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@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@
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python3 test_freeze.py
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Three parts, and the last two are the ones that matter:
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Six parts. Parts 2 and 3 are the acceptance argument; parts 5 and 6 exist
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because TEST-06 found three mutations that survived parts 1-4 green - the
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evaluation POSITION inside cycle(), the NOT COVERED status string, and the
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shipped `meter_freeze_s` itself:
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1. the predicate's boundaries and the edge-trigger, table-driven;
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2. SILENT ON REAL CONVERGED DATA. `scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz` is
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@@ -18,6 +21,14 @@ Three parts, and the last two are the ones that matter:
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repo is next to this one (or `$GOODWE_SIM`), and an equivalent local stub
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otherwise. Both are exercised; the run says which one it used.
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4. THE WIRING: the real `Controller.cycle()`, asserted on the service call
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that leaves the process;
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5. WHERE IN `cycle()` the detector is evaluated - by consequence, not by
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source order. It runs after `write_setpoint()`, and that is what makes two
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compositions safe (see the section for both);
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6. WHAT THE STATUS PAGE SAYS about an uncovered transport, and the shipped
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threshold read back out of `config.yaml`.
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⚠️ Part 3 runs in WALL CLOCK - `unchanged_s` is `time.monotonic()` and the
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transport really polls - so it drives the detector at `hold_s=10`, not the
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shipped 300. The THRESHOLD is config; the MECHANISM is what is under test, and
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@@ -57,6 +68,7 @@ import asyncio
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import gzip
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import json
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import os
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import re
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import time
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@@ -79,6 +91,29 @@ HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
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# The live install's numbers, which are the ones the exposure is written at.
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LIVE_MAX_W = 5000.0
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# THE SHIPPED THRESHOLD, READ FROM config.yaml (TEST-06 / AC3)
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# ⚠️ `meter_freeze_s: 300` used to appear in this file only as the literal 300,
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# retyped six times, so `300 -> 3600` in config.yaml left every check here
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# green. Everything below is now driven off the SHIPPED value, and the value
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# itself is pinned in test_validate.py the way MAINT-04 pins the other defaults.
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#
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# Regex, not PyYAML: the add-on image installs py3-aiohttp/py3-paho-mqtt only,
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# and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check.
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_CFG_TXT = (HERE / "config.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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def _cfg_default(key):
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"""The single ` key: <number>` default line in config.yaml's options block."""
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found = re.findall(rf"^ {key}: (-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _CFG_TXT, re.M)
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return float(found[0]) if len(found) == 1 else None
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SHIPPED_HOLD_S = _cfg_default("meter_freeze_s")
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SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W = _cfg_default("deadband_w")
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SHIPPED_MAX_W = _cfg_default("max_w")
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def check(name, cond):
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print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
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@@ -135,6 +170,35 @@ check("the reason names both terms",
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"unchanged over 300" in wd.reason and "command over 4750" in wd.reason)
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# 1b. the SHIPPED threshold, and the two properties it has to have (AC3)
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# ⚠️ This is the number the whole ticket is an argument about, and it was pinned
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# nowhere: `meter_freeze_s: 300 -> 3600` used to leave this file and
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# test_validate.py both green. test_validate.py pins the literal in MAINT-04's
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# manner; here it is pinned by its CONSEQUENCES, so a schema-legal value that
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# gives up the argument goes red even though it is a legal value.
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print("the shipped meter_freeze_s (AC3)")
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check(f"config.yaml's numeric defaults were read (freeze {SHIPPED_HOLD_S}, "
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f"deadband {SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W}, max_w {SHIPPED_MAX_W})",
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None not in (SHIPPED_HOLD_S, SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W, SHIPPED_MAX_W))
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check("the code default and the shipped default are the same number - "
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"FreezeWatchdogConfig() is a default, config.yaml is the ship",
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FreezeWatchdogConfig().hold_s == SHIPPED_HOLD_S)
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check("this file's `tuning()` really is config.yaml's deadband, so the "
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"mutual-exclusion arithmetic below is about the shipped law",
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tuning().deadband_w == SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W)
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# The upper bound is money: config.yaml's own comment says 300 s is "still
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# inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff". A hold that outlives
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# the quarter notifies after the peak is already billed.
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QUARTER_S = 900.0
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check(f"the alarm still lands inside the {QUARTER_S:.0f} s billing quarter "
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f"({SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s hold)", SHIPPED_HOLD_S < QUARTER_S)
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# The lower bound is the conjunction itself - see the derivation below, which
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# now runs off the shipped numbers rather than off two retyped literals.
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# 2. silent on 40 minutes of real converged behaviour
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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@@ -183,10 +247,10 @@ def replay(hold_s, max_w, cycle_floor_s=15.0):
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for mw in (2000.0, LIVE_MAX_W):
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wd_r, peak_cmd, peak_unchanged, fired = replay(300.0, mw)
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wd_r, peak_cmd, peak_unchanged, fired = replay(SHIPPED_HOLD_S, mw)
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print(f" max_w {mw:.0f}: worst |command| {peak_cmd:.0f} W (rail "
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f"{rail_w(mw):.0f} W), worst unchanged {peak_unchanged:.1f} s "
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f"(hold 300 s), episodes {wd_r.episodes}")
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f"(hold {SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s), episodes {wd_r.episodes}")
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check(f"max_w {mw:.0f}: never alarms on the converged capture", fired is None)
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check(f"max_w {mw:.0f}: and the rail term had margin to spare",
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peak_cmd < rail_w(mw))
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@@ -194,7 +258,7 @@ for mw in (2000.0, LIVE_MAX_W):
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# The margin on the OTHER term, as numbers rather than as trust. Both figures
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# are quoted in config.yaml and freeze.py, so they are re-measured every run and
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# a capture swapped underneath them cannot leave the prose saying the old thing.
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_, _, worst_unchanged, _ = replay(300.0, LIVE_MAX_W)
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_, _, worst_unchanged, _ = replay(SHIPPED_HOLD_S, LIVE_MAX_W)
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gaps, last, prev = [], rows[0]["t"], None
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for r in rows:
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if prev is None or r["pwr"] != prev:
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@@ -208,7 +272,8 @@ check("worst observed unchanged_s is the 8 s the docs quote",
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7.5 < worst_unchanged < 8.5)
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check("longest distinct-reading interval is the 15.4 s the docs quote",
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15.0 < max(gaps) < 16.0)
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check("300 s is at least 15x the worst of the two", 300.0 >= 15 * max(gaps))
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check(f"the shipped {SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s is at least 15x the worst of the two",
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SHIPPED_HOLD_S >= 15 * max(gaps))
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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# 2b. TEL-05's case, reconstructed, because the capture cannot contain it
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@@ -226,22 +291,26 @@ check("300 s is at least 15x the worst of the two", 300.0 >= 15 * max(gaps))
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# -14.2 W) rather than invented: one hour of a perfectly healthy converged meter
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# that happens not to move.
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print("TEL-05's low-power case - a converged meter that legitimately repeats")
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tel05 = FreezeWatchdog(FreezeWatchdogConfig(hold_s=300))
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tel05 = FreezeWatchdog(FreezeWatchdogConfig(hold_s=SHIPPED_HOLD_S))
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t5 = tuning(LIVE_MAX_W)
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tgt, iw, sc = 0.0, 0.0, 0
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bare_would_fire = False
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tel05_cmd = 0.0
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for k in range(3600):
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# Long enough that the REJECTED bare threshold has to get its chance even if
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# someone raises meter_freeze_s - the mutation must be caught by the pins above,
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# not by this case going red for an incidental reason.
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TEL05_S = max(3600, int(SHIPPED_HOLD_S) + 300)
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for k in range(TEL05_S):
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if k % 15 == 0: # cycle_floor_s, the only trigger left
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d = compute(prev_w=tgt, grid_w=-14.2, actual_w=tgt, tuning=t5,
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sat_count=sc, i_w=iw)
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tgt, iw, sc = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
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tel05_cmd = max(tel05_cmd, abs(tgt))
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# The REJECTED design, written out so the case can be shown to be real.
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bare_would_fire = bare_would_fire or float(k) >= 300
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bare_would_fire = bare_would_fire or float(k) >= SHIPPED_HOLD_S
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tel05.evaluate(float(k), tgt, LIVE_MAX_W, T0 + timedelta(seconds=k))
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print(f" an hour at -14.2 W: worst |command| {tel05_cmd:.0f} W, "
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f"unchanged_s reaches 3599 s, episodes {tel05.episodes}")
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print(f" {TEL05_S / 60:.0f} min at -14.2 W: worst |command| {tel05_cmd:.0f} W, "
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f"unchanged_s reaches {TEL05_S - 1} s, episodes {tel05.episodes}")
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check("the bare unchanged_s threshold TEL-05 rejected WOULD fire here",
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bare_would_fire)
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check("the conjunction does not - this is what the rail term buys",
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@@ -255,8 +324,11 @@ check("...and the command stayed nowhere near the rail",
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# figure is inside the deadband, so the command there is parked at 0 W. If
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# someone lowers meter_freeze_s or narrows the deadband, this is the check that
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# should stop them.
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DEADBAND_W = 15.0
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slowest_healthy_w = 3600.0 / 300.0
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DEADBAND_W = SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W # config.yaml's, not a retyped 15
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slowest_healthy_w = 3600.0 / SHIPPED_HOLD_S
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print(f" at the shipped {SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s hold, the slowest healthy "
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f"meter that still looks unchanged is {slowest_healthy_w:.1f} W, against "
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f"a {DEADBAND_W:.0f} W deadband")
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check("a healthy meter slow enough to look unchanged is inside the deadband",
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slowest_healthy_w < DEADBAND_W)
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_park = compute(prev_w=0.0, grid_w=-slowest_healthy_w, actual_w=0.0,
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@@ -277,11 +349,19 @@ check("...and the same replay DOES alarm once both terms are made reachable",
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# 3. a genuinely frozen meter, over real HTTP, through the real transport
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
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def find_hwsim():
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"""The rig's own fake meter, if the infra repo is reachable."""
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"""The rig's own fake meter, if the infra repo is reachable.
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⚠️ `HERE.parents[1]` only exists when this package sits at least two levels
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below the filesystem root - it raised IndexError and took the WHOLE suite
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down on a checkout at `C:/goodwe_controller`, which is a failure of the
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lookup, not of the thing being tested. Guarded, so a shallow checkout falls
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through to the stub like any other missing sibling repo.
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"""
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cands = []
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if os.environ.get("GOODWE_SIM"):
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cands.append(Path(os.environ["GOODWE_SIM"]) / "hwsim.py")
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cands.append(HERE.parents[1] / "goodwe" / "sim" / "hwsim.py")
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if len(HERE.parents) > 1:
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cands.append(HERE.parents[1] / "goodwe" / "sim" / "hwsim.py")
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for c in cands:
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if c.exists():
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return c
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@@ -379,7 +459,15 @@ def with_server(argv, port, fn):
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hw = find_hwsim()
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print(f"frozen meter over HTTP - using {'the rig hwsim at ' + str(hw) if hw else 'the local stub'}")
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# ⚠️ WHICH TRANSPORT BACKED PART 3 IS PART OF THE RESULT, and it is repeated in
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# the summary at the end of the run. The two are not equivalent: pointed at the
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# real `sim/hwsim.py` the rig path failed 1 run in 3 (a 16 s window against a
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# 10 s hold, when hwsim.serve() is slow to start), while the stub is tuned never
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# to fail. A green log that does not say which one ran is a green log that can
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# have quietly substituted the weaker stand-in - the same shape as an assertion
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# that cannot fail, from the other end.
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PART3_TRANSPORT = f"the rig hwsim at {hw}" if hw else "the local stub"
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print(f"frozen meter over HTTP - using {PART3_TRANSPORT}")
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if hw:
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def argv_for(mode):
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return [HWSIM_DRIVER, "8791" if mode == "freeze" else "8792", mode,
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@@ -454,11 +542,17 @@ class _Hass:
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# runaway under test never happens - which would have made this a check
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# that passes for the wrong reason.
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self.batt = 0.0
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# ⚠️ The dead-poll-task case (AC1's second half): every input reads
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# None, exactly as it does when the transport task has died while the
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# controller keeps cycling.
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self.dead = False
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async def limits(self, entity):
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return (-5000.0, 5000.0, 1.0)
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async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
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if self.dead:
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return None
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return {"sensor.grid": self.grid, "sensor.soc": 50.0,
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"sensor.batt": self.batt}.get(entity)
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@@ -479,44 +573,113 @@ class _Source:
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self.unchanged_s = unchanged_s
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# ⚠️ meter_freeze_s is deliberately NOT in here. A controller built with the key
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# absent must land on the shipped number by itself, and that is asserted below -
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# supplying it here would test this dict instead of the shipped default.
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STALE_INPUT_S = 15.0
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def _opts(**over):
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o = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
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"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
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"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
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"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W,
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"target_grid_w": -10, "step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10,
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"stale_input_s": STALE_INPUT_S}
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o.update(over)
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return o
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# ⚠️ TWO SURFACES, AND EVERY ASSERTION BELOW SAYS WHICH ONE IT IS ABOUT.
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# The first cut of this helper selected by SERVICE, which measured "any guard's
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# notification" while every assertion built on it was named for THIS guard's.
|
|
|
|
|
# That was true only because `check_meter_frozen()` was the sole
|
|
|
|
|
# `persistent_notification.create` in `app/`; SAFETY-03 (#12) adds a second one
|
|
|
|
|
# (`goodwe_output_clamp`) raised by scenarios that rail the command on purpose,
|
|
|
|
|
# and eight assertions here went red against it - AC1's core check included.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Blanket id-keying is NOT the repair. Three of those eight are claims about the
|
|
|
|
|
# WHOLE notification surface, and narrowing them to this guard's id would have
|
|
|
|
|
# silently shrunk a claim rather than fixed a conflation - which is the defect
|
|
|
|
|
# class this card exists to close. So both surfaces are available by name, and
|
|
|
|
|
# each assertion picks one deliberately.
|
|
|
|
|
FREEZE_NOTE_ID = "goodwe_meter_frozen"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def all_notes_of(hass):
|
|
|
|
|
"""EVERY HA persistent notification raised this run, whoever raised it."""
|
|
|
|
|
return [d for dom, svc, d in hass.calls
|
|
|
|
|
if (dom, svc) == ("persistent_notification", "create")]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _is_freeze_note(d):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Is this notification the freeze detector's?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
⚠️ THE ID **OR** THE TITLE, and the `or` is measured rather than tidy.
|
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|
|
|
Keyed on the id alone, renaming the id empties every list in this file and
|
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|
|
|
SIX assertions collapse together - so the one check whose subject IS the id
|
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|
|
|
could no longer fail on its own, in the file about assertions that cannot
|
|
|
|
|
fail. Recognising the guard by what it says as well leaves the rename
|
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|
|
|
exactly one red: the id's own check. Measured both ways:
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
selector vs #12's app/ id renamed
|
|
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|
|
by service (the first cut) 8 red 1 red
|
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|
|
by id alone 3 red 6 red
|
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|
|
by id or title (this) 3 red 1 red
|
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|
|
|
|
|
The union cannot re-admit another guard's alarm unless that guard also
|
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|
|
calls itself frozen, which would be a confusable alarm on its own account.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
return (d.get("notification_id") == FREEZE_NOTE_ID
|
|
|
|
|
or "frozen" in str(d.get("title", "")).lower())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
def notes_of(hass):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Only THIS guard's - see _is_freeze_note()."""
|
|
|
|
|
return [d for d in all_notes_of(hass) if _is_freeze_note(d)]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def notes_by_text_of(hass):
|
|
|
|
|
"""This guard's, recognised by what it SAYS and never by its id.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exists for the two assertions whose subject IS the id: selected by the id,
|
|
|
|
|
both would be true by construction.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
return [d for d in all_notes_of(hass)
|
|
|
|
|
if "frozen" in str(d.get("title", "")).lower()]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
def wired(unchanged_s, grid, cycles=60, **over):
|
|
|
|
|
"""Returns (hass, controller, trace).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
`trace` is one row per cycle - (command after the cycle, the watchdog's
|
|
|
|
|
level, notifications raised so far) - which is what AC1 needs: the
|
|
|
|
|
QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE ALARM HAPPENS BUT ON WHICH CYCLE.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
async def go():
|
|
|
|
|
hass = _Hass(grid)
|
|
|
|
|
c = Controller(dict(
|
|
|
|
|
{"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
|
|
|
|
|
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
|
|
|
|
|
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
|
|
|
|
|
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": -10,
|
|
|
|
|
"step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15},
|
|
|
|
|
**over), hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
|
|
|
|
|
c = Controller(_opts(**over), hass, _Store(), _Pub(),
|
|
|
|
|
stop=asyncio.Event())
|
|
|
|
|
c.auto = True
|
|
|
|
|
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
|
|
|
|
|
c.p1_source = _Source(unchanged_s)
|
|
|
|
|
trace = []
|
|
|
|
|
for _ in range(cycles):
|
|
|
|
|
await c.read_inputs()
|
|
|
|
|
await c.cycle()
|
|
|
|
|
return hass, c
|
|
|
|
|
trace.append((c.target, c.freeze_wd.active, len(notes_of(hass))))
|
|
|
|
|
return hass, c, trace
|
|
|
|
|
return asyncio.run(go())
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hass_f, ctl_f = wired(3600.0, 4000.0)
|
|
|
|
|
# ⚠️ FILTERED BY notification_id, NOT BY SERVICE, since SAFETY-03. This add-on
|
|
|
|
|
# now raises MORE THAN ONE kind of persistent notification, and the scenarios
|
|
|
|
|
# below drive a command to the rail on purpose - which is a winding loop, which
|
|
|
|
|
# legitimately raises the output-clamp alarm too. A bare `svc == "create"` test
|
|
|
|
|
# therefore counts a DIFFERENT guard's alarm as this one's, which is exactly the
|
|
|
|
|
# conflation SAFETY-03's second acceptance criterion exists to forbid. Keying on
|
|
|
|
|
# the id is what makes "this detector said nothing" mean it.
|
|
|
|
|
FROZEN_ID = "goodwe_meter_frozen"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def frozen_notes(hass):
|
|
|
|
|
return [d for dom, svc, d in hass.calls
|
|
|
|
|
if (dom, svc) == ("persistent_notification", "create")
|
|
|
|
|
and d.get("notification_id") == FROZEN_ID]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
notes = frozen_notes(hass_f)
|
|
|
|
|
# ⚠️ SAFETY-03 (#12) arrived at the same diagnosis independently and added a
|
|
|
|
|
# `frozen_notes()` keyed on the id. `notes_of()` above subsumes it - same id,
|
|
|
|
|
# plus the title fallback that keeps the id's own check independently
|
|
|
|
|
# falsifiable, plus `all_notes_of()` for the claims that are about the whole
|
|
|
|
|
# surface rather than about this guard.
|
|
|
|
|
hass_f, ctl_f, trace_f = wired(3600.0, 4000.0)
|
|
|
|
|
notes = notes_of(hass_f) # THIS guard's
|
|
|
|
|
all_notes = all_notes_of(hass_f) # the whole surface
|
|
|
|
|
# The status row lives behind `p1_enabled`, which is what a homewizard_local
|
|
|
|
|
# install has. Flipped here rather than plumbing a whole P1 transport in - the
|
|
|
|
|
# row's own content is what is under test.
|
|
|
|
@@ -524,9 +687,28 @@ ctl_f.p1_enabled = True
|
|
|
|
|
rows = [c for c in ctl_f.checks() if "METER MAY BE FROZEN" in c["text"]]
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" frozen at +4000 W: command ran to {ctl_f.target:.0f} W, "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{len(notes)} notification(s), {len(rows)} red status row(s)")
|
|
|
|
|
check("the shipped cycle() raises exactly one HA notification", len(notes) == 1)
|
|
|
|
|
# SURFACE-WIDE, deliberately, and the second guard has now landed. SAFETY-03
|
|
|
|
|
# ships `goodwe_output_clamp`, and this scenario - a runaway loop winding into
|
|
|
|
|
# the rail - raises it legitimately: the loop asks for more than the rating and
|
|
|
|
|
# is clamped. So the answer to "is this scenario still meant to raise exactly
|
|
|
|
|
# one alarm" is NO, it raises exactly two, and BOTH ARE NAMED here rather than
|
|
|
|
|
# the claim being narrowed until it went green again. A third guard has to come
|
|
|
|
|
# back to this line, which is the whole point of keeping one assertion in the
|
|
|
|
|
# file that accounts for the controller's entire alarm output.
|
|
|
|
|
_ids = sorted(d.get("notification_id") for d in all_notes)
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" the whole notification surface this run: {_ids}")
|
|
|
|
|
check("the whole notification surface carried exactly two alarms this run - "
|
|
|
|
|
"SAFETY-18's and SAFETY-03's, both named",
|
|
|
|
|
_ids == ["goodwe_meter_frozen", "goodwe_output_clamp"])
|
|
|
|
|
# THIS GUARD'S, keyed on the id.
|
|
|
|
|
check("...and the freeze detector is the one that raised it", len(notes) == 1)
|
|
|
|
|
# ⚠️ Selected by TEXT, not by id - see notes_by_text_of(). One of the two
|
|
|
|
|
# assertions whose subject IS the id (the other is the stability check in part
|
|
|
|
|
# 5), so it must not be selected by the thing it is checking, and it has to be
|
|
|
|
|
# able to fail while everything else stays green.
|
|
|
|
|
check("...with a fixed notification_id so repeats replace, not stack",
|
|
|
|
|
notes and notes[0].get("notification_id") == "goodwe_meter_frozen")
|
|
|
|
|
[d.get("notification_id") for d in notes_by_text_of(hass_f)]
|
|
|
|
|
== [FREEZE_NOTE_ID])
|
|
|
|
|
check("...and it says the controller is still running",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(notes) and "STILL RUNNING" in notes[0]["message"])
|
|
|
|
|
check("the status page carries a failed row saying so",
|
|
|
|
@@ -537,17 +719,293 @@ check("the event log names it", any("METER FROZEN" in e for e in ctl_f.events))
|
|
|
|
|
check("and it does NOT command 0 W - this cut is an alarm only",
|
|
|
|
|
abs(ctl_f.target) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hass_n, ctl_n = wired(3600.0, -14.2)
|
|
|
|
|
check("wired up, TEL-05's converged case still raises nothing",
|
|
|
|
|
not frozen_notes(hass_n))
|
|
|
|
|
hass_m, ctl_m = wired(2.0, 8000.0)
|
|
|
|
|
check("wired up, a real railed load against a moving meter raises nothing",
|
|
|
|
|
not frozen_notes(hass_m)
|
|
|
|
|
and abs(ctl_m.target) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W))
|
|
|
|
|
check("an uncovered transport (no unchanged_s) raises nothing, and says so",
|
|
|
|
|
not frozen_notes(wired(None, 4000.0)[0]))
|
|
|
|
|
# ⚠️ THE THREE SCENARIOS THAT SAFETY-03 FORCED A DECISION ON, decided one at a
|
|
|
|
|
# time and not reflexively narrowed to green. Measured on the merged tree:
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# scenario surface ids freeze
|
|
|
|
|
# frozen meter, railed command (above) 2 frozen + clamp 1
|
|
|
|
|
# TEL-05 converged, -14.2 W 0 - 0
|
|
|
|
|
# moving meter, a real 8 kW load 1 clamp 0
|
|
|
|
|
# uncovered transport, no unchanged_s 1 clamp 0
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# CONVERGED stays SURFACE-WIDE. At the operating point this controller exists to
|
|
|
|
|
# hold, the correct behaviour is that the whole add-on has nothing to say - not
|
|
|
|
|
# merely that the freeze guard has nothing to say. Nothing about SAFETY-03
|
|
|
|
|
# weakens that claim, and it still holds, so narrowing it would give away a real
|
|
|
|
|
# property for nothing.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# The other two NARROW to notes_of(), and the reason is the same in both: the
|
|
|
|
|
# clamp alarm there is CORRECT and is SAFETY-03's subject, not this file's. A
|
|
|
|
|
# genuine 8 kW load really does drive the loop past the rating; an uncovered
|
|
|
|
|
# transport really does not stop it doing so. Asserting silence across the whole
|
|
|
|
|
# surface would make this file fail whenever a different guard correctly does
|
|
|
|
|
# its job - a claim about somebody else's behaviour wearing this file's name.
|
|
|
|
|
# What each still owns is the load-bearing half: THE FREEZE DETECTOR SAID
|
|
|
|
|
# NOTHING. The surface is printed rather than asserted, so a reader can still
|
|
|
|
|
# see what else fired without this file grading it.
|
|
|
|
|
hass_n, ctl_n, _ = wired(3600.0, -14.2)
|
|
|
|
|
check("wired up, TEL-05's converged case leaves the WHOLE SURFACE silent - at "
|
|
|
|
|
"the operating point the add-on should have nothing at all to say",
|
|
|
|
|
not all_notes_of(hass_n))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hass_m, ctl_m, _ = wired(2.0, 8000.0)
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" real 8 kW load, moving meter: surface "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{sorted(d.get('notification_id') for d in all_notes_of(hass_m))}, "
|
|
|
|
|
f"freeze {len(notes_of(hass_m))}")
|
|
|
|
|
check("wired up, a real railed load against a moving meter raises nothing FROM "
|
|
|
|
|
"THIS GUARD (the clamp alarm there is SAFETY-03's and is correct)",
|
|
|
|
|
not notes_of(hass_m) and abs(ctl_m.target) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hass_u = wired(None, 4000.0)[0]
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" uncovered transport: surface "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{sorted(d.get('notification_id') for d in all_notes_of(hass_u))}, "
|
|
|
|
|
f"freeze {len(notes_of(hass_u))}")
|
|
|
|
|
check("an uncovered transport (no unchanged_s) raises nothing FROM THIS GUARD, "
|
|
|
|
|
"which is the honest report of a detector that cannot see",
|
|
|
|
|
not notes_of(hass_u))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
|
|
|
|
# 5. WHERE in cycle() the detector is evaluated (TEST-06 / AC1)
|
|
|
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
|
|
|
|
# ⚠️ WHERE THE BOUNDARY ACTUALLY IS - AND IT IS NOT write_setpoint().
|
|
|
|
|
# The first version of this comment said the detector runs "after
|
|
|
|
|
# write_setpoint()" and grades "the command that has just gone on the wire".
|
|
|
|
|
# TEST-06's reviewer disproved both halves by mutation:
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# N3 move check_meter_frozen() to immediately BEFORE write_setpoint()
|
|
|
|
|
# -> green, and CORRECTLY green
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# because `self.target = resolution.target_w` is assigned two lines above the
|
|
|
|
|
# write, `write_setpoint()` clamps only a local `value`, and it can skip the
|
|
|
|
|
# write entirely (`if not (changed or force): return`). So what the detector
|
|
|
|
|
# grades is `self.target` - the arbiter's resolved intent, PRE device clamp and
|
|
|
|
|
# possibly never emitted - and the invariant these checks pin is:
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# check_meter_frozen() runs AFTER `self.target = resolution.target_w`
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# That distinction is not pedantry. A check more robust than its own
|
|
|
|
|
# explanation is how the next person moves the call ABOVE the assignment
|
|
|
|
|
# believing they had preserved the stated rule.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Both properties below are asserted by an OBSERVABLE CONSEQUENCE rather than by
|
|
|
|
|
# source order, so semantic-preserving refactors stay green (measured by the
|
|
|
|
|
# reviewer: renaming the method, and calling it from a helper that itself runs
|
|
|
|
|
# last, both survive - the suite drives `await c.cycle()` and never names the
|
|
|
|
|
# method):
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# (a) BOTH TERMS MUST DESCRIBE THE SAME MOMENT. The command it grades has to
|
|
|
|
|
# be the one THIS cycle resolved, judged against how long the meter that
|
|
|
|
|
# chose it has stood still. Evaluated above the assignment it grades the
|
|
|
|
|
# PREVIOUS cycle's command against THIS cycle's meter - a pairing that was
|
|
|
|
|
# never true of any moment - and the alarm arrives a whole cycle late.
|
|
|
|
|
# (b) THE DEAD-POLL-TASK COMPOSITION. When the poll task dies the inputs go
|
|
|
|
|
# stale, the arbiter resolves 0 W, and the detector - evaluated after that
|
|
|
|
|
# resolution lands in self.target - correctly sees an unrailed command and
|
|
|
|
|
# CLEARS. Evaluated above the assignment it would still be looking at the
|
|
|
|
|
# railed command from before the failsafe, and would keep the alarm
|
|
|
|
|
# standing over a controller that is already commanding 0 W.
|
|
|
|
|
print("WHERE the detector is evaluated in cycle() - the ordering AC1 protects")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_railed = [i for i, (t, _, _) in enumerate(trace_f)
|
|
|
|
|
if abs(t) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W)]
|
|
|
|
|
_alarmed = [i for i, (_, _, n) in enumerate(trace_f) if n >= 1]
|
|
|
|
|
_first_railed = _railed[0] if _railed else None
|
|
|
|
|
_first_alarm = _alarmed[0] if _alarmed else None
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" ramp to the rail: first railed command on cycle {_first_railed}, "
|
|
|
|
|
f"first notification on cycle {_first_alarm}, over {len(trace_f)} cycles")
|
|
|
|
|
# Without this the equality below could be satisfied on cycle 0, where "the same
|
|
|
|
|
# cycle" and "one cycle later" are indistinguishable.
|
|
|
|
|
check("the command takes several cycles to reach the rail, so 'same cycle' and "
|
|
|
|
|
"'one cycle later' are different observations",
|
|
|
|
|
_first_railed is not None and _first_railed >= 1
|
|
|
|
|
and len(trace_f) > _first_railed + 1)
|
|
|
|
|
check("the alarm lands on the SAME cycle the command reaches the rail - "
|
|
|
|
|
"evaluated after `self.target = resolution.target_w` it grades the "
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"command THIS cycle resolved; evaluated above that assignment it grades "
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"the previous one and arrives a cycle late",
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_first_alarm is not None and _first_alarm == _first_railed)
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def dead_poll(after_cycles=20, dead_cycles=4, revived_cycles=20):
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"""Alarm on a railed command, then kill the poll task and keep cycling.
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The real thing: the transport task dies, every input reads None, and after
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`stale_input_s` the arbiter's P_SAFETY stop resolves 0 W. `inputs_bad_since`
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is backdated rather than slept through - the clock is wall clock, and the
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mechanism rather than the wait is what is under test.
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"""
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async def go():
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hass = _Hass(4000.0)
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c = Controller(_opts(), hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
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c.auto = True
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c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
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c.p1_source = _Source(3600.0)
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for _ in range(after_cycles):
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await c.read_inputs()
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await c.cycle()
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before = (c.target, c.freeze_wd.active, len(notes_of(hass)))
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hass.dead = True
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trace = []
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for _ in range(dead_cycles):
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await c.read_inputs()
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if c.inputs_bad_since is not None:
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c.inputs_bad_since = (datetime.now(timezone.utc)
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- timedelta(seconds=STALE_INPUT_S + 1))
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await c.cycle()
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trace.append((c.target, c.freeze_wd.active, len(notes_of(hass))))
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# ...and then the transport comes back, against a meter that is still
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# frozen. The loop re-rails and this is a NEW episode - the alarm is
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# allowed, indeed required, to speak again.
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hass.dead = False
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revived = []
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for _ in range(revived_cycles):
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|
|
await c.read_inputs()
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|
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await c.cycle()
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revived.append((c.target, c.freeze_wd.active, len(notes_of(hass))))
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# ⚠️ by TEXT: "the second episode REPLACED the first" is a claim about
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|
# the id, so the list it is checked against must not be selected by the
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|
# id - that would make it true by construction.
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return before, trace, revived, notes_by_text_of(hass), c
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|
|
return asyncio.run(go())
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_before, _dead, _revived, _freeze_notes, _ctl_d = dead_poll()
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|
_zeroed = [i for i, (t, _, _) in enumerate(_dead) if t == 0.0]
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|
|
print(f" poll task killed: alarming at {_before[0]:+.0f} W "
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|
f"(active={_before[1]}, {_before[2]} notification(s)) -> "
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|
+ ", ".join(f"cycle {i}: {t:+.0f} W active={a} notes={n}"
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|
for i, (t, a, n) in enumerate(_dead)))
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|
check("the episode really was standing before the poll task died - otherwise "
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|
"the release below is vacuous",
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|
_before[1] and _before[2] == 1 and abs(_before[0]) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W))
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|
|
check("a dead poll task drives the command to 0 W",
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|
|
bool(_zeroed) and _zeroed[0] == 0)
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|
|
check("...and on THAT SAME cycle the alarm is already clear, because the "
|
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|
|
|
"detector ran after 0 W was resolved into self.target, not before it",
|
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|
|
bool(_zeroed) and not _dead[_zeroed[0]][1])
|
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|
|
check("...and it stays clear for as long as the failsafe holds it there",
|
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|
_dead and not any(a for _, a, _ in _dead))
|
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|
|
# ⚠️ "and it raises nothing new while parked" is NOT asserted here, and the
|
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|
|
# reason matters more than the deletion. It was dropped as REDUNDANT, not as
|
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|
|
|
# undecidable: TEST-06's reviewer falsified it in one line - move the
|
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|
|
|
# `hass.call` above `if not fired: return` so the detector notifies every cycle,
|
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|
|
# and notifications appear in exactly these parked cycles (that mutation takes
|
|
|
|
|
# this file RED 9). My first note here claimed no mutation could break it, which
|
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|
|
|
# was the very inference this file exists to distrust, made about this file.
|
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|
|
|
# The deletion stands because the exact count below catches that same mutation
|
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|
|
|
# nine times over - no coverage was lost - and the honest form of the claim is
|
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|
|
|
# "I tried to break it and here is what happened", never "I could not, so it
|
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|
|
|
# cannot".
|
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|
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|
|
|
|
|
# ⚠️ AND THE OTHER HALF, or "no second notification" is a claim no mutation can
|
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|
|
|
# break: when the transport comes back against a meter that is STILL frozen the
|
|
|
|
|
# loop re-rails, and that is a new episode which MUST speak. What must not
|
|
|
|
|
# happen is a second notification stacking up beside the first.
|
|
|
|
|
_re_railed = [i for i, (t, _, _) in enumerate(_revived)
|
|
|
|
|
if abs(t) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W)]
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" transport revived: command re-rails on cycle "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{_re_railed[0] if _re_railed else None}, "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{_ctl_d.freeze_wd.episodes} episode(s), {len(_freeze_notes)} "
|
|
|
|
|
f"notification(s) from this guard, "
|
|
|
|
|
f"ids {sorted({n.get('notification_id') for n in _freeze_notes})}")
|
|
|
|
|
# A PRECONDITION, not a discriminating check - the same role as "the command
|
|
|
|
|
# takes several cycles to reach the rail" above, and labelled the same way:
|
|
|
|
|
# without it the two checks below are satisfied by a controller that never came
|
|
|
|
|
# back. The crudest falsifier (never file the loop claim) takes most of this
|
|
|
|
|
# file red, which is the signature of a precondition rather than a check; the
|
|
|
|
|
# narrowest one measured is a stale-input stop that never releases.
|
|
|
|
|
check("PRECONDITION: a revived transport against a still-frozen meter re-rails "
|
|
|
|
|
"the command",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_re_railed))
|
|
|
|
|
check("...which is a SECOND episode, and it alarms again on the cycle it rails",
|
|
|
|
|
_ctl_d.freeze_wd.episodes == 2
|
|
|
|
|
and bool(_re_railed) and _revived[_re_railed[0]][2] == _before[2] + 1)
|
|
|
|
|
# ⚠️ STABILITY, not the value - the value is pinned once, above. Renaming the
|
|
|
|
|
# id must fail that check and NOT this one; the two say different things and
|
|
|
|
|
# each has to be able to go red on its own.
|
|
|
|
|
check("...on the same notification_id, so the second REPLACES the first "
|
|
|
|
|
"instead of stacking a second one beside it",
|
|
|
|
|
len(_freeze_notes) == 2
|
|
|
|
|
and len({n.get("notification_id") for n in _freeze_notes}) == 1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
|
|
|
|
# 6. what the status page SAYS about coverage (TEST-06 / AC2)
|
|
|
|
|
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
|
|
|
|
|
# ⚠️ The check above only ever asserted that an uncovered transport is SILENT,
|
|
|
|
|
# which a status page claiming `armed` on a guard that cannot run also satisfies.
|
|
|
|
|
# The AC was that the detector reports uncovered transports *and says so*, so
|
|
|
|
|
# the string is what gets asserted here, in both directions: the uncovered row
|
|
|
|
|
# must not claim `armed`, and the covered row must still claim it - or "does not
|
|
|
|
|
# say armed" would be satisfiable by deleting the armed branch outright.
|
|
|
|
|
print("what the status page SAYS about coverage")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def freeze_rows(unchanged_s, grid, **over):
|
|
|
|
|
"""The freeze-detector rows of the real checks(), on a p1 install.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT COVER. The rows live behind `if self.p1_enabled:`, and
|
|
|
|
|
the flag is set here by hand rather than by building a real P1 transport -
|
|
|
|
|
inherited from part 4's fixture. So everything below proves "WHEN the row is
|
|
|
|
|
produced it says the right thing", and nothing below proves "the row is
|
|
|
|
|
produced on homewizard_local and not otherwise". That gate is uncovered;
|
|
|
|
|
AC2 is about the string, and widening the fixture belongs to whoever covers
|
|
|
|
|
the gate.
|
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
|
_h, ctl, _t = wired(unchanged_s, grid, cycles=3, **over)
|
|
|
|
|
# p1_enabled is what a homewizard_local install has; the row's own content
|
|
|
|
|
# is what is under test, not the transport that feeds it.
|
|
|
|
|
ctl.p1_enabled = True
|
|
|
|
|
return ctl, [r for r in ctl.checks()
|
|
|
|
|
if r["text"].startswith("freeze detector")]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_ctl_u, _rows_u = freeze_rows(None, 4000.0, meter_source="ha_dsmr")
|
|
|
|
|
_ctl_c, _rows_c = freeze_rows(2.0, -14.2)
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" uncovered: {_rows_u[0]['text'] if _rows_u else '(no row at all)'}")
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" covered: {_rows_c[0]['text'] if _rows_c else '(no row at all)'}")
|
|
|
|
|
check("an uncovered transport gets exactly one freeze-detector row",
|
|
|
|
|
len(_rows_u) == 1)
|
|
|
|
|
check("...and it says NOT COVERED",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_rows_u) and "NOT COVERED" in _rows_u[0]["text"])
|
|
|
|
|
check("...and it does NOT claim the guard is armed - that would be the status "
|
|
|
|
|
"page lying on behalf of a guard that cannot run",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_rows_u) and "armed" not in _rows_u[0]["text"])
|
|
|
|
|
check("...and it names the meter_source it is not covering, so the operator "
|
|
|
|
|
"knows which install this is",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_rows_u) and "ha_dsmr" in _rows_u[0]["text"])
|
|
|
|
|
check("...and it names homewizard_local as the transport that would be covered",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_rows_u) and "homewizard_local" in _rows_u[0]["text"])
|
|
|
|
|
check("...flagged as a warning rather than a silent ok",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_rows_u) and not _rows_u[0]["ok"] and _rows_u[0]["warn"])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
check("a COVERED transport gets exactly one freeze-detector row",
|
|
|
|
|
len(_rows_c) == 1)
|
|
|
|
|
check("...and that one DOES say armed - without this, 'the uncovered row does "
|
|
|
|
|
"not say armed' is satisfied by deleting the armed branch",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_rows_c) and "armed" in _rows_c[0]["text"]
|
|
|
|
|
and "NOT COVERED" not in _rows_c[0]["text"])
|
|
|
|
|
check("...and it quotes the hold and the rail it is armed at, derived from the "
|
|
|
|
|
"config the controller was actually built with",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_rows_c)
|
|
|
|
|
and f"{_ctl_c.freeze_wd.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s unchanged" in _rows_c[0]["text"]
|
|
|
|
|
and f"{rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W):.0f} W" in _rows_c[0]["text"])
|
|
|
|
|
check("...as an ok row, since a covered armed guard is not a warning",
|
|
|
|
|
bool(_rows_c) and _rows_c[0]["ok"] and not _rows_c[0]["warn"])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# AC3's other half, through the built object rather than through a literal: the
|
|
|
|
|
# opts dict does NOT carry meter_freeze_s, so this is the number an install that
|
|
|
|
|
# leaves the key at its config.yaml default actually lands on.
|
|
|
|
|
print(f" a Controller built with meter_freeze_s ABSENT holds "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{_ctl_c.freeze_wd.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s (config.yaml ships "
|
|
|
|
|
f"{SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s)")
|
|
|
|
|
check("a Controller built with the key absent lands on the SHIPPED hold, so "
|
|
|
|
|
"config.yaml and main.py's fallback cannot drift apart unnoticed",
|
|
|
|
|
_ctl_c.freeze_wd.cfg.hold_s == SHIPPED_HOLD_S)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
print()
|
|
|
|
|
print(f"part 3 (the live HTTP transport) ran against: {PART3_TRANSPORT}")
|
|
|
|
|
if fails:
|
|
|
|
|
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
|
|
|
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
|
|
|