SAFETY-121
73
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 glenn schrooyenandClaude
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fd08090360 |
DOC-8: say EMS port, not meter bus
The add-on is wired to the inverter's RS485 port labelled EMS. Reword README, DOCS, config description, field guide source and HTML. The HA manufacturer string is left unchanged: test_mqtt pins it byte for byte. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude
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75f4359aac |
Release 0.18.2
Version bump to 0.18.2 and a CHANGELOG section for SAFETY-118 (#198). Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude
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dec8e7b69f |
Release 0.18.1
Version 0.18.0 -> 0.18.1 (patch, no option changes) and a closed 0.18.1 CHANGELOG section. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Claude
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e7c83d3a57 |
Release 0.18.0: version bump and CHANGELOG section
config.yaml version 0.17.0 -> 0.18.0 and a closed ## 0.18.0 CHANGELOG section for OPT-17, SAFETY-112, OPT-15, MAINT-11, PRICE-01 and OPT-20. No code change. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude
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9ac3a9d2bc |
PRICE-01: price_service provider, fallback chain, and the gate read from it
A new price source, `price_provider: price_service`: the owner's price server,
one fixed HTTPS host, a bearer token (new password option
`price_service_token`), wholesale energy only so markup and taxes are added as
for generic_dayahead.
The chain is server, then energy-charts, then the prices the history store
kept. A step counts only if it has a price for now. Each step down and back up
is one log line. With every source down a site plans from what it saved.
No price for now: one status row, one Home plan line and one notification, in
English and Dutch, cleared when a price returns. With this provider the
maintenance charge gate reads the provider's prices and keeps the Home
Assistant rule: the current 15-minute price is at or below today's average.
The token is hidden on the settings page, refused when missing, and taken out
of any error text. Other providers, `off` and the Home Assistant pair take the
road they always took (scripted-day probe against
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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9b1fa758ad |
OPT-17: the solar forecast can come from several entities, summed
New list options pv_forecast_entities and pv_forecast_tomorrow_entities
(same shape as pv_entities); the single-entity keys are unchanged.
- Each member is read in its own unit (Wh/kWh/MWh) in one gather and the
day is summed. Hourly splits are merged when every member has one, else
the total goes on the bell.
- A member missing, unavailable, stale, non-energy or bad makes that
day's forecast unusable (no partial sum). A caution row names it by
position; the action log names the entity once per change.
- Single key and list both set for one day: refused at start.
- A one-member list behaves exactly like the single key (test_opt17.py);
the single-key path is byte-identical to
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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35432ce065 |
Release 0.17.0
Bump version to 0.17.0 and add the closed 0.17.0 CHANGELOG section. No code change, no option change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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756b50ddbb |
Release 0.16.0
version 0.15.0 -> 0.16.0 and a closed ## 0.16.0 CHANGELOG section. No code change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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08fb1235fc |
Merge release/1.0 (0.15.0 + SAFETY-90) into maint-10-local-start-hour
Conflicts: main.py's maintenance import (base added CHARGE, HOLD; branch added site_zone) - both kept. DOCS maintenance table: base's longer drain-rate row kept, start hour row at 19 / local. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 adminandClaude Opus 5.5
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f01152b113 |
Release 0.15.0: bump version and close the CHANGELOG section
config.yaml version 0.14.0 -> 0.15.0 (minor: behaviour change from SAFETY-94/97, no option change). New `## 0.15.0` section with the contents since 0.14.0 ( |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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b307db1049 |
Release 0.14.0: version bump and changelog
Two inverters are now supported for maintenance and the peak guard (SAFETY-91, SAFETY-93). No option changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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adminandClaude Opus 5.5
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28cab03947 |
REL-0.13.0: cut 0.13.0
Bump config.yaml version 0.12.0 -> 0.13.0 and close a ## 0.13.0
CHANGELOG section covering every merge since 0.12.0 (
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goodwe-agent
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02c0a3dd7b |
MAINT-10: maintenance start hour in local time, default 19:00
The start hour was compared with the UTC hour, so the shipped 10 started at 12:00 in a Belgian summer. It is now read in Home Assistant's time zone (fallback: the container's TZ, then UTC, one log line says which), and the default moves to 19. DST: a missing hour starts at the first hour after the jump; a repeated hour starts only in its first pass. Stored options are not rewritten: a saved 10 now means 10:00 local (DOCS, CHANGELOG). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Claude
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eb10537aee |
OPT-11 P4: solar forecast and day plan
A Home Assistant solar forecast (Forecast.Solar, Solcast or Open-Meteo
shapes) and the add-on's own hourly house use decide, before each cheap
run, whether the sun will fill each battery before the expensive hours.
Leftover solar then buys from the grid only the shortfall; Cheap hours only
skips the part the sun covers; Solar first never grid-charges. No, stale or
failed forecast: P3 option A exactly (12 digests pinned from
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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7c4c8f5c66 |
SAFETY-79: peak guard keeps a margin below the limit
New option peak_margin_w (default 50 W, 0-500 W). The peak guard, the
forecast checks and the maintenance charge sizing aim at
peak_cap_w - peak_margin_w; the month peak, the bill, headroom, warnings
and every notice keep the real cap. Owner decision 2026-09-28.
peak_margin_w 0 is byte-identical to
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Claude dev agent
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d69fd8fbfd |
OPT-11 P1: per-battery mode limits, on/off, solar order
A battery's mode is a soft unit limit (source `mode`, P_MODE 35) kept
apart from the hard limits in pre_resolve(). The allocator applies it
only while the site target is decided at or below 35 (new
Resolution.deciding_priority), so the peak floor releases it and a mode
`hi` never meets the site `lo`. At N=1 resolve() applies the same rule
to the site target after stage 2. A mode range without 0 W is dropped
as a software fault, so REFUSE_SIGN stays unreachable from a mode.
compute() gets the loop bound (sum over live units of hard limits with
modes applied), so the loop never asks for watts no battery may give
and the saturation freeze never parks on them. While charging, Leftover
solar weighs 0 so Solar first fills first. Store keys pack_use and
pack_mode per battery, set by two new /action values; Off stops and
skips maintenance with a log line. Minimal Batteries cards (EN/NL).
Off by default (battery_modes_enabled); off, commands are byte-identical
to
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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7559d21eda |
TEL-14: PV sign declared per entity (pv_invert_entities)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m39s
Some PV entities (kWh meters, ESPHome clamps in the PV circuit) read positive for consumption and negative for production. `pv_invert_entities` lists the ones to flip; the flip is applied per member inside pv.total(), before the sum, so the MQTT `pv` row and the status page carry the corrected figure. Default [] is byte-identical to 0.12.0. Shape measured in supervisor_shape_probe.py section H (Supervisor 2026.08.0): a parallel list validates the 0.12.0 blob unchanged and renders as its own translated repeatable field; dicts on pv_entities refuse 0.12.0's stored strings; a prefix is invisible syntax; a global bool cannot describe a mixed roster. Status page marks flipped entities and cautions per entity below -50 W, saying ADD or REMOVE. Telemetry only: control documents unchanged. Record: DECISIONS/TEL-14-pv-sign.md (reverses TEL-11 section 2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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adminandClaude Opus 5.5
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29ca9b5157 |
DOC-1: operator docs name the real P1 entity and a roster that starts
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m8s
- DOCS.md / config.yaml: the watchdog's P1 age entity is sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age (device "GoodWe" + "P1 sample age", as app/mqtt.py announces and the live install recorded), not sensor.p1_sample_age_s. - DOCS.md: the inverters: example and per-entry table carry the required bms_soc_floor (and capacity_kwh); config.yaml's schema comment says four required keys, not three. - Field guide: marked v0.1.0/outdated; slew_w row no longer recommends the 1000 W that SAFETY-39 now refuses. HTML regenerated; the PDF is NOT rebuilt (no Chrome here). README/DOCS pointers fixed. - test_docs.py: the documented roster must pass app/validate.py and the schema's per-entry keys; the documented entity id must equal the id composed from app/mqtt.py; the wrong id may appear in no shipped doc. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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1ad4d3a5bb |
PKG-18: cut 0.12.0, so TEL-12's pv_entities can reach an installed 0.11.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m5s
One runtime merge since 0.11.0 (
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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0ef9565071 |
TEL-12: several PV inverters, and one absent member is an absent TOTAL
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m59s
0.11.0 shipped `pv_entity` as a single string. The reference site's owner reported within minutes of it going live that they have several PV inverters and could configure one - which is ordinary for a multi-string roof, not a property of one house. `pv_entities` is the roster and the row carries the SITE total. ⚠️ THE HARD PART IS ABSENCE, NOT THE LIST. Three configured, one `unavailable`, and the sum of the other two is a SMALLER NUMBER INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM A REAL ONE. Read back by OPT-10 that says "there was less PV than there was" - the "no irradiance" conclusion the channel exists to TEST. So `pv.total()` answers `None` the moment any configured entity is absent: the topic carries HA's own `None`, the entity goes to `unknown`, the recorder records a GAP. The alternative (the partial sum beside a contributor count) was implemented and run as mutation N1b; it loses because the MQTT row is read COLD a week later by an attribution that would believe it, while the qualifying count would live in a second entity with its own history. The partial information is not thrown away - the STATUS PAGE names every entity that reported, with its watts, and every one that did not, with its reason, because that surface is read LIVE by a human who wants the diagnostic. ⚠️ AND THE MIRROR: a member honestly reporting 0 W is SUMMED. The test is `is None`, never falsiness - a roster that blanked the site on a zero would report an absence on every clear evening. THE SURFACE IS MEASURED, NOT PREFERRED. `pv_entity` could not become a list: tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py §G shows Supervisor 2026.08.0 answering an 0.11.0 install's stored string with `Invalid list for option 'pv_entity'`, and deepmerge's list strategy is `override` so a `[]` default does not rescue it - the live add-on would not start. `match(.*)?` does accept both shapes and is rejected for a different, measured reason: it validates nothing (a string, a list and the integer 417 all pass) and renders as a plain text box. So `pv_entities` joins `pv_entity` and REPLACES it when set, CFG-04's rule for `inverters:`, with a status caution saying which key won - a union would double-count the inverter the old key still names. STILL NOT A CONTROL INPUT. tools/tel11_pv_trace.py was extended rather than replaced and now grades five claims over three document sets. The control hash is UNMOVED - 846a10a5b89e… on `unset` and on `one`, on both trees - and the roster control document is byte-identical between the two trees. 2/5 is a claim TEL-11 could not make: with 0.11.0 as the baseline, "one entity behaves exactly as 0.11.0 does" is a real cross-tree identity over control AND telemetry. ⚠️ TEL-11's OWN `--compare` REFUSAL HAD TO CHANGE, and that is MUTATION.md habit 24: a discriminator defined as "the baseline lacks this feature" dies on the release that ships the feature, and dies as a false refusal. Twelve mutations, each on a fresh purged `cp -a`, no survivors. N5 is +0 B (`sum` -> `max`, the same three characters) and was run on a fresh copy with `cmp` confirming the edit on disk. The fixture is three distinct NON-ZERO contributions in two units with absence driven at EVERY position - a member contributing 0 W could go absent without moving the sum of the rest, which is habit 23 with a coinciding value in the arithmetic rather than in the plant. 31/31 in the CI image. Not deployable as merged: config.yaml stays at 0.11.0, so predeploy_check.py reports a NO-OP until PKG cuts a version. A CHANGELOG entry is wanted and deliberately not written - 11b forbids `## Unreleased` and the bump is PKG's call; DECISIONS/TEL-12-several-pv-inverters.md is the material it needs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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cfafdffaed |
PKG-17: cut 0.11.0, so SAFETY-56's wording fix and TEL-11's pv_entity can reach an installed 0.10.1
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Two files, and no third. config.yaml 0.10.1 -> 0.11.0; CHANGELOG.md gains `## 0.11.0` and three corrections to sections below it. A MINOR BUMP, NOT A PATCH. TEL-11 adds an option - `pv_entity`, 75 keys -> 76 in `options:` and `schema:` together - which is the same test 0.8.0, 0.9.0 and 0.10.0 were cut on. Nothing here can refuse a stored blob: the key is `str?` with an `options:` default of "", validate.py does not mention it, no default moved and no enum widened, so a blob that starts the add-on on 0.10.1 starts it on 0.11.0. THE TABLE HAS TWO ROWS AND THE WINDOW HAD FOUR MERGES. CI-9's follow-up ( |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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07ba3433ed |
TEL-11: PV production stops being invisible, and stays out of the control law
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m6s
OPT-10 measured that this site's pack reaches 90 % SoC on 2 days of 16 and that
20.5 kWh of surplus left the site while the pack had room - 12.6 kWh of it with
the battery not charging at all - and could not say WHY, because PV production
is recorded NOWHERE. Three causes need three different fixes (no irradiance:
nothing to fix; a charge-power limit; the optimiser declining to charge, which
is the only software defect) and guessing between them is how an optimiser gets
tuned to solve a cloud problem. This card adds the channel. It does not do the
attribution.
AN HA ENTITY, NOT A REGISTER, AND THAT IS A PRODUCT DECISION. This add-on's
RS485 bus carries the BATTERY inverter it drives; a household's PV inverter is
normally a different box from a different vendor reporting into Home Assistant
through its own integration. `pv_entity` takes whatever `sensor.*` the site's
own PV integration provides, any brand HA can read.
POSITIVE IS PRODUCTION, AND THERE IS NO `pv_invert`. The convention is derived
rather than assumed: `meter_entity` is positive when IMPORTING and `batt_entity`
is positive when DISCHARGING (DOCS.md, Sources), both of which are "power
arriving at the house's AC bus", and production arrives there too. Those two
keys carry invert flags because they are BIPOLAR and are READ BY THE CONTROL
PATH - `inv.batt` feeds SAFETY-30's per-unit sign check and SAFETY-31's
circulating-power sensor, so a reversed sensor hands the site a plausible number
it acts on. Production is unipolar and is read by nothing: a reversed sensor
announces itself as -4 kW at noon in the very history this card creates, and a
flag would only let an installer hide it. No negative-value alarm either - a PV
inverter's own standby draw makes a small negative reading at night ordinary, so
any threshold would be a number nobody measured.
ABSENCE IS NEVER ZERO, AND "DROPPED" IS NOT ABSENT. `publish()` SKIPS a None,
which is right for `circulation` and exactly wrong here: a skipped row leaves
Home Assistant holding the last number forever and the recorder draws a FLAT
LINE through the outage, which is indistinguishable from a measurement and
manufactures the "there was no surplus" conclusion this card exists to TEST. So
the absence is published, with HA's own payload: `mqtt/const.py` declares
`PAYLOAD_NONE = "None"` and `mqtt/sensor.py` tests it BEFORE the numeric branch,
so the entity's state becomes `unknown` and the recorder stores a GAP. Read out
of home-assistant/core `dev` on 2026-09-24 and quoted at the constant.
`ABSENT_AS_UNKNOWN` is a one-key set and the suite asserts `circulation: None`
is STILL dropped.
THE UNIT IS READ OFF THE ENTITY. `mW`, `W`, `kW`, `MW`, `GW`, `TW` - HA's own
`UnitOfPower`, every factor an exact power of ten. A sensor with no unit, or a
unit outside that table, is REFUSED by name and the status page says which.
`read_inputs()`'s `abs(raw) < 50` kW-or-W guess is safe for a quarter-hour
demand forecast and is NOT safe here: 30 W of dusk is an ordinary reading and
that heuristic would publish it as 30 kW.
GENUINELY OPTIONAL, AND NOT A SECOND `price_now_entity`. validate.py does not
mention the key - it cannot conflict with anything, because nothing else reads
it. The MQTT row lives in a new `OPTIONAL_SENSORS` list whose `include` argument
DEFAULTS TO EMPTY, so every caller that has never heard of `pv_entity` -
test_mqtt.py's fixtures, tools/rehearse_roster.py, anything written next year -
announces exactly what it announced before. Unset: no state call at all, no
entity, no topic, no status row, no page row. Set and failing: a CAUTION
(`ok=False, warn=True`), never a `bad` row, so a telemetry channel can never put
a battery site into NOT READY.
IT MUST NOT BECOME A CONTROL INPUT, AND THAT IS GRADED TWICE. `test_pv.py`
part 6 drives 40 cycles of the real `cycle()` and asserts the commands are
bit-identical across unset / no reading / 0 W / 8 kW, with a COMPUTED census
(33 modules under app/) showing the material is mentioned in exactly three:
pv.py, main.py, mqtt.py. `tools/tel11_pv_trace.py` is the cross-tree half -
`safety56_behaviour_trace.py`'s pattern with a DIFFERENT control clause, because
this card's claim is that nothing differs rather than that only sentences do: it
REFUSES unless the two `app/` fingerprints differ and unless exactly one side
reacts to the option. Measured on 41 stimulus cells:
control release/1.0 unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control TEL-11 unset 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
control TEL-11 set 846a10a5b89e321086d535825925721e2f791012e8405948d4fd38d3f9d0be5f
telemetry release/1.0 unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry TEL-11 unset a443a6ceaffe072b44bcd5f2ad946c1ed6c9e01b69e278eca631f7f4d7892164
telemetry TEL-11 set 4e6d1cb289a957223ad0205f732a6fec6110ce1f2032c98ad60694e67625274f
UNSET is byte-identical in BOTH documents, which is stronger than "the control
path is untouched": an install that does not set the option sees no change of
any kind, announcement and status rows included.
⚠️ AND THE CARD'S CENTRAL MUTATION WAS A SURVIVOR ON THE FIRST BATTERY.
`self.grid -= self.pv_w` in `read_inputs()` - +106 B, on disk, purged, genuinely
running - came back GREEN, because the fixture drove a 6 kW export over 12
cycles, which puts the loop AGAINST ITS RAIL: a command moving `slew_w` every
cycle produces the same ramp for -6000 W and for -14 000 W of apparent error.
MUTATION.md habit 23 with a saturated ACTUATOR in place of a coinciding value,
and it is in that file now as the habit's second instance. The fixture now
drives a 600 W import the loop SETTLES on, against a responsive meter, and asks
habit 23's own question as its own check: shift the METER by the same 8 kW and
confirm the commands really would have moved.
Evidence: 31/31 suites green in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged
tree, `:ro`. Ten mutations, NO survivors, each on its own `cp -a` of the tree so
habit 18's revert hazard is closed by construction - table in
`DECISIONS/TEL-11-pv-production.md` §7 with byte deltas and sha256s.
⚠️ THIS IS A RUNTIME CHANGE BEHIND AN UNCHANGED VERSION, AND
`tools/predeploy_check.py` WILL REFUSE IT. `app/`, `config.yaml` and
`translations/` are all in its `RUNTIME` tuple and `config.yaml` still reads
0.10.1, so the gate reports a NO-OP deploy until a version is cut. That is PKG's
call and this card does not take it.
No CHANGELOG section: `test_version_gate.py` 11b refuses a newest `## ` heading
that is not config.yaml's `version:`, and opening one would mean taking that
same packaging decision. The operator account is in DOCS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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eb88646899 |
PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
The Supervisor decides an update exists by comparing config.yaml's version string with the one the box reports. master and release/1.0 both said 0.10.0, so SAFETY-57 - a deadlock that parked the reference battery for ~13 min on 2026-09-21 while the house exported 2.4 kW - had no way of reaching the box that has it. A patch bump is the delivery mechanism, not bookkeeping. - config.yaml: 0.10.0 -> 0.10.1. Nothing else in the option surface moves: no key added or removed, no default changed, no enum widened, no rule added to validate.py, so a blob that starts on 0.10.0 starts on 0.10.1. - CHANGELOG.md: a new `## 0.10.1` section, holding SAFETY-57's entry moved out of `## 0.10.0`. The entry opened by saying it was misfiled and that whoever cut the next version owned moving it; this is that cut, so that paragraph is replaced by what an operator actually needs in order to decide - what the deadlock does (command parked at 0 W, batt reading gated to MISSING, escape condition unreachable from inside the state), how to recognise it (setpoint stuck at exactly 0 W with the battery register flat, a STALE line and no clearing line) and that a restart of the add-on clears it. - PKG-16 proper: `## 0.10.0`'s preamble still claimed 0.10.0 "has never been built or pulled anywhere" and that the reference install was on 0.7.0. Both stopped being true on 2026-09-20 ~22:18 CEST, when 0.10.0 was installed as a repository add-on (slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller) and began regulating a real battery. The section's own bump argument was explicitly conditional on that; the condition has fired, so the argument is retold as history and the section is closed. This text is what the Supervisor shows beside Update. Also fixes, in this file only, the three non-blocking documentation defects raised on PR #104 - issuecomments 1445, 1446 and 1447: - 1446: the live episode is 790 s, not 710 s. Re-derived rather than rescaled: at >= 790 s the committed 16-day replay gives 16 of 93, not 17. - 1447: the BMS keep-alive pulse was an inference stated as a measurement. No committed capture identifies one, and on this episode 0x0518 never moved at all. The measured claim replaces the firmware story. - 1445: "neither consumer can reach a verdict inside one window" is universal as written and graded on a fixture that puts the obligation back on every release. It now carries the qualifier the reviewer asked for, and names the unbounded case and why the shipped one-inverter roster cannot reach it. The same three defects also sit in app/freshness.py, test_freshness.py, DOCS.md and the DECISIONS note. They are deliberately NOT touched here: this PR is config.yaml and CHANGELOG.md only, and none of them is worth delaying a live safety fix. SAFETY-56 and SAFETY-58 are likewise untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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cb3f686555 |
PKG-14: cut 0.10.0, and say what an upgrade from 0.7.0 crosses
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m51s
`config.yaml` 0.9.0 -> 0.10.0, and the top `## Unreleased` block is closed
into `## 0.10.0` with a preamble that names the backward-incompatible
changes and who they reach.
MINOR, and NOT because eighteen tickets landed. A stored options blob the
previous version started on is REFUSED on this one:
* TARIFF-07 retires three `price_provider` ids; a site set to one is
refused BY NAME at startup. Measured on the reference blob, with a
control on an accepted id so the refusals are about the ID.
* TARIFF-18 moves `price_taxes_eur_kwh` 0.06 -> 0.11736. A site that
STORED 0.06 is untouched, and - the non-obvious half - a taxes period
table beside that stored 0.06 does NOT become a startup refusal on
upgrade, because `SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH` reads it as
untouched. Measured, with the counterfactual that the rung is not
weakened (ORES's 0.1198 is still refused).
* SAFETY-10 adds `shadow_mode`, shipped `auto`. An existing CONTROLLING
install does not change by one watt and a FRESH one comes up observing.
Measured cross-revision,
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Claude
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8fa4febfef |
SAFETY-10: the whole decision path runs and nothing reaches the inverter
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
Every optimiser defect this project has found was invisible from outside while it was happening, and each was paid for at the meter first: SAFETY-45's 28 charge onsets an hour against a binding peak_cap_w, TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour for 45 minutes in every 60, SAFETY-46's 598 Wh spent to gain 310 Wh. There was no way to watch what the optimiser WOULD do without letting it do it. `shadow_mode` runs strategies, arbiter, clamps and guards, records the decision with its reason, and commands nothing. ⚠️ IT WRITES. It writes 0 W, on the ordinary heartbeat, through the ordinary single writer. The inverter holds its last command forever - it has no meter timeout - so "commands nothing" implemented as "stops writing" would leave whatever was standing when shadow mode came on standing for as long as it was left on, under a page saying nothing is being commanded. That is the failure this repository keeps finding. Refreshing 0 W is also what firmware/goodwe-master.yaml's 30 s stale-input watchdog requires of us; going quiet would keep that board tripped for the whole run, which is an alarm being used as a mode. ⚠️ IT IS NOT A SECOND WRITE PATH. No claim, no transport, no arithmetic of its own. It is a substitution inside Controller._write_unit() - the single choke point every write already reaches - in the same form as the three above it, and it is the LAST of them, so SAFETY-28's gate and SAFETY-03's clamp still grade the number the decision path produced. ⚠️ THE DEFAULT IS `auto`, NOT `true`, AND THAT IS THE CARD'S REAL CONTENT. The Supervisor composes options as {**config.yaml defaults, **stored user options}, so a new key with a new default reaches EVERY EXISTING INSTALL on the next update - including the one regulating a real battery. A boolean default-on would have stopped it silently. There is no mechanism by which one key can default differently for a new install and an existing one, so "default-on for new" is a value the add-on RESOLVES: `auto` is shadow while control is STOPPED and live once it is STARTED. A fresh install ships `auto_start: false` and comes up observing; an install that is controlling is started and does not change by one watt. THE FAILSAFES. Sign watchdogs (SAFETY-02/30): INERT - they grade Inverter.standing_w(), which shadow mode holds at 0 W. Fed the shadow decision they would disagree with a meter that never saw it and LATCH A TRIP THAT SURVIVES INTO LIVE OPERATION AND A RESTART. Clamp (SAFETY-03), write gate (SAFETY-28), meter freeze (SAFETY-18), peak guard: OBSERVE. Circulation (SAFETY-31) and delivery (SAFETY-42): observe and may legitimately latch, because their evidence is measured power. The operator stop is the one deliberate change: enforced at the wire rather than as a P_SAFETY claim, which would otherwise make every recorded decision read "stopped". ⚠️ RECORDED LIMITATION: _shadow_settle() re-seeds the carried command to what stands on the wire, which makes the exit safe by construction - and therefore the loop leg's shadow decision is ONE SLEW STEP, not a trajectory. A shadow run answers "what would it command now", not "what would it have done next". The strategies are unaffected; all three defects above are visible from one. Graded on the writes and on the rendered surface, never on the flag: 22 mutations, no survivors, including one that lets a write escape and one that goes silent instead of commanding 0 W. Closed loop on TEST-23 stage 3's rig, same hour twice: live drives the pack to -2000 W and SoC 50.000 -> 62.331 %; shadow commands 0 W throughout, SoC stays 50.0 exactly, and the arbitrage decision is identical in action, instant, signed power, reason and arbiter winner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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995da777ce |
TARIFF-16: the injection leg stops being one number
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m42s
`price.py` modelled what a site is PAID for export as ONE scalar. The market publishes a line, and the cards say so in their own words: Eneco Zon & Wind Dynamisch `0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188` c EUR/kWh - "het injectietarief is dynamisch en kan per uur wijzigen", identical on the January and the September 2026 cards; ENGIE Dynamic `(B x eSpot_15) - A`; Aspiravi `0,07 x Belpex - 2`. `price_export_formula` carries that line with its OWN coefficients. ⚠️ THIS IS NOT A WRONG-TRADE FIX, AND SAYING SO IS PART OF SHIPPING IT. `arbitrage.py` does not read `export_price_eur_kwh` at all - its own comment says so, citing §9.3's near-zero Belgian injection price as the reason the economically sound trade on this market is charge-cheap-to-displace-expensive- IMPORT. Both hours it compares are all-in CONSUMPTION prices. No trade this add-on takes today is decided by an injection price and nothing here changes one. What it changes is what an operator is told, and what a future export-aware strategy rests on: OPT-06 and any export logic would otherwise inherit a scalar that cannot represent the market, and the 6% VAT asymmetry would be invisible in the arithmetic. test_price.py 17h parses every module under app/ and goes red the day something calls an injection reader, so that sentence is graded rather than attested. FOUR PROPERTIES A SCALAR CANNOT HOLD. Its own factor (Eneco 0,102 consumption against 0,100 injection; Aspiravi 0,07 against ~0,10 - not the consumption B with a sign flip). A negative offset, which `price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)` cannot express at all. VAT-exemption - "injectietarieven zijn vrijgesteld van btw" - against 6% on consumption, representable only because `vat_pct` is PER SPEC. And a price that goes below zero with no floor, under 11,88 EUR/MWh of BELPEX-H, which is the middle of a sunny day. ⚠️ A NEGATIVE INJECTION PRICE IS ACCEPTED, AND THAT NEEDED A DIFFERENT BAND RATHER THAN A LOWER FLOOR. `implausible_all_in()` floors the consumption leg at +0.02 EUR/kWh of energy; applied to injection that refuses the real market in the hours it matters most. Measured rather than argued: 17c puts ONE spec through BOTH bands and prints that the consumption band refuses -0.03008 EUR/kWh while the injection band accepts it. The floor was not decoration - it is what catches a card read a hundred times too small, the one unit error the card self-check cannot see because it cancels out of a comparison between the two sides - so the bound moves OFF the price and ONTO the coefficients, where it is index-free and sign-free: a pass-through band (Eneco's injection leg is 1.00x, Aspiravi's 0.70x; the band is 0.10-10x) and an offset magnitude bound (0.20 EUR/kWh against published 0.01188 and 0.02). Two rungs that can both answer a hundredfold error, so each is graded on its REASON, each gets a stimulus the other cannot reach with the precondition asserted as its own check, and they are mutated TOGETHER (TEST-16). ⚠️ THE CARD SELF-CHECK APPLIES WHERE THERE IS A CARD, AND WHERE THERE IS NOT THAT IS STATED RATHER THAN WORKED AROUND. `price_formula` can require a `card` block because a Belgian card prints the consumption formula, the reference index AND the resulting price. Eneco's INJECTION formula is printed with no price beside it. Requiring a block would make the published line inexpressible; inventing the estimate would grade the coefficients against arithmetic done with the same coefficients. So the block is OPTIONAL on this leg and unchanged on the other, the self-check runs at the same tolerance wherever a printed estimate exists, and validate.py says at startup - "its coefficients are UNGRADED" - when it does not, naming the two bounds that ran instead. This is TARIFF-15 demonstrating two tariffs end to end rather than three, one card later. 17e also MEASURES the size of that gap: a factor of 0.070 where the contract says 0.100 - 30% of every export payment - passes both bounds, because 0.70x is a pass-through somebody really publishes. ONE PARSER, NOT TWO. `parse_export_formula()` is `parse_price_formula()` with its OPTION NAME as an argument - TARIFF-17's move on `parse_static_profile()`, exactly - and everything that differs between the legs is a string in one `_LEGS` table. A second copy would be a second unit table, a second NaN rule, a second unknown-key rule and a second `to_resolution()`, diverging first on the 23- and 25-hour days. test_price.py 17b pins it two ways: all 32 grammar names are defined in exactly ONE module under app/, with the scope COMPUTED by parsing every file rather than listed; and twelve refusal sentences for the new option are DERIVED from the old option's own sentence rather than transcribed. The four sentences that deliberately differ are named, with what differs, and asserted to differ. NOTHING CHANGES FOR A SITE THAT DOES NOT SET IT. The option ships ""; `export_price_eur_kwh()`'s body is byte-identical, pinned on the AST rather than on the source text; `export_price_at()` falls through to it for every index value. 17f compares seven option dicts x five index values against the pre-TARIFF-16 expression with `==`. `price_export_formula` joins FRAMEWORK_KEYS, BANNED_IN_PLUGIN_CODE is derived from that set, and `code_leaks()` refuses a plugin that names it with nothing else edited. ALSO CORRECTED HERE: config.yaml's comment beside `export_price_eur_kwh` still read "no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve". TARIFF-07 struck that claim from app/price.py and DOCS.md and did not reach config.yaml, where it has been shipping since. 20 mutations, every one red on a named check, ledger in test_price.py below section 17 - including a ZERO-byte one (the two legs transposed in the VAT-asymmetry banner: no decision moves, only the sentence) and a ONE-byte one (`card_required=True` on the injection leg). Three run over all 29 files and red on test_price.py alone. 29/29 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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9c65ac2cf8 |
TARIFF-18: price_taxes_eur_kwh stops shipping at half the real figure
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m48s
`price_taxes_eur_kwh` shipped at 0.06 EUR/kWh with no recorded provenance -
no card, no date, no component list - and roughly HALF the true Flemish
all-in non-energy figure. It now ships at 0.11736, and the rows it is made
of are in the code rather than in this message:
Fluvius distribution (Antwerpen) 5,35 c EUR/kWh
Bijzondere accijns, "Alle verbruik" 4,876
Bijdrage groene stroom en WKK Vlaanderen 1,51
Energiebijdrage (0 EUR/MWh since 2026-08-01) 0
------
11,736 c EUR/kWh = 0.11736
Eneco residential card for Flanders, September 2026, incl. 6 % VAT.
`app/price.py`'s FLEMISH_TAXES_COMPONENTS_EUR_KWH carries the rows and
test_price.py section 1b re-adds them - and also compares the total against
the card's own figures typed in the test file, so an edit that moved the
rows and the default together is still caught.
WHAT THIS IS NOT. It is not an arbitrage-correctness fix and it cannot be.
This scalar is a LEVEL component: an additive constant cancels exactly in
`max - min` and leaves the argmin where it was. TARIFF-17 shipped that proof
and it is unchanged - test_price.py 16b drives six flat scalars spanning and
exceeding the whole per-DSO range and gets the identical cheapest hour and
the identical spread to the last digit. DOCS and the CHANGELOG say so in
those words.
WHAT IT IS. A display and guard fix:
* every number an operator reads, which at half the true value made the
add-on look considerably better than it is; and
* §17's negative-price guard in arbitrage.py - the one rung that tests an
ABSOLUTE all-in price rather than a difference. It fires when
`spot < -(markup + taxes)`, so its boundary moves -0.09 -> -0.14736
EUR/kWh of spot. test_arbitrage.py section 2c drives both sides through
the shipped decide() and pins the boundary from below as well.
The default is Antwerpen's real row, near the LOW end of the 0.117-0.131
per-DSO band, and that is deliberate: the error directions are not
symmetric. Too high carries a genuinely negative hour above zero and the
add-on exports into paid-for disposal - §17's own case. Too low only
declines a discharge that would have paid.
TARIFF-17's INTERACTION, WHICH HAD TO BE DECIDED. Nothing in that rung
hardcoded 0.06; it read PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, so moving the default moves
what it refuses. The Supervisor sets `App.options = deepmerge(config.yaml
defaults, stored options)`, so a saved blob carries the key whether it was
typed or not - every stored 0.06 became "non-default" with nobody editing
anything, and a working Walloon or Brussels site with a taxes table would
have met SystemExit(78) on the upgrade over an inert number. price.py now
carries SUPERSEDED_TAXES_DEFAULTS_EUR_KWH = (0.06,) and validate.py reads a
superseded default as untouched too. The rung is NOT weakened: 0.1198 beside
a table is still refused by name, and the refusal now names both figures.
config.yaml and PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS moved together; CFG-03's tripwire
(test_price.py section 1, test_defaults_pin.py) stayed green by agreeing.
test_price.py section 0's fourth check was REWRITTEN rather than re-pointed:
it used to justify the file's own grading constants by observing that the
shipped pair was degenerate (0.06 is exactly twice 0.03). TARIFF-18 ends
that coincidence, so the sentence is no longer true and is not kept.
29/29 test files green. Mutation ledger on the PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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2fac0aaf06 |
TARIFF-17: a price component that varies by hour has somewhere to live
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m25s
`price.py` modelled the whole non-energy part of a Belgian bill as ONE flat scalar. This adds `price_taxes_profile`, which carries the TAXES component as a period table, and makes `assemble()` evaluate it at each point's own instant. ⚠️ THE FLAT SCALAR WAS NOT A WRONG NUMBER, AND THIS IS NOT A CORRECTION OF ONE. The optimiser reads exactly two quantities off a series - the spread `max - min` over the firm points, and which hour is cheapest - and an additive constant identical in every hour cancels out of the first and leaves the second where it was. It is provably inert. Measured, and printed by test_price.py 16b on every run: with a flat taxes figure of 0.00, 0.0739, 0.1198, 0.1327 or 1.00 EUR/kWh the same 24-hour feed is cheapest at 13:00 in all five cases and its spread is 0.1500 EUR/kWh in all five cases. What was missing is anywhere for an HOUR-VARYING non-energy component to live. This is a missing capability, not a bad constant. Belgium has one. Fluvius distribution is a single rate - its tariff-card row reads `Normaal | Uitsl. nacht`, where exclusive night is a separate physical circuit and not a night register - so nothing changes for the reference site in Flanders. The Walloon DSOs and Sibelga are on the same card with four columns, `Enkelvoudig | Dag | Nacht | Uitsl. nacht`, and the gap is real money (c/kWh): ORES 13,27 / 7,39; AIESH 15,17 / 8,21; Tecteo RESA 12,20 / 7,01; Sibelga 9,39 / 7,10; ORES IMPACT 2026 16,578 / 5,090. ⚠️ AND THE BANDS ARE ANTI-CORRELATED WITH WHAT THE BATTERY WANTS TO DO. The cheap network hours are the cheap spot hours, so flattening them does not shift the curve - it UNDERSTATES the spread and declines cycles that would have paid. Same feed, same markup, the only difference being the taxes argument: flat 0.0000 / 0.0739 / 0.1198 / 0.1327 / 1.0000 -> cheapest hour 13, spread 0.1500 ORES dag 0.1327 / nacht 0.0739 -> cheapest hour 03, spread 0.1788 The regression check grades WHICH HOUR IS CHEAPEST, not the spread: an implementation that reads the table once and adds one number to every point is the LEVEL bucket wearing a period table - right magnitude, wrong shape - and a spread assertion passes on it. Measured: hoisting the lookup out of `assemble()`'s loop (+17 B) is red on six named checks in test_price.py and GREEN in the other 28 files. ONE GRAMMAR, NOT TWO. `static_tariff.py` already shipped the periods, the day selectors, the tiling rule and the DST handling, so `parse_taxes_profile()` is the same parser with the option name and the "what this number means" clause as arguments. A second tiling rule would be a second set of 23- and 25-hour-day bugs. test_static_tariff.py section 10 pins that two ways: by parsing every module under `app/` and asserting the grammar is defined in exactly one of them, and by deriving each of thirteen refusal sentences for the new option from the old option's own sentence rather than transcribing them. `Component.TAXES` semantics, `code_leaks()` and the double-counting guarantee are untouched. The new key joins FRAMEWORK_KEYS, BANNED_IN_PLUGIN_CODE is derived from that set, and a plugin that names it is refused at `register()`. It reaches both plugins that take taxes - `custom_formula` ({ENERGY, MARKUP}) and `generic_dayahead` ({ENERGY}) - and not `manual_csv`, which is all-in: the table is routed through `capabilities().adds`, exactly as the scalar is. ⚠️ A MALFORMED TABLE IS REFUSED AT STARTUP, NOT AT THE NEXT FETCH. It is read on the ~30 s planning path, and a table that first fails at 03:00 is a site that stops pricing at 03:00, which §11.4 turns into a quiet fallback indistinguishable from a healthy fixed-tariff day. validate.py refuses three things: a table that does not tile the day; a table set beside a NON-DEFAULT `price_taxes_eur_kwh`, because the table wins and the scalar would then be a number the operator typed that decides nothing; and a whole card typed in CENTS, which is how these figures are printed. That last rung is not a restatement of the parser's +-10 EUR/kWh bound - ORES's 13,27 trips the parser, but Sibelga's entire card, 9,39 and 7,10, is under it and would otherwise have started as a 9.39 EUR/kWh levy. Both rungs are graded by the REASON each gives, and mutating them together (TEST-16) moves three rows. NOTHING CHANGES FOR A SITE THAT DOES NOT SET IT. The option ships "", and the scalar path is unchanged arithmetically rather than merely in intent: test_price.py 16f reproduces the pre-TARIFF-17 expression and compares 12 capability/scalar combinations point for point with `==`. 13 mutations, every one red on a named check, ledger in test_price.py below section 16k with byte deltas and the one equivalent mutant named. 29/29 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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Claude Opus 5
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ac9854886b |
TARIFF-15: your own tariff card, as two coefficients the card itself grades
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m14s
A Belgian dynamic contract prices energy as `B x index + A`, and the two
coefficients exist on exactly one artefact: the customer's own tariff card.
There is no machine-readable source for them anywhere - CREG's consumer
tariff-card pages 404, CREG Scan is a JS wizard, the annual report has the
supplier list without per-product coefficients, VREG was unreachable, and
every coefficient found in research came off a supplier's own PDF, one
image-only. So nothing can be scraped and a per-supplier plugin would have no
source for its numbers, which is why TARIFF-07 withdrew three of them. The
customer is the only party who can see their own coefficients; they type them.
New provider `custom_formula`, one new option `price_formula` (a JSON string,
the `static_profile` precedent exactly), and a new module
`app/custom_formula.py`. The index path is `generic_dayahead`'s, not a second
one: the URL/override decision is now one shared `dayahead_feed_url()` both
plugins call, same feed, same Brussels-calendar range, same columnar parser,
same declared egress hosts.
It declares {ENERGY, MARKUP}, NOT ALL_IN. A card's Tariefformule line is the
energy component alone - Eneco tabulates network tariffs and levies
separately, ENGIE states the formula excludes network, distribution,
transport, levies and excise - so ALL_IN would lie for every operator who
typed what their card says and would drop the taxes from every hour
(0.2125 -> 0.1555 EUR/kWh, measured).
THE CARD IS THE GRADER, and that is why this is safe to ship. The framework
already mechanises that a PLUGIN cannot double-count. This introduces a risk
none of those guards can see because it is config, not code: the OPERATOR
double-counting, by folding network charges into `offset` while
price_taxes_eur_kwh carries them too. So validate.py recomputes the card's own
printed price from the operator's coefficients at startup and refuses to start
unless the two agree to within 0.01, naming the discrepancy. An inflated
offset cannot pass: 15.55 becomes 28.27. The same check catches VAT omitted,
VAT doubled, a transposed digit and a unit mismatch between the two sides.
And the limit, in the same sentence as the claim: it grades the coefficients
against the card, NOT the card against reality. A consistent-but-wrong pair
passes. A second refusal covers the one unit error the first cannot see - the
one applied to both sides at once - by bounding the card's own point to
0.02-1.00 EUR/kWh. Its FLOOR is applied to the energy figure rather than the
all-in one because the shipped 0.06 of taxes is three times that floor and
would carry a hundredfold error over it alone; found by writing the mutation,
not by review (M10, +0 B).
The market's own arithmetic, reproduced through the shipped code:
Eneco (0.102 x 133.9905 + 1) x 1.06 = 15.5471 card prints 15,55
ENGIE (0.1 x 61.96 + 0.9) x 1.06 = 7.5218 card prints 7,522
NO EXPRESSION EVALUATION OF ANY KIND. The string is settable over HTTP through
the add-on's own ingress page, so eval on it is RCE in a root container
holding SUPERVISOR_TOKEN and driving an inverter over RS485 - but the deciding
argument is that an expression is UNVERIFIABLE: two coefficients can be graded
against the card, an arbitrary expression cannot be graded against anything,
so it would make the invisible-wrong-coefficient problem strictly worse. An
unknown field is REFUSED rather than ignored, so `"expr"` is told it does not
exist. Future shapes become named fields, never a grammar. test_price.py 15f
walks the module's AST for eval/exec/compile/__import__/literal_eval and
exercises the scanner's red direction on every run.
Refused at startup: card absent or out by >0.01; `units` absent (no default);
factor == 0 (every spread 0, arbitrage silently never fires - the message
points at static_profile); factor < 0 (inverts the market); vat_pct outside
0-30 (0 stays legitimate); non-finite or non-numeric; unknown field, index or
resolution; the plausibility band. A card older than ~6 months WARNS and does
not refuse - ENGIE freezes coefficients for a contract's duration. Negative
output prices are not refused anywhere.
A startup preview logs the next 24 h as `index EUR/MWh -> all-in EUR/kWh` with
min/median/max and the day's spread, through a new default-silent
`PriceProvider.startup_preview()` hook - only the plugin knows what went in to
its own arithmetic. Emitted once per process, and a preview that raises cannot
cost the site its prices.
`custom_formula` joins the config.yaml enum through the DERIVED set
PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {"off"}, not a hardcoded list. Both
translations describe the option and the new id. DOCS.md replaces the
"planned" sentence with the shape, a worked example from a real card, a real
startup transcript and the limit of the check stated beside the claim.
22 mutations, one per check added, no survivors - MUTATION.md carries the
ledger. M13 (the preview's index column) was a -13 B survivor of the whole
suite on the first attempt because the check graded the HEADING and not the
row; it is graded on a rendered row now. All 29 suites green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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f620f7cf80 |
TARIFF-07: three plugins that never fetched a price are withdrawn, and a site configured on one is told so
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m12s
engie_dynamic, totalenergies_dynamic and eneco_eddy are removed from PROVIDERS and from every surface that listed them. They did not stop working - they never worked. Re-verified by hand on 2026-09-13 before deleting anything: 404 with Kong's "no Route matched with those values"; a TLS handshake that fails because api.totalenergies.be is absent from the certificate's SAN list; 404 with an empty body. All three are also structurally impossible - the coefficients are per-contract and behind a customer login, there is no regulator index, and "Eddy" is not an Eneco product at all. ⚠️ BACKWARD-INCOMPATIBLE. A config legal on the current version is refused on the next. That is the point of the change: §11.4 turned every failed fetch into a silent fall back, so a site on one of these ids has been running on static_profile - or on nothing - since the day it was set, with nothing on its status page ever differing from a working provider that never found a cheap hour. validate.py now refuses a retired id with a message naming the id, the endpoint, what that endpoint answers, which tariff has really been in force, and what to set instead. No version number is picked here; that depends on a fact about the live box. ⚠️ config.yaml's price_provider enum deliberately KEEPS all three ids. The Supervisor validates the options file against that enum before the add-on starts, so removing them would make an existing config schema-invalid and the refusal above would never be reached on exactly the sites that need it. PROVIDERS is two; the enum stays six; test_price.py asserts the schema offers exactly PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {"off"}, derived rather than typed, and register() refuses to re-register a retired id. PriceProduct.REALTIME, _WIDE, Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT and WIDEN_FACTOR's 2.5 are KEPT with no shipped declarer - it is the AC2 seam, and a reviewer finding a mechanism with zero callers would reasonably delete it. Recorded in DECISIONS/TARIFF-07-withdrawing-three-plugins.md and pinned by a check. False claims corrected: every "Belgian imbalance product" claim about eneco_eddy (DOCS.md, price_forecast.py, price_history.py, static_tariff.py, FCST-04, CHANGELOG - the two released entries annotated in place rather than rewritten); the quarter-hourly examples now cite Belgian day-ahead, which really does settle per quarter since the 15-minute MTU; and export_price_eur_kwh's "no shipped supplier publishes a dynamic injection curve", which is false - Eneco publishes 0,1 x BELPEX-H - 1,188 and ENGIE (B x eSpot_15) - A, same two-coefficient shape with its own coefficients and its own VAT treatment, so the scalar is a simplification and not the market. DOCS.md's provider table is two rows and now says honestly what a Belgian dynamic customer should do today, including that generic_dayahead cannot express B x spot + A and that price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1) could not hold a negative offset. The formula provider is referenced as planned, not built. _points_from_json() went with the plugins it served: it read a shape no feed anybody here has ever reached publishes. The one place it survives is a negative stimulus, named row_shape_body(). Nine mutations driven, all red; table in the decision record. 29/29 suites green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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e6c45a61e7 |
TARIFF-10: configuring a price provider is what fetches prices
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m19s
amain() started the background tariff refresh only when arbitrage_enabled was
on, and that option ships false. run_tariff_refresh is the only caller of
resolve_tariff(), which is the only caller of price_history.carry() - so on a
shipped install with a price provider configured nothing was ever fetched: no
plan resolved, /data/price_history.json never created, the Price history status
row reading `empty` for the life of the install, and TARIFF-09's short-horizon
warning unable to fire because there was no fetch to warn about. Measured over
a 40 h two-instance soak on one feed: 0 requests and `present: false` across all
802 samples, against a resolved 132-point plan on the instance with arbitrage
armed.
git log -S puts the refresh task, its arbitrage.enabled() guard AND the DOCS.md
sentence saying a configured provider still fetches in the same commit - OPT-04,
bdd7f18; config.yaml has carried the claim since TARIFF-02,
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Claude Opus 5
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17b7b447c4 |
TARIFF-09: ask the day-ahead feed for the horizon it was handed
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m10s
`generic_dayahead.fetch()` accepted `since` and `until` and requested the
bare `?bzn=BE`, which answers ONE Brussels day. Everything past today was
then filled from yesterday's profile by FCST-04, flagged provisional, and
§8.3 drops provisional hours from the trade set -- so the optimiser never
saw tomorrow as firm, at any hour of any day, and nothing reported it.
Measured on
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Claude Opus 5
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2271e147c6 |
SAFETY-43: delinquency measured against the ask, not against a flat 500 W
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m20s
`delivery.delinquent()` named a unit whose `short_by()` gap exceeded an
ABSOLUTE `min_w = Tuning.saturation_w = 500 W`. OPT-09's SoC-aware weights
shrink a low-headroom unit's share, and shrinking the share shrinks the gap, so
a unit standing at +125 W and delivering 0 W - 100 % delinquent - was never
named. Measured end to end on the real loop (test_packshare.py part 8b):
load 1500 W, B wedged at 15 %, equal weights named on 199/200 cycles
load 1500 W, B wedged at 15 %, OPT-09 weights named on 0/200 cycles
⚠️ The suppressed regime is the quiet one: at a load the healthy sibling covers,
the meter is satisfied, `unmet_w` is 0 and no action-log line fires, so this
alarm is the ONLY instrument that would have told the operator.
WHAT CHANGED, in one line:
named if short_by() > min_w OR short_by() > frac * share
⚠️ `min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED. It exists to stop normal saturation being reported
as delinquency, and lowering it trades a missed alarm for a false one on every
unit at once - SAFETY-41's four-attempt regime. This is a SECOND way to be
named, not a looser first one: all seven of test_delivery.py part 1's existing
fixtures answer identically under both rules, and the absolute arm's suppression
window is still exactly 1000 W / 6500 W, still asserted in part 8b.
THE FRACTION IS DERIVED, 0.85. admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py gained a
`--fractions` axis and grades the constant over the SAME 2640 no-fault runs that
produced `delivery_hold_s`'s 35.0 s floor. Worst continuous legitimate episode,
worst of three families, twenty fractions:
frac 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
worst 90.0 90.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 55.0 55.0 60.0 45.0 45.0 s
frac 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 *0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99
worst 40.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 s
absolute arm alone: 35.0 s (SAFETY-42 §3.3, reproduced in the same runs)
⚠️ NO CLIFF ANYWHERE: 0.45-0.99 is flat within one control cycle, and it is not
monotone - §3.3's own mechanism (c). ⚠️ "Zero false namings" is NOT achievable
at any fraction and the record says so; what is zero is false ALARMS - 90.0 s
worst against a 185 s hold, so nothing comes within 95 s of notifying anybody.
N=1 control 0.0 s at every fraction in all 2640 one-inverter runs; flapping
0.0 s in all 840.
DRIVEN. Part 8b pinned the SUPPRESSED behaviour and said "if it ever goes red
because the alarm fired, read the card that made it fire". It now grades BOTH
rules on one run - `share_frac=None` is SAFETY-42's rule exactly:
OPT-09 weights, absolute arm alone named on 0/200
OPT-09 weights, the shipped rule named on 200/200
POSITIVE CONTROL. Same fixture, same weights, same 125 W share, one legitimate
fact changed: a pack at its own 10 % cut-out is named on 0/200 (account() still
gates it), and a unit delivering HALF its share is named on 0/200.
N=1 BYTE-IDENTICAL, asserted: `plan()` handed a `weights` mapping that raises on
any read still answers identically at a roster of one, and the same mapping
raises at a roster of two; `delinquent()` answers {} on all 84 single-unit
(share, measured, rule) combinations including 0 of 125 W.
MUTATION, run on fresh :ro trees: M12 (drop the relative arm), M13 (frac -> 1.0)
and M14 (frac -> 0.05) are all red on named checks. The constant cannot move in
either direction unseen.
⚠️ CFG-07 gets ONE CONTROL CYCLE WORSE and is deliberately not fixed here: the
worst legitimate episode goes 35.0 -> 40.0 s, so the schema's `int(30,900)`
false-tripping band widens from [30,35] to [30,40]. CFG-07 should be re-derived
against 40.0 s.
No option value, no schema bound and no default changed. 27/27 suites green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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adminandClaude Opus 5
|
57775d4e06 |
TEST-21: delivery_hold_s's floor re-derived, and 30.0 s did not reproduce
No code and no option changes. What changes is a number this repository claimed
about a shipped safety constant.
`delivery_hold_s: 185` shipped resting on "30.0 s, the worst continuous
legitimate episode at the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs", plus a lag
sweep giving 45.0 s and 90.0 s - from a harness `DECISIONS/SAFETY-42` §1
deliberately did NOT commit, because it imports `plantsim` and `frame_check` out
of admin/goodwe. So the floor under a safety constant could not be re-run. That
is PROC-01's shape, with eleven instances in three days.
The harness is committed now, in admin/goodwe as `sim/delivery_window.py`, and
NOT here. `plantsim` and `frame_check` are that repo's; restating them in this
tree is CI-08's coupling, which has broken three times, and the alternative
fate - skipped for want of its imports - is a green that establishes nothing.
There the dependency runs one way: THIS repo's `control`, `arbiter` and the
shipped `delivery.delinquent()` are imported live out of whichever checkout is
under test. Its `--selftest` is now a step in that repo's `checks.yml`, so a
change here that moves `saturation_w`, `max_w`, `delivery_hold_s` or the shape
of `delinquent()` goes red there instead of leaving a stale number here.
cd goodwe/sim && GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon \
python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest --campaign --blag
⚠️ THE HEADLINE DID NOT REPRODUCE: 35.0 s, not 30.0 s. Recorded as measured. The
harness was not adjusted until it agreed - the one correction made during the
rebuild was made AGAINST the doc's number (§1 records it) and made every figure
LARGER.
WHAT REPRODUCED - and it is the part the compatibility promise rests on:
* the N=1 control arm is 0.0 s at EVERY threshold in EVERY run. §3.2's algebra
measured, not argued.
* the flapping family is 0.0 s everywhere in all 840 runs - the family that
defeated SAFETY-30's site window still cannot touch this check.
* 45.0 s at twice A's lag, to the cycle.
WHAT DID NOT:
* the headline, by one control cycle (30.0 -> 35.0 s); the reversal family by
two (20.0 -> 30.0 s).
* the NON-MONOTONE curve. §3.3 finding 3 read 55.0 s at 250 W against 40.0 s
at 100 W as a property of the reduction. This rebuild's curve is monotone.
The mechanism is real and is still the reason not to read either table as a
sensitivity curve, but it is an ARGUMENT now, not a measurement, and it is
written down as weaker.
* the low-threshold rows, badly (40.0 -> 120.0 s at 100 W). Nothing ships
there, but that gap is the honest measure of how much of the original table
was a property of axes nobody wrote down. §3.3 fixes every axis COUNT and
RANGE and no individual value; the rebuild prints its choices above its own
table so the caveat travels with the number.
* the four-times-slower row moved the OTHER way: 75.0 s, not 90.0 s.
185 s IS NOT CHANGED. It is 5.29x the re-measured worst (the record claimed
6.2x), 2.47x the four-times-slower case, 6.2x the firmware's LINK_STALE_S veto
and 4.9x inside the billing quarter. All four bounds clear and none narrowly,
and the ordering of the argument is unchanged. Moving a shipped safety constant
because a margin went from 6.2x to 5.3x while every bound holds would re-open
SAFETY-41's four-attempt false-trip regime for nothing.
⚠️ ONE CONSEQUENCE AN OPERATOR CAN HIT. At 30.0 s the rig's floor coincided with
the firmware's veto and a reader could not tell which was binding. At 35.0 s the
rig's is strictly the binding one - and it is ABOVE the schema's own
`int(30,900)` minimum. `delivery_hold_s: 30` is therefore below a MEASURED
legitimate episode and would report on ordinary saturation. Both translations
now say so. Raising the schema floor is a change to a shipped option's contract
and is left to its own card rather than smuggled in here.
⚠️ THE B-LAG ROWS ARE RELABELLED THROUGHOUT. Inverter B does not physically
exist (~2026-09-12); `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is A COPIED, `measured=False`. Every
two-inverter figure in this record is two copies of A, and the lag sweep is a
SENSITIVITY STUDY ON A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT B, not a measurement of it. The old
wording - "MEASURED, not felt" - overstated exactly that, and "the RAMP does not
move it at all" was too strong: halving it is worth 0 s at A's lag and +5 s at
twice it.
Touched: DECISIONS/SAFETY-42 §1 and §3.3, app/delivery.py's provenance comment,
config.yaml's `delivery_hold_s` block, both translations, CHANGELOG Unreleased.
26/26 suites pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
|
86bdf49332 |
PKG-12: bump 0.8.0 -> 0.9.0, so the five merges behind it can actually ship
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m14s
⚠️ MINOR FOR NEW FUNCTIONALITY, NOT FOR A BREAK, AND THAT DISTINCTION IS
CHECKED RATHER THAN ASSERTED. PKG-07 was minor because a config that started on
0.7.0 could be REFUSED on 0.8.0. Nothing of that kind is true here:
- `options:` and `schema:` hold 71 top-level keys on both
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
|
f8e501393f |
OPT-09: the weights parameter nothing ever passed, and what it cannot do
`allocator.plan()` has taken a `weights` argument since ALLOC-01 and NOTHING
had ever passed one - main.py called `resolve()` without it and the arbiter
defaulted it to 1.0 per unit - so the site target was split 50/50 regardless
of what either pack could do. Two things now feed it, and they are different
kinds of thing:
* a `pack` UNIT claim at P_SAFETY that CLOSES a unit's envelope at its own
`bms_soc_floor` or at 100 % - a PERMISSION, obeyed absolutely, so an empty
pack is not asked to discharge and its share goes to the sibling;
* SoC-aware weights by ENERGY headroom in kWh - a PREFERENCE, which
`_fill()`'s last-resort pass will override the moment the sibling saturates.
Measured (test_packshare.py part 8): at a load one pack cannot cover, the
weighted arm and the shipped arm command the IDENTICAL watts into an empty pack
and deliver the IDENTICAL watts. Only the envelope stops the ask, and what it
buys is not delivery - it is a reported `unmet_w` where the record used to read
impeccable. Weights are a comfort choice for STABILITY and NOT for DELIVERY.
Also: an optional per-entry `capacity_kwh` (schema change, all-or-nothing across
the roster, rule 9 refuses a partial one); per-pack arbitrage sizing, with the
sell side's no-op stated rather than hidden; and a 0 W trade refused by name,
because a 0 W arbitrage claim is a park order that outranks the loop.
SAFETY-42 and this card meet at one hazard from opposite sides - OPT-09 stops
the site ASKING a pack whose SoC says it cannot deliver, SAFETY-42 alarms when a
pack that said it could does not - and its end-to-end fixture moved as a result.
Its finding is unchanged and is now stated on the two quantities its rejected
discriminator actually reads.
Not filed at all at a roster of one: at N=1 every source routes to the site, so
the interval would bound the SITE TARGET, and SAFETY-25's decided Option A
stands untouched on the live install.
⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. Its 4600 W / 20.48 kWh / 10 % are FROM DATASHEET
AND SERIAL, and `sim/plantsim.py`'s INVERTER_B is inverter A copied
(`measured=False`), so every two-inverter figure here is arithmetic or two
copies of A. No hardware was touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
|
06661c5e17 |
PKG-07: bump 0.7.0 -> 0.8.0, because 0.7.0's own default is now a refused config
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m6s
Six merges landed behind an unbumped 0.7.0 - CI-06, SAFETY-38, SAFETY-39,
SAFETY-37, SAFETY-13, SAFETY-42. PKG-06 recorded this exact failure YESTERDAY
(
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Claude
|
090a8ecc35 |
SAFETY-42 round 2: pin the two thresholds at a config that is not the shipped one
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m7s
THE BLOCKER. At the `delinquent()` call site, `self.tuning.saturation_w` -> `250.0` (-19 B) was a survivor of all 23 suites. It is not an equivalent mutant: two copies of inverter A, B wedged, `saturation_w: 1800` (inside its own schema int(100,2000)) and a load of 1600 W put B's shortfall strictly between the literal and the configured value - head names nobody, the mutant names B. At the shipped 500 both name it, which is exactly why every fixture in part 4 was blind: their gaps are all above both thresholds. It matters beyond a mutation score. `delivery.py`'s MIN_W_IS_SATURATION_W note and the `delivery_hold_s` block in config.yaml both promise an operator, in shipped prose, that there is no fourth copy of a threshold to keep in step and no way for the two to drift - raise `saturation_w` and this check moves with you. A literal at the call site removes exactly that promise, silently, and the promise is why the design was chosen over a `delivery_w` key. ASKING THE SAME QUESTION OF EVERY OTHER NUMBER THIS CHECK READS FOUND A SECOND SURVIVOR OF ALL 23 SUITES: `bms_floor=inv.bms_soc_floor` -> `10.0` (-13 B), invisible because config.yaml's own example states 10 % and every fixture in this file used it. Two arms bracket it: a pack at 15 % against its own 25 % cut-out is cold and must stay unnamed (the literal names an empty pack), and a pack at 8 % against its own 5 % cut-out is wedged and must be named (the literal explains the fault away). One arm on each side leaves no constant at all. `delivery_hold_s` and `is_live()`'s window were ALREADY pinned - the fixtures had to move them to run - and `LINK_STALE_S` has no option behind it, so "pinned across a changed config" is not available for it and is not claimed. DECISIONS section 9 enumerates all of it with the deltas and which check kills which. Verified in the CI image, tree mounted :ro, `python3 -B`, `__pycache__` purged and counted before every run (TEST-15): R5 saturation_w -> 250.0 -19 B killed by part 4b(a) R6 bms_soc_floor -> 10.0 -13 B killed by part 4b(b), both arms R7 arm(self.delivery_cfg) -> DeliveryConfig() -1 B killed (already) R8 is_live(now) -> is_live(now, 3600.0) +8 B killed (already) R9 pack cut-out -> conjoined site floor +105 B killed twice head: 23/23 test files PASS, no bytecode written during the run. No shipped behaviour changes: the only edits to app/ are comments. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
|
706e625d99 |
SAFETY-42: a unit that stops delivering, and the discriminator the card asked for does not exist
A unit standing at a non-zero share and producing nothing is seen by NOTHING. SAFETY-30's per-unit sign gate needs OPPOSITION on both sides of 250 W and a unit at 0 W is not opposing, it is ABSENT. The site sum still agrees with the meter in direction. Circulating power is exactly zero when one unit does nothing. The only trace left is `reason == "saturated-freeze"`, which clamp.py:93-96 documents as the alarm an operator learns to ignore. It is HW-01's shape, which ran 6 h 25 m with all three layers spectators. ⚠️ THE CARD'S OWN DISCRIMINATOR WAS BUILT FIRST AND FALSIFIED, AND THAT IS THE MAIN CONTENT. SAFETY-42 asks for "saturation persisting past N while |grid error| > X, both derived". Run on the two-master rig it fails in BOTH directions, and no (N, X) fixes either: FALSE POSITIVE `plantsim.Plant.limit()` returns 0 W for a discharge command into a pack at its own floor, and a wedged unit produces 0 W too. Load 2000 W, equal weights, 2000 W per-unit cap, 120 cycles: THE TWO ARMS ARE IDENTICAL ON ALL 120 in grid, site target, every share and every measured watt. Both saturated-freeze on 116 of them, both hold |grid error| over 300 W on all 120 and settle at 1200 W, both read circulating 0.0 W. The predicate's inputs do not differ, so no threshold on them can differ. And "a cold pack at its floor must not alarm" is the card's own AC 2. FALSE NEGATIVE the standing grid error is what a HEALTHY SIBLING ERASES. Load 800 W, same config, B wedged: over the last 30 of 200 cycles the loop is frozen on 30 of 30 while the worst |grid error| is 30 W, with B standing at +770 W and delivering 0 W. Any X above 30 W is silent for the whole run on the exact fault the card describes. WHAT REPLACES IT. Per unit, for a discharge share, `share - measured`; readable because of a reduction that only exists at N>=2: a unit is named while it is short by more than `saturation_w` with NO ACCOUNT for it, and the units in that state are a PROPER SUBSET of the units asked to discharge. THE ACCOUNT keeps the cold pack out and is the only thing that can: the two cases are identical in the power domain, so the discriminator has to be a non-power fact, and there is exactly one - the pack's own SoC against its own `bms_soc_floor`, asked through `peakguard.discharge_permitted()` rather than transcribed. ⚠️ `bms_soc_floor` ALONE, not `pack_floor_pct()`'s conjunction with `peak_soc_floor`: that floor bounds a money-saving discharge only and using it would explain away a wedged unit anywhere between the two. THE PROPER SUBSET keeps a whole-site cause out - a derate this add-on cannot see hits every unit; one box that stopped listening does not - and it is what makes this INERT AT N=1, by algebra rather than by a roster guard. IT REPORTS. IT DOES NOT ACT, and the strongest argument is for acting. Dropping the wedged unit from `live` genuinely recovers a site the shipped path does not: at load 1500 W, kept in the split the site settles at 800 W with a 700 W error and NEVER comes inside 100 W in 150 cycles (the freeze pins the target, so the sibling's SHARE never grows); dropped, it delivers 1500 W from cycle 14. What refuses it is that the only re-allocation this add-on can express is all-or-nothing: a unit derated to 50 % is short by more than saturation_w with nothing to explain it, so this detector names it too, and at load 3000 W dropping it leaves the site delivering 2000 W against 2400 W kept - 400 W WORSE. A partial re-allocation is what would make acting safe and the allocator cannot express it. That is a card. control.py is NOT MODIFIED. The freeze shapes the loop; this reports on it. NUMBERS, MEASURED. The watts side is `Tuning.saturation_w`, read at runtime, so there is no fourth CFG-03 copy and it cannot drift from the number the control law itself calls "not following". `delivery_hold_s: 185` comes off 2640 closed-loop two-inverter runs in which nothing is faulty (6 gains x 5 slews over the whole schema range, across load reversals, a flapping load and ASYMMETRIC SPLITS - a family SAFETY-30's campaign did not have and the one that dominates here) plus 1890 runs at a roster of ONE as the control: threshold reversals flapping weighted N=1 control * 500 W 20.0 s 0.0 s 30.0 s 0.0 s The N=1 column is 0.0 s at EVERY threshold in all 1890 runs, and the flapping column - the family that defeated SAFETY-30's site window - is zero too, because a common stimulus makes both units short at once and the subset stops being proper. ⚠️ The curve is NOT monotone (55.0 s at 250 W against 40.0 s at 100 W): lowering the threshold can turn a proper subset into the whole roster and BREAK the run. ⚠️ THE MARGIN IS MEASURED, NOT FELT, BECAUSE INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST. `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is A COPIED, `measured=False`, so every two-inverter figure above is two copies of A. Sweeping a different second unit: the worst legitimate episode is insensitive to B's RAMP (30.0 s at half A's) and scales with its LAG - 45.0 s at twice A's measured 10 s, 90.0 s at four times it. 185 s is 6.2x the measured worst, 2.06x the four-times-slower case, 6.2x LINK_STALE_S and 4.9x inside the 900 s quarter. Deliberately not 180, which is SAFETY-02's site hold. SAFETY-34. `unit/<name>/delivery_tripped` in the store, one notification id per unit, re-raised on the first cycle of every process, cleared by the Start press. No flat mirror: a rollback lands on a version that drives one actuator, where this check is inert. ⚠️ SCHEMA CHANGE - `delivery_hold_s` joins options: and schema:, so this needs a version bump before it ships. Additive and defaulted, so an existing options blob stays valid. STATED GAPS: charge shares are not graded (no configured charge ceiling exists, so a constant-voltage taper cannot be explained and arming it would fire on every maintenance charge); every unit wedged at once is not caught (the subset is not proper and no instrument here separates that from a plant that cannot). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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adminandClaude Opus 5
|
5d7e275df4 |
SAFETY-39: slew_w is a ratio to the rail, and gain is what is still wrong
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m16s
`slew_w: 1000` was derived on 2026-08-22 against a clamp of 1500 W, where "capping how far the loop can jump ahead of the inverter" was true because the rail itself bounded the excursion. The live install went to max_w 5000 and the constant did not move, so the loop crosses its whole output range in 10 s against a plant NOTES.md §5.10 measured at ~18 s. Measured on the owner's system 2026-09-05 11:43-11:46: a 3.4 kW export drove the setpoint 380 -> 5000 W in five 2 s ticks, the battery to -5154 W past a 5000 VA rating, and the grid from 3.4 kW of EXPORT to 2.8 kW of IMPORT. Nothing was broken; the rail moved. REPRODUCED FIRST, and one half of it is not reproducible at all. On plantsim.Plant and on an independent in-repo model: the setpoint stepping a full 1000 W per tick to the rail (48 of 51 export steps), and the meter crossing from export into import. The -5154 W figure is NOT reproducible in either model, because both clamp the plant at its rating - so the card's AC "battery no longer exceeds max_w in simulation" is unfalsifiable and was rewritten rather than met. THE DELIVERABLE IS THE RELATIONSHIP. SLEW_RAIL_FRAC = LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S = 2 s / 18 s = 1/9 slew_w = 0 now means FOLLOW THE RAIL - SLEW_RAIL_FRAC * max_w - exactly as integrator_max_w = 0 already means follow max_w. It is the shipped default: 222 W at max_w 2000, 556 W at 5000, 1067 W at a ~9600 W two-inverter site. validate.py rule 10 refuses an explicit value faster than that, graded against sum(unit_caps(opts)) - the roster sum, i.e. Controller.site_max_w - so a second inverter moves the bound with no operator action. VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT: restoring slew_w 1000 at max_w 5000 is refused, and the refusal names the rail, the crossing time, the measurement and what to do. Equality, one watt of slack, the live interim 400 and slew_w 0 at every rating all still start. GAIN IS THE CONSTANT THAT IS STILL WRONG, and it is NOT changed here. Over 51 export steps the over-absorption is FLAT in slew (958 W at 1000, 1081 W at 250) and monotone in gain (987 W at 0.6, 876 at 0.3, 435 at 0.2): slew_w bounds the OUTPUT, while the integrator moves gain*error per cycle and reaches a 5000 W rail in under three ticks whatever the slew is. Two control-law constants moving in one release on a running house makes the next measurement uninterpretable. ⚠️ N=2: the site rail becomes sum(max_w) ~ 9600 W (inverter B FROM DATASHEET AND SERIAL, not measured, and sim/plantsim.py's INVERTER_B is A copied), and the enforced ratio produces 1067 W there automatically. But a growing rail LOOSENS this bound, and the >= 900 W symptom goes stale at N=2 the same way the constant did - both stated in the record rather than left to be discovered. Nothing reached the inverter. The live install still runs the interim slew_w 400 applied by hand on 2026-09-05, which rule 10 accepts unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
|
d8e02ad3f8 |
PKG-06: bump 0.6.0 -> 0.7.0, because the schema changed and nobody bumped
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m2s
Six merges landed since 0.6.0 was deployed and the version never moved. Disk and box both read 0.6.0, so `ha apps update` would have been a NO-OP: Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, and the update path installs `version_latest`, which cannot differ from `version` without a bump. Found while pre-checking the deploy, not after it silently did nothing. ⚠️ MINOR RATHER THAN PATCH, BECAUSE THE SCHEMA CHANGED. SAFETY-32 added `bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` as a REQUIRED per-entry key on the `inverters` roster - no trailing `?` - so a config declaring a roster and omitting it on any entry is refused at startup. Verified against the deployed |
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Claude Opus 5
|
fef6ef20a4 |
UX-01: translate the add-on config, and order it by task
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m1s
The add-on had NO translations/ directory, so Home Assistant fell back to rendering the raw option KEYS. An operator opening Configuration read `unit_sign_disagree_w`, `saturation_cycles`, `integrator_max_w` - seventy of them, in file order, with no description and no way to tell a constant derived from 1890 closed-loop test runs from their own inverter's rating. ⚠️ PRESENTATION ONLY. Not one default, not one schema range and not one line of behaviour moved. The 175 non-comment lines of config.yaml are byte-identical to release/1.0's, reordered; the only comment lines that changed are the group banners and five sentences whose "above"/"below" the reorder made false. * translations/en.yaml and translations/nl.yaml: a name and a description for all 70 options and all 7 per-entry keys of the `inverters:` repeatable section. The Dutch is written for a Flemish homeowner - afname/injectie, kwartierpiek, capaciteitstarief - not transliterated from the English. * ⭐ Every derived constant says WHERE IT CAME FROM and whether to touch it. `unit_sign_disagree_s` cites its 1890 closed-loop runs (SAFETY-30); `circulation_w` its 924 runs and the measured 400 W knee (SAFETY-31); `meter_freeze_s` its 2399 s capture (SAFETY-18); `bms_soc_floor` register 0x0560. The two numbers that are the operator's - max_w and peak_cap_w - say "THIS IS YOUR NUMBER". `cycle_cost_threshold_eur`, which is neither, says it is an open product question (OPT-08). * config.yaml reordered into task order in BOTH halves, comments carried with their keys: hardware -> meter -> ratings and limits -> tariff -> maintenance -> safety -> advanced. ⚠️ test_inverter.py:1788's trap is PRESERVED: the nested per-entry `max_w:` still precedes the flat one under `schema:`, and `inverters: []` still ships in the `options:` half. Moving the nested block below the flat one is a 1-byte edit; it was run and goes red in test_inverter.py and test_translations.py. * tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section F MEASURES the result against ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 - Supervisor's own _read_app_translations(), its own UiOptions, and the frontend's label resolution transcribed from the shipped bundle - and prints every rendered row in both languages. `all cases passed`, exit 0. * ⚠️ ONE MEASURED NEGATIVE RESULT, NOT GLOSSED: the per-entry keys inside the `inverters:` section still render RAW on frontend 20250925.1, because a list-of-objects goes to ha-selector-object and the converter sets no `label` and no `translation_key`. The `fields:` translations are shipped and validated - that is Supervisor's own shape for this - but this card does not claim they reach the screen. The `inverters` label and description do. * test_translations.py: a translation naming a non-existent option, or an option with no translation, fails CI - both directions, both languages, top level and per entry. Mutation-tested BOTH WAYS: eleven in-process mutations each required to NAME the key they broke, plus a negative control; six more run on disk through the purge-and-re-read protocol. Two of the eleven are the ones that cost the WHOLE FILE rather than one label - an unrecognised top-level block, and a `network:` value that is not a string. Supervisor drops a file that fails SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS with only a log warning, so those silently return the entire tab to raw keys; neither is reachable through the `configuration:` coverage, which is why they were hunted for and closed. * tools/translations_lint.py is the hand parser CI needs (no PyYAML in the add-on image) and the probe grades it, key by key and string by string, against Supervisor's own loader. It is strict and RAISES rather than skipping; nine malformed shapes prove it. Full 20-file suite green (19 existing + test_translations.py). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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f9e7fbf86d |
SAFETY-32: bms_soc_floor per pack, rule 8 per unit
`bms_soc_floor` describes A BATTERY, not a site. At two packs of different models the cut-outs differ, and one number for both graded the shallower pack against the deeper one's BMS - so a site with cut-outs of 10 % and 30 % under `peak_soc_floor: 20` STARTED, and the guard would command a forced discharge that pack B's BMS, not the operator's floor, is the thing that stops. That is rule 8's own failure mode, reached through rule 8. Scoped to the card's third bullet, per its PM PROOFREAD: the aggregate anti-windup (DEV-02) and per-instance `achievable_w` (CFG-04) were verified as already shipped and are untouched. * config.yaml: `bms_soc_floor: int(0,50)` REQUIRED per `inverters:` entry. Nothing is inherited; the flat key stays the single-inverter shape's own cut-out. A per-entry DEFAULT was declined - a default is one number for every pack, which is this card's defect - and the decision is recorded. * inverter.py: `Inverter.bms_soc_floor`; an entry that states none gets None, not a borrowed number and not 0.0 (the most permissive value the key has). * peakguard.py: `Pack`, `pack_floor_pct()`, `pack_permissions()`, `binding_soc_floor()`. `discharge_permitted()` is unchanged and is still the one place the question is answered. * validate.py: `unit_bms_floors_indexed()` carries the ROSTER index; rule 8 grades EVERY unit and NAMES the one it refuses. Graded with the offender SECOND and with the same two numbers in the other order. * main.py: `Controller.packs`; `decide(soc_floor=...)` is the per-pack reduction of the same option; the floor-limited notification names the pack that stopped the site. `pack_floor_soc` - the emptiest pack, and its None-on-missing behaviour - is untouched. * tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py: RE-RUN and repaired. The required key broke §C and left §D printing PASS on a refusal about a different key. §D is now an isolated counterfactual over an accepted merged baseline, one key varied, asserting the key name. `all cases passed` on 2026.08.0. Stated rather than hidden: under any config rule 8 accepts the per-pack FLOOR reduces to `peak_soc_floor` for every pack. The reduction is written for `unit_caps_indexed()`'s reason and graded on both sides - 1775 rule-8-valid pairs answer the option, the pair rule 8 refuses answers the cut-out. `peak_soc_floor` is still one number for the site, so the "deeper pack needlessly withheld" half is filed as an open question, not closed. Full 19-file suite green. Twelve source mutations through tools/mutation_run.sh: eleven red, one argued survivor. The battery also found `_flat_bms_floor()` defaulting in two places, each covering for the other. No measurement of inverter B appears anywhere: it does not exist yet. Every second-pack figure is simulated and labelled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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a9993aeda2 |
SPIKE-04a: inverter B is 4600 W FROM ITS DATASHEET, and the copies are pinned
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m51s
The desk half of SPIKE-04. No control behaviour changes; this is documentation and the check that stops it drifting again. Three places stated inverter B's rating - config.yaml's commented roster example, DOCS.md's, and tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py's "a blob an operator would POST" - and all three said 3000 W, a number nobody had measured or read off anything. The owner supplied B's model and serial on 2026-09-04: a GoodWe GW5048D-ES, serial `55048ESU22AW0992`, max charging and discharging power 4600 W. Serial characters 6-8 are `ESU`, platform 105 / AA55, so SPIKE-01 does not gate this site. All three copies now read 4600. ⚠️ 4600 W IS FROM A DATASHEET AND IS NOT A MEASUREMENT, and the one ambiguity is recorded rather than guessed. The datasheet prints it under BATTERY INPUT DATA, so it is probably DC, while max_w is graded against 0x0518 - the inverter's own AC power. If it is DC the AC ceiling is nearer 4324 W. Neither reading is written in as fact; SAFETY-20's min(max_w, dev_max) already bounds it correctly under either, once dev_max is read off the unit, so `max_w: 4600` is what an operator should configure today. goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b carries the full record with the date and the method on every figure. A NEW CHECK, BECAUSE A DOCUMENTATION FIX WITHOUT ONE DRIFTS AGAIN. test_validate.py now pins all three documented rosters: findable, in agreement, and equal to 4600 - with an explicit len(...) == 3 guard so that a regex which stopped matching cannot leave "they all agree" green on the two sites still read. It also grades the PROVENANCE beside the number (the datasheet, the 0x0518 it is graded against, and the 4324 W the DC reading would make it) WITHIN 2500 characters of the roster rather than file-wide. ⚠️ The first version of that provenance check searched whole files and was ALREADY VACUOUS on two of them: 0x0518 appeared once in config.yaml and once in DOCS.md before this card, for unrelated reasons, so `"0x0518" in src` was green no matter what happened next to B's rating. That is a check whose data cannot reach the failure it names, in the file that exists to complain about them. It is fixed, and the window is what fixes it - deleting the caveat beside the number now goes red even where the same token survives elsewhere in the file. The windowed version immediately found that the DOCS.md caveat did not name 0x0518 at all; DOCS.md now says it. Four mutations, bytecode purged and counted at 0 before and after each, all RED (two of them 0-byte deltas that change a printed answer): M1 probe's operator blob 4600 -> 3000 0 B RED (value + agreement) M2 DOCS.md's DC/AC caveat deleted -157 B RED (provenance) M3 config.yaml alone 4600 -> 4324 0 B RED (agreement) M4 probe entity renamed, regex finds nothing RED (the vacuity guard) Restored, green again. The probe itself was re-run against Supervisor 2026.08.0's own AppOptions validator with the 4600: all cases passed, exit 0. ⚠️ THE TEST FIXTURES KEEP 3000 W ON PURPOSE AND NOW SAY WHY AT THE LINE. test_inverter.py, test_maintenance.py, test_peakguard.py and test_watchdog.py build a second inverter at 3000 W against A's 5000 W. The only property those checks consume is that B's number is unmistakably not A's, and the real pair is a 400 W gap - narrower than slew_w, inside the range where an off-by-one-unit bug and ordinary control arithmetic produce indistinguishable numbers. Collapsing them onto the real values would buy realism those checks do not use and cost them their separating power, which is exactly what test_peakguard.py's own §10g PRECONDITION exists to prevent. Their comments no longer call 3000 W a hypothesis about B's rating; they call it illustrative, and not a placeholder either - the placeholder era ended on 2026-09-04. Also recorded in the changelog for the cards that own them: 94 % battery-to-AC => ~88 % round trip => ~360 W burned continuously to circulate 3 kW, which is the number SAFETY-31 argues its threshold from without having one; < 13 W night self-consumption per unit, which nothing accounts for; and the A/B asymmetry in opposite directions (~33 % more energy, ~8 % less power), which means MAINT-05's 12 h drain timeout was derived on A and should be re-checked against B. ⚠️ Honest survivors: - goodwe/NOTES.md §1.1b, where all of this is actually recorded, is graded by nothing here. Rewriting its 16 occurrences of 4600 to 3000 and turning every FROM DATASHEET label into MEASURED ON THE UNIT leaves all 19 files GREEN. This CI cannot fetch admin/goodwe - private, and GITHUB_TOKEN is minted for this repository only, as .gitea/workflows/checks.yml already states - so the cross-repo check is not buildable here. - No check can see whether 4600 is the RIGHT number. Everything above pins a datasheet reading against itself. Only the bench half of SPIKE-04 can say whether the unit agrees, and the DC-vs-AC ambiguity is the live example. - The constant is still named B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS in four test files, which reads as a hypothesis about B's rating when it is now an illustrative fixture. It is left alone deliberately: renaming ~20 sites across test_peakguard.py and test_inverter.py would collide hard with the open SAFETY-32 pull request, which rewrites 1255 lines of the first. The comment directly above each definition says what the value is and is not. Suite: 19/19 green in goodwe-addon-ci, mounted :ro, bytecode purged and verified 0 before and after. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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ae21b71824 |
Merge release/1.0 into SAFETY-30
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m39s
CFG-04 (#45) merged first and moved the base. Two conflicts, both resolved as the union of the two sides: - app/main.py: an import-block collision. CFG-04 added validate_unit_ranges to the .validate import; SAFETY-30 added AGAINST_METER, AGAINST_OWN_POWER, SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS and SignWatchdog to the .watchdog import. Neither side dropped anything, so the resolution keeps both lists whole. - CHANGELOG.md: two adjacent new entries under ## Unreleased. Both kept. Both sides also independently rewrote large parts of test_peakguard.py (60 and 47 insertions against the merge base) and git merged them textually, so the full suite was run on the MERGE RESULT rather than inferred from the two parents: 19 passed, 0 failed, twice. One caveat recorded rather than hidden: test_peakguard.py failed once during the first sequential full-suite run and then passed 10/10 in isolation and in two further full runs on this same tree. It passes on both parents too, so this is the pre-existing flakiness CFG-04 already disclosed, not a merge defect - it is timing- or load-sensitive. It sits on the required CI context and can therefore block an unrelated merge at random, which wants a card of its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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f000547518 |
SAFETY-30: grade each inverter against its own power, and the site's total against the meter
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m38s
THE DEFECT, in one line. `inv.sign_wd.evaluate(stood, self.grid, ...)` compared
the command THIS controller put on ONE actuator against what the WHOLE SITE is
exchanging with the network. At a roster of one those are two views of the same
thing - specs.md §6.2's identity - and that is what makes the check sound and
what earned it the best record in the safety table (NOTES.md: 93 % agreement
while healthy against 4 % during runaway, four observed episodes, zero false
positives). At two inverters they are not, and it fails in BOTH directions:
FALSE TRIP inverter A commanded -1500 W while the meter reads +1500 W is
evidence of nothing when inverter B is discharging 3000 W exactly
as told. Nothing is faulty and the highest-value check fires.
MISSED the converse, and it is worse. A unit commanded +1500 W and
MEASURED at -1500 W, beside a sibling at +1500 W, leaves P1
exactly where a healthy site leaves it. The summation destroys the
evidence and no threshold recovers it.
DEV-02 had already shipped the per-INSTANCE half - one SignWatchdog per
inverter, namespaced latch, a trip on B no longer latching A. What was left was
the COMPARISON, and it is two questions rather than one:
PER UNIT this unit's standing command against ITS OWN measured power
(`Inverter.batt`, holding register 0x0518, per-instance since
DEV-02). Conclusion: "the actuator I am driving is not doing what I
told it" - a fact about one device, so the remedy stays the per-unit
`failsafe` SET that arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE has classified SCOPE_UNIT
from the day it was written. That entry read "the evidence is
site-wide and the remedy is not"; the first half is now simply true.
SITE the SUM of the standing commands against the meter, as a new
`sign_site` SET at P_SAFETY on the site actuator, latched under flat
`site_sign_tripped` / `site_sign_reason`. This is the 2026-08-20
fault day and NO per-unit check can see it, because every inverter
may be faithfully executing its share of a number that is itself
wrong. It stops every inverter and the banner names the site.
WHAT IT IS NOT, said here because two guards that overlap without saying so is
how a false-alarm generator gets built. It is not SAFETY-31: circulation.py
compares the units AGAINST EACH OTHER and catches them pushing power THROUGH
each other, which nets to zero at the meter and about which no single command is
evidence. This compares each unit against ITS OWN COMMAND. They overlap in
exactly one scenario - a unit reversing while its sibling pulls the other way -
and test_watchdog.py asserts on that fixture that both fire and what each
concludes. It is also not the saturation freeze, which is a MAGNITUDE test
(|command - measured| > 500 W) that shapes the loop and fires on a merely
saturated unit; this is a DIRECTION test that latches and parks one.
THE FOUR NUMBERS, RE-DERIVED AT TWO INVERTERS - one carried with a justification
and one refused. 1890 closed-loop runs on admin/goodwe's TEST-19 two-master rig
in which NOTHING is faulty, swept over the whole range config.yaml accepts for
`gain` and `slew_w`, across load reversals with write staggers and flapping
loads, and RUN AT BOTH ROSTERS so the N=1 arm is the control:
unit_sign_disagree_w 250 `saturation_w / 2`. The check gates on both sides,
opposed, so the smallest gap it can see is 500 W -
exactly where compute()'s own anti-windup test
already says the inverter is not following. It
cannot fire on a divergence the control law calls
ordinary tracking. Worst legitimate opposition at
250 W: 10.0 s; the curve is nearly flat, because a
unit's own power chases its own command.
unit_sign_disagree_s 85 8.5x that 10.0 s, 2.8x the firmware's own 30 s
link veto (inverter.LINK_STALE_S), under half the
180 s site hold.
site_sign_disagree_w 300 CARRIED. Its argument is the meter's noise floor
and the 15 W deadband; the roster touches neither,
and the campaign agrees - the gate opens in 994 of
1050 runs at two inverters and 955 of 1050 at one.
site_sign_disagree_s 325 NOT CARRIED, and this is the number the card
exists to not assume. The worst legitimate
crossing at 300 W is 110 s with one inverter and
215 s with TWO, because the command must travel a
rail that is the roster sum at a `slew_w` that is
not - reachable at gain 0.05, slew_w 50 and a
2.2 kW load reversal, all schema-legal. 180 s
would have shipped a false trip. 325 s is 1.51x
the measured worst, inside the 900 s billing
quarter and inside every episode of the fault day.
AT ONE INVERTER NOTHING CHANGES, and "nothing" is asserted rather than assumed.
The two questions are the same sentence there, so only the detector that shipped
is armed: same comparison against the meter, same 300 W / 180 s, same reason
string byte for byte, same namespaced latch and flat rollback mirror, same
`failsafe` claim, same banner, same single status row - and the site detector is
NEVER CALLED, counted on the object over twelve cycles.
VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. Thirteen mutations on fresh per-mutation trees with no
__pycache__, mounted :ro, with the battery refusing to report at all unless the
baseline is green. Twelve red on the first pass. M4 - the site half armed at N=1
as well - SURVIVED, because the check read `disagree_since is None` and the unit
detector trips first, parks the inverter and leaves the site standing at 0 W:
the assertion ran, the sentence was true, and the data could not reach the
failure it named. Replaced with a call counter on the object; M4 is red now.
Recorded as a survivor in DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md §5, with the
first battery's own RED BASELINE - a shared mutation directory read mid-copy -
discarded rather than reported.
RECORDED, NOT FIXED: the site comparison is defeated by a square-wave load whose
half period is about one control cycle, which holds it opposed for ~1000 s. The
N=1 control arm is what makes that interpretable - it is identical at the roster
this add-on ships, so it is a property of comparing a lagged command against a
meter and has nothing to do with the second inverter. It wants an alternation
test rather than a number, and a card of its own.
SAFETY-24's lo-only asymmetry proof re-run unchanged: 1296 combinations, 0
negative floors, `hi` +inf on every claim, every claim on the SITE actuator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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6b85acb0f1 |
CFG-04: an operator can declare a second inverter, and the shape was measured
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m30s
DEV-02 made every per-device value per-instance - rating, SoC, watchdogs, heartbeat, store keys - so the code stopped assuming one inverter. The options schema did not. `build_roster()` returned a list of exactly one and said so in its own docstring, and there was no `inverters:` key for an operator to write, so the roster could only ever be a roster of one. THE SHAPE, AND WHY IT WAS MEASURED RATHER THAN CHOSEN config.yaml had no list-of-objects anywhere, and `static_profile` carries a whole tariff structure as a JSON string in a `str?` precisely because a nested schema was doubted. That is a question about somebody else's software, so it was answered by running it: `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` (committed) runs Supervisor 2026.08.0's OWN `AppOptions` validator and `SCHEMA_APP_CONFIG`, out of the release image, against this repository's config.yaml. 2026.08.0 is the version the live install reports. The full transcript and the argument are in DECISIONS/CFG-04-inverter-roster.md. It accepts the list, enforces per-entry types, refuses a missing `name` / `setpoint_entity` / `max_w` BY NAME, renders the option in the UI as a repeatable section, and drops the key with a warning under an older schema - so a downgrade is not the forward trap in reverse. ⚠️ AND THE `inverters: []` DEFAULT IS LOAD-BEARING, WHICH IS THE MEASUREMENT THAT MATTERED MOST. Supervisor answers `Missing option 'inverters' in root` for an options blob that has no such key - which every existing install's has, since the key did not exist when they were written. `App.options` is the shipped `options:` block deep-merged with the operator's stored one, so the empty default is the difference between an upgrade nobody notices and an add-on that cannot start with a schema pinned to the version that would fix it. That is docs/deploy-rollback.md §4's trap in the FORWARD direction, found before it was sprung. The merger was checked too: lists override rather than concatenate, so a non-empty default could not have grown a roster behind the operator's back. NOTHING IS INHERITED, WHICH IS DEV-02 RESTATED AS A CONFIG RULE `name`, `setpoint_entity` and `max_w` are required of every entry. An entry that omits `soc_entity` has no SoC sensor; it does not borrow the flat one. A three-line fallback would have rebuilt the sibling-grading defect DEV-02 spent a card removing, in YAML. Defaults still live in exactly one place (CFG-03): there is no per-entry default anywhere, because there is no optional per-entry number. A flat `setpoint_entity` left set beside a declared roster is refused rather than ignored - it names an actuator nothing will write. TWO PERMISSIVE READERS IN SHIPPED CODE, AND THREE MORE IN THE CHECKS validate.py rules 5 and 6 compared their thresholds against the FLAT `max_w`. At a roster of two 2000 W units with `max_w: 5000` left over from a single-inverter install, `sign_disagree_w: 3000` passed rule 5 while SAFETY-02's watchdog could fire on NEITHER unit - rule 5's own failure mode, reached through rule 5. They read `unit_caps()` now, which at one inverter is `[max_w]` exactly. main.py's `run_control()` re-ran the device-rating check behind `if self.o.get("setpoint_entity")` - the flat key, which a roster leaves blank - so on a two-inverter site no inverter's `max_w` was graded against the device it is written to, and the skip was silent. `validate_unit_ranges()` grades each unit against its own ESPHome and runs unconditionally. test_peakguard.py's `read_option()` and `_schema_bound()` and test_inverter.py's `read_schema_max()` matched a STRIPPED line and took the first hit, so the nested per-inverter `max_w:` began outranking the flat one - silently, and correctly, because the two bounds are the same int(100,5000) today. A reader that is right by coincidence is this project's named failure mode. All three are anchored at exactly two spaces now; the file's two halves disambiguate `peak_cap_w` instead of first-match, and an ambiguous key raises rather than picking one. test_tariff.py's copy of the idiom went with them. THE AUDIT IS A CHECK, NOT A PROMISE test_inverter.py part 11 finds every config.yaml-reading function in the suite - transitively, because two of the readers CFG-04 had to change never name the file - EXECUTES each against a synthetic two-inverter config.yaml whose per-inverter numbers differ from its flat ones, and fails if any answers with the per-inverter value. The table is not maintained by hand: the signature decides, so the eleventh reader is named on its first run. config.yaml declares `inverters:` BEFORE `max_w:` on purpose and part 11 asserts that ordering, so the trap stays baited. SAFETY-28's `actuator_writers()` needed no change - it was already a structural, case-folding census - but until now there was no configuration in which two writers on one actuator could be WRITTEN DOWN. There is now, and it is refused. VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT Ten mutations run through tools/mutation_run.sh and observed red, listed in test_inverter.py part 12 with the check that bites each. Two survived the first run and the CHECKS were changed, not the table: the inheritance check had blank flat keys, so "inherited" and "not inherited" were the same empty string; and the `run_control()` check asserted a SOURCE LINE was present, which re-indenting it does not remove. Both are recorded in MUTATION.md's "the check's data cannot reach the failure it names" section, which now carries two more habits: assert on behaviour rather than on source text, and give a check whose failure mode is a hang a deadline. 19/19 green in the goodwe-addon-ci image. The one-inverter path is byte- identical: the whole existing suite runs unmodified against it. Version bumped to 0.6.0 - the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, so a schema change without a bump is a schema nobody reads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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7ef3d23245 |
SAFETY-31: measure circulating power, which nets to zero at the meter
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m28s
Inverter A charging at 3 kW while inverter B discharges at 3 kW nets ~0 W at
P1. The site reads idle while both packs are cycled through two round-trip
conversion losses continuously, for no benefit, and the wear is real.
NOTHING EXISTING CAN SEE IT, AND THAT IS STRUCTURAL. Every guard in this
add-on is a consumer of the NET figure at the grid connection: SAFETY-02's
sign watchdog gates on abs(grid_w) > 300 and the gate never opens at a netted
zero; the peak guard and the capacity tariff both bill grid exchange.
Circulating power is precisely the component of per-inverter power that the
sum destroys, so no threshold on any existing detector could reach it.
WHAT ALLOC-01 ALREADY COVERED, AND IS NOT RE-IMPLEMENTED HERE. Its AC 7
shipped the sign-coherence gate (allocator.REFUSE_SIGN, graded by
test_alloc.py part 6): an allocation whose shares carry two signs is REFUSED,
both units named, no shares returned. That is the COMMAND half - the allocator
can no longer command circulating power. This commit is the MEASUREMENT half:
circulation the allocator NEVER COMMANDED.
app/circulation.py the sensor and the trip
main.py site_circulating_w, the evaluation, the claim, the alarm
arbiter.py `circulation` classified SCOPE_SITE, with the argument
store.py a flat, site-level durable latch
mqtt.py sensor.goodwe_circulating_power
config.yaml two options, two schema ranges, CFG-03 discipline
THE SENSOR: sum(|Bi|) - |sum(Bi)|. Zero when the units pull the same way,
2*min(|Ba|,|Bb|) when they oppose. DERIVED FROM MEASURED PER-INVERTER POWER -
Inverter.batt, register 0x0518 - and never from the allocation record. The
cheap version would be simpler and worth nothing: ALLOC-01's gate already
guarantees the record is sign-coherent, so a record-derived sensor reads zero
BY CONSTRUCTION and can only confirm that the allocator agrees with itself,
which is the third failure mode MUTATION.md names. What this catches is a unit
ignoring or lagging its share, a stale share still being executed, a
maintenance or SAFETY-25 pin holding one unit while the loop drives the other,
or HW-01's power stage running its last instruction for 6 h 25 m with the
comms dead and the allocation record impeccable throughout. batt became
per-instance in DEV-02; before that this could not have been written.
VERIFIED BY MAKING ONE UNIT IGNORE ITS SHARE, on the TEST-19 two-master rig:
S = -2500 W shares a = -1250 W b = -1250 W <- record ok, ONE sign, sums
MEASURED A = -1250 W B = +1000 W <- hardware
sensor over the RECORD : 0 W
sensor over MEASURED power : 2000 W -> trips at 190 s
and the card's own scenario, A -3000 W against B +3000 W at zero house load:
the meter reads +0 W, the sensor reads 6000 W, and the shipped SignWatchdog's
predicate is FALSE on 30 of 30 cycles.
WHAT "ACTED ON" MEANS - decided, and recorded in DECISIONS/. The trip files
Claim.set("circulation", P_SAFETY, 0.0) on the SITE actuator: every inverter
to 0 W, latched. HW-01 established that commanding a wedged inverter achieves
nothing, so the remedy is not aimed at it. A circulating loop needs TWO
participants and one of them is THIS CONTROLLER, faithfully driving the
listening sibling into the one that stopped listening. Stopping (1) halves the
loop, which needs no cooperation from the wedged unit, and (2) - the more
important half - makes the residue VISIBLE at the meter instead of cancelled
at it, where every ordinary guard can finally see it. What it cannot do is
stop the wedged unit; the notification says so and names the isolator as the
last actuator. SITE-scoped because the quantity is defined over the roster and
is identically zero for any one unit - there is no fact of the matter about
which of two opposing inverters is the offender, so filing it per-unit would
invent an attribution and could park the only unit still listening.
THE WINDOW IS FROM THE RIG, NOT A ROUND NUMBER (AC 3). 924 closed-loop runs in
which NOTHING is faulty, over both families of legitimate opposition (7
reversals x 5 write staggers; 7 flap periods x 4 amplitudes), swept across the
whole range the schema accepts for gain and slew_w. Worst CONTINUOUS
legitimate opposition by threshold: 505.0 s at 100 W, 40.0 s at 250 W, 10.0 s
at 300 W, 5.0 s at 400 W and above. The knee is 400 W and it is the schema
floor - below it, ordinary operation holds the sensor over the line for
minutes and no window inside the 900 s billing quarter could tell that from a
fault. circulation_w 700 is 1.75x the knee, the headroom bought for inverter
B's ramp and lag being PLACEHOLDERS until SPIKE-04 measures them.
circulation_hold_s 75 clears three bounds: 15x the worst legitimate episode,
2.5x the firmware's own LINK_STALE_S veto, 12x inside the quarter. A momentary
opposition while one unit slews through zero is LEGITIMATE - writes are
serialised, so B's number lands up to a cycle after A's - and 0 of the 924
runs trip.
THE ALARM SURVIVES AN HA RESTART (SAFETY-34). persistent_notification is in
memory, which is exactly how the 2026-09-02 outage went unseen for 6 h 25 m
with the detector correct throughout. The latch is persisted to /data as flat
site-level keys and the notification is RE-RAISED on the first cycle after
every start, through the same code path as a fresh trip - two paths would be
two chances for the restart one to rot unnoticed.
AT N=1 NOTHING CHANGES (AC 5). |B| - |B| is 0 for every reading including one
nobody took, no claim is ever filed, the arbitration is byte-identical, and
the status page says n/a rather than claiming to watch something that cannot
happen.
VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT (AC 4). 18 mutations, all RED on named checks, each on
a freshly copied tree with no __pycache__ mounted :ro. M10 - the sensor
rewritten to read self.allocation.shares - is the headline: it takes AC 2 red.
Three mutations are +0 B, the risky delta, and are marked as such. One
equivalent mutant (the max(0.0,...) guard) is ARGUED rather than claimed:
searched over 700 000 rosters without a negative. One genuine SURVIVOR was
found and closed - publish() turning an unknown into a published 0 W, the
sensor's own None rule defeated one layer out. Full ledger in DECISIONS/.
arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE gains its ninth source, so test_peakguard.py's 10f and 10g
tripwires and test_arbiter.py's scope table went red on the line the append
was written. Updated deliberately, with the argument, as their own comments
require. Full 19-file suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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d5b1ef19b3 |
CFG-03: give maintenance option defaults one source of truth
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m44s
Option defaults for the maintenance cycle were declared in three places that
could disagree, and MAINT-04 proved they already did. config.yaml shipped
`maintenance_charge_w: 2000`; main.py carried TWO `opts.get(..., 2500)`
fallbacks; MaintConfig's dataclass carried a third `2500.0`. So an options dict
with the key ABSENT was ACCEPTED by validate.py's rule 6 - which read 2000 -
and then built by main.py at 2500, against a 2000 W ceiling:
options dict with maintenance_charge_w ABSENT, max_w=2000
validate_startup_config -> [] (accepted, no problems)
MaintConfig().charge_w -> 2500.0
arbiter.resolve() -> 0.0 W, contradiction=True
That is the bug rule 6 exists to refuse, passing rule 6. It is unreachable on a
Supervisor install, which always supplies every key from config.yaml, and fully
reachable from sim/inject.py and from the test suite - which is where anyone
debugging maintenance actually works.
MAINT-04 shipped a TRIPWIRE and said so: test_validate.py pinned all three
literals and asserted the consequence through the real arbiter, so the
divergence could not silently widen or be half-closed. Its PASSING CONDITION
WAS THE BUG. Both it and validate.py's comment said to delete each other when
the divergence was closed. It is closed, so both are deleted.
THE DIVERGENCE WAS WIDER THAN ONE KEY. `maintenance_discharge_w` had the
identical three-way split (config.yaml 2000, MaintConfig 2500) and the card
named only the charge side. Closing one and leaving its twin would have
satisfied the numbers and left three sources of truth one line down, which is
the state that produced the bug. Both are closed, and so is the whole family:
all eight `maintenance_*` keys go through the same mechanism.
WHAT THE SINGLE SOURCE IS. config.yaml's `options:` block - it is what the
Supervisor reads and what the operator edits, so it wins by definition. There
is now exactly one in-code copy, `maintenance.MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS`, which is
TARIFF-02's `PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS` and SAFETY-24's `PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS`
pattern applied to the family that named the card - validate.py's rule 8 comment
already called that "CFG-03 read as a rule rather than as a complaint", so this
makes the rule hold where it was first broken rather than inventing a fourth
mechanism for one option family.
A MIRROR RATHER THAN A RUNTIME READ, and the reason is mechanical: the
Dockerfile copies `app/` and `run.sh` into the image and NOT config.yaml. The
running add-on cannot open the file it is configured by, so there is nothing to
read at 03:00 on a client's Pi, and a YAML-subset parser that could fail at
import is a new way for the add-on not to start. What makes the copy safe is
that test_maintenance.py pins every entry by READING the shipped file - drift is
a CI failure, not a comment.
EVERY OTHER SITE NOW DERIVES FROM IT OR HAS CEASED TO EXIST:
* MaintConfig's eight dataclass defaults are indexed out of the mirror. No
numeric literal survives in the class that held the third opinion.
* `MaintConfig.from_options()` is the ONLY place in the add-on that reads a
`maintenance_*` option. main.py's eight inline `opts.get(key, <literal>)`
calls are gone: moving the read next to the mirror means the fallback cannot
be anything but the mirror, because there is no literal in sight of it to
disagree with. It uses `key in opts` rather than truthiness, so a shipped
`false` or `0` is honoured instead of being quietly replaced by the default
- this card's own bug in a different costume.
* main.py's SECOND fallback site - the cheap-window charge floor at the
P_MAINT_SHAPE claim - reads `self.maint.cfg.charge_w` instead of re-opening
the options dict with its own literal. The Controller had already parsed
this once in __init__; asking the object that owns it cannot drift from it,
and the rate the shaping asks for can no longer be a different number from
the rate the state machine drains at on the same install.
* validate.py's rule 6 and its `maintenance_discharge_w` warning take their
fallbacks from the mirror.
WHERE THE RANGE LIVES, STATED AND CHECKED. config.yaml's `schema:` block carries
`maintenance_charge_w: int(500,5000)` - a fourth declaration site of a different
kind. It is a BOUND, not a default, so it is not this bug; but leaving the
question open is how a fifth site arrives. The decision recorded in config.yaml
and in maintenance.py is: bounds live in the schema block ONLY, because the
Supervisor is what enforces them and the Supervisor reads only that file, so a
Python copy of `int(500,5000)` would be a place to disagree and nothing else.
test_maintenance.py checks both halves of that: every mirrored key must have a
schema entry - without one the Supervisor drops the option and the add-on
silently runs on the mirror instead of the operator's value - and every shipped
default must lie INSIDE its own range, since a default the schema rejects is a
config that cannot be re-entered once it is edited. What the schema grammar
cannot express is a relation BETWEEN keys (`maintenance_charge_w` against
`max_w`), which is exactly why rule 6 is written in Python and why it does not
belong in the mirror either.
THE REPLACEMENT CHECKS, AND HOW THEY WERE VERIFIED. test_validate.py's new
section exercises the same four consumers the defect ran through, the same way:
the validator ACCEPTS a dict with every maintenance key missing; a REAL
Controller built from that same dict holds 2000 W (through main.py, not through
a regex over its source); `MaintConfig()` answers 2000 W with no dict at all;
and the real arbiter emits `-2000 W, limited by supervised(max_w)` instead of
`0 W, contradiction=True`. test_maintenance.py pins the mirror to config.yaml in
both directions - equal values, and full coverage of every `maintenance_*` key
the file ships, so a ninth key cannot arrive unmirrored - and asserts the
consumers move as a RELATION rather than against numbers, reading MaintConfig's
defaults back out of `dataclasses.fields()`.
Each new check was verified by BREAKING the thing it watches and observing red,
this project's rule:
1. config.yaml -> 1500, mirror left at 2000: test_maintenance 1 FAILED,
test_validate 4 FAILED.
2. config.yaml AND the mirror -> 1500: green again, and every consumer moved
together - MaintConfig() 1500 W, the Controller 1500 W, and the arbiter
`-1500 W, limited by maintenance(cheap-window charge)` where it had said
`-2000 W, limited by supervised(max_w)`. That is AC4: change the single
source and watch the consumers follow.
3. `charge_w: float = 2500.0` retyped into the dataclass: 2 FAILED in each of
the two files.
4. `opts.get("maintenance_charge_w", 2500)` restored in main.py: 1 FAILED,
naming the file and the literal it found.
5. `maintenance_hold_min` deleted from config.yaml's options block: 3 FAILED.
Full suite 17/17 in goodwe-addon-ci, twice, once under parallel load.
Stale prose that asserted the now-closed divergence as current is corrected in
app/watchdog.py, test_watchdog.py and test_peakguard.py - watchdog.py's example
still uses 1500 W, but because the point of the example is a charge strictly
inside the ceiling, not because 2500 is what ships.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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adminandClaude Opus 5
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182102eeaf |
SAFETY-25: say what peak_soc_floor bounds, and measure what it does not
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m41s
peak_soc_floor reads like a pack-wide reserve and is not one. The
grid-following loop has no SoC guard of any kind, so on a sustained-load
evening it discharges straight past that number and keeps going until the
pack's own BMS cut-out stops it.
The gap has now been written down four times without being filed -
SAFETY-18's finding (freeze.py:18), SAFETY-24's module note, its PR body,
and its honestly-uncaught 13th mutation - and never once measured. It is
measured here, on the committed 2026-08-20 capture, driving the SHIPPED
control.compute(), peakguard.decide(), peakguard.claim() and the real
arbiter.resolve() in main.py's order:
19:00-22:00 UTC, 830 W mean, minimum 701 W, zero export in the window
reference pack (300 Ah x 51.2 V x DoD 90) started at 21 %, one point
above peak_soc_floor
ends at 10.0 % - the bms_soc_floor cut-out
1525 Wh delivered by the LOOP over 587 cycles
549 cycles below peak_soc_floor, 343 of them still discharging
0 cycles on which the peak guard filed any floor at all
AND IT IS A BEHAVIOUR, NOT A CONFIG VALUE. The same evening ends at
9.9715 % at peak_soc_floor = 5, 11, 20 and 60 - the shipped value and both
ends of the schema range - identical to four decimal places. The option an
operator would reach for cannot move the number by any amount at all. On
the same day's high-load block the two states coexist: 49 cycles reporting
PEAK GUARD FLOOR-LIMITED and, on all 49 of them, the arbiter simultaneously
granting the loop up to 2000 W of discharge.
WHY SAFETY-24 COULD NOT CLOSE IT. The peak guard files a `lo` limit - a
LOWER bound on the setpoint. That asymmetry is exactly what makes it
trustworthy: a reviewer proved across 19,800 combinations that it can never
lower a target, cap a discharge or contradict the arbiter. The same property
makes it structurally incapable of stopping a discharge the loop itself
wants. A floor on the guard cannot become a floor on the pack by being
raised, and the sweep above is that sentence measured.
WHAT THIS COMMIT CHANGES IS THE HONESTY, on the four surfaces an operator
actually reads. That half is required whichever way the open question is
answered, and it is the real misstatement on the live system today:
* config.yaml, beside the option itself - it BOUNDS THE PEAK GUARD ONLY
and is NOT A PACK-WIDE RESERVE, with the replayed evening and the sweep;
* DOCS.md, in the options table and in a new section carrying the figures;
* the STATUS-PAGE ROW for a floor-limited guard. This is the one line a
human reads at the moment the guard stops discharging, and read alone it
says "the battery is being held at peak_soc_floor" - which the replay
shows is false in every cycle that row is rendered;
* the PERSISTENT NOTIFICATION, which outlives the page. It now names what
has stopped (the guard buying a lower bill) and what has not (the pack
being spent).
peakguard.py and freeze.py carry the measurement beside the findings they
already recorded, so the next reader does not have to take the caveat on
trust.
THE PRODUCT DECISION IS NOT TAKEN HERE, and must not be. Whether the loop
gets a reserve floor of its own decides whether this house's battery may
discharge to the BMS floor on a heavy evening; that moves real energy and it
is the owner's call. DECISIONS/SAFETY-25-loop-soc-floor.md is the memo AC 1
asks for: the options, what each costs, what each protects, weighed against
MAINT-01 (a pack repeatedly at the BMS floor is the SoC-drift condition the
maintenance cycle exists to correct, and an over-tight reserve fights it from
the other side) and against the fact that this would be the FIFTH SoC key -
OPT-04's arbitrage_soc_floor fired SAFETY-24's "revisit if a third floor
appears" trigger unremarked, so SAFETY-27's naming decision should land
first. It carries a recommendation and says plainly that it is not a
decision.
It also records a trap found while writing it, and now CHECKED through the
real arbiter rather than described: the obvious shape of a loop-side floor
is a `hi` limit at P_LOOP, and filed while the peak guard is asking for a
positive floor that is `lo > hi` - which arbiter.py resolves to a
CONTRADICTION at 0 W, the battery PARKED in the one quarter of the month
that sets the bill. It is the same crossing-limits hazard
shaping_suspended() already exists to avoid. The ordering
`bms_soc_floor < loop_soc_floor <= peak_soc_floor` removes it provably,
because wherever the reserve binds the guard is already floor-limited and
files lo = 0; both halves are run in part 10d.
test_peakguard.py part 10 is a TRIPWIRE, not a guarantee. It records a
defect and goes RED the day somebody builds a loop-side floor, so the
exposure cannot change size under a green suite and closing it has to be
deliberate. Part 11's mutation 13 stays honestly NOT CAUGHT - nothing
prevents the loop discharging past this floor - but it now reports a number
instead of a sentence.
Verified: 16/16 suites green in the CI image. Eight mutations, each against
a tree copied fresh with __pycache__ excluded and mounted :ro, so no .pyc
existed to go stale (MUTATION.md's structural immunity, the same one it
records for CI); byte deltas +61, -8, -465, -430, -1088, -46, file deleted,
and -95; none is +0 B. All eight go red on the named check:
M1 peakguard.claim() also files hi=floor_w -> 7 red, incl. 10c
M2 control.compute() gain forced to 0 -> 6 red, incl. 10a/10b
M3 scope sentence removed from the status row -> 10e red
M4 scope sentence removed from the notification -> 10e red
M5 scope paragraph removed from config.yaml -> 10e red
M6 scope bullet weakened in DOCS.md -> 10e red
M7 the decision memo deleted -> 10e red
M8 arbiter clamps crossing limits instead of
reporting a contradiction -> 5 red, incl. 10d
AC 2 is left explicitly OPEN, pending the owner's answer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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