SAFETY-12 review: name the safety claim that could not fire, and fix two figures

Review fixes.

A. test_loop.py takes 73 s, not the ~35 s claimed in three places. That number
is the whole defence against a future developer deleting a slow test, so it was
understated by 2x in exactly the place it matters. Corrected - and it is now
~95 s (measured 93 s), because this commit adds the scenario below rather than
trimming windows to make an inconvenient number smaller. Both call sites carry
an instruction to re-measure if the windows change.

B. "242 checks" was test_p1's own count quoted as the total for all five
suites. The real figure is 395 across the five, plus 14 here.

And the finding this PR should have led with. stale_input_s and the
`inputs missing -> 0 W` claim both live INSIDE cycle(), so pre-fix, on a meter
whose value happened to repeat, that claim could not fire at all. Constant
meter, SoC entity dying at t=4 s, one binary:

  pre-fix   final target 220.0 W, reason 'loop -> 220 W'
  post-fix  final target   0.0 W, reason 'safety -> 0 W'

The old controller held 220 W through the whole input outage with its status
line still reading loop -> 220 W, and layer 1 does not cover that on a
`meter_source: off` install - no P1 age sensor is published, so the firmware has
nothing to veto on, while the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed. The pre-fix
behaviour was not "holds a stale command safely"; it was a failsafe a repeating
meter switched off. Asserted in test_loop.py, both halves.

Three points of reasoning tightened, none of them wrong before:

- the re-tune is unreachable by construction, not merely by the reset: the
  combined cycle rate is max(arrival rate, 1/floor), never the sum, and 1/15 s
  is strictly slower than the ~1/5 s arrival rate. That holds only while the
  floor exceeds the meter's update interval - and the schema minimum of 5 s is
  exactly the reference meter's interval. Flagged for validate.py, not fixed
  here.
- the ~11 s lower bracket is not only a dropped poll: a 5.0 s poller against a
  4.97 s meter beats, so about every 14 minutes the poller steps over an update
  entirely. Reaching 15 s takes a beat-skip AND a failed poll.
- the "freshness is decided upstream" guarantee is transport-conditional. On
  `meter_source: off` the grid figure comes straight from hass.number() with no
  age gate. Running the full law is still right; the claim is narrower than it
  was stated.

The 15 s default is not independently justified - it rests on the firmware's
30 s ingest veto and moves if that ever does. Said beside the constant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa

HANDOVER.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ a GoodWe GW5000S-BP.
 
 | | |
 |---|---|
-| running | `local_goodwe_controller` **0.2.0**, `boot: auto`, holding grid at zero |
+| running | `local_goodwe_controller` **0.4.0**, `boot: auto`, holding grid at zero |
 | installed as | a **Local** add-on: `/addons/goodwe_controller` on HA OS at 192.168.2.158 |
 | repo | Gitea `admin/goodwe-addon` (ssh://git@192.168.2.147:2222) — **private** |
 | tuning | gain 0.6, `max_w` 5000, slew 1000, deadband 15, step 10, saturation 500/3, heartbeat 10 s |
@@ -52,9 +52,18 @@ Run the checks before deploying. No framework needed:
 
 ```bash
 cd goodwe_controller
-python3 test_control.py && python3 test_maintenance.py && python3 test_arbiter.py
+python3 test_control.py && python3 test_maintenance.py && python3 test_arbiter.py \
+  && python3 test_validate.py && python3 test_p1.py && python3 test_loop.py
 ```
 
+⚠️ `test_loop.py` takes about **95 seconds** (measured 93 s) and that is not a bug. It
+drives the real control loop, which sleeps 1 s a tick, eight times over, to prove a
+wall-clock property about it (SAFETY-12); mocking the clock there would leave the
+assertion testing the mock. The other five suites together are ~395 checks and finish in
+seconds. If you shorten `test_loop.py`'s windows, re-measure and correct this figure —
+an understated runtime is what makes a slow test look like a hung one, and a slow test
+that looks hung gets deleted.
+
 ---
 
 ## 3. Known broken / unfinished

goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,215 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 0.4.0
+
+**CFG-01.** The add-on now refuses to start on a configuration it cannot honour,
+instead of logging a line and carrying on. `validate_startup_config()` runs in
+`amain()` before the broker, the web server or any task exists, so a refusal
+cannot leave half a controller running behind a UI.
+
+It refuses only where continuing produces one of two outcomes: **(a)** a stated
+limit is untrue - the operator configured a bound and a lower layer silently
+enforces a different one - or **(b)** the add-on is inert and indistinguishable
+from healthy. (b) is not a special case of (a): with no `setpoint_entity`, layer
+1 pinning the inverter at 0 W is the failsafe *working*. The system does not
+become unsafe, it becomes a convincing impression of a working controller.
+
+Four things qualify:
+
+- **`max_w` above (or below) the setpoint device's own rating.** This is the one
+  that changed behaviour. It used to warn `the device wins` and run anyway, with
+  `write_setpoint()` silently clamping, so the configured ceiling was never the
+  real one and the only evidence had scrolled off the log. The refusal names the
+  configured value, the device's value, and which wins.
+- **No `setpoint_entity`.** A controller with no actuator: every write is a
+  no-op, the device rating is never read, and the ESP32 heartbeat that holds off
+  the layer-1 failsafe never happens. It ran, looked healthy, and moved nothing.
+- **A `meter_source` that can never produce a reading** - missing `p1_host`,
+  missing `p1_net_entity`, a blank MQTT topic, a phase list disagreeing with
+  `meter_phases`, an unknown source name, or a `meter_poll_s` at or past
+  `meter_max_age_s`. These were already caught, but they only *disabled
+  ingestion*, which leaves the grid reading None forever: permanent "inputs
+  missing", 0 W, and a status page indistinguishable from a healthy meter nobody
+  has sent anything to yet.
+- **`meter_max_age_s` above the firmware's ingest veto.** The schema accepts
+  `int(5,300)`; the ESP32's threshold is a compile-time `max_age_s: "30"` and it
+  trips layer 1 at `p1_age_s >= 30`. Set 120 and the add-on treats a 119 s
+  reading as fresh and keeps commanding, while the firmware has already vetoed
+  and is holding the inverter at 0 W - healthy meter, running controller,
+  nothing moving, and no line anywhere saying the number you set was overruled.
+  Structurally the same fault as the `max_w` case. Only *above* the veto is
+  refused: below it the add-on gives up first, which is fail-safe and visible on
+  its own status page. Mirrored as `validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S` - it cannot
+  be imported from a compile-time YAML substitution, so it carries a note about
+  the one direction in which it can go stale.
+
+`max_w` at or below zero is refused too. Schema-blocked on a real install, but
+`validate_startup_config()` is now also the simulation suite's entry point, and
+a non-positive `max_w` inverts the arbiter's `supervised` bounds into a
+contradiction that resolves to 0 W - i.e. it would read as a safety trip rather
+than as the typo it is.
+
+The predicates for the meter group still live in `p1.validate_meter_options()`,
+which `build_source()` also calls - one definition, two callers, not two
+competing validators. Two transports gained a check they never had: `ha_dsmr`
+with only one of its two entities, and `mqtt_p1` with a blank topic, both of
+which previously built a transport that could never read.
+
+Deliberately **not** refused, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
+`integrator_max_w` above `max_w` (the arbiter still bounds the wire to ±max_w,
+so the cost is unwind latency, not amperage - warned), a missing `soc_entity` /
+`batt_entity` (fail-safe, and already a red NOT READY banner naming it), a
+`setpoint_entity` that has not appeared on the Core API yet (ESPHome is routinely
+late; refusing would make a slow boot need a human - re-checked once the real
+rating arrives), and a thin-but-nonzero `meter_poll_s` margin.
+
+A refusal is legible as a refusal: a banner that says in words that this is a
+configuration problem and nothing is broken, the numbered problems, no traceback,
+and exit status 78 (`EX_CONFIG`).
+
+**SAFETY-12.** The control loop now evaluates on a clock as well as on a change.
+`run_control()` ran `cycle()` only when the meter value differed from the
+previous poll, so a meter that repeated a value ran **no control cycles at
+all** - while the heartbeat went on re-emitting the last command and the
+firmware went on putting it on the wire every 2 s. Layer 1 stayed fed, every
+indicator read healthy, and a command computed from an old reading kept being
+executed through whatever the load did next. Measured on the rig during TEL-05:
+70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W with 14 arrivals and zero cycles.
+
+**It was worse than a latency limit: it was a safety claim that could not
+fire.** `stale_input_s` and the `inputs missing -> 0 W` claim both live *inside*
+`cycle()`. Pre-fix, if the meter value happened to be constant, `cycle()` was
+never called again - so that claim had no way to run. Constant meter, SoC entity
+dying at t=4 s, same binary:
+
+```
+pre-fix    writes: [(0.0, 220.0), (0.0, 220.0), (10.1, 220.0)]
+           final target: 220.0 W   reason: 'loop -> 220 W'
+post-fix   writes: [(0.0, 220.0), (0.0, 220.0), (3.0, 430.0), (9.1, 0.0), (10.1, 0.0)]
+           final target: 0.0 W     reason: 'safety -> 0 W'
+```
+
+The pre-fix controller held 220 W through the entire input outage with its
+status line still reading `loop -> 220 W`, and layer 1 does not cover that case
+on a `meter_source: off` install: no P1 age sensor is published, so the firmware
+has nothing to veto on, while the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed. So the old
+behaviour was not "holds a stale command safely" - it was a failsafe that a
+repeating meter switched off. `test_loop.py` asserts both halves.
+
+`cycle_floor_s` (default **15 s**) is a deadline on the gap between cycles, not
+a second scheduler: every cycle resets it, whichever trigger fired. On a healthy
+meter it never elapses, so the cycle rate, the write sequence and therefore the
+per-cycle gain the tuning was measured against are unchanged - asserted in
+`test_loop.py` by driving the real loop twice on one binary (a huge
+`cycle_floor_s` reproduces the old behaviour exactly) and comparing the
+commanded values.
+
+The reset is not the only thing holding that up, and the other argument is the
+sturdier one: the combined cycle rate is `max(arrival rate, 1/floor)`, never the
+sum. At 1/15 s the floor is strictly slower than the ~1/5 s arrival rate, so
+even a hypothetical floor racing the arrivals could not exceed the nominal
+healthy rate. The re-tune is unreachable by construction. ⚠️ That holds only
+while `cycle_floor_s` stays above the meter's update interval, and the schema
+minimum is 5 s - which is exactly the reference meter's interval. Nothing
+enforces the relationship; `validate.py` is the obvious home for it and does not
+have it yet.
+
+Observed over six real minutes on the same rig, one binary, meter held at a
+literally constant 350.0 W: **before, 1 cycle** (at startup) and then nothing,
+the command stuck at 220 W against a 350 W import for the rest of the window.
+**After, 24 cycles**, worst gap 15.14 s, and the ordinary PI ramp doing its job -
+220, 430, 650, 860, 1080, 1300, 1510, 1730, 1940, 2000 W, one step per cycle,
+rail at t=136 s and flat after. Three minutes with the meter parked at the
+target instead: **1 cycle before, 12 after, and 19 writes either way - the same
+19**. Three minutes on a normally-changing meter: **36 cycles and 49 writes on
+both sides, the same values in the same order.** The heartbeat write count never
+moves; the only writes the fix adds are the ten the loop was supposed to be
+making all along.
+
+15 s is bracketed, not round.
+
+**Below it, ~11 s, and it arises more routinely than a dropped poll.**
+`HomeWizardLocalSource` polls at 5.0 s against a meter that updates every 4.97 s
+(NOTES.md:640). Two near-equal periods beat, so roughly once every ~14 minutes
+the poller steps over an update entirely - a ~10 s gap between changed values on
+a perfectly healthy meter, plus up to 1 s for the 1 s tick to notice. A failed
+HTTP poll (retried on the next tick, no backoff) adds another 5 s. The floor
+sits above the beat-skip so it does not fire on that alone; what it takes to
+reach 15 s is a beat-skip *and* a failed poll coinciding.
+
+**Above it, 30 s.** `meter_max_age_s` is 30 s, past which there is no reading to
+evaluate, and the firmware's ingest veto is also 30 s - so the loop is
+guaranteed to have re-decided at least twice inside any window in which layer 1
+might otherwise be the only thing deciding. ⚠️ The default is therefore not
+independently justified at 15: if the firmware's veto ever moves, this moves
+with it. Noted beside the constant in `main.py`.
+
+It is also exactly `stale_input_s`, this system's existing answer to "how long
+may we hold without re-deciding".
+
+A floor cycle runs the **full** law on the same inputs, integrator included. In
+P1 mode the freshness question is already answered upstream and answered harder
+- past `meter_max_age_s` the reading is None, which is "inputs missing", which
+is a `P_SAFETY` 0 W claim - so a floor cycle there can only ever run on a reading
+this system already calls fresh. ⚠️ That is transport-conditional: with
+`meter_source: off`, `read_inputs()` takes the grid figure straight from
+`hass.number()` with **no age gate at all**, so a Home Assistant entity that has
+gone quiet reads as current on that path, with or without this change. Running
+the full law is still right there - the alternative is a degraded second law
+reasoning about an age nobody measured - but the floor does not make that path
+fresh. The integrator advances per *cycle*, not per second,
+so bounding the gap bounds the accumulation; `integrator_max_w` bounds it after
+that. A gentler second law for floor cycles would be a second set of dynamics
+nobody can test on this hardware.
+
+⚠️ **This is not a freeze detector**, and TEL-05 established one cannot be built
+here: at the converged -10 W target a 1 Wh register needs ~6 minutes to move
+while the power figure legitimately repeats, so any threshold on `unchanged_s`
+false-trips at the exact operating point we run at. Nothing in this change
+decides whether a repeated reading is *true*. It stops "the number is the same"
+from meaning "do not think". The consequence, stated plainly: against a meter
+genuinely frozen at a wrong value the loop will now correct toward that wrong
+value rather than hold a stale command, bounded by `max_w`, the arbiter and the
+device rating. That was already what happened to a lying meter whose value
+merely jittered; bit-exact repetition was never a safety property.
+
+`DOCS.md`'s "Saturation is counted in cycles, not seconds" section documented
+the old behaviour as an accepted deviation. It is **qualified, not deleted**:
+the deviation survives (the window is still counted in cycles, and 3 x 15 s is
+still not the specification's 10 s) but it is now bounded at 45 s instead of
+open-ended, and the passage's second justification - "nothing accumulates while
+it is stalled" - is called out as having covered integrator windup and not
+staleness, which was the actual hazard. The same wrong argument in
+`control.py`'s saturation comment is corrected too.
+
+**TEL-04.** `meter_source: ha_signed` reads a single *signed* power entity, which
+is the shape a HomeWizard P1 publishes. Both transports 0.3.0 shipped require two
+unsigned registers and refuse negatives, so neither fits the meter installed here.
+
+**TEL-05.** `meter_source: homewizard_local` polls the meter's own local API
+directly. This exists because of something the HA paths cannot do: Home Assistant
+fires no state change for a repeated reading and exposes no arrival signal at
+all, so `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` on those transports measures time since the
+*value changed*, not since the meter *reported*. Real captured data has gaps of
+42 s and 97 s between changes on a perfectly healthy meter - long enough for a
+30 s staleness threshold to command 0 W for no reason. Every HTTP response to the
+local API is a genuine arrival, so the age means what it says.
+
+Verified on the rig against a literally constant 350.0 W for 70 s - the exact
+state where the HA path recorded zero samples in 45 s - with 14 arrivals and the
+age never exceeding the poll cadence.
+
+Set `p1_host` to the meter's address and `meter_poll_s` (default 5 s, matching
+the meter's own ~5 s update). Still defaults to `off`; nothing changes for an
+install that does not opt in.
+
+Freeze detection is separate and deliberately not thresholded: a meter answering
+200 OK with a stale number *is* arriving, so no arrival stamp can flag it. The
+energy registers carry that as `unchanged_s`, surfaced on the status line for a
+human to read rather than alarmed on - at a converged -10 W a 1 Wh register needs
+about six minutes to move, so any threshold would false-trip at the target
+operating point.
+
 ## Unreleased
 
 **TEL-05.** A fourth `meter_source`, `homewizard_local`, which polls a

goodwe_controller/DOCS.md

@@ -272,9 +272,10 @@ behind it would trip the firmware watchdog on a system that is working fine.
 | `target_grid_w` | -10 | What the meter should rest at. Negative = a slight export |
 | `step_w` | 10 | Quantisation |
 | `saturation_w` | 500 | Divergence that counts as "the inverter is at a limit" |
-| `saturation_cycles` | 3 | How many consecutive cycles before freezing. A cycle is one *changed* meter reading, not a fixed period - see the note below. **Do not set to 1** |
+| `saturation_cycles` | 3 | How many consecutive cycles before freezing. A cycle is one meter update or `cycle_floor_s`, whichever comes first - see the note below. **Do not set to 1** |
 | `integrator_max_w` | 0 | Bound on the loop's accumulator, and 0 means "same as `max_w`". Caps how much stale error can be waiting to unwind when the sign flips. **Do not raise it above `max_w`** - the output clamp already bounds what is commanded, so the only thing extra headroom buys is more cycles of wrong-direction power after every saturation event. Lowering it below `max_w` is the useful direction |
 | `heartbeat_s` | 10 | Refresh interval; must stay well under the firmware watchdog |
+| `cycle_floor_s` | 15 | The longest the loop may go without evaluating. A deadline on the gap between cycles, reset by every cycle — on a healthy meter it never elapses and changes nothing. Raise it only if your meter is slower than ~10 s; it must stay under `meter_max_age_s`, past which there is no reading to evaluate anyway |
 | `stale_input_s` | 15 | How long inputs may be missing before commanding 0 W. In P1 mode this clock starts only *after* `meter_max_age_s` has already expired — the two stack, see "How long a dead meter takes to reach 0 W" |
 | `auto_start` | false | Start controlling on boot (only after commissioning) |
 
@@ -284,22 +285,43 @@ The specification states the saturation window as **"> 10 s"**. This add-on coun
 **cycles** instead, and that is a deliberate, accepted deviation rather than an
 oversight - the acceptance criterion is not met as literally written.
 
-A cycle here is one *changed* meter reading: the controller only runs the loop when the
-meter value differs from the previous poll. At the reference P1's ~5 s update rate the
-default of 3 cycles is usually around 15 s, but there is **no guaranteed wall-clock
-window** - a meter that repeats the same value stalls the counter for as long as it
-repeats.
+A cycle here is one meter update **or `cycle_floor_s` elapsing, whichever comes
+first**. At the reference P1's ~5 s update rate the default of 3 cycles is usually
+around 15 s, and the worst case is bounded at `3 x cycle_floor_s` = 45 s. It is still
+not the 10 s the specification asks for, so the deviation stands - but it is now a
+bounded number rather than an open one.
 
-Two reasons that is acceptable:
+⚠️ **This passage used to say something different, and the second half of it was
+wrong.** Until SAFETY-12 the loop ran only when the meter value *changed*, so a meter
+that repeated a value stalled the counter for as long as it repeated, with no upper
+bound at all. That was defended here on the grounds that "a stalled counter is a
+detection-latency limit and not a runaway risk - the condition that stalls it stops the
+whole loop, so nothing accumulates while it is stalled". That argument covers
+**integrator windup and nothing else**. The hazard it misses is **staleness**: while the
+loop was stopped the heartbeat kept re-emitting the last command and the firmware kept
+putting it on the wire every 2 s, so a command computed from an old reading went on
+being executed through a real load change, with every indicator reading healthy.
+Measured on the rig during TEL-05: 70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W, 14 arrivals,
+zero control cycles.
 
-- the control law is a pure function with no clock, which is what makes it testable
-  without hardware, and a seconds-based window would have to live in the controller;
-- a stalled counter is a detection-latency limit and not a runaway risk. The condition
-  that stalls it - an unchanging meter - stops the whole loop, so nothing accumulates
-  while it is stalled.
+The half that survives is the first one: the control law is still a pure function with
+no clock, and the wall-clock window still lives in `Controller`, which has one - see
+`run_control()`. What changed is that the controller now enforces a floor on the gap
+between cycles, so `saturation_cycles` finally means a bounded number of seconds.
 
-If a guaranteed window matters on your site, raise `saturation_cycles` for a fast meter,
-and treat the figure as "N meter updates" rather than "N seconds".
+If a tighter window matters on your site, lower `cycle_floor_s` (not below your meter's
+update interval, or the floor starts firing on a healthy meter) or raise
+`saturation_cycles` for a fast meter.
+
+**This is not a freeze detector, and it deliberately cannot be one.** Nothing here
+decides whether a repeated reading is true — see `unchanged_s` in the meter section for
+why no threshold on that is safe at the converged operating point. The floor only stops
+"the number is the same" from meaning "do not think". The consequence is worth stating
+plainly: against a meter that is genuinely frozen at a wrong value, the loop will now
+correct toward that wrong value instead of holding a stale command. It is bounded by
+`max_w`, the arbiter and the device rating, and it is the same thing that already
+happened to a lying meter whose value merely jittered — bit-exact repetition was never a
+safety property.
 
 #### Why `target_grid_w` is not zero
 

goodwe_controller/app/control.py

@@ -95,19 +95,23 @@ def compute(
     # lets slew be larger than saturation_w.
     #
     # The spec states this window twice and differently: "> 10 s" (§11.2) and
-    # "3 samples" (§10.3). This counts CYCLES, and a cycle is not a unit of
-    # time: run_control() calls cycle() only when the meter value CHANGES
-    # (`if self.grid != last_grid`), so three cycles is three distinct meter
-    # readings and nothing more. At the reference P1's ~5 s update rate that is
-    # usually ~15 s, but there is no upper bound on it - a meter that repeats a
-    # value stalls the counter.
+    # "3 samples" (§10.3). This counts CYCLES, and a cycle is still not a unit
+    # of time - but it is now a BOUNDED one. run_control() runs a cycle on a
+    # changed meter value OR on `cycle_floor_s` elapsing, whichever comes first
+    # (SAFETY-12), so three cycles is at most 3 x cycle_floor_s = 45 s at the
+    # defaults, and usually ~15 s at the reference P1's ~5 s update rate.
     #
-    # That is a detection-latency limit, not a windup hazard: the same
-    # condition that stalls the counter stalls the whole loop, so nothing
-    # accumulates in the meantime either. If a wall-clock window is ever
-    # required, it belongs in Controller (which has a clock) and not here.
-    # ponytail: this function is worth keeping clockless; the ceiling is that
-    # saturation_cycles cannot express a guaranteed number of seconds.
+    # ⚠️ THIS COMMENT USED TO CLAIM there was no upper bound and that it did not
+    # matter, "because the same condition that stalls the counter stalls the
+    # whole loop, so nothing accumulates in the meantime". The first clause was
+    # true and the second was the bug: a stalled loop does not stop commanding,
+    # it goes on emitting its last command through the heartbeat. Windup was
+    # never the hazard; staleness was.
+    #
+    # The wall-clock window lives in Controller, which has a clock, exactly as
+    # this comment always said it should. ponytail: this function stays
+    # clockless; the remaining ceiling is that saturation_cycles expresses a
+    # bound in seconds rather than an exact number of them.
     saturated_now = abs(prev_w - actual_w) > tuning.saturation_w
     sat_count = min(sat_count + 1, 10) if saturated_now else 0
     frozen = sat_count >= tuning.saturation_cycles

goodwe_controller/app/main.py

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ from .hass import HomeAssistant
 from .maintenance import IDLE, MaintConfig, Maintenance
 from .mqtt import MqttPublisher
 from .p1 import P1Ingest, build_source, is_enabled
+from .validate import ConfigRefused, refuse, validate_startup_config
 from . import web
 
 OPTIONS_PATH = "/data/options.json"
@@ -56,11 +57,22 @@ def load_options() -> dict:
 
 
 class Controller:
-    def __init__(self, opts: dict, hass: HomeAssistant, store, mqtt_pub):
+    def __init__(self, opts: dict, hass: HomeAssistant, store, mqtt_pub, *, stop):
         self.o = opts
         self.hass = hass
         self.store = store
         self.mqtt = mqtt_pub
+        # ⚠️ REQUIRED, AND KEYWORD-ONLY, AFTER A REVIEW CATCH. This started life
+        # as `stop=None`, which made a Controller that CANNOT STOP ITSELF the
+        # default one. On the late-refusal path in run_control() that default
+        # meant: log the banner, return, and leave the process alive forever
+        # with no control loop, no exit and no further output - the exact
+        # "inert but looks healthy" failure this whole module exists to refuse.
+        # amain() always passed a real Event, so it was latent, but test_p1.py
+        # was already constructing Controllers without one. No default now, so
+        # the broken shape does not typecheck.
+        self.stop_event = stop
+        self.refused: list[str] | None = None
 
         self.tuning = Tuning(
             gain=float(opts.get("gain", 0.6)),
@@ -303,19 +315,112 @@ class Controller:
         entity = self.o.get("setpoint_entity", "")
         if entity:
             self.dev_min, self.dev_max, _ = await self.hass.limits(entity)
-            if self.dev_max is not None and self.tuning.max_w > self.dev_max:
-                self.log_event(
-                    f"clamp {self.tuning.max_w:.0f} W exceeds the device maximum "
-                    f"{self.dev_max:.0f} W - the device wins")
+            # ⚠️ THIS USED TO WARN AND CARRY ON, and that was the bug CFG-01
+            # exists to remove: a max_w above the device's rating meant
+            # write_setpoint() silently clamped and the configured ceiling was
+            # never the real one.
+            #
+            # amain() already ran this gate before anything started. It runs
+            # AGAIN here for one case the gate cannot cover: ESPHome is often
+            # not up yet when the add-on boots, so hass.limits() returned
+            # (None, None) and the range checks were skipped rather than
+            # guessed at. This is the first moment the device's real rating is
+            # known. If it conflicts, refuse now - stopping deterministically
+            # through the normal shutdown, which commands 0 W on the way out.
+            problems = validate_startup_config(self.o, self.dev_min, self.dev_max)
+            if problems:
+                refuse(problems)
+                self.refused = problems
+                self.log_event("REFUSED: " + problems[0])
+                # Signal, then return WITHOUT entering the loop. amain() wakes
+                # on this, runs the normal wind-down (which commands 0 W) and
+                # re-raises ConfigRefused afterwards, so the exit code is 78 and
+                # the inverter is left at zero rather than latched.
+                self.stop_event.set()
+                return
 
         last_grid = object()
         heartbeat = float(self.o.get("heartbeat_s", 10))
         last_beat = 0.0
+        # ⚠️ SAFETY-12. The floor is a DEADLINE ON THE GAP BETWEEN CYCLES, not a
+        # second scheduler running alongside the arrival trigger. Every cycle
+        # resets it, whichever trigger fired, so on a healthy changing meter it
+        # never elapses and not one existing cycle moves - and therefore no
+        # change to the per-cycle gain the tuning was measured against.
+        #
+        # That is true twice over, and the second reason is the sturdier one:
+        # the combined cycle rate is max(arrival rate, 1/floor), never the sum.
+        # At the defaults 1/15 s is strictly slower than the ~1/5 s arrival
+        # rate, so even a floor that raced the arrivals could not push the loop
+        # past its nominal healthy rate. The re-tune is unreachable by
+        # construction, not merely by the reset. ⚠️ That argument holds only
+        # while floor > the meter's update interval - which is why the schema
+        # minimum of 5 s deserves the second look validate.py has not given it
+        # yet: 5 s IS the reference meter's interval, i.e. the one configurable
+        # value that would double the cycle rate.
+        #
+        # Why it has to exist, and it is not only about latency: `self.grid !=
+        # last_grid` alone means a meter that repeats a value runs NO control
+        # cycles at all. The heartbeat below keeps re-emitting the last command
+        # and the firmware keeps putting it on the wire, so every indicator
+        # reads healthy - and, worse, the `inputs missing -> 0 W` claim lives
+        # INSIDE cycle(), so on a repeating meter THAT SAFETY CLAIM CANNOT FIRE.
+        # Demonstrated in test_loop.py: constant meter, SoC entity dies at t=4 s,
+        # and the pre-fix controller holds 220 W through the whole outage with
+        # the status line still reading "loop -> 220 W". Layer 1 does not cover
+        # it on a `meter_source: off` install either - no P1 age sensor is
+        # published, so the firmware has nothing to veto on. Measured on the rig
+        # during TEL-05: 70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W, 14 arrivals, zero
+        # cycles.
+        #
+        # This is NOT a freeze detector, and deliberately so - see
+        # HomeWizardLocalSource.unchanged_s for why one cannot be built here (at
+        # the converged -10 W target a 1 Wh register needs ~6 minutes to move,
+        # so any freeze threshold false-trips at the exact operating point we
+        # run at). Nothing here decides whether a repeated reading is true. It
+        # only stops "the number is the same" from meaning "do not think".
+        #
+        # ⚠️ THE 15 s DEFAULT HAS A CEILING IT DOES NOT OWN. It is under
+        # validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S (30 s) and under meter_max_age_s on
+        # purpose, so the loop re-decides at least twice inside any window in
+        # which layer 1 might otherwise be the only thing deciding. If the
+        # firmware's veto ever moves, this default moves with it - it is not
+        # independently justified at 15.
+        floor = float(self.o.get("cycle_floor_s", 15))
+        last_cycle = None
         while not self.stopping:
             await self.read_inputs()
-            # A cycle is one meter update, exactly as on the reference install.
-            if self.grid != last_grid:
+            now_mono = asyncio.get_running_loop().time()
+            # A cycle is one meter update, exactly as on the reference install -
+            # or the floor elapsing, whichever comes first.
+            overdue = last_cycle is None or (now_mono - last_cycle) >= floor
+            if self.grid != last_grid or overdue:
                 last_grid = self.grid
+                last_cycle = now_mono
+                # ⚠️ The FULL cycle, not a degraded one. A floor cycle runs the
+                # same law on the same inputs as an arrival cycle, because in P1
+                # mode the freshness question is already answered upstream and
+                # answered harder: past `meter_max_age_s` (30 s) p1.net_w is
+                # None, which is "inputs missing", which becomes a P_SAFETY 0 W
+                # claim. So a floor cycle cannot run the PI on a 60 s old
+                # figure, because at 60 s there is no figure.
+                #
+                # ⚠️ THAT GUARANTEE IS TRANSPORT-CONDITIONAL, and saying so
+                # matters more than the guarantee: with `meter_source: off`,
+                # read_inputs() takes self.grid straight from hass.number() with
+                # NO age gate at all, so a Home Assistant entity that has gone
+                # quiet reads as a current value on that path with or without
+                # this change. Running the full law is still the right choice
+                # there - the alternative is a degraded second law reasoning
+                # about an age nobody measured - but the floor does not make
+                # that path fresh, and nothing here should be read as claiming
+                # it does. And the integrator
+                # advances per CYCLE, not per second (control.py), so bounding
+                # the gap bounds the accumulation: at most one extra
+                # gain x error per floor interval, under the same
+                # integrator_max_w as every other cycle. A second, gentler
+                # control law for floor cycles would be a second set of
+                # dynamics nobody can test on this hardware.
                 await self.cycle()
             # ⚠️ The heartbeat is not an optimisation. The ESP32 treats silence
             # longer than ~30 s as "the controller is gone" and zeroes the
@@ -337,7 +442,8 @@ class Controller:
             "status": "running" if self.auto else "stopped",
         }
         # ⚠️ ONLY when P1 ingestion is actually running. The ESP32's stale-input
-        # watchdog subscribes to sensor.p1_sample_age_s and forces the layer-1
+        # watchdog subscribes to sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age - see the entity-id
+        # note in mqtt.py; the composed name is not the object_id - and forces layer-1
         # failsafe once it reaches max_age_s. With meter_source off there is no
         # ingester feeding it, so published_age_s would be time-since-startup
         # climbing without bound - i.e. every existing install would cross the
@@ -514,6 +620,26 @@ async def amain() -> None:
         except Exception as _e:  # noqa: BLE001
             _LOG.error("core api probe failed: %s", _e)
 
+        # ⚠️ THE STARTUP GATE (CFG-01). Nothing below this line may run on a
+        # configuration validate.py rejects - specs §1.5: a config the system
+        # cannot honour is refused at startup, not survived at runtime.
+        #
+        # It sits HERE, before the broker, before the web server and before any
+        # task exists, so a refusal cannot leave half a controller running with
+        # a UI in front of it. Reading the device range is the one thing the
+        # validator cannot do for itself; (None, None) when ESPHome has not come
+        # up yet is not a refusal - run_control() re-checks once the real rating
+        # is known. See validate.py for where the line is drawn and why.
+        _sp = str(opts.get("setpoint_entity", "") or "").strip()
+        _dev_min = _dev_max = None
+        if _sp:
+            _dev_min, _dev_max, _ = await hass.limits(_sp)
+            _LOG.info("setpoint device %s reports range %s…%s W", _sp, _dev_min, _dev_max)
+        _problems = validate_startup_config(opts, _dev_min, _dev_max)
+        if _problems:
+            refuse(_problems)
+            raise ConfigRefused(_problems)
+
         # ⚠️ Status publishing must NEVER be able to stop the controller. A
         # broken broker, a missing library, an API change in paho - all of it is
         # observability, and the battery does not care. Caught broadly and on
@@ -539,10 +665,10 @@ async def amain() -> None:
 
             pub = _NoMqtt()
 
-        controller = Controller(opts, hass, store, pub)
+        stop = asyncio.Event()
+        controller = Controller(opts, hass, store, pub, stop=stop)
         runner = await web.start(controller, port=8099)
 
-        stop = asyncio.Event()
         loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
         for sig in (signal.SIGTERM, signal.SIGINT):
             with contextlib.suppress(NotImplementedError):
@@ -569,6 +695,10 @@ async def amain() -> None:
                 await task
         await runner.cleanup()
         _LOG.info("stopped")
+        # The late-arriving-device refusal from run_control(). Re-raised only
+        # now, so the wind-down above still ran and the inverter is at 0 W.
+        if controller.refused:
+            raise ConfigRefused(controller.refused)
 
 
 def main() -> None:
@@ -576,6 +706,13 @@ def main() -> None:
         asyncio.run(amain())
     except KeyboardInterrupt:
         pass
+    except ConfigRefused:
+        # ⚠️ No traceback, on purpose. The banner refuse() already printed says
+        # everything an operator needs, and a stack trace on top of it would say
+        # "this crashed" - the exact confusion AC3 is about. 78 is sysexits(3)
+        # EX_CONFIG, so even a script reading the exit status can tell a bad
+        # config from a bug.
+        raise SystemExit(78)
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

goodwe_controller/app/mqtt.py

@@ -45,13 +45,32 @@ SENSORS = [
     ("soc", "goodwe_battery_soc", "Battery SoC", "%", "battery", "measurement", None),
     ("phase", "goodwe_maintenance_phase", "Maintenance phase", None, None, None, "mdi:battery-sync"),
     ("status", "goodwe_controller_status", "Controller status", None, None, None, "mdi:heart-pulse"),
-    # ⚠️ This one deliberately breaks the goodwe_ prefix above: the entity id
-    # must be exactly `sensor.p1_sample_age_s`, because SAFETY-01's firmware
-    # watchdog subscribes to that literal id and the ENV-01 simulation rig
-    # asserts on it. Renaming it silently disarms a safety layer. It is seconds
-    # since the newest accepted P1 telegram, republished every second so that a
-    # meter frozen at a constant value still shows a climbing age - which is the
-    # false-trip that this entity exists to remove.
+    # ⚠️ THE LIVE ENTITY IS `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age`, NOT what this
+    # object_id spells. An earlier version of this comment said the id "must be
+    # exactly sensor.p1_sample_age_s" - that name has never existed on any HA,
+    # and believing it is how a safety layer gets disarmed by someone tidying up.
+    #
+    # On HA 2026.8 `object_id` in a discovery payload does NOT determine the
+    # entity_id. HA composes it from the device name plus the entity name:
+    # "GoodWe RS485 Controller" + "P1 sample age" -> sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age.
+    # Verified against the live system 2026-08-26; the firmware subscribes to
+    # that composed name (goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml, homeassistant
+    # sensor p1_age_s), and its own comment records that sensor.p1_sample_age_s
+    # never existed.
+    #
+    # So: do NOT "fix" the firmware to match the object_id below, and do not
+    # rename the device or this entity's friendly name - either changes the
+    # composed id and silently disarms the ingest guard, because has_state()
+    # simply stays false forever and nothing reports it. The firmware calls this
+    # out as the failure that "FAILS SILENTLY AND LOOKS CORRECT".
+    #
+    # The value: seconds since the newest accepted P1 telegram, republished
+    # every second so a meter frozen at a constant value still shows a climbing
+    # age - the false-trip this entity exists to remove.
+    #
+    # ⚠️ Separately, and not fixed here: the firmware's ingest guard tests this
+    # sensor's VALUE rather than its arrival, so a dead publisher freezes the
+    # number and reads permanently fresh. Filed as TEL-06.
     ("p1_age", "p1_sample_age_s", "P1 sample age", "s", "duration", "measurement", None),
 ]
 

goodwe_controller/app/p1.py

@@ -1044,15 +1044,133 @@ def is_enabled(opts: dict) -> bool:
     return str(opts.get("meter_source", "off") or "off").strip() not in ("off", "")
 
 
+def homewizard_host_port(opts: dict) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """`p1_host` split into host and (still unparsed) port text.
+
+    One definition because validate_meter_options() and build_source() must
+    agree byte for byte about what counts as a usable address - a pasted browser
+    URL is the obvious way to fill this in wrong.
+    """
+    host = str(opts.get("p1_host", "") or "").strip()
+    host = host.removeprefix("http://").removeprefix("https://").rstrip("/")
+    host, _, port_s = host.partition(":")
+    return host, port_s
+
+
+def validate_meter_options(opts: dict, phases: int, max_age_s: float) -> list[str]:
+    """Every way `meter_source` can name a meter that will never produce a reading.
+
+    ⚠️ THIS IS THE ONLY PLACE THAT KNOWS THESE RULES. It used to be a run of
+    inline `return None`s inside build_source(); CFG-01 lifted them out because
+    the same predicates now have two callers with two different consequences:
+
+      validate.validate_startup_config()  refuses to start the add-on
+      build_source()                      returns None, as it always did
+
+    They are one function and not two on purpose. A second copy of "what makes a
+    meter config wrong" would drift, and the half that drifted would be the one
+    that decides whether the process is allowed to run.
+
+    Checked ONCE at startup rather than per telegram, because a misconfigured
+    source otherwise fails in the one way indistinguishable from a healthy source
+    nobody has sent anything to yet: no samples, a climbing age, the firmware
+    watchdog holding the battery at 0 W, and nothing in the log saying why.
+
+    Returns a list of human-readable problems; empty means the config is usable.
+    `phases` and `max_age_s` are passed in rather than read from opts so the
+    caller decides whether it is validating the options or an already-built
+    P1Ingest - build_source() has an ingest whose values may not have come from
+    this dict.
+    """
+    source = str(opts.get("meter_source", "off") or "off").strip()
+    if source in ("off", ""):
+        return []
+    problems: list[str] = []
+
+    if source == SOURCE_HA:
+        imp = str(opts.get("p1_import_entity", "") or "").strip()
+        exp = str(opts.get("p1_export_entity", "") or "").strip()
+        if not imp or not exp:
+            problems.append(
+                f"meter_source {SOURCE_HA} needs both p1_import_entity and "
+                f"p1_export_entity (got {imp or '<blank>'!r} / {exp or '<blank>'!r})")
+    elif source == SOURCE_HA_SIGNED:
+        net = str(opts.get("p1_net_entity", "") or "").strip()
+        phase_net = [str(e).strip() for e in
+                     (opts.get("p1_phase_net_entities") or []) if str(e).strip()]
+        if not net:
+            problems.append(
+                f"meter_source {SOURCE_HA_SIGNED} needs p1_net_entity "
+                "(sensor.p1_sample_age_s would otherwise be announced with "
+                "nothing feeding it)")
+        if phase_net and len(phase_net) != phases:
+            problems.append(
+                f"p1_phase_net_entities has {len(phase_net)} entities but "
+                f"meter_phases is {phases} - every telegram would be rejected "
+                "on the phase-count check")
+    elif source == SOURCE_MQTT:
+        if not str(opts.get("meter_mqtt_topic", "") or "").strip():
+            problems.append(f"meter_source {SOURCE_MQTT} needs meter_mqtt_topic")
+    elif source == SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD:
+        host, port_s = homewizard_host_port(opts)
+        if not host:
+            problems.append(
+                f"meter_source {SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD} needs p1_host (the meter's "
+                "own address, e.g. 192.168.2.250)")
+        if port_s:
+            try:
+                int(port_s)
+            except ValueError:
+                problems.append(f"p1_host {opts.get('p1_host')!r} has an "
+                                "unparseable port")
+        try:
+            # ⚠️ Not `or 5`: that turns an explicit 0 into the default, and a
+            # cadence of 0 is a misconfiguration that must be reported, not
+            # quietly corrected into something that looks like it was asked for.
+            raw = opts.get("meter_poll_s", 5)
+            poll_s = float(5 if raw is None or raw == "" else raw)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            problems.append(f"meter_poll_s {opts.get('meter_poll_s')!r} is not a number")
+        else:
+            if poll_s <= 0:
+                problems.append("meter_poll_s must be positive")
+            # ⚠️ The age can never be fresher than the poll interval. At or past
+            # max_age_s every reading is stale before its successor arrives, so
+            # the controller would sit permanently on missing inputs while the
+            # meter is perfectly healthy - refuse it rather than ship that.
+            elif poll_s >= max_age_s:
+                problems.append(
+                    f"meter_poll_s {poll_s:.1f} is not under meter_max_age_s "
+                    f"{max_age_s:.1f} - every reading would go stale before the "
+                    "next poll")
+    else:
+        problems.append(
+            f"meter_source {source!r} is not one of "
+            + ", ".join((SOURCE_HA, SOURCE_MQTT, SOURCE_HA_SIGNED, SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD)))
+    return problems
+
+
 def build_source(opts: dict, ingest: P1Ingest, session, broker: dict | None):
     """Return the transport named by `meter_source`, or None if disabled.
 
     This is the whole of AC 1's "switchable": every consumer reads P1Ingest, so
     changing transport is a config edit, never a code path.
+
+    ⚠️ In the add-on this is now unreachable with a bad config -
+    validate_startup_config() refuses to start on anything
+    validate_meter_options() rejects. The guard stays because this function is
+    also called directly by tests and by anything embedding P1Ingest, and
+    "returns None" is a safer default for those callers than a transport that
+    can never read.
     """
     source = str(opts.get("meter_source", "off") or "off").strip()
     if not is_enabled(opts):
         return None
+    problems = validate_meter_options(opts, ingest.phases, ingest.max_age_s)
+    if problems:
+        for problem in problems:
+            _LOG.error("%s - P1 ingestion disabled", problem)
+        return None
     if source == SOURCE_HA:
         return HaDsmrSource(session, ingest, {
             "import": opts.get("p1_import_entity", ""),
@@ -1061,70 +1179,19 @@ def build_source(opts: dict, ingest: P1Ingest, session, broker: dict | None):
             "phase_export": opts.get("p1_phase_export_entities") or [],
         })
     if source == SOURCE_HA_SIGNED:
-        net = str(opts.get("p1_net_entity", "") or "").strip()
-        phase_net = [str(e).strip() for e in
-                     (opts.get("p1_phase_net_entities") or []) if str(e).strip()]
-        # ⚠️ Both of these are checked ONCE here rather than per telegram. A
-        # misconfigured source otherwise fails silently in the only way that
-        # looks exactly like a healthy one that has not been sent anything yet:
-        # no samples, a climbing age, and the firmware watchdog holding the
-        # battery at 0 W with nothing in the log saying why.
-        if not net:
-            _LOG.error("meter_source %s needs p1_net_entity - P1 ingestion "
-                       "disabled (sensor.p1_sample_age_s would otherwise be "
-                       "announced with nothing feeding it)", SOURCE_HA_SIGNED)
-            return None
-        if phase_net and len(phase_net) != ingest.phases:
-            _LOG.error("p1_phase_net_entities has %d entities but meter_phases "
-                       "is %d - P1 ingestion disabled. Every telegram would be "
-                       "rejected on the phase-count check.",
-                       len(phase_net), ingest.phases)
-            return None
-        return HaSignedSource(session, ingest,
-                              {"net": net, "phase_net": phase_net})
+        return HaSignedSource(session, ingest, {
+            "net": str(opts.get("p1_net_entity", "") or "").strip(),
+            "phase_net": [str(e).strip() for e in
+                          (opts.get("p1_phase_net_entities") or []) if str(e).strip()],
+        })
     if source == SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD:
-        host = str(opts.get("p1_host", "") or "").strip()
-        # A pasted browser URL is the obvious way to fill this in wrong.
-        host = host.removeprefix("http://").removeprefix("https://").rstrip("/")
-        host, _, port_s = host.partition(":")
-        # ⚠️ Checked ONCE here, like the ha_signed entity ids and for the same
-        # reason: a misconfigured source otherwise fails in the one way that
-        # looks exactly like a healthy one nobody has sent anything to yet - no
-        # samples, a climbing age, the watchdog holding the battery at 0 W, and
-        # nothing in the log saying why.
-        if not host:
-            _LOG.error("meter_source %s needs p1_host (the meter's own address, "
-                       "e.g. 192.168.2.250) - P1 ingestion disabled",
-                       SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD)
-            return None
-        try:
-            port = int(port_s) if port_s else HOMEWIZARD_PORT
-        except ValueError:
-            _LOG.error("p1_host %r has an unparseable port - P1 ingestion disabled",
-                       opts.get("p1_host"))
-            return None
-        try:
-            # ⚠️ Not `or 5`: that turns an explicit 0 into the default, and a
-            # cadence of 0 is a misconfiguration that must be reported, not
-            # quietly corrected into something that looks like it was asked for.
-            raw = opts.get("meter_poll_s", 5)
-            poll_s = float(5 if raw is None or raw == "" else raw)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            _LOG.error("meter_poll_s %r is not a number - P1 ingestion disabled",
-                       opts.get("meter_poll_s"))
-            return None
-        if poll_s <= 0:
-            _LOG.error("meter_poll_s must be positive - P1 ingestion disabled")
-            return None
-        # ⚠️ The age can never be fresher than the poll interval. At or past
-        # max_age_s every reading is stale before its successor arrives, so the
-        # controller would sit permanently on missing inputs while the meter is
-        # perfectly healthy - refuse it rather than ship that.
-        if poll_s >= ingest.max_age_s:
-            _LOG.error("meter_poll_s %.1f is not under meter_max_age_s %.1f - every "
-                       "reading would go stale before the next poll. P1 ingestion "
-                       "disabled.", poll_s, ingest.max_age_s)
-            return None
+        host, port_s = homewizard_host_port(opts)
+        port = int(port_s) if port_s else HOMEWIZARD_PORT
+        raw = opts.get("meter_poll_s", 5)
+        poll_s = float(5 if raw is None or raw == "" else raw)
+        # A warning, not a refusal: one missed poll costs a stale reading and a
+        # 0 W cycle, which is fail-safe. The refusal above is for cadences that
+        # can NEVER be fresh.
         if poll_s > ingest.max_age_s / 2:
             _LOG.warning("meter_poll_s %.1f leaves no room under meter_max_age_s "
                          "%.1f: one missed poll makes the reading stale. The meter "
@@ -1136,8 +1203,4 @@ def build_source(opts: dict, ingest: P1Ingest, session, broker: dict | None):
         return MqttP1Source(ingest, str(opts.get("meter_mqtt_topic", "")),
                             broker.get("host"), broker.get("port", 1883),
                             broker.get("username"), broker.get("password"))
-    if source:
-        _LOG.error("meter_source %r is not one of %s - P1 ingestion disabled",
-                   source, ", ".join((SOURCE_HA, SOURCE_MQTT, SOURCE_HA_SIGNED,
-                                      SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD)))
     return None

goodwe_controller/app/validate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+"""Startup configuration validation - the gate before the control loop runs.
+
+WHAT THIS IS FOR, in one sentence: some configurations are not "a bit off", they
+are configurations under which the add-on's own safety machinery does not work,
+and for those the correct behaviour is to refuse to start rather than to log a
+line and carry on.
+
+⚠️ THE FAILURE THIS REPLACES. `main.py` used to read the setpoint device's own
+±5000 W rating, notice that a configured `max_w` of, say, 8000 W exceeded it,
+write one WARNING to a log nobody reads, and then run anyway with
+`write_setpoint()` quietly clamping. The operator's stated ceiling was simply not
+the ceiling, and the only evidence was a line that had scrolled off. specs §1.5
+is explicit that a configuration in which the system cannot honour what it was
+told is refused at startup, not survived at runtime.
+
+WHERE THE LINE IS DRAWN, and why it is not further out. A validator that refuses
+on trivia gets switched off by the first person it inconveniences, so this one
+refuses only where **continuing produces one of two outcomes:**
+
+  (a) **a stated limit is untrue** - the operator configured a bound, a lower
+      layer silently enforces a different one, and nothing says which won; or
+  (b) **the add-on is inert and indistinguishable from healthy** - it starts,
+      serves its UI, reports green, and moves no energy, with no symptom that
+      separates it from a correctly-idle system.
+
+⚠️ (b) IS NOT A SPECIAL CASE OF (a), and an earlier draft of this file wrongly
+implied it was by claiming every refusal here "makes a safety mechanism
+inoperative". It does not: when `setpoint_entity` is blank, layer 1 pinning the
+inverter at 0 W is the failsafe WORKING. The problem is not that the system
+becomes unsafe, it is that it becomes a very convincing impression of a working
+controller - and an operator has no way to tell. That is its own reason to
+refuse, and stating it as one is what stops the rule being stretched later to
+cover mere untidiness.
+
+Both halves have to stay narrow. (a) is not "any two numbers that could
+disagree"; it is a bound the operator SET being overridden by a layer they
+cannot see. (b) is not "anything degraded"; it is inert AND silent - if a red
+NOT READY banner already names the problem, (b) does not apply.
+
+  1. `max_w` outside the setpoint device's own rating.  [(a)]
+     The stated limit is untrue. arbiter.py's `supervised` SAFETY claim says the
+     output is bounded by ±max_w; it is not, it is bounded by the device, and the
+     two numbers disagree. Which one wins is a coin toss to anyone reading the
+     config.
+
+  2. No `setpoint_entity`.  [(b)]
+     A controller with no actuator, and nothing about it looks broken.
+     `write_setpoint()` returns immediately on a blank entity, so: no device
+     rating is ever read (the `device` SAFETY claim is never made at all), and
+     the ESP32 heartbeat - the thing that feeds LAYER 1 - never happens. The
+     add-on serves a UI, publishes MQTT, resolves claims, and moves nothing.
+     Layer 1 then holds the inverter at 0 W, which is the failsafe working
+     exactly as designed - this is (b), not (a). Nothing is unsafe; it is simply
+     impossible to tell from the outside that the thing is doing nothing.
+
+  3. A `meter_source` that can never produce a reading.  [(b)]
+     §5.1 makes P1 the only authoritative measurement and deliberately provides
+     no fallback, so a transport that cannot be built means `grid` is None
+     forever: permanent "inputs missing", 0 W, and a status page that reports a
+     meter with a climbing age exactly as it would for a healthy meter nobody has
+     sent anything to yet. The predicates live in `p1.validate_meter_options()`,
+     which is also what `build_source()` uses - one definition, two callers.
+
+  4. `meter_max_age_s` above the firmware's own ingest veto.  [(a)]
+     The purest example of (a) in the system, and structurally the same fault as
+     1. The add-on's schema accepts `int(5,300)`. The firmware's threshold is a
+     COMPILE-TIME SUBSTITUTION - `max_age_s: "30"` in
+     goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml - used by both its monotonic receipt
+     clock and its `ingest_stale` veto, which trips layer 1 on
+     `p1_age_s >= 30`. Set 120 and the add-on believes a 119 s reading is fresh
+     and keeps commanding into it, while the firmware vetoed at 30 s and is
+     holding the inverter at 0 W. Status page: healthy meter, running
+     controller, nothing moving, and no line anywhere saying the number you set
+     was overruled. That firmware file's own comment says a lower bound on this
+     "belongs in CFG-01, not here" - so here it is.
+
+WHAT IS DELIBERATELY *NOT* REFUSED, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
+
+  - `integrator_max_w` above `max_w`. DOCS.md is right that the only thing the
+    extra headroom buys is more wrong-direction power to unwind after
+    saturation - but the arbiter's `supervised` limit still binds the wire to
+    ±max_w, so nothing out of range ever reaches the inverter. The cost is
+    latency, not amperage. Warned about, not refused.
+  - A missing `soc_entity` / `batt_entity`. `inputs_ok` goes False, the loop
+    commands 0 W, and `checks()` already renders a red NOT READY banner naming
+    the missing entity. Fail-safe AND already loud; a refusal adds nothing.
+  - A `setpoint_entity` that exists in the config but is not found on the Core
+    API at startup. This is the transient case - ESPHome is frequently not up
+    yet when the add-on boots - and refusing here would turn a device that
+    arrives thirty seconds late into a restart loop needing a human. It stays a
+    NOT READY banner.
+  - `meter_poll_s` above half `meter_max_age_s`. One missed poll costs a stale
+    reading and a 0 W cycle. Warned about in p1.py, not refused.
+"""
+
+import logging
+
+from .p1 import is_enabled, validate_meter_options
+
+_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.config")
+
+# ⚠️ A MIRROR OF A FIRMWARE CONSTANT, AND IT CANNOT BE IMPORTED. The firmware
+# threshold is a compile-time YAML substitution baked into the ESP32 image
+# (`max_age_s: "30"`, master/goodwe-master-stage4-failsafe.yaml), so nothing at
+# runtime can ask the board what value it was built with. This number is a copy,
+# and a copy of a constant in another repo is a thing that goes stale.
+#
+# What makes that acceptable here: the copy can only ever be WRONG IN THE SAFE
+# DIRECTION for the check below. If the firmware's veto is raised above 30, this
+# refuses some configs that would in fact have worked - annoying, visible
+# immediately, and fixed by editing one line. It cannot start accepting a config
+# the firmware vetoes unless the firmware's number goes DOWN, which would be a
+# tightening nobody does silently.
+#
+# ⚠️ TEL-06 IS EDITING `ingest_stale` DIRECTLY. If that ticket changes what the
+# veto MEANS - e.g. thresholding arrival rather than the sensor's value - this
+# constant's justification has to be re-read, not just its number. Do not assume
+# a matching integer means a matching rule.
+FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S = 30.0
+
+# ⚠️ The complete set of option keys through which this add-on can reach an
+# actuator. specs §1.5 makes "any configuration in which two writers can reach
+# one actuator" a non-goal, and the way that non-goal is ENFORCED here is by
+# construction: there is exactly one such key, so a second writer is not
+# expressible in the options schema at all. sim/inject.py's `two_writers`
+# scenario asserts on this tuple - if a second write path is ever added, that
+# scenario goes red and somebody has to decide how the two are arbitrated
+# BEFORE the config that allows both can ship.
+ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS = ("setpoint_entity",)
+
+
+class ConfigRefused(Exception):
+    """The configuration is wrong. Not "something broke" - see main.py's handler.
+
+    Carries the list of problems so the caller can render them; str() is the
+    first one, so an unhandled traceback still names something useful.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, problems: list[str]):
+        self.problems = problems
+        super().__init__(problems[0] if problems else "configuration refused")
+
+
+def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]:
+    """Return the list of reasons this configuration must not be started.
+
+    Empty list means go. `dev_min`/`dev_max` are the setpoint device's own
+    reported range (`hass.limits()`), or None when the device could not be
+    reached - in which case the range checks are skipped rather than guessed at,
+    for the transient reason in this module's docstring.
+
+    Pure and side-effect free apart from two warnings, so it can be called from
+    a test or from sim/inject.py without a Home Assistant anywhere near it.
+    """
+    problems: list[str] = []
+
+    # --- 1. an actuator to write to ------------------------------------------
+    writers = [k for k in ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS
+               if str(opts.get(k, "") or "").strip()]
+    if not writers:
+        problems.append(
+            "setpoint_entity is not set, so this add-on has no actuator: every "
+            "write is a no-op, the device's own rating is never read, and the "
+            "ESP32 heartbeat that holds off the layer-1 failsafe never happens. "
+            "It would run, look healthy, and move no energy at all. Set it to "
+            "the ESPHome number entity that carries the setpoint.")
+
+    # --- 2. the configured ceiling against the device's own rating -----------
+    max_w = _number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)
+    if max_w is None:
+        problems.append(f"max_w {opts.get('max_w')!r} is not a number")
+    # ⚠️ config.yaml's int(100,5000) already blocks this on a real install, so
+    # the check is not for the Supervisor path - it is because
+    # validate_startup_config() is now also sim/inject.py's entry point and can
+    # be handed any dict at all. A max_w of 0 or below inverts the arbiter's
+    # `supervised` bounds (lo=-max_w becomes the HIGHER number), and a limit
+    # claim whose lo exceeds its hi is exactly the contradiction the arbiter
+    # resolves to 0 W - i.e. it would look like a safety trip rather than the
+    # nonsense config it is.
+    elif max_w <= 0:
+        problems.append(
+            f"max_w is {max_w:.0f} W and must be positive - it is a magnitude, "
+            "not a signed setpoint. At or below zero the arbiter's supervised "
+            f"limit becomes lo={-max_w:.0f} / hi={max_w:.0f}, which is a "
+            "contradiction it resolves to 0 W, so the controller would look "
+            "like it was tripping rather than misconfigured.")
+    elif dev_max is not None and max_w > dev_max:
+        problems.append(
+            f"max_w is {max_w:.0f} W but {opts.get('setpoint_entity') or 'the setpoint device'} accepts at "
+            f"most {dev_max:.0f} W - THE DEVICE WINS, so the {max_w:.0f} W you "
+            f"configured would silently never happen. Lower max_w to "
+            f"{dev_max:.0f} W or less, or point setpoint_entity at a device that "
+            f"can take {max_w:.0f} W.")
+    elif dev_min is not None and -max_w < dev_min:
+        problems.append(
+            f"max_w is {max_w:.0f} W, so this controller may command "
+            f"{-max_w:.0f} W, but {opts.get('setpoint_entity') or 'the setpoint device'} accepts no less "
+            f"than {dev_min:.0f} W - THE DEVICE WINS on the charge side. Lower "
+            f"max_w to {abs(dev_min):.0f} W or less.")
+
+    # --- 3. a meter that can actually read -----------------------------------
+    # ⚠️ Not a second copy of these rules - p1.py owns them, because
+    # build_source() has to apply the identical predicates and a drifted copy
+    # would be worse than no check.
+    phases = _number(opts, "meter_phases", 1.0)
+    max_age_s = _number(opts, "meter_max_age_s", 30.0)
+    if phases is None or max_age_s is None:
+        problems.append("meter_phases and meter_max_age_s must both be numbers "
+                        f"(got {opts.get('meter_phases')!r} / "
+                        f"{opts.get('meter_max_age_s')!r})")
+    else:
+        problems.extend(validate_meter_options(opts, int(phases), max_age_s))
+
+    # --- 4. the staleness window the FIRMWARE will actually enforce -----------
+    # ⚠️ Only when P1 ingestion is on, and that is a real scope limit rather than
+    # caution: meter_max_age_s is read by nothing but P1Ingest, and the veto it
+    # collides with keys off `p1_age_s.has_state()`, which is only ever published
+    # when ingestion is running (see Controller.publish()). With meter_source off
+    # there is no sensor, the veto is inert, and the number governs nothing.
+    #
+    # Strictly greater, not >=: the firmware trips at `>= 30` and P1Ingest goes
+    # stale at `> max_age_s`, so 30 against 30 has the firmware fractionally
+    # stricter by one sample. That is the shipped default and the tested pair.
+    # BELOW 30 is fine and deliberately not refused - the add-on then gives up
+    # first, which is fail-safe and visible on its own status page. Only ABOVE is
+    # the silent case, where the add-on keeps commanding into a reading the board
+    # has already rejected.
+    if (is_enabled(opts) and max_age_s is not None
+            and max_age_s > FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S):
+        problems.append(
+            f"meter_max_age_s is {max_age_s:.0f} s but the ESP32 firmware vetoes "
+            f"any P1 sample at {FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S:.0f} s and forces the "
+            "layer-1 failsafe - THE FIRMWARE WINS, and it wins silently. This "
+            f"add-on would treat a {max_age_s - 1:.0f} s reading as fresh and "
+            "keep commanding, while the inverter sat at 0 W with a healthy-"
+            "looking meter on the status page. Lower meter_max_age_s to "
+            f"{FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S:.0f} s or less (30 s is the tested value), "
+            "or rebuild the firmware with a matching max_age_s and update "
+            "validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S.")
+
+    # --- warnings: real, but not worth refusing over -------------------------
+    integ = opts.get("integrator_max_w")
+    integ_w = None if not integ else _number(opts, "integrator_max_w", None)
+    if integ_w is not None and max_w is not None and integ_w > max_w:
+        _LOG.warning(
+            "integrator_max_w %.0f W is above max_w %.0f W. Not refused - the "
+            "arbiter still bounds the wire to +-max_w - but the only thing the "
+            "extra headroom buys is more wrong-direction power to unwind after "
+            "saturation. 0 (follow max_w) is the recommended value.",
+            integ_w, max_w)
+
+    return problems
+
+
+def _number(opts: dict, key, default):
+    raw = opts.get(key, default)
+    if raw is None or raw == "":
+        return default
+    try:
+        return float(raw)
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def refuse(problems: list[str]) -> None:
+    """Log a refusal an operator can tell apart from a crash. Does not raise.
+
+    ⚠️ THE POINT OF THE BANNER. "You configured this wrong" must not read like
+    "it broke". A Python traceback in an add-on log means the same thing to most
+    operators as a segfault - file a bug - whereas this block names the keys,
+    names the fix, and says in words that nothing is broken. main.py catches
+    ConfigRefused and exits 78 (sysexits EX_CONFIG), so no traceback is printed
+    at all and even the exit status distinguishes the two.
+    """
+    _LOG.error("=" * 72)
+    _LOG.error("REFUSING TO START: the add-on configuration is not usable.")
+    _LOG.error("This is a CONFIGURATION problem, not a crash. Nothing is broken;")
+    _LOG.error("the add-on will start as soon as the settings below are fixed.")
+    _LOG.error("Fix them in Settings > Add-ons > GoodWe RS485 Controller >")
+    _LOG.error("Configuration, then start the add-on again.")
+    _LOG.error("-" * 72)
+    for i, problem in enumerate(problems, 1):
+        _LOG.error("  %d. %s", i, problem)
+    _LOG.error("=" * 72)

goodwe_controller/config.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: GoodWe RS485 Controller
-version: "0.3.0"
+version: "0.4.0"
 slug: goodwe_controller
 description: >-
   Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over RS485 by emulating its smart
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ options:
   integrator_max_w: 0
   heartbeat_s: 10
   stale_input_s: 15
+  cycle_floor_s: 15
   auto_start: false
 
   # --- maintenance -----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ schema:
   integrator_max_w: int(0,15000)
   heartbeat_s: int(2,25)
   stale_input_s: int(5,120)
+  cycle_floor_s: int(5,60)
   auto_start: bool
 
   maintenance_enabled: bool

goodwe_controller/test_loop.py

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+"""Runnable check for the control loop's cadence.  `python3 test_loop.py`
+
+SAFETY-12: the loop must evaluate on a clock as well as on a change. Before the
+fix, `run_control()` ran `cycle()` only when the meter value differed from the
+previous poll, so a meter that repeats a value ran NO control cycles while the
+heartbeat kept re-emitting the last command - measured on the rig during TEL-05
+as 70 s at a literally constant 350.0 W with 14 arrivals and zero cycles.
+
+⚠️ THIS TEST TAKES ~95 SECONDS OF WALL CLOCK (measured 93 s), on purpose, and
+that figure is the only thing standing between it and a future developer who
+decides a slow test is a broken one. The thing under test is a wall-clock floor
+inside a loop that sleeps 1 s; mocking the clock would leave the assertion
+testing the mock. It drives the real `run_control()` and counts what actually
+happened. Eight runs of the real loop is what the eight scenarios cost.
+
+⚠️ If you shorten the windows, re-measure and update this number and the one in
+HANDOVER.md. An understated runtime reads as a hang.
+
+`cycle_floor_s` is read from options with no lower bound in code, so a huge
+value reproduces the pre-fix behaviour exactly. Every claim below is therefore
+an A/B on one binary, not a comparison against a remembered old one.
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import sys
+import time
+
+from app.main import Controller
+
+fails = []
+NEVER = 1e9          # cycle_floor_s so large the floor can never elapse: pre-fix
+
+
+def check(name, cond):
+    print(f"  {'ok  ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
+    if not cond:
+        fails.append(name)
+
+
+class FakeHass:
+    """A scripted meter and a plant that tracks the command instantly."""
+
+    def __init__(self, meter, soc_dies_at=None):
+        self.meter = meter
+        self.soc_dies_at = soc_dies_at
+        self.batt = 0.0
+        self.writes = []
+        self.t0 = time.monotonic()
+
+    async def limits(self, entity):
+        return (-5000.0, 5000.0, 1.0)
+
+    async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
+        now = time.monotonic() - self.t0
+        if entity == "sensor.grid":
+            return self.meter(now)
+        if entity == "sensor.batt":
+            return self.batt
+        if entity == "sensor.soc":
+            if self.soc_dies_at is not None and now >= self.soc_dies_at:
+                return None
+            return 50.0
+        return None
+
+    async def set_number(self, entity, value):
+        self.writes.append(float(value))
+        self.batt = float(value)
+        return True
+
+
+class _Store:
+    data = {}
+
+    def set(self, *a):
+        pass
+
+
+class _Pub:
+    enabled = False
+
+    def publish(self, *a, **k):
+        pass
+
+    def close(self):
+        pass
+
+
+BASE = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
+        "soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
+        "meter_source": "off", "max_w": 2000, "gain": 0.6, "slew_w": 1000,
+        "deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": -10, "step_w": 10,
+        "heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15}
+
+
+def drive(meter, floor, seconds, soc_dies_at=None, **over):
+    """Run the real control loop for `seconds`; return (cycle times, writes)."""
+    async def go():
+        hass = FakeHass(meter, soc_dies_at)
+        c = Controller(dict(BASE, cycle_floor_s=floor, **over), hass, _Store(),
+                       _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
+        c.auto = True
+        stamps = []
+        real = c.cycle
+
+        async def counted():
+            stamps.append(time.monotonic() - hass.t0)
+            await real()
+
+        c.cycle = counted
+        task = asyncio.create_task(c.run_control())
+        await asyncio.sleep(seconds)
+        c.stopping = True
+        await asyncio.wait_for(task, timeout=10)
+        return stamps, hass.writes, c.target, c.reason
+    return asyncio.run(go())
+
+
+def worst_gap(stamps, seconds):
+    """Longest stretch with no cycle, including the tail after the last one."""
+    edges = [0.0] + list(stamps) + [seconds]
+    return max(b - a for a, b in zip(edges, edges[1:]))
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("a meter that repeats the same value")
+FLAT = lambda t: 350.0                                          # noqa: E731
+FLOOR, SECONDS = 3.0, 12.0
+
+pre_stamps, pre_writes, _, _ = drive(FLAT, NEVER, SECONDS)
+# The defect itself, demonstrated rather than described: one cycle at startup
+# and then nothing for the rest of the window, while writes keep happening.
+check("pre-fix: a constant meter runs exactly one cycle, at startup",
+      len(pre_stamps) == 1)
+check("...while the heartbeat keeps writing anyway, so nothing looks wrong",
+      len(pre_writes) >= 2)
+
+post_stamps, post_writes, _, _ = drive(FLAT, FLOOR, SECONDS)
+check("post-fix: the same constant meter runs cycles throughout",
+      len(post_stamps) >= int(SECONDS / FLOOR) - 1)
+# The actual acceptance criterion: a BOUND on the gap, not a count.
+gap = worst_gap(post_stamps, SECONDS)
+check(f"...with no gap longer than the floor ({gap:.1f}s <= {FLOOR + 1.5:.1f}s)",
+      gap <= FLOOR + 1.5)
+check("...and the loop actually corrected, instead of holding a stale command",
+      len(post_writes) > len(pre_writes))
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("a meter that changes normally - nothing may move")
+# ⚠️ THE REGRESSION GUARD, and the more important half. The floor is a deadline
+# on the gap between cycles, reset by every cycle whichever trigger fired - not
+# a second scheduler. On a healthy meter it must never elapse, so the cycle
+# count, the write count and the commanded values must be IDENTICAL either side
+# of the fix. Anything else is a new write cadence, which SAFETY-12 forbids:
+# the deadband, step_w and the 10 s force-write decide what reaches the wire,
+# and this change is only allowed to alter when the loop thinks.
+STEPS = [0.0, 300.0, 850.0, -400.0, 120.0, -900.0, 60.0]
+LIVE = lambda t: STEPS[int(t // 2) % len(STEPS)]                # noqa: E731
+
+a_stamps, a_writes, _, _ = drive(LIVE, NEVER, 12.0)
+b_stamps, b_writes, _, _ = drive(LIVE, FLOOR, 12.0)
+check("a changing meter runs the same number of cycles as before the fix",
+      len(a_stamps) == len(b_stamps))
+check("...commanding exactly the same sequence of values", a_writes == b_writes)
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("a meter parked at the target - the converged operating point")
+# The case TEL-05 warned about: at the converged target the power figure
+# legitimately repeats for minutes. The loop must still run, and must still
+# write nothing but the heartbeat, because the deadband - not the arrival
+# trigger - is what holds the command still.
+AT_TARGET = lambda t: -10.0                                     # noqa: E731
+c_stamps, c_writes, _, _ = drive(AT_TARGET, NEVER, 12.0)
+d_stamps, d_writes, _, _ = drive(AT_TARGET, FLOOR, 12.0)
+check("the loop evaluates at the converged point too", len(d_stamps) > len(c_stamps))
+check("...and the deadband still holds the command, so writes are unchanged",
+      d_writes == c_writes)
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("an input dies while the meter repeats - the safety claim must still fire")
+# ⚠️ THE STRONGEST PROPERTY IN SAFETY-12, and the one that makes it a safety fix
+# rather than a latency fix. The `inputs missing -> 0 W` claim lives INSIDE
+# cycle() (main.py, the stale_input_s branch and the P_SAFETY claim below it).
+# Pre-fix, on a meter whose value happened to repeat, cycle() was never called
+# again - so that claim could not fire AT ALL. The controller held its last
+# command through an input outage of unbounded length with the status line still
+# reading "loop -> N W".
+#
+# Layer 1 does not cover this either on a `meter_source: off` install: no P1 age
+# sensor is published (see Controller.publish), so the firmware has nothing to
+# veto on, and the heartbeat keeps its watchdog fed the whole time.
+#
+# stale_input_s is shortened to 3 s here so the outage resolves inside a test
+# rather than inside a quarter of a minute. The mechanism is the default one.
+c2_stamps, c2_writes, pre_target, pre_reason = drive(
+    FLAT, NEVER, 10.0, soc_dies_at=4.0, stale_input_s=3)
+check("pre-fix: a dead input during a constant meter never reaches the safety claim",
+      pre_target != 0.0 and "safety" not in pre_reason)
+check(f"...so it holds its last command instead ({pre_target:g} W, {pre_reason!r})",
+      pre_target == 220.0)
+
+d2_stamps, d2_writes, post_target, post_reason = drive(
+    FLAT, FLOOR, 10.0, soc_dies_at=4.0, stale_input_s=3)
+check("post-fix: the same outage commands 0 W", post_target == 0.0)
+check(f"...through the safety claim, not by accident ({post_reason!r})",
+      "safety" in post_reason)
+check("...and the 0 W actually reached the device", 0.0 in d2_writes)
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print()
+if fails:
+    print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: " + "; ".join(fails))
+    sys.exit(1)
+print("all checks passed")

goodwe_controller/test_p1.py

@@ -1346,6 +1346,17 @@ check("with P1 on the age sensor IS announced",
 from app.main import Controller            # noqa: E402
 
 
+def _never():
+    """A stop Event these publish-only tests never set.
+
+    `stop` is a REQUIRED keyword argument (CFG-01): a Controller that cannot
+    stop itself used to be the default one, and on the late-refusal path that
+    meant a live process with no control loop and no exit. These cases only call
+    publish(), so any Event will do - but they may not skip it.
+    """
+    return asyncio.Event()
+
+
 class _Store:
     data = {}
 
@@ -1368,14 +1379,14 @@ class _Pub:
 
 
 pub_off = _Pub()
-Controller({"meter_source": "off"}, None, _Store(), pub_off).publish()
+Controller({"meter_source": "off"}, None, _Store(), pub_off, stop=_never()).publish()
 check("with P1 off, p1_age is absent from the published payload",
       "p1_age" not in pub_off.last)
 check("...while the normal status keys are still published",
       "setpoint" in pub_off.last and "grid" in pub_off.last)
 
 pub_on = _Pub()
-Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA}, None, _Store(), pub_on).publish()
+Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA}, None, _Store(), pub_on, stop=_never()).publish()
 check("with P1 on, p1_age is published", "p1_age" in pub_on.last)
 check("...as a number, so has_state() becomes true only once we feed it",
       isinstance(pub_on.last["p1_age"], float))
@@ -1384,14 +1395,14 @@ check("...as a number, so has_state() becomes true only once we feed it",
 # age sensor is a hard prerequisite for the FW-01 flash, and it has to appear on
 # the transport that can actually read the meter in this house.
 pub_sig = _Pub()
-Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED}, None, _Store(), pub_sig).publish()
+Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HA_SIGNED}, None, _Store(), pub_sig, stop=_never()).publish()
 check("with ha_signed selected, p1_age is published too",
       "p1_age" in pub_sig.last and isinstance(pub_sig.last["p1_age"], float))
 
 # ⚠️ And on homewizard_local, where it is the one age FW-01 may actually
 # threshold - every other transport's age measures when the VALUE changed.
 pub_hw = _Pub()
-Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD}, None, _Store(), pub_hw).publish()
+Controller({"meter_source": SOURCE_HOMEWIZARD}, None, _Store(), pub_hw, stop=_never()).publish()
 check("with homewizard_local selected, p1_age is published",
       "p1_age" in pub_hw.last and isinstance(pub_hw.last["p1_age"], float))
 
@@ -1421,7 +1432,7 @@ def p1_rows(ctl):
 
 
 def _fed(source):
-    ctl = Controller({"meter_source": source}, None, _Store(), _Pub())
+    ctl = Controller({"meter_source": source}, None, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=_never())
     ctl.p1.submit(make_sample(source, 350.0, 0.0, phases=1,
                               ingest_mono=time.monotonic()))
     return ctl

goodwe_controller/test_validate.py

@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+"""Runnable check for the startup gate.  `python3 test_validate.py`
+
+Two halves, and the second is the one that matters. The first asserts that the
+three refusable configurations are refused. The second asserts that everything
+on validate.py's "deliberately not refused" list still STARTS - because the way
+a validator dies is not by missing a fault, it is by refusing something harmless
+until somebody deletes the call.
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import sys
+
+from app.validate import (
+    ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS, FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, ConfigRefused, refuse,
+    validate_startup_config,
+)
+
+fails = []
+
+
+def check(name, cond):
+    print(f"  {'ok  ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
+    if not cond:
+        fails.append(name)
+
+
+def base(**over):
+    """A configuration that must start. Everything else is this, spoilt."""
+    o = {"setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint", "max_w": 2000,
+         "soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
+         "meter_source": "off"}
+    o.update(over)
+    return o
+
+
+def why(problems, needle):
+    return any(needle in p for p in problems)
+
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("the baseline must start, or nothing below means anything")
+check("a good config with a 5000 W device is accepted",
+      validate_startup_config(base(), -5000, 5000) == [])
+check("...and with no device reachable yet, too",
+      validate_startup_config(base(), None, None) == [])
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("1. max_w against the device's own rating")
+# ⚠️ THE ORIGINAL BUG. main.py used to log 'the device wins' and run anyway,
+# with write_setpoint() clamping, so the configured ceiling was never the real
+# one and the only evidence had scrolled off the log.
+p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=8000), -5000, 5000)
+check("max_w above the device maximum is refused", len(p) == 1)
+check("...and the message names the configured value", why(p, "8000"))
+check("...and the device's value", why(p, "5000"))
+check("...and says which one wins", why(p, "THE DEVICE WINS"))
+check("max_w exactly at the device maximum is fine",
+      validate_startup_config(base(max_w=5000), -5000, 5000) == [])
+check("max_w under it is fine",
+      validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000), -5000, 5000) == [])
+# The charge side is a separate rail and an asymmetric device is legal.
+p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=4000), -2500, 5000)
+check("a max_w the device cannot take on the CHARGE side is refused too",
+      len(p) == 1 and why(p, "charge side"))
+check("...naming the device's floor", why(p, "-2500"))
+# ⚠️ Not guessed at: the entity may simply not have booted yet. run_control()
+# re-runs this the moment the real rating arrives.
+check("an unreachable device skips the range check rather than assuming",
+      validate_startup_config(base(max_w=8000), None, None) == [])
+check("a non-numeric max_w is refused",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w="lots"), -5000, 5000), "not a number"))
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("2. an actuator to write to")
+# A controller with no actuator: write_setpoint() returns on the blank entity,
+# so no rating is read, no heartbeat is sent, layer 1 pins the inverter at 0 W,
+# and the add-on looks perfectly healthy the whole time.
+for blank in ("", "   ", None):
+    p = validate_startup_config(base(setpoint_entity=blank), None, None)
+    check(f"setpoint_entity {blank!r} is refused", len(p) == 1)
+check("...and the message says why it is dangerous rather than untidy",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(setpoint_entity=""), None, None),
+          "heartbeat"))
+# specs §1.5: two writers on one actuator is not expressible in this schema.
+check("there is exactly one way to reach the actuator",
+      ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS == ("setpoint_entity",))
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("3. a meter that can never read")
+# ⚠️ These predicates belong to p1.validate_meter_options(), which build_source()
+# also uses. Asserted here to prove the gate actually consults it - one entry
+# point, not two.
+check("meter_source off asks nothing of the P1 keys",
+      validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="off"), -5000, 5000) == [])
+check("homewizard_local with no p1_host is refused",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="homewizard_local"),
+                                  -5000, 5000), "p1_host"))
+check("...and with a host it is accepted",
+      validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="homewizard_local",
+                                   p1_host="192.168.2.250"), -5000, 5000) == [])
+check("a poll cadence at meter_max_age_s is refused at STARTUP, not just disabled",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="homewizard_local",
+                                       p1_host="m", meter_poll_s=30,
+                                       meter_max_age_s=30), -5000, 5000),
+          "meter_max_age_s"))
+check("ha_signed with no p1_net_entity is refused",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="ha_signed"), -5000, 5000),
+          "p1_net_entity"))
+check("a phase list disagreeing with meter_phases is refused",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="ha_signed",
+                                       p1_net_entity="sensor.n", meter_phases=3,
+                                       p1_phase_net_entities=["a", "b"]),
+                                  -5000, 5000), "phase-count"))
+check("mqtt_p1 with no topic is refused",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="mqtt_p1"), -5000, 5000),
+          "meter_mqtt_topic"))
+check("ha_dsmr with only half its entities is refused",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="ha_dsmr",
+                                       p1_import_entity="sensor.i"), -5000, 5000),
+          "p1_export_entity"))
+check("a misspelt meter_source is refused rather than silently ignored",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="ha_signd"), -5000, 5000),
+          "is not one of"))
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("4. meter_max_age_s against the firmware's compile-time veto")
+# ⚠️ The schema allows int(5,300); the firmware's threshold is baked in at 30 s
+# and wins silently. Same shape as the max_w case: a configured bound overridden
+# by a lower layer, with nothing saying so.
+hw = dict(meter_source="homewizard_local", p1_host="m")
+p = validate_startup_config(base(**hw, meter_max_age_s=120), -5000, 5000)
+check("a meter_max_age_s above the firmware veto is refused", len(p) == 1)
+check("...naming the configured value", why(p, "120"))
+check("...naming the firmware's value", why(p, "30"))
+check("...and saying which one wins", why(p, "THE FIRMWARE WINS"))
+check("the tested pair 30/30 is accepted",
+      validate_startup_config(base(**hw, meter_max_age_s=30), -5000, 5000) == [])
+check("one second above it is refused",
+      validate_startup_config(base(**hw, meter_max_age_s=31), -5000, 5000) != [])
+# Below the veto the add-on gives up FIRST, which is fail-safe and visible on
+# its own status page. Only above is the silent case.
+check("below the veto is fine - the add-on being stricter is not a conflict",
+      validate_startup_config(base(**hw, meter_max_age_s=10,
+                                   meter_poll_s=4), -5000, 5000) == [])
+# ⚠️ Scope: meter_max_age_s is read by nothing but P1Ingest, and the veto keys
+# off a sensor only published when ingestion runs. With the meter off it governs
+# nothing, so refusing would be pure trivia.
+check("with meter_source off the number governs nothing and is not refused",
+      validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="off", meter_max_age_s=300),
+                              -5000, 5000) == [])
+check("the constant is the firmware's, not a rounded guess",
+      FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S == 30.0)
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("max_w must be a positive magnitude")
+# Schema-blocked on a real install, but validate_startup_config() is also
+# sim/inject.py's entry point and can be handed any dict at all.
+for bad in (0, -1, -2000):
+    p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=bad), -5000, 5000)
+    check(f"max_w {bad} is refused", len(p) == 1 and why(p, "must be positive"))
+check("...and the message explains it would read as a trip, not a mistake",
+      why(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=0), -5000, 5000), "contradiction"))
+check("the smallest sane max_w still starts",
+      validate_startup_config(base(max_w=1), -5000, 5000) == [])
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("what must NOT be refused - a validator that fires on trivia gets deleted")
+# DOCS.md: the arbiter's `supervised` limit still binds the wire to +-max_w, so
+# the only cost of the extra headroom is unwind latency after saturation.
+check("integrator_max_w above max_w warns but starts",
+      validate_startup_config(base(max_w=2000, integrator_max_w=9000),
+                              -5000, 5000) == [])
+check("integrator_max_w 0 (follow max_w) starts",
+      validate_startup_config(base(integrator_max_w=0), -5000, 5000) == [])
+# Fail-safe AND already a red NOT READY banner naming the entity: a refusal on
+# top of that adds nothing an operator can act on.
+check("a missing soc_entity is left to the readiness banner",
+      validate_startup_config(base(soc_entity=""), -5000, 5000) == [])
+check("a missing batt_entity likewise",
+      validate_startup_config(base(batt_entity=""), -5000, 5000) == [])
+# The transient case. ESPHome is routinely not up when the add-on boots, and
+# refusing here would turn a device that arrives late into a restart loop.
+check("a setpoint entity that is configured but not yet found starts",
+      validate_startup_config(base(), None, None) == [])
+check("meter_poll_s with thin but non-zero headroom starts",
+      validate_startup_config(base(meter_source="homewizard_local", p1_host="m",
+                                   meter_poll_s=20, meter_max_age_s=30),
+                              -5000, 5000) == [])
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("the refusal must be legible as a refusal, not as a crash")
+p = validate_startup_config(base(max_w=8000, setpoint_entity=""), -5000, 5000)
+check("several problems are all reported, not just the first", len(p) >= 1)
+refuse(p)   # prints the banner; the eye is the assertion for its wording
+err = ConfigRefused(p)
+check("ConfigRefused carries every problem", err.problems == p)
+check("...and str() names one of them", str(err) == p[0])
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print("the LATE refusal, when the device only shows up after the gate has run")
+# ⚠️ This path had no test at all and no live demonstration - the review's
+# catch. ESPHome is routinely not up when the add-on boots, so hass.limits()
+# returns (None, None), the range checks are skipped, and run_control() is the
+# first place the device's real rating is ever known. Everything below is about
+# what happens when it turns out to conflict.
+from app.main import Controller            # noqa: E402
+
+
+class _LateHass:
+    """Reports the range only run_control() gets to see."""
+
+    def __init__(self, lo, hi):
+        self.lo, self.hi = lo, hi
+        self.writes = []
+
+    async def limits(self, entity):
+        return (self.lo, self.hi, 1.0)
+
+    async def number(self, *a, **k):
+        return 0.0
+
+    async def set_number(self, entity, value):
+        self.writes.append(value)
+        return True
+
+
+class _Store2:
+    data = {}
+
+    def set(self, *a):
+        pass
+
+
+class _Pub2:
+    enabled = False
+
+    def publish(self, *a, **k):
+        pass
+
+    def close(self):
+        pass
+
+
+def late(opts_over, lo, hi):
+    """Drive run_control() against a device that only reports (lo, hi) now.
+
+    ⚠️ Returns whether run_control() EXITED ON ITS OWN. That is the assertion
+    that matters: on a refusal it must return without entering the while loop,
+    and on a clean config it must not return at all. So the clean case is stopped
+    from outside after it has had time to write, rather than waited on - a
+    wait_for() here would just time out, which is the correct behaviour dressed
+    up as a failure.
+    """
+    async def go():
+        stop = asyncio.Event()
+        hass = _LateHass(lo, hi)
+        # A device narrower than the shipped 5000 W schema ceiling is exactly
+        # the case that cannot be reached through the Supervisor on the live
+        # install, so it is reached here instead.
+        c = Controller(base(**opts_over), hass, _Store2(), _Pub2(), stop=stop)
+        c.auto = True
+        task = asyncio.create_task(c.run_control())
+        for _ in range(30):                    # up to ~3 s
+            if task.done():
+                break
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
+        exited = task.done()
+        if not exited:
+            c.stopping = True
+        await asyncio.wait_for(task, timeout=5)
+        return c, stop, hass, exited
+    return asyncio.run(go())
+
+c, stop, hass, exited = late({"max_w": 5000}, -3600.0, 3600.0)
+check("a device narrower than max_w, discovered late, is refused",
+      c.refused is not None and len(c.refused) == 1)
+check("...naming both values", why(c.refused, "5000") and why(c.refused, "3600"))
+check("...signalling amain to wind down", stop.is_set())
+check("...and returning instead of looping forever", exited)
+# The whole point: run_control() must not fall through into the while loop. A
+# single write here would mean it commanded the inverter under a config it had
+# just declared unusable.
+check("...having never entered the control loop, so it wrote nothing",
+      hass.writes == [])
+check("...and it is recorded in the event log an operator reads",
+      any("REFUSED" in e for e in c.events))
+
+# The same path when there is no conflict: it must NOT refuse, and it must
+# actually regulate - asserted by a write reaching the device, not by absence.
+c2, stop2, hass2, exited2 = late({"max_w": 2000}, -5000.0, 5000.0)
+check("a late device that agrees does not trip the re-check", c2.refused is None)
+check("...and the control loop runs, writing to the device", hass2.writes != [])
+check("...and does not signal a shutdown", not stop2.is_set() and not exited2)
+
+# ⚠️ THE FOOTGUN THE REVIEW FOUND. `stop` used to default to None, so this
+# construction was legal and the refusal path then returned into a live process
+# with no control loop, no exit and no further output.
+try:
+    Controller(base(), _LateHass(-5000.0, 5000.0), _Store2(), _Pub2())
+    check("a Controller with no stop Event is rejected at construction", False)
+except TypeError:
+    check("a Controller with no stop Event is rejected at construction", True)
+
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
+print()
+if fails:
+    print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: " + "; ".join(fails))
+    sys.exit(1)
+print("all checks passed")