SAFETY-25: say what peak_soc_floor bounds, and measure what it does not #31

Merged
admin merged 3 commits from SAFETY-25 into release/1.0 2026-09-01 05:23:38 +02:00
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 e498dd4c1c SAFETY-25: pin the claim-source set, so the tripwire is one
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m53s
The durability claim this PR shipped was FALSE, and the reviewer of #31
disproved it by building the fix. Part 10 said, in four committed places,
that it "goes RED the day a loop-side floor is built, so the exposure
cannot change size under a green suite". The reviewer implemented the
memo's own recommended Option B in main.py - a
`Claim.limit("reserve", P_LOOP, hi=0.0)` filed under a `loop_soc_floor` -
and the ENTIRE SUITE STAYED GREEN. Part 10 green. Mutation 13 went on
printing "NOTHING PREVENTS IT, ON PURPOSE" and the same 21 % -> 10.0 %,
on a tree where something DID prevent it. Pushed to an absurd
always-binding 95 % reserve it was caught only by SAFETY-24's pre-existing
part 7 wiring checks; part 10 was still green.

THE CAUSE IS STRUCTURAL, not a missing assertion. `replay_loop()`
hand-builds main.py's claim list as a literal
`[supervised, loop, peakguard.claim(...)]`, so it is blind to any claim
main.py ADDS - which is exactly where AC 2 would be built. That is this
repository's named failure mode: a check that observed something other
than what it claimed to observe, shipped as a guarantee inside the
document that recommends the change.

THE FIX IS 10f: THE CLAIM-SOURCE SET, PINNED, two ways because the two
fail differently.

  * STATICALLY, over `Controller.cycle()`'s own AST. Every
    `claims.append(...)` in it must be one the scan can read - an
    unreadable append FAILS rather than counting as nothing, which is how
    a scan like this goes quietly vacuous - and the sources it can file
    must be exactly {device, supervised, failsafe, safety, peak,
    arbitrage, maintenance, loop}. A ninth takes part 10 red on the line
    it is written, in every configuration, whether or not any fixture
    here reaches the state that files it.
  * DYNAMICALLY, through REAL `Controller.cycle()`s with main.py's OWN
    `resolve` spied - not a list this file built and hoped matched -
    swept over the WHOLE 0..100 % SoC range in the two states 10a-10c
    replay. Idle: exactly {device, supervised, loop}. Floor-limited:
    exactly {device, supervised, loop, peak}. A claim conditioned on a
    low pack, which is the shape a loop-side floor has, cannot hide from
    a sweep that visits 0 %.

And the fold is checked rather than assumed: main.py's two P_SAFETY
rating limits are both symmetric LIMITs, so replay_loop() modelling them
as one `supervised` claim at the tighter bound is exact.

MEASURED AGAINST THE COUNTEREXAMPLE. Reproduced first on the unfixed
tree (green, as reported). On this tree the reviewer's Option B at its
recommended default takes part 10 RED on 3 checks, and the 95 % variant
on 6. Nine mutations were run in all, each against a freshly copied tree
with no `__pycache__` present, mounted `:ro`; all nine red, no survivors,
no `+0 B` delta. MUTATION.md records why a second round was needed: the
first round's mutations were all aimed at DISARMING the guard, while the
claim part 10 actually made was about the guard being FIXED.

The four false sentences are replaced with what is now true, and each
says WHICH half catches WHICH shape - 10f for an arbiter claim
(Options B and C), 10a-10c for a clamp inside control.compute() or the
guard (Option D), which the replay drives directly.

AC 2 IS STILL OPEN AND NOTHING HERE BUILDS IT. The loop-side floor was a
test mutant, reverted before commit. The memo still says "Status: OPEN.
This is a memo, not a decision."

Also, non-blocking, from the same review: the NOT READY banner had
inherited the new scope sentence and become a ~550-character paragraph
that the row three lines below repeated verbatim. A checks() row may now
carry an optional short `banner` form; the floor-limited row does, and
`status_payload()` prefers it. THE ROW IS UNCHANGED - shortening that
would have been weakening AC 3 - and rows without the key are
unaffected. Graded, and mutated: dropping the short form goes red.

Merged origin/release/1.0 first (CI-02), keeping both tickets' CHANGELOG
entries.

Full suite green: 17/17 in goodwe-addon-ci (test_ci_gate.py needs `git`,
which CI-02 added to .gitea/ci/Dockerfile but the local image lacks; run
with it installed and it passes).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 05:04:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyen 3cb9d3b7d9 Merge origin/release/1.0 into SAFETY-25
CI-02 landed on release/1.0 after this branch was opened and both tickets
add a block under `## Unreleased`, so CHANGELOG.md collided. Both entries
are kept, newest-first: SAFETY-25's, then CI-02's, then SAFETY-20's.
Nothing else conflicted.
2026-09-01 04:38:46 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 182102eeaf SAFETY-25: say what peak_soc_floor bounds, and measure what it does not
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m41s
peak_soc_floor reads like a pack-wide reserve and is not one. The
grid-following loop has no SoC guard of any kind, so on a sustained-load
evening it discharges straight past that number and keeps going until the
pack's own BMS cut-out stops it.

The gap has now been written down four times without being filed -
SAFETY-18's finding (freeze.py:18), SAFETY-24's module note, its PR body,
and its honestly-uncaught 13th mutation - and never once measured. It is
measured here, on the committed 2026-08-20 capture, driving the SHIPPED
control.compute(), peakguard.decide(), peakguard.claim() and the real
arbiter.resolve() in main.py's order:

    19:00-22:00 UTC, 830 W mean, minimum 701 W, zero export in the window
    reference pack (300 Ah x 51.2 V x DoD 90) started at 21 %, one point
    above peak_soc_floor

      ends at 10.0 %  -  the bms_soc_floor cut-out
      1525 Wh delivered by the LOOP over 587 cycles
      549 cycles below peak_soc_floor, 343 of them still discharging
      0 cycles on which the peak guard filed any floor at all

AND IT IS A BEHAVIOUR, NOT A CONFIG VALUE. The same evening ends at
9.9715 % at peak_soc_floor = 5, 11, 20 and 60 - the shipped value and both
ends of the schema range - identical to four decimal places. The option an
operator would reach for cannot move the number by any amount at all. On
the same day's high-load block the two states coexist: 49 cycles reporting
PEAK GUARD FLOOR-LIMITED and, on all 49 of them, the arbiter simultaneously
granting the loop up to 2000 W of discharge.

WHY SAFETY-24 COULD NOT CLOSE IT. The peak guard files a `lo` limit - a
LOWER bound on the setpoint. That asymmetry is exactly what makes it
trustworthy: a reviewer proved across 19,800 combinations that it can never
lower a target, cap a discharge or contradict the arbiter. The same property
makes it structurally incapable of stopping a discharge the loop itself
wants. A floor on the guard cannot become a floor on the pack by being
raised, and the sweep above is that sentence measured.

WHAT THIS COMMIT CHANGES IS THE HONESTY, on the four surfaces an operator
actually reads. That half is required whichever way the open question is
answered, and it is the real misstatement on the live system today:

  * config.yaml, beside the option itself - it BOUNDS THE PEAK GUARD ONLY
    and is NOT A PACK-WIDE RESERVE, with the replayed evening and the sweep;
  * DOCS.md, in the options table and in a new section carrying the figures;
  * the STATUS-PAGE ROW for a floor-limited guard. This is the one line a
    human reads at the moment the guard stops discharging, and read alone it
    says "the battery is being held at peak_soc_floor" - which the replay
    shows is false in every cycle that row is rendered;
  * the PERSISTENT NOTIFICATION, which outlives the page. It now names what
    has stopped (the guard buying a lower bill) and what has not (the pack
    being spent).

peakguard.py and freeze.py carry the measurement beside the findings they
already recorded, so the next reader does not have to take the caveat on
trust.

THE PRODUCT DECISION IS NOT TAKEN HERE, and must not be. Whether the loop
gets a reserve floor of its own decides whether this house's battery may
discharge to the BMS floor on a heavy evening; that moves real energy and it
is the owner's call. DECISIONS/SAFETY-25-loop-soc-floor.md is the memo AC 1
asks for: the options, what each costs, what each protects, weighed against
MAINT-01 (a pack repeatedly at the BMS floor is the SoC-drift condition the
maintenance cycle exists to correct, and an over-tight reserve fights it from
the other side) and against the fact that this would be the FIFTH SoC key -
OPT-04's arbitrage_soc_floor fired SAFETY-24's "revisit if a third floor
appears" trigger unremarked, so SAFETY-27's naming decision should land
first. It carries a recommendation and says plainly that it is not a
decision.

It also records a trap found while writing it, and now CHECKED through the
real arbiter rather than described: the obvious shape of a loop-side floor
is a `hi` limit at P_LOOP, and filed while the peak guard is asking for a
positive floor that is `lo > hi` - which arbiter.py resolves to a
CONTRADICTION at 0 W, the battery PARKED in the one quarter of the month
that sets the bill. It is the same crossing-limits hazard
shaping_suspended() already exists to avoid. The ordering
`bms_soc_floor < loop_soc_floor <= peak_soc_floor` removes it provably,
because wherever the reserve binds the guard is already floor-limited and
files lo = 0; both halves are run in part 10d.

test_peakguard.py part 10 is a TRIPWIRE, not a guarantee. It records a
defect and goes RED the day somebody builds a loop-side floor, so the
exposure cannot change size under a green suite and closing it has to be
deliberate. Part 11's mutation 13 stays honestly NOT CAUGHT - nothing
prevents the loop discharging past this floor - but it now reports a number
instead of a sentence.

Verified: 16/16 suites green in the CI image. Eight mutations, each against
a tree copied fresh with __pycache__ excluded and mounted :ro, so no .pyc
existed to go stale (MUTATION.md's structural immunity, the same one it
records for CI); byte deltas +61, -8, -465, -430, -1088, -46, file deleted,
and -95; none is +0 B. All eight go red on the named check:

  M1 peakguard.claim() also files hi=floor_w        -> 7 red, incl. 10c
  M2 control.compute() gain forced to 0             -> 6 red, incl. 10a/10b
  M3 scope sentence removed from the status row     -> 10e red
  M4 scope sentence removed from the notification   -> 10e red
  M5 scope paragraph removed from config.yaml       -> 10e red
  M6 scope bullet weakened in DOCS.md               -> 10e red
  M7 the decision memo deleted                      -> 10e red
  M8 arbiter clamps crossing limits instead of
     reporting a contradiction                      -> 5 red, incl. 10d

AC 2 is left explicitly OPEN, pending the owner's answer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 03:46:43 +02:00