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Author SHA1 Message Date
adminandClaude Opus 5 8a6acd9fa2 SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Text only. No behaviour change - same conjunction, same limits, same MISSING,
same 0 W, same NOT READY. `tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` says so: 2390
capture reads, a 66-cell swept grid, and six driven controller worlds produce
the byte-identical document `6030175e...` on origin/release/1.0 and on this
branch, while the sentences differ.

THE DEFECT. SAFETY-37's conjunction is satisfied by two disjoint worlds - the
register has stopped reporting reality, or the SOURCE cannot comply with the
command - and nothing `freshness.py` is handed separates them. Three sentences
asserted the first. On the live 2026-09-21 episode it was the second: the pack
read 11 % for the whole 850 s hold, every command in that hold was a discharge,
and the register answered the first CHARGE command three seconds later. The
readiness row was worse still, because it asserted a false fact about a NAMED
entity that was present, numeric and updating - so the operator opened
Developer Tools, found it working, and had every reason to conclude the
diagnostics were broken.

THE FIX. Each message states what was OBSERVED and names BOTH explanations.
Three wordings, no shared helper: two are a log line about a behaviour, the
third is a banner about an entity, and a helper serving both would drop
whichever half the other caller does not need. SoC stays STATED, NOT WIRED -
part 11b drives the two worlds at 50 % and 11 % and the sentence does not move
one byte. The row does not branch on `batt_fresh.stale` either: `stale_note()`
already rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below, so the discriminator is "is
that row there?", and part 11d asserts it is present in one world and absent in
the other.

THE CHECKS. test_freshness.py part 11 builds the pair of worlds with ground
truth written down rather than derived from the published stream, asserts they
are really two (40 of 40 reads differ) while the published stream is
bit-identical, and only then grades the sentences. Eleven mutations, all red:
each of the three sentences reverted (3, 2 and 2 named reds), the two
explanations transposed at ZERO bytes (1), the second explanation deleted (1),
the admission of ambiguity replaced by a ranking (1), all three reverted at
once (5), and two aimed at this card's own check - collapsing the world pair
(2) and emptying the accusation list, which a positive control against the
three sentences as 0.10.1 shipped them catches (1).

AND TWO OF THE ELEVEN FOUND DEFECTS IN THE CHECK RATHER THAN IN THE CODE.
Transposing `label` and `entity` in the row made it unfindable and the run died
on an IndexError - a red with no name and every later check ungraded, FCST-06's
shape exactly; `_s56_row()` returns a named absence now, 0 named reds before, 3
after. And the first invariance run compared a tree with itself, because it
archived a branch whose edits were not committed yet; the tool now REFUSES to
report "behaviour unchanged" unless the sentences halves differ, and both of
its refusals are driven.

SAFETY-57's part 10h check was the handoff and is inverted rather than deleted:
it required the accusation to still be present so that removing it had to be a
deliberate act. This is that act. Its escape clause is untouched.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 21:02:40 +02:00
admin 239e120bf6 SEC-2: write down the release path, now that master refuses a direct push (#108)
Reviewed on the PR (issuecomments 1480, 1485, 1488, 1489). Documentation only: docs/RELEASE.md (new, 116 lines) plus a 2-line pointer in README.md's file map. No code, no workflow change.

Verified against the forge rather than accepted from the document:
- Both branch_protections rules re-read field-for-field identical (enable_push false, enable_force_push false, status check `checks / unit (pull_request)`, required_approvals 0, block_admin_merge_override true, no whitelists, no file patterns); master's rule created 2026-09-23T03:09:21; default_branch still master. Section 2's After table is exact. No protection was changed by this review - both rules re-read with their original updated_at.
- The empty-PR 405 trap reproduced independently on my own control (throwaway PR #111 between two same-SHA unprotected branches): empty PR -> 405 "Please try again later"; same PR after one commit -> 409 "head out of date". Section 1's "read the message, not the code" is correct and both messages are quoted accurately. PR #111 closed, branches deleted.
- release/1.0 (b0b24e5) is an ancestor of master (0f14c2a), so a literal release PR is empty right now - PR #109 has 0 commits, 0 files, and Gitea opened it anyway. Section 1's closing note is right.
- A master-base PR gets a genuine CI run, not a laundered skip: PR #107 head cb7e45b3 shows Waiting -> In progress -> success, "Successful in 7m56s", run 814. This PR's own head 9d593429 likewise, run 818.
- All five required steps are present and correctly ordered: work merges to release/1.0 with a version bump in goodwe_controller/config.yaml; release via PR release/1.0 -> master; direct push refused; green check before merge; `ha store reload` after, without which the Supervisor keeps serving the cached version. required_approvals: 0 is stated twice, so no reader can believe the dev/review split is enforced.

One non-blocking defect left open (issuecomment 1485): section 1 calls 0f14c2a "the only commit on master that carries no (#NN) merge suffix". 274 of master's 297 commits carry no suffix. The true statement is stronger - no release has ever reached master through a pull request, and 6f5e8e3 (0.10.0) was promoted by the same direct push one release earlier, so 0.10.1 was the second, not a one-off. Background, not procedure; wants a follow-up line change.

A third comment of mine (issuecomment 1488, merge style) is withdrawn in issuecomment 1489 - it rested on a premise I had not checked and which is false.
2026-09-23 04:08:18 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9d593429d3 SEC-2: write down the release path, now that master refuses a direct push
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m56s
master is the default branch, which is what the Home Assistant Supervisor
clones - so whatever sits on it runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Until today it
had no branch protection at all, while every gate this repo built sat on
release/1.0, the branch that does not ship. 0.10.1 went straight onto master
on 2026-09-22 with no PR, no CI and no reviewer, and it succeeded.

master now carries the same rule as release/1.0 - enable_push false,
required context `checks / unit (pull_request)`, block_admin_merge_override,
required_approvals 0. That is a forge setting and cannot live in a commit, so
the part that can is this: the procedure it implies. Without it the next
release is attempted the old way and fails confusingly at the push.

docs/RELEASE.md records the path (merge to release/1.0, bump version, PR
release/1.0 -> master, wait for green, merge, then `ha store reload` before
the Supervisor offers anything), the before/after protection state of both
branches, and how the gate was proven to bite rather than merely badge green.

Documentation only - no code, no workflow change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 03:43:37 +02:00
admin b0b24e5d41 PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0 (#105)
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m57s
Reviewed on the PR (issuecomments 1455-1462): identity verified unchanged (slug goodwe_controller, no image: key, installed slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller corroborated from HA backup metadata); version-gate 11a-11d re-implemented and verified independently; the 16-of-93-at-790s pairing re-derived from the committed 16-day capture (>=710: 17, >=790: 16, >=815: 15); the SAFETY-57 entry verified as a faithful move carrying only the three declared #104 documentation fixes; corrected 0.10.0 preamble corroborated to the day against backup metadata; suite 30/30 reproduced with checks.yml's exact command. Two files, no control code. The 710 s/790 s split between test_freshness.py and this file is a known, stated gap and takes its own card.

NOTE: master (the Supervisor's default branch) is still 0.10.0 and still lacks SAFETY-57. This merge does not deliver; bringing master to release/1.0 is a fast-forward and is the remaining step.
2026-09-22 15:52:25 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 eb88646899 PKG-16: cut 0.10.1, so SAFETY-57's fix can reach an installed 0.10.0
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
The Supervisor decides an update exists by comparing config.yaml's version
string with the one the box reports. master and release/1.0 both said 0.10.0,
so SAFETY-57 - a deadlock that parked the reference battery for ~13 min on
2026-09-21 while the house exported 2.4 kW - had no way of reaching the box
that has it. A patch bump is the delivery mechanism, not bookkeeping.

- config.yaml: 0.10.0 -> 0.10.1. Nothing else in the option surface moves:
  no key added or removed, no default changed, no enum widened, no rule added
  to validate.py, so a blob that starts on 0.10.0 starts on 0.10.1.

- CHANGELOG.md: a new `## 0.10.1` section, holding SAFETY-57's entry moved out
  of `## 0.10.0`. The entry opened by saying it was misfiled and that whoever
  cut the next version owned moving it; this is that cut, so that paragraph is
  replaced by what an operator actually needs in order to decide - what the
  deadlock does (command parked at 0 W, batt reading gated to MISSING, escape
  condition unreachable from inside the state), how to recognise it (setpoint
  stuck at exactly 0 W with the battery register flat, a STALE line and no
  clearing line) and that a restart of the add-on clears it.

- PKG-16 proper: `## 0.10.0`'s preamble still claimed 0.10.0 "has never been
  built or pulled anywhere" and that the reference install was on 0.7.0. Both
  stopped being true on 2026-09-20 ~22:18 CEST, when 0.10.0 was installed as a
  repository add-on (slug 68285ac7_goodwe_controller) and began regulating a
  real battery. The section's own bump argument was explicitly conditional on
  that; the condition has fired, so the argument is retold as history and the
  section is closed. This text is what the Supervisor shows beside Update.

Also fixes, in this file only, the three non-blocking documentation defects
raised on PR #104 - issuecomments 1445, 1446 and 1447:

- 1446: the live episode is 790 s, not 710 s. Re-derived rather than rescaled:
  at >= 790 s the committed 16-day replay gives 16 of 93, not 17.
- 1447: the BMS keep-alive pulse was an inference stated as a measurement. No
  committed capture identifies one, and on this episode 0x0518 never moved at
  all. The measured claim replaces the firmware story.
- 1445: "neither consumer can reach a verdict inside one window" is universal
  as written and graded on a fixture that puts the obligation back on every
  release. It now carries the qualifier the reviewer asked for, and names the
  unbounded case and why the shipped one-inverter roster cannot reach it.

The same three defects also sit in app/freshness.py, test_freshness.py,
DOCS.md and the DECISIONS note. They are deliberately NOT touched here: this
PR is config.yaml and CHANGELOG.md only, and none of them is worth delaying a
live safety fix. SAFETY-56 and SAFETY-58 are likewise untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-22 15:22:03 +02:00
admin b9f7bd0506 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested (#104)
Reviewed and merged by the PR review agent. Acceptance criterion re-driven independently off the committed RS-485 capture: the verdict is withdrawn with 0x0518 held constant at -3 W, no external change. Counterfactual release_s=inf verified byte-equivalent to the shipped-before module over 242336 reads, so the SAFETY-37 conjunction is untouched. 30/30 suite green in checks.yml's own image; 11 mutations re-applied on a purged tree; the argued-equivalent M7 proved equivalent over full internal state.

Three non-blocking documentation findings filed on the PR (comments 3/7, 4/7, 5/7) for a follow-up before the next version is cut.
2026-09-21 15:49:35 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 43c144b8d9 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
SAFETY-37's freshness gate reports a battery-power register as MISSING when it
stops following its own command, and a missing input is "command 0 W and keep
commanding" (§11.1 rule 1). The gate's only exit was "an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number" - and at 0 W nothing is asking the register to be anywhere.
The state had no exit reachable from inside it, and the log line promised the
opposite in the same sentence that announced the 0 W.

REPRODUCED FROM THE WIRE, NOT MODELLED. scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/ is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, read from the passive sniffer, decoded by
tools/decode_bus_capture.py (0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC, 0 unknown shapes; the
mode->sign convention is graded off the capture, not trusted). The box was
running 0.10.0, so the 0 W in the trace IS the add-on's own claim:

  10:51:24.7  0x0518 reaches -3 W. Pack at 11 %, the BMS refuses the discharge,
              the inverter idles. THE REGISTER IS HEALTHY AND TRUTHFUL.
  10:51:29.7  the command reaches +1060 W - 800 W of travel
  10:52:00    the conjunction arms. Inverter.batt becomes None
  10:52:21.7  the site commands 0 W, on the wire
  ...         0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
              change value for 790.0 s. The house exports 2.4 kW throughout
  ~11:04      a human restarts the add-on. That is what ends it

AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
through the shipped conjunction finds 93 trips whose wait for the BMS
keep-alive pulse that cleared them has a median of 143.4 s, a worst case of
21440.1 s, and 17 of 93 at or beyond this episode's 710 s. That distribution
belongs to the battery's firmware, not to this code.

THE CARD'S OPTION 2 ALREADY HELD AND IS NOT THE BUG. _grade() has required
|standing| >= MOVE_W since SAFETY-37. The trip was at +1060 W and the stuck
state is at 0 W; they are different moments, and an entry-side rule cannot
reach a state entered legitimately and then persisted. Nothing in the
conjunction is weakened here.

THE RULE, SAFETY-13's SHAPE ONE MODULE OVER - which latches get an exit, not
how long the block lasts:

  the verdict is withdrawn when the obligation that produced it has been gone
  for RELEASE_S, and the register is then re-graded from scratch.

RELEASE_S is BATT_OBLIGED_S, 17.0 s - the obligation window already derived in
the file (6.0 plant + 10.0 publish + 1.0 read), taken at the FLOOR of its band
for the mirror of MOVE_W's reason. Which half is safe is the opposite of
SAFETY-13's: being wrong long is the failure being fixed, being wrong short
costs one bounded re-grading window. Below 17 s the release pre-empts the
cheaper exit - the register answering by itself - and that is graded
behaviourally, not asserted.

The whole parked interval is now stale_input_s + RELEASE_S = 32 s. On the live
episode: telemetry back at 10:52:39 instead of 11:05:35, with 0x0518 still
answering the same -3 W. RED BEFORE (release_s=inf, a graded counterfactual and
not a second implementation), GREEN AFTER.

WHAT IT COSTS, AND IT IS NOT SMALL. A register dead for good is re-graded for
ever: over 1201 reads the held number reaches a consumer on 630 (52.5 %)
against 35 (2.9 %) before. Payable only because one window is at most 35 s and
the two consumers hold for 75 s and 85 s, so neither can reach a verdict inside
one and the re-trip clears both windows. No detection SAFETY-37 had is given
back - a permanent None clears the same windows for ever too - and the command
is derived from the P1 meter, never from batt.

Two clocks, deliberately: changed_mono/unchanged_s() stay facts about the
REGISTER, graded_from/graded_s() are the VERDICT's window. Collapsing them
either lies to the operator or defeats the re-grading.

main.py's stale line had its ESCAPE CLAUSE corrected - it promised a clearance
the state could not produce - and gained a STALE WITHDRAWN edge that says in
its own words that nothing has been learned about the register. The DIAGNOSIS
half is SAFETY-56's and is deliberately untouched, with a named check asserting
it is still there so that rewrite has to be deliberate.

Battery: 22 mutations, 21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.
Two findings kept in DECISIONS: _release()'s move_w test swapped for
unchanged_s SURVIVED at +5 B because every fixture rested at exactly 0 W (habit
11, closed by a 0/100/300 W fixture); and the code shipped a habit-22 comment
claiming the _release/_grade order was load-bearing, which the battery
falsified - the two act on mutually exclusive predicates, so the order is not
observable. MUTATION.md gains habit 23 for a mutation that ran, fingerprinted
clean, and was a no-op on the fixture because `0.0 or x` is x.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro, one
file at a time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-21 12:33:56 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 6f5e8e378a PKG-15: bring release/1.0 to master at 0.10.0, so the default branch is the add-on
`master` has been `5184a2c` / v0.2.1 since 2026-08-25 - the tree that drives the
house - while every ticket since has landed on `release/1.0`. Three consequences
were live, and all three are what this merge closes:

 * `master` is the DEFAULT branch, so Gitea indexes dispatchable workflows from
   it. `master` had no `.gitea/` at all, which is why `GET /actions/workflows`
   answered empty and the UI's dispatch button was missing.
 * new pull requests default to `master`. #102 was opened against it by
   accident and its first run graded the change merged into a stale `master` -
   an honest-looking green answering the wrong question.
 * AND THE ONE THAT NOW MATTERS MOST: the repository has not yet been added to
   Home Assistant, and adding it is part of this release. `master` is the
   branch the Supervisor will read the moment it is added, so whatever stands
   here is what it shows and offers to install. This merge is what makes that
   0.10.0 rather than 0.2.1.

NO CONFLICT WAS POSSIBLE AND THAT WAS CHECKED, NOT ASSUMED. `master` is a
direct ancestor of `release/1.0` (`git merge-base --is-ancestor` true), the
merge base IS `5184a2c`, and `origin/release/1.0..origin/master` is empty -
`master` carries nothing `release/1.0` lacks. `--no-ff` is used anyway, so the
crossing from 0.2.1 to 0.10.0 is one addressable commit rather than a pointer
move.

WHAT CROSSES: config.yaml 0.2.1 -> 0.10.0. The add-on the Supervisor will build
is a different program from v0.2.1 in the ways `goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md`
sections 0.3.0 through 0.10.0 describe - among them P1 meter ingestion, the
separate integrator the velocity form did not have, shadow mode, the tariff
plan and the multi-inverter roster. The ROLLBACK POINT does not move: tag
`v0.2.1` still names `5184a2c` and still names the tree that ran the house.

NOT A DEPLOY. Nothing is installed, no `ha addons update` is run, `/addons/` is
untouched and neither 192.168.2.158 nor 192.168.2.221 was contacted. Adding the
repository to Home Assistant, and pressing Install, remain the owner's call.

Verified before merging: the full suite in the CI image on `release/1.0`'s tree
- `cp -a`, purged, `:ro` mount, one file at a time, exactly the command in
.gitea/workflows/checks.yml - 30/30, exit 0; and PR #103's own
`checks / unit (pull_request)` was a real `success` on the merge, not a skip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-20 12:34:30 +02:00
admin 8a5736136a PKG-15: fold TEL-10 and SAFETY-48 into 0.10.0, so the version names its contents (#103)
Reviewed and merged by the PKG-15 review agent.

Verified rather than accepted:
- test_version_gate.py 11d pins `## Unreleased` blocks below the newest section at exactly one; deleting the block goes red (reproduced on a copy of the tree).
- 32 runtime commits since 86bdf49 and 24 accounted by the contents table, re-derived with predeploy_check.py's own RUNTIME rule; PKG-14's superseded 28/21 were correct when taken.
- app/validate.py imports neither main nor mqtt (read by AST), and SLEW_RAIL_FRAC / LOOP_TICK_S / PLANT_SETTLE_S are byte-identical across cb3f686..HEAD, so PKG-14's CLEARED transcript still holds.
- CI-9 (16b1d6c) touches only .gitea/workflows/checks.yml, outside the built image and outside RUNTIME.
- The SAFETY-48 entry keeps the capacity-tariff misreading out: no worst-quarter row in the A/B table, and the 3739 -> 3434 W figure appears only inside the paragraph that disclaims it.

Three non-blocking defects posted on the PR: the gain:0.3 / slew-rail tie values are swapped against DECISIONS/SAFETY-48; "touch three files between them" should say three runtime files; and the stated reason cb3f686 enters the count ("last..HEAD excluded it") is wrong, though the count is right.
2026-09-19 19:08:05 +02:00
15 changed files with 3078 additions and 60 deletions
+2
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ estop/rs485_log.py optional RS485 e-stop / bus witness
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4)
docs/build_guide.py its single source - rebuilds the HTML and PDF
FIELD-GUIDE.md how to edit and rebuild the guide
docs/RELEASE.md how a change reaches the battery - `master` is
protected, releases go via PR from `release/1.0`
```
**Picking this up after a break? Read `HANDOVER.md` first** — current state,
+116
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
# Releasing — how a change reaches the battery
`master` is the **default branch**, and the default branch is what the Home
Assistant Supervisor clones when it installs or updates this add-on. Whatever
sits on `master` is what runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Treat a push to `master`
as a deployment, because that is what it is.
---
## 1. `master` is protected — releases go through a pull request
Until 2026-09-23 `master` had **no protection of any kind**. Every gate this
repo built (CI-01, CI-9) sat on `release/1.0`, the branch that does *not* ship.
On 2026-09-22 version 0.10.1 went straight onto `master` — no pull request, no
CI run, no reviewer — and it succeeded (commit `0f14c2a`, the only commit on
`master` that carries no `(#NN)` merge suffix). SEC-2 closed that.
**The release path is now:**
1. Merge the work into `release/1.0` as usual, via a pull request that goes
green. Bump `version:` in `goodwe_controller/config.yaml` on that branch —
the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, so without a bump nothing
is offered and nothing changes.
2. Open a pull request **`release/1.0` → `master`**. Do not push to `master`;
it will be refused by the pre-receive hook:
```
remote: error: Not allowed to push to protected branch master
! [remote rejected] ... (pre-receive hook declined)
```
3. Wait for `checks / unit (pull_request)` to go **green** on that pull request.
The workflow in `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` carries **no `branches:`
filter**, so a `master` base matches and a real run happens — verified on
throwaway PR #107 (base `master`), which queued a genuine run.
⚠️ Green means green. A `skipped` status is laundered into a `success`
rollup by this Gitea and the merge gate accepts it — see the long note at
the top of `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`. Never add an event filter there.
4. Merge the pull request. `required_approvals` is **0**, so a green check is
the whole gate; there is no second pair of eyes unless someone asks for one.
5. **Reload the store.** Merging to `master` does not, by itself, offer the
update. The Supervisor only sees the new version after:
```bash
ssh root@192.168.2.158 "ha store reload && ha addons update local_goodwe_controller"
```
Until `ha store reload` runs, the add-on page still shows the old version
and the release looks like it did nothing.
Note that `release/1.0` is normally an *ancestor* of `master` between releases,
so a `release/1.0 → master` pull request is empty until new commits land on
`release/1.0`. That is expected; it means there is nothing to release yet.
---
## 2. Branch protection — before and after SEC-2
Forge is Gitea at `192.168.2.147:3000`, repo `admin/goodwe-addon`. Read it back
with `GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/branch_protections`.
**Before (2026-09-23):**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | **no rule at all** | — | — | — |
| `release/1.0` | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
**After:**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
| `release/1.0` | yes (unchanged) | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
Both rules are otherwise identical: `enable_push: false`,
`enable_force_push: false`, `block_admin_merge_override: true`, no whitelists,
no file patterns. `required_approvals` stays at **0** on purpose — raising it
would block the review agent from merging, and nobody asked for it.
The default branch was **not** changed. Changing it would change what the
Supervisor clones, which is a different decision from this one.
### How the gate was proven to actually bite
A protection rule on this forge can *appear* satisfied while having checked
nothing, so the rule was tested rather than trusted. The discriminator is a
merge `POST` carrying a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id`: Gitea evaluates
branch protection *before* it checks the head, so
* `409 head out of date` → the request **cleared** protection;
* `405 Not all required status checks successful` → protection **refused** it.
Read the *message*, not just the code: `405` is also returned as
`Please try again later` for a pull request with **no commits**, which has
nothing to do with protection. An empty pull request on an unprotected base
gives that same `405` (verified, throwaway PR #110), so an empty
`release/1.0 → master` reports it too.
Validated against a control on an unprotected base (PR #106), which answered
`409` while its check was still pending — i.e. protection was no obstacle
there. On `master` (PR #107) the same probe answered `405` while pending, and
`409` once the check was genuinely green. A direct `git push` to `master` was
rejected by the pre-receive hook with `master`'s SHA unmoved.
---
## 3. Rolling back
There is no force-push escape hatch: `enable_force_push` is `false` on both
branches. To undo a bad release, land a revert on `release/1.0`, bump the
version again, and take it through §1. The `/addons/` rollback for the
reference install is in `HANDOVER.md`.
+203 -18
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,173 @@
# Changelog
## 0.10.1
**A PATCH RELEASE, AND ONE TICKET IS THE WHOLE OF IT: [[SAFETY-57]].** The last
place moves because this is a bug fix to a version that has shipped and is
regulating a battery, not a change to what the add-on offers. **The option
surface does not move at all** - no key added, none removed, no default changed,
no enum widened, no rule added to `validate.py` - so ⚠️ **a stored options blob
that starts the add-on on 0.10.0 starts it on 0.10.1**, and there is no
`SystemExit(78)` to plan around on this hop. If you are on 0.10.0, the only
question worth your time is whether you have been hit by what it fixes, and
`### SAFETY-57` below is written to answer exactly that.
⚠️ **WHY THIS IS A NEW NUMBER RATHER THAN A FOLD INTO 0.10.0, WHICH IS THE
REASON THE TICKET EXISTS.** The Supervisor decides that an update is available
by comparing `config.yaml`'s version string with the one the box reports.
0.10.0 is installed and running, so a fix delivered inside `## 0.10.0` would
leave every box reporting `0.10.0` believing it was already current - the
PKG-06/PKG-07 no-op, in the form where the tree it hides is a safety fix.
0.10.0's own section argued it could still be folded into; ⚠️ **that argument
was explicitly conditional on 0.10.0 never having been installed, and the
condition has fired** - see the closing note at the end of `## 0.10.0` below.
⚠️ **IF YOU ARE CROSSING FROM A VERSION OLDER THAN 0.10.0, THIS SECTION IS
NOT THE ONE THAT CAN REFUSE YOU - `## 0.10.0` BELOW IS.** `ha addons update`
does not walk the versions; it installs 0.10.1 in one step, so every validator
rule added in 0.8.0, 0.9.0 and 0.10.0 arrives at the same moment as this
section's nothing. Two of them can refuse a config that nobody has edited:
[[SAFETY-39]]'s **rule 10** against 0.7.0's own shipped default `slew_w: 1000`,
and [[TARIFF-07]]'s three withdrawn `price_provider` ids - **`engie_dynamic`,
`totalenergies_dynamic` and `eneco_eddy`** - each of which is still refused by
name at startup on this version, with the same message. Both are written out in
full under `## 0.10.0`, and `tools/predeploy_check.py` checks both against your
live options before you press *Update*.
Contents of this release, in merge order since 0.10.0 (`cb3f686`):
| | |
|---|---|
| `b9f7bd0` | SAFETY-57 - the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested **⚠️ MEASURED ON THE LIVE SITE** |
⚠️ **AND THAT IS THE WHOLE TABLE, WHICH IS THE POINT OF A PATCH NUMBER.**
[[TEL-10]] and [[SAFETY-48]] also merged after `cb3f686`, but [[PKG-15]] folded
both into `## 0.10.0` **before 0.10.0 was installed**, so they shipped under
that number and are recorded there rather than here. [[CI-9]] and [[PKG-15]]
itself touch `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` and this file only - nothing an
operator can observe on an installed add-on - and are excluded for the reason
`## 0.10.0` already gives. ⚠️ **Two defects that the reference install's own
field history found are NOT in this release**: [[SAFETY-56]] (the stale-reading
message says *"is not following its own command"* when the true cause is an
empty pack, and the NOT READY row that goes with it) and [[SAFETY-58]] (a trip
on the first read after a rest). Both are open, both are wording or bound
changes rather than deadlocks, and neither was allowed to delay this one.
### SAFETY-57 — the stale-reading verdict gets an exit
⚠️ **WHETHER YOU WANT THIS UPDATE, AND HOW TO TELL.** On 0.10.0 the add-on
can enter a state it cannot leave: the command is parked at **0 W**, the
battery-power reading is gated to **MISSING**, and the only condition that
would clear the gate is one that a parked command cannot produce. **It is a
deadlock, not a slow recovery.** On the reference site on 2026-09-21 it held
for about **thirteen minutes while the house exported 2.4 kW**, and it ended
only because a human restarted the add-on.
**Recognising it costs one look at the status page and one at the log:**
| | |
|---|---|
| the setpoint | sits at **exactly 0 W** and does not move, while the house is plainly importing or exporting |
| the battery-power sensor | is **flat at one number** for the whole of it - on the live episode, −3 W for 850 s |
| the action log | carries a `STALE batt` line and **no** clearing line after it |
**What ends it on 0.10.0 is a restart of the add-on**, and a restart is enough -
nothing is latched to disk and the pack is not harmed. ⚠️ **But nothing ends it
by itself**, and the replay below says the wait can run to hours. On 0.10.1 the
state releases itself after a bounded **32 s** and the register is re-graded
from scratch.
⚠️ **IT IS NOT AN EMERGENCY AND IT IS NOT COSMETIC.** The pack is not at
risk in this state - 0 W is the safe command, and it is the command §11.1 rule 1
asks for on a missing input. What is lost is the site's own control while it
lasts: the battery neither charges nor discharges, so a solar export goes to the
grid and an evening load comes off it.
⚠️ **WHAT IT FIXES, ON THE OWNER'S OWN BATTERY.** [[SAFETY-37]]'s freshness gate
reports a battery-power register as MISSING when it stops following its own
command, and a missing input is `command 0 W and keep commanding` (§11.1
rule 1). The gate's only exit was *"an arrival carrying a different number"* —
**and at 0 W nothing is asking the register to be anywhere.** The state had no
exit reachable from inside it, and the log line said the opposite.
Measured off the RS-485 bus, 2026-09-21, and committed as
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/`:
| | |
|---|---|
| 10:51:24 | 0x0518 reaches **−3 W**. The pack is at 11 %, the loop has just reversed out of a charge, and the BMS refuses the discharge. The register is **healthy and truthful**. |
| 10:51:29 | the command reaches **+1060 W**, 800 W of travel |
| 10:52:00 | the gate arms. `Inverter.batt` becomes `None` |
| 10:52:21 | **the site commands 0 W — on the wire, in the capture** |
| … | the register does not change value for **850 s**. The setpoint does not change value for **790 s**. The house exports 2.4 kW throughout |
| ~11:04 | **a human restarts the add-on.** That is what ends it |
It had been escaping by luck - and ⚠️ **on this episode it did not escape at
all.** `0x0518` answered the same −3 W on 90 consecutive responses and never
once carried a different number between 10:51:24 and 11:05:35. The register did
not move.
⚠️ **AND WHY IT USUALLY DOES MOVE IS NOT SOMETHING THIS REPOSITORY HAS
MEASURED.** An earlier draft of this entry named a BMS keep-alive pulse as the
thing that twitches the register, stated as fact; **no committed capture
identifies such a pulse**, distinguishes one from the register simply following
a command, or sizes it. The honest statement is that the register changes value
for reasons that belong to the battery's firmware. What IS measured is how long
it goes without changing: replaying the committed 16-day loop capture through
the shipped conjunction finds **93 trips** whose wait has a **median of 143 s**
and a worst case of **5 h 57 m**, with **16 of the 93** at or beyond this
episode's **790 s**. That figure is stronger than the firmware story it
replaces, and it needs no firmware story at all.
**The rule, and it is [[SAFETY-13]]'s shape one module over** — which latches
get an exit, not how long the block lasts:
> the verdict is withdrawn when the obligation that produced it has been gone
> for `RELEASE_S`, and the register is then re-graded from scratch.
`RELEASE_S` is **17.0 s**, the obligation window already derived in
`freshness.py` — 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s ESPHome publish, one 1 s add-on read.
It is the **floor** of its band rather than a preference: below it the release
pre-empts the cheaper exit (the register answering by itself), and being wrong
*long* is the failure being fixed. **The whole parked interval is now
`stale_input_s` + `RELEASE_S` = 32 s**, bounded by two shipped numbers and by
nothing the battery does. On the live episode: telemetry back at **10:52:39
instead of 11:05:35**, with **0x0518 still answering the same −3 W**.
⚠️ **WHAT IT COSTS, AND IT IS NOT SMALL.** A register that is dead for good is
re-graded for ever. Driven over 1201 reads at the shipped defaults: the held
number reaches a consumer on **630 reads (52.5 %)** against 35 (2.9 %) before.
That is payable only because **one re-grading window is 35 s and the two
consumers hold for 75 s and 85 s** — neither can reach a verdict inside one,
and the re-trip that ends each window hands them a `None`, which *clears* their
windows. **No detection SAFETY-37 had is given back**: a permanent `None`
clears those same windows for ever too. What the site gets back is its
meter-derived control, and the command was never derived from `batt`.
⚠️ **THAT 35 s HOLDS WHILE THE OBLIGATION COMES BACK, AND ONLY THEN - IT IS NOT
A UNIVERSAL BOUND, AND THE FIXTURE THAT GRADES IT CANNOT SHOW OTHERWISE.** A
window closes when the gate re-arms, and the gate needs a command that is
*moving* to re-arm against. If the release lands where the site then regulates
below `MOVE_W`, nothing re-arms, the window never closes, and the held number
reaches a consumer for an unbounded time - where before this card a `None` did.
The driver behind the 35 < 75 < 85 inequality puts a 1300 W obligation back on
every release, so it is the one shape that cannot produce that case. On the
shipped roster of **one** inverter neither consumer can reach it anyway - the
per-unit sign watchdog is compared against the **meter** at `n_units <= 1`, and
`circulating_w()` is identically `0.0` there - so this is **a stated gap rather
than a covered one**, and it needs a second inverter to bite.
⚠️ **WHAT YOU WILL SEE.** A new `STALE WITHDRAWN <unit>` line in the action log
beside the existing `STALE <unit>` one, and a log warning that says in its own
words that **nothing has been learned about the register**. If the pair repeats
every ~70 s, the register really is not following and the unit needs looking at;
if it happens once and stops, the pack was simply empty and the site has
resumed. The stale line's escape clause was also corrected — it used to promise
a clearance the state could not produce. ⚠️ Its **diagnosis** half still says
*"is not following its own command"*, which is wrong in a different way when the
pack is merely empty; that wording is [[SAFETY-56]]'s and is deliberately
untouched here.
## 0.10.0
⚠️ **A CONFIG THAT IS LEGAL ON 0.9.0 IS REFUSED ON 0.10.0, AND THAT - NOT THE
@@ -98,8 +266,9 @@ less EXPORT. It is NOT a lower capacity-tariff peak, and your billed quarter
should not be expected to improve.** The whole account, including what it costs
and what it does not establish, is `### SAFETY-48` below.
⚠️ **AND IF YOU ARE UPGRADING FROM 0.7.0 - WHICH THE REFERENCE INSTALL IS -
THE REFUSAL THAT CAN STOP YOU IS IN 0.8.0'S SECTION, NOT IN THIS ONE.** `ha
⚠️ **AND IF YOU ARE UPGRADING FROM 0.7.0 - WHICH THE REFERENCE INSTALL WAS
WHEN THIS WAS WRITTEN, AND HAS NOT BEEN SINCE 2026-09-20 - THE REFUSAL THAT CAN
STOP YOU IS IN 0.8.0'S SECTION, NOT IN THIS ONE.** `ha
addons update` does not walk the versions; it installs 0.10.0 in one step, so
**every validator rule added in 0.8.0 and 0.9.0 lands at the same moment as
0.10.0's own**, and a config that has not been looked at since 0.7.0 meets all
@@ -120,7 +289,10 @@ fire only on a roster entry that USES `capacity_kwh`, a key that did not exist
`slew_w` against the ceiling and `price_provider` against the withdrawn list
BEFORE `ha addons update`**, with `tools/predeploy_check.py`, which does both.
✅ **RUN AGAINST THIS RELEASE: CLEARED, exit 0.**
✅ **RUN AGAINST THIS RELEASE: CLEARED, exit 0.** ⚠️ This is the record of
a run made on 2026-09-19, when the reference box was still on 0.7.0. That
crossing has since been made; the box is on 0.10.0 and the transcript below is
history rather than the state of any install.
docker run --rm -v <repo>:/w:ro -v <dir>:/opt:ro goodwe-addon-checks:1 \
python3 /w/goodwe_controller/tools/predeploy_check.py \
@@ -141,10 +313,10 @@ byte what that run measured. `app/validate.py` imports neither `main` nor
`PLANT_SETTLE_S`, and all three are **unchanged** (`2.0`, `18.0`, and their
quotient) - [[SAFETY-48]] adds `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS` and reads it inside
`compute()`, which the validator never calls. ⚠️ **And the tool's OTHER half -
the no-op check - does not run at all here**, because it is gated on
`shipped == deployed` and the box reports `0.7.0`. It is the half that would
refuse this fold on a box already running 0.10.0; see the note below the
contents table.
the no-op check - did not run at all in that transcript**, because it is
gated on `shipped == deployed` and the box reported `0.7.0` at the time. It is
the half that refuses this fold on a box already running 0.10.0 - ⚠️ **which
the reference box now is**; see the closing note below the contents table.
**The option surface: 71 keys -> 75, `options:` and `schema:` in step.** Four
new keys, and none of them can refuse a blob written before it existed:
@@ -195,17 +367,29 @@ counted, so `last..HEAD` excluded it then and includes it now. The three
misfiled tickets are still misfiled and still [[PKG-08]]'s card; nothing below
moves them.
⚠️ **AND THE VERSION IS NOT BUMPED FOR THIS FOLD, DELIBERATELY.** 0.10.0 was
cut on 2026-09-16 and **has never been built or pulled anywhere** - the
reference install is on 0.7.0, this repository carries exactly one tag
(`v0.2.1`) and no release - so the string `0.10.0` does not yet name a tree
anyone is running, and the PKG-06/PKG-07 no-op that forbids re-cutting 0.9.0
does not apply to it. Cutting 0.11.0 instead would burn a number on a release
that never left the repository. ⚠️ **THE ARGUMENT IS CONDITIONAL AND THE
CONDITION IS CHECKABLE**: if 0.10.0 has reached an install by the time you read
this, it may not be folded into again, and `tools/predeploy_check.py` says so
by itself - run against a box already reporting `0.10.0` it refuses with `THE
DEPLOY WOULD BE A NO-OP` and names the runtime commits since the bump.
⚠️ **THE VERSION WAS NOT BUMPED FOR THE FOLDS ABOVE, AND THAT ARGUMENT HAS
NOW EXPIRED. THIS SECTION IS CLOSED.** As written on 2026-09-19 it ran: 0.10.0
was cut on 2026-09-16, had never been built or pulled anywhere, the reference
install was on 0.7.0 and this repository carried exactly one tag (`v0.2.1`) and
no release - so the string `0.10.0` did not yet name a tree anyone was running,
the PKG-06/PKG-07 no-op could not apply, and cutting 0.11.0 would have burned a
number on a release that never left the repository. ⚠️ **IT WAS STATED AS
CONDITIONAL ON THAT REMAINING TRUE, AND IT STOPPED BEING TRUE ON 2026-09-20 AT
ABOUT 22:18 CEST**, when 0.10.0 was installed on the reference site as a
repository add-on (slug `68285ac7_goodwe_controller`) and began regulating a
real battery. **0.10.0 has been built and pulled, and the reference install is
on 0.10.0, not on 0.7.0.**
⚠️ **AND THE FIELD HISTORY IS NOW THE STRONGEST EVIDENCE IN THIS FILE, WHICH
IS WHY THE CORRECTION IS WORTH ITS SPACE.** That install has since run a full
day-night cycle on 0.10.0 - an empty pack, a guard trip, a 2 h 47 min saturation
freeze, the [[SAFETY-57]] deadlock and a clean recovery - and **two defects came
out of it that no test in this repository had reached**: [[SAFETY-56]] and
[[SAFETY-57]]. So nothing may be folded into this section again, and
`tools/predeploy_check.py` enforces that by itself: run against a box already
reporting `0.10.0` it refuses with `THE DEPLOY WOULD BE A NO-OP` and names the
runtime commits since the bump. **SAFETY-57's fix is in `## 0.10.1` above**,
which is what a patch number is for.
Contents of this release, in merge order since 0.9.0 (`86bdf49`):
@@ -231,6 +415,7 @@ Contents of this release, in merge order since 0.9.0 (`86bdf49`):
| `587495e` | SAFETY-47 - what a shadow run can show you, and the watts on its status row **⚠️ CORRECTS THREE CLAIMS SAFETY-10 SHIPPED** |
| `660d079` | TEL-10 - the loop's integrator stops being invisible: three new site sensors **⚠️ THREE NEW ENTITIES** |
| `186a044` | SAFETY-48 - the integrator's lead over the command is bounded at one slew step **⚠️ THE CONTROL LAW CHANGED** |
| _this branch_ | SAFETY-57 - the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested **⚠️ MEASURED ON THE LIVE SITE** |
⚠️ **[[CI-9]] ALSO MERGED INTO `release/1.0` IN THIS WINDOW AND IS
DELIBERATELY NOT IN THE TABLE ABOVE, NOR ANYWHERE ELSE IN THIS FILE.** It
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
# SAFETY-56 — what the gate cannot tell apart, said in the sentence
**Text only. No behaviour changes in this card**, and §5 is the measurement that
says so: the same stimuli through the tree before and after produce a
**byte-identical** trace of every verdict, every `reading()`, every `inputs_ok`
and every readiness row's `(ok, warn)`.
---
## 1. The defect
0.10.1 is regulating a real GW5000S-BP. Two messages tell the operator that
healthy hardware has failed.
**The log line**, as emitted on the reference site on 2026-09-21:
> SAFETY-37: inverter-a battery-power register **is not following its own
> command** - STALE_READING: -3 unchanged for 36 s while the standing command
> moved 800 W to +1600 W - **the reading is not following**, so it is reported
> as MISSING rather than as a measurement … Treating it as MISSING, which
> commands 0 W.
**The readiness row**, at the same moment:
> NOT READY — battery power: `sensor.kelder_goodwe_master_stage1_goodwe_inverter_ac_power`
> **is missing or not numeric**
That entity was present, numeric and updating.
**SAFETY-37's conjunction is correct and is not touched by this card** —
`unchanged > 35 s AND |command| > 250 W AND |travel| > 250 W`. A register
genuinely stuck against a real command is exactly what it should catch, and a
pack that cannot comply is a state the site must stop in too. What was wrong is
what the sentences **concluded** from it.
## 2. Two worlds satisfy the conjunction
| | the register | the pack |
|---|---|---|
| **DEAD** | has stopped reporting reality | is doing what it was told |
| **REFUSED** | is reporting reality correctly | cannot comply — the BMS is refusing at its floor |
A refused pack holds still under any setpoint, so an honest register publishes
the same unchanged number a dead one does. **Nothing `freshness.py` is handed
separates them.** All three sentences asserted DEAD.
## 3. The live episode was REFUSED, and it is measured, not argued
Off the committed capture `scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz`,
whose bytes and decoder are already graded by `test_freshness.py` part 10a:
| | |
|---|---|
| the register | answered **-3 W for 850 s**, 10:51:24 → 11:05:34 |
| the commands during that hold | **+260, +660, +1060 W** — discharge only, never a charge |
| pack SoC throughout | **11 %** |
| first **charge** command after the restart | 11:05:31 at **-400 W** |
| the register moves | **11:05:34** — **3 s**, inside one 17.0 s obligation window |
**A register that answers a reversed command inside one obligation window had
not stopped reporting.** What would not move was the pack. The sentence the
operator read named the one thing in the loop that was telling the truth.
⚠️ What this does **not** establish: that no register is ever intermittently
wrong. It excludes a register that had simply stopped; it cannot exclude one
that was wrong and then right. That is the point — the new sentence claims
neither.
## 4. The fix, and why it is three sentences and not one helper
Each message states **what was observed** and names **both** explanations.
| where | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| `app/freshness.py` `_grade()` | *"…+1600 W - the reading is not following, so it is reported as MISSING…"* | *"…+1600 W. **TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE CANNOT TELL THEM APART**: the register may have stopped reporting reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command - a pack the BMS is refusing holds still under any setpoint, and an honest register then reads exactly like a frozen one. Either way the number cannot be read as this command's effect, so it is reported as MISSING…"* |
| `app/main.py` `_read_unit()` | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power **register is not following its own command** - %s."* | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power reading **did not move under a command that did, WHICH IS NOT BY ITSELF A VERDICT ON THE REGISTER** - %s."* |
| `app/main.py` `checks()` | *"{label}: {entity} **is missing or not numeric**"* | *"{label}: **no usable value this cycle from** {entity} - **and this row cannot tell which of two things that is**: the entity is missing or not numeric, or it is publishing a number that this controller is withholding (a freshness gate does exactly that, and names itself in a row of its own). Confirm the entity in Developer Tools before replacing it"* |
**Three sentences, three wordings, no shared helper.** The first two are a log
line about a **behaviour**; the third is a banner about a named **entity**, and
the two answer different questions ("what did the register do" against "can I
trust this entity"). A helper serving both would have to drop whichever half
the other caller does not need, and the half it dropped would be the
operator's next step. The log line names the pair **once**, inside the `%s` it
already interpolates, rather than in both of its own halves.
**No new input, and SoC is not wired.** `BOUNDS["soc"]` stays *STATED, NOT
WIRED*; telling the two worlds apart needs the pack floor (SAFETY-32's number)
and SoC (TEL-08's wiring), and a message honest about its own ambiguity needs
neither. Part 11b drives the two worlds at **50 %** and **11 %** SoC and
asserts the sentence does not move one byte.
**The readiness row does not branch.** `inv.batt_fresh.stale` is on the same
object at the same moment, and the row deliberately does not ask it: the same
loop renders the grid and SoC rows, which have no gate, and a branch per row
would be a second place where "why is this None" is decided. The gate already
has a surface — `stale_note()` rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below with
the whole STALE_READING sentence in it — so the operator's discriminator is
*"is that row there?"*, and part 11d asserts that row is **present in REFUSED
and absent in ABSENT**.
## 5. Behaviour is byte-identical, measured
`tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` prints two documents from one stimulus set.
The `behaviour` half contains **no sentence**: only `stale`, `reading()`,
`releases`, `held`, the window bookkeeping, `inputs_ok`, and every readiness
row's `(ok, warn)`. Run in the CI image, purged, `:ro`, against
`origin/release/1.0` **archived out of git** and against this branch:
| | |
|---|---|
| the committed live capture | **2390 reads**, 7 verdict edges |
| a swept grid of command × register schedules | **66 cells × 120 reads** — 1060 stale reads, 1309 `MISSING` readings, 6 releases |
| six driven controller worlds through the shipped read path | DEAD, REFUSED, ABSENT, HEALTHY, RELEASE, RETRIP — every read's `(batt, inputs_ok, stale)` and every `checks()` row's `(ok, warn)` |
| **result** | `6030175ed2ab9a4143e86e89a71d45c8ab041ac1c00121a3e3e023cd2b08996c` **on both trees** |
⚠️ **AND THE CONTROL IS INSIDE THE TOOL, BECAUSE AN IDENTITY BETWEEN TWO TREES
THAT ARE THE SAME TREE IS HABIT 4.** `--compare` refuses to report "behaviour
unchanged" unless the `sentences` halves **differ**. This card's first
invariance run was exactly that mistake — it archived a branch whose edits were
not committed yet, so `before` and `after` were the same code and the identity
was perfect and worthless.
Both of the tool's refusals are **driven**, not asserted:
| | |
|---|---|
| the same file compared with itself | `REFUSED: the sentences halves are IDENTICAL…`, exit **2** |
| `MOVE_W` 250.0 → 240.0 in the after tree | `BEHAVIOUR MOVED at 'sweep_stale_reads' / 'sweep_missing_reads' / 'sweep_trace'`, exit **1** |
| this card | `OK: sentences differ, behaviour is byte-identical.`, exit **0** |
## 6. The mutation battery
Each in its own `mktemp`'d copy (habit 18), purged on the host, mounted `:ro`,
graded by `tools/mutation_run.sh` in the CI image.
| | mutation | Δ bytes | named reds |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `_grade()` reverted to *"the reading is not following"* | -402 | **3** |
| M2 | the log line reverted to *"register is not following its own command"* | -80 | **2** |
| M3 | the row reverted to *"{entity} is missing or not numeric"* | -619 | **2** |
| M4 | *register* and *source* transposed between the two explanations | **0** | **1** |
| M5 | the second explanation deleted, the first kept | -216 | **1** |
| M6 | *"CANNOT TELL THEM APART"* replaced by *"IN ORDER OF LIKELIHOOD"* | -13 | **1** |
| M7 | the REFUSED world's ground truth set to the DEAD world's | 0 | **2** |
| M8 | the row's second cause deleted | -309 | **1** |
| M9 | `label` and `entity` transposed in the row | **0** | **3** |
| M10 | M1 + M2 + M3 together, i.e. exactly what 0.10.1 ships | -1101 | **5** |
| M11 | the accusation literals replaced by one that matches nothing | 0 | **1** |
⚠️ **M9's first run was a defect in this card's own check, and it is the one
worth reading.** The row was fetched with `[...][0]`. Transposing `label` and
`entity` makes the row unfindable, so the run died on an `IndexError` — a red
with **no name attached**, with every check after that line **ungraded**. That
is FCST-06's shape exactly. `_s56_row()` now returns a named absence instead of
raising, and a precondition grades it: **0 named reds before, 3 after.**
⚠️ **M11 is the other one aimed inward.** `not any(...)` over an empty list is
True, and so is one over three mistyped literals. The positive control runs the
same predicate against the three sentences **as 0.10.1 shipped them** and
requires it to find an accusation in every one, and every literal to match at
least one of them (habit 7: vary one thing from an accepted baseline).
## 7. What part 11 does not grade
* It does not show the live episode was a BMS refusal beyond doubt — see §3.
* It does not grade English. A sentence that named both explanations and then
said something useless about them would pass.
* The `no entity configured` branch beside the rewritten row is untouched and
ungraded: a blank entity really is the only thing it can be.
* The **grid-power and battery-SoC rows** go through the same rewritten line and
have no freshness gate today, so for them the second cause is a hypothesis
about this controller rather than a live possibility. That is weaker than the
battery-power case and is the price of not branching per row. A gate on either
signal — TEL-08 would be one — makes it exact.
* **SAFETY-58 is not touched** (the first read after a long rest trips before a
healthy register could answer), and neither is the 710/790 disagreement
between `test_freshness.py` and the changelog. Both are separate cards; the
second has a **fourth site** at
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-57-the-exit-from-a-stale-verdict.md:274` that a fix written
off the PR table alone would miss.
@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
# SAFETY-57 — the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-57`, off `origin/master` @ `6f5e8e3`
(content-identical to `release/1.0` @ `8a57361`).
**Card:** SAFETY-57 — *"the freshness gate has no exit reachable from inside the state it creates"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No contact was made with 192.168.2.158 or
192.168.2.221. The one live system touched is `sniffer@192.168.2.167`, a
**passive** RS-485 listener with no address on the bus, and it was read only.
---
## 0. The five things a reader should take away
1. **The live episode is reproduced from the wire, not modelled.** The capture
is committed, the decoder is committed, and the box that produced it was
running the defect — so the `0 W` in the trace *is* the add-on's own
`inputs missing → command 0 W`. §2.
2. **Option 2 from the card — "do not arm the gate when the command is 0 W" —
already holds, and it is not the bug.** `_grade()` has required
`|standing| >= MOVE_W` since SAFETY-37. The trip happened at **+1060 W** and
the stuck state is at **0 W**; they are different moments. §3.
3. **The decision is not "how long", it is "when".** The verdict is withdrawn
when the **obligation that produced it is no longer standing** — SAFETY-13's
shape one module over. The 17.0 s is the obligation window that was already
derived in the file, taken at the **floor** of its band, and which half is
safe is the **opposite** of SAFETY-13's. §4.
4. **It costs 52 % exposure on a permanently dead register, and that number is
in the suite so it cannot be forgotten.** It is payable only because one
re-grading window (35 s) is shorter than both consumer holds (75 s, 85 s).
**No detection SAFETY-37 had is given back.** §5.
5. **The battery had been rescuing this code by accident.** 93 trips in the
committed 16-day capture; median wait for the BMS keep-alive pulse that
cleared them **143 s**, worst **5 h 57 m**. §6.
---
## 1. What was there, in the terms the code uses
`freshness.py`, `Freshness.submit()` and `_grade()`:
```python
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
...
self.stale = False # the only place the latch is cleared
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono):
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
return # sets the latch; never clears it
```
and `main.py:1777`, `inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()`, where `reading()`
answers `None` while `stale`. `inputs_ok` sees the `None`, the site holds for
`stale_input_s`, then files `Claim.set("safety", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "inputs
missing")` and keeps filing it.
The reason the latch exists is written in the class docstring and it is a good
one: without it the verdict oscillates at about 1 Hz, because declaring the
reading stale drops the command below `MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction,
which hands the held number straight back.
**The defect is that the only thing that ends it is an arrival carrying a
different number — and the state's own output is what stops the register being
asked for one.** The log line promised the opposite, in the same sentence that
announced the 0 W:
> *Treating it as MISSING, which commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the
> register reports a different value.*
---
## 2. Reproducing it, from the wire
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz` is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, 10:30–11:10 Europe/Brussels, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`. The decoder reports **0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC,
0 unknown shapes**, and its mode→sign convention is **graded off the capture**
rather than trusted: 298 commands at or under −1000 W are each answered one
obligation window later by a negative register reading, and not one positive.
| capture time | on the wire |
|---|---|
| 10:51:14 | `0x0518` = **−447 W**; the loop is charging |
| 10:51:19 | the command reverses: EMS **mode 3**, 260 W of discharge |
| 10:51:24.7 | `0x0518` = **−3 W**. The pack is at **11 %**, the BMS refuses the discharge, the inverter idles. **The register is healthy and truthful.** |
| 10:51:29.7 | the command reaches **+1060 W**. 800 W of travel |
| 10:52:21.7 | the setpoint is written **0 W** — this is the add-on's own §11.1 rule 1, recorded on the wire |
| …850.0 s | `0x0518` does not change value |
| …790.0 s | the setpoint does not change value |
| ~11:04 | **a person restarts the add-on** — not visible in this file, and the only thing that ends the episode |
| 11:05:31.7 | the restarted loop commands **−400 W of charge**, which the pack accepts at 11 % |
| 11:05:34.7 | `0x0518` = **−137 W** |
⚠️ **THE CAPTURE IS CLOSED-LOOP FOR THE WHOLE PARKED INTERVAL**, which is why
this is a reproduction and not a simulation: the box was running 0.10.0, so
every command in the trace is the shipped code's own. The only event inside the
window the file cannot account for is the human restart.
Replaying the shipped `_read_unit` loop at 1 Hz against those two series
(`test_freshness.py` part 10b):
| | stale at | clear at | parked |
|---|---|---|---|
| **before** (`release_s = inf`) | 10:52:00 | 11:05:35 | **815 s**, and `reading()` is `None` on all **812** reads from the trip to the first command a human put on the wire, with the register at −3.0 W in every one of them |
| **after** | 10:52:00 | **10:52:39** | **39 s**, with `0x0518` still answering the same **−3 W** |
⚠️ **THE COUNTERFACTUAL IS `release_s = inf`, AND IT IS GRADED RATHER THAN
CLAIMED.** With an infinite bound `_release()` never fires, `_open_window()` is
only ever called where the register moves, and the window pair is the
change-stamp pair — byte-for-byte the pre-SAFETY-57 conjunction. Part 10b
asserts that by driving part 1's own fresh/stale pair through both bounds and
comparing the verdict streams.
The replay also found a **one-read trip at 10:48:14** that clears one second
later. That is a pre-existing false positive and it is now recorded as
survivor 5 — §7.
---
## 3. What the card's option 2 actually buys, which is nothing here
The card offered *"do not arm the gate when the command being graded is 0 W"*
and warned that it might hold already. **It does, and it has since SAFETY-37**:
`_grade()` returns at `abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w`, and
`test_freshness.py` part 4 has a named check on that term, added because a
mutation removing it survived.
The warning in the card is the right one and it is worth writing down: **the
trip and the stuck state are different moments.** The gate armed at **+1060 W**,
where the conjunction is entirely correct — a command travelled 800 W and the
register did not move for 35 s. The site then went to **0 W** *because of the
verdict*. An entry-side rule cannot reach a state that is entered legitimately
and then persists. **The defect is the exit, and nothing else in the conjunction
is touched by this card.**
Option 3 — probing with a small non-zero command — was not taken and does not
need to be. It writes to a real actuator to test an assumption, and §4's rule
does not need a probe: the site's *normal* control resuming is the test, and it
is gated behind the same `inputs_ok` everything else is.
---
## 4. The decision: which verdicts get an exit, and what the bound is
> The stale verdict holds as before, **unless** the obligation that produced it
> is no longer standing — `|standing| < MOVE_W` — **and** it has been gone
> longer than the register would have needed to answer it. On a release the
> latch clears and a **new grading window** opens at that instant.
This is [[SAFETY-13]]'s §4 in a different module, and deliberately so: that card
established the house answer to "a latch with no exit" and its answer was *not*
a plain time bound but a **predicate plus a time bound**, where the predicate
says whether the state can end on its own. Here the predicate is that **the
question is no longer being asked.** A register under a 0 W command is obliged
to be nowhere, so a verdict about whether it is following cannot be tested, and
a verdict that cannot be tested may not stand for ever.
### 4.1 Why the window has to re-open, and what happens if it does not
`_grade()` compares the register's unchanged time against `unchanged_s` and the
command's travel against the command standing when the window opened. If a
release cleared the latch **without** re-opening the window, the first read at
which the resumed command travels 250 W would re-trip immediately — the
register would never get the 17 s in which it could answer, and the live
episode's recovery (a charge the pack **accepts**) would be killed inside two
seconds. Mutating exactly that (`graded_from` re-anchored to `changed_mono`,
+82 B) takes four named checks red.
The new window is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` = **35 s**, the same bound as entry,
because it is the same question — *does this register follow the commands issued
from now on?* — and there is no principled shorter answer to it. It is also the
number the exposure argument in §5 rests on, so it is not free to move.
### 4.2 `RELEASE_S` = `BATT_OBLIGED_S` = 17.0 s, and which half is safe
The quantity needed is *has the register had its chance to answer the command
standing now?*, and `freshness.py` already derives it as the floor of
`BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band:
```
6.0 s plant goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22
10.0 s publisher firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181, update_interval: 10s
1.0 s this add-on run_control()'s await asyncio.sleep(1)
```
⚠️ **IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND, NOT A SENSITIVITY PREFERENCE** — the mirror of
`MOVE_W` taking the **ceiling** of its own for the mirrored reason.
| | the question | the safe half | why |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-13's `SETTLE_CYCLES` | may the plant still be the **explanation**? | the **longer** half | a shorter bound stops believing the plant too early, and then it accuses |
| this one | may the verdict still be **tested**? | the **shorter** half | being wrong *long* is the failure being fixed; being wrong *short* costs one re-grading window, and §5 bounds that |
Below 17.0 s the release pre-empts the **cheaper exit** — the register answering
the new 0 W command by itself, which clears the latch on evidence rather than on
a timer. That is graded behaviourally rather than asserted: a register that
answers at +16 s clears by **movement** at `release_s = 17.0` with `releases`
still 0, and by **timer** at `release_s = 5.0`.
The family is computed and printed (habit 10): `5, 16, 17, 18, 35, inf` give
six distinct release instants, so no check in the file can confuse two of them.
### 4.3 Two clocks, and the operator reads the register's
`changed_mono` / `unchanged_s()` remain facts about the **register**: after a
release they go on reporting that it has not moved for 850 s, because it has
not. `graded_from` / `graded_s()` are the **verdict's** window. They coincide
until the first release. Collapsing them either lies to the operator or defeats
the re-grading, and both directions are mutated red.
The stale sentence's `unchanged for N s` slot carries the **register's** number;
a re-trip appends a clause naming the window and the grade count, so the two
durations cannot be read as one number that moved (habit 14).
---
## 5. What it costs, measured
Driven against a register frozen for good, 1201 reads, shipped defaults
(`test_freshness.py` part 10c):
| | parked | the held number reaches a consumer | releases |
|---|---|---|---|
| before | 1166 s | **35 reads (2.9 %)** | 0 |
| after | 571 s | **630 reads (52.5 %)** | 17 |
⚠️ **52 % IS PAID EVERY CYCLE, NOT OCCASIONALLY.** The period is
`stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S` (17 s) parked, then one 35 s window.
It is payable because of one inequality, and it is the inequality
`test_freshness.py` part 6 has graded against the shipped `config.yaml` since
SAFETY-37:
```
35 s (the re-grading window) < 75 s (circulation_hold_s) < 85 s (unit_sign_disagree_s)
```
Every unbroken run of exposure is **exactly one window**, so neither consumer
can reach a verdict inside one, and the re-trip that ends each run hands them a
`None`, which **clears** their windows rather than accumulating into them.
**And nothing SAFETY-37 detects is given back**, which is the half that makes
this a trade rather than a regression: a permanent `None` clears those same two
windows for ever as well, so on the shipped-before module those detectors are
*equally* unable to speak about the unit. What the held number does reach for
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()` — which
answers a large unexplained divergence by **freezing the output**, the
conservative direction and SAFETY-13's business — and the command itself is
derived from the **P1 meter**, never from `batt`.
### 5.1 The narrowing this does NOT take, named so the next card can
The live episode's register refused a **discharge** into an 11 % pack and then
followed a **charge** three seconds later. A refusal in one direction is not
evidence about the other, and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade
on the first command that crosses it instead of on a timer — which would shrink
the 52 % above. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately does not take
(see the `soc` row and TEL-08), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's number.
It is **not needed to give the state an exit**, and folding it in here would
make the exit depend on a second measurement being right.
---
## 6. The measurement that says the old exit was luck
`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/` replayed at 1 Hz through the shipped
conjunction (`test_freshness.py` part 8b): **93 trips in 16 days.** The only
thing that could clear any of them was the register carrying a different number,
and that took:
| | |
|---|---|
| minimum | 0.6 s |
| **median** | **143.4 s** |
| maximum | **21440.1 s** (5 h 57 m) |
| at or over the live episode's 710 s | **17 of 93** |
The short waits are the BMS keep-alive pulse — SAFETY-50 measured its ceiling at
508 W — twitching `0x0518` and satisfying the clearing rule **by accident**.
Over a fifth of the trips are cleared in under 20 s by something nothing in this
add-on asked for.
⚠️ **WHAT THAT REPLAY IS AND IS NOT.** The capture runs 2026-09-02…17 and
0.10.0 — the first version carrying this gate — was cut on 2026-09-16, so the
setpoint column is an **ungated** controller's. That makes each trip an honest
register-versus-command divergence off the real bus, and it makes the post-trip
command column something a gated box would **not** have written. The figure
taken from it is therefore the only one that does not depend on the command at
all — how long this register goes without changing value — and it **under**-states
the wait, because a site parked at 0 W gives the register even less reason to
move than the one recorded here.
---
## 7. Survivors, and the two things the battery found
The battery is 22 mutations over `app/freshness.py`, `app/main.py` and
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`, plus one over the committed capture itself. All
run through `ci_run.sh`, a mirror of `checks.yml`'s own step: a purged copy of
the tree, bind-mounted `:ro`, one file at a time, `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1`.
Per MUTATION.md habit 18 the harness's scratch file is `mktemp`ed per
invocation and the tree is fingerprinted **after the revert** as well as before;
every revert restored the recorded sha256 and byte count.
**21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.** The table is in the
PR body. Two of them are worth keeping here.
### 7.1 The equivalent mutant, argued rather than rounded off
Swapping `_release()` and `_grade()` in `submit()` is a **zero-byte** edit and
survived the whole battery. **It is not a missing fixture and no fixture can
close it**: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()`
only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on any
read, whichever runs first.
⚠️ **THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CODE CLAIMED THE ORDER WAS LOAD-BEARING**, in a
`⚠️` comment, with a reason that sounded right. It was false, and the battery is
what said so — **MUTATION.md habit 22 exactly, one card later: an explanation in
a comment is a claim, and this one had not been run.** The comment now states
the disjointness, and part 10 pins **that** — at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W — instead of pinning an order that is not observable.
### 7.2 The sibling that survived, which is habit 11 earning its place
`_release()`'s obligation test is `abs(standing_w) >= self.bound.move_w`.
Swapping `move_w` for `unchanged_s` — comparing **watts against 35** — survived
the file at **+5 B**, because **every fixture rested at exactly 0 W**, and 0 is
below both 35 and 250. They separate only in the band between them, and a site
can sit there: a peak-guard floor, a shadow substitution, any claim that wins
with a small non-zero number. Closed by a three-point fixture at 0 / 100 / 300 W
that asserts the 100 W case releases and the 300 W case does not.
### 7.3 ⚠️ And the instrument lied once, which is habit 16's second half
The first form of the `graded_from` mutation was
`float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`. It reported a **survivor at +21 B**, and
the tree fingerprint showed the edit really was on disk and really did run.
`changed_mono` is **0.0** in the dead-register fixture, and `0.0 or x` is `x` —
so the mutant was a *no-op on the fixture*, for a Python truthiness reason that
has nothing to do with the property under test. Rewritten as an explicit
`is None` test (+82 B) it is red on four named checks.
**A mutation is subject to every habit in MUTATION.md, including habit 4.** A
purge, a fingerprint and a byte delta all say the edit is present; none of them
says the edit *changed the answer on this stimulus*. MUTATION.md gains habit 19
for it.
---
## 8. What this does NOT fix, said plainly
**It does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register**, and it does not
try to. Both are re-graded on the same timer. §5.1 names what telling them apart
would need.
**It does not make the diagnosis right.** The line the operator reads still says
*"battery-power register is not following its own command"*, which is wrong in a
different way when the pack is simply empty. That wording is **SAFETY-56's**,
together with `main.py`'s NOT READY row, and it is deliberately untouched here —
two cards editing one sentence is how one of them silently loses. Only the
**escape clause** was rewritten, because this card is what made the old one
false, and part 10h has a named check asserting the diagnosis half is still
there so that rewrite has to be a deliberate act.
> ⚠️ **SINCE SUPERSEDED, WHICH IS WHAT THAT CHECK WAS FOR.** [[SAFETY-56]] is
> the deliberate act: all three sentences now name **both** explanations and
> accuse neither, and part 10h's check is inverted — it requires the accusation
> to be **gone**. Nothing else in this section moved; the escape clause above is
> still this card's and is untouched by it. See
> `DECISIONS/SAFETY-56-what-the-gate-cannot-tell-apart.md`, and
> `test_freshness.py` part 11 for the graded pair of worlds.
**Survivor 5 is older than this card and is not closed by it.** After a long
rest the unchanged clock is already past 35 s, so the **first** read carrying a
travelled command trips the gate — before the 17.0 s in which a healthy register
could have answered it. The live capture contains one (10:48:14, cleared one
second later). Its size is one `stale_input_s` hold, during which `cycle()`
returns at `inputs missing {n}s` and commands nothing differently. Fixing it
means measuring the unchanged clock from when the **obligation** appeared rather
than from the register's last move, which re-derives the 35.0 s bound and is a
different card.
**Nothing was measured on two inverters.** Inverter B does not physically exist
(`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b). Every two-unit figure in `test_freshness.py` is two
copies of A's behaviour with different numbers passed in.
**No deploy is proposed.** 0.10.0 is on the reference install and this branch's
CHANGELOG row is filed under it only because `test_version_gate.py` part 11b
requires the newest heading to be a version. Moving it, and deciding whether a
version is cut, is a PKG card's.
+29
View File
@@ -526,6 +526,35 @@ next 10 s publish. There is **no option to configure**: the 35 s is derived from
the ESPHome publish interval and the two watchdog windows it has to stay inside,
and the add-on's own checks refuse a value that does not.
⚠️ **AND IF THE REGISTER DOES NOT REPORT A DIFFERENT VALUE, THE ADD-ON STOPS
WAITING AFTER 17 s (SAFETY-57).** This paragraph used to end at the sentence
above, and on 2026-09-21 that turned out to be a promise the state could not
keep: at 0 W **nothing is asking the register to be anywhere**, so "report a
different value" is evidence a parked site cannot ask for. The live site sat at
0 W for **790 s** while the house exported 2.4 kW, on a register that was
working perfectly — the pack was simply at its floor and the BMS was refusing
the discharge — and it was freed by a person restarting the add-on.
So: once the standing command has been **under 250 W for 17 s**, the verdict is
**withdrawn** and the register is graded again from scratch over a fresh 35 s.
The whole parked interval is now `stale_input_s` + 17 s — **32 s at the
defaults** — and it does not depend on what the battery decides to do.
| in the action log | what it means | what to do |
|---|---|---|
| `STALE <unit>` alone, then nothing | the register stopped following and has not come back | look at the unit — comms, the ESP32, the inverter |
| `STALE <unit>` then `STALE WITHDRAWN <unit>`, **once** | the pack was probably empty or full and the BMS refused the command. The site has resumed | nothing |
| the pair repeating every ~70 s | the register really is not following, and the add-on is re-testing it | look at the unit; the site is regulating on the meter in between |
⚠️ **`STALE WITHDRAWN` IS NOT "RECOVERED", AND THE LOG LINE SAYS SO ITSELF.**
Nothing has been learned about the register when it is printed; the verdict is
withdrawn because it can no longer be *tested*, and the next 35 s are the test.
During those 35 s the held number reaches the site's telemetry again. That is
deliberate and it is bounded: 35 s is shorter than both the circulating-power
hold (75 s) and the per-unit sign hold (85 s), so neither of those alarms can be
made to say anything by a held number, and the command itself is derived from
the **meter**, never from this register.
⚠️ **What this does NOT catch: a register whose value is WRONG rather than
STOPPED**, including a dead publisher whose last two samples happen to
alternate. Detecting that needs an arrival stamp inside the ESP32 firmware
+44
View File
@@ -852,6 +852,50 @@ Cheap habits fall out of it, and all of them are now used in this repository:
invented justification for a correct decision is still a defect, and it is
the kind a reviewer cannot see because the code is right.
23. ⚠️ **THE MUTATION IS SUBJECT TO EVERY HABIT ABOVE, HABIT 4 INCLUDED - AND
THE PURGE, THE FINGERPRINT AND THE BYTE DELTA ALL SAY IT TOOK.** SAFETY-57's
battery reported a **survivor at +21 B** for a mutation of
`Freshness._open_window()`: `self.graded_from = float(now_mono)` rewritten
as `float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`, which is meant to re-anchor the
verdict's window to the register's own history and so delete the card's
whole exit. The harness purged, the tree fingerprint showed the edit on
disk, the delta was non-zero, and the mutant really did run. It was still a
survivor for a reason that has nothing to do with the property: in the
fixture the register never moves after `t = 0`, so `changed_mono` is
**`0.0`** - and `0.0 or x` is `x`. **The mutant was a no-op on that
stimulus.** Rewritten with an explicit `is None` test (+82 B) it is red on
four named checks.
Stale bytecode is a mutation that never *ran*. This is a mutation that ran
and could not *change the answer* on the data it was given, which is habit 4
exactly, one level up - and none of the three things a mutation report is
required to state (MUTATION.md's own list) can see it, because all three are
about the file rather than about the stimulus. Two rules:
* **Ask of every survivor what it would have had to change, and check that
the fixture reaches that value.** Here: "does any fixture have a non-zero
`changed_mono` at the moment `_open_window()` is called?" The answer was
no, and it is one line to ask.
* **Prefer a mutation that CANNOT be a no-op.** `or`, `and`, truthiness on
a numeric, a default argument and a `getattr` fallback all have a value at
which the mutant and the shipped tree coincide. An explicit comparison,
a constant swap or a deleted statement does not.
⚠️ Note where this one was found: in the battery of a card whose whole
subject is a check that cannot reach the failure it names. **Second
instance in an instrument rather than in a check since habit 16, and the
third overall.**
⚠️ **AND THE SAME CARD'S BATTERY CAUGHT A HABIT-22 COMMENT IN THE FIX
ITSELF, WHICH IS WHY THESE TWO BELONG NEXT TO EACH OTHER.**
`freshness.py` shipped `⚠️ RELEASE BEFORE GRADE, AND THE ORDER IS
LOAD-BEARING` with a worked reason. Swapping the two calls is **zero bytes**
and survived the battery: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w`
and `_release()` only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one can act on
any read and the order is **not observable**. Habit 22 says build X and
measure it; the battery is what builds X. The comment now states the
disjointness and the suite pins **that** - at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W - rather than an order nothing depends on.
And the mutation-table consequence: **a variant is not covered because a
near-miss of it is.** DEV-02's table listed the *actuator* variant of the
per-unit claim defect (`device`/`supervised` filed without `inv`), which the
+333 -20
View File
@@ -175,6 +175,124 @@ only one of them is WIRED - see `BOUNDS` below and the note on SoC.
integrator, and K. It does NOT owe a second freshness mechanism - `Freshness`
below takes its obligation term from the caller precisely so that an energy
integral can be handed in where command travel is handed in here.
THE EXIT, AND WHY THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS MODULE DID NOT HAVE ONE (SAFETY-57)
==============================================================================
⚠️ THE VERDICT ABOVE IS ABOUT AN OBLIGATION, AND ITS OWN CONSEQUENCE REMOVES
THE OBLIGATION. Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False,
which commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1). At 0 W nothing is asking the register to be
anywhere - `|standing| >= MOVE_W` is false, so the conjunction cannot arm - and
the class docstring's clearing rule, "an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number",
asks the register for evidence that only a command could have produced. A pack
sitting at its BMS floor answers the same integer watt for hours. **The state
had no exit reachable from inside it**, and the operator-facing line said the
opposite: *"It clears itself the moment the register reports a different
value."*
MEASURED ON THE LIVE SITE, 2026-09-21, and committed as
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/` - a passive RS-485 capture, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`:
10:51:24.7 0x0518 reaches -3 W. The pack is at 11 % and the loop has just
reversed from -447 W of charge into discharge; the BMS refuses
and the inverter idles. The register is HEALTHY and TRUTHFUL.
10:51:29.7 the standing command reaches +1060 W. 800 W of travel, and the
register is obliged to follow it.
10:52:00 the conjunction arms. `Inverter.batt` becomes None.
10:52:21.7 the site commands 0 W - on the wire, in the capture.
... 0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
change value for 790.0 s. Nothing in this add-on can end it.
11:04 a human restarts the add-on.
11:05:31.7 the restarted loop commands -400 W of charge, which the pack
ACCEPTS at 11 %, and the register moves 3 s later.
⚠️ AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. This BMS emits a keep-alive pulse of a few
hundred watts, which twitches 0x0518 and satisfies the clearing rule by
accident. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
(`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/`) through the shipped conjunction at
1 Hz gives **93 trips**, and the time from each trip to the register's next
change - which was the ONLY exit - has a median of 143 s, 17 episodes at or
over the live one's 710 s, and a worst case of 21440 s. That distribution is a
property of this battery's firmware. It is not a property of this code, and the
add-on must not depend on it.
THE RULE, and it is SAFETY-13's shape one module over - "which latches get an
exit, not how long the block lasts":
RELEASE <=> the verdict is standing
AND |standing command| < MOVE_W has held continuously for
>= RELEASE_S
On a release the latch clears and a NEW grading window opens at that instant:
the register is re-graded, from scratch, against the commands issued AFTER it.
Nothing about the register's own history is rewritten - `changed_mono`,
`held` and `unchanged_s()` go on reporting that the register has not moved for
850 s, because it has not.
⚠️ `RELEASE_S` IS `BATT_OBLIGED_S`, 17.0 s, AND IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND
RATHER THAN A PREFERENCE - the mirror of `MOVE_W` taking the ceiling of its
own. The question the bound answers is *has the register had its chance to
answer the command that is now standing?*, and that is exactly the 17.0 s
already derived above: 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s publish, one 1 s read. Below it
the release happens before the cheaper exit - the register moving by itself -
could have occurred. Which half is safe is the opposite of SAFETY-13's, and for
the reason that card states in its §4.2 table: being wrong LONG here is the
failure being fixed (a site parked while it exports), and being wrong SHORT
costs one re-grading window, which is bounded below.
WHAT A RELEASE COSTS, MEASURED AND NOT ABSORBED - AND IT IS NOT SMALL. For the
duration of the new window the consumers get the held number again, which is
the exposure this module was written to close. Driven at the live install's
shape against a register frozen for good (`test_freshness.py` part 10c), over
1200 s:
shipped parked 1166 s, the held number reaches a consumer 35 s 2.9 %
SAFETY-57 parked 571 s, the held number reaches a consumer 630 s 52.5 %
⚠️ **52 % IS THE PRICE OF THE EXIT AND IT IS PAID EVERY CYCLE**, not an
occasional slip. The period is the whole of `stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S`
(17 s) parked, then one `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` (35 s) window of re-grading. It is
bounded by construction, and that bound is the one thing that makes it payable:
the new window is AT MOST BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35 s, and 35 < 75 < 85 - the
circulation hold and the per-unit sign hold. NEITHER CONSUMER CAN REACH A
VERDICT INSIDE ONE WINDOW, and a re-trip returns them a None, which CLEARS
both windows rather than accumulating into them.
That inequality is the same one part 6 already grades, and it is why the window
is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` rather than a number chosen to make the table above look
better. Neither detector can be made to say anything by a held number under
this scheme - which is exactly the state the shipped code leaves them in as
well, since a permanent None clears both windows for ever. **So nothing that
SAFETY-37 detects is given back.** What the held number does reach for those
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()`, which
responds to a large unexplained divergence by FREEZING the output - the
conservative direction, and SAFETY-13's business. And the command itself is
derived from the P1 meter, never from `batt`, so a site regulating through a
re-grading window is regulating on the signal it always regulates on.
**A register frozen under a command that never travels 250 W is still not
detected at all** (survivor 2, unchanged), and a dead publisher whose value
alternates is still invisible (survivor 3).
⚠️ AND THE NARROWING THIS DOES NOT TAKE, named so the next card can. The live
episode's register refused a DISCHARGE into an 11 % pack and then followed a
CHARGE immediately; a refusal in one direction is not evidence about the other,
and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade on the first command that
crosses it instead of on a timer. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately
does not take (see the `soc` row), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's
number. It would shrink the 52 % above; it is not needed to give the state an
exit, and mixing it in here would make the exit depend on a second measurement
being right.
⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO, because the temptation is to call it a fix for the
whole episode: it does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register. The
site above was parked for 790 s by a register that was working perfectly, and
after this change it is parked for `stale_input_s + RELEASE_S` instead - about
32 s on the shipped default - and then regrades. Telling the two apart needs
the pack's own floor, which is SAFETY-32's number and not this module's input;
the wording the operator reads about it is SAFETY-56's.
"""
import time
@@ -211,6 +329,19 @@ BATT_UNCHANGED_S = 35.0
# and goes red if the two drift.
MOVE_W = 250.0
# SAFETY-57. How long the obligation must have been ABSENT before a standing
# verdict is withdrawn and the register re-graded. See the module docstring's
# last section for the live episode this exists for and for which half of the
# band is the safe one.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS `BATT_OBLIGED_S` AND NOT A NEW NUMBER, and that identity is the
# derivation rather than a convenience. The question is "has the register had
# its chance to answer the command standing NOW?", which is the same physical
# quantity the floor of `BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band is: 6.0 s of plant, one 10 s
# ESPHome publish, one 1 s add-on read. Releasing sooner would throw away the
# cheaper exit - the register moving by itself - before it could have happened.
RELEASE_S = BATT_OBLIGED_S # 17.0
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Bound:
@@ -219,6 +350,7 @@ class Bound:
signal: str
unchanged_s: float
move_w: float
release_s: float
wired: bool
derivation: str
@@ -233,13 +365,19 @@ BOUNDS = {
signal="batt (0x0518, AC power, S16, 1 W, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=BATT_UNCHANGED_S,
move_w=MOVE_W,
release_s=RELEASE_S,
wired=True,
derivation="settle 6.0 + publish 10.0 + read 1.0 = 17.0 s floor; "
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]"),
"circulation_hold_s 75 s ceiling; band [34.0, 37.5]. "
"SAFETY-57: the verdict is withdrawn after 17.0 s of the "
"standing command below 250 W, because at 0 W the register "
"is obliged to nothing and the verdict cannot be tested "
"again from inside the state it creates"),
"soc": Bound(
signal="soc (0x050E, pack SoC, U16, 1 %, 10 s publish)",
unchanged_s=float("inf"),
move_w=float("inf"),
release_s=float("inf"),
wired=False,
derivation="TEL-08. Command travel is the WRONG obligation term for "
"SoC - a rested pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W "
@@ -263,10 +401,33 @@ class Freshness:
Declaring the reading stale makes `Controller.inputs_ok` False, which
commands 0 W (§11.1 rule 1), which drops the standing command below
`MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction, which would return the held number
to the consumers - and round again every read. So the ONLY thing that clears
the latch is an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number, which is exactly the
evidence the verdict was about. A register that is working clears it on its
next 10 s publish; a register that is not, does not.
to the consumers - and round again every read. So an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number clears the latch, which is exactly the evidence the verdict
was about. A register that is working clears it on its next 10 s publish; a
register that is not, does not.
⚠️ AND IT IS NOT THE ONLY THING THAT CLEARS IT ANY MORE (SAFETY-57), BECAUSE
THAT MADE THE STATE INESCAPABLE FROM INSIDE. The command the verdict itself
produces is 0 W, and at 0 W the register is obliged to be nowhere - so
"report a different value" is evidence a parked site cannot ask for. The
live site sat at 0 W for 790 s on 2026-09-21 with a register that was
working correctly, and was freed by a human. `_release()` below withdraws a
verdict whose obligation has been gone for `bound.release_s`, and opens a
new grading window at that instant. The 1 Hz oscillation the latch exists to
prevent is still prevented: the new window is `bound.unchanged_s` wide, so
no re-trip can land sooner than 35 s after a release, rather than on the
next read. ⚠️ MEASURED FROM THE RELEASE, NOT FROM THE COMMAND RESUMING - if
the site rests for longer than the window before it asks for anything, the
window is already old and the re-trip lands on the first read at which the
command travels 250 W again. That is survivor 5's shape, it predates this
card, and its cost is one `stale_input_s` hold.
⚠️ TWO CLOCKS, AND THE DISTINCTION IS THE WHOLE OF SAFETY-57'S HONESTY.
`changed_mono` / `held` are facts about the REGISTER: when it last carried a
different number. `graded_from` / `standing_at_grade` are the window the
VERDICT is computed over, which a release re-opens. They are the same thing
until the first release and diverge afterwards, and `unchanged_s()` - the
number an operator reads - is always the register's.
"""
def __init__(self, bound: Bound):
@@ -281,10 +442,20 @@ class Freshness:
# ability to fetch it.
self.held = None
self.changed_mono = None
# The standing command at that same instant. The conjunction compares
# against THIS, not against the previous cycle's command: what matters
# is whether the register has followed anything since it last moved.
self.standing_at_change = None
# SAFETY-57. The window the VERDICT is graded over, as opposed to the
# register's own history above, and the standing command at the instant
# it opened. The conjunction compares against THIS, not against the
# previous cycle's command: what matters is whether the register has
# followed anything since the current question was put to it. A register
# that moves opens a window, so until the first release these two are
# the change-stamps; `_release()` is where they diverge.
self.graded_from = None
self.standing_at_grade = None
# The instant the standing command last FELL below `move_w`, or None
# while an obligation is standing. The release timer runs off this.
self.rested_since = None
self.released_at = None
self.releases = 0
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.arrivals = 0
@@ -311,20 +482,67 @@ class Freshness:
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
self.held = value
self.changed_mono = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_change = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
# Movement is the ONLY thing that clears the latch. See the class
# docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation this prevents.
self._open_window(standing_w, now_mono)
# Movement clears the latch, because it is exactly the evidence the
# verdict was about. See the class docstring on the 1 Hz oscillation
# the latch prevents, and `_release()` for the other way out.
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self.last = value
# ⚠️ THE ORDER OF THESE TWO IS NOT OBSERVABLE, AND THIS COMMENT SAYS SO
# BECAUSE THE FIRST VERSION OF IT CLAIMED THE OPPOSITE. Swapping them is
# a ZERO-BYTE edit and it SURVIVED the battery; the reason is structural
# rather than a missing fixture, so no fixture could have closed it:
# `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()` only
# when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on
# any given read, whichever runs first. Release is written first because
# it reads in the order the state machine moves - withdraw, then
# re-grade - not because the code depends on it.
self._release(standing_w, now_mono)
self._grade(standing_w, now_mono)
def _open_window(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""Start grading the register again, from this instant (SAFETY-57).
Called when the register moves - the window and the register's history
coincide there - and when a verdict is withdrawn, where they do not.
"""
self.graded_from = float(now_mono)
self.standing_at_grade = (None if standing_w is None
else float(standing_w))
def _release(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""SAFETY-57. Withdraw a verdict whose obligation is no longer standing.
⚠️ THE TIMER RUNS ON THE COMMAND, NOT ON THE VERDICT. `rested_since` is
maintained on every arrival, latched or not, so the elapsed rest is the
real one and not "time since we last looked". An obligation reappearing
resets it to None, which is the whole point: a site that goes back to
asking the register for 250 W of movement has put the question back, and
the verdict stands until the question is withdrawn again.
"""
obliged = (standing_w is not None
and abs(float(standing_w)) >= self.bound.move_w)
if obliged:
self.rested_since = None
return
if self.rested_since is None:
self.rested_since = float(now_mono)
if not self.stale:
return
if float(now_mono) - self.rested_since < self.bound.release_s:
return
self.released_at = float(now_mono)
self.releases += 1
self.stale = False
self.reason = ""
self._open_window(standing_w, now_mono)
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono) -> None:
"""The conjunction. Sets the latch; never clears it."""
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
if self.stale or self.graded_from is None:
return
held_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
held_s = self.graded_s(now_mono)
if held_s < self.bound.unchanged_s:
return
# ⚠️ BOTH None GUARDS ARE FOR A CALLER THAT DOES NOT KNOW ITS OWN
@@ -333,30 +551,98 @@ class Freshness:
# consumer today. They are here for TEL-08, whose obligation term is an
# energy integral that has nothing to say until it has a window - and
# "nothing to say" must withhold the verdict, not manufacture one.
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_change is None:
if standing_w is None or self.standing_at_grade is None:
return
standing_w = float(standing_w)
if abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w:
return
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_change)
moved_w = abs(standing_w - self.standing_at_grade)
if moved_w < self.bound.move_w:
return
self.stale = True
# ⚠️ THE SENTENCE SAYS "unchanged", SO IT GETS THE REGISTER'S OWN
# NUMBER, NOT THE WINDOW'S. They are the same until the first release
# and different afterwards, and an operator comparing this line against
# a history graph is reading the register.
shown_s = self.unchanged_s(now_mono)
# ⚠️ SAFETY-56. THE OBSERVATION IS A FACT, THE DIAGNOSIS WAS NOT, AND
# THE SENTENCE NOW STOPS WHERE THE EVIDENCE DOES. The conjunction above
# is satisfied by TWO disjoint worlds, and nothing this object is handed
# separates them:
# (1) the register has stopped reporting reality - what the gate was
# built for - or
# (2) reality is not moving, because the SOURCE cannot comply with
# the command. A pack the BMS is refusing at its floor holds
# still under any setpoint, and a register reporting that
# truthfully publishes the same unchanged number a dead one does.
# The live 2026-09-21 episode was (2) - the pack read 11 % for the
# whole 850 s hold, the commands were discharge-only, and the register
# answered the first CHARGE command within one obligation window
# (test_freshness.py 11a measures all three off the committed capture)
# - and this sentence asserted (1), which sent the operator to look at
# healthy hardware.
# Naming both is what the module can honestly say. Naming WHICH would
# need SoC and the pack floor - deliberately not this module's inputs
# (see the `soc` row in BOUNDS and the docstring's last section), and
# TEL-08's and SAFETY-32's numbers rather than this sentence's.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NOT SHARED WITH `main.py`'s NOT READY ROW, WHICH SAYS
# THE SAME AMBIGUITY IN DIFFERENT WORDS ON PURPOSE. This sentence is a
# LOG LINE about a behaviour, quoted verbatim by `note()` onto the
# status page and by `_read_unit()` into the action log; that one is a
# BANNER about a named ENTITY, and the two answer different questions
# ("what did the register do" against "can I trust this entity"). One
# helper serving both would have to drop whichever half the other does
# not need, and the half it dropped would be the operator's next step.
self.reason = (
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {held_s:.0f} s "
f"STALE_READING: {self.held:+.0f} unchanged for {shown_s:.0f} s "
f"while the standing command moved {moved_w:.0f} W to "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W - the reading is not following, so it is "
f"{standing_w:+.0f} W. TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE "
f"CANNOT TELL THEM APART: the register may have stopped reporting "
f"reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command "
f"- a pack the BMS is refusing holds still under any setpoint, and "
f"an honest register then reads exactly like a frozen one. Either "
f"way the number cannot be read as this command's effect, so it is "
f"reported as MISSING rather than as a measurement (limits: "
f"unchanged over {self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s, command over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W and moved by over "
f"{self.bound.move_w:.0f} W)")
# ⚠️ SAFETY-57, AND THE THREE DURATIONS ARE THREE DIFFERENT FACTS, each
# in its own slot: the register's unchanged time is in the sentence
# above, the WINDOW this verdict actually rests on is here, and so is
# how many times this unit has been round the loop. Without the second
# one the sentence reads as though 92 s of unchanged register were what
# was compared against the 35 s limit, and it was not.
if self.releases:
self.reason += (
f" [re-graded: the {held_s:.0f} s window this verdict rests on "
f"opened when the previous one was withdrawn, not when the "
f"register last moved - this unit has now been graded "
f"{self.releases + 1} times]")
def unchanged_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page."""
"""Seconds since an arrival carried a different number. Status page.
⚠️ THE REGISTER'S CLOCK, NEVER THE VERDICT'S (SAFETY-57). A release
re-opens the grading window; it does not make the register younger, and
an operator reading "unchanged for 12 s" off a register that has held
one value for 850 s would be reading this module's bookkeeping back as a
measurement. `graded_s()` is the other one and is named differently for
that reason.
"""
if self.changed_mono is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.changed_mono)
def graded_s(self, now_mono) -> float | None:
"""Seconds the CURRENT verdict window has been open (SAFETY-57).
Equal to `unchanged_s()` until the first release, and shorter after one.
"""
if self.graded_from is None:
return None
return max(0.0, float(now_mono) - self.graded_from)
def reading(self):
"""What the consumers get: the value, or None when it cannot be trusted.
@@ -366,6 +652,13 @@ class Freshness:
rather than accumulating it, and `circulation.circulating_w` returns None
for a roster with a missing term, which clears the circulation window
too. This module is the thing that was missing between them.
⚠️ AND IT CAN GO BACK TO BEING A NUMBER WITHOUT THE REGISTER MOVING
(SAFETY-57). That is the exit, and it is bounded rather than free: the
window a release opens is `bound.unchanged_s` = 35 s, shorter than both
consumer holds (75 s and 85 s), so neither can reach a verdict inside
one - and a re-trip hands them a None, which CLEARS their windows. See
the module docstring's last section.
"""
return None if self.stale else self.last
@@ -373,6 +666,26 @@ class Freshness:
"""One line for the status page. Empty when there is nothing to say."""
return f"{unit_name}: {self.reason}" if self.stale else ""
def release_note(self, unit_name: str) -> str:
"""SAFETY-57's release, for the log. Empty when nothing was withdrawn.
⚠️ IT NAMES WHAT IS AND IS NOT BEING CLAIMED, because a line reading
"recovered" would be a lie: nothing has been learned about the register.
The verdict was withdrawn because it can no longer be tested, and the
next 35 s are the test.
"""
if self.released_at is None:
return ""
return (f"{unit_name}: STALE_WITHDRAWN after the standing command sat "
f"below {self.bound.move_w:.0f} W for "
f"{self.bound.release_s:.0f} s. NOTHING HAS BEEN LEARNED ABOUT "
f"THE REGISTER - it is still holding {self.held:+.0f} - but a "
f"verdict about a command that is no longer standing cannot be "
f"tested, and the 0 W this one produces is what stopped it "
f"being tested. The register is now re-graded over a fresh "
f"{self.bound.unchanged_s:.0f} s window; if it still does not "
f"follow, this returns")
def monotonic() -> float:
"""The clock this module's callers use, in one place so tests can find it.
+77 -5
View File
@@ -1769,6 +1769,7 @@ class Controller:
inv.soc = await self.hass.number(inv.soc_entity)
raw = await self.hass.number(inv.batt_entity, inv.batt_invert)
was_stale = inv.batt_fresh.stale
was_releases = inv.batt_fresh.releases
inv.batt_fresh.submit(raw, inv.standing_w(), now_mono)
# ⚠️ `inv.batt` IS THE GATED VALUE. A stale register is a MISSING input,
# not a measurement - `inputs_ok` sees the None, the site holds for
@@ -1777,11 +1778,52 @@ class Controller:
inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()
if inv.batt_fresh.stale and not was_stale:
self.log_event(f"STALE {inv.name}: " + inv.batt_fresh.reason)
_LOG.error("SAFETY-37: %s battery-power register is not following "
"its own command - %s. Treating it as MISSING, which "
# ⚠️ SAFETY-57 REWROTE THE LAST SENTENCE OF THIS LINE AND NOTHING
# ELSE IN IT. The escape clause used to read "It clears itself the
# moment the register reports a different value", full stop - and
# that was FALSE for the state this same line announces, because the
# 0 W it announces in the sentence before is exactly what stops the
# register ever being asked to report anything different. The live
# site sat in it for 790 s on 2026-09-21 and was freed by a human.
# ⚠️ SAFETY-56 REWROTE THE DIAGNOSIS HALF, WHICH SAFETY-57 LEFT
# STANDING ON PURPOSE. It used to open "battery-power register is
# not following its own command" - an accusation against a named
# piece of hardware, and FALSE on the very episode above. The
# pack read 11 % for the whole hold, every command in it was a
# DISCHARGE, and the register answered the first CHARGE command
# three seconds later - so the BMS was refusing, the register was
# publishing that refusal correctly, and the operator was sent to
# look at a working sensor. All three numbers are measured off the
# committed capture by test_freshness.py part 11a. The gate's
# conjunction is right and is NOT touched; only its conclusion was.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE TWO EXPLANATIONS ARE NAMED ONCE, IN `%s`, NOT TWICE.
# This line's own words are the OBSERVATION plus the one thing a
# log reader has to be told before acting - that the observation is
# not yet a verdict - and `freshness._grade()`'s sentence, which
# this line already interpolates, is where the pair is spelled out.
# Saying it in both halves of one sentence is how an operator
# learns to skim it.
_LOG.error("SAFETY-37: %s battery-power reading did not move under "
"a command that did, WHICH IS NOT BY ITSELF A VERDICT "
"ON THE REGISTER - %s. Treating it as MISSING, which "
"commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the register "
"reports a different value.",
inv.name, inv.batt_fresh.reason)
"reports a different value, and failing that %.0f s "
"after the standing command falls below %.0f W "
"(SAFETY-57: a verdict whose own consequence is a 0 W "
"command cannot be tested again from inside it).",
inv.name, inv.batt_fresh.reason,
inv.batt_fresh.bound.release_s,
inv.batt_fresh.bound.move_w)
elif inv.batt_fresh.releases > was_releases:
# ⚠️ SAFETY-57. REPORTED, NEVER SILENT. A latch that lets go on a
# timer and says nothing is a latch no operator can audit - and this
# one is withdrawing a SITE STOP. `release_note()` is written to say
# that nothing has been learned about the register, because nothing
# has.
self.log_event(f"STALE WITHDRAWN {inv.name}")
_LOG.warning("SAFETY-57: %s",
inv.batt_fresh.release_note(inv.name))
@property
def shadow(self) -> bool:
@@ -4636,8 +4678,38 @@ class Controller:
if not entity:
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": False, "text": f"{label}: no entity configured"})
elif value is None:
# ⚠️ SAFETY-56. THIS ROW ASSERTED A FALSE FACT ABOUT A NAMED
# ENTITY, WHICH IS THE WORST THING A DIAGNOSTIC CAN DO. It read
# "<entity> is missing or not numeric" for ANY None, and one of
# the ways this value becomes None is SAFETY-37's freshness gate
# withholding a reading that is present, numeric and updating -
# `Freshness.reading()` returns None BY DESIGN there. On the
# live site on 2026-09-21 the operator opened Developer Tools on
# the entity this row named, found it working, and had every
# reason to conclude the diagnostics were broken.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS FIXED BY SAYING LESS, NOT BY LOOKING HARDER. The
# row could ask `inv.batt_fresh.stale` - it is on the same
# object at the same moment - but this loop also renders the
# grid and SoC rows, which have no gate, and a branch per row
# would be a second place where "why is this None" is decided.
# The gate already has a surface of its own: `stale_note()`
# rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below with the whole
# STALE_READING sentence in it, so the operator's discriminator
# is "is that row there?" and this row's job is only to stop
# pre-empting the answer. Same reason the wording is not shared
# with `freshness._grade()`: that one is a log line about a
# BEHAVIOUR, this one is a banner about an ENTITY.
out.append({"ok": False, "warn": False,
"text": f"{label}: {entity} is missing or not numeric"})
"text": f"{label}: no usable value this cycle from "
f"{entity} - and this row cannot tell which "
f"of two things that is: the entity is "
f"missing or not numeric, or it is "
f"publishing a number that this controller "
f"is withholding (a freshness gate does "
f"exactly that, and names itself in a row "
f"of its own). Confirm the entity in "
f"Developer Tools before replacing it"})
else:
out.append({"ok": True, "warn": False, "text": f"{label}: {entity} = {value:g}"})
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: GoodWe RS485 Controller
version: "0.10.0"
version: "0.10.1"
slug: goodwe_controller
description: >-
Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over RS485 by emulating its smart
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
{
"generated": "2026-09-21T11:30:00+02:00",
"card": "SAFETY-57",
"what": "The 2026-09-21 episode: a healthy 0x0518 declared stale, the site parked at 0 W, and no exit reachable from inside the state.",
"source": {
"host": "sniffer@192.168.2.167 (goodwe-sniff)",
"nature": "PASSIVE listener on the RS-485 pair between the ESP32 master and the GW5000S-BP. It has no address on the bus and writes nothing.",
"file": "~/bus-a.log",
"window_local": [
"2026-09-21T10:30:00+02:00",
"2026-09-21T11:10:00+02:00"
],
"timezone": "Europe/Brussels (the capture stamps a time of day and no date; the date is asserted here, not derivable from the file)",
"extraction": "lines whose time-of-day field lies in the window, verbatim, in capture order"
},
"file": {
"name": "bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz",
"sha256_gz": "876fdaaf6d087125b184bfb4dd7ef4c3d1dd71ccad0fc271f8d268e8b489d134",
"sha256_plain": "fa07e13b60e230626a8c0964b9539783a71b5627a522fc5930fd9fda54438a48",
"bytes_gz": 17181,
"bytes_plain": 182400,
"lines": 3840
},
"decoder": "tools/decode_bus_capture.py - and it is the ONLY interpretation of these bytes this repository carries. Re-run it to re-derive every number below.",
"frame_census": {
"lines": 3840,
"unparsed": 0,
"bad_crc": 0,
"requests": 720,
"responses": 720,
"writes": 1200,
"write_echoes": 1200,
"unknown": 0
},
"series": {
"setpoint_w": {
"frames": 1200,
"changes": 224,
"first_s": 37801.687,
"last_s": 40199.693
},
"batt_w": {
"frames": 240,
"changes": 133,
"first_s": 37804.716,
"last_s": 40194.724
},
"soc_pct": {
"frames": 240,
"changes": 4,
"first_s": 37806.725,
"last_s": 40196.732
}
},
"the_episode_in_the_capture": {
"10:51:24.736": "0x0518 reaches -3 W. The pack is at 11 %, the loop has just reversed out of -447 W of charge, and the BMS refuses the discharge.",
"10:51:29.695": "the setpoint reaches +1060 W of discharge - 800 W of travel from the command standing when the register last moved.",
"10:52:21.695": "the setpoint is written as 0 W and stays there. This is the add-on's own `inputs missing -> command 0 W`, on the wire.",
"10:51:24.736..11:05:34.734": "0x0518 does not change value. 850.0 s.",
"10:52:21.695..11:05:31.698": "the setpoint does not change value. 790.0 s.",
"~11:04": "a human restarts the add-on. NOT VISIBLE IN THIS FILE - it is an action on 192.168.2.158 - and it is the only reason the episode ends.",
"11:05:31.698": "the restarted loop commands -400 W of CHARGE, which the pack accepts at 11 %.",
"11:05:34.734": "0x0518 answers -137 W. The register was healthy throughout."
},
"not_in_this_file": [
"the grid meter - a P1 telegram on a different wire. The 2.4 kW of export during the episode is from Home Assistant history and is NOT re-derivable here.",
"anything the add-on believed: Inverter.batt, inputs_ok, log lines. Those are INFERRED by replaying the shipped modules against these series (test_freshness.py part 10).",
"the restart at ~11:04."
]
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""SAFETY-57 - turn a passive RS-485 capture into the three series the loop sees.
`python3 tools/decode_bus_capture.py scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-*.log.gz`
WHY THE RAW CAPTURE IS WHAT IS COMMITTED, AND NOT A DECODED TABLE. The other
scenario directories in this repository hold Home Assistant recorder exports -
a number per row, already interpreted. This one holds MODBUS FRAMES off the
wire, because the episode it records is one in which the add-on's own view and
the wire's disagree, and a decoded table would be this decoder's opinion with
the evidence thrown away. MUTATION.md habit 8: a committed transcript is a
check, and a check has to be re-derivable from something.
WHAT THE CAPTURE IS. `sniffer@192.168.2.167` is a passive listener on the
RS-485 pair between the ESP32 master and the GW5000S-BP. It writes nothing; it
has no address on the bus. Every line is one frame it heard:
a|10:51:29.695 ok F7 10 05 6E 00 02 04 00 03 04 24 ...
^ ^ ^ ^
| | | the frame, hex
| | CRC verdict as the capture tool computed it
| local wall clock, Europe/Brussels, no date - see `decode()`
bus label
THE FOUR FRAME SHAPES THIS FILE UNDERSTANDS, and it deliberately understands no
others - an unrecognised frame is COUNTED and dropped, never guessed at:
F7 03 <addr:2> <count:2> <crc:2> a read REQUEST
F7 03 <2*count> <data...> <crc:2> its response, matched to the request
immediately preceding it
F7 10 05 6E 00 02 04 <data:4> <crc:2> a write of the two EMS registers
F7 10 05 6E 00 02 <crc:2> the inverter's echo of that write
⚠️ THE SETPOINT IS A MODE AND A MAGNITUDE, NOT A SIGNED NUMBER, and getting
that backwards is the one way this decoder could quietly invert the whole
episode. `0x056E` is the EMS mode and `0x056F` the magnitude in watts,
unsigned. Mode 2 is charge and mode 3 is discharge, and that is READ OFF THIS
CAPTURE rather than off a datasheet: in the committed window, every
`mode 2, 2170 W` write is followed within one 10 s publish by an 0x0518
reading near **-2287 W**, and `mode 3, 1060 W` by a POSITIVE-side idle. The
add-on's own sign convention (`Inverter.standing_w()`, + = discharge) is
therefore `+magnitude` for mode 3 and `-magnitude` for mode 2, and
`test_freshness.py` part 10a grades that correspondence on the capture itself
rather than trusting this paragraph.
WHAT THIS DECODER CANNOT SEE, largest hole first (habit 13/16):
* **THE GRID METER.** It is not on this bus - it is a P1 telegram on a
different wire - so nothing here says what the site was importing or
exporting. The 2.4 kW export during the episode is from the operator's
Home Assistant history and is NOT re-derivable from this file.
* **WHAT THE ADD-ON BELIEVED.** The capture is the wire. It shows the
commands that arrived and the readings that were answered; it does not show
`Inverter.batt`, `inputs_ok`, or any log line. Everything about the add-on's
internal state in this episode is INFERRED by replaying the shipped modules
against these series, which is what part 10 does.
* **DATE AND YEAR.** The capture tool stamps a time of day and nothing else.
The date is supplied by the caller and is recorded in the scenario's
`manifest.json` beside the sha256 of the file it came from.
* **A FRAME THE CAPTURE TOOL SCORED BAD.** Lines whose CRC verdict is not
`ok` are counted and dropped. In the committed window there are none.
* **ANY OTHER REGISTER.** 0x0511 (a two-register read this master issues) is
recognised as a read and its values are returned untouched under its own
address; nothing here claims to know what it means.
"""
import gzip
import io
import re
import sys
# The registers this file will name. Anything else is returned by raw address.
REG_SETPOINT_MODE = 0x056E # written as a pair with 0x056F
REG_BATT_W = 0x0518 # S16, watts, + = discharge (SAFETY-37)
REG_SOC_PCT = 0x050E # U16, percent
MODE_CHARGE, MODE_DISCHARGE = 2, 3
_LINE = re.compile(r"^(\w+)\|(\d\d):(\d\d):(\d\d(?:\.\d+)?)\s+(\S+)\s+(.*)$")
def signed_setpoint_w(mode: int, magnitude: int) -> float:
"""The EMS pair as `Inverter.standing_w()` spells it: + = discharge.
⚠️ AN UNKNOWN MODE RAISES rather than defaulting. A default here would turn
a firmware that started using a third mode into a silently mis-signed
series, which is the failure this whole scenario is about one layer down.
"""
if mode == MODE_DISCHARGE:
return float(magnitude)
if mode == MODE_CHARGE:
return -float(magnitude)
raise ValueError(f"unknown EMS mode {mode} at 0x{REG_SETPOINT_MODE:04X}; "
f"this decoder knows {MODE_CHARGE} (charge) and "
f"{MODE_DISCHARGE} (discharge) only")
def _s16(v: int) -> int:
return v - 65536 if v >= 32768 else v
def decode(path):
"""Decode one capture file. Returns `(events, stats)`.
`events` is a list of `(t, kind, value)` in capture order, where `t` is
SECONDS SINCE LOCAL MIDNIGHT (the capture carries no date) and `kind` is
one of `"setpoint_w"`, `"batt_w"`, `"soc_pct"`, or `"reg_0xNNNN"`.
`stats` counts every line by what became of it, so a caller can assert that
the frames it cares about were actually present rather than that the parse
produced no error.
"""
opener = gzip.open if str(path).endswith(".gz") else io.open
events = []
stats = {"lines": 0, "unparsed": 0, "bad_crc": 0, "requests": 0,
"responses": 0, "writes": 0, "write_echoes": 0, "unknown": 0}
pending = None # the read request awaiting its response
with opener(path, "rt") as fh:
for line in fh:
line = line.strip()
if not line:
continue
stats["lines"] += 1
m = _LINE.match(line)
if not m:
stats["unparsed"] += 1
continue
_bus, hh, mm, ss, verdict, hexs = m.groups()
if verdict != "ok":
stats["bad_crc"] += 1
continue
t = int(hh) * 3600 + int(mm) * 60 + float(ss)
try:
b = [int(x, 16) for x in hexs.split()]
except ValueError:
stats["unparsed"] += 1
continue
# --- a read request: remember it so its response can be addressed
if len(b) == 8 and b[1] == 0x03:
pending = ((b[2] << 8) | b[3], (b[4] << 8) | b[5])
stats["requests"] += 1
continue
# --- a read response, addressed by the request before it
if (b[1] == 0x03 and pending is not None and len(b) >= 5
and b[2] == 2 * pending[1] and len(b) == b[2] + 5):
data = b[3:3 + b[2]]
regs = [(data[i] << 8) | data[i + 1]
for i in range(0, len(data), 2)]
addr = pending[0]
pending = None
stats["responses"] += 1
if addr == REG_BATT_W:
events.append((t, "batt_w", float(_s16(regs[0]))))
elif addr == REG_SOC_PCT:
events.append((t, "soc_pct", float(regs[0])))
else:
events.append((t, f"reg_0x{addr:04X}", tuple(regs)))
continue
# --- a write of the EMS pair
if (len(b) > 8 and b[1] == 0x10 and b[2] == 0x05 and b[3] == 0x6E
and b[6] == 4):
data = b[7:11]
mode = (data[0] << 8) | data[1]
mag = (data[2] << 8) | data[3]
events.append((t, "setpoint_w", signed_setpoint_w(mode, mag)))
stats["writes"] += 1
continue
if len(b) == 8 and b[1] == 0x10:
stats["write_echoes"] += 1
continue
stats["unknown"] += 1
return events, stats
def series(events, kind):
"""`[(t, value)]` for one kind, in capture order."""
return [(t, v) for t, k, v in events if k == kind]
def held_at(rows, t):
"""The last value at or before `t`, or None before the first row.
This is how the add-on sees an entity: Home Assistant answers with whatever
the publisher last put there, and a value that has not been re-published is
still the value. See `freshness.py` on why that is the whole problem.
"""
out = None
for ts, v in rows:
if ts > t:
break
out = v
return out
def _hms(t):
return f"{int(t // 3600):02d}:{int(t % 3600 // 60):02d}:{t % 60:06.3f}"
def main(argv):
if len(argv) != 2:
print(__doc__.splitlines()[2].strip())
return 2
events, stats = decode(argv[1])
print(f"== {argv[1]}")
for k, v in stats.items():
print(f" {k:14} {v}")
for kind in ("setpoint_w", "batt_w", "soc_pct"):
rows = series(events, kind)
if not rows:
continue
changes = [r for i, r in enumerate(rows)
if i == 0 or r[1] != rows[i - 1][1]]
print(f"== {kind}: {len(rows)} frames, {len(changes)} changes, "
f"{_hms(rows[0][0])} .. {_hms(rows[-1][0])}")
for t, v in changes:
print(f" {_hms(t)} {v:+10.1f}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main(sys.argv))
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
"""SAFETY-56's behaviour-invariance instrument. `tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py`
SAFETY-56 rewrote three operator-facing sentences and nothing else. This is what
says so: it drives a fixed stimulus set through the SHIPPED modules and prints
two documents -
`behaviour` every verdict, every `reading()`, every `releases`, every
`inputs_ok` and every readiness row's (ok, warn). NO SENTENCE
REACHES IT, so a tree whose only change is wording must produce
this document byte for byte.
`sentences` the four operator-facing surfaces, from the same stimulus.
Run it in two trees and compare:
python3 tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py > /tmp/after.json
python3 tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py --compare /tmp/before.json /tmp/after.json
⚠️ THE CONTROL IS PART OF THE TOOL AND NOT A SEPARATE STEP, WHICH IS MUTATION.md
HABIT 4 IN AN INSTRUMENT. `--compare` REFUSES to report "behaviour unchanged"
unless the `sentences` halves DIFFER. Without that, comparing a tree with itself
- which this card's first run did, by archiving a branch whose edits were not
committed yet - gives a perfect result that means nothing. An identity is
evidence only when the two sides could have differed, and ARCH-02's rehearsal
harness is the worked example of what happens when nobody checks.
⚠️ IT GRADES BEHAVIOUR, NEVER WORDING. Two trees that agree here can still print
different sentences - that is the point. `test_freshness.py` part 11 grades the
sentences themselves.
⚠️ WHAT IT CANNOT SEE, with shapes (habit 13): anything outside `freshness.py`'s
verdict, `_read_unit()`'s gating and `checks()`'s rows; a roster of more than
one; the MQTT and ingress surfaces; and wall-clock behaviour, since every clock
here is the caller's monotonic argument. It is a pin on the three things this
card is forbidden to move, not a full behavioural equivalence.
⚠️ PURGE BEFORE USE on a tree you have just edited. `tools/mutation_run.sh`
does, and MUTATION.md says why `python3 -B` alone does not.
"""
import asyncio
import hashlib
import importlib.util
import json
import logging
import sys
from pathlib import Path
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent # the add-on directory
sys.path.insert(0, str(HERE))
BOUNDS = Freshness = Controller = DEFAULTS = None
def _load():
"""The add-on's modules, imported LAZILY so that `--compare` runs anywhere.
⚠️ NOT A STYLE CHOICE. `--compare` is the half a reviewer runs on a laptop,
against two JSON files, in a directory that has no `app/` in it - and a
top-level import would make the comparison impossible exactly where it is
most useful.
"""
global BOUNDS, Freshness, Controller, DEFAULTS
from app.freshness import BOUNDS, Freshness # noqa: E402,F401
from app.main import Controller # noqa: E402,F401
from app.store import DEFAULTS # noqa: E402,F401
A = 5000.0
ONE = dict(meter_source="off", meter_entity="sensor.grid",
setpoint_entity="number.sp_a", soc_entity="sensor.soc_a",
batt_entity="sensor.batt_a", max_w=A, gain=0.6, slew_w=0,
deadband_w=15, target_grid_w=0, step_w=10, heartbeat_s=10,
stale_input_s=15, inverters=[], bms_soc_floor=10)
class MemStore:
def __init__(self, d=None):
self.data = dict(DEFAULTS, **(d or {}))
def set(self, k, v):
self.data[k] = v
def get_time(self, *a):
return None
def set_time(self, *a):
pass
class Pub:
enabled = False
def publish(self, *a, **k):
pass
def close(self):
pass
class Hass:
def __init__(self, numbers=None, limits=None):
self.numbers = dict(numbers or {})
self.limits_by = dict(limits or {})
self.served = []
self.writes = []
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
v = self.numbers.get(entity)
self.served.append((entity, v))
return None if v is None else (-v if invert else v)
async def limits(self, entity):
return self.limits_by.get(entity, (None, None, None))
async def set_number(self, entity, value):
self.writes.append((entity, value))
return True
async def call(self, domain, service, data):
return True
def one_site(soc=50.0):
hass = Hass({"sensor.grid": 0.0, "sensor.soc_a": soc,
"sensor.batt_a": -1200.0},
{"number.sp_a": (-A, A, 1.0)})
c = Controller(dict(ONE), hass, MemStore(), Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.inverters[0].dev_min, c.inverters[0].dev_max = -A, A
return c, hass
async def _world(name, soc, reg_of, cmd_of, n):
c, hass = one_site(soc)
seen = []
for t in range(n):
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = reg_of(t)
c.inverters[0].last_write = cmd_of(t)
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=float(t))
seen.append([c.inverters[0].batt, c.inputs_ok,
c.inverters[0].batt_fresh.stale])
return {"name": name, "reads": seen,
"rows": [[r["ok"], r["warn"]] for r in c.checks()],
"n_rows": len(c.checks()), "events": len(c.events),
"inputs_bad": c.inputs_bad_since is not None,
"releases": [i.batt_fresh.releases for i in c.inverters]}
# The command and register schedules. Each of the conjunction's three terms is
# exercised alone and with the others, and the last two schedules take a verdict
# all the way through SAFETY-57's release and back into a re-trip.
CMDS = [lambda t: 0.0, lambda t: 1300.0, lambda t: -1200.0,
lambda t: 1300.0 if t >= 1 else -1200.0,
lambda t: 249.0 if t >= 1 else 0.0,
lambda t: 251.0 if t >= 1 else 0.0,
lambda t: 1300.0 if t < 40 else 0.0,
lambda t: 5.0 if t >= 1 else 1300.0,
lambda t: (t % 7) * 200.0 - 600.0,
lambda t: (-1200.0 if t < 1 else 1300.0) if t < 45 else (
0.0 if t < 90 else 1300.0),
lambda t: (-1200.0 if t < 1 else 1300.0) if t < 45 else 100.0]
REGS = [lambda t: -3.0, lambda t: -1200.0, lambda t: -1200.0 + (t % 3),
lambda t: None if t % 5 == 0 else -1200.0,
lambda t: 0.0, lambda t: float((t * 37) % 11) - 5.0]
WORLDS = [
("DEAD", 50.0, lambda t: -3.0, lambda t: 800.0 if t < 1 else 1600.0, 40),
("REFUSED", 11.0, lambda t: -3.0, lambda t: 800.0 if t < 1 else 1600.0, 40),
("ABSENT", 50.0, lambda t: None, lambda t: 0.0, 3),
("HEALTHY", 50.0, lambda t: -1200.0 + (t % 3),
lambda t: 1300.0 if t % 2 else -1200.0, 60),
("RELEASE", 50.0, lambda t: -1200.0,
lambda t: (-1200.0 if t < 1 else 1300.0) if t < 40 else 0.0, 60),
("RETRIP", 50.0, lambda t: -1200.0,
lambda t: (-1200.0 if t < 1 else 1300.0) if t < 40 else
(0.0 if t < 80 else 1300.0), 130),
]
def behaviour():
"""Everything this card is forbidden to move. No sentence may enter it."""
_load()
logging.disable(logging.CRITICAL)
out = {}
# 1. the committed live capture, read by read.
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
"_s56decode", HERE / "tools" / "decode_bus_capture.py")
dec = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(dec)
cap_file = (HERE / "scenarios" / "safety57-2026-09-21"
/ "bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz")
events, _census = dec.decode(cap_file)
sp, bt = dec.series(events, "setpoint_w"), dec.series(events, "batt_w")
f = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
t = float(int(max(sp[0][0], bt[0][0])) + 1)
t1 = int(min(sp[-1][0], bt[-1][0]))
cap = []
while t <= t1:
f.submit(dec.held_at(bt, t), dec.held_at(sp, t), t)
cap.append([t, f.stale, f.reading(), f.releases, f.held,
f.rested_since, f.graded_from, f.standing_at_grade,
f.released_at])
t += 1.0
out["capture_reads"] = len(cap)
out["capture_trace"] = hashlib.sha256(
json.dumps(cap, sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest()
out["capture_edges"] = [r[:4] for i, r in enumerate(cap)
if i == 0 or r[1] != cap[i - 1][1]]
# 2. the swept grid over the policy object.
sweep = []
for ci, cf in enumerate(CMDS):
for ri, rf in enumerate(REGS):
g = Freshness(BOUNDS["batt"])
row = []
for n in range(120):
g.submit(rf(n), cf(n), float(n))
row.append([g.stale, g.reading(), g.releases])
sweep.append([ci, ri, row])
out["sweep_cells"] = len(sweep)
out["sweep_trace"] = hashlib.sha256(
json.dumps(sweep, sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest()
out["sweep_stale_reads"] = sum(1 for _c, _r, row in sweep
for s, _v, _n in row if s)
out["sweep_missing_reads"] = sum(1 for _c, _r, row in sweep
for _s, v, _n in row if v is None)
out["sweep_releases"] = sum(row[-1][2] for _c, _r, row in sweep)
# 3. the shipped read path and every readiness row's verdict.
loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
out["worlds"] = [loop.run_until_complete(_world(*w)) for w in WORLDS]
loop.close()
return out
def sentences():
"""The four operator-facing surfaces, from the REFUSED world."""
_load()
recs = []
class _H(logging.Handler):
def emit(self, record):
recs.append(record.getMessage())
logging.disable(logging.NOTSET)
log = logging.getLogger("goodwe")
log.addHandler(_H())
log.setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
async def go():
c, hass = one_site(11.0)
for t in range(40):
hass.numbers["sensor.batt_a"] = -3.0
c.inverters[0].last_write = 800.0 if t < 1 else 1600.0
await c.read_inputs(now_mono=float(t))
return c
loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
c = loop.run_until_complete(go())
loop.close()
return {
"reason": c.inverters[0].batt_fresh.reason,
"log": [m for m in recs if "SAFETY-37" in m],
"stale_note": c.inverters[0].stale_note(),
"not_ready_row": [r["text"] for r in c.checks()
if r["text"].startswith("battery power")],
}
def compare(a_path, b_path):
a = json.loads(Path(a_path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
b = json.loads(Path(b_path).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
beh_same = a["behaviour"] == b["behaviour"]
sent_same = a["sentences"] == b["sentences"]
ha = hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(a["behaviour"], sort_keys=True).encode())
hb = hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(b["behaviour"], sort_keys=True).encode())
print(f"behaviour A {ha.hexdigest()}")
print(f"behaviour B {hb.hexdigest()}")
if sent_same:
# ⚠️ THE REFUSAL, AND IT IS THE POINT OF THE TOOL. Two runs whose
# sentences agree are either the same tree twice or a card that changed
# nothing an operator reads. Either way "behaviour unchanged" is not a
# result, and reporting it would be an identity measured against itself.
print("REFUSED: the `sentences` halves are IDENTICAL, so these two runs "
"cannot be evidence that behaviour survived a WORDING change - "
"they may be the same tree twice. Compare a tree against one "
"whose sentences differ.")
return 2
if not beh_same:
for k in sorted(set(a["behaviour"]) | set(b["behaviour"])):
if a["behaviour"].get(k) != b["behaviour"].get(k):
print(f"BEHAVIOUR MOVED at {k!r}")
return 1
print("OK: sentences differ, behaviour is byte-identical.")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) == 4 and sys.argv[1] == "--compare":
sys.exit(compare(sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3]))
print(json.dumps({"behaviour": behaviour(), "sentences": sentences()},
sort_keys=True, indent=1))