Review findings, all confirmed in code before changing anything. THE RULE DID NOT AUTHORISE ITS OWN BEST REFUSAL. The stated test was "makes a safety mechanism inoperative, or makes a stated limit untrue", and a blank setpoint_entity does neither - layer 1 pinning the inverter at 0 W is the failsafe WORKING, as validate.py's own text admitted. The real justification is a second, separate category: the add-on is inert and indistinguishable from healthy. Stated as (a) and (b), with each refusal tagged, and with both halves explicitly bounded - (a) is not "any two numbers that could disagree", (b) is not "anything degraded". Left implicit, the gap is where trivia-creep comes back in. meter_max_age_s ABOVE THE FIRMWARE'S VETO IS NOW REFUSED. The schema allows int(5,300); the firmware's threshold is a compile-time `max_age_s: "30"` and it trips layer 1 at `p1_age_s >= 30`. At 120 the add-on believes a 119 s reading is fresh and keeps commanding while the board has already vetoed and is holding at 0 W - healthy meter, running controller, nothing moving. Structurally identical to the max_w case, and unlike max_w it is settable on this install, so the headline behaviour finally has a live demonstration. That firmware file's own comment says a lower bound on this "belongs in CFG-01, not here". Only ABOVE is refused: below the veto the add-on gives up first, which is fail-safe and visible on its own status page. Scoped to P1 being enabled, because meter_max_age_s governs nothing otherwise. FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S cannot be imported from a compile-time YAML substitution, so it carries a note on the single direction in which it can go stale - and a warning that TEL-06 is editing `ingest_stale`, so a matching integer may stop meaning a matching rule. stop= WAS A LIVE FOOTGUN. It defaulted to None, which made a Controller that cannot stop itself the DEFAULT one. On the late-refusal path that meant: log the banner, return, and leave the process alive forever with no control loop and no exit - the exact "inert but looks healthy" failure this module exists to refuse. Now required and keyword-only, so the broken shape does not construct; test_p1.py's five call sites pass an Event. That whole path had no test and no live demo. It has one now: it drives run_control() against a device that only reports a narrower range once the loop starts, and asserts it refuses, signals, returns, and writes NOTHING - plus the converse, that an agreeing device leads to real writes. This also covers the max_w composition that cannot be reached through the Supervisor on the live install. max_w <= 0 is refused. Schema-blocked in production, but validate_startup_config() is the simulation suite's entry point too, and a non-positive max_w inverts the arbiter's supervised bounds into a contradiction that reads as a safety trip rather than a typo. Verified live 2026-08-28 (backup goodwe_controller-cfg01r2-1787940076): meter_max_age_s 120 refused with a message naming 120, 30, and THE FIRMWARE WINS; no traceback; add-on restored byte-exact and running. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
309 lines
18 KiB
Markdown
309 lines
18 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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## 0.4.0
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**CFG-01.** The add-on now refuses to start on a configuration it cannot honour,
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instead of logging a line and carrying on. `validate_startup_config()` runs in
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`amain()` before the broker, the web server or any task exists, so a refusal
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cannot leave half a controller running behind a UI.
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It refuses only where continuing produces one of two outcomes: **(a)** a stated
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limit is untrue - the operator configured a bound and a lower layer silently
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enforces a different one - or **(b)** the add-on is inert and indistinguishable
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from healthy. (b) is not a special case of (a): with no `setpoint_entity`, layer
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1 pinning the inverter at 0 W is the failsafe *working*. The system does not
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become unsafe, it becomes a convincing impression of a working controller.
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Four things qualify:
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- **`max_w` above (or below) the setpoint device's own rating.** This is the one
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that changed behaviour. It used to warn `the device wins` and run anyway, with
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`write_setpoint()` silently clamping, so the configured ceiling was never the
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real one and the only evidence had scrolled off the log. The refusal names the
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configured value, the device's value, and which wins.
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- **No `setpoint_entity`.** A controller with no actuator: every write is a
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no-op, the device rating is never read, and the ESP32 heartbeat that holds off
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the layer-1 failsafe never happens. It ran, looked healthy, and moved nothing.
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- **A `meter_source` that can never produce a reading** - missing `p1_host`,
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missing `p1_net_entity`, a blank MQTT topic, a phase list disagreeing with
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`meter_phases`, an unknown source name, or a `meter_poll_s` at or past
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`meter_max_age_s`. These were already caught, but they only *disabled
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ingestion*, which leaves the grid reading None forever: permanent "inputs
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missing", 0 W, and a status page indistinguishable from a healthy meter nobody
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has sent anything to yet.
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- **`meter_max_age_s` above the firmware's ingest veto.** The schema accepts
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`int(5,300)`; the ESP32's threshold is a compile-time `max_age_s: "30"` and it
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trips layer 1 at `p1_age_s >= 30`. Set 120 and the add-on treats a 119 s
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reading as fresh and keeps commanding, while the firmware has already vetoed
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and is holding the inverter at 0 W - healthy meter, running controller,
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nothing moving, and no line anywhere saying the number you set was overruled.
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Structurally the same fault as the `max_w` case. Only *above* the veto is
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refused: below it the add-on gives up first, which is fail-safe and visible on
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its own status page. Mirrored as `validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S` - it cannot
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be imported from a compile-time YAML substitution, so it carries a note about
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the one direction in which it can go stale.
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`max_w` at or below zero is refused too. Schema-blocked on a real install, but
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`validate_startup_config()` is now also the simulation suite's entry point, and
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a non-positive `max_w` inverts the arbiter's `supervised` bounds into a
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contradiction that resolves to 0 W - i.e. it would read as a safety trip rather
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than as the typo it is.
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The predicates for the meter group still live in `p1.validate_meter_options()`,
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which `build_source()` also calls - one definition, two callers, not two
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competing validators. Two transports gained a check they never had: `ha_dsmr`
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with only one of its two entities, and `mqtt_p1` with a blank topic, both of
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which previously built a transport that could never read.
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Deliberately **not** refused, because it is untidy rather than unsafe:
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`integrator_max_w` above `max_w` (the arbiter still bounds the wire to ±max_w,
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so the cost is unwind latency, not amperage - warned), a missing `soc_entity` /
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`batt_entity` (fail-safe, and already a red NOT READY banner naming it), a
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`setpoint_entity` that has not appeared on the Core API yet (ESPHome is routinely
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late; refusing would make a slow boot need a human - re-checked once the real
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rating arrives), and a thin-but-nonzero `meter_poll_s` margin.
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A refusal is legible as a refusal: a banner that says in words that this is a
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configuration problem and nothing is broken, the numbered problems, no traceback,
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and exit status 78 (`EX_CONFIG`).
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**TEL-04.** `meter_source: ha_signed` reads a single *signed* power entity, which
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is the shape a HomeWizard P1 publishes. Both transports 0.3.0 shipped require two
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unsigned registers and refuse negatives, so neither fits the meter installed here.
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**TEL-05.** `meter_source: homewizard_local` polls the meter's own local API
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directly. This exists because of something the HA paths cannot do: Home Assistant
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fires no state change for a repeated reading and exposes no arrival signal at
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all, so `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` on those transports measures time since the
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*value changed*, not since the meter *reported*. Real captured data has gaps of
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42 s and 97 s between changes on a perfectly healthy meter - long enough for a
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30 s staleness threshold to command 0 W for no reason. Every HTTP response to the
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local API is a genuine arrival, so the age means what it says.
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Verified on the rig against a literally constant 350.0 W for 70 s - the exact
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state where the HA path recorded zero samples in 45 s - with 14 arrivals and the
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age never exceeding the poll cadence.
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Set `p1_host` to the meter's address and `meter_poll_s` (default 5 s, matching
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the meter's own ~5 s update). Still defaults to `off`; nothing changes for an
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install that does not opt in.
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Freeze detection is separate and deliberately not thresholded: a meter answering
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200 OK with a stale number *is* arriving, so no arrival stamp can flag it. The
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energy registers carry that as `unchanged_s`, surfaced on the status line for a
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human to read rather than alarmed on - at a converged -10 W a 1 Wh register needs
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about six minutes to move, so any threshold would false-trip at the target
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operating point.
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## Unreleased
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**TEL-05.** A fourth `meter_source`, `homewizard_local`, which polls a
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HomeWizard P1's **own local API** (`GET /api/v1/data`) instead of watching a
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Home Assistant entity. Set `p1_host` to the meter's address; `meter_poll_s`
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(default 5 s, the meter's own update rate) sets the cadence.
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✅ **This is the first transport whose `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` measures when
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the meter *reported*, and therefore the first one a firmware watchdog may
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threshold.** Every HTTP response is an arrival: the meter answered, now, with
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its current reading, and whether the *number* moved is not consulted. Home
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Assistant cannot express that at all — a repeated reading emits no
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`state_changed`, advances `last_reported` on neither serialiser, and
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`state_reported` is not subscribable ("Event filter is required"). On
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`ha_signed` that made a healthy meter under a flat load indistinguishable from
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a dead one, and our own capture of this house's meter goes 42.2 s and 97.0 s
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between changes — both past the default `meter_max_age_s` of 30, i.e. a false
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trip to 0 W on a meter that is fine. If you have a HomeWizard P1, move to this
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mode.
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Everything TEL-01 established is reused, not re-implemented: ingest
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timestamping, `meter_max_age_s`, the clock-recomputed age, the plausibility
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bounds and the §20 unsigned-decode rejection, and the same `split_signed` sign
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convention `ha_signed` uses. A failed or timed-out poll submits nothing, so it
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is a *missing* reading — never 0 W — and it does not reset the age.
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Verified on the ENV-01 rig against `sim/hwsim.py`, steady and with `--fault
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freeze` injected. Still defaults to `off`.
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⚠️ **An arrival stamp still cannot see a *frozen* meter**, and no arrival
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detector can: a meter answering `200 OK` forever with a stale number is
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arriving. The local API does expose what the HA path never had — the
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`total_power_*_kwh` registers stop advancing — and the transport tracks it as
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`unchanged_s`, but that is deliberately **not** folded into the age and not
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thresholded: this controller regulates grid power toward ~0 W, and at a
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converged −10 W the export register needs six minutes to move by its 1 Wh
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resolution while the power figure legitimately repeats. Thresholding it at 30 s
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would rebuild the false-trip limit cycle at the exact operating point we aim
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for. Freeze detection needs the low-power case solved first, separately. It is
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shown on the status page's P1 line instead — leaving it unthresholded only
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holds up if a human can read it, so now they can.
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**TEL-04.** A third `meter_source`, `ha_signed`, reading **one signed** Home
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Assistant entity: positive = import, negative = export. That is the shape a
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HomeWizard P1 publishes (`sensor.p1_meter_active_power`), and it is the meter
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actually fitted here - which neither TEL-01 transport can read, because
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`ha_dsmr` needs two unsigned registers and refuses a negative one, i.e. every
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exporting telegram. Set `p1_net_entity`, and `p1_phase_net_entities` for the
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per-phase capacity-tariff figures on a three-phase connection.
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Everything TEL-01 established is inherited rather than re-implemented - the
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new transport is a subclass of the `ha_dsmr` one overriding only which
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entities it wants and how they become a sample. So ingest timestamping,
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`meter_max_age_s`, `sensor.p1_sample_age_s` recomputed against the clock and
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republished once a second, the plausibility bounds, and `unavailable` /
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`unknown` treated as a *missing reading and never 0 W* all behave identically
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across the three sources.
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Still defaults to `off`; an existing install is unaffected until it opts in.
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⚠️ **`sensor.p1_sample_age_s` is published on `ha_signed`, but must not yet be
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thresholded by the ESP32 stale-input watchdog.** On the HA WebSocket paths the
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age is stamped from `state_changed`, so it measures time since the value
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*changed*, not since the meter *reported* - and Home Assistant exposes no
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arrival signal for a repeated reading (no `state_changed`, no `last_reported`
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movement on either serialiser, and `state_reported` is not subscribable over
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the WebSocket). Measured on the ENV-01 rig against the real HomeWizard
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integration. `ha_dsmr` mostly escapes it because a telegram moves several
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entities at once; `ha_signed` has one, so a healthy meter under a flat load is
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indistinguishable from a dead one. Our own capture has the house meter going
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42.2 s and 97.0 s between changes. Raising `meter_max_age_s` does not fix that,
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it only chooses which error you get; the fix is an arrival stamp from the meter
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itself and is a separate ticket. Full detail in DOCS.md.
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## 0.3.0
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**SAFETY-04.** The control law's integrator is now an explicit accumulator,
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bounded independently of the output clamp instead of inheriting whatever
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headroom the clamp happened to leave. It also freezes while the inverter is
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not tracking, rather than continuing to wind up against a command nothing is
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acting on. `integrator_max_w` (default `0`) governs the bound; `0` means
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"follow `max_w`", which is the existing behaviour.
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Behaviour is unchanged at the defaults - a 4,928-case equivalence sweep
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against the previous control law confirms it decides identically at
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`integrator_max_w: 0`.
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**TEL-01.** P1 meter ingestion, so a Belgian P1's two unsigned registers
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(consumption, injection) no longer need a hand-written signed template
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sensor: the subtraction moves into the add-on, done once and tested. Two
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transports, chosen with the new `meter_source` option: `ha_dsmr` subscribes
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to the DSMR integration over the HA WebSocket, `mqtt_p1` reads a topic.
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Defaults to `off`, which keeps the existing `meter_entity` path untouched -
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nothing changes for an install that does not opt in.
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Enabling it publishes `sensor.p1_sample_age_s`: seconds since the newest
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accepted telegram, recomputed against the clock and republished roughly once
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a second rather than only when a telegram lands. That is deliberate - Home
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Assistant only pushes a state on change, so a meter sitting at a genuinely
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constant reading would otherwise look identical to a dead one. Watching the
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age instead means a frozen meter shows a climbing age, not a flat line. The
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firmware watchdog subscribes to this exact entity id.
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Known limits, both already in DOCS.md: on `mqtt_p1`, a bridge stuck
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republishing its last telegram still "arrives", so the age cannot detect
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that particular failure - prefer `ha_dsmr` where both are available. And a
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dead P1 meter takes 45 s to reach 0 W commanded (30 s for `meter_max_age_s`
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to call the reading stale, then 15 s of `stale_input_s` on top), which is
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`meter_max_age_s` and `stale_input_s` stacking, not either one alone.
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## 0.2.1
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`target_grid_w` (default -10 W): what the meter should rest at. The deadband
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holds any resting point inside it indefinitely, and the meter bills import and
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export on separate registers, so resting at +14 W import costs 0.34 kWh/day
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with the loop behaving perfectly. Biasing the target slightly negative moves
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that residue onto the export register. Configurable in the Configuration tab;
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see DOCS.md for the trade-off table.
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Behaviour is unchanged at `target_grid_w: 0`.
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## 0.2.0
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Precedence between strategies is now a first-class object instead of an if/else
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ladder, ahead of there being more than three of them.
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Every strategy returns a CLAIM each cycle - `set` ("I want X") or `limit` ("the
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result must stay within these bounds") - and `arbiter.py` resolves them by one
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rule:
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1. Highest-priority `set` wins; no claim at all means 0 W.
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2. Then every `limit` whose priority is >= that set's priority applies, most
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restrictive first.
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3. Contradictory limits are a BUG: command 0 W and say so.
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Clause 2 is why "money outranks maintenance" is now a consequence of the
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priorities rather than a special case in a Jinja template: the maintenance
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charge-only limit binds the loop, but will not bind a higher-priority peak
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shaving claim when one exists.
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- Maintenance shaping (charge-only, cheap-window floor) moved out of the control
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law. `control.py` is once again only a controller that tracks the meter.
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- The loop computes from the ARBITER's last output, not its own last wish. If
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something outranked it, that is what the hardware actually did, and tracking
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anything else makes it jump when it regains control.
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- Every decision is explainable: "loop -> 0 W, limited by maintenance
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(charge-only)" now appears in the UI and the log, instead of a bare number.
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- Safety limits (device rating, supervised max_w) bind every strategy including
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the highest, and are still enforced a second time at the point of writing.
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## 0.1.6
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Findings from installing this on a live system, replacing a working YAML
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implementation. Every one of these was silent - the add-on looked healthy while
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being completely unable to do its job.
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- **`run.sh` must use `#!/usr/bin/with-contenv sh`.** The HA base images run
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s6-overlay, which starts services with a SANITISED environment. With a plain
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shebang, SUPERVISOR_TOKEN is simply absent and every Home Assistant call
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returns 401 - while `homeassistant_api: true` makes the permissions look
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correctly granted. Startup now logs the token length and probes the Core API,
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so the next person sees it in one line.
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- **Bump `version:` for every change.** Supervisor keys the built image by
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version, so editing source and rebuilding silently reuses the old image. Two
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fixes appeared not to work because of this.
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- **Dependencies come from apk, not pip.** Alpine is musl and there are no musl
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wheels for aiohttp; pip would compile it on the client's Pi.
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- **paho-mqtt 1.x and 2.x are both supported.** Alpine ships 1.x, which has no
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`CallbackAPIVersion`; that raised and took the whole add-on down with it.
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- **MQTT can no longer take down control.** Publisher construction is wrapped -
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observability must never stop the controller.
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- **MQTT discovery is published from `on_connect`.** paho drops QoS-0 publishes
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issued before the CONNACK, so announcing straight after `connect()` published
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nothing at all while logging "MQTT connected".
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- **Repeated failures log at most once a minute.** The control loop retries every
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second; unthrottled warnings rolled the log buffer and destroyed the startup
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diagnostics needed to debug the 401 above.
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- **`auto_start` works.** The store's defaults supplied `auto: False`, so the
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fallback to the option could never fire.
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Known issue: after deleting the MQTT entities from the registry during
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development, Home Assistant would not re-adopt them from retained discovery -
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not even after clearing the retained topics and reconnecting. The add-on
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publishes correct discovery and live state (verified on the broker); this is an
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HA-side adoption problem and affects status entities only, never control.
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## 0.1.0
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First packaged release. Ports the control loop and the monthly maintenance
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cycle from the reference Home Assistant implementation into an add-on.
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- Grid-following control: gain/slew/clamp/deadband with anti-windup, all tuned
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against measured hardware behaviour (see FIELD-GUIDE.md §14).
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- Saturation freeze **with the duration term** — three consecutive diverging
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cycles, not one. The instantaneous test fires on every large correction,
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because the plant itself needs 3-6 s to settle.
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- Monthly maintenance cycle as an ownership state machine: drain / charge /
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hold, with exactly one writer of the setpoint at any moment.
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- Capacity-tariff awareness: the maintenance charge is capped by quarter-hour
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peak headroom, and peak shaving outranks the maintenance schedule.
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- Failsafe behaviour: commands 0 W on missing inputs, on stop, and on shutdown.
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Never replays a stale setpoint - the reference implementation did, and the
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hardware watchdog cannot catch that.
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- Ingress UI with a commissioning checklist that names problems in words.
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- Optional MQTT discovery for status entities.
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Known limits:
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- Home Assistant OS / Supervised only (add-ons cannot run on Container/Core).
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- The inverter protocol is reverse-engineered; no vendor contract.
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- Without the optional RS485 e-stop, nothing covers the host machine dying.
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