goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller/MUTATION.md

# Mutation runs in this repository — and the one way they lie

Nearly every safety claim in this add-on was established the same way: change
the shipped module, run the suites, watch one go **red**, put the module back,
watch it go **green**. There is no coverage tool here and there is not meant to
be — the check that matters is whether a *check* notices when the behaviour it
names is removed.

That method has exactly one silent failure mode, and TEST-15 exists because we
walked into it.

## The defect

FCST-03's developer reverted `self.provisional` to `here.provisional`, re-ran,
and reported the mutation as a **survivor**. It was not. CPython decides a
cached `.pyc` is still valid from two numbers:

* the source file's **size in bytes**, and
* the source file's **mtime truncated to whole seconds**.

`self` and `here` are the same length, and the revert happened in the same
second as the edit. Neither number moved, so the interpreter loaded the
bytecode it already had. Confirmed at the time by disassembly: **the source read
`here`, the running code loaded `self`.** The suite had graded code that was not
there — no error, no warning, exit status 0.

The same collision, in the other direction, can leave a **red** standing on
correct source after a revert that never took.

### Which way it lies, and why that scopes everything

A mutation that never took effect leaves the suite **green**, and a green run of
a mutated tree is reported as a survivor. So stale bytecode **manufactures
survivors**; it cannot manufacture a red. The false-red case exists but
announces itself, because a developer chases a failure they cannot explain.

Two consequences, and both are used below:

* a recorded **"all red, no survivors"** result is not at risk from this defect;
* a recorded **survivor** — and a recorded *zero*, such as a coverage-audit
  count of 0 — is exactly what this defect produces.

`test_control.py`'s coverage-audit table says the same thing in its own terms:
the error is one-directional, so every figure there is a lower bound at worst.

## The rule

**Purge `__pycache__` before every mutation run.** Not afterwards, not usually,
not when the edit looks big enough.

```sh
cd goodwe_controller
tools/mutation_run.sh                     # every test_*.py in this directory
tools/mutation_run.sh . test_tariff.py    # or just the ones you are watching
tools/mutation_run.sh "$GOODWE_ADDON_REPO/goodwe_controller"   # from elsewhere
```

The harness purges, prints a `sha256`/byte-count fingerprint of every `app/*.py`
it is about to grade, runs each suite under `python3 -B`, and fails if a cache
appeared during the run. Diff two fingerprints and the file you mutated is the
line that changed — which is also how a mutation report proves *which source*
produced it.

### What does **not** fix this

| | writes bytecode | reads a stale `.pyc` |
|---|---|---|
| `python3 -B` | no | **yes** |
| `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1` | no | **yes** |
| purging `__pycache__` | (unchanged) | **no — nothing to read** |

Both flags are *write-side only*. A mutation run always has a cache already,
because the previous run wrote it, so a harness that only adds `-B` closes
nothing. This is measured, not read off documentation: `test_bytecode.py`
part 2 arranges the collision and shows both flags still running the old code.

`-B` is still worth passing — it stops **this** run leaving a cache for the
**next** edit to inherit, which is the one nobody is thinking about three
mutations into a batch. Purge for this run, `-B` for the next one.

### And not a `sleep`

One-second mtime resolution is the *mechanism*, not the enemy. Waiting out the
clock would slow every run down, and would still only cover the edit somebody
remembered to slow down. Stop trusting mtime instead.

## Reporting a mutation

State the things a reviewer cannot reconstruct afterwards:

1. **the byte delta** of the mutated file (`+5 B`, `+0 B`). `+0 B` is the risky
   one — say so;
2. **that the mutated line was on disk** when the run started (the harness
   fingerprint, or a `grep` of the line);
3. **which suite went red, and on which named check** — "the suite is red" and
   "the check that watches this is red" are different claims;
4. for a **survivor**, that the run was purged. An unpurged survivor is not a
   result.

## The other thing a mutation sweep cannot see: masking (TEST-16)

Stale bytecode is not the only way a survivor lies. **Two guards can mask each
other**, and a sweep that mutates one line at a time is structurally blind to it.

TEST-16 is the worked example. `static_tariff.arbitrage()` refuses a
one-firm-hour series at `len(firm) < 2`, and refuses a flat series at
`spread == 0.0`. A single firm hour *also* has a spread of zero. So:

* weaken the firm-pair rung alone → the flat rung refuses the stimulus anyway;
* weaken the flat rung alone → the tiny-spread stimulus is still refused, just
  for the wrong reason;
* and the suite, grading `kind == "refused"`, reports **nothing either way**.

Both rungs could then be weakened *together* and still nothing would report —
which is precisely the state in which the next edit to either one opens a real
hole. It survived four rounds of review on TARIFF-03 and FCST-03.

Two rules come out of it, and both are cheap:

1. **Grade the reason, not just the verdict.** "Refused" and "refused for the
   right reason" are different claims, and a masked rung is the case where the
   first is true and the second is false. A refusal sentence is what the
   operator reads; it is also the only observable that moves when one rung
   quietly absorbs another's work.
2. **When two rungs can answer the same stimulus, mutate them together.** One
   extra run per suspected pair. If a sweep finds two survivors in the same
   function, that pair is the first thing to try — TEST-16's two survivors were
   adjacent lines in one function and neither was individually live.

## Where each surface stands

* **Local and dev-harness runs — the exposed one.** This is where FCST-03 hit
  it. `goodwe_controller/__pycache__` and `app/__pycache__` are gitignored and
  are sitting in most working trees right now. Use the harness.
* **CI — structurally immune, and it was before this card.** `.gitea/workflows/
  checks.yml` bind mounts the checkout `-v "$WS:/w:ro"`, so the interpreter
  cannot write a `__pycache__` into the tree under test at all; measured for
  TEST-15, and it fails *silently* — no error, exit status 0. Each job also
  `rm -rf`s its workspace and clones afresh, so nothing crosses between jobs on
  the shared runner. `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1` is now set there too, as belt
  and braces: the `:ro` is one character wide and the next person debugging a
  write will be tempted by it.
* **The shipped add-on — not affected, and this is closed.**
  `goodwe_controller/Dockerfile` has carried `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1` since
  it was written. There is no deploy-side finding here; do not re-open it.
* **The infra repo's `sim/` harnesses — exposed, and NOT fixed by this card.**
  `sim/replay_sign.py` and friends import the add-on out of
  `$GOODWE_ADDON_REPO` and write `__pycache__` into *both* trees
  (`goodwe/sim/__pycache__` exists today). SAFETY-02's headline validation is a
  replay, not a suite, so a mutation graded through it carries the same
  exposure. `tools/mutation_run.sh` takes the tree to purge as its first
  argument precisely so that repo can call it, but the change belongs in that
  repo and some of those harnesses want the rig. **Anyone mutating a module
  graded by a replay must purge both trees by hand until then.**

## Survey — mutation claims of 2026-08-25 … 2026-09-01

Scoped **by the property, not by re-running everything**. A claim is at risk
only if a mutation could have preserved the file's byte count *and* been
reverted inside the same second, *and* the claim is of the kind stale bytecode
can fabricate (see "which way it lies"). Sources: `git log release/1.0` and the
commit and PR bodies.

| claim | verdict | why |
|---|---|---|
| **FCST-03** M9 `self.provisional`→`here.provisional` (dd40c56, 71cd784) | **re-verified** | this is the original false survivor. Re-run with the cache cleared, M9 is caught. The shipped source was correct throughout. |
| **FCST-03** X1, X6 degenerate stimuli (71cd784) | **not at risk** | run after the purge discipline landed in that branch. |
| **SAFETY-24** 11 author + 9 reviewer mutations (e709554, 4601682) | **not at risk** | the commit records them run under `python -B` with a purged `__pycache__` and real byte deltas. Its one survivor is an equivalent mutant, argued structurally rather than by a green run. |
| **SAFETY-26** tolerance sweep over `arbitrage.py` and `static_tariff.py`, 2 survivors (2b8b8cb) | **not at risk** | purge, printed `+5 B` delta, mutated line asserted present, tree re-read before each run. One survivor is explicitly recorded at `+0 B` — the risky delta — and was produced *under* the purge. **Both survivors are now closed by TEST-16** (`test_static_tariff.py` section 9), which also found that the two of them *masked each other* — each was individually non-live only because the other rung caught its stimulus, an arrangement single-mutation testing cannot see. Its own ledger is 7 mutations, 4 of them at `+0 B`, all red. |
| **OPT-04** mutations reported on PR #22 (bdd7f18) | **not at risk** | `test_arbitrage.py`'s header records the exact command: purge, then `python3 -B`. |
| **TEST-17** `checks()` dropping `when` (504e8da) | **not at risk** | a *red* claim, and dropping an argument changes the file length. Neither half of the collision is available. |
| **SAFETY-07** wiring mutations B1/B2/B3 and `test_peakguard.py` parts 7 and 10 (2d570d8, e7c95bf) | **not at risk** | those mutations are **executed in-process**, monkeypatched onto the imported module. No source file is edited, so no `.pyc` is consulted. |
| every **"all red, no survivors"** claim in the window — TARIFF-02 (24/0), TARIFF-03 (11), MAINT-04 (10), SAFETY-18 (6+4), SAFETY-03 (6), TEL-04 (10), TEL-05 (6) | **not at risk** | direction. Stale bytecode turns a red into a green survivor, never the reverse. A red is evidence that *something* changed under the check. |
| **TEST-06**'s deleted assertion, "no new notification while parked at 0 W" (c34b5a2) | **not at risk / superseded** | it was recorded as undecidable and then *falsified* — `test_freeze.py` records the one-line mutation that takes the file red 9 times. The stronger later claim is a red one. |
| **TARIFF-01** reviewer survivor: `record_block()` ignoring its `policy` argument (0dbd485) | **re-verified — still a survivor** | re-run here through `tools/mutation_run.sh` against the 15 suites that were on the record, all green with `billed_w(block, policy)` mutated to `billed_w(block, POLICY_NET)`. The recorded diagnosis holds: every block reaching the store is single-phase, where NET, SUM and MAX collapse. |
| **SAFETY-25** 8 mutations against `test_peakguard.py` part 10, then 9 more after review, all red | **not at risk** | each run against a tree copied fresh with `__pycache__` excluded and mounted `:ro`, so no `.pyc` existed to go stale - the same structural immunity recorded for CI above. Byte deltas recorded on the PR; none is `+0 B`. All are **reds**, which is the direction this defect cannot fabricate. ⚠️ The second round exists because the first round's mutations were all aimed at DISARMING the guard, and the claim part 10 actually made was about the guard being FIXED - the reviewer built the fix and the suite stayed green. Bytecode was never the issue there; an unaimed battery was. |
| **SAFETY-03** reviewer survivor: `abs()` dropped from `clamp_to_rating`'s limit (6aabb83) | **re-verified — still a survivor** | re-run the same way, all 15 green. Also as recorded: unreachable under the `int(100, 5000)` schema. |
| **TARIFF-01**'s other three survivors, **SAFETY-03**'s `describe()` survivor, **TARIFF-02**'s M3/M5/M7, **SAFETY-18**'s three | **still unverified** | recorded before the purge discipline, with no byte delta on the record, so a `+0 B` same-second revert cannot be excluded. All are survivors, which is the direction this defect fabricates. TARIFF-02's and SAFETY-18's were **closed by later commits whose claims are reds**, so what is unverified is the *diagnosis*, not the current state of the code. |

**Nothing here says a past result is wrong.** The two survivors re-run above
both stood. What changed is that they are now on the record as measured rather
than assumed, and the rest are labelled honestly. The still-unverified rows are
cheap to close — one harness run each — and the right moment is when somebody
next touches that module, not in a re-run campaign nobody will read.