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goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller/app/store.py
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 753f700539
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DEV-02: merge release/1.0, and close the two review blockers
PR #43 was rejected on two findings and had gone unmergeable behind SAFETY-28
and the ALLOC-01 fix. This is the merge commit; the conflict resolution and both
fixes are below, because a merge that also changes behaviour has to say so.

THE MERGE, AND WHAT IT COST
===========================
Two conflicts in main.py, both where SAFETY-28 and this card touched the same
method:

  * `write_setpoint()` split into a site entry point plus a per-unit
    `_write_unit()` here, while SAFETY-28 put its record gate in the old
    single-unit body. `write_refusal()` now takes the INVERTER it is about.
    Asking it with `self.unit` - as release/1.0 does - would authorise A's share
    on B's wire, and would also trip test_inverter.py part 1's AST scan, which
    goes red on any read of a Controller N=1 view inside Controller.
  * the SAFETY-28 gate sits above the clamp and below the non-finite coercion,
    exactly where release/1.0 put it, and is now asked about `inv`.

Fallout the merge produced in the checks, re-aimed rather than relaxed:

  * every fixture that calls `write_setpoint()` DIRECTLY - the clamp probe, the
    hung-heartbeat experiment and its serialised counterfactual, the split
    deadline probe - now arms a real allocation record first. test_inverter.py
    grows an `arm()` built through the shipped `resolve()`, the same shape
    test_clamp.py's is: the per-unit envelopes are filed as real `supervised`
    claims and the site target is their sum, so the water-fill has exactly one
    answer and the fixture cannot quietly become its own allocator.
  * test_clamp.py's two-unit failsafe fixture assigned `c.units`, which DEV-02
    made a derived property with no setter. It appends a real `Inverter`.

BLOCKER 1 - AC 4's ARBITER-BOUND EVIDENCE WAS VACUOUS
=====================================================
test_peakguard.py claimed "each unit's `supervised` bound is ITS OWN `max_w` -
give inverter B a different rating and the claim filed on inverter B moves with
it", and compared B's bound against `_b2.max_w`. `second_inverter()` DEFAULTED
B's rating to `LIVE_MAX_W`, which is A's. IT COMPARED (-5000, 5000) AGAINST
(-5000, 5000): a number against itself, unable to observe the failure it named.

Reproduced: filing the per-unit `device`/`supervised` claims from
`self.inverters[0]`'s numbers while leaving `actuator=self.actuator_of(..., inv)`
alone left ALL 19 FILES GREEN. At a roster of two with A=5000/B=3000 that makes
inverter B's planned envelope (-5000, 5000) instead of (-3000, 3000) - a 2000 W
over-command the arbiter believes is supervised. It is a DIFFERENT defect from
the actuator variant the static routing pin catches, and only the actuator
variant was in the mutation table.

  * `second_inverter()` gives B 3000 W - a hypothesis, marked as one - for every
    fixture in the file, so no check there can compare B against A by accident.
  * the claim is asserted against LITERAL numbers rather than against an
    expression that can read the same object twice, for `supervised` AND for
    `device` (whose `dev` had the same defect), plus the envelope the ARBITER
    RESOLVED for B - a claim filed right and resolved wrong is the same defect
    one layer down.
  * a PRECONDITION check fails if the two ratings are ever made equal again.
  * the BOUND mutation is in the table, beside the actuator one, and was
    observed RED (3 checks in test_peakguard.py) via tools/mutation_run.sh.

⚠️ THIRD INSTANCE THIS SESSION of a check whose DATA cannot reach the failure it
names - ARB-03's call-site scan saw 3 of 8 appends, ALLOC-01's replay generator
saw 0 escapes where a widened one saw 39,991. MUTATION.md gains a section for it
beside the stale-bytecode and masking ones, and the rule is written at the line:
ANY CHECK ASSERTING "X DIFFERS FROM Y" MUST BE RUN ONCE WITH X AND Y ACTUALLY
MADE DIFFERENT.

BLOCKER 2 - THE LATCH WAS SILENTLY DISARMED BY THE ROLLBACK ROUND TRIP
======================================================================
store.py's rule 2 keeps the flat keys "so a rollback still finds its latch". The
operator path that rule contemplates is a ROUND TRIP, and this card lost the
latch on it:

  1. install migrates          -> schema_version=1, unit/inverter-a/... = False
  2. operator DOWNGRADES; SAFETY-02 trips inside the downgrade window and the
     old add-on writes only the flat `sign_tripped: true`
  3. operator upgrades again   -> `rep.ran` is False, so `_grade_store_migration()`
     returned early, and `Inverter.__init__` read the namespaced key: False

Observed: the controller came up with `sign_wd.tripped = False` while
/data/state.json said `sign_tripped: true`. That is store.py's own header
sentence - "the file still says sign_tripped: true, the banner is green, and the
controller resumes driving the wrong way" - rebuilt by the version marker. A
firmware version change with a rollback path was performed on this site on
2026-09-02, so this is not hypothetical.

Three changes, each graded by a mutation observed RED:

  * THE OPERATOR'S CLEAR CLEARS BOTH SPELLINGS. That is what removes the
    "re-arm forever" objection the `rep.ran` gate existed to answer: with the
    fossil cleared, `flat True + namespaced False` is unambiguously a
    downgrade-window latch.
  * A TRIP MIRRORS THE FLAT PAIR. Rule 2 only ever covered the latch present AT
    MIGRATION TIME - nothing flat was written for a trip taken afterwards, so an
    operator who downgraded found `sign_tripped: false` and came up DRIVING.
    store.py claimed the staleness could only fail toward a SPURIOUS latch. It
    could not; that sentence is corrected rather than left standing.
  * THE GUARD RUNS ON EVERY START, and asks the STORE - not the roster - whether
    anything namespaced is latched. A mirrored trip on B must not re-arm a
    healthy A, and the store is the right place to ask because it holds every
    `unit/*/sign_tripped` this install has written, including one belonging to a
    unit that is not in today's roster.

Graded by the three-step scenario itself, run end to end in test_inverter.py
part 2, with all three preconditions asserted - including that the catching
start did NOT migrate anything, which is what used to skip the guard. Part 2's
idempotence check now PRESSES the button instead of hand-writing the store,
because the state it used to construct is not one the shipped clear path can
produce. Part 3 grades the mirror and the clear on a real roster of two.

test_watchdog.py's "the flat key is NOT written" assertion is re-aimed rather
than deleted: its argument was right about the READ and wrong about the WRITE.
Nothing at runtime reads that key, and the one thing that does ignores it
whenever any namespaced latch is set - which a sibling's trip always leaves.
What its absence actually cost was the rollback.

HANDOVER.md and DOCS.md said the flat key "is never read again", which was the
instruction an operator clearing a trip by hand would follow. Both corrected: it
is a maintained rollback view, it IS read on every start, and clearing a trip by
hand means clearing both spellings.

MUTATIONS THIS ROUND, each applied on a purged tree via tools/mutation_run.sh
and observed RED:
  * per-unit `device`/`supervised` BOUNDS from `self.inverters[0]`, actuator
    left correct                                   -> test_peakguard.py 10g
  * `_grade_store_migration()` gated on `rep.ran`   -> test_inverter.py part 2
  * the operator's clear leaving the flat keys set  -> test_inverter.py part 2/3
  * a trip not mirroring the flat pair              -> test_inverter.py part 3
  * the guard asking only `self.inverters[0]`       -> test_inverter.py part 3

19/19 files green on the merged tree. No hardware was touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-03 23:37:23 +02:00

305 lines
15 KiB
Python

"""Persistent state, in /data (the add-on's only durable volume).
The maintenance cycle is month-scale state: it MUST survive add-on restarts,
HA restarts and power cuts, or the battery quietly stops being maintained and
nothing says so.
Times are stored as ISO-8601 with an explicit UTC offset and parsed back to
aware datetimes. That is not fussiness: the YAML implementation this replaces
was disabled for hours by exactly one naive-vs-aware subtraction, and it failed
silently - the automation never even recorded itself as triggered.
"""
import json
import logging
import os
import tempfile
from datetime import datetime, timezone
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.store")
# ⚠️ "auto" is deliberately NOT in here. Controller falls back to the add-on's
# `auto_start` option only when the key is absent - if a default supplied False,
# the fallback could never fire and auto_start would silently do nothing on
# every fresh install.
#
# ⚠️ `sign_tripped` IS in here, and the difference from `auto` is the whole
# reason both decisions are written down. `auto` has an option to fall back to
# (`auto_start`), so a stored default would mask a fresh install. A latched
# failsafe has no such fallback: absent means "never tripped", which is exactly
# what a default of False says.
#
# It is persisted for the reason this module's docstring gives for maintenance
# state, applied to something with a much shorter fuse. SAFETY-02's latch is the
# only thing standing between a controller that has been caught driving the wrong
# way and its own restart, and "restart the add-on" is the FIRST thing an operator
# looking at a FAILSAFE banner will try. Held only in memory it came back armed,
# into the fault, unattended - measured: after reconstructing Controller against
# the same store, `tripped` was False, the banner read NOT READY, and it resumed
# commanding -1000, -2000 W before re-tripping 180 s later. Under a supervisor
# that restarts a crashed add-on that is a loop, three minutes of wrong-direction
# power at a time, forever.
#
# ⚠️ AND SINCE DEV-02 THE TWO SAFETY-02 KEYS ARE THE *LEGACY* SPELLING. They are
# FLAT - one `sign_tripped` for a controller that now holds a LIST of inverters -
# so a trip caused by inverter B would latch inverter A across restarts, and one
# operator action would clear both. The LIVE latch is per inverter, under
# `unit/<name>/...`, and that is the one the watchdog is restored from.
#
# ⚠️ THE FLAT PAIR IS NOT DEAD, THOUGH: it is the ROLLBACK VIEW. It is written
# alongside the namespaced keys on a trip and cleared alongside them on the
# operator's clear, so an add-on that is DOWNGRADED past this schema still finds
# the latch it should - and so that a trip taken while the install was rolled
# back is still visible to the version that comes back up. Rule 2 of
# `migrate_unit_keys()` and `Controller._grade_store_migration()` carry the
# argument; the short version is that a latch is only worth persisting if it
# survives the version change an operator makes while staring at the banner.
DEFAULTS = {
"phase": "idle",
"phase_started": None,
"last_completed": None,
"last_start_attempt": None,
"sign_tripped": False,
"sign_reason": "",
}
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# DEV-02: PER-INVERTER KEYS, AND THE MIGRATION IS THE RISKY HALF
#
# ⚠️ A LATCH THAT SILENTLY FAILS TO MIGRATE IS A DISARMED SAFETY GUARD ON AN
# INSTALL THAT BELIEVES IT IS PROTECTED. SAFETY-02's whole reason for being
# persisted is that "restart the add-on" is the FIRST thing an operator staring
# at a FAILSAFE banner tries, and a latch held only in memory comes back armed,
# into the fault, unattended. A latch that is written down under a key nothing
# reads any more is exactly the same failure with a longer paper trail: the file
# still says `sign_tripped: true`, the banner is green, and the controller
# resumes driving the wrong way.
#
# So this is a MIGRATION WITH A POSTCONDITION, not a copy. `migrate_unit_keys()`
# reports what it did AND reads the result back; `Controller.__init__` grades
# that report and refuses to come up quietly if the latch did not survive. The
# test that grades it BREAKS the migration and watches the guard fire.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 0 = the flat, one-inverter layout that shipped before DEV-02.
# 1 = per-inverter keys under `unit/<name>/...`.
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
SCHEMA_KEY = "schema_version"
# Which flat keys belong to ONE inverter, and therefore move into its namespace.
# ⚠️ THE MAINTENANCE KEYS ARE NOT IN HERE AND THAT IS DELIBERATE. `phase`,
# `phase_started`, `last_completed` and `last_start_attempt` belong to the
# maintenance state machine, of which this add-on still holds exactly ONE - a
# monthly recalibration is a pack procedure and per-pack SCHEDULING is a card of
# its own, not something to infer from a key rename. Moving them here would
# quietly re-home an install's whole maintenance history under a unit name; they
# stay where they are, untouched, which is the other half of "migrates without
# losing its latch OR ITS HISTORY".
LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS = ("sign_tripped", "sign_reason")
def unit_key(unit: str, key: str) -> str:
"""The namespaced Store key for `key` on inverter `unit`.
⚠️ ONE SPELLING, IN ONE PLACE. `Inverter.key()` calls this and so does the
migration, so a check can assert that what was migrated is what is read.
Two transcriptions of a key name is one copy plus a future disagreement
about which one holds the latch - and the copy that drifts is always the one
that reads.
"""
return f"unit/{unit}/{key}"
class MigrationReport:
"""What `migrate_unit_keys()` did, and whether it can be believed.
⚠️ IT CARRIES `verified`, WHICH IS READ BACK FROM THE STORE RATHER THAN
ASSUMED FROM THE ASSIGNMENT. That is the difference between this and a
two-line copy: the caller is able to ask "is the latch that was in the file
before now under the key the watchdog reads", and a `False` there is a
disarmed guard, which is an ERROR and not a log line nobody sees.
"""
def __init__(self):
self.ran = False # did anything need moving
self.from_version = 0
self.moved = {} # new key -> value written
self.kept = [] # keys already namespaced, left alone
self.verified = True # every move read back equal
self.problems = [] # human-readable, one per failed move
# ⚠️ THE SUBSET THAT MATTERS, AND THE DISTINCTION IS NOT PEDANTRY. A
# store that drops a write of `sign_tripped=False` has lost the
# DEFAULT - the same statement "absent" already makes, so nothing is
# gone. One that drops a write of `True` has lost A LATCH. Only the
# second is a disarmed safety guard, and only the second may be allowed
# to shout: an alarm that fires on the harmless case is an alarm an
# operator learns to dismiss before the real one arrives.
self.lost = []
@property
def ok(self) -> bool:
"""Nothing that CARRIED STATE failed to land."""
return not self.lost
def explain(self) -> str:
if not self.ran:
return (f"store already at schema {self.from_version}; no "
f"per-inverter migration needed")
out = (f"migrated {len(self.moved)} flat key(s) to inverter "
f"namespaces: " + ", ".join(sorted(self.moved)))
if self.kept:
out += " (left alone, already namespaced: " + ", ".join(sorted(self.kept)) + ")"
if self.problems:
out += " - PROBLEMS: " + "; ".join(self.problems)
if self.lost:
out += " - STATE LOST: " + "; ".join(self.lost)
return out
def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
"""Move the pre-DEV-02 flat per-inverter keys into `unit`'s namespace.
`unit` is the FIRST inverter in the roster, which on every install that can
possibly have a flat key is the only one it ever had. A store written by a
version that knew about more than one inverter is already at
SCHEMA_VERSION and is not touched.
THE THREE RULES, each one a case that would otherwise be a wrong answer:
1. IT NEVER OVERWRITES AN EXISTING NAMESPACED VALUE. A store that has both
spellings has been written by this version, and the namespaced one is
where the WATCHDOG is restored from. Preferring the flat one HERE would
resurrect a trip the operator has already cleared, because a migration
runs before anything can tell the two apart. Deciding between them is
main.py's job and it has the one rule that can: the flat key carries new
information only when NOTHING namespaced is latched.
2. THE FLAT KEYS ARE LEFT IN THE FILE, AND THEY ARE KEPT LIVE. Deleting
them buys tidiness and costs a rollback: an operator who downgrades the
add-on after a migration would find no latch at all, which is the
disarmed guard again in the other direction. Left in place, a downgrade
finds the trip it had.
⚠️ AND "LEFT IN PLACE" IS NOT ENOUGH ON ITS OWN, WHICH IS WHAT THIS RULE
USED TO SAY. The sentence here read "they go stale from this moment -
nothing writes them again - and the direction that staleness fails in is
a SPURIOUS latch, never a missing one". That was true of the latch this
migration MOVES and false of every trip that happens AFTERWARDS: nothing
flat was written for those, so a rollback found `sign_tripped: false` and
came up DRIVING. So main.py mirrors both keys on a trip and clears both
on the operator's clear. The flat pair is the ROLLBACK VIEW of the latch,
maintained, not a fossil - which is also what lets main.py's
`_grade_store_migration()` run on every start and catch a trip that
happened while the install was rolled back (see its docstring: the flat
key saying tripped while no inverter came up tripped is the one
disagreement that can occur, and it is a DOWNGRADE-WINDOW LATCH).
3. THE VERSION MARKER IS WRITTEN LAST. A crash between the copies and the
marker leaves the migration to run again, and rule 1 makes running it
again a no-op. A marker written first would leave a half-migrated store
looking finished.
"""
rep = MigrationReport()
data = getattr(store, "data", {})
rep.from_version = int(data.get(SCHEMA_KEY, 0) or 0)
if rep.from_version >= SCHEMA_VERSION:
return rep
rep.ran = True
for legacy in LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS:
target = unit_key(unit, legacy)
if target in data:
rep.kept.append(target)
continue
# ⚠️ `DEFAULTS[legacy]` RATHER THAN A LITERAL. An install that never
# tripped has no `sign_tripped` in its file at all, and the value it
# then lands on has to be the one `Store.load()` would have supplied -
# otherwise "absent" and "never tripped" stop being the same statement,
# which is the distinction store.py's own header is about.
value = data.get(legacy, DEFAULTS.get(legacy))
store.set(target, value)
rep.moved[target] = value
# THE POSTCONDITION, AND IT IS A READ-BACK RATHER THAN AN ASSUMPTION. This
# is the difference between this function and a two-line copy: the caller
# can ask "is the latch that was in the file before now under the key the
# watchdog reads", through the same `unit_key()` the watchdog's constructor
# reads through, and a `False` there is a guard that is off on an install
# whose state file says it is on.
for target, value in rep.moved.items():
got = getattr(store, "data", {}).get(target, "<<missing>>")
if got == value:
continue
rep.verified = False
note = f"{target} was written as {value!r} and reads back as {got!r}"
rep.problems.append(note)
legacy = target.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
if value != DEFAULTS.get(legacy):
rep.lost.append(note)
if rep.ok:
store.set(SCHEMA_KEY, SCHEMA_VERSION)
else:
# ⚠️ NOT MARKED DONE. A migration that lost state must run again on the
# next start rather than be recorded as finished - the one thing worse
# than a failed migration is a failed migration a later version skips.
_LOG.error("per-inverter store migration LOST STATE and has not been "
"marked done: %s", rep.explain())
return rep
class Store:
def __init__(self, path: str = "/data/state.json"):
self.path = path
self.data = dict(DEFAULTS)
self.load()
def load(self) -> None:
try:
with open(self.path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
loaded = json.load(fh)
if isinstance(loaded, dict):
self.data = {**DEFAULTS, **loaded}
_LOG.info("state restored: phase=%s last_completed=%s "
"sign_tripped=%s",
self.data.get("phase"), self.data.get("last_completed"),
self.data.get("sign_tripped"))
except FileNotFoundError:
_LOG.info("no saved state, starting fresh")
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError) as err:
# A corrupt state file must not stop the controller: losing the
# maintenance history is recoverable, refusing to run is not.
_LOG.warning("state unreadable (%s) - starting fresh", err)
def save(self) -> None:
# Atomic replace: a power cut mid-write must not leave a truncated file
# that reads as "no maintenance ever ran".
try:
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(self.path), exist_ok=True)
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=os.path.dirname(self.path))
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
json.dump(self.data, fh, indent=1)
os.replace(tmp, self.path)
except OSError as err:
_LOG.error("could not persist state: %s", err)
# -- typed helpers ------------------------------------------------------
def get_time(self, key: str):
raw = self.data.get(key)
if not raw:
return None
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
_LOG.warning("unparseable timestamp for %s: %r", key, raw)
return None
# Anything that ever escaped without an offset is treated as UTC rather
# than raising later in an arithmetic expression.
return parsed if parsed.tzinfo else parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
def set_time(self, key: str, when: datetime | None) -> None:
self.data[key] = when.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat() if when else None
self.save()
def set(self, key: str, value) -> None:
self.data[key] = value
self.save()