ALLOC-01: allocate the site grid target across N inverters, sum-invariant #41

Merged

admin merged 2 commits from ALLOC-01 into release/1.0

2026-09-02 12:13:34 +02:00

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	3fe3c7acb0	ALLOC-01: clamp each envelope end on its own, and widen the replay that missed it checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m9s Details Two blocking findings from the review of `186e13c`. The second is why the first survived, and it is the one this commit is really about. THE CLAMP. `_clamp_int()` folded both ends of the interval into one `min(max(...))` and substituted `v` itself for a bound that was infinite. That reads as "an absent bound cannot bind", and it is not what it does: with `hi == inf` the expression collapses to `min(max(v, lo), v) == v`, so A MISSING CEILING SILENTLY DISCARDED THE FLOOR. `_clamp_int(0, 2142, inf)` returned 0. It reached the shares through all three call sites - the base, the pin clamp and the post-floor clamp. The worked failure: bounds `{a: [2000, +inf], b: [-5000, 5000]}` against a +1000 W site target returned `a=+500, b=+500` - inverter-a commanded at a quarter of its own 2000 W floor - while THE SAME CASE WITH A FINITE CEILING correctly REFUSES on sign coherence. So one defect broke the ticket's first named deliverable ("each share clipped to that unit's UnitBounds interval") and suppressed a circulating-power refusal that should have fired. Both now behave identically, and the refusal is the behaviour. Not reachable on the live install - N=1 is a pass-through, and via main.py the supervised claim unconditionally files a finite +/-max_w LIMIT at P_SAFETY that pre_resolve's gate can never filter because nothing outranks P_SAFETY. But `plan()` and `arbiter.allocate()` are the public envelope contract SAFETY-28 and DEV-02 are being asked to build on, and `UnitBounds()` DEFAULTS TO `(-inf, +inf)`, so a one-sided envelope is the ordinary case at N>=2 rather than an edge, and any caller with one inherited the defect. Fixed by clamping the two ends independently: cast to int, apply `lo` only if it is not -inf, apply `hi` only if it is not +inf. `_int_envelope()` already passes infinities through untouched and needed no change; it is the only other place in the module that special-cases infinity, and the rest of the tree's `isfinite` calls are input validation in unrelated modules. THE RECORD. `UnitPlan.explain()` printed `inverter-a -> +500 W in [2000, +inf] (weighted share)` - a line asserting a share is inside an interval that excludes it, in the record SAFETY-28 gates on. It now ASKS: `within_envelope` checks the share against the interval, and a violated plan prints `OUTSIDE ... - ENVELOPE VIOLATED, DO NOT WRITE` instead. A dropped unit is exempt and prints "not commanded" - it was told nothing, its interval may be a contradiction no number is inside, and a banner there would cry wolf on the one row that is working. THE REPLAY THAT COULD NOT SEE IT, WHICH IS THE FINDING THAT MATTERS. The 250 000-tick replay drew every envelope as `B(-uniform(0, RATING), uniform(0, RATING))` - finite on both ends and containing zero, every time - while the check it fed claimed "no share ever leaves the envelope it was clamped into", which reads as a statement about `UnitBounds`. The data could only exercise a symmetric closed interval around zero. That is why it reported 0 escapes against a live defect while the reviewer's own 120 000 ticks reported 6 254. The generator now draws from every shape `UnitBounds` can express: finite straddling zero, half-open above, half-open below, finite excluding zero in each direction, half-open AND excluding zero, and bare `UnitBounds()`. Over the same seed and the same 250 000 ticks it draws 166 657 half-open intervals, 55 233 bare ones and 222 082 that exclude zero, and those counts are PRINTED and asserted so "the replay covers half-open intervals" is a number a reader can see rather than a sentence the file asserts about itself. The escape check also dropped its 1 W tolerance: `_int_envelope()` narrows inward, so there is nothing for slack to absorb except a defect. GRADED, NOT MERELY APPLIED - the acceptance bar for this round. A/B on one seed and one tick count, against the defective clamp: THE OLD GENERATOR SEES 0 ESCAPES, THE NEW ONE SEES 39 991. Reverting the fix under the widened generator takes test_alloc.py RED on four checks (the escape count, the record check, and both halves of the new half-open block); re-applying it takes it green. The collapse is now a row in part 12's mutation table, recorded as the mutation that actually shipped rather than a hypothetical one. TWO CHECKS RE-AIMED RATHER THAN LOOSENED. * Part 6's "the sign gate never fires on an ordinary tick" counted refusals over the whole replay. Envelopes that EXCLUDE zero are precisely what that gate is for, so the widened generator makes refusals correct there. It now counts an ORDINARY tick explicitly - no pin, every envelope contains zero - and asserts 0 refusals over 77 533 of them, half-open and bare envelopes among them. That is stronger than what it replaced, not weaker. * Part 1's third check summed `sum_w - sum(shares)` over ticks where `unmet_w == 0`, and `unmet_w` IS that difference - so it was true by construction and would have gone quiet rather than red. It now measures the one rounding that is actually left: the site-level `quantisation_w`, totalling -39.8 W over 137 964 allocations, i.e. -0.0003 W per tick. Largest remainder against the per-unit alternative is still graded in part 2, where the counterfactual drifts -125 W over 50 000 ticks at three inverters. Verified: all 18 suites green in the CI image on a tree with no bytecode cache; test_alloc.py also re-run through tools/mutation_run.sh, which purges. AC 2 and AC 3 are untouched by this change - the rig and part 8 use symmetric finite envelopes, which the old and new clamp treat identically - and part 8 is green. No hardware touched; admin/goodwe not fetched, not modified, not pushed to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-02 11:49:18 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	186e13ceca	ALLOC-01: allocate the site grid target, sum-invariant, never broadcast checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m6s Details ARB-03 left `allocate()` as a documented seam that passed through at N<=1 and DECLINED at N>=2, with the reasoning recorded at the line: the obvious placeholder - hand the site target to each inverter - IS the ARCH-01 fault, and "a placeholder that cannot be told apart from the real thing by any guard we have is worse than no placeholder". This fills the seam. WHY A BROADCAST IS A FAULT AND NOT AN INEFFICIENCY. The control primitive is meter emulation: the master reports a FABRICATED grid reading and the inverter regulates itself to it, so one number means "the battery moves X W" to this add-on and "the grid is at X W" to the inverter - an identity that holds only at N=1. Hand two inverters the same target and each supplies it IN FULL, so the loop gain at the meter becomes N times the per-unit gain. Reproduced on admin/goodwe's two-master rig against this tree: -400 W export overshoot at gain 0.6, and at gain 1.0 - which config.yaml accepts as its documented maximum - a permanent 4000 W peak-to-peak limit cycle, commands alternating 1000/2000/1000/0 W, with NOT ONE GUARD FIRING. The sign watchdog is evaluated on every cycle and never trips, because the disagreement flips on alternate ticks and never holds its 180 s window. WHAT WAS BUILT. `app/allocator.py`, host-side and strictly above the driver seam. It consumes intervals and a number and nothing else - no claims, no priorities, and no measurement, because an allocator that read P1 would be a SECOND integrator on the site measurement. * ENVELOPE CLAMP, from ARB-03 stage 1's `UnitBounds`, read PER TICK. `plan()` is a pure function and the module holds no state, so there is nowhere for a construction-time envelope to be cached. * WATER-FILL by weight, with the surplus of a full unit moving to the others. Weights express PREFERENCE, envelopes express PERMISSION: a zero weight is honoured while another unit has headroom and overridden when it does not, because the SUM is the safety property and stranding capacity behind a comfort choice manufactures a standing error at the meter. * LARGEST-REMAINDER ROUNDING. The target is rounded ONCE, at the top; every sum below that line is integer arithmetic, so it cannot drift. Measured: a per-unit round() drifts -125 W over 50 000 ticks at three inverters. * THE ALLOCATION RECORD, with `unmet_w`, `dropped` and a per-unit reason. `ok` is one boolean for SAFETY-28 to gate on, and `unmet_w` is deliberately NOT fused into it - a saturated inverter must not park the whole site. THE STABILITY PROPERTY IS STRUCTURAL. With sum(a_i) = 1 the gain at the meter is sum(a_i * g_i), a convex combination of the per-unit gains, so it lies in [min g_i, max g_i] FOR ANY SPLIT. That is what makes the weights a comfort choice rather than a tuning parameter, and it is why a bad split cannot destabilise the site. Graded directly, and measured end to end: 90/10, 50/50 and 100/0 give a bit-identical aggregate trace at the meter, and a gain sweep to 1.0 at every split has a flat tail at all 84 combinations. THE TWO REFUSALS main.py NOW MAKES, AND WHY THERE ARE TWO. `allocated=False` no longer means "no allocator"; it means no safe split EXISTS - a mis-routed claim, an empty envelope set, or a split that could only be made by commanding one pack to charge while another discharges. Separately, and this guard is the price of making allocate() succeed rather than something inherited, main.py refuses to act on a valid split it cannot DELIVER: there is one `setpoint_entity`, so writing the site target to the one inverter it can reach would over-command that inverter by exactly the other's share. Commanding a partial site is a worse instruction than commanding nothing. DEV-02 gives it the second writer. scope_violations() IS NOW CONSUMED, AND AS A REFUSAL. ARB-03 left it logging without changing the resolution. A mis-routed claim means the number about to be divided may itself be wrong, and dividing a number that may be wrong is worse than not dividing it - the same answer clause 3 already gives a contradiction. It is NOT promoted into an envelope: a unit-scoped claim that landed on the site names no unit, so promoting it would mean guessing one, or applying one inverter's rating to a sibling that does not have it. AT N<=1 IT IS A PASS-THROUGH, BYTE-IDENTICAL: the share is the site target, as a float, unrounded and unclamped. All 17 existing suites replay unedited. test_peakguard.py part 10h and test_arbiter.py part 7 were RE-AIMED, not deleted. PR #40's reviewer proved that refusal branch was unreachable and untested once; removing its trigger without giving it a new one would have rebuilt the hole. Part 10h now drives three real cycles - a deliverable split, a dead sibling, and every master stale - and grades all three. KNOWN AND NOT CLOSED HERE: at a roster of two the loop's `actual_w` is one inverter's power used as a site measurement, because the add-on binds a single `inverter_power` sensor. That is the SENSING half of the same N=1 identity this card removes from the COMMANDING half, and it makes the aggregate trace split-dependent below gain 1.0. Measured with its counterfactual in test_alloc.py part 8 and tools/alloc_sim.py --splits. It belongs to DEV-02. Verified: all 18 suites green in the CI image. 16 mutations run through tools/mutation_run.sh on a purged tree; 13 red, and the 3 survivors are recorded in test_alloc.py part 12 with the reason each cannot be caught. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-02 10:42:33 +02:00

glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5

3fe3c7acb0

ALLOC-01: clamp each envelope end on its own, and widen the replay that missed it

checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m9s

Details

Two blocking findings from the review of 186e13c. The second is why the first
survived, and it is the one this commit is really about.

THE CLAMP. `_clamp_int()` folded both ends of the interval into one
`min(max(...))` and substituted `v` itself for a bound that was infinite. That
reads as "an absent bound cannot bind", and it is not what it does: with
`hi == inf` the expression collapses to `min(max(v, lo), v) == v`, so A MISSING
CEILING SILENTLY DISCARDED THE FLOOR. `_clamp_int(0, 2142, inf)` returned 0. It
reached the shares through all three call sites - the base, the pin clamp and
the post-floor clamp.

The worked failure: bounds `{a: [2000, +inf], b: [-5000, 5000]}` against a
+1000 W site target returned `a=+500, b=+500` - inverter-a commanded at a
quarter of its own 2000 W floor - while THE SAME CASE WITH A FINITE CEILING
correctly REFUSES on sign coherence. So one defect broke the ticket's first
named deliverable ("each share clipped to that unit's UnitBounds interval") and
suppressed a circulating-power refusal that should have fired. Both now behave
identically, and the refusal is the behaviour.

Not reachable on the live install - N=1 is a pass-through, and via main.py the
supervised claim unconditionally files a finite +/-max_w LIMIT at P_SAFETY that
pre_resolve's gate can never filter because nothing outranks P_SAFETY. But
`plan()` and `arbiter.allocate()` are the public envelope contract SAFETY-28 and
DEV-02 are being asked to build on, and `UnitBounds()` DEFAULTS TO
`(-inf, +inf)`, so a one-sided envelope is the ordinary case at N>=2 rather than
an edge, and any caller with one inherited the defect.

Fixed by clamping the two ends independently: cast to int, apply `lo` only if it
is not -inf, apply `hi` only if it is not +inf. `_int_envelope()` already passes
infinities through untouched and needed no change; it is the only other place in
the module that special-cases infinity, and the rest of the tree's `isfinite`
calls are input validation in unrelated modules.

THE RECORD. `UnitPlan.explain()` printed
`inverter-a -> +500 W in [2000, +inf] (weighted share)` - a line asserting a
share is inside an interval that excludes it, in the record SAFETY-28 gates on.
It now ASKS: `within_envelope` checks the share against the interval, and a
violated plan prints `OUTSIDE ... - ENVELOPE VIOLATED, DO NOT WRITE` instead. A
dropped unit is exempt and prints "not commanded" - it was told nothing, its
interval may be a contradiction no number is inside, and a banner there would
cry wolf on the one row that is working.

THE REPLAY THAT COULD NOT SEE IT, WHICH IS THE FINDING THAT MATTERS. The
250 000-tick replay drew every envelope as `B(-uniform(0, RATING),
uniform(0, RATING))` - finite on both ends and containing zero, every time -
while the check it fed claimed "no share ever leaves the envelope it was clamped
into", which reads as a statement about `UnitBounds`. The data could only
exercise a symmetric closed interval around zero. That is why it reported 0
escapes against a live defect while the reviewer's own 120 000 ticks reported
6 254.

The generator now draws from every shape `UnitBounds` can express: finite
straddling zero, half-open above, half-open below, finite excluding zero in each
direction, half-open AND excluding zero, and bare `UnitBounds()`. Over the same
seed and the same 250 000 ticks it draws 166 657 half-open intervals, 55 233
bare ones and 222 082 that exclude zero, and those counts are PRINTED and
asserted so "the replay covers half-open intervals" is a number a reader can see
rather than a sentence the file asserts about itself. The escape check also
dropped its 1 W tolerance: `_int_envelope()` narrows inward, so there is nothing
for slack to absorb except a defect.

GRADED, NOT MERELY APPLIED - the acceptance bar for this round. A/B on one seed
and one tick count, against the defective clamp: THE OLD GENERATOR SEES 0
ESCAPES, THE NEW ONE SEES 39 991. Reverting the fix under the widened generator
takes test_alloc.py RED on four checks (the escape count, the record check, and
both halves of the new half-open block); re-applying it takes it green. The
collapse is now a row in part 12's mutation table, recorded as the mutation that
actually shipped rather than a hypothetical one.

TWO CHECKS RE-AIMED RATHER THAN LOOSENED.
* Part 6's "the sign gate never fires on an ordinary tick" counted refusals over
  the whole replay. Envelopes that EXCLUDE zero are precisely what that gate is
  for, so the widened generator makes refusals correct there. It now counts an
  ORDINARY tick explicitly - no pin, every envelope contains zero - and asserts
  0 refusals over 77 533 of them, half-open and bare envelopes among them. That
  is stronger than what it replaced, not weaker.
* Part 1's third check summed `sum_w - sum(shares)` over ticks where
  `unmet_w == 0`, and `unmet_w` IS that difference - so it was true by
  construction and would have gone quiet rather than red. It now measures the
  one rounding that is actually left: the site-level `quantisation_w`, totalling
  -39.8 W over 137 964 allocations, i.e. -0.0003 W per tick. Largest remainder
  against the per-unit alternative is still graded in part 2, where the
  counterfactual drifts -125 W over 50 000 ticks at three inverters.

Verified: all 18 suites green in the CI image on a tree with no bytecode cache;
test_alloc.py also re-run through tools/mutation_run.sh, which purges. AC 2 and
AC 3 are untouched by this change - the rig and part 8 use symmetric finite
envelopes, which the old and new clamp treat identically - and part 8 is green.
No hardware touched; admin/goodwe not fetched, not modified, not pushed to.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-02 11:49:18 +02:00

glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5

186e13ceca

ALLOC-01: allocate the site grid target, sum-invariant, never broadcast

checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m6s

Details

ARB-03 left `allocate()` as a documented seam that passed through at N<=1 and
DECLINED at N>=2, with the reasoning recorded at the line: the obvious
placeholder - hand the site target to each inverter - IS the ARCH-01 fault, and
"a placeholder that cannot be told apart from the real thing by any guard we
have is worse than no placeholder". This fills the seam.

WHY A BROADCAST IS A FAULT AND NOT AN INEFFICIENCY. The control primitive is
meter emulation: the master reports a FABRICATED grid reading and the inverter
regulates itself to it, so one number means "the battery moves X W" to this
add-on and "the grid is at X W" to the inverter - an identity that holds only at
N=1. Hand two inverters the same target and each supplies it IN FULL, so the
loop gain at the meter becomes N times the per-unit gain. Reproduced on
admin/goodwe's two-master rig against this tree: -400 W export overshoot at
gain 0.6, and at gain 1.0 - which config.yaml accepts as its documented maximum
- a permanent 4000 W peak-to-peak limit cycle, commands alternating
1000/2000/1000/0 W, with NOT ONE GUARD FIRING. The sign watchdog is evaluated on
every cycle and never trips, because the disagreement flips on alternate ticks
and never holds its 180 s window.

WHAT WAS BUILT. `app/allocator.py`, host-side and strictly above the driver
seam. It consumes intervals and a number and nothing else - no claims, no
priorities, and no measurement, because an allocator that read P1 would be a
SECOND integrator on the site measurement.

  * ENVELOPE CLAMP, from ARB-03 stage 1's `UnitBounds`, read PER TICK. `plan()`
    is a pure function and the module holds no state, so there is nowhere for a
    construction-time envelope to be cached.
  * WATER-FILL by weight, with the surplus of a full unit moving to the others.
    Weights express PREFERENCE, envelopes express PERMISSION: a zero weight is
    honoured while another unit has headroom and overridden when it does not,
    because the SUM is the safety property and stranding capacity behind a
    comfort choice manufactures a standing error at the meter.
  * LARGEST-REMAINDER ROUNDING. The target is rounded ONCE, at the top; every
    sum below that line is integer arithmetic, so it cannot drift. Measured: a
    per-unit round() drifts -125 W over 50 000 ticks at three inverters.
  * THE ALLOCATION RECORD, with `unmet_w`, `dropped` and a per-unit reason.
    `ok` is one boolean for SAFETY-28 to gate on, and `unmet_w` is deliberately
    NOT fused into it - a saturated inverter must not park the whole site.

THE STABILITY PROPERTY IS STRUCTURAL. With sum(a_i) = 1 the gain at the meter is
sum(a_i * g_i), a convex combination of the per-unit gains, so it lies in
[min g_i, max g_i] FOR ANY SPLIT. That is what makes the weights a comfort
choice rather than a tuning parameter, and it is why a bad split cannot
destabilise the site. Graded directly, and measured end to end: 90/10, 50/50 and
100/0 give a bit-identical aggregate trace at the meter, and a gain sweep to 1.0
at every split has a flat tail at all 84 combinations.

THE TWO REFUSALS main.py NOW MAKES, AND WHY THERE ARE TWO. `allocated=False` no
longer means "no allocator"; it means no safe split EXISTS - a mis-routed claim,
an empty envelope set, or a split that could only be made by commanding one pack
to charge while another discharges. Separately, and this guard is the price of
making allocate() succeed rather than something inherited, main.py refuses to
act on a valid split it cannot DELIVER: there is one `setpoint_entity`, so
writing the site target to the one inverter it can reach would over-command that
inverter by exactly the other's share. Commanding a partial site is a worse
instruction than commanding nothing. DEV-02 gives it the second writer.

scope_violations() IS NOW CONSUMED, AND AS A REFUSAL. ARB-03 left it logging
without changing the resolution. A mis-routed claim means the number about to be
divided may itself be wrong, and dividing a number that may be wrong is worse
than not dividing it - the same answer clause 3 already gives a contradiction.
It is NOT promoted into an envelope: a unit-scoped claim that landed on the site
names no unit, so promoting it would mean guessing one, or applying one
inverter's rating to a sibling that does not have it.

AT N<=1 IT IS A PASS-THROUGH, BYTE-IDENTICAL: the share is the site target, as a
float, unrounded and unclamped. All 17 existing suites replay unedited.

test_peakguard.py part 10h and test_arbiter.py part 7 were RE-AIMED, not
deleted. PR #40's reviewer proved that refusal branch was unreachable and
untested once; removing its trigger without giving it a new one would have
rebuilt the hole. Part 10h now drives three real cycles - a deliverable split, a
dead sibling, and every master stale - and grades all three.

KNOWN AND NOT CLOSED HERE: at a roster of two the loop's `actual_w` is one
inverter's power used as a site measurement, because the add-on binds a single
`inverter_power` sensor. That is the SENSING half of the same N=1 identity this
card removes from the COMMANDING half, and it makes the aggregate trace
split-dependent below gain 1.0. Measured with its counterfactual in test_alloc.py
part 8 and tools/alloc_sim.py --splits. It belongs to DEV-02.

Verified: all 18 suites green in the CI image. 16 mutations run through
tools/mutation_run.sh on a purged tree; 13 red, and the 3 survivors are recorded
in test_alloc.py part 12 with the reason each cannot be caught.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-02 10:42:33 +02:00