target < slewed:
i_w = max(i_w, slewed - _lead_cap)
target = slewed
if frozen:
@@ -589,7 +748,8 @@ def compute(
target = round(target / step) * step
return Decision(float(target), sat_count, frozen, reason, float(i_w),
i_clamped, clamped)
i_clamped, clamped, float(i_bound_w), float(want),
float(clamped_w))
def maintenance_charge_floor(
+333 -20
View File
@@ -175,6 +175,124 @@ only one of them is WIRED - see `BOUNDS` below and the note on SoC.
integrator, and K. It does NOT owe a second freshness mechanism - `Freshness`
below takes its obligation term from the caller precisely so that an energy
integral can be handed in where command travel is handed in here.
THE EXIT, AND WHY THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS MODULE DID NOT HAVE ONE (SAFETY-57)
==============================================================================
⚠️ THE VERDICT ABOVE IS ABOUT AN OBLIGATION, AND ITS OWN CONSEQUENCE REMOVES
THE OBLIGATION. Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False,
which commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1). At 0 W nothing is asking the register to be
anywhere - `|standing| >= MOVE_W` is false, so the conjunction cannot arm - and
the class docstring's clearing rule, "an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number",
asks the register for evidence that only a command could have produced. A pack
sitting at its BMS floor answers the same integer watt for hours. **The state
had no exit reachable from inside it**, and the operator-facing line said the
opposite: *"It clears itself the moment the register reports a different
value."*
MEASURED ON THE LIVE SITE, 2026-09-21, and committed as
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/` - a passive RS-485 capture, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`:
10:51:24.7 0x0518 reaches -3 W. The pack is at 11 % and the loop has just
reversed from -447 W of charge into discharge; the BMS refuses
and the inverter idles. The register is HEALTHY and TRUTHFUL.
10:51:29.7 the standing command reaches +1060 W. 800 W of travel, and the
register is obliged to follow it.
10:52:00 the conjunction arms. `Inverter.batt` becomes None.
10:52:21.7 the site commands 0 W - on the wire, in the capture.
... 0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
change value for 790.0 s. Nothing in this add-on can end it.
11:04 a human restarts the add-on.
11:05:31.7 the restarted loop commands -400 W of charge, which the pack
ACCEPTS at 11 %, and the register moves 3 s later.
⚠️ AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. This BMS emits a keep-alive pulse of a few
hundred watts, which twitches 0x0518 and satisfies the clearing rule by
accident. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
(`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/`) through the shipped conjunction at
1 Hz gives **93 trips**, and the time from each trip to the register's next
change - which was the ONLY exit - has a median of 143 s, 17 episodes at or
over the live one's 710 s, and a worst case of 21440 s. That distribution is a
property of this battery's firmware. It is not a property of this code, and the
add-on must not depend on it.
THE RULE, and it is SAFETY-13's shape one module over - "which latches get an
exit, not how long the block lasts":
RELEASE <=> the verdict is standing
AND |standing command| < MOVE_W has held continuously for
>= RELEASE_S
On a release the latch clears and a NEW grading window opens at that instant:
the register is re-graded, from scratch, against the commands issued AFTER it.
Nothing about the register's own history is rewritten - `changed_mono`,
`held` and `unchanged_s()` go on reporting that the register has not moved for
850 s, because it has not.
⚠️ `RELEASE_S` IS `BATT_OBLIGED_S`, 17.0 s, AND IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND
RATHER THAN A PREFERENCE - the mirror of `MOVE_W` taking the ceiling of its
own. The question the bound answers is *has the register had its chance to
answer the command that is now standing?*, and that is exactly the 17.0 s
already derived above: 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s publish, one 1 s read. Below it
the release happens before the cheaper exit - the register moving by itself -
could have occurred. Which half is safe is the opposite of SAFETY-13's, and for
the reason that card states in its §4.2 table: being wrong LONG here is the
failure being fixed (a site parked while it exports), and being wrong SHORT
costs one re-grading window, which is bounded below.
WHAT A RELEASE COSTS, MEASURED AND NOT ABSORBED - AND IT IS NOT SMALL. For the
duration of the new window the consumers get the held number again, which is
the exposure this module was written to close. Driven at the live install's
shape against a register frozen for good (`test_freshness.py` part 10c), over
1200 s:
shipped parked 1166 s, the held number reaches a consumer 35 s 2.9 %
SAFETY-57 parked 571 s, the held number reaches a consumer 630 s 52.5 %
⚠️ **52 % IS THE PRICE OF THE EXIT AND IT IS PAID EVERY CYCLE**, not an
occasional slip. The period is the whole of `stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S`
(17 s) parked, then one `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` (35 s) window of re-grading. It is
bounded by construction, and that bound is the one thing that makes it payable:
the new window is AT MOST BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35 s, and 35 < 75 < 85 - the
circulation hold and the per-unit sign hold. NEITHER CONSUMER CAN REACH A
VERDICT INSIDE ONE WINDOW, and a re-trip returns them a None, which CLEARS
both windows rather than accumulating into them.
That inequality is the same one part 6 already grades, and it is why the window
is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` rather than a number chosen to make the table above look
better. Neither detector can be made to say anything by a held number under
this scheme - which is exactly the state the shipped code leaves them in as
well, since a permanent None clears both windows for ever. **So nothing that
SAFETY-37 detects is given back.** What the held number does reach for those
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()`, which
responds to a large unexplained divergence by FREEZING the output - the
conservative direction, and SAFETY-13's business. And the command itself is
derived from the P1 meter, never from `batt`, so a site regulating through a
re-grading window is regulating on the signal it always regulates on.
**A register frozen under a command that never travels 250 W is still not
detected at all** (survivor 2, unchanged), and a dead publisher whose value
alternates is still invisible (survivor 3).
⚠️ AND THE NARROWING THIS DOES NOT TAKE, named so the next card can. The live
episode's register refused a DISCHARGE into an 11 % pack and then followed a
CHARGE immediately; a refusal in one direction is not evidence about the other,
and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade on the first command that
crosses it instead of on a timer. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately
does not take (see the `soc` row), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's
number. It would shrink the 52 % above; it is not needed to give the state an
exit, and mixing it in here would make the exit depend on a second measurement
being right.
⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO, because the temptation is to call it a fix for the
whole episode: it does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register. The
site above was parked for 790 s by a register that was working perfectly, and
after this change it is parked for `stale_input_s + RELEASE_S` instead - about
32 s on the shipped default - and then regrades. Telling the two apart needs
the pack's own floor, which is SAFETY-32's number and not this module's input;
the wording the operator reads about it is SAFETY-56's.
"""
import time
@@ -211,6 +329,19 @@ BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35.0
# and goes red if the two drift.
MOVE_W = 250.0
# SAFETY-57. How long the obligation must have been ABSENT before a standing
# verdict is withdrawn and the register re-graded. See the module docstring's
# last section for the live episode this exists for and for which half of the
# band is the safe one.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS `BATT_OBLIGED_S` AND NOT A NEW NUMBER, and that identity is the
# derivation rather than a convenience. The question is "has the register had
# its chance to answer the command standing NOW?", which is the same physical
# quantity the floor of `BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band is: 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s
# ESPHome publish, one 1 s add-on read. Releasing sooner would throw away the
# cheaper exit - the register moving by itself - before it could have happened.
RELEASE_S = BATT_OBLIGED_S # 17.0
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Bound:
@@ -219,6 +350,7 @@ class Bound:
signal: str
unchanged_s: float
move_w: float
release_s: float
wired: bool
derivation: str
@@ -233,13 +365,19 @@ BOUNDS = {
signal="batt (0x0518, AC power, S16, 1 W, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=BATT_UNCHANGED_S,
move_w=MOVE_W,
release_s=RELEASE_S,
wired=True,
derivation="settle 6.0 + publish 10.0 + read 1.0 = 17.0 s floor; "
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]"),
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]. "
"SAFETY-57: the verdict is withdrawn after 17.0 s of the "
"standing command below 250 W, because at 0 W the register "
"is obliged to nothing and the verdict cannot be tested "
"again from inside the state it creates"),
"soc": Bound(
signal="soc (0x050E, pack SoC, U16, 1 %, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=float("inf"),
move_w=float("inf"),
release_s=float("inf"),
wired=False,
derivation="TEL-08. Command travel is the WRONG obligation term for "
"SoC - a rested pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W "
@@ -263,10 +401,33 @@ class Freshness:
Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False, which
commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1), which drops the standing command below
`MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction, which would return the held number
to the consumers - and round again every read. So the ONLY thing that clears
the latch is an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number, which is exactly the
evidence the verdict was about. A register that is working clears it on its
next 10 s publish; a register that is not, does not.
to the consumers - and round again every read. So an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number clears the latch, which is exactly the evidence the verdict
was about. A register that is working clears it on its next 10 s publish; a
register that is not, does not.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT THE ONLY THING THAT CLEARS IT ANY MORE (SAFETY-57), BECAUSE
THAT MADE THE STATE INESCAPABLE FROM INSIDE. The command the verdict itself
produces is 0 W, and at 0 W the register is obliged to be nowhere - so
"report a different value" is evidence a parked site cannot ask for. The
live site sat at 0 W for 790 s on 2026-09-21 with a register that was
working correctly, and was freed by a human. `_release()` below withdraws a
verdict whose obligation has been gone for `bound.release_s`, and opens a
new grading window at that instant. The 1 Hz oscillation the latch exists to
prevent is still prevented: the new window is `bound.unchanged_s` wide, so
no re-trip can land sooner than 35 s after a release, rather than on the
next read. ⚠️ MEASURED FROM THE RELEASE, NOT FROM THE COMMAND RESUMING - if
the site rests for longer than the window before it asks for anything, the
window is already old and the re-trip lands on the first read at which the
command travels 250 W again. That is survivor 5's shape, it predates this
card, and its cost is one `stale_input_s` hold.
⚠️ TWO CLOCKS, AND THE DISTINCTION IS THE WHOLE OF SAFETY-57'S HONESTY.
`changed_mono` / `held` are facts about the REGISTER: when it last carried a
different number. `graded_from` / `standing_at_grade` are the window the
VERDICT is computed over, which a release re-opens. They are the same thing
until the first release and diverge afterwards, and `unchanged_s()` - the
number an operator reads - is always the register's.
"""
def __init__(self, bound: Bound):
@@ -281,10 +442,20 @@ class Freshness:
# ability to fetch it.
self.held = None
self.changed_mono = None
# The standing command at that same instant. The conjunction compares
# against THIS, not against the previous cycle's command: what matters
# is whether the register has followed anything since it last moved.
self.standing_at_change = None
# SAFETY-57. The window the VERDICT is graded over, as opposed to the
# register's own history above, and the standing command at the instant
# it opened. The conjunction compares against THIS, not against the
# previous cycle's command: what matters is whether the register has
# followed anything since the current question was put to it. A register
# that moves opens a window, so until the first release these two are
# the change-stamps; `_release()` is where they diverge.
self.graded_from = None
self.standing_at_grade = None
# The instant the standing command last FELL below `move_w`, or None
# while an obligation is standing. The release timer runs off this.
self.rested_since = None
self.released_at = None
self.releases = 0
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.arrivals = 0
@@ -311,20 +482,67 @@ class Freshness:
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
self.held = value
self.changed_mono = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_change = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
# Movement is the ONLY thing that clears the latch. See the class
# docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation this prevents.
self._open_window(standing_w, now_mono)
# Movement clears the latch, because it is exactly the evidence the
# verdict was about. See the class docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation
# the latch prevents, and `_release()` for the other way out.
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.last = value
# ⚠️ THE ORDER OF THESE TWO IS NOT OBSERVABLE, AND THIS COMMENT SAYS SO
# BECAUSE THE FIRST VERSION OF IT CLAIMED THE OPPOSITE. Swapping them is
# a ZERO-BYTE edit and it SURVIVED the battery; the reason is structural
# rather than a missing fixture, so no fixture could have closed it:
# `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()` only
# when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on
# any given read, whichever runs first. Release is written first because
# it reads in the order the state machine moves - withdraw, then
# re-grade - not because the code depends on it.
self._release(standing_w, now_mono)
self._grade(standing_w, now_mono)
def _open_window(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""Start grading the register again, from this instant (SAFETY-57).
Called when the register moves - the window and the register's history
coincide there - and when a verdict is withdrawn, where they do not.
"""
self.graded_from = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_grade = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
def _release(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""SAFETY-57. Withdraw a verdict whose obligation is no longer standing.
⚠️ THE TIMER RUNS ON THE COMMAND, NOT ON THE VERDICT. `rested_since` is
maintained on every arrival, latched or not, so the elapsed rest is the
real one and not "time since we last looked". An obligation reappearing
resets it to None, which is the whole point: a site that goes back to
asking the register for 250 W of movement has put the question back, and
the verdict stands until the question is withdrawn again.
"""
obliged = (standing_w is not None
and abs(float(standing_w)) >= self.bound.move_w)
if obliged:
self.rested_since = None
return
if self.rested_since is None:
self.rested_since = float(now_mono)
if not self.stale:
return
if float(now_mono) - self.rested_since < self.bound.release_s:
return
self.released_at = float(now_mono)
self.releases += 1
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self._open_window(standing_w, now_mono)
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""The conjunction. Sets the latch; never clears it."""
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
if self.stale or self.graded_from is None:
return
held_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
held_s = self.graded_s(now_mono)
if held_s < self.bound.unchanged_s:
return
# ⚠️ BOTH None GUARDS ARE FOR A CALLER THAT DOES NOT KNOW ITS OWN
@@ -333,30 +551,98 @@ class Freshness:
# consumer today. They are here for TEL-08, whose obligation term is an
# energy integral that has nothing to say until it has a window - and
# "nothing to say" must withhold the verdict, not manufacture one.
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_change is None:
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_grade is None:
return
standing_w = float(standing_w)
if abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w:
return
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_change)
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_grade)
if moved_w < self.bound.move_w:
return
self.stale = True
# ⚠️ THE SENTENCE SAYS "unchanged", SO IT GETS THE REGISTER'S OWN
# NUMBER, NOT THE WINDOW'S. They are the same until the first release
# and different afterwards, and an operator comparing this line against
# a history graph is reading the register.
shown_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
# ⚠️ SAFETY-56. THE OBSERVATION IS A FACT, THE DIAGNOSIS WAS NOT, AND
# THE SENTENCE NOW STOPS WHERE THE EVIDENCE DOES. The conjunction above
# is satisfied by TWO disjoint worlds, and nothing this object is handed
# separates them:
# (1) the register has stopped reporting reality - what the gate was
# built for - or
# (2) reality is not moving, because the SOURCE cannot comply with
# the command. A pack the BMS is refusing at its floor holds
# still under any setpoint, and a register reporting that
# truthfully publishes the same unchanged number a dead one does.
# The live 2026-09-21 episode was (2) - the pack read 11 % for the
# whole 850 s hold, the commands were discharge-only, and the register
# answered the first CHARGE command within one obligation window
# (test_freshness.py 11a measures all three off the committed capture)
# - and this sentence asserted (1), which sent the operator to look at
# healthy hardware.
# Naming both is what the module can honestly say. Naming WHICH would
# need SoC and the pack floor - deliberately not this module's inputs
# (see the `soc` row in BOUNDS and the docstring's last section), and
# TEL-08's and SAFETY-32's numbers rather than this sentence's.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NOT SHARED WITH `main.py`'s NOT READY ROW, WHICH SAYS
# THE SAME AMBIGUITY IN DIFFERENT WORDS ON PURPOSE. This sentence is a
# LOG LINE about a behaviour, quoted verbatim by `note()` onto the
# status page and by `_read_unit()` into the action log; that one is a
# BANNER about a named ENTITY, and the two answer different questions
# ("what did the register do" against "can I trust this entity"). One
# helper serving both would have to drop whichever half the other does
# not need, and the half it dropped would be the operator's next step.
self.reason = (
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {held_s:.0f} s "
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {shown_s:.0f} s "
f"while the standing command moved {moved_w:.0f} W to "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W - the reading is not following, so it is "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W. TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE "
f"CANNOT TELL THEM APART: the register may have stopped reporting "
f"reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command "
f"- a pack the BMS is refusing holds still under any setpoint, and "
f"an honest register then reads exactly like a frozen one. Either "
f"way the number cannot be read as this command's effect, so it is "
f"reported as MISSING rather than as a measurement (limits: "
f"unchanged over {self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s, command over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W and moved by over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W)")
# ⚠️ SAFETY-57, AND THE THREE DURATIONS ARE THREE DIFFERENT FACTS, each
# in its own slot: the register's unchanged time is in the sentence
# above, the WINDOW this verdict actually rests on is here, and so is
# how many times this unit has been round the loop. Without the second
# one the sentence reads as though 92 s of unchanged register were what
# was compared against the 35 s limit, and it was not.
if self.releases:
self.reason += (
f" [re-graded: the {held_s:.0f} s window this verdict rests on "
f"opened when the previous one was withdrawn, not when the "
f"register last moved - this unit has now been graded "
f"{self.releases + 1} times]")
def unchanged_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page."""
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page.
⚠️ THE REGISTER'S CLOCK, NEVER THE VERDICT'S (SAFETY-57). A release
re-opens the grading window; it does not make the register younger, and
an operator reading "unchanged for 12 s" off a register that has held
one value for 850 s would be reading this module's bookkeeping back as a
measurement. `graded_s()` is the other one and is named differently for
that reason.
"""
if self.changed_mono is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.changed_mono)
def graded_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds the CURRENT verdict window has been open (SAFETY-57).
Equal to `unchanged_s()` until the first release, and shorter after one.
"""
if self.graded_from is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.graded_from)
def reading(self):
"""What the consumers get: the value, or None when it cannot be trusted.
@@ -366,6 +652,13 @@ class Freshness:
rather than accumulating it, and `circulation.circulating_w` returns None
for a roster with a missing term, which clears the circulation window
too. This module is the thing that was missing between them.
⚠️ AND IT CAN GO BACK TO BEING A NUMBER WITHOUT THE REGISTER MOVING
(SAFETY-57). That is the exit, and it is bounded rather than free: the
window a release opens is `bound.unchanged_s` = 35 s, shorter than both
consumer holds (75 s and 85 s), so neither can reach a verdict inside
one - and a re-trip hands them a None, which CLEARS their windows. See
the module docstring's last section.
"""
return None if self.stale else self.last
@@ -373,6 +666,26 @@ class Freshness:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
return f"{unit_name}: {self.reason}" if self.stale else ""
def release_note(self, unit_name: str) -> str:
"""SAFETY-57's release, for the log. Empty when nothing was withdrawn.
⚠️ IT NAMES WHAT IS AND IS NOT BEING CLAIMED, because a line reading
"recovered" would be a lie: nothing has been learned about the register.
The verdict was withdrawn because it can no longer be tested, and the
next 35 s are the test.
"""
if self.released_at is None:
return ""
return (f"{unit_name}: STALE_WITHDRAWN after the standing command sat "
f"below {self.bound.move_w:.0f} W for "
f"{self.bound.release_s:.0f} s. NOTHING HAS BEEN LEARNED ABOUT "
f"THE REGISTER - it is still holding {self.held:+.0f} - but a "
f"verdict about a command that is no longer standing cannot be "
f"tested, and the 0 W this one produces is what stopped it "
f"being tested. The register is now re-graded over a fresh "
f"{self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s window; if it still does not "
f"follow, this returns")
def monotonic() -> float:
"""The clock this module's callers use, in one place so tests can find it.
+11 -3
View File
@@ -61,10 +61,17 @@ class HomeAssistant:
if resp.status == 404:
return None
resp.raise_for_status()
return await resp.json()
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError) as err:
obj = await resp.json()
# SAFETY-61: an undecodable body is an absence like any other failed
# read, never an exception into the control loop.
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError, ValueError) as err:
self._moan(f"read:{entity_id}", "read %s failed: %s", entity_id, err)
return None
if not isinstance(obj, dict):
self._moan(f"shape:{entity_id}", "read %s: not a state object: %.80r",
entity_id, obj)
return None
return obj
async def number(self, entity_id: str, invert: bool = False) -> float | None:
"""Numeric state, or None. Never substitutes a default."""
@@ -117,7 +124,8 @@ class HomeAssistant:
domain, service, resp.status, body[:200])
return False
return True
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError) as err:
# ValueError: an undecodable error body (SAFETY-61) is a failed write.
except (aiohttp.ClientError, TimeoutError, ValueError) as err:
self._moan(f"svcerr:{domain}.{service}", "service %s.%s failed: %s",
domain, service, err)
return False
+486 -163
View File
@@ -25,9 +25,11 @@ battery to zero on its own. Never "hold the last value to be safe".
import asyncio
import contextlib
import functools
import json
import logging
import signal
import time
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import aiohttp
@@ -47,9 +49,11 @@ from .circulation import (
circulating_w, opposing,
)
from .clamp import (
REASON_CODE as CLAMP_REASON, ClampWatchdog, clamp_to_rating, is_commandable,
BUG_SIGNAL as CLAMP_BUG_SIGNAL, REASON_CODE as CLAMP_REASON, ClampWatchdog,
clamp_to_rating, is_commandable, loop_clamp_note,
)
from . import freshness
from . import messages
from .freeze import (
FreezeWatchdog, FreezeWatchdogConfig, looks_frozen, rail_unreachable, rail_w,
)
@@ -62,10 +66,11 @@ from .inverter import (LINK_STALE_S, UNIT_A, build_roster,
from .maintenance import (
IDLE, POWER_MOVING, MaintConfig, Maintenance, arbitrate as maint_arbitrate,
)
from .mqtt import (MqttPublisher, announced_units, unit_slugs,
from .mqtt import (MqttPublisher, announced_units, optional_keys, unit_slugs,
unit_state_key)
from . import peakguard
from . import packshare
from . import pv as pv_read
from . import shadow
from .p1 import P1Ingest, build_source, is_enabled
from .price import Uncertainty, price_option, provider_configured
@@ -73,8 +78,8 @@ from .price_history import PriceHistory
from .static_tariff import resolve_tariff, static_status
from .tariff import PeakStore, PeakTracker
from .store import migrate_maint_keys, migrate_unit_keys
from .validate import (ConfigRefused, refuse, validate_startup_config,
validate_unit_ranges)
from .validate import (FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, ConfigRefused, refuse,
validate_startup_config, validate_unit_ranges)
from .watchdog import (
AGAINST_METER, AGAINST_OWN_POWER, SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS,
SignWatchdog, SignWatchdogConfig, loop_is_following,
@@ -110,6 +115,12 @@ __all__ = ["UNIT_A", "Controller", "amain", "main"]
# the re-issue happens by itself) than hold the control loop for ten seconds.
WRITE_BUDGET_S = 4.0
# SAFETY-34: a Core-only restart wipes persistent_notification and does NOT
# restart this add-on (measured on TEST-23), so a latched alarm is re-asserted
# this often. Why: goodwe docs/DECISIONS.md, SAFETY-34.
REANNOUNCE_S = 300.0
_mono = time.monotonic # patched by the checks; asyncio keeps the real one
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# OPT-04: THE BACKGROUND TARIFF REFRESH, AND WHY IT IS NOT OPTIONAL
#
@@ -688,6 +699,9 @@ class Controller:
# does, so the latch alone is not the alarm - re-raising it is.
# `run_control()` does that, once, before the first cycle.
self._circ_announced = False
# SAFETY-34: when each latched alarm was last put in front of HA, by
# notification_id - see REANNOUNCE_S.
self._announced_mono = {}
if self.circ_wd.tripped:
_LOG.error(
"SAFETY-31 was TRIPPED before this restart and stays tripped: "
@@ -872,6 +886,27 @@ class Controller:
self.loop_i_lead = 0.0
self.loop_reason = "not-running"
self.loop_w = None # what the loop asked for last cycle, or None
# --- TEL-11: the site's PV production, and NOTHING READS IT ----------
# ⚠️ INSTRUMENTATION. It is published, it is shown on the status page,
# and it reaches no decision: not `inputs_ok`, not the allocator, not
# the arbiter, not a claim, not a watchdog. Wiring it into the control
# law would be an unrequested behaviour change on a system driving a
# real battery AND would destroy the measurement, because the loop would
# then react to the quantity being measured. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py`
# is the instrument that says so, on both trees and both settings.
#
# ⚠️ `None` IS A READING THAT DOES NOT EXIST, AND IT IS SEEDED AS ONE.
# Nothing here ever becomes 0.0 by default; see `app/pv.py`.
self.pv_w = None
# Why there is no reading, in words the page prints - or, on a good
# read, the UNIT the value came in. Never empty.
self.pv_why = ("not configured" if not self.pv_roster
else "not read yet")
# TEL-12. EVERY configured entity's own answer, `(entity, watts, why)`,
# in roster order - kept because `checks()` has to be able to name the
# sensor that is missing, and `self.pv_w` alone cannot. Empty before the
# first read, which is what "no entity has answered yet" is.
self.pv_parts = []
# Did the grid-following loop actually win the LAST arbitration? That is
# the question SAFETY-02 has to ask about the command standing on the
# wire right now, so it is recorded when the arbitration happens rather
@@ -961,8 +996,13 @@ class Controller:
# the counterpart to `clamp_last` moving onto the Inverter: the integrator
# that wound is the SITE integrator, of which there is exactly one, while
# the value a clamp bit is a value written to ONE device.
self.loop_clamped: tuple[bool, str] = (False, "")
# (engaged, note, over_rating) - SAFETY-40 splits the last one out.
self.loop_clamped: tuple[bool, str, bool] = (False, "", False)
# UX-08: the numbers of a loop-side over-rating, for the notification.
self.loop_clamp_facts: tuple = ()
self.stopping = False
# SAFETY-61. time.monotonic() at the end of the last run_control() pass.
self.loop_pass_mono = None
# -- helpers -------------------------------------------------------------
def log_event(self, msg: str) -> None:
@@ -1651,6 +1691,57 @@ class Controller:
for inv in self.inverters)
# -- io ------------------------------------------------------------------
@property
def pv_roster(self) -> tuple:
"""Every configured PV production entity, or `()`. TEL-11/TEL-12.
⚠️ ONE READING OF THE OPTIONS, and it is `pv.entities()` - the SAME call
`mqtt.optional_keys()` makes. The thing that decides whether the row is
ANNOUNCED, the thing that decides whether it is READ and the thing that
decides WHAT IS SUMMED have to be one predicate, or the add-on ends up
with an entity nothing feeds, a topic nothing declared, or a total taken
over a different list from the announced one. `announced_units()` in
mqtt.py is the same argument for the inverter roster, in its own words.
⚠️ IT REPLACED A `pv_entity` PROPERTY RATHER THAN JOINING ONE. Two
properties where one is a subset of the other is the second spelling
arriving by the back door; every gate in this file reads this one.
"""
return pv_read.entities(self.o)
async def _read_pv(self) -> None:
"""This cycle's SITE PV production, or an ABSENCE with a reason.
TEL-11 for one entity, TEL-12 for a roster of them. `pv.total()` is where
"one of three is absent" becomes an absence of the SITE figure rather
than the sum of the two that answered, and its docstring is the argument.
⚠️ IT ASSIGNS ON EVERY CALL, INCLUDING THE FAILING ONES. Leaving the
last good number standing through an outage is what `circulation` does
on purpose - there, a stale figure beats a zero that reads as health -
and it is exactly wrong here: this row is read back as HISTORY, and a
value that persists through an outage is indistinguishable from a real
one at the moment somebody is trying to work out whether the sun was
shining.
⚠️ `hass.state()` RATHER THAN `hass.number()`, because the UNIT is half
the reading. See `pv.watts()`: a PV integration may publish kW, and
there is no magnitude heuristic that can separate 30 W of dusk from
30 kW of noon.
"""
# ⚠️ TEL-12: EVERY ENTITY IN ONE GATHER, for the reason the outer
# gather exists (see `read_inputs()`). Read serially, a three-inverter
# roster with one slow sensor would add up to three of `hass.state()`'s
# 10 s timeouts to a cycle that feeds the ESP32 heartbeat - i.e. the
# telemetry channel would be able to push a healthy battery towards
# layer 1's veto, which is exactly the foot in the control path this
# card is not allowed to have. Gathered, N entities cost what one does.
roster = self.pv_roster
states = await asyncio.gather(
*(self.hass.state(entity) for entity in roster))
self.pv_w, self.pv_why, self.pv_parts = pv_read.total(
list(zip(roster, states)), pv_read.inverted(self.o))
async def read_inputs(self, now_mono: float | None = None) -> None:
"""Every input this cycle needs, and SAFETY-37's freshness verdict.
@@ -1682,8 +1773,26 @@ class Controller:
# names for the WRITE path, one function up. Within a unit the order is
# unchanged (SoC, then battery power), so at the shipped roster of one
# this is the same two calls in the same order.
await asyncio.gather(*(self._read_unit(inv, now_mono)
for inv in self.inverters))
#
# --- TEL-11: AND THE PV READ RIDES IN THIS SAME GATHER ---------------
# ⚠️ IN THE GATHER RATHER THAN ON A LINE OF ITS OWN, AND THAT IS THE
# WHOLE "OBSERVABILITY MUST NOT BE ABLE TO DELAY CONTROL" DECISION.
# This coroutine feeds the ESP32 heartbeat; a sequential read would add
# its own worst case - `hass.state()`'s 10 s timeout - to every cycle,
# so a hung PV sensor at a client site would push a healthy battery
# towards layer 1's ~30 s veto for the sake of a telemetry row.
# Gathered, its latency OVERLAPS reads that already happen and the
# added worst case is zero. `peak_forecast_entity` below is read
# serially and stays that way because it is a CONTROL input (the
# capacity guard sizes off it), so the site is entitled to wait for it.
#
# ⚠️ AND AN EMPTY PV ROSTER APPENDS NOTHING. Not a coroutine, not an
# HTTP call, not a log line: at the shipped default this gather is the
# same list of the same coroutines it has always been.
_reads = [self._read_unit(inv, now_mono) for inv in self.inverters]
if self.pv_roster:
_reads.append(self._read_pv())
await asyncio.gather(*_reads)
if o.get("peak_forecast_entity"):
raw = await self.hass.number(o["peak_forecast_entity"])
# Accept kW or W - nobody's quarter-hour forecast is 50 W.
@@ -1769,6 +1878,7 @@ class Controller:
inv.soc = await self.hass.number(inv.soc_entity)
raw = await self.hass.number(inv.batt_entity, inv.batt_invert)
was_stale = inv.batt_fresh.stale
was_releases = inv.batt_fresh.releases
inv.batt_fresh.submit(raw, inv.standing_w(), now_mono)
# ⚠️ `inv.batt` IS THE GATED VALUE. A stale register is a MISSING input,
# not a measurement - `inputs_ok` sees the None, the site holds for
@@ -1777,11 +1887,52 @@ class Controller:
inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()
if inv.batt_fresh.stale and not was_stale:
self.log_event(f"STALE {inv.name}: " + inv.batt_fresh.reason)
_LOG.error("SAFETY-37: %s battery-power register is not following "
"its own command - %s. Treating it as MISSING, which "
# ⚠️ SAFETY-57 REWROTE THE LAST SENTENCE OF THIS LINE AND NOTHING
# ELSE IN IT. The escape clause used to read "It clears itself the
# moment the register reports a different value", full stop - and
# that was FALSE for the state this same line announces, because the
# 0 W it announces in the sentence before is exactly what stops the
# register ever being asked to report anything different. The live
# site sat in it for 790 s on 2026-09-21 and was freed by a human.
# ⚠️ SAFETY-56 REWROTE THE DIAGNOSIS HALF, WHICH SAFETY-57 LEFT
# STANDING ON PURPOSE. It used to open "battery-power register is
# not following its own command" - an accusation against a named
# piece of hardware, and FALSE on the very episode above. The
# pack read 11 % for the whole hold, every command in it was a
# DISCHARGE, and the register answered the first CHARGE command
# three seconds later - so the BMS was refusing, the register was
# publishing that refusal correctly, and the operator was sent to
# look at a working sensor. All three numbers are measured off the
# committed capture by test_freshness.py part 11a. The gate's
# conjunction is right and is NOT touched; only its conclusion was.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE TWO EXPLANATIONS ARE NAMED ONCE, IN `%s`, NOT TWICE.
# This line's own words are the OBSERVATION plus the one thing a
# log reader has to be told before acting - that the observation is
# not yet a verdict - and `freshness._grade()`'s sentence, which
# this line already interpolates, is where the pair is spelled out.
# Saying it in both halves of one sentence is how an operator
# learns to skim it.
_LOG.error("SAFETY-37: %s battery-power reading did not move under "
"a command that did, WHICH IS NOT BY ITSELF A VERDICT "
"ON THE REGISTER - %s. Treating it as MISSING, which "
"commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the register "
"reports a different value.",
inv.name, inv.batt_fresh.reason)
"reports a different value, and failing that %.0f s "
"after the standing command falls below %.0f W "
"(SAFETY-57: a verdict whose own consequence is a 0 W "
"command cannot be tested again from inside it).",
inv.name, inv.batt_fresh.reason,
inv.batt_fresh.bound.release_s,
inv.batt_fresh.bound.move_w)
elif inv.batt_fresh.releases > was_releases:
# ⚠️ SAFETY-57. REPORTED, NEVER SILENT. A latch that lets go on a
# timer and says nothing is a latch no operator can audit - and this
# one is withdrawing a SITE STOP. `release_note()` is written to say
# that nothing has been learned about the register, because nothing
# has.
self.log_event(f"STALE WITHDRAWN {inv.name}")
_LOG.warning("SAFETY-57: %s",
inv.batt_fresh.release_note(inv.name))
@property
def shadow(self) -> bool:
@@ -3125,12 +3276,16 @@ class Controller:
# it - so a string test is silent on the two cases a winding loop
# most often presents as. These flags are set where the clamp
# happens and nothing downstream touches them.
# SAFETY-40: every number comes from THIS decision, at clamp time,
# never from `self.target` after slew/freeze/arbiter rewrote it.
self.loop_clamped = (
decision.i_clamped or decision.clamped,
(f"the loop asked for {decision.i_w:+.0f} W"
+ (" (integrator bound)" if decision.i_clamped else "")
+ (" (output bound)" if decision.clamped else "")),
loop_clamp_note(decision),
decision.clamped,
)
self.loop_clamp_facts = (
(messages.Clamp(None, decision.requested_w, decision.clamped_w,
"rating"),) if decision.clamped else ())
# SITE. compute() regulates `grid_w` - the P1 measurement - to
# zero. Its subject is the meter, and §6.2's architecture is ONE
# integrator on P1 whose output is then SPLIT. This is the claim the
@@ -3153,7 +3308,8 @@ class Controller:
# A loop that is not running cannot be winding. Clearing this here
# rather than letting the last value stand is what makes the alarm
# de-assert when control is stopped.
self.loop_clamped = (False, "")
self.loop_clamped = (False, "", False)
self.loop_clamp_facts = ()
# SAFETY-28. A new resolution is a new tick, and the previous record is
# stale from this line onwards. Incremented BEFORE resolve() so that the
@@ -3570,20 +3726,24 @@ class Controller:
clamped_units = [inv for inv in self.inverters
if inv.clamp_last is not None and inv.clamp_last.engaged]
engaged_write = bool(clamped_units)
engaged_loop, loop_note = self.loop_clamped
engaged_loop, loop_note, loop_bug = self.loop_clamped
engaged = engaged_write or engaged_loop
if engaged:
where = (", ".join(f"{inv.name}: {inv.clamp_last.describe()}"
for inv in clamped_units) if engaged_write
else f"{CLAMP_REASON}: {loop_note}, above the "
f"{self.site_max_w:.0f} W rating, and "
f"was clamped to {self.target:+.0f} W")
reason = (f"{where}. This is a BUG SIGNAL, not a limit being used: "
f"something upstream computed a setpoint the actuator "
f"cannot deliver.")
# SAFETY-40: only an over-rating is a bug; the integrator bound is not.
bug = engaged_write or loop_bug
if engaged_write:
reason = (", ".join(f"{inv.name}: {inv.clamp_last.describe()}"
for inv in clamped_units) + ". " + CLAMP_BUG_SIGNAL)
_named = len(self.inverters) > 1
facts = [messages.Clamp(inv.name if _named else None,
inv.clamp_last.requested_w,
inv.clamp_last.applied_w,
inv.clamp_last.bound)
for inv in clamped_units]
else:
reason = ""
fired = self.clamp_wd.note(engaged, reason, datetime.now(timezone.utc))
reason = loop_note if engaged else ""
facts = self.loop_clamp_facts if engaged else ()
fired = self.clamp_wd.note(engaged, reason, datetime.now(timezone.utc),
bug=bug, facts=facts)
# --- THE ACTION LOG, AND IT IS COALESCED PER EPISODE ------------------
# Every engagement is recorded, but consecutive ones are recorded by
@@ -3614,6 +3774,15 @@ class Controller:
self.log_event(row)
if not fired:
return
if not self.clamp_wd.bug:
# SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is anti-windup, not a bug - a
# WARNING and a plainly titled notice, same cadence. Its OWN id, so
# it can never replace a BUG SIGNAL notice still on screen.
_LOG.warning("SAFETY-03 - %s Engagements so far: %d.",
self.clamp_wd.reason, self.clamp_wd.engagements)
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create",
messages.loop_bound().data())
return
_LOG.error(
"SAFETY-03 - %s Silently clipping this is how a winding integrator "
"reached 14 768 W on this project before: the clamp makes every "
@@ -3624,16 +3793,10 @@ class Controller:
# A fixed notification_id, for the reason check_meter_frozen() gives -
# and a DIFFERENT one from every other alarm this add-on raises, because
# a clamp is not a frozen meter and neither is a saturation freeze.
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create", {
"notification_id": "goodwe_output_clamp",
"title": "GoodWe: a computed setpoint exceeded the rating",
"message": (
f"{self.clamp_wd.reason}\n\nThe command has been clamped and "
f"the controller is STILL RUNNING. This is NOT the inverter "
f"failing to follow a legal command (that is the saturation "
f"freeze, which is normal and does not alarm) - the value asked "
f"for was itself out of range."),
})
# UX-08: the words are messages.output_clamp()'s; the numbers are the
# ones `reason` was written from (ClampWatchdog.facts), asked first.
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create",
messages.output_clamp(self.clamp_wd.facts).data())
async def check_peak_saturated(self) -> None:
"""SAFETY-07. Alarm ONLY when the guard has run out of inverter.
@@ -3675,18 +3838,8 @@ class Controller:
# A fixed notification_id, and a DIFFERENT one from every other alarm
# here - check_meter_frozen() gives the reasoning. A saturated peak guard
# is not a frozen meter and is not an out-of-range setpoint.
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create", {
"notification_id": "goodwe_peak_saturated",
"title": "GoodWe: the capacity-peak guard has run out of inverter",
"message": (
f"{g.reason}.\n\nThe battery is being commanded to everything "
f"it can give and the quarter is STILL projected over the "
f"{g.ceiling_w:.0f} W ceiling, so this quarter will set or raise "
f"the month's billed capaciteitstarief peak. This is not a "
f"controller fault - the load is simply larger than the "
f"inverter. Shedding load in the next few minutes is the only "
f"thing that changes the bill."),
})
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create",
messages.peak_saturated(g.ceiling_w).data())
async def check_peak_floor_limited(self) -> None:
"""SAFETY-24. Alarm when the EMS SoC floor stops the guard shaving.
@@ -3751,45 +3904,23 @@ class Controller:
# think the pack is AT it. `decide()` guards its own reason string the
# same way; a f-string that formats a None here would turn the one
# notification that matters into a traceback.
_at_floor = ("at the floor" if g.soc_floor is None
else f"at {float(g.soc_floor):.0f} %")
# ⚠️ SAFETY-32. WHICH PACK STOPPED THE SITE. `g.soc_floor` is the floor
# the decision was actually taken with, so this re-grades nothing and
# cannot disagree with the alarm it is printed inside. At a roster of one
# the sentence is omitted entirely and this notification is byte-for-byte
# what SAFETY-25 shipped - there is exactly one pack and naming it would
# be noise on every existing install.
# no pack is named - there is exactly one.
_blocked = [name for name, why
in peakguard.pack_permissions(self.packs, g.soc_floor)
if why is not None]
_which = ("" if len(self.inverters) < 2 else
f"\n\nSAFETY-32 - WHICH PACK: this is graded per pack against "
f"that pack's own BMS cut-out (bms_soc_floor), and the "
f"pack(s) at or below their own floor right now are "
f"{', '.join(_blocked) if _blocked else '(none - see the reason above)'}"
f". The other packs on the roster are not the reason the guard "
f"stopped and raising their cut-out will not change this.")
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create", {
"notification_id": "goodwe_peak_soc_floor",
"title": "GoodWe: the capacity-peak guard has run out of battery",
"message": (
f"{g.reason}.\n\nTHIS QUARTER WILL GO OVER THE "
f"{g.ceiling_w:.0f} W ceiling and will set or raise the "
f"month's billed capaciteitstarief peak, because the peak guard "
f"is not allowed to discharge any further: {g.soc_floor_reason}."
f" This is not a controller fault - it is the EMS-side energy "
f"floor (peak_soc_floor) doing what it is set to do, and it sits "
f"deliberately above the pack's own BMS cut-out. Charging stays "
f"blocked. Shedding load is the only thing that changes the bill "
f"now; if this pack can afford a deeper discharge, lower "
f"peak_soc_floor.\n\nSAFETY-25 - WHAT THIS FLOOR IS NOT: "
f"peak_soc_floor bounds THE PEAK GUARD ONLY. It is not a "
f"pack-wide reserve, and the battery is NOT being held "
f"{_at_floor} - ordinary self-consumption has no SoC "
f"floor at all and will go on discharging past it, down to the "
f"pack's own BMS cut-out. What has stopped is the guard buying "
f"you a lower bill, not the pack being spent." + _which),
})
# ⚠️ SAFETY-25's sentence (the reserve binds the peak guard only) is
# part of messages.peak_reserve() on every branch, the unreadable-SoC
# one included.
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create",
messages.peak_reserve(
g.ceiling_w, soc_unread=g.soc is None,
floor_unknown=(g.soc is not None
and g.soc_floor is None),
packs=(_blocked if len(self.inverters) > 1
else ())).data())
async def check_circulating(self) -> None:
"""SAFETY-31 + SAFETY-34. The alarm, and it must survive a restart.
@@ -3806,15 +3937,17 @@ class Controller:
The latch says "this site is tripped"; the flag says "this process has
put that in front of a human". A restart clears the flag and keeps the
latch, so the notification is RE-RAISED on the first cycle after every
add-on start - which is also the first cycle after a Home Assistant
restart, because the add-on is restarted with it.
add-on start. A Core-only restart does NOT restart the add-on, so it is
also re-asserted every REANNOUNCE_S (SAFETY-34).
⚠️ ONE CODE PATH FOR BOTH, ON PURPOSE. A fresh trip and a restart into
an existing trip raise the alarm through these same lines. Two paths
would be two chances for the restart one to rot unnoticed, and the
restart one is the case nobody exercises by hand.
"""
if not self.circ_wd.tripped or self._circ_announced:
if not self.circ_wd.tripped:
return
if self._circ_announced and not self._reannounce_due("goodwe_circulating_power"):
return
# Set BEFORE the await. `hass.call()` can raise or hang, and a retry
# every cycle for a broker that is down would be an alarm storm on the
@@ -3822,39 +3955,22 @@ class Controller:
# already durable and the log line above already fired; this surface is
# best-effort by design.
self._circ_announced = True
self._announced_mono["goodwe_circulating_power"] = _mono()
names = self.units
pos, neg = opposing([inv.batt for inv in self.inverters],
min_w=self.circ_wd.cfg.min_w / 2.0)
who = ""
if pos and neg:
who = ("\n\nRight now " + ", ".join(names[i] for i in pos)
+ " is discharging while " + ", ".join(names[i] for i in neg)
+ " charges.")
# A fixed notification_id, and a DIFFERENT one from every other alarm
# this add-on raises - check_meter_frozen() gives the reasoning. A
# circulating loop is not a frozen meter, is not an out-of-range
# setpoint and is not a saturated peak guard.
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create", {
"notification_id": "goodwe_circulating_power",
"title": "GoodWe: the inverters are pushing against each other",
"message": (
f"{self.circ_wd.reason}{who}\n\nTHE METER CANNOT SEE THIS. "
f"Circulating power nets to zero at P1, so the site reads idle "
f"while the packs are cycled through two conversion stages "
f"continuously. Every other guard in this add-on is a consumer "
f"of that net figure, which is why none of them fired.\n\n"
f"CONTROL HAS BEEN STOPPED - every inverter is commanded 0 W "
f"and held there. That removes this controller as one of the "
f"two participants, and it makes anything still happening "
f"VISIBLE at the meter instead of cancelled at it.\n\n"
f"⚠️ IF THE GRID READING DOES NOT MOVE AFTER THIS, one inverter "
f"is no longer listening to this add-on and no command will "
f"reach it - that has happened twice on this hardware, once for "
f"6 h 25 m. The remaining actuator is a human at the isolator.\n"
f"\nThis alarm survives a Home Assistant restart. Restarting "
f"will not clear it; start control from the add-on UI once you "
f"know why two inverters were opposing."),
})
# this add-on raises - check_meter_frozen() gives the reasoning.
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create",
messages.circulating(
[names[i] for i in pos] if pos and neg else (),
[names[i] for i in neg] if pos and neg else (),
).data())
def _reannounce_due(self, notification_id: str) -> bool:
"""SAFETY-34: has this latched alarm gone REANNOUNCE_S without being re-asserted?"""
t = self._announced_mono.get(notification_id)
return t is None or _mono() - t >= REANNOUNCE_S
async def check_not_delivering(self) -> None:
"""SAFETY-42 + SAFETY-34. The alarm, and it must survive a restart.
@@ -3875,8 +3991,8 @@ class Controller:
not persisted. The latch says "this unit is tripped"; membership says
"this process has put that in front of a human". A restart empties the
set and keeps the latch, so the notification is RE-RAISED on the first
cycle after every add-on start - which is also the first cycle after a
Home Assistant restart, because the add-on is restarted with it.
cycle after every add-on start, and re-asserted every REANNOUNCE_S
because a Core-only restart does not restart the add-on (SAFETY-34).
⚠️ ONE CODE PATH FOR BOTH, ON PURPOSE - `check_circulating()`'s
argument. A fresh trip and a restart into an existing trip raise the
@@ -3894,7 +4010,10 @@ class Controller:
names = self.units
slugs = unit_slugs(names)
for inv, slug in zip(self.inverters, slugs):
if not inv.delivery_wd.tripped or inv.name in self._delivery_announced:
nid = f"goodwe_not_delivering_{slug}"
if not inv.delivery_wd.tripped:
continue
if inv.name in self._delivery_announced and not self._reannounce_due(nid):
continue
# Added BEFORE the await, for `check_circulating()`'s reason:
# `hass.call()` can raise or hang, and a retry every cycle for a
@@ -3902,38 +4021,9 @@ class Controller:
# latch is already durable and the log line already fired; this
# surface is best-effort by design.
self._delivery_announced.add(inv.name)
peers = ", ".join(n for n in names if n != inv.name) or "no sibling"
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create", {
"notification_id": f"goodwe_not_delivering_{slug}",
"title": f"GoodWe: {inv.name} is not delivering its share",
"message": (
f"{inv.delivery_wd.reason}\n\nWHY NOTHING ELSE SAID SO. A "
f"unit sitting at 0 W against a non-zero share is not "
f"pushing the wrong way, it is ABSENT: the per-unit sign "
f"check needs opposition on both sides of "
f"{self.unit_sign_cfg.min_w:.0f} W and never opens, the "
f"site sum still agrees with the meter in "
f"direction, and circulating power is exactly zero when one "
f"unit does nothing. The only other trace is a saturation "
f"freeze, which this add-on's own code calls an alarm "
f"operators learn to ignore.\n\nNOTHING HAS BEEN COMMANDED "
f"DIFFERENTLY. This guard reports and does not act. "
f"Commanding an inverter that has stopped listening "
f"achieves nothing - that has happened on this hardware, "
f"once for 6 h 25 m - and the only re-allocation this "
f"add-on can express is all-or-nothing, which would throw "
f"away the output of a unit that is delivering PART of its "
f"share. So {peers} is still regulating and the site is "
f"short by up to {inv.rating_w():.0f} W until somebody "
f"looks at {inv.name}.\n\nWHAT TO CHECK, in order: is "
f"{inv.name} answering on RS485 at all; is its pack colder "
f"or emptier than its configured bms_soc_floor says (if it "
f"is, that setting does not describe this battery and this "
f"alarm is telling you so); and is anything else writing to "
f"it.\n\nThis alarm survives a Home Assistant restart. "
f"Restarting will not clear it; start control from the "
f"add-on UI once you know why."),
})
self._announced_mono[nid] = _mono()
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create",
messages.not_delivering(inv.name, slug).data())
async def check_meter_frozen(self) -> None:
"""SAFETY-18. Alarm on a meter that answers forever without changing.
@@ -3971,14 +4061,8 @@ class Controller:
# ⚠️ A fixed notification_id, so a second episode REPLACES the first
# rather than stacking. An operator who has to dismiss eleven identical
# notifications learns to dismiss the twelfth without reading it.
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create", {
"notification_id": "goodwe_meter_frozen",
"title": "GoodWe: the P1 meter may be frozen",
"message": (
f"{self.freeze_wd.reason}.\n\nThe controller is STILL RUNNING "
f"and still following this reading. Check the meter; if it is "
f"stuck, stop control from the add-on UI."),
})
await self.hass.call("persistent_notification", "create",
messages.meter_frozen(unchanged).data())
# -- tasks ---------------------------------------------------------------
# -- OPT-04: the background tariff refresh -------------------------------
@@ -4264,6 +4348,7 @@ class Controller:
await self.send_heartbeats(asyncio.get_running_loop().time(),
heartbeat)
self.publish()
self.loop_pass_mono = time.monotonic()
await asyncio.sleep(1)
async def send_heartbeats(self, loop_now: float, heartbeat_s: float) -> None:
@@ -4355,6 +4440,30 @@ class Controller:
"loop_lead": round(self.loop_i_lead, 1),
"loop_reason": self.loop_reason,
}
# --- TEL-11 ----------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ THE KEY IS PRESENT WITH THE VALUE `None` WHEN THERE IS NO READING,
# AND ABSENT ENTIRELY WHEN THERE IS NO SOURCE. Those are two different
# states and the publisher treats them as two: `mqtt.ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN`
# turns the first into HA's own `None` payload, so the entity's state
# goes to `unknown` and the recorder records a GAP - which is how a
# reader of a week of history tells "no PV reported" from "PV reported
# 0 W". The second never reaches the broker at all, because an install
# that never set `pv_entity` or `pv_entities` has no such entity
# announced. ⚠️ TEL-12: AND THE ROW IS STILL ONE NUMBER. At a roster of
# three it is the SITE total, `None` unless EVERY entity answered - see
# `pv.total()`, whose note is where the decision not to publish a
# partial sum is argued. This line did not have to change for that, and
# that is the point: TEL-11's `None`-is-an-absence rule already covered
# it, one layer up.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE GATE IS `optional_keys()`, THE SAME EXPRESSION THE
# ANNOUNCEMENT USES. Written as a second predicate here the two could
# disagree, and both directions are bad - an announced entity nothing
# feeds, or a topic nothing declared. `announced_units()` two blocks
# down is the same discipline for the roster.
if "pv" in optional_keys(self.o):
values["pv"] = (None if self.pv_w is None
else round(self.pv_w, 1))
# ⚠️ ONLY when P1 ingestion is actually running. The ESP32's stale-input
# watchdog subscribes to sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age - see the entity-id
# note in mqtt.py; the composed name is not the object_id - and forces layer-1
@@ -4439,6 +4548,22 @@ class Controller:
"""
o = self.o
out = []
# SAFETY-61. First, so a stalled loop is the headline: the heartbeat is
# sent from this loop, so past layer 1's veto the inverter is at 0 W.
if self.loop_pass_mono is None:
out.append({"ok": True, "warn": False,
"text": "control loop: starting"})
else:
_pass_age = time.monotonic() - self.loop_pass_mono
if _pass_age > FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S:
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": False,
"text": f"control loop: NO PASS FOR {_pass_age:.0f} s"
f" (layer 1 zeroes the inverter after "
f"{FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S:.0f} s without a "
f"heartbeat)"})
else:
out.append({"ok": True, "warn": False,
"text": f"control loop: last pass {_pass_age:.0f} s ago"})
if self.p1_enabled:
age = self.p1.published_age_s
if self.p1.stale:
@@ -4636,8 +4761,38 @@ class Controller:
if not entity:
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": False, "text": f"{label}: no entity configured"})
elif value is None:
# ⚠️ SAFETY-56. THIS ROW ASSERTED A FALSE FACT ABOUT A NAMED
# ENTITY, WHICH IS THE WORST THING A DIAGNOSTIC CAN DO. It read
# "<entity> is missing or not numeric" for ANY None, and one of
# the ways this value becomes None is SAFETY-37's freshness gate
# withholding a reading that is present, numeric and updating -
# `Freshness.reading()` returns None BY DESIGN there. On the
# live site on 2026-09-21 the operator opened Developer Tools on
# the entity this row named, found it working, and had every
# reason to conclude the diagnostics were broken.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS FIXED BY SAYING LESS, NOT BY LOOKING HARDER. The
# row could ask `inv.batt_fresh.stale` - it is on the same
# object at the same moment - but this loop also renders the
# grid and SoC rows, which have no gate, and a branch per row
# would be a second place where "why is this None" is decided.
# The gate already has a surface of its own: `stale_note()`
# rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below with the whole
# STALE_READING sentence in it, so the operator's discriminator
# is "is that row there?" and this row's job is only to stop
# pre-empting the answer. Same reason the wording is not shared
# with `freshness._grade()`: that one is a log line about a
# BEHAVIOUR, this one is a banner about an ENTITY.
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": False,
"text": f"{label}: {entity} is missing or not numeric"})
"text": f"{label}: no usable value this cycle from "
f"{entity} - and this row cannot tell which "
f"of two things that is: the entity is "
f"missing or not numeric, or it is "
f"publishing a number that this controller "
f"is withholding (a freshness gate does "
f"exactly that, and names itself in a row "
f"of its own). Confirm the entity in "
f"Developer Tools before replacing it"})
else:
out.append({"ok": True, "warn": False, "text": f"{label}: {entity} = {value:g}"})
@@ -4664,16 +4819,21 @@ class Controller:
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": "NOT COMMANDABLE" not in note,
"text": note})
# SAFETY-03. Red while a clamp is engaged, and the engagement COUNT is
# shown even after it clears - a loop that wound once and stopped is
# still a bug, and a row that vanishes with the condition takes the
# SAFETY-03. Red while an over-rating clamp is engaged (amber for the
# integrator bound, SAFETY-40), and the engagement COUNT is shown even
# after it clears - a row that vanishes with the condition takes the
# evidence with it. Reported only when there is something to report:
# unlike the freeze detector this guard has no "not covered" state, it
# runs on every write on every transport.
if self.clamp_wd.active:
if self.clamp_wd.active and self.clamp_wd.bug:
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": False,
"text": "OUTPUT CLAMP ENGAGED - " + self.clamp_wd.reason
+ f" Engagements: {self.clamp_wd.engagements}."})
elif self.clamp_wd.active:
# SAFETY-40: the integrator bound alone is amber, not red.
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": True,
"text": "LOOP AT INTEGRATOR BOUND - " + self.clamp_wd.reason
+ f" Engagements: {self.clamp_wd.engagements}."})
elif self.clamp_wd.engagements:
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": True,
"text": f"output clamp: not engaged now, but it has "
@@ -4842,6 +5002,120 @@ class Controller:
# is both is a check nobody reads.
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": True,
"text": "no peak forecast: maintenance charging is not capacity-capped"})
# --- TEL-11 ----------------------------------------------------------
# ⚠️ NO ROW AT ALL WHEN THE ROSTER IS EMPTY, AND THAT IS A DELIBERATE
# DIFFERENCE FROM THE PEAK-FORECAST CAUTION DIRECTLY ABOVE. That one
# nags because an unset forecast entity leaves a MONEY GUARD without an
# input; this one is pure instrumentation, and a permanent caution on
# every install that never asked for a PV channel is exactly the
# "no warning spam, no degraded status row" the card forbids.
#
# ⚠️ AND WHEN IT IS SET, A FAILED READ IS `ok=False, warn=True` - a
# CAUTION, never `bad`. `status_payload()` builds "NOT READY" from rows
# that are neither ok nor warn, and a telemetry channel that could put a
# battery site into NOT READY would be observability with a foot in the
# control path. The reason comes from `pv.watts()` rather than being
# re-derived here, so the page cannot disagree with the reading.
#
# --- TEL-12: AND AT A ROSTER OF ONE THESE TWO SENTENCES ARE 0.11.0's --
# ⚠️ THE `len(...) == 1` BRANCH IS 0.11.0's CODE UNCHANGED, DOWN TO THE
# f-string, so an install that set `pv_entity` reads the row it already
# reads. That is an ACCEPTANCE CRITERION rather than a courtesy, and it
# is graded across trees by `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` rather than argued
# here: `pv.total()` passes a single entity's `why` through verbatim for
# exactly this reason. Multi-entity sentences are separate BECAUSE they
# have to say something the single-entity ones never could.
roster = self.pv_roster
if roster:
# TEL-14: each flipped entity is marked where its watts are printed;
# an unflipped one gets "", so 0.12.0's sentences are unchanged.
flip = pv_read.inverted(self.o)
def inv(ent):
return " [sign inverted]" if ent in flip else ""
if len(roster) == 1:
if self.pv_w is None:
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": True,
"text": f"PV production: no reading from "
f"{roster[0]} - {self.pv_why}"})
else:
# habit 14: the value sits inside its own literal text, in
# its own slot, beside the entity it was read from and the
# unit it was read in - so a transposition of any two of the
# three is visible in the sentence rather than merely
# present in it.
out.append({"ok": True, "warn": False,
"text": f"PV production: {self.pv_w:.0f} W "
f"from {roster[0]} (reported "
f"in {self.pv_why})" + inv(roster[0])})
elif self.pv_w is None:
# ⚠️ THE ROW THAT SAYS THERE IS NO TOTAL, AND IT SAYS IT IN
# THOSE WORDS. `pv.total()`'s note is the argument; this is
# where the operator meets it. The partial information is NOT
# thrown away - every entity that reported is named with its
# watts and every one that did not is named with its reason -
# because this surface is read LIVE by a human who wants the
# diagnostic, whereas the MQTT row is read back COLD a week
# later by an attribution that would believe a smaller number.
# Different reader, different instant, different rule.
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": True,
"text": "PV production: NO SITE TOTAL - "
+ self.pv_why + ". Reporting: "
+ (", ".join(
f"{ent} {watt:.0f} W" + inv(ent)
for ent, watt, _y in self.pv_parts
if watt is not None) or "nothing")})
else:
# habit 14 at a roster: the total in its own slot, then EVERY
# contributor in its own slot with its own watts and its own
# unit. A sum that disagrees with the addends it is printed
# beside is visible in the sentence.
out.append({"ok": True, "warn": False,
"text": f"PV production: {self.pv_w:.0f} W from "
f"{len(self.pv_parts)} entities ("
+ ", ".join(
f"{ent} {watt:.0f} W in {why}"
+ inv(ent)
for ent, watt, why in self.pv_parts)
+ ")"})
# ⚠️ AND WHEN BOTH KEYS ARE SET, WHICH ONE WON IS STATED. `pv.py`'s
# `entities()` makes `pv_entities` REPLACE `pv_entity`, which is the
# right rule (its docstring says why) and is also the rule an
# operator upgrading from 0.11.0 is most likely to trip over: they
# add all their inverters to the new field and the old key is left
# standing, doing nothing. A replacement nobody is told about is the
# "one of which silently wins" `config.yaml` refuses elsewhere - and
# refusing to START over a telemetry key would be observability with
# a foot in the control path, so this is a CAUTION and never a `bad`
# row.
if pv_read.entity_is_ignored(self.o):
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": True,
"text": "PV production: `pv_entities` is set, so "
"`pv_entity` is IGNORED - the "
f"{len(roster)} entities in the "
"list are what is summed. Clear "
"`pv_entity` to remove this caution"})
# TEL-14: a sign that looks reversed, per entity rather than on the
# total - see `pv.NEGATIVE_W` and DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md §3.
for ent, watt, _y in self.pv_parts:
if watt is not None and watt < pv_read.NEGATIVE_W:
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": True,
"text": f"PV production: {ent} reads "
f"{watt:.0f} W - far below zero, so "
f"its sign is probably reversed. If "
f"it is producing now, "
+ ("REMOVE it from "
"`pv_invert_entities`"
if ent in flip else
"ADD it to `pv_invert_entities`")
+ " in the Configuration tab"})
for ent in pv_read.stray_inverts(self.o):
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": True,
"text": f"PV production: `pv_invert_entities` "
f"names {ent}, which is not a PV entity in "
f"use, so it flips nothing - check the "
f"spelling against `pv_entities`"})
return out
def status_payload(self) -> dict:
@@ -4961,6 +5235,13 @@ class Controller:
# identically zero and a permanent "0 W" row would be noise.
*(() if len(self.inverters) <= 1
else ((("Circulating", w(self.site_circulating_w)),))),
# TEL-11, and ONLY when a source is configured - see `checks()`.
# `w(None)` renders "—", which is how this row says "no reading"
# rather than "0 W". It sits beside Grid and Battery because the
# question it answers is the one those two cannot: at "Grid 0 W,
# Battery 0 W" the site is either becalmed or throwing away every
# watt it makes, and only this row separates them.
*(() if not self.pv_roster else ((("PV", w(self.pv_w)),))),
("State of charge", "—" if self.pack_floor_soc is None
else f"{self.pack_floor_soc:g} %"),
("Commanded", w(self.target)),
@@ -5169,6 +5450,30 @@ class Controller:
return None
# SAFETY-61. Exit status when the control task dies; 70 is sysexits(3)
# EX_SOFTWARE. See DECISIONS/SAFETY-61-control-task-death.md.
EXIT_CONTROL_DIED = 70
class ControlTaskDied(RuntimeError):
"""The control task ended while nothing had asked it to stop."""
def control_task_done(task: asyncio.Task, *, controller, stop: asyncio.Event,
died: list) -> None:
"""Done-callback on the control task: log its death now and wake amain()
to wind down and exit (SAFETY-61, see its DECISIONS record)."""
if stop.is_set() or controller.stopping:
return # the normal wind-down, or run_control()'s refusal path
exc = None if task.cancelled() else task.exception()
_LOG.critical("CONTROL LOOP DIED (%s) - commanding 0 W and exiting with "
"status %d", "cancelled" if task.cancelled() else
(repr(exc) if exc else "returned"), EXIT_CONTROL_DIED,
exc_info=exc)
died.append(exc)
stop.set()
async def amain() -> None:
opts = load_options()
logging.basicConfig(
@@ -5234,6 +5539,11 @@ async def amain() -> None:
broker.get("username") if broker else None,
broker.get("password") if broker else None,
omit=() if is_enabled(opts) else ("p1_age",),
# TEL-11. ⚠️ THE SHIPPED PREDICATE, NOT A SECOND READING OF THE
# OPTION - `Controller.publish()` gates the row on this same
# call. An install with no PV roster announces exactly
# what it announced before: no topic, no entity, no row.
include=optional_keys(opts),
# TEL-07. ⚠️ THE NAMES, NOT A ROSTER. `build_roster()` here
# would construct a SECOND set of `Inverter`s off the same
# Store, minutes before `Controller.__init__` constructs the
@@ -5261,7 +5571,13 @@ async def amain() -> None:
with contextlib.suppress(NotImplementedError):
loop.add_signal_handler(sig, stop.set)
tasks = [asyncio.create_task(controller.run_control())]
# SAFETY-61: the control task's death ends the process, after the
# wind-down below. See DECISIONS/SAFETY-61-control-task-death.md.
died: list = []
control = asyncio.create_task(controller.run_control())
control.add_done_callback(functools.partial(
control_task_done, controller=controller, stop=stop, died=died))
tasks = [control]
# OPT-04. The tariff refresh runs as its OWN long-lived task, for the
# reason P1 ingestion does and then some: `resolve_tariff()` may open an
@@ -5296,10 +5612,14 @@ async def amain() -> None:
for task in tasks:
task.cancel()
for task in tasks:
if task is control and died:
continue # already logged by control_task_done()
with contextlib.suppress(asyncio.CancelledError):
await task
await runner.cleanup()
_LOG.info("stopped")
if died:
raise ControlTaskDied(died[0])
# The late-arriving-device refusal from run_control(). Re-raised only
# now, so the wind-down above still ran and the inverter is at 0 W.
if controller.refused:
@@ -5318,6 +5638,9 @@ def main() -> None:
# EX_CONFIG, so even a script reading the exit status can tell a bad
# config from a bug.
raise SystemExit(78)
except ControlTaskDied:
# No second traceback: control_task_done() logged it at the death.
raise SystemExit(EXIT_CONTROL_DIED)
if __name__ == "__main__":
+250
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
"""Every Home Assistant notification this add-on raises, in plain words (UX-08).
The rule is `STYLE.md` at the repository root; `test_messages.py` enforces it.
Titles, bodies and severities live here and nowhere else, so `main.py` only
decides WHEN to raise a notice and this file decides WHAT it says. The detail
that used to fill the bodies is in DOCS.md, under "Notifications", one section
per title; the body ends with a link to it.
"""
import os
import re
from dataclasses import dataclass
# Severity (STYLE.md section 3). An ALARM may use up to three sentences so
# that no action a person must take is lost; everything else gets one.
ALARM, WARNING, INFO, RESOLVED = "alarm", "warning", "info", "resolved"
DOCS_SECTION = "Notifications"
def watts(value) -> str:
"""`7412` -> `7 412 W`: a magnitude, grouped for reading, no sign."""
return f"{abs(float(value)):,.0f} W".replace(",", " ")
def duration(seconds) -> str:
s = float(seconds)
if s < 120:
return f"{s:.0f} seconds"
return f"{s / 60:.0f} minutes"
def names(items) -> str:
items = list(items)
if len(items) <= 1:
return "".join(items)
return ", ".join(items[:-1]) + " and " + items[-1]
def addon_slug() -> str | None:
"""This add-on's Supervisor slug, from the container hostname.
The Supervisor names an add-on's host after its slug with `_` spelled `-`
(`local_goodwe_controller` -> `local-goodwe-controller`). Anything else,
e.g. a test run, gets no link rather than a wrong one.
"""
host = os.environ.get("HOSTNAME", "")
if re.fullmatch(r"[a-z0-9]+-goodwe-controller", host):
return host.replace("-", "_")
return None
def details(title: str) -> str:
where = f"section “{title}” under {DOCS_SECTION}"
slug = addon_slug()
if slug is None:
return f"Details: add-on documentation, {where}."
return (f"Details: [add-on documentation](/hassio/addon/{slug}/documentation),"
f" {where}.")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Notice:
id: str
severity: str
title: str
body: str
section: str = "" # the DOCS.md heading, when it is not the title itself
@property
def docs(self) -> str:
return self.section or self.title
def data(self) -> dict:
"""The `persistent_notification.create` payload."""
return {"notification_id": self.id, "title": self.title,
"message": f"{self.body}\n\n{details(self.docs)}"}
# --- the catalogue ----------------------------------------------------------
# Each title below is also a DOCS.md heading (test_messages.py checks it).
T_LOOP_BOUND = "Battery is not keeping up"
T_OUTPUT_CLAMP = "Power request too high"
T_PEAK_SATURATED = "Load too high for battery"
T_PEAK_RESERVE = "Battery stopped limiting the peak"
T_CIRCULATING = "Inverters working against each other"
T_NOT_DELIVERING = "{unit} is not delivering"
S_NOT_DELIVERING = "An inverter is not delivering"
T_METER_FROZEN = "Meter reading may be stuck"
ID_LOOP_BOUND = "goodwe_integrator_bound"
ID_OUTPUT_CLAMP = "goodwe_output_clamp"
ID_PEAK_SATURATED = "goodwe_peak_saturated"
ID_PEAK_RESERVE = "goodwe_peak_soc_floor"
ID_CIRCULATING = "goodwe_circulating_power"
ID_NOT_DELIVERING = "goodwe_not_delivering_{slug}"
ID_METER_FROZEN = "goodwe_meter_frozen"
# Which limit cut a command (clamp.ClampResult.bound, plus the loop's own).
LIMIT_WORDS = {
"max_w": "the configured inverter rating",
"device": "the inverter's own limit",
"max_w+device": "the configured inverter rating and the inverter's own limit",
"rating": "the inverter rating",
}
def loop_bound() -> Notice:
"""SAFETY-40: the integrator bound. Normal in short bursts; not a fault."""
return Notice(ID_LOOP_BOUND, WARNING, T_LOOP_BOUND,
"The battery cannot give what the controller asks, which is "
"normal for a moment but needs a check if it keeps happening.")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Clamp:
"""One command that was cut: what was asked, what was sent, and by what."""
unit: str | None
asked_w: float
sent_w: float
limit: str # a key of LIMIT_WORDS
def output_clamp(clamps) -> Notice:
"""SAFETY-03: a computed command above the limit. A software fault.
Asked comes before sent, always - reading them the other way round turns
the alarm backwards (test_clamp.py part 6).
"""
if not clamps:
return Notice(ID_OUTPUT_CLAMP, ALARM, T_OUTPUT_CLAMP,
"The controller asked for more power than the inverter "
"rating and was cut back. Control is still running. This "
"is a software fault, so please report it to your "
"installer.")
c = clamps[0]
who = f"For {c.unit}, the" if c.unit else "The"
others = [x.unit for x in clamps[1:] if x.unit]
running = (f"{names(others)} {'was' if len(others) == 1 else 'were'} cut "
f"too, and control is still running." if others
else "Control is still running.")
return Notice(ID_OUTPUT_CLAMP, ALARM, T_OUTPUT_CLAMP,
f"{who} controller asked for {watts(c.asked_w)}, above "
f"{LIMIT_WORDS.get(c.limit, LIMIT_WORDS['rating'])}, and sent "
f"{watts(c.sent_w)} instead. {running} "
f"This is a software fault, so please report it to your "
f"installer.")
def peak_saturated(ceiling_w) -> Notice:
"""SAFETY-07: the battery gives all it can and the peak still goes up."""
return Notice(ID_PEAK_SATURATED, ALARM, T_PEAK_SATURATED,
f"The battery is giving all it can, but this 15-minute period "
f"will still go over your {watts(ceiling_w)} peak limit and "
f"raise this month's peak. Switch off large loads in the next "
f"few minutes. This is not a fault: the load is bigger than "
f"the inverter.")
def peak_reserve(ceiling_w, *, soc_unread: bool, floor_unknown: bool,
packs=()) -> Notice:
"""SAFETY-24/25/32: the peak guard may not discharge any further.
The last sentence is SAFETY-25 and must stay: the reserve binds the peak
guard only, and normal home use goes on discharging below it.
`packs` names the batteries at their limit, only on a site with several.
`floor_unknown`: the floor the guard grades against is None, which at a
roster means some inverter's cut-out level is missing (the peak reserve
itself always has a value) - so the action names the cut-out level.
"""
if soc_unread:
why = "The battery level cannot be read"
act = "Switch off large loads, and check the battery level sensor."
elif floor_unknown:
why = "The cut-out level of a battery is not known"
act = ("Switch off large loads, and set each battery's cut-out level "
"in the settings.")
else:
why = (f"The battery of {names(packs)} is at its peak reserve" if packs
else "The battery is at its peak reserve")
act = ("Switch off large loads, or lower the peak reserve if the "
"battery allows it.")
return Notice(ID_PEAK_RESERVE, ALARM, T_PEAK_RESERVE,
f"{why}, so this 15-minute period will go over your "
f"{watts(ceiling_w)} peak limit and raise this month's peak. "
f"{act} The reserve only applies to keeping the peak down: normal home use "
f"can still discharge the battery below it, down to its "
f"cut-out level.")
def circulating(discharging=(), charging=()) -> Notice:
"""SAFETY-31: the inverters push power round each other. Control stopped."""
if discharging and charging:
what = (f"{names(discharging)} was discharging while "
f"{names(charging)} was charging, and your meter cannot see "
f"this.")
else:
what = ("One inverter was charging from another, and your meter "
"cannot see this.")
return Notice(ID_CIRCULATING, ALARM, T_CIRCULATING,
f"{what} Every inverter is set to 0 W: if the grid power does "
f"not change now, switch the inverters off at the isolator. "
f"Control stays stopped, even after a restart, until you "
f"start it on the add-on page once you know why.")
def not_delivering(unit: str, slug: str) -> Notice:
"""SAFETY-42: one inverter gives less than its share. Reports, never acts."""
return Notice(
ID_NOT_DELIVERING.format(slug=slug), ALARM,
T_NOT_DELIVERING.format(unit=unit),
f"{unit} gives less power than it is asked for, but nothing was "
f"changed and control keeps running. Check that {unit} is "
f"on and connected, that its battery is not empty or cold, and that "
f"nothing else controls it. A restart does not clear this: once you "
f"know why, stop and start control on the add-on page.",
section=S_NOT_DELIVERING)
def meter_frozen(unchanged_s) -> Notice:
"""SAFETY-18: the meter answers but its value does not move."""
return Notice(ID_METER_FROZEN, ALARM, T_METER_FROZEN,
f"The meter has shown the same value for "
f"{duration(unchanged_s)} while the controller asks the "
f"battery for full power. Control is still running and still "
f"follows this reading. Check the meter, and if it is stuck, "
f"stop control on the add-on page.")
def samples() -> list:
"""One rendering of every notice, with realistic values, for the test."""
return [
loop_bound(),
output_clamp([Clamp(None, 7412, 5000, "rating")]),
output_clamp(()),
output_clamp([Clamp("inverter-a", -3000, -2500, "device"),
Clamp("inverter-b", 6000, 4600, "max_w+device")]),
peak_saturated(5000),
peak_reserve(5000, soc_unread=False, floor_unknown=False),
peak_reserve(5000, soc_unread=False, floor_unknown=False,
packs=["inverter-b"]),
peak_reserve(5000, soc_unread=True, floor_unknown=False),
peak_reserve(5000, soc_unread=False, floor_unknown=True),
circulating(["inverter-a"], ["inverter-b"]),
circulating(),
not_delivering("inverter-b", "inverter_b"),
meter_frozen(600),
meter_frozen(90),
]
+109 -4
View File
@@ -117,6 +117,82 @@ SENSORS = [
("loop_reason", "goodwe_loop_reason", "Loop reason", None, None, None, "mdi:sigma"),
]
# --- TEL-11: rows that exist ONLY when the operator configured a source ------
#
# ⚠️ A SECOND LIST RATHER THAN A TENTH ENTRY IN `SENSORS`, AND THE DEFAULT IS
# WHAT MAKES IT ONE. `SENSORS` is announced by every caller of
# `discovery_payloads()`; `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` is announced only by a caller that
# ASKS, so a caller that has not been taught about `pv_entity` - `test_mqtt.py`'s
# fixtures, `tools/rehearse_roster.py`, anything written next year - announces
# exactly what it announced before. `p1_age` solves the same problem the other
# way round, with `omit`, because `p1_age` is announced by DEFAULT and withdrawn
# when the meter is off; this one does not exist by default and appears when a
# source for it does. Getting that direction wrong is the hazard `omit`'s own
# note names: an entity that exists and is never fed is a worse signal than one
# that does not exist at all, and MOST installs will never set `pv_entity`.
#
# ⚠️ `state_class: measurement` IS THE WHOLE POINT OF THE ROW. It is what puts
# the number into the recorder's long-term statistics, and a week of statistics
# is what OPT-10 needs to say whether the surplus that left this site was cloud,
# a charge-power limit, or the optimiser declining to charge.
OPTIONAL_SENSORS = [
("pv", "goodwe_pv_power", "PV power", "W", "power", "measurement", None),
]
# ⚠️ HA's OWN "this sensor has no value" PAYLOAD, and the one place this add-on
# spells it. `homeassistant/components/mqtt/const.py` declares
# `PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"` and `mqtt/sensor.py` tests it BEFORE the numeric
# branch - `if payload == PAYLOAD_NONE: self._attr_native_value = None` - so the
# entity's state becomes `unknown` rather than a number. (Read out of
# github.com/home-assistant/core `dev` on 2026-09-24; the shipped MQTT-sensor
# documentation says the same thing in its `state_topic` entry: "a 'None' value
# will set the sensor to an unknown state".)
PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"
# The keys whose ABSENCE MUST BE PUBLISHED rather than skipped. ⚠️ THIS IS THE
# DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "no PV reported" AND "PV reported 0 W" IN A WEEK OF
# HISTORY, AND WITHOUT IT THE CHANNEL LIES IN THE WORSE DIRECTION. `publish()`
# below drops a `None` - which is right for `circulation`, where the last figure
# standing is better than a zero that reads as health - but a DROPPED pv row
# leaves Home Assistant holding the last number it was told, forever, and the
# recorder then draws a flat line at that value through an outage. Someone
# reading it back would conclude the sun was not shining, which is precisely the
# conclusion this card exists to TEST rather than to manufacture.
ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN = frozenset({"pv"})
def optional_keys(opts: dict) -> tuple:
"""Which `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` rows this configuration has a source for.
⚠️ ONE ANSWER TO "IS THE PV ROW LIVE", read by the ANNOUNCEMENT (through
`MqttPublisher`) and by `Controller.publish()`. `announced_units()` above
exists for exactly this reason and says it in full: two spellings of one
predicate is how an entity gets announced that nothing feeds, or fed on a
topic nothing announced.
⚠️ AND SINCE TEL-12 IT IS `pv.entities()` RATHER THAN A SECOND READING OF
THE OPTION - `Controller.pv_roster` is the SAME call. TEL-11 got away with
two spellings because both were `bool()` of one string; with `pv_entities`
beside `pv_entity`, and `pv_entities` REPLACING it, a second spelling is how
the row gets announced off one key and summed off the other. ⚠️ THE ROW IS
ONE SITE TOTAL AT EVERY ROSTER SIZE: there is deliberately no per-entity
topic, because the recorder statistic OPT-10 reads back is the site figure
and a per-inverter breakdown is a dashboard question the operator's own PV
integration already answers.
"""
# ⚠️ THE IMPORT IS FUNCTION-LOCAL AND THAT IS NOT A STYLE CHOICE. This
# module is EXEC'D STANDALONE, outside its package, by `test_mqtt.py`
# part 8's mutation harness - which says so in its own comment, and whose
# honesty depends on it ("`app/mqtt.py` imports nothing from this package,
# which is what makes exec'ing it standalone honest rather than a stub").
# A module-scope `from . import pv` turns that whole instrument into an
# `ImportError` before it grades anything. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py`'s
# `_load()` is the same decision for the same kind of reason. Measured, not
# assumed: move this line to module scope and test_mqtt.py part 8 dies.
from . import pv as _pv
return ("pv",) if _pv.entities(opts) else ()
BASE = "goodwe_ctl"
AVAILABILITY = f"{BASE}/availability"
@@ -299,15 +375,23 @@ def _payload(name, object_id, unique_id, state_topic, device,
return cfg
def discovery_payloads(units=(), omit=()) -> list:
def discovery_payloads(units=(), omit=(), include=()) -> list:
"""Every `(topic, payload)` this add-on announces, in announcement order.
Split out of `_announce()` so that the acceptance criterion can be graded as
a DIFF OF THE ANNOUNCED PAYLOADS against `release/1.0`, rather than as a
reading of the code. `_announce()` publishes exactly this list and nothing
else, which is itself checked.
`include` names `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` keys to announce. ⚠️ IT DEFAULTS TO
NOTHING AND THE ROWS GO LAST, so no existing row's POSITION moves under any
configuration - not the site rows, not the per-unit ones. Order is part of
the output here (`_payload()`'s note, and test_mqtt.py part 1 asserts an
ordered LIST precisely because a re-order is a zero-byte edit that
re-announces every entity on a live install).
"""
omit = set(omit)
include = [k for k in include if k not in omit]
out = []
for key, object_id, name, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in SENSORS:
if key in omit:
@@ -336,12 +420,19 @@ def discovery_payloads(units=(), omit=()) -> list:
unique_id,
f"{BASE}/{unit_state_key(slug, key)}",
device, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon)))
for key, object_id, name, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon in OPTIONAL_SENSORS:
if key not in include:
continue
out.append((
f"homeassistant/sensor/{BASE}_{key}/config",
_payload(name, object_id, f"{BASE}_{key}", f"{BASE}/{key}",
DEVICE, unit, dev_class, state_class, icon)))
return out
class MqttPublisher:
def __init__(self, host, port, username=None, password=None, omit=(),
units=()):
units=(), include=()):
# `omit` drops sensor keys from discovery entirely. ⚠️ Announcing a
# sensor that nothing will ever publish to is not harmless here:
# p1_sample_age_s is a watchdog input, and an entity that exists but is
@@ -353,6 +444,10 @@ class MqttPublisher:
# per-unit is announced, so every caller that has not been taught about
# the roster keeps publishing what it published before.
self.units = [str(u) for u in units]
# TEL-11. `mqtt.optional_keys(opts)` - the shipped predicate, not a
# second reading of the option. Defaults to empty, so a caller that has
# not been taught about it announces exactly what it announced before.
self.include = [str(k) for k in include]
self.enabled = mqtt is not None and bool(host)
self.client = None
if not self.enabled:
@@ -389,7 +484,8 @@ class MqttPublisher:
# announcement, so the check that diffs it against `release/1.0` is
# diffing what actually goes on the wire - and a payload built here
# instead would be one this add-on publishes and no check has ever seen.
for topic, cfg in discovery_payloads(self.units, self.omit):
for topic, cfg in discovery_payloads(self.units, self.omit,
self.include):
self.client.publish(topic, json.dumps(cfg), retain=True)
self.client.publish(AVAILABILITY, "online", retain=True)
@@ -399,7 +495,16 @@ class MqttPublisher:
try:
for key, value in values.items():
if value is None:
continue
# ⚠️ TEL-11. A DROPPED ROW IS NOT AN ABSENT ROW. Skipping
# leaves Home Assistant holding the last value it was told,
# which is what `circulation` wants (its note in main.py
# says why) and is exactly wrong for a measurement somebody
# will read back as history: a flat line at the last number
# is indistinguishable from a real one. See
# `ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN`.
if key not in ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN:
continue
value = PAYLOAD_NONE
self.client.publish(f"{BASE}/{key}", str(value))
except OSError as err: # pragma: no cover
_LOG.debug("MQTT publish failed: %s", err)
+274
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
"""TEL-11/TEL-12 - the site's PV production, read from Home Assistant entities.
WHY THIS IS AN ENTITY AND NOT A REGISTER. This add-on's RS485 bus carries the
BATTERY inverter it drives. A household's PV inverter is, on nearly every site,
a different box from a different vendor that reports into Home Assistant
through its own integration - so the only place a product can read production
for an arbitrary install is an HA entity. `pv_entities` therefore takes whatever
`sensor.*` the site's own PV integration provides.
⚠️ AND THERE IS USUALLY MORE THAN ONE OF THEM, WHICH IS TEL-12. TEL-11 shipped
`pv_entity` as a single string and the owner of the reference site reported
within minutes of 0.11.0 going live that they have SEVERAL PV inverters and
could configure one. That is not a property of one house: a multi-string or
multi-orientation roof routinely carries two or three inverters, each
publishing its own power sensor. `entities()` below is the roster and `total()`
is the site figure over it.
⚠️ AND A PARTIAL TOTAL IS WORSE THAN NO TOTAL, WHICH IS THE WHOLE OF TEL-12.
Three inverters configured, one `unavailable`, and the sum of the other two is A
SMALLER NUMBER INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM A REAL ONE. Fed into OPT-10's attribution
that reads as "there was less PV than there was" - which is the "no irradiance"
conclusion the card exists to TEST rather than to manufacture. So `total()`
answers `None` the moment ANY configured entity is absent. See the note on
`total()` for the alternative that was weighed and why it lost.
WHY THE CHANNEL EXISTS AT ALL. OPT-10 measured that 20.5 kWh of surplus left the
site in 16 days while the pack had room, 12.6 kWh of it with the battery not
charging at all - and could not say WHY, because PV production is recorded
NOWHERE. Three causes need three different fixes (no irradiance: nothing to fix;
a charge-power limit; the optimiser declining to charge - the only software
defect), and guessing between them is how an optimiser gets tuned to solve a
cloud problem. This module is the missing measurement and NOTHING ELSE.
⚠️ NOTHING HERE MAY EVER REACH A CONTROL DECISION, AND THAT IS THE CARD'S FIRST
CONSTRAINT RATHER THAN A STYLE NOTE. The add-on regulates a real battery; adding
production as a term of the control law would be an unrequested behaviour change
AND it would destroy the measurement, because the loop would then be reacting to
the quantity being measured. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is what says the path is
untouched: it grades a control document that contains none of this material on
both trees and with `pv_entity` set and unset.
⚠️ ABSENCE IS NEVER ZERO, AND THAT IS THE SECOND CONSTRAINT. Every refusal below
returns `None` with a REASON, never `0.0`. A PV channel that reported 0 W for a
dead sensor would manufacture exactly the "there was no surplus to store"
conclusion the card exists to TEST - and it would do it silently, in a week of
recorder history nobody would re-derive. `app/hass.py`'s own note on `state()`
is the same rule one layer down. ⚠️ TEL-12 EXTENDS THAT RULE RATHER THAN
WEAKENING IT: at a roster of three, "one of them is absent" is an absence of the
SITE figure, and it publishes as an absence. A partial sum is a second way of
reporting 0-where-there-was-production, one layer up, and it is refused for the
same reason.
THE SIGN CONVENTION: POSITIVE IS PRODUCTION, as for `meter_entity` and
`batt_entity` ("power arriving at the house's AC bus"). TEL-14: a kWh meter or
power clamp in the PV circuit reads the other way, so `pv_invert_entities`
flips the sign per entity. See `DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md`.
"""
from .hass import BAD_STATES
# Home Assistant's OWN power units, each as the number of watts one of it is.
# ⚠️ READ OUT OF HA, NOT LISTED FROM MEMORY: `UnitOfPower` in
# `homeassistant/const.py` (github.com/home-assistant/core, `dev`, retrieved
# 2026-09-24) declares mW, W, kW, MW, GW, TW and BTU/h. Every factor here is an
# exact power of ten, so none of them is a number anybody chose.
#
# ⚠️ BTU/h IS IN HA's ENUM AND DELIBERATELY NOT HERE. Its factor (0.293071…)
# is a measured conversion rather than a decimal shift, no PV integration
# publishes in it, and a wrong constant in the one channel that exists to
# attribute a 20.5 kWh shortfall is worse than a refusal an operator can read.
# It lands in the "not a power unit" refusal below, BY NAME.
WATTS_PER = {
"mW": 0.001,
"W": 1.0,
"kW": 1000.0,
"MW": 1000000.0,
"GW": 1000000000.0,
"TW": 1000000000000.0,
}
# What `watts()` answers when there is nothing to report. ⚠️ THE REASON IS PART
# OF THE RETURN VALUE, not a log line: it is what the status page prints, and an
# absence whose cause is invisible sends an operator to look at the wrong box.
UNIT_KEY = "unit_of_measurement"
def watts(state: dict | None) -> tuple:
"""`(watts, why)` from a Home Assistant state object.
`watts` is `None` whenever there is no reading - and `why` then says which
of the five refusals it was, in words an operator can act on. On a good read
`why` is the unit the value was read in, because "1234 W" and "1234, unit
unknown" are different claims and the page has to be able to make the first.
⚠️ THE UNIT IS READ OFF THE ENTITY AND NOT ASSUMED, AND THERE IS NO
MAGNITUDE HEURISTIC. `read_inputs()` guesses kW-or-W for
`peak_forecast_entity` with `abs(raw) < 50`, which is safe there because
nobody's quarter-hour demand forecast is 50 W. It is NOT safe here: 30 W of
real production at dusk is an ordinary reading, and that heuristic would
publish it as 30 kW - a fabricated number, in the channel whose entire
purpose is to be believed a week later. A sensor whose unit this cannot read
is REFUSED rather than guessed at.
"""
if state is None:
# `hass.state()` answers None for a non-existent entity, a 404 and a
# transport failure alike. All three are "no reading", and HA does not
# consider a non-existent entity an error - see `hass.state()`.
return None, "no state (entity missing, or the read failed)"
raw = str(state.get("state", "")).strip()
if raw.lower() in BAD_STATES:
# ⚠️ THE SAME LIST `hass.number()` REFUSES ON, IMPORTED RATHER THAN
# RESPELLED. A second copy of it is how one path starts treating
# `unavailable` as a number the other one rejects.
return None, f"entity is {raw or 'empty'}"
try:
value = float(raw)
except ValueError:
return None, f"state {raw!r} is not numeric"
unit = str((state.get("attributes") or {}).get(UNIT_KEY) or "").strip()
if not unit:
return None, ("no unit_of_measurement on the entity - it cannot be "
"read in watts")
if unit not in WATTS_PER:
return None, (f"unit {unit!r} is not one of "
f"{', '.join(WATTS_PER)} - it cannot be read in watts")
return value * WATTS_PER[unit], unit
# --- TEL-12: the ROSTER, and the SITE figure over it --------------------------
def entities(opts: dict) -> tuple:
"""Every PV entity this configuration names, in configured order. TEL-12.
⚠️ ONE ANSWER TO "WHICH ENTITIES ARE THE PV CHANNEL", and it is the answer
BOTH sides read. `Controller.pv_roster` is this call and
`mqtt.optional_keys()` is `bool()` of this call, so the thing that decides
whether the row is ANNOUNCED, the thing that decides whether it is READ and
the thing that decides HOW MANY entities are summed cannot disagree. TEL-11
already had that discipline for one entity and spelled the predicate TWICE
- `str(opts.get("pv_entity") or "").strip()` in `main.py` and again in
`mqtt.py`. Two spellings of one predicate is how an entity gets announced
that nothing feeds; a roster makes it how a SUM gets taken over a different
list from the one that was announced. It is one function now.
⚠️ `pv_entities` REPLACES `pv_entity` RATHER THAN EXTENDING IT, and that is
CFG-04's shipped precedent (`inverters:` replaces the six flat keys) applied
to the only upgrade path that matters. The install this card exists for HAS
`pv_entity` set, to inverter A. Opening the Configuration tab, the natural
action is to put ALL the inverters in the new repeatable field - and under a
UNION rule that double-counts A unless the operator also remembers to clear
the old key. A doubled total is the same defect as a partial one in the
other direction, in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later.
Under REPLACE the effective roster is exactly what one key says, and no
arithmetic depends on a de-duplication rule the operator has to know about.
⚠️ `Controller.checks()` says WHICH key is in use whenever both are set, so
the replacement is stated on the page rather than being silent.
⚠️ AND IT DE-DUPLICATES WITHIN THE LIST, ORDER PRESERVED. A site cannot have
two sensors with one entity_id, so a repeated id in the list is never a
second inverter - it is a typo that would DOUBLE that inverter's production
in the total. `dict.fromkeys` is the order-preserving spelling.
"""
listed = [e for e in (str(x or "").strip()
for x in (opts.get("pv_entities") or [])) if e]
if listed:
return tuple(dict.fromkeys(listed))
one = str(opts.get("pv_entity") or "").strip()
return (one,) if one else ()
def entity_is_ignored(opts: dict) -> bool:
"""Is a set `pv_entity` being REPLACED by a set `pv_entities`? TEL-12.
⚠️ HERE RATHER THAN IN `Controller.checks()`, for the reason `entities()`
exists: the rule and the sentence that reports the rule must not be two
readings of the options. This is the negative half of `entities()`' first
branch and it is spelled once, beside it, where an edit to one is in front
of whoever is editing the other.
"""
return bool(str(opts.get("pv_entity") or "").strip()
and [x for x in (opts.get("pv_entities") or [])
if str(x or "").strip()])
def inverted(opts: dict) -> frozenset:
"""The entity ids `pv_invert_entities` flips. TEL-14."""
return frozenset(e for e in (str(x or "").strip()
for x in (opts.get("pv_invert_entities") or []))
if e)
def stray_inverts(opts: dict) -> list:
"""`pv_invert_entities` entries naming no entity in the roster - a typo
that would otherwise leave a sign unflipped with nothing said. TEL-14."""
roster = set(entities(opts))
return sorted(e for e in inverted(opts) if e not in roster)
# TEL-14: a reading below this is not standby draw. A correctly signed meter in
# the PV circuit reads a few watts NEGATIVE at night (the owner's: 13 W); -50 W
# clears that with room for a couple of such devices on one entity, while a
# reversed sensor in daylight reads hundreds to thousands of watts below zero.
NEGATIVE_W = -50.0
def total(readings, flip=frozenset()) -> tuple:
"""`(watts, why, parts)` - the SITE's production, or an ABSENCE. TEL-12.
`readings` is `[(entity_id, state), ...]` in `entities()` order, one entry
per configured entity, each `state` shaped as `hass.state()` returns.
`parts` is `[(entity_id, watts, why), ...]` - EVERY entity's own answer from
`watts()`, kept because the operator surfaces have to be able to name which
sensor is missing. `watts` is the sum when every entity answered, and `None`
otherwise; `why` always says which of those it was, in words a status page
can print.
⚠️ ONE OR MORE ABSENT -> THE TOTAL IS ABSENT. NOT THE PARTIAL SUM. This is
the decision the card turns on and it was taken deliberately against the
alternative, which was to publish the partial sum ALONGSIDE a count of how
many entities contributed. Both are defensible; this one wins on the ONE
question that matters, which is who reads the number and when:
* the MQTT row is read back COLD, a week later, by OPT-10's attribution
and by whatever plots `sensor.goodwe_pv_power` over that week. A partial
sum there is a smaller number indistinguishable from a real one, and the
count that would have qualified it lives in a SECOND entity with its own
history - so believing the total requires joining two recorder series by
timestamp to find out which samples to distrust. Nobody re-derives that,
which is the same "nobody will re-derive it" TEL-11's note names. And it
is worse than a gap in exactly the direction that matters: a gap makes
the attribution say "I do not know", a partial sum makes it say "there
was less sun than there was".
* the STATUS PAGE is read LIVE, by a human, who wants the diagnostic. So
the partial information is not thrown away - `Controller.checks()` names
every entity that DID report, with its watts, and every one that did
not, with its reason, in a row that states plainly that there is no site
total. Different reader, different instant, different rule.
A count published beside the total would also carry no information in the
state this function actually admits: the total is published ONLY when every
entity contributed, so the count would be the constant `len(parts)`.
⚠️ AND `0 W` IS STILL A READING AT EVERY ROSTER SIZE - the test is
`watts is None`, never falsiness. An inverter honestly reporting 0 W at dusk
beside two that are producing must give the SUM of the three, not blank the
site: shading, a tripped string and nightfall are all real 0s, and a roster
that went to `unknown` whenever one member read zero would report an absence
on every clear evening and defeat the channel from the other end.
⚠️ TEL-14: `flip` is `inverted(opts)`; each member's sign is applied HERE,
before the sum, so every surface reads the corrected figure. `0.0 - w`
rather than `-w`, so a flipped 0 W is `0.0` and never `-0.0` on the wire.
"""
parts = [(ent, w if w is None or ent not in flip else 0.0 - w, why)
for ent, (w, why) in ((e, watts(st)) for e, st in readings)]
if not parts:
# No roster. `Controller` does not call this in that state - the gate is
# `pv_roster` - but a reader of `parts` should never have to wonder.
return None, "not configured", parts
if len(parts) == 1:
# ⚠️ AT ONE ENTITY THIS IS `watts()` AND NOTHING ELSE: the same value
# and the SAME `why` string, passed through rather than re-composed, so
# 0.11.0's single-entity surfaces are byte-identical rather than
# similar. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` grades that identity across trees.
return parts[0][1], parts[0][2], parts
missing = [(ent, why) for ent, w, why in parts if w is None]
if missing:
return None, (
f"only {len(parts) - len(missing)} of {len(parts)} entities are "
f"reporting and a partial sum would understate production: "
+ "; ".join(f"{ent} - {why}" for ent, why in missing)), parts
return (sum(w for _e, w, _y in parts),
f"{len(parts)} entities", parts)
+112 -6
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: GoodWe RS485 Controller
version: "0.10.0"
version: "0.12.0"
slug: goodwe_controller
description: >-
Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over RS485 by emulating its smart
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ options:
# against a sibling's numbers; an entry silently inheriting `soc_entity` would
# rebuild that defect in YAML. `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w` and
# `bms_soc_floor` are therefore REQUIRED of every entry (the schema below enforces it, and
# validate.py rule 9 enforces it again for the callers the Supervisor never
# validate.py rules 8 and 9 enforce it again for the callers the Supervisor never
# sees). An omitted `soc_entity`/`batt_entity` means THIS UNIT HAS NO SUCH
# SENSOR - `inputs_ok` already stops the site for that - and never means
# "use the other one's".
@@ -147,6 +147,76 @@ options:
inverters: []
estop_fitted: false
# TEL-11 - THE SITE'S PV PRODUCTION, IN WATTS, AND IT IS READ BY NOTHING THAT
# DECIDES ANYTHING. Optional, empty on every install that does not set it, and
# when it is empty the add-on reads no entity, announces no entity, publishes
# no topic and shows no status row.
#
# ⚠️ AN HA ENTITY AND NOT A REGISTER, BECAUSE MOST SOLAR INVERTERS ARE NOT ON
# THIS BUS. The RS485 bus this add-on speaks carries the BATTERY inverter it
# drives; a household's PV inverter is normally a different box from a
# different vendor, reporting into Home Assistant through its own integration.
# So this takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's PV integration provides, any
# brand Home Assistant can read.
#
# POSITIVE IS PRODUCTION. An entity that reads the other way round goes in
# `pv_invert_entities` below - see DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md.
#
# ⚠️ THE ENTITY'S OWN `unit_of_measurement` IS WHAT IS BELIEVED - W, kW, MW
# and the rest of Home Assistant's power units. A sensor with no unit, or with
# a unit that is not power, is REFUSED and the status page says which: there
# is no magnitude heuristic that can tell 30 W of dusk from 30 kW of noon, and
# a factor of 1000 in the one channel that exists to be believed a week later
# is worse than a refusal an operator can read.
pv_entity: ""
# TEL-12 - THE SAME CHANNEL WHEN THE ROOF HAS SEVERAL INVERTERS, WHICH IS THE
# ORDINARY CASE AND NOT AN EDGE ONE. A multi-string or multi-orientation roof
# routinely carries two or three PV inverters, each publishing its own power
# sensor; 0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity` as a single string and the reference
# site's owner reported within minutes that they could configure one of
# theirs. List them all here and the row carries the SITE total.
#
# ⚠️ DECLARED, THIS REPLACES `pv_entity` - it does not extend it. Set both and
# ONLY this list is read, and the status page says so. That is CFG-04's rule
# for `inverters:` applied to the upgrade path this key exists for: the
# install being upgraded HAS `pv_entity` set, and an operator who adds all
# their inverters to this list while the old key still names one of them would
# DOUBLE that inverter under a union rule. Clear `pv_entity` when you fill
# this in.
#
# ⚠️ AND IF ANY ONE OF THEM IS NOT REPORTING, THERE IS NO SITE TOTAL - the row
# publishes `unknown` and the recorder records a GAP. It does NOT publish the
# sum of the ones that answered: two of three inverters add up to a smaller
# number that is indistinguishable from a real one, and a week later that
# reads as "there was less sun than there was" - the exact conclusion this
# channel exists to TEST rather than to manufacture. The status page names
# which entity is missing and why, and lists what the others reported, because
# a human reading it live wants the diagnostic; the recorded number does not,
# because nobody re-derives a week of history. See
# DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md.
#
# ⚠️ THE FIX IS NOT A TEMPLATE SENSOR THAT SUMS THEM. You may legitimately
# prefer one, but a template sensor summing an `unavailable` source yields the
# partial total silently - the same defect one layer down, in a place this
# add-on cannot see or report.
#
# pv_entities:
# - sensor.pv_east_power
# - sensor.pv_west_power
# - sensor.pv_garage_power
#
# Each entity's OWN `unit_of_measurement` is read, so a kW inverter beside a W
# one sums correctly. Empty is the shipped default and means "use `pv_entity`,
# which is also empty" - i.e. no PV channel at all, which is every install.
pv_entities: []
# TEL-14. Every PV entity listed here (in `pv_entity` or `pv_entities`) has
# its sign flipped, for a kWh meter or power clamp that reads production as
# negative. Per entity, because one roster can mix both conventions. `[]` is
# load-bearing like `pv_entities: []`; see DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md.
pv_invert_entities: []
# ==========================================================================
# METER - where the grid reading comes from
# ==========================================================================
@@ -156,7 +226,7 @@ options:
# ha_signed reads ONE signed HA entity (+ import / - export), which is what a
# HomeWizard P1 publishes and what ha_dsmr cannot consume.
# homewizard_local skips Home Assistant entirely and polls the meter's own
# local API. ⚠️ It is the ONLY mode whose sensor.p1_sample_age_s measures when
# local API. ⚠️ It is the ONLY mode whose sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age measures when
# the meter REPORTED rather than when the value last CHANGED - HA emits
# nothing at all for a repeated reading - so it is the only mode a firmware
# watchdog may threshold. See DOCS.md.
@@ -848,12 +918,13 @@ schema:
# batteries, whereas an absent capacity has an honest answer - no opinion
# about the split, every unit weighs 1.0, which is what shipped.
#
# ⚠️ THREE KEYS ARE REQUIRED PER ENTRY AND THAT IS DELIBERATE. An entry with
# ⚠️ FOUR KEYS ARE REQUIRED PER ENTRY AND THAT IS DELIBERATE. An entry with
# no `name` has no Store namespace and would share another unit's SAFETY-02
# latch; one with no `setpoint_entity` is a unit nothing can command; one with
# no `max_w` would have to borrow a rating, which is the sibling-grading
# defect DEV-02 removed. The optional pair is the sensors, whose absence
# honestly means "this unit reports none".
# defect DEV-02 removed; `bms_soc_floor` is SAFETY-32's (options block above).
# The optional keys are the sensors, whose absence honestly means "this unit
# reports none", and `capacity_kwh`.
#
# ⚠️ THIS BLOCK IS DECLARED BEFORE `max_w:` ON PURPOSE. `max_w` now appears
# TWICE under `schema:` - once nested here, once flat below - and a reader
@@ -872,6 +943,41 @@ schema:
capacity_kwh: float(0.1,200)?
estop_fitted: bool
# TEL-11. Optional, and OPTIONAL WITHOUT A COMPANION RULE - unlike
# `price_now_entity`/`price_avg_entity`, which are legal only while
# `price_provider` is `off` and make the add-on REFUSE TO START otherwise.
# Nothing in validate.py mentions this key: it cannot conflict with anything,
# because nothing else reads it.
pv_entity: str?
# TEL-12. ⚠️ A SECOND KEY RATHER THAN A LIST SHAPE ON `pv_entity`, AND THAT IS
# A MEASUREMENT AND NOT A PREFERENCE. `pv_entity` shipped in 0.11.0 as `str?`
# and the reference site has a string persisted in it. Declared as a list,
# Supervisor 2026.08.0 answers that stored string with
#
# Invalid list for option 'pv_entity' in GoodWe RS485 Controller
#
# and `deepmerge`'s list strategy is `override`, so a shipped `[]` default does
# NOT rescue it - the operator's string stands and is refused. That is CFG-04
# §B's trap in the other direction: an add-on that will not start, and the
# schema needed to fix it pinned to the version that cannot be installed. The
# only single-key spelling Supervisor accepts for BOTH shapes is `match(.*)?`,
# which validates nothing at all (it admits a number, a dict, any list of
# anything) and renders as a plain text box. Measured, both of them, by
# `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §G - the transcript is in
# DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md §1.
#
# ⚠️ AND `pv_entities: []` IN THE `options:` BLOCK IS LOAD-BEARING, exactly as
# `inverters: []` is. §G measures the same isolated counterfactual: the
# shipped defaults MINUS only this key are refused with `Missing option
# 'pv_entities' in root`, which is every options blob written before 0.12.
# `p1_phase_import_entities` is the shipped precedent for the pair.
pv_entities:
- str
# TEL-14. A parallel list, not a prefix or a dict: measured by
# tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section H, DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md.
pv_invert_entities:
- str
# ==========================================================================
# METER - where the grid reading comes from
+99
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
"""Read a value a check prints or grades without raising (TEST-26).
Each test file is one script, so an IndexError in a print or a check name
kills every check after it (MUTATION.md, FCST-06). Read through these instead,
and conjoin `present(x)` in the check so the absence grades as a named FAIL.
`ABSENT` values never raise: they format as `<ABSENT ...>` under any spec,
index and attribute to themselves, compare unequal AND not-unequal, and are
falsy. `not x`, `"a" not in x` and `all(... for _ in x)` are therefore TRUE of
one, which is why the check needs the `present()` term. `int()`, `range()` and
use as a list index still raise: guard those with `present()`.
"""
_NAN = float("nan")
class Absent:
__slots__ = ("what",)
def __init__(self, what):
object.__setattr__(self, "what", what)
def __repr__(self):
return f"<ABSENT {self.what}>"
__str__ = __repr__
def __format__(self, spec):
return repr(self)
def __bool__(self):
return False
def __eq__(self, other):
return False
__ne__ = __lt__ = __le__ = __gt__ = __ge__ = __eq__
def __hash__(self):
return id(self)
def __getitem__(self, _):
return self
def __getattr__(self, _):
return self
def __call__(self, *_a, **_k):
return self
def __len__(self):
return 0
def __iter__(self):
return iter(())
def __contains__(self, _):
return False
def __float__(self):
return _NAN
def _same(self, *_):
return self
__add__ = __radd__ = __sub__ = __rsub__ = __mul__ = __rmul__ = _same
__truediv__ = __rtruediv__ = __floordiv__ = __rfloordiv__ = _same
__mod__ = __rmod__ = __neg__ = __pos__ = __abs__ = __round__ = _same
def present(*xs):
"""True when none of `xs` is an ABSENT stand-in."""
return not any(isinstance(x, Absent) for x in xs)
def nth(seq, i=0, what=None):
"""`seq[i]`, or an ABSENT saying how many items there were."""
n = 0 if seq is None else len(seq)
if -n <= i < n:
return seq[i]
return Absent(what or f"[{i}] of {n} item(s)")
def first(it, what="no match"):
"""`next(it)`, or ABSENT when it is exhausted."""
return next(iter(it), Absent(what))
def field(mapping, key, what=None):
"""`mapping[key]`, or ABSENT when the key (or the mapping) is missing."""
try:
return mapping[key]
except (KeyError, IndexError, TypeError):
return Absent(what or f"key {key!r}")
def given(x, what="None"):
"""`x`, or ABSENT when it is None - so `:.2f` and arithmetic cannot raise."""
return Absent(what) if x is None else x
@@ -0,0 +1,799 @@
{
"generated": "2026-09-18T23:52:32.622227+02:00",
"generator": "tools/replay_recorded_loop.py --export",
"source": "http://192.168.2.158:8123/api/history/period",
"timezone": "Europe/Brussels",
"entities": {
"grid": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power",
"batt": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_power",
"setpoint": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_setpoint",
"soc": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_soc"
},
"format": "{\"t\": <ISO-8601 with offset>, \"v\": <state string>} per line, gzip, mtime 0",
"days": [
{
"date": "2026-09-02",
"window": [
"2026-09-02T00:00:00+02:00",
"2026-09-03T00:00:00+02:00"
],
"files": {
"grid": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power",
"samples": 16515,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
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"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-14-setpoint.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 229164,
"sha256_raw": "4b3feb9cf7349bf8d6b3c4b6daa7d8b598f5589e52dfe48c98791d89e5678d79"
},
"soc": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_soc",
"samples": 75,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-14-soc.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 4116,
"sha256_raw": "31b3d54b0b4ea4e2e5ee5fc0131c05bea5f920996699888ac764b66d19763d89"
}
}
},
{
"date": "2026-09-15",
"window": [
"2026-09-15T00:00:00+02:00",
"2026-09-16T00:00:00+02:00"
],
"files": {
"grid": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power",
"samples": 15947,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-15-grid.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 890223,
"sha256_raw": "6a6d39306d47b08dc190d576b3b7a2e486a755ad846fa721262a53002305bb2c"
},
"batt": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_power",
"samples": 3651,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-15-batt.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 208309,
"sha256_raw": "4b60ab3ab24b9fc6dbde7262d36c74b0ef164429e382448c48ceea709921ddf4"
},
"setpoint": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_setpoint",
"samples": 4641,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-15-setpoint.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 265543,
"sha256_raw": "308ab0767d0dfd1c78daf313aef292e4383cd78d155656f2e829b88ad8539ece"
},
"soc": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_soc",
"samples": 116,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-15-soc.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 6372,
"sha256_raw": "5a8d8bdca4c6eccc275edcc13ee1b1ec24092f86d209b605f4405d95f23107d6"
}
}
},
{
"date": "2026-09-16",
"window": [
"2026-09-16T00:00:00+02:00",
"2026-09-17T00:00:00+02:00"
],
"files": {
"grid": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power",
"samples": 15888,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-16-grid.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 886214,
"sha256_raw": "cc3a1fc8f892fd22bb27b64f9928dcbbea9849a9c26ef8e7b2221483c82e5c15"
},
"batt": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_power",
"samples": 4444,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-16-batt.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 252502,
"sha256_raw": "70189159b45c26f742dca92475d991f70210b5766a711e466b2fbd266968842b"
},
"setpoint": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_setpoint",
"samples": 5424,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-16-setpoint.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 309293,
"sha256_raw": "9f8c00b6bdea1de540f7ade4bc31870f61d972dfcd58d48a1653b1e114320d75"
},
"soc": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_soc",
"samples": 155,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-16-soc.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 8517,
"sha256_raw": "1bf7f07c5b60eea5cadb9758a40d2b34463ecaf33627b117ea2bed6afa45fb57"
}
}
},
{
"date": "2026-09-17",
"window": [
"2026-09-17T00:00:00+02:00",
"2026-09-18T00:00:00+02:00"
],
"files": {
"grid": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.p1_meter_active_power",
"samples": 15544,
"non_numeric_states": 0,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-17-grid.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 867466,
"sha256_raw": "340bec5e35fed7a4f0964694bbca294fba21fce77ddd27af616720398c1cbbc4"
},
"batt": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_power",
"samples": 3868,
"non_numeric_states": 2,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-17-batt.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 218642,
"sha256_raw": "4cb8e89baa89b4919d5e9b578585ab591eac4e94a636fa3aa88d293926f8401b"
},
"setpoint": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_setpoint",
"samples": 4599,
"non_numeric_states": 2,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-17-setpoint.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 261144,
"sha256_raw": "ddebbc60d2d8b0b8e06d2bef6bc3b61ea7c39becb22f25b7b2219455a7398519"
},
"soc": {
"read": "OK",
"entity": "sensor.goodwe_rs485_controller_goodwe_battery_soc",
"samples": 97,
"non_numeric_states": 2,
"attempts": 1,
"file": "2026-09-17-soc.jsonl.gz",
"bytes_raw": 5336,
"sha256_raw": "f1fade3d84a924447659fefa680f5b795266f3281bc2f5d5b6f86a1e434ddd4e"
}
}
}
]
}
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
{
"generated": "2026-09-21T11:30:00+02:00",
"card": "SAFETY-57",
"what": "The 2026-09-21 episode: a healthy 0x0518 declared stale, the site parked at 0 W, and no exit reachable from inside the state.",
"source": {
"host": "sniffer@192.168.2.167 (goodwe-sniff)",
"nature": "PASSIVE listener on the RS-485 pair between the ESP32 master and the GW5000S-BP. It has no address on the bus and writes nothing.",
"file": "~/bus-a.log",
"window_local": [
"2026-09-21T10:30:00+02:00",
"2026-09-21T11:10:00+02:00"
],
"timezone": "Europe/Brussels (the capture stamps a time of day and no date; the date is asserted here, not derivable from the file)",
"extraction": "lines whose time-of-day field lies in the window, verbatim, in capture order"
},
"file": {
"name": "bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz",
"sha256_gz": "876fdaaf6d087125b184bfb4dd7ef4c3d1dd71ccad0fc271f8d268e8b489d134",
"sha256_plain": "fa07e13b60e230626a8c0964b9539783a71b5627a522fc5930fd9fda54438a48",
"bytes_gz": 17181,
"bytes_plain": 182400,
"lines": 3840
},
"decoder": "tools/decode_bus_capture.py - and it is the ONLY interpretation of these bytes this repository carries. Re-run it to re-derive every number below.",
"frame_census": {
"lines": 3840,
"unparsed": 0,
"bad_crc": 0,
"requests": 720,
"responses": 720,
"writes": 1200,
"write_echoes": 1200,
"unknown": 0
},
"series": {
"setpoint_w": {
"frames": 1200,
"changes": 224,
"first_s": 37801.687,
"last_s": 40199.693
},
"batt_w": {
"frames": 240,
"changes": 133,
"first_s": 37804.716,
"last_s": 40194.724
},
"soc_pct": {
"frames": 240,
"changes": 4,
"first_s": 37806.725,
"last_s": 40196.732
}
},
"the_episode_in_the_capture": {
"10:51:24.736": "0x0518 reaches -3 W. The pack is at 11 %, the loop has just reversed out of -447 W of charge, and the BMS refuses the discharge.",
"10:51:29.695": "the setpoint reaches +1060 W of discharge - 800 W of travel from the command standing when the register last moved.",
"10:52:21.695": "the setpoint is written as 0 W and stays there. This is the add-on's own `inputs missing -> command 0 W`, on the wire.",
"10:51:24.736..11:05:34.734": "0x0518 does not change value. 850.0 s.",
"10:52:21.695..11:05:31.698": "the setpoint does not change value. 790.0 s.",
"~11:04": "a human restarts the add-on. NOT VISIBLE IN THIS FILE - it is an action on 192.168.2.158 - and it is the only reason the episode ends.",
"11:05:31.698": "the restarted loop commands -400 W of CHARGE, which the pack accepts at 11 %.",
"11:05:34.734": "0x0518 answers -137 W. The register was healthy throughout."
},
"not_in_this_file": [
"the grid meter - a P1 telegram on a different wire. The 2.4 kW of export during the episode is from Home Assistant history and is NOT re-derivable here.",
"anything the add-on believed: Inverter.batt, inputs_ok, log lines. Those are INFERRED by replaying the shipped modules against these series (test_freshness.py part 10).",
"the restart at ~11:04."
]
}
+3 -5
View File
@@ -10,12 +10,10 @@ IN FULL.
⚠️ WHAT THIS FILE CAN AND CANNOT CLAIM, SAID BEFORE THE FIRST CHECK.
The two-master rig lives in admin/goodwe (TEST-19, `sim/sitesim.py`), where
`compute()` closes the loop against `plantsim.Plant` with the firmware's own
encoder on the wire. That repository is PRIVATE and this repository's CI token
is minted for this one, so the rig is not reachable from the gate - and a test
file that needed it would either fail the gate or, like test_freeze.py's hwsim
section, pass SILENTLY having checked nothing.
encoder on the wire. CI checks admin/goodwe out at `.gitea/infra-pin` (CI-12),
but this file does not import the rig.
So the split is deliberate:
The split:
* `tools/alloc_sim.py` drives the REAL rig, and its output is quoted in the
pull request. It is where "no limit cycle" is a claim about the shipped

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