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DEV-02: merge release/1.0, and close the two review blockers
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m15s
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PR #43 was rejected on two findings and had gone unmergeable behind SAFETY-28
and the ALLOC-01 fix. This is the merge commit; the conflict resolution and both
fixes are below, because a merge that also changes behaviour has to say so.

THE MERGE, AND WHAT IT COST
===========================
Two conflicts in main.py, both where SAFETY-28 and this card touched the same
method:

  * `write_setpoint()` split into a site entry point plus a per-unit
    `_write_unit()` here, while SAFETY-28 put its record gate in the old
    single-unit body. `write_refusal()` now takes the INVERTER it is about.
    Asking it with `self.unit` - as release/1.0 does - would authorise A's share
    on B's wire, and would also trip test_inverter.py part 1's AST scan, which
    goes red on any read of a Controller N=1 view inside Controller.
  * the SAFETY-28 gate sits above the clamp and below the non-finite coercion,
    exactly where release/1.0 put it, and is now asked about `inv`.

Fallout the merge produced in the checks, re-aimed rather than relaxed:

  * every fixture that calls `write_setpoint()` DIRECTLY - the clamp probe, the
    hung-heartbeat experiment and its serialised counterfactual, the split
    deadline probe - now arms a real allocation record first. test_inverter.py
    grows an `arm()` built through the shipped `resolve()`, the same shape
    test_clamp.py's is: the per-unit envelopes are filed as real `supervised`
    claims and the site target is their sum, so the water-fill has exactly one
    answer and the fixture cannot quietly become its own allocator.
  * test_clamp.py's two-unit failsafe fixture assigned `c.units`, which DEV-02
    made a derived property with no setter. It appends a real `Inverter`.

BLOCKER 1 - AC 4's ARBITER-BOUND EVIDENCE WAS VACUOUS
=====================================================
test_peakguard.py claimed "each unit's `supervised` bound is ITS OWN `max_w` -
give inverter B a different rating and the claim filed on inverter B moves with
it", and compared B's bound against `_b2.max_w`. `second_inverter()` DEFAULTED
B's rating to `LIVE_MAX_W`, which is A's. IT COMPARED (-5000, 5000) AGAINST
(-5000, 5000): a number against itself, unable to observe the failure it named.

Reproduced: filing the per-unit `device`/`supervised` claims from
`self.inverters[0]`'s numbers while leaving `actuator=self.actuator_of(..., inv)`
alone left ALL 19 FILES GREEN. At a roster of two with A=5000/B=3000 that makes
inverter B's planned envelope (-5000, 5000) instead of (-3000, 3000) - a 2000 W
over-command the arbiter believes is supervised. It is a DIFFERENT defect from
the actuator variant the static routing pin catches, and only the actuator
variant was in the mutation table.

  * `second_inverter()` gives B 3000 W - a hypothesis, marked as one - for every
    fixture in the file, so no check there can compare B against A by accident.
  * the claim is asserted against LITERAL numbers rather than against an
    expression that can read the same object twice, for `supervised` AND for
    `device` (whose `dev` had the same defect), plus the envelope the ARBITER
    RESOLVED for B - a claim filed right and resolved wrong is the same defect
    one layer down.
  * a PRECONDITION check fails if the two ratings are ever made equal again.
  * the BOUND mutation is in the table, beside the actuator one, and was
    observed RED (3 checks in test_peakguard.py) via tools/mutation_run.sh.

⚠️ THIRD INSTANCE THIS SESSION of a check whose DATA cannot reach the failure it
names - ARB-03's call-site scan saw 3 of 8 appends, ALLOC-01's replay generator
saw 0 escapes where a widened one saw 39,991. MUTATION.md gains a section for it
beside the stale-bytecode and masking ones, and the rule is written at the line:
ANY CHECK ASSERTING "X DIFFERS FROM Y" MUST BE RUN ONCE WITH X AND Y ACTUALLY
MADE DIFFERENT.

BLOCKER 2 - THE LATCH WAS SILENTLY DISARMED BY THE ROLLBACK ROUND TRIP
======================================================================
store.py's rule 2 keeps the flat keys "so a rollback still finds its latch". The
operator path that rule contemplates is a ROUND TRIP, and this card lost the
latch on it:

  1. install migrates          -> schema_version=1, unit/inverter-a/... = False
  2. operator DOWNGRADES; SAFETY-02 trips inside the downgrade window and the
     old add-on writes only the flat `sign_tripped: true`
  3. operator upgrades again   -> `rep.ran` is False, so `_grade_store_migration()`
     returned early, and `Inverter.__init__` read the namespaced key: False

Observed: the controller came up with `sign_wd.tripped = False` while
/data/state.json said `sign_tripped: true`. That is store.py's own header
sentence - "the file still says sign_tripped: true, the banner is green, and the
controller resumes driving the wrong way" - rebuilt by the version marker. A
firmware version change with a rollback path was performed on this site on
2026-09-02, so this is not hypothetical.

Three changes, each graded by a mutation observed RED:

  * THE OPERATOR'S CLEAR CLEARS BOTH SPELLINGS. That is what removes the
    "re-arm forever" objection the `rep.ran` gate existed to answer: with the
    fossil cleared, `flat True + namespaced False` is unambiguously a
    downgrade-window latch.
  * A TRIP MIRRORS THE FLAT PAIR. Rule 2 only ever covered the latch present AT
    MIGRATION TIME - nothing flat was written for a trip taken afterwards, so an
    operator who downgraded found `sign_tripped: false` and came up DRIVING.
    store.py claimed the staleness could only fail toward a SPURIOUS latch. It
    could not; that sentence is corrected rather than left standing.
  * THE GUARD RUNS ON EVERY START, and asks the STORE - not the roster - whether
    anything namespaced is latched. A mirrored trip on B must not re-arm a
    healthy A, and the store is the right place to ask because it holds every
    `unit/*/sign_tripped` this install has written, including one belonging to a
    unit that is not in today's roster.

Graded by the three-step scenario itself, run end to end in test_inverter.py
part 2, with all three preconditions asserted - including that the catching
start did NOT migrate anything, which is what used to skip the guard. Part 2's
idempotence check now PRESSES the button instead of hand-writing the store,
because the state it used to construct is not one the shipped clear path can
produce. Part 3 grades the mirror and the clear on a real roster of two.

test_watchdog.py's "the flat key is NOT written" assertion is re-aimed rather
than deleted: its argument was right about the READ and wrong about the WRITE.
Nothing at runtime reads that key, and the one thing that does ignores it
whenever any namespaced latch is set - which a sibling's trip always leaves.
What its absence actually cost was the rollback.

HANDOVER.md and DOCS.md said the flat key "is never read again", which was the
instruction an operator clearing a trip by hand would follow. Both corrected: it
is a maintained rollback view, it IS read on every start, and clearing a trip by
hand means clearing both spellings.

MUTATIONS THIS ROUND, each applied on a purged tree via tools/mutation_run.sh
and observed RED:
  * per-unit `device`/`supervised` BOUNDS from `self.inverters[0]`, actuator
    left correct                                   -> test_peakguard.py 10g
  * `_grade_store_migration()` gated on `rep.ran`   -> test_inverter.py part 2
  * the operator's clear leaving the flat keys set  -> test_inverter.py part 2/3
  * a trip not mirroring the flat pair              -> test_inverter.py part 3
  * the guard asking only `self.inverters[0]`       -> test_inverter.py part 3

19/19 files green on the merged tree. No hardware was touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
This commit is contained in:
glenn schrooyen
2026-09-03 23:37:23 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent d48c6b971d f594543988
commit 753f700539
14 changed files with 1379 additions and 120 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
HANDOVER.md
+16 -9
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@@ -85,15 +85,22 @@ rejected.
add-on will not clear a trip.** That is the point of it; use the *Start / stop
control* button twice, or delete the trip from `/data/state.json`.
⚠️ **DEV-02 renamed that key and the old name is now a fossil.** There is one
`SignWatchdog` per inverter, so the latch lives under
`unit/<inverter>/sign_tripped` — `unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped` on a
single-inverter site. The pre-DEV-02 flat `sign_tripped` is still written in
the file on purpose (so a rollback finds its latch) and is **never read again**,
so deleting it clears nothing. An install upgrading is migrated on first start,
and if the latch cannot be made to survive that migration the controller
re-arms it from the old key and says so in the log rather than coming up
disarmed.
⚠️ **DEV-02 renamed that key. There is one `SignWatchdog` per inverter, so the
LIVE latch lives under `unit/<inverter>/sign_tripped`** —
`unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped` on a single-inverter site. **That is the one to
delete if you are clearing a trip by hand**; deleting the flat one alone clears
nothing.
⚠️ **The flat `sign_tripped` is still maintained, though — it is the ROLLBACK
VIEW, not a fossil.** It is written alongside the namespaced key on a trip and
cleared alongside it when you press *Start / stop control*, so an add-on you
**downgrade** past this version still finds the latch it should. It is also read
on **every** start, and the one disagreement it can produce is acted on: *the
flat key says tripped and no inverter came up latched* means the latch was
written by an older add-on while this install was rolled back — or the migration
lost it — and the controller **re-arms the latch and shouts in the log** rather
than coming up disarmed with a green banner. So if you edit `/data/state.json`
by hand, clear **both** spellings or the next start will put the trip back.
⚠️ `test_loop.py` takes about **95 seconds** (measured 93 s) and that is not a bug. It
drives the real control loop, which sleeps 1 s a tick, eight times over, to prove a
goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md
+64
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@@ -64,6 +64,70 @@ the P1 reading, the site integrator, and the tariff quarter.
two-unit figure above is architecture, not a measurement of a second device;
the second rating in the checks is marked as a hypothesis.
**The write path is gated on the allocation record, not on how many config keys
exist (SAFETY-28).** specs §1.5 makes *"any configuration in which two writers
can reach one actuator"* a non-goal. Until now that non-goal was enforced by
`len(validate.ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS) == 1` - there is exactly one option key, so a
second writer is not expressible in the schema. True, and a statement about **the
shape of the options schema rather than about the writes**: add a per-inverter
config (CFG-04) and there are two real writers with that length still 1, so the
check stays green while the property it protects is gone. `sim/inject.py`'s
`two_writers` scenario asserted on the same tuple and went green with it.
* **The enforcement moved onto the writes.** `write_setpoint()` now refuses any
value that is not in **this tick's** allocation record from ALLOC-01:
`Controller.write_refusal()` asks `Allocation.authorises()` whether the single
allocator placed exactly this number, for this unit, on this tick. A second
writer with arithmetic of its own cannot satisfy that - its number appears in
no record - so it has to file a `Claim` and go through `resolve()`, which is
the one allocator. "Exactly one allocator per shared resource" stops being a
convention and becomes something the write path checks.
* **A refusal is a refusal, not a log line.** The unauthorised value is replaced
with **0 W and written**. Returning instead would leave the inverter latched
on its last command with the ESP32 heartbeat still being fed - holding an
unauthorised setpoint quietly, which is the outcome the gate exists to prevent.
* **A stale record cannot be replayed.** Every record now carries the `tick` it
was made for, handed *in* by the caller so `allocator.plan()` stays the pure
function `test_alloc.py` part 10 grades. The counter advances **once per
resolution, not once per loop iteration**: a new allocation makes the previous
record stale immediately, while the "inputs missing, not yet stale" hold -
which returns before the allocator runs, so one dropped meter reading does not
zero the inverter - leaves the standing authorisation intact for the heartbeat.
An **unstamped** record authorises nothing; "I cannot say when I was made"
fails closed.
* **⚠️ 0 W IS AUTHORISED UNCONDITIONALLY, SO THE FAILSAFE CANNOT DEADLOCK BEHIND
THE GATE.** `write_setpoint()` is also how layer 2 commands zero, and every
path that does so - `cycle()`'s two refusal branches, `shutdown()`, the
operator's stop button - runs while the allocator has *refused*. A gate that
asked the allocator's permission to command zero would block the safety write
behind the very component whose failure the safety write answers. The
exemption is on the **value**, not on a `failsafe=True` flag a caller asserts,
and the argument is that the hazard §1.5 names is N-times loop gain from
*broadcast*: at `S = 0` the broadcast and the correct allocation coincide -
`a_i = 1` for every unit gives every unit 0 W, which is exactly its share - so
there is no over-command to make at zero. Driven end to end through the real
refusal branch in `test_clamp.py` part 7c.
* **`unmet_w` is still not `ok`.** The gate reads `ok` and the unit's share and
never `unmet_w`, because an allocation that could not place every watt is
still safe to write; fusing them would let one saturated inverter park the
whole site. Graded on a record with 3800 W unmet.
* **`ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS` is replaced by `actuator_writers()`**, which counts
**writers per actuator** rather than option keys, and finds them by walking
the options tree rather than by looking for a container name CFG-04 has not
chosen yet. Two inverters with two entities are accepted - that is what the
per-inverter roster is *for*; two declarations aimed at one entity are refused,
naming the actuator and every writer pointed at it. The tuple survives only as
the enumeration a census needs, and nothing asserts on its length any more.
* **What neither check observes, said out loud.** The census sees *configured*
writers, so a second write path added in **code** is invisible to it - exactly
as it was invisible to the tuple. That half is closed at runtime by the record
gate, which does not care what the options look like or who called the method.
* Verified by breaking it: seven mutations on a purged tree via
`tools/mutation_run.sh` - removing the gate, making the zero exit an amnesty,
dropping the tick comparison, deleting the census refusal, fusing `unmet_w`
into `ok`, freezing the tick on the live path, and moving the gate below the
clamp - each turn `test_clamp.py` or `test_validate.py` red.
**The site grid target is now ALLOCATED across N inverters, sum-invariant, and
never broadcast (ALLOC-01).** `ARB-03` left `allocate()` as a documented seam
that passed through at N<=1 and DECLINED at N>=2; this fills it. The new
goodwe_controller/DOCS.md
+5 -1
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@@ -308,7 +308,11 @@ does. That is deliberate on both counts:
driving the wrong way, three minutes later, forever.
- The trip is written to `/data/state.json` — under
`unit/<inverter>/sign_tripped`, one key per inverter since DEV-02, so a trip
caused by one inverter cannot latch another — and restored on startup. Restarting
caused by one inverter cannot latch another — and restored on startup. The
pre-DEV-02 flat `sign_tripped` is written and cleared alongside it as the
**rollback view**, so downgrading the add-on past DEV-02 still finds the
latch, and a trip taken while the install is rolled back is re-armed by the
version that comes back up rather than silently lost. Restarting
the add-on is the first thing most people try when they see a red banner, and
a latch that a restart clears would bring the controller back **armed, into the
same fault, unattended** — and under a Supervisor that restarts a crashed add-on
goodwe_controller/MUTATION.md
+57
View File
@@ -127,6 +127,63 @@ Two rules come out of it, and both are cheap:
function, that pair is the first thing to try — TEST-16's two survivors were
adjacent lines in one function and neither was individually live.
## The third way a check lies: its DATA cannot reach the failure it names
Stale bytecode manufactures survivors from a mutation that never ran. Masking
manufactures them from a second guard doing the first one's work. This one
manufactures them from a **fixture**: the check runs, the assertion is
evaluated, the sentence above it is true — and the numbers it compares are
arranged so that the failure it describes could not have changed the answer.
It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. Three instances in one week, all
found by review rather than by a red line:
* **ARB-03** shipped a call-site scan asserting that every `claims.append` in
`cycle()` routes through `actuator_of()`. Its own parse **saw 3 of the 8
appends**; the other five were invisible to it and would have passed however
they were routed.
* **ALLOC-01** shipped a replay generator to hunt for envelope escapes. It found
**0**. A widened generator over the same allocator found **39,991**.
* **DEV-02** shipped `"each unit's supervised bound is ITS OWN max_w — give
inverter B a different rating and the claim filed on inverter B moves with
it"`, comparing inverter B's bound against `_b2.max_w`. The fixture defaulted
B's rating to A's, so it compared `(-5000, 5000)` against `(-5000, 5000)` —
**a number against itself**. Filing both per-unit bounds from
`self.inverters[0]` left **all 19 files green**.
Note what these have in common with a masked rung: the mutation *runs*, and the
suite is *honestly* green. Nothing in a purge, a fingerprint or a disassembly
can see it, because the code under test really did behave identically on the
stimulus it was given. The defect is upstream of the assertion, in what the
check was handed.
**The rule, and it is one line:**
> **Any check asserting "X differs from Y" must be run once with X and Y
> actually made different.**
Three cheap habits fall out of it, and all three are now used in this repository:
1. **Write the PRECONDITION as its own check.** `test_peakguard.py` 10g asserts
that A and B have different ratings *before* it asserts that B's bound is
B's. If a later edit makes them equal again, the precondition goes red rather
than the claim going quietly vacuous.
2. **Assert against literals, not against the expression under test.**
`== [(-_b2.max_w, _b2.max_w)]` cannot distinguish "B's number" from "the
number this fixture happens to have twice"; `== (-3000.0, 3000.0)` beside a
printed `A = 5000` can.
3. **Print what the check saw.** Every one of the three above would have been
caught by a human reading one line of output — `supervised bounds by
actuator: {'inverter-a': (-5000, 5000), 'inverter-b': (-5000, 5000)}` is
self-evidently not evidence of a difference.
And the mutation-table consequence: **a variant is not covered because a
near-miss of it is.** DEV-02's table listed the *actuator* variant of the
per-unit claim defect (`device`/`supervised` filed without `inv`), which the
static routing pin catches. The *bound* variant — right actuator, wrong
numbers — is a different defect with a different fix, and it was absent. Both
are in the table now.
## Where each surface stands
* **Local and dev-harness runs — the exposed one.** This is where FCST-03 hit
goodwe_controller/app/allocator.py
+80 -5
View File
@@ -197,12 +197,82 @@ class Allocation:
quantisation_w: float = 0.0
refused: str | None = None
passthrough: bool = False # N<=1: the share IS the site target, unrounded
# SAFETY-28. WHICH TICK PRODUCED THIS RECORD, as an opaque token minted by
# the caller - `Controller.alloc_tick`, incremented once per resolution.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS AN INPUT, NOT A COUNTER THIS MODULE KEEPS. `plan()` is a pure
# function and part 10 of test_alloc.py grades that by asserting the module
# holds no state at all; a serial number incremented in here would be
# exactly the cached-across-ticks thing the envelope rule forbids, wearing a
# different hat. So the tick is handed in and handed back out, and the
# freshness question is answered by whoever owns the clock.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT DEFAULTS TO None, WHICH THE WRITE GATE REFUSES. A record built
# without a tick is not "tick zero", it is a record that cannot say when it
# was made - and the gate fails closed on it. Every test in this repository
# that calls `plan()` for its arithmetic gets None and does not care;
# main.py stamps every record it puts on the write path.
tick: int | None = None
@property
def ok(self) -> bool:
"""The one boolean SAFETY-28's write gate reads."""
return self.refused is None
def authorises(self, unit: str, value: float, tick: int | None) -> str | None:
"""Why `unit` may NOT be written `value` on tick `tick`, or None if it may.
⚠️ THIS IS THE QUESTION SAFETY-28 REPLACED A CONFIG-SHAPE PROXY WITH, and
it lives on the record rather than in main.py so that the record is the
thing that answers it. Before this, "two writers can never reach one
actuator" was enforced by `len(validate.ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS) == 1` -
true, but a statement about the OPTIONS SCHEMA. Add a per-inverter
config (CFG-04) and there are two real writers with that length still 1:
the check stays green while the property it protects is gone.
Asking the record instead makes the property mechanical. A number
reaches the wire only if the single allocator placed it, on THIS tick,
for THIS unit. A second writer with its own arithmetic cannot produce
one, because it does not appear in a record; and it cannot borrow an old
one, because the tick has moved on.
⚠️ `unmet_w` IS NOT CONSULTED AND MUST NOT BE. An allocation that could
not place every watt is still SAFE TO WRITE - see this class's own
docstring. Fusing the two would let one saturated inverter park the
whole site, which is a worse outcome than the hole this gate closes.
⚠️ NOR IS 0 W ITS BUSINESS. The caller answers that one before it asks
this, and the reason is at `Controller.write_refusal()`: a gate that can
block the failsafe is worse than the hole it closes.
"""
if tick is None or self.tick is None or self.tick != tick:
return (f"the allocation record on hand was made on tick "
f"{self.tick!r} and this is tick {tick!r} - a record whose "
f"envelopes have moved cannot authorise a write")
if not self.ok:
return f"the allocator refused this tick ({self.explain()})"
if unit not in self.shares:
return (f"{unit} has no share in this tick's allocation "
f"({self.explain()})")
share = self.shares[unit]
if value != share:
return (f"{value:+.0f} W is not {unit}'s share of this tick's "
f"allocation, which is {share:+.0f} W ({self.explain()})")
# ⚠️ THE RECORD IS ASKED WHETHER IT AGREES WITH ITSELF. `within_envelope`
# exists because the half-open clamp defect once shipped a plan reading
# `inverter-a -> +500 W in [2000, +inf]` - stating the floor and a share
# below it in one breath - and `UnitPlan.explain()` renders that as
# ENVELOPE VIOLATED, DO NOT WRITE. This is the DO NOT WRITE.
#
# Unreachable at the shipped roster of one, where the pass-through's
# interval is (-inf, +inf) and every number is inside it. Graded anyway,
# on a constructed record, because the branch PR #40's reviewer replaced
# with `if False:` was unreachable too and the whole suite stayed green.
for p in self.plans:
if p.unit == unit and not p.within_envelope:
return (f"the record contradicts itself: {p.explain()}")
return None
def explain(self) -> str:
"""One line an operator can act on."""
if self.refused is not None:
@@ -315,7 +385,7 @@ def _fill(order, weights, cap, amount):
def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
site_priority=None, site_key="site") -> Allocation:
site_priority=None, site_key="site", tick=None) -> Allocation:
"""Divide the site grid target `target_w` across the units in `bounds`.
`bounds` unit name -> that unit's interval for THIS TICK (arbiter stage 1,
@@ -333,6 +403,11 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
`site_priority` the priority of the SITE claim that chose `target_w`. It is
what a unit's own winning SET is weighed against - see PINS.
`site_key` the name to use when there are no units at all.
`tick` an opaque token identifying the tick this record is FOR, handed
straight back on the record. SAFETY-28's write gate compares it
against the tick it is writing on, so that a record cannot be
replayed after its envelopes have moved. It is an input rather
than something this module counts, for the reason on the field.
⚠️ N<=1 IS A PASS-THROUGH AND IS BYTE-IDENTICAL TO WHAT SHIPPED. The share
IS the site target, as a float, unclamped and unrounded. That is §6.2's N=1
@@ -380,7 +455,7 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
shares={}, plans=(), dropped=(),
unmet_w=int(round(float(target_w))),
quantisation_w=float(int(round(float(target_w)))) - float(target_w),
refused=f"{REFUSE_SCOPE}: " + "; ".join(scope_errors))
refused=f"{REFUSE_SCOPE}: " + "; ".join(scope_errors), tick=tick)
if len(units) <= 1:
only = units[0] if units else site_key
@@ -390,7 +465,7 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
shares={only: share},
plans=(UnitPlan(only, int(round(share)), -inf, inf, 1.0,
"N<=1: the share IS the site target"),),
passthrough=True)
passthrough=True, tick=tick)
w = {u: 1.0 if weights is None else float(weights.get(u, 1.0))
for u in units}
@@ -443,7 +518,7 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
return Allocation(
target_w=float(target_w), sum_w=sum_w, shares={}, plans=(),
dropped=tuple(dropped), unmet_w=sum_w, quantisation_w=quant,
refused=why)
refused=why, tick=tick)
# --- REFUSAL 2: nobody is available ------------------------------------
if not considered:
@@ -576,4 +651,4 @@ def plan(target_w, bounds, *, weights=None, live=None, scope_errors=(),
return Allocation(target_w=float(target_w), sum_w=sum_w, shares=shares,
plans=tuple(plans), dropped=tuple(dropped),
unmet_w=int(unmet), quantisation_w=quant)
unmet_w=int(unmet), quantisation_w=quant, tick=tick)
goodwe_controller/app/arbiter.py
+23 -5
View File
@@ -416,11 +416,19 @@ def allocate(target_w: float, bounds: dict, *, weights=None, live=None,
def allocate_record(target_w: float, bounds: dict, *, weights=None, live=None,
scope_errors=(), site_priority=None) -> tuple:
"""`allocate()` plus the record - `(shares, allocated, allocation)`."""
scope_errors=(), site_priority=None, tick=None) -> tuple:
"""`allocate()` plus the record - `(shares, allocated, allocation)`.
`tick` is SAFETY-28's freshness token: it identifies the tick the record is
FOR and is handed straight through to `allocator.plan()`. Left None the
record is UNSTAMPED, which the write gate refuses - so a caller that intends
the record to authorise a write must pass one. Every existing caller in this
repository wants the arithmetic and not the authority, and gets None.
"""
rec = allocator.plan(target_w, bounds, weights=weights, live=live,
scope_errors=scope_errors,
site_priority=site_priority, site_key=ACTUATOR_SITE)
site_priority=site_priority, site_key=ACTUATOR_SITE,
tick=tick)
return rec.shares, rec.ok, rec
@@ -472,7 +480,8 @@ def site_resolve(claims: list) -> Resolution:
winner_priority=winner.priority)
def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None) -> Resolution:
def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None,
tick=None) -> Resolution:
"""The three stages, in order, over one cycle's claims.
`units` is the site's roster of inverters. Left None it is derived from the
@@ -499,6 +508,14 @@ def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None) -> Resolution:
with its own evidence removed. That mutation survived the whole suite until
test_arbiter.py part 7 graded it on a SILENT unit.
⚠️ `tick` IS SAFETY-28's FRESHNESS TOKEN AND IT IS NOT OPTIONAL ON THE LIVE
PATH. It identifies the tick this resolution is FOR, and it ends up on
`Resolution.allocation.tick`, where the write gate compares it against the
tick it is writing on. A record with no tick cannot authorise a write, which
is why main.py passes `self.alloc_tick` and why a test that only wants the
arbiter's arithmetic can leave it out and be sure it has not accidentally
minted a licence to write.
⚠️ THE PARTITION IS BY `actuator`, AND IT IS A PARTITION, NOT A FILTER. Every
claim lands in exactly one stage. That is the whole structural argument: a
unit's `hi` and the site's `lo` are never both terms of the same `lo > hi`
@@ -533,5 +550,6 @@ def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None) -> Resolution:
out.unit_bounds = bounds
out.shares, out.allocated, out.allocation = allocate_record(
out.target_w, bounds, weights=weights, live=live,
scope_errors=out.scope_errors, site_priority=out.winner_priority)
scope_errors=out.scope_errors, site_priority=out.winner_priority,
tick=tick)
return out
goodwe_controller/app/main.py
+250 -31
View File
@@ -219,11 +219,13 @@ class Controller:
# the add-on - and the controller then comes back armed, into the fault,
# with nobody involved.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE MIGRATION IS GRADED HERE RATHER THAN TRUSTED. A latch that
# silently failed to move into its namespace is a DISARMED SAFETY GUARD
# on an install whose state file still says `sign_tripped: true`. So the
# pre-DEV-02 flat value is compared against what unit A actually came up
# with, and a disagreement is not a log line - it re-arms the latch by
# ⚠️ AND THE LATCH IS GRADED HERE RATHER THAN TRUSTED, ON EVERY START. A
# latch that silently failed to move into its namespace - or that was
# taken by an OLDER add-on while this install was rolled back, which is
# the round trip store.py's rule 2 exists for - is a DISARMED SAFETY
# GUARD on an install whose state file still says `sign_tripped: true`.
# So the flat value is compared against what the roster actually came up
# with, and a disagreement is not a log line: it re-arms the latch by
# hand and shouts, because the fail-safe direction for a latch is ON.
self._grade_store_migration(store)
for inv in self.inverters:
@@ -361,6 +363,25 @@ class Controller:
# the cached envelope this card exists to forbid, wearing a different
# hat.
self.allocation = None
# SAFETY-28. THE TICK THE RECORD ABOVE BELONGS TO, and the counter that
# mints it. It is incremented ONCE PER RESOLUTION - not once per loop
# iteration - and that distinction is load-bearing in both directions:
#
# * a NEW resolution makes the previous record stale IMMEDIATELY, so a
# record cannot be replayed into a later tick after the envelopes it
# describes have moved. That is the replay half of the gate.
# * a cycle that produced NO resolution does not bump it. The "inputs
# missing, not yet stale" hold above returns before the allocator
# runs precisely so that a single missed poll does not zero the
# inverter, and the heartbeat re-affirms `self.target` through the
# write path while it does. Bumping here would make that heartbeat
# unauthorised and drop the site to 0 W on the first dropped poll -
# turning a hold into the outage it exists to prevent.
#
# So the record is SUPERSEDED, never expired: it stands until the
# allocator produces its successor, and nothing else has moved in
# between that it does not still describe.
self.alloc_tick = 0
# What the last cycle's allocator dropped, so the log line above is
# edge-triggered. Starts as the empty tuple - nothing has been dropped
# yet and nothing has been said about it.
@@ -413,25 +434,50 @@ class Controller:
worse than never having persisted the latch, because now there is
evidence that says it is fine.
So the pre-DEV-02 flat value is compared against what unit A ACTUALLY
came up with, and a disagreement is not reported and survived - the
latch is re-armed by hand, from the flat value, and the store is written
so the next start does not need this branch. The fail-safe direction for
a latch is ON: a spurious trip costs a 0 W hold an operator clears with
one button, and a missing one costs whatever SAFETY-02 was watching for.
So the pre-DEV-02 flat value is compared against what the roster
ACTUALLY came up with, and a disagreement is not reported and survived -
the latch is re-armed by hand, from the flat value, and the store is
written so the next start does not need this branch. The fail-safe
direction for a latch is ON: a spurious trip costs a 0 W hold an
operator clears with one button, and a missing one costs whatever
SAFETY-02 was watching for.
⚠️ AND IT RUNS ON EVERY START, NOT ONLY ON THE ONE THAT MIGRATES. It
used to return early on `not rep.ran`, for a real reason: while nothing
cleared the flat key, an install that had ever tripped carried
`sign_tripped: true` in its file forever, and a guard reading it would
have re-armed the failsafe on every restart for the rest of the
install's life.
THAT GATE SWALLOWED THE EXACT ROUND TRIP store.py's RULE 2 EXISTS FOR,
and it is not hypothetical - a firmware version change with a rollback
path was performed on this site on 2026-09-02:
1. the install migrates -> `schema_version = 1`,
`unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped = False`
2. the operator DOWNGRADES, and SAFETY-02 trips inside the downgrade
window. The old code knows only the flat key, so the file gains
`sign_tripped: true` and nothing namespaced
3. the operator upgrades again. `rep.ran` is False - the store is
already at schema 1 - so BOTH the migration and this guard are
skipped, `Inverter.__init__` reads the namespaced key, and the
controller comes up with `sign_wd.tripped = False` while
/data/state.json says `sign_tripped: true`
Which is this module's own sentence, rebuilt by the version marker: the
file still says tripped, the banner is green, and the controller resumes
driving the wrong way.
The gate is gone because the reason for it is gone. `handle_action()`
now clears the flat keys alongside the namespaced ones when the operator
clears the latch, and the trip mirrors them, so the two spellings can
disagree in exactly one direction: FLAT SAYS TRIPPED AND NO UNIT CAME UP
TRIPPED means the flat key was written by a version that did not know
about namespaces - a downgrade-window trip - or a migration that lost
the latch. Both want the same answer, which is the one below.
"""
rep = self.store_migration
# ⚠️ ONLY ON THE START THAT ACTUALLY MIGRATES, AND THAT IS NOT A
# SHORTCUT. Once the store is marked migrated the NAMESPACED value is
# the live latch and the flat key is a fossil that nothing writes any
# more - so an operator who clears the failsafe leaves `sign_tripped:
# true` sitting in the file forever. A guard that went on comparing
# against it would re-arm the failsafe on every restart, for the rest of
# the install's life, on a fault that was dealt with weeks ago. That is
# rule 1 of `migrate_unit_keys()` read from the other end.
if not rep.ran:
return
if not rep.ok:
if rep.ran and not rep.ok:
_LOG.error("SAFETY-02: the per-inverter store migration did not "
"verify (%s). The latch is being re-derived from the "
"legacy keys.", rep.explain())
@@ -439,9 +485,24 @@ class Controller:
legacy_tripped = bool(data.get("sign_tripped", False))
if not legacy_tripped or not self.inverters:
return
first = self.inverters[0]
if first.sign_wd.tripped:
# ⚠️ THE QUESTION IS "IS ANY NAMESPACED LATCH SET", AND IT IS ASKED OF
# THE STORE RATHER THAN OF THE ROSTER. At a roster of two a trip on B
# leaves A untripped, so re-arming A off a flat key that B's own trip
# mirrored would latch a healthy inverter on every restart - the
# flat-key defect this card removed, coming back through its own guard.
# And the STORE is the right place to ask: it holds every
# `unit/*/sign_tripped` this install has ever written, including one
# belonging to a unit that is not in TODAY's roster (a roster is
# configuration and it changes), whereas the roster only knows what is
# configured right now. The flat key carries new information only when
# nothing namespaced is latched at all.
namespaced_latched = any(
bool(v) for k, v in data.items()
if k.startswith("unit/") and k.endswith("/sign_tripped"))
if namespaced_latched or any(inv.sign_wd.tripped
for inv in self.inverters):
return
first = self.inverters[0]
# The one state this method exists for.
reason = str(data.get("sign_reason", "") or "")
first.sign_wd.tripped = True
@@ -451,12 +512,14 @@ class Controller:
first.store_set("sign_reason", first.sign_wd.reason)
first.store_set("sign_tripped", True)
_LOG.error(
"SAFETY-02 MIGRATION GUARD: this store carries a LATCHED "
"sign-disagreement failsafe under the pre-DEV-02 flat key, and %s "
"came up UNLATCHED. That is a disarmed safety guard on an install "
"whose state file says it is protected, so the latch has been "
"re-armed from the legacy value: %s. %s is held at 0 W until "
"control is started from the UI.",
"SAFETY-02 LATCH GUARD: this store carries a LATCHED "
"sign-disagreement failsafe under the pre-DEV-02 flat key and NO "
"inverter came up latched. Either the per-inverter migration lost "
"it, or it was written by an older add-on while this install was "
"rolled back. Both are a disarmed safety guard on an install whose "
"state file says it is protected, so the latch has been re-armed "
"on %s from the legacy value: %s. %s is held at 0 W until control "
"is started from the UI.",
first.name, first.sign_wd.reason, first.name)
self.log_event("FAILSAFE re-armed from the pre-DEV-02 store keys - "
+ first.sign_wd.reason)
@@ -767,6 +830,77 @@ class Controller:
inv.soc = await self.hass.number(inv.soc_entity)
inv.batt = await self.hass.number(inv.batt_entity, inv.batt_invert)
def write_refusal(self, value: float, inv=None) -> str | None:
"""Why `value` may NOT be written to `inv` right now, or None if it may.
--- SAFETY-28: THE WRITE PATH IS GATED ON THE ALLOCATION RECORD --------
specs §1.5 makes "any configuration in which two writers can reach one
actuator" a non-goal. Until this method that non-goal was enforced by
`len(validate.ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS) == 1` - there is one option key, so a
second writer is not expressible. True, and a statement about the SHAPE
OF THE OPTIONS SCHEMA rather than about the writes. Add CFG-04's
per-inverter config and there are two real writers with that length
still 1: the check stays green while the property it protects is gone.
That is this repository's named failure mode - a check that observes
something other than what it claims to observe - so the enforcement
moved here, onto the writes themselves.
The rule is: A NUMBER REACHES THE WIRE ONLY IF THE SINGLE ALLOCATOR
PLACED IT, ON THIS TICK, FOR THIS UNIT. A second writer with arithmetic
of its own cannot satisfy that - its number is not in any record - so it
has to file a Claim and go through `resolve()`, which is the one
allocator. "Exactly one allocator per shared resource" stops being a
convention somebody can forget and becomes a thing the write path
checks. `Allocation.authorises()` holds the per-record half of the
argument.
⚠️ 0 W IS ALWAYS AUTHORISED, AND THAT IS THE ANSWER TO "WHAT IF THE
ALLOCATOR IS THE THING THAT FAILED". This is not a convenience exit; it
is the one value whose correctness does not depend on a split existing:
* The hazard the non-goal names is N-times loop gain from BROADCAST -
handing every inverter the same target so each supplies it in full
(see allocator.py's opening argument, and TEST-19's measured
`N=2 gain 1.0` limit cycle). At S = 0 the broadcast and the correct
allocation COINCIDE: a_i = 1 for every unit gives every unit 0 W,
and 0 W is exactly its share. There is no over-command to make.
* It is the fail-toward-inaction direction §11.1 rule 1 already
names, and it is what layer 2 commands. `cycle()`'s two refusal
branches replace the resolution with a 0 W failsafe and then write
it through here like any other cycle; `shutdown()` and the
operator's stop button do the same. Every one of those runs while
the allocator has REFUSED - `Allocation.ok` is False and there are
no shares - so a gate that asked the allocator's permission to
command zero would deadlock the failsafe behind the very component
whose failure the failsafe exists to answer.
A gate that can block the safety write is worse than the hole it closes,
so it cannot block it: the test for zero is first and reads nothing.
⚠️ AND IT IS `value == 0.0`, THE REQUESTED NUMBER - not a `failsafe=True`
argument. A flag is an assertion by the caller, which is precisely what
a second writer would pass; the value is a fact about what is going to
be written. -0.0 == 0.0 in Python, and a nan never reaches here (the
caller has already turned it into 0.0), so the predicate is total.
⚠️ DEV-02: THE UNIT IS AN ARGUMENT, NOT THE CONTROLLER'S N=1 VIEW OF
IT. The record holds one share PER UNIT, so "did the allocator place
this number" is a question about a NAMED actuator. Asking it with the
first inverter's name at a roster of two would authorise A's share on
B's wire and refuse B's own - the site/unit confusion this card
removes, wearing the gate's name. `_write_unit()` always passes the
unit it is about; the default is for the N=1 callers and REFUSES at
N>=2 (see `_only()`) rather than answering for the first inverter.
"""
if value == 0.0:
return None
inv = self._only() if inv is None else inv
rec = self.allocation
if rec is None:
return ("no allocation record exists yet - nothing has authorised "
f"{value:+.0f} W on {inv.name}")
return rec.authorises(inv.name, value, self.alloc_tick)
async def write_setpoint(self, value: float, *, force: bool = False,
unit=None) -> None:
"""Put `value` on ONE inverter, or - with `unit=None` - on all of them.
@@ -832,6 +966,46 @@ class Controller:
"0 W and continuing to command. This is a bug upstream, "
"not a limit.", value)
value = 0.0
# --- SAFETY-28: AND IT IS REFUSED HERE, NOT LOGGED SOMEWHERE ----------
# ⚠️ ABOVE THE CLAMP AND BELOW THE NON-FINITE COERCION, and both halves
# of that placement are decisions.
#
# Below the coercion, because a nan is loss of input rather than an
# unauthorised write: rule 1 has already turned it into 0 W, which this
# gate then authorises unconditionally, so a transport bug does not get
# a second, differently-worded refusal.
#
# Above the clamp, because the question is WHO CHOSE THIS NUMBER and the
# answer is only meaningful about the number that was asked for. The
# clamp then narrows what was authorised, always toward safety, and it
# stays the last thing between a bug and the hardware. Gating the
# CLAMPED value would be worse than useless: on every cycle the clamp
# engages, the emitted watts differ from the allocator's share by
# construction, so the gate would refuse exactly the cycles SAFETY-03
# exists for.
#
# The refusal is a SUBSTITUTION, not a return: 0 W goes on the wire in
# place of the number nothing stands behind. Returning instead would
# leave the inverter latched on its last command with the ESP32's
# heartbeat still being fed - holding an unauthorised setpoint quietly,
# which is the outcome this gate exists to prevent.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS ASKED ABOUT `inv`, NOT ABOUT THE SITE. The record holds
# one share per unit, so the question "did the single allocator place
# this number" is only answerable about a named actuator; DEV-02 made
# this method per-unit, and passing the first inverter here would
# authorise A's share on B's wire.
refusal = self.write_refusal(value, inv)
if refusal is not None:
self.log_event(
f"{inv.name}: WRITE REFUSED {value:+.0f} W - commanding 0 W")
_LOG.error("SAFETY-28 REFUSED a write of %+.0f W to %s: %s. "
"Commanding 0 W instead. Every setpoint must be one the "
"allocator placed on THIS tick, for THIS unit - see "
"Controller.write_refusal().", value, inv.name, refusal)
value = 0.0
# ⚠️ THIS UNIT'S OWN THREE NUMBERS. `inv.max_w` is the supervised cap on
# what may be written to THIS setpoint entity and `inv.dev_min/dev_max`
# are what THIS device reported about itself - which is the whole of "the
@@ -1002,6 +1176,20 @@ class Controller:
# pressed start, and one press cleared both. See store.py.
inv.store_set("sign_reason", inv.sign_wd.reason)
inv.store_set("sign_tripped", True)
# ⚠️ AND THE LEGACY FLAT KEYS ARE MIRRORED, WHICH IS THE OTHER
# HALF OF store.py's RULE 2. That rule keeps the flat keys "so a
# rollback still finds its latch", and it only ever covered the
# latch that existed AT MIGRATION TIME: a trip that happens
# AFTER the migration wrote nothing flat, so an operator who
# downgraded would find `sign_tripped: false` and come up
# DRIVING, into the fault. store.py used to claim the staleness
# could only fail toward a spurious latch; it could not, and
# this is what makes that sentence true. The pair is
# site-level on purpose - the version being rolled back TO
# drives exactly one actuator - and it is cleared by the same
# operator press that clears the namespaced ones.
self.store.set("sign_reason", inv.sign_wd.reason)
self.store.set("sign_tripped", True)
self.log_event(f"FAILSAFE {inv.name}: " + inv.sign_wd.reason)
_LOG.error("SAFETY-02 TRIPPED on %s - %s. Commanding 0 W on "
"that inverter and holding it until control is "
@@ -1423,7 +1611,12 @@ class Controller:
# de-assert when control is stopped.
self.loop_clamped = (False, "")
resolution = resolve(claims, units=self.units, live=self.live_units())
# SAFETY-28. A new resolution is a new tick, and the previous record is
# stale from this line onwards. Incremented BEFORE resolve() so that the
# record resolve() builds is stamped with the tick it is for.
self.alloc_tick += 1
resolution = resolve(claims, units=self.units, live=self.live_units(),
tick=self.alloc_tick)
self.allocation = resolution.allocation
# --- THE TWO REFUSALS, AND THEY ARE NOT THE SAME REFUSAL --------------
# Both do the same thing - REPLACE the resolution with a 0 W failsafe
@@ -2589,6 +2782,32 @@ class Controller:
inv.store_set("sign_reason", "")
self.log_event(f"sign-disagreement failsafe cleared by "
f"operator on {inv.name}")
# ⚠️ AND THE PRE-DEV-02 FLAT KEYS GO WITH THEM, UNCONDITIONALLY.
# This is what makes `flat True + namespaced False` MEAN
# something, and it is the reason `_grade_store_migration()` can
# run on every start instead of only on the start that migrates.
#
# Without it the flat key is a fossil that says `true` forever
# on any install that ever tripped, so a guard comparing against
# it would re-arm the failsafe on every restart for the rest of
# the install's life - which is why that guard used to be gated
# on `rep.ran`, and why the gate then swallowed the rollback
# ROUND TRIP: migrate, downgrade, trip during the downgrade
# window (the old code writes only the flat key), upgrade again
# -> `rep.ran` is False, the guard never runs, and the
# controller comes up UNLATCHED while /data/state.json says
# `sign_tripped: true`. That is store.py's own header sentence,
# rebuilt by the version marker.
#
# Cleared here, the two spellings can only disagree one way: the
# flat key is newer than the namespaced one, which means it was
# written by a version that did not know about namespaces - i.e.
# a trip inside a downgrade window. Unconditional rather than
# inside the loop because an operator pressing START is
# declaring the whole site clear, and the fossil belongs to no
# unit in particular.
self.store.set("sign_tripped", False)
self.store.set("sign_reason", "")
if not self.auto:
# ⚠️ THE WHOLE SITE, TARGETS INCLUDED - see command_site_zero().
# Zeroing `self.target` alone would leave each unit's last share
goodwe_controller/app/store.py
+36 -13
View File
@@ -43,9 +43,17 @@ _LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.store")
# ⚠️ AND SINCE DEV-02 THE TWO SAFETY-02 KEYS ARE THE *LEGACY* SPELLING. They are
# FLAT - one `sign_tripped` for a controller that now holds a LIST of inverters -
# so a trip caused by inverter B would latch inverter A across restarts, and one
# operator action would clear both. They live on here as the pre-DEV-02 layout
# that `migrate_unit_keys()` reads ONCE and never reads again. Nothing in the
# add-on writes them any more; see SCHEMA_VERSION.
# operator action would clear both. The LIVE latch is per inverter, under
# `unit/<name>/...`, and that is the one the watchdog is restored from.
#
# ⚠️ THE FLAT PAIR IS NOT DEAD, THOUGH: it is the ROLLBACK VIEW. It is written
# alongside the namespaced keys on a trip and cleared alongside them on the
# operator's clear, so an add-on that is DOWNGRADED past this schema still finds
# the latch it should - and so that a trip taken while the install was rolled
# back is still visible to the version that comes back up. Rule 2 of
# `migrate_unit_keys()` and `Controller._grade_store_migration()` carry the
# argument; the short version is that a latch is only worth persisting if it
# survives the version change an operator makes while staring at the banner.
DEFAULTS = {
"phase": "idle",
"phase_started": None,
@@ -159,16 +167,31 @@ def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
THE THREE RULES, each one a case that would otherwise be a wrong answer:
1. IT NEVER OVERWRITES AN EXISTING NAMESPACED VALUE. A store that has both
spellings has been written by this version, and the namespaced one is the
live latch - the flat one is the fossil. Preferring the fossil would
resurrect a trip the operator has already cleared.
2. THE FLAT KEYS ARE LEFT IN THE FILE. Deleting them buys tidiness and costs
a rollback: an operator who downgrades the add-on after a migration would
find no latch at all, which is the disarmed guard again in the other
direction. Left in place, a downgrade finds the trip it had. They go
stale from this moment - nothing writes them again - and the direction
that staleness fails in is a SPURIOUS latch (a 0 W hold an operator
clears), never a missing one.
spellings has been written by this version, and the namespaced one is
where the WATCHDOG is restored from. Preferring the flat one HERE would
resurrect a trip the operator has already cleared, because a migration
runs before anything can tell the two apart. Deciding between them is
main.py's job and it has the one rule that can: the flat key carries new
information only when NOTHING namespaced is latched.
2. THE FLAT KEYS ARE LEFT IN THE FILE, AND THEY ARE KEPT LIVE. Deleting
them buys tidiness and costs a rollback: an operator who downgrades the
add-on after a migration would find no latch at all, which is the
disarmed guard again in the other direction. Left in place, a downgrade
finds the trip it had.
⚠️ AND "LEFT IN PLACE" IS NOT ENOUGH ON ITS OWN, WHICH IS WHAT THIS RULE
USED TO SAY. The sentence here read "they go stale from this moment -
nothing writes them again - and the direction that staleness fails in is
a SPURIOUS latch, never a missing one". That was true of the latch this
migration MOVES and false of every trip that happens AFTERWARDS: nothing
flat was written for those, so a rollback found `sign_tripped: false` and
came up DRIVING. So main.py mirrors both keys on a trip and clears both
on the operator's clear. The flat pair is the ROLLBACK VIEW of the latch,
maintained, not a fossil - which is also what lets main.py's
`_grade_store_migration()` run on every start and catch a trip that
happened while the install was rolled back (see its docstring: the flat
key saying tripped while no inverter came up tripped is the one
disagreement that can occur, and it is a DOWNGRADE-WINDOW LATCH).
3. THE VERSION MARKER IS WRITTEN LAST. A crash between the copies and the
marker leaves the migration to run again, and rule 1 makes running it
again a no-op. A marker written first would leave a half-migrated store
goodwe_controller/app/validate.py
+100 -11
View File
@@ -229,17 +229,84 @@ _LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.config")
# a matching integer means a matching rule.
FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S = 30.0
# ⚠️ The complete set of option keys through which this add-on can reach an
# actuator. specs §1.5 makes "any configuration in which two writers can reach
# one actuator" a non-goal, and the way that non-goal is ENFORCED here is by
# construction: there is exactly one such key, so a second writer is not
# expressible in the options schema at all. sim/inject.py's `two_writers`
# scenario asserts on this tuple - if a second write path is ever added, that
# scenario goes red and somebody has to decide how the two are arbitrated
# BEFORE the config that allows both can ship.
# ⚠️ THE OPTION KEYS UNDER WHICH A WRITER CAN BE DECLARED - AN ENUMERATION, AND
# SAFETY-28 DEMOTED IT TO ONE. This tuple used to BE the guarantee. The comment
# that stood here said specs §1.5 makes "any configuration in which two writers
# can reach one actuator" a non-goal, and that the non-goal was ENFORCED by
# construction: exactly one such key, so a second writer is not expressible in
# the options schema at all.
#
# That was true, and it graded THE SHAPE OF THE OPTIONS SCHEMA rather than the
# writes. Add CFG-04's per-inverter config - a list of inverters, each with its
# own `setpoint_entity` - and there are two real writers with `len()` of this
# tuple still equal to 1. The check stays green while the property it protects
# is gone, which is this repository's named failure mode: a check that observes
# something other than what it claims to observe.
#
# So the guarantee moved to `actuator_writers()` below, which counts WRITERS PER
# ACTUATOR rather than keys, and finds them wherever in the options tree they
# are declared. This tuple survives only because a census has to know which key
# NAMES an actuator; it is not a bound on how many writers there can be, and
# nothing should ever assert on its length again.
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS = ("setpoint_entity",)
def _collect_writers(node, path: str, out: list) -> None:
"""Walk the options tree, collecting `(where, entity)` for every writer.
⚠️ STRUCTURAL, NOT NAME-BASED ON THE CONTAINER, and that is the point. A
census that looked for a key called `inverters` would be guessing the name
CFG-04 has not chosen yet, and a guess that is wrong goes GREEN while two
writers exist - the same defect one level along. This walks whatever shape
the options happen to have and reports every `setpoint_entity` in it,
however deeply nested and under whatever container.
"""
if isinstance(node, dict):
for k, v in node.items():
here = f"{path}.{k}" if path else str(k)
if k in ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS:
entity = str(v or "").strip()
if entity:
out.append((here, entity))
continue
_collect_writers(v, here, out)
elif isinstance(node, (list, tuple)):
for i, v in enumerate(node):
_collect_writers(v, f"{path}[{i}]", out)
def actuator_writers(opts: dict) -> dict:
"""actuator -> the configured writers that can reach it. INSTANCE-AWARE.
The replacement for `len(ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS) == 1`. It answers HOW MANY
THINGS CAN WRITE TO EACH ACTUATOR, which is the property §1.5 actually
names, and it keeps answering it when the schema grows a per-inverter list:
two inverters with two entities are two writers on two actuators and fine,
two declarations naming ONE entity are the non-goal and are refused.
The key is the entity id, lowercased - Home Assistant entity ids are
lowercase by construction, and folding case here means a config cannot
smuggle a second writer past the census on `Number.X` versus `number.x`.
⚠️ SAY WHAT THIS STILL DOES NOT OBSERVE, because the argument that demoted
the tuple applies to its replacement too. This is a census of CONFIGURED
writers. A second write path added in CODE - a `hass.set_number()` call next
to some new strategy - declares nothing and is invisible here, exactly as it
was invisible to the tuple. That hole is not closed at startup and cannot
be: it is closed at runtime, by `Controller.write_refusal()`, which refuses
any value the single allocator did not place on this tick and does not care
what the options look like. The two checks are deliberately different
kinds - one grades the config, one grades the writes - and only the second
one survives a schema this file has not seen yet.
"""
found: list = []
_collect_writers(opts, "", found)
census: dict = {}
for where, entity in found:
census.setdefault(entity.lower(), []).append(where)
return census
class ConfigRefused(Exception):
"""The configuration is wrong. Not "something broke" - see main.py's handler.
@@ -265,9 +332,8 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
"""
problems: list[str] = []
# --- 1. an actuator to write to ------------------------------------------
writers = [k for k in ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS
if str(opts.get(k, "") or "").strip()]
# --- 1. an actuator to write to, and AT MOST ONE WRITER PER ACTUATOR -----
writers = actuator_writers(opts)
if not writers:
problems.append(
"setpoint_entity is not set, so this add-on has no actuator: every "
@@ -275,6 +341,29 @@ def validate_startup_config(opts: dict, dev_min=None, dev_max=None) -> list[str]
"ESP32 heartbeat that holds off the layer-1 failsafe never happens. "
"It would run, look healthy, and move no energy at all. Set it to "
"the ESPHome number entity that carries the setpoint.")
# SAFETY-28. The §1.5 non-goal, graded on the writers rather than on the
# count of option keys. Read `actuator_writers()` for why the old check went
# green on the very config this one is here to refuse.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT REFUSES A DUPLICATE DECLARATION EVEN WHEN BOTH NAME THE SAME
# ENTITY, which is the case an author of the per-inverter config will meet
# first: keep `setpoint_entity` as inverter A's and add A to the list again
# and there are two config sites aimed at one actuator, each with its own
# neighbouring options. "They happen to be the same entity, so it is fine"
# is precisely the reasoning that makes two writers invisible. Declare each
# actuator exactly once and the refusal does not fire.
for actuator, who in sorted(writers.items()):
if len(who) > 1:
problems.append(
f"{len(who)} configured writers can reach the one actuator "
f"{actuator}: {', '.join(who)}. specs §1.5 makes any "
"configuration in which two writers can reach one actuator a "
"non-goal - two independent setpoints on one inverter is the "
"arbitration problem this add-on refuses to have, and at "
"runtime it is a meter-emulation target being written twice a "
"second by two strategies that cannot see each other. Give "
"each actuator exactly one writer, or point the second one at "
"its own entity.")
# --- 2. the configured ceiling against the device's own rating -----------
max_w = _number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)
goodwe_controller/test_clamp.py
+367 -6
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
No framework, asserts only, same house style as test_freeze.py.
Six parts, and parts 3 and 4 are the ones that carry SAFETY-03's own
acceptance criteria; part 6 is TEST-11's:
Seven parts, and parts 3 and 4 are the ones that carry SAFETY-03's own
acceptance criteria; part 6 is TEST-11's and part 7 is SAFETY-28's:
1. THE CLAMP ARITHMETIC, on the shipped `clamp_to_rating()` - boundaries,
symmetry, the device second stage, and the non-finite cases. Table driven.
@@ -31,6 +31,13 @@ acceptance criteria; part 6 is TEST-11's:
watchdog could see when it was consulted - so that a rename or a helper
does not trip it, and with the write-path half exercised on a stimulus of
its own, because parts 3-5 never produce one through cycle().
7. SAFETY-28. THE WRITE PATH IS GATED ON THE ALLOCATION RECORD - a value the
single allocator did not place on THIS tick does not reach the wire, a
record from a previous tick cannot authorise one, and 0 W is authorised
unconditionally so the failsafe can never deadlock behind the gate. This is
the check that replaced a config-shape proxy: `ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS` graded
how many option KEYS exist, which stays 1 while a per-inverter config adds
a second real writer.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHY PART 4 ALSO ASSERTS ON `Decision`'s BOOLEANS AND NOT ON `reason`
@@ -74,8 +81,10 @@ from app.clamp import (
CLEAR_CYCLES, REASON_CODE, REASSERT_S, ClampWatchdog, clamp_to_rating,
is_commandable,
)
from app.arbiter import UnitBounds, allocate
from app.allocator import Allocation, UnitPlan, plan
from app.arbiter import P_LOOP, Claim, UnitBounds, allocate, resolve
from app.control import Tuning, compute
from app.inverter import Inverter
from app.main import Controller
fails = []
@@ -533,16 +542,48 @@ print()
print("5. no path reaches the wire around the clamp")
def arm(c, value):
"""Give `c` a real allocation record authorising `value` on the CURRENT tick.
⚠️ SAFETY-28 MADE THIS NECESSARY, AND THE FACT THAT IT IS NECESSARY IS THE
TICKET. `write_setpoint()` now refuses any value the single allocator did
not place on this tick, so the probes below - which call it directly, the
way the heartbeat and the operator's buttons do - have to say where their
number came from. Before this they did not, and that was precisely the hole:
a second writer's number reached the wire on nothing but the fact that
somebody called the method.
⚠️ AND IT IS BUILT THROUGH THE SHIPPED `resolve()`, NOT BY HAND. A helper
that assembled an `Allocation` itself would be a second allocator living in
the test file, and every check below would then be grading the fixture's
idea of a record rather than the one main.py produces. The tick is bumped
the same way `cycle()` bumps it, for the same reason.
"""
c.alloc_tick += 1
res = resolve([Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, value, "test stimulus")],
units=c.units, live=c.units, tick=c.alloc_tick)
c.allocation = res.allocation
return res.allocation
async def _direct():
hass = _Hass(0.0)
c = Controller({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "max_w": 2000,
"meter_source": "off"},
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
# The shape the heartbeat, shutdown() and handle_action() all use.
await c.write_setpoint(9999.0, force=True)
await c.write_setpoint(-9999.0, force=True)
# The shape the heartbeat, shutdown() and handle_action() all use - each one
# authorised by this tick's allocation, which is what those callers have
# too: the heartbeat re-affirms `self.target`, and the buttons write 0 W,
# which needs no allocator at all (see part 7).
for wanted in (9999.0, -9999.0):
arm(c, wanted)
await c.write_setpoint(wanted, force=True)
# A nan is loss of input, not an unauthorised write: rule 1 turns it into
# 0 W ABOVE the gate, and 0 W is always authorised. No arming, on purpose -
# if the gate ever moved above the coercion this line would go red.
await c.write_setpoint(float("nan"), force=True)
arm(c, 1500.0)
await c.write_setpoint(1500.0, force=True)
return hass, c
@@ -807,6 +848,11 @@ async def _write_path(moved=False):
# The inverter is SMALLER than the configured ceiling - SAFETY-20's install.
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -2500.0, 2500.0
c.target = 3000.0
# SAFETY-28: the write path only carries numbers the allocator placed, so
# this stimulus is authorised the same way cycle()'s is. It has to be: the
# clamp is what this part grades, and a gate refusal would substitute 0 W
# and there would be no clamp to see.
arm(c, c.target)
if moved:
await c.check_output_clamp()
await c.write_setpoint(c.target)
@@ -852,6 +898,321 @@ check("...and main.py:856's consumer is the line that goes quietly false",
bool(ctl_w.clamp_last and ctl_w.clamp_last.engaged))
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("7. SAFETY-28: the write path is gated on the allocation record")
# WHY THIS PART IS IN THIS FILE. Part 5 already claims "no path reaches the wire
# around the clamp", and the clamp is the last thing between a bug and the
# hardware. SAFETY-28 adds a second thing on the same path and asks a different
# question of it: not "is this number in range" but "WHO CHOSE THIS NUMBER".
#
# THE DEFECT IT REPLACES. specs §1.5 makes two writers on one actuator a
# non-goal, and until this ticket that was enforced by
# `len(validate.ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS) == 1` - one option key, so a second writer
# is not expressible. True, and a statement about the OPTIONS SCHEMA rather than
# about the writes: add CFG-04's per-inverter config and there are two real
# writers with that length still 1. test_validate.py part 2 grades the config
# half; this part grades the write half, which is the one that does not care
# what the options look like.
A_UNIT, B_HYPO = "inverter-a", "inverter-b"
def fresh(**over):
"""A Controller with a stub HA, no cycle run, and therefore NO record."""
hass = _Hass(0.0)
c = Controller(dict({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "max_w": 2000,
"meter_source": "off"}, **over),
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
return hass, c
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 7a. AC 1 - an unauthorised value is REFUSED AT THE WRITE PATH
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# The second writer, modelled as what it would actually look like in code: some
# other strategy with arithmetic of its own calling the one method that reaches
# the wire. It has a perfectly reasonable number - in range, finite, nothing the
# clamp would object to - and the only thing wrong with it is that nothing
# allocated it.
async def _second_writer():
hass, c = fresh()
arm(c, 1500.0) # the allocator placed 1500 W this tick
await c.write_setpoint(1500.0, force=True) # the loop's own write
await c.write_setpoint(1200.0, force=True) # ...and the second writer's
return hass, c
hass_2w, ctl_2w = asyncio.run(_second_writer())
print(f" allocator placed +1500 W; a second writer asked for +1200 W; "
f"the device saw {hass_2w.writes}")
check("AC 1: a value the allocation record does not contain never reaches the "
"device. 1200 W is in range and finite - the clamp has no opinion about "
"it - so the ONLY thing that stopped it is that no allocator placed it",
1200.0 not in hass_2w.writes)
check("...and it is REFUSED, not merely logged: 0 W goes on the wire in its "
"place. Returning instead would leave the inverter latched on the last "
"command with the ESP32 heartbeat still being fed - holding an "
"unauthorised setpoint quietly, which is the outcome this gate exists "
"to prevent",
hass_2w.writes == [1500.0, 0.0])
check("...and the action log says so in words an operator can act on",
any("WRITE REFUSED" in e for e in ctl_2w.events))
check("...while the authorised write of the SAME shape went through "
"untouched, so the gate is not simply refusing everything",
hass_2w.writes[0] == 1500.0)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 7b. AC 2 - a record from a previous tick cannot authorise a write in this one
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE CACHED-ENVELOPE FAULT WEARING A DIFFERENT HAT. allocator.py's
# rule is that a unit's interval is read per tick and never cached, because a
# pack at its floor or a stale link moves it between one cycle and the next.
# A record is that envelope written down - so code that keeps one and replays it
# is caching the envelope through the record, and the allocator's own purity
# cannot stop it. The tick stamp is what stops it.
async def _replay():
hass, c = fresh()
stale = arm(c, 1500.0) # tick N
await c.write_setpoint(1500.0, force=True)
arm(c, 800.0) # tick N+1: the envelopes have moved on
c.allocation = stale # ...and somebody puts the old one back
await c.write_setpoint(1500.0, force=True)
return hass, c, stale
hass_rp, ctl_rp, stale_rec = asyncio.run(_replay())
print(f" a tick-{stale_rec.tick} record replayed on tick "
f"{ctl_rp.alloc_tick}: the device saw {hass_rp.writes}")
check("AC 2: replaying the previous tick's record does NOT authorise its "
"value again - the write is refused and 0 W goes out instead",
hass_rp.writes == [1500.0, 0.0])
check("...and the refusal names both ticks, so the reason is legible rather "
"than 'computer says no'",
"tick" in (ctl_rp.write_refusal(1500.0) or "")
and str(stale_rec.tick) in (ctl_rp.write_refusal(1500.0) or "")
and str(ctl_rp.alloc_tick) in (ctl_rp.write_refusal(1500.0) or ""))
check("...and an UNSTAMPED record - one built by a caller that passed no tick "
"at all - is refused too, because 'I cannot say when I was made' must "
"fail closed and not read as tick zero",
ctl_rp.allocation is not None
and (lambda c: (setattr(c, "allocation",
plan(1500.0, {A_UNIT: UnitBounds()}))
or c.write_refusal(1500.0) is not None))(ctl_rp))
# ⚠️ AND THE TICK HAS TO ADVANCE ON THE LIVE PATH, WHICH IS A DIFFERENT CLAIM
# FROM ANY OF THE ABOVE. Everything so far drives `arm()`, which bumps the
# counter itself - so all of it would stay green with `self.alloc_tick += 1`
# deleted from cycle(), and the replay protection would be gone on the only path
# that matters. This drives REAL cycles and asks the same question of them.
async def _live_staleness():
hass = _Hass(6000.0)
c = Controller({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "step_w": 10, "stale_input_s": 15},
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
first, first_v = c.allocation, c.target
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
# ...and now the HOLD: one missed poll, which must NOT age the record, or a
# single dropped meter reading would drop the site to 0 W.
held_before = c.alloc_tick
c.grid = None
c.inputs_bad_since = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
await c.cycle()
hass.writes.clear()
await c.write_setpoint(c.target, force=True) # the heartbeat's own call
return c, first, first_v, held_before, hass
ctl_ls, rec1, val1, held_before, hass_ls = asyncio.run(_live_staleness())
print(f" two real cycles: tick {rec1.tick} -> {ctl_ls.allocation.tick}; "
f"a held cycle left it at {ctl_ls.alloc_tick}")
check("PRECONDITION: two real cycles produced two records with two different "
"ticks and a value worth replaying",
rec1.tick != ctl_ls.allocation.tick and val1 != 0.0)
check("the tick advances on the LIVE path, so cycle 1's record does not "
"authorise a write on cycle 2. Everything above this line drives the "
"test's own `arm()` and would stay green with the increment deleted from "
"cycle() - this is the check that would not",
(lambda c: (setattr(c, "allocation", rec1)
or c.write_refusal(val1) is not None))(ctl_ls))
check("⚠️ AND A CYCLE THAT PRODUCED NO RESOLUTION DOES NOT AGE IT. The "
"'inputs missing, not yet stale' hold returns before the allocator runs, "
"precisely so one dropped meter reading does not zero the inverter, and "
"the heartbeat re-affirms self.target through this same gate while it "
"does. A tick incremented per LOOP ITERATION rather than per RESOLUTION "
"would refuse that heartbeat and turn the hold into the outage it exists "
"to prevent",
ctl_ls.alloc_tick == held_before and hass_ls.writes == [ctl_ls.target]
and ctl_ls.target != 0.0)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 7c. THE FAILSAFE CANNOT DEADLOCK BEHIND THE GATE
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ THE HAZARD THIS PART EXISTS FOR. `write_setpoint()` is also how layer 2
# commands 0 W: cycle()'s two refusal branches substitute a 0 W failsafe and
# write it like any other cycle, and shutdown() and the operator's stop button
# do the same. Every one of those runs while the allocator has REFUSED - `ok` is
# False and there are no shares - so a gate that asked the allocator's
# permission to command zero would block the safety write behind the very
# component whose failure the safety write answers. A gate that can do that is
# worse than the hole it closes.
#
# The resolution: 0 W is authorised unconditionally, and it is authorised on the
# VALUE rather than on a `failsafe=True` flag the caller asserts. The argument is
# at Controller.write_refusal(): the hazard §1.5 names is N-times loop gain from
# broadcasting one target to N inverters, and at S = 0 the broadcast and the
# correct allocation COINCIDE - a_i = 1 for every unit gives every unit 0 W,
# which is exactly its share. There is no over-command to make at zero.
_hostile = []
_h, _c = fresh()
_hostile.append(("no record at all", _c))
_h, _c = fresh()
_c.alloc_tick = 1
_c.allocation = plan(1500.0, {A_UNIT: UnitBounds()}, scope_errors=("mis-routed",),
tick=1)
_hostile.append(("the allocator REFUSED this tick", _c))
_h, _c = fresh()
_c.allocation = arm(_c, 1500.0)
_c.alloc_tick += 7 # ...and then seven ticks went by
_hostile.append(("only a stale record", _c))
for _why, _c in _hostile:
check(f"0 W is authorised with {_why}", _c.write_refusal(0.0) is None)
check(f"...and a NON-zero write is still refused with {_why}, so the zero "
f"exit is a floor and not an amnesty",
_c.write_refusal(1500.0) is not None)
async def _failsafe_wire():
"""The refusal path END TO END, through the real cycle().
⚠️ THE ROSTER HERE IS A HYPOTHESIS AND NOTHING IS MEASURED FROM IT.
INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. It is named only so `live_units()` can return
nothing and drive the allocator into REFUSE_EMPTY, which is the state
main.py's first refusal branch is written for and the one this check needs:
the allocator itself has failed, and layer 2 must still be able to command
zero.
"""
hass = _Hass(0.0)
class _Blind(Controller):
def live_units(self):
return ()
c = _Blind({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_source": "off",
"max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "soc_entity": "sensor.soc",
"batt_entity": "sensor.batt", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid"},
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
# ⚠️ DEV-02: THE ROSTER IS GROWN BY ADDING AN `Inverter`, NOT BY ASSIGNING
# `units`. `Controller.units` is now DERIVED from `Controller.inverters` and
# has no setter, because a settable roster is a site that claims two
# actuators while holding one writer - a half-driven site with nothing to
# say so. The object carries the writer, which is what makes this fixture a
# roster of two rather than a tuple of two names.
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W # while the roster is one
_b = Inverter(B_HYPO, setpoint_entity="number.sp_b",
soc_entity="sensor.soc", batt_entity="sensor.batt",
max_w=LIVE_MAX_W, store=c.store)
_b.dev_min, _b.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
_b.soc, _b.batt = 50.0, 0.0
c.inverters.append(_b)
c.auto = True
for _ in range(3):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
return hass, c
hass_fs, ctl_fs = asyncio.run(_failsafe_wire())
print(f" allocator refused every tick "
f"({ctl_fs.allocation.refused!r}); the device saw {hass_fs.writes}")
check("the allocator having failed, the 0 W failsafe still REACHES THE WIRE - "
"this is the deadlock the gate must not have, driven through the real "
"cycle() and its real refusal branch rather than asserted",
not ctl_fs.allocation.ok and hass_fs.writes == [0.0, 0.0]
and ctl_fs.target == 0.0)
check("...and it was the ALLOCATOR's refusal that produced it, not the gate's "
"- if the gate were the thing zeroing this cycle the action log would "
"say WRITE REFUSED and the distinction between the two failures would "
"be lost to whoever has to debug it",
any("ARBITER: REFUSED" in e for e in ctl_fs.events)
and not any("WRITE REFUSED" in e for e in ctl_fs.events))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 7d. `unmet_w` IS NOT `ok`, AND THE GATE MUST NOT FUSE THEM
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# allocator.py says it plainly: an allocation that could not place every watt is
# still SAFE TO WRITE and strictly better than commanding zero. Fusing the two
# would let ONE SATURATED INVERTER PARK THE WHOLE SITE - the site target goes
# unmet by 3800 W, every share is legal, and a gate reading `unmet_w` would
# answer that by commanding 0 W and meeting even less of it.
_tight = plan(4000.0, {A_UNIT: UnitBounds(lo=-100.0, hi=100.0),
B_HYPO: UnitBounds(lo=-100.0, hi=100.0)}, tick=1)
_h, _c = fresh()
_c.alloc_tick, _c.allocation = 1, _tight
print(f" saturated site: {_tight.explain()}")
check("PRECONDITION: this record is ok AND has watts it could not place",
_tight.ok and _tight.unmet_w == 3800 and _tight.shares[A_UNIT] == 100)
check("the gate authorises this unit's share anyway. `unmet_w` is not read - "
"it is the site target that went unmet, not a broken allocation",
_c.write_refusal(100.0) is None)
check("...and it still refuses a value that is not the share, so 'do not read "
"unmet_w' has not been implemented as 'read nothing'",
_c.write_refusal(4000.0) is not None)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 7e. A RECORD THAT CONTRADICTS ITSELF AUTHORISES NOTHING
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# `UnitPlan.explain()` renders a share outside its own interval as
# "ENVELOPE VIOLATED, DO NOT WRITE". This is the DO NOT WRITE. The shape is the
# half-open clamp defect ALLOC-01 fixed: a plan stating the floor and a share
# below it in the same breath, and agreeing with itself.
#
# ⚠️ UNREACHABLE FROM THE ALLOCATOR AS IT STANDS, AND GRADED ANYWAY. At the
# shipped roster of one the pass-through's interval is (-inf, +inf) and every
# number is inside it. PR #40's reviewer proved what an unreachable ungraded
# branch is worth by replacing one with `if False:` and watching the whole suite
# stay green, so this one is exercised on a constructed record rather than
# trusted.
_liar = Allocation(target_w=500.0, sum_w=500, shares={A_UNIT: 500},
plans=(UnitPlan(A_UNIT, 500, 2000.0, math.inf, 1.0,
"weighted share"),), tick=1)
_h, _c = fresh()
_c.alloc_tick, _c.allocation = 1, _liar
print(f" {_liar.plans[0].explain()}")
check("PRECONDITION: the record is `ok`, and its share IS what the gate would "
"otherwise match on - so nothing but the envelope question stops it",
_liar.ok and _liar.shares[A_UNIT] == 500)
check("a share outside its own plan's interval is refused, and the refusal "
"quotes the plan's own DO NOT WRITE line",
"DO NOT WRITE" in (_c.write_refusal(500.0) or ""))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 7f. AC 5 - AT N=1 NOTHING CHANGES
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# The strongest form of this is not a new assertion, it is the 17 other files in
# this suite passing unedited on real cycles. What is added here is the
# statement that the live path is not being quietly zeroed: over part 3's
# sixty-cycle replay - the 10.3 runaway, an inverter that never follows - the
# gate refused nothing at all.
check("AC 5: across part 3's 60 real cycles the gate refused ZERO writes, so "
"the shipped one-inverter path reaches the wire exactly as it did "
"before. A gate that silently substituted 0 W here would leave every "
"clamp check above green and the install dead",
not [e for e in ctl_r.events if "WRITE REFUSED" in e])
check("...and the numbers those cycles put on the wire are the arbiter's own "
"target, unrounded and unaltered by the record it now has to appear in",
hass_r.writes and all(abs(w) <= LIVE_MAX_W for w in hass_r.writes))
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
goodwe_controller/test_inverter.py
+199 -11
View File
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ from app.store import (
)
from app.validate import FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S
from app.freeze import rail_w
from app.arbiter import P_LOOP, P_SAFETY, Claim, resolve
fails = []
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
@@ -213,6 +214,36 @@ def inverter_b(store=None, max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, dev=None,
return inv
def arm(c, shares):
"""Give `c` a real allocation record authorising exactly `shares`.
⚠️ SAFETY-28 MADE THIS NECESSARY AND THE FACT THAT IT IS NECESSARY IS THAT
TICKET. `write_setpoint()` refuses any number the single allocator did not
place on this tick, and the probes below call it directly - the way the
heartbeat and the operator's buttons do - so they have to say where their
number came from. Before that gate they did not, and that was the hole.
⚠️ AND IT IS BUILT THROUGH THE SHIPPED `resolve()`, NOT BY HAND, for the
reason test_clamp.py's twin says: a helper that assembled an `Allocation`
itself would be a second allocator living in the test file. The per-unit
numbers are forced the way the add-on forces them - each unit files its own
`supervised` envelope and the site target is their sum, so the water-fill
has exactly one answer - and the assert is what says this fixture got it.
"""
c.alloc_tick += 1
claims = [Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, float(sum(shares.values())),
"test stimulus")]
for unit, watts in shares.items():
claims.append(Claim.limit("supervised", P_SAFETY, -abs(float(watts)),
abs(float(watts)), "max_w", actuator=unit))
res = resolve(claims, units=c.units, live=c.units, tick=c.alloc_tick)
c.allocation = res.allocation
assert res.allocation.shares == {u: float(w) for u, w in shares.items()}, (
f"arm() asked for {shares} and the shipped allocator placed "
f"{res.allocation.shares} - fix the fixture, not the assert")
return res.allocation
def run(coro):
return asyncio.run(coro)
@@ -320,6 +351,15 @@ check("...and the views are PROPERTIES, not attributes, so `c.soc = 4` writes "
print()
print("2. AC 2: the store migration, and it is GRADED rather than performed")
async def _one_cycle_early(c):
"""One real cycle. `_one_cycle` below is the same three lines; this one is
needed before it, and duplicating three lines beats moving a definition
somebody is reading in place."""
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
return c
# ⚠️ THE RISKY HALF, IN THE CARD'S OWN WORDS. Namespacing `sign_tripped` is
# right - flat, a trip on B latches A - but a latch that silently fails to move
# is a disarmed safety guard on an install whose state file still says
@@ -360,24 +400,109 @@ check("...and the keys that moved are exactly the ones store.py names as "
and "phase" not in LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS)
# IDEMPOTENCE, AND IT IS THE ONE THAT PROTECTS THE OPERATOR'S CLEAR.
_pre.set(unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped"), False)
_pre.set(unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_reason"), "")
#
# ⚠️ THE CLEAR IS PRESSED, NOT SIMULATED, AND THAT CHANGE IS THE TICKET. This
# check used to clear the NAMESPACED key by hand and leave the flat one saying
# `true`, then assert that a restart did not resurrect the latch. It graded a
# state the shipped clear path does not produce: `handle_action("auto_toggle")`
# clears BOTH spellings, precisely so that `flat True + namespaced False` can
# only ever mean a trip taken while the install was rolled back (see below).
# Driving the button is also the only way to find that out - a fixture that
# hand-writes the store is a check on the fixture.
run(_c2.handle_action("auto_toggle")) # the operator presses START
_writes_before = _pre.writes
_c2b, _ = built(store=_pre)
check("⚠️ RUNNING AGAIN AFTER AN OPERATOR CLEARED THE LATCH DOES NOT RESURRECT "
"IT. The flat key still says `true` - it is a fossil, left in the file on "
"purpose - and a migration that re-read it would re-arm a failsafe the "
"operator has already dealt with, once per restart, forever",
"IT. A guard that went on comparing against a flat key nothing cleared "
"would re-arm a failsafe the operator has already dealt with, once per "
"restart, forever - which is what the `rep.ran` gate used to buy, and "
"what clearing both spellings buys instead",
not _c2b.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped
and _pre.data[unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped")] is False)
check("...and it wrote nothing at all the second time, which is what "
"`schema_version` buys",
_pre.writes == _writes_before)
check("...and the flat keys are still there, unread. Deleting them costs a "
"ROLLBACK: an operator who downgrades the add-on after a migration would "
"find no latch at all. Left in place the staleness fails toward a "
"spurious 0 W hold, which is the safe direction",
_pre.data["sign_tripped"] is True)
check("⚠️ AND THE OPERATOR'S PRESS CLEARED THE PRE-DEV-02 FLAT KEYS TOO. That "
"is what makes the two spellings comparable at all: cleared together, "
"the only disagreement they can reach is `flat says tripped, nothing "
"namespaced does` - which is a latch written by a version that had no "
"namespaces, i.e. a trip taken while this install was ROLLED BACK",
_pre.data["sign_tripped"] is False and _pre.data["sign_reason"] == "")
# ⚠️ THE ROLLBACK ROUND TRIP, RUN END TO END. THIS IS THE STATE THE `rep.ran`
# GATE SWALLOWED, and it is not a thought experiment - a firmware version change
# with a rollback path was performed on this site on 2026-09-02. store.py's
# rule 2 keeps the flat keys "so a rollback still finds its latch"; the operator
# path that rule contemplates is a ROUND TRIP, and the guard used to return
# early on every start that did not migrate, which is every start after the
# first.
#
# 1. install migrates -> schema_version=1, unit/inverter-a/... = False
# 2. operator DOWNGRADES, and SAFETY-02 trips inside the downgrade window.
# The old add-on knows only the flat key, so that is all it writes.
# 3. operator upgrades again. `rep.ran` is False - the store is already at
# schema 1 - so the migration and the guard were both skipped and
# `Inverter.__init__` read the namespaced key, which is still False.
#
# Observed before this fix: the controller came up with `sign_wd.tripped =
# False` while /data/state.json said `sign_tripped: true`. That is store.py's
# own header sentence - the file still says tripped, the banner is green, and
# the controller resumes driving the wrong way - rebuilt by the version marker.
_trip = MemStore()
_c2r0, _ = built(store=_trip) # 1. install, migrate
check("PRECONDITION 1: the install migrated and came up armed and untripped",
_trip.data[SCHEMA_KEY] == SCHEMA_VERSION
and _trip.data[unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped")] is False
and not _c2r0.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped)
# 2. THE DOWNGRADE WINDOW. The old add-on is the one that shipped before this
# card: it writes the flat pair and knows nothing about `unit/...`. Written the
# way that version wrote them - two `Store.set()` calls - rather than by
# reaching into `data`, so this is the file an old add-on would leave behind.
_trip.set("sign_reason", "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded -1800 W against a "
"meter reading +2100 W for 181 s")
_trip.set("sign_tripped", True)
check("PRECONDITION 2: the rolled-back add-on latched under the flat key ONLY, "
"and left the namespaced one exactly as the migration wrote it. This is "
"the state that made `rep.ran` a trap - the store is already at schema "
"1, so nothing on the next start has any reason to run",
_trip.data["sign_tripped"] is True
and _trip.data[unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped")] is False
and _trip.data[SCHEMA_KEY] == SCHEMA_VERSION)
_c2r, _ = built(store=_trip) # 3. upgrade again
print(f" the rollback round trip: {_c2r.store_migration.explain()}; "
f"inverter-a came up tripped={_c2r.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped}")
check("PRECONDITION 3: this start did NOT migrate anything, which is exactly "
"why the guard used to be skipped on it",
not _c2r.store_migration.ran)
check("⚠️ AND THE LATCH IS CAUGHT ANYWAY. The guard runs on EVERY start now, "
"so a trip taken while the install was rolled back is re-armed instead "
"of being silently discarded by the version marker. A latch that a "
"version change disarms is worse than one that was never persisted, "
"because the state file is evidence saying it is fine",
_c2r.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped
and "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in _c2r.inverters[0].sign_wd.reason
and "-1800 W" in _c2r.inverters[0].sign_wd.reason)
check("...and it is persisted under the NAMESPACED key as it re-arms, so the "
"next start reads it from the live spelling rather than re-deriving it",
_trip.data[unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped")] is True)
check("...and the operator is told in the action log, because a latch re-armed "
"on their behalf that only appears in a banner is a 0 W hold with no "
"explanation",
any("re-armed" in e for e in _c2r.events))
run(_one_cycle_early(_c2r))
check("...and it commands 0 W on its first cycle, which is what makes the "
"re-arm a latch rather than a log line",
_c2r.target == 0.0 and "failsafe" in _c2r.reason)
run(_c2r.handle_action("auto_toggle"))
_c2r2, _ = built(store=_trip)
check("⚠️ AND THE OPERATOR CAN STILL GET OUT OF IT - ONCE. The press clears "
"both spellings, so the next start does NOT re-arm. This is the "
"'re-arm forever' objection the `rep.ran` gate existed to answer, "
"answered where it belongs: by clearing the fossil rather than by "
"refusing to look at it",
not _c2r2.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped
and _trip.data["sign_tripped"] is False
and _trip.data[unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped")] is False)
# A FRESH INSTALL MUST NOT INVENT A LATCH.
_fresh = MemStore()
@@ -518,6 +643,15 @@ check("⚠️ AND THE LATCHES ARE UNDER SEPARATE KEYS, which is the half that "
"it, and every Controller built afterwards read it as A's",
_s3.data.get(unit_key("inverter-b", "sign_tripped")) is True
and _s3.data.get(unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped")) is False)
check("⚠️ ...AND THE TRIP IS MIRRORED ONTO THE PRE-DEV-02 FLAT PAIR, WHICH IS "
"THE ROLLBACK VIEW. store.py's rule 2 keeps the flat keys 'so a rollback "
"still finds its latch', and that only ever covered the latch present AT "
"MIGRATION TIME: nothing flat was written for a trip taken afterwards, so "
"an operator who downgraded found `sign_tripped: false` and came up "
"DRIVING, into the fault. The site-level spelling is right for it - the "
"version being rolled back TO drives one actuator",
_s3.data.get("sign_tripped") is True
and "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in str(_s3.data.get("sign_reason", "")))
# THE RESTART, which is the whole reason the latch is persisted at all.
_h3b = Hass({"sensor.grid": 2000.0, "sensor.soc_a": 50.0,
@@ -563,6 +697,19 @@ check("pressing start clears EVERY latched inverter, under its own key. One "
not _c3r.inverters[1].sign_wd.tripped
and _s3.data[unit_key("inverter-b", "sign_tripped")] is False
and _s3.data[unit_key("inverter-b", "sign_reason")] == "")
check("...and the same press cleared the flat rollback view, so a downgrade "
"after a clear does not find a trip the operator has already dealt with "
"- and neither does the next start, which now reads that key on EVERY "
"boot rather than only on the one that migrates",
_s3.data["sign_tripped"] is False and _s3.data["sign_reason"] == "")
_c3r2, _ = built({"sign_disagree_w": 300, "sign_disagree_s": 1}, store=_s3,
hass=_h3b)
check("⚠️ AND THE RESTART AFTER THAT CLEAR COMES UP UNLATCHED. This is the "
"'re-arm forever' hazard the every-start guard would have if the clear "
"did not reach both spellings, driven through the real button and a real "
"reconstruction rather than argued",
not _c3r2.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped
and not any("re-armed" in e for e in _c3r2.events))
# ==============================================================================
@@ -612,6 +759,10 @@ check("...and a bound that could NOT be read is skipped rather than read as "
# THE CLAMP. Same requested value, two inverters, two answers.
async def _clamp_both():
c, hass = built(store=MemStore(), second=inverter_b())
# SAFETY-28's gate is upstream of the clamp, so the out-of-range request
# has to be one the allocator actually placed or it is substituted with
# 0 W and this part grades the gate instead of the clamp.
arm(c, {"inverter-a": 9999.0, "inverter-b": 9999.0})
await c.write_setpoint(9999.0, force=True, unit=c.inverters[0])
await c.write_setpoint(9999.0, force=True, unit=c.inverters[1])
return c, hass
@@ -811,6 +962,7 @@ async def _hung_heartbeat():
hass = Hass({}, {}, hang={"number.sp_a"}, hang_s=30.0)
c, _ = built(store=store, hass=hass, second=inverter_b(store))
c.inverters[0].target, c.inverters[1].target = 500.0, 700.0
arm(c, {"inverter-a": 500.0, "inverter-b": 700.0})
t0 = time.monotonic()
await c.send_heartbeats(1000.0, 10.0)
return c, hass, time.monotonic() - t0, t0
@@ -851,6 +1003,7 @@ async def _serialised():
hass = Hass({}, {}, hang={"number.sp_a"}, hang_s=30.0)
c, _ = built(store=store, hass=hass, second=inverter_b(store))
c.inverters[0].target, c.inverters[1].target = 500.0, 700.0
arm(c, {"inverter-a": 500.0, "inverter-b": 700.0})
t0 = time.monotonic()
b_at = None
for inv in c.inverters: # <- the shape this card replaces
@@ -880,6 +1033,7 @@ async def _split_deadlines():
hass = Hass()
c, _ = built(store=store, hass=hass, second=inverter_b(store))
c.inverters[0].target, c.inverters[1].target = 500.0, 700.0
arm(c, {"inverter-a": 500.0, "inverter-b": 700.0})
# A was refreshed a moment ago; B has not been refreshed for a long time.
c.inverters[0].last_beat, c.inverters[1].last_beat = 1000.0, 0.0
await c.send_heartbeats(1005.0, 10.0)
@@ -1152,6 +1306,26 @@ MUTATIONS = [
"test_inverter.py part 2: 'the migration REPORTS that it failed'"),
("`_grade_store_migration()` reduced to a log line",
"test_inverter.py part 2: 'the controller REFUSES to come up disarmed'"),
# ⚠️ THE THREE ROWS BELOW ARE ONE DEFECT SEEN FROM THREE SIDES, and it was
# found by review rather than by a check: the latch was silently DISARMED
# by the rollback ROUND TRIP store.py's rule 2 exists for. The guard used to
# return early on `not rep.ran`, which is every start after the first, so a
# trip taken inside a downgrade window was discarded by the version marker.
("`_grade_store_migration()` gated on `rep.ran` again",
"test_inverter.py part 2, the ROLLBACK ROUND TRIP: 'AND THE LATCH IS "
"CAUGHT ANYWAY'. Every other check in that part passes with the gate "
"restored, because every other one runs on the start that migrates"),
("the operator's clear leaving the pre-DEV-02 flat keys set",
"test_inverter.py part 2: 'THE OPERATOR CAN STILL GET OUT OF IT - ONCE' "
"and part 3's 'the restart after that clear comes up UNLATCHED' - i.e. "
"the re-arm-forever hazard, which is why the `rep.ran` gate existed"),
("a trip writing only the namespaced keys, not the flat rollback view",
"test_inverter.py part 3: 'THE TRIP IS MIRRORED ONTO THE PRE-DEV-02 FLAT "
"PAIR'. A downgrade after a post-migration trip found no latch at all"),
("the guard asking only `self.inverters[0]` whether anything is latched "
"instead of asking the STORE - so B's own mirrored trip re-arms A",
"test_inverter.py part 3: 'a brand new Controller comes back with B "
"latched and A NOT' - the flat-key defect returning through its own guard"),
("one shared SignWatchdog: every unit graded on inverter A's command",
"test_inverter.py part 3: 'inverter A did NOT trip'"),
("`sign_tripped` written flat again instead of namespaced",
@@ -1180,6 +1354,20 @@ MUTATIONS = [
"test_inverter.py part 4: 'the pack floor is the EMPTIEST pack'"),
("`device`/`supervised` filed without `inv` - B's rating on A",
"test_peakguard.py 10g: the static routing pin, at the line"),
# ⚠️ THE ROW ABOVE IS THE *ACTUATOR* VARIANT AND IT WAS THE ONLY ONE HERE
# FOR A WHOLE REVIEW ROUND. The BOUND variant below routes every claim
# correctly and builds the NUMBERS from the wrong unit - a different defect
# with a different fix, invisible to the routing pin. It survived all 19
# files, because test_peakguard.py's AC 4 check compared B's bound against
# B's `max_w` while the fixture defaulted B's `max_w` to A's. Both halves
# are fixed: B now has a different rating and the bound is asserted against
# literal numbers. ANY CHECK ASSERTING "X DIFFERS FROM Y" MUST BE RUN ONCE
# WITH X AND Y ACTUALLY MADE DIFFERENT.
("the per-unit `device`/`supervised` BOUNDS read off `self.inverters[0]` "
"while the `actuator=` stays `inv` - right envelope, wrong numbers",
"test_peakguard.py 10g: 'AND EACH UNIT'S supervised BOUND IS ITS OWN "
"max_w' and the two lines under it, which read literal 5000/3000 rather "
"than an expression that can compare a number against itself"),
("the stop button zeroing `self.target` but not each `inv.target`",
"test_inverter.py part 6: 'the next heartbeat does NOT put the old shares "
"back' - a hazard THIS CARD created, because the heartbeat re-emits a "
@@ -1198,7 +1386,7 @@ for what, caught in MUTATIONS:
check(f"all {len(MUTATIONS)} defeats of this card are caught by a named check "
f"above. A guard whose checks survive its own defeat is not a guard, and "
f"this repository has three separate records of exactly that",
len(MUTATIONS) == 19)
len(MUTATIONS) == 24)
print()
goodwe_controller/test_peakguard.py
+72 -14
View File
@@ -2574,18 +2574,32 @@ check("...and the arbiter agrees the routing is legal, on the list main.py "
# setpoint entity, its own rating and its own device range, so the claims below
# are filed from ITS numbers rather than from a copy of A's.
#
# ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST YET. Its rating here is A's, copied, and that is
# a PLACEHOLDER: nothing in this file is a measured parameter for a second
# device (SPIKE-04 measures one). What is graded is the ARCHITECTURE - which
# actuator each claim lands on - and that is independent of the number.
# ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST YET. Its rating here is a HYPOTHESIS: nothing in
# this file is a measured parameter for a second device (SPIKE-04 measures one).
# What is graded is the ARCHITECTURE - which actuator each claim lands on, and
# whose number each per-unit bound is built from.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS 3000 W RATHER THAN A's 5000 W, WHICH IS NOT COSMETIC. THE RULE,
# STATED AT THE LINE THAT NEEDED IT: ANY CHECK ASSERTING "X DIFFERS FROM Y" MUST
# BE RUN ONCE WITH X AND Y ACTUALLY MADE DIFFERENT. This helper used to default
# B's rating and device range to A's `LIVE_MAX_W`, and the AC 4 check below
# compared inverter B's `supervised` bound against `_b2.max_w` - which was
# LITERALLY THE SAME NUMBER as A's. It read as evidence and observed nothing:
# filing both per-unit claims from `self.inverters[0]`'s numbers instead of
# `inv`'s left all 19 files green. That is the third check this session whose
# DATA could not reach the failure it named (ARB-03's call-site scan saw 3 of 8
# sites; ALLOC-01's replay generator saw 0 escapes where a widened one saw
# 39,991), so the number is different HERE, once, for every fixture in the file.
B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS = LIVE_MAX_W - 2000.0
def second_inverter(ctl, *, name="inverter-b", setpoint="number.sp_b",
max_w=None, dev=None):
"""Append a real second `Inverter` to `ctl`, and return a restore()."""
rating = B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS if max_w is None else max_w
inv = Inverter(name, setpoint_entity=setpoint, soc_entity="sensor.soc_b",
batt_entity="sensor.batt_b",
max_w=LIVE_MAX_W if max_w is None else max_w,
store=ctl.store)
inv.dev_min, inv.dev_max = dev or (-LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W)
batt_entity="sensor.batt_b", max_w=rating, store=ctl.store)
inv.dev_min, inv.dev_max = dev or (-rating, rating)
# The readings a real cycle needs from it. `inputs_ok` requires EVERY unit
# to have answered, which is the point - a pack nothing can grade stops the
# site rather than being quietly dropped from the split.
@@ -2778,12 +2792,56 @@ check("...and naming those three is not an accident of this fixture but the "
{c.source for c in _cl2}
== CLAIM_SOURCES - {"failsafe", "safety", "maintenance", "peak",
"arbitrage"})
check("...and each unit's `supervised` bound is ITS OWN `max_w`, not a copy of "
"the first unit's. That is the sentence AC 4 is: give inverter B a "
"different rating and the claim filed on inverter B moves with it",
[(c.lo, c.hi) for c in _cl2
if c.source == "supervised" and c.actuator == "inverter-b"]
== [(-_b2.max_w, _b2.max_w)])
# ⚠️ AND NOW THE HALF THAT WAS EVIDENCE-SHAPED AND OBSERVED NOTHING. The three
# checks above grade WHICH ACTUATOR each claim lands on. They say nothing about
# WHOSE NUMBERS the bound is built from - and those are two different defects
# with two different fixes. Filing the per-unit `device` and `supervised` claims
# from `self.inverters[0]`'s numbers while leaving `actuator=self.actuator_of(
# ..., inv)` alone routes every claim correctly and bounds inverter B by
# inverter A's rating: at A=5000/B=3000 the planned envelope for inverter-b
# becomes (-5000, 5000) instead of (-3000, 3000), which is a 2000 W
# over-command the arbiter believes is supervised.
#
# ⚠️ THE RULE THIS LINE EXISTS TO OBEY: ANY CHECK ASSERTING "X DIFFERS FROM Y"
# MUST BE RUN ONCE WITH X AND Y ACTUALLY MADE DIFFERENT. The version this
# replaces compared inverter B's bound against `_b2.max_w` while
# `second_inverter()` defaulted `max_w` to A's `LIVE_MAX_W` - so it compared
# 5000 against 5000, and the mutation above left all 19 files GREEN. The
# PRECONDITION below is what stops that happening again: it fails if the two
# ratings are ever made equal, so the check cannot go quietly vacuous.
_sup2 = {c.actuator: (c.lo, c.hi) for c in _cl2 if c.source == "supervised"}
_dev2 = {c.actuator: (c.lo, c.hi) for c in _cl2 if c.source == "device"}
print(f" supervised bounds by actuator: {_sup2}; device bounds: {_dev2}")
check("PRECONDITION, AND IT IS THE WHOLE POINT: A AND B HAVE DIFFERENT "
"RATINGS. A check that 'B's bound is B's own number' cannot observe "
"anything while B's number IS A's number, and this file shipped that "
"check for a whole review round",
_b2.max_w != c_src.inverters[0].max_w
and (_b2.dev_min, _b2.dev_max)
!= (c_src.inverters[0].dev_min, c_src.inverters[0].dev_max))
check("⚠️ AND EACH UNIT'S `supervised` BOUND IS ITS OWN `max_w`, NOT A COPY OF "
"THE FIRST UNIT'S. That is the sentence AC 4 is, and it is now stated "
"against LITERAL, DIFFERENT numbers rather than against an expression "
"that could be reading the same object twice: B is bounded at "
f"+/-{B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS:.0f} W and A at +/-{LIVE_MAX_W:.0f} W",
_sup2 == {"inverter-a": (-LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W),
"inverter-b": (-B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS)})
check("...and so is each unit's `device` bound, which is the other number the "
"same loop files and the one that was NEVER READ before this card - one "
"`dev_min`/`dev_max` pair came off one `setpoint_entity`, so a second "
"inverter's reported range bound nothing at all",
_dev2 == {"inverter-a": (-LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W),
"inverter-b": (-B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS)})
check("...and the bounds the ARBITER RESOLVED for inverter B - not just the "
"claims filed at it - are B's own, because a claim filed correctly and "
"then resolved against the wrong envelope would be the same defect one "
"layer down",
_n2_alloc is not None
and next((p for p in _n2_alloc.plans if p.unit == "inverter-b"), None)
is not None
and (lambda p: p.lo == -B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS
and p.hi == B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS)(
next(p for p in _n2_alloc.plans if p.unit == "inverter-b")))
# --- 10h. ALLOC-01: WHAT MAIN.PY DOES WITH AN ALLOCATION IT CANNOT DELIVER ---
goodwe_controller/test_validate.py
+91 -5
View File
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ import sys
from app.maintenance import MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS, MaintConfig
from app.validate import (
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS, FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, ConfigRefused, refuse,
validate_startup_config,
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS, FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S, ConfigRefused,
actuator_writers, refuse, validate_startup_config,
)
fails = []
@@ -135,9 +135,95 @@ for blank in ("", " ", None):
check("...and the message says why it is dangerous rather than untidy",
why(validate_startup_config(base(setpoint_entity=""), None, None),
"heartbeat"))
# specs §1.5: two writers on one actuator is not expressible in this schema.
check("there is exactly one way to reach the actuator",
ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS == ("setpoint_entity",))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# specs §1.5: TWO WRITERS ON ONE ACTUATOR, AND WHAT ACTUALLY GRADES IT
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ WHAT USED TO BE HERE, AND WHY IT WAS NOT ENOUGH. This was one line:
#
# check("there is exactly one way to reach the actuator",
# ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS == ("setpoint_entity",))
#
# and validate.py's comment said the §1.5 non-goal was ENFORCED by construction -
# exactly one such key, so a second writer is not expressible in the options
# schema at all. Both were true. Both graded THE SHAPE OF THE OPTIONS SCHEMA
# rather than the writes, and the difference is not academic: the config below
# has TWO WRITERS ON ONE ACTUATOR and leaves that tuple's length at 1. The check
# stays green while the property it protects is gone, which is this repository's
# named failure mode - a check that observes something other than what it claims
# to observe.
#
# So the first thing this section does is DEMONSTRATE the old check passing on
# the hazardous config, rather than assert in prose that it would have.
_PER_INVERTER_HAZARD = base(inverters=[
{"id": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint"},
# ⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. Nothing is measured from it here; it is a
# config fixture, and the only thing that matters about it is that its
# `setpoint_entity` NAMES THE SAME ENTITY as the scalar key above - which is
# the shape of the mistake, and the shape CFG-04 makes reachable.
{"id": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint"}])
check("⚠️ THE DEFECT, DEMONSTRATED: on a per-inverter config with two writers "
"aimed at ONE entity, the old proxy is still green - it counts option "
"KEYS, and there is still exactly one key called setpoint_entity. This "
"is the check that could not see the thing it was named after",
len(ACTUATOR_WRITE_KEYS) == 1)
_census = actuator_writers(_PER_INVERTER_HAZARD)
print(f" the same config, censused by writer: "
f"{ {k: len(v) for k, v in _census.items()} }")
check("...and the replacement SEES it, because it counts writers per ACTUATOR "
"rather than keys: three declarations, one entity",
list(_census) == ["number.goodwe_setpoint"]
and len(_census["number.goodwe_setpoint"]) == 3)
_hazard_problems = validate_startup_config(_PER_INVERTER_HAZARD, -5000, 5000)
check("AC 3: and the config is REFUSED, where today it starts",
why(_hazard_problems, "one actuator"))
check("...and the refusal names the actuator and every writer aimed at it, so "
"an operator can see WHICH declarations to remove rather than being told "
"only that something is wrong",
why(_hazard_problems, "number.goodwe_setpoint")
and why(_hazard_problems, "inverters[0].setpoint_entity")
and why(_hazard_problems, "inverters[1].setpoint_entity"))
# ⚠️ AND THE GATE MUST NOT REFUSE THE CONFIG CFG-04 IS ACTUALLY FOR. A validator
# that fires on the legitimate case gets switched off by the first person it
# inconveniences, and then none of this is enforced. Two inverters with two
# entities are two writers on TWO actuators, which is not the non-goal - it is
# the whole point of the per-inverter roster.
_PER_INVERTER_OK = {k: v for k, v in base().items() if k != "setpoint_entity"}
_PER_INVERTER_OK["inverters"] = [
{"id": "inverter-a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint"},
{"id": "inverter-b", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint_b"}]
check("two inverters with their own entities are ACCEPTED - one writer each, "
"no shared actuator, and that is CFG-04's whole purpose",
validate_startup_config(_PER_INVERTER_OK, -5000, 5000) == [])
check("...and today's single-inverter config is untouched: one writer, one "
"actuator, and the census finds it wherever it is declared",
validate_startup_config(base(), -5000, 5000) == []
and actuator_writers(base()) ==
{"number.goodwe_setpoint": ["setpoint_entity"]})
# The census is found STRUCTURALLY, not by looking for a container called
# `inverters` - CFG-04 has not chosen that name yet, and a census that guessed
# wrong would go green while two writers existed, which is the same defect one
# step along.
check("a writer nested under a container this file has never heard of is "
"still counted, because the walk is over the options TREE and not over a "
"list of blessed key names",
len(actuator_writers({"setpoint_entity": "number.x",
"whatever_cfg04_calls_it": {
"unit_b": {"setpoint_entity": "NUMBER.X"}}})
["number.x"]) == 2)
check("...and entity ids are folded to lower case, so a second writer cannot "
"be smuggled past the census on Number.X versus number.x",
why(validate_startup_config(base(inverters=[{"setpoint_entity":
"NUMBER.GOODWE_SETPOINT"}]),
-5000, 5000), "one actuator"))
check("a BLANK per-inverter entity is not a writer - the same rule the scalar "
"key gets, since write_setpoint() returns immediately on a blank entity "
"and blank is how an operator leaves a slot unconfigured",
validate_startup_config(base(inverters=[{"setpoint_entity": " "}]),
-5000, 5000) == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("3. a meter that can never read")
goodwe_controller/test_watchdog.py
+19 -9
View File
@@ -446,13 +446,20 @@ check("the trip reached the store, UNDER THE TRIPPED INVERTER'S OWN KEY",
store.data[TRIPPED_KEY] is True)
check("...with the reason beside it, so the operator is told why",
"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in store.data[REASON_KEY])
check("⚠️ ...AND THE FLAT PRE-DEV-02 KEY IS NOT THE ONE THAT MOVED. It was "
"written by the migration at construction, with the value the store then "
"held (untripped), and nothing has written it since. A controller that "
"went on writing the flat key would latch every OTHER inverter on this "
"site as well - which is the defect, and it is only visible as the "
"ABSENCE of a second write here",
store.data.get("sign_tripped") is False)
check("⚠️ ...AND THE FLAT PRE-DEV-02 KEY IS MIRRORED, AS THE ROLLBACK VIEW. "
"This assertion used to read the other way - that the flat key was NOT "
"written - on the argument that writing it would latch every other "
"inverter on the site. That argument was right about the READ and wrong "
"about the WRITE: nothing at runtime reads the flat key, and the one "
"thing that does (`_grade_store_migration()`, on every start) ignores it "
"whenever ANY namespaced latch is set, which a sibling's trip always "
"leaves. What the absence actually cost was the ROLLBACK: store.py's "
"rule 2 keeps this key so a downgrade finds the latch, and a trip taken "
"after the migration wrote nothing here - so an operator who downgraded "
"came up DRIVING. `test_inverter.py` part 3 is where 'B's trip does not "
"latch A across a restart' is graded, on a real roster of two",
store.data.get("sign_tripped") is True
and "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in str(store.data.get("sign_reason", "")))
check("the new Controller comes back TRIPPED", post.sign_wd.tripped)
check("...and says why, restored rather than re-detected",
"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in post.sign_wd.reason)
@@ -469,9 +476,12 @@ asyncio.run(post.handle_action("auto_toggle")) # -> stopped
check("pressing stop does not clear the failsafe",
post.sign_wd.tripped and store.data[TRIPPED_KEY] is True)
asyncio.run(post.handle_action("auto_toggle")) # -> started
check("pressing start DOES clear it, and clears the store with it",
check("pressing start DOES clear it, and clears the store with it - BOTH "
"spellings, which is what stops the every-start latch guard re-arming a "
"failsafe the operator has already dealt with",
not post.sign_wd.tripped and store.data[TRIPPED_KEY] is False
and store.data[REASON_KEY] == "")
and store.data[REASON_KEY] == ""
and store.data.get("sign_tripped") is False)
# One more restart from the cleared store, to prove the clear persisted too.
fresh = Controller({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_source": "off"},
_Hass(), store, _P(), stop=asyncio.Event())