adminandClaude Opus 5 182102eeaf
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SAFETY-25: say what peak_soc_floor bounds, and measure what it does not
peak_soc_floor reads like a pack-wide reserve and is not one. The
grid-following loop has no SoC guard of any kind, so on a sustained-load
evening it discharges straight past that number and keeps going until the
pack's own BMS cut-out stops it.

The gap has now been written down four times without being filed -
SAFETY-18's finding (freeze.py:18), SAFETY-24's module note, its PR body,
and its honestly-uncaught 13th mutation - and never once measured. It is
measured here, on the committed 2026-08-20 capture, driving the SHIPPED
control.compute(), peakguard.decide(), peakguard.claim() and the real
arbiter.resolve() in main.py's order:

    19:00-22:00 UTC, 830 W mean, minimum 701 W, zero export in the window
    reference pack (300 Ah x 51.2 V x DoD 90) started at 21 %, one point
    above peak_soc_floor

      ends at 10.0 %  -  the bms_soc_floor cut-out
      1525 Wh delivered by the LOOP over 587 cycles
      549 cycles below peak_soc_floor, 343 of them still discharging
      0 cycles on which the peak guard filed any floor at all

AND IT IS A BEHAVIOUR, NOT A CONFIG VALUE. The same evening ends at
9.9715 % at peak_soc_floor = 5, 11, 20 and 60 - the shipped value and both
ends of the schema range - identical to four decimal places. The option an
operator would reach for cannot move the number by any amount at all. On
the same day's high-load block the two states coexist: 49 cycles reporting
PEAK GUARD FLOOR-LIMITED and, on all 49 of them, the arbiter simultaneously
granting the loop up to 2000 W of discharge.

WHY SAFETY-24 COULD NOT CLOSE IT. The peak guard files a `lo` limit - a
LOWER bound on the setpoint. That asymmetry is exactly what makes it
trustworthy: a reviewer proved across 19,800 combinations that it can never
lower a target, cap a discharge or contradict the arbiter. The same property
makes it structurally incapable of stopping a discharge the loop itself
wants. A floor on the guard cannot become a floor on the pack by being
raised, and the sweep above is that sentence measured.

WHAT THIS COMMIT CHANGES IS THE HONESTY, on the four surfaces an operator
actually reads. That half is required whichever way the open question is
answered, and it is the real misstatement on the live system today:

  * config.yaml, beside the option itself - it BOUNDS THE PEAK GUARD ONLY
    and is NOT A PACK-WIDE RESERVE, with the replayed evening and the sweep;
  * DOCS.md, in the options table and in a new section carrying the figures;
  * the STATUS-PAGE ROW for a floor-limited guard. This is the one line a
    human reads at the moment the guard stops discharging, and read alone it
    says "the battery is being held at peak_soc_floor" - which the replay
    shows is false in every cycle that row is rendered;
  * the PERSISTENT NOTIFICATION, which outlives the page. It now names what
    has stopped (the guard buying a lower bill) and what has not (the pack
    being spent).

peakguard.py and freeze.py carry the measurement beside the findings they
already recorded, so the next reader does not have to take the caveat on
trust.

THE PRODUCT DECISION IS NOT TAKEN HERE, and must not be. Whether the loop
gets a reserve floor of its own decides whether this house's battery may
discharge to the BMS floor on a heavy evening; that moves real energy and it
is the owner's call. DECISIONS/SAFETY-25-loop-soc-floor.md is the memo AC 1
asks for: the options, what each costs, what each protects, weighed against
MAINT-01 (a pack repeatedly at the BMS floor is the SoC-drift condition the
maintenance cycle exists to correct, and an over-tight reserve fights it from
the other side) and against the fact that this would be the FIFTH SoC key -
OPT-04's arbitrage_soc_floor fired SAFETY-24's "revisit if a third floor
appears" trigger unremarked, so SAFETY-27's naming decision should land
first. It carries a recommendation and says plainly that it is not a
decision.

It also records a trap found while writing it, and now CHECKED through the
real arbiter rather than described: the obvious shape of a loop-side floor
is a `hi` limit at P_LOOP, and filed while the peak guard is asking for a
positive floor that is `lo > hi` - which arbiter.py resolves to a
CONTRADICTION at 0 W, the battery PARKED in the one quarter of the month
that sets the bill. It is the same crossing-limits hazard
shaping_suspended() already exists to avoid. The ordering
`bms_soc_floor < loop_soc_floor <= peak_soc_floor` removes it provably,
because wherever the reserve binds the guard is already floor-limited and
files lo = 0; both halves are run in part 10d.

test_peakguard.py part 10 is a TRIPWIRE, not a guarantee. It records a
defect and goes RED the day somebody builds a loop-side floor, so the
exposure cannot change size under a green suite and closing it has to be
deliberate. Part 11's mutation 13 stays honestly NOT CAUGHT - nothing
prevents the loop discharging past this floor - but it now reports a number
instead of a sentence.

Verified: 16/16 suites green in the CI image. Eight mutations, each against
a tree copied fresh with __pycache__ excluded and mounted :ro, so no .pyc
existed to go stale (MUTATION.md's structural immunity, the same one it
records for CI); byte deltas +61, -8, -465, -430, -1088, -46, file deleted,
and -95; none is +0 B. All eight go red on the named check:

  M1 peakguard.claim() also files hi=floor_w        -> 7 red, incl. 10c
  M2 control.compute() gain forced to 0             -> 6 red, incl. 10a/10b
  M3 scope sentence removed from the status row     -> 10e red
  M4 scope sentence removed from the notification   -> 10e red
  M5 scope paragraph removed from config.yaml       -> 10e red
  M6 scope bullet weakened in DOCS.md               -> 10e red
  M7 the decision memo deleted                      -> 10e red
  M8 arbiter clamps crossing limits instead of
     reporting a contradiction                      -> 5 red, incl. 10d

AC 2 is left explicitly OPEN, pending the owner's answer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 03:46:43 +02:00

GoodWe RS485 Controller — Home Assistant add-on repository

Replaces a GoodWe battery inverter's vendor controller with a local one: holds net grid exchange at zero by emulating the inverter's smart meter over RS485, and runs the monthly battery maintenance cycle the vendor box was doing.

repository.yaml            add-on repository metadata
goodwe_controller/         the add-on
  config.yaml              manifest + options schema (the per-site config form)
  app/                     the controller
    control.py             the control law — pure functions, no I/O
    maintenance.py         the monthly cycle state machine
    hass.py                Supervisor/Core API access
    store.py               persistent state in /data
    mqtt.py                optional status entities
    web.py                 ingress UI
    main.py                orchestration, heartbeat, failsafe behaviour
  test_control.py          runnable checks — no framework needed
  test_maintenance.py      runnable checks — walks a full cycle in fake time
  DOCS.md                  the add-on's documentation tab
  MUTATION.md              how to run a mutation so the result means something
  tools/mutation_run.sh    the mutation harness - purges bytecode, then grades
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml  ESPHome config for the T-CAN485
estop/rs485_log.py           optional RS485 e-stop / bus witness
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf  the guide techs carry (10pp, A4)
docs/build_guide.py          its single source - rebuilds the HTML and PDF
FIELD-GUIDE.md             how to edit and rebuild the guide

Picking this up after a break? Read HANDOVER.md first — current state, what is known broken, and what to do next.

Install

Settings → Add-ons → Add-on store → ⋮ → Repositories → add

https://gittea.kammenstraatha.duckdns.org/admin/goodwe-addon

then install GoodWe RS485 Controller.

⚠️ The repository must be PUBLIC for this to work. Home Assistant clones it anonymously; against a private repo the store shows nothing and gives no useful error. If it must stay private, install locally instead: copy goodwe_controller/ into the machine's /addons/ folder, then ha store reload — it appears as a Local add-on.

⚠️ Bump version: in goodwe_controller/config.yaml for every change. Supervisor keys the built image by that version, so without a bump it silently reuses the old image and your fix appears not to work — on your bench and on every client's machine.

Requires Home Assistant OS or Supervised. Add-ons cannot be installed on HA Container or Core.

Read this first

The inverter holds its last command forever. It has no meter-timeout of its own — a controller that dies mid-command leaves the battery running until a human intervenes. Measured on real hardware: 5 kW of discharge held for 113 seconds after a controller went silent.

Three layers exist because of that, and only the third covers the Home Assistant machine itself dying:

  1. ESP32 watchdog — no fresh setpoint for ~30 s → command 0 W, and keep commanding it.
  2. Wind-down before firmware updates — 0 W written before the update starts.
  3. RS485 e-stop (optional) — writes 0 W after 30 s of total bus silence.

Sites sold without the e-stop must have the acknowledgement in FIELD-GUIDE.md §10 signed.

Development

The control law and the maintenance machine are pure Python with no Home Assistant imports, so they run anywhere:

cd goodwe_controller
python3 test_control.py
python3 test_maintenance.py

Both must pass before shipping any change. To prove a check bites - the way almost every claim in this repository was established - mutate the module and run tools/mutation_run.sh, which clears __pycache__ first. It is not optional: a same-size edit reverted inside one second leaves CPython reusing the old bytecode, and the run grades code that is not there. goodwe_controller/MUTATION.md has the mechanism, the measurement, and what the flags do not do. They are not unit-test theatre — each assertion corresponds to a rule whose absence produced an observed failure on real hardware, and the comments in control.py say which.

Compatibility

Check the serial number, not the model name. Characters 6-8 of the serial are the platform tag:

tag platform verdict
ESU EMU ESA BPS BPU EMJ IJL 105 — ES/EM/BP, AA55-era meter bus supported
SPB SPN 745 — SBP G2 (GW…-SBP-20) no
ESN ESC 745 — ES G2 (GW…-ES-20) no
ETU EHU BTU … 205/745/753 — ET/EH/BT hybrids no
SDT DST MSU NSU … PV-only inverters — no battery to control no

A "-20" or "G2" suffix means a different platform with a different meter protocol. The tags come from the goodwe library's PLATFORM_105_MODELS, which is also what Home Assistant's own integration uses to pick a protocol.

  • GoodWe ES / BP family inverters (AA55 / RS485 meter-bus generation)
  • The protocol is reverse-engineered. There is no vendor contract, and a firmware change on GoodWe's side could break every installation at once. Say so when you sell it.
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