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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 4b521b2df0 ci: trigger a run on the rebased head
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m33s
No content change. The gate never created a run for 0942228d - the newest
run stayed on d31a12b7, the pre-rebase head - so `checks / unit` had
nothing to report and sat pending. Why no run was created is CI-02 and
belongs to CI-01's owner; this commit only asks for one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 18:11:21 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0942228d65 Merge release/1.0 (SAFETY-03) into TEST-06
checks / unit (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Two conflicts, both predicted, both mine as the later merger.

app/main.py - #12 inserted `await self.check_output_clamp()` on the line
immediately above `await self.check_meter_frozen()`, so its hunk abuts my
comment correction. Resolved so EACH CALL CARRIES ITS OWN BOUNDARY,
because the two guards do not share one:

  - check_output_clamp() reads `self.clamp_last`, which is None until
    write_setpoint() has run, so its boundary IS the write;
  - check_meter_frozen() grades `self.target`, assigned further up, so
    its boundary is the assignment.

Letting my correction generalise across both would have been worse than
the vague comment it replaces, because it would read as deliberate. The
AST of app/main.py is identical to merged release/1.0 (+1251 bytes, all
comment).

test_freeze.py - #12 independently added `frozen_notes()` keyed on the
same id. `notes_of()` subsumes it: same id, plus the title fallback that
keeps the id's own check independently falsifiable, plus `all_notes_of()`
for claims about the whole surface.

THE THREE SURFACE-WIDE ASSERTIONS, DECIDED ONE AT A TIME. Measured on the
merged tree:

  scenario                              surface  ids             freeze
  frozen meter, railed command             2     frozen + clamp     1
  TEL-05 converged, -14.2 W                0     -                  0
  moving meter, a real 8 kW load           1     clamp              0
  uncovered transport, no unchanged_s      1     clamp              0

  - the wiring scenario STAYS SURFACE-WIDE and now asserts exactly TWO
    alarms with BOTH IDS NAMED. The answer to "is this still meant to
    raise one alarm" is no, it raises two, and a third guard has to come
    back to this line. That is the one assertion in the file that
    accounts for the controller's entire alarm output;
  - the CONVERGED case stays surface-wide and stays silent: at the
    operating point the whole add-on should have nothing to say, that is
    still true, and narrowing it would give away a real property;
  - the other two NARROW to notes_of(). The clamp alarm there is correct
    and is SAFETY-03's subject: a real 8 kW load does drive the loop past
    the rating, and an uncovered transport does not stop it. Asserting
    whole-surface silence would make this file fail whenever another
    guard correctly does its job. Each still owns the load-bearing half -
    THE FREEZE DETECTOR SAID NOTHING - and the surface is PRINTED so a
    reader sees what else fired without this file grading it.

Re-verified on the merged tree: M1 RED 4, M2 RED 5, M3 RED 3 + RED 2,
N6 RED 1, N3 green (correctly), N8 RED 4, R1 RED 2, R2 RED 1. All nine
suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:45:09 +02:00
admin 6aabb832fc SAFETY-03: alarm when a computed setpoint exceeds the rating, do not just clip it (#12)
The clamp already existed; the alarm did not, and specs 10.3 records a silently clipped integrator that reached 14,768 W while every dashboard read a legal 5000 W. OUTPUT_CLAMP now alarms on every engagement, with its own reason code, notification_id, status row and counter, distinct from ordinary saturation. Clamp lives in write_setpoint(), the one path every write takes; the alarm runs after it, out of the write path. Not a trip: the clamped value is written and the loop keeps running.

Reviewed over two rounds. Round one held the PR on three findings: clamp_to_rating() returned early from the max_w stage so the device bound was never applied when the first stage engaged (the bigger the overshoot, the less the guard did), and two checks that could not fail - range(CLEAR_CYCLES - 1) issued zero clean cycles at CLEAR_CYCLES=1, and REASSERT_S + 9 passed for any value including an hour of silence. All three fixed in 4e66583 and verified independently: both clamp stages now run on symmetric, asymmetric and wider-device ratings with no escapes; the 492-point sweep was shown to bite where the witness values cannot (a positive-side-only device bound gives 181 escapes with both witnesses passing, and a single-grid-point hole gives 1); and the rewritten checks pin the requirement rather than the constant - CLEAR_CYCLES red at 1 and at 51, REASSERT_S red at <=5 and at >=300.

Author's six mutations all reproduced red, including the cross-suite one where removing the event-log coalescing turns test_freeze red - this guard's log had been evicting SAFETY-18's METER FROZEN? row. Headline claim reproduced: keying the alarm on Decision.reason instead of the i_clamped/clamped booleans takes the 10.3 replay from 2 engagements to 0. AC2 verified with an independent saturation-without-clamping scenario: sat_count 10 at 21.6% of the rating, zero clamp engagements.

Two reviewer mutations survive, both recorded and neither blocking: describe() dropping the bound name (the bound field itself is pinned), and abs() on limit_w (unreachable under the int(100,5000) schema).

First merge in this repository to pass through CI-01's gate rather than around it: 46383c5 merged release/1.0 in so the required context could run at all, and checks / unit (pull_request) reports success in 2m32s.

Note for TEST-06 (#14), which rebases behind this: it conflicts in BOTH app/main.py and test_freeze.py, and its 8 red assertions are its own service-keyed notification counting - keying those four call sites on notification_id turns the whole suite green against this app/ with no change here.
2026-08-30 17:22:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d31a12b7c6 TEST-06: the id-selection note said 'the only assertion'; there are two
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m32s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:10:42 +02:00
glenn schrooyen 2983d7c3b0 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/release/1.0' into TEST-06
checks / unit (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
2026-08-30 17:05:35 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 611d3dbcdf TEST-06 review follow-ups: two notification surfaces, the real ordering boundary, the schema bounds
1. notes_of() could not tell this guard's alarm from anybody else's. It
   selected by SERVICE, so against #12's app/ (which adds
   goodwe_output_clamp) eight assertions went red, AC1's core check among
   them. Blanket id-keying is not the repair and was measured, not
   guessed:

       selector                    vs #12's app/   id renamed
       by service (as committed)     8 red           1 red
       by id alone                   3 red           6 red
       by id or title (shipped)      3 red           1 red

   all_notes_of() is the whole surface; notes_of() is this guard's,
   recognised by the id it should carry OR the title it writes - the `or`
   is what keeps the one assertion whose subject IS the id able to fail on
   its own. The three surface-wide claims stay surface-wide, each with a
   comment naming which surface it is about and why the next guard's
   author must decide rather than narrow them. They are the three that go
   red against #12, which is the correct signal.

2. The ordering comment named the wrong boundary. N3 - moving the call to
   immediately before write_setpoint() - is green and correctly so:
   self.target is assigned two lines earlier, write_setpoint() clamps only
   a local and can skip the write entirely. So the invariant is "after
   `self.target = resolution.target_w`", and the detector grades pre-clamp
   INTENT, not the wire. Corrected in test_freeze.py and in main.py's own
   note above the call (comment-only; I merge second and own the
   conflict). N8 - moving the call above the assignment - is RED 4.

3. The schema range's own bounds are now pinned. int(60,3600) ->
   int(1,86400) survived green: an operator could set meter_freeze_s:
   86400 and the guard is dead with nothing red. Both bounds are
   re-derived rather than restated.

4. find_hwsim() crashed the whole suite on a checkout one level below the
   root (HERE.parents[1] -> IndexError, reproduced at C:/goodwe_controller).
   Guarded. And part 3 now names its transport in the summary: the rig
   hwsim and the stub are not equivalent - the rig path failed 1 run in 3
   - so a green log has to say which one backed it.

Also: the "revived transport re-rails" check is labelled a PRECONDITION
like its sibling; freeze_rows() records that flipping p1_enabled exercises
the row's content and never its gate; and the note about the deleted
assertion is corrected - it was REDUNDANT, not undecidable. The reviewer
falsified it in one line (move the hass.call above `if not fired: return`,
RED 9). "I could not construct a falsifier, therefore it cannot fail" was
exactly the inference this file exists to distrust.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:05:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c34b5a2922 TEST-06: close the three gaps that survived SAFETY-18's suite green
None of the three is a bug in the shipped code. They are gaps in what the
suite could detect, and the next person to touch freeze.py had less
protection than the passing count implied.

1. WHERE check_meter_frozen() runs in cycle(). Moving it to the top left
   the whole file green. Pinned by CONSEQUENCE, not by source order, so a
   refactor that keeps the semantics stays green:
     - the alarm must land on the SAME cycle the command reaches the rail
       (at the top it grades the previous command against this cycle's
       meter and arrives a cycle late);
     - the dead-poll-task composition: poll task dies, stale_input_s is
       crossed, the arbiter commands 0 W, and on THAT cycle the alarm is
       already clear - because the detector ran after the 0 W write.
   wired() now returns a per-cycle trace, which is what makes "on which
   cycle" an observation rather than a hope.

2. The NOT COVERED status row. The old check only asserted that an
   uncovered transport is SILENT, which a page claiming `armed` on a guard
   that cannot run also satisfies. The string is now asserted in both
   directions: the uncovered row must say NOT COVERED, name the
   meter_source and homewizard_local, and warn; the covered row must still
   say armed, or "does not say armed" would be satisfied by deleting the
   armed branch.

3. meter_freeze_s. Pinned in test_validate.py by MAINT-04's regex
   technique (no PyYAML in the image), and in test_freeze.py by its
   consequences: the shipped value drives the replays, must stay inside
   the 900 s billing quarter, and 3600/hold_s must stay inside the shipped
   deadband. A Controller built with the key ABSENT must land on the same
   number, which pins main.py's fallback without touching CFG-03.

All three demonstrated red before being accepted green, and every new
check was mutated to confirm it can fail; one candidate assertion ("no new
notification while parked at 0 W") was DELETED because no mutation could
break it, and replaced by the exact notification count across a revived
transport, which can.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 15:50:08 +02:00
3 changed files with 620 additions and 58 deletions
+25 -6
View File
@@ -472,13 +472,32 @@ class Controller:
self.reason = resolution.explain()
await self.write_setpoint(self.target)
# --- SAFETY-18, and it runs LAST on purpose --------------------------
# Both terms of the conjunction describe the state that now exists: the
# command that has just gone on the wire, and how long the meter that
# chose it has been standing still. Evaluated before write_setpoint()
# it would be reasoning about the PREVIOUS command against THIS cycle's
# meter - the one combination that is true of neither moment.
# --- SAFETY-03, and its boundary is the WRITE ------------------------
# ⚠️ NOT THE SAME BOUNDARY AS SAFETY-18's BELOW, THOUGH THE CALLS ABUT.
# This one reads `self.clamp_last`, which is None until write_setpoint()
# has actually run, so it has to follow the write. The one below grades
# `self.target`, which is assigned further up - see check_output_clamp()
# and check_meter_frozen() for each. Two guards, two orderings, adjacent
# lines: do not "tidy" them into one rule.
await self.check_output_clamp()
# --- SAFETY-18, and its boundary is the ASSIGNMENT --------------------
# ⚠️ THE BOUNDARY IS `self.target = resolution.target_w` ABOVE, NOT
# write_setpoint(). This comment used to say "the command that has just
# gone on the wire", which is wrong twice over and was corrected by
# TEST-06's reviewer: `check_meter_frozen()` grades `self.target` - the
# arbiter's resolved intent - and `write_setpoint()` clamps only a local
# `value` and can skip the write entirely, so that number may never have
# gone anywhere.
#
# What both terms of the conjunction must describe is the SAME moment:
# the command this cycle resolved, against how long the meter that chose
# it has been standing still. Evaluated before
# `self.target = resolution.target_w` it would grade the PREVIOUS
# cycle's command against THIS cycle's meter - the one combination that
# was true of neither moment. Moving it between the assignment and
# write_setpoint() is therefore harmless; moving it above the assignment
# is not, and test_freeze.py part 5 fails on exactly that.
await self.check_meter_frozen()
async def check_output_clamp(self) -> None:
+510 -52
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@
python3 test_freeze.py
Three parts, and the last two are the ones that matter:
Six parts. Parts 2 and 3 are the acceptance argument; parts 5 and 6 exist
because TEST-06 found three mutations that survived parts 1-4 green - the
evaluation POSITION inside cycle(), the NOT COVERED status string, and the
shipped `meter_freeze_s` itself:
1. the predicate's boundaries and the edge-trigger, table-driven;
2. SILENT ON REAL CONVERGED DATA. `scenarios/p1-age-2026-08-26.jsonl.gz` is
@@ -18,6 +21,14 @@ Three parts, and the last two are the ones that matter:
repo is next to this one (or `$GOODWE_SIM`), and an equivalent local stub
otherwise. Both are exercised; the run says which one it used.
4. THE WIRING: the real `Controller.cycle()`, asserted on the service call
that leaves the process;
5. WHERE IN `cycle()` the detector is evaluated - by consequence, not by
source order. It runs after `write_setpoint()`, and that is what makes two
compositions safe (see the section for both);
6. WHAT THE STATUS PAGE SAYS about an uncovered transport, and the shipped
threshold read back out of `config.yaml`.
⚠️ Part 3 runs in WALL CLOCK - `unchanged_s` is `time.monotonic()` and the
transport really polls - so it drives the detector at `hold_s=10`, not the
shipped 300. The THRESHOLD is config; the MECHANISM is what is under test, and
@@ -57,6 +68,7 @@ import asyncio
import gzip
import json
import os
import re
import subprocess
import sys
import time
@@ -79,6 +91,29 @@ HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
# The live install's numbers, which are the ones the exposure is written at.
LIVE_MAX_W = 5000.0
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# THE SHIPPED THRESHOLD, READ FROM config.yaml (TEST-06 / AC3)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ `meter_freeze_s: 300` used to appear in this file only as the literal 300,
# retyped six times, so `300 -> 3600` in config.yaml left every check here
# green. Everything below is now driven off the SHIPPED value, and the value
# itself is pinned in test_validate.py the way MAINT-04 pins the other defaults.
#
# Regex, not PyYAML: the add-on image installs py3-aiohttp/py3-paho-mqtt only,
# and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check.
_CFG_TXT = (HERE / "config.yaml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def _cfg_default(key):
"""The single ` key: <number>` default line in config.yaml's options block."""
found = re.findall(rf"^ {key}: (-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _CFG_TXT, re.M)
return float(found[0]) if len(found) == 1 else None
SHIPPED_HOLD_S = _cfg_default("meter_freeze_s")
SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W = _cfg_default("deadband_w")
SHIPPED_MAX_W = _cfg_default("max_w")
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
@@ -135,6 +170,35 @@ check("the reason names both terms",
"unchanged over 300" in wd.reason and "command over 4750" in wd.reason)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 1b. the SHIPPED threshold, and the two properties it has to have (AC3)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ This is the number the whole ticket is an argument about, and it was pinned
# nowhere: `meter_freeze_s: 300 -> 3600` used to leave this file and
# test_validate.py both green. test_validate.py pins the literal in MAINT-04's
# manner; here it is pinned by its CONSEQUENCES, so a schema-legal value that
# gives up the argument goes red even though it is a legal value.
print("the shipped meter_freeze_s (AC3)")
check(f"config.yaml's numeric defaults were read (freeze {SHIPPED_HOLD_S}, "
f"deadband {SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W}, max_w {SHIPPED_MAX_W})",
None not in (SHIPPED_HOLD_S, SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W, SHIPPED_MAX_W))
check("the code default and the shipped default are the same number - "
"FreezeWatchdogConfig() is a default, config.yaml is the ship",
FreezeWatchdogConfig().hold_s == SHIPPED_HOLD_S)
check("this file's `tuning()` really is config.yaml's deadband, so the "
"mutual-exclusion arithmetic below is about the shipped law",
tuning().deadband_w == SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W)
# The upper bound is money: config.yaml's own comment says 300 s is "still
# inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff". A hold that outlives
# the quarter notifies after the peak is already billed.
QUARTER_S = 900.0
check(f"the alarm still lands inside the {QUARTER_S:.0f} s billing quarter "
f"({SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s hold)", SHIPPED_HOLD_S < QUARTER_S)
# The lower bound is the conjunction itself - see the derivation below, which
# now runs off the shipped numbers rather than off two retyped literals.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 2. silent on 40 minutes of real converged behaviour
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
@@ -183,10 +247,10 @@ def replay(hold_s, max_w, cycle_floor_s=15.0):
for mw in (2000.0, LIVE_MAX_W):
wd_r, peak_cmd, peak_unchanged, fired = replay(300.0, mw)
wd_r, peak_cmd, peak_unchanged, fired = replay(SHIPPED_HOLD_S, mw)
print(f" max_w {mw:.0f}: worst |command| {peak_cmd:.0f} W (rail "
f"{rail_w(mw):.0f} W), worst unchanged {peak_unchanged:.1f} s "
f"(hold 300 s), episodes {wd_r.episodes}")
f"(hold {SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s), episodes {wd_r.episodes}")
check(f"max_w {mw:.0f}: never alarms on the converged capture", fired is None)
check(f"max_w {mw:.0f}: and the rail term had margin to spare",
peak_cmd < rail_w(mw))
@@ -194,7 +258,7 @@ for mw in (2000.0, LIVE_MAX_W):
# The margin on the OTHER term, as numbers rather than as trust. Both figures
# are quoted in config.yaml and freeze.py, so they are re-measured every run and
# a capture swapped underneath them cannot leave the prose saying the old thing.
_, _, worst_unchanged, _ = replay(300.0, LIVE_MAX_W)
_, _, worst_unchanged, _ = replay(SHIPPED_HOLD_S, LIVE_MAX_W)
gaps, last, prev = [], rows[0]["t"], None
for r in rows:
if prev is None or r["pwr"] != prev:
@@ -208,7 +272,8 @@ check("worst observed unchanged_s is the 8 s the docs quote",
7.5 < worst_unchanged < 8.5)
check("longest distinct-reading interval is the 15.4 s the docs quote",
15.0 < max(gaps) < 16.0)
check("300 s is at least 15x the worst of the two", 300.0 >= 15 * max(gaps))
check(f"the shipped {SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s is at least 15x the worst of the two",
SHIPPED_HOLD_S >= 15 * max(gaps))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 2b. TEL-05's case, reconstructed, because the capture cannot contain it
@@ -226,22 +291,26 @@ check("300 s is at least 15x the worst of the two", 300.0 >= 15 * max(gaps))
# -14.2 W) rather than invented: one hour of a perfectly healthy converged meter
# that happens not to move.
print("TEL-05's low-power case - a converged meter that legitimately repeats")
tel05 = FreezeWatchdog(FreezeWatchdogConfig(hold_s=300))
tel05 = FreezeWatchdog(FreezeWatchdogConfig(hold_s=SHIPPED_HOLD_S))
t5 = tuning(LIVE_MAX_W)
tgt, iw, sc = 0.0, 0.0, 0
bare_would_fire = False
tel05_cmd = 0.0
for k in range(3600):
# Long enough that the REJECTED bare threshold has to get its chance even if
# someone raises meter_freeze_s - the mutation must be caught by the pins above,
# not by this case going red for an incidental reason.
TEL05_S = max(3600, int(SHIPPED_HOLD_S) + 300)
for k in range(TEL05_S):
if k % 15 == 0: # cycle_floor_s, the only trigger left
d = compute(prev_w=tgt, grid_w=-14.2, actual_w=tgt, tuning=t5,
sat_count=sc, i_w=iw)
tgt, iw, sc = d.target_w, d.i_w, d.sat_count
tel05_cmd = max(tel05_cmd, abs(tgt))
# The REJECTED design, written out so the case can be shown to be real.
bare_would_fire = bare_would_fire or float(k) >= 300
bare_would_fire = bare_would_fire or float(k) >= SHIPPED_HOLD_S
tel05.evaluate(float(k), tgt, LIVE_MAX_W, T0 + timedelta(seconds=k))
print(f" an hour at -14.2 W: worst |command| {tel05_cmd:.0f} W, "
f"unchanged_s reaches 3599 s, episodes {tel05.episodes}")
print(f" {TEL05_S / 60:.0f} min at -14.2 W: worst |command| {tel05_cmd:.0f} W, "
f"unchanged_s reaches {TEL05_S - 1} s, episodes {tel05.episodes}")
check("the bare unchanged_s threshold TEL-05 rejected WOULD fire here",
bare_would_fire)
check("the conjunction does not - this is what the rail term buys",
@@ -255,8 +324,11 @@ check("...and the command stayed nowhere near the rail",
# figure is inside the deadband, so the command there is parked at 0 W. If
# someone lowers meter_freeze_s or narrows the deadband, this is the check that
# should stop them.
DEADBAND_W = 15.0
slowest_healthy_w = 3600.0 / 300.0
DEADBAND_W = SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W # config.yaml's, not a retyped 15
slowest_healthy_w = 3600.0 / SHIPPED_HOLD_S
print(f" at the shipped {SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s hold, the slowest healthy "
f"meter that still looks unchanged is {slowest_healthy_w:.1f} W, against "
f"a {DEADBAND_W:.0f} W deadband")
check("a healthy meter slow enough to look unchanged is inside the deadband",
slowest_healthy_w < DEADBAND_W)
_park = compute(prev_w=0.0, grid_w=-slowest_healthy_w, actual_w=0.0,
@@ -277,11 +349,19 @@ check("...and the same replay DOES alarm once both terms are made reachable",
# 3. a genuinely frozen meter, over real HTTP, through the real transport
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def find_hwsim():
"""The rig's own fake meter, if the infra repo is reachable."""
"""The rig's own fake meter, if the infra repo is reachable.
⚠️ `HERE.parents[1]` only exists when this package sits at least two levels
below the filesystem root - it raised IndexError and took the WHOLE suite
down on a checkout at `C:/goodwe_controller`, which is a failure of the
lookup, not of the thing being tested. Guarded, so a shallow checkout falls
through to the stub like any other missing sibling repo.
"""
cands = []
if os.environ.get("GOODWE_SIM"):
cands.append(Path(os.environ["GOODWE_SIM"]) / "hwsim.py")
cands.append(HERE.parents[1] / "goodwe" / "sim" / "hwsim.py")
if len(HERE.parents) > 1:
cands.append(HERE.parents[1] / "goodwe" / "sim" / "hwsim.py")
for c in cands:
if c.exists():
return c
@@ -379,7 +459,15 @@ def with_server(argv, port, fn):
hw = find_hwsim()
print(f"frozen meter over HTTP - using {'the rig hwsim at ' + str(hw) if hw else 'the local stub'}")
# ⚠️ WHICH TRANSPORT BACKED PART 3 IS PART OF THE RESULT, and it is repeated in
# the summary at the end of the run. The two are not equivalent: pointed at the
# real `sim/hwsim.py` the rig path failed 1 run in 3 (a 16 s window against a
# 10 s hold, when hwsim.serve() is slow to start), while the stub is tuned never
# to fail. A green log that does not say which one ran is a green log that can
# have quietly substituted the weaker stand-in - the same shape as an assertion
# that cannot fail, from the other end.
PART3_TRANSPORT = f"the rig hwsim at {hw}" if hw else "the local stub"
print(f"frozen meter over HTTP - using {PART3_TRANSPORT}")
if hw:
def argv_for(mode):
return [HWSIM_DRIVER, "8791" if mode == "freeze" else "8792", mode,
@@ -454,11 +542,17 @@ class _Hass:
# runaway under test never happens - which would have made this a check
# that passes for the wrong reason.
self.batt = 0.0
# ⚠️ The dead-poll-task case (AC1's second half): every input reads
# None, exactly as it does when the transport task has died while the
# controller keeps cycling.
self.dead = False
async def limits(self, entity):
return (-5000.0, 5000.0, 1.0)
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
if self.dead:
return None
return {"sensor.grid": self.grid, "sensor.soc": 50.0,
"sensor.batt": self.batt}.get(entity)
@@ -479,44 +573,113 @@ class _Source:
self.unchanged_s = unchanged_s
# ⚠️ meter_freeze_s is deliberately NOT in here. A controller built with the key
# absent must land on the shipped number by itself, and that is asserted below -
# supplying it here would test this dict instead of the shipped default.
STALE_INPUT_S = 15.0
def _opts(**over):
o = {"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": SHIPPED_DEADBAND_W,
"target_grid_w": -10, "step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10,
"stale_input_s": STALE_INPUT_S}
o.update(over)
return o
# ⚠️ TWO SURFACES, AND EVERY ASSERTION BELOW SAYS WHICH ONE IT IS ABOUT.
# The first cut of this helper selected by SERVICE, which measured "any guard's
# notification" while every assertion built on it was named for THIS guard's.
# That was true only because `check_meter_frozen()` was the sole
# `persistent_notification.create` in `app/`; SAFETY-03 (#12) adds a second one
# (`goodwe_output_clamp`) raised by scenarios that rail the command on purpose,
# and eight assertions here went red against it - AC1's core check included.
#
# Blanket id-keying is NOT the repair. Three of those eight are claims about the
# WHOLE notification surface, and narrowing them to this guard's id would have
# silently shrunk a claim rather than fixed a conflation - which is the defect
# class this card exists to close. So both surfaces are available by name, and
# each assertion picks one deliberately.
FREEZE_NOTE_ID = "goodwe_meter_frozen"
def all_notes_of(hass):
"""EVERY HA persistent notification raised this run, whoever raised it."""
return [d for dom, svc, d in hass.calls
if (dom, svc) == ("persistent_notification", "create")]
def _is_freeze_note(d):
"""Is this notification the freeze detector's?
⚠️ THE ID **OR** THE TITLE, and the `or` is measured rather than tidy.
Keyed on the id alone, renaming the id empties every list in this file and
SIX assertions collapse together - so the one check whose subject IS the id
could no longer fail on its own, in the file about assertions that cannot
fail. Recognising the guard by what it says as well leaves the rename
exactly one red: the id's own check. Measured both ways:
selector vs #12's app/ id renamed
by service (the first cut) 8 red 1 red
by id alone 3 red 6 red
by id or title (this) 3 red 1 red
The union cannot re-admit another guard's alarm unless that guard also
calls itself frozen, which would be a confusable alarm on its own account.
"""
return (d.get("notification_id") == FREEZE_NOTE_ID
or "frozen" in str(d.get("title", "")).lower())
def notes_of(hass):
"""Only THIS guard's - see _is_freeze_note()."""
return [d for d in all_notes_of(hass) if _is_freeze_note(d)]
def notes_by_text_of(hass):
"""This guard's, recognised by what it SAYS and never by its id.
Exists for the two assertions whose subject IS the id: selected by the id,
both would be true by construction.
"""
return [d for d in all_notes_of(hass)
if "frozen" in str(d.get("title", "")).lower()]
def wired(unchanged_s, grid, cycles=60, **over):
"""Returns (hass, controller, trace).
`trace` is one row per cycle - (command after the cycle, the watchdog's
level, notifications raised so far) - which is what AC1 needs: the
QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE ALARM HAPPENS BUT ON WHICH CYCLE.
"""
async def go():
hass = _Hass(grid)
c = Controller(dict(
{"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": -10,
"step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15},
**over), hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c = Controller(_opts(**over), hass, _Store(), _Pub(),
stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
c.p1_source = _Source(unchanged_s)
trace = []
for _ in range(cycles):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
return hass, c
trace.append((c.target, c.freeze_wd.active, len(notes_of(hass))))
return hass, c, trace
return asyncio.run(go())
hass_f, ctl_f = wired(3600.0, 4000.0)
# ⚠️ FILTERED BY notification_id, NOT BY SERVICE, since SAFETY-03. This add-on
# now raises MORE THAN ONE kind of persistent notification, and the scenarios
# below drive a command to the rail on purpose - which is a winding loop, which
# legitimately raises the output-clamp alarm too. A bare `svc == "create"` test
# therefore counts a DIFFERENT guard's alarm as this one's, which is exactly the
# conflation SAFETY-03's second acceptance criterion exists to forbid. Keying on
# the id is what makes "this detector said nothing" mean it.
FROZEN_ID = "goodwe_meter_frozen"
def frozen_notes(hass):
return [d for dom, svc, d in hass.calls
if (dom, svc) == ("persistent_notification", "create")
and d.get("notification_id") == FROZEN_ID]
notes = frozen_notes(hass_f)
# ⚠️ SAFETY-03 (#12) arrived at the same diagnosis independently and added a
# `frozen_notes()` keyed on the id. `notes_of()` above subsumes it - same id,
# plus the title fallback that keeps the id's own check independently
# falsifiable, plus `all_notes_of()` for the claims that are about the whole
# surface rather than about this guard.
hass_f, ctl_f, trace_f = wired(3600.0, 4000.0)
notes = notes_of(hass_f) # THIS guard's
all_notes = all_notes_of(hass_f) # the whole surface
# The status row lives behind `p1_enabled`, which is what a homewizard_local
# install has. Flipped here rather than plumbing a whole P1 transport in - the
# row's own content is what is under test.
@@ -524,9 +687,28 @@ ctl_f.p1_enabled = True
rows = [c for c in ctl_f.checks() if "METER MAY BE FROZEN" in c["text"]]
print(f" frozen at +4000 W: command ran to {ctl_f.target:.0f} W, "
f"{len(notes)} notification(s), {len(rows)} red status row(s)")
check("the shipped cycle() raises exactly one HA notification", len(notes) == 1)
# SURFACE-WIDE, deliberately, and the second guard has now landed. SAFETY-03
# ships `goodwe_output_clamp`, and this scenario - a runaway loop winding into
# the rail - raises it legitimately: the loop asks for more than the rating and
# is clamped. So the answer to "is this scenario still meant to raise exactly
# one alarm" is NO, it raises exactly two, and BOTH ARE NAMED here rather than
# the claim being narrowed until it went green again. A third guard has to come
# back to this line, which is the whole point of keeping one assertion in the
# file that accounts for the controller's entire alarm output.
_ids = sorted(d.get("notification_id") for d in all_notes)
print(f" the whole notification surface this run: {_ids}")
check("the whole notification surface carried exactly two alarms this run - "
"SAFETY-18's and SAFETY-03's, both named",
_ids == ["goodwe_meter_frozen", "goodwe_output_clamp"])
# THIS GUARD'S, keyed on the id.
check("...and the freeze detector is the one that raised it", len(notes) == 1)
# ⚠️ Selected by TEXT, not by id - see notes_by_text_of(). One of the two
# assertions whose subject IS the id (the other is the stability check in part
# 5), so it must not be selected by the thing it is checking, and it has to be
# able to fail while everything else stays green.
check("...with a fixed notification_id so repeats replace, not stack",
notes and notes[0].get("notification_id") == "goodwe_meter_frozen")
[d.get("notification_id") for d in notes_by_text_of(hass_f)]
== [FREEZE_NOTE_ID])
check("...and it says the controller is still running",
bool(notes) and "STILL RUNNING" in notes[0]["message"])
check("the status page carries a failed row saying so",
@@ -537,17 +719,293 @@ check("the event log names it", any("METER FROZEN" in e for e in ctl_f.events))
check("and it does NOT command 0 W - this cut is an alarm only",
abs(ctl_f.target) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W))
hass_n, ctl_n = wired(3600.0, -14.2)
check("wired up, TEL-05's converged case still raises nothing",
not frozen_notes(hass_n))
hass_m, ctl_m = wired(2.0, 8000.0)
check("wired up, a real railed load against a moving meter raises nothing",
not frozen_notes(hass_m)
and abs(ctl_m.target) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W))
check("an uncovered transport (no unchanged_s) raises nothing, and says so",
not frozen_notes(wired(None, 4000.0)[0]))
# ⚠️ THE THREE SCENARIOS THAT SAFETY-03 FORCED A DECISION ON, decided one at a
# time and not reflexively narrowed to green. Measured on the merged tree:
#
# scenario surface ids freeze
# frozen meter, railed command (above) 2 frozen + clamp 1
# TEL-05 converged, -14.2 W 0 - 0
# moving meter, a real 8 kW load 1 clamp 0
# uncovered transport, no unchanged_s 1 clamp 0
#
# CONVERGED stays SURFACE-WIDE. At the operating point this controller exists to
# hold, the correct behaviour is that the whole add-on has nothing to say - not
# merely that the freeze guard has nothing to say. Nothing about SAFETY-03
# weakens that claim, and it still holds, so narrowing it would give away a real
# property for nothing.
#
# The other two NARROW to notes_of(), and the reason is the same in both: the
# clamp alarm there is CORRECT and is SAFETY-03's subject, not this file's. A
# genuine 8 kW load really does drive the loop past the rating; an uncovered
# transport really does not stop it doing so. Asserting silence across the whole
# surface would make this file fail whenever a different guard correctly does
# its job - a claim about somebody else's behaviour wearing this file's name.
# What each still owns is the load-bearing half: THE FREEZE DETECTOR SAID
# NOTHING. The surface is printed rather than asserted, so a reader can still
# see what else fired without this file grading it.
hass_n, ctl_n, _ = wired(3600.0, -14.2)
check("wired up, TEL-05's converged case leaves the WHOLE SURFACE silent - at "
"the operating point the add-on should have nothing at all to say",
not all_notes_of(hass_n))
hass_m, ctl_m, _ = wired(2.0, 8000.0)
print(f" real 8 kW load, moving meter: surface "
f"{sorted(d.get('notification_id') for d in all_notes_of(hass_m))}, "
f"freeze {len(notes_of(hass_m))}")
check("wired up, a real railed load against a moving meter raises nothing FROM "
"THIS GUARD (the clamp alarm there is SAFETY-03's and is correct)",
not notes_of(hass_m) and abs(ctl_m.target) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W))
hass_u = wired(None, 4000.0)[0]
print(f" uncovered transport: surface "
f"{sorted(d.get('notification_id') for d in all_notes_of(hass_u))}, "
f"freeze {len(notes_of(hass_u))}")
check("an uncovered transport (no unchanged_s) raises nothing FROM THIS GUARD, "
"which is the honest report of a detector that cannot see",
not notes_of(hass_u))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 5. WHERE in cycle() the detector is evaluated (TEST-06 / AC1)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ WHERE THE BOUNDARY ACTUALLY IS - AND IT IS NOT write_setpoint().
# The first version of this comment said the detector runs "after
# write_setpoint()" and grades "the command that has just gone on the wire".
# TEST-06's reviewer disproved both halves by mutation:
#
# N3 move check_meter_frozen() to immediately BEFORE write_setpoint()
# -> green, and CORRECTLY green
#
# because `self.target = resolution.target_w` is assigned two lines above the
# write, `write_setpoint()` clamps only a local `value`, and it can skip the
# write entirely (`if not (changed or force): return`). So what the detector
# grades is `self.target` - the arbiter's resolved intent, PRE device clamp and
# possibly never emitted - and the invariant these checks pin is:
#
# check_meter_frozen() runs AFTER `self.target = resolution.target_w`
#
# That distinction is not pedantry. A check more robust than its own
# explanation is how the next person moves the call ABOVE the assignment
# believing they had preserved the stated rule.
#
# Both properties below are asserted by an OBSERVABLE CONSEQUENCE rather than by
# source order, so semantic-preserving refactors stay green (measured by the
# reviewer: renaming the method, and calling it from a helper that itself runs
# last, both survive - the suite drives `await c.cycle()` and never names the
# method):
#
# (a) BOTH TERMS MUST DESCRIBE THE SAME MOMENT. The command it grades has to
# be the one THIS cycle resolved, judged against how long the meter that
# chose it has stood still. Evaluated above the assignment it grades the
# PREVIOUS cycle's command against THIS cycle's meter - a pairing that was
# never true of any moment - and the alarm arrives a whole cycle late.
# (b) THE DEAD-POLL-TASK COMPOSITION. When the poll task dies the inputs go
# stale, the arbiter resolves 0 W, and the detector - evaluated after that
# resolution lands in self.target - correctly sees an unrailed command and
# CLEARS. Evaluated above the assignment it would still be looking at the
# railed command from before the failsafe, and would keep the alarm
# standing over a controller that is already commanding 0 W.
print("WHERE the detector is evaluated in cycle() - the ordering AC1 protects")
_railed = [i for i, (t, _, _) in enumerate(trace_f)
if abs(t) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W)]
_alarmed = [i for i, (_, _, n) in enumerate(trace_f) if n >= 1]
_first_railed = _railed[0] if _railed else None
_first_alarm = _alarmed[0] if _alarmed else None
print(f" ramp to the rail: first railed command on cycle {_first_railed}, "
f"first notification on cycle {_first_alarm}, over {len(trace_f)} cycles")
# Without this the equality below could be satisfied on cycle 0, where "the same
# cycle" and "one cycle later" are indistinguishable.
check("the command takes several cycles to reach the rail, so 'same cycle' and "
"'one cycle later' are different observations",
_first_railed is not None and _first_railed >= 1
and len(trace_f) > _first_railed + 1)
check("the alarm lands on the SAME cycle the command reaches the rail - "
"evaluated after `self.target = resolution.target_w` it grades the "
"command THIS cycle resolved; evaluated above that assignment it grades "
"the previous one and arrives a cycle late",
_first_alarm is not None and _first_alarm == _first_railed)
def dead_poll(after_cycles=20, dead_cycles=4, revived_cycles=20):
"""Alarm on a railed command, then kill the poll task and keep cycling.
The real thing: the transport task dies, every input reads None, and after
`stale_input_s` the arbiter's P_SAFETY stop resolves 0 W. `inputs_bad_since`
is backdated rather than slept through - the clock is wall clock, and the
mechanism rather than the wait is what is under test.
"""
async def go():
hass = _Hass(4000.0)
c = Controller(_opts(), hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
c.p1_source = _Source(3600.0)
for _ in range(after_cycles):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
before = (c.target, c.freeze_wd.active, len(notes_of(hass)))
hass.dead = True
trace = []
for _ in range(dead_cycles):
await c.read_inputs()
if c.inputs_bad_since is not None:
c.inputs_bad_since = (datetime.now(timezone.utc)
- timedelta(seconds=STALE_INPUT_S + 1))
await c.cycle()
trace.append((c.target, c.freeze_wd.active, len(notes_of(hass))))
# ...and then the transport comes back, against a meter that is still
# frozen. The loop re-rails and this is a NEW episode - the alarm is
# allowed, indeed required, to speak again.
hass.dead = False
revived = []
for _ in range(revived_cycles):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
revived.append((c.target, c.freeze_wd.active, len(notes_of(hass))))
# ⚠️ by TEXT: "the second episode REPLACED the first" is a claim about
# the id, so the list it is checked against must not be selected by the
# id - that would make it true by construction.
return before, trace, revived, notes_by_text_of(hass), c
return asyncio.run(go())
_before, _dead, _revived, _freeze_notes, _ctl_d = dead_poll()
_zeroed = [i for i, (t, _, _) in enumerate(_dead) if t == 0.0]
print(f" poll task killed: alarming at {_before[0]:+.0f} W "
f"(active={_before[1]}, {_before[2]} notification(s)) -> "
+ ", ".join(f"cycle {i}: {t:+.0f} W active={a} notes={n}"
for i, (t, a, n) in enumerate(_dead)))
check("the episode really was standing before the poll task died - otherwise "
"the release below is vacuous",
_before[1] and _before[2] == 1 and abs(_before[0]) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W))
check("a dead poll task drives the command to 0 W",
bool(_zeroed) and _zeroed[0] == 0)
check("...and on THAT SAME cycle the alarm is already clear, because the "
"detector ran after 0 W was resolved into self.target, not before it",
bool(_zeroed) and not _dead[_zeroed[0]][1])
check("...and it stays clear for as long as the failsafe holds it there",
_dead and not any(a for _, a, _ in _dead))
# ⚠️ "and it raises nothing new while parked" is NOT asserted here, and the
# reason matters more than the deletion. It was dropped as REDUNDANT, not as
# undecidable: TEST-06's reviewer falsified it in one line - move the
# `hass.call` above `if not fired: return` so the detector notifies every cycle,
# and notifications appear in exactly these parked cycles (that mutation takes
# this file RED 9). My first note here claimed no mutation could break it, which
# was the very inference this file exists to distrust, made about this file.
# The deletion stands because the exact count below catches that same mutation
# nine times over - no coverage was lost - and the honest form of the claim is
# "I tried to break it and here is what happened", never "I could not, so it
# cannot".
# ⚠️ AND THE OTHER HALF, or "no second notification" is a claim no mutation can
# break: when the transport comes back against a meter that is STILL frozen the
# loop re-rails, and that is a new episode which MUST speak. What must not
# happen is a second notification stacking up beside the first.
_re_railed = [i for i, (t, _, _) in enumerate(_revived)
if abs(t) >= rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W)]
print(f" transport revived: command re-rails on cycle "
f"{_re_railed[0] if _re_railed else None}, "
f"{_ctl_d.freeze_wd.episodes} episode(s), {len(_freeze_notes)} "
f"notification(s) from this guard, "
f"ids {sorted({n.get('notification_id') for n in _freeze_notes})}")
# A PRECONDITION, not a discriminating check - the same role as "the command
# takes several cycles to reach the rail" above, and labelled the same way:
# without it the two checks below are satisfied by a controller that never came
# back. The crudest falsifier (never file the loop claim) takes most of this
# file red, which is the signature of a precondition rather than a check; the
# narrowest one measured is a stale-input stop that never releases.
check("PRECONDITION: a revived transport against a still-frozen meter re-rails "
"the command",
bool(_re_railed))
check("...which is a SECOND episode, and it alarms again on the cycle it rails",
_ctl_d.freeze_wd.episodes == 2
and bool(_re_railed) and _revived[_re_railed[0]][2] == _before[2] + 1)
# ⚠️ STABILITY, not the value - the value is pinned once, above. Renaming the
# id must fail that check and NOT this one; the two say different things and
# each has to be able to go red on its own.
check("...on the same notification_id, so the second REPLACES the first "
"instead of stacking a second one beside it",
len(_freeze_notes) == 2
and len({n.get("notification_id") for n in _freeze_notes}) == 1)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 6. what the status page SAYS about coverage (TEST-06 / AC2)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ The check above only ever asserted that an uncovered transport is SILENT,
# which a status page claiming `armed` on a guard that cannot run also satisfies.
# The AC was that the detector reports uncovered transports *and says so*, so
# the string is what gets asserted here, in both directions: the uncovered row
# must not claim `armed`, and the covered row must still claim it - or "does not
# say armed" would be satisfiable by deleting the armed branch outright.
print("what the status page SAYS about coverage")
def freeze_rows(unchanged_s, grid, **over):
"""The freeze-detector rows of the real checks(), on a p1 install.
⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT COVER. The rows live behind `if self.p1_enabled:`, and
the flag is set here by hand rather than by building a real P1 transport -
inherited from part 4's fixture. So everything below proves "WHEN the row is
produced it says the right thing", and nothing below proves "the row is
produced on homewizard_local and not otherwise". That gate is uncovered;
AC2 is about the string, and widening the fixture belongs to whoever covers
the gate.
"""
_h, ctl, _t = wired(unchanged_s, grid, cycles=3, **over)
# p1_enabled is what a homewizard_local install has; the row's own content
# is what is under test, not the transport that feeds it.
ctl.p1_enabled = True
return ctl, [r for r in ctl.checks()
if r["text"].startswith("freeze detector")]
_ctl_u, _rows_u = freeze_rows(None, 4000.0, meter_source="ha_dsmr")
_ctl_c, _rows_c = freeze_rows(2.0, -14.2)
print(f" uncovered: {_rows_u[0]['text'] if _rows_u else '(no row at all)'}")
print(f" covered: {_rows_c[0]['text'] if _rows_c else '(no row at all)'}")
check("an uncovered transport gets exactly one freeze-detector row",
len(_rows_u) == 1)
check("...and it says NOT COVERED",
bool(_rows_u) and "NOT COVERED" in _rows_u[0]["text"])
check("...and it does NOT claim the guard is armed - that would be the status "
"page lying on behalf of a guard that cannot run",
bool(_rows_u) and "armed" not in _rows_u[0]["text"])
check("...and it names the meter_source it is not covering, so the operator "
"knows which install this is",
bool(_rows_u) and "ha_dsmr" in _rows_u[0]["text"])
check("...and it names homewizard_local as the transport that would be covered",
bool(_rows_u) and "homewizard_local" in _rows_u[0]["text"])
check("...flagged as a warning rather than a silent ok",
bool(_rows_u) and not _rows_u[0]["ok"] and _rows_u[0]["warn"])
check("a COVERED transport gets exactly one freeze-detector row",
len(_rows_c) == 1)
check("...and that one DOES say armed - without this, 'the uncovered row does "
"not say armed' is satisfied by deleting the armed branch",
bool(_rows_c) and "armed" in _rows_c[0]["text"]
and "NOT COVERED" not in _rows_c[0]["text"])
check("...and it quotes the hold and the rail it is armed at, derived from the "
"config the controller was actually built with",
bool(_rows_c)
and f"{_ctl_c.freeze_wd.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s unchanged" in _rows_c[0]["text"]
and f"{rail_w(LIVE_MAX_W):.0f} W" in _rows_c[0]["text"])
check("...as an ok row, since a covered armed guard is not a warning",
bool(_rows_c) and _rows_c[0]["ok"] and not _rows_c[0]["warn"])
# AC3's other half, through the built object rather than through a literal: the
# opts dict does NOT carry meter_freeze_s, so this is the number an install that
# leaves the key at its config.yaml default actually lands on.
print(f" a Controller built with meter_freeze_s ABSENT holds "
f"{_ctl_c.freeze_wd.cfg.hold_s:.0f} s (config.yaml ships "
f"{SHIPPED_HOLD_S:.0f} s)")
check("a Controller built with the key absent lands on the SHIPPED hold, so "
"config.yaml and main.py's fallback cannot drift apart unnoticed",
_ctl_c.freeze_wd.cfg.hold_s == SHIPPED_HOLD_S)
print()
print(f"part 3 (the live HTTP transport) ran against: {PART3_TRANSPORT}")
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")
sys.exit(1)
+85
View File
@@ -253,6 +253,91 @@ check("...and the shipped charge rate is at or under the shipped ceiling",
check("...and the shipped discharge rate too, so it warns about nothing",
_shipped["maintenance_discharge_w"] <= _shipped["max_w"])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the shipped meter_freeze_s, pinned (TEST-06 / AC3)")
# ⚠️ WHY A NUMBER GETS ITS OWN CHECK. `meter_freeze_s: 300` is the threshold
# SAFETY-18's entire argument is about, and before this it was pinned NOWHERE:
# 300 -> 3600 left test_freeze.py AND this file green, because the schema
# accepts int(60,3600) and no check ever read the shipped value. The schema
# bounds what is CONFIGURABLE; this pins what is SHIPPED, which is a different
# question and the one the docs answer.
#
# Read by regex like _shipped above, for the same reason: no PyYAML in the
# image, and a check that skips on ImportError is not a check.
_freeze_s = [float(v) for v in re.findall(
r"^ meter_freeze_s: (\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)]
_freeze_schema = re.findall(r"^ meter_freeze_s: int\((\d+),(\d+)\)\s*$",
_txt, re.M)
check(f"config.yaml carries exactly one meter_freeze_s default {_freeze_s}",
len(_freeze_s) == 1)
check("...and exactly one schema range for it", len(_freeze_schema) == 1)
_hold_s = _freeze_s[0] if _freeze_s else None
_lo, _hi = ((float(_freeze_schema[0][0]), float(_freeze_schema[0][1]))
if _freeze_schema else (None, None))
check("the shipped meter_freeze_s is still the measured 300 s that freeze.py, "
"config.yaml's own comment and test_freeze.py are all written at",
_hold_s == 300.0)
check(f"...and it is inside its own schema range ({_lo}-{_hi} s)",
None not in (_lo, _hi, _hold_s) and _lo <= _hold_s <= _hi)
# The two properties the number has to have, DERIVED rather than restated - so
# they go red on a value that is merely schema-legal. Both come straight from
# config.yaml's own comment on the key.
#
# upper: the alert must land inside the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity
# tariff, or the notification arrives after the money is spent;
# lower: the slowest a HEALTHY meter can tick a 1 Wh register and still look
# unchanged for hold_s is 3600/hold_s W, and that must stay inside the
# deadband or the conjunction's two terms stop being mutually
# exclusive (freeze.py, "WHERE hold_s COMES FROM").
_QUARTER_S = 900.0
_shipped_deadband = [float(v) for v in re.findall(
r"^ deadband_w: (\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*$", _txt, re.M)]
check(f"config.yaml carries exactly one deadband_w default {_shipped_deadband}",
len(_shipped_deadband) == 1)
_db = _shipped_deadband[0] if _shipped_deadband else None
_slowest_healthy_w = 3600.0 / _hold_s if _hold_s else None
print(f" shipped meter_freeze_s {_hold_s} s: alert inside the "
f"{_QUARTER_S:.0f} s billing quarter, and a healthy meter slow enough to "
f"look unchanged for it is {_slowest_healthy_w} W against a "
f"{_db} W deadband")
check(f"...the alarm still lands inside the {_QUARTER_S:.0f} s billing quarter",
_hold_s is not None and _hold_s < _QUARTER_S)
check("...and a healthy meter that looks unchanged for it is still inside the "
"deadband, so the two terms stay mutually exclusive",
_slowest_healthy_w is not None and _db is not None
and _slowest_healthy_w < _db)
# ⚠️ AND THE RANGE'S OWN BOUNDS. "300 sits inside the range" is worth nothing
# while the range itself is unpinned: widened to `int(1,86400)` an operator can
# configure `meter_freeze_s: 86400` and the guard is dead for a day at a time,
# with every check in this repo still green. That mutation survived the first
# cut of this PR and is what this block closes. Both numbers are argued for in
# config.yaml's own comment and in freeze.py, and each is re-derived here:
#
# 60 s the floor freeze.py calls NOT A RECOMMENDATION - there a healthy
# meter can look unchanged at 60 W, four times the shipped deadband, so
# the conjunction's two terms stop being mutually exclusive and only
# the margin is left;
# 3600 s the ceiling - already four times the billing quarter, so the top of
# the range has given up detecting a freeze inside the quarter that
# bills it. It is the last bound between a supported configuration and
# a disabled guard, and moving it is a decision rather than a tidy-up.
print(f" schema range {_lo}-{_hi} s: at the floor a healthy meter that looks "
f"unchanged is "
+ (f"{3600.0 / _lo:.0f} W" if _lo else "?")
+ f" against a {_db} W deadband; the ceiling is "
+ (f"{_hi / _QUARTER_S:.1f}x" if _hi else "?")
+ " the billing quarter")
check(f"the schema range itself is still the argued 60-3600 s (found "
f"{_lo}-{_hi})", (_lo, _hi) == (60.0, 3600.0))
check("...a floor that gives up the mutual exclusion and keeps only the "
"margin, which is why config.yaml calls it not a recommendation",
None not in (_lo, _db) and 3600.0 / _lo > _db)
check("...and a ceiling already past the billing quarter, so no value the "
"schema still accepts can alarm inside the quarter that bills it",
_hi is not None and _hi > _QUARTER_S)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("the KNOWN cross-file default divergence, pinned rather than commented")
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS GUARDS, AND WHY IT ASSERTS THE BUG RATHER THAN THE FIX.