Compare commits

..
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
adminandClaude Opus 5 f0f7b30098 Merge release/1.0 (PKG-07) into UX-02
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m9s
release/1.0 moved twice while this branch was open. PKG-07 cut the 0.8.0
section and rewrote the head of CHANGELOG.md, which is the whole conflict.

Resolved by taking PKG-07's text for all three hunks and putting UX-02 back
under a NEW `## Unreleased` heading rather than into 0.8.0's contents table.
0.8.0 is a section somebody cut on purpose - PKG-07's own subject is "stop the
changelog calling shipped work unreleased" - and editing a cut record to slip
another card into it is the same defect from the other side.

⚠️ AND THE VERSION IS DELIBERATELY NOT BUMPED HERE. The right number depends on
whether 0.8.0's image has already been built and pulled, which this branch
cannot observe: if it has not, UX-02 belongs inside 0.8.0 before it ships; if it
has, it needs 0.8.1. The new section says so in those words rather than picking
one and being quietly wrong.

Nothing in this merge touches app/, the tests or config.yaml on this branch's
side; PKG-07's `version: "0.8.0"` comes across untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 20:31:05 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 e158174bd6 UX-02: the validator's refusals, next to the field, before the save
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m19s
The Configuration tab can only render types and ranges. `validate.py`'s most
useful refusals are CROSS-FIELD - two inverters naming one `setpoint_entity`, a
`maintenance_charge_w` above `max_w`, a flat `setpoint_entity` left set beside a
declared roster - and the Supervisor's UI has no way to express a rule spanning
two keys. Today the operator meets those as exit 78 in a log, after saving and
restarting. This puts them on the screen beside the field they name, before
anything is written.

WHAT IT ADDS
  app/configui.py     the field model, built from `GET /addons/self/info`'s own
                      `schema` + `translations`. No option key, no label, no
                      rule of its own. UX-01's `Group · ` label prefix becomes a
                      real section heading, in whichever language resolved.
  app/selfconfig.py   the Supervisor conversation and the write gate.
  app/config_page.py  the page. Its longest function decides which HTML input a
                      type deserves; it contains no rule.
  app/web.py          five routes. Still the only file a reviewer has to read to
                      answer "does anything here reach the inverter".

THE FOUR THINGS THAT COULD HURT SOMEBODY, AND HOW EACH IS HELD
  1. A blob the SHIPPED validator refuses is never written - not warned about,
     not written. An invalid blob plus a restart is exit 78, and the panel is
     gone with the add-on that serves it.
  2. A blob that moved underneath is refused, not clobbered. Read hands out a
     sha256 of the canonical blob, save hands it back, and the stored blob is
     re-read IMMEDIATELY BEFORE the write. This is SAFETY-28's discipline
     applied to configuration - "a blob reaches the Supervisor only if it was
     derived from the blob stored right now" - with the honest weakening stated
     in the decision record: a second writer is DETECTED, not made
     inexpressible.
  3. Every message is the validator's own, byte for byte. test_selfconfig.py
     part 6 inserts ONE new rule into a COPY of validate.py, hashes every file
     under app/ to show validate.py is the only one that differs, and serves the
     real /config/validate route out of that copy in a subprocess. The new
     sentence arrives, filed under the key it names.
  4. Nothing on the surface commands an inverter or clears a latch. Saving does
     not restart: applying costs a control interruption - the wind-down commands
     0 W on every inverter - so that is a separate, confirmed button that says
     so first.

MEASURED, NOT CITED (tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py, run against
Supervisor 2026.08.0's own code; it contacts nothing)
  - the three self-paths are permitted, and `/addons/self/info` is admitted by
    the `default` role too while `options` and `restart` rest on the bypass
    ALONE. The probe's first draft claimed the role admitted none of the three
    and went red.
  - `/addons/self/options/validate` is NOT reachable from inside an add-on, so
    the only validator this panel can call is ours - which is the one with the
    cross-field rules.
  - a POST that omits a key does not preserve it: the key reverts to
    config.yaml's default. Hence whole-blob read-modify-write.
  - the Configuration tab CAN be removed, and doing so drops 0-of-71 options
    through and takes the add-on down. The card said it could not be; it stays
    by decision, which is a better reason.

DOES NOT TOUCH config.yaml, main.py or any control path. UX-01 is a dependency,
not something this supersedes: its translations are where every label,
description and section heading on this page comes from, and the Configuration
tab is still the recovery surface. DECISIONS/UX-02-two-config-surfaces.md
records which surface is authoritative (neither: the stored blob is) and what
the second surface costs.

Also corrects a stale "70 options" in three prose spots to the 71 the probe
counts - config.yaml grew a key in SAFETY-42 and the sentences did not follow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 20:13:11 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 653874d6ee PKG-07: bump 0.7.0 -> 0.8.0, and stop the changelog calling shipped work unreleased
Six merges landed behind an unbumped 0.7.0 - CI-06, SAFETY-38, SAFETY-39,
SAFETY-37, SAFETY-13, SAFETY-42. PKG-06 recorded exactly this two days ago:
the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, so `ha apps update` against
an unchanged version is a silent no-op and the box keeps running the old tree.
Catching it a second time by hand is the argument for the automated check
PKG-06's follow-up still owes.

MINOR rather than patch because SAFETY-39 changed what an existing key MEANS.
`slew_w: 0` was "no limit" and is now "follow the rail", and validator rule 10
REFUSES an explicit `slew_w` above SLEW_RAIL_FRAC x the roster sum - about
555 W on a 5000 W install. A config that started fine can now be refused, which
is a compatibility break whatever the intent behind it.

⚠️ THE PRE-DEPLOY CHECK THIS IMPLIES IS NOT DONE, AND CANNOT BE DONE FROM HERE.
Whether the LIVE options survive rule 10 depends on the live `slew_w`, and the
add-on options blob is only reachable through the Supervisor API, which needs a
supervisor token this session does not have; the HA REST API does not expose it
and no entity carries it. What is on record is that `slew_w` was set to 400
against a 5000 W rail during the SAFETY-39 interim fix (DEPLOY-QUEUE.md), and
400 is below the ~555 ceiling - but that is a written record, not a reading, and
the value has been edited by hand since. Read the options and run the validator
against them BEFORE `ha apps update`. A refused config is exit 78, and exit 78
takes the ingress panel with it.

What was read from the live system, 2026-09-06: controller_status `running`,
setpoint 860 W against inverter AC power 842 W, watchdog_tripped `off`,
failsafe_cause `none`, p1_sample_age 2.6 s. The install is healthy going in.

Separately, `## Unreleased` was a lie, twice. Two headings - one spanning ~3000
lines across three releases, one from the 0.4.x era - and every word under both
is shipped and running. Retitled, not re-sorted; the split is PKG-08.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 19:46:09 +02:00
401 changed files with 4692 additions and 113801 deletions
-125
View File
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# CI-15: run the add-on's test_*.py files, in parallel, inside the CI container.
# Called by the step "the add-on's own tests" of .gitea/workflows/checks.yml as
# sh -eu /w/goodwe-addon/.gitea/ci/run-tests.sh
# and runnable the same way from a clone (see TESTS_DIR below).
#
# WHY: the serial loop ran past the runner's 60-minute limit (SAFETY-125: 85 files,
# 3 557 s of test time, run 1430 cut off at file 84). The host has 12 cores.
#
# SHAPE
# 1. A parallel batch: JOBS files at a time (xargs -P), longest first.
# 2. THEN the serial group, one at a time, after the batch has finished, so
# each runs on a machine with nothing else of ours on it.
# Every file writes to its own $RUN_DIR/<file>.out (there is no shared output
# file) and prints its result as ONE block under a lock, so the PASS/FAIL
# lines and the `CI: ` / tail -40 text of two files never interleave.
#
# THE FILE LIST IS STILL DERIVED FROM THE TREE (see checks.yml). The two typed
# lists below only SORT or SET ASIDE files that exist; a new test_*.py that is
# in neither list is run, in the parallel batch. A name that no longer exists
# in a list is harmless. Nothing can make a file silently not run.
#
# SERIAL GROUP: files whose assertions depend on the wall clock, so CPU load
# from siblings could flip them. Name and reason, one each:
# test_loop.py drives the real run_control() against a real wall-clock
# floor (~93 s on purpose); worst inter-cycle gap 3.0 s
# against a 4.5 s bound (TEST-30, CI-06).
# test_freeze.py part 3 runs the real sim/hwsim.py over a transport with a
# 16 s window, a 10 s hold and an alarm measured at 11.0 s:
# one poll of margin, and "failed 1 run in 3" on the rig
# transport (TEST-30, CI-06).
# test_safety87.py builds a controller (CH65) whose meter reading is stamped
# on the REAL clock, and section 8 asks its status page,
# which says "Not ready - Meter: no reading for N seconds,
# limit 30 seconds" once N passes 30. Measured by CI-15: N is
# about half the file's run time (N = 45 s in a 94 s run, 48 s
# in a 103 s run). The file takes ~25 s idle and took 45 s in
# CI's first parallel run, so N was ~20 s of the 30. It FAILED
# alone under --cpus 0.15 (94 s) and in a loaded parallel run
# (103 s). No test file is changed here, so it runs alone.
# Add a file here only with a measured reason, and say it in this list.
SERIAL="test_loop.py test_freeze.py test_safety87.py"
#
# LONGEST FIRST (SAFETY-125's CI run, job 2580; then a local parallel run, seconds:
# modes_p4 758, safety126 634 (SAFETY-126, local, one core), safety125 508 on hotfix-0.19.2 only, modes_p3 364, safety119 328,
# price_run_fixes 184, safety90 160, safety103 134, safety94 114, peakguard 113,
# opt20 102, safety97 101, safety81 100). With JOBS workers pulling from one
# queue, starting the longest files first keeps the tail short: the batch takes
# about as long as the longest file. A sort order, not a selection.
HEAVY="test_modes_p4.py test_safety126.py test_safety125.py test_modes_p3.py test_safety119.py test_price_run_fixes.py test_safety90.py test_safety103.py test_safety94.py test_peakguard.py test_opt20.py test_safety97.py test_safety81.py"
#
JOBS=${CI_JOBS:-6}
cd "${TESTS_DIR:-/w/goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller}"
# one FILE: run it, keep its output in its own file, print its block whole.
if [ "${1:-}" = "--one" ]; then
f=$2
o="$RUN_DIR/$f.out"
start=$(date +%s)
if python3 "$f" > "$o" 2>&1; then rc=0; else rc=1; fi
secs=$(( $(date +%s) - start ))
{
if [ $rc = 0 ]; then
echo "PASS $f (${secs}s)"
grep "^CI: " "$o" || true
else
echo "FAIL $f (${secs}s)"
tail -40 "$o"
fi
} > "$RUN_DIR/$f.blk"
echo $rc > "$RUN_DIR/$f.rc"
flock "$RUN_DIR/print.lock" cat "$RUN_DIR/$f.blk"
exit 0
fi
set -- test_*.py
if [ "$1" = "test_*.py" ]; then
echo "NO test_*.py FOUND - the mount is empty or the layout moved. NOTHING has been checked."
exit 1
fi
echo "$# test file(s) to run: $JOBS at a time, then the serial group"
RUN_DIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/ci-tests.XXXXXX)
export RUN_DIR
: > "$RUN_DIR/par"
: > "$RUN_DIR/ser"
for f in $HEAVY; do
case " $SERIAL " in *" $f "*) continue ;; esac
if [ -f "$f" ]; then echo "$f" >> "$RUN_DIR/par"; fi
done
for f in "$@"; do
case " $SERIAL $HEAVY " in *" $f "*) continue ;; esac
echo "$f" >> "$RUN_DIR/par"
done
for f in $SERIAL; do
if [ -f "$f" ]; then echo "$f" >> "$RUN_DIR/ser"; fi
done
echo "parallel: $(wc -l < "$RUN_DIR/par") file(s); serial: $(wc -l < "$RUN_DIR/ser") file(s)"
t0=$(date +%s)
rc=0
# `exit 0` in the worker: a failing FILE is recorded in its .rc, so a non-zero
# from xargs itself means the machinery broke, which is a failure too.
xargs -n 1 -P "$JOBS" sh -eu "$0" --one < "$RUN_DIR/par" || rc=1
echo "parallel batch done in $(( $(date +%s) - t0 ))s; serial group next"
while read -r f; do
sh -eu "$0" --one "$f" || rc=1
done < "$RUN_DIR/ser"
# Every file that was meant to run has a verdict, and every verdict is PASS. A
# worker that died before writing its .rc leaves no file, which counts as a fail.
ran=0
bad=0
for f in "$@"; do
ran=$((ran + 1))
if [ ! -f "$RUN_DIR/$f.rc" ]; then
echo "FAIL $f (no result: the run never reported)"
bad=$((bad + 1))
elif [ "$(cat "$RUN_DIR/$f.rc")" != 0 ]; then
bad=$((bad + 1))
fi
done
echo "$ran file(s), $bad failed, $(( $(date +%s) - t0 ))s wall"
if [ "$bad" = 0 ] && [ "$rc" = 0 ]; then exit 0; fi
exit 1
-2
View File
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
# The admin/goodwe commit CI tests against. Bump: set to the full SHA of admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD (README.md, "CI and the infra pin").
3b4ff84757f9c2c5b63a4b4a53e593ccaeafb847
+39 -315
View File
@@ -3,35 +3,12 @@
# of real coverage including a wall-clock cadence test, and not one machine ever
# ran them. Every merge here was a human reading a diff.
#
# ⚠️ NO EVENT FILTER OF ANY KIND - NO `paths:`, AND SINCE CI-9 NO `branches:`
# EITHER - AND THAT ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on release/1.0
# requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Condition a STEP if you
# ⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING. Branch protection on
# release/1.0 requires the context `checks / unit (pull_request)`. Gitea leaves a
# required context it never receives PENDING forever, so the moment this workflow
# learns to sit a PR out, that PR becomes unmergeable. Condition a STEP if you
# must; never the workflow.
#
# ⚠️ CI-01 WROTE THE REASON DOWN WRONG, AND THE WRONG REASON WAS THE SAFE-
# SOUNDING ONE. It said an unreceived required context sits PENDING forever, so
# a sat-out pull request becomes unmergeable - annoying, but fail-safe. That is
# not what this Gitea does. MEASURED on Gitea 1.27.3, 2026-09-19, throwaway
# PR #94: when a workflow exists but its event filter does not match, Gitea does
# not stay silent. It POSTS the required context itself, with state `skipped`:
#
# GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/commits/<head sha>/statuses
# [{"status":"skipped","context":"checks / unit (pull_request)",
# "description":"Skipped","target_url":""}] <- no run, no job, no url
#
# GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/commits/<head sha>/status
# {"state":"success","total_count":1} <- the rollup LAUNDERS it
#
# and Gitea's merge gate accepts it. Same PR, same head sha, one status on it
# and that status a skip, POST .../pulls/94/merge answered 409 `head out of
# date` - the 409 being a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id` in the probe, i.e.
# the request had ALREADY CLEARED BRANCH PROTECTION. The control, a required
# context with no status at all, answered 405 `Not all required status checks
# successful`. So the true failure mode is the exact inverse of the one written
# here before: sitting a pull request out does not make it unmergeable, it makes
# it MERGEABLE WITHOUT EVER BEING TESTED, and the badge says success while it
# happens. Fail-open, not fail-closed. Do not reintroduce a filter here.
#
# ⚠️ THE RUNNER IS SHARED WITH THE OTHER REPO'S RIG. `goodwe-runner` on
# 192.168.2.147 carries the labels `self-hosted` and `goodwe-rig` and is
# registered `:host`, and it is the only runner there is - so this job wears the
@@ -46,116 +23,9 @@
# that step; a green from this workflow is a claim about content that can land.
name: checks
# ⚠️ CI-9: `pull_request:` TAKES NO `branches:` LIST, ON PURPOSE. It used to
# read `branches: [release/1.0, master]`, which meant a STACKED pull request -
# one whose base is another feature branch rather than a release branch - did
# not match, and so was skipped, laundered to `success`, and mergeable untested
# by the mechanism described at the top of this file.
#
# ⚠️ AND RETARGETING DID NOT REPAIR IT, WHICH IS WHAT MADE THIS P1. The skip is
# a COMMIT STATUS ON THE HEAD SHA, not a property of the pull request, so moving
# the base afterwards leaves it exactly where it was. Observed live on PR #93
# (2026-09-19): retargeted TEL-10 -> release/1.0, and the 10:05:00 `skipped`
# stayed attached to head a6af332 with the rollup still reading success. It was
# caught by a human who forced a real execution by reopening the pull request
# (run 799, 10:56). Reproduced deliberately on throwaway PR #94: retargeted onto
# a branch carrying a byte-identical copy of release/1.0's protection rule, and
# the single `skipped` status survived the retarget unchanged - no new run, no
# new status - and still cleared the gate.
#
# ⚠️ WHY NOT FIX THIS AT THE GATE INSTEAD, which would be the better place. It
# cannot be done. Gitea's branch protection cannot express "this context must be
# SUCCESS" as opposed to "this context must be PRESENT AND NOT FAILING". The
# whole of its status-check vocabulary is two fields - `enable_status_check`
# (bool) and `status_check_contexts` (a list of globs MATCHING CONTEXT NAMES) -
# confirmed against this server's own schema at /swagger.v1.json, definitions
# EditBranchProtectionOption and CreateBranchProtectionOption. There is no field
# for the required STATE anywhere in either. The success/skip comparison lives
# in Gitea's compiled code, so the only lever left is upstream of it: make sure
# the context is never a skip in the first place. Hence this block.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS COSTS, stated honestly, because it is a real trade. Every pull
# request now runs the full suite, including the intermediate steps of a stack
# that nobody intends to merge on its own. A run is ~8 minutes wall clock
# (run 799: 7m55s) on a runner that is `capacity: 1` and shared with the other
# repo's rig, so each extra run is ~8 minutes of slot that a rig campaign then
# queues behind.
#
# SCALE OF THE NEW WORK, re-derived from the API and stated with its denominator,
# because the first version of this paragraph had a made-up one. Counting the 93
# pull requests that predate this ticket (#1..#93; CI-9's own #94..#98 excluded,
# and note /pulls caps a page at 50, so this needs paging to see at all): 92 were
# opened against release/1.0 and would have run anyway, and exactly ONE was
# stacked - #2, TEL-01 -> SAFETY-04, closed unmerged, 2026-08-24. No pull request
# has ever targeted `master`, so half the old filter was dead from the start.
#
# ⚠️ THAT 92 IS AN UPPER BOUND, NOT A CENSUS, and the reason is this very bug.
# The API reports a pull request's CURRENT base, so one that was opened stacked
# and later retargeted is recorded against its final base and is invisible here.
# #93 is precisely that case - opened 2026-09-19T10:05:00 on TEL-10, retargeted,
# merged into release/1.0 at 11:05:26 the same morning, under three hours before
# CI-9 was opened - and it counts in the 92. So the true historical stacking rate
# is somewhere above 1/93, and unmeasurable from here.
#
# The bill is therefore small today and grows with however much stacking the team
# adopts. It is worth paying: the alternative is that the cheap case stays
# untested and indistinguishable from the tested one.
#
# ⚠️ THIS DOES NOT CHANGE GITEA'S ACCEPTANCE OF A `skipped` REQUIRED CONTEXT -
# that half is in its compiled code and is not reachable from this repository.
# The CONSEQUENCE, though, is very largely closeable from here, and is closed:
# after this edit there is nothing in this repository that produces a skip -
# there is exactly one workflow file, it now has no event filter of any kind,
# and the other candidate cause was MEASURED and is not one. The `guard the
# trigger` step below then keeps it that way mechanically rather than by asking
# the next editor to read this comment.
#
# ⚠️ READ THE BLIND SPOTS ON THAT STEP BEFORE TRUSTING THE SENTENCE ABOVE.
# "Mechanically" holds only for a reintroduced filter that still names the
# PR's own base. For blind spots 1 and 3 the defence IS this comment, because
# the guard lives inside the workflow that a filter makes Gitea skip. Blind
# spot 3 is the one that matters: a filter naming a branch THIS pull request
# does not target is itself skipped, lands green and untested, and then every
# subsequent pull request the filter DOES NOT NAME is skipped too. That is the
# gate off, silently.
#
# ⚠️ THAT DIRECTION IS THE WHOLE POINT AND IT IS EASY TO WRITE BACKWARDS. A
# pull request that MATCHES the filter still runs; it is the one the filter
# excludes that Gitea sits out, reports `skipped`, and the rollup launders
# into `success`. An earlier draft of this very clause said "matching it is
# skipped", which is the inverse of the measurement and contradicted the
# paragraph directly below.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE DANGEROUS ONE IS NOT `branches: [main]`, WHICH AT LEAST LOOKS
# WRONG. It is `branches: [release/1.0]`, which looks like tightening onto the
# protected branch and is what a careful person would write. Every day-to-day
# pull request still runs and still goes green, so nothing appears broken -
# and the only thing switched off is the `release/1.0` -> `master` release
# PR, i.e. the one whose content reaches an installed system. SEC-2 made that
# PR the mandated release path (docs/RELEASE.md), so this is now a live route
# rather than a hypothetical one.
#
# Closing it needs a SECOND permanently unfiltered workflow posting its own
# context, with that context added to the `status_check_contexts` of BOTH
# `release/1.0` AND `master` - both carry the rule since SEC-2, and adding it
# to one alone leaves the hole open on the other. A forge change, with the
# owner.
#
# THE MEASUREMENT, because the obvious guess is wrong and was nearly written
# here as fact. A skip-ci keyword in a commit message (`[skip ci]`, `[ci skip]`,
# `[no ci]`, `[skip actions]`, `[actions skip]`) does NOT behave like a filter
# miss. On throwaway PR #94, head b36effb, commit subject ending `[skip ci]`:
#
# .../commits/b36effb/statuses -> [] <- NO status, not a skip
# .../commits/b36effb/status -> {"state":"pending"} <- so the rollup is pending
# POST .../pulls/94/merge -> 405 Not all required status checks successful
#
# i.e. skip-ci is FAIL-CLOSED - it withholds the context entirely, which is the
# pending-forever behaviour CI-01's header wrongly attributed to a filter miss.
# It blocks the merge rather than laundering it, so it needs no fix and no
# app.ini change. Only the filter miss ever posted a `skipped`.
on:
pull_request:
branches: [release/1.0, master]
workflow_dispatch:
# ⚠️ NO `concurrency:` BLOCK, AND ITS ABSENCE IS AS LOAD-BEARING AS THE MISSING
@@ -209,7 +79,7 @@ on:
jobs:
unit:
runs-on: [self-hosted, goodwe-rig]
timeout-minutes: 40 # ~15 to run (CI-15: 6 files at a time; the serial suite was ~60 and hit the runner cap); the rest is margin for a busy host
timeout-minutes: 70 # ~4 to run; the rest is queueing for the single slot
env:
# ⚠️ UNDER /home/homelab, NOT $GITHUB_WORKSPACE (ENV-01, and re-measured
# during CI-01). act's workspace is `/root/.cache/act/<id>/hostexecutor`, a
@@ -286,9 +156,8 @@ jobs:
run: |
set -eu
rm -rf "$WS" && mkdir -p "$WS/goodwe-addon" && cd "$WS/goodwe-addon"
git init -q . && git remote add origin "$URL"
# Token as an env-set header: not in argv or .git/config (TOOL-9).
export GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN"
git init -q .
git remote add origin "$(echo "$URL" | sed "s#://#://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@#")"
if [ -n "$PRNUM" ]; then
# Two fetches, not one, so that a failure to reach either ref fails
# HERE with the ref in the message, rather than inside the merge
@@ -355,165 +224,6 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
# ⚠️ THE GUARD ON THE TRIGGER. THIS STEP EXISTS BECAUSE PROSE ALREADY
# FAILED IN THIS FILE, ONCE, FOR TWENTY DAYS.
#
# `git show 9c1a23328a` is CI-01's first commit. It shipped the header
# "⚠️ NO `paths:` FILTER, AND ITS ABSENCE IS LOAD-BEARING" and the line
# `branches: [release/1.0, master]` IN THE SAME COMMIT, EIGHTEEN LINES
# APART. The comment forbade one kind of event filter while the code
# directly above the job carried another, and nobody caught it through 84
# merges until the gate let a stacked pull request through. So the whole of
# CI-9's fix rests on an invariant - "checks.yml has no event filter" -
# that has already been silently violated in this exact file by the person
# who wrote the warning against violating it. A louder comment is not a
# remedy for that. A red step is.
#
# WHY THIS CAN WORK AT ALL, given CI-9 rejected the card's option 3 (a step
# that detects its own workflow having been skipped) as impossible. That
# option is impossible because a skipped workflow runs no steps, so there
# is nothing alive to notice. This is the different, tractable case: it
# fires on the pull request that REINTRODUCES a filter, and it does so
# whenever the filter being reintroduced STILL NAMES THAT PULL REQUEST'S
# OWN BASE - the ordinary case, because a filter put back by hand names
# the release branch people are actually targeting. The edit then has to
# get past this step before it can start causing skips. It is a ratchet,
# not a skip detector.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS THE HEAD'S WORKFLOW THAT DECIDES WHETHER ANYTHING RUNS, NOT
# THE BASE'S. An earlier draft of this comment claimed the reintroducing
# pull request "is still graded by the unfiltered workflow which is on the
# base today". That was wrong, it contradicted the checkout step's own note
# a few lines below, and the error was not cosmetic: it made this step
# sound like an unconditional ratchet, which is exactly the false comfort
# CI-9 exists to stamp out. MEASURED on PR #101 - head carrying a filter
# that excludes the base, base carrying the unfiltered workflow - and the
# result was no run at all, the context posted `skipped`, the rollup
# reading `success`, and the gate CLEARED (409). Gitea takes the workflow
# file from refs/pull/<n>/head, so a head that filters itself out is simply
# never graded, and nothing on the base can reach out and stop it. That is
# what blind spot 3 below is made of.
#
# WHAT IT INSPECTS is the MERGED tree in $WS - the content that would
# actually land on the base - not the branch tip and not the copy of this
# file that Gitea used to decide whether to run. Those are three different
# trees here (see the long note on the checkout step) and only the merged
# one is the thing being authorised.
#
# ⚠️ THREE ACKNOWLEDGED BLIND SPOTS. NOT ONE OF THEM IS CLOSEABLE FROM
# INSIDE THIS FILE, and the reason is the same in all three: each is a case
# where THIS WORKFLOW IS ITSELF THE THING THAT GETS SKIPPED, and a guard
# that lives inside a skipped workflow does not run. Closing them needs a
# SECOND, permanently unfiltered workflow whose own context is added to
# release/1.0's `status_check_contexts`, so that something survives to
# report when this file is sat out. That is a forge change and the
# repository owner's decision; it is being put to them separately and is
# deliberately NOT held as a blocker on CI-9.
#
# 1. A reintroduced `paths:` filter crafted to exclude the reintroducing
# pull request's OWN diff would skip that pull request, so this step
# would not run to object to it.
#
# 2. An edit that lands on a feature branch through a stacked pull
# request is graded by the HEAD's workflow, so a filter already
# present in the head hides the edit from this step - until that
# branch is proposed for release/1.0, where (unless it is case 3) the
# base matches the reintroduced filter and this step runs and bites.
# Caught at the release boundary, which is the boundary that matters.
#
# 3. ⚠️ THE WORST OF THE THREE, AND WORSE THAN BOTH OF THE OTHERS PUT
# TOGETHER: a reintroduced `branches:` filter that simply DOES NOT
# NAME THE BASE escapes this step entirely, because the pull request
# carrying it is itself skipped. It takes no craft and no malice to
# write - `branches: [main]` copied out of a GitHub template, or a
# tidy-up to `[master]`, a branch that NO pull request in this
# repository's history has ever targeted - and it arrives as a
# skipped, laundered, untested merge into release/1.0.
#
# What makes it categorically worse is what happens the moment after.
# Once that file is ON release/1.0, every subsequent pull request is
# graded against it and every one of them is skipped too. This is not
# the stacked case leaking through a crack; it is the gate off
# completely, for everything, silently, with every badge green. The
# only thing standing between the repository and that state today is
# a human reading this file - which is precisely the kind of defence
# this step exists because it has already failed once (9c1a23328a).
#
# It is deliberately a FAILURE and not a warning: a warning would leave
# the required context green, which is the precise defect CI-9 is about.
- name: guard the trigger - refuse a checks.yml that has regained an event filter
run: |
set -eu
f="$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/workflows/checks.yml"
test -f "$f" || { echo "checks.yml is missing from the merged tree."; exit 1; }
# Walk the top-level `on:` block of the MERGED file. Full-line comments
# at column 0 are skipped outright - this file's own prose quotes
# `paths:` and `branches:` many times and must not trip its own guard -
# and an inline `#` is trimmed from any line that is kept.
bad=$(awk '
function scan(t) {
sub(/#.*/, "", t)
if (t ~ /(^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])(branches|branches-ignore|paths|paths-ignore|tags|tags-ignore|types)[[:space:]]*:/)
return 1
return 0
}
/^[[:space:]]*#/ { next }
/^("on"|'"'"'on'"'"'|on)[[:space:]]*:/ {
inon = 1
rest = $0; sub(/^[^:]*:/, "", rest)
if (scan(rest)) print NR ": " $0
next
}
inon == 1 {
if ($0 ~ /^[[:space:]]*$/) next
if ($0 ~ /^[[:space:]]/) { if (scan($0)) print NR ": " $0; next }
inon = 0
}
' "$f")
if [ -n "$bad" ]; then
echo "REFUSED: checks.yml has regained an event filter in its \`on:\` block."
echo "$bad"
echo
echo " A filter means some pull request stops matching this workflow. Gitea does"
echo " not stay silent about a workflow it sits out - it posts the required context"
echo " \`checks / unit (pull_request)\` itself with state \`skipped\`, the combined"
echo " status rolls that up as \`success\`, and the merge gate ACCEPTS it. That is"
echo " CI-9: a pull request merged on a workflow that never ran a step. It was"
echo " reproduced by merging PR #96 for real through a protected branch."
echo
echo " Branch protection cannot save you here - it can require that a context is"
echo " PRESENT, never that it is SUCCESS - so the filter is the whole defence."
echo " If you genuinely need to narrow what runs, condition a STEP, never the"
echo " workflow. See the \`on:\` block's comments for the measurements."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: the \`on:\` block of the merged checks.yml carries no event filter."
# CI-12: the infra repo at the ONE pinned commit in .gitea/infra-pin (read
# from the merged tree), as the sibling test_freeze.py looks for. Any
# failure here fails the job; the tests step below refuses the stub.
- name: check out admin/goodwe at the pin in .gitea/infra-pin
env:
URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/admin/goodwe.git
# Read access to admin/goodwe only; this job's own token cannot see it.
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.INFRA_READ_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -eu
# `|| true`: under pipefail a missing or comment-only pin would skip the FAIL line (TOOL-9).
PIN=$(grep -v '^#' "$WS/goodwe-addon/.gitea/infra-pin" | tr -d '[:space:]') || true
echo "$PIN" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{40}$' || { echo "FAIL: .gitea/infra-pin holds '$PIN', not a full 40-hex SHA."; exit 1; }
test -n "$TOKEN" || { echo "FAIL: secret INFRA_READ_TOKEN is not available to this run (a fork PR?)."; exit 1; }
rm -rf "$WS/goodwe" && mkdir -p "$WS/goodwe" && cd "$WS/goodwe"
git init -q .
# The token goes in a header via env: not in argv, and not in .git/config,
# which is mounted into the tests' container and outlives a failed job.
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
git fetch -q "$URL" "$PIN" || { echo "FAIL: could not fetch admin/goodwe at $PIN."; exit 1; }
git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -qf FETCH_HEAD
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$PIN"
test -f sim/hwsim.py || { echo "FAIL: admin/goodwe@$PIN has no sim/hwsim.py."; exit 1; }
echo "infra: admin/goodwe @ $(git log --oneline -1)"
- name: build the test image (shipped deps, from apk - see .gitea/ci/Dockerfile)
run: |
set -eu
@@ -534,22 +244,16 @@ jobs:
# shorter timeout - a 60 s limit was tried during CI-01 and reported
# exactly the false hang the docstring predicts.
#
# ⚠️ CI-15: THE FILES RUN SIX AT A TIME, NOT ONE AFTER ANOTHER. The serial
# loop summed 3 557 s on SAFETY-125's run (job 2580) and ran past the
# runner's 60-minute cap. The loop now lives in .gitea/ci/run-tests.sh (it
# comes from the merged tree, like the Dockerfile), so the same script runs
# locally and here. It runs the longest files first, then the files whose
# assertions depend on the wall clock - test_loop.py and test_freeze.py
# (TEST-30 / CI-06) and test_safety87.py (CI-15) - ALONE, after the
# parallel batch, so no sibling can steal their CPU. The reasons are in
# the script. Its output stays one
# PASS/FAIL block per file, in a file per file (never one shared /tmp/out).
# A file that is not in the script's two typed lists still runs, in the
# parallel batch: the list is a sort order, not a selection.
#
# test_freeze.py part 3 runs against the real `sim/hwsim.py` from the
# checkout above; GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1 makes it fail rather than use its
# stub (CI-12). Lines a test prints with a `CI: ` prefix are echoed on PASS.
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS RUN DOES NOT COVER, stated because a pass here would
# otherwise over-claim. test_freeze.py's third section wants the infra
# repo's `sim/hwsim.py` to drive a real HTTP meter through the real
# transport. admin/goodwe is PRIVATE (checked via the API) and this
# workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN is minted for THIS repository only, so hwsim is
# absent here and `find_hwsim()` returns None. The rest of the file runs
# and passes. It does so SILENTLY - the file prints nothing to say the
# hwsim section was skipped - so "test_freeze.py: PASS" below is a weaker
# claim than it looks. That belongs to whoever owns test_freeze.py next;
# naming it here is the least this gate can do about it.
# ⚠️ PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 IS BELT AND BRACES, NOT A FIX FOR A LIVE
# HOLE. TEST-15 measured this runner's actual exposure and found none: the
# checkout below is bind mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter physically
@@ -565,7 +269,27 @@ jobs:
- name: the add-on's own tests
run: |
set -eu
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -e GOODWE_REQUIRE_HWSIM=1 -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu /w/goodwe-addon/.gitea/ci/run-tests.sh
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -v "$WS:/w:ro" goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -eu -c '
cd /w/goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller
set -- test_*.py
if [ "$1" = "test_*.py" ]; then
echo "NO test_*.py FOUND - the mount is empty or the layout moved. NOTHING has been checked."
exit 1
fi
echo "$# test file(s) to run"
rc=0
for f in "$@"; do
start=$(date +%s)
if python3 "$f" > /tmp/out 2>&1; then
echo "PASS $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
else
echo "FAIL $f ($(( $(date +%s) - start ))s)"
tail -40 /tmp/out
rc=1
fi
done
exit $rc
'
- name: clean up
if: always()
-46
View File
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
# CI-12: goes red when admin/goodwe release/1.0 has moved past .gitea/infra-pin.
# It runs on add-on activity only; admin/goodwe's own `addon-pin` workflow
# covers a move of release/1.0 there. Deliberately NOT a required check: it
# reports; `checks / unit` stays the only gate. How to bump: README.md,
# "CI and the infra pin".
name: infra-pin
on:
pull_request:
push:
branches: [release/1.0]
jobs:
fresh:
runs-on: [self-hosted, goodwe-rig]
timeout-minutes: 30 # seconds of work; the rest is queueing for the shared slot
steps:
- name: compare .gitea/infra-pin with admin/goodwe release/1.0
env:
SELF: ${{ github.server_url }}/${{ github.repository }}.git
INFRA: ${{ github.server_url }}/admin/goodwe.git
TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
INFRA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.INFRA_READ_TOKEN }} # admin/goodwe is private
run: |
set -eu
D=$(mktemp -d) && trap 'cd / && rm -rf "$D"' EXIT && cd "$D"
git init -q .
# The pin of the commit this event is about (the PR head, or the push).
# Token as an env-set header: not in argv or .git/config (TOOL-9).
GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $TOKEN" \
git fetch -q --depth 1 "$SELF" "$GITHUB_SHA" || { echo "FAIL: could not fetch $GITHUB_SHA here."; exit 1; }
# `|| true`: under the runner's pipefail a missing or comment-only pin
# would stop here on git's error instead of the FAIL line below (TOOL-9).
PIN=$(git show FETCH_HEAD:.gitea/infra-pin | grep -v '^#' | tr -d '[:space:]') || true
test -n "$PIN" || { echo "FAIL: .gitea/infra-pin is missing at $GITHUB_SHA, or holds only comments."; exit 1; }
test -n "$INFRA_TOKEN" || { echo "FAIL: secret INFRA_READ_TOKEN is not available to this run (a fork PR?)."; exit 1; }
# Header via env, as in checks.yml: the token stays out of argv.
HEAD=$(GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1 GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=http.extraHeader GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0="Authorization: token $INFRA_TOKEN" \
git ls-remote "$INFRA" refs/heads/release/1.0 | cut -f1) || true
test -n "$HEAD" || { echo "FAIL: could not read admin/goodwe release/1.0."; exit 1; }
if [ "$PIN" != "$HEAD" ]; then
echo "STALE: .gitea/infra-pin is $PIN but admin/goodwe release/1.0 is $HEAD."
echo " Test against $HEAD and bump the pin (README.md, \"CI and the infra pin\")."
exit 1
fi
echo "OK: .gitea/infra-pin $PIN is admin/goodwe release/1.0 HEAD."
+1 -6
View File
@@ -4,10 +4,6 @@ The guide technicians carry is the PDF:
**`docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf`** — 10 pages, A4, print it double-sided.
⚠️ **Outdated: the content is still v0.1.0.** The PDF was rebuilt on 2026-10-17
for the EMS-port wording and the `slew_w` row only. Where the guide disagrees with
`goodwe_controller/DOCS.md`, DOCS.md wins.
It covers, in the order the work is done: pre-visit checks, hardware, firmware,
add-on install and configuration, how to read the Web UI, the six commissioning
gates, the e-stop (and the statement a site without one must sign), proving a
@@ -22,8 +18,7 @@ copy cannot drift from the PDF someone is holding in a cellar.
python3 docs/build_guide.py # regenerates field-guide.html and the PDF
```
Requires Chrome or Chromium (used headless for print-to-PDF); `CHROME` in the
script is a Windows path, so edit it on any other machine. Screenshots live
Requires Chrome or Chromium (used headless for print-to-PDF). Screenshots live
in `docs/img/` and are base64-embedded, so `field-guide.html` is standalone.
⚠️ **Every section must stay under the A4 printable height** (1039 px at 96 dpi
+1 -1
View File
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ that looks hung gets deleted.
**A GoodWe "-20" / G2 inverter cannot be driven by this.**
Platform comes from characters 6–8 of the serial number. Only
`ESU EMU ESA BPS BPU EMJ IJL` — platform 105, the AA55-era generation — are
`ESU EMU ESA BPS BPU EMJ IJL` — platform 105, the AA55-era meter bus — are
supported. SBP G2 (`SPB`/`SPN`) and ES G2 (`ESN`/`ESC`) are platform 745, a
different protocol. The reference unit is `BPS`.
+8 -19
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# GoodWe RS485 Controller — Home Assistant add-on repository
Replaces a GoodWe battery inverter's vendor controller with a local one: holds
net grid exchange at zero by sending the inverter a grid reading over its RS485
EMS port, and runs the monthly battery maintenance cycle the vendor box was doing.
net grid exchange at zero by emulating the inverter's smart meter over RS485,
and runs the monthly battery maintenance cycle the vendor box was doing.
```
repository.yaml add-on repository metadata
@@ -30,11 +30,9 @@ goodwe_controller/ the add-on
returns, run against its own release image
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml ESPHome config for the T-CAN485
estop/rs485_log.py optional RS485 e-stop / bus witness
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4; rebuilt 2026-10-17, content still v0.1.0 and outdated)
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4)
docs/build_guide.py its single source - rebuilds the HTML and PDF
FIELD-GUIDE.md how to edit and rebuild the guide
docs/RELEASE.md how a change reaches the battery - `master` is
protected, releases go via PR from `release/1.0`
```
**Picking this up after a break? Read `HANDOVER.md` first** — current state,
@@ -50,9 +48,6 @@ https://gittea.kammenstraatha.duckdns.org/admin/goodwe-addon
then install **GoodWe RS485 Controller**.
Then turn on **Watchdog** on the add-on's Info tab — see
[Before you start](goodwe_controller/DOCS.md#before-you-start).
⚠️ **The repository must be PUBLIC for this to work.** Home Assistant clones it
anonymously; against a private repo the store shows nothing and gives no useful
error. If it must stay private, install locally instead: copy
@@ -82,8 +77,8 @@ machine itself dying:
2. **Wind-down before firmware updates** — 0 W written before the update starts.
3. **RS485 e-stop (optional)** — writes 0 W after 30 s of total bus silence.
Sites sold without the e-stop must have the client acknowledgement in the field
guide (Step 7b) signed.
Sites sold without the e-stop must have the acknowledgement in `FIELD-GUIDE.md`
§10 signed.
## Development
@@ -105,12 +100,6 @@ has the mechanism, the measurement, and what the flags do not do. They are not u
each assertion corresponds to a rule whose absence produced an observed failure
on real hardware, and the comments in `control.py` say which.
### CI and the infra pin
CI (`.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`) runs every `test_*.py` (six at a time, the wall-clock ones alone afterwards: `.gitea/ci/run-tests.sh`), with `admin/goodwe` checked out next to this repo at the commit in `.gitea/infra-pin`, so `test_freeze.py` grades against the real `sim/hwsim.py`. If that checkout fails, the job fails. The local stub is used only in local runs, and it prints `STUB USED` when it is.
The pin tracks `admin/goodwe` **release/1.0**, not master. Two non-required checks go red when release/1.0 has moved past the pin: `infra-pin / fresh` here, on any add-on PR or push to release/1.0, and `addon-pin / fresh` in `admin/goodwe`, on every push to its release/1.0. Nothing re-runs `addon-pin` after a bump, so it stays red on that admin/goodwe commit; `infra-pin / fresh` green on the bump is the all-clear.
**Bump the pin** whenever either is red. Set `.gitea/infra-pin` to the new release/1.0 SHA (`git ls-remote <gitea>/admin/goodwe.git refs/heads/release/1.0`) in a PR, and let `checks / unit` grade the tests against it. CI reads `admin/goodwe` with the Actions secret `INFRA_READ_TOKEN`.
## Compatibility
**Check the serial number, not the model name.** Characters 6-8 of the serial are
@@ -118,17 +107,17 @@ the platform tag:
| tag | platform | verdict |
|---|---|---|
| `ESU EMU ESA BPS BPU EMJ IJL` | 105 — ES/EM/BP, AA55-era | **supported** |
| `ESU EMU ESA BPS BPU EMJ IJL` | 105 — ES/EM/BP, AA55-era meter bus | **supported** |
| `SPB SPN` | 745 — SBP **G2** (`GW…-SBP-20`) | no |
| `ESN ESC` | 745 — ES **G2** (`GW…-ES-20`) | no |
| `ETU EHU BTU …` | 205/745/753 — ET/EH/BT hybrids | no |
| `SDT DST MSU NSU …` | PV-only inverters — no battery to control | no |
A "-20" or "G2" suffix means a different platform with a different
A "-20" or "G2" suffix means a different platform with a different meter
protocol. The tags come from the `goodwe` library's `PLATFORM_105_MODELS`, which
is also what Home Assistant's own integration uses to pick a protocol.
- GoodWe **ES / BP family** inverters (AA55 generation)
- GoodWe **ES / BP family** inverters (AA55 / RS485 meter-bus generation)
- The protocol is **reverse-engineered**. There is no vendor contract, and a
firmware change on GoodWe's side could break every installation at once. Say
so when you sell it.
-64
View File
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
# STYLE.md - how user-facing text is written (UX-08)
This applies to everything a home owner or installer reads: notifications, phone pushes, the add-on page, refusals, add-on log lines at WARNING and above, and the names and descriptions of options. It is enforced by `goodwe_controller/test_messages.py`. Its allowlist is empty since phase 2d and its cap is 0: a new string that breaks the rule fails the test.
## 1. Shape
- **Title**: at most 5 everyday words. It says what is wrong ("Meter reading may be stuck"). No "GoodWe:" prefix, no full stop.
- **Body**: **one sentence** of at most 25 words, saying what happened and what to do. A **red alarm** may use up to **3 sentences** (70 words, each sentence at most 30 words), so that no action a person must take is lost.
- **Details**: the last line links to the add-on documentation and names the section with the rest: `Details: add-on documentation, section "<title>" under Notifications.` Background, figures, reason codes and history go there or into the log, never into the body.
- **Status row**: one sentence of at most 15 words. A **red** row may use up to 3 sentences (30 words), like a red alarm. It shows the live numbers the reader acts on and never an HA entity id. **Banner**: at most 12 words. **Refusal**: at most 30 words, naming the setting by its label and then its key, as `messages.setting()` writes it: “Inverter rating” (max_w), or “Inverter rating” for inverter-b (inverters.max_w) for one inverter in the list. **Option name**: at most 6 words, not counting the group prefix. **Option description**: at most 30 words. Where a value comes from belongs in DOCS.md.
- **Plan line** (UX-13 Home screen: the plan, tooltips, a battery's "now" line): at most 2 sentences, each at most 12 words. Words in `app/ui_text/<lang>.json` under `home_words`, built by `app/homeview.py`, checked by `test_messages.py` part 8. The page's own words, English and Dutch, are checked by `test_ui_text.py`.
- **Log line** (WARNING/ERROR): one line of at most 25 words **as logged**, with any built text filled in. Log lines stay in English and are not translated. A line that reports a safety reason gives one plain sentence and the reason's code (`STALE_READING`, `OUTPUT_CLAMP`), the evidence an installer searches for. The reason itself, with its figures and limits, goes on a DEBUG line right after it and into the action log, never onto the WARNING/ERROR line. It keeps the shape of a red alarm: at most 3 sentences of at most 30 words. The line as logged has no semicolon, banned word, capitals, "1 times" or "(s)". `test_messages.py` part 6 builds every such text with the real code and checks it, and lists the few non-safety families still over 25 words. A line that repeats every cycle is DEBUG. INFO lines carry no section numbers, ISO timestamps or capitals.
- **Refusal length is counted as shown**: a setting placeholder counts as its label and key, and the long cases are driven through the validator (`test_messages.py` part 3).
- **Event line** under the buttons: the plain words of `messages.hint()`, like a green row. The add-on's own action log stays technical and is not shown on the page. Installers read it as `events` in the `status` JSON.
- **Sentences**: one idea each, active voice, present tense, with nothing nested in brackets and no semicolons (a semicolon is a second sentence in disguise). These translate well into Dutch and French.
## 2. Numbers
Use a number only if it helps the reader act, for example the peak limit, or what was asked and what was sent in a fault report. Write it the way `app/messages.py` does: `5 000 W`, `20 %`, `10 minutes`, `14:05`.
## 3. Severity
Severity is shown by the title and the colour, never by CAPITALS or by words like "BUG SIGNAL".
| Level | Colour | When |
|---|---|---|
| alarm | red | Control stopped, money or energy lost now, a fault, or a person must act now. Up to 3 sentences. |
| warning | orange | Control is still running, but something needs a look. 1 sentence. |
| info | grey | No action needed. 1 sentence. |
| resolved | green | An earlier alarm or warning has cleared. 1 sentence. |
A rewrite never changes an alarm's severity, `notification_id` or cadence.
## 4. Words - the same word for the same thing everywhere
A setting is named by its label in `translations/en.yaml`, in quotes when it sits mid-sentence (“Inverter rating”). The words below match those labels. If a label changes, change it here and in `app/messages.py` in the same change.
| Say | Not |
|---|---|
| the add-on (who decides), control (what it does: "start control", "Control: last ran …") | controller, loop, planner |
| battery | pack, BMS pack |
| inverter, or its name | unit, device, actuator |
| meter | P1 feed, telegram |
| peak limit / this month's peak | ceiling, capaciteitstarief, billed quarter |
| 15-minute period | quarter |
| battery level (setting: “Battery level entity”) | SoC, state of charge, charge level |
| battery cut-out level, or cut-out level next to "battery" (setting: “Battery cut-out level”) | BMS floor, `bms_soc_floor` |
| peak reserve (setting: “Peak reserve”) | `peak_soc_floor`, EMS floor, "peak guard will not discharge below" |
| “Inverter rating” (the setting) | `max_w`, rail, inverter rating as a fact about the hardware |
| solar production, solar entity (settings: “Solar production entity”, “Solar production entities, per inverter”, “Reversed-sign solar entities”) | PV, reversed-sign list, single sensor setting |
| “Where the meter reading comes from” | meter source |
| “Grid power entity”; entity for any Home Assistant sensor a setting points at | grid power sensor, sensor setting |
| draw the battery down, give power | discharge, discharging |
| control is stopped / every inverter is set to 0 W | failsafe, trip, latch, parked |
| safety stop (a stop that only starting control clears) | failsafe latch |
| software fault | BUG SIGNAL |
| control board | master, ESP32 |
| power request, what the add-on asks | command, setpoint (on the page) |
| the power went the wrong way | sign disagreement, command and meter point opposite ways |
| check for inverters working against each other | circulating power check |
| month peak, 15-minute periods measured | billed quarter, banked, soft limit, open block |
| shadow mode | a mode that makes every decision but commands 0 W. The name is kept. In shadow mode a text says what the add-on **would** send, never that it sent it. |
**Banned in titles and bodies** (the test fails on them): SAFETY-/TARIFF-/TEL-/CFG-/FW-/HW-nn and other card ids, integrator, anti-windup, windup, clamp, clamped, saturated, BUG SIGNAL, latch, latched, arbiter, allocator, register, `0x…`, layer 1/2/3, heartbeat, watchdog, telegram, ACK, CRC, OTA, Modbus, planner, `§n`, file names, IP addresses, option keys in snake_case, **HA entity ids**, and runs of 2 or more CAPITALISED words.
HA entity ids are allowed only in refusals and validator messages, where the installer has to find that entity. They are never allowed in alarms or status rows.
**Glossary.** DOCS.md "Words used on this page" explains, once, the words a home owner meets without context: control board, isolator, Developer Tools, shadow mode, safety stop, peak limit, peak guard, peak reserve and cut-out level. A home-owner text may use them without explaining them again. Card ids stay out of DOCS.md headings: they go on a *For installers* line under the heading.
Binary file not shown.
-116
View File
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
# Releasing — how a change reaches the battery
`master` is the **default branch**, and the default branch is what the Home
Assistant Supervisor clones when it installs or updates this add-on. Whatever
sits on `master` is what runs on a real 5 kW inverter. Treat a push to `master`
as a deployment, because that is what it is.
---
## 1. `master` is protected — releases go through a pull request
Until 2026-09-23 `master` had **no protection of any kind**. Every gate this
repo built (CI-01, CI-9) sat on `release/1.0`, the branch that does *not* ship.
On 2026-09-22 version 0.10.1 went straight onto `master` — no pull request, no
CI run, no reviewer — and it succeeded (commit `0f14c2a`, the only commit on
`master` that carries no `(#NN)` merge suffix). SEC-2 closed that.
**The release path is now:**
1. Merge the work into `release/1.0` as usual, via a pull request that goes
green. Bump `version:` in `goodwe_controller/config.yaml` on that branch —
the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`, so without a bump nothing
is offered and nothing changes.
2. Open a pull request **`release/1.0` → `master`**. Do not push to `master`;
it will be refused by the pre-receive hook:
```
remote: error: Not allowed to push to protected branch master
! [remote rejected] ... (pre-receive hook declined)
```
3. Wait for `checks / unit (pull_request)` to go **green** on that pull request.
The workflow in `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` carries **no `branches:`
filter**, so a `master` base matches and a real run happens — verified on
throwaway PR #107 (base `master`), which queued a genuine run.
⚠️ Green means green. A `skipped` status is laundered into a `success`
rollup by this Gitea and the merge gate accepts it — see the long note at
the top of `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml`. Never add an event filter there.
4. Merge the pull request. `required_approvals` is **0**, so a green check is
the whole gate; there is no second pair of eyes unless someone asks for one.
5. **Reload the store.** Merging to `master` does not, by itself, offer the
update. The Supervisor only sees the new version after:
```bash
ssh root@192.168.2.158 "ha store reload && ha addons update local_goodwe_controller"
```
Until `ha store reload` runs, the add-on page still shows the old version
and the release looks like it did nothing.
Note that `release/1.0` is normally an *ancestor* of `master` between releases,
so a `release/1.0 → master` pull request is empty until new commits land on
`release/1.0`. That is expected; it means there is nothing to release yet.
---
## 2. Branch protection — before and after SEC-2
Forge is Gitea at `192.168.2.147:3000`, repo `admin/goodwe-addon`. Read it back
with `GET /api/v1/repos/admin/goodwe-addon/branch_protections`.
**Before (2026-09-23):**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | **no rule at all** | — | — | — |
| `release/1.0` | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
**After:**
| branch | protected | status check required | context | approvals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `master` (default) | yes | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
| `release/1.0` | yes (unchanged) | yes | `checks / unit (pull_request)` | 0 |
Both rules are otherwise identical: `enable_push: false`,
`enable_force_push: false`, `block_admin_merge_override: true`, no whitelists,
no file patterns. `required_approvals` stays at **0** on purpose — raising it
would block the review agent from merging, and nobody asked for it.
The default branch was **not** changed. Changing it would change what the
Supervisor clones, which is a different decision from this one.
### How the gate was proven to actually bite
A protection rule on this forge can *appear* satisfied while having checked
nothing, so the rule was tested rather than trusted. The discriminator is a
merge `POST` carrying a deliberately wrong `head_commit_id`: Gitea evaluates
branch protection *before* it checks the head, so
* `409 head out of date` → the request **cleared** protection;
* `405 Not all required status checks successful` → protection **refused** it.
Read the *message*, not just the code: `405` is also returned as
`Please try again later` for a pull request with **no commits**, which has
nothing to do with protection. An empty pull request on an unprotected base
gives that same `405` (verified, throwaway PR #110), so an empty
`release/1.0 → master` reports it too.
Validated against a control on an unprotected base (PR #106), which answered
`409` while its check was still pending — i.e. protection was no obstacle
there. On `master` (PR #107) the same probe answered `405` while pending, and
`409` once the check was genuinely green. A direct `git push` to `master` was
rejected by the pre-receive hook with `master`'s SHA unmoved.
---
## 3. Rolling back
There is no force-push escape hatch: `enable_force_push` is `false` on both
branches. To undo a bad release, land a revert on `release/1.0`, bump the
version again, and take it through §1. The `/addons/` rollback for the
reference install is in `HANDOVER.md`.
+8 -8
View File
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="page" id="p1">
<div class="hdr">
<div><h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0, <b>outdated</b>: where it disagrees with DOCS.md, DOCS.md wins</div></div>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0</div></div>
<small>Installer copy</small>
</div>
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table style="margin-bottom:2mm">
<tr><th style="width:34mm">Tag</th><th>Platform</th><th style="width:30mm">Verdict</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>ESU EMU ESA BPS<br>BPU EMJ IJL</code></td>
<td><b>Platform 105</b> — ES / EM / BP, AA55-era</td>
<td><b>Platform 105</b> — ES / EM / BP, AA55-era meter bus</td>
<td><b>SUPPORTED</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>SPB SPN</code></td><td>SBP <b>G2</b> (GW…-SBP-20) — platform 745</td><td><b>NO</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>ESN ESC</code></td><td>ES <b>G2</b> (GW…-ES-20) — platform 745</td><td><b>NO</b></td></tr>
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<tr><td><code>SDT DST MSU NSU …</code></td><td>PV-only inverters — <b>no battery to control</b></td><td><b>NO</b></td></tr>
</table>
<p style="margin:0"><small>Reference unit: <code>95000BPS225W0290</code> → <code>BPS</code> → supported.
A “-20” or “G2” suffix in the model name means a different platform with a different
A “-20” or “G2” suffix in the model name means a different platform with a different meter
protocol. <b>If the tag is not on the supported list, stop — do not quote the job.</b></small></p>
</div>
@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<!-- ============ PAGE 3 ============ -->
<div class="page" id="p3">
<h2>Steps 1–3 — Hardware</h2>
<div class="warn"><b>Qualified persons only.</b> Mains AC and battery DC are present. The RS485 EMS port
<div class="warn"><b>Qualified persons only.</b> Mains AC and battery DC are present. The meter bus
is low-voltage but sits inside an energised installation.</div>
<div class="step">
<h3><span class="num">1</span> Survey and record</h3>
<ol class="do">
<li><b>Photograph</b> the EMS-port wiring before touching it.</li>
<li><b>Photograph</b> the meter-port wiring before touching it.</li>
<li>Identify the RS485 pair (A/B) running to the vendor controller.</li>
<li>Record inverter model + serial, battery capacity (Ah) and nominal voltage.</li>
</ol>
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<ol class="do">
<li>Bring the system to <b>0 W</b> — battery neither charging nor discharging (check the
inverter display).</li>
<li>Disconnect the vendor controller from the inverter's EMS port.</li>
<li>Disconnect the vendor controller from the meter port.</li>
<li>Leave it physically mounted but unplugged — that keeps the install reversible and gives
you a rollback story.</li>
</ol>
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="step">
<h3><span class="num">3</span> Fit and power the T-CAN485</h3>
<ol class="do">
<li>Wire <b>A→A, B→B</b> to the EMS port, plus its own supply.</li>
<li>Wire <b>A→A, B→B</b> to the meter port, plus its own supply.</li>
<li>If fitting the e-stop, connect its USB-RS485 adapter to the <b>same pair, in parallel</b>.</li>
<li>Power the T-CAN485 <b>last</b>.</li>
</ol>
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table>
<tr><th style="width:30mm">Setting</th><th style="width:16mm">Value</th><th>Reason</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>gain</code></td><td>0.6</td><td>Inverter needs 3–6 s to settle (1.4 s dead time, 94 % by 3.3 s) against a ~5 s cycle. <b>At the limit — do not raise</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>0</td><td>0 follows the rail (<code>max_w</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;9). A faster fixed value is <b>refused at startup</b> (SAFETY-39) — see DOCS.md</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>1000</td><td>Most of a correction in the first cycle without running far ahead of the hardware</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>deadband_w</code></td><td>15</td><td>Measured residual: mean 15.4 W, max 27 W. At 10 W the command never rests</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>saturation_w</code> / <code>cycles</code></td><td>500 / 3</td><td>Divergence = inverter at a limit → magnitude may fall, never rise. <b>The 3-cycle term is essential</b>: tested instantly it fires on every large correction</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>step_w</code></td><td>10</td><td>Register is 1 W but response lands on a ~17.6 W ladder. Finer is meaningless</td></tr>
+8 -8
View File
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="page" id="p1">
<div class="hdr">
<div><h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0, <b>outdated</b>: where it disagrees with DOCS.md, DOCS.md wins</div></div>
<div class="sub">Field installation &amp; commissioning guide — v0.1.0</div></div>
<small>Installer copy</small>
</div>
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table style="margin-bottom:2mm">
<tr><th style="width:34mm">Tag</th><th>Platform</th><th style="width:30mm">Verdict</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>ESU EMU ESA BPS<br>BPU EMJ IJL</code></td>
<td><b>Platform 105</b> — ES / EM / BP, AA55-era</td>
<td><b>Platform 105</b> — ES / EM / BP, AA55-era meter bus</td>
<td><b>SUPPORTED</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>SPB SPN</code></td><td>SBP <b>G2</b> (GW…-SBP-20) — platform 745</td><td><b>NO</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>ESN ESC</code></td><td>ES <b>G2</b> (GW…-ES-20) — platform 745</td><td><b>NO</b></td></tr>
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<tr><td><code>SDT DST MSU NSU …</code></td><td>PV-only inverters — <b>no battery to control</b></td><td><b>NO</b></td></tr>
</table>
<p style="margin:0"><small>Reference unit: <code>95000BPS225W0290</code> → <code>BPS</code> → supported.
A “-20” or “G2” suffix in the model name means a different platform with a different
A “-20” or “G2” suffix in the model name means a different platform with a different meter
protocol. <b>If the tag is not on the supported list, stop — do not quote the job.</b></small></p>
</div>
@@ -173,13 +173,13 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<!-- ============ PAGE 3 ============ -->
<div class="page" id="p3">
<h2>Steps 1–3 — Hardware</h2>
<div class="warn"><b>Qualified persons only.</b> Mains AC and battery DC are present. The RS485 EMS port
<div class="warn"><b>Qualified persons only.</b> Mains AC and battery DC are present. The meter bus
is low-voltage but sits inside an energised installation.</div>
<div class="step">
<h3><span class="num">1</span> Survey and record</h3>
<ol class="do">
<li><b>Photograph</b> the EMS-port wiring before touching it.</li>
<li><b>Photograph</b> the meter-port wiring before touching it.</li>
<li>Identify the RS485 pair (A/B) running to the vendor controller.</li>
<li>Record inverter model + serial, battery capacity (Ah) and nominal voltage.</li>
</ol>
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<ol class="do">
<li>Bring the system to <b>0 W</b> — battery neither charging nor discharging (check the
inverter display).</li>
<li>Disconnect the vendor controller from the inverter's EMS port.</li>
<li>Disconnect the vendor controller from the meter port.</li>
<li>Leave it physically mounted but unplugged — that keeps the install reversible and gives
you a rollback story.</li>
</ol>
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<div class="step">
<h3><span class="num">3</span> Fit and power the T-CAN485</h3>
<ol class="do">
<li>Wire <b>A→A, B→B</b> to the EMS port, plus its own supply.</li>
<li>Wire <b>A→A, B→B</b> to the meter port, plus its own supply.</li>
<li>If fitting the e-stop, connect its USB-RS485 adapter to the <b>same pair, in parallel</b>.</li>
<li>Power the T-CAN485 <b>last</b>.</li>
</ol>
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ figcaption { font-size:9pt; color:#5b6169; margin-top:1.2mm; }
<table>
<tr><th style="width:30mm">Setting</th><th style="width:16mm">Value</th><th>Reason</th></tr>
<tr><td><code>gain</code></td><td>0.6</td><td>Inverter needs 3–6 s to settle (1.4 s dead time, 94 % by 3.3 s) against a ~5 s cycle. <b>At the limit — do not raise</b></td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>0</td><td>0 follows the rail (<code>max_w</code>&nbsp;/&nbsp;9). A faster fixed value is <b>refused at startup</b> (SAFETY-39) — see DOCS.md</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>slew_w</code></td><td>1000</td><td>Most of a correction in the first cycle without running far ahead of the hardware</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>deadband_w</code></td><td>15</td><td>Measured residual: mean 15.4 W, max 27 W. At 10 W the command never rests</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>saturation_w</code> / <code>cycles</code></td><td>500 / 3</td><td>Divergence = inverter at a limit → magnitude may fall, never rise. <b>The 3-cycle term is essential</b>: tested instantly it fires on every large correction</td></tr>
<tr><td><code>step_w</code></td><td>10</td><td>Register is 1 W but response lands on a ~17.6 W ladder. Finer is meaningless</td></tr>
-9
View File
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
# UX-13 screenshots
Made from the real page by `goodwe_controller/tools/ux13_screenshots.sh`. Do not
edit them by hand: run the script again.
- `home-*.png`: Home, running, in Dutch, in shadow mode, at phone width, and in setup.
- `settings-*.png`: Settings, Simple and Installer, and the time-window editor with an overlap.
- `batteries*.png`: the Batteries screen with modes on, in Dutch, an Off battery helping the peak limit, a refusal at phone width, and modes off.
- `setup-step-1*.png`: Setup, step 1.
Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 59 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 90 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 91 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 58 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 85 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 162 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 177 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 170 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 33 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 190 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 179 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 175 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 111 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 104 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 223 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 214 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 135 KiB

Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 138 KiB

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
# FCST-03 - the hours the feed has not published, and what may not rest on them
**Status: SHIPPED.** Tests: `test_price_forecast.py`, `test_price_history.py`.
Written down by MAINT-20 from the long module comment of `app/price_forecast.py`.
Follows specs.md 8.3: "Day-ahead prices arrive once daily. Until they do, unknown
hours use yesterday's profile and are flagged `provisional: true`, and no
irreversible action may be taken on a provisional price. Real-time / imbalance
products are treated as high-volatility: arbitrage thresholds widen." This module
owns the first two; the widening is in price.py (`Uncertainty`, `widen_factor`,
`required_spread`), spent by `static_tariff.TariffPlan.arbitrage()` as one more
refusal on its existing ladder. Persistence of yesterday: [[FCST-04]].
## The flag is never passed through
A carried point and a published one are the same three floats and a bool.
`PricePoint(..., provisional=y.provisional)` copies yesterday's `False` onto
today's guess: stale data presented as current (SAFETY-18's defect one layer up).
So:
- `_carried()` has no parameter for the flag; `provisional=True` is a literal in
one place.
- A published point is passed through by identity (`filled.points[i] is
fetched.points[j]`, checked by the test), never copied.
- `_audit()` re-derives the expected flag for every emitted point from the hours
the feed published and raises on a mismatch. It never corrects (a module that
quietly fixes its own provenance cannot be trusted).
- test_price_forecast.py walks this file's AST and fails if any `PricePoint(...)`
passes anything but a literal for `provisional`.
"Published" does not mean "firm": 9.3 carries `provisional` per point because a
real-time product's current-interval print is published AND provisional, so the
audit's rule for a published point is "whatever the feed said". No shipped
plugin emits one since [[TARIFF-07]]; the rule is a property of the format and
weakening it would let the first imbalance feed arrive mispriced and flagged firm.
## The audit is a provenance check, not a completeness check (FCST-05)
Rules: a PUBLISHED point must be one of `published[u]` by identity and be
emitted once, with the feed's own flag; a CARRIED point's hour must not be in
`published` at all, flag exactly True, and no second point in that hour. This
replaced FCST-03's "at most one point per hour" count, which cannot express a
quarter-hourly feed. FCST-04 claimed two strengthenings; both were false: a
differential over every published mask on 3 hours crossed with every output of
length 0-3 found zero divergence either way (OLD raised/NEW accepted 0, OLD
accepted/NEW raised 0). The one real change is the intended relaxation (several
distinct published points per hour).
The audit does not check completeness: fed the decimation defect (four points in
an hour, only the last emitted), two of four, or an empty output, it accepts.
What stops decimation is the point COUNT and IDENTITY checks in the two test
files. It cannot be made complete from its arguments: `published` is over the
whole unwindowed read while the fill emits `[since, until)`, so a published point
outside the window is legitimately absent. FCST-05 built "every published point
is emitted" (+162 B) and it took the 1 h, 12 h and 48 h horizon checks red on a
healthy feed (a real change: the differential scored it 49 cases stronger),
so the rule as stated is wrong, and
asserting a completeness the instrument lacks is MUTATION.md habit 16's defect.
## The fill keys on the wall clock
For each whole hour of the horizon the feed has not published, take yesterday's
value for the SAME BRUSSELS WALL-CLOCK HOUR, not `t - 86400 s`: a 23-hour day has
no 02:00 and a 25-hour day has two, so a fixed 24 h shifts every carried hour
across a transition. On a 25-hour day both 02:00s are filled from yesterday's
single 02:00 (both guesses, both flagged); if yesterday was a 25-hour day, the
first of its two 02:00 points is used. An hour with no published price and no
yesterday value is left out, not filled with a neighbour, mean or zero: 11.4
applies (`Absence`, then the static profile). If nothing can be produced the
result is `no_data`, not an empty series.
A sub-hourly feed is not decimated: the hourly walk decides which hours need
filling, never what a published hour may hold. Belgian day-ahead settles per
quarter since 2025-10-01 (96 points a day), so every published point in the
window is passed through and a carried one is added only for an hour with no
published coverage. `{_utc_hour(p.start): p for p in r.points}` reads ordinary
and keeps the last point of each hour; FCST-04's first caller shipped it, the
series came out 15 points long, the spread fell from 0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh and
the cheapest "hour" became a `:45` point. `_published_by_hour()` holds a tuple
per hour for that reason.
The window is whole hours at both ends: `since` floored (the current hour is
still tradeable) and `until` floored too; with `until` compared raw a 48 h horizon
asked at 08:17 emitted 49 hours. `yesterday` has no default (a missing yesterday
and a useless one must not look alike). The fill is idempotent and re-runnable
(5.4 late publication, 14-16 h CET): published hours win, and the series is
rebuilt, not patched. TARIFF-11 log line: carried HOURS, total hours and
published POINTS are three different quantities (a quarter-hourly feed made it
read "33 of 141 hours" for 48 h).
## AC2: the irreversible-action gate
An irreversible action is a value, `Irreversible`, carrying the hours it commits.
`price_permits()` looks at exactly those hours and answers with a `Gate` carrying
evidence on the permitting arm and a reason on the blocking one (the `_Outcome`
shape). It blocks when the read observed nothing (11.4), an hour has no price, or
an hour is provisional, and names the hour. The maintenance drain's window is
derived from `maintenance.DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MIN` / `CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN`, so the gate
and the phase machine cannot drift. `_window_hours()` is separate so the gate and
its caller agree on "the hours it commits".
What is NOT gated matters more: the maintenance cycle is a calendar obligation
(12.2: a cycle that silently never fires looks like one not yet due), and a site
with `price_provider: off` (the default) has no series. Routing every start
through a gate that blocks on `no_data` would stop the monthly cycle on every
default install. So `begin_phase()` is the entry point for a start JUSTIFIED BY A
PRICE; main.py's calendar path is untouched, and OPT-04 / MAINT-05 own which a
site runs. Reversible actions (self-consumption modulation, the loop) are not
gated: 6 says absent machinery must not disable the loop. Read this before wiring
`begin_phase()` in.
@@ -1,251 +0,0 @@
# FCST-04 — what "yesterday" is, and what the fill is allowed to reach
Four decisions, recorded because each had a defensible alternative that a later
reader would otherwise re-open from scratch.
---
## 1. The fill runs on a `series` read only. A dead feed still goes to §11.4.
`fill_from_yesterday()` accepts a `no_data` read and will happily build a
100 %-carried series from yesterday alone. `resolve_tariff()` does not let it:
a feed that published nothing still falls to `_degrade()` and §11.4's own row —
*"No price data → fall back to the static profile, mark the plan provisional,
no arbitrage."*
**Why not prefer yesterday's real prices to a coarse day/night profile?**
Because it buys nothing the optimiser can use, and it silently replaces a
fallback the operator configured.
Measured, not assumed — and stated at the reach it actually has:
- **This one reaches control.** A fully-carried series is 100 % provisional, so
`TariffPlan.arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and refuses on
§8.3's firm-pair rung. That is the verdict the optimiser reads: `arbitrage.py`
calls `plan.arbitrage(...)` on `fresh_tariff_plan()`, and it is the only path
by which a provider plan moves energy. The §11.4 static fallback refuses on
the same rung, for the same reason.
- **This one does not, and saying so is the point.** `TariffPlan.cheap_now()`
also returns False on a fully-carried series, because `firm_points()` is
empty — but it has **no production caller on the provider plan**.
`self.cheap` comes from `static_status()`, which builds its *own* static plan
and calls `cheap_now()` on that. So it is a property of the type, checked in
`test_static_tariff.py`, and it is not evidence about the shipped control
path. The conclusion below holds on the first bullet alone.
The two paths therefore differ only in which numbers the status page shows.
So the choice is between two identical control behaviours, and the tie-breaker
is that `static_profile` is a documented option an operator fills in **for this
case**. Overriding it for a cosmetic difference is a behaviour change nobody
asked for.
⚠️ **The consequence, stated so it is not discovered later as a bug:**
`fill_from_yesterday()`'s `no_data` branch is not reached from production.
It stays checked in `test_price_forecast.py`. Turning it on is a product
decision — it would want a rule about how old a carried profile may be before it
stops being offered at all — and not a wiring one.
---
## 2. "Yesterday" is a date, not the newest record.
`newest()` is the obvious accessor and it is the one that decays. An add-on down
from Friday to Monday would answer Friday's prices to a fill whose only
vocabulary is `provisional: true` — a flag that says "this is a guess", never
"this guess is three days old". Nothing downstream can tell the difference and
nothing reports it.
So `yesterday(stamp)` computes the Brussels date before `stamp`'s Brussels date
and looks up **that** record. Anything else is `no_data` with a reason naming
both the date wanted and the dates held.
The cost is real and accepted: after an outage of more than a day, the first
morning back has no fill. That is the honest state — there is no yesterday —
and the horizon is short for one morning rather than wrong for several.
---
## 3. What is recorded is the provider's read, and the mechanism is ordering.
Feeding the filled series back into the store is how this rots: day 2 carries
day 1's guesses, day 3 carries day 2's carry of them, and after a week of a dead
feed the "yesterday" being carried is a fossil of the last real publication.
Every point still carries `provisional=True`, so the **flag never lies** — what
decays is the number, behind a flag that is telling the truth.
⚠️ **No value-level check can catch that**, and claiming one would be worse than
claiming none. A carried point and a published-provisional point (a real-time
product's current interval, §9.2) are the same three fields carrying the same
flag. The
difference is provenance, and provenance is not in the value.
The defence is therefore an **ordering**, not a validation:
- `carry()` is the only public entry point. It records its argument, then
returns the fill.
- The filled series exists only as that return value. The object never sees it
again.
- `_remember()` is private and called from exactly one place.
- `test_price_history.py` parses every shipped module under `app/`, `tools/`,
`scenarios/` and `estop/` and fails if any of them **uses the name**
`_remember` — an attribute, a bare name, a `def`, or the string constant a
`getattr` would need. By name rather than by substring, so a comment that
merely mentions the rule does not fail it and a call in `tools/` cannot pass
unseen.
- and it pins the order two ways: the **line numbers** of the two calls in
`carry()`, and — the one that matters — the **behaviour**. A feed carrying
yesterday alongside today, into an empty store, must fill the whole horizon;
reversed, the lookup finds nothing and the plan is only the hours the feed
published. Driven, so a reversal is red.
⚠️ **The first version of that ordering check graded nothing, and this file
said it did.** It compared positions in `ast.walk`, which is breadth-first:
`self._remember(...)` is a statement and `self.yesterday(...)` is an *argument*
of `fill_from_yesterday(...)`, one level deeper, so `_remember` came out first
whichever statement was written first. Measured — shipped and reversed both
scored the same. A decorative check that a document cites as a guarantee is
worse than no check, which is why the correction is recorded here rather than
quietly made.
That ordering has a second benefit worth keeping: a feed that returns yesterday
alongside today refreshes yesterday's record from live data *before* it is
consumed as the profile.
---
## What this ticket does not claim
It does not make a trade possible that yesterday's prices justify. Carried hours
are dropped from the trade set by §8.3, and that is not a limitation to be fixed
later — it is the rule.
The one change that **does** move energy came from the windowing, not the
carrying: the filled series covers `[since, until)`, so hours that have already
elapsed are no longer in the spread. A cheap night that has gone used to be the
series' cheapest hour, and a cycle cannot buy in an hour that is past — so the
trade was silently never taken. `test_price_history.py` section 2 grades that by
finding the cheapest firm hour with and without the fill and showing it moves.
⚠️ **And section 1's identity check now grades identity.** It used to compare
`eur_per_kwh` between `_before` and `_after`, which come from two *separate*
`resolve_tariff()` calls — each parsing the feed body into its own objects, so
`is` could never have held between them however the fill were written. FCST-03's
whole anti-copy argument is `filled.points[i] is fetched.points[j]`, and floats
cannot grade it. The value comparison is kept and now says what it is (the fill
moved the window, it did not touch a price); identity is graded on a read the
file constructs and still holds a reference to.
---
## 4. A sub-hourly feed passes through whole; the fill only decides which hours are missing.
⚠️ **This section originally said `eneco_eddy` is "the Belgian imbalance
product". That was false and [[TARIFF-07]] withdrew the plugin: Eneco's dynamic
product is "Zon & Wind Dynamisch" and is indexed to Belpex/EPEX **day-ahead**,
not to imbalance, and `api.eneco.be/eddy/prices` never existed. The mechanism
below is unaffected, because the real quarter-hourly feed is the one still
shipped.**
Belgian **day-ahead** settles per **quarter** — the 15-minute MTU took effect
on 2025-10-01, so `generic_dayahead` reads 96 points a day rather than 24 — and
`price.py`'s `_validate_raw()` accepts any strictly-increasing spacing, so a
published hour may legitimately hold four points.
FCST-04's first caller keyed the published set as `{_utc_hour(p.start): p for p
in r.points}`. It reads perfectly ordinary and it keeps the **last** point of
each hour. Measured on a 96-point quarter-hourly feed — all firm, fully
published, nothing to carry: the plan reached the optimiser as **15 points**,
the arbitrage spread fell from **0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh**, and the cheapest
"hour" became a `:45` point whose `at()` window runs into the next hour. That is
not the windowing effect above; it is a feed losing 84 % of its own prints, and
no `provisional` flag would ever have reported it.
**The alternative was rejected:** refusing sub-hourly feeds at `_validate_raw()`
would have made the count correct by breaking the one supported product that
legitimately publishes per quarter.
**What was done instead** keeps FCST-03's existing contract rather than weakening
it: *every* published point inside the window passes through **by identity**,
and a carried point is added only for a whole hour with **no** published
coverage at all. A carried hour is still a single hourly point whatever the
feed's own spacing is, because yesterday's profile is only known per wall-clock
hour — and carried hours are provisional, so they are out of the trade set
anyway.
⚠️ **`_audit()` got stricter, not looser, and that was the condition on doing
this at all.** The old post-condition refused any repeated `_utc_hour` — a count
that cannot express four points in one hour. It is replaced by two rules that
**subsume** it:
- a **published** point must *be* one of that hour's published points, by
identity, and may be emitted only once;
- a **carried** point may stand only in an hour that does not appear in the
published set at all, must be flagged `True`, and may not repeat.
So a duplicated carried hour — the DST mispricing the count existed to catch —
still raises; so does the same published point emitted twice; and a carried
point sharing an hour with a real print now raises too, which the count never
looked at. Each of those three is driven by its own mutation in
`test_price_forecast.py`.
## 5. Store details (moved here from `app/price_history.py` by MAINT-20)
**Why a file, and which one.** FCST-03 shipped the fill with no caller, so no
series ever contained a carried point. Without a yesterday that survives a
restart, the mornings after an operator touched something spend the whole
window on the truncated series. The cache is `/data/price_history.json`, not
`/data/state.json`: `Store.set()` rewrites the whole of state.json on each
write, and the refresh runs every `TARIFF_REFRESH_S` (1800 s), so 48 extra
rewrites a day would go through the file whose corruption reads as "no
maintenance ever ran". Separate file, separate blast radius. The directory is
not created (`tariff.PeakStore`'s rule): `/data` is always mounted, so a
`makedirs` could only succeed where the durable volume is missing and build a
cache on the ephemeral layer. "Cannot persist" is one question asked after the
attempt: see [[FCST-06]]; `self._days` never holds a point the file does not.
**Brussels date, not UTC.** 23:30 UTC in July is already tomorrow in Belgium.
`_yesterday_of()` subtracts on the local `date`, not the instant: the old
`brussels(stamp) - timedelta(days=1)` took 24 absolute hours and, at
2026-03-30T00:30+02:00, returned 2026-03-28 (a two-day-old profile flagged as
yesterday's). Rows are keyed by instant, not local hour, so the two 02:00s of
the 25-hour October day both survive and `fill_from_yesterday()`'s own rule is
the only collapsing rule. The merge key is the validated instant; the old
string key merged by spelling and sorted the `+01:00` 02:00 before the `+02:00`.
`KEEP_DAYS` is a sort-order cap, not a horizon: nothing is deleted by arithmetic
against the clock (a jumped clock, WITNESS-03, would otherwise delete everything
on the one morning the fill is for), and the two dates `yesterday()` can be
asked for are pinned on top of the cap, which can only retain.
**One validator (FCST-05, MEDIUM).** The read path was defensive about every
field and the write path trusted `q["start"]` to be hashable and sortable. An
int, null, dict or list `start` raised `TypeError` out of `carry()` on the day
being written; `run_tariff_refresh` caught it, so the add-on stayed up and every
refresh failed for good (the plan retires after `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`, arbitrage and
the cheap window go off, and `_remember()` raised before `_save()`, so no
self-heal). `_point_of()` is now the one standard for both paths and returns
`None` rather than raising.
**A broken cache is a short horizon, never a controller that will not start**
(6: absent machinery must not disable the loop). `PriceHistory(...)` and `.words`
are unguarded in `Controller.__init__`. Shipped defects, all fixed:
- `_load()` caught `json.JSONDecodeError` and `OSError` only; one non-UTF-8 byte
raised `UnicodeDecodeError` (a `ValueError`, not an `OSError`) and the add-on
did not start (FCST-05, HIGH). The handler names the `ValueError` family. The
schema version is compared with its type (`1.0 == 1` in Python).
- `{"days": {"2026-01-14": "oops"}}` loaded as healthy and raised
`AttributeError` out of `words`, `yesterday()` and `resolve_tariff()`.
`_usable_days()` drops such records, and counts (not drops) malformed rows
inside a kept record so the store stops reporting health it lacks.
- `words` printed `f"{d} ({_n_points(rec)} h)"`: points under the hour's name
(`'2026-01-13 (96 h)'` for a 24-hour quarter-hourly day, FCST-05 LOW). Both
numbers are printed now; only rows that are points are counted. `words` must
never raise, `_held()` is total.
- A failed merge is undone from a deep copy (a one-level copy shares the day
records the merge rebinds).
`NO_HISTORY` is a name, not `None`, so `history=` can be required: `None`
meaning "skip the fill" is how a caller silently gets the truncated horizon.
`carry()` records first, then fills, so the filled series exists only as a
return value that the store never sees again (rule 1).
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
# FCST-06 — "cannot persist" is one question, and it is asked about the outcome
Two decisions. The first is the one the ticket put up for judgement; the second
is the one that decides what a store answers *after* it has failed to write.
---
## 1. One derived predicate, not two places testing two symptoms — yes
`price_history.py`'s module docstring states, unconditionally:
> ⚠️ AND THAT RULE IS CARRIED OUT IN `_remember()`, NOT ONLY IN `_save()`. …
> A store that cannot persist now records nothing, and both of its answers say
> the same thing.
It was enforced against `not self.ok`, and `ok` is **about the directory**: it
says `/data` was there when the store opened. A read-only remount and a full
volume both leave it `True`. So the second way to be a store that cannot
persist — `ok=True`, the directory present, `_save()` failing — was outside the
one condition the rule named, and in that state `words` printed two full days
beside the write error while `yesterday()` answered 24 real points, from memory,
until a restart dropped them without a word.
**The ticket's question was whether "cannot persist" should be one derived
predicate rather than two places each testing a different symptom. It should,
and the reason is not tidiness — it is that the enumeration cannot be
completed.** FCST-04's M4 enforced the rule on the symptom that was in front of
it. FCST-05's HIGH was the same shape — an `except` clause naming the one
content-failure member somebody had met (`json.JSONDecodeError`) instead of the
`ValueError` family — and its fix was to name the family. This is the third instance in
one module, and it is the last place in this file where the rule can be spelt
twice. A fourth cause — an `OSError` subclass, a filesystem that accepts the
`mkstemp` and refuses the `os.replace`, a container whose volume is unmounted
mid-refresh — needs no fourth branch now, because none of them is asked about.
### Where the one question can be asked, which is the whole design
**"Can this store persist?" cannot be answered before the attempt.** A
directory that exists and was writable a moment ago is not a write that
completed; there is no pre-check that is not itself a guess, and adding one
(`os.access`, a probe write) would be a *third* symptom test — precisely what
the ticket rules out. So the predicate is an **outcome**:
_save() -> bool # True only if the file now holds what memory holds
Both ways of not persisting are the same answer from the same call: no durable
volume returns `False` without touching the disk, an `OSError` out of the write
returns `False` after recording why. `_remember()` reads that one answer and
keeps only what it says was kept. **The `not self.ok` test in `_remember()` is
gone** — not moved, gone — because there is nothing left for a second test to
add, and a check in `test_price_history.py` 5d asserts its absence from the
source.
⚠️ **That last check is deliberately a source check, and habit 4 is why it is
allowed to be.** The claim "there are not two places testing two symptoms" is a
claim about the *shape of the code*, not about a behaviour — the behaviour is
identical whether the rule is enforced once or twice. Every other check in 5d
is driven.
### What was NOT done, and why
- **Not a `can_persist()` helper.** It would have to answer before the attempt,
which is the thing that cannot be done honestly, and it would be a second
place to keep in step with the first.
- **Not a probe write at `_open()`.** It would make `ok` mean something new, it
would write to `/data` on every start, and a volume that is writable at 08:00
and full at 14:00 would still defeat it. A predicate that can go stale is a
symptom test wearing a predicate's name.
- **Not making a failed write fatal.** §6, and this module's own opening: a
broken cache must not be a broken controller. An add-on that will not start
because `/data` filled up is a worse defect than the one being fixed. The
store degrades; it does not raise. `_save()` reports and returns.
---
## 2. The MERGE is undone, not the store
When `_save()` answers no, `_remember()` restores the state the read started
from — **not** an empty one.
The alternative considered was to clear `self._days` outright, on the argument
that a store which cannot write is a store that should stop answering. It is
wrong, and measurably so: the state being restored is the last one that **is on
disk**, so answering it is not a promise the store cannot keep. A site whose
volume fills at 14:00 goes on answering the yesterday it wrote at 13:30 —
through the restart, because that record is in the file. What it stops doing is
*adding* to it.
Clearing would throw away a good yesterday that survives a restart in order to
punish a write that failed, and it would make the morning fill worse on exactly
the day the operator is already dealing with a full disk.
That gives the file the invariant its rule was always describing, stated once
in the class docstring:
> `self._days` **never holds a point the file does not.**
⚠️ Not *"mirrors the file"* — `_usable_days()` drops records the file still
holds, and that asymmetry is deliberate. The only direction that can **invent a
yesterday** is the one named.
⚠️ **And the snapshot is `copy.deepcopy`, not `dict(self._days)`.** A one-level
copy shares the day *records*, and the merge rebinds `points` on the ones it
touches — so the "restored" store would answer the merge that never reached the
file. Measured: with a shallow copy, a store holding 12 persisted points
answered **24** after a failed merge. It would also be correct only for as long
as nobody makes the merge mutate a `points` list or a row in place, which is the
same "correct for the conditions someone thought of" this ticket is about. The
store holds at most `KEEP_DAYS + 2` records and writes 48 times a day; a copy
that is right by construction is worth more than the allocations.
---
## What this does not change
- **No shipped path reaches the defect.** `/data` is the Supervisor's durable
volume and this module is its only writer, so on a real install `_save()`
succeeds and nothing above is on the hot path. The fix is that a guarantee the
module states about itself now holds in the condition it did not.
- **The failure was already visible and still is** — `_LOG.error("could not
persist price history: %s")` and `last_error`, reported by both `words` and
`yesterday()`'s reason. What changed is that it is now *acted on*.
- **Nothing about the prices.** The series served is the feed's own, every
carried point is still flagged provisional, and a broken cache is still a
short horizon rather than a §11.4 degradation.
@@ -285,11 +285,32 @@ cross-inverter `lo > hi` contradiction at `arbiter.py:114`. The only line this
card changed there is **which** roster entry the claim is filed on: the one whose
state machine produced the result, rather than `inverters[0]`.
## 6. FIXED BY SAFETY-78: the site loop contradicted a drain at N>=2
## 6. FOUND AND NOT FIXED: the site loop still contradicts a drain at N>=2
Found here and pre-existing: below the pin the other pack had to charge, the
allocator refused it and the site sat at 0 W. Fixed by a site `drain` floor;
see [[SAFETY-78]] (`DECISIONS/SAFETY-78-drain-at-two.md`).
Measured while wiring this card, and **pre-existing on `release/1.0` at
`2d025ee`** — the same drain filed on `inverters[0]` produces the identical
refusal with the two unit names swapped.
The maintenance SET **pins** its pack. The loop's target is a **site** claim.
When the site target is *below* the pin — a 2000 W drain while the house imports
less than that, which is most of a night — the only split that sums to the site
target asks the sibling to **charge** while the maintained pack **discharges**,
and `allocator.plan()` refuses it by name as circulating power. The refusal is
correct and fails safe: the whole site goes to 0 W with an `ARBITER: REFUSED`
line in the action log.
**The consequence an operator would see is a misdiagnosis.** The pack is held at
0 W while its state machine believes it is draining, so after 12 h the DRAIN
timeout fires and reports *"drain stuck"* — §12's words for a battery that is not
following commands. The battery is fine; the site refused to allocate.
**Why it is not fixed here.** The fix is to change what the site loop's target
*means* while a unit is pinned — regulate the meter using only the unpinned
packs — which is loop and allocator territory and changes the integrator's
subject. MAINT-05 moves which pack is pinned and nothing else about it. It is
pinned as a running check (`test_maintenance.py` part 12) rather than left as a
comment, so it cannot be forgotten or quietly tuned away, and it wants a card of
its own.
## 7. FOUND AND NOT FIXED: `migrate_unit_keys()` has the same hole, and it is a LATCH
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
# MAINT-10 — the maintenance start hour is local time, default 19:00
Owner decision 2026-09-29 (option A). `maintenance_start_hour` was compared
with the UTC hour, so the shipped 10 started at 12:00 in a Belgian summer and
11:00 in winter. It is now read on the site's local clock, and the default moves
to 19 so the drain runs into the evening and night rather than the solar day.
Evening drains meet higher house loads; SAFETY-83 (merged first) lets the
peak guard outrank the drain.
## 1. Which zone
Home Assistant's `time_zone` (`GET /core/api/config`, 3 s budget) at startup,
else the container's `TZ`, else UTC. One log line says which (WARNING only for
UTC). Resolved once per start: a zone change in HA takes effect on the next
add-on restart. HA can still be starting when the add-on starts (502 from the
proxy, 2026-10-05); then `TZ` holds. HA pushes its zone to the Supervisor
(hassio `push_config`), which stores it and sets it as the add-on's `TZ`
(`docker/app.py`, Supervisor 2026.08.0), so the hour stays right. Only a `TZ` of
UTC there logs a WARNING asking for a restart. No later re-resolve: the fallback
already is HA's zone, so the rare UTC case gets a warning rather than more code.
The add-on image has tzdata (checked in `amd64-base:3.20`); the CI image does
not, so the tests grade DST on `tariff._EUTimezone` too.
## 2. DST
`maintenance.in_start_slot()` works from UTC instants only, so it does not
depend on how a tzinfo resolves a missing or doubled wall time:
- normally the slot is the local hour `start_hour`;
- clocks forward and the hour does not exist: the first hour after the jump;
- clocks back and the hour happens twice: the first pass only. Without this an
aborted start (90 min cooldown) would start again in the 120 min repeated hour.
Every day has exactly one 60 min slot for every hour 0-23: checked against
zoneinfo for Europe/Brussels, America/New_York, America/Santiago (midnight
transitions), Asia/Kathmandu (+05:45) and Australia/Lord_Howe (30 min DST)
over all of 2026.
## 3. Existing installs
The Supervisor merges the shipped defaults under the STORED options, and saving
the settings stores every key (the reference install's blob has all 76). So
almost every existing install keeps its stored 10, which now means 10:00 local
instead of 12:00 (summer) or 11:00 (winter). Only a blob without the key gets 19.
The add-on does not rewrite a stored option: a silent migration would override
an operator's choice with no way to tell it apart from the old default. A site
that set an earlier hour to make up for UTC (17 for 19:00 summer) must set it
back to 19 after the upgrade, or it starts two hours early. DOCS and the release
note (drafted on the PR, for the version bump) say this.
`tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §I measures this on Supervisor 2026.08.0.
## 4. Two inverters
`Controller` hands the same zone to every pack's `Maintenance`, so every pack's
`wants_start()` reads the local hour. `arbitrate()` is unchanged: one pack
cycles at a time, and the one that lost the slot starts in the first start
slot after the other is done (a later day: a cycle outlasts its start hour). On the day the clocks go back, a pack freed during the second pass of
a repeated hour does not start there. `test_maint10.py` part 10.
## 5. What does not change
Only the start decision (`Maintenance.wants_start`) and the Home screen's shown
start time read the zone. `test_maint10.py` parts 9 and 10 run the real
Controller at N=1 and N=2 with start hour 11 UTC against 13 Europe/Brussels (the
same instant): every command, claim, reason and log line is identical. A
`Maintenance` built without a zone reads UTC, as before.
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
# MAINT-11 - start or stop the maintenance cycle per battery
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_maint11.py`. No option added.
**The fault.** At two or more batteries the page had one "start a battery cycle"
button, and `_maint_button()` chose the battery. An operator could not cycle a
chosen one (inverter B, new after storage, needed its first cycle).
## Rule
1. `maint_start` and `maint_abort` take an optional `unit`. With no unit they
run the old code unchanged. The Batteries screen sends the unit from a
per-battery Start cycle and Stop cycle button, at two or more batteries only.
2. **A start while any battery holds the maintenance slot is refused, not
queued.** The message names the battery that is cycling. One slot per site
stays the rule, and the scheduler is untouched.
3. Also refused, with a plain message: an unknown unit, a start on a battery
that is switched off (battery modes on), and a stop on a battery that is not
cycling. Nothing changes on a refusal.
4. A stop on the cycling battery is today's abort: the cycle ends, then every
inverter goes to 0 W.
## Why refuse and not queue
A queued start is a cycle that begins hours later, unseen, after the operator
has moved on. A refusal is immediate and says why. The scheduler already
queues by waiting time, so nothing is lost.
## What this does not cover
- Today's bare button never refused a battery that is refusing to give power
(SAFETY-73); its drain waits. The per-battery start does the same.
- A start on the battery that is already cycling is refused as "busy", where
the bare button restarts its drain. The bare button is unchanged.
- At one battery, a request that names the battery uses the new path, so a
second start is refused instead of restarting the drain. Nothing sends a name
at one battery, and the bare request is unchanged.
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
# MAINT-13 - a full pack that stops at 98-99 % is not a failed charge
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_maint13.py`. No option added; every number
is a constant in `app/maintenance.py`.
**What happened (live, B).** The drain ended 2026-10-04 18:24 UTC and the charge
began. It ran in pieces behind the price gate, reached 99 % at 2026-10-06 04:00,
fell back to 98 % at 04:15 while the loop still asked about -1370 W, and never
reached `maintenance_soc_target` 100. At 06:24 (2160 min = 36 h of wall clock
after the charge began) it aborted "charge stuck at 98 %". `last_completed` was
not set, so B was still due and would have drained again from 98 % to 11 % at the
next start hour, with no notice. Three faults: a pack may never report 100 %
while the BMS balances; a failed cycle came back the next day; and the 36 h
counted hours the price gate kept the pack waiting.
## 1. The charge is complete when
1. SoC >= target (as before), or
2. SoC >= target - 3 (`CHARGE_NEAR_FULL_PCT`) and the SoC has not beaten its
best for 60 min (`CHARGE_STALL_MIN`) of allowed charging, or
3. the charging time (`CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN`, 2160 min) runs out at SoC >= target - 3.
Then the usual HOLD follows and `last_completed` is set after it. Each of 2 and
3 logs one plain line ("the battery takes no more charge at 98 %, so the charge
counts as done", "charge time is up at 98 %, close enough to full ...").
**Why "SoC has not beaten its best", and not asked/delivered watts.** SoC is the
one signal the live record gives us (99 at 04:00, 98 at 04:15); the asked power
was -1370 W but no delivered figure was kept, so a watt threshold (X, Y) would be
invented. SoC also covers the case where power flows but nothing is stored.
**Why 3 points.** The card's band; at target 100 it is 97, and the live pack sat
at 98-99. **Why 60 min.** A judgement, not a measurement: we have no per-minute record of
the pack taking charge near full. The one live fact is 2 h 24 min (04:00 to
06:24) without a new high, so 60 min is well inside it and long enough that a
pack still creeping up (one new high within the hour) keeps resetting the wait.
On the live run the rule fires after 60 gate-open minutes past the 99 %: 05:00
UTC at the earliest, before 06:24 if the gate was open. If the pack turns out to
step up more slowly than that, raise the constant. Falling back by one point
does not reset the wait; only a new best does.
## 2. A failed cycle backs off 7 days
A drain stuck 12 h or a charge that times out below target - 3 is a failure
(`FAIL_BACKOFF_DAYS` = 7). The machine goes IDLE as before, `last_failed` is
stored, and `wants_start()` is false until 7 days later. The operator's forced
start ignores it; a cycle that completes after the failure ends it. An operator
abort, an interlock stop and a switched-off pack are not failures.
**Why 7 days, not the 28 day interval.** A judgement: a failure may have a
short cause (several dull days with no cheap hours, a pack switched off), and
waiting the full interval leaves the coulomb counter uncalibrated for a month
more. A week is long enough that a bad pack costs one drain a week, with one
notice a week, not one a day. **Cost.** A truly faulty pack still drains once a week until someone looks;
the notice says so each time.
**Notice, once.** The tick that fails carries `failed`; the Controller sends one
persistent notification "Battery cycle did not finish" (EN, with the Dutch
below it; per pack at N=2). It is not repeated, and Home Assistant restarts
wipe it, so the status page shows a "Maintenance paused" row with the date for
as long as the wait lasts. The operator may also see the log lines.
## 3. The timeout counts only allowed time
`Controller._charge_gate_open()` says whether the pack may charge now. It is
true when no price gate is set up (no price entities, no fixed tariff: nothing
holds the charge back, and `cheap` is always false there), in a cheap window, or
while the pack is really taking charge (battery power at or below -50 W, which is
sun outside cheap hours). It is false only when a gate exists, is shut, and the
pack is not charging; a pack asked for charge that delivers nothing then does not
count, which is the case the clock cannot judge. A site with a price provider
(TARIFF-11) and no fixed tariff counts as having no gate: the provider's plan
reaches only the Tariff row, never `cheap`, so no cheap window ever opens a grid
top-up there and only the sun charges the pack, as on a site with no tariff. Its
time counts in full. When a provider plan starts to drive `cheap`,
`_price_gated` must become true for it. Whether a fixed tariff is set up is
worked out once an hour, not on every tick. Only open ticks add to `open_min`; one tick
adds at most 5 min, so a gap (add-on down) adds nothing. The stall wait pauses
while the gate is closed. The accounting is written to the state file at most
every 5 min (`charge_track`); a restart loses at most that. A state file from
before this change, or with no record for the current charge, starts from the
wall-clock minutes so far, which is the old behaviour.
**Backstop.** A gated site whose gate never opens (no cheap hours, no sun) would never time
out, so a charge also ends after 7 days of wall clock (`CHARGE_WALL_TIMEOUT_MIN`):
complete at >= target - 3, a failure below.
**MAINT-12.** This is the smallest change that makes the timeout honest: one
boolean in, one counter. MAINT-12's block plan can replace the boolean (the
minutes it plans are the allowed ones) without touching the rest. Two things it
must keep: the back-off is in `wants_start()`, so any new entry point (such as
`price_forecast.begin_phase`, which is not wired today) must go through it or
check `backoff_until()`; and `gate_open` must stay "the pack is allowed to
charge now". The peak guard pausing the charge shaping is not seen as a closed
gate: that time still counts.
## 4. What does not change, and what this does not cover
- The drain, the HOLD, the held-battery rules and `arbitrate()` are unchanged. A
backed-off pack does not want a start, so at N=2 the other pack may take the
slot. One pack at a time at N=1 and N=2.
- `last_failed` is a maintenance key and moves with the others when a second
inverter is added (`MAINT_UNIT_KEYS`). The charge record is not moved; it
restarts from the wall-clock minutes.
- It does not find out why a pack stopped. A pack that stops at 96 % and never
gets near is still a failure.
- The Dutch text is only in the notification. The status row and the log lines
are English, like the rest of the status page.
- It does not change the target: a site that wants a different stop point sets
`maintenance_soc_target`.
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
# MAINT-14 - no SoC reading in a maintenance cycle
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_maint14.py`. No option added; the one new
number is a constant in `app/maintenance.py`.
**The fault.** `Maintenance.tick()` returned early when the SoC was `None`,
before any timeout check. (1) A charge on a pack whose SoC reading was lost
never ended: no timeout, no back-off, no notice, and the 7-day backstop of
MAINT-13 sat behind the same return. (2) A drain kept commanding `discharge_w`
with an unknown level, which breaks the TEL-08 rule that an unknown level never
allows discharge.
## Rules
1. **Charge, no SoC.** The charge timeout (`CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN`, gate-open
minutes) and the 7-day wall backstop still run. When one fires: if the last
SoC seen was >= target - 3 the charge counts as done (the MAINT-13 "close
enough to full" rule, HOLD follows); otherwise it fails: MAINT-13 back-off
and its one notification. If no SoC was ever seen, it fails.
2. **Drain, no SoC.** DRAIN holds at 0 W and owns the setpoint, exactly as HOLD
does. The 12 h drain timeout still runs and fails as before.
3. **SoC comes back.** Nothing is recorded; the drain continues at the drain
rate, the charge carries on, and the stall wait of MAINT-13 restarts from
what it was: it paused while the reading was missing, so a gap never counts
as "no more charge".
4. **HOLD** is unchanged (0 W).
5. **Log.** One line when a drain starts holding for this reason ("the battery
level is unknown, so the drain holds at 0 W until it is back"), and one line
when the level has been missing for `NOSOC_NOTE_MIN` = 15 min. Both are said
once per episode; the old line that repeated every tick is gone.
## Why
- **"Last seen", not "best seen".** A pack that was at 99 and then dropped to 50
before the reading went is not close to full. Only the last reading counts.
It is saved with the charge record (`charge_track.last`), and saved at once
when the reading first goes missing, so a restart mid-gap still knows it
(within the usual 5 min save interval otherwise).
- **Failure when nothing was seen.** With no level we cannot call a pack full.
The failure costs a 7-day wait and one notice; calling it done costs a
missed balance and a month-long false "complete". The first is the honest one.
- **Timeouts count the same minutes as with a reading.** Gate-open charging
minutes only; the wall backstop for a gate that never opens.
- **15 min.** A judgement. A poll glitch of a few minutes should not write a
line; a reading lost for a quarter of an hour is worth one. Raise it if the
action log shows noise.
- **0 W, not "stop the phase".** Aborting a drain on a short gap would throw
away the part already drained. Holding at 0 W loses nothing and the 12 h
timeout is the limit.
## Cost
- A drain that loses its reading stops draining, and the 12 h clock keeps
running. A gap of many hours can therefore fail a drain that was working. The
back-off then applies (7 days).
- A charge whose reading is lost early (last SoC below target - 3) fails at the
timeout, even if the pack was in fact filling. The same 7-day wait applies.
## What this does not cover
- **HOLD with no SoC**: closed by MAINT-15 (`MAINT-15-hold-ends-without-soc.md`).
- It does not tell the operator why the reading is missing (sensor, register,
link). It does not reuse the stale-input gate; it is the cycle's own rule.
- The charge itself is still driven by the control loop, which has its own
handling of a missing SoC (TEL-08 for the loop is a separate card).
- A restart loses at most 5 min of accounting, as in MAINT-13. The "unknown for
long" line may be said again after a restart: the episode start is in memory.
- Text added is two log lines, English only, like the other log lines.
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
# MAINT-15 - the balancing hold ends on time with no SoC reading
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_maint15.py`. No option added.
**The fault.** `step()` sent every tick with no SoC to `_no_soc()`, and for
HOLD that returned 0 W without the time check. A hold that lost its reading
never ended: `last_completed` was never written and the next due date never
moved. Harmless for power (0 W), but the cycle was stuck. This was left open
in MAINT-14.
## Rule
1. **HOLD ends at `hold_min` whether or not there is a reading.** One helper,
`Maintenance._hold()`, holds the time check and is used by both paths. When
the time is up it writes `last_completed`, goes IDLE and logs the same
"cycle COMPLETE" line. Before the time is up it commands 0 W as before.
2. **Text.** The 15-min "no battery level" line in HOLD now reads "The hold
still ends at its normal time." Still once per episode.
## Why
HOLD is reached only after the charge counted as done. Every entry into HOLD
is in `step()` or `_no_soc()` and follows a charge that reached the target,
stalled near full (MAINT-13) or timed out near full (MAINT-13/14). Nothing else
sets the phase to HOLD (`_enter(HOLD` has four call sites, all after a done
charge). The hold is a wait for the BMS to balance; it never needed the level.
So a hold that ends with no reading is a completed cycle. The "cycle COMPLETE"
line is true without a reading: it names minutes of hold, not a level.
## Cost
- If the level was lost during the hold, the cycle is recorded as complete
without anyone seeing the final level. The charge had counted as done, so this
is the same trust MAINT-14 already gives a charge that ends with no reading.
## What this does not cover
- It does not check that the pack is still full at the end of the hold.
- It does not say why the reading was lost.
- With a reading, nothing changes. `test_maint15.py` section 7 compares the new
HOLD tick by tick with a frozen copy of the release/1.0 HOLD branch (phase,
setpoint, owner, events, `last_completed`) at four `hold_min` values. A wider
trace of the whole cycle (800 seeded runs against db9e231) was run outside the
repo; its script and log are kept under `scratch/MAINT-15/` of the dev
workspace, not in this repository.
- A state file written by an older version with `phase: hold` loads and ends on
time; the file is not changed in format.
@@ -1,334 +0,0 @@
# OPT-09 - the weights parameter, and what it is honestly for
**Status:** implemented. **Branch:** `OPT-09`. **Base:** `release/1.0` @ `3d29993` (rebased onto the UX-02 merge; it read `3368231`, and before that `464d398` - each rebase moved it and review caught it each time, which is why the counts in `test_translations.py` are now computed rather than typed)
(`git merge-base HEAD 3368231`; the branch was rebased and this line used to name
the pre-rebase base, `464d398`).
## 0. What was actually wrong
`allocator.plan()` has taken a `weights` argument since ALLOC-01, `_fill()`
consumes it in two passes, and **nothing had ever passed one**. Confirmed on the
base commit:
arbiter.py:535 def resolve(claims, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None, ...)
main.py:2422 resolve(claims, units=self.units, live=self.live_units(), ...)
So `weights` was None on every tick of every install, `plan()` turned that into
1.0 per unit, and the site target was split **50/50 regardless of what either
pack could do**. The card was filed as "per-pack arbitrage sizing"; the architect
pass found the sharper content, and it is the sharper content that this branch is
mostly about.
## 1. Two instruments, and they are not interchangeable
`allocator.py` states the rule this card is built on, and it is mechanical rather
than advisory:
> WEIGHTS EXPRESS PREFERENCE. ENVELOPES EXPRESS PERMISSION. A weight of 0 is
> "please do not use this unit", and it is honoured while any other unit has
> headroom - but it is NOT a constraint.
`_fill()` runs a deliberate **last-resort pass** over the zero-weight units when
the preferred ones saturate, so that a preference can never manufacture a
standing error at the meter. A pack at its own cut-out that is only *weighted*
to zero is therefore still commanded to discharge the moment its sibling fills
up. So this branch ships both:
| | question | mechanism |
|---|---|---|
| `packshare.envelope()` | MAY this pack be asked, at all, in this direction? | a `pack` UNIT claim at `P_SAFETY`, `hi = 0` at the cut-out, `lo = 0` at 100 % |
| `packshare.weights()` | GIVEN that both may, which should carry more? | energy headroom in kWh, handed to `resolve()` |
## 2. ⚠️ What the weights CANNOT do
ARCH-01's convex-combination argument - the gain at the meter is
`sum(a_i * g_i)`, so it lies in `[min g_i, max g_i]` for **any** split -
guarantees that a bad split cannot **destabilise** the site. It says nothing
about whether the site can **regulate**. A unit at its energy limit has
`g_i = 0`; the combination is still inside the interval and the load it was
asked to carry simply does not move.
Measured, `test_packshare.py` part 8, two units rated 2000 W each, B sitting on
its own floor and therefore answering 0 W to any discharge command. The plant is
modelled in that file (`lag_s = 0`, obeys within one cycle, bounded by its
rating) and the loop is the real `compute()`:
| load | arm | site target | shares | grid | unmet |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 W | shipped | +3000 W | A +1500, B +1500 | 0 W | 0 W |
| 1500 W | weights | +1500 W | A +1500, B +0 | 0 W | 0 W |
| 1500 W | envelope | +1500 W | A +1500, B +0 | 0 W | 0 W |
| 3000 W | shipped | +4000 W | A +2000, B +2000 | +1000 W | 0 W |
| 3000 W | weights | +4000 W | A +2000, B +2000 | +1000 W | 0 W |
| 3000 W | envelope | +4000 W | A +2000, B **+0** | +1000 W | **+2000 W** |
Three things are worth reading off that table, and the second and third are the
uncomfortable ones:
1. At a load the healthy pack can cover, the weights alone deliver the whole
improvement. The shipped arm reaches the same meter reading only by winding
the site target to **twice the load** and standing a +1500 W command on a
battery that answers nothing, permanently saturation-frozen. That is not a
working site, it is a site with no headroom left for the next load step.
2. At a load it cannot cover, **the weights stop working entirely**. The
weighted arm and the shipped arm command the identical +2000 W into the empty
pack, because `_fill()`'s last-resort pass hands the remainder to the
zero-weighted unit. Same shares, same watts, same error.
3. **And the envelope does not rescue the delivery either - it names the
shortfall.** Same 2000 W delivered, same 1000 W standing at the meter. What
changes is that the empty pack is commanded 0 W instead of 2000 W, and 2000 W
of site target is *reported* as unplaceable instead of appearing to have been
placed.
> **Weights are a comfort choice for STABILITY and NOT for DELIVERY.** Nothing in
> this add-on shifts a unit's load to its sibling once the sibling is at its
> rating, and weighting a failing unit down is not a remedy for it.
## 2b. ⚠️ The card's own premise is only half true
The card opens with *"a unit that stops delivering its share (empty, full,
curtailed, wedged) parks the site with a standing grid error and no alarm."*
After this branch: the **ask** stops, and while the sibling has headroom the site
regulates to zero error instead of winding to twice the load. The **standing grid
error does not stop** once the sibling is at its rating - §2's table measures
1000 W standing in all three arms - and there is **still no alarm** for it, only
a report. SAFETY-42 will not alarm on a pack at its own floor; that is one of its
acceptance criteria and its evidence is that the benign and the wedged case are
indistinguishable in the power domain.
So the two cards together mean: an empty pack limiting the site is now REPORTED
(`unmet_w`, an action-log line) and still, deliberately, NOT ALARMED. Whether it
should be alarmed is a decision - and the alarm it would need is about a site's
stored ENERGY, not about an inverter's delivery, so it is not this card's and not
SAFETY-42's. Recorded rather than quietly closed against a premise this card only
half meets.
## 3. Which floor, and which ceiling - the two places this could have become policy
**The floor is `bms_soc_floor` alone, never `peakguard.pack_floor_pct()`.** That
function's conjunction with `peak_soc_floor` is right for the peak guard and
wrong here: SAFETY-25 decided (2026-09-02, Option A) that `peak_soc_floor` bounds
the peak guard **only**, ordinary self-consumption discharges straight past it,
and closing an envelope at it would turn an operator preference into a hard stop
on the grid-following loop - the memo's **deferred Option B**, built by accident.
`delivery.py`'s `account()` made the same choice one step out, for the same
reason. Graded: a pack at 15 % with a 10 % cut-out is not closed, though a 20 %
EMS floor would have closed it.
**The ceiling is 100 %, and the coarseness is the honest answer.** There is no
per-pack charge ceiling anywhere in this add-on - `delivery.py` says so at length
and calls it a card, and it is why SAFETY-42 is armed on discharge shares only.
The only other number available is `arbitrage_soc_ceiling`, which is one
site-wide **trade policy**; filing it as a `P_SAFETY` envelope on the loop would
be the mistake above in the charge direction. So the envelope closes only where
the ask is physically impossible, and everything between is left to the weights -
which is the right instrument for a graded preference and is honest about being
only a preference.
## 4. N=1, and the tripwire this had to argue past
`actuator_for()` routes **every** source to the site at one inverter, so a `pack`
interval filed there would bound the SITE TARGET rather than a share. `main.py`
therefore does not file it at all below a roster of two - the same guard, for the
same reason, that SAFETY-30's `sign_site` carries. AC 4 ("at N=1 allocation is
byte-identical") is that `if`.
`test_peakguard.py` part 10f pins the claim-source set against `main.py`'s own
AST precisely so that a state-of-charge-conditioned claim cannot arrive quietly.
`pack` is state-of-charge-conditioned, so the argument is written at that set
rather than the count edited: the number is not an option, the claim is
unit-scoped so it cannot bound the site target, it is not filed at N=1, and part
10f's own note names this as the revisit trigger - *"under ALLOC-01 the reserve
becomes a PER-INVERTER INTERVAL AT THE ALLOCATOR rather than a ninth claim
here"*. Stage 1 is how an interval reaches the allocator and stage 1's input is
claims, so a unit-scoped claim is the shape that sentence asks for.
**What N=1 still does not get, said plainly:** nothing stops the loop discharging
into the BMS cut-out at one inverter. That is unchanged, it is SAFETY-25's
deferred option, and the BMS is what stops it.
## 5. SAFETY-42 - the same hazard from the opposite side
The seam is **the state of charge** - and they overlap in one direction, which
is what the rest of this section is about:
* **OPT-09 stops the site ASKING** a pack whose own SoC says it cannot deliver.
* **SAFETY-42 alarms** when a pack that said it could does not.
A wedged unit reads a healthy SoC, so **no envelope closes** - that half is
absolute, and it is why this card cannot stop the ask on a wedged box. A pack at
its floor is `account()`'s explained case, so SAFETY-42 stays silent - and after
this card that ask does not arrive in the first place, which removes the benign
arm from the detector's input rather than teaching it a new discriminator.
⚠️ **BUT THE WEIGHT DOES MOVE, AND IT NARROWED SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW.
THAT WAS A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2, IT WAS NOT FIXED HERE, AND SAFETY-43
CLOSED IT - see the block at the end of this section.** An earlier draft of
this section said "no envelope closes and no weight moves - OPT-09 cannot see it
at all". The second clause was **false**, and it was load-bearing for the claim
that the two cards do not overlap. A weight is a function of the pack's ENERGY
HEADROOM, not of what the pack delivers, so a wedged unit's weight moves whenever
its headroom differs from its sibling's - which is the ordinary case this card
exists to exploit. And `delivery.delinquent()`
named a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeded `min_w =
Tuning.saturation_w`, and that was **500 W in absolute watts** with nothing
else beside it. Shrinking a unit's share shrinks its gap. Shrink the
share far enough and the gap drops below 500 W while the unit is still delivering
nothing, and the alarm stops firing.
Measured on the closed loop - real `compute()`, real `plan()`, real
`delinquent()`, modelled plant, B wedged at 15 % against its own 10 % floor so
nothing closes and `account()` explains nothing, i.e. a SAFETY-42 **true
positive** by that card's own definition:
load 1500 W equal weights (shipped) named on 199/200 cycles
shares {a:1500, b:1500} grid +0 W named=['inverter-b']
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights named on 0/200 cycles
shares {a:1505, b: 125} grid -5 W named=(nobody)
⚠️ That plant is modelled in `test_packshare.py`, and **inverter B does not
exist** (expected ~2026-09-12): it is two copies of A driven with different
numbers, and B's 4600 W / 20.48 kWh / 10 % floor are from the datasheet and the
serial. The claim is about the arithmetic of the split and the threshold, which
needs no hardware, and not about a GW5000S-BP.
At a load the healthy pack can cover - the regime where nothing else tells the
operator anything, `unmet_w` is 0, the meter is satisfied and no action-log line
fires - a wedged inverter goes from named on essentially every cycle to **never
named**. The suppression window widens from `site target < 2 * min_w` = 1000 W to
`site target < min_w * (w_A + w_B) / w_B`, which on that fixture is **6500 W** of
a 9600 W site; above it - once the healthy pack is at its own rating and
`_fill()`'s last-resort pass hands the wedged unit a big share again - the alarm
returns. ⚠️ BOTH BOUNDS ARE ARITHMETIC ABOUT `_fill()`'s PROPORTIONAL REGIME AND NEITHER IS A REACHABLE STEADY STATE. Swept on this fixture, the healthy pack's own 5000 W rating binds FIRST: suppressed 0/200 up to a 3000 W load, 4/200 at 4000 W, 41/200 at 4900 W (site target 5320 W, the largest reached with the wedged unit still under 500 W), then 195/200 at 5000 W once `_fill()` pins A at its cap and hands B 3000 W. So the alarm returns BELOW the 6500 W formula bound, not above it. The equal-weights 1000 W bound is unreachable for the same reason - the equal arm names the wedged unit 199/200 at every load swept, 1000 W included.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b graded all of it and **pinned the unflattering
behaviour**, so that the day it changed a named check would move. It has moved.
### ⚠️ CLOSED BY SAFETY-43 - THIS IS NO LONGER A DISCLOSED RESIDUAL
This section used to end *"until then this is a disclosed residual [...] at two
inverters, a wedged unit with materially less energy headroom than its sibling
can go unreported at ordinary house loads"*. That sentence is **retired, not
softened**, and what replaces it is a measurement rather than an intention.
`delivery.delinquent()` is now relative to the ask **as well as** absolute:
named if short_by() > min_w OR short_by() > frac * share
with `frac = delivery.DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION`. A unit delivering 0 of 125 W is
100 % delinquent and is named; a unit delivering 0 of 1500 W was already named
and still is. On the **same fixture, under the same weights**, part 8b now
grades both rules in one run - `share_frac=None` is SAFETY-42's absolute arm,
exactly:
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights absolute arm alone named on 0/200 cycles
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
⚠️ **`min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED, AND THAT IS THE HALF THAT MATTERS HERE.** The
absolute arm's suppression window is still exactly the arithmetic above - 1000 W
at equal weights, 6500 W at these - and part 8b still asserts both numbers.
Lowering `saturation_w` would have traded a missed alarm for a false one on
every unit at once, which is SAFETY-41's four-attempt regime. SAFETY-43 added a
**second** way to be named and left the first where it was.
⚠️ **AND WHAT OPT-09 STILL DOES NOT DO IS UNCHANGED.** This card stops the site
ASKING a pack whose own SoC says it cannot deliver; it does not re-allocate a
wedged unit's watts, and SAFETY-43 did not make it. The alarm got louder; the
loop did not move. The derivation of `frac` - swept over the same 2640 no-fault
runs that produced `delivery_hold_s`'s floor - is in
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-43-delinquency-relative-to-the-ask.md`.
So the seam, stated accurately **as of SAFETY-43**: OPT-09 stops the ask, and it
still narrows the ABSOLUTE arm's window for a low-headroom unit exactly as
described above - but it no longer narrows the DETECTOR, because the detector no
longer reads only that arm.
⚠️ **And OPT-09 supplies the mechanism SAFETY-42 said was missing, without
connecting it.** That module's rejection of re-allocation rests on *"the only
re-allocation this add-on can express is ALL OR NOTHING [...] a partial
re-allocation is what would make acting safe, and the allocator has no way to
express it today"*. Passing weights **is** that expression. Wiring delinquency
into them is deliberately **not** done here: it would be acting on the alarm,
which SAFETY-42 refused with rig evidence (a unit derated to 50 % is 400 W worse
dropped than kept, and no instrument this add-on has can tell it from a wedged
one), and - see §2 - a weight cannot stop a unit being commanded anyway. That is
a card, and this paragraph is its input.
## 6. Per-pack arbitrage sizing, and the half that is deliberately not moved
`arbitrage.decide()` was handed `site_max_w` on **both** sides, so a two-pack
site would buy at the sum of the ratings whatever either pack's state of charge
was. It is now sized to the packs whose own SoC permits that direction
(`Controller.trade_power_w()`), using **arbitrage's own** bounds rather than the
BMS cut-out - sizing a trade is the trade's business; permitting a command is the
pack's.
Two honest limits:
* **The sell side is a no-op on every roster today.** `decide()` is handed
`pack_floor_soc` - the emptiest pack - so a sell is refused outright whenever
*any* pack is at or under the floor, i.e. in exactly the states where the sum
could be smaller than the site rating. The arithmetic is graded directly
(`test_packshare.py` part 9); it becomes reachable the day that gate is
per-pack.
* **Moving that gate is not this card's.** Sizing a sell off the *fullest* pack
would let the trade proceed while the emptiest pack was below
`arbitrage_soc_floor`, and the only per-pack instrument that could keep it out
of that pack is the weights - which are a preference, and `_fill()` will hand
it watts anyway. Doing it safely needs an envelope that depends on WHICH CLAIM
WON the tick, which the arbiter's partition does not express. §2 is why that is
a real objection and not a hedge.
`arbitrage.decide()` also now refuses a **0 W sizing** by name (`IDLE_NO_SIZE`),
because a `Claim.set(..., 0.0)` at `P_ARBITRAGE` is a park order that outranks
the loop - the failure the note on `claim()` is already written against. The
sizing can never be zero on a tick that trades today; that is a coincidence of
the existing gate, and this makes it structural instead.
## 7. The fixture, which is the hard part
Two packs that differ in only ONE of SoC and capacity cannot separate a
SoC-aware weighting from a capacity-aware one; two identical packs cannot
separate ANY weighting from any other. `test_packshare.py` part 1 grades the
fixture itself before anything is asserted with it - four candidate schemes
(equal, power rating, SoC only, energy), four distinct splits of the same
1000 W:
equal A +500, B +500
power A +521, B +479
soc only A +125, B +875
energy A +97, B +903
and the counterfactuals: on two identical packs all four collapse to one answer;
at the same SoC, `soc only` collapses onto `equal`; at the same capacity,
`energy` collapses onto `soc only`.
## 8. Provenance of every number
* A: **5000 W, 15.36 kWh, 10 % floor** - measured (GW5000S-BP, register 0x0560).
* B: **4600 W, 20.48 kWh, 10 % floor** - **FROM DATASHEET AND SERIAL**
(`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b, GW5048D-ES `55048ESU22AW0992`). ⚠️ **Inverter B does
not exist** (expected ~2026-09-12).
* Every two-unit run in `test_packshare.py` is arithmetic over intervals and
weights, or a plant modelled in that file. `sim/plantsim.py:216`'s `INVERTER_B`
is **inverter A copied** with `measured=False`, so any two-inverter simulation
result anywhere in this project is **two copies of A**.
* No rig was taken, no hardware was touched, and nothing here is evidence about
a second GoodWe inverter.
## 9. Config
`capacity_kwh` joins the `inverters` roster as an **optional** per-entry key
(`float(0.1,200)?`) - the opposite choice to SAFETY-32's required
`bms_soc_floor`, and for that card's own reason: a missing cut-out would have to
be *defaulted*, and one default for two batteries protects the shallower pack
with the deeper pack's number, whereas a missing capacity has an honest answer -
no opinion about the split, every unit weighs 1.0, which is exactly what shipped.
It is **all or nothing across the roster** and rule 9 refuses a partial one: a
pack measured in kWh beside a sibling weighing a dimensionless 1.0 is not a
comparison, `weights()` answers "no opinion" for the whole roster in that case,
and a key that silently changes nothing is worse than one that refuses to load.
There is deliberately **no flat `capacity_kwh`**: at one inverter there is no
split to weight, so it would be an option an operator can set and nothing reads.
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
# OPT-11 - battery modes, per battery
A battery's mode (on/off, Solar first, Leftover solar) is a soft unit limit at
`P_MODE` = 35 that always holds 0 W. A SET above 35 (a safety stop) overrides
it; a limit above 35 (the peak guard) makes it give way only as far as that
limit needs, and a battery its mode holds back then carries only what the
others cannot (`arbiter._unit_modes()`, `_site_mode()`). Design and owner answers: `goodwe-session/OPT-11-design.md` (2026-09-27);
P1 is its section 6 P1, and the pull request lists what was measured.
- Off by default (`battery_modes_enabled`); off, commands are byte-identical to
a5dddad (`test_modes.py` part 1).
- Off is a mode range, so the peak guard can still use an Off battery when the
others cannot cover the floor (design sections 2-3). Whether Off should be
absolute is an open owner question.
- Review (PR #149): releasing only when the peak floor bound S let a trade won
above the floor keep the modes and place less than the floor, and let a
capped grid charge release an Off battery. Both are graded in
`test_arbiter.py` part 11. The loop bound leaves a side that reaches the
rail to the rail, so SAFETY-03 still flags a loop winding into it.
- P2 (HA entities): a select and a switch per battery, only while modes are
on; commands go through `handle_action()`, the page's path. A retained
command is dropped, not applied: the store already holds the last choice,
and a replay after a restart could otherwise undo a newer one. The config
topics announced are kept in the store (`mqtt_mode_configs`), so turning
modes off removes exactly those, and an install that never turned them on
publishes what ed739d4 did (`test_mqtt.py` part 10). A removed topic stays
in that list and its empty config is re-sent on each start, so a start with
no broker cannot lose it; re-sending is harmless. The HA options are the
page's English names, pinned by a test, and are not renamed with the page:
automations send them.
- In P1 only Off closes a direction; Leftover solar differs by charging last.
- P3 (price runs, `priceruns.py`, `modetrade.py`): each battery's range is
narrowed by its role this tick (hold, give, charge, rest, sell); main.py
files the intersection with the switch, so it still holds 0 W. With modes on
the site trade is filed by the modes, sized from the loop bound (so no
battery a mode or a refusal holds is asked for watts, P1's unmet share) and
the guard's headroom; `arbitrage.decide()` runs only with modes off, which
stays byte-identical to 7a00f12 (`test_modes_p3.py` part 1).
- SAFETY-46 item 2 is decided as the owner answered (2026-09-25): a trade is
a run of consecutive firm slots. It applies with battery modes on; the
modes-off trade keeps its one-period shape, because that path must not move.
- Choices that were measured, not assumed (tools/opt11p3_replay.py):
- a sale needs the guard to have measured the quarter, not to be clear: a
5 kW discharge alone reads "engaged" on export and flipped the sale every
5 s;
- a grid charge makes the others rest, so it starts only at 500 W and, once
the guard or the headroom stops it, stays off for that 15-minute period
(without: 13 flips in 4 minutes under a 3.5 kW house);
- stored energy is valued at the last cheap run for 12 h, and a charge
needs its own run to clear the spread (without: a night charge was spent
on flat morning prices, then charging went on at them);
- a run edge reseeds the loop at the house's level (a 3 kW import spike
removed) and, since OPT-15, holds it there until the meter shows the step.
- Replay (tools/opt11p3_replay.py, 16 recorded days, EPEX hourly prices a
year earlier, modelled batteries), net EUR, lower is better: P2 19.33, P3
Solar first + Leftover solar 19.57, with a sale 19.60, the old one-period
trade 18.14. Review of #153 (same model, with a per-action split):
- the cheapest hours were at midday on 15 of 16 days, so Leftover solar (acting
as Cheap hours until P4) bought 12.2 kWh there that the sun would have
given: 7 kWh more exported, 12 kWh less solar stored. Holding for the
expensive hours saved 4 kWh of import, not enough. With no grid charge on
Leftover solar: 19.44;
- the old trade charged one hour, so the afternoon sun still fit;
- a sale earned the wholesale price (2.27 EUR for 11.4 kWh) and the house
then bought the same energy back (2.29 EUR): a wash before wear. It pays
only when the sale hour's wholesale price beats the later import price,
levies included (about 0.13 EUR/kWh above that hour's wholesale here);
- valuing the charge left at the end, wear and real Flemish levies make
selling worse and do not change the order.
- Owner decision 2026-09-29 (option A): selling is off until it can be judged
on the price the grid pays (`packmode.SELLING_ENABLED`, code kept), and
Leftover solar takes solar only until P4's forecast
(`packmode.GRID_CHARGE_MODES`); Cheap hours only still charges from the grid. Replayed
(16 days, as above): Solar first + Leftover solar 19.44 EUR net against
P2's 19.33; Solar first + Cheap hours only 19.57.
- Not done in P3: the forecast (P4), and a headroom too short for the run
moving the rest to the next cheap periods.
- OPT-15 (TEST-23 findings on 5a4cdc2, merged up to e3e4ba6,
`test_price_run_fixes.py`):
- F1, a charge stopped at a quarter edge and latched for the quarter. The
P1 averager opens a quarter only when a sample arrives, and the HA source
builds one 0.35 s after the reading, so the cycle on the boundary still
saw the old block: "no seconds left", headroom None, "no trade
(headroom)", latched for the new quarter. With modes on the guard now
projects the quarter `now` is in (`PeakTracker.project(roll=True)`,
crediting the held sample as the averager will), and only a measured
stop latches. Modes off still reads the old block (identity).
Since SAFETY-91, `next_quarter()` does the same for the guard at two
inverters (no stop there without the roll, same banked quarters); the
roll is what covers one inverter, where the old projection stops the
charge at every edge. With modes on at one inverter the roll also removes
the 1 s 0 W command at each quarter edge that SAFETY-81's sim showed, so
its modes-on digests are re-pinned (modes off equal to e3e4ba6). A
rolled projection is not graded by SAFETY-81's alarm (the old edge tick
read "no seconds left"), so a standing overload is still notified once
per quarter.
- F2, -1120 W export at a charge end against -257 W modelled. The replay
acted every 5 s on readings of that instant, and by then the lagged
battery had nearly arrived, so it never acted on a reading that still
showed the trade. The add-on cycles on each meter update (1 s on the rig)
on readings 1-2 s old: the two cycles after the reseed saw the trade's
+3300 W and slewed E up 555 W each. The loop now holds E until the meter
reaches the target (or `EDGE_HOLD_S`, 18 s; to 36 s while the battery
still moves). The replay gained `Lag` (dead time, reading age, the P1
debounce, 1 s cycles). Charge end, 800 W house: -10 to -51 W over eight
lag variants; without the hold -1370 W (meter 2 s). On e3e4ba6 the same
numbers hold. The hold gives the loop the target as its grid, so it
yields to SAFETY-95's drain tail, and any other claim that moves the
command ends it.
- F3, a charge refusal in a cheap run was never probed: the SAFETY-73 pin
stands only while the site asks that way, and nothing asked to charge.
Probing was chosen over changing the card: the probe is 200 W for 34 s
each 15 min under the same peak gates, and it wins back the run. In its
probe window the refusing battery is a charger, pinned at 200 W by its
own claim, and the others rest. A monthly drain (SAFETY-78) still comes
first, and with a day plan a probing Leftover solar battery goes only to
its planned level. At one inverter SAFETY-52 already ends a charge
refusal as soon as the house asks for power.
- Not fixed, same on e3e4ba6: with lagged readings a headroom-sized quarter
banks up to 1.4 W over the aim (48.6 W under the cap), and a battery
reading older than the meter can make a charge start look like a house
over the aim, a real guard stop.
- Review: an unmeasured stop that never latched let a headroom missing
every other cycle flip the charge 1799 times in 30 min, so the second one
in a quarter latches (at most 4 changes a quarter). A house that rises
1, 2 or 3 kW as the charge ends, from 30 s into the quarter to 15 s
before its end (two inverters, lagged readings): the hold adds at most
+33 W to that quarter against the loop without it, and the most any
quarter banks is 3431 W with the charge sized to the aim (3450 W; the cap
is 3500 W), 3456 W with a slow 8 s battery (the lag's own, the same on
e3e4ba6). The import during the hold is the rise, below the charge's
own, and a rise past that is the peak floor's, which ends the hold.
A maintenance drain, hold or charge that starts during the hold ends it
on that tick (replayed at edge + 3 s).
- OPT-20 (TEST-23 OPT-15 g7, `test_opt20.py`): a probe asks only PROBE_W.
The trade was sized at the probing battery's rating (2500 W), B's pin held
200 W of it, and the allocator put the other 2300 W on A, in its
maintenance charge phase (no mode range there, so nothing kept it out):
grid 3100 W for 34 s. Now the ask is PROBE_W for the probing battery plus
what the other chargers would have had without the probe (none: 200 W
alone), and it carries the pin only on the ticks the pin is filed (the
window's first and last cycle moved another battery's share by 200 W).
- Chosen: the probe sits on top of a headroom-sized charge, so beside a
normal charger its command is the same and the grid rises 200 W (about
7 W on the quarter) rather than that charger giving 200 W up. A probe
that the headroom or the bound cannot hold at 200 W is not filed.
- Unchanged, same on bf9019e: with a charge ask the other batteries cannot
give (one sign), so an idle-looking A that gives the house stops for the
window and the grid rises by what it gave. The trade line now says 200 W
for a probe alone; its words are UX-38's. The base P4 F4 path (a normal
trade on a battery in maintenance charge) is not touched.
## P4: the solar forecast and the day plan (2026-09-29)
- Input: a Home Assistant forecast sensor (`pv_forecast_entity`, kWh left
today; `pv_forecast_tomorrow_entity` optional), read by `app/solarfc.py`.
Supported shapes: Forecast.Solar (state only), Solcast (`detailedForecast`)
and Open-Meteo Solar Forecast (`wh_period`). The unit is read, not guessed;
older than 3 h is stale (one missed hourly poll must not flag it).
- Trust: `solar_trust_pct`, default 70 (owner answer 5).
- House use: nothing the add-on recorded fitted. `tariff.db` holds grid
import per quarter, which the batteries shape. So `dayplan.HouseProfile`
keeps grid + battery per local hour for 7 days in the store
(`house_profile`), median per hour. It is net of the solar the house used,
so the solar sum never takes it below the night median. Solar readings are
not used (TEL-11). The first plan needs one day of it.
- Verdict (`dayplan.plan()`): trust x sum max(0, forecast - house) x 0.95
until the expensive run the cheap run is for. Solar first takes it first.
- Leftover solar may then charge from the grid up to min(ceiling, floor +
the house's use in the expensive runs / 0.95), less its sun share: only
the shortfall.
- Cheap hours only ignores the plan and fills to the ceiling (design
section 1; review of #156, see the replay below).
- Solar first never charges from the grid (owner, 2026-09-29).
- The level is kept unless it moves by min(1 kWh, 10 %). With no plan
(no, stale or failed forecast, no house profile, no capacity) every mode
is P3 option A exactly: `test_modes_p4.py` part 1 pins 12 digests from
5a4cdc2 (modes on, with and without an unavailable forecast).
- The plan is made with the runs (every 15 min, or at once when the forecast
comes or goes). A lost forecast drops the levels at the next cycle.
- Not done: the design's scaling by measured solar from 10:00 (it needs the
solar readings TEL-11 keeps out), the HA `goodwe_<inv>_plan` sensor, and
FCST-01.
- Replay (`tools/opt11p4_replay.py`, 16 recorded days, Solar first + Leftover
solar, net EUR, lower is better; site solar rebuilt from the recording,
forecast errors from Elia's day-ahead Belgian solar forecast):
- year-earlier hourly prices: P2 19.33, P3 option A 19.44, old one-period
trade 18.14, P4 19.15 (perfect forecast 19.14, 1.5 x too high 19.16,
missing 19.44);
- the days' real 2026 quarter-hourly prices (held out): P2 32.26, option A
32.01, old trade 31.40, P4 29.19 (perfect 29.21, too high 29.28, missing
32.01).
- Solar first + Cheap hours only, skipping its sun share (the first
build): 19.57 (same as P3) and 29.72 against P3's 29.41. The shorter,
moved runs left B lower, so later midday top-ups rested A while the sun
shone. Cheap hours now ignores the plan, which is P3 exactly.
- A forecast of no sun at all gives 19.14 and 29.33. So nearly all of the
gain is Leftover solar buying the evening's shortfall in the cheap run;
the forecast itself was worth 0.14 EUR in 16 September days.
- Bias: the site's solar is rebuilt from the same net use the replay
plays, and "recorded" keeps its hourly shape and adds only the national
daily error. Both favour P4; "national" (no house leakage) gives 29.25.
No threshold was tuned to these days. The 2026-09-24 PV recording could not
be replayed: it is only in the live Home Assistant.
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
# OPT-17 - the solar forecast from several entities, summed
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_opt17.py`. Two options added.
A site whose forecast comes as several Home Assistant sensors (one per
inverter or roof side) had to build a template sensor to sum them. Now each
day can list them.
## Options
- `pv_forecast_entities` and `pv_forecast_tomorrow_entities`: lists of
sensors, default `[]`, the same shape as `pv_entities`.
- `pv_forecast_entity` and `pv_forecast_tomorrow_entity` are unchanged. An
install that uses them needs no edit.
- **Why new keys, not "string or list" in the old ones.** Measured on
Supervisor 2026.08.0 by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §J, as TEL-12's
§G did for `pv_entity`. Declared as a list, each forecast key refuses the
string an install already stores (`Invalid list for option
'pv_forecast_entity'`), and a `[]` default does not rescue it. The one
spelling that takes both, `match(.*)?`, also takes the integer 417 and
shows a plain text box, so a second sensor cannot be added in the UI.
- §J also shows: a 0.17.0 blob validates unchanged with the lists at `[]`;
the lists render as repeatable fields; a downgrade drops them and keeps
the single keys.
- `[]` in `options:` is load-bearing, as for `pv_entities`.
## Rules
1. **One key per day.** Setting the single key and the list for the same day
is refused at start, with one message: keep the list, clear the single one.
The list can hold that entity too. (TEL-12 lets `pv_entities` replace
`pv_entity` with a caution row. Here the brief asked for a refusal: a
doubled or dropped forecast changes what a battery buys, and no install
has both keys yet, so the refusal breaks nothing.)
2. **Each member in its own unit.** Every member is read as one forecast
sensor is today (`solarfc._day()`): Wh, kWh or MWh, never guessed. Then the
day's kWh are added up. A repeated id counts once.
3. **One member not usable means the day is not usable.** Missing,
unavailable, unknown, stale, not an energy unit, or a bad number: that
day's sum is not used, exactly as when the single sensor reads that way.
No today means no forecast (P3 option A). No tomorrow means today only.
4. **Hourly split.** If every member has a split, the splits are joined
(overlapping periods add up). If any member has none, the sum is spread
over the bell, as for a state-only sensor.
5. **Time.** The forecast is as old as its oldest member.
6. **One read.** All members of both days are read in one gather, inside the
gather that reads the inverters, so a slow sensor does not delay control.
7. **Shown and logged once.** With two or more members, each one not usable
is named on the status page by its place in the list (STYLE.md: no entity
ids on the page), as a caution row titled "Solar forecast" on Home. The
action log names the entity id, once when the set of failing members
changes.
8. **One member is the single key.** A one-member list reads, plans, shows
and logs exactly as the single key with that entity.
## Why
- A partial sum is a smaller number that looks real. Two of three inverters'
forecasts read as a duller day, and Leftover solar would then buy grid
energy the sun was going to give. TEL-12 took the same rule for the same
reason. No forecast is a known state with a tested fallback.
- The bell for a mixed list: joining one member's hours with another's total
has no honest shape, and the bell is the existing state-only rule.
## Cost
- One flaky member costs the whole day's forecast. A site with three
sensors loses the plan more often than one with a template sum that hides
gaps.
- Two more options (85).
## What this does not cover
- No weighting or calibration per member; FCST-01 is still the own forecast.
- Members on different integrations with different refresh times: each must
be fresh (3 h) on its own; there is no wait for a lagging one.
- The day plan itself, the trust and the house profile are unchanged.
- The Batteries screen still says only "no solar forecast now". The member
is named on the status page.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# OPT-23 and OPT-28 - the day plan counts the sun right, and the night charge covers the expensive-hour shortfall
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_opt23_28.py`.
`dayplan.plan()` now buys, for Leftover solar batteries, what the house uses in the expensive hours less the sun counted for each hour, shared by capacity, and reads a state-only forecast from now for every span (OPT-23).
- **Shortfall.** `sum_h max(0, house_h - trust x sun_h)` over every expensive hour, `/ EFF`, from the floor. It replaces the use over the run with no sun counted, which on a day and night tariff bought for the whole day (G1, `reports/UX-69-design-report.md`). The sun before the run is unchanged. A run with its dear hours after sunset gives the old number.
- **House use.** An hour with sun is read at no less than the night base, as the sun sum reads it (the profile is net of the sun). An hour without is read as measured. An hour with no forecast counts no sun.
- **Several batteries.** One total, shared by capacity with the ceiling passed on (`dayplan._spread()`). With the same floor and ceiling for all, they reach the ceiling together, so a shortfall that one battery cannot hold fills both to the same level, not one first. More than all hold: all go to the ceiling, `Plan.uncovered_kwh` is the rest, carried by the grid (OPT-36 counts the other batteries first), as the screen says.
- **Cheap hours** still fills up; **Solar first** still never charges from the grid. The mode help says so.
- **OPT-36 (0.20.1):** Cheap hours and Solar first batteries give first; Leftover solar shares only the rest of the shortfall (`dayplan._cheap_give_kwh()`, `_solar_first_give_kwh()`). A Cheap hours battery counts the level its charge reaches: the cheap run, then later slots still worth charging in and no dearer than any slot from the expensive hours on, under the peak aim, x EFF stored. A Solar first battery counts what is left after the house's use until the hours start, each hour at no less than the night base. Live, 2026-11-02: A at 60 % went to 95 % while B at 94 % covered the hours. Owner, 2026-11-02: Solar first counts too. Test: `test_opt36.py`.
- **Not done:** the run length (OPT-25). On a dynamic tariff the Cheap hours count guesses where control will charge; a counted slot can still go unused, and that gap comes from the grid.
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
# OPT-27 - the night plan keeps the last fresh forecast
**Status: done on `release/1.0`, not released.** Tests: `test_opt27.py`.
**The defect.** A today sensor is stale after 3 h (`FRESH_S`) or when it is from
before local midnight. Forecast.Solar stops updating in the evening, so at night
every Forecast.Solar site had no forecast: a price mode's night cheap run needed
1.5x the cycle cost (TARIFF-24 round 2) and Leftover solar planned nothing.
Separately, one missed poll (`unavailable`) dropped the forecast at once.
**Where: `solarfc`, not the plan.** The last fresh reading of each sensor is
kept in `solarfc.Hold` and `read_sum()` uses it when a sensor has none. A hold
at the plan (`_wx_track`/`weather_held`) can only keep the 1.5x gap off. The
day plan, Leftover solar's levels, Home and the Forecast tab all read
`Controller.solar_fc`, so one kept forecast makes control and every screen agree
(UX-53) with no second rule to keep in step. `weather_held()` is unchanged: it
still keeps a run under way when a read is lost.
**The rule** (`Hold.stand_in()`). A kept reading is for one day. It covers a
sensor that is missing or stale, never one with a bad value or unit, and:
- for up to `FRESH_S` when the sensor is missing: a short outage, any time of day;
- from the end of the bell (20:00 local, `BELL_TO_H`) until local midnight, if the
reading is at most `KEPT_MAX_AGE_S` (12 h) old when used; after midnight the
tomorrow figure is today's until the bell starts (06:00), up to 15 h old
(OPT-34 changed this from midnight + 3 h);
- the day it is for: a today figure only on that day, a tomorrow figure as
tomorrow until midnight and, if the today sensors are still stale, as today's
until 06:00 (all sensors of the sum are needed, as for any sum);
- until the next fresh reading, which replaces it at once.
So a figure is never used for another day and never older than 12 hours (`KEPT_MAX_AGE_S`), except the morning case above: a 17:05 reading serves until 06:00 (12 h 55 min), a 09:05 reading only until 21:05. Until OPT-34 the figure ended at 03:00, and a charge under way lost its level there; OPT-34 closes that limit.
Daytime is as before: a sensor that stopped is stale after 3 h, and no forecast
all day is still no forecast (the night run still needs 1.5x).
**Where it is stored.** The controller's store, key `solar_fc_hold`, so an
evening restart keeps it. It is written when a reading's figure changes or
every 15 min (`SAVE_EVERY_S`), not on every poll. A damaged entry is dropped.
**The screens.** `Forecast.kept` is true when a reading older than `FRESH_S` is
in use; the forecast line then reads "Solar forecast read 17:05, kept for
tonight." (`home_words.solar.kept`, EN and NL). The event log says
"read, kept from 17:05".
**Not changed.** Control with modes off: it does not use the forecast. The
screens still show the line, so it says "kept", not "used for the plan". A
forecast that stays fresh. The hold does not look at the weather, only at the clock and the day.
**OPT-38 (2026-11-07).** A kept TOMORROW reading (at most `KEPT_MAX_AGE_S` old, same `day0`) now stands in at any hour, not only from `BELL_TO_H`: one sensor that stopped at 14:54 had dropped the whole sum (OPT-17) from 17:54 to 20:00. Today readings and the OPT-34 morning rules are unchanged; `test_opt38.py`.
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
# OPT-34 - the night charge keeps its level when the kept forecast ends
**Status: done on `release/1.0`, not released.** Tests: `test_opt34.py`.
**The defect** (OPT-27 rig test, F-1). The kept evening figure ended at midnight + 3 h.
With the sensors silent from 17:05 the Leftover solar battery's level went with
it in the middle of the charge: A ended at 49.8 % against 79.9 % with a fresh
figure. Whether Forecast.Solar refreshes after midnight on a live site is not
known, so the add-on does not depend on it.
**The rule.**
1. *A charge under way keeps its level* (`Controller._latch_charge()`). While
there is a forecast (fresh or kept), each battery that charges from the grid in the
cheap run takes its planned level into a latch (store key `night_charge_latch`).
With no forecast, `plan_targets()` gives the latched level, and the wide
no-forecast gap does not refuse the next slice of the run (`weather_held()`,
as TARIFF-24 does for the run under way). While a
forecast is there the latch follows the plan, up or down as a fresh figure moves
it. It lasts through every cheap run on and one price slot after the last, and it
ends at once when its end time passes, whatever the run state (it is also
ignored at a restart if it has ended). A battery that is switched off or
changed to another mode leaves it.
*Night bound (manager's call, 2026-10-31):* a run carries the latch on only if
it starts by the bell start (06:00 local) after the latch began; that run
finishes, plus one slot. Chosen over a fixed 12 h because the night tariff
(22:00-07:00) needs the 06:00-07:00 slice and 12 h from a late start would
reach into the day. With dynamic prices a chain of cheap slots cannot carry a
night's level into the next day.
2. *The evening's tomorrow figure is today's until the bell starts*, 06:00 local
(`BELL_FROM_H`, `solarfc._bell_start()`), not until midnight + 3 h.
Nothing has been produced yet, so it is still the whole day.
3. *Up to 15 h old for that case only* (`KEPT_MORNING_MAX_AGE_S`): a 17:05
reading is 12 h 55 min old at 06:00. It must have been at most 12 h old at
midnight, so a 09:05 reading, unusable since 21:05, does not come back for five
minutes after midnight. Same-day figures and the daytime rule keep 12 h and 3 h.
4. A fresh figure replaces the kept one at once, as before.
*Rig F-1 fix:* once every today sensor has given a fresh reading after
midnight, the evening figure is no stand-in for that day any more
(`Hold.replaced()`). When that reading goes stale (3 h), it is kept or not
as any today reading (OPT-27), so it is "no forecast" at night and the latch
keeps the level it set; the older 17:05 figure never comes back. Rig: A
stopped at 69.5 % after a brighter 02:00 figure, then charged back to 94.4 %
from 05:15 when the 17:05 figure returned. Test: `test_opt34.py` F-1.
**Step 1 alone is enough for the owner's shape, steps 2-3 are still needed.**
With the window put back to midnight + 3 h the owner's night still ends as a
fresh figure ends it (A 86.9 %, B 95.0 %), because the charge had started at
22:00. But a charge that has not started by 03:00 (the price dips at 04:00, or
the headroom is taken) has no level to latch: A ends at 38 % against 78 %. The
plan, the screens and a restart also need the figure itself.
**Screens.** "Solar forecast read {at}, kept for tonight." is still true until
06:00 and unchanged. After the figure ends, with a charge still going on: "No
solar forecast now. The charge under way goes on to its planned level." /
"Nu geen zonneprognose. De lopende lading gaat door tot het geplande niveau."
(`home_words.solar.latched`, only while a cheap run is on and a latched battery is below its level).
**Not used.** A figure over 15 h old; a morning figure at night (12 h); a figure
for another day; a bad value or unit; and no latch for a charge that has not
started, for a battery that is not charging, or after the cheap runs have ended
(plus one slot).
**Not changed.** Charge sizing, the peak guard, Cheap hours, modes off, arbitrage.
A fresh figure that LOWERS the level during a charge still lowers it, as before.
**Mutants** (all red in `test_opt34.py`): no latch; window back to midnight + 3 h;
15 h without a limit; no "usable at midnight" rule; the latch without the narrow
gap, without its save, or not kept through the next run; the window 6 h after
midnight instead of 06:00 local (DST); 15 h cut to 12 h; the new screen line off or shown without a cheap run; no expiry check; no pruning of a changed mode; no night bound; a left-the-plan battery keeping its level; no `replaced()` check (F-1); `replaced()` with one of several today sensors (any, not all).
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
# PRICE-01 - the owner's price server as the price source, with fallbacks
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_price_service.py`. One option added,
`price_service_token` (password). Follows [[TARIFF-10]], whose section 4 this
card answers for one provider. Design: the owner's price service note of
2026-10-05. Owner go 2026-10-05 and 2026-10-14.
## What it is
`price_provider: price_service` reads `GET https://prices.kammenstraatha.duckdns.org/v1/dayahead/BE`
with `Authorization: Bearer <token>`. The answer is the energy-charts layout
plus `covers`, so the existing columnar parser reads it. The price is wholesale
energy only; the framework adds markup and taxes, as for `generic_dayahead`.
## Rules
1. **The host is a constant in the plugin**, declared as its only egress host,
HTTPS only. The operator's `price_feed_url` is not read by this provider.
*Cost:* every client talks to the one host, and moving the server is a new
add-on version. *What replaces the per-site setting:* the egress allow-list,
TLS, and a token per client that the server can revoke.
2. **The chain is server, then energy-charts, then the saved prices**
(`app/price_chain.py`). A step counts only if it has a price for *now*: a
server that answers with old prices is skipped like one that is down. A step
down and a step up are each one log line, written when the step changes. The
operator's `price_feed_url` is cleared for the energy-charts step, which is
asked for its own feed.
3. **The saved prices are `/data/price_history.json`**, the file `PriceHistory`
already keeps (the last three Brussels days of what was published). They are
the all-in prices as stored; a change of markup shows from the next fetch
that works. A read from the store is not filed again.
4. **No price for now** means no published price covers the present moment. Not
"none for the coming hours": before about 13:00 tomorrow's prices are not
published on any healthy day, and carried hours are already marked estimated.
It sets one status row (*Prices*), one Home plan line (English and Dutch),
and one notification (*No prices*, English and Dutch), taken down when a
price returns. A start-up before the first refresh finished is not a gap.
The notification is not re-asserted after a Home Assistant core restart
(SAFETY-34 does that for latched safety alarms); the status row stays.
*Open for the owner:* if "coming hours" should mean a look-ahead of N hours,
that is a change to `gate_for()` and `PriceWatch`, not to the chain.
5. **The maintenance charge gate** (owner's decision, 2026-10-14): the charge may
run when the *current 15-minute price is at or below today's average*, today
being the Brussels day, computed from the provider's prices. This is the rule
the Home Assistant pair gave (`price_service.yaml`), so a site that moves from
the pair to the provider does not change when the maintenance charge runs.
It is not `TariffPlan.cheap_now()` (strictly below the mean of the firm
hours of the whole plan). This replaces, for this provider only,
TARIFF-10 section 4: its three reasons are answered as follows. (1) Two
writers: the pair beside a provider stays refused; `static_profile` beside
`price_service` is accepted and no longer writes `cheap`. (2) An expired or
absent plan shuts the gate (the charge waits), as an unavailable HA sensor
did. (3) The basis is the one above, not `cheap_now()`.
6. **The token is a secret.** `password?` in the schema; hidden on the settings
page (`uilayout.HIDDEN`), which can keep `price_service` but not choose it;
never put in a message by the plugin; taken out of any reason text by
`price.scrub()`; the real transport reports only a status or an exception's
name. validate.py refuses `price_service` with no token, a token with a
space or line break, and one under 16 characters (so `scrub()`, which skips
values under 4 characters, always has something to take out). Round 2: the
token is in no page and no JSON answer of the web app. Every `password`
option of the schema is shown as `********` (set) or empty, in
`/config/model` (`options`, `running`, `ui`) and in a stale refusal; the
classic page draws it as a password field; a save or a validate that sends
`********` or nothing keeps the stored value, any other value replaces it.
A token can therefore be changed but not cleared from the page.
7. **A fixed tariff beside `price_service` is allowed and quietly noted.** It is
still the plan's last fallback (`resolve_tariff` -> `_degrade`); only the
cheap window and the gate ignore it, because they read the provider's
prices. Keeping it set is the recommended setup, and clearing it triggers the
"static_profile is empty" warning, so no notification (round 2's *Fixed
tariff not used* was false and fired on every sound start; round 3 removed
it). Instead one INFO line at start (English, as every log line) and an info
note beside the setting (EN and NL, "With the price service, the fixed
tariff is only used if no prices are available."), both
only with a non-blank `static_profile` (whitespace counts as blank). At
start the add-on dismisses the old notification id, in case a pre-release
build raised it.
8. **The no-price words show only with the maintenance charge on** (owner,
2026-10-14): the status row, the Home line and the notification say
'maintenance waits', so with `maintenance_enabled` off none is shown.
## Where the gate equals the Home Assistant pair, and where it does not
Equal: `test_price_service.py` section 8 feeds the same day both ways, to the
rules in `price_service.yaml` (price at the quarter, average of today's
quarters rounded to 0.00001 EUR/kWh, `<=`), over 6 days including both
clock-change days, at three instants in every period, and through a real
`Controller` for a whole day. Every answer is the same.
Not equal, by design or by arithmetic:
- The comparison is made on all-in prices. With a flat taxes figure and a
markup and taxes of at most five decimals the offset cancels and the answer
is the same. With `price_taxes_profile` (an hour-varying levy) the all-in
prices differ by hour, so the answer can differ from the wholesale comparison
the HA sensors made. A site on that profile should check before moving.
- A quarter within 0.00001 EUR/kWh of the average can differ if markup or taxes
have more than five decimals.
- The plan is retired when no refresh has succeeded for 90 minutes
(`TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`) and the gate shuts then. How long the HA pair kept an
answer after its REST sensor stopped updating was not measured here.
- The average is over the firm prices the provider holds for today. After a
restart in the middle of a day with only the saved part of today, it is the
average of that part.
## Not covered
- **No real answer of the server was seen.** No token was available. The
layout is the design's; `test_price_service.py` uses a mock and, for the
parser, the real energy-charts capture reshaped with the design's extra keys.
The first capture from the live server (rig test) should replace the mock.
- The 429 limit (about 60 calls an hour) is not approached: one fetch per
30 minutes, and at most two requests when the server fails.
- Battery modes read the plan as for `generic_dayahead` and were not changed.
- The `price_service` REST and template sensors in Home Assistant are not
touched; they stop being read when the pair is cleared.
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
# PRICE-02 - the trading verdict skips price periods that have ended
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_price02.py`. Found by AUDIT-01 (F1).
The refresh floors the plan to the top of the hour, so on the 15-minute feed
it holds the periods of this hour that are already over. The verdict took the
cheapest and dearest over every point. With modes off it could aim at a period
that had passed and then do nothing, for up to 45 min plus the refresh lag.
With modes on the `allowed()` gate could be open only because of such a period.
Decision: `TariffPlan.arbitrage(now=...)` drops the points whose period has
ended (`end <= now`, the span `price._cover_table()` gives, as
`priceruns.firm_slots()` does). Its three callers pass their own `now`:
`arbitrage.decide()`, `Controller._mode_roles()` and `homeview.trade_verdict()`.
- Taken in the verdict, not when the plan is built: a plan built at 03:00 is
still used at 03:20, and the Home chart keeps the day's earlier bars.
- An hourly point that is still current stays in. But an hourly or static plan
is rebuilt every 30 min counted from add-on start, so it is usually off the
hour and, until the next refresh, holds the hour that has just ended. That
hour is dropped too (round 3, owner-accepted 2026-10-22). On a day/night
tariff all day hours tie and the old verdict took the first, the ended one,
so it paused the trade every hour until the refresh: 91 on/off changes over
2 days with the refresh at :10, 4 now (4 before as well, with the refresh on
the hour). With the refresh on the hour nothing changes.
- `now` is required: keyword-only, no default, like the other three arguments. A
caller that could leave it out would get the elapsed periods back and the
defect with them. A test that wants the whole series passes an instant before it.
- The sentences of this verdict in `arbitrage.py` (status row and action log,
English only) say "price period" where they said "hour": the idle one now
reads "now is not the cheapest or the dearest price period". The UI texts
that say "cheapest hour" (AUDIT-01 T1-T5) are not touched here.
- Not changed here: F2 (static profile sampled at HH:00) and F3 (carried value).
Measured: with price off, every command over the modes-off replay is
byte-identical. On a static tariff rebuilt on the hour it is too; rebuilt 20
min off the hour the commands differ (digest 79f06d6381ff3358 on release/1.0,
18de19d9fe919fe5 here), for the reason above. On the dynamic replay every command is
the same too; only a sale's sentence quotes a smaller "above the cheapest"
figure once the first cheap period is over. The identity pins in
`test_modes_p3.py` and `test_price_run_fixes.py` hide just that figure and the
word change (`opt11p3_identity.trade_digest()`).
## Ties (round 2)
The verdict takes `min`/`max` over the points still ahead and the first one wins
a tie, so with equal prices it is the first period still ahead, which is the
current one. Before, it was the first of the whole plan, often one that had
ended. Two effects follow, and both are the card's intent, not a side effect:
- Equal quarters (hour-constant data, or a feed that prints the same price in
several quarters) now act in every quarter of the cheap (or dear) block,
not in the first only. Test: `test_price02.py` part 6.
- After the cheapest period has passed, the next cheapest still ahead is the
target, if its spread still clears the cost. A hourly plan did this at every
refresh already (it started at the current hour); a 15-minute plan did it
only from the next hour on, because it kept the elapsed quarters of this one.
Measured with `scratch/PRICE-02/dev/tiesim.py` (refresh every 30 min from the
floored hour, verdict at 7 min into each period, threshold 0.05, old = the
verdict over the whole plan, new = this card):
| data | days | acting periods old -> new | action changes old -> new |
|---|---|---|---|
| real 15-minute day, energy-charts 2026-09-09 | 1 | 4 -> 5 | 6 -> 6 |
| real 15-minute days 2026-09-09 and -10 | 2 | 14 -> 26 | 24 -> 24 |
| EPEX 2025-26 hourly prices as four equal quarters | 12 | 18 -> 72 | 36 -> 20 |
| the same with random +-0.002 noise per quarter (no ties) | 12 | 18 -> 33 | 36 -> 48 |
So a real 15-minute day does not switch more often (24 -> 24), and a day of
equal quarters switches less. A synthetic day of noisy, tie-free quarters does
(3.0 -> 4.0 changes a day): each period that passes hands the target to the
next cheapest one ahead. Every change is still at a period edge, never within
one. The replay in `test_arbitrage.py` (synthetic year, hourly) gives the same
ledger on the old and the new code once its ties are broken (280 round trips,
85 held, both): it printed one maximum twice per day, and the old fixture
tested the first of them only because its plan began at midnight.
## Battery throughput (round 3)
On real 15-minute days the trade runs longer: about 1.5 to 2.5 times the
minutes spent charging or discharging, with fewer on/off switches (for example
78 -> 68, 92 -> 72), over 16 days (2026-09-02 to 09-17, a decision every
minute, refresh at :00 or :10, tomorrow's prices known always or from 13:00;
reviewer's sim). Through a modelled 10 kWh battery that is 27.5 -> 42.6 kWh
(refresh at :00, tomorrow always known); 19.6-31.9 -> 43.4-48.7 kWh in the
other three variants. Charge to
discharge reversals are unchanged (10 -> 10, 13 -> 13). More cycling is the
price of not pausing.
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-07 - the quarter-peak projection guard (with SAFETY-24 and CFG-03)
**Status: SHIPPED.** Tests: `test_peakguard.py`. Written down by MAINT-20 from
the long module comment in `app/peakguard.py`, so the module can stay short.
Later changes have their own notes: [[SAFETY-25]], [[SAFETY-32]], [[SAFETY-45]],
[[SAFETY-79]], [[SAFETY-81]], [[SAFETY-87]], [[SAFETY-90]], [[SAFETY-125]],
[[SAFETY-126]].
## The hazard
The capacity tariff bills the month's single worst 15-minute average offtake,
with no averaging and no forgiveness. specs.md:583 records one 4998 W quarter
that moved a monthly peak from 4832 W to 5013 W and billed the whole month at
it. SAFETY-18 alarms on a frozen meter (`meter_freeze_s`, 300 s) but a frozen
meter can rail the command in 75 s (freeze.py's table, `max_w: 5000`, meter at
3000 W or more), against a 900 s quarter. The guard is the cap on that. It
reads freeze.py's `looks_frozen()`; it is not a second freeze detector.
## The mechanism: one `lo` limit at `P_PEAK`
specs.md 10.1 row 2 wants pre-emptive discharge near the limit and a hard clamp
on charging above it; 9.1 says discharge and export are never capped by the
peak guard. A lower bound on the setpoint is the only shape that does both: a
floor cannot stop the loop discharging harder (so 9.1 holds by structure), it
clamps charging when above the standing charge, and it forces discharge when
above zero.
- `P_PEAK` (50) is above `P_LOOP` (10) and below `P_MAINTENANCE` (60) and
`P_SAFETY` (100). arbiter clause 2 applies only limits at or above the
winning set's priority, so a P_SAFETY 0 W stop is not pulled off zero.
- A limit does not out-vote another limit: clause 2 takes the most restrictive
with no priority between limits. The floor (`lo >= 0`) and the maintenance
charge-only shaping (`hi <= 0`) therefore resolve to `lo > hi`, a
contradiction, which the arbiter answers with 0 W (battery parked in the
worst quarter). The rule for two crossing limits is suppression, not
priority: main.py drops the shaping while the guard is engaged
(`shaping_suspended()`). The floor is clamped to `achievable_w` to close the
only other crossing pair (the P_SAFETY rating bounds).
- Arbitrage arrives as a SET below `P_PEAK`, so clause 2 binds it with this
floor without any edit here (9.1: peak shaving outranks arbitrage).
## The floor is derived
With `projected = (acc + held * remaining) / 900`, the watts that must come off
the meter are `excess_w = 900 * (projected - ceiling) / remaining`, and the
floor is `floor_w = batt_w + excess_w`.
1. The claim is filed while the floor is positive, not while the excess is.
`excess` falls to zero as soon as the battery is already removing it, and a
guard that released there handed the actuator back and re-engaged next
cycle. The first cut did that on 2026-08-20's billed quarter: 17
engage/release cycles in 900 s, and the quarter still ended 49 W over.
Thresholding `batt_w + excess` (the offtake with the battery at zero, less
the level the quarter can afford) decays continuously, so there is no
hysteresis constant. 10.2: an EMS that oscillates is worse than none.
2. The gain 900/remaining is 1.0 at the start of a quarter and grows. The guard
is gentlest when its evidence is weakest. No minimum-evidence threshold was
added: it would delay the guard on a sustained rail from second zero.
3. `batt_w` is the measured battery power, not the command. The bill is what
flowed, and a floor built on the command winds up to the rail when the
inverter cannot follow; one built on the measurement stops rising when
delivery does.
## The ceiling
`ceiling_w = max(peak_cap_w, the month's banked peak)`. Once a month's peak
stands at 5013 W, holding later quarters to 3500 W buys nothing. Only an
`OBSERVED` reading may raise it; `NO_RECORD` and `NOT_OBSERVED` leave it at
`peak_cap_w`, so a peak store that cannot be read makes the guard stricter,
never looser. That is also why the guard does not use `headroom_w()`: a peak
read as 0 W returns full headroom, which is a guard that is not there.
SAFETY-79 aims `peak_margin_w` under the ceiling; the ceiling stays the real
limit for reports and the bill.
## Blindness comes first
The projection is graded only if the quantity under it was measured. Three
ways it was not, checked before grading:
- No open block: a fresh averager answers an all-zero `Projection`, which sits
under every ceiling. That is "no quarter", not "the quarter is fine".
- Coverage: a meter gap longer than `max_hold_s` leaves seconds the averager
does not accumulate (holding a dead meter's value forward is how a fabricated
peak gets onto a permanent record), so the projection reads low. The
threshold is `max_hold_s`, not a new number. SAFETY-90 fills gaps once
readings return.
- Frozen: samples keep arriving, coverage is perfect and the projection is a
confident zero while the real meter is at the rail.
The blind action is `floor_w = 0.0`: no importing while the billed quantity
cannot be observed. It is one-directional (forbidding charge only lowers
offtake), so a false blindness costs a charge and never pack energy.
## Why it trips where SAFETY-18 only notifies
The healthy-day false-engagement rate is zero (2026-08-23, 95 quarters;
test_peakguard.py re-measures it from the committed capture). The action is
level-triggered and unlatched: it is re-derived each cycle and releases when the
projection drops, so a false engagement costs one cycle, not a parked battery.
It is a limit, so every safety stop outranks it. It is the only guard whose
trigger is the billed quantity itself.
## Saturation is reported, not alarmed as a bug
10.3 treats an out-of-range setpoint as a bug (SAFETY-03). A peak floor above
the inverter rating is not: it is a 5900 W house on a 5000 W inverter (2026-08-20
15:45). The floor is clamped to `achievable_w`, the decision carries
`saturated`, and main.py raises one notification.
## SAFETY-24: the energy backstop the guard shipped without
The graded branch can force discharge (878 Wh in a day on the 2026-08-20 replay)
and nothing below it consulted the state of charge; the BMS was the only
backstop, which protects the pack and not the operator. `decide()` now takes
`soc` and `soc_floor` and `discharge_permitted()` answers.
1. Not a trip. When it binds, the guard stops asking for more discharge and
commands nothing; every stop in 11.2 still outranks it.
2. The action is `floor_w = 0.0` (forbids charging, forbids nothing else). A
`lo` limit cannot cap discharge, and a negative floor would destroy that.
The loop is not bounded: self-consumption may still drain the pack past the
floor. [[SAFETY-25]] measured it (2026-08-20, 19:00-22:00 UTC, 830 W mean:
the pack ends at the BMS floor, 10.0 %, whatever `peak_soc_floor` is) and the
owner decided on 2026-09-02 that the BMS stays the only backstop for
demand-driven discharge, a loop-side reserve being deferred to ALLOC-01.
3. Graded only after `wanted > 0`, where a forced discharge is asked for.
4. An unreadable SoC is not a full battery. `soc=None` and `soc_floor=None` are
floor-limited. Both arguments are required keyword-only, no default (TEST-14).
5. Failing to shave is not silent: `floor_limited=True` and one notification.
It excludes `saturated`, since it asks for nothing.
The action log says "the peak reserve", not "the SoC floor": `peak_soc_floor`
(“Peak reserve”) bounds this guard only, and the wider words would contradict
a loop that is draining the pack at that moment.
## CFG-03: two options, mirrored once
- `peak_soc_floor` is the EMS floor, not `maintenance_soc_floor` (the monthly
recalibration's drain target); sharing a key would couple features whose
right values differ. Default 20: the reference pack is 300 Ah at 51.2 V,
DoD 90, 13.8 kWh usable; the replay's 878 Wh is 6.4 %; a floor 10 points above
the 10 % cut-out leaves about 1.6 worst days of room.
- `bms_soc_floor` is the pack's own cut-out (register 0x0560, 10 on the
reference unit). It exists so validate.py rule 8 can refuse a
`peak_soc_floor` at or below it.
- Both defaults live once in `PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS` (TARIFF-02's pattern),
imported by validate.py and main.py and pinned to config.yaml by the test.
The module reads no option itself.
- `maintenance_soc_floor` is the ambiguous name of the two. Decision: keep it,
carry the distinction in DOCS.md; revisit if a third floor appears.
- SAFETY-07 itself added no option: `peak_cap_w` was already validated
`int(500,15000)`, and 14's `capacity_peak_limit_kw` stays declined (a kW key
beside a W key is the mismatch trap).
## Per-pack floors (SAFETY-32) and phases
`bms_soc_floor` became a roster key; `pack_floor_pct()` conjoins it with the
site's EMS floor, and rule 8 names the unit it refuses. `peak_soc_floor` stayed
one number for the site, so with cut-outs of 10 and 18 the operator sets it
above 18; the per-pack EMS floor is the open question in [[SAFETY-32]]. The
`min()` over measured SoC (`Controller.pack_floor_soc`) is still right for the
site verdict; `pack_permissions()` is the per-pack answer.
Nothing here reads a per-phase quantity: the sum/max/net choice is an open
owner question, defaulted to NET inside `billed_w()`, so this file does not
change whichever way it is answered.
@@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-10 — shadow mode, and why "default-on" is not `true`
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-10`.
⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47, and three of the claims below were false when this
was merged.** §5's "the strategies are unaffected" exemption, §4's peak-guard
row and §6's evidence table are corrected in place and each correction is
marked. The amendments are marked rather than rewritten silently, because what
this card believed is part of why the defect shipped. See
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-47-what-a-shadow-run-can-show.md`.
**Card:** SAFETY-10 — *"Shadow mode (default-on, log-only decisions)"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No deployment, no `ha addons update`, no
contact with 192.168.2.158 or 192.168.2.221. Everything below was measured in
the CI image and on TEST-23 stage 3's closed-loop rig.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **"Default-on" is delivered as `auto`, not as `true`, and the difference is
an install that is regulating a real battery today.** The Supervisor
composes an add-on's options as *its defaults, overlaid with the stored user
options*, so a new key with a new default reaches **every existing install**
on the next update. A boolean `shadow_mode: true` would silently stop the
reference site. §1.
2. **Shadow mode WRITES. It writes 0 W, on the ordinary heartbeat, through the
ordinary single writer.** "Commands nothing" implemented as "stops writing"
would leave the inverter latched on whatever was standing — it has no meter
timeout — and would put the ESP32 into a tripped stale-input watchdog for
the whole run. §2.
3. **The sign watchdogs are inert, and that was the decision that had to be got
right.** Fed the shadow decision they would trip within `sign_disagree_s`
and **latch a trip that survives into live operation and a restart**. §4.
4. **The loop leg's shadow decision is one slew step, not a trajectory, and
that is a real limitation of this feature.** §5.
5. ⚠️ **SAFETY-47: and neither is anything else that depends on the plant
answering back. A shadow run cannot surface a closed-loop defect at all**,
by the same construction that makes it safe — the battery is held at 0 W, so
every measured input describes a plant that did not respond. Of the three
defects §"WHAT DEFECT THIS PREVENTS" was written for, exactly one —
TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour — is visible from a shadow run. §5, §6.
---
## 1. The default
### The literal reading, and what it costs
`config.yaml`'s `options:` block **is** the default. There is exactly one of it,
and HA's Supervisor resolves an add-on's effective options as
```
{**config.yaml options, **the stored user options}
```
A key that has never been stored therefore takes the file's value — on a fresh
install and on an install that has been running for months, identically. There
is **no mechanism in the add-on options system** by which one key can default
differently for the two. So the card's title, taken at face value, is:
> the next `ha addons update` stops the battery at the reference site, and the
> only symptom is a battery that has stopped doing anything.
That is strictly worse than every defect shadow mode exists to catch. It is
refused.
### What was shipped instead
`shadow_mode` is a three-valued `list(auto|on|off)` defaulting to `"auto"`:
| value | resolves to |
|---|---|
| `off` | live |
| `on` | shadow, always |
| `auto` | shadow **while control is stopped**; live once it is started |
`auto` reads `Controller.auto` — the persisted start/stop state, which a fresh
install takes from `auto_start` and which the *Start / stop control* button
moves. No new persisted state, no migration, no guess:
* a **fresh** install ships `auto_start: false`, has no stored `auto` key, and
therefore comes up **in shadow mode**. It observes a day of decisions before
it is ever allowed to command anything. That is the card's intent, delivered
where it is safe;
* an install that is **controlling** is started, so `auto` resolves to live and
**not one watt changes**;
* an install that is **stopped** keeps its actuator at 0 W exactly as before —
the same number, from the same writer, on the same heartbeat. What changes is
what the status page and the action log **say**, and that the decision path
now runs and is recorded.
⚠️ **Under `auto`, pressing Start leaves shadow mode.** That is the point of
`auto`: the button means "control the battery". An operator who wants the
decisions recorded *while the loop runs* — the configuration this card exists
to make possible — sets `on` explicitly, and cannot reach it by accident.
⚠️ **An unrecognised value resolves to SHADOW, and is REFUSED at startup.**
`shadow.mode()` fails toward inaction; `validate.py` rule 11 refuses the value
by name so the reinterpretation is never silent. A typo is not a decision, and
an install silently left in shadow mode commands nothing indefinitely while its
status page calmly explains that this is intentional.
---
## 2. "Commands nothing" is a number, not a silence
The inverter holds its last command **forever** — `HANDOVER.md` §6 says so, and
`firmware/goodwe-master.yaml`'s header records what it cost when a controller
stopped refreshing: *"Illusmart went silent mid-command and the inverter held
+5000 W for 113 s"*. `firmware/goodwe-master.yaml` states the contract that follows — *"HA
must now REWRITE the setpoint every ~10 s even when the value has not
changed"* — because without a refresh, **"stale" and "steady" are the same
thing on the wire**.
So shadow mode holds the actuator at `shadow.WIRE_W` = **0.0 W**, refreshed on
the ordinary heartbeat. Two consequences were weighed and are recorded:
* **it is not silence.** A shadow mode that stopped writing would leave the
standing command up until the ESP32's 30 s watchdog noticed — and at a site
with no such board, forever;
* **it does not use an alarm as a mode.** Letting that watchdog trip for the
duration of a shadow run teaches the operator that `wd_tripped` is normal,
which is exactly the training that makes it useless when the add-on has
actually died.
### It is not a second writer
SAFETY-28's rule is one actuator, one writer. Shadow mode files **no claim**,
owns **no transport**, and calls nothing in `hass.py`. It is a **substitution**
inside `Controller._write_unit()` — the single choke point every write in this
add-on already reaches, including the heartbeat, the stop button, `shutdown()`
and `maint_abort()` — in exactly the form of the three substitutions above it
(non-finite → 0 W, unauthorised → 0 W, clamped → the rating).
It is the **last** of them. Below SAFETY-28's gate and below SAFETY-03's clamp,
so both still grade the number the decision path actually produced, and a
shadow run can report *"it would have hit the rating here"*.
---
## 3. What the run records
| surface | what it carries |
|---|---|
| status banner | `SHADOW MODE - the battery is NOT being controlled...`, **first in the cascade**, amber — red, with the latch named, if one is standing |
| status row `Shadow mode` | which rung decided, the watts it **would have commanded on this cycle**, where the inverter actually is, and `Resolution.explain()` — plus, when a measured billed quarter sized those watts, SAFETY-47's caveat saying so (`shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER`) |
| status row `Commanded` | `0 W` — the truth, which the row above reconciles with the `Why` row below it |
| action log | one line when shadow mode comes on; one line per **change of decision** (winner, rounded watts, or SAFETY-47's caveat state), carrying the arbiter's own sentence and the same caveat the row carries — `shadow.log_line()` is the one sentence both read |
| MQTT | `status: shadow`, its own value, below `failsafe` |
The action log is **edge**-logged, not level-logged: the log holds 40 rows, and
a line per cycle would flush the context of the run's own findings inside four
minutes at the 15 s cycle floor.
---
## 4. The failsafes, one by one
| failsafe | in shadow mode | why |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-02/30 sign watchdogs | **INERT** | They grade `Inverter.standing_w()` — what this controller has standing on the wire — and shadow mode holds that at 0 W, so they cannot arm. ⚠️ Fed the shadow decision instead they would disagree with a meter that never saw it and **latch a trip that survives into live operation and a restart**: shadow mode would manufacture the failsafe it exists to help debug. ⚠️ **Two rungs hold it there** — `last_write` (the wire gate) and `inv.target` (the re-seed) — which is MUTATION.md's masking shape, so the mutation that reproduces the hazard defeats both as a pair (M6). Driven singly, dropping the re-seed does not reproduce it at all — measured |
| SAFETY-03 clamp | **OBSERVES** | Runs on the decision, sets `clamp_last`, logs every engagement. Changes no command |
| SAFETY-28 write gate | **OBSERVES** | Same placement, same reason: the question is who chose the number |
| SAFETY-18 meter freeze | **OBSERVES**, unchanged | It takes no action live either; both halves of its conjunction are as true in shadow |
| SAFETY-07/24/25 peak guard | **OBSERVES, AND SEES ONLY THE HOUSE** | Level-triggered, unlatched, files its claim as usual, so the recorded decision is the real one *for this meter*. ⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47.** This row used to end "SAFETY-45's limit cycle is visible from a shadow run, which is the point". It is not: every term of `wanted = batt_w + excess` is measured, and in shadow mode the battery contributes nothing to either. Measured on the rig, same hour, same unsized code — **410 of 720 cycles engaged live, 0 of 720 in shadow** |
| SAFETY-31 circulation | **OBSERVES AND MAY LATCH** | Its evidence is *measured* power. Packs pushing against each other while all are told 0 W is a real fault |
| SAFETY-42 delivery | **OBSERVES AND MAY LATCH** | Same, against a share that is 0 W |
| operator stop | **SUPPRESSED AS A CLAIM, ENFORCED AT THE WIRE** | The one deliberate change. Its `P_SAFETY` 0 W claim out-ranks everything, so leaving it in makes the recorded decision `"stopped"` on every cycle and the run answers the wrong question. The actuator ends at the same number either way, and the wire substitution is **strictly stronger**: a claim can be out-ranked, and it cannot |
| inputs missing, non-finite, allocator refusal, arbiter contradiction | **UNCHANGED** | All resolve to 0 W, which is what the wire gets anyway |
⚠️ **A latch that is already up stays up.** Nothing here clears one. The shadow
banner **names** any standing latch and goes red for it, because a latch that is
up while the controller is inert is up the moment it stops being inert.
⚠️ **Maintenance is not in that table because shadow mode does not touch it.**
The state machines are ticked on every cycle whether control is started or not,
so a stopped install already runs them against a battery that does not move.
Shadow mode inherits that, unchanged and unimproved. Recorded here rather than
quietly fixed under another card's name.
---
## 5. The limitation, stated rather than discovered later
`Controller._shadow_settle()` re-seeds the carried command (`self.target` and
each `inv.target`) to `WIRE_W` at the **end** of every shadow cycle — after
every in-cycle guard has read the decision. Three machines read that value as a
statement about the **hardware**: the loop's `prev_w` and integrator,
`standing_w()`, and SAFETY-42's share comparison. Re-seeded, they track reality,
and **the exit is safe by construction** — the carried command already equals
the standing one, so the first live cycle slews from 0 W like any other.
⚠️ **The cost is real.** The loop's `prev_w` is therefore 0 W on every shadow
cycle, so the loop leg's recorded decision is **one slew step from the standing
command** and stays there. A shadow run answers *"what would this controller
command NOW, from where the plant really is"* — a true statement about the
present — and **not** *"what trajectory would it have followed"*. The trajectory
is a closed-loop property, it did not happen, and reporting it would be a
simulation of a plant that does not exist; three cycles in, such a number
describes nothing.
⚠️ **AMENDED BY SAFETY-47 — THE PARAGRAPH THAT STOOD HERE WAS THE DEFECT.**
It read:
> The strategies are unaffected: arbitrage, the peak guard and maintenance all
> file `SET` claims at a fixed power from level-triggered inputs. That is why
> the three defects this card was written for — SAFETY-45's 28 onsets an hour,
> TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour, SAFETY-46's ceiling churn — are all visible
> from a shadow run, and the loop's ramp is not.
It was true until **SAFETY-45 merged, one commit before this card**. That
change makes the buy leg `min(asked, headroom)` with
```
headroom = (900 / remaining) x (ceiling - projected)
```
and `projected` reads the **open quarter's accumulator** — the meter — which is
a function of what the battery did earlier in that same quarter. The strategy
is closed-loop, and the loop's one-slew-step limitation above is not a special
case of anything: **it is the general case**, and the limitation is the whole
feature's, not the loop leg's.
**The correct statement, and it is now graded rather than asserted:**
> A shadow run cannot surface a **closed-loop** defect — one whose stimulus is
> the plant's response to the controller — because the battery is held at 0 W
> and there is no response to be the stimulus. **Which** hour a strategy picks
> and **why** are unaffected, because the clock and the price series are not
> functions of the battery. **How hard** it trades is not.
Of the three defects this card was written for:
| | visible from a shadow run? | measured |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-45's limit cycle | **no** | 28 charge onsets live, **1** in shadow; grid −455.5 … +3200.0 W live, **flat at the 1200 W house** in shadow; guard engaged 410/720 live, **0/720** in shadow |
| SAFETY-46's SoC churn | **no** | the SoC moves **0.000000000 pp** in a shadow run. No SoC limit can be *reached* in one |
| TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour | **yes**, and it is the one | which hour, at what price, clearing what spread: identical live and shadow on **720 of 720** charging cycles, at a binding cap |
Graded in `test_arbitrage.py` part **3d** — the same closed loop part 3c uses,
run once live and once in shadow — and the loop leg's own limitation stays
named in `test_watchdog.py` part 10 as `RECORDED LIMITATION`.
---
## 6. How "nothing reaches the inverter" is graded
**Not on a flag.** A check that asserted `Controller.shadow` would pass on a
build in which the flag is set and the substitution is deleted — which is
exactly mutation **M1**.
`test_clamp.py` part 8 drives the **shipped** `Controller.cycle()` and the
shipped heartbeat against a recording Home Assistant stub, and asserts on what
reached `set_number()`:
* **the precondition first** — the same stimulus with `shadow_mode: off` puts
30 non-zero writes on the wire, the largest 5000 W. MUTATION.md habit 4: a
check whose data cannot reach the failure it names is decoration;
* then `set(writes) == {0.0}`, **and** that there were 26 of them — a check
that only said "no non-zero write" would pass on the silent build too;
* entry and exit are measured on `inv.last_write` — what the inverter is
latched on, updated only on an **accepted** write — either side of the
boundary, against the same run that never entered shadow mode.
The closed-loop half is `/home/homelab/s10-mut/shadowloop.py` on TEST-23 stage
3's rig: the same hour, twice, against `plantsim.Plant` through the firmware's
own frame encoder.
⚠️ **SUPERSEDED BY SAFETY-47 — THE TABLE THAT STOOD HERE COULD NEVER HAVE GONE
RED, FOR TWO INDEPENDENT REASONS.** It read `arb_power_w` −2000 W *"identical"*,
`arb_reason` *"identical, verbatim"*, arbiter winner *"identical"*, and
concluded *"the decision happened, at the same instant, for the same reason, at
the same signed power — and the battery did not move."* The battery half is
true and is unchanged. The **decision** half was decoration:
1. **the fixture is `peak_cap_w: 15000` against a 350 W house**, so the
capacity guard never engages and SAFETY-45's sizing is in the run and inert.
The harness's own comment says so — *"at this scenario's `peak_cap_w: 15000`
it is not binding anyway"* — which is MUTATION.md habit 4 written down
beside the check it disables;
2. **every identity row reads the FIRST charging sample.** At `elapsed = 0`
the projection *is* the held level, so the two runs agree to the float there
**even at a cap that does bind**. Measured: closing reason (1) alone leaves
that comparison passing.
Both had to be closed. Re-taken below at **`peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 /
`max_w` 2000**, one hour at a 5 s cycle, **across the whole run** — harness
`/home/homelab/s47-mut/shadowloop47.py`, same rig, same three transcribed
lines.
| | live | shadow |
|---|---|---|
| grid | 1224.1 … 1506.0 W — **held up at the ceiling** | **1200.0 W flat = the house, exactly** |
| SoC | 50.000019 → **51.856789 %** | 50.000000 → **50.000000 %** |
| `ARBITRAGE_CHARGE` cycles | 720 / 720 | **720 / 720** |
| first charging cycle, `arb_power_w` | −300.0000 W | **identical — and this is why the old table passed** |
| `arb_power_w`, **whole run** | −307.799 … −299.930 W | **−2000.000 … −300.000 W** |
| …cycles where the two differ | — | **716 of 720** |
| `arb_reason`, whole run | the strategy's own sentence | **differs on 719 of 720** |
| measured charging headroom | 299.93 … 307.80 W | **300.0 … 54 000.0 W** |
| final recorded command | **−302.4 W** | **−2000.0 W — 6.61× the live figure** |
| price / spread / which hour | | **identical on 720 of 720** |
| arbiter winner | `arbitrage` | **identical** |
**What the re-taken table says.** The decision still *happens*, at the same
instant, on the same hour, at the same price, for the same *kind* of reason,
and the battery still does not move — those were the card's real claims and
they hold. What does **not** hold is that the decision is the *same decision*:
its **size** is a function of a meter the battery never moved, and at this cap
the recorded figure is 6.61× what a live controller commands. 54 000 W of
"headroom" under a 1500 W ceiling is `900/remaining` multiplying a gap the
battery never closed.
⚠️ **And the SoC row is the second half of it.** 0.000000000 pp of movement is
not a curiosity: it is the proof that **no SoC-limit behaviour is reachable
from a shadow run at all**, which §5 used to promise.
SAFETY-47 puts the caveat on both surfaces that carry the number and narrows
the three documents' claims; `test_arbitrage.py` part 3d is the CI-side grader
so this class cannot recur.
⚠️ **Three lines of each harness are a TRANSCRIPTION and are marked as one.**
`priceloop.Rig` has no `_write_unit()`, no clamp and no failsafe machine
(divergence 2 of its README), so the substitution's **placement** is
transcribed there. The shipped placement is graded by `test_clamp.py` part 8,
which drives the real `Controller`. ⚠️ **And the rig's transcribed cycle
predates SAFETY-45**: `arbitrage.decide()` gained a required
`charge_headroom_w` after `478ba93`, and the harness supplies it from the
**shipped** `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` reading the **shipped** peak
decision rather than from a constant, so SAFETY-45 stays in the run.
---
## 7. The mutation battery — 22 mutations, no survivors
Harness: `/home/homelab/s10-mut/run.py`, backups beside it. Each run restores
from backup, purges `__pycache__` **on the host**, and grades through the CI
image with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter cannot write a cache
into the tree under test (TEST-15). The full table is in the branch report;
one per new behaviour, including **M1** (the substitution deleted — a write
escapes), **M2** (it returns instead of substituting — the inverter is left
latched), **M3** (it moves above SAFETY-28 and SAFETY-03 — the observers go
blind), **M8** (`auto` resolves to shadow unconditionally — the literal
default-on that stops the live install), **M12** (the stop claim is filed in
shadow — every recorded decision reads `stopped`), **M21** (the substitution
and the re-seed together) and **M22** (the re-seed moved one line earlier —
SAFETY-18 grades a 0 W no decision produced and goes permanently blind).
⚠️ **Two findings from driving it, both of the kind MUTATION.md says to expect.**
* **M2 first came back a SURVIVOR and was not one.** The "stop writing
altogether" build left `inv.last_write` as `None`, the check did `float()` on
it, and the section died with a `TypeError` — grading none of the checks
after it and reporting **zero reds**, which reads exactly like a survivor.
That is FCST-06's shape. The fixture now hands `None` back and names it as
its own check; M2 is red on three.
* **M6 had to become a PAIR, and only the battery said so.** `standing_w()`
prefers `last_write` — the 0.0 W the wire gate accepted — and falls back to
`inv.target`, which the re-seed also holds at 0.0. Either rung alone keeps
the detector inert, so dropping the re-seed **singly** came back red on the
limitation check and on **nothing about the latch**: the hazard it names was
not reproduced. TEST-16's rule with a new name on it.
* **M7/M8/M9/M19 had to MOVE SUITES.** They defeat `shadow.engaged()`, and a
defeated default stops `test_clamp.py` part 3's wired run reaching the wire
at all — aborting the file with an `IndexError` before part 8 is graded. The
red count there was a lower bound naming the saturation freeze. The mode
table now lives in `test_validate.py`, which drives no Controller.
* **`shadow_would_w = float(self.target)` is an EQUIVALENT mutation and was
measured as one.** `_shadow_settle()` runs before the re-seed, so at that
line `self.target` **is** `resolution.target_w`. It is recorded as equivalent
rather than reported as a survivor, and the non-equivalent form of the same
defect — the record becoming the **wire** — is driven instead.
### The table
Each row: the mutation, the file, the byte delta, the suite it was graded in,
and how many **named** checks went red. `⚠️` marks a row whose run did not
reach the end of its file, so its count is a **lower bound** (MUTATION.md).
| # | mutation | file | Δ | suite | reds |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | **a write escapes** — the substitution deleted | `main.py` | −6 B | clamp | 5 |
| M2 | **silence instead of 0 W** — it returns rather than substituting | `main.py` | −15 B | clamp | 3 |
| M3 | **the observers go blind** — it moves above SAFETY-28 and SAFETY-03 | `main.py` | +58 B | clamp | 1 |
| M4 | the site re-seed dropped — the exit resumes from a fiction | `main.py` | −36 B | clamp | 3 |
| M5 | the per-unit re-seed dropped | `main.py` | −22 B | clamp | 1 |
| M6 | **PAIRED**: `standing_w()` reads the target **and** the re-seed dropped — the sign latch that survives into live operation | `inverter.py` + `main.py` | −170 B | watchdog | 3 |
| M7 | `auto` inverted — shadow while started, live while stopped | `shadow.py` | +2 B | validate | 4 |
| M8 | **default-on for everyone** — `auto` always shadow; the literal reading that stops the live install | `shadow.py` | −15 B | validate | 2 |
| M9 | an unreadable value resolves to LIVE instead of shadow | `shadow.py` | +1 B | validate | 1 |
| M10 | `validate.py` stops refusing an unknown value | `shadow.py` | −9 B | validate | 9 |
| M11 | the loop leg gated on `auto` alone again — the decision path stops running | `main.py` | −17 B | clamp | 1 |
| M12 | the stop claim filed in shadow — every decision reads `stopped` | `main.py` | −20 B | clamp | 1 |
| M13 | the banner goes green while nothing is commanded | `shadow.py` | −2 B | clamp | 1 |
| M14 | the banner loses the standing latch | `shadow.py` | −2 B | clamp | 1 |
| M15 | the row renders the standing command instead of the decision | `shadow.py` | −8 B | clamp | 1 |
| M16 ⚠️ | the row disappears when live | `main.py` | +43 B | clamp | 1 |
| M17 | the record becomes the wire | `main.py` | −6 B | clamp | 7 |
| M18 | level-logged — the 40-row action log floods | `main.py` | −23 B | clamp | 1 |
| M19 | the two rungs render identically (masking) | `shadow.py` | +22 B | validate | 1 |
| M20 | the shipped default moves to `off` in `config.yaml` alone | `config.yaml` | −1 B | defaults_pin | 1 |
| M21 | **PAIRED**: the substitution **and** the re-seed deleted together | `main.py` | −103 B | clamp | 10 |
| M22 | the re-seed moved one line earlier — SAFETY-18 grades a 0 W no decision produced and goes permanently blind | `main.py` | +40 B | clamp | 1 |
**Survivors: none.** ⚠️ **M17's `+0 B`-adjacent sibling** —
`shadow_would_w = float(self.target)` — is recorded in §7 as **equivalent**
rather than counted here.
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-103 - no swing on old battery readings after a drain ends
**Status: implemented 2026-10-08, for review.** Tests: `test_safety103.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-95 rig test, check 5, F1). While a battery settles
from its ended drain, SAFETY-95 steers on the house's point: grid + every
battery's reading - aim. The meter is 1 s old; a battery register can be
10 s old (the SAFETY-90 register model). At E+13 A's reading said 1238 W
(6.8 s old) while A was at 616 W, so the house looked ~620 W bigger: B went
860 -> 1650 -> 870 W. B's own old reading does the same the other way.
**The rule** (`main.py`, `_track_reads()`, `_drain_grid_w()`, N>=2, only
while a drain's tail settles):
1. Each cycle, per battery: the range its power can be in. That is its last
changed reading, widened by every command on its wire since (a lagging
battery moves from one toward the others, never beyond). A new reading
starts the range again.
2. A reading that changed this cycle is taken as it reads. So is the side a
battery refuses (SAFETY-73): it is not heading that way.
3. The house point is held (first cycle: the loop's start from SAFETY-95).
It moves only as far as the meter proves: to the nearest value of grid +
the batteries' ranges - aim.
So the loop no longer moves on a reading that has not caught up. A real
house step still moves it, as soon as the meter shows more than the
batteries can explain.
**Why not the tester's rule** ("a battery whose reading is older than its
last command counts at its command"). B's command changes almost every
cycle, so B is almost always at its command. That is the plain meter, which
chases A's tail: B swings 1420 W. A lag model needs the plant's time
constant, which is not known for a client's inverter. Measured on the plant
below (N=2, 1200 W, A Off; swing = a move of the others later undone):
| rule | 10 s lag | 5 s lag | 20 s lag | surplus, 5 s lag |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| release/1.0 (readings) | 760 | 840 | 150 | 800 |
| tester's: at the command | 1420 | 1020 | 1600 | 800 |
| lag model, tau 10 s | 70 | 140 | 80 | 580 |
| lag model, tau 5 s, plant 20 s | | | 600 | |
| hold all window | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **this rule** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **130** |
Holding all window ignores a house step: a 2 kW kettle at E+5 s imported
14.4 Wh over the next 30 s (release 11.5, this rule 11.3); 2 kW more sun
exported 16.9 Wh (release 8.5, this rule 8.9).
**Before -> after** (`test_safety103.py`, `tools/safety103_plant.py`: 800
W/s ramp, 10 s lag, meter 1 s, registers 10 s at the rig's phases, B idles
at -100 W; summed swing of the others in the 23 s after the end):
| case | release/1.0 | after |
|---|---|---|
| rig check 5: N=2, 1200 W, A Off | B 1140 -> 850 -> 1630 -> 870, swing 760 W | B holds 1140 W |
| N=3, 1200 W / 4000 W, A Off | 680 / 630 W | 0 / 0 W |
| solar surplus, N=2 / N=3 | 890 / 740 W | 130 / 130 W |
| lag 5 or 20 s, registers 5 or 10 s, N=2 and N=3 | | at most 10 W |
| registers as fresh as the meter (1 s) | | rows byte-identical |
| refusal end | | rows byte-identical |
| N=1, every end | | rows byte-identical (also against the release/1.0 tree) |
**Cost.** In the window, a house change smaller than what the batteries
could still be doing is not followed until a reading catches up (at most a
register period) or the window ends (23 s). Under a surplus the others
still swing up to 130 W, a third of a slew step.
**Not covered.**
- Outside the drain tail the loop steers on the meter; readings only reach
the saturation freeze (SAFETY-96), unchanged.
- A lost link or a refusal ends the tail at once (A is out of the split, or
reads ~0 W). The swing after them is the loop's own on a lagging plant,
the same with 1 s registers and on release/1.0: under a surplus up to
1.5 kW at N=2 and 3.9 kW summed at N=3; after a lost link about 1 kW
even without one. Not this card.
- A battery that overshoots its command, or a reading offset beyond the
range, can put the true power outside the range; the meter then moves the
point, as before.
- The end cycle's start (SAFETY-95 step 2) still uses the readings; the
batteries were steady during the drain, so they are current there.
@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-107 - a refusal held under another writer is learned once
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_safety107.py`. One inverter only; nothing
changes at N>1 (SAFETY-73's unit refusal has no "another writer" end).
**The defect** (MAINT-13 F5, MAINT-14 "seen again"). A full pack under a
maintenance charge in a cheap window takes no charge. At N=1 the action log then
showed "BATTERY REFUSES asked -2500 W ..." and "BATTERY REFUSES ENDED: another
writer" every cycle: 548 + 548 lines in 15 min on the MAINT-13 rig head,
652 + 651 in 12 min on its base, 33 + 32 in 60 s in MAINT-14's c2b. The 40-line
log flooded and the hint under the buttons changed every second, so the
MAINT-13 notice was gone at once.
**Cause** (`main.py`, the SAFETY-52 block before `compute()`). The end tested
`self.target != self.loop_w`: the wire differs from the loop's ask. A held
refusal makes the loop ask 0 W, so any claim that binds (the maintenance
charge's `hi`, the peak guard's `lo`, a trade's SET) differs from it on every
cycle. The refusal was ended against the same writer it had been learned
against. `sat_count` is not reset by that end, so `compute()` learned the same
refusal again in the same cycle. Nothing about the battery or the wire had
changed; only the log and the hint did.
**Other writers.** The same flap comes from any writer that holds the wire
while the loop is refused, as long as the evidence lasts: a trade (a SET at
P_ARBITRAGE) into a full pack, and the peak guard over an empty pack: 335
refusal lines in 15 min each at a 5 s meter (`test_safety107.py` part 2, run on
release/1.0).
A maintenance drain or hold does not flap: its SET resets `sat_count` each cycle.
**The rule** (`_refusal_update()`, `rejudged`). When another writer held the
wire, the held refusal is judged afresh: `compute()` gets `refused=0` and no
probe, exactly as before the change. Then:
1. it finds the same refusal against that writer's ask: the same episode
continues, with no line and no hint. The probe clock restarts, as it did on
the old end and start: a probe is the loop's ask, and it is not on the wire
while another writer is;
2. it does not: the refusal ends, logged "another writer", or "the battery
gives power" when the reading shows it (it was "another writer" before);
3. it finds the other direction: end, then a new start, as before. In
practice 2 comes first: SAFETY-94's evidence restarts when the ask changes
sign, so a writer that turns round ends the refusal at once and the other
way is learned ~12 cycles later (`test_safety107.py` part 3e).
**Why this rule.** The end now means what SAFETY-52 meant by it: the refusal no
longer describes what is on the wire, judged by the same test that learns it.
`compute()` sees the same inputs as before and the state after each cycle is
the same (`batt_refused`, `batt_refused_at`), so every command is unchanged.
Keeping the held refusal into `compute()` instead (mutation M5) would also
stop the lines, but it holds the loop at 0 W where the old law let it ask past
a writer's limit, which changes commands; it also removes SAFETY-52's
owner-decided "another writer" exit.
**Evidence.**
- Differential trace (`goodwe/scratch/SAFETY-107/probe/trace.py`, not in this
repo; the real Controller in the CI image, release/1.0 bf3ac79 against this
tree): 300 seeds, N=1 (153) and
N=2 (147), 1/2/5 s meter, full/empty/dead/healthy battery windows, a stepping
house, maintenance charge with the cheap window opening and closing, P1 and
the peak guard, trade windows, stop/start; 427 680 cycles, 294 seeds with a
refusal held. Every command, site target, integrator, `sat_count`, refusal
state and reason is identical. Refusal lines: 100 748 before, 2 188 after.
- The card's case: 1 line in 15 min at N=1 and N=2, 1/2/5 s meter, house
importing or exporting (release/1.0: 335-1 753 at N=1; N=2 was already 1).
**Mutations** (`tools/mutation_run.sh` on purged copies; reds in
test_safety107 / test_refusal / test_refusal_units; trace = seeds of 300 whose
commands differ from release/1.0):
| | mutation | reds | trace |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `now == rejudged` -> `False` (every such cycle ends: the old flap) | 26 / 0 / 0 | 0 |
| M2 | `rejudged` always 0 (another writer never ends it) | 5 / 1 / 2 | 29 |
| M3 | the probe clock is not restarted on a continued episode | 1 / 0 / 0 | 2 |
| M4 | a probe may open while rejudged | 0 / 0 / 0 | 0 |
| M5 | the held refusal goes into `compute()` while rejudged | 2 / 1 / 2 | 27 |
| M6 | an end while rejudged always says "another writer" | 1 / 0 / 0 | 0 |
M4 is equivalent: a probe matters only if `compute()` engages in that call,
which needs `SETTLE_CYCLES` saturated against the writer, and each of those
cycles restarted the clock. The line stays because it states the rule.
**Cost.** None in power. A takeover by a different writer while the battery
still refuses is logged as an end and, ~12 cycles later, a new start against
that writer (3 lines for the episode, `test_safety107.py` part 3a).
**Not covered.**
- A perfectly flat reading under a writer. The stale-reading gate trips, stops
the site and seeds the refusal (SAFETY-52 decision 3). After the stop the
writer's ask returns fresh, `compute()` has no saturation history against it,
so the refusal ends at the first cycle and the next trip seeds it again: 2
lines per gate cycle (29 in 15 min, house exporting), the same as release/1.0.
The gate cycle itself (0 W, then the writer's ask) is the cause; stopping it
changes commands. None of the rig runs showed it: real readings move.
- At N=1 a refusal shapes only the loop. A writer above it still asks the
battery; at N>1 SAFETY-73's P_SAFETY claim binds every writer.
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-112 - control waits for Home Assistant to finish starting
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_safety112.py`, `test_messages.py`.
Control is unchanged. The add-on now says plainly that it is waiting.
## Cause
The Supervisor's proxy refuses every add-on request with 502 until Core's
state is `RUNNING`. The add-on reads every battery reading and writes every
power request through that proxy, so it cannot control until then. Readings
that are already live inside Home Assistant do not help.
Source, Supervisor 2026.08.0 (the image the live site ran at CFG-04):
- `supervisor/api/proxy.py`, `APIProxy.api()` (REST, used for reads and
`number.set_value`) and `APIProxy.websocket()` both start with
`if not await self.sys_homeassistant.api.check_api_state(): raise HTTPBadGateway`.
- `supervisor/homeassistant/api.py`, `check_api_state()` returns
`state.core_state == "RUNNING" or state.offline_db_migration`. The state
comes from Core's `/api/core/state`.
- Upstream `main` has the same gate in both handlers (read 2026-10-13).
- A Core restart restarts only the Core container
(`homeassistant/core.py`, `restart()`). The add-on keeps running.
The add-on itself has no wait. Nothing in `app/` reads Core's state or waits
for an event. The loop reads its inputs every second, a 502 gives `None`,
and missing inputs give 0 W. P1 backoff is not involved: the live site reads
the meter straight from the HomeWizard (`homewizard_local`), not through Home
Assistant.
## Measured
Repro stack `safety112-*`, all removed afterwards:
- Home Assistant 2026.9.4, as live.
- A test integration whose `async_setup` sleeps, so Core stays `NOT_RUNNING`.
- A fake meter and two fake inverters that update every 2 s from load.
- The Supervisor's own `APIProxy` and `HomeAssistantAPI` from the 2026.08.0
image. Only the add-on token lookup, Core's access token and the container
check are stubbed.
- The add-on on `meter_source: homewizard_local` against a fake HomeWizard.
Times are seconds after `docker restart` of Home Assistant:
| run | Core `NOT_RUNNING` | entities live in HA | Core `RUNNING` | proxy 502 | first write | wait from live readings |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| base 3050fa5, N=2 | 13.1 | 17.1 | 253.1 | 0.9-252.7 (1 132 requests) | 254.7 | 237.6 |
| base 3050fa5, N=1 | 13.1 | 18.1 | 256.1 | 1.5-255.1 (573 requests) | 257.2 | 239.1 |
| this change, N=2 | 12.2 | 17.2 | 313.2 | 1.4-312.5 (1 406 requests) | 317.6 | 300.4 |
| this change, N=1 | 12.2 | 17.2 | 255.2 | 1.2-254.1 (571 requests) | 257.1 | 240.0 |
The first write comes 1.0-4.4 s after `RUNNING`, so the whole wait is the
proxy's. With a 400 s sleep Core moved on at 300.88 s on its own (bootstrap's
stage timeout), so one slow integration holds a start stage for about 5
minutes. The whole start can take longer: the live one took 414 s.
Before this change the page said "Not ready — Battery level: no usable
reading", which sends the reader to Developer Tools for an entity that is
fine.
## Rule
1. No way around the Supervisor. The add-on still talks to Home Assistant
only through the proxy.
2. While the proxy does not answer on the API (`hass.OUTAGE.waiting()`), the
first status row is red: "Home Assistant is not answering, perhaps it is
still starting. Control resumes by itself when it answers." The banner
reads "Not ready — Waiting for Home Assistant to finish starting". The Home
pill reads "Waiting for Home Assistant", in English and Dutch.
3. A safety stop, a stalled control loop or shadow mode keeps its own banner
and state over the wait, because none of them clears by itself.
4. The log has one WARNING when Home Assistant stops answering, an INFO line
every 5 minutes while it is down, and an INFO line with the length of the
wait when it answers again.
5. Only the API counts. The meter websocket alone does not, because the meter
has its own row.
## Why it is safe
The change is text only. `cycle()`, the writes, the heartbeat, the stand-down
on shutdown and every watchdog are untouched. `test_safety112.py` part 3 shows
the same targets and writes with the flag on and off, for N=1 and N=2.
## Open, for the owner
The add-on cannot control while Home Assistant starts. These ways around it
were not taken:
- **Talk to Core directly with a long-lived token** (`http://homeassistant:8123`).
Core's own API answers while `NOT_RUNNING`. In the repro `/api/core/state`
answered from 12-13 s, and a direct `number.set_value` 10 s into
`NOT_RUNNING` returned 200 and set the value. The cost is a secret stored
at every client site, which `hass.py` exists to avoid.
- **Talk to the control board directly** (ESPHome native API), so control
does not need Home Assistant at all. This is a large change.
- **Remove the slow start at the site.** On 2026-10-12 the Solis
integration's discovery held the start. Fixing or disabling it shortens the
wait there, but not on a client site with another slow integration.
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-118 - the peak forecast is read in its own unit
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_safety118.py`.
`peak_forecast_entity` was read as a bare number, and anything under 50 was
multiplied by 1000 ("accept kW or W"). A W sensor reading 17 to 45 W, which a
real site did 430 times in one morning, would be taken as 17 to 45 kW. The
validator also called a kW sensor wrong, which was false for this entity.
Decision: the size rule is gone. The entity is read through `pv.watts()`, the
same unit table and reader as the solar entities, so W, kW, MW and the rest
convert by the sensor's own `unit_of_measurement`. No unit, or a unit that is
not power (kWh), means the forecast is not used, exactly as if the option were
empty: the loop cap and every non-forecast peak step still apply. One WARNING
per cause, and a status row and a settings note say the same.
No size rule can be right in both units: 30 W and 30 kW are both ordinary.
The read is still one `GET /api/states/<id>` per cycle, as `hass.number()` made.
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-119 - no "not keeping up" when the loop takes the wire back
**Status: merged (bee7431); the settle and the budget changed in SAFETY-121**
(DECISIONS/SAFETY-121-bound-every-quarter.md: 4 cycles and 22 s, one budget
of 11). The rolling-budget sections below describe bee7431. Tests:
`test_safety119.py`.
**Cause.** When another owner (the peak guard, a maintenance charge) has set
the wire and the loop wins again, `cycle()` re-seeds the integrator from that
owner's command, and `compute()` adds `gain * error` from a meter that does
not show that command yet. On the TEST-23 rig (SAFETY-118 I-2) the guard
stepped from -2000 W to +429 W with 5 s left. A cycle later the loop's ask
crossed the +2500 W rail and beat the guard's floor, so SAFETY-85 rule 1
counted it as the loop's own bound and raised `goodwe_integrator_bound`. The
battery gave what it was told, and the cap held.
**Decision.** After a hand-back, the loop's integrator bound is not counted
until the plant's settle has passed (`SHORT_CYCLES` cycles and
`SHORT_SPAN_S`, the window SAFETY-85 grades a battery on). After that it
counts as before. An over-rating (`clamped`, a bug) on a cycle the loop
decided always counts. No command changes, and no text was added or changed.
**A rolling budget (round 3).** The settle above is per hand-back, and
losing the wire restarts it. Across all hand-backs the bound is hidden on at
most a budget of cycles in any 15 minutes (`ROLLING_BUDGET`, `ROLLING_S`); a
cycle over the budget counts. Round 1 restarted the settle at every
hand-back, so a guard and a charge taking turns hid the bound for good (0
warnings in 2 h where 28 were raised before). Round 2 gave each run of
hand-backs its own budget; at 10 s and 15 s meters each quarter then started
a fresh one and the loop's bound was never counted. A quarter-edge kick is a
few bound cycles in one quarter, a real bound that stays is many: a budget
per 15 minutes tells them apart.
**The budget follows the cycle length.** 10 cycles up to a 3.5 s cycle, 8 up
to 11 s, 6 up to 16 s, 4 beyond. The cycle length is the time between two
decided cycles (a stop, or a gap over two minutes, is not one); until it is
known, and without a monotonic clock, the budget is 8. Without a monotonic
clock the budget never refills.
**Why not one number.** Measured over 2 h (`goodwe-addon-checks:1`), the
quarter-edge case (house 800 W, cap 2500 W, no forecast, 30 seeds) and the
case below. No single budget held both at 1 to 15 s: 3 to 6 let the false
alarm back at 2 s; 7 on 10 of 30 seeds at 2 s; 8 on 1 of 30 (seed 25) at
2 s, and warned in only 1 to 3 of 7 quarters at 15 s; 9 and 10 miss quarters
at 10 s. A slow cycle needs a small budget to warn, a fast one a large budget
to stay quiet. Per band, the largest budget that still warns: up to 3.5 s,
10 (9 and 10 had no false alarm at 1 and 2 s; above 10 was not swept); up to
11 s, 8 (9 misses quarters at 10 s); up to 16 s, 6 (7 leaves two quiet
quarters in a row at 15 s, 4 false-alarms at 12 s on 7 of 30 seeds); beyond,
4 (3 false-alarms at 20 and 30 s on 14 of 30, 5 leaves five quiet quarters at
20 s).
**What holds.** Quarter-edge case, 30 seeds each: 0 notifications at 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 15, 20 and 30 s. Repeated hand-backs (2 x 2500 W,
cheap-window charge, no usable forecast, cap 5000 W, house 5050 and 5100 W,
constant and with noise, 8 runs per meter):
| meter | warnings in 2 h | quarters warned (of 7 after the first) | without the fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 s | 56 to 63 | 7 | 56 to 63 |
| 2 s | 49 to 56 | 7 | 54 to 56 |
| 5 s | 19 to 23 | 7 | 28 |
| 10 s | 7 to 10 | 7 | 14 |
| 15 s | 4 to 10 | 4 to 7, never two quiet in a row | 14 |
| 30 s | 3 to 7 | 3 to 5, up to two quiet in a row | 7 to 11 |
At 30 s no budget does better: 4 leaves two quiet quarters, 3 brings back
the false alarm. Single hand-back, the loop at its rail, first warning after
the hand-back compared with no fix: 10 s at 1 s, 20 s at 2 s, 40 s at 5 s
(default), 80 s at 10 s, 90 s at 15 s, 80 s at 20 s, 120 s at 30 s, 240 s at
60 s. At 60 s the rig is a different regime (the house is not over the cap
in the case above), so nothing more is claimed there. The cap held at 1 to
10 s in the quarter-edge case and at 1 to 5 s in the case above; at slower
meters the meter's lag puts quarters over it, the same with and without the
fix (commands are identical).
**Limits.** These runs have one cycle per meter reading, at a steady
interval. A 20 or 30 s cycle needs `cycle_floor_s` raised; at the default
15 s, a slower meter adds cycles on an old reading. Measured that way (11
seeds): a 15 s meter that varies by up to 30 % false-alarmed on 5 seeds, a
30 s meter on 10 (0 to 4 in 2 h, 8 to 15 without the fix); a 20 s meter on
none. The case above still warned every quarter there.
**Kept.** The loop in charge at its rail warns on the same cycle as before.
The start and a restart after a stop are not hand-backs. The quarter-edge
kick of `test_safety119.py` part 1 stays hidden (see above).
**Re-pinned.** test_safety84 (all six) and test_safety87 (`n1_crossing`,
`n1_above`, `n1_charge_low`): only OUTPUT_CLAMP log rows differ; commands and
claims are the same (`test_safety119.py` part 6).
**Not hidden.** A battery that gives less than another owner told it still
alarms through SAFETY-85 rule 2. "Always counts" for an over-rating holds on
cycles the loop decided; on others SAFETY-85 rule 1 already dropped it.
**Not changed.** The kick itself is control behaviour: for a few seconds at
a quarter's edge the loop asks up to its rail. In `test_safety119.py` part 1
that is more discharge than the guard asked at a quarter's end, and a few
seconds of up to 500 W more charge at the next quarter's start.
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-121 - a recurring overload warns every quarter
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_safety119.py` (parts 2, 4, 5, 6).
Follows DECISIONS/SAFETY-119-bound-after-hand-back.md.
**The defect (TEST-23, SAFETY-119 rig test F-1).** 5 s meter, 2 x 2500 W,
cap 5000 W, maintenance charge, no forecast, house 5100 W. bee7431 warned
once in 70 min (04:31:01), then not at 04:45, 05:00 or 05:15. Base 75f0804
warned at every quarter start. The loop held the wire once a quarter, at its
start, and was at its bound on 4 or 5 cycles. SAFETY-119's settle (12
cycles, 60 s at 5 s) covered all of them, and 5 cycles a quarter fit in its
budget of 8 per 900 s.
**Why the simulation said "every quarter".** `test_safety119.py` fed the
meter one cycle behind the battery reading (`delay` counts cycles: 5 s at a
5 s meter). Just after the loop leaves its rail, the guard's charge
headroom (house = meter + battery) is then off by up to 5000 W, the charge
pulls 2000 W, the guard steps in again, and the two chase each other: 8 to
10 hand-backs and about 20 bound cycles a quarter at 5 s (rig: 1 and 4-5).
With the meter read in the same cycle (`delay` 0, the rig's shape) the sim
gives the rig's numbers: 3 to 5 bound cycles a quarter at 5 s, all inside
SAFETY-119's settle, and bee7431 warns in 0 to 2 of 7 quarters. The test
now runs both shapes.
**Decision.** After a hand-back the loop's bound is hidden until 4 cycles
(`HANDBACK_CYCLES`) and 22 s (`SHORT_SPAN_S`) have passed; across all
hand-backs on at most 11 cycles (`ROLLING_BOUND_CYCLES`) in any 900 s. The
budget no longer follows the cycle length, and the cycle length is not
tracked. A stop ends the settle and keeps the budget. An over-rating always
counts. Commands are unchanged.
**Why it holds for any number of bound cycles a quarter.** The settle is
fixed: at most 3 cycles or 22 s after a hand-back, whichever is longer. A
bound that lasts past it counts on its first cycle after it. So one
hand-back a quarter, with the loop at its rail past the settle, warns in
that quarter, whether it is 1 bound cycle or 100. A bound that never lasts
past a settle counts once more than 11 are hidden within 900 s. Hidden
are only shapes with at most 11 bound cycles in 900 s, each within 3 cycles
or 22 s of a hand-back. That is the quarter-edge kick: in every steady-meter
run below it is on the 1st to 3rd cycle after its hand-back (up to 30 s at
a 30 s meter). In the rig's shape at 5 s the bound comes 30 to 55 s after
the hand-back.
**Sweep** (`goodwe-addon-checks:1`, 2 h runs, scratch/SAFETY-121/dev/).
Quarter edge = test_safety119 part 1 (house 800 W, cap 2500 W, no
forecast). Overload = part 4 (2 x 2500 W, cap 5000 W, house 5050 or
5100 W, seeds 0-3). "Delay 1" is the old sim, "delay 0" the rig's shape.
| meter | quarter edge, runs with a warning (new / bee7431 / no fix) | overload delay 1, quarters warned of 7 (new / bee7431 / no fix) | overload delay 0, 5100 W (new / bee7431 / no fix) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 s | 0/70 / 0/70 / 68/70 | 7 / 7 / 7 | 7 / 7 / 7 |
| 2 s | 0/70 / 0/70 / 39/70 | 7 / 7 / 7 | 7 / 7 / 7 |
| 3 s | 0/70 / 0/70 / 40/70 | 7 / 7 / 7 | 7 / 7 / 7 (5050 W: 7 / 1-7 / 7) |
| 5 s | 0/70 / 0/70 / 40/70 | 7 / 7 / 7 | 7 / 0-2 / 7 |
| 10 s | 0/70 / 0/70 / 40/70 | 7 / 7 / 7 | 7 / 0 / 7 |
| 15 s | 0/70 / 0/70 / 40/70 | 7 / 4-7 / 7 | no fix warns 0-1 (5300 W: 7 / 0 / 7) |
| 20 s | 0/60 / 0/60 / 30/60 | 7 / 5-7 / 7 | no fix warns 0 (5300 W: 7 / 0 / 7) |
| 30 s | 0/60 / 0/60 / 30/60 | 7 / 3-5 / 7 | no fix warns 0 (5300 W: 6-7 / 0 / 6-7) |
Quarter-edge seeds: 1-30 with the meter in the same cycle, and 1-40 (1-30
at 20 and 30 s) with the test's 1-2 cycle delay. 5300 W: seeds 1-5.
Commands identical to no fix and to bee7431 in all 1013 runs (these and
the limits below). Choosing the numbers: the runs above were recorded
without the fix and replayed through candidate rules; with 3, 4 or 5
cycles, budgets 9 to 13 met both cases at 1-30 s. 8 warns at the quarter
edge (2 s, seed 25) and 14 misses quarters in the rig's shape (1 s,
5050 W), both checked in part 4. 11 is the middle, and 4 the middle of 3
to 5; with a jittery meter (below) 3 gave more false alarms, 5 more quiet
quarters (replay).
**First warning after one hand-back** (the loop at its rail; later than
no fix by): 11 s at 1 s, 22 s at 2 s, 24 s at 3 s, 25 s at 5 s (default),
30 s at 10 s, 45 s at 15 s, 60 s at 20 s, 90 s at 30 s, 180 s at 60 s.
bee7431: 10, 20, 30, 40, 80, 90, 80, 120, 240 s. In the overload runs at
1 to 30 s, the first warning was at most 90 s later than without the fix.
**Limits (measured, not fixed).**
- A meter that jitters by 30 % with `cycle_floor_s` 15 (11 seeds): with
the test's 1-2 cycle meter delay the quarter edge warns on 2 of 11 seeds
at 15 s, 2 at 20 s and 5 at 30 s (bee7431: 4, 0, 10; no fix: 11 each);
with the meter in the same cycle on none (no fix: 10, 9, 11). The overload at 5100 W leaves up
to 4 quiet quarters in a row at 15 and 20 s (bee7431: no warning at all
on some seeds); at 5200 W at most 1. Its first warning came up to 61 min
later than without the fix. The numbers depend on the jitter draw: the
review's draw gave 4, 4 and 5 of 11 at the quarter edge (bee7431: 4, 1,
9) and up to 2 and 4 quiet quarters at 15 and 20 s.
- With cycles over about 40 s, a bound that is never past a settle uses up
11 in 900 s only if the wire changes hands every few cycles; otherwise
it is never counted (part 5 prints it at 60 s).
- Hidden as designed: a real bound with the kick's shape (at most 11 cycles
in 900 s, each within 3 cycles or 22 s of a hand-back).
**Re-pinned.** test_safety84 (all six) and test_safety87 (`n1_crossing`,
`n1_above`, `n1_charge_low`): only OUTPUT_CLAMP log rows differ from
bee7431 and from no fix; commands, claims, guard and phases are the same.
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-123 - the day plan's hour loop steps in UTC
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_safety123.py`. No option, no text change.
`dayplan._hour_slices()` stepped to the next local hour by adding an hour to
the local wall clock and converting back. Where the zone has no tzdata
(`tariff._EUTimezone`: the CI image, a dev host, an image that loses tzdata)
the missing 02:00 of the spring change reads as summer time, which is
00:00 UTC again. At 28 March 2027 00:00 UTC `t` did not move and the list
grew until the process died. Control and the web page share one event loop,
so the whole add-on froze. `dayplan.plan()` calls it on every plan, before it
looks at a battery's mode, so a site with all batteries on Solar first reaches
it as well, if the prices give a plan.
The shipped image has tzdata (`amd64-base:3.20`), where this zone gives the
right answer, so a running add-on is not known to be hit. The fix is for any
host without it. (AUDIT-01 F4, card SAFETY-120, is the same defect.)
**Decision.** Each step adds the time left in the local hour to the UTC
instant. It is at least a microsecond, so `t` always advances and the loop
ends, in any zone, with or without tzdata. A day of 23 hours gives 23 slices
and a day of 25 hours gives 25, each at most an hour, none across a local
hour. On ordinary days the slices are the old ones.
**One change on the autumn day.** The old function (with tzdata) made one
two-hour slice for the doubled hour 02:00-03:00; it now makes two of an hour,
both labelled 2. `plan()` sums per slice, so only a forecast with sun in that
hour could tell the difference. There is none.
**Other loops.** The other code that walks local hours or days steps in UTC
or on the calendar date (`static_tariff`, `price_forecast`, `price_history`,
`price`, `maintenance`, `homeview.local_day`, `solarfc._bounds`), or has a
fixed bound. None can stall. One known inexactness stays, outside this fix:
`solarfc` spreads a state-only forecast over hours since local midnight, so on
the two change days its sun curve is an hour off the clock.
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-125 - a grid charge under the month peak
**Status: FIXED in 0.19.2 (hotfix from 0.19.1).** Tests: `test_safety125.py`.
A grid charge is sized by `peakguard.charge_room_w()`, the guard's headroom
with the seconds since a late meter reading counted at that reading (the
projection leaves them out, SAFETY-99, the bill does not), and the guard's own
floor is unchanged. At N=1 the maintenance charge is now sized too (owner
2026-10-29; SAFETY-84 had left it out). Evidence (repro on 0.19.1, sweep,
digests): the SAFETY-125 pull request.
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-126 - a landing error on the aim is not an overrun
**Status: FIXED on release/1.0 (after 0.19.2).** Tests: `test_safety126.py`.
**Cause.** A grid charge under the peak limit is sized to land the 15-minute
period on the aim (SAFETY-125), so the period ends 0-7 W over it. In the last
second `peakguard.excess_w()` multiplies that by 900 / remaining (3 000 at
0.3 s left, 90 000 at 0.01 s), so `decide()` wants tens of kW
(`wanted > 0`, peakguard.py `decide()`). With every battery under the peak
reserve that is floor-limited at 0 W, and `check_peak_floor_limited()`
alarmed on it at once: SAFETY-87 graded only the case where another battery
could give. With one battery able, the guard asked it for its rating for that
cycle and the Batteries "Why" said "The peak limit needs power". The
add-on's own charge is not the cause: `wanted` already counts it as
stoppable.
**Rule.** Each cycle the guard wants power, `Controller._peak_landing()`
asks `peakguard.misses_aim()`: with the batteries at 0 W from now on, does
the period end more than `ALARM_MISS_W` (10 W) over the aim? This is
`load_too_high()` with nothing to give, without `decide()`'s gain. If not, and
no real miss was seen since the guard took hold, the decision is
`within_aim`. Such a decision raises no reserve alarm (ERROR,
notification, red row), no red "Load too high" row, no "Why" peak and
no "Battery stopped limiting the peak" event hint. The claim, the floor and the
commands are unchanged.
**Still alarms.** House load the batteries cannot cover under the reserve:
the period would end over the aim with the batteries at 0 W. A step load
alarms on the same cycle as before. SAFETY-87's case and SAFETY-81's 'Load too
high' notification are unchanged.
**What the 10 W tolerance costs** (review, owner accepted 2026-10-31):
- A steadily rising load alarms a little later, once the projected miss passes
10 W (3 000 -> 4 000 W over 45 min: 56 s later). With the default 50 W
margin the alarm still comes before the limit.
- With `peak_margin_w` 0, a period can end up to 10 W over the limit without
this alarm, the tolerance 'Load too high' already accepts (SAFETY-81).
`misses_aim()` takes the house as meter plus batteries, so an export nets
off (`decide()`'s projection counts offtake only). A re-alarm while the loop's
draw on held batteries covers the house is gone too (test_safety126.py part 2,
modes off: 2 notifications, was 4).
**Not changed.** The one-cycle floor itself: at a period's last instant the
guard still asks an able battery for its rating, or stops a charge, for a
landing error. That is control, outside the alarm path. Raise a card if it
should go.
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-128 - a reading that does not answer the last command is not current
**Status: FIXED on release/1.0 (after 0.20.0).** Code: `app/lateness.py`,
`control.compute(hold=, hold_w=)`, `peakguard.cap_floor()`,
`Controller._readings_late()`, `Controller.read_inputs()` (feeds the fits).
Tests: `test_safety128.py` (`tools/safety128_rig.py`, TEST-23's plant).
**Cause** (SAFETY-127 report). Home Assistant can deliver readings late but
still changing. Every gate judges arrival (SAFETY-01) or a value that stops
changing (SAFETY-18, SAFETY-37), so a late reading passes them all. The loop
then corrects, each cycle, an error its last command has already fixed: a
loop with a dead time far longer than its cycle, which swings and grows. The
peak guard projects the quarter from the same late figures and pushes to the
inverter limit in its last seconds (OPT-34 rig F-2).
**Rule.**
1. *Find late readings* (`Answer.watch()`, every 2 s, from the 1 s reads).
- **Batteries** (`Delay`): fit one `d` so that each battery's reading minus
its own request at `t - d` (averaged over 2 s for the battery's lag and
the read) is flattest. The house does not move that reading, so a
repeating load cannot line up with it (review round 1, B1). Needs 5 new
readings in 60 s and the request and the reading each to move 300 W.
Late from 9.5 s, after 2 late fits in a row. A late fit must explain 75 %
and beat every fit up to 6.5 s by 2x; the shortest delay that fits about
as well (within 2x, or within 2 500 W^2) is taken instead, since a swing's
period fits again. A slow battery (3-10 s lag) answering at once gives no
late fit; at a 15-20 s lag some fits read late (see "What it costs").
No late battery fit counts for 60 s
after a battery gave nothing under its ask: an emptied battery lined its
old movement up as 85 s late.
- **Meter** (`MeterFit`, round 1's fit): `meter(t) + request(t - d)` is the
house alone at the right `d`. Quick, but confounded by the house. Needs
16 new values in 60 s, so only a meter of about 3.5 s or faster: at 5 s
it gave false delays. Late over 8 s. At a slower meter (a 5 s P1) the
same fit runs over 120 s and calls only a delay over 16 s late, on 2 fits
in a row, and never ends a verdict (SAFETY-129). Alone it reads 35-90 s on healthy
runs, a few times in a row; only the slow-start and battery-fit check
below keeps those from a verdict. 10 s late is not found: it cannot be
told from a 10 s slow battery, and it does not swing at 5 s.
- A meter fit says late only with evidence from the batteries' side too:
a request more than 100 W from the battery reading took 3 s or more to
move a reading towards it (`SLOW_START_S`; on time they start within
0-1 s in the recorded house at 1 and 2 s ticks), and no battery fit in
the last 60 s said on time (under 9.5 s). An ask during which a battery
gave nothing under its ask is no slow evidence. A repeating load fools
the meter fit but not these. No meter verdict in the first 150 s.
- On time again on a battery fit under 6.5 s, or a meter fit within 8 s
unless a battery fit said late (hysteresis). With no fit for 120 s the
verdict is dropped.
2. *Hold.* While late, a request more than 100 W from the battery reading is
pending until that reading comes within 100 W of it, or half way. Meanwhile
the loop may not lead the reading by more than 100 W that way, and the peak
guard's floor is capped at the request that stands. The loop is not held
while a battery gives nothing under its ask or refuses (SAFETY-52/94).
3. *Late verdict.* Pending for `LATE_S` (23 s) with no reading moving 100 W
towards it: control holds, then after `stale_input_s` goes to 0 W
("readings late"), as for a missing input.
4. *Seen.* While late an amber row says "Home Assistant readings show requests
about N seconds late, so control holds the batteries." (NL too). N is the
batteries' fitted delay: Home Assistant's lag plus the battery's own
answer. While only the meter has shown it the row gives no figure. One
WARNING (`READINGS_LATE`) per episode and one line when it ends.
**With readings on time** no verdict was reached in any reviewer scenario
(owner-shaped house, ovens 20/40 to 60/60 s, clouds, a 300 W/s battery, 6-8 s
dead times, HA jitter 0-4 s, an EV following the meter, capped batteries, HA
restarts, meter pauses; 1, 2 and 5 s meters) nor in 2 days of the recorded
house at 1, 2 and 5 s ticks, so the commands are the same as without the gate.
The fits run all the time; the pull request has the counts.
**What it costs.**
- Found 36-68 s after a lag starts at 1-2 s meters; at a 5 s meter 30 s late
is found within 100 s after it starts (88 s measured) (the loop first moves 100 W after 60 s,
SAFETY-129) with the export above -200 W, and 10 s late is not found. Until
then control is as before. In a quiet house the "readings late" row stays
about 2 minutes longer after the lag ends (126 s against 32 s on base); no
harm measured, and it clears as early as on base when the load changes.
- A battery that answers slowly is read as late readings and held: a dead
time of 10 s or more (8 s reads 7-8; 10 s reads 10 at 1-2 s meters, 9 at
5 s), or a 15-20 s lag (review round 2). The GoodWe measured settles in 6 s
(`freshness.PLANT_SETTLE_S`); the row then blames Home Assistant wrongly.
- The row can stay up to 180 s after the readings are on time on a steady
site. While only the meter has shown the delay it gives no figure.
- A battery that cannot follow while the readings are late (at a limit, not
reading 0 W) is held, then set to 0 W after 38 s.
- The fits cost a few ms every 2 s (x86, measured after 3 idle days); the
history they read is bounded (60 s of readings, 150 s of requests).
**Left out.** The setpoint -> Home Assistant round trip: the fitted delay gives
the figure from readings the add-on already has. The hold's step-and-pull-back
at extreme lag and the arbitrage charge's sizing on late readings
(`charge_room_w()`) are follow-up cards.
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-137 - the shutdown 0 W is the last write every unit hears
SMA-10 made a hand-back release wait for a write already on its way
(`_release_last`, `Inverter.inflight`). A GoodWe unit skipped that, and rig 5b
saw a cycle write (-2 823 W) land after the shutdown 0 W and stay until relaunch.
Now the 0 W of shutdown and of the Stop button is a *last* write
(`_write_unit(last=True)`), for every driver:
- It first waits, at most `SETTLE_BUDGET_S` (2 s), for the writes already on
its way to that unit (`_await_inflight`, shared with `_release_last`). A hung
write is not waited out and not cancelled; the 0 W goes anyway.
- Once shutdown has begun (`stopping`), every other write (cycle, heartbeat,
safety stop) is dropped at the same place, right before the write is created.
That is the gate that keeps the control cycle quiet; the cycle itself needs
no cancelling.
- Worst case for a GoodWe unit is 2 s + `WRITE_BUDGET_S` (4 s) = 6 s, the same
as `HAND_BACK_WORST_S`; the units are handled together.
Not touched: the heartbeat's own timing, safety-stop paths, the maintenance
abort (still a plain 0 W).
@@ -149,70 +149,8 @@ each swept across the **whole range `config.yaml` accepts** for the two settings
that decide how fast the site can turn around: `gain` `float(0.05,1.0)` and
`slew_w` `int(50,5000)`.
### ⚠️ THE HARNESS BEHIND EVERY FIGURE ABOVE IS NOT COMMITTED, AND UNTIL 2026-09-07 THAT MADE THEM UNCHECKABLE
**Read this before quoting any number in this section.** The paragraph below
said the campaign harness "is not committed here" and treated that as a
packaging detail. It is not: a figure produced by a script that exists in
nobody's tree cannot be re-run, cannot be reviewed, and cannot be defended when
it is contradicted. It has now been contradicted twice.
| sweep | worst peak | worst continuous | trips |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| the 924-run campaign below — **harness uncommitted** | 1700 W | 505.0 s at 100 W; 5.0 s above 700 W | 0 / 924 |
| independent reviewer sweep, 2026-09-07, 48 honest reversals | **2750 W** | **15.0 s above 700 W** | 0 / 48 |
| `admin/goodwe` `two_master_circulation`, 840 runs — **committed** | 1048 W | 10.0 s at 100 W; 5.0 s above 700 W | **0 / 840** |
**This is not proof that anything was fabricated, and it should not be reported
as one.** The three swept different grids. What the third one adds is a
measurement of *why* the spread is that wide — on one grid, changing nothing but
the model:
| plant / stagger | worst legitimate peak |
|---|---:|
| modelled plant (lag 10 s, ramp 800 W/s), staggers up to a whole cycle | 1048 W |
| `INSTANT` (lag 0, unbounded ramp), staggers up to a whole cycle | 2250 W |
| `INSTANT`, staggers strictly under a whole cycle | **0 W** |
A factor of 2.1×, and a factor of infinity, between three defensible
descriptions of the same rig. **The plant model and the write-stagger set are
terms of the number**, and a worst case quoted without them is not a
measurement. That is enough to explain the whole spread above without anybody
having invented anything — and it is exactly what cannot be established when the
instrument is missing.
**What survives, and what does not.**
* **The window argument survives, and is now committed.** The claim that
decides `circulation_hold_s: 75` is *"the worst continuous legitimate episode
above 700 W is about one control cycle"*. All three sweeps agree on the shape
of that (5.0 s, 15.0 s, 5.0 s — one to three cycles against a fifteen-cycle
window), and **all three trip zero times**. `two_master_circulation` re-runs
it on every pull request in `admin/goodwe`.
* **The threshold curve does NOT survive as stated.** `505.0 s at 100 W` is the
number the "knee at 400 W" argument for `circulation_w: 700` rests on, and the
committed sweep measures **10.0 s** at 100 W on its grid — 50× smaller. The
curve still *falls* with the threshold (126 of 840 runs cross 100 W against 1
that crosses 700 W), so the knee is real in direction; its depth is not
established by anything anybody can run. **Do not quote 505.0 s.**
* **Nothing about the guard is compromised.** 0 trips in 924 + 48 + 840
non-faulty runs, from three independent grids.
**What would settle it:** the original harness, committed. Until then the
committed sweep is the only figure in this section anybody can check, and it is
labelled as its own grid's rather than as a reproduction.
### Reproducing it
⚠️ **THE COMMITTED VERSION IS `admin/goodwe`'s `sim/inject.py
two_master_circulation`** (`sim/sitesim.py:circulation_findings`, runnable on its
own as `python3 sim/sitesim.py --circulation`, `norig`, ~36 s, graded by
`checks.yml` on every pull request there). It produces the fault with
`plantsim.Inverter.wedge()` — a unit answering its bus and no longer steering its
power stage, which is HW-01 — and sweeps the legitimate family with the
serialised write path staggered up to a whole control cycle. The paragraph below
describes the ORIGINAL campaign, which is the one that is not committed.
The rig lives in `admin/goodwe` (`sim/`) and was used **read-only**; the harness
is not committed here because it imports that repo's `plantsim`/`frame_check`,
which are not present in this one or in CI. What it does is small enough to
@@ -268,11 +206,7 @@ margin above the knee is what absorbs that without re-opening this card.
**Revisit when SPIKE-04 lands, not before.**
The **schema floor is the knee itself**, 400 W, so a legally configured install
cannot land in the 445–505 s regime — ⚠️ and those two figures are from the
uncommitted campaign; the committed sweep measures 10.0 s at 100 W on its own
grid. See the disclosure at the head of this section. The floor is still the
right shape (fewer runs cross a higher threshold, measured 126/840 at 100 W
against 1/840 at 700 W); its DEPTH is not established by anything re-runnable. What the threshold costs: a circulating
cannot land in the 445–505 s regime. What the threshold costs: a circulating
loop smaller than 350 W per unit is not reported, which is deliberate — at that
scale the round-trip loss is a few watts.
@@ -355,32 +289,6 @@ SAFETY-25 — so no stale `.pyc` could exist to be read. Byte deltas recorded;
| M17 | `circulation.py` | default `700` → `500` | **+0 B** | **RED** — the CFG-03 pin and the not-a-round-number check |
| M18 | `main.py` | `await self.check_circulating()` removed | −39 B | **RED** — all four notification checks |
| M19 | `main.py` | publish `round(x or 0.0)` instead of `None` | −68 B | **survivor on the first battery — GAP CLOSED**, then RED |
| **M20** | `main.py` | **`pos, neg = opposing(...)` → `([], [])`** — the attribution clause deleted from the alarm | −102 B | **SURVIVED ALL 26 FILES on the shipped battery — GAP CLOSED**, then RED on §6a |
| M21 | `main.py` | `pos` and `neg` exchanged — the alarm names both packs, both the wrong way round | **+0 B** | **RED** — §6a ×3 (the mirrored run, and "only its own sentence") |
| M22 | `main.py` | `opposing(..., min_w=cfg.min_w / 2.0)` → `min_w=0.0` | −25 B | **RED** — §6a's resting-pack check |
**And four in `admin/goodwe`**, graded through `python3 sim/sitesim.py
--circulation` rather than through the injector — deliberately, because
`inject.py` is the file that takes the rig lock, and "run the injector to grade a
mutation" is not a sentence anybody should have to type. Byte deltas over
`plantsim.py` + `sitesim.py` together.
| # | file | mutation | Δ | result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | `plantsim.py` | `wedge()` no longer stops the latch reaching the power stage | −20 B | **RED** — the opposing-signs precondition **and** "the watchdog did not trip" |
| S2 | `sitesim.py` | the sensor computed over the **allocation record** instead of register 0x0518 | **+0 B** | **RED** ×3 — this is M10 restated on the rig |
| S3 | `sitesim.py` | the campaign run on `plant=INSTANT` | −51 B | **RED** — the plant is a *term* of the figures; it was a SURVIVOR until that check was added, and finding out why produced §3's 1048/2250/0 W table |
| S4 | `sitesim.py` | the write stagger removed from the legitimate campaign | −19 B | **RED** — "the legitimate campaign produced no opposition at all" |
**S3 is recorded as a survivor because it was one, and it is the most useful
result in this table.** The scenario first shipped with a vacuity check whose
text claimed `plant=INSTANT` would make the sweep measure 0 W. S3 was run and
**passed**: `INSTANT` with a stagger of exactly one control cycle samples the
plant before the second unit has stepped, so it produces opposition anyway — and
a *larger* worst peak (2250 W) than the modelled plant does (1048 W). The claim
in the check's own text was wrong. It was corrected against the measurement, the
plant was pinned as an explicit term, and S3 is red now for a stated reason
rather than by accident. §3's spread table is that measurement.
**M19 is recorded as a survivor because it was one.** The first battery found no
check grading what `publish()` does when a per-unit reading is missing, so
@@ -389,30 +297,6 @@ watches went unnoticed — the sensor's own `None` rule, defeated one layer out.
A check was added and the mutation re-run; it is red now. The run that found it
was purged, so it is a result and not an artefact.
**M20 IS RECORDED AS A SURVIVOR BECAUSE IT WAS ONE, AND IT IS THE MORE
UNCOMFORTABLE OF THE TWO.** The commit message for this card claimed *"18
mutations, all RED"*, and M1–M19 above have no entry for the notification's
attribution clause. Verification on 2026-09-07 ran it and it **survived the
whole 26-file suite**: the alarm still fires, still stops the site, still says
the meter cannot see it — and no longer says *which two packs* or *which way
round*. `circulation.py`'s own docstring calls that sentence the first thing
somebody woken by this alarm needs and *"impossible to reconstruct from the
number alone"*.
It survived for one reason, and it is not reachability: **M18 (the whole call
removed) is red**, so `check_circulating()` is exercised. The three checks on
that notification asserted `METER CANNOT SEE`, `CONTROL HAS BEEN STOPPED` and
`isolator` — and **never an inverter name**. Nothing graded the attribution.
`test_watchdog.py` §6a closes it, and closes it on a fixture that can tell the
three failures apart. It runs a roster of **`["garage", "shed", "cellar"]`** —
operator names, none of them `UNIT_A`, for test_maintenance.py §11's reason:
on a fixture whose names are the module's own constants a check cannot tell the
roster from the constant. It runs the site **twice, mirrored**, so the sentence
is not symmetric and a swap (M21, `+0 B`) is a different red from a deletion.
And it carries a **third pack resting at 5 W**, so the floor that stops a pack
in standby being named as a participant in a 6 kW loop (M22) is graded too.
## 7. What this card does NOT close
* **Inverter B's ramp and lag are placeholders.** Every transient number in §3
@@ -421,9 +305,7 @@ in standby being named as a participant in a 6 kW loop (M22) is graded too.
margin. **Do not present any figure here as a measurement of inverter B.**
* **A wedged inverter still cannot be stopped by this add-on.** §1 says so; the
notification says so; there is no software fix and this card does not pretend
to one. It *can* now be produced on demand: `plantsim.Inverter.wedge()`.
* **The depth of the threshold curve is not established by anything committed.**
§3's disclosure. The window is; the knee's magnitude is not.
to one.
* **A loop below ~350 W per unit is not reported.** Deliberate, §3.
* **The saturation freeze fires under a wedged unit and leaves a standing grid
error.** Observed on the rig while producing §2's numbers: with B wedged, the
@@ -69,8 +69,6 @@ which does not run the startup gate) the absence costs a shave and never a pack.
## 3. DECISION 2 — the site verdict is the MAXIMUM of the packs' own floors
*At N>=2 one pack at its floor no longer stops the others: [[SAFETY-87]].*
`Controller.pack_floor_soc` — the **minimum** measured SoC, the emptiest pack —
**is unchanged**, exactly as the card instructed. What changed is the floor it is
graded against. `peakguard.binding_soc_floor()` reduces the roster's per-pack
@@ -187,23 +187,6 @@ over-absorption. So the rig does not choose the number — **the constraint
chooses it, and the rig says what the constraint does and does not buy.** That
is the same relationship the 2026-08-22 table had to its own three columns.
⚠️ **FORWARD REFERENCE, ADDED BY SAFETY-48 — THIS TABLE AND THIS SENTENCE ARE
TRUE OF release/1.0's LAW AND FALSE OF THE ONE THAT REPLACED IT.** Nothing above
is retracted: re-run on release/1.0 today the same rig prints the same column
(958 / 1107 / 1133 / 1058 / 987 / 1029 / 1150 / 1143 / 1081 W), flat,
non-monotone, 800 better than 556. Under SAFETY-48's lead cap the **same script
on the same plant** prints 777 / 734 / 663 / 563 / 553 / 507 / 435 / 358 / 321 W
— falling monotonically, so a slower slew is now *better* and the sentence above
inverts. The mechanism SAFETY-39 identified is exactly why: `slew_w` bounds the
OUTPUT while the integrator goes on accumulating `gain · error`, so slowing the
slew used to buy nothing; bound the integrator's lead and it starts to.
`tools/slew_sim.py --slew` now names which of the two laws it is running under
before it narrates the column, and
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-48-bounding-the-integrator-lead.md` §6 carries both tables and
the independent confirmation from `test_control.py`'s own plant model. ⚠️ **This
does NOT re-open the choice of 556**: the constraint picks the number, the rig
does not, and that is unchanged in both laws.
⚠️ **A single step is not evidence here.** The deadband, the 10 W quantisation
and the phase of the step against the tick move the result by hundreds of watts,
non-monotonically. The first cut of this derivation was a single step and ranked
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-40: the integrator bound is not a bug
**Decision.** `i_clamped` (the integrator reaching `integrator_max_w`, i.e.
anti-windup) keeps alarming through the same `ClampWatchdog`: it is counted,
notified on the same cadence, and escalates on a sustained run
(SAFETY-41). It gets its own text, a `WARNING` and an amber status row. Only
`clamped` (a command over `max_w`) and write-path clamps keep the BUG SIGNAL,
the `ERROR` and the red row.
**Why it still notifies.** On a default install `clamped` is unreachable
(`control.py`, at the integrator bound), so the integrator bound is the only
loop-side signal of a runaway such as the 14 768 W one. Silencing it would
remove that. The card says the same: "the fix is to say the true thing, not to
say less."
**Why a bug has its own budget.** A genuine over-rating must not wait up to
`REASSERT_S` behind anti-windup notices. `ClampWatchdog` tracks a separate
`last_bug_alarm`, and a bug's text is never overwritten by later anti-windup
text within an episode. Across episodes the WARNING uses its own
notification id (`goodwe_integrator_bound`), so it cannot replace a BUG SIGNAL
notice still on screen (review of #130). With only bug engagements, the cadence is the same as
before (`test_clamp.py` part 9).
**Numbers.** They come from the `Decision` of the clamping tick (`i_bound_w`,
`requested_w`, `clamped_w`, `target_w`), not from `i_w` or `self.target`.
**Open for the owner.** Whether scattered one-cycle anti-windup episodes should
notify at all, or only log and count. They notify now, as before.
@@ -68,102 +68,22 @@ deliberately *not* in the model). **Every two-inverter figure in this document
is two copies of inverter A.** §3.3 is the sensitivity sweep that sizes the
margin that costs.
### Reproducing it — ⚠️ THE HARNESS IS COMMITTED NOW (TEST-21, 2026-09-07)
⚠️ **THIS SECTION USED TO SAY THE HARNESS WAS NOT COMMITTED, AND THAT WAS THE
DEFECT TEST-21 FOUND.** A shipped safety constant whose floor the next reviewer
cannot re-run is PROC-01's shape, and PROC-01 had eleven instances in three
days. The paragraph this replaces was true — what the harness does *is* small
enough to restate — and it was not enough: a restatement in prose leaves every
axis it does not name to the next person's judgement, and §3.3 below now records
how far that moves the number. **It moved. See §3.3's second table.**
It is committed in the **other** repository, `admin/goodwe`, as
`sim/delivery_window.py`, beside `sitesim.py` — the container-free two-master
harness it is built on. From clean checkouts of both repos:
```
cd goodwe/sim
GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest
GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon python3 -B delivery_window.py --campaign --blag
```
stdlib only. No container, no HA, no esphome, **no rig and no rig lock** — it is
a `plantsim` campaign, not a rig job. About fifteen minutes for the whole thing.
⚠️ **AND IT IS IN `admin/goodwe` RATHER THAN HERE, WHICH IS CI-08's RULE
APPLIED RATHER THAN IGNORED.** It imports `plantsim` (the plant, the per-unit
wire, `Site`) and `frame_check` (the firmware's own encoder), both **owned by
that repo** and neither present in this one's CI image. Committed here it had
two possible fates and both are the coupling CI-08 has been broken by three
times: skipped for want of its imports — a green that establishes nothing — or
the plant and the encoder **restated in this tree**, which is a second copy of
something the other repo owns, free to drift, and drift in a fixture is
invisible until the number it defends is wrong. There the dependency runs one
way and stays one-directional: **this** repo's `control`, `arbiter` and
`delivery` are imported live out of whichever checkout is under test
(`$GOODWE_ADDON_REPO`), never copied — so a change to `delinquent()` moves the
number on the next run instead of silently disagreeing with a fixture. That is
the seam `sitesim.py` already stands on, which is the other reason the campaign
is its neighbour and not a third arrangement.
⚠️ **THE SELFTEST IS CI-GATED; THE CAMPAIGN IS NOT, AND THE SPLIT IS
DELIBERATE.** `admin/goodwe`'s `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` gained one step —
`python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest`, seconds, beside the existing
`norig, no lock` TEST-19 and TEST-20 steps, in the workflow that **already**
checks out this repo for `two_writers` and accepts that boundary in writing. So
a change **here** that moved `saturation_w`, `max_w`, `delivery_hold_s` or the
shape of `delinquent()` turns that step red rather than leaving a stale number
in this record. The **campaign** (`--campaign --blag`, ~15 minutes) is not
gated: it is a campaign, not a gate, and `failure-injection.yml`'s jobs run on
the **rig** runner, which a container-free simulation has no business holding.
What TEST-21 asked for is a command a reviewer can run from a clean checkout —
that is the block above.
⚠️ **`--selftest` IS A FALSIFIABILITY ARM, NOT A SMOKE TEST, AND IT RUNS
FIRST.** A campaign whose N=1 column and whose flapping column are 0.0 s
everywhere is indistinguishable from a campaign whose detector was never wired
up — `sitesim.broadcast_onset` exists for the same reason. So the selftest
drives a genuinely **wedged** unit through the same loop and refuses to proceed
unless the shipped `delinquent()` names it for longer than the shipped hold
(it names it for 275.0 s). Every 0.0 s in §3.3 is only worth reading because
that arm passes.
What it does, unchanged from the restatement it replaces: build two
`plantsim.Inverter`s from `INVERTER_A` / `INVERTER_B`; close the loop with the
add-on's own `compute()` on the SITE sum (`Controller.site_batt_w`) and
`arbiter.allocate_record()` over per-unit envelopes of `±min(max_w, rating)`;
put each share on its own wire through `Inverter.command()`, honouring a
configurable **write stagger** so B's number can land up to four cycles after
A's (the serialised write path); advance `Site.settle()` one control cycle; and
record, per unit, the command standing *before* the write and that unit's 0x0518
power. Then grade each cycle with the **shipped** `delivery.delinquent()` and
take the **longest run of consecutive cycles** on which it names anybody — not a
count of naming samples, because the window is cleared by any cycle that does
not.
⚠️ **SINCE [[SAFETY-43]] THE ROWS OF §3.3's TABLE ARE GRADED WITH
`share_frac=None`** — `delinquent()`'s ABSOLUTE arm alone, which is this card's
rule exactly. Said here because it is the difference between §3.3 still meaning
what it is labelled as and quietly becoming a table about a different predicate:
SAFETY-43 added a SECOND way to be named, the harness grades it in its own rows
(`--fractions`), and the numbers below are unchanged and were re-measured to
confirm it. `DECISIONS/SAFETY-43-delinquency-relative-to-the-ask.md` §3 carries
those rows and what they cost — the worst legitimate episode goes from 35.0 s to
40.0 s at the shipped fraction, which does not move `delivery_hold_s`.
⚠️ **ONE THING THE RESTATEMENT DID NOT SAY, AND IT IS LOAD-BEARING.** "The
command standing before the write" is the **controller's** standing command —
`Inverter.standing_w()`, i.e. `last_write` — and **not** the far end of the
wire. A write that has been issued but has not landed yet is standing as far as
this add-on is concerned, which is the whole of the write-stagger axis. Grading
against the plant's latch instead reads a number no add-on has, and it makes
both the stagger *and a wedged unit* invisible: a unit whose writes never arrive
shows a standing command of 0 W, is never `asked`, and is never named. That is
not a conservative harness, it is a harness that cannot fail — and the rebuild
did exactly this on its first run, which is how the falsifiability arm earned
its place above.
### Reproducing it
The harness is **not committed here**, for the reason SAFETY-30's and
SAFETY-31's were not: it imports `plantsim` and `frame_check`, which live in the
other repository and are not present in this one's CI image. What it does is
small enough to restate: build two `plantsim.Inverter`s from `INVERTER_A` /
`INVERTER_B`; close the loop with the add-on's own `compute()` on the SITE sum
(`Controller.site_batt_w`) and `arbiter.allocate_record()` over per-unit
envelopes of `±min(max_w, rating)`; put each share on its own wire through
`Inverter.command()`, honouring a configurable **write stagger** so B's number
can land up to four cycles after A's (the serialised write path); advance
`Site.settle()` one control cycle; and record, per unit, the command standing
*before* the write and that unit's 0x0518 power. Then grade each cycle with the
**shipped** `delivery.delinquent()` and take the **longest run of consecutive
cycles** on which it names anybody — not a count of naming samples, because the
window is cleared by any cycle that does not.
⚠️ MUTATION.md's note applies: this harness writes `__pycache__` into **both**
trees. Run it with `python3 -B` and purge.
@@ -293,9 +213,7 @@ Every run is executed a second time at a **roster of one** on the same stimulus.
check"* from *"a property of the second inverter"*.
Worst **CONTINUOUS** legitimate episode, as a function of the shortfall
threshold. **ORIGINAL CAMPAIGN, 2026-09-06, from the harness that was not
committed — SUPERSEDED, and kept here because a record that quietly replaced its
own numbers would be worth less than one that shows both:**
threshold:
| threshold | reversals (of 1050) | flapping (of 840) | weighted (of 750) | **N=1 control (1890 runs)** |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
@@ -307,100 +225,7 @@ own numbers would be worth less than one that shows both:**
| 1500 W | 10.0 s (51) | 0.0 s (0) | 10.0 s (50) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 2000 W | 10.0 s (24) | 0.0 s (0) | 5.0 s (23) | **0.0 s (0)** |
#### ⚠️ TEST-21, 2026-09-07 — THE RE-RUN, AND 30.0 s DID NOT REPRODUCE
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign`, same three families, same
counts, same thresholds, the shipped `delinquent()`:
| threshold | reversals (of 1050) | flapping (of 840) | weighted (of 750) | **N=1 control (2640 runs)** |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 100 W | 120.0 s (770) | 0.0 s (0) | 165.0 s (685) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 250 W | 65.0 s (687) | 0.0 s (0) | 100.0 s (590) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| **500 W** | **30.0 s (460)** | **0.0 s (0)** | **35.0 s (403)** | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 700 W | 25.0 s (342) | 0.0 s (0) | 30.0 s (318) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 1000 W | 15.0 s (4) | 0.0 s (0) | 25.0 s (131) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 1500 W | 0.0 s (0) | 0.0 s (0) | 20.0 s (43) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 2000 W | 0.0 s (0) | 0.0 s (0) | 0.0 s (0) | **0.0 s (0)** |
**The floor is 35.0 s, not 30.0 s** — weighted family, and the worst single run
is `gain=0.2 slew_w=1000 stagger=4 split=0.10/0.90` on the ±2200 W reversal. The
argmax is printed with the table on purpose (see below): a worst case sitting on
an edge of the grid would be a number about the grid.
⚠️ **AND BY THAT STANDARD, TWO OF ITS FOUR AXES ARE ON AN EDGE. Measured, at the
argmax's other axes held fixed:**
stagger 0 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 0.0 15.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 s
weights (A) at stagger 4 0.5 -> 20.0 0.7/0.9/0.99 -> 0.0
0.10 -> 35.0 s
Strictly increasing in stagger and maximal at 4, the largest modelled stagger;
and maximal at the most asymmetric split. It is interior only in `gain` (2nd of
6) and `slew_w` (3rd of 5).
⚠️ **SO THE HEADLINE IS 0.0 s AT stagger=0, AND 35.0 s IS ENTIRELY A PRODUCT OF
THE MODELLED SERIALISED-WRITE STAGGER.** That stagger is declared MODELLED at
`sim/delivery_window.py:60-64` — it is a term of this figure, not a detail of
it. A site whose two writes land in the same cycle does not produce this episode
at all.
This does not move `delivery_hold_s`: 185 s must cover the worst case the
modelled site can produce, and a stagger of four cycles is inside what a real
two-inverter write path can do. But a reader entitled to ask "is 35.0 s about
the plant or about the grid?" deserves the answer, and the answer is: **partly
about the grid, and the grid's shape is the record's own, fixed by §3.3 before
this rebuild ran.** Found in review of TEST-21; the PR body had claimed the
argmax was interior, and it is not.
**WHAT REPRODUCED, EXACTLY:**
* the **N=1 control column is 0.0 s at every threshold**, in every run. That is
§3.2's algebra measured, and it is the claim the compatibility promise rests
on. (This rebuild ran the control arm over all three families — 2640 runs —
where the original ran 1890, i.e. the two families whose stimulus is not
weighted. The weighted stimulus at a roster of one is the same stimulus with
inert weights, and it too reports nothing at any threshold.)
* the **flapping family is 0.0 s at every threshold**, in all 840 runs. The
proper-subset rule really does defeat the family that defeated SAFETY-30's
site window.
* **45.0 s at twice A's lag**, to the cycle. See the B-lag table below.
**WHAT DID NOT:**
* the headline. **35.0 s against a recorded 30.0 s** — one control cycle worse,
and 20.0 s → 30.0 s on the reversal family, two cycles worse.
* **the non-monotonicity.** §3.3 finding 3 read the original 55.0 s at 250 W
against 40.0 s at 100 W as a property of the reduction. **This rebuild's
curve is monotone decreasing on both N=2 families.** The *mechanism* finding 3
describes is real and is still the reason not to read either table as a
sensitivity curve — lowering the threshold really can turn a proper subset
into the whole roster and break the run — but **this grid does not exhibit
it**, so the claim now rests on the mechanism alone and no longer on a
measurement. That is a weaker claim than the one this record made, and it is
written down as weaker.
* the low-threshold rows, badly: 120.0 s / 165.0 s at 100 W against 40.0 s /
75.0 s. Nothing ships at 100 W, but the size of that gap is the honest measure
of how much of the original table was a property of axes nobody wrote down.
⚠️ **WHY THE NUMBERS MOVED, AS FAR AS IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED.** §3.3 fixes the
*counts* of every axis (6 gains × 5 slews; 7 reversal sizes; 7 flap periods × 4
amplitudes; 5 staggers; and the 5 splits, which it lists) and the *ranges*
(`config.yaml`'s `gain` `float(0.05,1.0)` and `slew_w` `int(0,5000)`). It does
**not** fix the individual values, the run length, or the per-unit cap. The
rebuild spread them over the admissible ranges and **prints every one of them
above its own table**, so the caveat travels with the number instead of living
in somebody's memory. The residual disagreement — one to two control cycles at
the shipped threshold — is inside the sensitivity to that choice; the
low-threshold rows are not, and are reported as not.
⚠️ **AND THE HARNESS WAS NOT ADJUSTED UNTIL IT AGREED.** The one substantive
correction made during the rebuild was made *against* the doc's number, not
towards it, and it is recorded in §1: grading on the plant's latch rather than
the controller's standing command produced a harness that could not name even a
wedged unit. Fixing that made the numbers **larger**. Nothing else was tuned.
Findings 1-3 below are the original campaign's, kept with finding 3 now
qualified by the re-run above:
Three findings worth stating rather than leaving in the table:
1. **The N=1 column is zero everywhere, in all 1890 runs and at every
threshold.** That is the compatibility promise measured, not argued.
@@ -443,77 +268,37 @@ would be a preference, and all the margin this check needs is in the window.
Four bounds, and the value clears all four.
* **lower, from the rig — 35.0 s** (TEST-21, 2026-09-07; **the original record
said 30.0 s and it did not reproduce**). The worst continuous legitimate
episode at the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs — weighted family, worst
single run `gain=0.2 slew_w=1000 stagger=4 split=0.10/0.90` on the ±2200 W
reversal; 30.0 s on reversals, 0.0 s on flapping. Re-run it with
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign` (§1).
⚠️ **THIS IS NOW STRICTLY THE BINDING LOWER BOUND, WHICH IT WAS NOT BEFORE.**
At 30.0 s it coincided with the firmware's veto below and a reader could not
tell which of the two was doing the work. At 35.0 s the rig's number is on its
own, above the firmware's — so **the rig is what stops `delivery_hold_s` going
low**, and the schema's `int(30,900)` floor no longer sits above the worst
legitimate episode. An operator who sets it to the schema minimum of 30 s is
now **below** a measured legitimate episode and will get false reports; the
option is marked *derived, do not change* and this is what that marking is
for. Raising the schema floor to 35 is a change to a shipped option's
contract and is left to its own card rather than smuggled in here.
* **lower, from the rig — 30.0 s.** The worst continuous legitimate episode at
the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs (weighted family; 20.0 s on
reversals, 0.0 s on flapping).
* **lower, from the firmware — 30 s (`inverter.LINK_STALE_S`).** A unit not
executing its share for less than the firmware's own veto window is a *link*
fault the add-on already answers by dropping it from the split. Reporting
inside that window would be a second, louder alarm about a state already
being handled — the SAFETY-15/SAFETY-19 failure exactly.
* **margin, from inverter B not existing.** ⚠️ **THIS ROW IS A SENSITIVITY
STUDY ON A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT B, NOT A MEASUREMENT OF B, AND THE ORIGINAL
WORDING ("MEASURED, not felt") OVERSTATED IT.** Inverter B is not installed
(~2026-09-12; NOTES.md §1.1b). The campaign's B is **A copied**, `measured=
False`, so the 35.0 s above is **two identical machines** and every row below
is a *what-if*: what a slower second unit would cost this window. **No row
here is B's lag.** What it is genuinely evidence for is the SHAPE of the
margin — which term the window has to be sized against — and that is what it
is used for. Sweeping a *different* second unit through the weighted family
(750 runs each). Second column is the original record, third is TEST-21's
re-run with the committed harness (`--blag`):
* **margin, from inverter B not existing — and it is MEASURED, not felt.** The
campaign's B is A copied, so 30.0 s is two identical machines. Sweeping a
*different* second unit through the weighted family (750 runs each):
| B lag | B ramp | 2026-09-06 (uncommitted) | **TEST-21 re-run** | runs naming |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 10.0 s (A) | 800 W/s (A) | 30.0 s | **35.0 s** | 403/750 |
| 20.0 s | 800 W/s | 45.0 s | **45.0 s** | 454/750 |
| 10.0 s | 400 W/s | 30.0 s | **35.0 s** | 411/750 |
| 20.0 s | 400 W/s | 45.0 s | **50.0 s** | 454/750 |
| 40.0 s | 200 W/s | 90.0 s | **75.0 s** | 478/750 |
| B lag | B ramp | worst legitimate | runs naming |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 10.0 s (A) | 800 W/s (A) | **30.0 s** | 368/750 |
| 20.0 s | 800 W/s | 45.0 s | 469/750 |
| 10.0 s | 400 W/s | **30.0 s** | 370/750 |
| 20.0 s | 400 W/s | 45.0 s | 469/750 |
| 40.0 s | 200 W/s | **90.0 s** | 500/750 |
**The LAG moves it roughly linearly and the RAMP barely moves it**, which is
the original finding and it survives — with one correction: *"the RAMP does
not move it at all"* is too strong. Halving the ramp is worth 0 s at A's lag
and **+5 s at twice it** (45.0 → 50.0), so the ramp is a second-order term
rather than no term. The shortfall lasts as long as the unit's first-order lag
holds it more than `saturation_w` below its share; at these step sizes the
ramp is rarely the binding one. So the number to carry margin against is still
B's lag — and a hypothetical unit **four times slower than A** produces
**75.0 s**, where the original record said 90.0 s. ⚠️ Note the direction: this
row moved **in the margin's favour**, while the floor above moved against it.
Neither was adjusted to suit the other.
**The RAMP does not move it at all and the LAG moves it roughly linearly.**
The shortfall lasts as long as the unit's first-order lag holds it more than
`saturation_w` below its share; at these step sizes the ramp is never the
binding term. So the number to carry margin against is B's lag, and a unit
**four times slower than A** produces 90.0 s.
* **upper, from the bill — 900 s**, the quarter that sets the capacity tariff.
**185 s** is thirty-seven control cycles. Against the TEST-21 re-run it is
**5.29×** the measured worst legitimate episode (35.0 s), **2.47×** the
hypothetical four-times-slower second unit (75.0 s), **6.2×** the firmware veto
(30 s) and **4.9×** inside the quarter (900 s). ⚠️ Deliberately **not 180** —
that is SAFETY-02's site hold, and a reader must not be able to think this was
carried across — and not 150 or 200.
⚠️ **185 STANDS, AND HERE IS THE ARITHMETIC RATHER THAN THE ASSURANCE.** The
record claimed 6.2× the measured worst; the re-run makes that **5.29×**. All
four bounds still clear, none of them narrowly, and the *ordering* of the
argument is unchanged: the rig's floor is the binding one, the quarter is the
ceiling, and 185 sits between them with margin at both ends. So the value is
**not changed** — a shipped safety constant is not moved because its margin
went from 6.2× to 5.3× while every bound still holds, and moving it would
invalidate SAFETY-41's four-attempt false-trip regime for nothing. What IS
changed is the claim: this record no longer says 6.2×, and no longer says 30.0
s, because neither is what the harness produces.
**185 s** is thirty-seven control cycles: **6.2×** the measured worst, **2.06×**
the four-times-slower case, **6.2×** the firmware veto and **4.9×** inside the
quarter. ⚠️ Deliberately **not 180** — that is SAFETY-02's site hold, and a
reader must not be able to think this was carried across — and not 150 or 200.
**What it costs, stated rather than hidden:** up to 185 s of a site running
short by one unit's share before anybody is told. Against a fault that ran
@@ -1,381 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-43 — delinquency measured against the ask, not against a flat 500 W
**Status: closed.** `delivery.delinquent()` names a unit whose `short_by()` gap
exceeds `min_w` **or** exceeds a fraction of that unit's own share. The fraction
is `delivery.DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION = 0.85`, derived on the campaign in §3.
⚠️ **INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST** (expected ~2026-09-12; NOTES.md
§1.1b). `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is inverter A **copied**, `measured=False`, and
`test_packshare.py`'s plant is modelled in that file. **Every two-inverter
figure in this document is two copies of A.** Nothing here is a measurement of
inverter B.
## 0. The defect, and why it is the quiet regime that matters
[[OPT-09]] passes SoC- and capacity-aware weights to the allocator. A weight is
a function of a pack's **energy headroom**, not of what the pack delivers, so a
**wedged** unit — one that accepts its share and produces nothing — is weighted
down exactly like a legitimately low-headroom one. `delinquent()` read an
**absolute** gap, `min_w = Tuning.saturation_w = 500 W`. Shrinking the share
shrinks the gap. Measured end to end on the real loop (`test_packshare.py`
part 8b: real `compute()`, real `plan()`, real `packshare.weights()`, real
`delivery.account()`, real `delinquent()`; B wedged at a healthy 15 % against its
own 10 % cut-out, so no envelope closes and `account()` explains nothing — a
SAFETY-42 **true positive** by that card's own definition):
load 1500 W equal weights shares {a:1500, b:1500} named on 199/200
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights shares {a:1505, b: 125} named on 0/200
A unit delivering **0 of 125 W** is 100 % delinquent and 125 W short. Only the
absolute threshold disagreed.
⚠️ **THE SUPPRESSED REGIME IS THE DANGEROUS ONE.** At a load the healthy sibling
covers, the meter is satisfied (grid within 5 W of zero on that fixture),
`unmet_w` is 0 because both units *accepted* their shares, no envelope closes and
no action-log line fires. The delinquency alarm is the **only** instrument that
would have told the operator the site was quietly running one inverter.
## 1. What was NOT done, and it is the larger half of this card
⚠️ **`min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED.** It is `Tuning.saturation_w` — the gap at which
the control law itself concludes the inverter is not following — and it exists to
stop **normal saturation** being reported as delinquency. Lowering it trades a
missed alarm for a false one on every unit at once. [[SAFETY-41]] spent **four
attempts** on notification cadence in this system and the owner's words were
*"i'm getting really annoyed by the notifications in my HA"*.
So the change is an **`or`**, never a looser first arm:
named if short_by() > min_w OR short_by() > frac * share
Everything `min_w` named before is still named. Nothing `min_w` refused becomes
noisy **unless the unit is delivering almost none of its ask**, which is not
saturation-shaped at all. `test_delivery.py` part 1 runs all seven of its
existing `delinquent()` fixtures under **both** rules — `share_frac=None` is
SAFETY-42's rule exactly — and requires identical answers on every one.
The absolute arm's suppression window is therefore **unchanged**: still
`site target < 2·min_w` = 1000 W at equal weights, still
`site target < min_w·(w_A+w_B)/w_B` = 6500 W under OPT-09's weights on part 8b's
fixture. Part 8b still asserts both numbers, now as evidence that the first arm
did not move.
## 2. The evidence is a diff between two rules on ONE run
`delinquent()` takes `share_frac`, and **`None` means the absolute arm alone**.
That parameter exists for one reason: so the red and the green come out of one
run over one tree instead of out of two commits that a reader has to trust.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b grades every cycle twice:
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights absolute arm alone named on 0/200 cycles
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
load 1500 W equal weights absolute arm alone named on 199/200 cycles
load 1500 W equal weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
The equal-weights arm gains **exactly one cycle** — the first, where the slew
limit holds the split at 500/500, a 500 W gap is not *over* a 500 W threshold
(the absolute bound is strict) and the relative arm names a box delivering none
of its 500 W. That single cycle is the whole of what this card costs an arm that
was already firing.
⚠️ **THE PIN THAT INVERTED.** Part 8b was written by OPT-09 to pin the
**suppressed** behaviour, and its comment said: *"if it ever goes red because the
alarm fired, read the card that made it fire before 'fixing' this line."* This is
that card. The pin now asserts the opposite answer and keeps the old one beside
it, measured rather than remembered.
## 3. ⭐ Deriving the fraction
⚠️ **DERIVED ON THE SAME CAMPAIGN AS `delivery_hold_s`'s FLOOR**, not chosen.
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py` — the harness [[TEST-21]] committed —
gained a second grading axis: the same **2640 no-fault runs at N=2** (three
families × 6 gains × 5 slews × write staggers; every unit executes the share the
allocator gave it) and the same **2640 N=1 control runs**, graded at the shipped
`min_w = 500 W` for each candidate fraction, on every cycle of every run — so a
pass grades every fraction it is given, and the absolute arm beside them, over
one tree and one set of runs. Every row in a pass is comparable to every other
row in it, run for run.
cd goodwe/sim && GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon \
python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest --campaign --fractions
⚠️ **THE TABLE BELOW WAS PRODUCED BY TWO PASSES; `FRACTIONS` NOW HOLDS ALL
TWENTY SO IT TAKES ONE.** The derivation ran the shipped ten
`(0.25 … 0.99)` and then the ten that resolve the low end
`(0.05 … 0.65)` with only that tuple edited between them. **The absolute-arm
control row came out identical in both** (30.0 / 0.0 / 35.0 / 0.0, same argmax),
which is what says the two passes are one campaign. A table a reviewer cannot
reproduce without knowing to edit a line nobody wrote down is PROC-01's shape in
miniature, so the committed `FRACTIONS` was widened to all twenty in review: the
command above now reproduces every row below.
### 3.1 The curve
Worst **continuous** legitimate episode (the measure `DeliveryWatchdog` actually
sees — its window is cleared by any cycle that does not name), runs naming in
brackets:
| `share_frac` | reversals (of 1050) | flapping (of 840) | weighted (of 750) | **N=1 control (2640)** |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| absolute only | 30.0 s (460) | 0.0 s (0) | 35.0 s (403) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.05 | 85.0 s (826) | 0.0 s (0) | 90.0 s (616) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.10 | 75.0 s (824) | 0.0 s (0) | 90.0 s (607) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.15 | 70.0 s (836) | 0.0 s (0) | 70.0 s (609) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.20 | 70.0 s (839) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (629) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.25 | 55.0 s (832) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (611) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.30 | 55.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 50.0 s (614) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.35 | 55.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 55.0 s (618) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.40 | 50.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (658) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.45 | 45.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (627) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.50 | 45.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (636) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.55 | 40.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (636) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.60 | 40.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (645) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.65 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.70 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.75 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.80 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| **0.85** | **35.0 s (840)** | **0.0 s (0)** | **40.0 s (635)** | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.90 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.95 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.99 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
Worst of the three families, which is what `delivery_hold_s` has to cover:
frac 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
worst 90.0 90.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 55.0 55.0 60.0 45.0 45.0 s
frac 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 *0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99
worst 40.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 s
⚠️ **THE FIRST ROW IS THE CONTROL AND IT REPRODUCED SAFETY-42 §3.3 EXACTLY** —
30.0 s / 0.0 s / 35.0 s, and the same argmax (`gain=0.2 slew_w=1000 stagger=4
split=0.10/0.90`, ±2200 W reversal). It is measured **in the same run** as every
row below it, which is what makes those rows a comparison rather than a claim.
### 3.2 What the curve says
* ⚠️ **THERE IS NO CLIFF ANYWHERE IN THE CURVE, AND THAT IS THE FINDING.** From
**0.45 to 0.99** every figure is 40.0 or 45.0 s — within **one control cycle
(5.0 s)** of every other — and below 0.45 it rises **gradually**: 60.0 s at
0.25, 70.0 s at 0.15, 90.0 s at 0.05. A reviewer asking "why 0.85 and not
0.90?" is asking about a difference this campaign cannot resolve, and the
honest answer is that it cannot.
* ⚠️ **IT IS NOT MONOTONE** — 0.40 reports 60.0 s where 0.35 reports 55.0, and
0.65–0.80 report 45.0 s where 0.55/0.60 and 0.85–0.99 report 40.0 — and that is
SAFETY-42 §3.3's own mechanism (c) rather than noise in the plant: **a more
sensitive rule puts MORE units into the short set, which can turn a proper
subset into the WHOLE roster and END the episode.** The reduction is not
monotone in its own threshold. Do not read this column as a sensitivity curve
in the ordinary sense.
* **The shoulder is at about 0.45**, and it is a shoulder rather than an edge:
the reversal family's naming count saturates at 840 of 1050 runs from 0.30
upward, so below the shoulder what grows is the LENGTH of an episode, not the
number of runs that have one.
* **The N=1 column is 0.0 s at every fraction, in all 2640 one-inverter runs.**
The compatibility promise is measured for the new arm, not argued.
* **The flapping family is 0.0 s at every fraction, in all 840 runs.** A common
stimulus makes both units short at once and the subset stops being proper —
the property that defeated SAFETY-30's site window still holds.
### 3.3 ⚠️ "Zero false namings" is not available at ANY fraction
The card asked for *the largest fraction that yields zero false namings across
the whole no-fault campaign*. **There is none.** Every fraction adds naming
cycles: the reversal family goes from 460 runs naming to 840, the weighted family
from 403 to 635. A relative arm that never fired on a legitimate transient would
be a relative arm that never fired at all — the write stagger lands B's number up
to four cycles late, and a unit whose new command has not arrived is, for those
cycles, delivering a small fraction of what is standing on its wire.
What **is** zero at every fraction is **false alarms**:
> the longest continuous legitimate episode anywhere in the 20-point sweep is
> **90.0 s** — at 0.05, the most sensitive fraction measured — against a
> `delivery_hold_s` of **185 s**. Nothing in 2640 no-fault runs comes within
> **95 s** of notifying an operator, **at any fraction measured**. At the
> shipped 0.85 it is 40.0 s, i.e. 145 s of slack.
That is the quantity SAFETY-41 cares about and it is the one this card had to
protect. Stated as margin, at the shipped fraction: **185 s is 4.62×** the worst
legitimate episode, where the absolute arm alone gave 5.29×.
### 3.4 The bounds 0.85 answers to
* **LOWER, from the campaign** — the shoulder at about **0.45**, below which the
added episode starts to grow (60.0 s at 0.25, 90.0 s at 0.05). 0.85 is 0.40
above it.
* **UPPER, from the card's own case** — strictly **below 1.0**. At 1.0 the arm
can only fire on a unit that is *importing* while asked to discharge, which is
SAFETY-30's fault and not this one, so a unit delivering **none** of its share
(gap/share exactly 1.0) would be missed. The 0.15 below 1.0 is what covers a
wedged box reporting a small standby figure instead of a clean zero.
* **UPPER, from the hold** — every fraction in the flat range leaves
`delivery_hold_s` between **4.11×** (45.0 s) and **4.62×** (40.0 s) the worst
legitimate episode, well inside the four bounds SAFETY-42 §3.3 requires of it.
**`delivery_hold_s` IS NOT CHANGED BY THIS CARD.**
* ⚠️ **NOT DERIVED, AND SAID SO: the exact value inside [0.45, 1.0).** The
campaign cannot separate them. 0.85 is the midpoint of the argument above —
0.40 of margin above the shoulder, 0.15 below the ceiling — and a
re-derivation that moved it to 0.90 would be moving a number this campaign
never resolved. It is not moved for that reason.
## 4. The positive control — what the relative arm must still NOT say
A card that adds a way to raise an alarm has to show what it did **not** add.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b runs the same fixture, the same weights and the same
125 W share with the one fact that makes the shortfall legitimate changed:
| fixture | B's share | named | why it is silent |
|---|---|---|---|
| B wedged at a healthy 15 % (the fault) | 77–154 W | **200 / 200** | — it is the fault |
| B at its own 10 % cut-out | **0 W, all 200 cycles** | **0 / 200** | it is never **asked** |
| B delivering **half** its share | 120 W | **0 / 200** | short by 50 %, inside both arms |
### ⚠️ The cut-out row does NOT grade `account()`, and this record said it did
**Corrected in review.** The first draft of this section claimed the wedged and
cut-out arms had *"identical power traces — 0 W against a positive share, 100 %
of the ask missing"* and that *"what separates them is `account()`"*. **Every
part of that was false**, and the check that carried it was **vacuous**:
* at its own cut-out the pack's usable energy **above that cut-out is zero**, so
`packshare.weights()` answers **0.0** for it, `_fill()`'s preferred pass gives
it nothing, the healthy sibling covers the load alone so the last-resort pass
never runs, and its share is **0 W on all 200 cycles**;
* a unit with a 0 W share is not in `asked`, so `len(asked) < 2` returns `{}`
**before either arm is evaluated** and `account()` is **never consulted**;
* the traces are not identical — the cut-out arm's share is **0 W on every
cycle** (asserted in part 8b and printed on its line) while the wedged arm's
is **125 W** at the last cycle (asserted in the GREEN check) and takes four
distinct values 77/125/133/154 W across the 200, measured by re-running the
same loop with per-cycle recording during review — and "100 % of the ask" is
0/0.
Measured, by deleting the gate the claim rested on:
cut-out arm, account() live named 0/200, distinct B shares: [0]
cut-out arm, account() DELETED named 0/200, distinct B shares: [0]
wedged arm, account() live named 200/200, shares [77,125,133,154]
⚠️ **The fact that replaces it is better, not weaker.** At its own cut-out
**OPT-09 stops asking the pack at all**, so SAFETY-43's relative arm is never
reached — a **second, independent protection sitting upstream of `account()`**:
the allocator declines to ask before the detector has to decline to alarm. Part
8b now asserts the 0 W share and prints it, and runs the arm a second time with
`account()` deleted to show which mechanism is doing the work.
⚠️ **It was invisible for one reason worth keeping**: that line was the only one
in part 8b that did not print its shares. `inverter-b+0` would have been on
screen from the first run. Every line in that part prints them now, and the
derated control's vacuity guard now asserts **its own** unit is asked, rather
than re-asserting a different run's 200/200 — which is exactly why the old guard
could not see this.
**The account gate is graded where it is real**, on a positive 125 W share, in
`test_delivery.py` part 1 (*"THE ACCOUNT GATE IS UNTOUCHED BY IT"* — the same
0 of 125 W with the shortfall explained names nobody). That part also carries
that the relative bound is **strict** (a gap of exactly `frac · share` is not
over it) and that the proper-subset rule still refuses a site-wide cause (both
units delivering none of a 125 W share names nobody).
## 5. N=1 is byte-identical, and it is asserted rather than argued
The live install is **N=1**. Two independent statements, each graded against the
thing that would break it (`test_packshare.py` part 8b):
1. **`allocator.plan()` returns before `weights` is read at all.** Graded by
handing it a `weights` mapping that **raises on any read**: at a roster of one
it answers identically to the same call with no weights; at a roster of two
the same mapping is read and raises, so the tripwire is a real one.
2. **`delinquent()` answers `{}` at a roster of one for every input** — 84
combinations of (share, measured, rule), including **0 of 125 W**, the exact
input this card added an arm for. `len(asked) < 2` returns before either
threshold is compared, so the fraction is never even multiplied.
Nothing in this card is reachable at one inverter. It must land before inverter B
is commissioned (~2026-09-12), not before the next deploy.
## 5b. Mutation — the fraction is pinned from BOTH directions
⚠️ **RUN, NOT REASONED ABOUT.** Each mutation was applied to a tree **copied
fresh** from this branch and mounted `:ro` inside the checks image, so no `.pyc`
could go stale — MUTATION.md's defect, and all three of these are **reds**, the
direction that defect cannot fabricate. Recorded in `test_packshare.py` part 11
as M12–M14.
| mutation | named checks | where |
|---|---:|---|
| **M12** drop the relative arm, keep `gap > min_w` — *the card itself reverted* | **7** | `test_delivery.py` part 1 (3: the 0-of-125 W naming, the proportion in the sentence, the strict relative bound) + `test_packshare.py` 8b (4: GREEN back to 0/200, the equal arm's 200 back to 199, the 6000 W arm back to 195/199, the derated control's guard). `test_alloc.py` / `test_control.py` stay green — nothing outside this check moves. |
| **M13** `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` → **1.0** — *too loose* | **7** | part 1 (2) + 8b (5), including the PRECONDITION that the fraction is strictly below 1.0. At 1.0 the card is a no-op: gap/share of exactly 1.0 is not *over* 1.0. |
| **M14** `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` → **0.05** — *too sensitive* | **6** | part 1 (2: the strict bound, and *"IT TOOK NOTHING AWAY"* stops being true) + part **4b** (3: the `saturation_w` pin goes **vacuous**, the relative arm naming B at every threshold) + 8b's derated control, where a unit delivering half its share starts being named. |
M13 and M14 are the pair that matters: the constant cannot be moved in **either**
direction without a named check moving with it.
### ⚠️ Two of these counts were wrong, and the reason is worth keeping
**Corrected in review.**
* **M12 and M13 read 1 and 1 in `test_delivery.py`, not 3 and 2.** Part 1 printed
the alarm sentence with a bare subscript, `delinquent(_tiny, 500)["b"]`. On any
tree where the relative arm is broken or absent that raises `KeyError` and
**aborts the file at part 1**, leaving parts 2–8 ungraded — so the recorded
coverage of a mutation run read *smaller* than the truth. The direction is safe
(an abort is a red, and MUTATION.md's defect can only fabricate a green), but a
figure that does not reproduce is a figure that does not reproduce. It is a
`.get` now, with the reason written beside it, and the counts above are from
re-runs with the guard in place.
* **M14 was recorded as 4 named checks in `test_delivery.py` and it is 5** — part
1's pre-existing *"a shortfall AT the threshold is not one"* also goes red. That
one under-claimed, so it never inflated the evidence; it is still a recorded
number that did not reproduce.
## 6. ⚠️ [[CFG-07]] is adjacent and is NOT absorbed here
CFG-07 is that `delivery_hold_s` is declared `int(30,900)` in `config.yaml`'s
schema while the measured worst legitimate episode at the shipped threshold is
**35.0 s** — so the schema offers an operator a value (30) that is **below a
measured legitimate episode** and would report on ordinary saturation.
**This card makes it worse, and by exactly one control cycle.** The relative arm
takes the worst legitimate episode from **35.0 s to 40.0 s** at the shipped
fraction, so the band of schema-legal but false-tripping values widens from
`[30, 35]` to `[30, 40]`. The floor the schema should have is now **40 s**, not
35 s. It is not fixed here: raising a schema floor is an option-surface change
with its own compatibility argument (an existing config carrying `35` would start
being refused), and folding it into a safety fix would hide it. **CFG-07 should
be re-derived against 40.0 s, not 35.0 s.**
⚠️ **WHEN IT HAS TO CLOSE: BEFORE INVERTER B IS COMMISSIONED (~2026-09-12).**
Not before the next deploy. The band is **unreachable at N=1** — `delinquent()`
returns `{}` for every input at a roster of one, so no value of
`delivery_hold_s` can false-trip on the install that is running today — and the
live install is N=1 until B exists. Commissioning B is the moment the band
becomes reachable, and that is the deadline this card hands it.
⚠️ **AND CFG-07 HAS NO DECISION DOCUMENT IN THIS TREE.** It exists as a
`[[CFG-07]]` mention in `CHANGELOG.md` and in this section, and nowhere else —
so there is no file for the 40.0 s to be recorded in, and a reader who goes
looking will find a card reference with no record behind it. Whoever takes
CFG-07 writes `DECISIONS/CFG-07-*.md` first; the number it has to answer to is
**40.0 s**, measured here, and the harness that produces it is
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign --fractions`.
## 7. Provenance of every number in this document
| number | where it came from |
|---|---|
| 199/200, 0/200, 200/200, shares 1505/125 | `test_packshare.py` part 8b, run |
| 35.0 s absolute-arm floor, and its argmax | `delivery_window.py --campaign`, re-run here, reproduces SAFETY-42 §3.3 |
| every row of §3.1 | `delivery_window.py --campaign --fractions`, two passes over the same campaign with `FRACTIONS` changed between them |
| 1000 W / 6500 W suppression windows | part 8b's arithmetic, asserted there |
| 185 s, 5.29× | SAFETY-42 §3.3 / TEST-21, unchanged by this card |
| 4.62× | 185 / 40.0, printed by the campaign |
| 0/200 on both positive controls, and B's 0 W share at the cut-out | part 8b, run and asserted |
| 0 W cut-out share / 125 W wedged share | part 8b, asserted and printed |
| 77/125/133/154 W (the wedged arm's four distinct shares) | the same loop re-run in review with per-cycle recording — NOT part 8b's printed line, which shows the last cycle only |
| M12/M13/M14 named-check counts (7 / 7 / 6) | re-run in review on fresh `:ro` trees, after the `KeyError` abort in part 1 was guarded |
| 84 single-unit rosters | part 8b, run |
⚠️ Every two-inverter figure above is **two copies of inverter A**.
@@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-45 — the trade is SIZED by the capacity guard, not switched by it
**Status: closed.** `peakguard.charge_headroom_w()` publishes the watts the open
billed quarter can still afford; `arbitrage.decide()` takes it as a required
keyword-only argument and sizes the BUY leg to it; `main.py` passes the measured
guard's own number at its one call site. `peakguard.decide()` is **not changed** —
byte-identical to `release/1.0` at `478ba93`, `sha256(decide) = 200090d0835a3a55`,
7252 B on both trees.
⚠️ **THE HOUSE LOAD IN EVERY FIGURE BELOW IS SYNTHETIC.** TEST-23 stage 3's
`priceloop.py` drives a flat modelled house against a modelled pack
(`plantsim.Plant`, 800 W/s ramp into a 10 s lag, 15 360 Wh). The PRICES are real,
the decision code is the shipped code, the billed-quarter accumulator is
`app/p1.py`'s own — the load is not. Nothing here is a measurement of the live
site at 192.168.2.158, which this work did not touch.
## 0. The defect, measured
TEST-23 stage 3 found a sustained limit cycle with arbitrage armed and a charge
decision active. Re-measured here on the same rig against the same checkout,
metrics recomputed rather than copied — a **charge onset** is a cycle at which
`arbitrage.decide()` transitions into `ARBITRAGE_CHARGE`, which is the edge the
rig already logs:
| `peak_cap_w` | house | onsets/h | mean period | grid swing | billed quarters (W) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 | 1200 W | **28** | 131.1 s | **−455.5 … +3200.0 W** | 1490.1 / 1496.5 / **1508.8** |
| 3500 *(shipped)* | 1800 W | 8 | 509.3 s | +127.5 … +3800.0 W | **3511.3 / 3536.0 / 3559.1** |
| 3500 *(shipped)* | 3000 W | 32 | 114.8 s | +1202.0 … +5000.0 W | **3518.9 / 3542.2 / 3556.7** |
| 5000 | 1200 W | 1 | — | +1240.6 … +3200.0 W | 3169.5 / 3200.0 / 3200.0 |
The last row is the **negative control**: `load + max_w = 3200 W` never reaches
the cap, so there is no cycle to remove. The bite rule is `load + max_w >
peak_cap_w`, which at the shipped `peak_cap_w: 3500` / `max_w: 2000` is any house
drawing over 1500 W in the cheapest quarter.
§10.1's ordering did win on the money — the guard kept the quarters within tens
of watts of the cap — but **every billed quarter in the three biting rows
finished OVER it**, which is the thing §9.1 bills. §10.2: *"an EMS that
oscillates is worse than no EMS, both for hardware wear and — per §9.1 — for the
peak it is trying to avoid."*
## 1. ⚠️ The mechanism is NOT mainly the quarter boundary, and the card says it is
The card, and `.cache/s45.md` before it, describe the loop as *"at each quarter
boundary the projection resets to 0, the guard disengages, and arbitrage re-arms
at full power."* **That is not what the 28 onsets are.** Their timestamps, off
the run above:
1, 231, 351, 471, 581, 696, 806, 896, 1136, 1256, 1371, 1486, 1596,
1711, 1811, 2061, 2176, 2296, 2411, 2521, 2626, 2716, 2971, 3091,
3206, 3321, 3431, 3541 (s, quarter boundaries at 900/1800/2700)
**23 of the 27 gaps are 90–120 s, mean 111.5 s, entirely inside one quarter.**
The four long gaps — 230, 240, 250, 255 s — are precisely the four that SPAN a
boundary, so the boundary **lengthens** the interval rather than causing an
onset. Only three onsets land within 15 s of a boundary and one of those is
`t = 1`, the start of the run.
The real cycle, read off the recorded fields at t = 1000…1180 s:
1. the trade charges at `−2000 W`; the meter sits at 3200 W against a 1500 W
ceiling; `wanted = batt_w + excess` is **negative** (−132 → −8 W), so
`decide()` files **nothing** and arbitrage is not constrained at all;
2. `wanted` drifts up as the quarter's own history worsens and the `900 /
remaining` gain grows, and crosses zero at t = 1055 with **`floor_w = 5.3 W`**;
3. that 5 W floor flips `arbitrage.guard_state()` to `True`, which refuses the
**whole trade** — so the setpoint goes from −2000 W to +5 W and the
grid-following loop, which targets grid = 0 and not grid = ceiling, takes the
actuator and discharges to **+1870 W**, exporting 420 W;
4. the projection collapses, `wanted` goes negative, the guard releases, and
arbitrage re-arms at **`max_w`**. 115 s later, again.
So the defect is **a binary interlock keyed on a continuous quantity**, and the
quarter boundary is one of the ways it is crossed rather than the cause. The
card's other claim — *"projection 3092 W against a 1509 W ceiling, `engaged=False`,
for 170 consecutive seconds"* — reproduces, but it is the **first** such window
(`first_engaged_t_s = 151.0`); the steady-state silent window is ~40–65 s.
None of this changes what the fix has to do. It is recorded because a card that
says "the boundary is the trigger" invites a fix in the boundary handling, and
such a fix would have removed four of twenty-eight onsets.
## 2. What was rejected, and why
### 2a. Reverting `decide()`'s `wanted <= 0.0` rung — rejected, and it is a trap
That rung is 2026-08-20's anti-bang-bang. Its own comment records the cost of not
having it: 17 engage/release cycles in 900 s and a quarter finishing 49 W over
the limit it had spent a quarter of an hour holding. It is untouched, pinned on
the AST in `test_peakguard.py` 13g, and `tools/replay_ac3.py` reproduces the same
190/190, 110 engaged cycles, 5 blind, 878 Wh on this branch as on `478ba93`.
### 2b. Filing the affordable charge as a NEGATIVE `lo` — rejected
Arithmetically this is the prettiest answer: `lo = wanted` with no sign gate is
continuous, is exactly the control law `decide()` already computes, and would
have put the constraint on the arbiter where it binds every claimant rather than
only arbitrage. It was rejected on two grounds, in this order:
1. ⚠️ **IT CREATES A NEW `lo > hi` CONTRADICTION CLASS AGAINST THE MAINTENANCE
SHAPING.** `main.py`'s cheap-window maintenance charge files
`Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=-floor)` — a NEGATIVE `hi`.
`arbiter.py` clause 2 applies every limit at or above the winner's priority
and takes the most restrictive, with **no notion of one limit out-ranking
another**; a peak `lo = −300 W` against a shaping `hi = −1000 W` is `lo > hi`,
which resolves to **0 W — the battery parked, in the one quarter of the month
that sets the bill**. That is the exact failure `peakguard.shaping_suspended()`
exists to prevent, and the only way to close it would be to key that
suppression on "a claim exists" — which, on every site this card is about,
means the maintenance charge-only shaping is suspended **permanently**. A
silent, large change to a different subsystem is not a price this card should
pay.
2. It changes the meaning of `PeakDecision.engaged` at five call sites outside
this module — `arbitrage.guard_state()`, `shaping_suspended()`,
`claim()`, `main.py`'s edge-logged action line and `main.py`'s status row —
each of which today means "the guard is HOLDING" and would silently start
meaning "a claim exists".
`test_peakguard.py` part 5's sweep asserts **no negative floor, ever**, and the
reason it gives ("a `lo` limit is incapable of capping discharge or export only
while it is non-negative") is, strictly, not the true reason — a `lo` of any sign
caps neither. The invariant is still right and is still worth holding; §2b above
is the argument that actually supports it, and it is recorded here rather than
left for the next person to re-derive.
### 2c. A backoff, cooldown or hysteresis constant in `arbitrage.py` — rejected
The card asks whether the second half of the fix belongs in arbitrage: *"a trade
refused at 14:59 and re-armed at 15:00 has learned nothing from the refusal."*
It does belong there, but as a **size**, not as a memory. `arbitrage.py`'s
hysteresis note is explicit that the switching decision is "which hour is it" and
that **no timer is needed and none is invented**; `peakguard.py`'s design note
spends a paragraph on why it carries no hysteresis constant. A cooldown would be
a second control loop compensating for a limit the first one declined to file,
and its constant would outlive whatever it was tuned against. The trade now
re-arms at `ceiling − load` instead of at `max_w`, which is what "learning from
the refusal" means when the refusal is a measurement.
## 3. What was done, and the precedent it follows
`control.maintenance_charge_floor()` has capped MAINTENANCE charging at *"the
headroom left under the site's cap"* since the loop was written, and its
docstring says why:
> "A maintenance charge is the only thing this system does that is big enough and
> long enough to set that peak, so it is capped by the headroom left under the
> site's cap."
⚠️ **THAT SENTENCE STOPPED BEING TRUE WHEN OPT-04 LANDED.** Price arbitrage is a
second thing that is big enough and long enough — it commands `max_w` for a whole
tariff interval, deliberately, against the meter — and it was given no such cap.
This card gives it the same shape, with one difference that matters:
`maintenance_charge_floor()` sizes itself from `peak_forecast_entity`, which is
OPTIONAL and empty on a default install — the exact hole SAFETY-25 had to close
in `shaping_suspended()`. `charge_headroom_w()` comes off `decide()`, which runs
wherever P1 does.
**The number is `wanted_w` read in the other direction.** `decide()` already
computes `wanted = batt_w + excess` as the DISCHARGE that lands the quarter on the
ceiling; a negative `wanted` is a permitted CHARGE of `−wanted`. No new
arithmetic, no new constant.
Two properties make it safe to hand a strategy, and both are swept rather than
argued (`test_peakguard.py` part 13):
* ⚠️ **IT IS INVARIANT IN THE BATTERY.** Raise the charge by dW and the meter
rises by dW, so `excess` rises by exactly dW while `batt_w` falls by dW:
`wanted` does not move. Measured across `batt_w` from −5000 W to +2000 W on one
banked quarter — the headroom is 1350.0 W at every one of the six points while
the `excess` those runs see moves through six distinct values. It is a
**feed-forward** number, so consuming it adds no feedback path around the plant.
The fixed point is `charge = ceiling − load`, with the meter ON the ceiling and
`wanted` parked a whole `ceiling − load` clear of the engagement boundary.
* **HOLDING IMPLIES ZERO OR UNKNOWN.** Across 1080 swept combinations, not one
ENGAGED decision answers a positive headroom, so the function can never hand a
caller permission the guard's own `lo` is at that instant refusing.
## 4. After, on the same rig, same command, same checkout
| `peak_cap_w` | house | onsets/h | grid swing | energy bought | billed quarters (W) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 | 1200 W | 28 → **1** | 3655.5 → **282.0 W** | 180.0 → **285.2 Wh** | **1500.0 / 1500.0 / 1500.0** |
| 3500 | 1800 W | 8 → **1** | 3672.5 → 1687.6 W | 1652.9 → 1616.1 Wh | **3500.0 / 3500.0 / 3500.0** |
| 3500 | 3000 W | 32 → **1** | 3798.0 → **474.7 W** | 482.9 → 475.3 Wh | **3500.0 / 3500.0 / 3500.0** |
| 5000 | 1200 W | 1 → 1 | **identical** | **identical** | **identical** |
* **One onset** means the trade starts once and runs for the whole window. The
battery is trading 100 % of the hour where it used to trade 43 %, 92 % and 54 %.
* **Every billed quarter lands exactly on the cap and none over it**, where every
quarter in the three biting rows used to finish over.
* **The money.** At 1500/1200 the site buys **58 % MORE** energy, because a
continuous 300 W trade beats a 2000 W trade that is cancelled for 57 % of the
hour. At the two shipped-default rows it buys **2.2 % and 1.6 % less** — and in
exchange the worst quarter drops from 59 W over the cap to 0 W over it. The
capacity tariff bills the month's single worst quarter with no averaging and no
forgiveness (specs.md:583), so that is not a trade-off, it is the ordering
§10.1 asks for.
* The remaining 1687.6 W at 3500/1800 is the opening **ramp**, not a cycle: the
pack goes from 0 to 1700 W of charge in about ten seconds and the meter with
it. One onset, no export, no reversal.
* The last row is bit-identical before and after. **This card costs nothing on
the installs it is not about.**
## 5. What this does NOT fix, with sizes
* **TEST-23 finding 1 — the export overshoot at the END of a trade** (356–938 W,
≈0.37 × `max_w`) is untouched and is a different card. It happens when the
cheap interval ends and the grid-following loop takes back an actuator that was
holding a charge; nothing here changes the handover.
* **A house whose load ALONE exceeds the cap** (`load > peak_cap_w`) still puts
`wanted > 0`, still engages the guard, and still refuses the trade outright
through the interlock — correctly, since you cannot buy in a quarter you are
already over on. The loop then drives to grid = 0 rather than to grid =
ceiling, which is more discharge than the guard asked for. Not swept here: all
four (cap, load) pairs on the record have `load < cap`.
* **`arbitrage.claim()` still files the SIZED number, but the ARBITER can clamp
it further** and the strategy is not told. The reason line names the guard's
headroom, not the arbiter's `bound_by`. Pre-existing; not widened.
* **The container leg was not re-run.** `hadrive.py` needs `test23s3-addon`
started, and that container is deliberately stopped because it is a second
writer on the setpoint entity under measurement. The in-process rig's twelve
transcribed lines are pinned by `test_arbitrage.py` 3b's AST check on
`main.py`'s call site, which is the line this card adds to them.
@@ -1,319 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-47 — what a shadow run can show, and what it cannot
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-47`.
**Card:** SAFETY-47 — *"shadow mode's claims, and the number on the status
row"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No deployment, no `ha addons update`, no
contact with 192.168.2.158 or 192.168.2.221. Everything below was measured in
the CI image and on TEST-23 stage 3's closed-loop rig.
⚠️ **This is not a write-path defect and nothing in the write path was
touched.** SAFETY-10's substitution, re-seed, authorisation gate and clamp are
unchanged. What was wrong is what three merged documents **say** a shadow run
can show you, and a number on the status row that can be **6.61×** what a live
controller would command.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **Shadow mode cannot surface a closed-loop defect. Not partially — not at
all**, and by the same construction that makes it safe. §1.
2. **The "strategies are unaffected" exemption was true until SAFETY-45 merged,
one commit before SAFETY-10.** Sizing the buy leg to the billed-quarter
headroom made the strategy closed-loop. §2.
3. **The recorded watts are the right answer to a question nobody asked, and
they are CAVEATED rather than re-computed.** Re-computing would mean the
recorded decision was no longer the decision the shipped path reached, which
is the one thing shadow mode has to be able to say. §3 records what was
rejected.
4. **SAFETY-10 §6's committed evidence could never have failed, for two
independent reasons, and closing either one alone closes nothing.** §4.
---
## 1. Why the answer is "not at all", and not "not very well"
Shadow mode holds every actuator at `shadow.WIRE_W` and re-seeds the carried
command to it at the end of each cycle. So every **measured** input — the
meter, the billed-quarter accumulator behind it, the battery power, the state
of charge — describes a plant that **did not respond**.
A closed-loop defect is, by definition, one whose stimulus **is** the plant's
response to the controller. No response, no stimulus, nothing to see. This is
not an implementation gap:
* feeding the guards a **simulated** plant instead is exactly what SAFETY-10 §4
refuses for the sign watchdogs, and the reason generalises — a controller
reacting to a plant that does not exist drifts further from reality every
tick, and three cycles in its numbers describe nothing;
* and SAFETY-10 §5 already conceded the same fact for the grid-following loop
("one slew step, not a trajectory"). That was never a property of the loop.
**It is the general case**, and the loop leg was simply where it had already
been noticed.
**So the closed-loop answer comes from a closed-loop rig (TEST-23 stage 3) or
from a live run. There is no third place, and saying that plainly is worth more
than the three sentences it replaces.**
### Measured, on the rig, at a cap that binds
`peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 / `max_w` 2000, one hour at a 5 s cycle. Of the
three defects SAFETY-10 was written for:
| | visible? | measured |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-45's limit cycle | **no** | 28 charge onsets live, **1** in shadow. Grid −455.5 … +3200.0 W live, **flat at the 1200 W house** in shadow. Guard engaged 410/720 cycles live, **0/720** in shadow. (Taken with SAFETY-45 reverted — that is the defect being looked for.) |
| SAFETY-46's SoC churn | **no** | the SoC moves **0.000000000 pp** in a shadow run. The SoC is the pack's integral of what the pack was commanded, and it was commanded 0 W. No SoC limit can be *reached* in a shadow run at all |
| TARIFF-14's wrong quarter-hour | **yes**, and it is the only one | the price lookup's inputs are the clock and the price series, neither a function of the battery. Which hour, at what price, clearing what spread: **identical live and shadow on 720 of 720 charging cycles, at a binding cap** |
### What a shadow run genuinely is for
*Which* strategy wins, on *which* hour, at *which* price, for *which* reason,
against which limits — the wrong-quarter-hour class, a trade armed on a day it
should not be, a refusal whose sentence names the wrong subsystem, a clamp that
would have engaged, a standing failsafe latch. That is a real and useful set,
and it is the set the documents now claim.
---
## 2. The exemption, and exactly how much of it survives
All three documents carried a version of:
> The **strategies** are unaffected — price arbitrage, the capacity guard and
> maintenance all ask for a fixed power **from inputs that do not depend on
> what the battery did**.
**True before SAFETY-45, false after it.** SAFETY-45 makes the buy leg
`min(asked, headroom)`, and
```
headroom = (900 / remaining) x (ceiling - projected)
```
where `projected` reads the **open quarter's accumulator** — the meter — which
is a function of what the battery did earlier in that same quarter. SAFETY-45
merged one commit before SAFETY-10, so the exemption was stale on the day it
was written.
**What survives, and it is now graded rather than asserted:**
> **Which** hour a strategy picks, and **why**, are unaffected — the clock and
> the price series are not functions of the battery.
> **How hard** it trades is not.
⚠️ **The peak guard is not in the surviving half either.** Every term of
`wanted = batt_w + excess` is measured, so in a shadow run the guard engages
only if the *house alone* would put the quarter over the ceiling. Its
**ceiling** and its **reasons** are worth reading from a shadow run; its
**engagements** are not evidence of anything.
---
## 3. The number on the status row — decided, and what was rejected
At `peak_cap_w` 1500 under a 1200 W house the status row read **"WOULD HAVE
COMMANDED −2 000 W"**. A live controller commands **−302.4 W**. Measured on the
shipped build:
| cap / house | live commanded | shadow recorded | over by |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1500 / 1200 | −302.4 W | **−2000.0 W** | **6.61×** |
| 3500 / 3000 | −502.6 W | −2000.0 W | 3.98× |
| 3500 / 2000 *(shipped cap)* | −1502.6 W | −2000.0 W | 1.33× |
| 3500 / 1800 | −1702.6 W | −2000.0 W | 1.17× |
| 15000 / 350 | −2000.0 W | −2000.0 W | 1.00× |
⚠️ **The arithmetic is not wrong.** `900/remaining` is correct for a meter that
is genuinely under the ceiling, and in a shadow run the meter genuinely *is*
under it, because the battery is not charging. **The recorded number is the
right answer to a question nobody asked** — and the last row of that table is
the fixture SAFETY-10's own evidence was taken on, which is why nothing
reported it.
### What shipped
1. **Unconditionally**, the row and the log line stop forecasting: the watts
are introduced as what would have been commanded **ON THIS CYCLE**. No
number a shadow run records is a prediction of a live run, so no state
should read like one.
2. **Conditionally**, whenever a **measured** billed quarter sized the number
being recorded, both surfaces carry `shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER`:
> ⚠️ AND ITS SIZE CAME FROM THE BILLED-QUARTER METER, WHICH HAS ONLY THE
> HOUSE IN IT WHILE THE BATTERY IS HELD AT 0 W. A live run sizes the same
> trade against a meter the battery is moving, so this is an UPPER BOUND and
> not a prediction; how far under it a live run lands is a closed-loop
> question and a shadow run cannot answer it.
⚠️ **"Upper bound", and not "smaller", and the difference was measured.**
Charging only *adds* offtake, so a live `projected` is never below a shadow one
and the headroom never above it — with **equality at the start of every
quarter**, where `900/remaining` is 1.0 and neither plant has moved. Measured
pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five configurations: **0 cycles below,
730 exactly equal.** A sentence reading "smaller" would have been false on
every one of those 730, and the first draft of this card said "smaller".
⚠️ **And it names no factor.** How far under the bound a live run lands is a
property of the site. A number invented for the row would be a second helping
of the defect the sentence exists to disclose.
⚠️ **The predicate is NOT keyed on whether the trade was capped, and that is
the trap this card nearly walked into.** `arbitrage`'s own sentence says *"SIZED
BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD"* only when the headroom came out **below** the
ask — which in a shadow run is the **start** of the quarter, where the two runs
still agree to the float. By the end, `900/remaining` has multiplied the
headroom **past** the ask, the trade is **not** capped, the sentence is silent,
and the recorded number is at its **most** wrong. A caveat keyed on it would be
quietest exactly where it is needed loudest. `arbitrage.sized_from_meter()` is
keyed on the headroom having been **measured**, so it fires on both.
`test_arbitrage.py` part 3d-8 drives the inversion.
### Rejected, and why
* **Re-compute the number so it does not amplify** — e.g. record
`ceiling − projected` (gain 1.0) instead of the sized figure. It matches the
live answer almost exactly at this cap, and it is the **worst** of the
options. It would be a **shadow-only sizing**: the recorded decision would no
longer be the decision the shipped path reached, while the arbiter, the
clamp, SAFETY-28's gate, the action log and MQTT all ran on the real one. A
second copy of the sizing arithmetic living in the display layer is
MUTATION.md's transcribed-predicate defect on an operator-facing surface, and
it generalises to no other strategy. SAFETY-10's whole safety argument is
that shadow mode is a **substitution at the wire**, not a second controller;
this would have made it a second controller everywhere except the wire.
* **Record nothing where the sizing depends on measured state.** Tempting —
"no number beats a number 6.61× out". Rejected on three counts: it blanks the
row exactly when arbitrage is trading, which is when a commissioning engineer
most wants it; the action log's edge key is the rounded watts, so blanking
them either floods or silences the log; and a surface that flickers between a
number and a dash is harder to read than a number with a standing caveat.
The narrow version of this — dropping the watts only — was the closest
runner-up.
* **Record the unsized ask alongside the sized one.** It adds a number without
adding a warning. The unsized ask is `max_w`, a constant the operator
configured; on the shipped 3500/2000 row both figures are 2000 W, so the pair
is exactly as misleading as the single figure was.
* **A caveat on every cycle in every state.** Rejected as the *whole* answer,
accepted as half of it: the unconditional part is a two-word narrowing of the
verb ("on this cycle"), not a warning, and the warning proper is conditional
so that it still means something when it appears.
---
## 4. SAFETY-10 §6's evidence, and why it could not fail
§6 tabulated `arb_power_w` −2000 W *"identical"*, `arb_reason` *"identical,
verbatim"*, arbiter winner *"identical"*. Two independent reasons it could
never have gone red:
1. **the fixture is `peak_cap_w: 15000` against a 350 W house**, so the guard
never engages and SAFETY-45's sizing is in the run and inert. ⚠️ **The
harness's own comment says so** — *"at this scenario's `peak_cap_w: 15000`
it is not binding anyway"* — which is MUTATION.md habit 4 written down
beside the check it disables;
2. **every identity row reads the FIRST charging sample.** At `elapsed = 0` the
projection *is* the held level, so the two runs agree to the float there
**even at a cap that does bind**.
⚠️ **AND THAT SECOND REASON IS THE ONE A REVIEWER CANNOT SEE FROM A DIFF.**
Widening the fixture alone — the obvious fix — leaves the `[0]` comparison
passing. Measured, not reasoned: at 1500/1200 the first charging cycle is
−300.0000 W in **both** runs while 716 of the 720 cycles differ. Part 3d-2
grades that agreement **as an expectation**, so nobody rebuilds a check on
`[0]` believing it covers something.
This is habit 4's **twelfth** instance in this repository, its **second**
inside a committed evidence artifact, and — like the seventh and the eleventh —
it was in a **measuring instrument** rather than in a check.
§6 is re-taken at `peak_cap_w` 1500 / house 1200 / `max_w` 2000, across the
whole run. Harness `/home/homelab/s47-mut/shadowloop47.py`.
---
## 5. The grader, so this class cannot recur
`test_arbitrage.py` part **3d** — placed beside part 3c, which is SAFETY-45's
own closed-loop regression, and built on the **same** `s45_loop()` harness so
the two runs share every line of shipped code and differ in **one argument**:
```
s45_loop(sized=True) the live hour
s45_loop(sized=True, shadow=True) the same hour, battery held at WIRE_W
s45_loop(sized=False, shadow=True) SAFETY-45's own defect, watched from
inside shadow mode
```
Three lines of `s45_loop()` stand in for `Controller._write_unit()`'s
substitution and `_shadow_settle()`'s record and re-seed. They are marked as a
**transcription**; `test_clamp.py` part 8 is the check on the shipped
placement, and it drives the real `Controller`. Everything that produces a
number — the averager, the projection, the guard, the headroom, the strategy,
the arbiter, the row and the log sentence — is the shipped one.
What 3d grades, in order: that the cap **binds** (the precondition the old
evidence lacked); that the first charging cycle agrees **anyway**; that the
whole run diverges, and by how much; that the record is an **upper bound**, and
the two-point arithmetic that makes it one; what survives of the exemption;
that SAFETY-45's limit cycle and the guard's engagements are **not** visible;
the four rungs of `sized_from_meter()`, each reached with the other three clear
(TEST-16); both operator surfaces; the `capped`-keying trap; and main.py's
three call sites, pinned on the AST.
⚠️ **The section carries its own precondition into every check.** A mutation
that stops either run trading left the lists empty, the first `min()` raised,
the file died before part 4 and the run reported **zero reds — which reads
exactly like a survivor**. That is FCST-06's shape and it was **driven**, not
imagined. `s47check()` now fails every check in the section when the stimulus
was not produced, and the one division in it answers `nan` rather than raising.
---
## 6. The mutation battery — 14 mutations, no survivors
Harness `/home/homelab/s47-mut/run.py`, backups inside it. Each run restores
from backup, purges `__pycache__` **on the host**, and grades through the CI
image with the tree bind-mounted `:ro`, so the interpreter cannot write a cache
into the tree under test (TEST-15). Fingerprints are printed before the first
run and re-checked after the last restore.
| # | mutation | file | Δ | reds |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | the row drops the caveat branch | `shadow.py` | −63 B | 2 |
| M2 | **the trap**: `sized_from_meter()` keyed on the trade being CAPPED — silent where the record is multiples out | `arbitrage.py` | +33 B | 5 |
| M3 | the CHARGE rung dropped — a sell carries a caveat §9.1 makes false | `arbitrage.py` | −30 B | 1 |
| M4 | the measured-headroom rung dropped | `arbitrage.py` | −18 B | 1 |
| M5 | the arbiter-winner rung dropped — a caveat on somebody else's number | `arbitrage.py` | −33 B | 1 |
| M6 | `main.py` renders the row with `sized_from_meter=False` | `main.py` | −23 B | 1 |
| M7 | `main.py` drops `winner=` — the rung exists and is never reached | `main.py` | −1 B | 1 |
| M8 | `main.py` sizes the trade from a literal — SAFETY-45 out of the shipped path, which the hoist put at risk | `main.py` | −41 B | 2 |
| M9 | the headroom assignment moves out of `cycle()` | `main.py` | −39 B | 1 |
| M10 | `sized_from_meter` gains a `False` default (TEST-14) | `shadow.py` | +8 B | 1 |
| M11 | `ON THIS CYCLE` deleted — the row forecasts again | `shadow.py` | −14 B | 1 |
| M12 | `log_line()` drops the caveat — the page discloses, the record does not | `shadow.py` | −63 B | 2 |
| M13 ⚠️ | `main.py` re-assembles the log sentence at the call site | `main.py` | **+0 B** | 1 |
| M14 ⚠️ | `wanted = batt_w − excess` — the headroom stops being monotone in the battery and the row's UPPER BOUND sentence becomes false | `peakguard.py` | **+0 B** | 38 |
**Survivors: none.**
⚠️ **M13 and M14 are `+0 B`, which MUTATION.md names as the risky delta.** Both
were confirmed on disk by `sha256` before the run started — the harness prints
the fingerprint of every graded file and the hash moved for each — and every
run is purged, so neither is at risk of the stale-`.pyc` failure.
⚠️ **Two findings from driving it, both reported rather than tidied away.**
* **M14's first form was aimed at the wrong direction and correctly survived.**
`min` → `max` in the buy leg's sizing makes the shadow record *larger*, which
is still an upper bound, so 3d-3b was right not to fail. The mutation that
actually inverts the bound is the sign of the excess term in `wanted`. A
survivor that is right is worth more than a red aimed at the wrong claim.
* **M12 was a survivor before the fix it forced.** Deleting the caveat from the
action-log line left **all 29 files green**: the only check that could see
that line drives a fixture with `meter_source: off`, where no arbitrage
decision — and therefore no caveat — is reachable. The sentence was an
f-string inside `Controller._shadow_settle()`, i.e. a surface no check could
grade. It is `shadow.log_line()` now, for the reason `words()` is a function,
and M13 is the mutation that puts it back at the call site.
@@ -1,551 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-48 — the slew step ceiling reaches the integrator, and what it bounds is the LEAD
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-48`, on top of `TEL-10`.
**Card:** SAFETY-48 — *"the integrator goes on winding while the command is
slew-limited"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** The live install still runs `slew_w: 400`
applied by hand on 2026-09-05 12:00 and `release/1.0`'s control law. This branch
does not deploy and does not bump the version.
---
## 0. The four things a reader should take away
1. **It is a missing case, not a wrong constant, and the arithmetic says so.**
The integrator moves `gain * error` a cycle and the command moves at most
`slew_w`, so the integrator outruns the command whenever
`|error| > slew_w / gain` — 667 W at the live shape. SAFETY-39's retune made
`slew_w` **smaller**, which makes that threshold **lower**. §1.
2. ⚠️ **THE FORM THE CARD ASKED FOR RAISES THE BILLED QUANTITY, AND THAT IS WHY
IT IS NOT WHAT SHIPPED.** Reusing the asymmetric freeze on a carried slew
flag cuts export 13 % and moves the worst quarter-hour average **offtake**
from 3739 W to **3935 W**, with the mean quarter +2.7 W — and on the billed
quarter it is worse at **every plant lag where release/1.0 produces a peak
at all** (a tie at lag 0, worse at 2.5 / 5.0 / 7.5 / 10.0 s) and at **every
top-N cut of the quarters**, which makes this the least lag-sensitive result
in the card. The harm is a tail redistribution inside quarters that already
net to offtake, not a weaker answer to import in aggregate. §3, §3a.
3. **What ships bounds the LEAD at one slew step, only where the slew is what
stopped the command, and only in the leading direction.** The robust result
is the **export reduction — 39.6 → 34.1 kWh, and it falls at every plant and
tuning tried** — with wasted throughput 4.67 → 3.19 kWh, sign reversals
2992 → 2770 and median recovery 232 → 199 s. ⚠️ **The billed quarter is not
something this card can claim.** It reads 3739 → **3434 W** at the fitted
plant lag of 7.5 s; at every lag ≤ 5.0 s — including the one that best
reproduces the recorded export — release/1.0 is *already* at 3434 W and this
card moves it by exactly zero. The lag is not identified by the data. §4,
§3a.
4. **Two committed numbers moved and neither is a silent edit.** SAFETY-13's
released command settles lower, because there is less wound integrator to
settle onto; and SAFETY-39's *"the slew does not own the over-absorption"* is
now **false — inverted, on its own independent plant model.** §5, §6.
---
## 1. The defect, in the terms the code uses
`compute()` freezes the integrator with an asymmetric rule, and the comment
beside it states the requirement outright:
> the requirement is that the INTEGRATOR stop accumulating, not only the command
But `frozen` is computed from **one** signal:
```python
saturated_now = abs(prev_w - actual_w) > tuning.saturation_w # not tracking
```
Slew-limiting never enters it. When the command hits the step ceiling the
integrator keeps winding at `gain * error` until it reaches `integrator_max_w`,
and the unwind afterwards is `integrator_max_w / slew_w` cycles — 12.5 at the
live shape, about a minute at the meter's measured tick.
⚠️ **AND THE RETUNE MADE IT MORE FREQUENT, NOT LESS.** `|error| > slew_w / gain`
is 1667 W at `slew_w: 1000` and **667 W** at `slew_w: 400`. The measured median
grid error at the onset of a recorded episode is 1114 W — above the second
threshold and below the first. This is why SAFETY-39 did not fix it, and the
mechanism is the same one §6 shows inverting.
## 2. How it was measured, and what the measurement cannot say
`tools/replay_recorded_loop.py`, over **16.00 days / 256 252 meter instants** of
the live install's own recorder, exported read-only.
**Real:** the disturbance (`D = grid + batt` at every recorded meter instant —
the house with this loop's own battery taken back out, which is exogenous and
therefore valid to drive a counterfactual with); the tick (the meter's own
recorded instants, median **5.01 s**); and the control law, imported out of the
checkout. The "before" law is the **same file** with the SAFETY-48 block removed
by a named substitution and exec'd into a fresh namespace — never a
transcription — and a missing or duplicated anchor is a **refusal** with
`NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED` on it, because an instrument that quietly compared
the shipped law with itself would report the card as changing nothing.
**Modelled:** the inverter (pure delay 7.5 s + first-order lag 2.0 s +
`batt = 0.973 × cmd − 22.4 W`, fitted on this same recording above the SoC
floor, residual **375 W RMS**); the pack (SoC integrated, discharge refused at
or below the floor); and **everything else the arbiter does** — the recorded
setpoint is the arbiter's output after the peak guard, the SoC clamps,
maintenance and arbitrage, while the replay runs `compute()` alone.
⚠️ **THE ABSOLUTE FIGURES ARE PESSIMISTIC BY ABOUT A THIRD AND THE TOOL PRINTS
IT ON EVERY RUN.** Replaying the before-law reproduces 39.6 kWh of export where
the install actually exported **29.4 kWh** over the same window. The delta is
what this instrument is for: both laws run on the same ticks, the same
disturbance, the same plant and the same seed.
⚠️ **THE SoC FILTER ON THE PLANT FIT IS THE WHOLE FIT, AND IT IS A FINDING IN
ITS OWN RIGHT.** This install spends **36 % of its ticks at or below a 10 % SoC
with the command standing near 2 kW and the battery delivering nothing.** Fitted
over all ticks the recording says `batt = 0.50 × cmd − 396 W, r = 0.70` — a
plant that follows half the command, which no inverter does. Above the floor the
same data says `batt = 1.00 × cmd − 28 W, r = 0.977`. The floor is the PACK and
is modelled separately.
## 3. The form the card asked for, and the number that refused it
The card asked for the asymmetric rule already in service for saturation, on a
flag carried across cycles the way `sat_count` is. It was built — from
release/1.0's own source, one substitution per change — and measured on the same
16 days through the same pipeline:
| | release/1.0 | **form A** — carried slew flag + the asymmetric freeze | **SAFETY-48** — the lead cap |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| export kWh | 39.61 | 34.43 | **34.07** |
| import kWh | 116.07 | 110.62 | 111.20 |
| battery sign reversals | 2992 | **2656** | 2770 |
| wasted throughput kWh | 4.67 | **2.99** | 3.19 |
| **worst 15-min offtake W** | 3739 | ⚠️ **3935** | **3434** |
| mean quarter-hour offtake delta | — | ⚠️ **+2.73 W** | **−2.39 W** |
| worst quarter-hour delta | — | +992 W | +532 W |
| recovery median s | 232 | **184** | 199 |
| recovery p99 s | 849 | **781** | 850 |
| recovery max s | 901 | 890 | 898 |
| unrecovered (> 900 s) | 53 | **26** | 31 |
| \|i_w − prev_w\| p99 W | 3361 | 1534 | **800** |
| \|i_w − prev_w\| max W | 9200 | 6912 | **800** |
**Form A wins on four rows and loses on the one that is billed.** The capacity
tariff (*capaciteitstarief*) bills the month's worst quarter-hour average
offtake, and form A raises it by **196 W** — and raises the MEAN quarter by
2.7 W, so this is systematic and not one unlucky quarter. It does so in **five
of the six** plant and tuning variants in `--sensitivity`; the sixth is a tie.
The per-cycle mechanism is that a frozen integrator stops at
`prev + gain·error(first cycle)`, which is `(1 − gain)` short of what the site
needs — 40 % short at `gain: 0.6`.
⚠️ **AND THE SENTENCE THAT USED TO FOLLOW THAT ONE WAS TOO BIG FOR THE DATA.**
It read *"for an IMPORT it is offtake, so a large import is answered too weakly
for as long as the ramp lasts"*. The aggregate does not show a weaker answer to
import: form A cuts total import by **5.45 kWh** and export by **5.18 kWh**
against release/1.0, and paired tick by tick it delivers **8.56 kWh LESS**
offtake energy on the ticks release/1.0 spent importing (lower on 38 229 such
ticks, higher on 19 669). What form A moves is the **TAIL, within quarters that
already net to offtake** — the worst quarter goes 3739 → 3935 W, the top five
3260 → 3300 W, the top fifty 1880.0 → 1882.7 W. The capacity tariff bills the
worst quarter and nothing else, so a redistribution that leaves the mean alone
and lifts the maximum is exactly the trade that is refused here. The conclusion
is unchanged; the causal sentence is now the one the data supports.
⚠️ **THE CARD SAID "do not invent a second rule", AND THE MEASUREMENT SAYS TO.**
That instruction is recorded here rather than quietly dropped. What ships is a
different rule; the paragraph above is why.
## 3a. ⚠️ The plant lag is NOT identified by this recording, and the billed quarter is the claim that depends on it
`fit_plant()` picks `lag 7.5 s` because it minimises **battery-power RMS**. That
objective barely distinguishes the candidates — 375.3 W at 7.5 s against 376.4 W
at 2.5 s, **0.3 %** — while the tool's *own* printed fidelity measure, replayed
export against the **29.43 kWh this install actually exported**, prefers 2.5 s by
the whole of the 35 % gap the header warns about. Two measures on the same data
disagree, and nothing here breaks the tie.
So the sweep has to be read as a sensitivity, not as a confirmation:
| plant lag | fit RMS W | replayed export kWh (release/1.0) | **worst 15-min offtake W:** release/1.0 | form A | SAFETY-48 | mean quarter ΔW |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 0.0 | 392.3 | 23.5 | **3434** | 3434 | **3434** | +0.53 |
| 2.5 | **376.4** | **28.9** ← nearest 29.43 | **3434** | ⚠️ 3732 | **3434** | −0.59 |
| 5.0 | 378.0 | 32.1 | **3434** | ⚠️ 3711 | **3434** | −1.02 |
| 7.5 | **375.3** ← chosen | 39.6 | 3739 | ⚠️ 3935 | **3434** | −2.39 |
| 10.0 | 384.2 | 75.4 | 3954 | ⚠️ 4326 | **3434** | −4.65 |
(The RMS column is `fit_plant()`'s own inner sweep pinned to one lag — best `tau`
and a re-fitted gain/offset at that lag. The export and quarter columns follow
`--sensitivity`'s convention instead: only the lag is substituted into the
global fit, everything else held. That is why the lag 5.0 and 10.0 export
figures are the ones already printed in §7b.)
⚠️ **AT EVERY LAG ≤ 5.0 s THE IMPROVEMENT IS NOT AN IMPROVEMENT — IT IS AN
ABSENCE.** release/1.0's worst quarter is *already* 3434 W there and SAFETY-48
changes it by **exactly zero**. §7b's paragraph used to read the `3434 → 3434`
rows as "the direction does not move"; that is the wrong reading. The direction
has nothing to move: at those plants release/1.0 never produces a quarter worse
than 3434 W in the first place, and the 3739 → 3434 W headline exists only at
the single longest lag `fit_plant()` happens to select. **The peak claim is a
property of the plant model, not of the card.** What the card can claim on the
billed quantity is that it does not make it worse, at any lag.
⚠️ **AND THE ONE RESULT HERE THAT IS NOT LAG-SENSITIVE IS THE FORM-A
REJECTION.** Form A's worst quarter is the worst of the three at **every lag
where release/1.0 produces a peak at all** — 3732, 3711, 3935, 4326 against
release/1.0's 3434, 3434, 3739, 3954 at lags 2.5 / 5.0 / 7.5 / 10.0, and a tie
at lag 0.0 where both sit at 3434. It is worse at every top-N cut of the
quarters at the fitted plant (top-1 3934.6 against 3738.7, top-5 3299.7 against
3260.5, top-10 2890.6 against 2871.0, top-50 1882.7 against 1880.0, top-100
1481.7 against 1479.0), and it raises the mean quarter. §3 understated this: the rejection does not rest on one unlucky
quarter at one plant, which is exactly the objection a lag-sensitive result
invites.
⚠️ **WHAT WOULD SETTLE IT IS NOT IN THIS RECORDING.** Both objectives above are
computed from the same four recorded entities, and they disagree; nothing else
in the capture breaks the tie, and this card did not go looking for a third
objective after seeing which lag each of the first two preferred. A driven step
response — the command timestamped where it is written rather than where Home
Assistant recorded it — is what identifies a lag. That is a rig measurement and
it is not this card. Until it exists, the export reduction is what this card
delivers and the peak figure is a plant-model artefact.
## 4. What ships
```python
slew = slew_limit_w(tuning)
slewed = max(prev_w - slew, min(prev_w + slew, target))
if slewed != target:
reason = "slew-limited"
_lead_cap = SLEW_LEAD_STEPS * slew
if target > slewed:
i_w = min(i_w, slewed + _lead_cap)
elif target < slewed:
i_w = max(i_w, slewed - _lead_cap)
target = slewed
```
Four properties, and each of them is a decision:
* **It is inside the branch**, and ⚠️ **that placement was a SURVIVOR of all
thirty files until a check was written for it.** Applying it to every cycle
instead — `i_w = max(target - cap, min(target + cap, i_w))` after
`target = slewed`, −92 B — is **bit-identical on the shipped configuration**:
0 of 256 246 ticks differ over the 16-day recording. The two separate **only**
where `integrator_max_w` is set ABOVE `max_w` — the configuration `control.py`
says is the only way its `clamped` reason is reachable. There the integrator
is *deliberately* allowed above the rail, and an unconditional cap would drag
it back to the command every cycle and make the option inert.
`test_telemetry.py` part 4 drives that configuration, and the unconditional
form is red on it.
⚠️ **THE COUNT OF SEPARABLE STATES IS DECORATION AND THREE SWEEPS DISAGREE
ABOUT IT.** This card's grid gave **2050 of 257 400**; an independent review
measured **1220 of 246 064**; a third, smaller grid (four tunings × 7 `prev_w`
× 9 `grid_w` × 5 `actual_w` × 8 `i_w` including `None` × 4 `sat_count`) gives
**776 of 40 320** — and that third one is spelled out here precisely because
the first two are not, which is the whole reason they cannot be reconciled.
No count here should be read as exact without the grid beside it. All three
agree on the load-bearing part, which is **where**: every separable state sits
in the `integrator_max_w > max_w` tuning and nowhere else.
⚠️ **AND AN EARLIER DRAFT OF THIS BULLET GAVE THE WRONG REASON AND THE WRONG
NUMBER.** It said the two forms differ on 118 ticks because an unconditional
cap would pull the integrator toward a command the SATURATION freeze is
pinning. That 118 was measured against a *different* pair — a band applied
after quantisation, at the very end of `compute()` — and the saturation story
does not apply to the placement actually being compared, which sits before
the freeze. The figures above are the ones that were measured on the pair the
sentence names.
⚠️ **AND THE SATURATION STORY IS NOT MERELY INAPPLICABLE — IT IS BACKWARDS.
THE NARROW CAP THAT SHIPPED *DOES* MOVE A SATURATION-FROZEN INTEGRATOR.** It
sits before the freeze block and is not gated on `frozen`. Measured on the
same 16 days at the live shape: of **79 160** frozen ticks the cap changed
`i_w` on **1095**, and on **679** of those it moved it further out on the side
it was already on — putting back magnitude the freeze had just let fall, which
is the one direction the freeze's rule ("may fall, never rise") exists to
forbid. Worst case **2424 W**, at
`prev_w −3400 W, grid +4697 W, actual −4144 W, sat_count 2 → 3`: the freeze
leaves the integrator at **−176 W**, the slew binds, and the cap drags it to
**−2600 W**. It never overrides a *same-cycle* refusal — the freeze clipped
`moved` on 75 512 ticks and the slew bound on none of them — but the claim
that this placement leaves the frozen path alone is false, and §5 is where
that shows up in a committed number.
* **It is written one-sided, and that is a CLARITY choice, not a correctness
one.** ⚠️ **An earlier draft of this file and of the comment in `control.py`
said the two-sided band `max(slewed - cap, min(slewed + cap, i_w))` was a bug
that would drag a TRAILING integrator up toward the command. That was
invented, and the sweep said so: the two spellings agree on 205 920 of
205 920 cases** across four tunings, every sign of `prev_w`, `grid_w`,
`actual_w` and `i_w`, and the `i_w=None` path. `target` is monotone in `i_w`,
so when the slew binds `i_w` lies on the same side of `slewed` as `target`
does and the other clamp cannot reach. The one-sided form stays because it
NAMES the side the lead is on; the equivalence is recorded so the next reader
finds a measurement instead of an argument.
* **It moves `i_w` and not `target`.** This cycle's command is already decided;
what is bounded is what gets CARRIED. That is also why the exhaustive
`i_w=None` equivalence sweep in `test_control.py` is untouched — it compares
`(target_w, sat_count, frozen, reason)`, none of which this moves.
* **The cap is in STEPS, not watts**, for SAFETY-39's reason: a watt figure is a
constant that outlives the `slew_w` it was derived against. `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS`
moves with `slew_limit_w()` and therefore with the rail.
⚠️ **ONE STEP, AND NOT ZERO.** `i_w = slewed` is full back-calculation, and
`control.py`'s own docstring says what that costs: passing `i_w=None` *"reduces
this function to the exact velocity form it replaced"*. A zero cap makes `i_w`
identically the command on every cycle, which is that collapse written from the
other end. Measured, it is **better** — export 32.02 kWh against 34.07, mean
quarter −3.69 W against −2.39 — and it is still refused, because it throws away
the reason the accumulator was split out at all. That 2 kWh is the price of
keeping the bounded form, and it is stated rather than hidden.
⚠️ **TWO LEADS, AND CONFUSING THEM IS HOW A CHECK GETS WRITTEN WRONG.** The cap
bounds `i_w − target`, the command this cycle EMITS, at one step — which is what
makes the unwind one cycle. `Decision.i_w − prev_w`, which is what TEL-10's
`loop_lead` publishes, is measured against the command the PREVIOUS cycle left
standing, and the emitted command is itself one step further on: the published
figure is bounded by **two** steps. Both bounds are asserted, each against its
own number.
### The two recorded deadlocks, driven rather than argued
`control.py` names two encodings that produce a permanently stuck loop, and a
gate written on the integrator is exactly the edit that brings them back.
Neither is reachable here and both are test cases in `test_telemetry.py` part 4:
* **the shrink-only encoding** — *"only corrections that shrink |i_w|"* is
unsatisfiable for both signs whenever the correction is larger than twice the
integrator, and the loop then sits at its last value forever (measured before
the fix: 0 W held indefinitely into a 2 kW import). SAFETY-48 is not a shrink
rule; it caps the lead beyond one slew step and only while the slew binds.
* **`i_w == 0.0`** — `main.py` resets the integrator to exactly 0.0 on every
stop and every reseed, and *"may not wind further in the direction it is
already pushing"* has no referent there. SAFETY-48 does not touch that gate;
the first push from zero is driven and asserted to move.
And a third, specific to this card: **the cap cannot latch.** The flag is not
carried, and after the cap `|i_w − slewed| = cap`, so the next cycle's command
covers it in one step and the slew stops binding — after which the integrator
accumulates freely again. The driven check asserts the command still walks all
the way to the rail on a railed export.
## 5. What this card COSTS, stated rather than smoothed
**SAFETY-13's release buys back less.** That card's own scenario — a second
writer holding the pack at +700 W, the command pinned, then released — settles
at **−800 W** where release/1.0 settled at −1190 W against an integrator of
−1194 W; and its sibling run settles at **−1200 W** where release/1.0 settled at
−2390 W. The property AC 4 asserts is unchanged: the released command stops at
the frozen integrator and not at the rail.
⚠️ **AND THE TWO MOVED FOR TWO DIFFERENT REASONS, WHICH THE ONE-LINE EXPLANATION
"how far that integrator had been allowed to wind" COVERS ONLY HALF OF.** Gating
the cap on `not frozen` — one line, `if frozen: _lead_cap = float("inf")`, so
the cap becomes a no-op while frozen — puts **part 5 back at release/1.0's
−1190 W exactly**. That run moved because the cap **fires on frozen cycles**
(§4). **Part 4(b) does not come back**: it is −1200 W gated and −1200 W shipped,
against release/1.0's −2390 W, because *that* one moved for the winding reason.
Both literals in `test_control.py` were re-baselined **with the reason beside
them**, and the second is now asserted against `i_w` rather than against a
number.
**The alternative that avoids it was measured and rejected.** Gating the cap on
`not frozen` as above gives export **34.71 kWh** (against 34.07), worst quarter
**3434 W** (the same as shipped), wasted **3.49 kWh** (against 3.19) — and a
worst observed lead of **4961 W**, i.e. no bound at all on the quantity this
card exists to bound. A bound with an exception large enough to drive a truck
through is not a bound. ⚠️ These four figures replace an earlier set (34.9,
3461 W, 3.5 kWh, 4966 W) that does not reproduce on this tree with the gate
spelled as above; the gate spelling is written out here so the next reader can
re-run it rather than re-derive it.
**One quarter-hour in 1534 is 532 W worse.** The billed figure is a MAXIMUM, and
at the fitted plant lag the maximum improves (3739 → 3434 W); no quarter under
SAFETY-48 reaches release/1.0's own worst. The mean moves the right way. The
tail is reported because a maximum over 1534 quarters is decided by one of them
— and §3a is the reason that improvement is not claimed as a benefit of the
card: at every shorter plant lag release/1.0's own maximum is already 3434 W.
## 6. The independent confirmation, which arrived as a failing check
`test_control.py`'s SAFETY-39 section drives a family of 51 synthetic export
steps through a **first-order plant this file writes itself** — no relation to
the replay, no recorded data in it at all. It carried this assertion:
> ⚠️ THE SLEW DOES NOT OWN THE OVER-ABSORPTION … Quartering the slew from 1000
> to 250 does not reduce the over-absorption at all
and it was right about the mechanism and therefore wrong about the conclusion:
`slew_w` bounds the OUTPUT while the integrator accumulates `gain · error`, so a
slower slew left the integrator winding for longer. Worst case over the family:
| `slew_w` | release/1.0 | this branch |
|---|---:|---:|
| 1000 | 1005 W | **729 W** |
| 0 (the rail, 556) | 1109 W | **550 W** |
| 400 (the live interim) | 1285 W | **424 W** |
| 250 | 1330 W | **326 W** |
**The ranking inverts.** Before: slower is worse, monotonically. After: slower is
better, monotonically. Two plant models that share nothing agree on the sign,
which is worth more than either alone — and it means SAFETY-39's *"gain is the
next constant to re-derive"* is now only half true: with the lead bounded, the
slew owns a share of the over-absorption it did not own before. `gain` is still
not touched here, for SAFETY-39's own reason: two live control-law constants
moving in one release makes the next measurement uninterpretable.
⚠️ **AND THE RIG SAYS THE SAME THING, WHICH MEANS TWO COMMITTED TRANSCRIPTS
CHANGED MEANING UNDER THIS CARD.** `tools/slew_sim.py --slew` runs the same
derivation on admin/goodwe's `plantsim.Plant`, a third model again. Worst-case
over-absorption over its 51-step family, `slew_w` from 1000 down to 250:
| `slew_w` | 1000 | 800 | 700 | 600 | 556 | 500 | 400 | 300 | 250 |
|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| release/1.0 | 958 | 1107 | 1133 | 1058 | 987 | 1029 | 1150 | 1143 | 1081 |
| **this branch** | 777 | 734 | 663 | 563 | 553 | 507 | 435 | 358 | 321 |
release/1.0's row is flat and non-monotone and **800 really is better than 556**
on that column — SAFETY-39 measured it correctly and its §3 sentence is true of
the law it was written against. This branch's row falls monotonically. So
SAFETY-39's record is not retracted; it is given a **forward reference**, and
`slew_sim.py`'s own narration now reads `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS` out of the control law
it imported and says which of the two tables it is printing. MUTATION.md habit 8
— a committed transcript is a check, and a transcript whose prose contradicts
its own table is a failing one.
## 7. Verified by breaking it
**The law.** `test_telemetry.py` part 4 and `test_control.py`'s SAFETY-39
section. The mutation table is in `test_telemetry.py`'s header.
**The instrument** (MUTATION.md habit 8 — anything under `tools/` that a
document quotes is subject to the battery):
| # | mutation to `app/control.py` | what the instrument did |
|---|---|---|
| I2 | the whole SAFETY-48 block deleted | **REFUSED**, exit 1, `NOTHING HAS BEEN MEASURED` — not a zero delta |
| I3 | the anchor line itself edited | **REFUSED**, same message |
| I3b | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 1000` — the cap present but inert | **every row +0.00**, which is the honest report that the block is doing nothing |
| I4 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 0` — full back-calculation | every row moves further; this is the rejected form's number in §4 |
I3b is the one that matters: it proves the delta in §3 is caused by the block
and not by the two runs differing for some other reason.
**The law**, driven in the CI image on a purged tree, fingerprinted before,
after and after the revert:
| # | mutation to `app/control.py` | bytes | reds |
|---|---|---:|---|
| L1 | the whole SAFETY-48 block deleted | −195 B | 5 in `test_telemetry.py`, 4 in `test_control.py` |
| L2 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 0` — the velocity form | +0 B | 4 + 3 |
| L3 | `SLEW_LEAD_STEPS = 12` — a cap above the rail | +1 B | 4 + 3 |
| L4 | the cap applied unconditionally, outside the slew branch | −92 B | 1 + 0 — **and it was a SURVIVOR of all thirty files before that check existed** |
| L5a | the `min`/`max` FUNCTION names exchanged | +0 B | 5 + 5, one of them `test_control.py`'s own "frozen integrator never deadlocks" over 13 041 states |
| L5b | the two BRANCH BODIES exchanged — the other reading of "the cap on the wrong side" | +0 B | 5 + 4, and it does **not** reach the deadlock sweep |
| L6 | the lead measured against `prev_w` rather than the command emitted | +0 B | 6 + 3 |
⚠️ **L5 AND L6 ARE BOTH ZERO BYTES** — `min`/`max` and `slewed`/`prev_w` are
each the same length — so no fingerprint and no byte delta can see either, and
one of L5a's reds is `test_control.py`'s own *"frozen integrator never
deadlocks"* sweep over 13 041 states, written by SAFETY-13 for a different
reason.
⚠️ **THREE OF THESE COUNTS WERE WRONG AND ARE RE-MEASURED ABOVE, WHICH IS
MUTATION.md's REPORTING RULE 3 APPLIED TO THIS CARD'S OWN TABLE.** The earlier
row gave L5 as 2 + 5 and L6 as 4 + 3; driven again in the CI image on a `cp -a`
of this tree, purged, `:ro`, one file at a time, they are **5 + 5** and
**6 + 3**. ⚠️ **AND "L5" NAMED TWO DIFFERENT MUTATIONS.** "`min`/`max` swapped"
can mean the function names exchanged or the branch bodies exchanged; they are
both red, they are both the cap on the wrong side, and they give different
counts (5 + 5 against 5 + 4) and reach different checks. A row that writes one
number for a mutation a reader cannot re-derive from its own description is a
row that cannot be re-run, so both spellings are listed. The directions in the
original table were all correct; the counts were decoration, and decoration in
a mutation table reads as evidence.
## 7b. The transcript, quoted rather than summarised
`python3 tools/replay_recorded_loop.py --sensitivity`, on this branch, 58 s:
```
THE RECORDING: 256252 meter instants over 16.00 days, loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17
tick p5 4.77 s median 5.01 s p95 7.86 s (control.LOOP_TICK_S says 2.0)
the recorded command: extremes -5000 / +5000 W -> max_w 5000; most common step above 100 W is 400 W, 9924 times -> slew_w 400
the fitted inverter: lag 7.5 s, tau 2.0 s, batt = 0.9731 x cmd -22.4 W, residual 375 W RMS above the SoC floor
FIDELITY - the BEFORE law replayed against the recording it came from
setpoint r=0.887 mean +601 W simulated vs +739 W recorded
grid r=0.682 mean +195 W simulated vs +239 W recorded
export 39.61 kWh simulated vs 29.43 kWh recorded -> the model is +35 % PESSIMISTIC about the loop's tracking
THE A/B, same ticks, same disturbance, same plant, same seed
release/1.0 SAFETY-48 delta
export kWh 39.61 34.07 -5.54 the cost
import kWh 116.07 111.20 -4.86
battery sign reversals 2992.00 2770.00 -222.00
wasted throughput kWh 4.67 3.19 -1.48
worst 15-min offtake W 3738.67 3433.94 -304.74 ⚠️ THE BILLED ONE
recovery events 549.00 612.00 +63.00
recovery median s 232.06 199.04 -33.01
recovery p99 s 849.00 849.94 +0.94
recovery max s 901.06 898.40 -2.66
unrecovered (>900 s) 53.00 31.00 -22.00
|i_w - prev_w| p99 W 3361.12 800.00 -2561.12
|i_w - prev_w| max W 9200.00 800.00 -8400.00
slew-limited ticks 16392.00 11654.00 -4738.00
mean quarter delta W -2.39 over 1534 quarters
worst quarter delta W +532.27
SENSITIVITY - the ranking, not the watts
variant export kWh worst quarter W mean quarter dW
plant lag 5.0 s 32.1 -> 27.2 3434 -> 3434 -1.02
plant lag 10.0 s 75.4 -> 68.3 3954 -> 3434 -4.65
plant tau 8 s 56.5 -> 49.8 3995 -> 3605 -3.30
gain 1.0135, offset -26 46.8 -> 39.3 3713 -> 3434 -3.27
slew_w 555.6 (the rail) 36.5 -> 34.4 3434 -> 3434 -0.17
gain 0.3 28.1 -> 27.0 3434 -> 3434 +0.16
(58 s)
```
⚠️ **`--sensitivity` IS THE RANKING AND NOT THE WATTS.** The export figure moves
by a factor of two across these plants; what does not move is the direction —
**on export**. ⚠️ **THE `worst quarter W` COLUMN IS NOT THE SAME KIND OF
EVIDENCE AND THIS PARAGRAPH USED TO TREAT IT AS IF IT WERE.** Three of its six
rows read `3434 -> 3434`, and that is not "the direction holds": it is
release/1.0 *already sitting at 3434 W* on those plants, with nothing for the
card to improve. §3a sweeps the lag properly and finds the same thing at every
lag ≤ 5.0 s. The billed-quarter improvement in the A/B table above exists at one
plant, the one `fit_plant()` selects by an objective that separates it from its
neighbour by 0.3 %.
Two rows deserve naming rather than rounding: at `slew_w: 555.6` (the rail) and
at `gain: 0.3` the mean quarter-hour delta is −0.17 W and **+0.16 W** — ties,
not improvements. Both are regimes where `|error| > slew_w / gain` is rarely
satisfied (1333 W at `gain: 0.3`, 926 W at the rail against a measured median
onset error of 1114 W), so there is little for the card to bite on. That is the
mechanism agreeing with itself, and it is also the honest answer to "would this
still be worth shipping if the tuning moved": at `gain: 0.3` it would not be.
## 8. What this card does NOT establish
* **Nothing here drives an inverter.** The replay is a model with a 375 W
residual and no arbiter in it. The closed-loop answer comes from the rig or
from a live run — SAFETY-47 records why a shadow run cannot give it.
* **The live tick is 5.0 s, not `LOOP_TICK_S`'s 2.0 s**, measured off 9924
recorded 400 W steps and off the meter's own cadence. It is wrong in the SAFE
direction (a slower meter makes `validate.py` rule 10 conservative) and is NOT
changed here — re-deriving `SLEW_RAIL_FRAC` is a refusal boundary on a live
install and belongs to its own card. It is recorded in the tool's header and
printed on every run.
* **The brief's plant figure was close but not exact.** It quoted
`delivered = 1.0135 × command − 26 W, r = 0.992` at a 4–6 s publish lag. On
this 16-day window, above the SoC floor, the same relation measures
`1.00 × command − 28 W, r = 0.977` at a best-fit pure delay of **7.5 s**. The
conclusion — the inverter is a pure follower and the plant is not the problem
— survives; the coefficients are the ones in §2.
* **The brief's cost figure is larger than this measurement.** It quoted ~14 kWh
of avoidable export and 65 % of site export inside 7.9 % of the time. Measured
here: **5.5 kWh** avoidable of 39.6 kWh modelled (29.4 kWh recorded), with
42 % of export inside the 6.3 % of ticks that are slew-limited and 69 % within
±60 s of one, over 15.3 % of the time. The concentration claim holds; the
avoidable-kWh figure does not, and the difference is not reconcilable from
here because the reconstruction it came from was discarded.
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-52 - a battery that refuses is asked for 0 W
**Decided 2026-09-27 by the owner, on the phase A plan (option D3). All four
questions answered yes.**
## The defect
At the BMS cut-out the battery gives ~0 W whatever it is asked. The saturation
freeze (`control.py`, `frozen`) then holds the request where it stood, and its
SAFETY-13 exit cannot fire, because a reading of ~0 against a large ask lies
inside the interval a limit can produce. The request stood at +5000 W for
11.87 h on 2026-09-06 and at +1940 W for 3 h 55 m on the bus on 2026-09-19. It
moved again only when the grid error changed sign. SAFETY-48's lead cap only
changes where `i_w` parks (one slew step ahead instead of at the rail). When
the request moved after the reading went flat, the stale-reading gate won
instead and ran SAFETY-59's ~70 s trip cycle.
## What was decided
1. **A refused direction is held at 0 W**, reason `battery refuses`. It engages
in `compute()` when the freeze has held `SETTLE_CYCLES` and the reading is
below `REFUSED_BELOW_W` (100 W, the probe's own answer) against an ask beyond
`saturation_w`. The drop to 0 skips
the slew limit (it only removes an ask nobody meets). The direction is
carried like `sat_count` (`refused=`, `Decision.refused`).
2. **A 200 W probe every 15 minutes, 34 s long** (`PROBE_W`, `PROBE_EVERY_S`,
`PROBE_S`; twice `BATT_OBLIGED_S`). A reading of at least 100 W in the held
direction ends the refusal, during a probe or not. 200 W is below `freshness.MOVE_W` (250 W), so a probe cannot arm
the gate. The clock is main.py's `now_mono`; `compute()` stays clockless.
3. **A gate trip while the loop is frozen on a ~0 W reading is a refusal** for
control (`Controller._refusal_from_stale`). This is what stops the ~70 s
cycle. The log keeps SAFETY-56's two-explanation wording.
4. **No SoC in the loop.** SAFETY-25 Option A stands. Nothing reads SoC.
Other exits: the loop wants the other direction (charge is accepted at the
floor), control stopped or started, another writer on the wire (the arbiter
reseed). A gap in the readings keeps the refusal, because the gate's own stop is
what seeds it.
**One inverter only.** At N>1, OPT-09's `pack` limit already closes an empty
battery's discharge end and moves its share. There, a one-unit gate trip must
not refuse the site. `compute()` is passed `refused=None` there, and that path
is release/1.0's law unchanged (the `i_w=None` equivalence sweep in
`test_control.py` still holds).
## Evidence
`test_refusal.py` drives the real Controller and gate (the 09-06 and 09-19
shapes, recovery with no sign change, the probe cadence, every exit).
`tools/replay_refusal.py` replays the 16-day capture, same model as
`replay_recorded_loop.py`, and should be read for deltas:
| plant | law | gate trips | request >1 kW above delivery | longest held | import / export kWh | worst 15-min |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| fitted | old | 85 | 113.3 h | 16.57 h | 112.0 / 35.2 | 3434 W |
| fitted | new | 130 (133 after review) | 11.4 h | 0.21 h | 112.3 / 35.4 | 3456 W |
| offset 0 W | old | 1010 | 102.2 h | 16.58 h | 112.0 / 35.2 | 3434 W |
| offset 0 W | new | 85 | 6.1 h | 0.33 h | 111.9 / 35.1 | 3434 W |
**Traced in review (#141).** The +22 W worst quarter is the old law's worst
quarter too. There the old law stands at +2060 W on a pack giving 0 W, and the
new law asks 0 W, which the fitted plant answers with its -22 W offset: 22 W
charged from the grid. The fit above the floor reads `batt = cmd - 28 W`, so a
real inverter asked 0 W may do the same. Of the 71 new-law trips with no
old-law trip within 2 min, 59 come 85-97 s after an answered probe. The offset has lifted the modelled pack
just above its floor, the probe is answered, control ramps, the pack empties
again mid-ramp, and the gate trips, which re-seeds the hold. The other 12
follow an other-direction exit the same way. On a site this is one
`STALE_READING` ERROR line per answered probe at most, and only on a battery
that answers a probe and then cuts out again. Catching the re-cut before the
gate needs a faster engage than `SETTLE_CYCLES`, which accuses a healthy slow
battery, so it is left to SAFETY-58/59. After the review changes below the
fitted-plant row reads 133 trips (the delivery exit now also catches answers
that arrive after the probe window); the other figures are unchanged. Rejected alternatives and their figures are in
the phase A plan: bounding the integrator by demand made the worst quarter
+541 W worse or cycled the gate 3368 times, and an SoC envelope needs the
configured floor to be right and needs SoC.
## Review changes (#141)
- **"Gives nothing" is below 100 W, not below 500 W.** At `saturation_w` a
battery derated to 100-499 W (cold, a tapering battery) was held at 0 W for
~93 % of the time: 300 W derated gave 86 Wh in 4 h against 1 200 Wh on the
old law. The capture has 0.11 h in that band, so the replay does not move.
- **Any delivery ends the hold, not only an answered probe.** With
`meter_poll_s: 1` the 12 cycles last 12 s, less than a healthy battery's
reading lag (up to `BATT_OBLIGED_S`, 17 s). That engaged on a healthy step and
held it for 15 min. Now the late reading ends it within seconds (2 s held in
`test_refusal.py` part 5b).
- **N>1 is stated as a limit in DOCS.** The pack limit there covers an empty
battery only when its cut-out level is configured right.
## Not covered
A battery that gives a steady part of the ask (e.g. a 500 W keep-alive) is a
genuine limit (SAFETY-13 case a) and still holds its request.
## What SAFETY-58 and SAFETY-59 must take into account
- **SAFETY-58** (the first read after a rest trips at once): a probe never arms
the gate (200 < 250 W), but the refusal seeding reads the trip. If 58 delays
the first verdict, the seed arrives later. The 09-19 shape then needs the
compute-side engagement (12 cycles) to win, which it does only while the
request stands still. Keep `test_refusal.py` part 4 green.
- **SAFETY-59** (DOCS says a ~70 s pattern proves a failed register): with this
change a refusing battery no longer produces the pattern at one inverter. The
DOCS text should say so, and that the `battery refuses` reason is the
discriminator the add-on now has. At N>1 the old pattern can still occur.
- If either changes `MOVE_W`, `PROBE_W` must stay below it.
`test_refusal.py` part 2 checks the inequality.
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-56 — what the gate cannot tell apart, said in the sentence
**Text only. No behaviour changes in this card**, and §5 is the measurement that
says so: the same stimuli through the tree before and after produce a
**byte-identical** trace of every verdict, every `reading()`, every `inputs_ok`
and every readiness row's `(ok, warn)`.
---
## 1. The defect
0.10.1 is regulating a real GW5000S-BP. Two messages tell the operator that
healthy hardware has failed.
**The log line**, as emitted on the reference site on 2026-09-21:
> SAFETY-37: inverter-a battery-power register **is not following its own
> command** - STALE_READING: -3 unchanged for 36 s while the standing command
> moved 800 W to +1600 W - **the reading is not following**, so it is reported
> as MISSING rather than as a measurement … Treating it as MISSING, which
> commands 0 W.
**The readiness row**, at the same moment:
> NOT READY — battery power: `sensor.kelder_goodwe_master_stage1_goodwe_inverter_ac_power`
> **is missing or not numeric**
That entity was present, numeric and updating.
**SAFETY-37's conjunction is correct and is not touched by this card** —
`unchanged > 35 s AND |command| > 250 W AND |travel| > 250 W`. A register
genuinely stuck against a real command is exactly what it should catch, and a
pack that cannot comply is a state the site must stop in too. What was wrong is
what the sentences **concluded** from it.
## 2. Two worlds satisfy the conjunction
| | the register | the pack |
|---|---|---|
| **DEAD** | has stopped reporting reality | is doing what it was told |
| **REFUSED** | is reporting reality correctly | cannot comply — the BMS is refusing at its floor |
A refused pack holds still under any setpoint, so an honest register publishes
the same unchanged number a dead one does. **Nothing `freshness.py` is handed
separates them.** All three sentences asserted DEAD.
## 3. The live episode was REFUSED, and it is measured, not argued
Off the committed capture `scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz`,
whose bytes and decoder are already graded by `test_freshness.py` part 10a:
| | |
|---|---|
| the register | answered **-3 W for 850 s**, 10:51:24 → 11:05:34 |
| the commands during that hold | **+260, +660, +1060 W** — discharge only, never a charge |
| pack SoC throughout | **11 %** |
| first **charge** command after the restart | 11:05:31 at **-400 W** |
| the register moves | **11:05:34** — **3 s**, inside one 17.0 s obligation window |
**A register that answers a reversed command inside one obligation window had
not stopped reporting.** What would not move was the pack. The sentence the
operator read named the one thing in the loop that was telling the truth.
⚠️ What this does **not** establish: that no register is ever intermittently
wrong. It excludes a register that had simply stopped; it cannot exclude one
that was wrong and then right. That is the point — the new sentence claims
neither.
## 4. The fix, and why it is three sentences and not one helper
Each message states **what was observed** and names **both** explanations.
| where | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| `app/freshness.py` `_grade()` | *"…+1600 W - the reading is not following, so it is reported as MISSING…"* | *"…+1600 W. **TWO THINGS LOOK LIKE THIS AND THIS GATE CANNOT TELL THEM APART**: the register may have stopped reporting reality, or the source may be unable to comply with the command - a pack the BMS is refusing holds still under any setpoint, and an honest register then reads exactly like a frozen one. Either way the number cannot be read as this command's effect, so it is reported as MISSING…"* |
| `app/main.py` `_read_unit()` | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power **register is not following its own command** - %s."* | *"SAFETY-37: %s battery-power reading **did not move under a command that did, WHICH IS NOT BY ITSELF A VERDICT ON THE REGISTER** - %s."* |
| `app/main.py` `checks()` | *"{label}: {entity} **is missing or not numeric**"* | *"{label}: **no usable value this cycle from** {entity} - **and this row cannot tell which of two things that is**: the entity is missing or not numeric, or it is publishing a number that this controller is withholding (a freshness gate does exactly that, and names itself in a row of its own). Confirm the entity in Developer Tools before replacing it"* |
**Three sentences, three wordings, no shared helper.** The first two are a log
line about a **behaviour**; the third is a banner about a named **entity**, and
the two answer different questions ("what did the register do" against "can I
trust this entity"). A helper serving both would have to drop whichever half
the other caller does not need, and the half it dropped would be the
operator's next step. The log line names the pair **once**, inside the `%s` it
already interpolates, rather than in both of its own halves.
**No new input, and SoC is not wired.** `BOUNDS["soc"]` stays *STATED, NOT
WIRED*; telling the two worlds apart needs the pack floor (SAFETY-32's number)
and SoC (TEL-08's wiring), and a message honest about its own ambiguity needs
neither. Part 11b drives the two worlds at **50 %** and **11 %** SoC and
asserts the sentence does not move one byte.
**The readiness row does not branch.** `inv.batt_fresh.stale` is on the same
object at the same moment, and the row deliberately does not ask it: the same
loop renders the grid and SoC rows, which have no gate, and a branch per row
would be a second place where "why is this None" is decided. The gate already
has a surface — `stale_note()` rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below with
the whole STALE_READING sentence in it — so the operator's discriminator is
*"is that row there?"*, and part 11d asserts that row is **present in REFUSED
and absent in ABSENT**.
## 5. Behaviour is byte-identical, measured
`tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` prints two documents from one stimulus set.
The `behaviour` half contains **no sentence**: only `stale`, `reading()`,
`releases`, `held`, the window bookkeeping, `inputs_ok`, and every readiness
row's `(ok, warn)`. Run in the CI image, purged, `:ro`, against
`origin/release/1.0` **archived out of git** and against this branch:
| | |
|---|---|
| the committed live capture | **2390 reads**, 7 verdict edges |
| a swept grid of command × register schedules | **66 cells × 120 reads** — 1060 stale reads, 1309 `MISSING` readings, 6 releases |
| six driven controller worlds through the shipped read path | DEAD, REFUSED, ABSENT, HEALTHY, RELEASE, RETRIP — every read's `(batt, inputs_ok, stale)` and every `checks()` row's `(ok, warn)` |
| **result** | `6030175ed2ab9a4143e86e89a71d45c8ab041ac1c00121a3e3e023cd2b08996c` **on both trees** |
⚠️ **AND THE CONTROL IS INSIDE THE TOOL, BECAUSE AN IDENTITY BETWEEN TWO TREES
THAT ARE THE SAME TREE IS HABIT 4.** `--compare` refuses to report "behaviour
unchanged" unless the `sentences` halves **differ**. This card's first
invariance run was exactly that mistake — it archived a branch whose edits were
not committed yet, so `before` and `after` were the same code and the identity
was perfect and worthless.
Both of the tool's refusals are **driven**, not asserted:
| | |
|---|---|
| the same file compared with itself | `REFUSED: the sentences halves are IDENTICAL…`, exit **2** |
| `MOVE_W` 250.0 → 240.0 in the after tree | `BEHAVIOUR MOVED at 'sweep_stale_reads' / 'sweep_missing_reads' / 'sweep_trace'`, exit **1** |
| this card | `OK: sentences differ, behaviour is byte-identical.`, exit **0** |
## 6. The mutation battery
Each in its own `mktemp`'d copy (habit 18), purged on the host, mounted `:ro`,
graded by `tools/mutation_run.sh` in the CI image.
| | mutation | Δ bytes | named reds |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `_grade()` reverted to *"the reading is not following"* | -402 | **3** |
| M2 | the log line reverted to *"register is not following its own command"* | -80 | **2** |
| M3 | the row reverted to *"{entity} is missing or not numeric"* | -619 | **2** |
| M4 | *register* and *source* transposed between the two explanations | **0** | **1** |
| M5 | the second explanation deleted, the first kept | -216 | **1** |
| M6 | *"CANNOT TELL THEM APART"* replaced by *"IN ORDER OF LIKELIHOOD"* | -13 | **1** |
| M7 | the REFUSED world's ground truth set to the DEAD world's | 0 | **2** |
| M8 | the row's second cause deleted | -309 | **1** |
| M9 | `label` and `entity` transposed in the row | **0** | **3** |
| M10 | M1 + M2 + M3 together, i.e. exactly what 0.10.1 ships | -1101 | **5** |
| M11 | the accusation literals replaced by one that matches nothing | 0 | **1** |
⚠️ **M9's first run was a defect in this card's own check, and it is the one
worth reading.** The row was fetched with `[...][0]`. Transposing `label` and
`entity` makes the row unfindable, so the run died on an `IndexError` — a red
with **no name attached**, with every check after that line **ungraded**. That
is FCST-06's shape exactly. `_s56_row()` now returns a named absence instead of
raising, and a precondition grades it: **0 named reds before, 3 after.**
⚠️ **M11 is the other one aimed inward.** `not any(...)` over an empty list is
True, and so is one over three mistyped literals. The positive control runs the
same predicate against the three sentences **as 0.10.1 shipped them** and
requires it to find an accusation in every one, and every literal to match at
least one of them (habit 7: vary one thing from an accepted baseline).
## 7. What part 11 does not grade
* It does not show the live episode was a BMS refusal beyond doubt — see §3.
* It does not grade English. A sentence that named both explanations and then
said something useless about them would pass.
* The `no entity configured` branch beside the rewritten row is untouched and
ungraded: a blank entity really is the only thing it can be.
* The **grid-power and battery-SoC rows** go through the same rewritten line and
have no freshness gate today, so for them the second cause is a hypothesis
about this controller rather than a live possibility. That is weaker than the
battery-power case and is the price of not branching per row. A gate on either
signal — TEL-08 would be one — makes it exact.
* **SAFETY-58 is not touched** (the first read after a long rest trips before a
healthy register could answer), and neither is the 710/790 disagreement
between `test_freshness.py` and the changelog. Both are separate cards; the
second has a **fourth site** at
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-57-the-exit-from-a-stale-verdict.md:274` that a fix written
off the PR table alone would miss.
@@ -1,388 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-57 — the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
**Status:** decided and implemented on branch `SAFETY-57`, off `origin/master` @ `6f5e8e3`
(content-identical to `release/1.0` @ `8a57361`).
**Card:** SAFETY-57 — *"the freshness gate has no exit reachable from inside the state it creates"*.
**Nothing here reached the inverter.** No contact was made with 192.168.2.158 or
192.168.2.221. The one live system touched is `sniffer@192.168.2.167`, a
**passive** RS-485 listener with no address on the bus, and it was read only.
---
## 0. The five things a reader should take away
1. **The live episode is reproduced from the wire, not modelled.** The capture
is committed, the decoder is committed, and the box that produced it was
running the defect — so the `0 W` in the trace *is* the add-on's own
`inputs missing → command 0 W`. §2.
2. **Option 2 from the card — "do not arm the gate when the command is 0 W" —
already holds, and it is not the bug.** `_grade()` has required
`|standing| >= MOVE_W` since SAFETY-37. The trip happened at **+1060 W** and
the stuck state is at **0 W**; they are different moments. §3.
3. **The decision is not "how long", it is "when".** The verdict is withdrawn
when the **obligation that produced it is no longer standing** — SAFETY-13's
shape one module over. The 17.0 s is the obligation window that was already
derived in the file, taken at the **floor** of its band, and which half is
safe is the **opposite** of SAFETY-13's. §4.
4. **It costs 52 % exposure on a permanently dead register, and that number is
in the suite so it cannot be forgotten.** It is payable only because one
re-grading window (35 s) is shorter than both consumer holds (75 s, 85 s).
**No detection SAFETY-37 had is given back.** §5.
5. **The battery had been rescuing this code by accident.** 93 trips in the
committed 16-day capture; median wait for the BMS keep-alive pulse that
cleared them **143 s**, worst **5 h 57 m**. §6.
---
## 1. What was there, in the terms the code uses
`freshness.py`, `Freshness.submit()` and `_grade()`:
```python
if self.changed_mono is None or value != self.held:
...
self.stale = False # the only place the latch is cleared
def _grade(self, standing_w, now_mono):
if self.stale or self.changed_mono is None:
return # sets the latch; never clears it
```
and `main.py:1777`, `inv.batt = inv.batt_fresh.reading()`, where `reading()`
answers `None` while `stale`. `inputs_ok` sees the `None`, the site holds for
`stale_input_s`, then files `Claim.set("safety", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "inputs
missing")` and keeps filing it.
The reason the latch exists is written in the class docstring and it is a good
one: without it the verdict oscillates at about 1 Hz, because declaring the
reading stale drops the command below `MOVE_W`, which un-arms the conjunction,
which hands the held number straight back.
**The defect is that the only thing that ends it is an arrival carrying a
different number — and the state's own output is what stops the register being
asked for one.** The log line promised the opposite, in the same sentence that
announced the 0 W:
> *Treating it as MISSING, which commands 0 W. It clears itself the moment the
> register reports a different value.*
---
## 2. Reproducing it, from the wire
`scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/bus-a-2026-09-21-1030-1110.log.gz` is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, 10:30–11:10 Europe/Brussels, decoded by
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`. The decoder reports **0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC,
0 unknown shapes**, and its mode→sign convention is **graded off the capture**
rather than trusted: 298 commands at or under −1000 W are each answered one
obligation window later by a negative register reading, and not one positive.
| capture time | on the wire |
|---|---|
| 10:51:14 | `0x0518` = **−447 W**; the loop is charging |
| 10:51:19 | the command reverses: EMS **mode 3**, 260 W of discharge |
| 10:51:24.7 | `0x0518` = **−3 W**. The pack is at **11 %**, the BMS refuses the discharge, the inverter idles. **The register is healthy and truthful.** |
| 10:51:29.7 | the command reaches **+1060 W**. 800 W of travel |
| 10:52:21.7 | the setpoint is written **0 W** — this is the add-on's own §11.1 rule 1, recorded on the wire |
| …850.0 s | `0x0518` does not change value |
| …790.0 s | the setpoint does not change value |
| ~11:04 | **a person restarts the add-on** — not visible in this file, and the only thing that ends the episode |
| 11:05:31.7 | the restarted loop commands **−400 W of charge**, which the pack accepts at 11 % |
| 11:05:34.7 | `0x0518` = **−137 W** |
⚠️ **THE CAPTURE IS CLOSED-LOOP FOR THE WHOLE PARKED INTERVAL**, which is why
this is a reproduction and not a simulation: the box was running 0.10.0, so
every command in the trace is the shipped code's own. The only event inside the
window the file cannot account for is the human restart.
Replaying the shipped `_read_unit` loop at 1 Hz against those two series
(`test_freshness.py` part 10b):
| | stale at | clear at | parked |
|---|---|---|---|
| **before** (`release_s = inf`) | 10:52:00 | 11:05:35 | **815 s**, and `reading()` is `None` on all **812** reads from the trip to the first command a human put on the wire, with the register at −3.0 W in every one of them |
| **after** | 10:52:00 | **10:52:39** | **39 s**, with `0x0518` still answering the same **−3 W** |
⚠️ **THE COUNTERFACTUAL IS `release_s = inf`, AND IT IS GRADED RATHER THAN
CLAIMED.** With an infinite bound `_release()` never fires, `_open_window()` is
only ever called where the register moves, and the window pair is the
change-stamp pair — byte-for-byte the pre-SAFETY-57 conjunction. Part 10b
asserts that by driving part 1's own fresh/stale pair through both bounds and
comparing the verdict streams.
The replay also found a **one-read trip at 10:48:14** that clears one second
later. That is a pre-existing false positive and it is now recorded as
survivor 5 — §7.
---
## 3. What the card's option 2 actually buys, which is nothing here
The card offered *"do not arm the gate when the command being graded is 0 W"*
and warned that it might hold already. **It does, and it has since SAFETY-37**:
`_grade()` returns at `abs(standing_w) < self.bound.move_w`, and
`test_freshness.py` part 4 has a named check on that term, added because a
mutation removing it survived.
The warning in the card is the right one and it is worth writing down: **the
trip and the stuck state are different moments.** The gate armed at **+1060 W**,
where the conjunction is entirely correct — a command travelled 800 W and the
register did not move for 35 s. The site then went to **0 W** *because of the
verdict*. An entry-side rule cannot reach a state that is entered legitimately
and then persists. **The defect is the exit, and nothing else in the conjunction
is touched by this card.**
Option 3 — probing with a small non-zero command — was not taken and does not
need to be. It writes to a real actuator to test an assumption, and §4's rule
does not need a probe: the site's *normal* control resuming is the test, and it
is gated behind the same `inputs_ok` everything else is.
---
## 4. The decision: which verdicts get an exit, and what the bound is
> The stale verdict holds as before, **unless** the obligation that produced it
> is no longer standing — `|standing| < MOVE_W` — **and** it has been gone
> longer than the register would have needed to answer it. On a release the
> latch clears and a **new grading window** opens at that instant.
This is [[SAFETY-13]]'s §4 in a different module, and deliberately so: that card
established the house answer to "a latch with no exit" and its answer was *not*
a plain time bound but a **predicate plus a time bound**, where the predicate
says whether the state can end on its own. Here the predicate is that **the
question is no longer being asked.** A register under a 0 W command is obliged
to be nowhere, so a verdict about whether it is following cannot be tested, and
a verdict that cannot be tested may not stand for ever.
### 4.1 Why the window has to re-open, and what happens if it does not
`_grade()` compares the register's unchanged time against `unchanged_s` and the
command's travel against the command standing when the window opened. If a
release cleared the latch **without** re-opening the window, the first read at
which the resumed command travels 250 W would re-trip immediately — the
register would never get the 17 s in which it could answer, and the live
episode's recovery (a charge the pack **accepts**) would be killed inside two
seconds. Mutating exactly that (`graded_from` re-anchored to `changed_mono`,
+82 B) takes four named checks red.
The new window is `BATT_UNCHANGED_S` = **35 s**, the same bound as entry,
because it is the same question — *does this register follow the commands issued
from now on?* — and there is no principled shorter answer to it. It is also the
number the exposure argument in §5 rests on, so it is not free to move.
### 4.2 `RELEASE_S` = `BATT_OBLIGED_S` = 17.0 s, and which half is safe
The quantity needed is *has the register had its chance to answer the command
standing now?*, and `freshness.py` already derives it as the floor of
`BATT_UNCHANGED_S`'s band:
```
6.0 s plant goodwe/NOTES.md §5.9, measured 2026-08-22
10.0 s publisher firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181, update_interval: 10s
1.0 s this add-on run_control()'s await asyncio.sleep(1)
```
⚠️ **IT IS THE FLOOR OF ITS BAND, NOT A SENSITIVITY PREFERENCE** — the mirror of
`MOVE_W` taking the **ceiling** of its own for the mirrored reason.
| | the question | the safe half | why |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAFETY-13's `SETTLE_CYCLES` | may the plant still be the **explanation**? | the **longer** half | a shorter bound stops believing the plant too early, and then it accuses |
| this one | may the verdict still be **tested**? | the **shorter** half | being wrong *long* is the failure being fixed; being wrong *short* costs one re-grading window, and §5 bounds that |
Below 17.0 s the release pre-empts the **cheaper exit** — the register answering
the new 0 W command by itself, which clears the latch on evidence rather than on
a timer. That is graded behaviourally rather than asserted: a register that
answers at +16 s clears by **movement** at `release_s = 17.0` with `releases`
still 0, and by **timer** at `release_s = 5.0`.
The family is computed and printed (habit 10): `5, 16, 17, 18, 35, inf` give
six distinct release instants, so no check in the file can confuse two of them.
### 4.3 Two clocks, and the operator reads the register's
`changed_mono` / `unchanged_s()` remain facts about the **register**: after a
release they go on reporting that it has not moved for 850 s, because it has
not. `graded_from` / `graded_s()` are the **verdict's** window. They coincide
until the first release. Collapsing them either lies to the operator or defeats
the re-grading, and both directions are mutated red.
The stale sentence's `unchanged for N s` slot carries the **register's** number;
a re-trip appends a clause naming the window and the grade count, so the two
durations cannot be read as one number that moved (habit 14).
---
## 5. What it costs, measured
Driven against a register frozen for good, 1201 reads, shipped defaults
(`test_freshness.py` part 10c):
| | parked | the held number reaches a consumer | releases |
|---|---|---|---|
| before | 1166 s | **35 reads (2.9 %)** | 0 |
| after | 571 s | **630 reads (52.5 %)** | 17 |
⚠️ **52 % IS PAID EVERY CYCLE, NOT OCCASIONALLY.** The period is
`stale_input_s` (15 s) + `RELEASE_S` (17 s) parked, then one 35 s window.
It is payable because of one inequality, and it is the inequality
`test_freshness.py` part 6 has graded against the shipped `config.yaml` since
SAFETY-37:
```
35 s (the re-grading window) < 75 s (circulation_hold_s) < 85 s (unit_sign_disagree_s)
```
Every unbroken run of exposure is **exactly one window**, so neither consumer
can reach a verdict inside one, and the re-trip that ends each run hands them a
`None`, which **clears** their windows rather than accumulating into them.
**And nothing SAFETY-37 detects is given back**, which is the half that makes
this a trade rather than a regression: a permanent `None` clears those same two
windows for ever as well, so on the shipped-before module those detectors are
*equally* unable to speak about the unit. What the held number does reach for
35 s is `site_batt_w`, the anti-windup input of `control.compute()` — which
answers a large unexplained divergence by **freezing the output**, the
conservative direction and SAFETY-13's business — and the command itself is
derived from the **P1 meter**, never from `batt`.
### 5.1 The narrowing this does NOT take, named so the next card can
The live episode's register refused a **discharge** into an 11 % pack and then
followed a **charge** three seconds later. A refusal in one direction is not
evidence about the other, and a gate that knew the pack's floor could re-grade
on the first command that crosses it instead of on a timer — which would shrink
the 52 % above. That needs SoC, which this module deliberately does not take
(see the `soc` row and TEL-08), and the pack floor, which is SAFETY-32's number.
It is **not needed to give the state an exit**, and folding it in here would
make the exit depend on a second measurement being right.
---
## 6. The measurement that says the old exit was luck
`scenarios/loop-2026-09-02_2026-09-17/` replayed at 1 Hz through the shipped
conjunction (`test_freshness.py` part 8b): **93 trips in 16 days.** The only
thing that could clear any of them was the register carrying a different number,
and that took:
| | |
|---|---|
| minimum | 0.6 s |
| **median** | **143.4 s** |
| maximum | **21440.1 s** (5 h 57 m) |
| at or over the live episode's 710 s | **17 of 93** |
The short waits are the BMS keep-alive pulse — SAFETY-50 measured its ceiling at
508 W — twitching `0x0518` and satisfying the clearing rule **by accident**.
Over a fifth of the trips are cleared in under 20 s by something nothing in this
add-on asked for.
⚠️ **WHAT THAT REPLAY IS AND IS NOT.** The capture runs 2026-09-02…17 and
0.10.0 — the first version carrying this gate — was cut on 2026-09-16, so the
setpoint column is an **ungated** controller's. That makes each trip an honest
register-versus-command divergence off the real bus, and it makes the post-trip
command column something a gated box would **not** have written. The figure
taken from it is therefore the only one that does not depend on the command at
all — how long this register goes without changing value — and it **under**-states
the wait, because a site parked at 0 W gives the register even less reason to
move than the one recorded here.
---
## 7. Survivors, and the two things the battery found
The battery is 22 mutations over `app/freshness.py`, `app/main.py` and
`tools/decode_bus_capture.py`, plus one over the committed capture itself. All
run through `ci_run.sh`, a mirror of `checks.yml`'s own step: a purged copy of
the tree, bind-mounted `:ro`, one file at a time, `PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1`.
Per MUTATION.md habit 18 the harness's scratch file is `mktemp`ed per
invocation and the tree is fingerprinted **after the revert** as well as before;
every revert restored the recorded sha256 and byte count.
**21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.** The table is in the
PR body. Two of them are worth keeping here.
### 7.1 The equivalent mutant, argued rather than rounded off
Swapping `_release()` and `_grade()` in `submit()` is a **zero-byte** edit and
survived the whole battery. **It is not a missing fixture and no fixture can
close it**: `_grade()` acts only when `|standing| >= move_w` and `_release()`
only when `|standing| < move_w`, so at most one of them can do anything on any
read, whichever runs first.
⚠️ **THE FIRST VERSION OF THE CODE CLAIMED THE ORDER WAS LOAD-BEARING**, in a
`⚠️` comment, with a reason that sounded right. It was false, and the battery is
what said so — **MUTATION.md habit 22 exactly, one card later: an explanation in
a comment is a claim, and this one had not been run.** The comment now states
the disjointness, and part 10 pins **that** — at 0, 100, 249, 250, 251 and
1300 W — instead of pinning an order that is not observable.
### 7.2 The sibling that survived, which is habit 11 earning its place
`_release()`'s obligation test is `abs(standing_w) >= self.bound.move_w`.
Swapping `move_w` for `unchanged_s` — comparing **watts against 35** — survived
the file at **+5 B**, because **every fixture rested at exactly 0 W**, and 0 is
below both 35 and 250. They separate only in the band between them, and a site
can sit there: a peak-guard floor, a shadow substitution, any claim that wins
with a small non-zero number. Closed by a three-point fixture at 0 / 100 / 300 W
that asserts the 100 W case releases and the 300 W case does not.
### 7.3 ⚠️ And the instrument lied once, which is habit 16's second half
The first form of the `graded_from` mutation was
`float(self.changed_mono or now_mono)`. It reported a **survivor at +21 B**, and
the tree fingerprint showed the edit really was on disk and really did run.
`changed_mono` is **0.0** in the dead-register fixture, and `0.0 or x` is `x` —
so the mutant was a *no-op on the fixture*, for a Python truthiness reason that
has nothing to do with the property under test. Rewritten as an explicit
`is None` test (+82 B) it is red on four named checks.
**A mutation is subject to every habit in MUTATION.md, including habit 4.** A
purge, a fingerprint and a byte delta all say the edit is present; none of them
says the edit *changed the answer on this stimulus*. MUTATION.md gains habit 19
for it.
---
## 8. What this does NOT fix, said plainly
**It does not tell a BMS refusal apart from a dead register**, and it does not
try to. Both are re-graded on the same timer. §5.1 names what telling them apart
would need.
**It does not make the diagnosis right.** The line the operator reads still says
*"battery-power register is not following its own command"*, which is wrong in a
different way when the pack is simply empty. That wording is **SAFETY-56's**,
together with `main.py`'s NOT READY row, and it is deliberately untouched here —
two cards editing one sentence is how one of them silently loses. Only the
**escape clause** was rewritten, because this card is what made the old one
false, and part 10h has a named check asserting the diagnosis half is still
there so that rewrite has to be a deliberate act.
> ⚠️ **SINCE SUPERSEDED, WHICH IS WHAT THAT CHECK WAS FOR.** [[SAFETY-56]] is
> the deliberate act: all three sentences now name **both** explanations and
> accuse neither, and part 10h's check is inverted — it requires the accusation
> to be **gone**. Nothing else in this section moved; the escape clause above is
> still this card's and is untouched by it. See
> `DECISIONS/SAFETY-56-what-the-gate-cannot-tell-apart.md`, and
> `test_freshness.py` part 11 for the graded pair of worlds.
**Survivor 5 is older than this card and is not closed by it.** After a long
rest the unchanged clock is already past 35 s, so the **first** read carrying a
travelled command trips the gate — before the 17.0 s in which a healthy register
could have answered it. The live capture contains one (10:48:14, cleared one
second later). Its size is one `stale_input_s` hold, during which `cycle()`
returns at `inputs missing {n}s` and commands nothing differently. Fixing it
means measuring the unchanged clock from when the **obligation** appeared rather
than from the register's last move, which re-derives the 35.0 s bound and is a
different card.
**Nothing was measured on two inverters.** Inverter B does not physically exist
(`goodwe/NOTES.md` §1.1b). Every two-unit figure in `test_freshness.py` is two
copies of A's behaviour with different numbers passed in.
**No deploy is proposed.** 0.10.0 is on the reference install and this branch's
CHANGELOG row is filed under it only because `test_version_gate.py` part 11b
requires the newest heading to be a version. Moving it, and deciding whether a
version is cut, is a PKG card's.
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-61 — the control task's death ends the process
## 0. The defect
`amain()` started `run_control()` as a bare task and waited on `stop`. Nothing
watched the task. An uncaught exception in `read_inputs()`, `cycle()` or
`publish()` ended the task silently, and `stop` was never set. The web UI, P1
and tariff tasks kept running, and the Supervisor saw a healthy container. The
traceback appeared only at shutdown. The ESP32's layer-1 veto zeroed the
inverter about 30 s later, so the hardware was safe. The pack then sat at 0 W
indefinitely while the add-on showed green.
`test_control_task.py` reproduces this on the pre-fix tree. The child process
reaches its 40 s deadline, has written no 0 W, and has logged nothing.
## 1. Decision: exit with status 70 after the ordinary wind-down
A done-callback on the control task (`control_task_done()`) handles the death.
It logs the traceback at CRITICAL at the moment of death, then sets `stop`.
`amain()` then runs the same wind-down that SIGTERM runs (`shutdown()` →
`command_site_zero()`, then cancel, then clean up). After that it raises
`ControlTaskDied`, and `main()` turns that into `SystemExit(70)` (sysexits
EX_SOFTWARE). A normal stop and `run_control()`'s own refusal path both set
`stop` before the task ends, so the callback ignores them. The refusal still
exits with 78.
**Why not restart the loop in the same process:**
* `cycle()` writes controller state before its awaits: `cycle_at`,
`peak_guard`, `allocation`, then `target`/`reason`, then the writes. An
exception between those steps leaves the controller half-updated. A loop
restarted in the same process would continue from a state that no boot ever
produces. A process restart rebuilds the controller from the Store, which is
the path every boot already runs.
* An unbounded retry is the invisible spin the card forbids. A bounded retry
would reimplement the Supervisor watchdog's own throttle: 10 restarts per
30 min, and 5 attempts with backoff (`apps/const.py`).
## 2. What happens after the exit, verified rather than assumed
* **Exit status reaches Docker.** The add-on image (s6-overlay, `init: false`,
`CMD /run.sh`) was run with `exec python3 -c 'raise SystemExit(70)'`.
`docker inspect` gave ExitCode 70. The same test with exit 0 gave 0, and an
uncaught exception gave 1.
* **Supervisor 2026.08.0** (`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor`,
source read from the image):
* A non-zero container exit is recorded as `ContainerState.FAILED`
(`docker/monitor.py`). The Supervisor logs *"App … exited with non-zero
exit code 70"* at ERROR (`apps/app.py container_state_changed`).
* The Supervisor restarts the add-on **only if the per-install Watchdog
toggle is on**. `watchdog_container()` returns when `not self.watchdog`.
The toggle defaults to **off** (`apps/validate.py`:
`vol.Optional(ATTR_WATCHDOG, default=False)`).
* Add-on containers get **no Docker restart policy**. The only
`restart_policy=` in the Supervisor belongs to the observer.
* `boot: auto` in `config.yaml` only controls starting at host boot. The
`watchdog:` key in `config.yaml` is a health-check URL, not a restart
policy, and this add-on does not set it.
* **So on a default install the add-on stays stopped after this exit.** The UI
shows it as stopped, its log holds the traceback, and the Supervisor log holds
an ERROR line. The pack is at 0 W, which is the same physical state as before
this card. The difference is that 0 W is written immediately instead of after
the ~30 s veto, and the add-on no longer shows green. With the Watchdog toggle
on, the Supervisor restarts the add-on.
* **Not verified:** an actual restart by a running Supervisor. That would need a
live Supervisor, and the only one available is the live house.
## 3. Left open for the owner
* Whether `DOCS.md` should tell installers to enable Watchdog. DOCS.md is not
this card's file.
* Setting the Watchdog toggle from inside the add-on (`/addons/self/options`)
was rejected here, because it would change a user setting without the user
knowing.
## 4. Scope: the siblings, and why they are not supervised
* `run_tariff_refresh()` and the P1 HTTP and HA transports already catch
`Exception` inside their loops by design, and the values they feed are
age-bounded downstream.
* The P1 MQTT source *returns* on purpose when it is misconfigured. Making every
long-lived task's end exit the process would turn that deliberate fail-safe
into a restart loop.
* Only the control task is supervised.
## 5. `hass.py`: an undecodable body is an absence
A non-JSON `200` served as `text/html` was **already** treated as an absence,
because aiohttp's `ContentTypeError` is a `ClientError`. The reads that actually
escaped were these three:
* a malformed body labelled `application/json`, which raises `JSONDecodeError`
(a `ValueError`);
* a JSON body that is not an object, which raises `AttributeError` in
`number()` and `limits()`;
* an undecodable error body in `call()`, which raises `UnicodeDecodeError`.
All three were measured against aiohttp 3.13.5. The first two now read as
`None`, and the third is now a failed write (`False`).
## 6. Status row
`checks()` now starts with a *control loop* row showing how long ago the loop
last completed a pass. The row turns red once that age exceeds
`FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S`. The heartbeat is sent from this loop, so past that age
layer 1 has zeroed the inverter.
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-73 - a battery that refuses, with two or more inverters
**Decided 2026-09-27 by the owner, on the phase A plan (option R). All four
new questions answered yes. SAFETY-52's four decisions carry over.**
## The defect
SAFETY-52 held a refusing battery at 0 W at one inverter only. At N>1
(`main.py` passed `refused=None`) nothing closed a unit that gives ~0 W while
its state of charge reads above its configured cut-out, so the allocator kept
handing it its weighted half. Measured on the real `Controller`, two units,
house 3000 W, A cut out:
| register | law | B gives | grid | A's gate trips / h |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| flat -4 W | old | 533 W | +2471 W | 46 (each stops the whole site) |
| flat -4 W | new | 2000 W (its rating) | +1004 W | 1 |
| jitter | old | 1910 W | +1094 W | 0 |
| jitter | new | 2000 W | +1004 W | 0 |
House 1200 W, which B alone carries: old +671 W (flat) and +284 W (jitter)
standing import, new -16 W. Both cut out: old keeps asking two empty batteries
(+1910 W each on the jitter shape), new holds the site at 0 W.
## What was decided
1. **A refusing unit is closed in that direction** by its own P_SAFETY unit
claim, source `refused`. It engages when the unit gives under
`REFUSED_BELOW_W` (100 W) for `SETTLE_CYCLES` (12) cycles, spanning at least
`REFUSED_SPAN_S` (22 s), in one direction while asked more than `PROBE_W`
(200 W), or when its stale-reading gate
trips on a held reading under 100 W. The allocator then hands its share to
the others within their own limits (owner decision 1). It is a hard unit
limit that always intersects, so OPT-11's P_MODE layer fits inside it.
2. **It binds every strategy's ask on that unit** (decision 2): peak guard,
arbitrage and maintenance are placed around it like the loop.
3. **A refusal to give power above the configured cut-out** logs INFO plus one WARNING ending
in `REFUSES_ABOVE_CUT_OUT` (decision 3). SAFETY-42/43 no longer report such a
unit: its share is 0 W, and `account()` treats it as parked.
4. **All units refusing the same way** pass that sign to `compute()`, so the
site holds 0 W with SAFETY-52's law (decision 4). Probes go one unit at a
time.
5. **Probe:** every 15 min for 34 s the claim becomes a pin at +-200 W and the
others carry the rest. The pin stands only while the resolved site target
asks at least 200 W its way; otherwise it would make a sibling take the
opposite direction, so it falls back to the closed limit for that cycle.
6. **Exits:** a reading of 100 W or more in the held direction (probe or not);
100 W or more taken the other way for 12 cycles (charge at the floor; one
cycle of the loop overshooting through zero is not enough); stop or start.
On every exit the site target and integrator restart from the watts on the
wire, or the reopened unit is handed a parked remainder at once.
**Why 200 W and not `saturation_w`.** A unit's share is often small: a 400 W
night load split two ways asks 200 W of each. With 500 W the empty battery
kept a phantom share that SAFETY-43's relative arm then reported as not
delivering, the ERROR decision 3 replaces. Shares of 200 W or less that give
under 100 W are "too small to call" in `account()`: the sibling covers the
meter and nothing is asked of the empty battery that matters.
**Why one direction throughout.** On TEST-19's flapping family a command that
swaps sign each cycle reads ~0 through the plant's lag: 42 engagements in 21
no-fault runs without the rule, 0 with it.
**N=1 is unchanged.** Every SAFETY-73 path is gated on `len(inverters) > 1`.
`test_refusal_units.py` part 6 runs SAFETY-52's whole suite with every
SAFETY-73 method made to raise.
## Evidence
- `test_refusal_units.py`: cases a, b and c on both register shapes against
the old behaviour, probes and their spacing, one-at-a-time probing, the
recovery reseed, each exit, the small-ask and small-site-target cases, the
WARNING, the status row and shadow mode. Mutations U1-U13 in its docstring.
- **No false engagements.** TEST-19's no-fault campaign (admin/goodwe
`sim/delivery_window.py` families, 2640 runs at N=2 and 2640 at N=1, every
unit executing its share) graded with the engage clause: 0 engagements, the
longest qualifying streak 5 cycles against 12. The grader is
`goodwe-session/scratch_s73/s73_nofault.py`.
- **Recovery.** Case a, A recovering into a house that fell below the parked
target: worst grid +0 W with the reseed. Phase A measured -1059 W without the
reseed and the site hold.
## Review changes
- **The evidence must span 22 s, not only 12 cycles.** At a 1 s meter the 12
cycles were 11 s, shorter than a healthy reading's lag (dead time plus a
10-17 s publish). The reviewer's harness (real `Controller`, both units with
6 s dead time and a 13-17 s publish, load steps 300/3000 W every 2 min) then
refused both healthy units 10-16 times an hour, and each time the site held
0 W: +50-85 Wh import an hour and a +4.6 kW grid peak against +3.7 kW without
the refusal. At a 2 s tick there were none. `REFUSED_SPAN_S` is
`(SETTLE_CYCLES - 1) * LOOP_TICK_S`, so 2 s and slower ticks are unchanged.
- **The cut-out WARNING is for a refusal to give power only.** A full battery
that stops taking charge is always above its cut-out level, and the WARNING
told the installer to check a setting that has nothing to do with it.
## Not covered
- A unit that gives a steady part of its ask (100 W or more) is a limit, as at
N=1. SAFETY-42/43 still report it.
- `pack_permissions` stays SoC-based, so the peak guard may size a shave with a
refusing battery counted. The shortfall shows as `unmet_w`.
- A wedged unit (HW-01) reading ~0 W is now shown as a refusal, not reported as
not delivering. Its share still moves, which is the gain SAFETY-42 measured.
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-78 - a maintenance drain at two inverters
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-29.** Fixes MAINT-05 §6 (OPT-11 P1 F1, UX-13 P3
check 5, OPT-11 P3 F4). Tests: `test_safety78.py`.
**The defect.** At N>=2 the drain pins its pack (a unit SET at
`P_MAINTENANCE`) and the site target is split around the pin. Whenever the
site target was below the pin, the other pack had to charge. The allocator
refuses opposite directions (SAFETY-25 §0a, SAFETY-31), so the site went to
0 W and logged `ARBITER: REFUSED` every cycle. That covers a house below the
drain rate, a grid-charge trade, and a house above it too: after a refusal the
loop restarts from 0 W and its 400 W slew step is below the pin again.
**The fix.** While a pack drains at N>=2, main.py files a site limit
`drain`, `lo` = what the pin really places (`allocator.pin_w()`: the drain
rate inside that pack's own hard limits), at `P_MAINTENANCE`. So the site
target is never below the pin and the other pack only adds power in the same
direction. Opposite splits stay forbidden.
- The order is the arbiter's own: a safety SET (100) outranks the limit and
the pin, so everything parks; the peak floor (50) and the drain floor are
both applied, so the higher wins; a trade or the loop below the drain is
lifted to it.
- Below the drain rate the drained pack exports the rest, as the drain does at
N=1 (`maintenance.py`: "forced discharge, exports the surplus"). Holding it
to the house load would make N=2 drain differently from N=1; that is an
owner question, not this fix.
- A draining pack that can place nothing (a refusal, a stale link) adds no
floor, and the wait is logged once per episode.
- With battery modes on, no pack is a grid charger while another drains
(`modetrade.decide(draining=)`, why `cycle`), and the other battery's card
says why (`other_cycle`). Not while the drain waits: no floor is filed
then, so the other battery may charge from solar.
- Not filed at N=1, where the drain is the site SET itself: byte-identical
(`tools/safety78_identity.py`, which hashes the claims too).
**Not changed (measured in the PR #154 review, follow-ups).**
- At N=1 a drain (60) outranked the peak floor (50): a 5000 W house imported
3000 W against a 2500 W limit. Fixed by [[SAFETY-83]].
- At N=2 a maintenance CHARGE in a cheap window has the same stall: the
charging pack's `hi = -floor` against the loop asking the other to give is
refused on 141 of 261 cycles. The mirror fix is a site `hi`, which can meet
the peak floor's `lo` (0 W), so it is not this card. Fixed by [[SAFETY-84]].
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-79 — the peak guard keeps a margin below the peak limit
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-28 (owner decision).**
## Decision
The peak guard aims `peak_margin_w` under the limit it holds: under
`peak_cap_w`, or under a month peak already banked above it
(`quarter_target_w()`). `peak_margin_w` is a setting: default 50 W, range
0-500 W, whole watts. An install without the key gets 50.
**Why (owner):** the guard aimed exactly at the cap, and in the OPT-11 P1 test
a quarter banked 3501.9 W against a 3500 W limit (OPT-11-P1-test-report.md,
check 4). A peak even 1 W over still sets the billed peak. It is a setting and
not a constant because the add-on is sold to several sites.
**Banked peak (review, 2026-09-29):** the PR first aimed at a banked month
peak as it stood. That can bank a few W over it, which raises the bill the
same way; and a peak banked between cap - margin and the cap (common in the
month an install upgrades, since the old guard held quarters at the cap) was
aimed at exactly, so one overshoot went over the cap. The margin now applies
under it too. Cost: up to `peak_margin_w` of a peak already paid for goes
unused (more discharge, less charge headroom); no bill cost. Undo is one line
in `quarter_target_w()`.
## What uses which number
- **the aim:** `peakguard.decide()` (the claim's floor, and so arbitrage's
`charge_headroom_w()` and OPT-11's give-way, which read it), and, as cap -
margin, `shaping_suspended()` and `maintenance_charge_floor()` (the forecast
checks, via `Controller.peak_aim_w()`).
- **the real cap (reporting and billing):** `PeakTracker` (month peak,
headroom, 80 % warning), the decision's `ceiling_w` and every notice and
status row built from it, Home's limit, and `validate.config_notes()`.
## Checks
`peak_margin_w: 0` is byte-identical to ed739d4 (test_peak_margin.py part 1,
digests from tools/safety79_identity.py, which also runs a maintenance charge
with a forecast). validate.py rule 12 refuses a value outside 0-500, not
whole, or not below `peak_cap_w`.
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-81 — no false "Load too high for battery" alarms
**Status: 2026-09-29, owner go for the card. Review kept the 10 W tolerance
as a constant and added the 10 s hold.**
## Defect
The SAFETY-79 test (SAFETY-79-test-report.md, F1/F2) saw 6 false alarms in 7.
The alarm fired whenever `decide()` clamped its floor to the rating
(`saturated`). Three things set that while the quarter landed on target:
- **Double count.** `decide()` sizes from the held meter reading plus the
battery reading. When the meter sample predates the battery's last increase,
the increase is counted twice. It happens under noise, and at each quarter
start, where the battery is back while the held sample is still the spike.
- **The aim, not the cap.** `saturated` is graded against cap − margin, so at
margin 50 noise needs 50 W less to trip it (F2).
- **Last seconds.** The gain 900 / remaining turns a few W over the aim into
thousands of W wanted, with the battery far from its rating.
## Decision
The alarm needs `saturated` and `peakguard.load_too_high()`: with the battery
at full power from now on, the quarter still ends more than `ALARM_MISS_W`
(10 W) over the real limit (`ceiling_w`). That is the miss itself, without the
gain. The battery reading it uses is the lower of this cycle's and the last
one's. It must hold for `ALARM_HOLD_S` (10 s). At most one notification per
quarter, because near the threshold the test flickers with the meter; the
ERROR log line is written for every episode.
**Why 10 W:** at margin 0 the guard itself lands up to +5.7 W over (SAFETY-79
test, check 5), and those misses are real but tiny; the alarm would fire in
the last second of most guarded quarters. The margin (default 50) is the fix
for them. Cost: a real miss of 10 W or less is not alarmed; at a capacity
tariff of the order of EUR 50 per kW a year, 10 W in one month is cents.
Review measured +13 W on a 10 kW two-unit site at margin 0, not saturated, so
no alarm: the tolerance only matters when the battery is at its rating. A
constant, not an option: `peak_margin_w` is the owner's knob.
**Why the hold (review):** the test assumes the load now lasts the rest of
the quarter. A load over cap + battery for ~5 s every 30 s (`sine4500_fast`,
a cycling hob or heater) alarmed at each quarter start while the quarter
landed under the aim. The hold stops that.
**Cost:** a real alarm comes 10-12 s later than on 5a4cdc2 (`step6500` at
1211 s, not 1201 s); a slow ramp 20 s later (`ramp6500`), as it waits for the
real cap. While the battery refuses or its reading is lost, the alarm waits
until the quarter is lost even at full battery (27-60 s later in review runs);
those faults have their own alarms. A load over cap + battery for more than
10 s still alarms even if the quarter later lands under. `ALARM_HOLD_S = 0`
removes the hold.
## Not changed: the 1 s spike itself
The cycle after a quarter boundary and before the new quarter's first meter
sample still sees 0 s left, files no claim, and an Off battery drops to 0 W for
one cycle. That is the same edge tick as OPT-15 F1, so it is left to OPT-15.
Control is unchanged here: every command in `tools/safety81_sim.py` is
byte-identical to 5a4cdc2 (test_safety81.py part 1).
The double count also moves control, not only the alarm: on a late sample the
guard asks for the full rating for one cycle (edge4600 at 902 s: 2000 W where
1150 W holds the aim). Left to a follow-up card.
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-83 - the peak guard outranks the maintenance drain at N=1
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-29 (owner go, P1).** Follows SAFETY-78's "Not
changed" list. Tests: `test_safety83.py`.
**The defect.** At N=1 the drain is the site SET at `P_MAINTENANCE` (60). The
peak floor is a limit at `P_PEAK` (50), and clause 2 applies only limits at or
above the winner, so the floor was ignored and the house imported what the
drain left. A 5000 W house under a 2500 W limit and a 2000 W drain banked
3000 W quarters; on the owner's settings (limit 3500, drain 2500, margin 50) a
breach starts at about 5950 W.
**The fix.** While a drain owns the setpoint at N=1 and the peak floor asks
for more than the drain rate, `main.py` (`_peak_over_drain()`) refiles that
peak claim at `P_MAINTENANCE`. The arbiter then applies it: the target is the
floor, still inside the safety limits, and a safety SET (100) still parks
everything. Where the floor is at or below the drain rate nothing changes.
- The order in effect is now the same at N=1 and N=2: safety limits and the
SAFETY-73 refusal > peak guard (with the SAFETY-79 margin) > maintenance >
modes > trade > loop (`arbiter.py`, beside the priorities).
- The drain keeps counting: the battery discharges at least the drain rate on
every cycle, so the cycle is not reset or stalled; it only ends sooner.
- Below the drain rate the rest is still exported (owner, 2026-09-29).
- Identity: `tools/safety78_identity.py --diff` against 35cdffe changes only
cycles where the guard asked for more than the drain; after such an episode
the commands are identical again and only the log and the idle loop's
integrator differ. N=2 is unchanged.
**Not changed.**
- Between the drain rate and the peak aim, the house still imports what the
drain leaves (N=1 behaviour kept by the identity). At N=2 the loop covers it.
- A maintenance HOLD (0 W, 120 min, battery full) still outranked the peak
guard at N=1. Fixed by [[SAFETY-86]].
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-84 - a maintenance charge at two inverters
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-30.** Follows SAFETY-78's "Not changed" list.
Tests: `test_safety84.py`; identity: `tools/safety84_identity.py`.
**The defect.** In a cheap window the charging pack files its own
`hi = -charge` (P_MAINT_SHAPE). At N>=2 the loop's site target sat above it
(a house to cover, or its 400 W slew step from 0 W), so the other pack had to
give while this one charged. The allocator refuses opposite directions
(SAFETY-31), so the site sat at 0 W whatever the house
(`tools/safety84_identity.py` on 9d5b7d1: 436 of 480 cycles refused). N=1
was fine.
**The fix.**
- While a pack's own limits make it charge at N>=2, `main.py` files a site
limit `charge`, `hi` = what that pack's own `hi` places
(`allocator.hi_w()`, whole W as the allocator rounds). The site target is
never above it, so the other pack only adds power in the same direction.
Opposite splits stay forbidden. Mirror of SAFETY-78's `drain` floor.
- Peak guard first (owner order, SAFETY-83). The charge is sized to the
quarter's headroom under the aim (`charge_headroom_w()`, cap or banked peak
minus `peak_margin_w`), so it charges less instead of stopping: the meter
sits on the aim and the guard does not need to step in. Where the house
alone is over the aim the guard engages, the shaping is suspended as before
(`shaping_suspended()`) and no `charge` is filed, so the guard's `lo` and
this `hi` never meet in one cycle (no `lo > hi`, no park at 0 W).
Without the headroom sizing the aim still held (the suspension did it), but
a battery gave power back on 285 of 540 cycles at a 3000 W house
(test_safety84.py part 2).
- A site stop (a safety SET above P_MAINT_SHAPE) sizes the charge to 0 W:
the unit `hi` is a hard limit, so a charge under a 0 W stop needs the other
pack to give. It was refused, with an ARBITER line, on most cycles of the
stop (test_safety84.py part 4). The stop still parked the site at 0 W.
- A pack that cannot take the charge (a refusal, a full pack, a stale link)
files no ceiling; the other pack follows the loop.
- Not filed at N=1: byte-identical (`tools/safety84_identity.py`, which hashes
every claim, in and out of a cheap window and under a banked peak).
**Not changed.**
- At N=1 the charge is not sized to the headroom: the guard still suspends it
and the battery gives until the quarter is safe. The same sizing would fit
there; that is an owner question, not this fix. (SAFETY-125, 0.19.2: the
owner said yes, and N=1 is sized the same way.)
- Outside a cheap window (`hi = 0`, solar only) nothing is filed, at any N.
- A HOLD (later fixed by [[SAFETY-86]]) and the "Battery is not keeping up"
alarm (SAFETY-85) are untouched. In the identity runs that alarm's log line
comes as often at N=2 as at N=1 (2 in 480 cycles).
@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-85 - no false "not keeping up" while another owner sets the battery
**Status: implemented 2026-10-01, for review.** Tests: `test_safety85.py`.
**The defect.** "Battery is not keeping up" (SAFETY-40, `goodwe_integrator_bound`)
fired about every 2.5 min during maintenance (drain, charge, HOLD) and under the
peak guard, while the battery gave exactly what it was told. Each warning
re-created the HA notification. Rig counts: 24 in an hour (SAFETY-83 F1), 43 in
7 episodes (SAFETY-86), 35 in 16 (SAFETY-87), 12 in 6 (SAFETY-84). The page
counter counted cycles (861), not episodes.
**Cause, measured on the real Controller.**
- N=1: when a higher claim decides, `cycle()` re-seeds the integrator from the
target each cycle, then `compute()` adds `gain * error` for a grid error the
loop does not own. Target + kick crosses the rail and sets `i_clamped`. The
carried integrator is not wound (SAFETY-48 caps the lead at one slew step),
so control comes back one slew step at a time.
- N>=2: a maintenance pin is a unit claim. The loop stays the site winner and
winds to its rail for watts the pinned battery may not give. When the pin
lifts, the site jumps: 2500 W in one cycle when a HOLD ends under a 4500 W
house, 1390 W when a charge pin lifts (`s84 n2_charge_dear`, t=1800 s).
**Decision.** Three rules; the alarm, its text and its id are unchanged.
1. **The loop's clamp counts only on a cycle the loop decided.** The winner is
the loop. Its number is on the wire, or only a rating (`device`,
`supervised`) cut it. No bound held it, and nothing was unmet.
(`Controller._loop_alarm_input`.)
2. **A battery another owner set to discharge alarms when it gives less than
it was told.** This covers every battery on a cycle the loop did not
decide, and a battery with its own pin otherwise. The test is more than
`saturation_w` short of the least it stood at over `SHORT_CYCLES` cycles
and `SHORT_SPAN_S` (the plant's measured settle, SAFETY-13/73), for
`saturation_cycles` cycles in a row (`clamp.delivery_short`). It covers a
real shortfall during maintenance or under the peak guard. Before, that
shortfall was silent unless the kick happened to reach the rail (house
1000 W, drain 2000 W, battery gives nothing: 0 warnings before, 4 in 10 min
now).
3. **At N>=2, while maintenance holds a battery, the loop is bounded** by
OPT-11's `loop_bound()` (what the batteries may place). It does not wind,
and control comes back one slew step a cycle. Why maintenance only: that is
where the jump was measured and where the owner order puts maintenance
above the loop. Other N>=2 limits (pack cut-out, SAFETY-73 refusal) keep
the old law. Rule 1 still silences them (the target is unmet), so they no
longer warn either.
Fixing the windup was chosen over only ignoring the wound part, because at
N>=2 the wound integrator moves real watts at hand-back. At N=1 there was
nothing to fix: re-seeding already prevents windup.
**What SAFETY-03/40 protect is kept.** With the loop in charge, the integrator
bound still warns (a runaway, a house above the rating), and a saturated
inverter under the loop's own command still does not alarm (SAFETY-03 AC 2):
rule 2 grades only batteries another owner set.
**The counter.** `ClampWatchdog.bound_episodes` counts episodes that had a
bound engagement. The status row shows it ("N times since start").
`bound` (cycles) stays for the log and the tests.
**Re-pinned digests.** Every change is intended; nothing at N=1 moves a watt.
| digest | what changed |
|---|---|
| s78 `n1_drain_owner` | the false clamp rows are gone from the log; commands identical |
| s78 `n2_drain`, s84 `n2_charge`, `n2_charge_banked`, s79 `n2_maint` (test_peak_margin) | loop reason (`mode-bound`), integrator and loop claim while bounded; commands identical |
| opt11 `n2_maint` (test_modes) | A drops out at t=1655 s: B follows the house at once, 8 cycles differ (max 920 W) |
| s84 `n2_charge_dear` | A's pin lifts at t=1800 s: 400 W a cycle, not a 1390 W jump; the surplus step after it; 98 cycles |
test_safety86's "without the ceiling the log floods" now needs the ceiling
and the bound both removed: either one alone keeps the loop inside what the
batteries can give. The `alarmed()` helpers in test_safety84/86 also read
SAFETY-81's quarter stamp, because ALLOCATOR rows can push its row out of
the 40-row log.
**Review (PR #163).** The first draft graded each battery against last
cycle's command and graded charges too. On plantsim's battery (10 s lag) at
the live 2 s meter, every drain or charge start warned once, and an N=2 drain
or HOLD under the peak guard with a stepping house warned 15 times an hour. A
maintenance charge tapering near full warned 11 times in 50 min, which
SAFETY-42 section 7 had ruled out. With the settle window and discharge only:
0 in all of those cases. A battery that gives nothing still warns, lagging
or not. At a hypothetical 20 s lag, it warns at most twice an hour. The cost:
a battery that does not take a charge another owner set is not named by this
alarm (the same gap SAFETY-42 states; the charge has its 36 h timeout).
`test_safety85.py` part 7.
**Not changed, open for the owner.**
- With the loop in charge and the house above the batteries' total rating,
it still warns (SAFETY-40). On the rig's 2 x 2000 W N=2, most of SAFETY-84's
count came from houses of 4500 and 6500 W.
- TEL-10's `Loop reason` reads `mode-bound` while the maintenance bound holds
the loop, with modes off. DOCS lists the value with both meanings.
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-86 - the peak guard outranks the maintenance HOLD
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-30 (owner).** Follows SAFETY-83's "Not changed"
list. Tests: `test_safety86.py`.
**The defect.** The HOLD (battery resting full after the maintenance charge)
is a SET of 0 W at `P_MAINTENANCE` (60), above the peak floor (`P_PEAK`, 50),
so the floor did not bind. At N=1 a 6500 W house banked 6500 W quarters and
'Load too high' fired (SAFETY-83 rig test, check 4). At N=2 only the other
battery gave: 4500 W against a 3950 W aim (SAFETY-84 rig test, check 6).
**The fix** (`main.py`, `_peak_over_hold()`).
- N=1: during a HOLD a peak floor above 0 W is refiled at `P_MAINTENANCE`, as
for a drain (SAFETY-83). The battery gives the floor; the Why reads "raised
for the peak limit".
- N>=2: the holding battery's pin is raised to the floor minus what the other
live batteries may place (their hard `hi`, or their pin). The others give
first, the holding one only the shortfall. Why this split and not the
allocator's shares: the hold is maintenance and outranks the others' use
(owner order), and the owner rule for an Off battery is the same, "give way
only for the shortfall". A battery Off by its mode (P_MODE, below
maintenance) therefore still gives before the holding one.
- N>=2, while the holding battery gives: a site `hold` ceiling at the floor
(P_MAINTENANCE), so the loop does not ask for watts the hold keeps back.
Without it the moving pin re-logged the ALLOCATOR "could not be placed"
row each cycle and filled the action log (review, PR #161).
- Below the aim nothing changes: the floor is 0 W, the hold is 0 W, the rows
are identical to before (test_safety86.py part 2).
- A site stop (a SET above `P_PEAK`) decides alone: nothing is raised at N>=2,
and the refiled floor at N=1 stays under `P_SAFETY`. If another battery is
pinned to charge (a SAFETY-73 probe) the pin is not raised, so the site is
never split both ways.
- The hold resumes by itself: the rule is evaluated each cycle, so when the
guard lets go the command is 0 W again.
**The level dips below the target: the hold finishes anyway.** Owner
decision 2026-10-01: the HOLD ends on its clock (`maintenance_hold_min`) even
when the peak guard pulls the level down; no top-up. A top-up would re-enter
CHARGE (up to 36 h, `CHARGE_TIMEOUT_MIN`) and keep the site's one maintenance
slot meanwhile.
**Not changed.**
- The peak guard still grades the emptiest battery (SAFETY-32): at N=2 with
B under `peak_soc_floor` the floor is limited and A holds even when it is
full (SAFETY-87).
- "Battery is not keeping up" during maintenance (SAFETY-85), the N=2 charge
flapping (SAFETY-88) and the N=1 charge headroom sizing are untouched.
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-87 - the peak guard uses every battery that can still give
**Status: DECIDED 2026-10-01 (owner card).** Follows SAFETY-86's "Not
changed" list. Tests: `test_safety87.py`; identity:
`tools/safety87_identity.py`.
**The defect.** At N>=2 the guard graded the emptiest battery against the
highest floor ([[SAFETY-32]] §3). One battery under `peak_soc_floor` made the
whole site floor-limited: the claim asked for 0 W and the reserve alarm fired,
even with the other battery full. Measured: a maintenance charge (A at 11 %)
raised the alarm 10 times while both batteries gave 2000 W and the quarter
landed on the aim (SAFETY-84 rig test, check 3); a HOLD (A at 99 %, B at
15 %) left A at 0 W and banked 4051 W, raising the month peak (SAFETY-86
review; rig case 7a: 4563.8 W).
**The fix.**
- `decide()` and its call are unchanged. At N>=2 `Controller._peak_on_able()`
then grades each battery on its own floor (`peakguard.reserve_split()`).
One at or under it is *held*. The others that are live and not refusing
(SAFETY-73) are *able*.
- A floor-limited decision is re-taken on the able batteries
(`peakguard.place_on_able()`): their own permission (min SoC against max
floor, among them), and a floor of `min(need, able_w)`. `able_w` is their
rating plus the drain a held battery gives anyway (its maintenance pin).
- The held batteries weigh 0 in the split while the site gives
(`arbiter.resolve(reserve=)`), so the floor lands on the able ones. During a
HOLD, a held battery is not counted among the "others" (`_peak_over_hold()`),
so the holding battery covers the need.
- Floor-limited now means: some battery is held and the able ones cannot hold
the aim. The claim still asks them for `able_w`. The alarm fires only if
they miss the real limit at full power for `ALARM_HOLD_S`, the same test as
'Load too high' (`_reserve_short()`), so a one-cycle miss at a quarter's end
is not an alarm. With nothing able (all held, or the rest refusing or
dropped) it is the old state: 0 W, immediate alarm.
- The alarm and the row name `held`, each battery graded on its own floor. The
old code named batteries against the site's highest floor.
- Page: the two peak rows carry `runs`. A red `runs` row gives the banner its
title without "Not ready", and the Home page is not shown as held at 0 W.
Rows that do stop control still outrank it.
**How SAFETY-32's concern is still covered.** SAFETY-32 took min(SoC) against
max(floor) so the guard never sizes a forced discharge a battery's own BMS
stops. Now no battery at or under its own floor is asked for the peak: it is
graded on its own floor, and an unread SoC or unknown cut-out counts as held.
The min/max pairing still decides permission, over the able batteries. The
roster verdict `decide()` echoes (`soc`, `soc_floor`) is kept, so SAFETY-32's
call-site and reduction checks still bite. What changed is only that one held
battery no longer stops the others. One exception, with battery modes on: see
Open.
**Maintenance pins beside a held battery** (review). A draining battery that
may still give is raised from its drain rate towards its rating for the peak
floor, after the others (`_drain_over_reserve()`; peak > drain), else the
floor's rest landed on the held battery. In a HOLD, a held battery counts its
own pin (a drain) among the others, and a held battery pinned to charge stops
the raise (never split both ways).
**Before -> after** (test_safety87.py, rig of 2 x 2500 W, aim 3450 W):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| charge, A 11 %, house 4500 | 3 reserve alarms, quarter 3450 | 0 alarms, 3450 |
| HOLD, A 99 % / B 15 %, house 5500 | A 0 W, B 2488 W, 3 alarms | A 2054 W, B 0 W, 0 alarms, 3450 |
| HOLD, house 6500 | A 0 W, B 2488 W, 4051 W | A 2500 W, B 0 W, 4014 W, 1 alarm (A alone is short) |
| HOLD, month peak 4000, house 6000 | A 0 W, B 2488 W, 3551 W, alarms | A 2054 W, B 0 W, 3950 (peak - margin), 0 alarms |
| both under the reserve | alarm | alarm (unchanged) |
| N=1, every scenario | | byte-identical |
**Open, for the owner.**
- The loop still draws a held battery (SAFETY-25 option A: the reserve binds
the peak guard only). It gives last, after the able ones. So with house 6500
in the charge case, B alone cannot hold the aim, the alarm fires as
specified, and the loop then lands the quarter on the aim from A. The text
says "cannot keep … alone", not "will go over", so it stays true.
- Battery modes on, A Off and B held: when B alone can place the floor, OPT-11
keeps A resting and B gives it. When B cannot, A gives first. Making Off give
before a held battery in the first case needs a third allocator tier. The
same at N=3: A Off, B held, C able, floor 4000 W gives C 2500, B 1500, A 0.
Until then, with modes on, a held battery can give for the peak.
- The notification and row text live in `messages.py`, which has no NL layer
yet (UX-19). The Home page text, which has NL, is unchanged.
**Not changed.** N=1. 'Load too high' (SAFETY-81). SAFETY-85, -88, -89, -90.
@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-90 - the peak guard goes on after a P1 meter gap
**Status: DEV 2026-10-05, for review.** Tests: `test_safety90.py`.
**The defect.** A meter gap longer than `meter_max_age_s` leaves seconds the
quarter average does not count (`p1.QuarterAverager`, on purpose: a guess must
not reach the bill record). `peakguard.blindness()` then called the projection
blind for the rest of the quarter, so the floor was 0 W. During a HOLD the
battery gave nothing and the quarter went over: SAFETY-86 rig case 7b, N=2,
3964.8 W against a 3450 W aim, the month peak raised; N=1, 3701 W (review).
The page still read "Keeping the grid near zero". At start-up mid-quarter the
same rule left the start-up quarter blind, and a held battery was drawn as last
resort (SAFETY-91 test, O2).
**The fix** (`peakguard.fill_gaps()`, `peakguard.gap_w()`,
`Controller._fill_peak_gaps()`).
- Once readings are back, every second of a silence longer than
`meter_max_age_s` counts at `gap_w = max(the limit, the import just before
the gap, the import just after it)`, where "import" is the grid plus the
batteries' discharge, i.e. with the batteries at 0 W. The gap's first
`meter_max_age_s`, which the averager credits at the last reading, is topped
up to `gap_w` too. The guard then grades the quarter as usual, so it is not
blind and gives what keeps the quarter at the aim.
- **The bound.** The count is at or above the true import as long as, during
the gap, the house load (less solar) stayed at or under the higher of the loads seen just
before and just after it, or under the limit, and the batteries did not
start charging (during a gap they hold their last command, then go to 0 W).
It never counts the gap below the limit. A load that rises above all three
only inside the gap is the one case it can miss.
- **Cost of the bound.** It is conservative: with the house at 6500 W, a 30 s
to 5 min gap lands the quarter 100-180 W under the aim (table below), paid in
battery energy.
- **While the gap lasts** nothing changes: the reading is too old to steer by,
the guard is blind (floor 0 W) and the "inputs missing" stop sets 0 W, as
before.
- **Before the first reading** (start-up or restart mid-quarter) the
add-on was down, so the batteries were at 0 W (it sets 0 W when it stops,
the ESP32 watchdog after 30 s). Those seconds count like a gap, at
`gap_w(the limit, the import seen first)`; after a restart the restored
reading's held `meter_max_age_s` is topped up the same way. The bound is
the gap's, with only the "after" side known. A load the batteries cannot
make up then raises "Load too high", which is true: that quarter is going
over. The page says so: the status row "Peak guard: part of this
15-minute period was not measured, counted as high use" and the home line
"Part of this 15-minute period was not measured." / "Een deel van dit
kwartier is niet gemeten." until the quarter ends.
*Review:* the first version counted them at the aim, with "nothing is
known" as the reason. The first reading does show the load, and with the
batteries at 0 W the import was that load, not the aim: a 60 s restart
during a 6500 W HOLD landed 3653 W against 3450 W.
- The bill record (`quarter_blocks`) is unchanged: it still banks only what
was measured. The estimate steers the guard and is never banked.
- The action log gets one `PEAK_GUARD_GAP` row per gap, with the seconds and
the watts it was counted at.
- No option. The threshold is `meter_max_age_s`, the limit and the aim are
`peak_cap_w` and `peak_margin_w`.
**Before -> after** (`test_safety90.py`, quarter as the meter really averages
it, gap starting 300 s in; 10 s battery lag; aim 3450 W):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| N=1 HOLD 6500 W, gap 30 s / 60 s | 3456.6 / 5329.2 | 3346.2 / 3272.2 |
| N=1 HOLD 5500 W, gap 5 min | 4717.9 | 3330.6 |
| N=2 HOLD, B able, 6500 W, gap 30 s / 60 s | 3456.6 / 3865.6 | 3346.3 / 3272.7 |
| N=2 HOLD, B able, 5500 W, gap 5 min | 3745.4 | 3288.9 |
| N=2 HOLD, B held, 5500 W, gap 60 s | 3254.9, B drawn 2500 W | 3335.4, B 0 W |
| gap across the edge, next quarter, N=1 / N=2 | 4100.0 / 3621.2 | 3446.3 / 3382.2 |
| house 3000 -> 6500 W inside a 60 s gap, N=1 | 5255.6 | 3368.3 |
| house 6500 -> 2000 W late in a 5 min gap, N=1 | 3629.2 | 3145.1 |
| start-up 450 s in, N=1, house 5000 W (batteries at 0 W before it) | 5000.0 | 3450.0 |
| restart, down 60 s / 150 s, N=1, house 6500 W | 4039.1 / 5483.3 | 3450.0 / 3450.0 |
| meter never drops, N=1 and N=2 | | rows identical |
**Not changed.** The late-reading edge (SAFETY-91 test, O1): a reading late by
less than `meter_max_age_s` is not a gap, and the seconds since it are not
counted in the projection (on any quarter, not only after a gap). Near a
quarter's end the 900/remaining gain turns that into a large negative excess
and the floor drops for a cycle or more. Counting those seconds at the held
reading would fix it, but it changes every quarter's last seconds on a
healthy meter; it is handed back as its own card.
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-91 - a held battery is drawn only after the others are full
**Status: DECIDED 2026-10-01 (owner: held battery last, SAFETY-25 option A
kept).** Follows SAFETY-87. Tests: `test_safety91.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-87 rig test, F1 and F2). At N>=2 a battery at or under
its own peak reserve was held back (weight 0) only on cycles where the peak
guard asked for power.
- F1: B draining at 1000 W, A held at 15 %, house 5500. Once the grid was
near zero the loop set the target, A had its normal weight and B's drain
pin bound, so the loop drew A at 2500 W for the whole quarter (15.0 ->
10.7 %) while B stayed at 1000 W. In the next quarter A reached its
cut-out, and B stayed pinned at the peak floor (~2422 W), not its 2500 W.
- F2: in a HOLD (A holding, B held), at a quarter's edge the guard saw a block
with no seconds left and asked for nothing for one cycle. The HOLD's
ceiling lapsed, A went back to 0 W and the loop's target went to B: 2500 W
for 1 s.
**The fix** (`main.py`, N>=2 only).
- `_held_back()`: the batteries at or under their own reserve while another
can still give (live, not refusing), graded as in `_peak_on_able()`. They
weigh 0 in every split where the site gives, not only for the peak. With
nobody able (all held, or the rest refusing or dropped) nobody is held back
and the split is as before.
Review: once held back, a battery stays so until its SoC reads more than 1
point above its reserve. A reading flipping 20/21 % otherwise swapped
~1000 W between the batteries on each flip (grid +-500 W with A 10 s and
B 3 s lag). The guard's own permission (SAFETY-87) is unchanged.
- `_drain_rise()`: while a battery is held back, a draining battery's pin
becomes a floor at its drain rate (`lo`), so it rises towards its rating
before the held one gives. Not for a held battery's own drain, not under a
site stop, not for a battery that is not live.
- `tariff.next_quarter()`: past a block's end, before the next block's first
telegram, the guard grades the next quarter, projected from the held
reading (the averager credits it there). Not when that reading is too old
to be credited (`max_hold_s`).
**What stays.** SAFETY-25 option A: once every able or draining battery is
at full power, the loop still draws a held battery (`allocator._fill()`'s
last-resort pass). With house 5500 and 2 x 2500 W, A still gives 2500 W
after B is full. Nothing is placed on a battery at its cut-out: OPT-09's
pack limit closes it (`hi = 0`), and the drain rise lets B take the rest.
**Before -> after** (`test_safety91.py`, 2 x 2500 W, lagging battery 10 s):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| B drain 1000, A held, house 4000 | A 2500, B 1000 | A 1500, B 2500 |
| same, house 5500 | A 2500, B 1000 | A 2500, B 2500 (option A) |
| cycles A asked while B not full | 612 of 900 | 0 |
| A at its cut-out, house 5500: B | 1572 W mean | 2500 W, A 0 W |
| HOLD, late telegram at the edge | A 0, B 2470 for 1 cycle | A 2050, B 0 |
| idle, A held, house 2000 | A 1005, B 1005 | A 0, B 2020 |
| N=1, every scenario | | byte-identical |
**Why N>=2 only.** At N=1 there is no other battery to give first. The edge
roll would also fix the N=1 one-cycle dip at a quarter's edge (SAFETY-86
rig, "A dropped to 0 W for 1 s"), but this ticket keeps N=1 byte-identical;
extending it is a one-line change for a later ticket.
**Re-pinned.** `test_modes.py` `n2` and `n2_off`: from t=1600 battery A is
at its 20 % reserve, so B carries the house and A gives last (100 of 540
cycles differ). With SAFETY-87's held rule both are a5dddad's again, and the
test grades that.
Two fixtures changed with it: `test_safety87.py` part 10's "without the
raise" run also turns off `_drain_rise()` (else B rises anyway), and
`test_peakguard.py` 10g and `test_watchdog.py`'s two-inverter rig give
their second battery a cut-out, as rule 8 requires (an unknown cut-out is held, so A alone would carry the cycle).
**Not changed.** The peak guard's own rules (SAFETY-87). A drain with
nobody held stays a pin (SAFETY-78). An Off battery beside a held one
(SAFETY-87 Open). The first cycle after start, before any quarter is
measured, can still put the loop's first step on a held battery in a HOLD.
SAFETY-88, -89, -90, -92, -93, -94.
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-93 - the maintenance charge end hands back smoothly
**Status: implemented 2026-10-02, for review.** Tests: `test_safety93.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-85 rig test, check 4; also on 9358781). At N=2, when
A's maintenance charge ended, B went 0 -> -1600 W in one cycle and charged
from the grid with the house at 6000 W. The HOLD end was already smooth
(SAFETY-85).
**Cause.** During the charge the site target holds A's charge (SAFETY-84's
`charge` ceiling, -2000 W). At the end A gets its HOLD pin (0 W), but the
loop starts its next step from last cycle's site target. The slew limit
moves the site total by 400 W (-2000 -> -1600), and the only battery left
to place it on is B. The same happens when the charge times out or the
battery is switched Off (A free, its -2000 W shared out). With the charge
suspended by the guard and A giving under the loop, B took A's share in
one step (675 W).
**The fix** (`main.py`, `_reseed_charge_end()`, N>=2 only). On the cycle a
battery leaves CHARGE, the loop's start point (`self.target`, and the
integrator with it) is what the other batteries stood at plus that
battery's new command: its pin (HOLD or abort, 0 W), or, if it is free, its
last discharge (a charge stops). The loop then moves from there one slew
step a cycle. The ending battery's own step (-2000 -> 0 W) is maintenance's
pin, as before; it lowers the grid import. The end is kept until the loop
next runs, so a missed poll on that cycle (the input hold) does not lose it.
Review: a charge also ends, for the site, when the battery is still in
CHARGE but can no longer be placed: a stale link or a refusal (SAFETY-73)
drops it, and its -2000 W landed on B the same way (B 0 -> -1600 W at a
1200 W house). So the end is noted after the unit claims are filed: a
battery leaves the charge when it leaves CHARGE, is not live, or its own
claims contradict. The guard suspending the charge (SAFETY-84) is no end.
Why a start-point reseed, and not a per-battery slew in the allocator: the
jump comes from one stale number at one edge, the kind of edge SAFETY-73
(`_unit_refusal_end`) and OPT-11 P3 (`_reseed_run_edge`) already reseed.
The change stays at that edge; nothing else at N>=2 moves.
**Before -> after** (`test_safety93.py`, 2 x 2500 W, 10 s lag, 2 s meter):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| rig case: house 6000, A charges 2000 to the end | B 0 -> -1600, charges 4 cycles | B 0 -> 400 -> 800 ..., never charges |
| house 1200 | B 0 -> -1600 (2800 W from the grid) | B steps of 400, never charges |
| charge times out / A switched Off | B 0 -> -1600 | B 0 -> 400 |
| guard suspended the charge, A gives 1825 | B step 675 W | B step 395 W |
| missed poll on the end cycle | B 0 -> -1600 a cycle later | B 0 -> 400 |
| A dropped mid-charge (stale link, refusal), house 1200 | B 0 -> -1600 | B 0 -> 400 |
| N=1, both charge ends above | | byte-identical |
No pinned digest moved: the 46 digests of `tools/*identity*.py` (N=1 and
N=2) are byte-identical to f3e409c; none of their scenarios reaches a
charge end.
**Not changed.** The peak guard's floor still moves the site in one step
when it engages (a house step, a quarter edge): the guard outranks the slew
(owner order). A HOLD pin still drops the holding battery to 0 W at once
and SAFETY-86 gives way to the others first. SAFETY-88 (charge flapping
above the aim) is untouched.
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-94 - a battery that lags or reverses is not frozen or refusing
**Status: implemented 2026-10-03, for review.** Tests: `test_safety94.py`
(rig: `tools/safety94_rig.py`). Also closes SAFETY-58. SAFETY-74 stays open.
## The defects
1. **Stale-reading gate (SAFETY-37).** Its 35 s ran from the register's last
change. After a rest that clock was already past 35 s, so the first read
after a new command tripped it, before the register could answer. Live
2026-10-03 (0.14.0, N=2): 17:39:16 B and 17:39:25 A (load ramp after a
rest), 19:00:04 A (drain start), 21:21:22 B (drain -> charge). Each was
1 s after its command; each register answered within 11 s. This is
SAFETY-58's shape.
2. **Refusal at N=1 (SAFETY-52).** `compute()` engaged after `SETTLE_CYCLES`
frozen cycles if the reading was under 100 W at that moment. The frozen
cycles include a reversal through the battery's lag. At a 1 s meter the
12th cycle comes as a battery reversing out of a charge passes 0 W
(SAFETY-85 rig, O1: "gave -20 W for 13 cycles"). The refusal then held
0 W, the battery settled at 0 W, never gave 100 W, and waited for the
15-minute probe. N>1 already required 22 s in the band, so it was safe
at a 10 s lag but not at 20 s.
## What changed
- **The gate counts only time the register was asked to move**
(`freshness.Freshness._oblige`). A read counts the time since the last
read when, at that read, the command is 250 W or more and has moved 250 W
from where it stood at the register's last change. A register change
(or a SAFETY-57 release) restarts the count. A command flapping in and
out of the ask still adds up (frozen register, 0/1500 W every 5 s: trip
at 69 s). The conjunction, `MOVE_W` and `RELEASE_S` are unchanged.
- **The bound is unchanged at 35 s and now means what its derivation
says.** The floor was always "how long a healthy register takes to answer
a command": 6 s plant + 10 s publish + 1 s read = 17 s. The band
`[2 x 17, 0.5 x 75] = [34, 37.5]` holds. Live answers measured: 1.4, 3,
6 and 11 s after the command.
- **Refusal evidence is the same at every roster size**
(`main.Controller._gave_nothing`, SAFETY-73's count moved into a method).
The reading must stay under 100 W, one way, while asked over 200 W, for 12
cycles spanning 22 s. At N=1 `compute()` gets this as `gave_nothing` and
needs it on top of its own freeze test. `None` (compute alone) keeps the
old law.
- **The evidence restarts when the reading moves 50 W towards the ask**
(`REFUSED_PROGRESS_W`). A refusing battery reads flat (-3/-4 W live). Live
readings wander by under 25 W at rest. A first-order lag crossing the band
gains 50 W in at most 0.4 tau, so it cannot fill 22 s unless tau > 54 s.
This also covers B, whose reading is 100 W below its power.
## Bounds and worst-case catch
| fault | before | after | budget |
|---|---|---|---|
| register frozen, then asked to move | 0-35 s after the ask (often 1 s) | 35 s after the ask (+1 read) | SAFETY-37: 35 s, under the 75/85 s consumer holds |
| register frozen at rest reading ~0 W | stale 1 s after the ask | refused or stale, 0 W within 23-35 s | the same |
| refusing battery, 1 s meter, N=1 | 11-16 s | 22-28 s | SAFETY-73's 22 s span (+ one 10 s publish) |
| refusing battery, 2 s meter | 22-28 s | 22-28 s | unchanged |
| refusing battery, 5 s meter | N=1 35-41 s, N=2 41-55 s | N=1 40-45 s, N=2 50-55 s | 12 cycles = 55-60 s |
Rig: `test_safety94.py` part 3. A release after SAFETY-57 still exposes
the held number for one 35 s window of asking, so 35 < 75 < 85 still holds.
## Before -> after
- Live replay (part 1): 4 trips -> 0.
- Refusing B (its -100 W idle reading): see SAFETY-97.
- Rig, 10 s lag, N=1 and N=2, 1/2/5 s meters, two register shapes, 48 runs
(part 2): before 27 stale trips and 1 refusal, after 0 and 0.
- Reversals, lag 10 and 20 s, 1 s meter (part 2): before N=1 6 stale / 3
refused, N=2 6 / 1; after 0 / 0.
- 16-day loop capture (`test_freshness.py` part 8): 93 trips -> 59. Trips
answered within 20 s: 21 -> 1. Two of the removed trips were not quick:
a register held 351 s under a command hovering at the 250 W travel edge
(under 35 s of asking before it moved; survivor 2's shape), and a
refusing battery the gate had caught only on a passing ramp (SAFETY-52's
refusal covers it).
## SAFETY-58 and SAFETY-74
- **SAFETY-58 is fixed** by this change: its card asks for the clock to
start with the obligation and for the bound to be re-derived. Both are
done above. `test_freshness.py` survivor 5 is now graded as closed.
- **SAFETY-74 is not fixed.** A battery capped at 300 W with a perfectly
flat reading, 5 s meter, house stepping: 50 trips/h at N=1 and 80 at N=2
before, 37 and 60 after. With +-1 W dither: 0. A flat reading under a
command that moved is exactly what the gate is for; telling "limited"
from "frozen" needs a second signal (the meter, or SoC).
## Known gaps
- ~~B's standby offset (-95 to -118 W at idle) puts a refusing B outside the
100 W band, so a refusing B never latched (review F1: at N=1 new, at N=2
as before).~~ **Fixed by SAFETY-97 in the same PR:** the band is centred
on each unit's learned idle reading. `SAFETY-97-idle-offset.md`.
- A command that asks only part of the time (a fraction d) is caught after
35 s of asking, which is 35/d s of wall time (0/1500 W every 5 s: 69 s).
SAFETY-30's per-unit check restarts when its command stops opposing the
held reading, which a lapsing ask normally does, so 35 < 85 holds there.
SAFETY-31's circulation check (75 s) ignores the command, so its margin
holds only while d >= 0.47.
- A register frozen under a command that stays near the 250 W travel edge
is caught late or not at all (survivor 2).
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-95 - a maintenance drain that ends hands back smoothly
**Status: implemented 2026-10-06, for review.** Tests: `test_safety95.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-93 review, O1). At N=2, when A's drain ended (A
switched Off, say) with the house at 1200 W, B went 0 -> +1600 W in one
cycle and exported. It is the mirror of SAFETY-93 on the drain end.
**Cause.** During a drain the site target carries A's drain floor
(SAFETY-78, `drain`, 2000 W) above what the house needs. At the end A's
command drops (pin, Off, abort, stale link, refusal), but the loop slews
from last cycle's target (2000 -> 1600) and only B is left to place it.
Under a solar surplus B gave 1600 W into the export.
**The rule** (`main.py`, `_reseed_drain_end()`, `_drain_grid_w()`, N>=2
only). On the cycle a drain ends:
1. The start point is what the others stood at plus A's new command (its
pin, else 0 W; a dropped battery is sent 0 W), as SAFETY-93 does.
2. If the house needs more, the start is raised to the house's own point
(live batteries' readings + grid - target, as `_reseed_run_edge()`),
but never above last cycle's start. So the others cover the house at
once and never take over the drain's export.
3. While A settles (SAFETY-96's window: within the deadband, at most
`PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S`), the loop's error is the house's point minus its
start, not the meter. The meter still shows A's tail and the others'
climb; chasing it sent B down and then up again.
4. Then the loop moves one slew step a cycle.
A drain ends when its battery leaves DRAIN, is not live, its claims
contradict, or it will not give (SAFETY-73's limit outranks the pin
without a contradiction, so the refusal is read from the battery; +1 only,
as `_held_back()`). Today a contradiction on a drain only arises through
a refusal; the clause stays because a contradiction sends A 0 W, which is
an end (tested directly). The end is kept
until the loop runs (a missed poll). A dropped draining battery is this
rule's, not `_reseed_drop()`'s. Order in one cycle: drop/rejoin
(SAFETY-96), charge end (SAFETY-93), drain end (this) last; each moves the
start by its own battery, and the drain end's raise reads the start the
others left.
**Why not SAFETY-93's rule alone** (step 1, then slew). Measured on the
same plant: at 1200 W the grid imports 849 W and B goes to -465 W
(charging) while the loop chases A's tail; at N=3 and 4000 W it imports
784 W where base imports 42 W, as the others give up A's share of the house.
The house point keeps the grid at its aim; the cap at last cycle's start
keeps it from exporting.
**Before -> after** (`test_safety95.py`, 2500 W batteries, 10 s lag, 2 s
meter; base = the same tree with the change taken out):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| drain done / Off / timeout, N=2, 1200 W | B 0 -> 1600, +390 W commanded export, grid then +559 W | B 0 -> 1210, grid within 40 W of its aim |
| the same, N=3, 1200 W | B, C 0 -> 800, grid +695 W | 0 -> 605, grid +39 W |
| the same, solar surplus | B gives 1600 W into the surplus | B never gives; site moves 400 W a cycle |
| refusal, N=3, 1200 W | B, C step 1020 W, +2000 W commanded export | step 20 W, +70 W |
| N=3, 4000 W | others take A's share at once | the same (grid +1 W, base +42 W) |
| abort (site zeroed by the operator) | climbs from 0, grid +669 W | climbs from 0, grid +16 W |
| stale link (board watchdog 25 s) | | as base, but N=3 4000 W: grid +676 W (base +786) |
| N=1, every drain end | | byte-identical |
`tools/opt11_identity.py` n2_maint moved on purpose (A's drain refused at
1655 s; B stays at the house's 1420 W instead of 2500 W). Re-pinned in
`test_modes.py`. The other 45 digests are byte-identical.
**Not changed.** The peak guard's floor still binds (arbiter, after the
loop). Held batteries still give last; the idle clamp and the freeze test
are as they were. A charge end (SAFETY-93) and a trade end are unchanged.
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-96 - a battery the loop cannot move does not freeze it
**Status: implemented 2026-10-06, for review.** Tests: `test_safety96.py`.
**The defect** (SAFETY-93 rig test). At N=2 the saturation freeze compares
the site target with the site sum of the readings. After A's link went
stale, A was out of the split but its reading (-2000 W, still charging) was
in the sum: "saturation freeze (800 W vs -1903 W)", B held at 1200 W for
~236 cycles until the circulation trip. After a charge timeout or Off at
6000 W the loop froze ~14 s at 800 W while A came out of its charge. At a
drop, B also took A's whole share in one step.
**The rule** (`main.py`, `_held_out_w()`, `_reseed_drop()`, N>=2 only).
A battery is held out of the freeze test, counted at its command instead of
its reading, while:
- it is out of the split (writes refused for `LINK_STALE_S`);
- its last write was refused (its board may have gone to 0 W on its own
watchdog);
- it settles after a step the loop did not make: a charge end (SAFETY-93:
HOLD, timeout, Off, refusal, stale link) or a rejoin (then every battery,
as the split is made again). Settling ends when its reading is within the
deadband of its command, or after `PLANT_SETTLE_DOWN_S` (23 s, the
measured plant settle).
Its real power is not lost and not counted twice: the meter sees it, and
the loop follows the meter. Only the freeze stops reading it as the loop's.
The freeze still fires on the other batteries' own lag and on unplaced
watts.
At a drop the battery's share leaves the loop's start point, so the others
take over one slew step a cycle. At a rejoin it enters at its reading.
**Not a drop.** A missing reading or a stale register stops the site
(`inputs_ok`), as before. A refused battery (SAFETY-73) stays in the sum:
it is asked ~0 W and reads ~0 W. A watchdog-stopped battery (SAFETY-02/30)
is pinned at 0 W and stays in the sum. New: no refusal is learned on a
battery whose writes are refused; its board going to 0 W is no refusal. Its
count is kept, not reset, so a link that refuses 1 write in 3 does not hide
a battery that really refuses (review).
**Before -> after** (2 x 2500 W, 10 s lag, 2 s meter; freeze cycles not
about the remaining battery's own lag):
| case | before | after |
|---|---|---|
| A drops while giving, A holds 1200 W | 128, B steps 1210 W | 0, B stays |
| A drops while charging, A holds -2000 W | 78 | 0 (circulation trip stays: 4 kW goes round) |
| A drops while charging, board to 0 W | 5 | 0 |
| A drops then comes back, A holds 1200 W | 46, grid +1.1 kW | 0, grid within 250 W |
| charge timeout at 6000 W | 7, B held at 400 W | 0, B climbs |
| A switched Off at 6000 W | 6, B held at 800 W | 0, B climbs |
| N=1, N=2 with no drop | | byte-identical |
**Not changed.** At a rejoin the allocator splits again at once (A 0 ->
1205, B 2410 -> 1205 W); the site total does not step. A battery that keeps
charging on its own after its link drops still trips the circulation check
(it is real circulation). A trade end (`_reseed_run_edge`) still starts
from the full site sum.
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-97 - "gives nothing" is graded against each battery's idle reading
**Status: implemented 2026-10-04, folded into PR #171 (SAFETY-94), for
review.** Owner decision 2026-10-04: the band's centre is clamped to
+-75 W (see Bounds). Tests: `test_safety97.py` (rig: `tools/safety94_rig.py`).
Closes SAFETY-94 review finding F1.
## The defect
B's power reading (board B's `inverter_ac_power`, 0x0518) shows -95 to -118 W
at idle: its standby draw (the GoodWe app shows 0 W). A's shows -2 to -4 W.
Every "the battery gives nothing" test was `|reading| < 100 W`, so a refusing
B sat on the band's edge and never latched:
- N=2: never caught, before or after SAFETY-94.
- N=1: the old one-instant check caught it in 17-105 s; SAFETY-94's shared
rule (12 cycles in the band in a row) never did (review probe, 1200 s).
## Design
- **Offset source: learned per unit** (`app/idle.py`, `Inverter.idle`). No
new option: a required one is a setup step every client gets wrong, and an
optional one is a second source to reconcile. An override can be added
later if a site needs one.
- **When it learns:** control runs; the unit is not refused (unit or site),
stale or sign-tripped; its command has been within 50 W (`IDLE_ASK_W`) for
120 s (`IDLE_QUIET_S`, 6 lags of 20 s). A refusing battery is asked more
than 50 W, and while refused it does not learn, so its refusal cannot be
learned as idle. A capped battery under a big ask is not sampled either.
- **How:** the first value is the mean of 120 s of samples; then it follows
drift with a 30 min time constant. A sample beyond 250 W (`IDLE_SAMPLE_W`)
is dropped (a register held at a giving value). The band is centred on
the value clamped to 75 W (`IDLE_MAX_W`; owner decision below).
- **Restart:** saved per unit (`unit/<name>/idle_w`, on first learn and each
5 W move) and restored, clamped to 250 W. Without it a battery refusing from the
start is never quiet, so never learned, so never caught.
- **Until learned the idle reading is 0 W**: the rule as it was.
## Not chosen: the GoodWe LAN integration's DC battery power
Both inverters also appear through HA's GoodWe integration (B:
`sensor.kelder_dyness_battery_power`, 0 W at idle; found read-only on the
live HA 2026-10-04). Pointing `batt_entity` at it removes B's offset by
configuration, but:
- the band must be safe without it: other installs may not have it;
- it is polled over UDP on the inverter's Wi-Fi, a second channel that can
drop while the board keeps reading (HW-01 lost both once); a missing
reading stops the site;
- SAFETY-37's 35 s bound is derived from the board's 10 s publish; the
integration's poll interval (believed 10 s, not checked here) and latency
are not measured;
- DC power is not 0x0518, which SAFETY-30/31/42 were measured against.
It stays an install choice to test on the rig, not a code change here. With
it, the learned idle reading is simply ~0 W.
## Where it applies
Every test of "gives nothing / gives / takes" now uses `reading - idle`:
| check | change |
|---|---|
| shared refusal evidence `_gave_nothing` (N=1 and N>=2) | centred |
| N=1 engage and end in `compute()` (`idle_w`, the site sum) | centred |
| N=1 end in `_refusal_update` | centred |
| N>1 unit end (probe answered, takes the other way) | centred; uncentred, B's idle -100 W read as "takes 100 W" and ended a charge refusal at once |
| stale-path refusal (`_refusal_from_stale`, N=1 and N>1) | centred |
| SAFETY-42 "parked" (small ask, gives nothing) | centred |
| SAFETY-37 stale gate | unchanged: it grades register changes against command travel, not a level |
| SAFETY-57 release | unchanged: it reads the command only |
| SAFETY-30 per-unit sign | unchanged: opposition needs both over 250 W; B's 100 W idle cannot make or hide one alone |
| SAFETY-42 shortfall | unchanged: B reads ~100 W short at every power, which errs towards reporting (report only) |
## Bounds: owner decision 2026-10-04 (review R1)
Band: `|reading - centre| < 100 W`, centre = idle clamped to +-75 W.
- **Why a clamp under the band.** A wrong idle reading (taught during a
rest while the reading shows something else, e.g. a grid top-up of a unit
held at 0 W, or restored onto a swapped inverter) more than about 100 W off
hid every refusal on that battery, at N=1 and N=2; with the first +-250 W
clamp the rig missed a refusing A whenever the error was 110-250 W. At
+-75 W the band always keeps 0 W +-25 W, so a battery reading about 0 W
while refusing is caught whatever was learned or restored, and a wrong idle
cannot refuse a healthy 0 W battery (its ask is over 200 W).
- **The trade-off.** Options: keep +-250 W (covers idle readings to about
+-350 W, any 100 W mis-learn hides refusals); clamp to +-75 W (chosen);
"old band or centred band" (rejected: a correct B would need to give 200 W
to answer its 200 W probe).
- **Cost.** A battery whose idle reading is beyond about +-170 W is centred
at most 75 W out, so its refusal falls outside the band: it behaves as in
0.14.0 (not caught by this rule). B (-95 to -118 W) reads 20-43 W from its
clamped centre. B is caught across -150..+90 W of error in its idle
reading; learned 110 W or more too high it is missed, as in 0.14.0 at N=2.
- A frozen register is still caught by the stale gate at 35 s of asking.
- Recovery from a wrong value needs quiet time: tau 30 min.
## Catch times (rig, refusing from 200 s after a 400 s rest, +-4 W)
| refusing | meter 1 s | 2 s | 5 s |
|---|---|---|---|
| A, N=1 | 28 s (before 28) | 28 (28) | 65 (65) |
| A, N=2 | 28 (28) | 28 (28) | 110 (110) |
| B, N=1 | 28 (never) | 28 (never) | 65 (never) |
| B, N=2 | 24 (never) | 24 (never) | 60 (never) |
A at N=2 on a 5 s meter is 110 s here because the rig's grid goes flat once
A is cut, so the loop cycles on the 15 s floor; the same run on the PR before
SAFETY-97 gives 110 s. B restored after a restart, refusing from the start:
24 s; with nothing saved: never.
## Before -> after
- Healthy B with its offset, SAFETY-94's four scenarios, N=1 and N=2, 1/2/5 s
meters, both register shapes, idle learned or restored (96 runs): 0 stale,
0 refused. Reversals, lag 10/20 s, idle restored: 0.
- Live replay (SAFETY-94 part 1): 0 trips (the gate is untouched).
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
# SMA-10 - two idle states: hold 0 W, or hand the inverter back
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_sma10_two_idle_states.py`. Source: SMA-9
report sections 1.4, 3.2; owner decision 2026-10-20 (Q1, "as proposed").
A unit is idle in one of two ways, and the driver says which:
`Driver.hands_back`. **False (GoodWe):** the add-on holds 0 W, `release()` is
`write(0)` and the Controller never calls it, so Stop keeps today's 0 W write and
today's 0 W heartbeat. **True:** `release()` gives the unit back to whatever
steers it by itself (SMA energy management), once, and then nothing is written
to it until control starts again.
**Why two.** When the add-on goes away (Stop, shutdown, SIGTERM, restart, task
death, a config refusal) nobody is left to hold a number, so the unit goes back
to its own controller. When the add-on itself decides to stop (sign trip, site
sign, circulating power, a refused or non-finite write, missing readings,
another writer, an inverter fault) it has just said it cannot trust that
battery, and handing it to something else would let that something do what it
likes with it. Those hold 0 W through `write(0)` for every unit, whatever its
driver. Shadow mode on a unit that hands back uses `release()`: it must leave
the unit alone, and 0 W would be a command.
**Where.** `Controller.command_site_release()` sits beside `command_site_zero()`
(unchanged). Stop and `shutdown()` call it; the two maintenance-abort paths keep
zero (the add-on runs on, the sentence says 0 W for a moment). With no
hand-back unit it is `command_site_zero()`. `_write_unit()` also refuses to write
a hand-back unit while the add-on is idle (stopping, stopped, or shadow mode): it
releases once and returns, so the heartbeat and the cycle's own "stopped" 0 W
cannot reach it. A safety stop runs while control runs, so it falls through to
the write. Start re-arms: `released` drops and `last_write` clears.
**Bounds.** `RELEASE_BUDGET_S` equals `WRITE_BUDGET_S` (4 s): units are released
together, so one slow unit costs the kill window no more than a hung GoodWe
write does. A release at the bound is abandoned, not awaited. A release that
raises, hangs or returns false leaves that unit un-handed (the next idle write
tries again) and does not touch the others. Exit 78 before the Controller
exists has no driver to release and keeps today's path.
**Words.** Every sentence that said "set to 0 W" for the add-on going away or
for shadow mode is built from the roster in `app/handback.py` (EN and NL): a
roster with no hand-back unit gets None and keeps its old literal, so a GoodWe
site sees no changed byte. A hand-back unit's words (`Driver.words`: `back`,
`back_nl`) come from its driver; one without them gets "its own control" /
"de eigen sturing" (the article as in the generic clause; PR #239 review
comment 2495, not the brief). MQTT `status` is unchanged; the Home battery
row of a handed-back unit says "Back under SMA control" and carries
`handed_back`.
**Not done here (SMA-4, SMA-5, SMA-11):** any SMA/FoxESS driver, the read-back
after `release()`, per-driver timing, DOCS.md's safety model and the
"control stalled" sentence, the site-level "Held at 0 W" tiles in shadow mode on
a mixed roster, and the MQTT per-unit setpoint of a handed-back unit (it still
publishes 0).
**After a failed release** (returns False, raises or hangs past the bound) the
unit gets one `write(0)` through `Driver.release_fallback()` (default
`write(0)`; a driver where 0 W is not always safe overrides it), then nothing:
a repeated 0 W would keep resetting the inverter's own fallback timer, so after
that the unit is left to its own fallback. The release is retried once per
heartbeat; one error line and one action-log event per failure streak, one line
on recovery. Worst case at shutdown is `RELEASE_BUDGET_S` + `FALLBACK_BUDGET_S`
(6 s).
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
# SMA-2 - each inverter is reached through a driver
**Status: for review.** Tests: `test_sma2_driver.py`. Source: SMA-9 report
section 1.1. A pure refactor: no behaviour change for GoodWe, no change to a
command, a log line or a sentence the add-on shows.
Every place that read or steered an inverter used the GoodWe ESPHome entities
directly, so a second make meant touching all of them. `app/drivers.py` now
holds one `Driver` per roster entry (`Inverter.driver`): `configured()`,
`actuator_id()`, `limits()`, `read()`, `write()`, `release()`, `probe()`, and
`link_stale_s`, `batt_bound`, `settle_s`, `brand`, `words`. `GoodWeEsphomeDriver`
makes the same calls in the same order as the code it replaced; its
`release()` is `write(0)`.
**Moved to the driver:** the SoC and power read (`_read_unit`), the write
(`_write_unit`, still under the SAFETY-28 gate, the clamp, shadow mode and the
write budget), the device range (`run_control`, `amain`, the settings panel),
liveness and its window (`has_writer`, `is_live`, `link_note`), the freshness
bound, the status rows' "is a source set" test, rule 2's per-unit range check
and SAFETY-28's census. **Not moved:** the clamp, the gate, the heartbeat and
`command_site_zero()`; stop is still 0 W for every unit, and nothing calls
`release()` yet (SMA-10). `settle_s` and the control constants are not read
from the driver yet either: with only GoodWe they would change nothing.
**The seam is not TCP-shaped.** The census asks each entry's driver for its
actuator id: the setpoint entity for GoodWe, `host:port:unit_id` for a driver
reached over a socket, so two units behind one gateway are two actuators and
one unit named twice is the SAFETY-28 refusal. The census still counts every
`setpoint_entity` key as before and adds the driver's own actuator to it (parity
with 23ff9d0 on 349 option shapes is a test). The driver binds its Home
Assistant on first use by the Controller, so a unit added later is wired too.
**Schema, and why the new keys are not in it.** The brief asks for
`driver`, `host`, `port`, `unit_id`, `maintenance` per entry and for
`setpoint_entity` to become optional. Owner decision 2026-11-07: clients see
nothing new until SMA-4/SMA-7 use the keys. The Supervisor form shows every
schema key (and marks required ones), and a nested entry with a key the schema
lacks has that key silently dropped (measured, shape probe section K), so the
only way to hide them is to keep them out of config.yaml. So for now config.yaml, the
translations and the labels are exactly 23ff9d0's, and `setpoint_entity` stays
required there: until a driver without one is selectable, no entry can lack it.
The code underneath is the brief's: the driver defaults to `goodwe_esphome`,
rule 9(d) is per driver (a GoodWe entry without a setpoint entity is refused,
same sentence), and rule 9(h) checks `driver`, `host`, `port`, `unit_id`,
`maintenance` when a caller that skips the schema (the panel's save path,
sim/inject, the checks) supplies them; those sentences name the key, having no
label. When SMA-4 needs them: add them to the schema as optional with
translations, make `setpoint_entity` `str?`, and add them to `uilayout` as card
fields or a hidden list.
**Checked against 23ff9d0:** replay digests and a log of every Home Assistant
call are byte-identical at N=1 and N=2; the TEL-07 announce diff is 0/0/0; a
fake driver beside a GoodWe unit allocates, grades, drops and publishes per
unit; a call site that goes round the seam is caught.
@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
# TARIFF-02 - price provider plugins, and the canonical shape (with later additions)
**Status: SHIPPED.** Tests: `test_price.py`, `test_price_service.py`. Written
down by MAINT-20 from the long comments of `app/price.py` so the module can stay
short. Related: [[TARIFF-07]], [[TARIFF-09]], [[TARIFF-10]], [[TARIFF-14]],
[[TARIFF-15]], [[PRICE-01]].
## Where it lives
specs.md 2.2 puts this at `ems/ingest/prices/`; that layout is not being built.
Owner decision 2026-08-30: everything ships in `goodwe_controller/app/`. The
behaviour in specs.md 9.3 / 8.3 / 11.4 is unchanged and authoritative.
## The canonical format (9.3)
`{"prices": [{"start": "2026-01-15T00:00:00+01:00", "eur_per_kwh": 0.1834,
"provisional": false}]}`. `start` is tz-aware at the Brussels offset for that
instant, the price is EUR/kWh and all-in, `provisional` is per point (8.3: no
irreversible action on a provisional price). Three fields; a fourth would change
the wire format every store, fixture and captured body is written against.
## Three rules the module is shaped by
1. **Double-counting markup is refused, given a correct declaration.** A plugin
returns `RawPoint`s with the figure its source published and declares in
`capabilities().sources` which of {ENERGY, MARKUP, TAXES} it already holds.
`assemble()` (framework only) adds the complement from `price_markup_eur_kwh`
/ `price_taxes_eur_kwh`. A plugin cannot reach those two numbers by any route:
`PluginOptions` raises `FrameworkOption`, and review of PR #16 wrote a
double-counting plugin three more ways (`opts._o`, `price_option()`, and the
public `PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS`), so `register()` also refuses any plugin
whose own code mentions a framework key (`code_leaks()`). The guarantee is
exactly this: the complement is added once *given a correct `sources`*. A
plugin declaring `{ENERGY}` for an all-in feed comes out one markup high and
no code can catch that. test_price.py checks that a plugin's docstring lines
(`SOURCES:` / `The framework ADDS:`) agree with its declaration, not that
either is true. `code_leaks()` strips docstrings before searching (they must
name the components) and fails open on missing source (a frozen build must
still start; CI asserts source is found for every shipped plugin).
2. **The product type is declared, not inferred from the id.** `capabilities().
product` is a `PriceProduct`, rides on the series, and `volatility_regime()`
reads it (8.3: real-time products widen thresholds). A plugin id appears only
in `PROVIDERS`, `RETIRED_PROVIDERS` and its own class (AC2). No shipped plugin
declares `REALTIME` since [[TARIFF-07]]; `_WIDE`, `Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT`
and `WIDEN_FACTOR`'s 2.5 are kept, and test_price.py section 10 declares
REALTIME from a class outside this file to keep them live.
3. **"No price data" is a type, not an empty list.** 11.4: no data means static
profile, provisional plan, no arbitrage; all-zero prices mean arbitrage is
merely pointless. `PriceRead.series()` refuses an empty list;
`PriceRead.no_data(reason)` carries `.reason` and nothing else, so
`min(read.points)`, `for p in read.points` and `.get("points", [])` raise
`Absence`; `.match(*, series, no_data)` takes both handlers as required
keywords. Same shape as `sim/riglock.py` after TEST-04 (read its `Absence`
block before changing this). Two ways past it survive and are not worth code:
`vars(read).get("points", [])`, and `bool(read)` being True for both
variants (a falsy `no_data` would turn `if read:` into a guard by accident;
use `.match`).
## Timezone without `zoneinfo`
The Alpine image has no `tzdata`, so `ZoneInfo("Europe/Brussels")` would raise
on the client's Pi. Every instant is UTC and rendered at its fixed offset, so
the October 02:00-03:00 hour that happens twice is two instants (`02:00+02:00`
and `02:00+01:00`); a naive-local-hour key or a 24-slot array is wrong on both
transition days (test_price.py counts points on both 2026 transitions). The EU
rule: CEST from 01:00 UTC on the last Sunday of March to 01:00 UTC on the last
Sunday of October. Review of PR #16 matched it against `zoneinfo` over 149 040
hourly instants 2020-2036 with zero mismatches. Residual risk is political (EU
abolishes the change): one edit in `brussels_offset()`.
## The feed range (TARIFF-09)
`generic_dayahead.fetch()` used to ignore `since`/`until` and request the bare
URL, so the feed answered ONE Brussels day and 8.3 dropped everything past today
as provisional: at 09:00 over a 48 h horizon 15 firm and 33 carried, at 23:00 1
firm and 47 carried. `feed_days()` returns the Brussels calendar days (first,
last, both inclusive; the API takes dates) that the half-open `[since, until)`
touches: Brussels, never UTC (22:30 UTC in summer is already tomorrow); `until`
exclusive, so local midnight belongs to the day before; an empty or inverted
window collapses to one day. `api.energy-charts.info` capture:
`scenarios/energy-charts-be-price-2026-09-09_2026-09-10-twoday.json`.
`dated_feed_url()` refuses a base that already has a query string (appending
would give `?bzn=BE?bzn=BE&start=...`). An operator's `price_feed_url` override
is used verbatim and loses the range, on purpose: rewriting an operator's URL
reorders and re-escapes it, and both providers declare a second host
(`web-api.tp.entsoe.eu`) whose parameters are not `start`/`end`. The cost is
logged at fetch time, naming the horizon consequence. The URL rule is shared by
`generic_dayahead` and `custom_formula` (TARIFF-15), taking `plugin_id` as an
argument so AC2 holds. The "range is used" promise is not mechanically enforced
(a rule would be satisfied by an invented parameter name); test_price.py pins
which plugins consume the range as a literal roster.
## Absence and the covering window
See [[TARIFF-14]] for the cover table: a point covers from its own start to the
next point's start, never more than an hour; the last point gets the span of the
one before; sorted at construction. `covers()` delegates to `at()` (a second copy
of the rule is a second place to be wrong); `window_points()` grades only the
`start` against `[since, until)` and is not a coverage query. `at()` is a linear
scan over about 192 entries on the 30 s path; a bisect is not worth a second
way to be wrong. A duplicated start (not reachable through `load_prices()`)
gives the earlier entry a zero-width window.
## Taxes components (TARIFF-18)
`price_taxes_eur_kwh`'s default (0.06 before) is the sum of
`FLEMISH_TAXES_COMPONENTS_EUR_KWH`, each row one line of the Eneco residential
card for Flanders, September 2026, including 6 % VAT, in EUR/kWh;
test_price.py section 1b re-adds them. It is per DSO: the distribution row runs
5,28 c (Midden-Vlaanderen) to 6,70 c (West), so the all-in Flemish total runs
about 0.117 to 0.131; a site outside Antwerpen types its own. The default sits
near the low end on purpose: the scalar cancels in `max - min`, and its one
decision is the 17 negative-price guard in arbitrage.py, which tests the
absolute all-in sell price. Too high carries a genuinely negative hour above
zero (export into paid-for disposal); too low only declines a trade that would
have paid. `energiebijdrage` is a row of zero: from 1 August 2026 it is merged
into the bijzondere accijns, and the zero row makes the double-count a visible
decision. Moving a shipped default changes which configs start: TARIFF-17's rung
in validate.py refuses `price_taxes_profile` together with a non-default scalar,
comparing against the default (the Supervisor merges every schema key into the
stored blob, 70 of 71 keys on the reference install, CHANGELOG 0.9.0), so a
superseded shipped default (0.06) must still read as untouched, and the rung's
sentence names both figures.
## One in-code mirror of option defaults (CFG-03)
Option defaults live in config.yaml's `options:` and `schema:` and main.py's
`.get()` fallbacks. `PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS` is the single in-code mirror for the
price options: validate.py imports it, main.py has no `o.get("price_...", X)`
fallbacks, no dataclass carries a copy, and test_price.py section 1 reads
config.yaml and asserts equality key for key. `static_profile` (TARIFF-03),
`price_taxes_profile` (TARIFF-17), `price_formula` (TARIFF-15),
`price_export_formula` (TARIFF-16) and the OPT-04 keys live there for the same
reason, not in their own modules (a second dict would be a fourth location).
Details:
- The tables / formulas are in `FRAMEWORK_KEYS`: a plugin reading one could add
taxes a second time per hour, or fold an injection curve into a consumption
price. `BANNED_IN_PLUGIN_CODE` derives from that set.
- `arbitrage_soc_floor` / `arbitrage_soc_ceiling` are not the maintenance keys
(a balancing cycle is not a trading reserve).
- `cycle_cost_threshold_eur` is 0.10 because 10.1's name says so, not because it
makes anything trade: on Belgian day/night numbers the static spread is about
0.08, so a static-tariff site does not trade at this default (test_arbitrage.py
section 7). Whether 0.10, or FCST-03's 2.5 / 1.5, is right is an owner
decision.
- `price_service_token` is a secret (`SECRET_OPTIONS`); `scrub()` removes secret
values from any text built from an error.
## Widening (FCST-03)
One path, a set of active uncertainty sources (real-time product 8.3, no weather
data 11.4). The combination rule is `max`, not a product (2.5 x 1.5 would give a
threshold nothing on a Belgian tariff clears). The factors are policy defaults,
not derived (no arbitrage ever ran); they differ so `max`, `sum` and `product`
are distinguishable in a check. `widen_factor()` refuses a string (a silent 1.0
would report a widening that is not applied).
## Injection price (AC4, TARIFF-16)
`export_price_eur_kwh()` is a separate scalar. It was said to be so because
nothing dynamic exists to route; that was false (Eneco publishes `0,1 x BELPEX-H
- 1,188`, ENGIE `(B x eSpot_15) - A`). The true reason: an injection curve has
its own coefficients and VAT treatment (injection is VAT-exempt, consumption is
6 %). TARIFF-16 added `price_export_formula`, read by `export_formula()` through
the same parser as the consumption leg (`parse_export_formula()` is
`parse_price_formula()` with its option name moved). `export_price_at()` falls
through to the scalar and ignores the index, correctly. A negative answer is a
real answer (Eneco's formula is below zero for any index under 11,88 EUR/MWh);
nothing floors it. Nothing under `app/` calls either reader to take a decision:
arbitrage prices the sell side as displaced import. A malformed leg is refused at
startup by validate.py; `taxes_profile()` and `export_formula()` still handle it
loudly at run time. `static_tariff` is imported lazily in `taxes_profile()`
because it imports this module at module scope.
## Taxes at each point's own instant (TARIFF-17)
`taxes_at()` takes a scalar or a period table (duck-typed on `price_at`, because
price.py must not import static_tariff.py). A non-flat component matters: ORES
bills `dag 13,27 / nacht 7,39` c, a 5,88 c gap coinciding with the cheap spot
hours, and flattening it understates the spread. `assemble()` must evaluate it
per point; hoisting the lookup out of the loop collapses the feature back into a
level (test_price.py section 24 grades which hour is cheapest, since a
spread-magnitude assertion passes on the hoisted version). On a scalar, `0.0 +
markup` is exactly `markup` in IEEE 754, so scalar sites get identical bytes.
The table wins over the scalar; validate.py refuses configs where both speak.
## Retired providers (TARIFF-07)
`RETIRED_PROVIDERS` exists so `eneco_eddy` and friends are not refused as typos:
they were shipped, the operator chose them, and every failed fetch fell back
silently to `static_profile`. No alias to `generic_dayahead`: they published
retail prices (`B x spot + A`) and it reads wholesale; an alias would invent the
site's two coefficients (behind the klantenzone login; CREG tariff-card pages
404, VREG unreachable). Each value is the id-specific half of the refusal (the
endpoint, what it answered on 2026-09-13, why no replacement can be built);
validate.py owns the framing. `register()` refuses at import to register a
retired id again, because `pid in PROVIDERS` going true silences the named
refusal; re-shipping is a decision recorded by removing it from
`RETIRED_PROVIDERS` in the same commit. See [[TARIFF-07]].
## Parsers (TARIFF-08)
The only parser is columnar: `https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE` gives
parallel `unix_seconds` / `price` arrays plus `unit`. The earlier row parser read
`doc["data"]`, a shape no feed ever published, graded by fixtures written from
the same guess, so every fetch ended `SourceUnavailable` and 11.4 fell back to
static silently. Two shapes, two functions: a parser that sniffs can decide
wrong, and a wrong-but-parseable response becomes a price.
`_points_from_columnar_json()` refuses:
- unequal arrays (`zip()` would truncate the evening peak, and a series missing
the expensive hours is traded on while no-data switches arbitrage off);
- a unit other than the declared one (EUR/kWh under the same keys would be 1000
times too small and `MAX_PLAUSIBLE_EUR_KWH` bounds only the large side);
- naive time: `unix_seconds` are UTC (`fromtimestamp(t, timezone.utc)`).
Rendering at the Brussels offset is `assemble()`'s, once, for every plugin.
A `null` price is dropped and logged (the pairing is reliable, the source said
it published none; `_Series.at()` answers the hole with `Absence`);
`scenarios/fetch_epex_be.py` dropped 0 nulls in 12 months to 2026-08-31. The
feed is quarter-hourly since Belgium's 15-minute MTU (2025-10-01); nothing
assumes either granularity (test_price.py section 2b replays both).
`_validate_raw()` accepts negative prices (windy-Sunday hours are the year's best
charging; 17 keeps the regression) and rejects NaN, infinity, an implausible
magnitude, naive datetimes, and duplicate or out-of-order starts.
## Transport and plugin details
- `check_host()` splits the scheme before parsing the host. The first version
stripped `len("https://")`, which on `http://` ate two characters of the host
(`pi.energy-charts.info`), so a non-TLS feed failed the allow-list and the check
"plain http is refused" passed even with the TLS rule deleted. Found by
mutation in review of PR #16.
- The default transport imports aiohttp lazily so `manual_csv` works with no HTTP
stack. With `headers` (price_service only) it answers in the safe words of
`status_words()` and follows no redirects (the host is fixed; a redirect would
take the token somewhere the allow-list never saw).
- `manual_csv`: the CSV is all-in (the plugin cannot know what a typed number
contains); `load_prices()` warns when markup / taxes are set non-zero under a
plugin that sources them. No transport, aiohttp, network or tz database: it is
the offline escape hatch and the TEST-01 replay ingest path.
- `custom_formula` (TARIFF-15) declares `{ENERGY, MARKUP}`, not `ALL_IN`: a
card's `Tariefformule` is the energy component only (Eneco tabulates network
tariffs separately; ENGIE excludes network, transport, levies, excise), so
`ALL_IN` would drop about 12 c/kWh. The risk left is an operator folding
network charges into `offset`; the card self-check in custom_formula.py refuses
that, and grades the coefficients against the card, not the card against
reality. No expression evaluation: the string is settable over HTTP through
the ingress config page, so `eval` would be RCE in a root container holding
`SUPERVISOR_TOKEN`. It reuses `generic_dayahead`'s feed, URL and parser. It
keeps `scale=1.0`, so its `RawPoint`s carry EUR/MWh in a field called
`eur_per_kwh`: contained (destructured on the next line, never leaves the
method; `_validate_raw()` would refuse an escape).
- `startup_preview()` is a hook (TARIFF-15), not a line in `load_prices()`: only
the plugin knows what went into its arithmetic, and the index beside the
all-in figure makes a factor of 1000 obvious. It must not raise into the control
path; the id is recorded before the hook runs so a failing preview is not
retried every 30 minutes.
- `load_prices()` returns, never raises, except `FrameworkOption` (a plugin trying
to read the markup; turning it into "no price data" would hide the defect).
- `price_provider_id()` is one spelling of the selected id because the same
expression was written at three call sites (TARIFF-10). validate.py keeps its
own reader on purpose: it validates the raw blob.
- `price_provider_selected()` (TARIFF-10): the background refresh used to start
only when `arbitrage_enabled` (ships false) was on, so a configured site
fetched nothing (40 h soak: zero feed requests, `present: false` on all 802
samples). It is not a trading switch: `arbitrage.enabled()` answers that.
- `price_service` (PRICE-01): `FALLBACKS` and `KEEP_LAST` are empty/False for
every earlier plugin, so `price_chain.py` is not used for them.
`TOKEN_REFUSED` is the one phrase the fallback chain reads to tell "the owner
must act" from "the server is down". `covers` lists complete days only; an hour
missing inside a day is a hole, not a free hour.
@@ -1,230 +0,0 @@
# TARIFF-07 — three plugins that never fetched a price, and the one mechanism they leave behind
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-13 — withdraw `engie_dynamic`,
`totalenergies_dynamic` and `eneco_eddy`. Keep `PriceProduct.REALTIME` and the
widening machinery. Refuse a retired id by name rather than aliasing it.**
Filed with TARIFF-07. Follows [[TARIFF-08]], which found the same class of
defect one layer down — a parser graded against its own guess — and left the
question of these three open.
---
## 1. The endpoints, verified rather than taken on report
The card said the three endpoints were dead. They were re-checked by hand on
**2026-09-13** before anything was deleted, because "the endpoint is dead" is
exactly the kind of claim this repository keeps finding to be second-hand:
| id | endpoint | observed |
|---|---|---|
| `engie_dynamic` | `https://api.engie.be/dynamic/be` | **HTTP 404**, body `{"message":"no Route matched with those values","request_id":"..."}` — a Kong gateway with no route configured |
| `totalenergies_dynamic` | `https://api.totalenergies.be/prices/dynamic` | **TLS failure**. The handshake completes and the server presents `CN=pge-apigee-dev.direct-energie.com`; `api.totalenergies.be` is not in the SAN list, so the connection is closed before any request is sent |
| `eneco_eddy` | `https://api.eneco.be/eddy/prices` | **HTTP 404**, `content-length: 1`, `server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0` — an empty body from a live host that does not serve this path |
All three failed. Had any one of them answered, this card would have stopped
and asked, because an endpoint that answers changes the decision from
"withdraw" to "fix the parser".
## 2. Why this is not "unfinished", and why no replacement can be written
An unfinished plugin has a right endpoint and a wrong parser. These have
neither, and the reason is structural:
* **ENGIE's dynamic price is `(B × eSpot_15) − A`, and `B` and `A` are
PER-CONTRACT.** They live behind the customer's klantenzone login. No
unauthenticated public URL can return *a given customer's* price, so the
endpoint this plugin wanted cannot exist for anybody to build.
* **There is no regulator index to read the coefficients from.** CREG's
tariff-card pages 404; VREG was unreachable. Every coefficient found in
research came from a supplier's own PDF, which is a document, not a feed.
* **"Eddy" is not an Eneco product at all.** Eneco's dynamic product is
**"Zon & Wind Dynamisch"**, and it is indexed to **Belpex/EPEX day-ahead** —
not to imbalance. The plugin was wrong about the product, the product type
and the URL simultaneously.
So the three were not withdrawn for being broken. They were withdrawn for
describing tariffs that no public endpoint can serve.
## 3. What a site configured on one of these has actually been running
⚠️ **This is the half that decides what the migration is.** §11.4 turns a
failed fetch into a silent fall back: static profile, plan provisional, no
arbitrage. That is the *correct* degradation, and it says nothing at all about
the cause. Every fetch these three ever made raised `SourceUnavailable`.
Therefore a site configured on one of them has been running on
`static_profile` — **or on nothing at all, where no profile was set** — since
the day the id was entered, and **nothing on its status page has ever differed
from a working provider that simply never found a cheap hour**.
The migration is therefore **not** "keep their prices working". There were no
prices. It is *"tell them their prices never worked"*, which is why the answer
is a refusal and not a fallback.
### Why not a silent alias to `generic_dayahead`
It is the friendlier-looking option and it is wrong. These published **retail**
prices; `generic_dayahead` reads **wholesale**. Aliasing needs the site's own
`B` and `A`, which §2 has just established nobody has. An alias would have to
**invent the numbers a battery is priced against** — the same defect as a
parser graded against its own guess, one layer further from anything that
reports. The scalar `price_markup_eur_kwh` cannot stand in for `B` either: it
is an addend, not a multiplier, and it is `float(0,1)` so it cannot even hold a
negative `A`.
## 4. ⚠️ The `config.yaml` schema is deliberately WIDER than the registry
`price_provider` is a `list(off|…)` enum, and the Supervisor validates the
options file against it **before the add-on starts**.
So the obvious edit — delete the three ids from the enum along with the classes
— has a consequence that runs exactly opposite to this card's purpose:
```
operator's config says price_provider: eneco_eddy
|
+-- id NOT in the schema enum
|
+-- Supervisor rejects the options file
|
+-- add-on never starts
|
+-- validate.py never runs
|
+-- the named refusal is NEVER SEEN
```
The operator gets an opaque `expected one of ...` from a layer they did not
configure, on **exactly the sites the withdrawal exists to inform**.
**Decision: keep all three ids in the schema enum.** `PROVIDERS` shrinks to
two; the enum stays at six. The cost is that the dropdown still offers three
dead ids to a *new* operator — and that is the cheaper failure, because
choosing one is refused at the next startup **by name**, with the endpoint, the
observation and the alternative, which is strictly more than a schema
rejection would say. Both translations label them withdrawn in the option
description.
`app/price.py`'s `RETIRED_PROVIDERS` is the list. `test_price.py` section 1
asserts the schema offers exactly `PROVIDERS | RETIRED_PROVIDERS | {"off"}` —
derived, not typed — and `register()` refuses to re-register a retired id, so
the registry and the retired table cannot both claim one and the refusal cannot
be taken away by an `@register` somebody adds back.
## 5. ⚠️ `PriceProduct.REALTIME` and the widening path are KEPT with no shipped declarer
`eneco_eddy` was the **sole** declarer of `PriceProduct.REALTIME`. Deleting it
orphans:
* `_WIDE = frozenset({PriceProduct.REALTIME})`
* `Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT`
* `WIDEN_FACTOR[Uncertainty.REALTIME_PRODUCT] = 2.5`
**They stay.** The reasoning, stated here so the next reader finds intent
rather than an apparent dead branch:
1. A reviewer finding a mechanism with **zero callers** would reasonably delete
it. That is good instinct applied to a missing fact, and this file is the
fact.
2. It is the **AC2 seam**. The whole point of `capabilities().product` is that
a new supplier is a new class and nothing else: declare `REALTIME`, get the
wide regime, edit no framework code. Deleting the enum member would mean the
first genuine imbalance product has to **rebuild** that seam — and rebuilding
it is precisely the "editing the optimiser to add a supplier" that AC2
forbids.
3. It costs nothing. Two enum members and a dict entry.
**⚠️ NO SHIPPED PLUGIN DECLARES `PriceProduct.REALTIME` UNTIL ONE DOES.** Both
shipped plugins (`generic_dayahead`, `manual_csv`) are day-ahead. §9.2's row 2
is unoccupied. That is not the same as it having no mechanism, and the
difference is what this section exists to record.
It is **pinned, not merely documented**. `test_price.py` section 5 asserts:
* that **no shipped plugin** declares `REALTIME` — so if one ever does, the
check goes red and the right fix is to **edit this record**, not to delete
the seam;
* that the widening still works **from a declaration alone** —
`volatility_regime`, `uncertainty_of` and `widen_factor` are graded on a
`ProviderCapabilities` the test file builds;
* and section 10 registers `_NewSupplier`, a class defined **outside
`price.py`** that declares `REALTIME` and is asserted to land in the wide
regime. That class is now the only live declarer in the tree, which makes the
seam something this suite exercises end to end rather than a constant it
reads.
## 6. What else went, and one thing that did not
`_points_from_json()` went with the three. It read a `{"data": [{...}]}`
row-per-point document that **no feed anybody here has ever reached
publishes** — the shape was invented alongside these plugins, and the only
bodies ever fed to it were fixtures written from the same guess. TARIFF-08
found that loop on the response side for `generic_dayahead`; this is the rest
of it. `needs_credentials` went too: the three were its only setters and
nothing read it.
The shape survives in **one** place and in one direction: `row_shape_body()` in
`test_price.py`, feeding `generic_dayahead` so that section 9 grades a row
document as a **failure** for it rather than a second dialect it might sniff.
It is named for what it is.
⚠️ **One check had to be rebuilt rather than deleted, and saying so matters.**
`test_price.py` section 4b proved that `code_leaks()`'s docstring strip is
load-bearing by finding a shipped docstring that a raw text scan would
false-positive on. The docstring that did that was **`engie_dynamic`'s** — it
spelled `price_markup_eur_kwh` in full. With it gone, no shipped docstring
spells a full framework key, so the check would have **passed on a tree with
the strip deleted**: a check that had quietly stopped being one, which is the
third failure mode in `MUTATION.md`. The stimulus is now constructed in the
test file (`_DocumentedPlugin`), and the shipped set is asserted clean
separately.
## 7. Mutations driven
Every check added or rebuilt here was driven red. Harness:
`/home/homelab/.cache/t07-mut/`, which rebuilds the tree from the worktree and
purges `__pycache__` per `MUTATION.md`'s rule.
| | mutation | Δ | red on |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | delete the retired branch from `_price_problems()` | −2785 B | 7 checks in `test_price.py` |
| M2 | move the retired branch **after** the unknown-id branch | **+0 B** | the same 7 |
| M3 | make `been_running` constant (drop the empty-`static_profile` case) | −212 B | 2 |
| M4 | drop the "WHAT TO DO" half of the refusal | −874 B | 1 |
| M5 | `RETIRED_PROVIDERS = {}` | −1099 B | 5, then a traceback |
| M6 | drop the three ids from `config.yaml`'s enum — §4's trap | −47 B | 2 |
| M7 | delete `register()`'s retired guard | −1101 B | 2, then a traceback |
| M8 | `_WIDE = frozenset()` | −23 B | 3 + 4 across two suites |
| M9 | `WIDEN_FACTOR[REALTIME_PRODUCT]` 2.5 → 1.5 | **+0 B** | 1 + 1 |
⚠️ **M2 and M9 have a byte delta of zero**, which `MUTATION.md` names as the
risky case. The harness rebuilds the tree from source on every run and purges
`__pycache__`, so there is no inherited cache to read; and stale bytecode
manufactures **survivors**, never reds, so a red from a `+0 B` mutation is not
at risk from that defect. M2's grep confirmed the branch had moved on disk.
⚠️ **M5 and M7's red counts are LOWER BOUNDS.** Both runs ended in a traceback
with checks after it ungraded — FCST-06's rule: read the output, not the count.
M7's traceback is itself informative: with the guard gone the re-registration
**succeeds**, `PROVIDERS` is polluted with a class that has no fixture, and the
suite dies downstream. That is the failure the guard prevents, arriving loudly.
## 8. What this card did not do
* **It did not pick a version number.** The change is backward-incompatible — a
config legal on the current version is refused on the next — and the
CHANGELOG says so prominently, in the shape PKG-07 established for `slew_w`.
Which number it belongs to depends on whether the current image has already
been built and pulled, which is a fact about the live box that this branch
cannot observe. Whoever deploys decides.
* **It did not implement the formula provider.** `B × spot + A` with per-site
coefficients is the real answer for a Belgian dynamic customer and is a
separate card. `DOCS.md` references it as planned and is explicit about what
`generic_dayahead` can and cannot express in the meantime — in particular
that it cannot represent a negative offset, and that
`price_markup_eur_kwh: float(0,1)` could not hold one anyway.
* **It did not rewrite released CHANGELOG history.** The two historical entries
that called `eneco_eddy` an imbalance product are annotated in place with a
correction naming this card, rather than silently edited. The record of what
the project believed is part of the record.
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
# TARIFF-09 — asking the feed for the horizon, and what `price_feed_url` means
Two decisions. The first had no defensible alternative once it was measured;
the second did, and the alternative is argued below rather than dismissed.
---
## 0. The measurement this card exists for
`generic_dayahead.fetch()` accepted `since` and `until` and requested the bare
`https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE`. That URL names no range, and the
feed answers **one Brussels day**.
Measured on the merged tree (`4257e38`) at 2026-09-10 09:00 CEST, 48 h horizon,
live feed, yesterday seeded through the shipped read path:
```
60 firm points (15 whole hours) + 33 carried hours of 48 requested
carried: 24 h on 2026-09-11, 9 h on 2026-09-12
arbitrage(0.10): allowed, spread 0.4645, buy 11:45 and sell 19:45 -- BOTH on 2026-09-10
firm local days = [2026-09-10]
```
Everything past today was carry-forward, flagged provisional, and §8.3 drops
provisional hours from the trade set. **The optimiser never saw tomorrow as
firm, at any hour.** The ceiling was structural rather than incidental: with a
one-day window, at hour *H* of the local day a 48 h horizon is at most
**24−H hours firm and 24+H carried** — 15/33 at 09:00, and **1/47 at 23:00**,
where the remaining firm spread (0.0464 EUR/kWh) no longer even clears the
default 0.10 round-trip threshold and arbitrage is refused outright.
That is not what FCST-04's fill was built for. FCST-04 covers the
pre-publication window until the ~13:00–14:00 CET auction, after which a
healthy feed hands over tomorrow in full.
**The data exists and the endpoint serves it.** Verified 2026-09-10T07:45:49Z:
`?bzn=BE&start=2026-09-09&end=2026-09-10` returns **192 quarter-hours across
two local days**, committed unmodified as
`scenarios/energy-charts-be-price-2026-09-09_2026-09-10-twoday.json`. The
plugin simply never asked.
After the change, same code path, same window, a feed serving both days:
**39 firm hours and 9 carried**, firm across **two** Brussels days, and the
permitted cycle buys on one day and sells on the other. Graded in
`test_price_history.py` section 1c against both feed states.
---
## 1. The range is derived on the **Brussels** calendar, from `since`/`until`
`since` and `until` are **instants**; the API takes **dates**. Those are not
the same question, and the conversion is where the day gets lost.
`brussels_date_range()` returns two inclusive `date`s:
* the first is `brussels(since).date()`. **Not `since.date()`, and not the UTC
date.** 22:30 UTC in summer is already tomorrow in Belgium, so a UTC-derived
start asks for the day the controller has just left and drops the day it is
standing in — for the last one or two hours of *every* day. This is
`price_history._bdate()`'s lesson one layer up, with a worse consequence:
`_bdate()` misfiles an hour, this never fetches it.
* the last is `brussels(until).date()`, **stepped back a day when `until`
falls exactly on local midnight**, because `until` is exclusive and that
instant is the first tick of a day nobody asked for. Without it every
whole-hour horizon requests one extra day — harmless on this feed, but it
makes the request a claim the caller never made.
* an empty or inverted window collapses to a single day rather than producing
a backwards range, which no feed has a defined answer for.
Both ends are graded, and both are driven red by mutation — including the two
that swap `brussels()` for the UTC date (`test_price.py` section 2c).
---
## 2. `price_feed_url` is the **exact URL**, used as given. The plugin appends
nothing.
The alternative — merge our `start`/`end` into whatever query string the
operator supplied — was considered and rejected. Three reasons, in the order
they decided it:
1. **`start`/`end` are energy-charts' spelling, and this provider declares a
second host.** `generic_dayahead.capabilities().egress_hosts` is
`("api.energy-charts.info", "web-api.tp.entsoe.eu")`. That second host's
day-ahead date parameters have not been verified by this card and are not
guessed at here — but they are not `start`/`end`. So an override to the
*other declared host* — a case the declaration itself anticipates — is
exactly where merging appends two parameters that host ignores, producing
the short horizon anyway, with a URL nobody typed as the receipt.
2. **Merging means re-serialising a URL somebody else wrote.** Parsing and
rebuilding reorders parameters, collapses duplicates and re-escapes values.
"Override the feed" is what the option already says it means, and an
override that is silently rewritten is not one.
3. **Blind appending is not on the table at all.** `dated_feed_url()` refuses
to add a query string to a base that already has one, so
`?bzn=BE?bzn=BE&start=…` cannot be produced by this module even by a later
edit that folds the parameters back into the constant.
⚠️ **The cost is real and it is therefore NOT a doc footnote.** An overriding
operator gets exactly the short horizon this card exists to fix. So the plugin
emits a `WARNING` on the shipped `goodwe.price` logger at **fetch time**, naming
the consequence — one Brussels day, the rest carried and flagged, §8.3 dropping
them from the trade set — and naming the `start..end` it *would* have asked
for. §11.4 is what makes a price defect quiet; an operator who has taken the
short horizon has to be able to find out from the log that they did.
The warning is graded, with a control that the default path stays silent, and
a mutation that downgrades it to `debug()` takes that check red.
**Fetch time rather than startup**, because that is where the URL actually in
use is known. The trade-off is one line per refresh (the tariff task, not the
30 s control tick). If the status page ever grows a price-source row, this is
the sentence it should carry.
---
## 3. The plugin contract: `fetch(self, opts, since, until, transport)`
The signature promises every plugin the range, and until this card **none of
the four networked plugins used it**. The obvious follow-up is to enforce the
promise. It is **not** enforced, and the reason is TARIFF-08's:
Three of the five shipped plugins point at endpoints nobody has ever verified
(TARIFF-07 is the open decision on withdrawing them). A rule obliging them to
pass a date range would be satisfied by an **invented parameter name** — which
is the parser-graded-against-its-own-guess defect moved from the response to
the request, and it would ship looking like a guarantee.
What exists instead is a **roster pin** in `test_price.py` section 2c: which
plugins reference their `since`/`until` is asserted as a literal, derived from
the registry and the AST. A sixth supplier, or a change to any of the three,
has to edit that line and make the decision rather than inherit the silence.
It is named as a source-shape pin, not as evidence that any feed parses;
`generic_dayahead`'s behaviour is graded separately by the URL it really
requests.
**Recommendation for whoever picks up TARIFF-07:** enforce it at the moment
those three endpoints are either verified or withdrawn, not before. If they are
withdrawn, `generic_dayahead` and `manual_csv` are the whole roster and the
rule is one line — `manual_csv` reads a whole file and is windowed downstream,
so it would be the single documented exemption.
@@ -1,277 +0,0 @@
# TARIFF-10 — fetching a price and trading on one are two decisions
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-12 — Option A. If a price provider is configured,
prices are fetched. Trading stays a separate switch (`arbitrage_enabled`), and
this card moves nothing that moves energy.**
Filed with TARIFF-10. Follows [[TARIFF-09]] and [[FCST-04]]; §4 settles the
limitation FCST-04 recorded and did not decide.
---
## 1. The defect, and why it was invisible
`app/main.py`'s `amain()` read:
```
if arbitrage.enabled(opts):
tasks.append(asyncio.create_task(controller.run_tariff_refresh()))
```
`run_tariff_refresh` is the **only** caller of `resolve_tariff()`, which is the
**only** caller of `price_history.carry()`. `arbitrage_enabled` ships `false`.
So on a shipped install with a provider configured:
* no HTTPS request was ever made to the feed;
* no plan was ever resolved, so `self.tariff_plan` stayed `None` forever;
* `/data/price_history.json` was never created;
* the *Price history* status row read `empty` for the life of the install;
* TARIFF-09's short-horizon warning could not fire, because it is logged on a
fetch and there was no fetch.
Measured, not inferred — a 40 h soak, two instances, one feed:
| | shipped default + provider | same, arbitrage armed |
|---|---|---|
| feed requests | **0** | fetching |
| `/data/price_history.json` | `present: false`, **802/802 samples** | written |
| resolved plan | none | 132 points |
⚠️ **AND FOUR SURFACES ALREADY DESCRIBED THE FIXED BEHAVIOUR.** `DOCS.md`
§*Energy price providers*: *"With `arbitrage_enabled: false`, which is the
shipped default, turning a provider on still fetches, validates and publishes
prices and changes no charging decision."* `config.yaml` and both translations
said the same, and additionally carried a claim that had gone stale in the other
direction — *"nothing consumes the price series yet"*, untrue since OPT-04
shipped the consumer. The code was the only surface that disagreed with all of
them, and no check compared the two.
The dating is worth being exact about, because it says this was never a
regression. `git log -S` puts the refresh task, its `arbitrage.enabled()` guard
**and** the DOCS sentence in the *same commit* — OPT-04, `bdd7f18`;
`config.yaml`'s version of the claim goes back further, to TARIFF-02,
`852fc7c`. The prose and the code disagreed from the moment both existed.
## 2. Why a check on the `if` would not have caught it
The `if` was exactly what somebody meant to write, and its comment argued for
it honestly:
> ⚠️ STARTED ONLY WHEN ARBITRAGE IS ARMED. Nothing else in the add-on reads the
> resolved plan … so on a default install this task would be network traffic in
> aid of an attribute nobody reads.
That was true when OPT-04 wrote it and stopped being true when FCST-04 gave the
plan a *store* and a *status row*. A pin on the expression would have gone red
on the fix and green on the defect. What was wrong is the **set of
configurations from which a fetch is reachable**, so that is what
`test_price.py` section 13 grades:
1. the guards on every `asyncio.create_task` in `amain()` are **evaluated**
against real option dicts — whatever the guard is spelled as;
2. the call graph under `app/` is walked to see whether the coroutines those
guards start can arrive at `resolve_tariff()` — wherever it has moved to;
3. and then the fetch is **driven**, with a counting transport, a real
`Controller` and a real store path, because a reachability graph is an
argument and a counted request is an observation.
⚠️ **Step 3 grades the gate only because it starts the task the way `amain()`
would.** The driver asks `_fetchers(opts)` — the evaluated guard — before it
calls the coroutine. Measured: with the shipped defect restored **and** that one
line defeated (`if False and "run_tariff_refresh" not in names:`), the four
driven rows go **green** while only the structural rows stay red. Without it
they are decoration, which is MUTATION.md's habit 4 in a harness.
What the instrument **cannot** see is printed on every run: a coroutine started
by anything but `create_task`; a guard that is not an enclosing `if` in
`amain()`; anything outside `app/`; and — because the graph is keyed by **name**
— two same-named functions as one node, which makes every *reachable* answer an
**upper** bound and every *not reachable* answer the strong one.
## 3. The gate, and why it is an `or`
```
def tariff_refresh_wanted(opts: dict) -> bool:
return provider_configured(opts) or arbitrage.enabled(opts)
```
The first term is what this card adds. **The second term is the old gate, kept
verbatim, and it is not there for symmetry.**
`price_provider: off` + a `static_profile` + `arbitrage_enabled: true` is a
configuration `validate.py` explicitly **accepts** (rule 7 refuses only the
no-prices-at-all case), and it **trades**. Measured on this branch:
```
opts: price_provider off, arbitrage_enabled true,
cycle_cost_threshold_eur 0.05,
static_profile 0.20 night / 0.284 day
plan : static_profile from static_profile, 48 h, 48 points
WITH the plan -> ARBITRAGE_CHARGE -5000.0 W
"cheapest firm hour at 0.2000 EUR/kWh, 0.0840 below the
dearest and clear of the 0.0750 this cycle had to cover"
WITHOUT the plan -> None "no tariff plan has been resolved yet"
```
Gating the refresh on the provider **alone** — which is the literal reading of
the ticket's second acceptance criterion — would leave that site's
`tariff_plan` at `None` forever and answer *"no tariff plan has been resolved
yet"* on every cycle. That is a strategy the UI says is running and that cannot
fire: the exact state `validate.py`'s OPT-04 rules exist to refuse, arrived at
from inside the code instead of from the configuration.
So the gate is a **strict widening**: every configuration that started the task
before still starts it, and `test_price.py` grades that as its own row rather
than leaving it to prose.
⚠️ **The AC's stated harm is still fully met, and it is worth being exact about
this rather than quietly declaring victory.** The criterion reads *"with
`price_provider: off`: no fetch task at all, whatever `arbitrage_enabled` says
— an operator with no provider must not acquire a periodic HTTPS call."* The
letter of it is not met in one configuration (provider off, trading armed),
because that configuration keeps the task it already had. The harm it names is:
* with `price_provider` off, `resolve_tariff()` returns `static_plan()` — pure
arithmetic, **no socket**. Driven and counted: **0 requests**.
* the true shipped default — no provider, no trading — starts **no task at
all**.
Nobody *acquires* a periodic HTTPS call from this card, and the only thing that
decides whether a request leaves the machine is `price_provider`. **If the
owner wants the literal reading instead, it is a one-token change** (drop the
`or` term) **and it costs the site in the measurement above its trading.** That
is the trade, stated rather than chosen silently.
## 4. `TariffPlan.cheap_now()` — available, and deliberately NOT consumed
**Decision: do not wire it in this card. `self.cheap` stays on
`static_status()`.**
FCST-04 recorded that `cheap_now()` has no production caller on the provider
plan: `main.read_inputs()` assigns `self.cheap, self.tariff_words =
static_status(o, now)`, which builds its **own** static plan and calls
`cheap_now()` on that. Under Option A a provider-backed plan now exists on every
configured site, so the limitation stops being structural and becomes a choice.
**It is not cosmetic, and that is the whole reason for the decision.**
`self.cheap` is read in `cycle()` by the maintenance cycle's cheap-window grid
top-up — the add-on's one shiftable load, and the one place a *price* reaches
something that **moves energy** on an install that has not armed trading.
⚠️ **And the direction it would move is not "a slightly different window".**
`static_status()` returns `(False, "no static profile")` whenever
`static_profile` is empty, so today a provider-only site — a plausible shape
for a dynamic-tariff install, and the shape this card makes work — has
`self.cheap = False` on **every** cycle and never forces a paid grid top-up at
all. Wiring `cheap_now()` would take that from *never* to *sometimes*. That is
a strictly larger behaviour change than this card's headline, and it belongs to
whoever owns the maintenance cycle rather than to the ticket that made it
reachable.
Three further reasons, in the order they would bite:
1. **Two sources, one attribute, and the loser is silent.** `validate.py`
already refuses `static_profile` alongside the Home Assistant price
entities *because* `read_inputs()` picks one and the other disappears. A
provider plan would be a third writer of the same attribute with no rule
saying which wins.
2. **The freshness question is not answered for this consumer.** The plan
retires after `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` and `fresh_tariff_plan()` returns `None`.
Arbitrage has an answer for that (refuse). The maintenance top-up has none:
"the plan expired" would have to mean *not cheap*, and *not cheap* on this
path means **wait for sun**, which is a real decision nobody has taken.
3. **The comparison basis changes, and so does the answer on a bad feed.**
`cheap_now()` is strictly-below-the-mean-of-the-**firm**-hours, and it is
`False` when THIS hour is provisional or is not in the series at all
(FCST-03's rule: this hour decides, not the whole plan). So a feed that
published nothing, or an hour the §8.3 fill could not cover, reads *not
cheap* where a `static_profile` reads whatever the clock says. Defensible
either way — and it is a change to the shipped maintenance cycle that needs
its own measurement rather than a side effect of this one.
**What adopting it would take**, so the next card does not start from scratch:
* a rule for which source wins when both a provider plan and a
`static_profile` are configured, enforced in `validate.py` the way the
entity/profile conflict already is;
* a decision on what an **expired** or **absent** plan means for the grid
top-up, stated as a default rather than left to `None`;
* `read_inputs()` splitting `self.cheap` from `self.tariff_words`, which are
currently one assignment from one function;
* a check that the maintenance top-up actually fires and does not fire on the
provider plan — driven through `cycle()`, not asserted on the attribute;
* and the *Tariff* status row, which FCST-04 pinned as a **pair** with
`DOCS.md` in `test_price_history.py` §9: it does not report the provider
plan, DOCS does not claim it does, and moving one without the other is
already red.
## 5. The *Arbitrage* status row, re-read and left alone
`main.status_payload()` renders `("Arbitrage", "off (arbitrage_enabled)" if
self.arb is None else self.arb.explain())`. `self.arb` is assigned only inside
`if arbitrage.enabled(self.o):` and `arbitrage.decide()` never returns `None`,
so `self.arb is None` **iff** the option is off. The string still names the
option that is actually off, and under Option A it gains a job it did not have:
on a site with a provider configured it is the row that tells an operator the
prices arriving on the *Price history* row above are moving nothing. Unchanged,
with a note at the call site saying it was checked.
## 6. What this card did not do
* It did not touch `run_tariff_refresh()`'s body (TARIFF-12 is there).
* It did not change `cycle()`'s `if arbitrage.enabled(self.o):`, the sizing,
the thresholds, the SoC bounds or the peak interlock.
* It did not wire the provider plan into the *Tariff* status row or into
`self.cheap` — §4.
* It did not pick a version number (PKG-06).
## 7. Mutation ledger
Every mutation applied to a **fresh `cp -a`** of the clean worktree rather than
reverted (habit 18: there is no revert to verify and no shared scratch path),
`__pycache__` purged, tree mounted `:ro`, run under `python3 -B`.
| id | mutation | Δ bytes | result |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | the shipped defect: gate back to `arbitrage.enabled(opts)` | **-4 B** | **RED**, 7 named checks |
| M2 | drop the `or arbitrage.enabled(opts)` term | -27 B | **RED**, 2 named checks (strict-widening + the static-profile row) |
| M3 | `tariff_refresh_wanted` -> always `True` | +8 B | **RED**, the AC2 reachability row |
| M4 | `provider_configured`: `"off"` counts as configured | -6 B | **RED**, the AC2 reachability row |
| M5 | `cycle()`'s trading gate -> `if True or arbitrage.enabled(self.o)` | +8 B | **RED**, both AC3 rows (`-5000 W` with trading off) |
| M6 | instrument: `_reaches()` always `True` | **+0 B** | **RED**, 4 checks incl. its own calibration row |
| M7 | instrument: `_task_sites()` returns `[]` | **+0 B** | **RED**, 10 checks incl. "it found 0 sites" |
| M8 | fixture: 5 minutes of telegrams instead of a whole quarter | **+0 B** | **RED**, the peak-guard precondition and both armed rows |
| M9 | M1 **plus** the harness's guard-driven start defeated | -4 B | the four DRIVEN rows go **GREEN** — see §2 |
| M10 | `provider_id()` drops `.strip()` | -8 B | **survivor**, then CLOSED — see below |
| M11 | `provider_configured()` -> `return True` | -32 B | **RED**, 4 checks |
| M12 | DOCS.md's sentence reverted to the old, vaguer claim | +0 B (docs) | **RED**, the AC4 pairing row (`fetches = True, DOCS says = False`) |
| M13 | the Dutch translation left behind while English moved | +0 B (docs) | **RED**, the both-languages row |
⚠️ **M10 was a real survivor and is recorded as one.** Dropping `.strip()` left
`test_price.py`, `test_price_history.py`, `test_static_tariff.py` and
`test_validate.py` all green: nothing in the repository fed a `price_provider`
with surrounding whitespace, and the `.strip()` predates this card — it was
carried into `provider_id()` from the three call sites it replaced. The
Supervisor's `list(off|…)` schema cannot produce `" off "`, but
`validate_startup_config()` is also `sim/inject.py`'s entry point and takes any
dict at all. Closed in the same commit by the padded-id pair in section 13;
re-run as **M10b**, red on two named checks.
⚠️ **M8 is the fixture defect this card walked into and then fenced.** The
first draft fed five minutes of telegrams. Whether that **covers** the current
billing quarter depends on where the wall clock sits inside it, so the peak
guard was blind and engaged on some runs and not others — and `decide()` refuses
outright while the guard is holding (§9.1 over §10.1). On those runs the armed
baseline did not trade, and "trading off never trades" would have been graded
on a fixture in which nothing could trade either way. It is now 900 s of
telegrams, and the guard's clear state is a **check** rather than an assumption.
## 8. What is still open
* The literal reading of AC2 (§3). One token, and it costs a measured trading
configuration its plan. **Owner's call.**
* `cheap_now()` (§4). Owner's call, with the adoption list above.
* The *Tariff* status row still shows the static-profile sentence on a
provider-backed site; the provider plan's own line goes to the log. Pinned as
a pair with `DOCS.md` by FCST-04 and untouched here.
@@ -1,252 +0,0 @@
# TARIFF-12 — a returned degradation is not a refresh
Three decisions. The first is what the ticket put up for judgement; the second
and third are what fall out of it and would otherwise be decided by accident.
---
## 0. What was actually wrong, stated once
`run_tariff_refresh()`'s docstring:
> ⚠️ **AND A FAILURE DOES NOT CLEAR THE PLAN.** … Zeroing the plan here would
> replace a coarse tariff with no tariff, which is the opposite of what §11.4
> asks for.
The guarantee was real. The condition it was enforced on was not:
```python
try:
plan = await resolve_tariff(...)
self.tariff_plan, self.tariff_at = plan, now # unconditional
except Exception as err:
_LOG.warning("tariff refresh failed (%s); keeping the plan ...")
```
`load_prices()` says in its own docstring that it **"RETURNS, NEVER RAISES, for
every failure a site can actually have"**, because a degradation arriving as a
traceback into the planning tick would stop the controller regulating over an
expired certificate. So a supplier outage — the case the docstring names first —
is a **return**: the `try` succeeds, `_degrade()` hands back a §11.4 plan, and
the good plan is overwritten. The `except` is reachable only by something
nobody expected, and nothing in the shipped path produces it.
This is the fourth card in one family: FCST-04's M4 (`not ok` only), FCST-05's
HIGH (`(JSONDecodeError, OSError)` only), FCST-06 (`not self.ok` only), and now
`except Exception` only, for a path that never raises. **A guarantee enforced on
the condition someone thought of, rather than the condition that occurs.**
Reproduced before the fix, driving the shipped chain with nothing stubbed but
the socket — 48 h horizon, `static_profile` empty, one good fetch then a
`ClientConnectorError` 1800 s later, `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` = 5400 s:
```
after a good fetch origin='provider' n_points=48 'dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 48 h'
after the failed fetch origin='none' n_points=0 'no tariff - generic_dayahead: ClientConnectorError: ...'
tariff_at moved: True
```
and after it:
```
after the failed fetch origin='provider' n_points=48 'dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 48 h'
tariff_at moved: False
```
---
## 1. The question is asked ONCE, after the attempt, from the evidence that exists
FCST-06's answer, one module over, and for the same reason: **the enumeration
of failure conditions cannot be completed.** There is no pre-check that a feed
will answer which is not itself a guess, and adding one would be a second
symptom test beside the `except`. So the predicate is an **outcome**, read off
the object the attempt produced:
```python
standing = self.fresh_tariff_plan(now)
keep = (not plan.from_feed
and standing is not None and standing.from_feed)
```
Two facts, both of which exist by the time the question is asked:
* **`plan.from_feed`** — did *this* resolution observe the configured provider?
`TariffPlan.origin` already names the four ways a plan is obtained; this
collapses them to the one question a caller holding a previous plan has to
ask. It lives on `TariffPlan` rather than as an `origin == "provider"` at the
call site for `fresh_tariff_plan()`'s own stated reason — *a check has to be
able to assert on the shipped expression rather than on a transcription that
drifts* — and because `origin`'s vocabulary belongs to `static_tariff.py`.
* **`fresh_tariff_plan(now)`** — is a standing observation still current. It
already existed, it is already the one place the age is judged, and it is
**reused, not transcribed**. `test_arbitrage.py` 8b pins that reuse on the
AST; a copy of the comparison behaves identically until the day the two
drift, which is a claim about the code's shape, so a shape check is what
grades it (FCST-06's precedent for the one source check among driven ones).
### What was NOT done
* **Not `except Exception` widened, or a second `if` beside it.** That is the
defect's own shape — a place where the rule is spelt twice, so a fifth cause
needs a fifth branch. The `except` stays, relabelled *"not the outage path"*,
keeps the plan on the same terms, and is now honestly the
something-nobody-expected branch.
* **Not the persisted price store as a cache.** Out of scope by the product
owner's call, and it is the right call: FCST-03 exists precisely to stop
stale prices being acted on, and "recent" is not "current". Keeping the last
**fetched** plan until it ages out is a different promise from serving the
store, and that one needs its own ticket.
* **Not a `no_data`-only guard.** `not plan.has_prices` is the tempting
spelling and it is wrong — see decision 2. It leaves the §11.4 fallback free
to replace a fresh observation, and it is a 1-byte edit from the shipped
line, which is why it is in the mutation table rather than in a comment.
---
## 2. A §11.4 static fallback does NOT replace a fresh provider plan
The ticket asked this directly, because the fallback is *not* nothing: it is
the operator's own configured profile, with real prices, for the requested
window. The answer is still no, and the reason is not that it is worse data —
it is that **nothing may be acted on it, and it is no more current.**
* Every point `_degrade()` builds carries `provisional=True`. So
`firm_points()` is empty, `arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and
refuses, and `cheap_now()` is False. Both of the two things `TariffPlan`
exposes for a consumer to act on are already off.
* A day-ahead price for a given hour **does not change once published**. A plan
fetched 30 minutes ago is exactly as true about 19:00 as one fetched now; at
most `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` of its horizon has elapsed. The observation is not
stale in any sense the fallback is fresher than.
So replacing the observation with the fallback trades a plan with firm hours
for a plan with none, and buys no currency with it. The fallback takes over
when the observation **retires** — which is exactly the row §11.4 describes,
arrived at when there is no longer an observation to prefer.
### And the rule is deliberately NOT symmetrical
`standing.from_feed` is a term in its own right. A standing plan that is itself
a degradation **is** replaced by the next degradation, and its timestamp moves.
Without that term:
* an outage on a static-profile site would freeze the operator's profile at the
window it was first generated for, and the guard would be *"never overwrite"*
wearing a bound's name;
* and on a `price_provider: off` install — the shipped default — the plan would
flip between kept and re-derived every `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`, for no behavioural
gain, changing which reason the status page prints on a two-hour cycle.
Each of the three terms is the only false one in some check in 8b, which is
MUTATION.md habit 17's test for whether a suite can tell an `AND` from an `OR`.
---
## 3. `tariff_at` does not move on a kept plan
The docstring's other half is that a plan must not *"freeze at its last value
and look current forever"*. `tariff_at` is what makes that work: it is the
moment of the fetch that produced the plan standing, and `fresh_tariff_plan()`
judges the age from it.
Re-stamping it on a kept plan would be this task asserting the feed answered
when it did not. The plan would be re-certified as current at every refresh, an
outage of any length would never retire it, and `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` would be
**exactly as dead as it was before this card** — reachable only by the refresh
task itself dying. Leaving it alone is what makes the bound govern: the plan is
served for the age bound after its own fetch, and no longer.
It is also the whole of **"distinguishable from a freshly-fetched one"**. A
kept plan and a fetched plan are the same object shape; what separates them is
that one's timestamp advanced and the other's did not, and every consumer that
asks how old the plan is already reads that number. The kept case additionally
logs at WARNING, naming the degradation's own reason, the fetch it is keeping,
its age, and the deadline it retires at.
⚠️ **What this does not give the operator, and why it is not here.** The status
page has no row for "the last refresh failed" — the banner/level not moving
when the plan is lost is separately carded, and the ticket rules it out of
scope. This card's change makes that surface *more* truthful, not less: during
the first `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` of an outage there is now a real plan behind the
Arbitrage row instead of a no-plan refusal, so the row says something true for
longer. The no-plan state is entered later by up to 5400 s; it is not removed,
and the 30-minute lag reported on that row is untouched by anything here.
---
## 4. Merged after TARIFF-10 — what the wider gate changed, and what it did not
TARIFF-10 landed on `release/1.0` while this card was open. It changed **which
installs run this task** — `if arbitrage.enabled(opts)` became
`tariff_refresh_wanted(opts)`, i.e. `provider_configured(opts) or
arbitrage.enabled(opts)` — while this card changed **what the task does on a
failed fetch**. Git auto-merged the two hunks, which is exactly when the
interaction needs reading rather than trusting.
**Nothing in the decisions above changed.** Two configurations are newly
reachable, and both are now driven in `test_arbitrage.py` 8b rather than
reasoned about:
* **A provider configured with trading DISARMED** — TARIFF-10's headline case.
This is precisely the configuration the guard was designed for: the plans are
`origin == "provider"`, and a dead feed must not delete one that is still
inside `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`. It needs no second fixture, because **nothing on
this path reads `arbitrage_enabled` at all**, and that is asserted rather
than assumed — over the AST's symbols and the non-docstring string constants,
because two earlier drafts of that check were **red against a correct tree**:
the first matched the docstring paragraph that *says* `arbitrage_enabled` is
not read, the second matched the log line's "arbitrage, where it is armed".
A substring test over a function grades its prose as much as its behaviour,
which is habit 4 in a third costume. A fixture that set the option and
asserted no difference would have been the other defect — comparing a thing
against itself.
* **`price_provider: off` + a `static_profile`** — the configuration TARIFF-10's
`or` exists to protect, and the one where a latching guard would do real harm.
`resolve_tariff()` returns `static_plan(provisional=False)`, whose origin is
`"static"`: the CONFIGURED product, not a §11.4 row. So `standing.from_feed`
is false on every refresh, `keep` is false on every refresh, and the plan is
regenerated for the current window every 30 minutes exactly as before this
card. **Driven, twice in a row**, because a guard that latched here would
freeze a static site's plan at its first window for the life of the install —
and mutation M3, which drops the `standing.from_feed` term, is red on that
check as well as on the fallback one.
Two further facts settle the rest of the interaction:
* **This decision is strictly downstream of every side effect.** The §8.3 carry
into `price_history` happens inside `resolve_tariff()`, on the `series`
branch, before `keep` is computed — so which of two plans is kept can neither
add nor lose a recorded day, and TARIFF-10's *Price history* row is
unaffected either way.
* **The kept-plan log line was reworded.** It said "arbitrage stops with it",
which after TARIFF-10 is false on a site that fetches without trading; it now
says "arbitrage, **where it is armed**, stops with it".
All eleven mutations were **re-driven on the merged tree** rather than carried
over — the surrounding code changed, so a red against the old base is not
evidence about the new one. Eleven red, no survivors, every revert
fingerprinted. The added member is M11: making the guard conditional on
`arbitrage.enabled(self.o)` (+86 B), red on five named checks.
⚠️ **And one process note that belongs in this file.** This card's mutation
harness was written to a shared scratchpad path and was **overwritten mid-run
by another agent's harness for a different card**, pointing at a different
worktree. That is MUTATION.md habit 18's second bullet almost verbatim. It was
caught because the harness fingerprints the tree after every revert and the
runs are what proved this worktree was never left mutated; the harness now
lives at a card-specific path. **A harness that edits source must not share a
name, a directory or a backup path with another one.**
---
## What this does not change
* **Nothing on the 30 s tick.** `cycle()` still reads two attributes and awaits
no fetch; the AST pin in `test_arbitrage.py` section 8 is unchanged and green.
* **Nothing about the prices themselves.** No series is invented, extended,
re-stamped or carried. The only question this card answers is *which of two
plans the controller holds*.
* **A `price_provider: off` install is bit-for-bit unaffected.** Its standing
plan is never `origin == "provider"`, so `keep` is false on every refresh it
will ever run, and the assignment happens exactly as it did before.
@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@
# TARIFF-13 — the coverage of a peak, and which quarter gets the credit
Two decisions. §1 is the defect the ticket was raised on; §2 is the smaller
question it asked to be settled deliberately rather than left as an accident.
§3 is what this branch deliberately did **not** do, and why.
---
## 0. What was actually wrong, stated once
`main.py`'s capacity-tariff status row prints a peak read from SQLite and a
coverage figure read from **process memory**:
```python
_pk = self.peak.peak(when) # SQLite, durable
...
+ f"; {self.peak.recorded} quarter(s) banked" # an int on the tracker
```
`PeakTracker.recorded` was `self.recorded = 0` in `__init__`, incremented once
per block inside `sync()`. A 40-hour soak caught what that means at a driven
restart, on both instances independently:
```
before: 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-11T18:45:00+00:00
- 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 120 quarter(s) banked
after : 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-11T18:45:00+00:00
- 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 0 quarter(s) banked
```
Reproduced here before anything was changed, through the real `Controller`, the
real `P1Ingest`, and a **real restart** — a second `Controller` object against
the same file on disk, never a re-read of the first:
```
before: 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-10T09:00:00+00:00
- 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 12 quarter(s) banked
after : 2026-09: peak 365 W, set by the quarter at 2026-09-10T09:00:00+00:00
- 10 % of the 3500 W soft limit; 0 quarter(s) banked
peak survives the restart: True
count survives the restart: False (12 -> 0, store held 12 rows)
```
**TARIFF-01's argument, one column over.** That module's whole design is that
an unreadable store must not read as a zero peak, *because a zero peak is
disarming*. A coverage figure of zero is disarming in exactly the same way and
about the same number: the count is what says how much of the billing month the
watt figure actually covers, and 365 W over 120 quarters and 365 W over 0
quarters are different claims about the same 365 W. After a restart the page
made the weaker claim while displaying the stronger one's value. It did not
under-report the peak — it under-reported **its own evidence**.
Two further defects fell out of the same variable once it was driven, neither
of them in the ticket:
* **it was never scoped to a month.** It counted every block the *process* had
banked, so on 1 October the row read September's tally beside October's "no
completed quarter recorded yet". Measured, on the shipped tree:
`2026-10: no completed quarter recorded yet - 0 % of the 3500 W soft limit;
1 quarter(s) banked`.
* **it missed the block `restore()` banks.** A stale block closed from the
checkpoint goes into `quarter_blocks` without passing through `sync()`, so
the counter never saw it.
---
## 1. Decision: the count is READ FROM THE TIER THE PEAK IS READ FROM
The acceptance criterion allowed either route — make the count durable, or stop
printing a number that silently resets. **Durable**, because the count is the
useful half of the row and removing it would have cost the operator the one
thing that says whether the peak means anything yet.
`PeakStore.banked_count(month)` asks the database `SELECT COUNT(*) FROM
quarter_blocks WHERE month=?`, and `PeakTracker.recorded` is a property over it
rather than an attribute. Three consequences, and all three are the defects
above:
* a restart re-reads the same rows, so the figure survives it;
* the count is per **month**, so it agrees with the peak it is printed beside;
* a block banked by `restore()` is a row like any other and is counted.
Three things this route deliberately does **not** do:
* **it does not count `len(blocks_in(month))`.** `blocks_in()` returns `[]` on a
read error — safe there only because no caller reads its emptiness as a peak,
which its own docstring says — so taking its length would rebuild the
disarming zero one call further out. `banked_count()` returns **`None`** when
the database will not answer.
* **it does not count `monthly_peak`.** That tier holds one row per *month* and
would answer `1` for every month ever measured — wrong by exactly the amount
that makes it look plausible. The two tables are proven equal on the **peak**
by `recompute_month()`; they were never equal on the **count**.
* **it does not remove the dedupe.** `_seen` is still what stops `cycle()`'s
once-a-second `sync()` re-banking a block that `P1Ingest.blocks` keeps for a
day, and `sync()`'s return value is still the number newly banked. What moved
is only where the *status page* reads its figure. ⚠️ The check that graded the
dedupe used to assert `recorded == 1` — the dedupe and the figure reporting it
were the same variable. Counting rows in `quarter_blocks` cannot see a
re-bank at all (it is a PRIMARY KEY no-op), so that check is now graded on
`sync()`'s **return**, with the store's tally as the second half.
### ⚠️ The unreadable case renders a WORD, not a number
`banked_count()` returns `int | None`; `recorded_in()` renders the `None` as
the module constant `COUNT_UNREADABLE = "an unreadable number of"`, so the
sentence reads
```
... ; an unreadable number of quarter(s) banked
```
`0` was never available. `None` was rejected too: `f"{None} quarter(s) banked"`
renders **"None quarter(s) banked"**, which an operator reads as the same zero.
This is the `PeakReading` trade — no `peak_w_or(default)`, ever — applied to the
coverage figure: a caller that formats it gets a true sentence in both states,
and a caller that does arithmetic on it gets a `TypeError`, which is loud.
"0 quarter(s) banked" remains a **true and reachable** sentence: it is what a
month nothing has been written to says, and part 11 asserts that the two states
are spelled differently.
---
## 2. Decision: at EQUAL wattage, the EARLIEST quarter keeps the attribution
**First, not most recent.** The reasoning, in the order it matters:
1. **It is not a money question.** The utility bills the wattage; the timestamp
is not part of the bill. So the decision is settled entirely on what the
status row is *for*.
2. **The row answers "when did my monthly peak happen".** An operator reading it
goes and looks at one event — what was running, what the weather was. A
stable answer is the one that can be investigated; "most recent wins"
guarantees the answer moves every time the wattage recurs, and an operator
who looked yesterday is sent somewhere else today for no reason.
3. **It is what one reader already did unconditionally.** `recompute_month()`
is `ORDER BY offtake_avg_w DESC, quarter_start ASC LIMIT 1` — earliest wins.
Choosing "most recent" would have meant changing both readers; choosing
"earliest" meant making the other one say out loud what it was already doing
by accident.
### ⚠️ And the two readers DID diverge, which is why this is a code change
The `monthly_peak` upsert was `WHERE excluded.peak_w > monthly_peak.peak_w` —
strictly greater, so an exact tie never wrote and the row kept whichever tied
block was **written first**. That coincides with *earliest* only while blocks
arrive in time order. Fed four equal 365 W blocks newest-first, measured on the
shipped tree:
```
ascending arrival monthly_peak -> 09:00:00 recompute_month -> 09:00:00 agree=True
DESCENDING arrival monthly_peak -> 09:45:00 recompute_month -> 09:00:00 agree=False
```
That is a divergence in the derived record that part 8 of `test_tariff.py`
exists to prove cannot happen — latent, because nothing in the shipped path
banks out of order today. The upsert now carries the tie term explicitly:
```sql
WHERE excluded.peak_w > monthly_peak.peak_w
OR (excluded.peak_w = monthly_peak.peak_w
AND excluded.quarter_start < monthly_peak.quarter_start)
```
**`peak_w` is untouched.** The `>` term is exactly as it was, no tie can move
the billed number, and SAFETY-07's guard reads the same watt figure it read
before. The second term moves only the timestamp.
### ⚠️ AND THE SOAK'S DRIFT WAS NOT A TIE AT ALL
The ticket's reading — "ties at the same wattage are re-attributed to the most
recent matching quarter" — is **false**, and driving it is what showed that.
Six exactly-equal 365.0 W quarters on the shipped tree moved the attribution
**zero** times, because `>` is strict.
What the soak saw was a genuine new maximum **smaller than the row's own
resolution**. The row renders `{peak_w:.0f}` — whole watts — so 365.0000001 W is
a new peak to the database and the same `365 W` to the reader:
```
q0 fed 365.0 -> renders 365 W, attributed 09:00:00
q1 fed 365.0000001 -> renders 365 W, attributed 09:15:00
q2 fed 365.0000002 -> renders 365 W, attributed 09:30:00
```
**Decision: left alone, deliberately.** It is the instrument behaving correctly
— the peak really did rise — and the alternative, printing more decimal places,
puts noise in the one row an operator reads at the moment the guard engages, to
explain a movement that is real. Both cases are pinned in part 12 so that
neither can be changed by accident, and the distinction is recorded here so the
next reader does not re-diagnose it as a tie.
---
## 3. What this branch did NOT do, and who owns it
**`main.py`'s status row was not touched.** TARIFF-11 holds `main.py`'s status
rows on a concurrent branch, and the standing instruction is to stop rather than
race there. Everything above is in `app/tariff.py`, and the row picks the fix up
without editing, because `self.peak.recorded` is an attribute access and is now
a property.
**The residual, stated with its scope.** `recorded` answers for
`datetime.now()`. The peak beside it follows `checks(when=...)`. The shipped
install has **exactly one** call site — `self.checks()` with no argument, at
`main.py:4359` — where the two are the same month, so **the live page is correct
and durable**. They part company only under the `when=` affordance TEST-17 added
for the suite, and the mismatch there is strictly smaller than the one it
replaces (this month's tally, rather than a process-wide total across all
months).
`PeakTracker.recorded_in(when)` is the scoped form and is shipped. Moving the
row onto it is:
```python
- + f"; {self.peak.recorded} quarter(s) banked"
+ + f"; {self.peak.recorded_in(when)} quarter(s) banked"
```
one token, on one line, inside the block TARIFF-11 owns. `test_tariff.py`
part 10 **pins the present behaviour** — graded against a row count taken
straight from `quarter_blocks`, not against the property that produces it — so
the gap goes red if it changes and cannot be quietly forgotten.
@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
# TARIFF-14 — how long one price point covers, and what the last one does
One defect and one genuinely open decision. The defect had no defensible
alternative once it was measured; the decision — the **last** point's window —
did, and the alternative is argued below rather than dismissed.
---
## 0. The measurement this card exists for
`_Series.at()` asked `s <= u < s + 1 h` of every point **in list order** and
returned the **first** match. Run against the shipped code at `5059e28` on a
quarter-hourly series:
```
series: 02:00=0.10 02:15=0.11 02:30=0.12 02:45=0.13 03:00=0.14 ...
ask + 0min -> 02:00 0.10
ask +15min -> 02:00 0.10 <-- WRONG (wanted 02:15)
ask +30min -> 02:00 0.10 <-- WRONG
ask +45min -> 02:00 0.10 <-- WRONG
ask +60min -> 02:15 0.11 <-- WRONG (wanted 03:00)
ask +75min -> 02:30 0.12 <-- WRONG (wanted 03:15)
```
**Two failure modes, not one.** Inside the first hour the `:00` point wins
because its hour has not run out. From the second hour on the answer is not
even the top of the hour — the first point still inside its own hour wins — so
**the error compounds with depth into the series**.
Same code, same run, after the fix:
```
ask + 0min -> 02:00 0.10 ask +60min -> 03:00 0.14
ask +15min -> 02:15 0.11 ask +75min -> 03:15 0.15
ask +30min -> 02:30 0.12 ask +90min -> 03:30 0.16
ask +45min -> 02:45 0.13 ask+120min -> 04:00 0.18
```
An hourly series is **unchanged at every instant**, before and after — which is
the whole reason nothing caught this. Every price fixture in this repository
before TARIFF-08 was the invented hourly row shape, `static_tariff.py` emits
hourly points, and the DST checks count points on the 23- and 25-hour days
without ever asking `at()` for a quarter-hour. **The suite had been exercising
the one resolution on which the broken rule and the right one agree.**
Belgium moved to a 15-minute MTU on 2025-10-01 and the live day-ahead feed
returns **96 points at 900 s**, so this is reachable only down the dynamic path
TARIFF-08/09 just made work. Static sites are immune.
## 0.1 What it cost, which is not "a slightly wrong price"
`arbitrage._act()` calls `_point_at(plan, now)` → `series.at(now)` and then
tests `here.start == v.cheapest.start` / `== v.dearest.start` to decide whether
this interval is the buy one or the sell one. That is an **identity test
between the matched point and the point the verdict was built from**, and on a
quarter-hourly series it almost never matched — so the strategy idled through
exactly the interval it exists to trade, reporting *"this hour is neither the
buy hour nor the sell hour"*. It also read `here.provisional` (§8.3) and §17's
`price < 0` off that same wrong point.
---
## 1. The rule
> **A point covers from its own start until the next point's start, and never
> more than one hour.**
* **900 s** → each point covers its own quarter.
* **3600 s** → each point covers its own hour. Identical to what shipped.
* **MIXED** → **each point takes its own gap.** FCST-04's carry-forward emits
hourly carried points beside quarter-hourly firm ones, and the soak measured
spacing `[900, 3600]` in **70 % of samples** — so a window derived from one
global spacing would be wrong in the **normal steady state**, not in an edge
case.
### 1.1 Why the one-hour cap is not decoration
FCST-04 **leaves holes on purpose**: an hour with no published price and no
yesterday value is left *out* of the series, and `price_forecast.py`'s module
note names `at()` raising `Absence` for it as the behaviour that sends the
caller to the static profile (§11.4 for that hour).
Uncapped, "until the next point's start" stretches the point **before** a
three-hour hole across the whole hole and answers every instant in it with a
stale price. Filling holes is the defect this module exists to refuse, and it
would have been introduced **by the fix for a different one**. Graded in
`test_price.py` 14d; the mutation that removes the cap is red there.
---
## 2. The decision: what the **last** point covers
There is no next start, and §9.3 says nothing about how wide the final interval
is — a `PricePoint` has **three fields** and must not learn a fourth, because
that is the wire format every store, replay, fixture and captured body in this
repository is written against. So the tail is a **choice**, and both candidates
are defensible.
**Chosen: the last point is given the same span as the point before it** (one
hour when it is the only point).
| | flat one hour | the span in front of it (**chosen**) |
|---|---|---|
| 96-point 900 s day, `at(23:50)` | answers 23:45 | answers 23:45 |
| the same day, `at(00:30)` **tomorrow** | **answers with today's 23:45 price** | `Absence` |
| 24-point hourly day, `at(23:50)` | answers 23:00 | answers 23:00 |
| mixed series ending at the firm/carried seam | answers for an hour | `Absence` after 15 min |
**The second row is why.** A flat one-hour tail reaches across a day boundary
and prices tomorrow morning with yesterday's last print — which is
"reaching for a neighbouring one", the single thing the `Absence` message has
always refused to do. The chosen rule never extends a point past a span the
series itself demonstrates.
### 2.1 The cost of the choice, stated rather than buried
On a **mixed** series whose last point is a carried **hourly** one sitting
behind quarter-hourly firm ones, the tail is **900 s**, and the last 45 minutes
of the horizon raise `Absence` for an hour something did carry a value for.
That is accepted, not tolerated, and the direction is the safe one:
* the caller falls back to the static profile (§11.4) instead of trading on a
span the series never demonstrated;
* the point is **carried**, so §8.3 forbids any irreversible action resting on
it regardless;
* it is at the far end of a 48 h horizon, where nothing is decided at 30 s.
Under-covering costs a missed decision. Over-covering prices a real interval
with a number that does not describe it. Those are not symmetric.
### 2.2 The degenerate case
A series of **one** point has no gap in front of it to copy and gets **one
hour** — the shipped behaviour, kept deliberately. `test_price.py` 14e states
it as its own check so it cannot decay into an accident.
---
## 3. Does `at()` now depend on sortedness? Yes — and it establishes it itself
The old rule read one point at a time and did not care about order. The new one
reads a point's **neighbours**, so it *would* depend on the series being
ascending.
It does not, because **the lookup index is sorted by UTC start at construction**
(`_cover_table()`, called once from `_Series.__init__`). No caller's list order
can reach `at()`.
That matters because the three things that "guarantee" order today each
guarantee it somewhere else:
| | what it guarantees | where |
|---|---|---|
| `_validate_raw()` | strictly increasing starts | the `load_prices()` path only |
| `price_history._parse_points()` | re-sorts by instant | the store read path only |
| FCST-04's fill | emits ascending | that one producer only |
| `PriceRead.series()` | **nothing** | every other caller, including tests |
Three producers agreeing today is not an invariant; it is a coincidence with
good references. `test_price.py` 14f drives a series handed its 96 points in
**reverse** order and asserts `at()` answers identically at every one of them —
red the moment the sort is removed.
**Duplicated starts** (refused by `_validate_raw()`, constructible by hand) give
the earlier list entry a zero-width window and the later one the real span. One
of the pair becomes unreachable through `at()`; **nothing raises**, at
construction or on the 30 s control path. Stated as a check rather than left to
be discovered.
---
## 4. `covers()` shared it. `window()` did not
* **`covers()`** has no window rule of its own — it calls `at()` — so it shared
the defect exactly and the same change fixes it. It is kept as a delegation
for that reason: a second copy of the rule is a second place for it to be
wrong.
* **`window(since, until)`** grades a point's **start** against a half-open
range and never asks how long a point lasts, so it carries no resolution
assumption at all. It is **not** a coverage query — a point that starts before
`since` and runs into it is absent from its result by design. That is now
said in its docstring and pinned by a check, because the next reader will ask.
It has **no callers** in `app/`.
---
## 5. What this card does NOT fix, with its shape
`price_forecast._walk()` — §8.3's irreversible-action gate — iterates
`committed_hours()`, which steps in **whole hours**, and asks `series.at(u)` at
each. On a quarter-hourly series that now reliably returns the hour's `:00`
point (it previously returned something earlier and arbitrary), so the gate
reads **one point per hour** and never looks at the `:15`/`:30`/`:45` flags.
A partially-provisional hour would therefore be gated on its first quarter
alone. **Two things keep it off every shipped install, and both are
circumstantial rather than structural:** `price_permits()`/`begin_phase()` have
**no caller in `app/main.py`** — the §12 price-justified entry point is built
and not yet wired — and FCST-04 carries **whole** hours while
`generic_dayahead` publishes whole days, so the four quarters of an hour are
firm or carried together anyway. Both are facts about the *callers and
producers*, not properties of the *gate*, so this is written down here rather
than left for the first sub-hourly feed or the first wiring-up to find. Fixing it means teaching
`committed_hours()` about resolution, which is a data-model question this card
deliberately does not open.
---
## 6. Mutations
Eight, each purged before the run (TEST-15), each reverted with the tree
fingerprint checked afterwards (MUTATION.md habit 18), backup at a `mktemp`
path per invocation.
⚠️ **Re-driven in full on the MERGED tree** after TARIFF-10 landed on
`release/1.0` (base `88c59a9` -> `559f0eb`). All eight give the same verdicts
and the same red-check counts as before the merge, which is the answer that
matters: TARIFF-10 added 650 lines of checks to `test_price.py` and none of
them moves under any of these edits, because they grade `resolve_tariff()`'s
*reachability from a configuration* and not the lookup. Clean `app/price.py` on
the merged tree = **`90d8ca31f7c0109d`, 85953 B** (pre-merge it was
`30d1a56f0117e571`, 83742 B; the difference is TARIFF-10's `provider_id()` /
`provider_configured()`, which this card does not touch).
| | mutation | Δ | red in |
|---|---|---|---|
| M1 | `at()` back to the shipped fixed one-hour scan over `self.points` | +68 B | **24 named checks**: `test_price.py` 14b ×4, 14c ×3, 14d, 14e ×3, 14f, 14g; `test_arbitrage.py` 10b ×6, 10c ×3, 10d ×2 |
| M2 | drop the one-hour cap | −68 B | `test_price.py` 14d |
| M3 | flat one-hour tail instead of the span in front | **+0 B** | `test_price.py` 14e ×3, 14g — 4 checks |
| M4 | trust the caller's list order — drop the sort | −61 B | `test_price.py` 14f |
| M5 | `covers()` grows its own hour-wide rule | +95 B | `test_price.py` 14e, 14g |
| M6 | `window()` becomes a coverage query | −37 B | `test_price.py` 14g |
| M7 | the window's end becomes inclusive | +1 B | `test_price.py` 14b ×4, 14c ×4, 14d, 14e ×4, 14f ×2, 14g — 16 checks |
| M8 | the window's start becomes exclusive | −1 B | `test_price.py` 14b ×4, 14c ×4, 14d, 14f ×2, 14g, 14h, plus the pre-existing section 6 check — 14 checks |
**M3 is the zero-byte one and it is the tail decision itself** — the case
MUTATION.md names as the risky size, caught by the check written for it.
**What the arbitrage file does NOT see, with sizes.** M2, M4, M5, M6 and M8
leave `test_arbitrage.py` green, and that is honest rather than a gap to round
off: they are `at()`-level properties (holes, caller order, `covers()`,
`window()`, the start boundary) that no arbitrage fixture reaches, because the
probes are seven minutes into a slot and the plans have no holes. The one that
matters end to end — M1, the shipped rule — is red in **both** files, on the
named check `THE PROPERTY THE DEFECT BROKE`.
---
## 7. TARIFF-10 landed on the base while this was open — what it changes here
Base moved `88c59a9` → `559f0eb` mid-card. The question is not whether the
branches merge; it is whether TARIFF-10 makes any sentence above **false**.
**In `app/price.py` the two do not meet.** TARIFF-10 added `provider_id()` and
`provider_configured()` beside `price_option()` and routed `load_prices()`
through them. That is the option-reading layer; it touches nothing in
`_Series`, `at()`, `covers()`, `window()` or `_cover_table()`. Git merged the
file without a conflict, and the merged `at()` is byte-identical to the one the
mutations above were driven against.
**Behaviourally it widens who has a series at all, and that cuts one way only.**
`run_tariff_refresh()` now runs on installs with `arbitrage_enabled` **off**, so
a provider-configured site has a standing plan — and therefore a `_Series` —
where before it had none. **It does not add a new `at()` consumer to the 30 s
tick**, which is the claim worth checking rather than assuming:
| caller of `at()`/`covers()` | reached by a non-trading install? |
|---|---|
| `arbitrage._point_at()` (`arbitrage.py:300`) | no — trading only |
| `static_tariff.TariffPlan.price_at()` / `.words` `here` (`:750`, `:819`) | on the tick these are reached through `static_status()`, which builds a **`static_plan`** — hourly points, immune. `main.py` calls only `plan.words` on the fetched plan, which counts points and never looks one up |
| `price_forecast._walk()` (`:562`, `:568`) | **`price_permits()` and `begin_phase()` have no caller in `app/main.py` at all** — §12's price-justified entry point is built and not yet wired |
So TARIFF-10 neither creates nor closes any exposure this card is about. What it
does do is make the defect's reach larger the moment such a site arms trading,
because the series it would trade against now exists on every configured
install rather than only on armed ones. That strengthens the case for the fix
and changes nothing in its reasoning.
**In `test_price.py` both cards appended a section 13.** Nothing is dropped:
TARIFF-10's stays **13**, this card's is renumbered **14** (which is also this
card's number), and the temp-directory teardown TARIFF-10 put at the end of the
file stays at the end of the file. The two sections share no fixture, no option
dict and no helper name; TARIFF-10's grades `resolve_tariff()`'s *reachability
from a configuration* and drives real fetches with a counting transport, and
**none of its checks moves under any of the eight mutations above** — measured,
not assumed.
---
## 8. TARIFF-12 landed too — a plan may now be 90 minutes old when it is asked
Base moved `559f0eb` → `a6e64fb` while this was open. TARIFF-12 stops a
returned §11.4 degradation from overwriting a standing plan that is still
inside `TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S`, so **a served plan can now be up to
`3 × TARIFF_REFRESH_S = 5400 s` old** where before it was at most one refresh
interval. `at()` is what answers *"what does it cost right now"* out of that
older plan, so the question is fair and the answer is written out rather than
assumed.
**Per-point span: unaffected, structurally.** Every window is derived from the
neighbouring points' **absolute `start` instants**. Those are `datetime`s inside
a frozen dataclass inside a tuple — they cannot move, and `_cover_table()` runs
once at construction over data that cannot change afterwards. A plan's *age* is
a property of `fetched_at` / `tariff_at`, never of a window. **The index cannot
go stale**, which is a small positive under TARIFF-12 rather than a risk: a kept
plan now lives longer, and there is nothing in it that needed recomputing.
**The one-hour cap: unaffected.** It bites only where a gap exceeds an hour,
i.e. at a hole FCST-04 left. Walking further into a series crosses more windows;
each is still resolved on its own neighbours.
**The tail: reachable for the first time, and the choice made in §2 is the one
that survives it.** This is the half worth spelling out.
* At the **shipped 48 h horizon** the tail is unreachable by staleness. A plan
is served for at most 90 minutes, so `now` is at most 90 minutes into a
~48 h series — the last point is still about 46½ hours away.
* But `price_horizon_h` is `int(1,72)` in `config.yaml`, so an operator **can**
configure a **1 h** horizon. A 90-minute serve-stale window against a 1 h
series puts `now` genuinely past the end. That is not hypothetical; it is a
supported configuration meeting a supported outage.
* Under the **chosen** rule a quarter-hourly 1 h series ends at `:45` and that
point's window closes at the top of the next hour: `at()` raises `Absence`,
`_point_at()` returns None, `_act()` idles with its "no price for this
instant" reason, and §11.4 sends the site to the static profile.
* Under the **rejected** flat one-hour tail the same stale plan would have gone
on trading against the `:45` print for **up to 45 minutes after the interval
it describes had ended** — pricing an outage with a number for a quarter that
is over.
So TARIFF-12 does not weaken the tail decision. It is the first thing that makes
it reachable on a shipped configuration, and it independently selects the same
answer. ⚠️ **Note which direction that runs**: the more stale a plan is allowed
to be, the more the tail rule is doing real work, so it should be re-read if
`TARIFF_MAX_AGE_S` is ever widened again.
**`TariffPlan.from_feed` cannot produce a series this code has not seen.** It is
a pure predicate on `origin` (`== "provider"`), and TARIFF-12's decision keeps or
replaces a **whole plan object**. It never splices two reads into one series, so
it cannot hand `at()` an unsorted or duplicated point list — the case §3 covers
defensively and that nothing shipped produces.
**Re-graded on this base.** All 29 files green. `app/price.py` is byte-identical
to the TARIFF-10 merge (`90d8ca31f7c0109d`, 85953 B) because TARIFF-12 does not
touch it. **M1** re-driven: +68 B, red on the same **24 named checks** across
both files. **M3** re-driven: **+0 B**, red on the same 4. This branch
contributes **zero diff** to `app/main.py` and `app/static_tariff.py`.

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More