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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 024a4f58dd OPT-09: the weights DO move on a wedged unit, and that narrows SAFETY-42
checks / unit (pull_request) Failing after 2s
B1, the blocking review finding. §5 of the decision said:

    "A wedged unit reads a healthy SoC, so no envelope closes and no weight
     moves - OPT-09 cannot see it at all."

The first clause is true and is about the ENVELOPE. The second clause is
FALSE, and it was load-bearing for the claim that OPT-09 and SAFETY-42 meet
without overlapping. A weight is a function of a pack's ENERGY HEADROOM, not
of what the pack delivers, so a wedged unit's weight moves whenever its
headroom differs from its sibling's - the ordinary case this card exists to
exploit. And delivery.delinquent() (app/delivery.py:484, threshold at :531)
names a unit only while its short_by() gap exceeds min_w = Tuning.saturation_w
= 500 W in ABSOLUTE WATTS. Shrinking the share shrinks the gap below the
threshold, and the alarm stops firing on a unit still delivering nothing.

So the seam, stated accurately: OPT-09 stops the ask AND narrows SAFETY-42's
detection window for a low-headroom unit. That is a DETECTION REGRESSION at
N=2. It is disclosed here, not fixed: making delinquent() relative to the ask
rather than absolute is SAFETY-42's code and a design change, filed as its own
card.

1. THE CORRECTION, in the three places that carried the claim

   * DECISIONS/OPT-09-soc-aware-weights.md §5 - rewritten. States the seam
     accurately, quotes the sentence it is replacing, carries the measured
     rows and the window arithmetic, and names the residual in the same voice
     as SAFETY-13's "2 of 272" and SAFETY-42's "the discriminator does not
     exist". Also drops "they meet and do not overlap" from the opening.
   * app/packshare.py - a new section in the module docstring, immediately
     after "weights are a comfort choice for stability and not for delivery",
     which is where the over-read starts.
   * CHANGELOG.md - a new paragraph in the SAFETY-42 entry, ending on the
     operator-facing sentence: a wedged inverter with less energy headroom
     than its sibling can now go unreported at ordinary house loads.

   test_packshare.py part 8's closing check and its "what this file cannot
   see" list repeated the same false clause; both now say the ENVELOPE cannot
   reach a wedged unit and point at part 8b for what the WEIGHTS do to it.

2. THE GRADED CHECK - test_packshare.py part 8b, 6 named checks

   The reviewer's probe, reproduced: real compute(), real plan(), real
   packshare.weights(), real delivery.account(), real delivery.delinquent();
   the only model is the plant (A obeys within one cycle inside its rating,
   B accepts its share and delivers 0 W). Unit B is WEDGED at 15 % against
   its own 10 % floor, so envelope() does not close and account() explains
   nothing - a SAFETY-42 true positive by that card's own definition, which
   a PRECONDITION check asserts before anything is concluded from it.

       load 1500 W, B wedged at 15 %, equal weights  named on 199/200 cycles,
         site target +3000 W, shares a+1500, b+1500, grid +0 W, named=[b]
       load 1500 W, B wedged at 15 %, OPT-09 weights named on   0/200 cycles,
         site target +1630 W, shares a+1505, b+125,  grid -5 W, named=(nobody)
       load 6000 W, B wedged at 15 %, equal weights  named on 199/200 cycles
       load 6000 W, B wedged at 15 %, OPT-09 weights named on 195/200 cycles

       suppression window: equal weights, site target < 1000 W; OPT-09
       weights, site target < 6500 W of a 9600 W site

   THE CHECKS ASSERT THE CURRENT, UNFLATTERING BEHAVIOUR ON PURPOSE - that
   the weighted arm names NOBODY where the equal arm names the wedged unit.
   A check asserting the alarm still fires would fail, and papering over it
   would be worse than the original defect. The 6000 W row is there so the
   part is not pinning "the weighted arm never names anybody": past the
   healthy pack's own rating, _fill()'s last-resort pass hands the wedged
   unit 3000 W and both arms name it. The window is real and it has an edge.

   MUTATION - packshare.weights() keeps its shape and forces every weight to
   1.0 (M11 in part 11's table, which now has 11 rows). RUN on a purged tree
   with python3 -B, not reasoned about:

       load 1500 W, B wedged at 15 %, equal weights  named on 199/200 cycles,
         site target +3000 W, shares a+1500, b+1500, grid +0 W, named=[b]
       load 1500 W, B wedged at 15 %, OPT-09 weights named on 199/200 cycles,
         site target +3000 W, shares a+1500, b+1500, grid +0 W, named=[b]
       load 6000 W, B wedged at 15 %, OPT-09 weights named on 199/200 cycles,
         site target +4000 W, shares a+2000, b+2000, grid +4000 W, named=[b]
       suppression window: equal weights < 1000 W; OPT-09 weights < 1000 W

     FAIL  AND WITH OPT-09's WEIGHTS IT IS NAMED ON NONE OF THE 200 [...]
     FAIL  ...and the arithmetic behind it, stated as a window [...]
     FAIL  AND IT IS NOT THAT THE WEIGHTED ARM NEVER NAMES ANYBODY [...]

   test_packshare.py exits 1. Restored: exits 0.

3. THREE PROC-01 PROSE DEFECTS

   * DECISIONS/OPT-09-soc-aware-weights.md:3 said "Base: release/1.0 @
     464d398". The branch was rebased; git merge-base HEAD 3368231 is
     3368231. Corrected, and it says why the old number was there.
   * Same file:13 cited main.py:2272 for "resolution = resolve(...)".
     git show 3368231:goodwe_controller/app/main.py | grep -n says 2422.
     Corrected. The sibling citation arbiter.py:535 is right and is left.
   * DOCS.md:174 said "Since 0.7.x the split is driven by two separate
     things", which tells an operator the fix already shipped. config.yaml
     is 0.8.0 and the live install is 0.7.0, where the split is 50/50 - this
     card's own premise. Now "from 0.8.0 onwards", with an explicit warning
     that 0.7.0 and earlier are a fixed 50/50.

NOT TOUCHED, deliberately: delinquent()'s absolute threshold (SAFETY-42's
code, its own card), and app/main.py:2699's double-logged scope refusal (N4,
filed separately).

INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST (expected ~2026-09-12). Every two-unit figure above
is TWO COPIES OF A through a plant modelled in test_packshare.py; B's 4600 W /
20.48 kWh / 10 % floor are from the datasheet and the serial. Nothing here was
measured on hardware, and the added disclaimers say so in each place.

Verified with the real harness per .gitea/workflows/checks.yml
(goodwe-addon-checks:1): COLLECTED 24 files, ALLGREEN. Harness positive
control run first - test_validate.py deliberately broken, harness reported
"FAILED: test_validate.py" and exited 1; restored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 22:53:03 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 8123e261ce OPT-09: the weights parameter nothing ever passed, and what it cannot do
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m19s
`allocator.plan()` has taken a `weights` argument since ALLOC-01 and NOTHING
had ever passed one - main.py called `resolve()` without it and the arbiter
defaulted it to 1.0 per unit - so the site target was split 50/50 regardless
of what either pack could do. Two things now feed it, and they are different
kinds of thing:

  * a `pack` UNIT claim at P_SAFETY that CLOSES a unit's envelope at its own
    `bms_soc_floor` or at 100 % - a PERMISSION, obeyed absolutely, so an empty
    pack is not asked to discharge and its share goes to the sibling;
  * SoC-aware weights by ENERGY headroom in kWh - a PREFERENCE, which
    `_fill()`'s last-resort pass will override the moment the sibling saturates.

Measured (test_packshare.py part 8): at a load one pack cannot cover, the
weighted arm and the shipped arm command the IDENTICAL watts into an empty pack
and deliver the IDENTICAL watts. Only the envelope stops the ask, and what it
buys is not delivery - it is a reported `unmet_w` where the record used to read
impeccable. Weights are a comfort choice for STABILITY and NOT for DELIVERY.

Also: an optional per-entry `capacity_kwh` (schema change, all-or-nothing across
the roster, rule 9 refuses a partial one); per-pack arbitrage sizing, with the
sell side's no-op stated rather than hidden; and a 0 W trade refused by name,
because a 0 W arbitrage claim is a park order that outranks the loop.

SAFETY-42 and this card meet at one hazard from opposite sides - OPT-09 stops
the site ASKING a pack whose SoC says it cannot deliver, SAFETY-42 alarms when a
pack that said it could does not - and its end-to-end fixture moved as a result.
Its finding is unchanged and is now stated on the two quantities its rejected
discriminator actually reads.

Not filed at all at a roster of one: at N=1 every source routes to the site, so
the interval would bound the SITE TARGET, and SAFETY-25's decided Option A
stands untouched on the live install.

⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. Its 4600 W / 20.48 kWh / 10 % are FROM DATASHEET
AND SERIAL, and `sim/plantsim.py`'s INVERTER_B is inverter A copied
(`measured=False`), so every two-inverter figure here is arithmetic or two
copies of A. No hardware was touched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 21:38:40 +02:00
51 changed files with 358 additions and 12263 deletions
+1 -8
View File
@@ -14,20 +14,13 @@ goodwe_controller/ the add-on
hass.py Supervisor/Core API access
store.py persistent state in /data
mqtt.py optional status entities
web.py ingress UI — routes only, status and configuration
config_page.py the configuration page's markup, style and script
configui.py its field model, built from the Supervisor's own
schema + translations — owns no key, label or rule
selfconfig.py reading and writing this add-on's own options,
with the validate-first / compare-and-swap gate
web.py ingress UI
main.py orchestration, heartbeat, failsafe behaviour
test_control.py runnable checks — no framework needed
test_maintenance.py runnable checks — walks a full cycle in fake time
DOCS.md the add-on's documentation tab
MUTATION.md how to run a mutation so the result means something
tools/mutation_run.sh the mutation harness - purges bytecode, then grades
tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py what the Supervisor really permits and
returns, run against its own release image
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml ESPHome config for the T-CAN485
estop/rs485_log.py optional RS485 e-stop / bus witness
docs/GoodWe-RS485-Field-Guide.pdf the guide techs carry (10pp, A4)
+1 -380
View File
@@ -1,380 +1,5 @@
# Changelog
## Unreleased
⚠️ **THIS HAS NO VERSION AND CANNOT REACH AN INSTALL UNTIL IT GETS ONE.**
PKG-06's and PKG-07's rule: the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`,
so `ha apps update` is a silent no-op on an unbumped change. This branch
deliberately does **not** pick the number, because the right one depends on a
fact the branch cannot observe - whether 0.9.0's image has already been built
and pulled. If it has not, this belongs inside 0.9.0's section before it ships;
if it has, it needs 0.10.0. Whoever deploys decides.
| | |
|---|---|
| _this branch_ | FCST-04 - the carry-forward fill reaches the plan, and the day it carries survives a restart |
**FCST-03 shipped the fill and no caller.** `price_forecast.fill_from_yesterday()`
was complete and checked, and so were the consumers written for it -
`TariffPlan.firm_points()`, `cheap_now()`'s refusal of a provisional hour, and
`arbitrage()`'s refusal 3, which drops provisional hours from the trade set
rather than refusing the whole series. Nothing in `app/` called the fill, so no
series ever contained a carried point and every one of those consumers was
exercising its all-firm branch.
⚠️ **THE DEFECT THAT PRODUCED WAS NOT AN ERROR ANYWHERE.** `load_prices()`
returns what the feed published and nothing widened it to the requested horizon,
so on a dynamic site between midnight and the 14-16 h CET day-ahead publication
the plan covered the rest of today and **nothing more** - typically 10-24 of the
48 hours `price_horizon_h` asked for. `arbitrage()` then took `max - min` over
that truncated window and reported a spread. The number was real, the window was
half the one configured, and **nothing said so**: tomorrow evening's peak, the
hour a morning charge would be sold into, was not in the series at all, so the
spread it would have created was never compared against anything.
**What changes:**
* `app/price_history.py` (new) keeps the **published** prices of the last few
Brussels days in `/data/price_history.json`, and `resolve_tariff()` now fills
an unpublished hour of the horizon from yesterday's same-wall-clock hour,
flagged provisional. ⚠️ **"An" unpublished hour, not "every" one:** the fill
can carry only an hour yesterday actually published, so a partial yesterday
leaves the local hours it never held **out of the series** - §11.4 for those
hours, and asking for one raises rather than answering. Correct behaviour,
and the wording is now the behaviour.
* ⚠️ **A sub-hourly feed keeps every print.** `eneco_eddy` is the imbalance
product and settles per **quarter**; the fill walks whole hours to decide
what needs carrying, and that is not a rule about what a published hour may
contain. Every published point inside the horizon passes through by identity,
and a carried point is added only for a whole hour with no published coverage
at all. The first draft keyed the published set by hour - last point wins -
and a 96-point quarter-hourly feed reached the optimiser as 15 points with
its spread down from 0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh, on an all-firm, fully-published
series.
* The horizon is **whole hours at both ends**: `since` is floored to the hour
that contains it, and so is `until`. Asked for 48 hours at 08:17, the plan is
48 hours long and not 49.
* `resolve_tariff(history=...)` is **required and keyword-only**. A caller with
no durable volume passes the explicit `NoHistory()`. A default of `None`
meaning "skip the fill" would hand a caller who forgot the argument exactly
the truncated horizon this card removes, silently.
* A new status row, **Price history**, names the days held and their hour
counts.
⚠️ **ONE CHANGE HERE MOVES ENERGY, AND IT IS NOT THE ONE THE CARD IS NAMED FOR.**
Carried hours are provisional, so §8.3 keeps them out of the trade set: the fill
widens what the optimiser can **see**, never what it may **do**. What does
change a trade is that the filled series is windowed to `[since, until)`, so
**hours that have already elapsed are no longer in the spread**. Before, a cheap
night that had already gone sat in the series as the day's cheapest hour - and a
cycle cannot buy in an hour that is past, so the trade was quietly never taken.
`test_price_history.py` section 2 grades this by finding the cheapest firm hour
with and without the fill and showing it **moves**.
⚠️ **A DEAD FEED IS STILL §11.4, NOT YESTERDAY.** The fill runs only on a
`series` read; a feed that published nothing still degrades to the configured
`static_profile`. The two are indistinguishable to the optimiser - both are
100 % provisional, so arbitrage refuses on the firm-pair rung and `cheap_now()`
is False - so preferring yesterday would change a documented degradation for a
difference only the status page can see.
`DECISIONS/FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried.md` carries that and two more.
⚠️ **A BROKEN CACHE IS NOT A BROKEN CONTROLLER.** No `/data`, an unreadable
file, a schema this build does not know (including a `version` of `1.0`, which
`== 1`), a **day record that is not a record**, a malformed point - each its own
state with its own reason, none of them a price and none of them an empty
series. In every one the plan is still a real provider series and the controller
still regulates; the horizon is just as short as it was before this card.
`.words` never raises, because `Controller.__init__` reads it unguarded and a
status line that throws is an add-on that does not start.
⚠️ **AND WHERE THERE IS NO `/data`, NOTHING IS RECORDED AT ALL** - not even in
memory. An in-memory yesterday answers for one run and is gone on the next
restart, which is a cache that forgets without saying so; the honest pair is
`unavailable` on the status row and no prices carried.
⚠️ **"YESTERDAY" IS A LOCAL DATE, AND THE ARITHMETIC IS ON THE DATE.**
`brussels()` renders at a fixed offset, so subtracting `timedelta(days=1)` from
it subtracts 24 **absolute** hours - and the Brussels day before a
spring-forward is 23 hours long. Between 00:00 and 00:59 on the morning after
the March transition that lands on the day *before* yesterday. **No option was
added and `config.yaml` is untouched.**
## 0.9.0
⚠️ **MINOR FOR NEW FUNCTIONALITY, NOT FOR A BREAK - AND THAT DISTINCTION IS THE
POINT.** 0.8.0 was minor because a config that started on 0.7.0 could be
REFUSED on it (rule 10 against 0.7.0's own default `slew_w: 1000`). Nothing of
that kind is true here, and it was checked rather than assumed:
- `options:` and `schema:` both hold **71 top-level keys**, the same 71 as
0.8.0. The one schema addition is a per-entry key, `capacity_kwh:
float(0.1,200)?` - **note the trailing `?`, it is OPTIONAL**.
- An unmodified 0.8.0-era config validates clean on 0.9.0. Measured on both the
flat single-inverter shape the reference install runs and an N=2 roster with
no `capacity_kwh` on any entry: **0 problems each**.
- The two refusals [[OPT-09]] adds fire only on configs that USE the new key -
an unparseable value, or the key stated on one roster entry and left empty on
another. Neither can reach a config written before the key existed.
So: existing installs upgrade untouched, and the bump is minor because the
option surface and the behaviour grew.
Contents, in merge order since 0.8.0 (`06661c5`):
| | |
|---|---|
| `3d29993` | UX-02 - the validator's refusals, next to the field, before the save |
| `fdb3b69` | OPT-09 - the weights parameter nothing ever passed, and what it cannot do |
| `fcaa724` | PKG-09 - refuse a deploy that would be a no-op, or that the add-on would reject |
**UX-02** builds the real configuration surface in the ingress panel, beside the
Supervisor Configuration tab that cannot be removed. The prize is not styling:
`validate.py` writes long cross-field refusals the Supervisor UI *structurally
cannot show*, and until now an operator met them as **exit 78 in a log**, after
saving and restarting. ⚠️ Two config surfaces now exist and the DECISIONS record
names the **stored options blob** as authoritative, neither UI.
**OPT-09** makes the architecture's one free parameter real. `main.py` called
`resolve()` without weights, so the split was a fixed 50/50 regardless of what
either pack could deliver; it now passes SoC- and capacity-aware weights.
⚠️ **OPT-09 SHIPS A DISCLOSED DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2.** `delivery.
delinquent()` reads an ABSOLUTE 500 W gap, so weighting a low-headroom unit down
to a small share puts a unit delivering **none of what it was asked** under the
threshold. Measured: a wedged inverter goes from named on 199 of 200 cycles to
**0 of 200** at a load its sibling can carry alone. The alarm returns once the
healthy pack saturates - swept, that is a 5000 W load on the fixture, **below**
the proportional-regime formula's 6500 W and not above it. ⚠️ **N=1 IS
UNAFFECTED**: `allocator.plan()` returns before weights are read at all.
⚠️ **CLOSED BY SAFETY-43 ON THIS BRANCH** - see its section below; the regression
above is history, and the record of it is kept because the measurement that
found it is what the fix is graded against.
**PKG-09** adds `tools/predeploy_check.py`. ⚠️ **RUN IT BEFORE DEPLOYING THIS
RELEASE** - it is what caught the fact that 0.8.0 had five runtime commits
behind it, which is why this section exists:
docker run --rm -v <repo>:/w:ro goodwe-addon-checks:1 \
python3 /w/goodwe_controller/tools/predeploy_check.py \
--deployed-version 0.8.0 --options /w/live-options.json
Exit `0` cleared, `1` REFUSED, `2` NOT CLEARED. ⚠️ **2 is not a pass.**
✅ **RUN AGAINST THIS RELEASE, 2026-09-07: CLEARED, exit 0.** The reference
install's options were exported from the Supervisor (70 keys) and checked twice
- the stored blob as-is, and the **effective post-upgrade config**, being those
70 keys merged over 0.9.0's 71 defaults. Both pass. `max_w` 5000, `slew_w` 400
against a rule-10 ceiling of 555.6 W.
⚠️ **THE STORED BLOB HAS 70 KEYS, NOT 71, AND THAT IS THE INTERESTING PART.**
`delivery_hold_s` arrived with SAFETY-42 in 0.8.0, so an install running 0.7.0
has never stored it - and it is REQUIRED in the schema, no trailing `?`, which
is the shape that becomes exit 78. It resolves to its `options:` default of
**185**, because the Supervisor sets `App.options = deepmerge(config.yaml
defaults, stored options)`; `tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py` §D pins that
against a real Supervisor image rather than assuming it. The second check above
exists because "your saved settings are valid" and "what the box will actually
run is valid" are different questions, and only the second one matters.
⚠️ **THE VERSION WENT UNBUMPED FOR THE THIRD TIME IN THREE DAYS** - PKG-06 six
merges, PKG-07 six, this one five - and this time it was caught by PKG-09's own
tool during PKG-09's review rather than by a person. `ha apps update` against an
unchanged version installs nothing and reports success. PKG-10 carries the
post-merge alarm so that noticing stops being a human's job.
## Unreleased
⚠️ **THIS HAS NO VERSION AND CANNOT REACH AN INSTALL UNTIL IT GETS ONE.**
PKG-06's and PKG-07's rule: the Supervisor keys the built image by `version:`,
so `ha apps update` is a silent no-op on an unbumped change. This branch
deliberately does **not** pick the number, because the right one depends on a
fact the branch cannot observe - whether 0.8.0's image has already been built
and pulled. If it has not, this belongs inside 0.8.0's section before it ships;
if it has, it needs 0.8.1. Whoever deploys decides, and PKG-07 is the record of
what happens when nobody does.
| | |
|---|---|
| _this branch_ | UX-02 - a configuration page in the ingress panel, where the validator's refusals can be seen |
| _this branch_ | UX-04 - UX-01's three unmet acceptance criteria: one withdrawn, one built, one re-attributed |
| _this branch_ | TEST-21 - `delivery_hold_s`'s floor re-derived from a harness that is now committed, and the recorded 30.0 s did not reproduce |
| _this branch_ | SAFETY-43 - delinquency measured against the ask as well as against a flat 500 W, closing OPT-09's disclosed detection regression |
⚠️ **SAFETY-43 CLOSES THE DETECTION REGRESSION OPT-09 DISCLOSED, AND IT IS A
TWO-INVERTER FIX. N=1 IS BYTE-IDENTICAL.** `delivery.delinquent()` named a unit
whose shortfall exceeded an **absolute** `min_w = saturation_w = 500 W`. OPT-09's
weights shrink a low-headroom unit's share, and shrinking the share shrinks the
gap - so a unit standing at +125 W and delivering **0 W**, 100 % delinquent, was
never named. It now names a unit whose gap exceeds `min_w` **OR** exceeds
`DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` (0.85) of that unit's **own share**. Measured on the
same closed-loop fixture, same weights, same detector:
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights the old rule named on 0/200 cycles
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights the shipped one named on 200/200 cycles
⚠️ **`saturation_w` WAS NOT LOWERED, AND THAT IS THE POINT.** Lowering it would
report normal saturation as delinquency on every unit at once - SAFETY-41's
four-attempt false-trip regime, *"i'm getting really annoyed by the notifications
in my HA"*. This ADDS a second way to be named: all seven of `test_delivery.py`
part 1's existing fixtures answer identically under the old rule and the new one,
and the absolute arm's suppression window is still exactly 1000 W / 6500 W.
**0.85 is derived, not chosen.** `admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign
--fractions` grades it over the SAME 2640 no-fault runs that produced
`delivery_hold_s`'s floor. The worst continuous legitimate episode is **35.0 s**
under the absolute arm alone (SAFETY-42 §3.3, reproduced in the same run) and
**40.0 s** at 0.85. ⚠️ **THE CURVE HAS NO CLIFF AND THAT IS THE FINDING**: swept
at twenty fractions from 0.05 to 0.99, everything from **0.45 to 0.99** is 40.0
or 45.0 s - within one control cycle of every other - and below 0.45 it rises
gradually to 90.0 s at 0.05. ⚠️ **"Zero false namings" is not achievable at any
fraction and the record says so**; what is zero is false ALARMS - the longest
legitimate episode in the whole sweep is 90.0 s against a 185 s hold, so nothing
comes within 95 s of notifying anybody at any fraction measured, and 145 s at the
shipped one. The N=1 control arm is 0.0 s at every fraction in all 2640
one-inverter runs, and the flapping family is 0.0 s in all 840.
⚠️ **[[CFG-07]] GETS ONE CONTROL CYCLE WORSE AND IS NOT FIXED HERE.**
`delivery_hold_s` is declared `int(30,900)` while the measured legitimate worst
was 35.0 s; it is now 40.0 s, so the band of schema-legal false-tripping values
widens from `[30, 35]` to `[30, 40]`. CFG-07 should be re-derived against 40.0 s.
⚠️ **IT MUST CLOSE BEFORE INVERTER B IS COMMISSIONED (~2026-09-12)**, not before
the next deploy: the band is UNREACHABLE at N=1 - `delinquent()` answers `{}` for
every input at a roster of one, so no `delivery_hold_s` can false-trip on the
install running today - and commissioning B is the moment it becomes reachable.
⚠️ **AND CFG-07 HAS NO DECISION DOCUMENT IN THIS TREE** - it exists as a card
reference here and in SAFETY-43's record and nowhere else, so whoever takes it
writes `DECISIONS/CFG-07-*.md` first.
**SAFETY-43 CHANGES NO OPTION VALUE, NO SCHEMA BOUND AND NO DEFAULT** - the
fraction is a derived constant with a committed harness behind it, deliberately
not a knob, for the reason there is no `delivery_w`. The one edit to
`config.yaml` is a COMMENT: the `delivery_hold_s` block described the check as
"short by more than `saturation_w`", which is now only half of it.
**No behaviour change at one inverter, asserted rather than argued**: `plan()` is
handed a `weights` mapping that raises if anything reads it and still answers
identically at a roster of one (and the same mapping raises at a roster of two,
so the tripwire is real), and `delinquent()` answers `{}` on all 84 single-unit
(share, measured, rule) combinations including 0 of 125 W.
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-43-delinquency-relative-to-the-ask.md` carries the curve, the
positive controls and the CFG-07 assessment.
⚠️ **TEST-21 CHANGES NO CODE AND NO OPTION. IT CHANGES A NUMBER THIS RECORD
CLAIMED.** `delivery_hold_s: 185` shipped resting on *"30.0 s, the worst
continuous legitimate episode at the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs"* -
from a harness `DECISIONS/SAFETY-42-unit-delivery.md` §1 deliberately did **not
commit**, because it imports `plantsim` and `frame_check` out of `admin/goodwe`.
A shipped safety constant the next reviewer cannot re-run is PROC-01's shape.
The harness is committed now, **in `admin/goodwe` as `sim/delivery_window.py`**,
beside `sitesim.py`. It is there and not here on purpose: those two modules are
that repo's, and restating them in this tree is the CI-08 coupling that has
broken three times. The dependency runs one way instead - this repo's `control`,
`arbiter` and the shipped `delivery.delinquent()` are imported live out of
whichever checkout is under test. Re-run it with:
```
cd goodwe/sim && GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon \
python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest --campaign --blag
```
⚠️ **AND 30.0 s DID NOT REPRODUCE - IT IS 35.0 s.** Reported as measured rather
than adjusted to agree. What DID reproduce is the part the compatibility promise
rests on: the **N=1 control arm is 0.0 s at every threshold in every run**, and
the **flapping family is 0.0 s everywhere** in all 840 runs. What did not: the
headline (one control cycle worse), the reversal family (20.0 → 30.0 s), the
non-monotone curve (this rebuild's is monotone, so that finding is now an
argument and not a measurement), and the low-threshold rows, badly. The B-lag
rows moved the other way - a hypothetical unit four times slower than A gives
**75.0 s**, not 90.0 s - and they are relabelled throughout as a **sensitivity
study on a hypothesis about inverter B, which does not physically exist yet**,
rather than as a measurement of it.
**`delivery_hold_s` is NOT changed.** 185 s is 5.29× the re-measured worst
(was claimed 6.2×), 2.47× the four-times-slower case, 6.2× the firmware's
`LINK_STALE_S` veto and 4.9× inside the billing quarter: all four bounds still
clear and none narrowly. ⚠️ One consequence is worth an operator's attention:
at 35.0 s the rig's floor is now **above** the schema's own `int(30,900)`
minimum, so `delivery_hold_s: 30` is below a measured legitimate episode and
would report on ordinary saturation. The option is marked *derived, do not
change*; raising the schema floor is left to its own card.
⚠️ **UX-02 ADDS A SECOND PLACE TO CONFIGURE THIS ADD-ON, AND NO NEW WAY TO
COMMAND THE INVERTER.** The ingress panel gains a Configuration page beside
Home Assistant's Configuration tab. Both edit the same options blob; neither is
authoritative, the stored blob is. What the new one can do that the old one
structurally cannot is show `validate.py`'s CROSS-FIELD refusals - two inverters
naming one `setpoint_entity`, a `maintenance_charge_w` above `max_w`, a flat
`setpoint_entity` left set beside a roster - **next to the field, before saving**,
instead of as exit 78 in a log afterwards. The Supervisor's tab knows only types
and ranges and has no way to express a rule spanning two keys.
Four properties are the ones that could hurt somebody, and each is checked
rather than asserted (`test_selfconfig.py`):
* a blob the shipped validator refuses is **never written** - because an invalid
blob plus a restart is exit 78, and the panel goes down with the add-on;
* a blob that **changed underneath** the page is refused, not clobbered, and the
keys that moved are named. Two surfaces, one blob;
* **every message comes from the shipped validator.** Proven by inserting one
new rule into a COPY of `validate.py` and watching it arrive on the page with
every UI file byte-identical;
* **nothing on the surface commands an inverter or clears a latch.** Saving does
not even restart: applying options costs a control interruption - the
wind-down commands 0 W on every inverter - so that is a separate button that
says so first.
⚠️ **NO SCHEMA CHANGE AND NO CONTROL CHANGE.** `config.yaml` is not modified at
all by this card: the permissions the panel needs - `ingress: true`,
`ingress_port: 8099`, `hassio_api: true`, `homeassistant_api: true` - were
already declared, and the panel was already live.
`tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py` re-measures them against Supervisor
2026.08.0's own code, and found things the card had wrong: Supervisor's own
`/addons/self/options/validate` is **not** reachable from inside an add-on, and
the Configuration tab **can** be removed - at the cost of all 71 options, which
is why it stays. `DECISIONS/UX-02-two-config-surfaces.md` carries both.
⚠️ **UX-04 CHANGES NO BEHAVIOUR, NO SCHEMA AND NO DEFAULT.** It adds one check
file, three assertions to a probe, and a decisions record; `config.yaml`,
`translations/` and every module under `app/` are byte-identical to `6e7b233`.
It closes out [[UX-01]], which shipped in **0.7.0 and is live**, with three
criteria that were never met:
* **AC 3 - "the visible count drops to ~15" - is WITHDRAWN as unsatisfiable.**
`options:` and `schema:` declare the same 71 keys, so the set HA's *show
unused optional configuration options* toggle can hide is **empty**, and
Supervisor's own `UiOptions` marks **59 of the 71 required** - the frontend
shows those unconditionally, so 59 is the floor even with `options:` emptied
altogether. The target was ~4x below what any manifest can reach. ⚠️ And the
12 hides that *are* expressible would be bought with the deep-merge: a key
absent from `options:` has no default for the Supervisor to merge into a
0.7.0 box's stored blob, which is exactly the `delivery_hold_s` mechanism
that makes this release's upgrade safe rather than exit 78. The count was
**printed** by `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §F from the day it was
written and never graded, which is how this passed review; it is now three
assertions, and removing one key from `options:` turns two of them red.
* **AC 4's third clause - the AST check for stray in-code literal fallbacks -
is BUILT**, as `test_defaults_pin.py`. It discovers the six
`*_OPTION_DEFAULTS` mirrors from the tree rather than naming them, grades all
30 mirrored keys against `config.yaml`, and freezes the CFG-03 backlog at
exactly today's **27 (module, key) pairs** so it can only shrink. It found
one previously unreported divergence: `main.py` answers a missing
`target_grid_w` with **0** where `config.yaml` ships **-10** - unreachable on
a Supervisor install, recorded rather than corrected. Its red direction runs
on every invocation, and a literal planted in the real tree was shown red.
* **AC 5 / the CFG-04 double-literal `max_w` hole is closed, by
[[UX-02]]'s `bcee235` and not by UX-01's `fef6ef2`.** Re-measured on this
branch: the `2000 -> 2500` triple mutation is **RED at `test_selfconfig.py`**,
where it survived 21/21 green on 0.7.0. The attribution is corrected in
`DECISIONS/UX-04-the-configuration-tab-and-the-defaults-pin.md`; nothing was
re-done.
The 8 per-entry `inverters:` translations **stay**. They are shipped, validated
and measured *not* to reach the Supervisor tab - `ha-selector-object` labels
those fields `fields[name].label || name` and the converter sets no `label` -
and UX-02's ingress panel is the surface that can render them. A written
decision, not a change.
## 0.8.0
⚠️ **A CONFIG THAT STARTED ON 0.7.0 CAN BE REFUSED ON 0.8.0, AND THAT IS WHY
@@ -614,11 +239,7 @@ own rating, the allocator's last-resort pass hands the wedged unit a big share
again and the alarm returns. So in the quiet regime - where `unmet_w` is 0, the
meter is satisfied and no action-log line fires - **a wedged inverter with less
energy headroom than its sibling can now go unreported at ordinary house
loads.**
⚠️ BOTH BOUNDS ARE ARITHMETIC ABOUT `_fill()`'s PROPORTIONAL REGIME AND NEITHER IS A REACHABLE STEADY STATE. Swept on this fixture, the healthy pack's own 5000 W rating binds FIRST: suppressed 0/200 up to a 3000 W load, 4/200 at 4000 W, 41/200 at 4900 W (site target 5320 W, the largest reached with the wedged unit still under 500 W), then 195/200 at 5000 W once `_fill()` pins A at its cap and hands B 3000 W. So the alarm returns BELOW the 6500 W formula bound, not above it. The equal-weights 1000 W bound is unreachable for the same reason - the equal arm names the wedged unit 199/200 at every load swept, 1000 W included.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b grades it and pins the CURRENT behaviour, so
loads.** `test_packshare.py` part 8b grades it and pins the CURRENT behaviour, so
the day it changes a named check moves. Closing it means making `delinquent()`
relative to the ask rather than absolute, which is SAFETY-42's code and a design
change; that is filed as its own card and is deliberately not done here.
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
# FCST-04 — what "yesterday" is, and what the fill is allowed to reach
Four decisions, recorded because each had a defensible alternative that a later
reader would otherwise re-open from scratch.
---
## 1. The fill runs on a `series` read only. A dead feed still goes to §11.4.
`fill_from_yesterday()` accepts a `no_data` read and will happily build a
100 %-carried series from yesterday alone. `resolve_tariff()` does not let it:
a feed that published nothing still falls to `_degrade()` and §11.4's own row —
*"No price data → fall back to the static profile, mark the plan provisional,
no arbitrage."*
**Why not prefer yesterday's real prices to a coarse day/night profile?**
Because it buys nothing the optimiser can use, and it silently replaces a
fallback the operator configured.
Measured, not assumed — and stated at the reach it actually has:
- **This one reaches control.** A fully-carried series is 100 % provisional, so
`TariffPlan.arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and refuses on
§8.3's firm-pair rung. That is the verdict the optimiser reads: `arbitrage.py`
calls `plan.arbitrage(...)` on `fresh_tariff_plan()`, and it is the only path
by which a provider plan moves energy. The §11.4 static fallback refuses on
the same rung, for the same reason.
- **This one does not, and saying so is the point.** `TariffPlan.cheap_now()`
also returns False on a fully-carried series, because `firm_points()` is
empty — but it has **no production caller on the provider plan**.
`self.cheap` comes from `static_status()`, which builds its *own* static plan
and calls `cheap_now()` on that. So it is a property of the type, checked in
`test_static_tariff.py`, and it is not evidence about the shipped control
path. The conclusion below holds on the first bullet alone.
The two paths therefore differ only in which numbers the status page shows.
So the choice is between two identical control behaviours, and the tie-breaker
is that `static_profile` is a documented option an operator fills in **for this
case**. Overriding it for a cosmetic difference is a behaviour change nobody
asked for.
⚠️ **The consequence, stated so it is not discovered later as a bug:**
`fill_from_yesterday()`'s `no_data` branch is not reached from production.
It stays checked in `test_price_forecast.py`. Turning it on is a product
decision — it would want a rule about how old a carried profile may be before it
stops being offered at all — and not a wiring one.
---
## 2. "Yesterday" is a date, not the newest record.
`newest()` is the obvious accessor and it is the one that decays. An add-on down
from Friday to Monday would answer Friday's prices to a fill whose only
vocabulary is `provisional: true` — a flag that says "this is a guess", never
"this guess is three days old". Nothing downstream can tell the difference and
nothing reports it.
So `yesterday(stamp)` computes the Brussels date before `stamp`'s Brussels date
and looks up **that** record. Anything else is `no_data` with a reason naming
both the date wanted and the dates held.
The cost is real and accepted: after an outage of more than a day, the first
morning back has no fill. That is the honest state — there is no yesterday —
and the horizon is short for one morning rather than wrong for several.
---
## 3. What is recorded is the provider's read, and the mechanism is ordering.
Feeding the filled series back into the store is how this rots: day 2 carries
day 1's guesses, day 3 carries day 2's carry of them, and after a week of a dead
feed the "yesterday" being carried is a fossil of the last real publication.
Every point still carries `provisional=True`, so the **flag never lies** — what
decays is the number, behind a flag that is telling the truth.
⚠️ **No value-level check can catch that**, and claiming one would be worse than
claiming none. A carried point and a published-provisional point (`eneco_eddy`'s
current quarter, §9.2) are the same three fields carrying the same flag. The
difference is provenance, and provenance is not in the value.
The defence is therefore an **ordering**, not a validation:
- `carry()` is the only public entry point. It records its argument, then
returns the fill.
- The filled series exists only as that return value. The object never sees it
again.
- `_remember()` is private and called from exactly one place.
- `test_price_history.py` parses every shipped module under `app/`, `tools/`,
`scenarios/` and `estop/` and fails if any of them **uses the name**
`_remember` — an attribute, a bare name, a `def`, or the string constant a
`getattr` would need. By name rather than by substring, so a comment that
merely mentions the rule does not fail it and a call in `tools/` cannot pass
unseen.
- and it pins the order two ways: the **line numbers** of the two calls in
`carry()`, and — the one that matters — the **behaviour**. A feed carrying
yesterday alongside today, into an empty store, must fill the whole horizon;
reversed, the lookup finds nothing and the plan is only the hours the feed
published. Driven, so a reversal is red.
⚠️ **The first version of that ordering check graded nothing, and this file
said it did.** It compared positions in `ast.walk`, which is breadth-first:
`self._remember(...)` is a statement and `self.yesterday(...)` is an *argument*
of `fill_from_yesterday(...)`, one level deeper, so `_remember` came out first
whichever statement was written first. Measured — shipped and reversed both
scored the same. A decorative check that a document cites as a guarantee is
worse than no check, which is why the correction is recorded here rather than
quietly made.
That ordering has a second benefit worth keeping: a feed that returns yesterday
alongside today refreshes yesterday's record from live data *before* it is
consumed as the profile.
---
## What this ticket does not claim
It does not make a trade possible that yesterday's prices justify. Carried hours
are dropped from the trade set by §8.3, and that is not a limitation to be fixed
later — it is the rule.
The one change that **does** move energy came from the windowing, not the
carrying: the filled series covers `[since, until)`, so hours that have already
elapsed are no longer in the spread. A cheap night that has gone used to be the
series' cheapest hour, and a cycle cannot buy in an hour that is past — so the
trade was silently never taken. `test_price_history.py` section 2 grades that by
finding the cheapest firm hour with and without the fill and showing it moves.
⚠️ **And section 1's identity check now grades identity.** It used to compare
`eur_per_kwh` between `_before` and `_after`, which come from two *separate*
`resolve_tariff()` calls — each parsing the feed body into its own objects, so
`is` could never have held between them however the fill were written. FCST-03's
whole anti-copy argument is `filled.points[i] is fetched.points[j]`, and floats
cannot grade it. The value comparison is kept and now says what it is (the fill
moved the window, it did not touch a price); identity is graded on a read the
file constructs and still holds a reference to.
---
## 4. A sub-hourly feed passes through whole; the fill only decides which hours are missing.
`eneco_eddy` is the Belgian imbalance product and settles **per quarter**, and
`price.py`'s `_validate_raw()` accepts any strictly-increasing spacing — so a
published hour may legitimately hold four points.
FCST-04's first caller keyed the published set as `{_utc_hour(p.start): p for p
in r.points}`. It reads perfectly ordinary and it keeps the **last** point of
each hour. Measured on a 96-point quarter-hourly feed — all firm, fully
published, nothing to carry: the plan reached the optimiser as **15 points**,
the arbitrage spread fell from **0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh**, and the cheapest
"hour" became a `:45` point whose `at()` window runs into the next hour. That is
not the windowing effect above; it is a feed losing 84 % of its own prints, and
no `provisional` flag would ever have reported it.
**The alternative was rejected:** refusing sub-hourly feeds at `_validate_raw()`
would have made the count correct by breaking the one supported product that
legitimately publishes per quarter.
**What was done instead** keeps FCST-03's existing contract rather than weakening
it: *every* published point inside the window passes through **by identity**,
and a carried point is added only for a whole hour with **no** published
coverage at all. A carried hour is still a single hourly point whatever the
feed's own spacing is, because yesterday's profile is only known per wall-clock
hour — and carried hours are provisional, so they are out of the trade set
anyway.
⚠️ **`_audit()` got stricter, not looser, and that was the condition on doing
this at all.** The old post-condition refused any repeated `_utc_hour` — a count
that cannot express four points in one hour. It is replaced by two rules that
**subsume** it:
- a **published** point must *be* one of that hour's published points, by
identity, and may be emitted only once;
- a **carried** point may stand only in an hour that does not appear in the
published set at all, must be flagged `True`, and may not repeat.
So a duplicated carried hour — the DST mispricing the count existed to catch —
still raises; so does the same published point emitted twice; and a carried
point sharing an hour with a real print now raises too, which the count never
looked at. Each of those three is driven by its own mutation in
`test_price_forecast.py`.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# OPT-09 - the weights parameter, and what it is honestly for
**Status:** implemented. **Branch:** `OPT-09`. **Base:** `release/1.0` @ `3d29993` (rebased onto the UX-02 merge; it read `3368231`, and before that `464d398` - each rebase moved it and review caught it each time, which is why the counts in `test_translations.py` are now computed rather than typed)
**Status:** implemented. **Branch:** `OPT-09`. **Base:** `release/1.0` @ `3368231`
(`git merge-base HEAD 3368231`; the branch was rebased and this line used to name
the pre-rebase base, `464d398`).
@@ -161,18 +161,17 @@ its floor is `account()`'s explained case, so SAFETY-42 stays silent - and after
this card that ask does not arrive in the first place, which removes the benign
arm from the detector's input rather than teaching it a new discriminator.
⚠️ **BUT THE WEIGHT DOES MOVE, AND IT NARROWED SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW.
THAT WAS A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2, IT WAS NOT FIXED HERE, AND SAFETY-43
CLOSED IT - see the block at the end of this section.** An earlier draft of
⚠️ **BUT THE WEIGHT DOES MOVE, AND IT NARROWS SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW. THIS
IS A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2 AND IT IS NOT FIXED HERE.** An earlier draft of
this section said "no envelope closes and no weight moves - OPT-09 cannot see it
at all". The second clause was **false**, and it was load-bearing for the claim
that the two cards do not overlap. A weight is a function of the pack's ENERGY
HEADROOM, not of what the pack delivers, so a wedged unit's weight moves whenever
its headroom differs from its sibling's - which is the ordinary case this card
exists to exploit. And `delivery.delinquent()`
named a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeded `min_w =
Tuning.saturation_w`, and that was **500 W in absolute watts** with nothing
else beside it. Shrinking a unit's share shrinks its gap. Shrink the
exists to exploit. And `delivery.delinquent()` (`app/delivery.py:484`)
names a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeds `min_w =
Tuning.saturation_w` - the comparison is `app/delivery.py:531`, and it is
**500 W in absolute watts**. Shrinking a unit's share shrinks its gap. Shrink the
share far enough and the gap drops below 500 W while the unit is still delivering
nothing, and the alarm stops firing.
@@ -199,49 +198,18 @@ named**. The suppression window widens from `site target < 2 * min_w` = 1000 W t
`site target < min_w * (w_A + w_B) / w_B`, which on that fixture is **6500 W** of
a 9600 W site; above it - once the healthy pack is at its own rating and
`_fill()`'s last-resort pass hands the wedged unit a big share again - the alarm
returns. ⚠️ BOTH BOUNDS ARE ARITHMETIC ABOUT `_fill()`'s PROPORTIONAL REGIME AND NEITHER IS A REACHABLE STEADY STATE. Swept on this fixture, the healthy pack's own 5000 W rating binds FIRST: suppressed 0/200 up to a 3000 W load, 4/200 at 4000 W, 41/200 at 4900 W (site target 5320 W, the largest reached with the wedged unit still under 500 W), then 195/200 at 5000 W once `_fill()` pins A at its cap and hands B 3000 W. So the alarm returns BELOW the 6500 W formula bound, not above it. The equal-weights 1000 W bound is unreachable for the same reason - the equal arm names the wedged unit 199/200 at every load swept, 1000 W included.
returns. `test_packshare.py` part 8b grades all of it and **pins the current,
unflattering behaviour**, so that the day it changes a named check moves.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b graded all of it and **pinned the unflattering
behaviour**, so that the day it changed a named check would move. It has moved.
### ⚠️ CLOSED BY SAFETY-43 - THIS IS NO LONGER A DISCLOSED RESIDUAL
This section used to end *"until then this is a disclosed residual [...] at two
inverters, a wedged unit with materially less energy headroom than its sibling
can go unreported at ordinary house loads"*. That sentence is **retired, not
softened**, and what replaces it is a measurement rather than an intention.
`delivery.delinquent()` is now relative to the ask **as well as** absolute:
named if short_by() > min_w OR short_by() > frac * share
with `frac = delivery.DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION`. A unit delivering 0 of 125 W is
100 % delinquent and is named; a unit delivering 0 of 1500 W was already named
and still is. On the **same fixture, under the same weights**, part 8b now
grades both rules in one run - `share_frac=None` is SAFETY-42's absolute arm,
exactly:
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights absolute arm alone named on 0/200 cycles
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
⚠️ **`min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED, AND THAT IS THE HALF THAT MATTERS HERE.** The
absolute arm's suppression window is still exactly the arithmetic above - 1000 W
at equal weights, 6500 W at these - and part 8b still asserts both numbers.
Lowering `saturation_w` would have traded a missed alarm for a false one on
every unit at once, which is SAFETY-41's four-attempt regime. SAFETY-43 added a
**second** way to be named and left the first where it was.
⚠️ **AND WHAT OPT-09 STILL DOES NOT DO IS UNCHANGED.** This card stops the site
ASKING a pack whose own SoC says it cannot deliver; it does not re-allocate a
wedged unit's watts, and SAFETY-43 did not make it. The alarm got louder; the
loop did not move. The derivation of `frac` - swept over the same 2640 no-fault
runs that produced `delivery_hold_s`'s floor - is in
`DECISIONS/SAFETY-43-delinquency-relative-to-the-ask.md`.
So the seam, stated accurately **as of SAFETY-43**: OPT-09 stops the ask, and it
still narrows the ABSOLUTE arm's window for a low-headroom unit exactly as
described above - but it no longer narrows the DETECTOR, because the detector no
longer reads only that arm.
So the seam, stated accurately: **OPT-09 stops the ask AND narrows SAFETY-42's
detection window for a low-headroom unit.** The two cards do not merely meet from
opposite sides; this one takes something away from the other one. Closing the gap
means making `delinquent()` relative to the ask rather than absolute, which is
SAFETY-42's code and a design change - it is filed as its own card, deliberately
not done here, and this paragraph is its input. Until then this is a **disclosed
residual**, in the same voice as SAFETY-13's "2 of 272" and SAFETY-42's own "the
discriminator does not exist": at two inverters, a wedged unit with materially
less energy headroom than its sibling can go unreported at ordinary house loads.
⚠️ **And OPT-09 supplies the mechanism SAFETY-42 said was missing, without
connecting it.** That module's rejection of re-allocation rests on *"the only
@@ -149,70 +149,8 @@ each swept across the **whole range `config.yaml` accepts** for the two settings
that decide how fast the site can turn around: `gain` `float(0.05,1.0)` and
`slew_w` `int(50,5000)`.
### ⚠️ THE HARNESS BEHIND EVERY FIGURE ABOVE IS NOT COMMITTED, AND UNTIL 2026-09-07 THAT MADE THEM UNCHECKABLE
**Read this before quoting any number in this section.** The paragraph below
said the campaign harness "is not committed here" and treated that as a
packaging detail. It is not: a figure produced by a script that exists in
nobody's tree cannot be re-run, cannot be reviewed, and cannot be defended when
it is contradicted. It has now been contradicted twice.
| sweep | worst peak | worst continuous | trips |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| the 924-run campaign below — **harness uncommitted** | 1700 W | 505.0 s at 100 W; 5.0 s above 700 W | 0 / 924 |
| independent reviewer sweep, 2026-09-07, 48 honest reversals | **2750 W** | **15.0 s above 700 W** | 0 / 48 |
| `admin/goodwe` `two_master_circulation`, 840 runs — **committed** | 1048 W | 10.0 s at 100 W; 5.0 s above 700 W | **0 / 840** |
**This is not proof that anything was fabricated, and it should not be reported
as one.** The three swept different grids. What the third one adds is a
measurement of *why* the spread is that wide — on one grid, changing nothing but
the model:
| plant / stagger | worst legitimate peak |
|---|---:|
| modelled plant (lag 10 s, ramp 800 W/s), staggers up to a whole cycle | 1048 W |
| `INSTANT` (lag 0, unbounded ramp), staggers up to a whole cycle | 2250 W |
| `INSTANT`, staggers strictly under a whole cycle | **0 W** |
A factor of 2.1×, and a factor of infinity, between three defensible
descriptions of the same rig. **The plant model and the write-stagger set are
terms of the number**, and a worst case quoted without them is not a
measurement. That is enough to explain the whole spread above without anybody
having invented anything — and it is exactly what cannot be established when the
instrument is missing.
**What survives, and what does not.**
* **The window argument survives, and is now committed.** The claim that
decides `circulation_hold_s: 75` is *"the worst continuous legitimate episode
above 700 W is about one control cycle"*. All three sweeps agree on the shape
of that (5.0 s, 15.0 s, 5.0 s — one to three cycles against a fifteen-cycle
window), and **all three trip zero times**. `two_master_circulation` re-runs
it on every pull request in `admin/goodwe`.
* **The threshold curve does NOT survive as stated.** `505.0 s at 100 W` is the
number the "knee at 400 W" argument for `circulation_w: 700` rests on, and the
committed sweep measures **10.0 s** at 100 W on its grid — 50× smaller. The
curve still *falls* with the threshold (126 of 840 runs cross 100 W against 1
that crosses 700 W), so the knee is real in direction; its depth is not
established by anything anybody can run. **Do not quote 505.0 s.**
* **Nothing about the guard is compromised.** 0 trips in 924 + 48 + 840
non-faulty runs, from three independent grids.
**What would settle it:** the original harness, committed. Until then the
committed sweep is the only figure in this section anybody can check, and it is
labelled as its own grid's rather than as a reproduction.
### Reproducing it
⚠️ **THE COMMITTED VERSION IS `admin/goodwe`'s `sim/inject.py
two_master_circulation`** (`sim/sitesim.py:circulation_findings`, runnable on its
own as `python3 sim/sitesim.py --circulation`, `norig`, ~36 s, graded by
`checks.yml` on every pull request there). It produces the fault with
`plantsim.Inverter.wedge()` — a unit answering its bus and no longer steering its
power stage, which is HW-01 — and sweeps the legitimate family with the
serialised write path staggered up to a whole control cycle. The paragraph below
describes the ORIGINAL campaign, which is the one that is not committed.
The rig lives in `admin/goodwe` (`sim/`) and was used **read-only**; the harness
is not committed here because it imports that repo's `plantsim`/`frame_check`,
which are not present in this one or in CI. What it does is small enough to
@@ -268,11 +206,7 @@ margin above the knee is what absorbs that without re-opening this card.
**Revisit when SPIKE-04 lands, not before.**
The **schema floor is the knee itself**, 400 W, so a legally configured install
cannot land in the 445–505 s regime — ⚠️ and those two figures are from the
uncommitted campaign; the committed sweep measures 10.0 s at 100 W on its own
grid. See the disclosure at the head of this section. The floor is still the
right shape (fewer runs cross a higher threshold, measured 126/840 at 100 W
against 1/840 at 700 W); its DEPTH is not established by anything re-runnable. What the threshold costs: a circulating
cannot land in the 445–505 s regime. What the threshold costs: a circulating
loop smaller than 350 W per unit is not reported, which is deliberate — at that
scale the round-trip loss is a few watts.
@@ -355,32 +289,6 @@ SAFETY-25 — so no stale `.pyc` could exist to be read. Byte deltas recorded;
| M17 | `circulation.py` | default `700` → `500` | **+0 B** | **RED** — the CFG-03 pin and the not-a-round-number check |
| M18 | `main.py` | `await self.check_circulating()` removed | −39 B | **RED** — all four notification checks |
| M19 | `main.py` | publish `round(x or 0.0)` instead of `None` | −68 B | **survivor on the first battery — GAP CLOSED**, then RED |
| **M20** | `main.py` | **`pos, neg = opposing(...)` → `([], [])`** — the attribution clause deleted from the alarm | −102 B | **SURVIVED ALL 26 FILES on the shipped battery — GAP CLOSED**, then RED on §6a |
| M21 | `main.py` | `pos` and `neg` exchanged — the alarm names both packs, both the wrong way round | **+0 B** | **RED** — §6a ×3 (the mirrored run, and "only its own sentence") |
| M22 | `main.py` | `opposing(..., min_w=cfg.min_w / 2.0)` → `min_w=0.0` | −25 B | **RED** — §6a's resting-pack check |
**And four in `admin/goodwe`**, graded through `python3 sim/sitesim.py
--circulation` rather than through the injector — deliberately, because
`inject.py` is the file that takes the rig lock, and "run the injector to grade a
mutation" is not a sentence anybody should have to type. Byte deltas over
`plantsim.py` + `sitesim.py` together.
| # | file | mutation | Δ | result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | `plantsim.py` | `wedge()` no longer stops the latch reaching the power stage | −20 B | **RED** — the opposing-signs precondition **and** "the watchdog did not trip" |
| S2 | `sitesim.py` | the sensor computed over the **allocation record** instead of register 0x0518 | **+0 B** | **RED** ×3 — this is M10 restated on the rig |
| S3 | `sitesim.py` | the campaign run on `plant=INSTANT` | −51 B | **RED** — the plant is a *term* of the figures; it was a SURVIVOR until that check was added, and finding out why produced §3's 1048/2250/0 W table |
| S4 | `sitesim.py` | the write stagger removed from the legitimate campaign | −19 B | **RED** — "the legitimate campaign produced no opposition at all" |
**S3 is recorded as a survivor because it was one, and it is the most useful
result in this table.** The scenario first shipped with a vacuity check whose
text claimed `plant=INSTANT` would make the sweep measure 0 W. S3 was run and
**passed**: `INSTANT` with a stagger of exactly one control cycle samples the
plant before the second unit has stepped, so it produces opposition anyway — and
a *larger* worst peak (2250 W) than the modelled plant does (1048 W). The claim
in the check's own text was wrong. It was corrected against the measurement, the
plant was pinned as an explicit term, and S3 is red now for a stated reason
rather than by accident. §3's spread table is that measurement.
**M19 is recorded as a survivor because it was one.** The first battery found no
check grading what `publish()` does when a per-unit reading is missing, so
@@ -389,30 +297,6 @@ watches went unnoticed — the sensor's own `None` rule, defeated one layer out.
A check was added and the mutation re-run; it is red now. The run that found it
was purged, so it is a result and not an artefact.
**M20 IS RECORDED AS A SURVIVOR BECAUSE IT WAS ONE, AND IT IS THE MORE
UNCOMFORTABLE OF THE TWO.** The commit message for this card claimed *"18
mutations, all RED"*, and M1–M19 above have no entry for the notification's
attribution clause. Verification on 2026-09-07 ran it and it **survived the
whole 26-file suite**: the alarm still fires, still stops the site, still says
the meter cannot see it — and no longer says *which two packs* or *which way
round*. `circulation.py`'s own docstring calls that sentence the first thing
somebody woken by this alarm needs and *"impossible to reconstruct from the
number alone"*.
It survived for one reason, and it is not reachability: **M18 (the whole call
removed) is red**, so `check_circulating()` is exercised. The three checks on
that notification asserted `METER CANNOT SEE`, `CONTROL HAS BEEN STOPPED` and
`isolator` — and **never an inverter name**. Nothing graded the attribution.
`test_watchdog.py` §6a closes it, and closes it on a fixture that can tell the
three failures apart. It runs a roster of **`["garage", "shed", "cellar"]`** —
operator names, none of them `UNIT_A`, for test_maintenance.py §11's reason:
on a fixture whose names are the module's own constants a check cannot tell the
roster from the constant. It runs the site **twice, mirrored**, so the sentence
is not symmetric and a swap (M21, `+0 B`) is a different red from a deletion.
And it carries a **third pack resting at 5 W**, so the floor that stops a pack
in standby being named as a participant in a 6 kW loop (M22) is graded too.
## 7. What this card does NOT close
* **Inverter B's ramp and lag are placeholders.** Every transient number in §3
@@ -421,9 +305,7 @@ in standby being named as a participant in a 6 kW loop (M22) is graded too.
margin. **Do not present any figure here as a measurement of inverter B.**
* **A wedged inverter still cannot be stopped by this add-on.** §1 says so; the
notification says so; there is no software fix and this card does not pretend
to one. It *can* now be produced on demand: `plantsim.Inverter.wedge()`.
* **The depth of the threshold curve is not established by anything committed.**
§3's disclosure. The window is; the knee's magnitude is not.
to one.
* **A loop below ~350 W per unit is not reported.** Deliberate, §3.
* **The saturation freeze fires under a wedged unit and leaves a standing grid
error.** Observed on the rig while producing §2's numbers: with B wedged, the
@@ -68,102 +68,22 @@ deliberately *not* in the model). **Every two-inverter figure in this document
is two copies of inverter A.** §3.3 is the sensitivity sweep that sizes the
margin that costs.
### Reproducing it — ⚠️ THE HARNESS IS COMMITTED NOW (TEST-21, 2026-09-07)
⚠️ **THIS SECTION USED TO SAY THE HARNESS WAS NOT COMMITTED, AND THAT WAS THE
DEFECT TEST-21 FOUND.** A shipped safety constant whose floor the next reviewer
cannot re-run is PROC-01's shape, and PROC-01 had eleven instances in three
days. The paragraph this replaces was true — what the harness does *is* small
enough to restate — and it was not enough: a restatement in prose leaves every
axis it does not name to the next person's judgement, and §3.3 below now records
how far that moves the number. **It moved. See §3.3's second table.**
It is committed in the **other** repository, `admin/goodwe`, as
`sim/delivery_window.py`, beside `sitesim.py` — the container-free two-master
harness it is built on. From clean checkouts of both repos:
```
cd goodwe/sim
GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest
GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon python3 -B delivery_window.py --campaign --blag
```
stdlib only. No container, no HA, no esphome, **no rig and no rig lock** — it is
a `plantsim` campaign, not a rig job. About fifteen minutes for the whole thing.
⚠️ **AND IT IS IN `admin/goodwe` RATHER THAN HERE, WHICH IS CI-08's RULE
APPLIED RATHER THAN IGNORED.** It imports `plantsim` (the plant, the per-unit
wire, `Site`) and `frame_check` (the firmware's own encoder), both **owned by
that repo** and neither present in this one's CI image. Committed here it had
two possible fates and both are the coupling CI-08 has been broken by three
times: skipped for want of its imports — a green that establishes nothing — or
the plant and the encoder **restated in this tree**, which is a second copy of
something the other repo owns, free to drift, and drift in a fixture is
invisible until the number it defends is wrong. There the dependency runs one
way and stays one-directional: **this** repo's `control`, `arbiter` and
`delivery` are imported live out of whichever checkout is under test
(`$GOODWE_ADDON_REPO`), never copied — so a change to `delinquent()` moves the
number on the next run instead of silently disagreeing with a fixture. That is
the seam `sitesim.py` already stands on, which is the other reason the campaign
is its neighbour and not a third arrangement.
⚠️ **THE SELFTEST IS CI-GATED; THE CAMPAIGN IS NOT, AND THE SPLIT IS
DELIBERATE.** `admin/goodwe`'s `.gitea/workflows/checks.yml` gained one step —
`python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest`, seconds, beside the existing
`norig, no lock` TEST-19 and TEST-20 steps, in the workflow that **already**
checks out this repo for `two_writers` and accepts that boundary in writing. So
a change **here** that moved `saturation_w`, `max_w`, `delivery_hold_s` or the
shape of `delinquent()` turns that step red rather than leaving a stale number
in this record. The **campaign** (`--campaign --blag`, ~15 minutes) is not
gated: it is a campaign, not a gate, and `failure-injection.yml`'s jobs run on
the **rig** runner, which a container-free simulation has no business holding.
What TEST-21 asked for is a command a reviewer can run from a clean checkout —
that is the block above.
⚠️ **`--selftest` IS A FALSIFIABILITY ARM, NOT A SMOKE TEST, AND IT RUNS
FIRST.** A campaign whose N=1 column and whose flapping column are 0.0 s
everywhere is indistinguishable from a campaign whose detector was never wired
up — `sitesim.broadcast_onset` exists for the same reason. So the selftest
drives a genuinely **wedged** unit through the same loop and refuses to proceed
unless the shipped `delinquent()` names it for longer than the shipped hold
(it names it for 275.0 s). Every 0.0 s in §3.3 is only worth reading because
that arm passes.
What it does, unchanged from the restatement it replaces: build two
`plantsim.Inverter`s from `INVERTER_A` / `INVERTER_B`; close the loop with the
add-on's own `compute()` on the SITE sum (`Controller.site_batt_w`) and
`arbiter.allocate_record()` over per-unit envelopes of `±min(max_w, rating)`;
put each share on its own wire through `Inverter.command()`, honouring a
configurable **write stagger** so B's number can land up to four cycles after
A's (the serialised write path); advance `Site.settle()` one control cycle; and
record, per unit, the command standing *before* the write and that unit's 0x0518
power. Then grade each cycle with the **shipped** `delivery.delinquent()` and
take the **longest run of consecutive cycles** on which it names anybody — not a
count of naming samples, because the window is cleared by any cycle that does
not.
⚠️ **SINCE [[SAFETY-43]] THE ROWS OF §3.3's TABLE ARE GRADED WITH
`share_frac=None`** — `delinquent()`'s ABSOLUTE arm alone, which is this card's
rule exactly. Said here because it is the difference between §3.3 still meaning
what it is labelled as and quietly becoming a table about a different predicate:
SAFETY-43 added a SECOND way to be named, the harness grades it in its own rows
(`--fractions`), and the numbers below are unchanged and were re-measured to
confirm it. `DECISIONS/SAFETY-43-delinquency-relative-to-the-ask.md` §3 carries
those rows and what they cost — the worst legitimate episode goes from 35.0 s to
40.0 s at the shipped fraction, which does not move `delivery_hold_s`.
⚠️ **ONE THING THE RESTATEMENT DID NOT SAY, AND IT IS LOAD-BEARING.** "The
command standing before the write" is the **controller's** standing command —
`Inverter.standing_w()`, i.e. `last_write` — and **not** the far end of the
wire. A write that has been issued but has not landed yet is standing as far as
this add-on is concerned, which is the whole of the write-stagger axis. Grading
against the plant's latch instead reads a number no add-on has, and it makes
both the stagger *and a wedged unit* invisible: a unit whose writes never arrive
shows a standing command of 0 W, is never `asked`, and is never named. That is
not a conservative harness, it is a harness that cannot fail — and the rebuild
did exactly this on its first run, which is how the falsifiability arm earned
its place above.
### Reproducing it
The harness is **not committed here**, for the reason SAFETY-30's and
SAFETY-31's were not: it imports `plantsim` and `frame_check`, which live in the
other repository and are not present in this one's CI image. What it does is
small enough to restate: build two `plantsim.Inverter`s from `INVERTER_A` /
`INVERTER_B`; close the loop with the add-on's own `compute()` on the SITE sum
(`Controller.site_batt_w`) and `arbiter.allocate_record()` over per-unit
envelopes of `±min(max_w, rating)`; put each share on its own wire through
`Inverter.command()`, honouring a configurable **write stagger** so B's number
can land up to four cycles after A's (the serialised write path); advance
`Site.settle()` one control cycle; and record, per unit, the command standing
*before* the write and that unit's 0x0518 power. Then grade each cycle with the
**shipped** `delivery.delinquent()` and take the **longest run of consecutive
cycles** on which it names anybody — not a count of naming samples, because the
window is cleared by any cycle that does not.
⚠️ MUTATION.md's note applies: this harness writes `__pycache__` into **both**
trees. Run it with `python3 -B` and purge.
@@ -293,9 +213,7 @@ Every run is executed a second time at a **roster of one** on the same stimulus.
check"* from *"a property of the second inverter"*.
Worst **CONTINUOUS** legitimate episode, as a function of the shortfall
threshold. **ORIGINAL CAMPAIGN, 2026-09-06, from the harness that was not
committed — SUPERSEDED, and kept here because a record that quietly replaced its
own numbers would be worth less than one that shows both:**
threshold:
| threshold | reversals (of 1050) | flapping (of 840) | weighted (of 750) | **N=1 control (1890 runs)** |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
@@ -307,100 +225,7 @@ own numbers would be worth less than one that shows both:**
| 1500 W | 10.0 s (51) | 0.0 s (0) | 10.0 s (50) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 2000 W | 10.0 s (24) | 0.0 s (0) | 5.0 s (23) | **0.0 s (0)** |
#### ⚠️ TEST-21, 2026-09-07 — THE RE-RUN, AND 30.0 s DID NOT REPRODUCE
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign`, same three families, same
counts, same thresholds, the shipped `delinquent()`:
| threshold | reversals (of 1050) | flapping (of 840) | weighted (of 750) | **N=1 control (2640 runs)** |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 100 W | 120.0 s (770) | 0.0 s (0) | 165.0 s (685) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 250 W | 65.0 s (687) | 0.0 s (0) | 100.0 s (590) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| **500 W** | **30.0 s (460)** | **0.0 s (0)** | **35.0 s (403)** | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 700 W | 25.0 s (342) | 0.0 s (0) | 30.0 s (318) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 1000 W | 15.0 s (4) | 0.0 s (0) | 25.0 s (131) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 1500 W | 0.0 s (0) | 0.0 s (0) | 20.0 s (43) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 2000 W | 0.0 s (0) | 0.0 s (0) | 0.0 s (0) | **0.0 s (0)** |
**The floor is 35.0 s, not 30.0 s** — weighted family, and the worst single run
is `gain=0.2 slew_w=1000 stagger=4 split=0.10/0.90` on the ±2200 W reversal. The
argmax is printed with the table on purpose (see below): a worst case sitting on
an edge of the grid would be a number about the grid.
⚠️ **AND BY THAT STANDARD, TWO OF ITS FOUR AXES ARE ON AN EDGE. Measured, at the
argmax's other axes held fixed:**
stagger 0 -> 1 -> 2 -> 3 -> 4 0.0 15.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 s
weights (A) at stagger 4 0.5 -> 20.0 0.7/0.9/0.99 -> 0.0
0.10 -> 35.0 s
Strictly increasing in stagger and maximal at 4, the largest modelled stagger;
and maximal at the most asymmetric split. It is interior only in `gain` (2nd of
6) and `slew_w` (3rd of 5).
⚠️ **SO THE HEADLINE IS 0.0 s AT stagger=0, AND 35.0 s IS ENTIRELY A PRODUCT OF
THE MODELLED SERIALISED-WRITE STAGGER.** That stagger is declared MODELLED at
`sim/delivery_window.py:60-64` — it is a term of this figure, not a detail of
it. A site whose two writes land in the same cycle does not produce this episode
at all.
This does not move `delivery_hold_s`: 185 s must cover the worst case the
modelled site can produce, and a stagger of four cycles is inside what a real
two-inverter write path can do. But a reader entitled to ask "is 35.0 s about
the plant or about the grid?" deserves the answer, and the answer is: **partly
about the grid, and the grid's shape is the record's own, fixed by §3.3 before
this rebuild ran.** Found in review of TEST-21; the PR body had claimed the
argmax was interior, and it is not.
**WHAT REPRODUCED, EXACTLY:**
* the **N=1 control column is 0.0 s at every threshold**, in every run. That is
§3.2's algebra measured, and it is the claim the compatibility promise rests
on. (This rebuild ran the control arm over all three families — 2640 runs —
where the original ran 1890, i.e. the two families whose stimulus is not
weighted. The weighted stimulus at a roster of one is the same stimulus with
inert weights, and it too reports nothing at any threshold.)
* the **flapping family is 0.0 s at every threshold**, in all 840 runs. The
proper-subset rule really does defeat the family that defeated SAFETY-30's
site window.
* **45.0 s at twice A's lag**, to the cycle. See the B-lag table below.
**WHAT DID NOT:**
* the headline. **35.0 s against a recorded 30.0 s** — one control cycle worse,
and 20.0 s → 30.0 s on the reversal family, two cycles worse.
* **the non-monotonicity.** §3.3 finding 3 read the original 55.0 s at 250 W
against 40.0 s at 100 W as a property of the reduction. **This rebuild's
curve is monotone decreasing on both N=2 families.** The *mechanism* finding 3
describes is real and is still the reason not to read either table as a
sensitivity curve — lowering the threshold really can turn a proper subset
into the whole roster and break the run — but **this grid does not exhibit
it**, so the claim now rests on the mechanism alone and no longer on a
measurement. That is a weaker claim than the one this record made, and it is
written down as weaker.
* the low-threshold rows, badly: 120.0 s / 165.0 s at 100 W against 40.0 s /
75.0 s. Nothing ships at 100 W, but the size of that gap is the honest measure
of how much of the original table was a property of axes nobody wrote down.
⚠️ **WHY THE NUMBERS MOVED, AS FAR AS IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED.** §3.3 fixes the
*counts* of every axis (6 gains × 5 slews; 7 reversal sizes; 7 flap periods × 4
amplitudes; 5 staggers; and the 5 splits, which it lists) and the *ranges*
(`config.yaml`'s `gain` `float(0.05,1.0)` and `slew_w` `int(0,5000)`). It does
**not** fix the individual values, the run length, or the per-unit cap. The
rebuild spread them over the admissible ranges and **prints every one of them
above its own table**, so the caveat travels with the number instead of living
in somebody's memory. The residual disagreement — one to two control cycles at
the shipped threshold — is inside the sensitivity to that choice; the
low-threshold rows are not, and are reported as not.
⚠️ **AND THE HARNESS WAS NOT ADJUSTED UNTIL IT AGREED.** The one substantive
correction made during the rebuild was made *against* the doc's number, not
towards it, and it is recorded in §1: grading on the plant's latch rather than
the controller's standing command produced a harness that could not name even a
wedged unit. Fixing that made the numbers **larger**. Nothing else was tuned.
Findings 1-3 below are the original campaign's, kept with finding 3 now
qualified by the re-run above:
Three findings worth stating rather than leaving in the table:
1. **The N=1 column is zero everywhere, in all 1890 runs and at every
threshold.** That is the compatibility promise measured, not argued.
@@ -443,77 +268,37 @@ would be a preference, and all the margin this check needs is in the window.
Four bounds, and the value clears all four.
* **lower, from the rig — 35.0 s** (TEST-21, 2026-09-07; **the original record
said 30.0 s and it did not reproduce**). The worst continuous legitimate
episode at the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs — weighted family, worst
single run `gain=0.2 slew_w=1000 stagger=4 split=0.10/0.90` on the ±2200 W
reversal; 30.0 s on reversals, 0.0 s on flapping. Re-run it with
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign` (§1).
⚠️ **THIS IS NOW STRICTLY THE BINDING LOWER BOUND, WHICH IT WAS NOT BEFORE.**
At 30.0 s it coincided with the firmware's veto below and a reader could not
tell which of the two was doing the work. At 35.0 s the rig's number is on its
own, above the firmware's — so **the rig is what stops `delivery_hold_s` going
low**, and the schema's `int(30,900)` floor no longer sits above the worst
legitimate episode. An operator who sets it to the schema minimum of 30 s is
now **below** a measured legitimate episode and will get false reports; the
option is marked *derived, do not change* and this is what that marking is
for. Raising the schema floor to 35 is a change to a shipped option's
contract and is left to its own card rather than smuggled in here.
* **lower, from the rig — 30.0 s.** The worst continuous legitimate episode at
the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs (weighted family; 20.0 s on
reversals, 0.0 s on flapping).
* **lower, from the firmware — 30 s (`inverter.LINK_STALE_S`).** A unit not
executing its share for less than the firmware's own veto window is a *link*
fault the add-on already answers by dropping it from the split. Reporting
inside that window would be a second, louder alarm about a state already
being handled — the SAFETY-15/SAFETY-19 failure exactly.
* **margin, from inverter B not existing.** ⚠️ **THIS ROW IS A SENSITIVITY
STUDY ON A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT B, NOT A MEASUREMENT OF B, AND THE ORIGINAL
WORDING ("MEASURED, not felt") OVERSTATED IT.** Inverter B is not installed
(~2026-09-12; NOTES.md §1.1b). The campaign's B is **A copied**, `measured=
False`, so the 35.0 s above is **two identical machines** and every row below
is a *what-if*: what a slower second unit would cost this window. **No row
here is B's lag.** What it is genuinely evidence for is the SHAPE of the
margin — which term the window has to be sized against — and that is what it
is used for. Sweeping a *different* second unit through the weighted family
(750 runs each). Second column is the original record, third is TEST-21's
re-run with the committed harness (`--blag`):
* **margin, from inverter B not existing — and it is MEASURED, not felt.** The
campaign's B is A copied, so 30.0 s is two identical machines. Sweeping a
*different* second unit through the weighted family (750 runs each):
| B lag | B ramp | 2026-09-06 (uncommitted) | **TEST-21 re-run** | runs naming |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 10.0 s (A) | 800 W/s (A) | 30.0 s | **35.0 s** | 403/750 |
| 20.0 s | 800 W/s | 45.0 s | **45.0 s** | 454/750 |
| 10.0 s | 400 W/s | 30.0 s | **35.0 s** | 411/750 |
| 20.0 s | 400 W/s | 45.0 s | **50.0 s** | 454/750 |
| 40.0 s | 200 W/s | 90.0 s | **75.0 s** | 478/750 |
| B lag | B ramp | worst legitimate | runs naming |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| 10.0 s (A) | 800 W/s (A) | **30.0 s** | 368/750 |
| 20.0 s | 800 W/s | 45.0 s | 469/750 |
| 10.0 s | 400 W/s | **30.0 s** | 370/750 |
| 20.0 s | 400 W/s | 45.0 s | 469/750 |
| 40.0 s | 200 W/s | **90.0 s** | 500/750 |
**The LAG moves it roughly linearly and the RAMP barely moves it**, which is
the original finding and it survives — with one correction: *"the RAMP does
not move it at all"* is too strong. Halving the ramp is worth 0 s at A's lag
and **+5 s at twice it** (45.0 → 50.0), so the ramp is a second-order term
rather than no term. The shortfall lasts as long as the unit's first-order lag
holds it more than `saturation_w` below its share; at these step sizes the
ramp is rarely the binding one. So the number to carry margin against is still
B's lag — and a hypothetical unit **four times slower than A** produces
**75.0 s**, where the original record said 90.0 s. ⚠️ Note the direction: this
row moved **in the margin's favour**, while the floor above moved against it.
Neither was adjusted to suit the other.
**The RAMP does not move it at all and the LAG moves it roughly linearly.**
The shortfall lasts as long as the unit's first-order lag holds it more than
`saturation_w` below its share; at these step sizes the ramp is never the
binding term. So the number to carry margin against is B's lag, and a unit
**four times slower than A** produces 90.0 s.
* **upper, from the bill — 900 s**, the quarter that sets the capacity tariff.
**185 s** is thirty-seven control cycles. Against the TEST-21 re-run it is
**5.29×** the measured worst legitimate episode (35.0 s), **2.47×** the
hypothetical four-times-slower second unit (75.0 s), **6.2×** the firmware veto
(30 s) and **4.9×** inside the quarter (900 s). ⚠️ Deliberately **not 180** —
that is SAFETY-02's site hold, and a reader must not be able to think this was
carried across — and not 150 or 200.
⚠️ **185 STANDS, AND HERE IS THE ARITHMETIC RATHER THAN THE ASSURANCE.** The
record claimed 6.2× the measured worst; the re-run makes that **5.29×**. All
four bounds still clear, none of them narrowly, and the *ordering* of the
argument is unchanged: the rig's floor is the binding one, the quarter is the
ceiling, and 185 sits between them with margin at both ends. So the value is
**not changed** — a shipped safety constant is not moved because its margin
went from 6.2× to 5.3× while every bound still holds, and moving it would
invalidate SAFETY-41's four-attempt false-trip regime for nothing. What IS
changed is the claim: this record no longer says 6.2×, and no longer says 30.0
s, because neither is what the harness produces.
**185 s** is thirty-seven control cycles: **6.2×** the measured worst, **2.06×**
the four-times-slower case, **6.2×** the firmware veto and **4.9×** inside the
quarter. ⚠️ Deliberately **not 180** — that is SAFETY-02's site hold, and a
reader must not be able to think this was carried across — and not 150 or 200.
**What it costs, stated rather than hidden:** up to 185 s of a site running
short by one unit's share before anybody is told. Against a fault that ran
@@ -1,381 +0,0 @@
# SAFETY-43 — delinquency measured against the ask, not against a flat 500 W
**Status: closed.** `delivery.delinquent()` names a unit whose `short_by()` gap
exceeds `min_w` **or** exceeds a fraction of that unit's own share. The fraction
is `delivery.DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION = 0.85`, derived on the campaign in §3.
⚠️ **INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST** (expected ~2026-09-12; NOTES.md
§1.1b). `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is inverter A **copied**, `measured=False`, and
`test_packshare.py`'s plant is modelled in that file. **Every two-inverter
figure in this document is two copies of A.** Nothing here is a measurement of
inverter B.
## 0. The defect, and why it is the quiet regime that matters
[[OPT-09]] passes SoC- and capacity-aware weights to the allocator. A weight is
a function of a pack's **energy headroom**, not of what the pack delivers, so a
**wedged** unit — one that accepts its share and produces nothing — is weighted
down exactly like a legitimately low-headroom one. `delinquent()` read an
**absolute** gap, `min_w = Tuning.saturation_w = 500 W`. Shrinking the share
shrinks the gap. Measured end to end on the real loop (`test_packshare.py`
part 8b: real `compute()`, real `plan()`, real `packshare.weights()`, real
`delivery.account()`, real `delinquent()`; B wedged at a healthy 15 % against its
own 10 % cut-out, so no envelope closes and `account()` explains nothing — a
SAFETY-42 **true positive** by that card's own definition):
load 1500 W equal weights shares {a:1500, b:1500} named on 199/200
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights shares {a:1505, b: 125} named on 0/200
A unit delivering **0 of 125 W** is 100 % delinquent and 125 W short. Only the
absolute threshold disagreed.
⚠️ **THE SUPPRESSED REGIME IS THE DANGEROUS ONE.** At a load the healthy sibling
covers, the meter is satisfied (grid within 5 W of zero on that fixture),
`unmet_w` is 0 because both units *accepted* their shares, no envelope closes and
no action-log line fires. The delinquency alarm is the **only** instrument that
would have told the operator the site was quietly running one inverter.
## 1. What was NOT done, and it is the larger half of this card
⚠️ **`min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED.** It is `Tuning.saturation_w` — the gap at which
the control law itself concludes the inverter is not following — and it exists to
stop **normal saturation** being reported as delinquency. Lowering it trades a
missed alarm for a false one on every unit at once. [[SAFETY-41]] spent **four
attempts** on notification cadence in this system and the owner's words were
*"i'm getting really annoyed by the notifications in my HA"*.
So the change is an **`or`**, never a looser first arm:
named if short_by() > min_w OR short_by() > frac * share
Everything `min_w` named before is still named. Nothing `min_w` refused becomes
noisy **unless the unit is delivering almost none of its ask**, which is not
saturation-shaped at all. `test_delivery.py` part 1 runs all seven of its
existing `delinquent()` fixtures under **both** rules — `share_frac=None` is
SAFETY-42's rule exactly — and requires identical answers on every one.
The absolute arm's suppression window is therefore **unchanged**: still
`site target < 2·min_w` = 1000 W at equal weights, still
`site target < min_w·(w_A+w_B)/w_B` = 6500 W under OPT-09's weights on part 8b's
fixture. Part 8b still asserts both numbers, now as evidence that the first arm
did not move.
## 2. The evidence is a diff between two rules on ONE run
`delinquent()` takes `share_frac`, and **`None` means the absolute arm alone**.
That parameter exists for one reason: so the red and the green come out of one
run over one tree instead of out of two commits that a reader has to trust.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b grades every cycle twice:
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights absolute arm alone named on 0/200 cycles
load 1500 W OPT-09 weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
load 1500 W equal weights absolute arm alone named on 199/200 cycles
load 1500 W equal weights the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
The equal-weights arm gains **exactly one cycle** — the first, where the slew
limit holds the split at 500/500, a 500 W gap is not *over* a 500 W threshold
(the absolute bound is strict) and the relative arm names a box delivering none
of its 500 W. That single cycle is the whole of what this card costs an arm that
was already firing.
⚠️ **THE PIN THAT INVERTED.** Part 8b was written by OPT-09 to pin the
**suppressed** behaviour, and its comment said: *"if it ever goes red because the
alarm fired, read the card that made it fire before 'fixing' this line."* This is
that card. The pin now asserts the opposite answer and keeps the old one beside
it, measured rather than remembered.
## 3. ⭐ Deriving the fraction
⚠️ **DERIVED ON THE SAME CAMPAIGN AS `delivery_hold_s`'s FLOOR**, not chosen.
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py` — the harness [[TEST-21]] committed —
gained a second grading axis: the same **2640 no-fault runs at N=2** (three
families × 6 gains × 5 slews × write staggers; every unit executes the share the
allocator gave it) and the same **2640 N=1 control runs**, graded at the shipped
`min_w = 500 W` for each candidate fraction, on every cycle of every run — so a
pass grades every fraction it is given, and the absolute arm beside them, over
one tree and one set of runs. Every row in a pass is comparable to every other
row in it, run for run.
cd goodwe/sim && GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon \
python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest --campaign --fractions
⚠️ **THE TABLE BELOW WAS PRODUCED BY TWO PASSES; `FRACTIONS` NOW HOLDS ALL
TWENTY SO IT TAKES ONE.** The derivation ran the shipped ten
`(0.25 … 0.99)` and then the ten that resolve the low end
`(0.05 … 0.65)` with only that tuple edited between them. **The absolute-arm
control row came out identical in both** (30.0 / 0.0 / 35.0 / 0.0, same argmax),
which is what says the two passes are one campaign. A table a reviewer cannot
reproduce without knowing to edit a line nobody wrote down is PROC-01's shape in
miniature, so the committed `FRACTIONS` was widened to all twenty in review: the
command above now reproduces every row below.
### 3.1 The curve
Worst **continuous** legitimate episode (the measure `DeliveryWatchdog` actually
sees — its window is cleared by any cycle that does not name), runs naming in
brackets:
| `share_frac` | reversals (of 1050) | flapping (of 840) | weighted (of 750) | **N=1 control (2640)** |
|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| absolute only | 30.0 s (460) | 0.0 s (0) | 35.0 s (403) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.05 | 85.0 s (826) | 0.0 s (0) | 90.0 s (616) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.10 | 75.0 s (824) | 0.0 s (0) | 90.0 s (607) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.15 | 70.0 s (836) | 0.0 s (0) | 70.0 s (609) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.20 | 70.0 s (839) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (629) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.25 | 55.0 s (832) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (611) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.30 | 55.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 50.0 s (614) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.35 | 55.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 55.0 s (618) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.40 | 50.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 60.0 s (658) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.45 | 45.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (627) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.50 | 45.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (636) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.55 | 40.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (636) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.60 | 40.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (645) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.65 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.70 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.75 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.80 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 45.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| **0.85** | **35.0 s (840)** | **0.0 s (0)** | **40.0 s (635)** | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.90 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.95 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
| 0.99 | 35.0 s (840) | 0.0 s (0) | 40.0 s (635) | **0.0 s (0)** |
Worst of the three families, which is what `delivery_hold_s` has to cover:
frac 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
worst 90.0 90.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 55.0 55.0 60.0 45.0 45.0 s
frac 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 *0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99
worst 40.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 s
⚠️ **THE FIRST ROW IS THE CONTROL AND IT REPRODUCED SAFETY-42 §3.3 EXACTLY** —
30.0 s / 0.0 s / 35.0 s, and the same argmax (`gain=0.2 slew_w=1000 stagger=4
split=0.10/0.90`, ±2200 W reversal). It is measured **in the same run** as every
row below it, which is what makes those rows a comparison rather than a claim.
### 3.2 What the curve says
* ⚠️ **THERE IS NO CLIFF ANYWHERE IN THE CURVE, AND THAT IS THE FINDING.** From
**0.45 to 0.99** every figure is 40.0 or 45.0 s — within **one control cycle
(5.0 s)** of every other — and below 0.45 it rises **gradually**: 60.0 s at
0.25, 70.0 s at 0.15, 90.0 s at 0.05. A reviewer asking "why 0.85 and not
0.90?" is asking about a difference this campaign cannot resolve, and the
honest answer is that it cannot.
* ⚠️ **IT IS NOT MONOTONE** — 0.40 reports 60.0 s where 0.35 reports 55.0, and
0.65–0.80 report 45.0 s where 0.55/0.60 and 0.85–0.99 report 40.0 — and that is
SAFETY-42 §3.3's own mechanism (c) rather than noise in the plant: **a more
sensitive rule puts MORE units into the short set, which can turn a proper
subset into the WHOLE roster and END the episode.** The reduction is not
monotone in its own threshold. Do not read this column as a sensitivity curve
in the ordinary sense.
* **The shoulder is at about 0.45**, and it is a shoulder rather than an edge:
the reversal family's naming count saturates at 840 of 1050 runs from 0.30
upward, so below the shoulder what grows is the LENGTH of an episode, not the
number of runs that have one.
* **The N=1 column is 0.0 s at every fraction, in all 2640 one-inverter runs.**
The compatibility promise is measured for the new arm, not argued.
* **The flapping family is 0.0 s at every fraction, in all 840 runs.** A common
stimulus makes both units short at once and the subset stops being proper —
the property that defeated SAFETY-30's site window still holds.
### 3.3 ⚠️ "Zero false namings" is not available at ANY fraction
The card asked for *the largest fraction that yields zero false namings across
the whole no-fault campaign*. **There is none.** Every fraction adds naming
cycles: the reversal family goes from 460 runs naming to 840, the weighted family
from 403 to 635. A relative arm that never fired on a legitimate transient would
be a relative arm that never fired at all — the write stagger lands B's number up
to four cycles late, and a unit whose new command has not arrived is, for those
cycles, delivering a small fraction of what is standing on its wire.
What **is** zero at every fraction is **false alarms**:
> the longest continuous legitimate episode anywhere in the 20-point sweep is
> **90.0 s** — at 0.05, the most sensitive fraction measured — against a
> `delivery_hold_s` of **185 s**. Nothing in 2640 no-fault runs comes within
> **95 s** of notifying an operator, **at any fraction measured**. At the
> shipped 0.85 it is 40.0 s, i.e. 145 s of slack.
That is the quantity SAFETY-41 cares about and it is the one this card had to
protect. Stated as margin, at the shipped fraction: **185 s is 4.62×** the worst
legitimate episode, where the absolute arm alone gave 5.29×.
### 3.4 The bounds 0.85 answers to
* **LOWER, from the campaign** — the shoulder at about **0.45**, below which the
added episode starts to grow (60.0 s at 0.25, 90.0 s at 0.05). 0.85 is 0.40
above it.
* **UPPER, from the card's own case** — strictly **below 1.0**. At 1.0 the arm
can only fire on a unit that is *importing* while asked to discharge, which is
SAFETY-30's fault and not this one, so a unit delivering **none** of its share
(gap/share exactly 1.0) would be missed. The 0.15 below 1.0 is what covers a
wedged box reporting a small standby figure instead of a clean zero.
* **UPPER, from the hold** — every fraction in the flat range leaves
`delivery_hold_s` between **4.11×** (45.0 s) and **4.62×** (40.0 s) the worst
legitimate episode, well inside the four bounds SAFETY-42 §3.3 requires of it.
**`delivery_hold_s` IS NOT CHANGED BY THIS CARD.**
* ⚠️ **NOT DERIVED, AND SAID SO: the exact value inside [0.45, 1.0).** The
campaign cannot separate them. 0.85 is the midpoint of the argument above —
0.40 of margin above the shoulder, 0.15 below the ceiling — and a
re-derivation that moved it to 0.90 would be moving a number this campaign
never resolved. It is not moved for that reason.
## 4. The positive control — what the relative arm must still NOT say
A card that adds a way to raise an alarm has to show what it did **not** add.
`test_packshare.py` part 8b runs the same fixture, the same weights and the same
125 W share with the one fact that makes the shortfall legitimate changed:
| fixture | B's share | named | why it is silent |
|---|---|---|---|
| B wedged at a healthy 15 % (the fault) | 77–154 W | **200 / 200** | — it is the fault |
| B at its own 10 % cut-out | **0 W, all 200 cycles** | **0 / 200** | it is never **asked** |
| B delivering **half** its share | 120 W | **0 / 200** | short by 50 %, inside both arms |
### ⚠️ The cut-out row does NOT grade `account()`, and this record said it did
**Corrected in review.** The first draft of this section claimed the wedged and
cut-out arms had *"identical power traces — 0 W against a positive share, 100 %
of the ask missing"* and that *"what separates them is `account()`"*. **Every
part of that was false**, and the check that carried it was **vacuous**:
* at its own cut-out the pack's usable energy **above that cut-out is zero**, so
`packshare.weights()` answers **0.0** for it, `_fill()`'s preferred pass gives
it nothing, the healthy sibling covers the load alone so the last-resort pass
never runs, and its share is **0 W on all 200 cycles**;
* a unit with a 0 W share is not in `asked`, so `len(asked) < 2` returns `{}`
**before either arm is evaluated** and `account()` is **never consulted**;
* the traces are not identical — the cut-out arm's share is **0 W on every
cycle** (asserted in part 8b and printed on its line) while the wedged arm's
is **125 W** at the last cycle (asserted in the GREEN check) and takes four
distinct values 77/125/133/154 W across the 200, measured by re-running the
same loop with per-cycle recording during review — and "100 % of the ask" is
0/0.
Measured, by deleting the gate the claim rested on:
cut-out arm, account() live named 0/200, distinct B shares: [0]
cut-out arm, account() DELETED named 0/200, distinct B shares: [0]
wedged arm, account() live named 200/200, shares [77,125,133,154]
⚠️ **The fact that replaces it is better, not weaker.** At its own cut-out
**OPT-09 stops asking the pack at all**, so SAFETY-43's relative arm is never
reached — a **second, independent protection sitting upstream of `account()`**:
the allocator declines to ask before the detector has to decline to alarm. Part
8b now asserts the 0 W share and prints it, and runs the arm a second time with
`account()` deleted to show which mechanism is doing the work.
⚠️ **It was invisible for one reason worth keeping**: that line was the only one
in part 8b that did not print its shares. `inverter-b+0` would have been on
screen from the first run. Every line in that part prints them now, and the
derated control's vacuity guard now asserts **its own** unit is asked, rather
than re-asserting a different run's 200/200 — which is exactly why the old guard
could not see this.
**The account gate is graded where it is real**, on a positive 125 W share, in
`test_delivery.py` part 1 (*"THE ACCOUNT GATE IS UNTOUCHED BY IT"* — the same
0 of 125 W with the shortfall explained names nobody). That part also carries
that the relative bound is **strict** (a gap of exactly `frac · share` is not
over it) and that the proper-subset rule still refuses a site-wide cause (both
units delivering none of a 125 W share names nobody).
## 5. N=1 is byte-identical, and it is asserted rather than argued
The live install is **N=1**. Two independent statements, each graded against the
thing that would break it (`test_packshare.py` part 8b):
1. **`allocator.plan()` returns before `weights` is read at all.** Graded by
handing it a `weights` mapping that **raises on any read**: at a roster of one
it answers identically to the same call with no weights; at a roster of two
the same mapping is read and raises, so the tripwire is a real one.
2. **`delinquent()` answers `{}` at a roster of one for every input** — 84
combinations of (share, measured, rule), including **0 of 125 W**, the exact
input this card added an arm for. `len(asked) < 2` returns before either
threshold is compared, so the fraction is never even multiplied.
Nothing in this card is reachable at one inverter. It must land before inverter B
is commissioned (~2026-09-12), not before the next deploy.
## 5b. Mutation — the fraction is pinned from BOTH directions
⚠️ **RUN, NOT REASONED ABOUT.** Each mutation was applied to a tree **copied
fresh** from this branch and mounted `:ro` inside the checks image, so no `.pyc`
could go stale — MUTATION.md's defect, and all three of these are **reds**, the
direction that defect cannot fabricate. Recorded in `test_packshare.py` part 11
as M12–M14.
| mutation | named checks | where |
|---|---:|---|
| **M12** drop the relative arm, keep `gap > min_w` — *the card itself reverted* | **7** | `test_delivery.py` part 1 (3: the 0-of-125 W naming, the proportion in the sentence, the strict relative bound) + `test_packshare.py` 8b (4: GREEN back to 0/200, the equal arm's 200 back to 199, the 6000 W arm back to 195/199, the derated control's guard). `test_alloc.py` / `test_control.py` stay green — nothing outside this check moves. |
| **M13** `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` → **1.0** — *too loose* | **7** | part 1 (2) + 8b (5), including the PRECONDITION that the fraction is strictly below 1.0. At 1.0 the card is a no-op: gap/share of exactly 1.0 is not *over* 1.0. |
| **M14** `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` → **0.05** — *too sensitive* | **6** | part 1 (2: the strict bound, and *"IT TOOK NOTHING AWAY"* stops being true) + part **4b** (3: the `saturation_w` pin goes **vacuous**, the relative arm naming B at every threshold) + 8b's derated control, where a unit delivering half its share starts being named. |
M13 and M14 are the pair that matters: the constant cannot be moved in **either**
direction without a named check moving with it.
### ⚠️ Two of these counts were wrong, and the reason is worth keeping
**Corrected in review.**
* **M12 and M13 read 1 and 1 in `test_delivery.py`, not 3 and 2.** Part 1 printed
the alarm sentence with a bare subscript, `delinquent(_tiny, 500)["b"]`. On any
tree where the relative arm is broken or absent that raises `KeyError` and
**aborts the file at part 1**, leaving parts 2–8 ungraded — so the recorded
coverage of a mutation run read *smaller* than the truth. The direction is safe
(an abort is a red, and MUTATION.md's defect can only fabricate a green), but a
figure that does not reproduce is a figure that does not reproduce. It is a
`.get` now, with the reason written beside it, and the counts above are from
re-runs with the guard in place.
* **M14 was recorded as 4 named checks in `test_delivery.py` and it is 5** — part
1's pre-existing *"a shortfall AT the threshold is not one"* also goes red. That
one under-claimed, so it never inflated the evidence; it is still a recorded
number that did not reproduce.
## 6. ⚠️ [[CFG-07]] is adjacent and is NOT absorbed here
CFG-07 is that `delivery_hold_s` is declared `int(30,900)` in `config.yaml`'s
schema while the measured worst legitimate episode at the shipped threshold is
**35.0 s** — so the schema offers an operator a value (30) that is **below a
measured legitimate episode** and would report on ordinary saturation.
**This card makes it worse, and by exactly one control cycle.** The relative arm
takes the worst legitimate episode from **35.0 s to 40.0 s** at the shipped
fraction, so the band of schema-legal but false-tripping values widens from
`[30, 35]` to `[30, 40]`. The floor the schema should have is now **40 s**, not
35 s. It is not fixed here: raising a schema floor is an option-surface change
with its own compatibility argument (an existing config carrying `35` would start
being refused), and folding it into a safety fix would hide it. **CFG-07 should
be re-derived against 40.0 s, not 35.0 s.**
⚠️ **WHEN IT HAS TO CLOSE: BEFORE INVERTER B IS COMMISSIONED (~2026-09-12).**
Not before the next deploy. The band is **unreachable at N=1** — `delinquent()`
returns `{}` for every input at a roster of one, so no value of
`delivery_hold_s` can false-trip on the install that is running today — and the
live install is N=1 until B exists. Commissioning B is the moment the band
becomes reachable, and that is the deadline this card hands it.
⚠️ **AND CFG-07 HAS NO DECISION DOCUMENT IN THIS TREE.** It exists as a
`[[CFG-07]]` mention in `CHANGELOG.md` and in this section, and nowhere else —
so there is no file for the 40.0 s to be recorded in, and a reader who goes
looking will find a card reference with no record behind it. Whoever takes
CFG-07 writes `DECISIONS/CFG-07-*.md` first; the number it has to answer to is
**40.0 s**, measured here, and the harness that produces it is
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign --fractions`.
## 7. Provenance of every number in this document
| number | where it came from |
|---|---|
| 199/200, 0/200, 200/200, shares 1505/125 | `test_packshare.py` part 8b, run |
| 35.0 s absolute-arm floor, and its argmax | `delivery_window.py --campaign`, re-run here, reproduces SAFETY-42 §3.3 |
| every row of §3.1 | `delivery_window.py --campaign --fractions`, two passes over the same campaign with `FRACTIONS` changed between them |
| 1000 W / 6500 W suppression windows | part 8b's arithmetic, asserted there |
| 185 s, 5.29× | SAFETY-42 §3.3 / TEST-21, unchanged by this card |
| 4.62× | 185 / 40.0, printed by the campaign |
| 0/200 on both positive controls, and B's 0 W share at the cut-out | part 8b, run and asserted |
| 0 W cut-out share / 125 W wedged share | part 8b, asserted and printed |
| 77/125/133/154 W (the wedged arm's four distinct shares) | the same loop re-run in review with per-cycle recording — NOT part 8b's printed line, which shows the last cycle only |
| M12/M13/M14 named-check counts (7 / 7 / 6) | re-run in review on fresh `:ro` trees, after the `KeyError` abort in part 1 was guarded |
| 84 single-unit rosters | part 8b, run |
⚠️ Every two-inverter figure above is **two copies of inverter A**.
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
# UX-02 — two configuration surfaces, one blob, and which one is authoritative
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-06 — the STORED OPTIONS BLOB is authoritative and
neither user interface is.** The ingress panel is the surface an operator
should normally use, because it is the only one that can show the add-on's
cross-field refusals *before* a save. The Supervisor's Configuration tab stays,
unchanged, and is the **recovery** surface: it is the only one of the two that
still exists when the add-on is not running.
Filed with UX-02. Card 6a9afc52d4e3662463274e9d. Depends on [[UX-01]], which is
not superseded by this — see §4.
---
## 1. The question
The owner asked, 2026-09-04: *"can't we use some kind of webUI in HA to have a
cleaner config with custom styling?"* Yes — `config.yaml` already declares
`ingress: true`, `ingress_port: 8099` and `hassio_api: true`, and the panel is
live. But building a second editor for the same settings creates a question the
first one never had: **when two surfaces can write one blob, which one is
right?**
Getting that wrong is not a cosmetic problem. `POST /addons/self/options`
*replaces* the stored user options, so a page that writes a blob it read five
minutes ago silently reverts whatever the other surface did in between.
## 2. What was measured, not assumed
All of it out of `ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0` —
the version this site runs — by `tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py`, which runs
Supervisor's own code rather than re-reading it. It touches nothing: no
Supervisor is contacted, no options are posted and nothing is restarted.
**(a) An add-on may read and write its own options, and needs no role.**
`_V1_PATTERNS.api_bypass` was run against the exact paths. `/addons/self/info`,
`/addons/self/options` and `/addons/self/restart` all match; `security` and
`update` do not. `token_validation()` tests that bypass *before* it consults
`access_hassio_api` or any role, so no `hassio_role` is involved.
Two results the card did not predict, and both changed the design:
* `/addons/self/options/validate` — Supervisor's **own** options validator — is
**not** reachable: it is two path segments after `self`, so `[^/]+` cannot
match it, and it is not one of the listed literals. There is exactly one
validator an add-on can call from inside itself, and it is `app/validate.py`.
Which is the one we want: Supervisor's knows only types and ranges.
* `/addons/self/info` is admitted by the `default` role *as well as* by the
bypass (`/.+/info`), while `/addons/self/options` and `/addons/self/restart`
are admitted by the **bypass only**. The two *writing* paths rest on that one
list. The first draft of the probe asserted that the role admitted none of
the three, and it went red — which is why the split is written down here.
**(b) `POST …/options` replaces; an omitted key reverts to the config.yaml
default.** `App.options` is `deepmerge(config defaults, persisted user
options)`, and the setter is `persist[options] = deepcopy(value)`. Run on real
objects: with `max_w: 4200` stored, a POST that simply omits `max_w` leaves the
effective value at **2000**, config.yaml's default — not at 4200.
That is why the panel posts the **whole** blob it read, and why it refuses to
post one built on a stale read.
**(c) Validation does not coerce.** The full merged blob goes through
`AppOptions` unchanged, key for key. That is what makes the panel's *"stored
but not running"* comparison honest: a difference shown is a difference that
exists.
**(d) The Configuration tab *can* be removed — and doing so destroys every
setting on the site.** The card said it cannot be. It can: `schema:` is
optional, a manifest without it is accepted, and `schema_ui` is then `[]`, so
the tab renders nothing. What goes with it is the add-on. `AppOptions` drops
every option the schema does not declare — **0 of 71 survive** — so
`/data/options.json` becomes `{}`, the controller starts with no actuator, the
startup gate refuses it (exit 78), and the ingress panel goes down with the
process serving it.
So the tab stays **by decision, not by constraint**. That distinction matters:
a constraint nobody re-examines is not a decision, and this one has a cost
(§4) that has to be paid knowingly.
## 3. The decision
> **The authoritative configuration is the options blob the Supervisor stores.
> Both surfaces are editors of it. Neither is a cache of the other, and neither
> owns a copy of anything.**
Consequences, in the order they bind:
1. **The panel never holds state.** Every page load re-reads
`GET /addons/self/info`. There is no local copy of the options, the schema
or the labels — the form is *built* from that response by
`app/configui.py`, which contains no option key, no label and no rule.
2. **A save is a compare-and-swap.** The read hands the page a
`fingerprint()` (a sha256 of the canonical blob); the save hands it back;
`selfconfig.save()` re-reads the stored blob **immediately before writing**
and refuses if the digest moved. The window in which the other surface can
slip a change past is one HTTP round trip, not the length of an editing
session.
3. **Validation happens before the compare, and a refused blob is never
written.** Not warned about — not written.
4. **Saving never restarts.** Applying options costs a control interruption
(§5), so it is a separate, explicitly confirmed act.
### Why a digest and not a version number
The Supervisor exposes no revision or ETag for an add-on's options. The only
thing a page can hold between reading and writing is the *content* it read —
and that is enough, because the question is not "how many times has this
changed" but "is what I am about to overwrite still what I was shown".
Identical content is by definition safe to overwrite.
### This is [[SAFETY-28]]'s discipline, applied to configuration
`arbiter.py` and `Controller.write_refusal()` enforce *exactly one writer per
actuator* not by convention but by a check on the write path:
> A NUMBER REACHES THE WIRE ONLY IF THE SINGLE ALLOCATOR PLACED IT, ON THIS
> TICK, FOR THIS UNIT.
The configuration analogue is written the same way and for the same reason:
> A BLOB REACHES THE SUPERVISOR ONLY IF IT WAS DERIVED FROM THE BLOB THAT IS
> STORED RIGHT NOW.
Note what is *not* claimed. SAFETY-28's rule makes a second writer
inexpressible; this one does not — the Supervisor's tab is a second writer and
stays one. What this gets is the weaker, honest property: **a second writer is
detected rather than silently overwritten.** That is the most a
compare-and-swap can give, and pretending otherwise would be the "check that
observes something other than what it claims to observe" this repository keeps
finding.
## 4. What this costs, stated plainly
**Two surfaces means two places to be confused.** The Configuration tab still
renders all 71 keys as a flat list, and it can still store a configuration the
add-on will refuse to start on — it knows only types and ranges. UX-01's
translations are therefore **not** superseded by this card: they are the only
thing standing between that tab and raw key names, and they are also where this
panel's labels, descriptions and section headings come from. The two surfaces
share one set of words on purpose; two vocabularies for one setting would be
worse than one plain list.
**The panel is not available when it is most needed.** If a configuration that
refuses to start is ever stored — from the Configuration tab, or by a hand-edit,
or by this panel in some future state it does not currently permit — the add-on
exits 78 and the panel goes with it. Recovery is the Configuration tab. That is
the reason it stays, and the reason the panel refuses to write a blob the
validator rejected: this surface must never be the thing that removes itself.
**The panel shows fewer refusals than the startup gate can, never more.** Two
of `validate.py`'s rules compare a configured ceiling against the setpoint
device's *own* reported range, which is only knowable by asking Home Assistant.
When ESPHome is asleep the range is `None` and those two rules are skipped —
here and at startup, identically. The page says so rather than looking green
for a reason the operator cannot see.
## 5. The restart cost, and why it is a separate button
Applying options needs a restart, and `Controller.shutdown()` commands **0 W on
every inverter** on the way out ("shutting down - commanding 0 W on every
inverter", main.py). A configuration save is therefore a real, if brief, loss
of control of the battery — and the operator is told that *before* they commit,
in the page's own markup, not in a message that appears afterwards.
So the panel splits the act in two:
* **Save** stores the blob. Nothing restarts, nothing is applied, and the page
then says which settings are stored but not running.
* **Restart to apply** asks again, names the 0 W again, and only then posts
`/addons/self/restart`. The request carries an intent token, so a reload, a
retry or a stray POST cannot spend a control interruption on the operator's
behalf.
A restart does **not** clear anything: SAFETY-02's latches are restored from
the Store on the way back up, which is what `Inverter.__init__` is written to
do and what [[SAFETY-38]] depends on.
## 6. The scope line, and it is a safety line
**Nothing on this surface commands an inverter, clears a latch or bypasses a
safety rule.** The set of things an operator can do to the hardware through the
panel is exactly what `/action` offered before this card. `app/selfconfig.py`
talks to the Supervisor about a JSON blob and to `validate.py` about whether
that blob is startable; the only actuator-shaped verb in it is `restart()`,
which restarts *this add-on* and whose 0 W is the existing, documented
wind-down.
test_selfconfig.py part 7 asserts that mechanically — it lists the routes, and
it greps `selfconfig.py` and the page for `set_number`, `write_setpoint`,
`handle_action`, `command_site_zero`, `sign_wd` and `reset(`. Adding "and also
set the setpoint while we are here" would put a second writer on the actuator
through the configuration surface, which is the non-goal this add-on is built
around.
## 7. How "every message comes from the shipped validator" is proven
Not by inspection. `test_selfconfig.py` part 6 copies the package, inserts **one
new rule** into `validate_startup_config()` in the copy, hashes every file under
`app/` to show that **validate.py is the only one that differs**, and then
serves the real `/config/validate` route out of that copy in a subprocess. The
new sentence arrives on the page, filed under the option key it names, with no
UI file touched.
That is the acceptance criterion run rather than argued, and it is what makes
"do not reimplement any rule in JavaScript" a property of the build instead of
a promise in a comment.
@@ -1,379 +0,0 @@
# UX-04 — what the Configuration tab renders, and the pin that was never built
**Status: DECIDED 2026-09-07.** Three decisions and one confirmation, in the
order [[UX-01]]'s unmet acceptance criteria are numbered:
1. **UX-01 AC 3 (hide the optional fields behind HA's toggle) is WITHDRAWN as
unsatisfiable**, not deferred. The target was arithmetically unreachable, and
the part of it that *was* reachable would be bought with the upgrade path.
The measurement is now **graded** in `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §F
rather than printed, so the withdrawal cannot be quietly reversed.
2. **UX-01 AC 4's third clause is now BUILT**: `test_defaults_pin.py`, an AST
check, with its red direction executed on every run.
3. **UX-01 AC 5 / the CFG-04 double-literal hole is CONFIRMED CLOSED on
`release/1.0`, by [[UX-02]]'s `bcee235`, not by UX-01's `fef6ef2`.** The
attribution is corrected here; no work was re-done.
4. **The 8 per-entry `inverters:` translations STAY.** They do not reach the
Supervisor tab and cannot be made to; [[UX-02]]'s ingress panel is where they
become visible.
Filed with UX-04. Card `6a9ec94617e9c48ed74ca5dd`. Every number below was
measured on `release/1.0` at `6e7b233` on 2026-09-07, against
`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0` — the version
`ha info` reports on the live install — and against the 26-file check suite in
`goodwe-addon-checks:1`. Nothing here contacted the live Supervisor at
192.168.2.158, posted options, or restarted anything.
---
## 1. Hiding: withdrawn, and why that is the *safe* answer
### 1.1 What AC 3 claimed
> "The visible count drops to ~15, with the rest behind HA's *show unused
> optional configuration options* toggle."
### 1.2 What the tab actually renders
`config.yaml` declares **71 keys under `options:` and the same 71 under
`schema:`**. The set that HA's toggle is *able* to hide — schema-only keys — is
therefore **empty**:
```
hideable = set(schema) - set(options) -> [] (0 of 71)
```
On the deployed 0.7.0 tree the same measurement is 70/70. Nothing was hidden
before UX-01, nothing is hidden after it, and no line of `fef6ef2` moved a key
either way. AC 3 is not partially met; it is unstarted.
### 1.3 The rule that decides it, replayed rather than paraphrased
From the frontend bundle shipped **in this image**,
`api/panel/frontend_latest/5680.*.js` (frontend 20250925.1):
```js
_filteredSchema = (opts, schema) => schema.filter(e => e.name in opts || e.required)
```
`opts` is the add-on's options **as Supervisor serves them** — the operator's
stored blob after `options:` has been deep-merged into it. So a field is hidden
only when it is **both** absent from `options:` **and** not `required`. The
probe now runs that filter on this manifest rather than quoting it.
### 1.4 Reason one: the target was never reachable
Supervisor's own `UiOptions` marks `required` on **59** of the 71 fields; 12 are
optional. The filter above shows a required field unconditionally. So the
**floor** — what the tab renders with `options:` emptied *altogether*, which is
the most hiding that is even expressible — is 59 fields.
| `options:` block | fields rendered |
|---|---|
| as shipped (71 keys) | **71** |
| emptied entirely (0 keys) | **59** |
| AC 3's target | ~15 |
AC 3 asked for a number roughly four times below the floor. No arrangement of
`options:` reaches it. The criterion could not have been met by any
implementation; it was mis-specified, and the honest disposal of a
mis-specified criterion is withdrawal, not a partial gesture toward it.
### 1.5 Reason two: the 12 hides that *are* expressible cost the deep-merge
Moving a key out of `options:` is not free. `App.options` is
`deepmerge(config.yaml defaults, the stored user options)`, so **a key absent
from `options:` has no default for the Supervisor to merge**.
That is exactly the mechanism the 0.9.0 upgrade rests on. From `CHANGELOG.md`,
the pre-deploy check run against this release on 2026-09-07:
> The reference install's stored blob has **70 keys, not 71**.
> `delivery_hold_s` arrived with SAFETY-42 in 0.8.0, so an install running
> 0.7.0 has never stored it — and it is REQUIRED in the schema, no trailing
> `?`, which is the shape that becomes **exit 78**. It resolves to its
> `options:` default of **185** because the Supervisor deep-merges.
Hiding a key is done by taking it *out* of `options:` and marking it `?`. That
is, precisely, the edit that removes a key's merge default — the thing standing
between a 0.7.0 box and exit 78 on upgrade. It would be traded for at most 12
fewer rows on a form, on a site where the add-on is holding a real house's grid
exchange at zero.
### 1.6 Reason three: it would promote 27 unpinned literals to load-bearing
And the cost compounds with §2 of this document. `test_defaults_pin.py` part 4
ledgers **27 (module, key) pairs** in `app/` that still answer a missing option
with an in-code literal. Today those literals are unreachable on a Supervisor
install, because the deep-merge guarantees every `options:` key is present in
the served blob. Remove keys from `options:` to hide them and those literals
stop being dead code: they become **the actual source of the defaults on a live
install** — the CFG-03 defect the same card's AC 4 exists to police, made
load-bearing by the card's own AC 3.
### 1.7 What now grades this
`tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §F. The count was printed there from the day
it was written — *"the Configuration tab renders 71 fields"* — and the probe
exited 0 through UX-01's whole review while displaying the number that
contradicted the criterion it was evidence for. **A measurement that is
displayed but not asserted is how this passed review.** Three assertions
replace the bare print:
```
PASS every one of the 71 `schema:` keys is ALSO in `options:`, so schema-only
- the only set HA's toggle can hide - is EMPTY. Hideable: []
PASS ...so replaying the frontend's own _filteredSchema on the served options
hides NOTHING: 71 of 71 fields render
PASS ...and with `options:` EMPTIED ENTIRELY - the maximum hiding that is
expressible - the tab still renders 59 required fields. THAT is the
floor, and AC 3 asked for ~15.
```
Every number in them is computed from the manifest and from Supervisor's own
`required` flag; none is typed. **The red direction was run**: deleting one key
(`price_feed_url`) from `options:` and nothing else turns the first two to FAIL
— `Hideable: ['price_feed_url']`, `70 of 71 fields render` — and the probe
exits 1. The counterfactual is isolated: one key varied, nothing else.
So if a future editor empties `options:` to shorten the form, this goes red and
somebody has to read §1.5 before merging.
---
## 2. The defaults pin: `test_defaults_pin.py`
### 2.1 What AC 4 asked for and what shipped
AC 4 has three clauses.
| clause | state before UX-04 |
|---|---|
| "every `schema:` key absent from `options:` has exactly one defaults-table entry" | **vacuous** — that set is empty (§1.2), so the clause is true of any tree, including one with no defaults at all |
| "the table changed → red" | **works**, six times over, once per mirror in its own suite |
| "no module carries its own literal fallback for a schema default — an AST check, not a grep" | **never built** |
The only literal scan in the repository before this card is
`test_validate.py:1025`: a `re.findall` restricted to eight `maintenance_*`
keys across three named files. It is a grep, it predates UX-01, and it was not
written for this.
### 2.2 What an "in-code literal fallback" is, structurally
A call in `app/` taking a string literal that names a `schema:` key, with a
constant in the next positional slot:
```python
opts.get("max_w", 2000) _number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)
```
Found by walking `ast.Call` nodes — so a multi-line call and a renamed `opts`
are found, and the same text inside a comment or docstring is not. Two
exclusions, both structural and both argued at the site:
* **`getattr(obj, "max_w", 0.0)`** reads an attribute off an object, not an
option off a blob. Excluded by callee name.
* **the empty string.** `opts.get("static_profile", "")` is Python's "not
stated", and all six such sites in `validate.py` normalise it immediately —
`str(opts.get(k, "") or "").strip()`. It cannot be a stale copy of a *number*,
which is the whole of the CFG-04 defect class. Excluded by value. **`0` is
not excluded**: `slew_w: 0` and `integrator_max_w: 0` are real shipped
defaults with real meanings.
### 2.3 What it grades, measured on `release/1.0` @ `6e7b233`
```
2. the mirrors, DISCOVERED from the tree rather than listed here
6 table(s): circulation.py:CIRC_OPTION_DEFAULTS, delivery.py:DELIVERY_OPTION_DEFAULTS,
maintenance.py:MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS, peakguard.py:PEAK_OPTION_DEFAULTS,
price.py:PRICE_OPTION_DEFAULTS, watchdog.py:SIGN_OPTION_DEFAULTS
30 mirrored key(s) of 71 in `schema:`
3. the AST scan
scanned 29 modules, 34 literal fallback site(s): 0 over mirrored keys,
34 over unmirrored ones
4. the CFG-03 ledger
27 (module, key) pair(s) carry a literal for a key no mirror answers for
```
Four properties, none of them vacuous:
1. **The mirrors are discovered, not listed.** Six suites already pin their own
table to `config.yaml` — and every one of those pins names its table by
hand, so a *seventh* table added tomorrow would be pinned by nobody and
nothing would say so. This walks `app/` for module-level `*_OPTION_DEFAULTS`
assignments and grades whatever it finds against `config.yaml`. That is the
property the six hand-written pins cannot have.
2. **No literal survives for a key a mirror already answers for.** 30 keys,
0 violations.
3. **The CFG-03 ledger is FROZEN, by (module, key) pair, not by count.** A
count goes green again the moment somebody deletes one site and adds
another. Line numbers are deliberately *not* in the key: a ledger that goes
red on an unrelated reformat is a ledger people learn to re-bless without
reading. The 27 pairs are the open CFG-03 backlog; they are **not** removed
here, because that is behaviour change across `main.py`, `p1.py`,
`inverter.py` and `validate.py` that no single card should make in passing.
The set can now only shrink.
4. **Every remaining literal is graded against `config.yaml`** — the half that
catches CFG-04's actual failure mode, two copies of one number and one moves.
### 2.4 One divergence found, and it is new
```
main.py target_grid_w: code 0 vs config.yaml -10
```
`main.py:290` reads `target_grid_w=float(opts.get("target_grid_w", 0))` while
`config.yaml` ships **-10**. A dict handed to `Controller` without the key holds
net exchange at 0 W instead of the shipped -10 W bias into import. **It cannot
reach an operator**: on a Supervisor install the deep-merge guarantees the key
is present, and the only paths that hand over a partial dict are
`sim/inject.py` and this repository's own fixtures. It is recorded in the check
as the single permitted divergence, with the reason, rather than corrected —
changing it alters the control loop's target and belongs to a card that grades
the loop. A *second* divergence goes red.
### 2.5 ⭐ The red direction, shown rather than claimed
A check that has never been shown failing is not a check — which is exactly
what clause one of this AC was. Two things follow from that:
**(a) The red direction runs on every invocation.** Part 5 feeds the scanner a
synthetic module containing a deliberate violation of each rule and *requires*
it to be flagged, in-process, through the same `literal_fallbacks()` the graded
parts call. A scanner that goes blind — a renamed helper, an `ast` change, a
`SCHEMA` that comes back empty — stops working here too, and the total site
count is additionally graded against a floor.
**(b) A literal was planted in the real tree and the check went red.** Planted
at `main.py:290`, `float(opts.get("maintenance_charge_w", 2000))` — a mirrored
key:
```
3. the AST scan: no module carries its own literal fallback for a MIRRORED schema default
scanned 29 modules, 35 literal fallback site(s): 1 over mirrored keys, 34 over unmirrored ones
ok the scanner is not blind: it found 35 sites (floor 20)
main.py:290 get('maintenance_charge_w', 2000)
FAIL no literal fallback survives for any of the 30 keys a mirror already
answers for - those sites must index the mirror
1 FAILED (exit 1)
```
And part 4's two directions, planted the same way with
`opts.get("p1_host", "x")` and `opts.get("slew_w", 999)`:
```
4. the CFG-03 ledger
28 (module, key) pair(s) carry a literal for a key no mirror answers for
FAIL no NEW module/key pair has started carrying a literal fallback [('main.py', 'p1_host')]
main.py p1_host: code 'x' vs config.yaml ''
main.py slew_w: code 999 vs config.yaml 0
main.py target_grid_w: code 0 vs config.yaml -10
FAIL every remaining literal still AGREES with config.yaml, except the 1
divergence(s) recorded above it
(exit 1)
```
The second of those is the CFG-04 defect class itself: a literal that has
drifted away from `config.yaml` while the file still says something else. Both
plants were removed; the tree is byte-identical to `6e7b233` apart from this
card's own files.
---
## 3. CFG-04: closed on `release/1.0`, by UX-02, not by UX-01
UX-01's AC 5 claimed the double-literal `max_w` hole. It did not close it.
`fef6ef2` touched `config.yaml`, `translations/`, `test_translations.py` and the
probe — **no defaults code at all** — and on the 0.7.0 tree the triple mutation
survives: 21 files, 0 RED.
**Confirmed on current `release/1.0` @ `6e7b233`, 2026-09-07.** The same triple
mutation, `2000 -> 2500` at the three descendants of 0.7.0's
`inverter.py:438` / `validate.py:383` / `validate.py:684`:
| 0.7.0 | `release/1.0` @ `6e7b233` |
|---|---|
| `inverter.py:438` `max_w=float(opts.get("max_w", 2000))` | `inverter.py:640` `raw = opts.get("max_w", 2000)` |
| `validate.py:383` `cap = _number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)` | `validate.py:466`, same line |
| `validate.py:684` `max_w = _number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)` | `validate.py:836`, same line |
Result — 26 files, **RED at `test_selfconfig.py`**, exit 1:
```
1 FAILED: ⚠️ CLEARING max_w ON THE LIVE SHAPE IS REFUSED - rule 10 catches the
rail collapsing to the 2000 default under an explicit 400 W slew, so the box
cannot be emptied into a quietly halved rail
```
`git log -L 310,325:goodwe_controller/test_selfconfig.py` attributes that check
to **`bcee235`, "UX-02: pin both halves of the max_w fix, because neither was
graded", glenn schrooyen, 2026-09-06** — not to UX-01. The hole ships closed
with the pending 0.9.0 deploy. **The AC is met by UX-02.** No work was re-done
here; the mutation was run once, on a throwaway copy, to confirm it.
---
## 4. The 8 per-entry translations: they stay
### 4.1 The measurement, and it is negative
`translations/{en,nl}.yaml` carry a name and a description for all 8 per-entry
keys of the repeatable `inverters:` section. They are loaded by Supervisor's own
loader, they pass `SCHEMA_APP_TRANSLATIONS`, and `test_translations.py` grades
their coverage. **They do not reach the screen**, and this is not a defect in
them. `UiOptions` gives `inverters` `type: "schema"` with `multiple: True`, and
the frontend's `_convertSchemaElement` sends exactly that case to a selector
rather than to a nested `ha-form`:
```js
if ("schema" === t.type && !t.multiple) return {...type:"expandable"...} // not us
if ("schema" === t.type) { const o = {}; for (const a of t.schema)
o[a.name] = {required: a.required, selector: ...}; return {object:{multiple:t.multiple, fields:o}} }
```
and `ha-selector-object` labels those fields `fields[name].label || name`, while
`_convertSchemaElementToSelector` sets **neither `label` nor `translation_key`**.
So an operator sees raw `name`, `setpoint_entity`, `max_w`, `bms_soc_floor`. The
probe already asserts this, negatively and by name.
### 4.2 Decision: keep them. Four reasons.
1. **The Supervisor tab cannot be made to render them.** The gap is in
somebody else's converter, not in this repository. There is no change here
that fixes it; deleting the translations does not fix it either.
2. **[[UX-02]]'s ingress panel is where they become visible**, and it renders
the roster itself rather than handing it to `ha-selector-object`. The
`fields:` block is the shape Supervisor's own schema defines for exactly
this, and it is what a surface that wires `label` through consumes.
3. **They cost nothing.** No runtime path reads them; they are two YAML blocks
in files the Supervisor already parses, and the parse is graded green.
4. **Deleting them would remove the only thing that catches a per-entry key
added without a translation.** `test_translations.py` grades top-level and
per-entry coverage symmetrically; drop the per-entry half and SAFETY-32's
`bms_soc_floor` — a *required* per-entry key added after UX-01 — would have
joined the roster with no label and nothing to say so.
This is a written decision, not a change. The tree is unmodified in
`translations/`.
### 4.3 Not re-filed
`tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py` has been known red since OPT-09 — it
hardcodes `len(_sub) == 7` against 8 per-entry keys. That is **TOOL-04**,
already filed, and it is not re-filed or fixed here. It is named only so a
reader of §4.1 knows why the *other* probe is the one quoted.
---
## 5. What this card did not do
* It did not remove a key from `options:`. See §1.5 — the deep-merge default is
what makes the pending 0.9.0 upgrade safe on a 0.7.0 box.
* It did not pay down the 27-pair CFG-03 ledger. See §2.3.
* It did not correct `main.py`'s `target_grid_w` fallback. See §2.4.
* It did not touch `translations/`. See §4.2.
* It did not re-do CFG-04. See §3.
* It did not touch hardware, the live Home Assistant at 192.168.2.158, or
`sim/`. Both probe runs were throwaway containers over a read-only mount.
+2 -358
View File
@@ -40,69 +40,6 @@ hardware holds it there.
## Configuration
### ⚠️ There are TWO places to configure this add-on (UX-02)
Since **UX-02** the ingress panel has a **Configuration** page of its own,
beside Home Assistant's *Configuration* tab. Both edit the **same** settings —
there is one options blob, and neither surface is a copy of it.
| | Ingress panel → **Configuration** | Supervisor → **Configuration** tab |
|---|---|---|
| **Use it for** | everyday editing | recovery, and when the add-on is down |
| **Sections, units, help** | real headings, units beside the boxes, the description under each field | one flat list of 71 fields, no headings, no units |
| **Tells you a setting is wrong** | **yes — before you save**, next to the field | no. It knows types and ranges only |
| **Can express a rule spanning two keys** | yes, because it runs the add-on's own validator | **no.** The schema grammar cannot say "must be at or below `max_w`" |
| **Available when the add-on is not running** | **no** — it is served *by* the add-on | **yes** |
| **Editing the inverter list** | cards you add and remove, with the per-entry labels rendered | a repeatable section whose per-entry keys render **raw** on frontend 20250925.1 |
**Which one is authoritative: neither.** The stored options blob is, and both
are editors of it. `DECISIONS/UX-02-two-config-surfaces.md` is the record, with
the measurements behind it.
The one thing you need to know in practice: **the panel refuses to save a
configuration the add-on would not start on, and the Configuration tab does
not.** The tab will happily store `maintenance_charge_w: 2500` beside
`max_w: 2000`; the add-on then exits 78 on its next start, the panel goes down
with it, and the tab is where you fix it. That asymmetry is the reason both
exist.
#### What the panel does when you press Save
1. It runs the **shipped** validator — the same `validate_startup_config()` and
`validate_unit_ranges()` the add-on runs at startup, not a copy of them — and
if anything is refused, **nothing is written** and your edits stay on screen.
2. It re-reads the stored blob and refuses if it changed while you were editing
— someone in the Configuration tab, or you on another device. It names the
keys that moved and shows both values; pressing Save again then writes yours.
3. It writes the whole blob. It does **not** restart: `POST …/options` replaces
the stored options, and a key left out would revert to the shipped default,
so the panel always sends everything it read.
#### ⚠️ Saving costs nothing. Applying costs a control interruption
Stored settings take effect when the add-on next starts. The panel shows which
stored settings are not what the add-on is currently running, and **Restart to
apply** is a separate button with its own confirmation — because the wind-down
commands **0 W on every inverter** before the process exits, and the battery
does nothing until it is back. Nothing else is changed by that restart: a
latched sign-disagreement failsafe is restored from the Store on the way back
up, not cleared.
#### Two range checks can be skipped, and the page says so
Two of the refusals compare a configured ceiling against the setpoint device's
**own** reported range, which means asking Home Assistant. If ESPHome has not
come up, that range is unknown and those two checks are skipped — on the page
and at startup, identically. The page prints a note saying so rather than
looking green for a reason you cannot see. If the device answers later and
disagrees, the add-on refuses to start then, with the same sentence.
#### On a phone
One column, big targets, sections collapsed until you open them, and the
refusals pinned where you cannot scroll past them. It is the screen for
standing in front of the inverter.
### What the Configuration tab actually shows you (UX-01)
Since **UX-01** the add-on ships `translations/en.yaml` and `translations/nl.yaml`,
@@ -110,13 +47,12 @@ so Home Assistant's *Configuration* tab renders human labels and a description
for every option instead of the raw option keys. What that does and does not buy
you is worth stating plainly, because it was **measured against the Supervisor
image this site runs** (`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0`)
rather than assumed — `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` section F GRADES (it
used only to print) the
rather than assumed — `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` section F prints the
whole rendered list, in both languages.
| | |
|---|---|
| **All 71 options are always shown** | The frontend keeps a field when `name in options \|\| required`, and every key is in `options:`. There is no "advanced" fold |
| **All 70 options are always shown** | The frontend keeps a field when `name in options \|\| required`, and every key is in `options:`. There is no "advanced" fold |
| **Order comes from `schema:`** | `App.schema_ui` is `UiOptions(...)(data["schema"])`, so the **schema half** of `config.yaml` decides the order the tab renders in — not the `options:` half |
| **There are no section headers** | Add-on options are a flat list: no header primitive, no per-option advanced flag, no units on the input, no sliders. Grouping is approximated by **order** plus the `Group · ` prefix in each label, and by nothing else |
| **Groups, in task order** | Hardware → Meter → Limits → Tariff → Maintenance → Safety → Advanced |
@@ -1424,70 +1360,6 @@ distinct state from "prices, all of them zero": the plan is marked provisional
and arbitrage is disabled, per the degradation matrix. It never falls back to a
price of zero, which would read as free electricity.
#### The hours the feed has not published yet (FCST-04)
A day-ahead auction publishes tomorrow's prices once a day, at **14–16 h CET**.
Before that, the feed is serving today and nothing else — so a `price_horizon_h`
of 48 asks for 48 hours and gets back the ten or fifteen that are left in the
day. Until FCST-04 those other hours were simply **absent** from the plan: not
priced badly, not flagged, just missing, and nothing said so.
Now the add-on keeps the **published prices of the last few days** in
`/data/price_history.json` and fills an unpublished hour of the horizon with
yesterday's price for the same Brussels wall-clock hour, flagged
`provisional: true`. Two things follow, and the second one matters more:
- **The plan says it is guessing** — `provisional: true` on every carried hour,
which is what the optimiser reads. Before, a half-length plan looked
completely settled.
- **Nothing may trade on a carried hour.** §8.3 forbids acting on a provisional
price, so arbitrage drops those hours from the trade set entirely — it needs a
buy hour and a sell hour that were *both* published. Carrying a price forward
widens what the optimiser can **see**; it never widens what it may **do**.
**"An unpublished hour", not "every unpublished hour"** — the fill can only
carry an hour yesterday actually published. If yesterday's record is itself
partial (a first day, an outage, a feed that only ever serves the rest of the
day), the local hours it never held are **left out of the series**: §11.4
applies to those hours, and asking the plan for one raises rather than
answering. An hour with no price is not a free hour, and the fill does not
invent a neighbour, a mean or a zero for it.
**A quarter-hourly feed keeps all four of its prints.** `eneco_eddy` settles
per quarter, and the fill decides *which whole hours need carrying* — never what
a published hour may contain. Every point the provider published inside the
horizon is passed through untouched; a carried point is added only for a whole
hour the feed did not print at all.
**What you can actually see on the status page.** *Price history* (below) says
what is held. *Arbitrage* carries the strategy's own sentence, which names the
firm/provisional split whenever that split is what refused a trade. *Tariff*
does **not** report the fill: it is the static-profile or Home Assistant
price-entity sentence, regenerated on the 30 s tick. The provider plan's own
line — `dynamic_dayahead from generic_dayahead, 48 h, provisional` — goes to the
**add-on log** at every refresh, alongside `§8.3: 33 of 48 hours carried forward
from yesterday's profile and flagged provisional; 15 published`.
The plan is also now cut to the horizon you asked for, which means **hours that
have already elapsed are no longer in it**. That is a real change to arbitrage:
a cheap night that has already gone used to sit in the series as the cheapest
hour of the day, and a cycle can never buy in an hour that is past — so the
trade was quietly never taken. The spread is now taken over hours still ahead.
A new status row, **Price history**, says which days are held and how many hours
each has. If it reads `empty` or `unavailable`, nothing is carried, the horizon
is as short as the feed makes it, and every other guarantee is unchanged — a
cache that cannot answer is not allowed to be a controller that cannot regulate.
The store is rebuilt by the next successful fetch; on a brand-new install the
first fill is possible the day after the first refresh.
The same applies to a file that is *partly* broken: a day record this build
cannot read is dropped, the row says how many were dropped and why, and the rest
of the file still loads. And where there is no `/data` at all the store records
**nothing** — not even in memory. An in-memory yesterday would answer for one
run and vanish on the next restart, which is a cache that forgets without saying
so; `unavailable` and *no prices carried* are the honest pair.
**Injection is priced separately** (`export_price_eur_kwh`). In Belgium it is
often near zero, which by itself strongly favours self-consumption over export.
It is a single number rather than a curve because no supported supplier
@@ -1625,237 +1497,9 @@ is, and a **Commissioning** checklist that names any problem in words. It also
carries the three buttons: start/stop control, force a maintenance cycle, and
abort one.
Since **UX-02** it has a second page, **Configuration** — see *There are TWO
places to configure this add-on*, above. ⚠️ **It adds nothing you can do to the
inverter.** The configuration page reads and writes the add-on's own settings
and can restart the add-on; the set of commands that reach the hardware is
exactly the three buttons it always had.
## Status entities
If an MQTT broker is available the add-on publishes setpoint, grid power,
battery power, circulating power, state of charge, maintenance phase and
controller status by MQTT discovery. This is observability only — the controller works fine without a
broker, and MQTT problems can never affect control.
## Before you commission inverter B: `tools/rehearse_roster.py` (ARCH-02)
The day the `inverters:` roster is declared, two things change that are
**one-way on a live box and invisible until after the restart that applies
them**: the store migration renames the keys that hold the SAFETY-02 latch and
the maintenance history, and the entity ids Home Assistant composes change
shape. This tool runs the **real `Controller`** through that transition against
a **copy** of the state file and reports the difference.
docker run --rm -e PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 -v <repo>:/w:ro \
goodwe-addon-checks:1 sh -c 'cd /w/goodwe_controller && \
python3 tools/rehearse_roster.py \
--state /w/state-copy.json \
--before /w/live-options.json \
--after /w/roster-options.json \
--live-entities /w/live-entities.txt \
--reverse --round-trip'
Exit `0` clean · `1` at least one finding · `2` could not run. ⚠️ **`2` is not a
pass.**
### The owner steps, because this session could not take them
⚠️ **The rehearsal is only as good as the state it is pointed at, and nothing in
this repository can fetch that.** SSH to the live box is blocked by policy and
that is correct — `/data/state.json` is the file the running add-on is writing.
So three things have to be exported by hand, onto the machine that runs the
check, **before** the roster is declared:
1. **The state file.** From the Supervisor host:
ha addons info local_goodwe_controller # confirm the slug first
docker cp addon_local_goodwe_controller:/data/state.json ./state-copy.json
or take it out of a full add-on backup, which is the same bytes. ⚠️ **Copy
it, never move it, and never write to the original.** The tool opens the path
it is given exactly once and does all of its writing on a scratch copy — but
the safe habit is to hand it a file the add-on has never heard of.
2. **The options blob**, as `--before`. It is not reachable through the Home
Assistant REST API and no entity carries it; export it from the Supervisor,
the same way `tools/predeploy_check.py` needs it. Write the roster you intend
to deploy into a second file and pass it as `--after`.
3. **The entity list**, as `--live-entities` — one entity id per line:
Developer tools -> Template:
{{ states | map(attribute='entity_id') | select('search','goodwe') | join('\n') }}
⚠️ **Omitting it is a REFUSAL (exit 2), not a quieter run.** The orphan check
is graded against the ids the install actually has, and without that file it
is not graded against reality at all — so the tool will not run rather than
hand back a clean bill of health for a half of the transition it did not
check. If you genuinely have to run without it, pass `--no-live-entities`:
the run then carries a standing banner in the report header **and** on the
exit line saying the orphan check was not graded. The asymmetry used to be
the other way round — an unreadable file refused, a missing flag passed with
exit 0 and no disclosure at all — and the owner runs this once, at
commissioning, under time pressure.
The install carries roughly 49 `goodwe*` entities and this add-on announces
eight of them. The tool separates the ids it owns from the ids it does not,
rather than claiming orphans it cannot cause.
### The reference, which is loaded on every run
`--reference` defaults to `tools/rehearsal/announced-reference.txt` and is read
**whether or not** you pass an entity list. It records what the build is
supposed to announce, three columns per row:
<entity_id> <unique_id> <device identifier>
⚠️ **All three, and the second and third are the ones an entity_id-only list
cannot see.** The tool's own before/after diff is composed twice by the same
build, so a change to the composition moves both sides equally and the diff
reports nothing. Worse, two changes orphan an install *without moving a single
composed entity_id*: renaming `mqtt.BASE` (every `unique_id` changes) and
changing `DEVICE["identifiers"]` (HA sees a new device). Home Assistant keys its
entity registry on `unique_id` and its device registry on the identifier, so
either one creates a **new** entity beside the old — and because discovery is
published `retain=True` with no removal payload, the old config stays on the
broker and the old entity stays in the registry, still named by every automation
that referenced it, never updating again. Both were measured coming back
**exit 0** before the reference carried three columns.
`object_id` is deliberately **not** a column: `app/mqtt.py` records that HA
2026.8 does not honour it in a discovery payload, so renaming one is a true
no-op, and `test_rehearse.py` requires that mutation to **survive** — otherwise
"the reference notices any edit to `mqtt.py`" would be indistinguishable from
"the reference notices what HA keys on".
⚠️ **No result in this repository was produced against real state.** Everything
recorded here and in `test_rehearse.py` was measured on the synthetic fixtures
in `tools/rehearsal/`.
### What it confirms on the synthetic fixtures
⚠️ **This is a SECOND INSTRUMENT reaching a conclusion this repository already
holds, not a discovery.** `test_maintenance.py` section 13 — *"RECORDED, NOT
FIXED: SAFETY-02's migration has the same wrong-namespace hole, and it is a
LATCH"* — already states it, already names `namespaced_latched`, and already
carries the sentence *"the guard is defeated by the very key the defect wrote"*.
That file is on `release/1.0` and this card does not touch it. What is new here
is that the finding is now reachable **from a state file the owner supplies**
rather than only from a fixture built in a test, and that it is reached by a
different route: a full `Controller` start diffed against its predecessor,
rather than assertions over a `MemStore`. Two instruments, one answer.
**The finding.** A pre-DEV-02 flat store that declares a multi-inverter roster
comes up with its SAFETY-02 latch **DISARMED**, unless the first roster entry
happens to be named `inverter-a`. `Controller.__init__` calls
`migrate_unit_keys(store, UNIT_A)` with a hardcoded constant, so the latch lands
in `unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped`; a roster of `["garage", "shed"]` reads
`unit/garage/sign_tripped`, which is absent. And `_grade_store_migration()` —
the guard written for exactly this — sees the migration's own misdirected key
satisfy its `namespaced_latched` test and returns without re-arming. The file
says `sign_tripped: true`, the banner is green, and nothing is held at 0 W.
**Both routes reach it, and they are NOT the same defect.** The rehearsal
reports them as separate legs because they need separate fixes:
| leg | how it gets there |
|---|---|
| `SAME-STEP` | the roster is declared in the same step as the upgrade. The migration runs, and is handed `UNIT_A`. |
| `STAGED` | the flat config runs once under 0.7.0+ first. That start stamps `schema_version = 1`, so the roster start's migration takes its `from_version >= SCHEMA_VERSION` early return and **the latch never moves at all**. |
⚠️ **So "hand `migrate_unit_keys()` the roster's own first name" is NOT the
whole fix, and the rehearsal measures that rather than asserting it.**
`test_rehearse.py` part 5b builds exactly that change and reports:
LEG STAGED: DISARMED
LEG SAME-STEP: clean
The staged path never reaches the line that was changed. A fix that stops there
closes the half an operator is least likely to take and leaves the half that
"upgrade first, declare the roster later" produces. The guard side —
`namespaced_latched` counting a namespace that is not on the roster — is what
covers both, and a change there turns every SAFETY-44 check in part 5 red, which
is what a fix should do to a pin that specifies a defect.
The fix belongs to its own card, shown red first. Part 5 pins the current
behaviour as a requirement so it cannot drift green by accident.
### The reverse direction: the retreat is supported, the round trip is not
If commissioning B goes wrong, **backing out to the flat single-inverter config
is supported and does not corrupt state.** Measured on the fixtures:
* the SAFETY-02 latch and the first pack's maintenance history both survive,
because `store.py` rule 2 keeps the flat spellings **live** rather than merely
present — `maintenance.UnitHistory.mirror_flat` writes them on every change,
so a single-FSM add-on finds a current history rather than one dated the day
the roster was declared;
* **it orphans eight Home Assistant entities** — the four per-unit rows for each
of the two units. **Measured:** the add-on stops announcing them and stops
publishing their state, so their history gaps and any automation whose
trigger names them stops firing, silently and without an error.
⚠️ **What is NOT measured, and was previously overstated here:** whether
advancing again restores them. An earlier draft of this section said the
orphaning was "not recoverable by advancing again: HA keeps the id it composed
at first discovery" — that reasoning cuts the other way, since keeping the
composed id is precisely what would let a re-advertised entity land back on
it, and discovery is published `retain=True` with no removal payload. Nothing
in this repository has tested a re-advance against a real Home Assistant, so
the claim is withdrawn rather than restated in the other direction. Plan the
retreat around the measured part: **the eight rows stop updating for as long
as you are retreated.**
⚠️ **What is NOT supported is the round trip.** A maintenance cycle that
completes *while the install is rolled back* is **discarded** when it
re-advances: `maint_schema_version` is already stamped, so `migrate_maint_keys()`
takes its early return and the pack reads the namespaced history from before the
retreat. The pack is then recalibrated on a schedule that does not know it
already was. **So: retreat freely, but treat a retreat as ending the current
maintenance bookkeeping — and if a cycle ran during it, correct
`unit/<first>/last_completed` by hand before advancing again.** This is a stated
decision, not a discovery made at the inverter.
## Before you deploy: `tools/predeploy_check.py` (PKG-09)
Two ways a deploy has gone wrong on this system, both of which the Supervisor
reports as success:
**The silent no-op.** The Supervisor keys the built image by `version:` in
`config.yaml`. `ha apps update` against an unchanged version installs nothing
and says it worked. This happened twice: PKG-06 (six merges behind an unbumped
version) and PKG-07 (six again). Both times a human noticed. Nothing else would have.
**The refused config.** A config the shipped validator rejects is
`SystemExit(78)` — the add-on does not start. ⚠️ **And the ingress panel goes
with it**, because the add-on serving it is not running, so recovery means the
Supervisor UI. SAFETY-39's rule 10 made this reachable from a config that
started fine on the previous version: 0.7.0's own default `slew_w: 1000`
exceeds the 555.6 W ceiling on a 5000 W rail.
Run it inside the container, so the validator half actually runs:
docker run --rm -v <repo>:/w:ro goodwe-addon-checks:1 \
python3 /w/goodwe_controller/tools/predeploy_check.py \
--deployed-version 0.7.0 --options /w/live-options.json
Export `live-options.json` from the Supervisor first — the options blob is not
reachable through the Home Assistant REST API, and no entity carries it.
**Exit codes.** `0` cleared · `1` REFUSED, do not deploy · `2` NOT CLEARED,
meaning a check did not run. ⚠️ **2 is not a pass.** On a bare host without the
add-on's dependencies the validator half skips and returns 2 rather than
pretending; `test_version_gate.py` pins that a skipped check can never exit 0,
because the first draft of that test reported four silent skips as passes.
⚠️ **Why this is not a CI check.** The obvious gate — "a pull request touching
runtime code must bump the version" — is the wrong shape here. This project
deliberately batches many merges into one deploy, so a per-PR bump would put
every branch in conflict over one line and still not prevent the failure, which
happens at deploy and not at merge. The check belongs where the mistake is made.
⚠️ This file's own change does **not** need a version bump, and the gate agrees:
`tools/` and `test_*.py` are not in its runtime set, because demanding a bump
for a typo fix trains people to bump without reading — the habit the check
exists to prevent.
-72
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@@ -225,78 +225,6 @@ same place twice, the check is decoration.
forever, *including after the call site is fixed*. The check was true and
passed for the wrong reason. Habit **9** below is what falls out of it.
* ⚠️ **ARCH-02's OWN REHEARSAL HARNESS, CAUGHT BY ITS OWN MUTATION BATTERY —
the THIRTEENTH instance, and the third in an INSTRUMENT rather than in a
check.** `tools/rehearse_roster.py` reports orphaned Home Assistant entities
by composing the ids the add-on announces **before** the roster switch and
**after** it, and diffing. Both sides are composed by the same build. So the
two mutations that change the id composition itself — renaming the MQTT device
(`"GoodWe"` -> `"GoodWe Controller"`), renaming one site sensor (`"Grid power"`
-> `"Grid power W"`) — moved **every id on both sides equally**, and the
harness reported *"no orphans"* about a change that orphans the entire live
entity list. It read exactly like a clean transition. The first draft's
M5/M6 came back `exit 0` and `exit 2`, and neither was the failure they name.
The fix is habit 2 with a filename: **the reference has to be data that does
not move with the code.** `--live-entities` takes a list of the ids the
install actually has, `tools/rehearsal/live-entities-recorded.txt` is the
recorded stand-in that keeps it live in CI, and a build that announces an id
the list does not carry is now a `COMPOSITION DRIFT` finding rather than a
silence. ⚠️ **The anchor moved for the same reason**: it had been
`compose(mqtt.DEVICE["name"], p1["name"]) == "sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age"`,
which any renaming of the device satisfies by moving both operands, and it is
now composed from two recorded **literals**.
Ask of an instrument what habit 4 asks of a check: *where did each side of
this comparison come from* — and if a mutation of the subject moves both
sides, the instrument is decoration.
⚠️ **AND REVIEW FOUND TWO MORE IN THE SAME CARD, ONE OF THEM INSIDE THE FIX
FOR THE OTHER — the FOURTEENTH and FIFTEENTH.** Both are the pin, not the
tool, and both are the same sentence in a new costume: *a check whose data
cannot reach the failure it names.*
* **Fourteenth — a COUNT cannot tell one red leg from two.** The rehearsal
reports two independent routes to the disarmed latch (`SAME-STEP` and
`STAGED`) and prints every finding **twice per red leg**: once in that
leg's own block and once in the closing summary. The check named *"NOT THE
SAME-STEP PATH ALONE"* was written `out.count("LATCH CAME UP DISARMED")
>= 2`, so **one** red leg always satisfied it. Measured on three builds:
shipped code (both legs red) → 4; `migrate_unit_keys()` handed the roster
name (SAME-STEP fixed) → 2, **passes**; a guard-side fix (both fixed) → 0.
The check reported `ok` on the build whose only remaining failure *is* the
path it says is not the only one. The fix is to parse the legs and require
the finding in **each**, which is habit 2 again: grade the thing, not a
total over the thing.
* **Fifteenth — and it is INSIDE THAT FIX, which is the third time this file
has had to write that sentence.** The first leg-splitter opened on a
`LEG <id>` marker and never closed, so every line after the *last* marker
was attributed to that leg — including the closing summary, which repeats
every finding from every leg. The last leg therefore read red whenever
**any** leg was red, and the new per-leg check was the old count with extra
steps. It was caught by building the one fixture that separates them: a
tree in which `SAME-STEP` is genuinely clean and `STAGED` is not. The tool
now prints `END LEG <id>` and the splitter closes on it.
The rule that falls out, and it is the cheap one: **a per-thing check that
has never seen the things DISAGREE is a total.** Part 5b exists to make
them disagree on every run.
⚠️ **AND ONE THAT HAS ONLY SEEN THEM DISAGREE IN ONE ARRANGEMENT IS A TOTAL
OVER THAT ARRANGEMENT.** Review found this by attacking the fix itself. Part
5b does make the legs disagree, on every run - and was still blind to a build
that merely REORDERS them, because it had only ever seen the clean leg
printed LAST. Three edits, two of them ordinary refactors (reorder the report
legs, reword a summary line), produced `all checks passed` from a splitter
that closed ZERO legs.
A fixture cannot enumerate the arrangements, so the STRUCTURE is asserted
instead: a leg may not open while one is open, and every leg that opens must
be explicitly closed. That fires on the FIRST edit of all three attacks,
whatever the order or the wording. **When a fixture cannot enumerate the
arrangements, assert the invariant they share.**
* **CFG-04's `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` §B** — and this one is the rule
reaching outside the suite. The probe is the committed evidence that
`config.yaml`'s `inverters: []` default is load-bearing, and four documents
-562
View File
@@ -1,562 +0,0 @@
"""UX-02: the configuration page itself - markup, style and the form's script.
⚠️ WHY THIS IS ITS OWN FILE. `web.py` is the ROUTES: three status handlers and,
since this card, five configuration ones. The page is ~500 lines of HTML, CSS
and JavaScript, and inlining it there would bury the routing - which is the
half a reviewer has to check for "does anything here command an inverter".
⚠️ AND WHAT IS NOT IN THIS FILE, WHICH IS THE POINT OF THE CARD. There is no
option key, no label, no unit, no range, no default and NO RULE in the script
below. It renders a model the server built out of `GET /addons/self/info`
(app/configui.py) and it renders refusals the server got out of
`validate_startup_config()` (app/selfconfig.py). Its longest function is the one
that decides which HTML input a `type` deserves.
That is deliberate and it is checkable: test_selfconfig.py part 5 greps this
file for the option keys and for phrases out of validate.py's refusals and
asserts it contains none of them, and part 6 adds a NEW rule to a copy of
validate.py and watches it appear on the page with this file untouched.
⚠️ EVERY URL IS RELATIVE. Ingress serves the add-on under a generated path
prefix (`/api/hassio_ingress/<token>/`), so an absolute `/config/model` 404s in
the field while working perfectly on a laptop. web.py's own header has said so
since the status page shipped; this file has five more chances to get it wrong.
⚠️ AND IT IS BUILT FOR A PHONE FIRST. This is the screen someone stands in
front of the inverter with: one column, big touch targets, sections that start
collapsed so 71 options do not arrive as one wall, and the refusal block pinned
where it cannot be scrolled past.
"""
CONFIG_PAGE = """<!doctype html>
<html><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
<title>GoodWe - Configuration</title>
<style>
:root{--bg:#f5f6f8;--card:#fff;--ink:#1c1e21;--muted:#6b7280;--line:#e5e7eb;
--ok:#137333;--warn:#b25e02;--bad:#c5221f;--accent:#1a73e8;
--badtint:rgba(197,34,31,.10);--warntint:rgba(178,94,2,.10);
--oktint:rgba(19,115,51,.10)}
@media(prefers-color-scheme:dark){:root{--bg:#111317;--card:#1b1e24;--ink:#e8eaed;
--muted:#9aa0a6;--line:#2c3038;--ok:#81c995;--warn:#fdd663;--bad:#f28b82;
--accent:#8ab4f8;--badtint:rgba(242,139,130,.14);
--warntint:rgba(253,214,99,.14);--oktint:rgba(129,201,149,.14)}}
*{box-sizing:border-box}
body{margin:0;padding:0 0 96px;background:var(--bg);color:var(--ink);
font:15px/1.5 system-ui,-apple-system,Segoe UI,Roboto,sans-serif}
.wrap{max-width:760px;margin:0 auto;padding:14px}
h1{font-size:18px;margin:0 0 2px}
a{color:var(--accent)}
.sub{color:var(--muted);font-size:13px;margin:0 0 12px}
.card{background:var(--card);border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:10px;
padding:14px;margin-bottom:12px}
.note{border-left:4px solid var(--warn);background:var(--warntint);
border-radius:8px;padding:11px 13px;margin-bottom:12px;font-size:14px}
.note.bad{border-left-color:var(--bad);background:var(--badtint)}
.note.ok{border-left-color:var(--ok);background:var(--oktint)}
.note b{display:block;margin-bottom:3px}
details.grp{background:var(--card);border:1px solid var(--line);
border-radius:10px;margin-bottom:10px;overflow:hidden}
details.grp>summary{cursor:pointer;padding:14px;font-weight:600;
list-style:none;display:flex;justify-content:space-between;gap:10px;
align-items:center}
details.grp>summary::-webkit-details-marker{display:none}
details.grp>summary::after{content:"\\25be";color:var(--muted);font-weight:400}
details.grp[open]>summary::after{content:"\\25b4"}
details.grp[open]>summary{border-bottom:1px solid var(--line)}
.gbody{padding:4px 14px 14px}
.pill{font-size:12px;font-weight:600;border-radius:999px;padding:2px 9px;
background:var(--badtint);color:var(--bad)}
.pill.q{background:var(--warntint);color:var(--warn)}
.f{padding:13px 0;border-bottom:1px solid var(--line)}
.f:last-child{border-bottom:0}
.f>label{display:block;font-weight:600;margin-bottom:2px}
.k{font:12px/1.4 ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace;color:var(--muted)}
.row{display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;margin:6px 0 0}
.row input[type=text],.row input[type=number],.row select{flex:1 1 auto;
min-width:0;font:inherit;padding:10px;border-radius:8px;
border:1px solid var(--line);background:var(--bg);color:var(--ink)}
.row .unit{color:var(--muted);font-size:13px;white-space:nowrap}
.rng{color:var(--muted);font-size:12px;margin-top:4px}
.help{color:var(--muted);font-size:13px;margin-top:6px;cursor:pointer;
max-height:3.1em;overflow:hidden;position:relative}
.help.open{max-height:none}
.help::after{content:" more";color:var(--accent)}
.help.open::after{content:" less";color:var(--accent)}
.prob{margin-top:8px;border-left:4px solid var(--bad);background:var(--badtint);
border-radius:6px;padding:9px 11px;font-size:13.5px}
.prob+.prob{margin-top:6px}
.sw{display:flex;align-items:center;gap:10px;margin-top:6px}
.sw input{width:20px;height:20px}
.entry{border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:9px;padding:10px 12px;
margin:10px 0;background:var(--bg)}
.entry h4{margin:0 0 2px;font-size:14px}
button{font:inherit;padding:10px 14px;border-radius:8px;
border:1px solid var(--line);background:var(--card);color:var(--ink);
cursor:pointer}
button.primary{background:var(--accent);border-color:var(--accent);color:#fff}
button.danger{background:var(--bad);border-color:var(--bad);color:#fff}
button[disabled]{opacity:.5;cursor:not-allowed}
button.small{padding:6px 10px;font-size:13px}
.bar{position:fixed;left:0;right:0;bottom:0;background:var(--card);
border-top:1px solid var(--line);padding:10px 14px;z-index:5}
.bar .in{max-width:760px;margin:0 auto;display:flex;gap:10px;
align-items:center;flex-wrap:wrap}
.bar .msg{flex:1 1 200px;min-width:0;font-size:13px;color:var(--muted)}
dialog{border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:12px;background:var(--card);
color:var(--ink);max-width:520px;width:92%;padding:18px}
dialog::backdrop{background:rgba(0,0,0,.5)}
.diff{font:12.5px/1.5 ui-monospace,SFMono-Regular,Menlo,monospace;
white-space:pre-wrap;word-break:break-word;margin-top:6px}
</style></head><body>
<div class="wrap">
<h1>GoodWe - Configuration</h1>
<p class="sub"><a href="./">&larr; Status and controls</a></p>
<div class="note" id="authority">
<b>This page and the Supervisor's Configuration tab edit the same settings.</b>
Both write one options blob. This page is the one that can tell you a
setting is wrong <i>before</i> you save it; the Configuration tab cannot,
because it only knows types and ranges. If the add-on is not running, the
Configuration tab is the only one of the two that still exists - that is
what it is for.
</div>
<div class="note" id="restartcost">
<b>Saving does not restart anything, and does not take effect on its own.</b>
Stored settings are applied when the add-on next starts. Restarting to
apply them costs a short loss of control: the add-on commands
<b>0 W on every inverter</b> as it shuts down, and the battery does nothing
until it is back up. That is a separate button, below, with its own
confirmation.
</div>
<div id="banner"></div>
<div id="staleness"></div>
<div id="form"></div>
</div>
<div class="bar"><div class="in">
<button class="primary" id="save" disabled>Save settings</button>
<button id="restart" disabled>Restart to apply</button>
<button id="reload">Discard edits</button>
<span class="msg" id="msg">loading&hellip;</span>
</div></div>
<dialog id="confirm">
<h3 style="margin-top:0">Restart the add-on?</h3>
<p>The add-on will command <b>0 W on every inverter</b>, stop, and start
again with the stored settings. Control of the battery is lost for as long as
that takes. Nothing else about the inverter is changed, and no latched
failsafe is cleared.</p>
<div style="display:flex;gap:10px;justify-content:flex-end">
<button id="cancel">Cancel</button>
<button class="danger" id="go">Yes, restart now</button>
</div>
</dialog>
<script>
"use strict";
var MODEL = null; // groups/fields, from the server
var STORED = null; // the options blob the server last read
var FP = ""; // its fingerprint - the compare-and-swap token
var VALS = {}; // what is on screen right now
var timer = null;
function el(tag, cls, text){
var e = document.createElement(tag);
if(cls) e.className = cls;
if(text !== undefined && text !== null) e.textContent = text;
return e;
}
function msg(text, kind){
var m = document.getElementById('msg');
m.textContent = text;
m.style.color = kind === 'bad' ? 'var(--bad)'
: kind === 'ok' ? 'var(--ok)' : 'var(--muted)';
}
function note(host, kind, title, body){
var d = el('div', 'note ' + (kind || ''));
if(title) d.appendChild(el('b', null, title));
if(body) d.appendChild(document.createTextNode(body));
host.appendChild(d);
return d;
}
// --- the value of one input, by the type the SERVER gave the field ---------
// The only "knowledge" in this script: which HTML control a Supervisor type
// deserves, and how to read it back. No key names, no bounds, no rules.
function readInput(input, type){
if(type === 'boolean') return input.checked;
if(type === 'integer' || type === 'float'){
if(input.value === '') return '';
var n = Number(input.value);
return isNaN(n) ? input.value : n;
}
return input.value;
}
function makeInput(field, value, onchange){
var row = el('div', 'row');
var input;
if(field.type === 'boolean'){
row.className = 'sw';
input = el('input');
input.type = 'checkbox';
input.checked = !!value;
var lab = el('span', 'k', field.key);
row.appendChild(input); row.appendChild(lab);
} else if(field.type === 'select'){
input = el('select');
(field.options || []).forEach(function(o){
var opt = el('option', null, o); opt.value = o;
if(String(value) === o) opt.selected = true;
input.appendChild(opt);
});
row.appendChild(input);
} else {
input = el('input');
if(field.type === 'integer' || field.type === 'float'){
input.type = 'number';
input.inputMode = field.type === 'integer' ? 'numeric' : 'decimal';
input.step = field.type === 'integer' ? '1' : 'any';
if(field.min !== undefined) input.min = field.min;
if(field.max !== undefined) input.max = field.max;
} else {
input.type = 'text';
input.autocapitalize = 'none';
input.spellcheck = false;
}
input.value = (value === undefined || value === null) ? '' : value;
row.appendChild(input);
if(field.unit) row.appendChild(el('span', 'unit', field.unit));
}
input.addEventListener('input', onchange);
input.addEventListener('change', onchange);
return {row: row, input: input};
}
function helpBlock(field){
if(!field.help) return null;
var h = el('div', 'help', field.help);
h.title = field.help;
h.addEventListener('click', function(){ h.classList.toggle('open'); });
return h;
}
function rangeHint(field){
var bits = [];
if(field.min !== undefined || field.max !== undefined){
bits.push('accepted: ' + (field.min !== undefined ? field.min : '-')
+ ' to ' + (field.max !== undefined ? field.max : '-')
+ (field.unit ? ' ' + field.unit : ''));
}
bits.push(field.key);
return el('div', 'rng', bits.join(' \\u00b7 '));
}
// --- a list of scalars (`- str` in the schema) -----------------------------
function scalarList(field, value){
var box = el('div');
var items = Array.isArray(value) ? value.slice() : [];
function draw(){
box.textContent = '';
items.forEach(function(v, i){
var row = el('div', 'row');
var input = el('input'); input.type = 'text'; input.value = v;
input.autocapitalize = 'none'; input.spellcheck = false;
input.addEventListener('input', function(){
items[i] = input.value; VALS[field.key] = items.slice(); queue();
});
var rm = el('button', 'small', 'Remove');
rm.addEventListener('click', function(){
items.splice(i, 1); VALS[field.key] = items.slice(); draw(); queue();
});
row.appendChild(input); row.appendChild(rm);
box.appendChild(row);
});
var add = el('button', 'small', 'Add');
add.addEventListener('click', function(){
items.push(''); VALS[field.key] = items.slice(); draw(); queue();
});
box.appendChild(add);
}
draw();
return box;
}
// --- a list of objects: the roster editor ----------------------------------
function objectList(field, value){
var box = el('div');
var entries = Array.isArray(value) ? JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value)) : [];
function push(){ VALS[field.key] = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(entries)); }
function draw(){
box.textContent = '';
if(!entries.length){
var e = el('div', 'rng',
'No entries. With none, the settings above describe the one inverter.');
box.appendChild(e);
}
entries.forEach(function(entry, i){
var card = el('div', 'entry');
card.appendChild(el('h4', null, 'Entry ' + (i + 1)
+ (entry && entry.name ? ' \\u2014 ' + entry.name : '')));
(field.fields || []).forEach(function(sub){
var f = el('div', 'f');
// The label is the translation's own, verbatim - UX-01 already says
// "(optional)" in the ones that are, and adding a second one here
// would be this panel putting words next to a field.
f.appendChild(el('label', null, sub.label));
var made = makeInput(sub, entry ? entry[sub.key] : undefined,
function(){
entries[i][sub.key] = readInput(made.input, sub.type);
push(); queue();
});
f.appendChild(made.row);
f.appendChild(rangeHint(sub));
var h = helpBlock(sub); if(h) f.appendChild(h);
card.appendChild(f);
});
var rm = el('button', 'small danger', 'Remove this inverter');
rm.addEventListener('click', function(){
entries.splice(i, 1); push(); draw(); queue();
});
card.appendChild(rm);
box.appendChild(card);
});
var add = el('button', 'small', 'Add an inverter');
add.addEventListener('click', function(){
var fresh = {};
(field.fields || []).forEach(function(sub){
fresh[sub.key] = sub.type === 'boolean' ? false
: (sub.type === 'integer' || sub.type === 'float') ? ''
: '';
});
entries.push(fresh); push(); draw(); queue();
});
box.appendChild(add);
}
draw();
return box;
}
// --- rendering the whole form ---------------------------------------------
var FIELD_NODES = {};
function render(){
var host = document.getElementById('form');
host.textContent = '';
FIELD_NODES = {};
MODEL.groups.forEach(function(group){
var d = el('details', 'grp');
var s = el('summary');
s.appendChild(el('span', null, group.name || 'Not grouped'));
var pill = el('span', 'pill'); pill.style.display = 'none';
s.appendChild(pill);
d.appendChild(s);
var body = el('div', 'gbody');
group.fields.forEach(function(field){
var f = el('div', 'f');
f.appendChild(el('label', null, field.label));
if(field.type === 'schema'){
f.appendChild(objectList(field, VALS[field.key]));
} else if(field.multiple){
f.appendChild(scalarList(field, VALS[field.key]));
} else {
var made = makeInput(field, VALS[field.key], function(){
VALS[field.key] = readInput(made.input, field.type); queue();
});
f.appendChild(made.row);
}
if(field.type !== 'schema') f.appendChild(rangeHint(field));
var h = helpBlock(field); if(h) f.appendChild(h);
var probs = el('div'); f.appendChild(probs);
FIELD_NODES[field.key] = {probs: probs, group: d, pill: pill};
body.appendChild(f);
});
d.appendChild(body);
host.appendChild(d);
});
}
// --- refusals: printed exactly as the validator wrote them -----------------
function showProblems(payload){
Object.keys(FIELD_NODES).forEach(function(k){
FIELD_NODES[k].probs.textContent = '';
});
document.querySelectorAll('.pill').forEach(function(p){
p.style.display = 'none'; p.textContent = '';
});
var banner = document.getElementById('banner');
banner.textContent = '';
var counts = new Map();
Object.keys(payload.by_key || {}).forEach(function(key){
var node = FIELD_NODES[key];
payload.by_key[key].forEach(function(text){
var box = el('div', 'prob', text);
if(node) node.probs.appendChild(box); else banner.appendChild(box);
});
if(node){
counts.set(node.pill, (counts.get(node.pill) || 0)
+ payload.by_key[key].length);
node.group.open = true;
}
});
counts.forEach(function(n, pill){
pill.textContent = n + (n === 1 ? ' problem' : ' problems');
pill.style.display = '';
});
(payload.unanchored || []).forEach(function(text){
banner.appendChild(el('div', 'prob', text));
});
var total = (payload.problems || []).length;
var save = document.getElementById('save');
save.disabled = total > 0;
if(total){
note(banner, 'bad', 'This configuration would not start.',
'The add-on refuses to run on it and would stop with exit 78. '
+ 'Saving is blocked until these are fixed; nothing has been written. '
+ 'Each message below is the add-on\\u2019s own words, from the same '
+ 'check that runs at startup.');
banner.insertBefore(banner.lastChild, banner.firstChild);
msg(total + (total === 1 ? ' problem' : ' problems')
+ ' - saving is blocked', 'bad');
} else {
msg('this configuration would start', 'ok');
}
if(payload.device_note){
note(banner, '', 'Two range checks could not run.', payload.device_note);
}
}
// ⚠️ THE DEBOUNCE IS WHAT BOUNDS THE READS THIS PAGE MAKES OF HOME ASSISTANT.
// Each validation asks the setpoint device(s) for their own range, and those
// are real Core API reads on the same session the control loop uses. Because
// every keystroke RESETS the timer, sustained typing produces no requests at
// all and one lands 350 ms after the operator stops - which is the property
// that matters, not the number.
function queue(){
msg('checking\\u2026');
document.getElementById('save').disabled = true;
if(timer) clearTimeout(timer);
timer = setTimeout(validate, 350);
}
async function validate(){
try{
const r = await fetch('config/validate', {method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({options: VALS})});
showProblems(await r.json());
}catch(e){
msg('cannot reach the add-on: ' + e, 'bad');
}
}
function showStaleness(keys, stored){
var host = document.getElementById('staleness');
host.textContent = '';
if(!keys || !keys.length) return;
var d = note(host, '', 'Saved, but not running yet.',
'These settings are stored and differ from what this add-on is running '
+ 'right now. They take effect when it next starts:');
var pre = el('div', 'diff', keys.map(function(k){
return k + ': running ' + JSON.stringify(stored.running[k])
+ ' -> stored ' + JSON.stringify(stored.stored[k]);
}).join('\\n'));
d.appendChild(pre);
}
async function load(){
msg('loading\\u2026');
try{
const r = await fetch('config/model?lang='
+ encodeURIComponent((navigator.language || 'en')
.slice(0, 2)),
{cache: 'no-store'});
const m = await r.json();
MODEL = m; STORED = m.options; FP = m.fingerprint;
VALS = JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(m.options));
render();
showStaleness(m.running_differs, {running: m.running, stored: m.options});
document.getElementById('restart').disabled = false;
await validate();
}catch(e){
msg('cannot load the configuration: ' + e, 'bad');
}
}
async function save(){
msg('saving\\u2026');
document.getElementById('save').disabled = true;
var r, body;
try{
r = await fetch('config/save', {method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({options: VALS, fingerprint: FP})});
body = await r.json();
}catch(e){
msg('cannot reach the add-on: ' + e, 'bad');
document.getElementById('save').disabled = false;
return;
}
if(r.ok){
FP = body.fingerprint;
msg('saved - restart to apply', 'ok');
var host = document.getElementById('staleness');
host.textContent = '';
note(host, 'ok', 'Saved. Not applied yet.',
'The add-on is still running the settings it started with. Press '
+ '"Restart to apply" when you are ready to lose control of the '
+ 'battery for a few seconds.');
return;
}
if(body.kind === 'stale'){
var host2 = document.getElementById('staleness');
host2.textContent = '';
var d = note(host2, 'bad', 'Nothing was saved: these settings changed '
+ 'somewhere else while you were editing.',
'Somebody - most likely the Supervisor\\u2019s Configuration tab - '
+ 'wrote these settings after this page loaded. Your edits are still on '
+ 'screen and nothing has been overwritten. Read what changed, then '
+ 'press Save again if you still want your version.');
d.appendChild(el('div', 'diff', (body.changed || []).map(function(k){
return k + ': theirs ' + JSON.stringify(body.stored[k])
+ ' -> mine ' + JSON.stringify(VALS[k]);
}).join('\\n') || 'no key that this page also edits'));
FP = body.fingerprint;
msg('not saved - the stored settings had changed', 'bad');
document.getElementById('save').disabled = false;
return;
}
if(body.kind === 'invalid'){
showProblems(body);
msg('not saved - the configuration would not start', 'bad');
return;
}
msg('not saved: ' + (body.error || r.status), 'bad');
document.getElementById('save').disabled = false;
}
document.getElementById('save').addEventListener('click', save);
document.getElementById('reload').addEventListener('click', load);
document.getElementById('restart').addEventListener('click', function(){
document.getElementById('confirm').showModal();
});
document.getElementById('cancel').addEventListener('click', function(){
document.getElementById('confirm').close();
});
document.getElementById('go').addEventListener('click', async function(){
document.getElementById('confirm').close();
msg('restarting\\u2026');
try{
await fetch('config/restart', {method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({confirm: 'restart'})});
msg('restart requested - this page will stop answering for a moment');
}catch(e){
msg('restart requested - this page will stop answering for a moment');
}
});
load();
</script></body></html>
"""
-315
View File
@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
"""UX-02: the config surface's MODEL - built from what the Supervisor returns.
WHAT THIS MODULE IS FOR, in one sentence: turn the three things
`GET /addons/self/info` already carries - `schema`, `translations` and
`options` - into the shape a form renders from, WITHOUT this repository owning
a second copy of any of them.
⚠️ THE RULE THIS FILE EXISTS TO OBEY. There is exactly one description of the
option surface (config.yaml's `schema:` block), exactly one set of labels
(translations/*.yaml, UX-01) and exactly one set of cross-field rules
(app/validate.py). A config UI is the classic place where all three get
transcribed a second time - a hand-written field list, a hand-written label, a
hand-written "max_w must not exceed the device" in JavaScript - and the second
copy is what drifts. So:
* the FIELDS come from `info["schema"]`, which is Supervisor's own
`App.schema_ui` == `UiOptions(...)(config.yaml["schema"])`. Nothing here
lists an option key.
* the LABELS come from `info["translations"]`, which is Supervisor's own
`_read_app_translations()` over translations/*.yaml. Nothing here contains
an English or Dutch sentence about an option.
* the RULES are not here at all. `problems_by_field()` takes strings the
SHIPPED validator produced and decides only WHERE ON THE PAGE to put them.
The consequence is the acceptance criterion: a rule added to validate.py, an
option added to config.yaml, or a label improved in translations/en.yaml all
reach the panel with no change to this file, to web.py, or to the page's
JavaScript. test_selfconfig.py part 6 proves the first of those by running the
panel against a MUTATED COPY of validate.py in a subprocess.
⚠️ STDLIB ONLY, AND THAT IS LOAD-BEARING. This module is imported by
tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py, which runs inside the Home Assistant
Supervisor release image so that the model can be built from the REAL loader's
output rather than from a transcription of it. That image has no paho-mqtt, so
an import of anything under `app/` that reaches `mqtt.py` would make the probe
unrunnable and the measurement would quietly become a re-reading.
--- WHAT THE SUPERVISOR CANNOT RENDER, AND WHY THAT IS THE POINT -------------
Add-on options are a FLAT LIST. UX-01's own header says it: no section-header
primitive, no units on an input, no per-option grouping. UX-01 answered that by
prefixing every label with `Group · `, which is the best a flat list allows.
This module reads that prefix back off and turns it into a real heading, so the
grouping the operator already has in words becomes grouping they have on the
screen - in whichever language their labels resolved in, because the prefix is
translated too (`Limits` / `Grenzen`).
⚠️ NOTHING IS INVENTED WHEN THE PREFIX IS ABSENT. A key whose label carries no
` · ` is NOT quietly filed under the last heading seen - that would put a new
option in a section nobody chose and it would look deliberate. It goes into the
model's `ungrouped` list, is rendered under a heading that says so, and
test_selfconfig.py asserts the list is EMPTY today, so the day config.yaml
grows a key UX-01 has not grouped, a check says so instead of the page guessing.
"""
import re
__all__ = ["resolve_entry", "label_of", "help_of", "split_group", "unit_of",
"field_model", "problems_by_field", "changed_keys"]
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 1. LABELS - the frontend's own resolution order, transcribed once
#
# ⚠️ THIS IS A TRANSCRIPTION OF SOMEBODY ELSE'S CODE AND IT IS LABELLED AS ONE.
# tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section F reads the resolution out of the
# shipped frontend bundle in the release image this site runs
# (`5680.*.js`, frontend 20250925.1):
#
# computeLabel = (s,_,o) => this._getTranslationEntry(this.hass.language,s,o)?.name
# || this._getTranslationEntry("en",s,o)?.name
# || s.name
#
# i.e. THE FALLBACK IS PER KEY, `en` is the second chance and the raw key is the
# third. The panel resolves labels the same way ON PURPOSE: two config surfaces
# that disagree about what a field is CALLED would be worse than one ugly one.
# If that resolution ever changes upstream, this is a copy that can go stale -
# it is three lines, it is named here, and the probe prints both renderings side
# by side so a divergence is visible rather than argued about.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def resolve_entry(translations, lang, key, path=()):
"""Yield `(language, entry)` for `key`, in the per-key `lang -> en` order.
`translations` is `info["translations"]` verbatim: `{lang: {"configuration":
{key: {"name", "description", "fields": {...}}}}}`. `path` names the
enclosing repeatable section for a per-entry key, e.g. `("inverters",)`.
"""
for language in (lang, "en"):
node = ((translations or {}).get(language) or {}).get("configuration")
if not isinstance(node, dict):
continue
for step in path:
node = ((node.get(step) or {}).get("fields")) or {}
entry = node.get(key)
if isinstance(entry, dict):
yield language, entry
def label_of(translations, lang, key, path=()):
"""(label, source-language) with the raw key as the last resort."""
for language, entry in resolve_entry(translations, lang, key, path):
name = str(entry.get("name") or "").strip()
if name:
return name, language
return key, "raw"
def help_of(translations, lang, key, path=()):
"""(description, source-language). "" when nothing was translated."""
for language, entry in resolve_entry(translations, lang, key, path):
text = str(entry.get("description") or "").strip()
if text:
return text, language
return "", "none"
# UX-01's separator, U+00B7 with a space each side. It is not a general
# delimiter guess: it is the exact string that file's generator writes, and the
# audit in tools/translations_lint.py is what keeps every label carrying one.
GROUP_SEP = " · "
def split_group(label):
"""`"Limits · Inverter rating (W)"` -> `("Limits", "Inverter rating (W)")`.
A label with no separator comes back as `("", label)` - see the module
docstring on why that is not filed under the previous heading.
"""
if GROUP_SEP in label:
group, _, rest = label.partition(GROUP_SEP)
return group.strip(), rest.strip()
return "", label
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 2. UNITS - presentation, derived from the key's own suffix
#
# ⚠️ THIS IS THE ONE PLACE THIS MODULE PUTS WORDS NEXT TO A FIELD, and it is
# deliberately the weakest possible rule: a suffix map, applied to a key name,
# affecting nothing but what is printed to the right of an input box. It states
# no bound, no default and no relation, so it cannot disagree with config.yaml
# or with validate.py about anything - the worst a wrong entry here can do is
# print "W" beside a number that is in seconds, which is visible to the first
# person who reads the screen.
#
# It is NOT a schema, and it must never become one: a unit string here that
# named a bound - "h (0-23)", say - would be a second copy of a range that
# config.yaml already states and the panel already renders from the schema. One
# such entry was written and removed; test_selfconfig.py part 5 is what removed
# it, by asserting that no unit string contains a digit.
#
# Anything the map does not know about gets no unit rather than a guessed one.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
_UNITS = (
("_eur_kwh", "€/kWh"),
("_eur", "€"),
("_soc_floor", "%"),
("_soc_target", "%"),
("_soc_ceiling", "%"),
("_days", "days"),
("_min", "min"),
("_hour", "h"),
("_horizon_h", "h"),
("_cycles", "cycles"),
("_phases", "phases"),
("_w", "W"),
("_s", "s"),
)
def unit_of(key):
for suffix, unit in _UNITS:
if key.endswith(suffix):
return unit
return ""
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 3. THE MODEL
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def _one_field(node, translations, lang, path=()):
"""One entry of Supervisor's `schema_ui` -> one field of the model.
⚠️ THE TYPE, THE RANGE AND THE ENUM ARE COPIED, NOT DECIDED. `type`,
`lengthMin`/`lengthMax` (which is what `UiOptions` calls a NUMERIC range,
misleadingly, and measured rather than guessed - see
tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py section C) and `options` come straight off
the node. This function chooses no bound of its own, so a range edited in
config.yaml is a range the panel enforces on the very next page load.
"""
key = str(node.get("name") or "")
raw_label, label_lang = label_of(translations, lang, key, path)
group, label = split_group(raw_label)
text, help_lang = help_of(translations, lang, key, path)
field = {
"key": key,
"label": label,
"group": group,
"help": text,
"label_lang": label_lang,
"help_lang": help_lang,
"type": str(node.get("type") or "string"),
"required": bool(node.get("required")),
"multiple": bool(node.get("multiple")),
"unit": unit_of(key),
}
if node.get("lengthMin") is not None:
field["min"] = node["lengthMin"]
if node.get("lengthMax") is not None:
field["max"] = node["lengthMax"]
if node.get("options"):
field["options"] = list(node["options"])
if node.get("type") == "schema":
field["fields"] = [_one_field(sub, translations, lang, path + (key,))
for sub in node.get("schema") or ()]
return field
def field_model(schema, translations, lang="en"):
"""`info["schema"]` + `info["translations"]` -> the groups a page renders.
Returns `{"groups": [{"name", "fields": [...]}], "ungrouped": [key, ...],
"keys": [key, ...]}`.
⚠️ ORDER IS THE SCHEMA'S, AND SO IS GROUP ORDER. `App.schema_ui` renders
config.yaml's `schema:` block in file order (measured in
tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py section F), and a group takes its position
from the FIRST field that names it. So the panel's section order is
config.yaml's section order, and moving a block in that file moves it here -
which is the property that stops this model needing an order of its own.
"""
groups, order, ungrouped, keys = {}, [], [], []
for node in schema or ():
field = _one_field(node, translations, lang)
keys.append(field["key"])
name = field["group"]
if not name:
ungrouped.append(field["key"])
if name not in groups:
groups[name] = []
order.append(name)
groups[name].append(field)
return {
"groups": [{"name": name, "fields": groups[name]} for name in order],
"ungrouped": ungrouped,
"keys": keys,
}
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 4. WHERE A REFUSAL GOES ON THE PAGE
#
# ⚠️ READ THIS BEFORE ADDING ANYTHING TO IT. The entire value of this card is
# that validate.py's cross-field sentences reach the operator BEFORE a save.
# Those sentences are written by validate.py and are shown BYTE FOR BYTE. This
# function decides one thing and one thing only: which field to print each
# sentence under. It does not shorten, re-word, classify by severity, or map a
# message to a rule number - every one of those would be a second, drifting
# opinion about a rule this module is not allowed to hold.
#
# THE MECHANISM IS NAME OCCURRENCE, and it knows no keys of its own: the caller
# passes the key list from the schema. A message that names `max_w` is filed
# under `max_w`. That is why validate.py's habit of naming the option it is
# refusing - which it already had, for the log - is what makes the anchoring
# work, and why nothing here breaks when a rule is added.
#
# ⚠️ WORD BOUNDARIES, AND THE COLLISION THEY EXIST FOR. `sign_disagree_w` is a
# substring of `unit_sign_disagree_w` and of `site_sign_disagree_w` - three
# distinct options, two of them SAFETY-30's. A plain `in` test files every
# per-unit refusal under the site key as well, which would put a message about
# unit-0 next to a field that has nothing to do with it. The boundary class
# excludes `_` on purpose so that the longer names do not match the shorter key.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE HONEST LIMIT, STATED RATHER THAN DISCOVERED: a refusal whose
# sentence never spells an option key cannot be anchored, and is shown in the
# page's top-level refusal block instead. Nothing is lost - it is the same
# sentence, on the same screen, before the same save - it simply is not beside
# a box. test_selfconfig.py part 4 MEASURES how many of the shipped rules
# anchor and prints the ones that do not, rather than this comment claiming a
# coverage figure.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
def problems_by_field(problems, keys):
"""(by_key, unanchored) for a list of validator sentences.
A sentence naming several keys is filed under EVERY one of them - a
cross-field rule is about all of its fields, and hiding it from one of them
would be this card's own defect in miniature.
"""
patterns = [(key, re.compile(r"(?<![A-Za-z0-9_])" + re.escape(key)
+ r"(?![A-Za-z0-9_])")) for key in keys]
by_key, unanchored = {}, []
for problem in problems:
hit = False
for key, pattern in patterns:
if pattern.search(problem):
by_key.setdefault(key, []).append(problem)
hit = True
if not hit:
unanchored.append(problem)
return by_key, unanchored
def changed_keys(left, right):
"""Sorted keys whose values differ between two option blobs.
Used for one thing: saying WHICH settings are stored but not yet running,
and which the other configuration surface moved underneath this one. It
compares values as they are, so a list reordered counts as changed - which
is correct for `inverters`, where order is the roster order.
"""
return sorted(k for k in set(left) | set(right)
if left.get(k) != right.get(k))
+39 -208
View File
@@ -264,66 +264,36 @@ DELIVERY_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
# such family, so reading its numbers across would have understated this.
#
# Every run was executed a second time at a roster of ONE, on the same
# stimulus, as the control.
#
# ⚠️ RE-RUN BY TEST-21 (2026-09-07) AND THE HEADLINE DID NOT REPRODUCE. The
# harness that produced the original table was never committed, which is
# PROC-01's shape; it is committed now, in the OTHER repository, as
# `admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py` (it imports `plantsim` and
# `frame_check`, which that repo owns - restating them here would be CI-08's
# coupling, and CI-08 has broken three times). Re-derive it with:
#
# cd goodwe/sim && GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon \
# python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest --campaign --blag
#
# Worst CONTINUOUS legitimate episode. Second block is the re-run:
# stimulus, as the control. Worst CONTINUOUS legitimate episode:
#
# threshold reversals flapping weighted N=1 control (1890 runs)
# 100 W 40.0 s 0.0 s 75.0 s 0.0 s } 2026-09-06
# 250 W 55.0 s 0.0 s 60.0 s 0.0 s } harness
# * 500 W 20.0 s 0.0 s 30.0 s 0.0 s } NOT
# 700 W 20.0 s 0.0 s 20.0 s 0.0 s } COMMITTED
# 1000 W 15.0 s 0.0 s 15.0 s 0.0 s } - see
# 2000 W 10.0 s 0.0 s 5.0 s 0.0 s } DECISIONS
#
# threshold reversals flapping weighted N=1 control (2640 runs)
# 100 W 120.0 s 0.0 s 165.0 s 0.0 s } TEST-21
# 250 W 65.0 s 0.0 s 100.0 s 0.0 s } 2026-09-07
# * 500 W 30.0 s 0.0 s 35.0 s 0.0 s } committed
# 700 W 25.0 s 0.0 s 30.0 s 0.0 s } harness,
# 1000 W 15.0 s 0.0 s 25.0 s 0.0 s } re-runnable
# 1500 W 0.0 s 0.0 s 20.0 s 0.0 s }
# 2000 W 0.0 s 0.0 s 0.0 s 0.0 s }
# 100 W 40.0 s 0.0 s 75.0 s 0.0 s
# 250 W 55.0 s 0.0 s 60.0 s 0.0 s
# * 500 W 20.0 s 0.0 s 30.0 s 0.0 s
# 700 W 20.0 s 0.0 s 20.0 s 0.0 s
# 1000 W 15.0 s 0.0 s 15.0 s 0.0 s
# 2000 W 10.0 s 0.0 s 5.0 s 0.0 s
#
# * is the shipped threshold, `Tuning.saturation_w`.
#
# ⚠️ THREE THINGS IN THAT TABLE ARE WORTH MORE THAN THE ROW THEY SIT ON.
# (a) The N=1 column is ZERO EVERYWHERE, at every threshold, IN BOTH
# CAMPAIGNS. The compatibility promise is measured, not argued, and it
# is the part that reproduced most cleanly.
# (b) The FLAPPING column is zero everywhere too, in both - and that is the
# family that defeated SAFETY-30's site window (980 s at N=2, 1000 s at
# N=1, no window inside the billing quarter surviving it). It cannot
# touch this check, because a common stimulus makes BOTH units short at
# once and the subset stops being proper.
# (c) THE ORIGINAL CURVE WAS NOT MONOTONE - 55.0 s at 250 W against 40.0 s
# at 100 W - and that was read as a property of the reduction: a lower
# threshold puts MORE units into the short set, which can turn a proper
# subset into the whole roster and BREAK the run. ⚠️ THE RE-RUN'S CURVE
# IS MONOTONE. The mechanism is real and is still the reason not to read
# either table as a sensitivity curve, but it is no longer something
# these numbers demonstrate - it is an argument now, not a measurement.
# (a) The N=1 column is ZERO EVERYWHERE, in all 1890 runs at every
# threshold. The compatibility promise is measured, not argued.
# (b) The FLAPPING column is zero everywhere too - and that is the family
# that defeated SAFETY-30's site window (980 s at N=2, 1000 s at N=1, no
# window inside the billing quarter surviving it). It cannot touch this
# check, because a common stimulus makes BOTH units short at once and
# the subset stops being proper.
# (c) THE CURVE IS NOT MONOTONE - 55.0 s at 250 W against 40.0 s at 100 W -
# and that is a property of the reduction, not noise: a lower threshold
# puts MORE units into the short set, which can turn a proper subset
# into the whole roster and BREAK the run. Do not read it as a
# sensitivity curve.
#
# THE BOUNDS THE VALUE ANSWERS TO:
#
# LOWER, from the rig - 35.0 s (TEST-21; the original record said 30.0 s
# and it did not reproduce), the worst continuous legitimate episode at
# the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs. ⚠️ THIS IS NOW STRICTLY THE
# BINDING LOWER BOUND: at 30.0 s it coincided with the firmware's veto
# below and a reader could not tell which was doing the work; at 35.0 s it
# is ABOVE it, and it is above the schema's own `int(30,900)` floor too -
# so an operator who sets `delivery_hold_s` to 30 is below a MEASURED
# legitimate episode. That is what "derived, do not change" is for.
# LOWER, from the rig - 30.0 s, the worst continuous legitimate episode at
# the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs.
#
# LOWER, from the firmware - `inverter.LINK_STALE_S`, 30 s. A unit not
# executing its share for less than the firmware's own veto window is a
@@ -332,47 +302,26 @@ DELIVERY_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
# second, louder alarm about a state already being handled - the
# SAFETY-15/SAFETY-19 failure exactly.
#
# MARGIN, from INVERTER B NOT EXISTING. ⚠️ THIS IS A SENSITIVITY STUDY ON
# A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT B, NOT A MEASUREMENT OF B, and the wording here used
# to say "MEASURED rather than GUESSED", which overstated it. B is not
# installed (~2026-09-12). The campaign's B is A COPIED
# (`plantsim.INVERTER_B`, `measured=False`), so the 35.0 s above is TWO
# IDENTICAL MACHINES and every row below is a what-if. NO ROW HERE IS B's
# LAG. Sweeping a DIFFERENT second unit through the weighted family
# (2026-09-06 -> TEST-21 re-run):
#
# B lag / ramp original re-run
# 10.0 s / 800 W/s 30.0 s 35.0 s (= A, both copies)
# 20.0 s / 800 W/s 45.0 s 45.0 s
# 10.0 s / 400 W/s 30.0 s 35.0 s
# 20.0 s / 400 W/s 45.0 s 50.0 s
# 40.0 s / 200 W/s 90.0 s 75.0 s (4x A's lag)
#
# The LAG moves it roughly linearly; the RAMP barely does. "The ramp does
# not move it AT ALL" was too strong - halving it is worth 0 s at A's lag
# and +5 s at twice it - so the ramp is second-order, not absent. That is
# the sensitivity the margin has to carry until SPIKE-04 measures the real
# unit.
# MARGIN, from INVERTER B NOT EXISTING, AND IT IS MEASURED RATHER THAN
# GUESSED. The campaign's B is A COPIED (`plantsim.INVERTER_B`,
# `measured=False`), so the 30.0 s above is two identical machines.
# Sweeping a DIFFERENT second unit through the weighted family: the worst
# legitimate episode is insensitive to B's RAMP (30.0 s at half A's) and
# scales with its LAG - 45.0 s at twice A's measured 10 s lag, 90.0 s at
# four times it. That is the sensitivity the margin has to carry until
# SPIKE-04 measures the real unit.
#
# UPPER, from the bill - 900 s, the quarter that sets the capacity tariff.
# A site running short of one unit's share must be reported well inside
# one.
#
# 185 s: thirty-seven control cycles. Against the TEST-21 re-run: 5.29x the
# worst legitimate episode this rig produces (35.0 s), 2.47x the worst a
# hypothetical second unit FOUR TIMES slower than A produces (75.0 s), 6.2x
# the firmware's own veto window (30 s), and 4.9x inside the quarter
# (900 s). ⚠️ DELIBERATELY NOT 180 - that is SAFETY-02's site hold and this
# 185 s: thirty-seven control cycles. 6.2x the worst legitimate episode this
# rig produces, 2.06x the worst a second unit FOUR TIMES slower than A
# produces, 6.2x the firmware's own veto window, and 4.9x inside the
# quarter. ⚠️ DELIBERATELY NOT 180 - that is SAFETY-02's site hold and this
# is a different check on a different quantity, so a reader must not be
# able to think it was carried across - and not 150 or 200.
#
# ⚠️ 185 STANDS AND IS NOT CHANGED. The record claimed 6.2x the measured
# worst; the re-run makes it 5.29x. All four bounds still clear and none of
# them narrowly, and the ordering of the argument is unchanged. A shipped
# safety constant is not moved because a margin went from 6.2x to 5.3x while
# every bound holds - moving it would re-open SAFETY-41's four-attempt
# false-trip regime for nothing. What changed is the CLAIM, not the value.
#
# WHAT IT COSTS, stated rather than hidden: up to 185 s of a site running
# short by one unit's share before anybody is told. Against a fault that ran
# 6 h 25 m unnoticed, and against a guard that TAKES NO ACTION, this window
@@ -414,94 +363,6 @@ DELIVERY_OPTION_DEFAULTS = {
MIN_W_IS_SATURATION_W = "control.Tuning.saturation_w"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SAFETY-43. THE SECOND WAY TO BE NAMED, AND WHY IT IS A FRACTION OF THE ASK.
#
# `min_w` above is an ABSOLUTE gap, and OPT-09 made that a hole. `weights()`
# shrinks a low-headroom unit's share, and shrinking the share shrinks the gap:
# a unit standing at +125 W and delivering 0 W is 100 % delinquent and 125 W
# short, so an absolute 500 W never names it. Measured end to end
# (`test_packshare.py` part 8b, real `compute()`, real `plan()`, real
# `delinquent()`, B wedged at a healthy 15 % against its own 10 % cut-out):
#
# load 1500 W, equal weights the wedged unit named on 199/200 cycles
# load 1500 W, OPT-09 weights named on 0/200 cycles
#
# ⚠️ AND THE SUPPRESSED REGIME IS THE QUIET ONE. At a load the healthy sibling
# covers, the meter is satisfied, `unmet_w` is 0 and no action-log line fires,
# so this alarm is the ONLY instrument that would have told the operator.
#
# ⚠️ THE FIX IS NOT A SMALLER `min_w`, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE SHAPE OF THIS
# CARD. `min_w` is `Tuning.saturation_w` and it exists to stop NORMAL
# SATURATION being reported as delinquency - the crying-wolf failure the whole
# module is written against, and the one SAFETY-41 spent four attempts on
# ("i'm getting really annoyed by the notifications in my HA"). Lowering it
# trades a missed alarm for a false one on every unit at once. A fraction of
# the unit's OWN SHARE is a SECOND way to be named that leaves the first
# exactly where it was: `gap > min_w OR gap > frac * share`. Nothing that was
# silent before this card becomes noisy unless the unit is delivering almost
# none of what it was asked for, which is not saturation-shaped at all.
#
# WHERE 0.85 COMES FROM - MEASURED ON THE SAME CAMPAIGN AS `delivery_hold_s`.
# `admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py --campaign --fractions` grades this
# constant over the SAME 2640 no-fault runs (three families x 6 gains x 5 slews
# x the write staggers, every unit executing the share it was given) that
# produced the 35.0 s worst legitimate episode, at the shipped `min_w`, and
# reports what the relative arm ADDS. Worst continuous legitimate episode,
# worst of the three families:
#
# frac 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
# worst 90.0 90.0 70.0 70.0 60.0 55.0 55.0 60.0 45.0 45.0 s
#
# frac 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 *0.85 0.90 0.95 0.99
# worst 40.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 s
#
# absolute arm alone: 35.0 s - SAFETY-42 §3.3's figure, re-measured in the
# SAME runs, which is what makes every row above a comparison and not a claim.
# N=1 control: 0.0 s at EVERY fraction, in all 2640 one-inverter runs.
# Flapping family: 0.0 s at EVERY fraction, in all 840 runs.
#
# ⚠️ READ THE CURVE, NOT THE ROW. THERE IS NO CLIFF ANYWHERE IN IT. From 0.45
# to 0.99 every figure is 40.0 or 45.0 s - within ONE CONTROL CYCLE (5.0 s) of
# every other - and below 0.45 it rises gradually to 90.0 s at 0.05. It is not
# monotone either (0.40 reports 60.0 s where 0.35 reports 55.0), which is
# §3.3's own mechanism (c) rather than noise in the plant: a more sensitive rule
# puts MORE units into the short set, which can turn a proper subset into the
# WHOLE roster and END the episode. So this constant is INSENSITIVE over the
# whole usable range, and that is the finding rather than a caveat on it. 0.85
# sits in the flat part, 0.40 above the shoulder at ~0.45 and 0.15 below 1.0.
#
# ⚠️ AND "ZERO FALSE NAMINGS" IS NOT AVAILABLE AT ANY FRACTION - said here
# because the card asked for exactly that. Every fraction adds naming CYCLES to
# the no-fault campaign; a relative arm that never fired on a legitimate
# transient would be one that never fired at all, because the modelled write
# stagger lands B's number up to four cycles late and a unit whose new command
# has not arrived IS delivering a small fraction of what is standing on its
# wire. What is zero at every fraction is false ALARMS: the longest legitimate
# episode anywhere in the 20-point sweep is 90.0 s - at 0.05, the most sensitive
# fraction measured and far below anything this card would ship - against a
# `delivery_hold_s` of 185 s, so NOTHING in 2640 no-fault runs comes within 95 s
# of notifying an operator at any fraction measured. At 0.85 the hold is 4.62x
# the worst legitimate episode where the absolute arm alone gave 5.29x. That is
# the price, in full.
#
# ⚠️ THE DIRECTION IS THE OPPOSITE OF `min_w`'s AND IT IS EASY TO GET BACKWARDS.
# A SMALLER fraction names MORE units - it is the more sensitive setting and the
# more dangerous one - so the campaign puts a LOWER bound on this number, not an
# upper one. It is bounded ABOVE by the card's own case: at 1.0 the arm can only
# fire on a unit that is IMPORTING while asked to discharge, which is
# SAFETY-30's fault and not this one, so a unit delivering NONE of its share
# (gap/share exactly 1.0) would be missed. The 0.15 below 1.0 is what covers a
# wedged box reporting a small standby figure rather than a clean zero.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NOT AN OPTION, FOR `delivery_w`'s REASON ONE PARAGRAPH UP. An
# operator has no instrument to derive it with, a knob here is a knob on how
# loud this add-on is, and SAFETY-41 is the record of what that costs. It is a
# derived constant with a committed harness behind it, and the way to move it
# is to re-run the campaign.
DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION = 0.85
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class DeliveryConfig:
"""Defaults, not constants - config.yaml carries both. See CFG-03 above."""
@@ -620,30 +481,12 @@ def account(*, live: bool, parked: bool, soc, bms_floor) -> str | None:
return None
def delinquent(units, min_w: float,
share_frac: float = DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION) -> dict:
def delinquent(units, min_w: float) -> dict:
"""Which units are short with NO ACCOUNT, when the roster disagrees with them.
`units` one `UnitDelivery` per inverter, in roster order.
`min_w` the ABSOLUTE shortfall that counts - `control.Tuning.
saturation_w`. See `MIN_W_IS_SATURATION_W`.
`share_frac` SAFETY-43. The RELATIVE shortfall that counts, as a fraction
of that unit's own share. See `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION`; it
is a parameter rather than a read of the constant so the
campaign that derived it can sweep it over the shipped code.
⚠️ `None` MEANS THE ABSOLUTE ARM ALONE - SAFETY-42's rule,
exactly - and it exists for ONE caller: the campaign in
`admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py`, which has to be able
to measure what this card ADDS against what it replaced, run
for run, over ONE tree. Nothing in the add-on passes it, and
`main.py` passes nothing at all.
⚠️ THE TWO ARMS ARE AN `or` AND THE ORDER OF THAT SENTENCE MATTERS. The
absolute arm is untouched by SAFETY-43: everything `min_w` named before it
is still named, and nothing `min_w` refused becomes noisy unless the unit
is delivering almost NONE of its ask. Lowering `min_w` would have been the
other change - the one that reports normal saturation on every unit at once
- and `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION` says at length why it was refused.
`units` one `UnitDelivery` per inverter, in roster order.
`min_w` the shortfall that counts - `control.Tuning.saturation_w`. See
`MIN_W_IS_SATURATION_W`.
Returns `{name: sentence}`, empty when there is nothing to say. The sentence
is the operator's first line and it carries the peer clause, because "B is
@@ -685,13 +528,7 @@ def delinquent(units, min_w: float,
gaps = {}
for u in asked:
gap = short_by(u.share_w, u.measured_w)
if gap is None:
continue
# SAFETY-43: absolute OR relative. `share_w` is > 0 for every member
# of `asked`, so the second comparison is always well formed.
if gap > float(min_w) or (share_frac is not None
and gap > float(share_frac)
* float(u.share_w)):
if gap is not None and gap > float(min_w):
gaps[u.name] = gap
unaccounted = {u.name: gaps[u.name] for u in asked
@@ -707,13 +544,7 @@ def delinquent(units, min_w: float,
out[u.name] = (
f"{REASON_CODE}: {u.name} is standing at {float(u.share_w):+.0f} W "
f"and delivering {float(u.measured_w):+.0f} W - "
f"{unaccounted[u.name]:.0f} W of its share "
# SAFETY-43. The PROPORTION is in the sentence because the watts
# alone stopped being the whole story the moment a unit could be
# named on the relative arm: "125 W is not arriving" reads like a
# rounding error, and "125 W (100 % of its share)" is the fault.
f"({100.0 * unaccounted[u.name] / float(u.share_w):.0f} % of it) "
f"is not arriving - while "
f"{unaccounted[u.name]:.0f} W of its share is not arriving - while "
f"{', '.join(peers)} {'is' if len(peers) == 1 else 'are'} not in "
f"that state. Nothing this add-on reads explains it")
return out
+1 -30
View File
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ def build_roster(opts: dict, store, sign_cfg=None,
soc_entity=opts.get("soc_entity", ""),
batt_entity=opts.get("batt_entity", ""),
batt_invert=bool(opts.get("batt_invert")),
max_w=_flat_max_w(opts),
max_w=float(opts.get("max_w", 2000)),
# SAFETY-32. THE FLAT KEY, because this IS the single-inverter shape
# - the one pack the flat options describe is the one pack whose
# cut-out `bms_soc_floor` states. Defaulted from CFG-03's single
@@ -616,35 +616,6 @@ def _entry_bms_floor(entry: dict):
return None
def _flat_max_w(opts: dict) -> float:
"""The single-inverter shape's cap, tolerating what rule 9 tolerates.
⚠️ THIS USED TO BE A BARE `float(opts.get("max_w", 2000))` AND IT
DISAGREED WITH THE VALIDATOR. `validate.py`'s `_number()` reads `""` as
"use the default", so rule 9 looks at an empty `max_w` box, sees 2000 and
is content - while the bare `float("")` here raised ValueError from inside
`Controller.__init__`. Through UX-02's panel that surfaced as HTTP 500 on a
non-JSON body, which the page reported as "cannot reach the add-on": untrue,
and for the most prominent limit field's most likely transient state.
That inverted this module's own docstring rule - "keep the two in step: a
shape this tolerates that rule 9 does not name is a shape that runs" - in
the other direction: a shape rule 9 TOLERATED could not be composed at all.
The roster path never had the bug, because `_entry_max_w` below already
guards; only the flat path did.
Empty or absent is the default, exactly as `_number()` reads it.
Unparseable is 0.0, exactly as `_entry_max_w` reads it - and rule 9 refuses
it by name at line 790, with a sentence, before a control loop exists.
"""
raw = opts.get("max_w", 2000)
if raw is None or raw == "":
return 2000.0
try:
return float(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return 0.0
def _entry_capacity_kwh(entry: dict):
"""One entry's OWN usable capacity in kWh, or None when it stated none.
+19 -207
View File
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ from . import peakguard
from . import packshare
from .p1 import P1Ingest, build_source, is_enabled
from .price import Uncertainty, price_option
from .price_history import PriceHistory
from .static_tariff import resolve_tariff, static_status
from .tariff import PeakStore, PeakTracker
from .store import migrate_maint_keys, migrate_unit_keys
@@ -166,8 +165,7 @@ def pack_energy_of(inv):
class Controller:
def __init__(self, opts: dict, hass: HomeAssistant, store, mqtt_pub, *, stop,
peak_db_path: str = "/data/tariff.db",
price_history_path: str = "/data/price_history.json"):
peak_db_path: str = "/data/tariff.db"):
self.o = opts
self.hass = hass
self.store = store
@@ -249,40 +247,7 @@ class Controller:
hold_s=float(opts.get("delivery_hold_s",
DELIVERY_OPTION_DEFAULTS["delivery_hold_s"])),
)
# SAFETY-44. THE NAMES THE MACHINES READ, HANDED TO THE MIGRATION THAT
# WRITES FOR THEM. This line used to read `migrate_unit_keys(store,
# UNIT_A)`, and the constant was wrong in exactly the way the
# `maint_migration` call below says the SAME constant would be wrong -
# ⚠️ this comment used to cite "line 315" and "two hundred lines
# below", and both were wrong. The correction I wrote for them was
# wrong too: it said "~54 lines down", which was review's distance to
# the WRONG line, carried to a new referent without re-measuring -
# inside the sentence apologising for a wrong number. There is no
# distance here now, because a distance is a coordinate and the
# sentence above already names the thing. On a declared roster the flat
# latch landed under
# `unit/inverter-a/`, which is on no roster, was read back under the
# name it was handed, and stamped the marker. `roster_names()` is the
# naming rule itself and returns `[UNIT_A]` on the flat shape, so the
# upgrade path every install runs today is byte-identical.
#
# ⚠️ AND `misdirected` IS UNREACHABLE FROM **THIS** CALL SITE, WHICH THE
# COMMIT MESSAGE ORIGINALLY CLAIMED AS A BENEFIT. `unit` is
# `roster_names(opts)[0]` and `build_roster()` names its entries from
# the same `roster_names()` list, so `unit` is a member of `roster` by
# construction and the refusal can never fire here. Review measured it:
# dropping the `roster` argument from the `_verify_moves()` call inside
# `migrate_unit_keys()` survives 28/28.
#
# THE ARGUMENT STAYS ANYWAY, and the reason is the one `_verify_moves()`
# already gives for keeping its own `roster=None` branch: it is what a
# NEW caller gets, and the grading it enables is measured at the
# function's own level in test_maintenance.py rather than through here.
# What is NOT true is that this call site buys the refusal, so that
# claim is gone rather than restated.
_roster_names = roster_names(opts)
self.store_migration = migrate_unit_keys(
store, _roster_names[0], _roster_names)
self.store_migration = migrate_unit_keys(store, UNIT_A)
self.inverters = build_roster(opts, store, sign_cfg, delivery_cfg)
# ⚠️ CFG-04. SAY WHICH SHAPE IS IN FORCE, BECAUSE THE OTHER ONE'S KEYS
# ARE STILL SITTING IN THE UI. A declared `inverters:` roster reads none
@@ -584,42 +549,6 @@ class Controller:
self.peak.restore(self.p1.averager)
_LOG.info("capacity-tariff peak store: %s", self.peak.restore_state)
# FCST-04. The §8.3 carry-forward store: the published prices of the
# last few Brussels days, so the hours a day-ahead feed has not printed
# yet can be filled from yesterday's profile and FLAGGED, instead of
# being absent from the series entirely.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS AN INSTRUMENT'S BACKING FILE, NOT A STRATEGY. It commands
# nothing and claims nothing; what it changes is how many hours the
# plan covers. Before this, a dynamic site between midnight and the
# 14-16 h CET publication had a series covering only the rest of today
# - typically 10-24 of the 48 hours `price_horizon_h` asked for - and
# `TariffPlan.arbitrage()` took its spread over that truncated window
# without anything reporting that it had. Every carried hour is
# provisional, so refusal 3 drops it from the trade set: CARRYING a
# price widens what the optimiser can SEE, never what it may act on.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE CAVEAT THAT BELONGS WITH THAT SENTENCE, because this is
# the one place a maintainer reads it on its own. THE OTHER HALF OF
# THIS CHANGE DOES MOVE ENERGY, and it is the windowing rather than the
# carrying: the filled series covers `[since, until)`, so hours that
# have ALREADY ELAPSED are no longer in the spread. A cheap night that
# has gone used to sit in the series as the day's cheapest hour, and no
# cycle can buy in an hour that is past - so the trade was quietly
# never taken. `resolve_tariff()`'s docstring, DOCS.md and the CHANGELOG
# all carry this beside the guarantee; it may not appear here without it.
#
# ⚠️ A BROKEN OR ABSENT STORE IS NOT AN ERROR HERE. It answers `no_data`,
# the fill carries nothing, and the plan is the pre-FCST-04 one minus
# the elapsed hours - short, but honest and still refusing on the same
# rules. It must not be an error in the other sense either: a day
# record this build cannot read is DROPPED by `PriceHistory._load()`
# and reported in `.words`, because both the constructor above and the
# `.words` read below are unguarded, and a cache that raises here is an
# add-on that does not start.
self.price_history = PriceHistory(price_history_path)
_LOG.info("§8.3 price history: %s", self.price_history.words)
# SAFETY-07. The guard TARIFF-01 was built for. It is stateless by
# design (peakguard.py holds no history between calls), so the only
# state here is what an EDGE needs: what the last cycle concluded, so
@@ -822,132 +751,23 @@ class Controller:
legacy_tripped = bool(data.get("sign_tripped", False))
if not legacy_tripped or not self.inverters:
return
# ⚠️ THE QUESTION IS "IS ANY NAMESPACED LATCH SET **THAT A MACHINE
# READS**", AND THE LAST CLAUSE IS SAFETY-44's SECOND HALF. At a roster
# of two a trip on B leaves A untripped, so re-arming A off a flat key
# that B's own trip mirrored would latch a healthy inverter on every
# restart - the flat-key defect DEV-02 removed, coming back through its
# own guard. That much stands, and it is why the question is asked of
# the STORE's keys rather than of the roster's objects.
#
# ⚠️ BUT IT USED TO ACCEPT **ANY** `unit/*/sign_tripped`, and the
# paragraph here defended that: the store "holds every one this install
# has ever written, including one belonging to a unit that is not in
# TODAY's roster ... whereas the roster only knows what is configured
# right now". THE PREMISE IS TRUE AND IT ARGUES THE WRONG WAY. A latch
# under a name no unit answers to is not protection an operator has - it
# is a key nothing reads, which is the definition of the state this
# method exists to repair. Counting it as protection made the guard
# return early on precisely the install that needed it, and that is not
# hypothetical: it is where the migration above USED to put the latch
# on every declared roster, so the guard was blinded by its own upgrade.
#
# THE MIGRATION FIX DOES NOT REACH THOSE INSTALLS. A store stamped by
# the shipped version already has the marker, so `migrate_unit_keys()`
# returns at the version check and never runs again. This guard is the
# ONLY repair path for a site that upgraded before this card, and it
# re-arms onto `inverters[0]` - which lands the latch back under a name
# the roster reads.
# ⚠️ AND "OFF THE ROSTER" IS NOT ENOUGH ON ITS OWN - IT HAS TO BE THE
# MIGRATION'S OWN FINGERPRINT, WHICH IS `UNIT_A`. The first draft of
# this treated EVERY off-roster latch as litter, and test_inverter.py's
# DEV-02 restart case caught it: there the store carries
# `unit/inverter-b/sign_tripped = True` from B's own trip while the
# roster being graded holds only A, and the blunt rule re-armed a
# HEALTHY A off the flat key that B's trip had mirrored - DEV-02's
# defect rebuilt inside its own guard, which is exactly what the
# paragraph above was right to be afraid of.
#
# `UNIT_A` is the discriminator because it is the ONLY name the broken
# migration ever wrote. `roster_names()` falls back to a POSITIONAL
# `inverter-N`, so `inverter-a` is not a name this code hands to anyone
# else. A latch stranded under any OTHER name is a real unit that is
# out of today's config - a roster is configuration and it changes -
# and it still counts as protection.
#
# ⚠️ THE RESIDUAL, STATED RATHER THAN LEFT TO BE FOUND: a site whose
# own first unit is NAMED `inverter-a`, latched, and then taken out of
# the roster gets re-armed on `inverters[0]`. That is a healthy unit
# held at 0 W until an operator clears it, which is the conservative
# direction; SAFETY-44's is a site DRIVING on a state file that says it
# is latched.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE SECOND HALF OF THAT RESIDUAL IS THE **SENTENCE**, NOT THE
# BOOLEAN. The reason re-armed from is the FLAT mirror, which carries
# whatever tripped LAST - so on a multi-unit site this path can print
# one inverter's evidence under another inverter's name. The latch is
# right and the explanation may not be. It is disclosed here because the
# banner is what an operator acts on, and `test_maintenance.py`'s check
# that the reason is not the removed unit's is guaranteed by that
# fixture's choice of flat string, NOT by this code.
# ⚠️ AND THE THREE CASES ARE THREE VARIABLES, NOT ONE SHARED FLAG.
# THIS IS WHERE THE FIRST VERSION OF THIS FIX WAS DEFEATED, BY ONE KEY.
# It wrote `namespaced_latched = True` for BOTH "on the roster" and "off
# the roster but not UNIT_A", so a single latched key belonging to a
# unit the operator had removed from `inverters:` vetoed the repair of
# the misdirected `inverter-a` latch sitting beside it. Measured on the
# shipped build, roster ['garage', 'shed'], store stamped so the
# migration cannot reach it:
#
# sign_tripped + unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped
# -> [('garage', True), ('shed', False)] repaired
# ...AND unit/old-shed/sign_tripped
# -> [('garage', False), ('shed', False)] ⚠️ DRIVING
#
# A site DRIVING on a state file that reads `sign_tripped: true`, which
# is the sentence this whole card exists to make false - and
# `tools/rehearse_roster.py` said so, on the unmodified tree, exit 1.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS ALSO INSTANCE #17 OF HABIT 4, IN THE EXTENSION MUTATION.md
# ADDED TWO DAYS AGO. The two fixtures written for this card each hold
# ONE arrangement - `_staged_store` has only `inverter-a`, `_other_store`
# has only `inverter-b` - and the flag is written twice with opposite
# intents only when BOTH are present. A per-key check whose keys have
# never disagreed WITHIN ONE STORE is a check over whichever key came
# last. The fixture below now holds both.
#
# THE THREE CASES, AND WHY THE ANSWER DIFFERS FOR EACH:
# on the roster a machine reads it: real protection, stop.
# off-roster, `UNIT_A` the broken migration's fingerprint - this
# IS the flat latch, misdirected. Repair.
# off-roster, other name a real unit out of today's config. Its
# latch is unread too, but it is NOT the flat
# key's misdirection, and re-arming a healthy
# sibling off it is DEV-02's defect. Stop -
# UNLESS a stranded `UNIT_A` latch is also
# present, because then the flat key IS
# accounted for and the repair is the point.
on_roster = {inv.name for inv in self.inverters}
stranded, on_roster_latched, other_off_roster = [], False, False
for k, v in data.items():
if not (k.startswith("unit/") and k.endswith("/sign_tripped")):
continue
if not bool(v):
continue
# `unit_key()` builds `unit/<unit>/<key>`, so the unit is field 1 -
# split through the writer's own spelling rather than re-deriving.
unit = k.split("/")[1]
if unit in on_roster:
on_roster_latched = True
elif unit == UNIT_A:
stranded.append(k)
else:
other_off_roster = True
if on_roster_latched or any(inv.sign_wd.tripped
for inv in self.inverters):
# ⚠️ THE QUESTION IS "IS ANY NAMESPACED LATCH SET", AND IT IS ASKED OF
# THE STORE RATHER THAN OF THE ROSTER. At a roster of two a trip on B
# leaves A untripped, so re-arming A off a flat key that B's own trip
# mirrored would latch a healthy inverter on every restart - the
# flat-key defect this card removed, coming back through its own guard.
# And the STORE is the right place to ask: it holds every
# `unit/*/sign_tripped` this install has ever written, including one
# belonging to a unit that is not in TODAY's roster (a roster is
# configuration and it changes), whereas the roster only knows what is
# configured right now. The flat key carries new information only when
# nothing namespaced is latched at all.
namespaced_latched = any(
bool(v) for k, v in data.items()
if k.startswith("unit/") and k.endswith("/sign_tripped"))
if namespaced_latched or any(inv.sign_wd.tripped
for inv in self.inverters):
return
if other_off_roster and not stranded:
# A removed unit's own latch, and no misdirected one. The flat key
# is that unit's mirror, so it carries no new information and
# re-arming `inverters[0]` from it would latch a healthy pack.
return
if stranded:
_LOG.error(
"SAFETY-44: this store carries a LATCHED sign-disagreement "
"failsafe under %s, and that unit is NOT on today's roster "
"%s - so no machine reads it and the site came up DRIVING on "
"a state file that says it is latched. Re-arming below.",
", ".join(sorted(stranded)), sorted(on_roster))
first = self.inverters[0]
# The one state this method exists for.
reason = str(data.get("sign_reason", "") or "")
@@ -3493,8 +3313,7 @@ class Controller:
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
try:
plan = await resolve_tariff(
self.o, now, now + timedelta(hours=horizon), now=now,
history=self.price_history)
self.o, now, now + timedelta(hours=horizon), now=now)
self.tariff_plan, self.tariff_at = plan, now
_LOG.info("tariff refreshed: %s", plan.words)
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001
@@ -4343,13 +4162,6 @@ class Controller:
("Maintenance due", "now" if next_due is None else next_due.strftime("%Y-%m-%d")),
("Cheap window", "yes" if self.cheap else "no"),
("Tariff", self.tariff_words),
# FCST-04. WHAT §8.3 HAS TO CARRY FORWARD, which is the difference
# between a 48-hour plan and a 12-hour one on a weekday morning.
# It is its own row rather than a clause of "Tariff" because it
# answers a different question: "Tariff" says what the plan IS, and
# this says what the plan could still be filled from if the feed is
# late again tomorrow.
("Price history", self.price_history.words),
# OPT-04. The strategy's own sentence, not a re-derivation of it -
# every refusal it can make already carries a reason a human can
# act on, and "Arbitrage: no" would throw all of them away.
+16 -31
View File
@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ deliver DOES NOT SHIFT TO ITS SIBLING by any mechanism in this add-on.
never rises. That module DETECTS it; this one cannot fix it, and saying so
is worth more than a weighting scheme that looks like it might.
⚠️ AND IT WAS WORSE THAN "CANNOT FIX IT": THESE WEIGHTS NARROWED SAFETY-42's
DETECTION WINDOW - A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2, NOW CLOSED BY SAFETY-43
⚠️ AND IT IS WORSE THAN "CANNOT FIX IT": THESE WEIGHTS NARROW SAFETY-42's
DETECTION WINDOW, WHICH IS A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2
=======================================================================
This module used to say - and `DECISIONS/OPT-09-soc-aware-weights.md` §5 said
with it - that a wedged unit's weight does not move, so OPT-09 cannot see the
@@ -68,40 +68,25 @@ pack's ENERGY HEADROOM, not of what the pack delivers, so a wedged unit's weight
moves whenever its headroom differs from its sibling's - the ordinary case this
module exists to exploit.
`delivery.delinquent()` named a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeded
`delivery.delinquent()` names a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeds
`min_w` (`Tuning.saturation_w`, 500 W) in ABSOLUTE WATTS. Shrinking a unit's
share shrinks its gap. Measured end to end (`test_packshare.py` part 8b: real
`compute()`, real `plan()`, real `delinquent()`, B wedged at 15 % against its
own 10 % cut-out, so `envelope()` does not close and `account()` explains
nothing): at a 1500 W load the healthy pack can carry alone, equal weights named
the wedged unit on 199 of 200 cycles and these weights named it on NONE. The
suppression window widened from `site target < 2 * min_w` = 1000 W to
`site target < min_w * (w_A + w_B) / w_B` = 6500 W on that fixture - and it had
own 10 % floor, so `envelope()` does not close and `account()` explains
nothing): at a 1500 W load the healthy pack can carry alone, equal weights name
the wedged unit on 199 of 200 cycles and these weights name it on NONE. The
suppression window widens from `site target < 2 * min_w` = 1000 W to
`site target < min_w * (w_A + w_B) / w_B` = 6500 W on that fixture - and it has
an upper edge: past the healthy pack's own rating, `_fill()`'s last-resort pass
hands the wedged unit a big share again and the absolute arm names it.
hands the wedged unit a big share again and the alarm returns.
⚠️ BOTH BOUNDS ARE ARITHMETIC ABOUT `_fill()`'s PROPORTIONAL REGIME AND NEITHER IS A REACHABLE STEADY STATE - KEPT HERE BECAUSE IT IS A MEASUREMENT, EVEN THOUGH SAFETY-43 HAS SINCE MADE THE WINDOW IRRELEVANT TO THE DETECTOR. Swept on this fixture with the ABSOLUTE arm alone, the healthy pack's own 5000 W rating binds FIRST: suppressed 0/200 up to a 3000 W load, 4/200 at 4000 W, 41/200 at 4900 W (site target 5320 W, the largest reached with the wedged unit still under 500 W), then 195/200 at 5000 W once `_fill()` pins A at its cap and hands B 3000 W. So the alarm returned BELOW the 6500 W formula bound, not above it. The equal-weights 1000 W bound is unreachable for the same reason - the equal arm named the wedged unit 199/200 at every load swept, 1000 W included.
⚠️ THAT IS NO LONGER A RESIDUAL. SAFETY-43 made `delinquent()` relative to
the ask AS WELL AS absolute - `gap > min_w OR gap > frac * share`, and a
unit delivering 0 of 125 W is as delinquent as one delivering 0 of 1500 W.
On the SAME fixture, under the SAME weights, the wedged unit is now named
on 200 of 200 cycles. Part 8b grades both rules on one run:
`share_frac=None` is SAFETY-42's absolute arm alone and still says nothing,
which is what keeps the paragraph above honest rather than nostalgic.
⚠️ AND `min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED. The absolute arm's suppression window is
still exactly the arithmetic above - 1000 W at equal weights, 6500 W at
these - because a lower `saturation_w` would report NORMAL SATURATION as
delinquency on every unit at once, which is the false-trip regime SAFETY-41
spent four attempts in. What changed is that there is a SECOND way to be
named; nothing that was quiet before became noisy.
⚠️ WHAT THIS MODULE STILL CANNOT DO IS UNCHANGED. OPT-09 stops the site
ASKING a pack whose own SoC says it cannot deliver; it does not, and will
not, re-allocate a wedged unit's watts to its sibling - `delivery.py`'s
"IT REPORTS. IT DOES NOT ACT" block is the measurement behind that, and
SAFETY-43 did not touch it. The alarm is louder; the loop is identical.
⚠️ SO THE SEAM IS NOT "OPT-09 CANNOT SEE IT". IT IS: OPT-09 STOPS THE ASK
**AND** NARROWS SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW FOR A LOW-HEADROOM UNIT. That
is a disclosed residual, not a fixed thing. Closing it means making
`delinquent()` relative to the ask rather than absolute - SAFETY-42's code
and a design change, filed as its own card and deliberately NOT done here.
Do not "fix" part 8b by making it assert the alarm still fires; it does not,
and a green check that says otherwise would be worse than the gap.
WHY ENERGY AND NOT POWER
========================
+27 -106
View File
@@ -48,8 +48,7 @@ So the flag is not passed through anywhere in this file:
the object the provider produced is the object in the output series - so
there is no copy that could lose or gain a flag. `filled.points[i] is
fetched.points[j]` is a checkable property, and test_price_forecast.py
checks it. EVERY published point in the window is passed through, not one
per hour: see the sub-hourly note below.
checks it.
* `_audit()` RE-DERIVES the expected flag for every output point from the set
of hours the feed actually published, and RAISES if any point disagrees.
It is a post-condition, not a filter: it never fixes a flag, because a
@@ -91,24 +90,6 @@ which is the row the spec actually writes for "no price data". If NOTHING can
be produced, the result is `PriceRead.no_data(reason)` and not an empty series,
because an empty series is not constructible on purpose (price.py trap 3).
⚠️ A SUB-HOURLY FEED IS NOT DECIMATED TO ONE POINT AN HOUR, and the hourly walk
below is about WHICH HOURS NEED FILLING - never about what a published hour is
allowed to contain. `eneco_eddy` is the Belgian imbalance product and settles
per QUARTER, `_validate_raw()` accepts any strictly-increasing spacing, and a
published hour may therefore hold four points. So EVERY published point inside
the window is passed through, in order, and a carried point is added only for a
whole hour with NO published coverage at all.
The alternative was measured rather than reasoned about, because FCST-04's
first caller shipped it: keying the published set as `{_utc_hour(p.start): p
for p in r.points}` reads perfectly ordinary and keeps the LAST point of each
hour, dropping the other three. On a 96-point quarter-hourly feed - all firm,
fully published, nothing to carry - the series came out 15 points long, the
arbitrage spread collapsed from 0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh, and the cheapest
"hour" became a `:45` point whose `at()` window runs into the next hour. A feed
losing 84 % of its own prints is not a windowing effect and is not something a
provisional flag would ever have reported.
AC2: THE IRREVERSIBLE-ACTION GATE
=================================
@@ -175,25 +156,6 @@ def _utc_hour(instant: datetime) -> datetime:
return u.replace(minute=0, second=0, microsecond=0)
def _published_by_hour(read: PriceRead) -> dict:
"""UTC hour -> the provider's OWN points that start inside it, in order.
⚠️ A TUPLE PER HOUR, NOT A POINT, AND THAT IS THE WHOLE OF THE SUB-HOURLY
RULE. `{_utc_hour(p.start): p for p in r.points}` reads identically, is one
character shorter, and silently keeps one point per hour - the last one
written. The mapping answers two DIFFERENT questions here: "does this hour
need filling at all?" is `u in published`, and "what does the output carry
for it?" is all of `published[u]`. Collapsing them is how a quarter-hourly
feed loses three quarters of its prints.
"""
out: dict = {}
read.match(
series=lambda r: [out.setdefault(_utc_hour(p.start), []).append(p)
for p in r.points],
no_data=lambda _r: [])
return {u: tuple(ps) for u, ps in out.items()}
def _carried(start_utc: datetime, eur_per_kwh: float) -> PricePoint:
"""A point filled from yesterday's profile. §8.3: ALWAYS provisional.
@@ -210,69 +172,37 @@ def _carried(start_utc: datetime, eur_per_kwh: float) -> PricePoint:
def _audit(points, published) -> None:
"""Post-condition: every flag matches the point's TRUE provenance (AC1).
`published` maps a UTC hour to the TUPLE of points the provider produced
for it (`_published_by_hour()`). An hour ABSENT from that mapping is an hour
the feed did not print, and a carried point is the only thing that may
stand in it.
The rule, in the two forms an output point can take:
* PUBLISHED - the point must BE one of `published[u]`, by identity, and
may be emitted only once. Its flag is whatever the feed said, never
forced to False: an imbalance print is published AND provisional (§9.2,
TARIFF-02), and a check that "corrected" it would be a bug wearing a
guarantee.
* CARRIED - the hour must not appear in `published` AT ALL, the flag must
be exactly True, and that hour may hold no second point.
⚠️ WHAT REPLACED "AT MOST ONE POINT PER HOUR", AND WHY IT IS STRICTER. This
audit began as a `seen` set: any repeated `_utc_hour` raised, because a
duplicated hour is how a DST day gets mispriced. A bare hour count cannot
express a quarter-hourly feed, where four distinct published points share
one hour legitimately - so the count was replaced by the two rules above,
which subsume it. A repeated CARRIED hour still raises; so does the same
published point emitted twice; and a carried point may no longer share an
hour with a published one, which the count never checked at all.
`published` maps a UTC hour to the point the provider produced for it.
⚠️ RAISES, NEVER REPAIRS. A module that silently corrects its own
provenance is one whose provenance means nothing; the only safe response to
"this point's flag disagrees with where it came from" is to refuse to emit
the series at all.
"""
carried_hours = set()
emitted = set()
seen = set()
for p in points:
u = _utc_hour(p.start)
if u in seen:
raise ValueError(f"the filled series repeats {u.isoformat()}; a "
f"duplicated hour is how a DST day gets mispriced")
seen.add(u)
src = published.get(u)
prov = Provenance.CARRIED if src is None else Provenance.PUBLISHED
if src is None:
if u in carried_hours:
raise ValueError(
f"the filled series repeats the carried hour "
f"{u.isoformat()}; a duplicated hour is how a DST day gets "
f"mispriced")
carried_hours.add(u)
if p.provisional is not True:
raise ValueError(
f"{u.isoformat()} is {Provenance.CARRIED.value} and is "
f"flagged provisional={p.provisional!r}. §8.3: an hour "
f"filled from yesterday's profile is provisional whether "
f"or not the number turns out to be right - the flag is a "
f"claim about PROVENANCE, not about accuracy.")
f"{u.isoformat()} is {prov.value} and is flagged "
f"provisional={p.provisional!r}. §8.3: an hour filled from "
f"yesterday's profile is provisional whether or not the "
f"number turns out to be right - the flag is a claim about "
f"PROVENANCE, not about accuracy.")
else:
if not any(p is q for q in src):
if p is not src:
raise ValueError(
f"{u.isoformat()} is {Provenance.PUBLISHED.value} but the "
f"series carries a COPY of that point rather than the "
f"point itself. A copy is where the provisional flag gets "
f"lost; published points pass through by identity.")
if id(p) in emitted:
raise ValueError(
f"the filled series emits the published point at "
f"{p.start.isoformat()} TWICE. The provider's own points "
f"are strictly increasing (`_validate_raw`), so a repeat "
f"is never a second print - it is a duplicated hour, which "
f"is how a DST day gets mispriced")
emitted.add(id(p))
f"{u.isoformat()} is {prov.value} but the series carries a "
f"COPY of that point rather than the point itself. A copy "
f"is where the provisional flag gets lost; published points "
f"pass through by identity.")
def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
@@ -287,21 +217,11 @@ def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
Returns a `PriceRead`:
* a series, carrying the provider's own objects - ALL of them, which on
a quarter-hourly feed is four inside one hour - for the hours it
published, and one `_carried()` point for each remaining whole hour,
ordered by instant;
* a series, whose points are the provider's own objects for the hours it
published and `_carried()` points for the rest, ordered by instant;
* `no_data` when neither source can produce a single hour - never an
empty series, which is not constructible (price.py trap 3).
⚠️ THE WINDOW IS WHOLE HOURS AT BOTH ENDS. `since` is floored to the hour
that CONTAINS it, because the current hour is still a tradeable hour; and
so is `until`, which is the half FCST-04's first draft left out. With
`since` floored and `until` compared raw, a 48 h horizon asked for at 08:17
emitted 49 hours - the hour of `until` was still `< until` - and the count
was one too many for every `now` that is not exactly on the hour, which is
every `now` a running controller has.
⚠️ IDEMPOTENT AND RE-RUNNABLE, WHICH IS THE §5.4 LATE-PUBLICATION CONTRACT.
Day-ahead publication at 14-16 h CET can be late or fail, so the fetcher
retries and this runs again against the fresher read. Published hours always
@@ -314,7 +234,9 @@ def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
raise ValueError(f"{name} must be tz-aware; a naive instant is "
f"ambiguous for one hour every October")
published = _published_by_hour(read)
published = read.match(
series=lambda r: {_utc_hour(p.start): p for p in r.points},
no_data=lambda _r: {})
# Yesterday's profile, keyed by BRUSSELS WALL-CLOCK HOUR. First point wins
# when yesterday itself was a 25-hour day and printed local hour 2 twice.
@@ -326,12 +248,11 @@ def fill_from_yesterday(read: PriceRead, *, yesterday: PriceRead,
out = []
u = _utc_hour(since)
end = _utc_hour(until)
end = until.astimezone(timezone.utc)
while u < end:
got = published.get(u)
if got:
out.extend(got) # BY IDENTITY, and ALL of them. No copy,
else: # and no decimation to one an hour.
if u in published:
out.append(published[u]) # BY IDENTITY. No copy.
else:
src = by_local_hour.get(brussels(u).hour)
if src is not None:
out.append(_carried(u, src.eur_per_kwh))
-598
View File
@@ -1,598 +0,0 @@
"""FCST-04 - the day the carry-forward carries, kept somewhere a restart cannot reach.
WHAT WAS MISSING, AND WHY IT WAS INVISIBLE. FCST-03 shipped
`price_forecast.fill_from_yesterday()` complete and checked, and shipped the
consumers that were written to expect it - `TariffPlan.firm_points()`,
`cheap_now()`'s refusal of a provisional hour, and `arbitrage()`'s refusal 3,
which drops provisional hours from the trade set instead of refusing the whole
series. Every one of those was live. The FILL ITSELF HAD NO CALLER: nothing in
`app/` referenced `fill_from_yesterday`, so no series ever contained a carried
point and every one of those consumers was exercising its all-firm branch.
The defect that produced is not an error anywhere. `load_prices()` returns
whatever the feed published and nothing widens it to the requested horizon, so
on a dynamic site between midnight and the 14-16 h CET day-ahead publication
the series covers the rest of TODAY and nothing more - typically 10-24 of the
48 hours `price_horizon_h` asked for. `TariffPlan.arbitrage()` then computes
`max - min` over that truncated window and reports a spread. The number is
real, the window is half the one the operator configured, and NOTHING SAYS SO:
tomorrow evening's peak - the hour a morning charge would be sold into - is
simply not in the series, so the spread it would have created cannot clear a
threshold it was never compared against. A missing hour is not a wrong price;
it is an hour the optimiser never learns exists.
So this module is the half FCST-03 left out, and it is deliberately the SMALL
half: the fill's arithmetic, its DST rule and its provenance audit all stay in
`price_forecast.py`, untouched. What lives here is the one thing that
arithmetic needs and could not have: A YESTERDAY THAT SURVIVES A RESTART.
WHY PERSISTENCE, AND NOT A VARIABLE ON THE REFRESH TASK
======================================================
An in-memory "the last full day I saw" costs nothing and is wrong exactly when
it matters. The window the fill exists for is midnight -> publication; an
add-on restarted at 08:00 - a config change, an HA update, a power cut - would
come up with no yesterday at all and spend that whole window on the truncated
series, which is the pre-FCST-03 behaviour arriving silently on the mornings
after an operator touched something. The fill's own value is a function of
surviving a restart, so the day it carries has to.
⚠️ AND NOT IN `/data/state.json`. That file holds the maintenance history and
SAFETY-02's sign latch, and `Store.set()` rewrites the whole of it on every
write. The tariff refresh runs every `TARIFF_REFRESH_S` (1800 s), so folding a
price cache into it would put 48 extra whole-file rewrites a day through the
file whose corruption reads as "no maintenance ever ran" and "never tripped".
The cache is worth having; it is not worth putting anywhere near that. Separate
file, separate blast radius.
⚠️ AND THE DIRECTORY IS NOT CREATED, which is `tariff.PeakStore`'s rule and its
reason applies unchanged: `/data` is mounted by the Supervisor and always
exists on a real install, so `makedirs` here could only ever succeed where the
durable volume is MISSING - manufacturing a cache on the container's ephemeral
layer that writes fine, reads fine, and is thrown away on the next restart.
That is a yesterday that silently forgets, which is worse than one that says it
cannot answer.
⚠️ AND THAT RULE IS CARRIED OUT IN `_remember()`, NOT ONLY IN `_save()`. FCST-04
first shipped it half-done: `_save()` short-circuited on `not self.ok` while
`_remember()` filled `self._days` anyway, so a store with no durable volume
answered `words` = "unavailable" and `yesterday()` = A SERIES - an in-memory
yesterday that works all day and is gone on the next restart, which is exactly
the silently-forgetting cache this rule exists to refuse. A store that cannot
persist now records nothing, and both of its answers say the same thing.
THE FOUR RULES THIS FILE IS SHAPED BY
=====================================
1. IT RECORDS WHAT THE PROVIDER PUBLISHED, NEVER WHAT THE FILL PRODUCED.
Feeding a filled series back in is the defect that makes the whole mechanism
rot: day 2 carries day 1's guesses, day 3 carries day 2's carry of them, and
after a week of a dead feed the "yesterday" being carried forward is a
fossil of the last real publication with nothing anywhere reporting its age.
Every point still carries `provisional=True`, so the flag never lies - what
decays is the NUMBER, silently, behind a flag that is telling the truth.
⚠️ NO VALUE-LEVEL CHECK CAN CATCH THAT, and saying so is more useful than a
guarantee that would not hold. A carried point and a published-provisional
point (`eneco_eddy`'s current quarter, §9.2) are the same three fields with
the same flag; the difference is provenance, and provenance is not in the
value. So the mechanism is ORDERING, not validation: `carry()` is the only
public entry point, it remembers the argument and returns the fill, and the
filled series exists only as a return value that `carry()` itself never
sees again. `_remember()` is private, is called from exactly one place, and
`test_price_history.py` PARSES every shipped module under `app/`, `tools/`,
`scenarios/` and `estop/` and fails if any of them uses the NAME - an
attribute, a bare name, a def, or the string constant a `getattr` needs. By
name rather than by substring, so a comment about the rule does not fail it
and a call from `tools/` cannot pass unseen.
⚠️ AND THE ORDER IS GRADED BY DRIVING IT, NOT BY READING THE SOURCE. The
first version of that check compared positions in `ast.walk`, which is
breadth-first: `self._remember(...)` is a statement and `self.yesterday(...)`
is an ARGUMENT of the fill, one level deeper, so `_remember` came out first
whichever statement was written first - shipped and reversed scored the
same. What grades it now is the behaviour: a feed carrying yesterday
alongside today, into an EMPTY store, must fill the whole horizon, and
reversed it fills nothing.
2. "YESTERDAY" MEANS YESTERDAY, NOT "THE NEWEST DAY I HAVE".
`newest()` is the natural accessor and it is the one that decays: an add-on
down from Friday to Monday would answer Friday's prices to a fill that flags
them as one day old. The lookup is BY DATE - the Brussels day before the
Brussels day of the instant asked about - and a record for any other date is
NO_RECORD with a reason naming both dates. A three-day-old profile is not a
worse yesterday; it is not a yesterday.
3. A STORE THAT CANNOT ANSWER SAYS SO, IN THE TYPE.
`yesterday()` returns a `PriceRead`: a `series` when a full record exists,
`no_data(reason)` for every other outcome - no file, no record for that
date, an unreadable file, a record that parses to nothing. There is no
empty-series answer and no `.get(..., [])`-shaped accessor, for
`price.py`'s reason: an empty series is how "the cache is broken" gets to
wear the shape of "yesterday was free". `fill_from_yesterday()` takes a
`PriceRead` and handles `no_data` on its own, so the degraded case needs no
branch at the call site - it fills nothing and the horizon stays short,
which is exactly the behaviour that shipped before this ticket.
4. HOURS ACCUMULATE WITHIN A DAY; THEY DO NOT REPLACE IT.
A feed that serves only the REMAINING hours of the day (a legitimate shape -
nothing in the plugin contract promises a whole day) would, under
replace-the-record, overwrite a complete 24-hour profile with the two points
left at 22:00 and hand the next morning a yesterday with two hours in it. So
a record is MERGED by instant: a later read updates the hours it carries and
leaves the rest, and a revised price for an hour already held wins because
it is the newer statement about the same hour.
⚠️ KEYED BY INSTANT, NOT BY LOCAL HOUR, AND THAT IS THE DST DECISION. Storing
`hour -> price` would collapse the two 02:00s of a 25-hour October day into
one, inventing a second and different collapsing rule beside the one
`fill_from_yesterday()` already documents ("the first of its two 02:00 points
is the one used, deterministically"). Storing the instants keeps both, in
order, and lets the fill's own rule be the only one in the system.
WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO, ON PURPOSE
=================================
It does not extend the fill to a feed that published NOTHING. `resolve_tariff()`
applies `carry()` only on a `series` read; a `no_data` read still falls to
`_degrade()` and §11.4's row - "No price data -> fall back to the static
profile, mark the plan provisional, no arbitrage" - which is the fallback the
operator configured `static_profile` FOR. Preferring yesterday's feed over it
would change a documented degradation without being asked, and it would buy
nothing measurable: a fully-carried series is 100 % provisional, so
`arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and refuses, and `cheap_now()` is
False, exactly as on the §11.4 fallback. The two differ only in which numbers
the status page shows. `fill_from_yesterday()` handles a `no_data` read anyway,
and that branch is therefore not reached from production - it stays checked,
and turning it on is a product decision, not a wiring one. See
DECISIONS/FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried.md.
"""
import json
import logging
import os
import tempfile
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from .price import PricePoint, PriceProduct, PriceRead, brussels
from .price_forecast import fill_from_yesterday
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.price.history")
# How many Brussels days of published prices the SORT-ORDER cap keeps. The fill
# needs exactly one - yesterday - and rule 2 refuses anything older, so this is
# not a horizon: it is the number of days a record may sit unused before
# pruning removes it, and it is small because a bigger cache would only hold
# days no lookup can ask for. Three covers today, yesterday, and the day a
# fetch spanning midnight writes ahead of itself.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS A CAP, NOT THE RETENTION RULE, AND THREE HAS NO SLACK. The steady
# state is already {yesterday, today, tomorrow}; a feed that publishes to D+2,
# or ONE stray point in the wrong year - which sorts LAST and is therefore
# immortal under a newest-N cap - pushes yesterday out of a three-slot store
# and keeps it out, permanently and silently. So `_prune()` PINS the two days a
# lookup can actually ask for on top of the cap; see its docstring. The store
# is then bounded at KEEP_DAYS + 2 records rather than at KEEP_DAYS.
KEEP_DAYS = 3
SCHEMA = 1
def _bdate(instant: datetime) -> str:
"""The Brussels calendar date of an instant, as `YYYY-MM-DD`.
⚠️ BRUSSELS, NOT UTC. 23:30 UTC in July is already tomorrow in Belgium, and
a cache keyed on the UTC date would file the last 90-120 minutes of every
day under the wrong one - so a lookup on the following morning would find a
"yesterday" missing its own evening hours, which are the expensive ones.
"""
return brussels(instant).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
def _yesterday_of(instant: datetime) -> str:
"""The Brussels date of the day BEFORE `instant`'s Brussels day.
⚠️ THE ARITHMETIC IS ON THE LOCAL DATE, NOT ON THE INSTANT, AND THAT IS A
DST DEFECT THIS FILE SHIPPED. `brussels()` renders at the FIXED offset in
force at that instant, so `brussels(stamp) - timedelta(days=1)` subtracts 24
ABSOLUTE hours from a wall clock - and the Brussels day before a
spring-forward is 23 hours long. Measured at 2026-03-30T00:30+02:00, the
first hour of the morning after the March transition: it returned
2026-03-28, so the fill carried a TWO-DAY-OLD profile flagged as yesterday's
(or, with only the last three days held, answered `no_data` naming a date
that is not yesterday).
A calendar day minus one day is `date` arithmetic, and a `date` has no
offset to lose. The 25-hour October day is right for the same reason.
"""
return (brussels(instant).date() - timedelta(days=1)).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
def _n_points(rec) -> int:
"""How many points a day record holds. 0 for anything that is not one.
⚠️ TOLERANT, AND IT IS THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE, NOT THE FIRST. `_load()`
drops a malformed day record and says so, so this should never see one. It
is written this way because `words` is read from `Controller.__init__` and
from every status render: a status LINE that raises takes the add-on down,
and "the cache is broken" must never be able to mean "the controller does
not start". That is exactly what FCST-04 shipped - `{"days": {"2026-01-14":
"oops"}}` gave `ok=True`, `last_error=None`, and an `AttributeError` out of
`words`, `yesterday()` and `resolve_tariff()` alike, with no self-heal
because `_remember()` raised before it could rewrite the file.
"""
if not isinstance(rec, dict):
return 0
pts = rec.get("points")
return len(pts) if isinstance(pts, (list, tuple)) else 0
class PriceHistory:
"""The published price series of the last few Brussels days, in /data.
⚠️ `ok` IS ABOUT THE FILE, NOT ABOUT THE DATA. A healthy store with no
record for yesterday is `ok` and answers `no_data` - a normal state on a
site's first day, and a different thing from a store that could not be
opened. Both are visible: `ok`/`last_error` describe the file, and
`yesterday()`'s reason describes the answer.
"""
def __init__(self, path: str = "/data/price_history.json"):
self.path = path
self.ok = False
self.last_error: str | None = None
self._days: dict = {}
self._open()
# -- the file ------------------------------------------------------------
def _open(self) -> None:
parent = os.path.dirname(self.path)
# See the module note: NOT created. A cache on the ephemeral layer is
# one that forgets without saying so.
if parent and not os.path.isdir(parent):
self.last_error = f"no durable volume at {parent}"
# INFO, not ERROR: on a dev host or in a test container there is no
# /data and nothing is wrong.
_LOG.info("no price history: %s - §8.3 carry-forward has nothing "
"to carry and the horizon stays as short as the feed",
self.last_error)
return
self.ok = True
self._load()
def _load(self) -> None:
try:
with open(self.path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
blob = json.load(fh)
except FileNotFoundError:
_LOG.info("no price history yet at %s - the first refresh writes "
"one, and the fill has nothing to carry until the day "
"after that", self.path)
return
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError) as err:
# A corrupt cache must not stop the controller, and must not be
# silently re-created either: the record is discarded, the reason
# is kept, and `yesterday()` reports it rather than answering
# "no record", which would read as a normal first day.
self.last_error = f"unreadable ({err})"
_LOG.warning("price history at %s is %s - starting from empty. "
"§8.3 carry-forward has nothing to carry until the "
"next refresh has written a full day",
self.path, self.last_error)
return
found = blob.get("version") if isinstance(blob, dict) else None
# ⚠️ THE TYPE IS PART OF THE VERSION. `1.0 == 1` in Python, so a float
# written by some other tool would pass a bare `!=` and be read as
# schema 1 - a version check that cannot tell 1 from 1.0 is one that
# would not notice a writer this build has never met.
if not isinstance(blob, dict) or isinstance(found, bool) \
or not isinstance(found, int) or found != SCHEMA:
self.last_error = f"schema {found!r}, not {SCHEMA}"
_LOG.warning("price history at %s has %s - discarding it rather "
"than guessing what its points mean",
self.path, self.last_error)
return
days = blob.get("days")
if not isinstance(days, dict):
self.last_error = "no `days` object"
_LOG.warning("price history at %s has %s", self.path, self.last_error)
return
self._days = self._usable_days(days)
def _usable_days(self, days: dict) -> dict:
"""The day records that are shaped like day records. The rest are dropped.
⚠️ THE ASYMMETRY THAT PRODUCED THE DEFECT: `_parse_points()` below is
carefully defensive about every field of a POINT, and `_load()` was not
defensive about the record holding them at all. `{"version": 1, "days":
{"2026-01-14": "oops"}}` therefore loaded as `ok=True`,
`last_error=None` - and then `rec.get(...)` raised `AttributeError` out
of `words`, `yesterday()` and `resolve_tariff()`. `PriceHistory(...)`
and `.words` are both unguarded in `Controller.__init__`, so THE ADD-ON
DID NOT START; and it never self-healed, because `_remember()` raised on
the same record before it could reach `_save()`.
A broken cache is a short horizon. It is not a controller that will not
regulate a battery, and §6's rule - absent machinery must not disable
the loop - does not stop applying because the machinery is a JSON file.
Dropped, not repaired: an unusable record has nothing in it to keep, and
the next `_remember()` writes a fresh one under that date.
"""
kept, dropped = {}, []
for key, rec in days.items():
if not isinstance(key, str) or not isinstance(rec, dict) \
or not isinstance(rec.get("points"), list):
dropped.append(str(key))
continue
kept[key] = rec
if dropped:
# Recorded, not silent: `yesterday()` and `words` both report
# `last_error`, and a cache that quietly discards half a file reads
# to an operator exactly like a normal first day.
self.last_error = (f"{len(dropped)} unusable day record(s) dropped "
f"({', '.join(sorted(dropped))})")
_LOG.warning("price history at %s: %s - the controller starts "
"anyway and the horizon is as short as the feed makes "
"it", self.path, self.last_error)
return kept
def _save(self) -> None:
if not self.ok:
return
# ⚠️ THE TEMP FILE IS REMOVED ON EVERY FAILING PATH. A write that dies
# between `mkstemp` and `os.replace` used to leave its temp behind, and
# the refresh task runs 48 times a day: a persistent write failure -
# a full volume being the likeliest cause - leaked 48 inodes a day onto
# the volume that was already the problem.
tmp = None
try:
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=os.path.dirname(self.path))
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
json.dump({"version": SCHEMA, "days": self._days}, fh, indent=1)
# Atomic: a power cut mid-write must not leave a truncated file
# that parses as an empty day.
os.replace(tmp, self.path)
tmp = None # it IS the file now; do not unlink
except OSError as err:
self.last_error = f"could not write ({err})"
_LOG.error("could not persist price history: %s", err)
finally:
if tmp is not None:
try:
os.unlink(tmp)
except OSError: # nothing further to try, and a
pass # failed cleanup is not a fault
# -- the one public entry point -----------------------------------------
def carry(self, read: PriceRead, *, since: datetime, until: datetime,
stamp: datetime) -> PriceRead:
"""Remember what this read published, then §8.3-fill the missing hours.
THE ORDER IS DELIBERATE AND IS THE POINT OF THE METHOD. The read is
recorded FIRST, so a feed that hands back yesterday alongside today
refreshes yesterday's record from live data before it is consumed as
the profile; and the filled series - the one thing that must never be
recorded - exists only as this method's return value, which this object
never sees again. See rule 1, including how that order is graded.
Returns whatever `fill_from_yesterday()` returns: a series over the
whole hours of [since, until), carrying EVERY point the provider
published inside it - by identity, and four of them in one hour on a
quarter-hourly feed - plus one carried point for each remaining whole
hour FOR WHICH YESTERDAY HELD THAT WALL-CLOCK HOUR. An hour neither
source can price is left out (§11.4 for that hour), and `no_data` comes
back when that is every hour.
"""
self._remember(read, stamp)
return fill_from_yesterday(read, yesterday=self.yesterday(stamp),
since=since, until=until, stamp=stamp)
# -- the halves, private because rule 1 is an ordering ------------------
def _remember(self, read: PriceRead, stamp: datetime) -> None:
"""File a provider read's points under their own Brussels days.
⚠️ PRIVATE, AND CALLED FROM EXACTLY ONE PLACE. A caller that can reach
this can record a filled series, which is the decay in rule 1. There is
no value-level defence against that - a carried point and a published
provisional point are the same three fields - so the defence is that
nothing outside this file names it, and `test_price_history.py` checks
the tree for that rather than trusting the underscore.
"""
if not self.ok:
# ⚠️ A STORE THAT CANNOT PERSIST RECORDS NOTHING. See the module
# docstring's third warning: filling `self._days` here would give a
# site with no /data an in-memory yesterday that answers a series
# all day and is gone on the next restart - a cache that forgets
# without saying so, which is the one thing that rule refuses. The
# honest degraded state is `words` = "unavailable" and `yesterday()`
# = `no_data`, and those two must agree.
return
points = read.match(series=lambda r: r.points, no_data=lambda _r: ())
if not points:
return
product = read.match(series=lambda r: r.product.value,
no_data=lambda _r: None)
provider = read.match(series=lambda r: r.provider,
no_data=lambda _r: None)
touched = set()
for p in points:
day = _bdate(p.start)
rec = self._days.setdefault(
day, {"product": product, "provider": provider, "points": []})
# Rule 4: MERGE by instant. A later read updates the hours it
# carries and leaves the rest; a revised price for an hour already
# held wins, because it is the newer statement about that hour.
raw = rec.get("points")
held = {q["start"]: q for q in (raw if isinstance(raw, list) else ())
if isinstance(q, dict) and "start" in q}
held[p.start.isoformat()] = p.canonical()
rec["points"] = sorted(held.values(), key=lambda q: q["start"])
rec["product"], rec["provider"] = product, provider
touched.add(day)
self._prune(stamp)
self._save()
_LOG.debug("price history: %d point(s) filed under %s; %d day(s) held",
len(points), ", ".join(sorted(touched)), len(self._days))
def _prune(self, stamp: datetime) -> None:
"""Drop records no lookup can reach. A sort-order cap, plus two pins.
⚠️ NOTHING IS DELETED BY ARITHMETIC AGAINST THE CLOCK. A clock that
jumped - the failure mode WITNESS-03 spent a session on - would
otherwise delete every record in one pass and leave the fill with
nothing on the morning after, which is the one morning it is for.
Deleting on a bad clock is unrecoverable; holding a few days too many
is not, so the cap is `sorted(...)[-KEEP_DAYS:]` and stays that way.
⚠️ AND A CAP ALONE IS DEFEATED BY ONE POINT IN THE WRONG YEAR. Sorting
is lexicographic on the date string, so a stray far-future record sorts
LAST and is immortal - it consumes a slot for good, and with the steady
state already {yesterday, today, tomorrow} filling all three, yesterday
is what falls out. A feed that publishes to D+2 does the same thing
without any stray at all. So the two days `yesterday()` can ACTUALLY be
asked for are pinned on top of the cap.
`stamp` is READ here, which it was not before: the pin is the only use
of it, and it is additive. Pinning can only RETAIN a record, never
delete one, so a jumped `stamp` pins two dates that are not held and
changes nothing - the WITNESS-03 property is preserved by construction
rather than by remembering to check it.
"""
if len(self._days) <= KEEP_DAYS:
return
keep = set(sorted(self._days)[-KEEP_DAYS:])
keep |= {_bdate(stamp), _yesterday_of(stamp)}
for day in [d for d in self._days if d not in keep]:
del self._days[day]
def yesterday(self, stamp: datetime) -> PriceRead:
"""The published series of the Brussels day BEFORE `stamp`'s, or no_data.
⚠️ THE DATE IS COMPUTED, NOT LOOKED UP. See rule 2: `newest()` would
answer Friday's prices to a Monday fill, and the fill would flag them as
one day old because that is the only thing its flag can say.
"""
if stamp.tzinfo is None or stamp.utcoffset() is None:
raise ValueError(
f"yesterday({stamp!r}): a naive datetime is not an instant, "
f"and 'which Brussels day was yesterday' is exactly the "
f"question a wall-clock reading cannot answer.")
want = _yesterday_of(stamp)
if self.last_error and not self._days:
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"the price history at {self.path} is {self.last_error}, so "
f"§8.3 has no profile to carry forward for {want}; the plan "
f"covers only the hours the feed published")
rec = self._days.get(want)
if rec is None:
have = ", ".join(sorted(self._days)) or "no days at all"
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"no published prices recorded for {want} (held: {have}), so "
f"§8.3 has no profile to carry forward. A record for another "
f"day is not a yesterday")
points, bad = _parse_points(rec.get("points"))
if not points:
why = bad or "it is empty"
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"the {want} record holds no usable point ({why}), and an "
f"empty series is not a free day")
try:
product = PriceProduct(rec.get("product"))
except ValueError:
return PriceRead.no_data(
f"the {want} record names product {rec.get('product')!r}, "
f"which is not a PriceProduct. The optimiser switches on that "
f"enum, so a record that cannot name one cannot be a series")
if bad:
_LOG.warning("price history: %s in the %s record were dropped; "
"%d point(s) carried forward", bad, want, len(points))
return PriceRead.series(points, product,
str(rec.get("provider") or "price_history"),
stamp)
# -- observability -------------------------------------------------------
@property
def words(self) -> str:
"""One line for the status page. Says what is held, or why nothing is.
⚠️ THIS MUST NOT RAISE, EVER. It is read once from `Controller.__init__`
and again on every status render, and neither call site guards it - so
an exception here is an add-on that does not start. It went out that
way: a day record that was a string instead of a dict raised
`AttributeError` from the `len(...)` below. `_load()` now drops such a
record and `_n_points()` is total, so this has two independent reasons
not to fail on a broken file.
"""
if not self.ok:
return f"unavailable - {self.last_error}"
if not self._days:
why = f" - {self.last_error}" if self.last_error else ""
return f"empty{why} - nothing to carry forward yet"
held = "; ".join(f"{d} ({_n_points(self._days[d])} h)"
for d in sorted(self._days, key=str))
# A file that PARTLY loaded says so, or the dropped days read as days
# that were simply never written.
return held + (f" [{self.last_error}]" if self.last_error else "")
def _parse_points(raw) -> tuple:
"""Canonical dicts -> PricePoints, and a phrase naming what was dropped.
⚠️ A MALFORMED POINT IS DROPPED, NOT DEFAULTED, and the drop is reported.
`float(row.get("eur_per_kwh", 0))` is the shape of the whole family of
defects this repo has been removing: a cache that lost a field would answer
"that hour was free" to a fill that flags it as an ordinary guess.
"""
if not isinstance(raw, list):
return (), "the `points` field is not a list"
out, dropped = [], 0
for row in raw:
if not isinstance(row, dict):
dropped += 1
continue
try:
start = datetime.fromisoformat(row["start"])
value = float(row["eur_per_kwh"])
flag = row["provisional"]
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
dropped += 1
continue
if start.tzinfo is None or start.utcoffset() is None \
or not isinstance(flag, bool):
dropped += 1
continue
out.append(PricePoint(start=start, eur_per_kwh=value, provisional=flag))
out.sort(key=lambda p: p.start.astimezone(timezone.utc))
return tuple(out), (f"{dropped} malformed point(s)" if dropped else "")
class NoHistory:
"""The explicit "this caller keeps no history" - a NAME, not a `None`.
⚠️ IT EXISTS SO THE PARAMETER CAN BE REQUIRED. `history=None` meaning "skip
the fill" is the shape this repo keeps removing: a caller who forgets the
argument gets the truncated-horizon behaviour of the bug this ticket is
about, silently, and the code reads as though the fill is happening. With
no default there is nothing to forget, and a caller with no durable volume
- a check, a replay harness - has to say `NoHistory()` and be visible in
the diff.
It carries out the ordering faithfully: it records nothing and carries
nothing, so `carry()` returns the provider's read unchanged and the plan is
exactly what it was before FCST-04.
"""
ok = False
last_error = "no history is kept by this caller"
words = "not kept"
def carry(self, read: PriceRead, *, since, until, stamp) -> PriceRead:
return read
def yesterday(self, stamp: datetime) -> PriceRead:
return PriceRead.no_data(
"this caller keeps no price history (NoHistory), so §8.3 has no "
"profile to carry forward")
-401
View File
@@ -1,401 +0,0 @@
"""UX-02: reading and writing THIS add-on's own options, through the Supervisor.
WHAT THIS IS. An add-on may read and write its own options. That is not a
guess: `supervisor/api/middleware/security.py` in
`ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0` - the version this
site runs - matches an installed app's own token against
api_bypass = ^(?:|/addons/self/(?!security|update)[^/]+
|/addons/self/options/config|/info|/services.*
|/discovery.*|/auth)$
BEFORE it looks at `access_hassio_api` or at any role, so `GET
/addons/self/info`, `POST /addons/self/options` and `POST /addons/self/restart`
need no `hassio_role` at all. tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py RUNS those
compiled patterns against these exact paths rather than re-reading the regex,
because a bypass list is precisely the kind of thing that is read optimistically.
⚠️ AND THE PROBE FOUND ONE THE CARD DID NOT PREDICT, WHICH IS WHY IT WAS RUN.
`/addons/self/options/validate` - Supervisor's OWN options validator - has TWO
path segments after `self`, so `[^/]+` does not match it and it is not in the
list of literals either. An add-on cannot call it. That is not a problem for
this card, because the Supervisor's validator only knows the schema (types and
ranges) and this panel's whole reason to exist is the CROSS-FIELD rules it
structurally cannot express - but it does mean there is exactly one validator
reachable from here, `app/validate.py`, which is the one we want.
--- THE THREE THINGS THIS MODULE REFUSES TO DO ------------------------------
1. ⚠️ IT NEVER WRITES A BLOB THE SHIPPED VALIDATOR REFUSED. Not "warns and
writes"; does not write. The reason is specific to an INGRESS panel and it
is the failure mode that makes this card dangerous: an invalid blob plus a
restart is exit 78, and an add-on that is not running is not serving the
panel either. The operator would be left with no way back except the
Supervisor UI - the surface this card exists because it is hard to read.
So the refusal happens here, before the POST, and the edits stay on screen.
2. ⚠️ IT NEVER OVERWRITES A BLOB THAT MOVED UNDERNEATH IT. The Supervisor's
Configuration tab CANNOT be removed (see DECISIONS/UX-02-two-config-
surfaces.md), so there are two editors of one blob, and `POST
/addons/self/options` REPLACES the stored user options - measured, not
assumed: `App.options`'s setter is `self.persist[ATTR_OPTIONS] = deepcopy(
value)`, and the effective options are `deepmerge(config defaults, persist)`.
A key omitted from the POST therefore falls back to config.yaml's DEFAULT
rather than to its previous value.
This is the same shape of hazard as two writers on one actuator, and it gets
the same discipline. `Controller.write_refusal()` (SAFETY-28) says: A NUMBER
REACHES THE WIRE ONLY IF THE SINGLE ALLOCATOR PLACED IT, ON THIS TICK, FOR
THIS UNIT. Here: A BLOB REACHES THE SUPERVISOR ONLY IF IT WAS DERIVED FROM
THE BLOB THAT IS STORED RIGHT NOW. The read hands out a `fingerprint()`, the
save hands it back, and the save re-reads and compares before writing. A
change made in the other tab in the meantime is a REFUSAL with the changed
keys named, not a silent clobber.
⚠️ THE COMPARISON IS RE-READ IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE WRITE, not taken from
the page load, so the window in which the other surface can slip in is one
HTTP round trip rather than however long the operator spent typing.
3. ⚠️ IT NEVER RESTARTS AS A SIDE EFFECT OF SAVING. Applying options costs a
restart, and `Controller.shutdown()` commands 0 W on every inverter on the
way out (main.py, "shutting down - commanding 0 W on every inverter"). That
is a real, if brief, loss of control of the battery, so it is its own
deliberate action with its own confirmation - `restart()` below requires an
explicit token in the request body, so no stray POST can spend it.
--- WHAT THIS MODULE MAY NOT GROW INTO --------------------------------------
⚠️ NOTHING HERE COMMANDS AN INVERTER, CLEARS A LATCH, OR REACHES A SAFETY
MECHANISM. The panel's configuration half talks to the Supervisor about a JSON
blob and to `validate.py` about whether that blob is startable; the only
actuator-shaped verb in the file is `restart()`, which restarts THIS ADD-ON and
whose 0 W is the existing, documented wind-down. Adding "and also set the
setpoint while we are here" would put a second writer on the actuator through
the config surface, which is the non-goal this add-on is built around.
"""
import asyncio
import hashlib
import json
import logging
import os
import aiohttp
from .configui import changed_keys
from .inverter import build_roster
from .validate import validate_startup_config, validate_unit_ranges
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.selfconfig")
SUPERVISOR_API = "http://supervisor"
SELF_INFO = f"{SUPERVISOR_API}/addons/self/info"
SELF_OPTIONS = f"{SUPERVISOR_API}/addons/self/options"
SELF_RESTART = f"{SUPERVISOR_API}/addons/self/restart"
# The word the page has to send with a restart request. It is not a password -
# ingress means Home Assistant has already authenticated the caller - it is an
# INTENT token, so that a reload, a retry or a stray fetch cannot spend a
# control interruption on the operator's behalf.
RESTART_CONFIRM = "restart"
# ⚠️ LONGER THAN hass.py's 10 s, AND FOR THE OPPOSITE REASON. `hass.py` would
# rather abandon a write and re-issue it on the next tick than hold the control
# loop. Nothing here is on the control loop - these calls are made by an
# operator standing at a screen - and a Supervisor busy with a backup can take
# a while to answer. Abandoning a `POST /addons/self/options` early would leave
# the panel unsure whether the blob was stored, which is the one state this
# module must never be in.
TIMEOUT_S = 30.0
class SupervisorUnavailable(Exception):
"""The Supervisor could not be reached, or answered with an error."""
class NotConfirmed(Exception):
"""A control interruption was asked for without the intent token.
Its own exception rather than a `SaveRefused`, because it is not a refusal
ABOUT a configuration - nothing was validated and nothing was compared. It
means the request did not say what it was asking for.
"""
class SaveRefused(Exception):
"""The save did not happen, and NOTHING WAS WRITTEN.
`kind` is `"invalid"` (the shipped validator refused the blob) or `"stale"`
(the stored blob changed underneath). `problems` carries the validator's
own sentences, byte for byte; `changed` names the keys that moved.
"""
def __init__(self, kind, problems=(), changed=(), stored=None):
self.kind = kind
self.problems = list(problems)
self.changed = list(changed)
self.stored = stored
super().__init__(f"save refused ({kind})")
def canonical(options) -> str:
"""The one textual form of an options blob, for identity only.
Sorted keys, no insignificant whitespace, `ensure_ascii=False` so an entity
id with a non-ASCII character is one character rather than an escape - the
string is hashed, never displayed, so the only property that matters is
that equal blobs produce equal text and different blobs do not.
"""
return json.dumps(options, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"),
ensure_ascii=False, default=str)
def fingerprint(options) -> str:
"""The compare-and-swap token for one options blob.
⚠️ A DIGEST, NOT A VERSION NUMBER, because there is no version to read. The
Supervisor exposes no revision or ETag for an add-on's options, so the only
thing the panel can hold onto between reading and writing is the CONTENT it
read. That is enough for what this is for: the question is not "how many
times has this changed" but "is what I am about to overwrite still what I
was shown". Identical content is by definition safe to overwrite.
"""
return hashlib.sha256(canonical(options).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
class SelfConfig:
"""The add-on's own options, read and written through the Supervisor."""
def __init__(self, session: aiohttp.ClientSession, token: str | None = None):
self.session = session
self.token = token or os.environ.get("SUPERVISOR_TOKEN", "")
@property
def _headers(self) -> dict:
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json"}
async def _call(self, method, url, payload=None):
try:
async with self.session.request(
method, url, headers=self._headers, json=payload,
timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=TIMEOUT_S),
) as resp:
text = await resp.text()
if resp.status >= 400:
# The Supervisor's own message is carried through unedited:
# `{"result": "error", "message": "..."}`. A rewritten
# error is a second opinion about somebody else's failure.
try:
detail = (json.loads(text) or {}).get("message") or text
except ValueError:
detail = text
raise SupervisorUnavailable(
f"{method} {url} -> HTTP {resp.status}: "
f"{str(detail)[:400]}")
try:
body = json.loads(text) if text else {}
except ValueError as err:
raise SupervisorUnavailable(
f"{method} {url} -> unreadable answer: {err}") from None
return body.get("data", body)
except (aiohttp.ClientError, asyncio.TimeoutError) as err:
raise SupervisorUnavailable(f"{method} {url} -> {err}") from None
async def info(self) -> dict:
"""`GET /addons/self/info`.
⚠️ THREE OF THIS PANEL'S FOUR INGREDIENTS COME OUT OF THIS ONE CALL, and
that is the reason the panel owns no copy of any of them. Measured on
2026.08.0 (`supervisor/api/apps.py:info_data`):
`options` - `App.options`, i.e. deepmerge(config.yaml defaults,
the stored user options). Every key is present, which
is what makes a whole-blob read-modify-write safe.
`schema` - `App.schema_ui`, i.e. `UiOptions(...)(config.yaml
["schema"])`. The field list, types, ranges and
enums, in config.yaml's own order.
`translations` - `App.translations`, i.e. Supervisor's own
`_read_app_translations()` over translations/*.yaml,
which is UX-01's work reaching a second surface for
free.
The fourth ingredient is `app/validate.py`, and it is not fetched.
"""
return await self._call("GET", SELF_INFO)
async def write_options(self, options: dict) -> None:
"""`POST /addons/self/options` - REPLACES the stored user options.
⚠️ CALL THIS ONLY THROUGH `save()`. On its own it is the unguarded
write: no validation, no compare-and-swap. It is a separate method so
that the gate above it can be read - and tested - as a gate.
"""
await self._call("POST", SELF_OPTIONS, {"options": options})
async def restart(self, confirm: str) -> None:
"""`POST /addons/self/restart`. Costs a control interruption.
The add-on's own wind-down runs first: `Controller.shutdown()` commands
0 W on every inverter before the process exits. So this is not an
abrupt loss of control, it is a deliberate one - but it IS one, and the
page says so before the operator presses it.
"""
if confirm != RESTART_CONFIRM:
raise NotConfirmed(
"a restart interrupts control and must be confirmed")
_LOG.warning("operator asked for a restart from the ingress panel - "
"the wind-down commands 0 W on every inverter first")
await self._call("POST", SELF_RESTART)
async def problems_for(opts: dict, hass=None) -> list:
"""Every reason the SHIPPED validator would refuse to start on `opts`.
⚠️ THIS IS THE STARTUP GATE'S OWN COMPOSITION, NOT A SUBSET OF IT. The
gate runs in TWO places in main.py and this is the union of both, which is
what an operator meets:
* `amain()` calls `validate_startup_config(opts, dev_min, dev_max)`
UNCONDITIONALLY, before anything starts - so this does too, with the
flat `setpoint_entity`'s device range when that entity was readable and
None when it was not;
* `run_control()` adds `validate_unit_ranges(roster, skip_entity=flat)`
once every unit's own ESPHome has answered - so this does too, with the
same `skip_entity`, so one inverter is not reported twice under two
wordings.
A panel that ran only half the gate would go green on a config that then
exits 78 - which is worse than no panel, because the operator would have
been told it was fine.
⚠️ AND THE DEVICE RANGES ARE READ, NOT INVENTED. `hass.limits()` is a READ
of a Home Assistant state; nothing here writes anything to any device. When
a device does not answer - ESPHome asleep, an entity that does not exist
yet, or `hass=None` in a check - the range is None and the range rules are
SKIPPED, exactly as they are at startup. That is the honest behaviour and it
is also the conservative one: the panel then shows fewer refusals than the
startup gate might, never more, so it cannot bless a config the gate refuses
on a rating it could not see. It is stated on the page rather than hidden.
`build_roster(opts, None)` builds the roster with NO Store, so this reads
no latch and writes no state; it exists to give `validate_unit_ranges()`
the same objects `main.py` gives it, rather than a second transcription of
what counts as a roster entry.
"""
problems, _unread = await problems_and_ranges(opts, hass)
return problems
async def problems_and_ranges(opts: dict, hass=None):
"""`problems_for()`, plus WHICH setpoint entities did not report a range.
⚠️ THE SECOND HALF EXISTS SO THE PAGE CANNOT LOOK GREEN FOR A REASON THE
OPERATOR CANNOT SEE. Two rules compare a configured ceiling against the
device's own rating, and when the device is silent they are skipped rather
than guessed at - so an unread range means the panel is showing FEWER
refusals than the startup gate might, and it has to say so, naming the
entity that did not answer rather than hinting at one.
It is a separate function from `problems_for()` because the answer is about
the CONFIGURATION UNDER TEST, not about the running roster: an operator who
has just typed a new `setpoint_entity` must be told about THAT entity, and
a route that asked the running controller instead would report on the old
one. That was the first shape of this and it disagreed with itself.
"""
flat = str(opts.get("setpoint_entity", "") or "").strip()
# ⚠️ THE ROSTER IS BUILT BEFORE THE VALIDATOR RUNS, AND IT PARSES NUMBERS.
# `build_roster` reaches `inverter.py`'s `float(opts.get("max_w", 2000))`,
# which raises on a value the validator has a SENTENCE for. Cleared the
# `max_w` box and the panel answered HTTP 500 - not JSON, so the page said
# "cannot reach the add-on", which was untrue - while `validate.py`'s
# "max_w ... is not a number" was unreachable through the panel and reachable
# at startup, where `main.py` validates before it composes. That made this
# surface WEAKER than the startup gate for one field, which is the opposite
# of what this module claims below.
#
# A malformed scalar therefore falls back to validating WITHOUT device
# bounds. Those bounds come from the roster, and there is no roster; the
# validator's own complaint about the unparseable value is the answer the
# operator needs, and it is strictly more informative than a 500.
try:
units = build_roster(opts, None)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as exc:
# ⚠️ AND IT MUST NOT RETURN AN EMPTY LIST. An empty list means "no
# problems", and the page enables Save on it. If the roster could not be
# composed at all and the validator has nothing to say about why, that
# disagreement is itself the finding - so it is reported rather than
# swallowed. Returning `[]` here would turn a crash into a silent
# acceptance, which is worse than the 500 this replaced.
found = list(validate_startup_config(opts))
if not found:
found = [f"the configuration could not be composed ({type(exc).__name__}: "
f"{exc}), and the validator did not name a reason. This is a "
f"disagreement between the two and should be reported."]
return found, []
if hass is not None:
async def _limits(unit):
if unit.setpoint_entity:
unit.dev_min, unit.dev_max, _ = await hass.limits(
unit.setpoint_entity)
await asyncio.gather(*(_limits(unit) for unit in units))
dev_min = dev_max = None
for unit in units:
if flat and unit.setpoint_entity.strip().lower() == flat.lower():
dev_min, dev_max = unit.dev_min, unit.dev_max
break
problems = list(validate_startup_config(opts, dev_min, dev_max))
problems += validate_unit_ranges(units, skip_entity=flat)
unread = [unit.setpoint_entity for unit in units
if unit.setpoint_entity and unit.dev_min is None
and unit.dev_max is None]
return problems, unread
async def save(selfcfg: SelfConfig, proposed: dict, expect: str, *,
hass=None) -> dict:
"""Validate, compare-and-swap, then write. Refuse rather than half-do.
Returns `{"fingerprint": <the new one>}` on success. Raises `SaveRefused`
with nothing written otherwise.
THE ORDER IS DELIBERATE AND BOTH HALVES ARE PRE-WRITE GATES:
1. VALIDATE FIRST. It is local, it costs nothing, and its refusal is
about what is on the operator's screen - so it is the answer they can
act on without knowing anything about the other surface.
2. RE-READ AND COMPARE SECOND, immediately before the POST, so the
window in which the Supervisor tab can slip a change past is one round
trip rather than the length of an editing session.
3. Only then write.
⚠️ `expect` IS REQUIRED AND THERE IS NO "FORCE" DOOR. A caller that has not
read the current blob has nothing to compare, and a save that skips the
comparison is the clobber this gate exists to prevent. If the operator
genuinely wants what the other surface wrote replaced, the page reloads,
shows them what changed, and they save again from THAT - which is a
decision made in front of the difference rather than through it.
"""
problems = await problems_for(proposed, hass)
if problems:
_LOG.warning("panel REFUSED to save: %d configuration problem(s); "
"nothing written. First: %s", len(problems), problems[0])
raise SaveRefused("invalid", problems=problems)
info = await selfcfg.info()
stored = info.get("options") or {}
actual = fingerprint(stored)
if actual != expect:
changed = changed_keys(stored, proposed)
_LOG.warning("panel REFUSED to save: the stored options changed "
"underneath this page (keys: %s); nothing written",
", ".join(changed) or "none this page also edited")
raise SaveRefused("stale", changed=changed, stored=stored)
await selfcfg.write_options(proposed)
_LOG.info("options saved from the ingress panel; a restart is needed "
"before they take effect")
return {"fingerprint": fingerprint(proposed)}
+2 -49
View File
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ def static_status(opts: dict, now: datetime):
async def resolve_tariff(opts: dict, since: datetime, until: datetime,
transport=None, now=None, *, history) -> TariffPlan:
transport=None, now=None) -> TariffPlan:
"""The full §9.2 + §11.4 resolution. MAY PERFORM I/O - see `static_plan`.
⚠️ NOT ON THE 30 s TICK, and that is a deliberate boundary rather than an
@@ -1033,42 +1033,9 @@ async def resolve_tariff(opts: dict, since: datetime, until: datetime,
price_provider off + profile -> the CONFIGURED product (§9.2 rows 3-4)
price_provider off + none -> no prices at all (§11.4, nothing to
fall back to)
provider series -> the feed, §8.3-FILLED (§9.2 rows 1-2)
provider series -> the feed (§9.2 rows 1-2)
provider no_data + profile -> §11.4 FALLBACK, provisional, no arbitrage
provider no_data + none -> no prices at all
⚠️ `history` IS REQUIRED, KEYWORD-ONLY, AND HAS NO DEFAULT (FCST-04). It is
the §8.3 carry-forward store - `price_history.PriceHistory`, or the explicit
`price_history.NoHistory()` for a caller that keeps none. A default of
`None` meaning "skip the fill" would give a caller who forgot the argument
the TRUNCATED HORIZON this ticket exists to remove, silently, while the code
read as though the fill were happening. There is nothing to forget now.
⚠️ AND THE FILL RUNS ONLY ON A `series` READ. A feed that published nothing
still falls to `_degrade()` and §11.4's own row - the static profile the
operator configured FOR that case - rather than to yesterday's feed. The two
are indistinguishable to the optimiser (both are 100 % provisional, so
`arbitrage()` finds fewer than two firm hours and refuses, and `cheap_now()`
is False), so preferring yesterday would change a documented degradation for
a difference only the status page can see. See price_history.py's closing
note and DECISIONS/FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried.md.
⚠️ THE FILL IS PER WHOLE HOUR AND ITS COVERAGE IS CONDITIONAL. Every point
the provider published inside the window passes through BY IDENTITY - four
of them in one hour on a quarter-hourly product like `eneco_eddy` - and a
carried point is added only for a whole hour the feed did not print at all
AND yesterday did. An hour neither source can price is left out, which is
§11.4 for that hour: `plan.price_at()` raises rather than answering, and an
hour with no price is not a free one.
⚠️ THE FILLED SERIES IS WINDOWED TO [since, until), AND THAT IS A CHANGE.
`load_prices()` returns whatever the feed sent, past hours included, and
`TariffPlan.arbitrage()` took its spread over all of it - so an hour that
had already gone could be the cheapest hour of a cycle nothing can now buy
in. `fill_from_yesterday()` walks the requested horizon and emits exactly
that, so the spread is over hours that are still ahead. Both directions of
the difference are real: the window gains the unpublished hours it was
missing and loses the elapsed ones it should never have had.
"""
stamp = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
pid = str(price_option(opts, "price_provider") or "off").strip()
@@ -1077,20 +1044,6 @@ async def resolve_tariff(opts: dict, since: datetime, until: datetime,
read = await load_prices(opts, since, until, transport)
return read.match(
series=lambda r: _provider_plan(opts, r, since, until, stamp, history),
no_data=lambda r: _degrade(opts, r, since, until, stamp))
def _provider_plan(opts, read, since, until, stamp, history) -> TariffPlan:
"""§8.3: record what the feed published, carry yesterday into the gaps.
The fill can itself return `no_data` - a feed whose points all fall outside
the horizon, with nothing in the history to fill it from - and that is the
§11.4 row arrived at one step later, so it degrades exactly as a failed
fetch does rather than being special-cased here.
"""
filled = history.carry(read, since=since, until=until, stamp=stamp)
return filled.match(
series=lambda r: TariffPlan(r, _quiet_profile(opts), "provider"),
no_data=lambda r: _degrade(opts, r, since, until, stamp))
+8 -40
View File
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ class MigrationReport:
return out
def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str, roster=None) -> MigrationReport:
def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str) -> MigrationReport:
"""Move the pre-DEV-02 flat per-inverter keys into `unit`'s namespace.
`unit` is the FIRST inverter in the roster, which on every install that can
@@ -261,24 +261,6 @@ def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str, roster=None) -> MigrationReport:
version that knew about more than one inverter is already at
SCHEMA_VERSION and is not touched.
⚠️ `roster` IS THE NAMES THE MACHINES READ, AND IT IS SAFETY-44. This
function shipped WITHOUT it, taking a hardcoded `inverter.UNIT_A` at its one
call site - which is, exactly, the MAINT-05 defect `_verify_moves()` spends
a paragraph describing, still live in the sibling that paragraph was written
beside. On a store that ran pre-DEV-02 flat and declares
`inverters: [garage, shed]`, the latch moved to `unit/inverter-a/
sign_tripped`, was read back under that same name, was SATISFIED, and
stamped the marker - so the next start skipped the migration too and NO
inverter came up latched on an install whose state file says `sign_tripped:
true`. A disarmed SAFETY-02 guard, every symptom of a clean migration.
`roster_names(opts)` answers this BEFORE any `Inverter` exists - it is
defined to, for `MqttPublisher`, which is constructed before the roster for
the same reason - so the "there is no roster yet" that kept this argument
out was never true. On the flat shape it returns `[UNIT_A]`, so the upgrade
every install runs today passes `unit == roster[0] == UNIT_A` and is
byte-identical.
THE THREE RULES, each one a case that would otherwise be a wrong answer:
1. IT NEVER OVERWRITES AN EXISTING NAMESPACED VALUE. A store that has both
@@ -320,7 +302,7 @@ def migrate_unit_keys(store, unit: str, roster=None) -> MigrationReport:
rep.ran = True
_move_flat_keys(store, unit, LEGACY_UNIT_KEYS, rep)
_verify_moves(store, rep, roster)
_verify_moves(store, rep)
if rep.ok:
store.set(SCHEMA_KEY, SCHEMA_VERSION)
@@ -401,26 +383,12 @@ def _verify_moves(store, rep: MigrationReport, roster=None) -> None:
itself. `test_maintenance.py` section 9c calls this twice with the SAME
wrong `unit` over one store, which is the shape nothing in the suite had.
`roster=None` still means "not graded", and SAFETY-44 is what it cost. This
paragraph used to end here, saying that the one caller passing it was
`migrate_unit_keys()`, "which runs BEFORE `build_roster()` ... so the keys
have to be in place before there is a roster to check against", and calling
that gap real. THE FIRST HALF IS TRUE AND THE CONCLUSION IS NOT. The keys do
have to be written before the `Inverter`s restore from them - but the NAMES
do not come from the `Inverter`s. `roster_names(opts)` reads them straight
off the options, before anything is constructed, which is the whole reason
it exists (`MqttPublisher` is built before the roster too). So the argument
that could have graded that write was available at the call site the entire
time, and the sibling function three screens down had already been fixed by
passing it.
⚠️ SO NO CALLER PASSES `None` TODAY, and this branch is kept for one reason:
it is what a NEW caller gets by DEFAULT. A future migration that forgets the
roster gets the ungraded read-back and stamps its marker over a namespace no
machine reads - silently, exactly as this one did. That is the shape of both
defects, and the gap is recorded as a running check rather than left to a
comment: test_maintenance.py section 13, and test_rehearse.py part 5, which
drives it end-to-end through the harness an operator actually runs.
`roster=None` means "not graded", and the one caller that passes it is
`migrate_unit_keys()`, which runs BEFORE `build_roster()` for the reason its
own docstring gives - the `Inverter` objects restore their latch in their
constructors, so the keys have to be in place before there is a roster to
check against. That gap is real and is recorded as a running check rather
than left to a comment: see test_maintenance.py section 13.
"""
for target, value in rep.moved.items():
got = getattr(store, "data", {}).get(target, "<<missing>>")
+3 -186
View File
@@ -8,33 +8,12 @@ perfectly on a developer's laptop.
Design bias: this page must be readable at the end of a long day, on a phone, in
a cellar, by someone who did not write it. Numbers alone are not enough - it
says what is wrong in words.
⚠️ SINCE UX-02 THERE ARE TWO PAGES HERE, AND ONLY ONE OF THEM IS THIS FILE'S.
`/` is the status and control surface and is unchanged. `/config` is the
configuration surface: its markup lives in app/config_page.py, its field model
in app/configui.py and its Supervisor conversation in app/selfconfig.py. What
stays HERE is the routing, so that the question a reviewer has to answer - does
anything the panel exposes reach the inverter? - is answered by reading one
short file.
⚠️ THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION, STATED SO IT CAN BE CHECKED: the configuration
routes below read `GET /addons/self/info`, run the SHIPPED validator, write
`POST /addons/self/options` and, on an explicitly confirmed request, `POST
/addons/self/restart`. NONE of them writes a setpoint, clears a latch, changes a
mode or reaches `controller.handle_action()`. The set of things an operator can
do to the inverter through this panel is exactly what `/action` offered before
this card - test_selfconfig.py part 7 asserts that by listing the routes and the
actions and comparing them with the shipped set.
"""
import logging
from aiohttp import web
from . import selfconfig
from .config_page import CONFIG_PAGE
from .configui import changed_keys, field_model, problems_by_field
_LOG = logging.getLogger("goodwe.web")
PAGE = """<!doctype html>
@@ -70,7 +49,6 @@ PAGE = """<!doctype html>
.muted{color:var(--muted);font-size:13px}
</style></head><body>
<h1>GoodWe RS485 Controller</h1>
<p class="muted"><a href="config">Configuration &rarr;</a></p>
<div id="banner" class="banner b-warn">loading…</div>
<div class="card">
@@ -117,33 +95,7 @@ refresh(); setInterval(refresh, 3000);
"""
# ⚠️ WHAT THE PANEL SAYS WHEN IT COULD NOT READ A DEVICE RANGE. Two of
# validate.py's rules compare a configured ceiling against the setpoint
# device's OWN reported range, and that range is only knowable by asking Home
# Assistant. When ESPHome is asleep or the entity does not exist yet the
# startup gate SKIPS those two rules rather than guessing - so the panel skips
# them too, and says so, because a green page that is green for a reason the
# operator cannot see is the exact failure this add-on keeps refusing to ship.
DEVICE_NOTE = (
"%s did not report a range, so the two checks that compare a configured "
"ceiling against what the device itself accepts were skipped - here and at "
"startup, identically. Everything else was checked. If the device answers "
"later and disagrees, the add-on refuses to start then, with the same "
"message you would have seen here.")
def build_app(controller, selfcfg=None) -> web.Application:
"""The ingress app. `selfcfg` is injectable so a check can drive it.
⚠️ IT IS BUILT FROM THE CONTROLLER'S OWN SESSION AND TOKEN, not from a
second `ClientSession`. `amain()` owns one session for the process and every
Home Assistant call already goes through it; a second one here would be a
second connection pool whose failures nothing reports.
"""
if selfcfg is None:
selfcfg = selfconfig.SelfConfig(controller.hass.session,
controller.hass.token)
def build_app(controller) -> web.Application:
async def index(_request):
return web.Response(text=PAGE, content_type="text/html")
@@ -161,152 +113,17 @@ def build_app(controller, selfcfg=None) -> web.Application:
raise web.HTTPBadRequest(text=f"unknown action {what!r}")
return web.json_response({"ok": True, "result": result})
# --- UX-02: the configuration surface ---------------------------------
async def config_index(_request):
return web.Response(text=CONFIG_PAGE, content_type="text/html")
async def _proposed(request):
try:
body = await request.json()
except ValueError:
raise web.HTTPBadRequest(text="expected JSON")
options = body.get("options")
if not isinstance(options, dict):
raise web.HTTPBadRequest(text="expected an options object")
return body, options
async def config_model(request):
"""Everything the page needs to draw itself, from ONE Supervisor call.
⚠️ `running_differs` IS NOT COSMETIC. `controller.o` is the blob this
PROCESS started with (`/data/options.json`); `info["options"]` is what
the Supervisor has STORED and would apply at the next start. They differ
exactly when somebody has saved and not restarted - here, or in the
Configuration tab. Printing the difference is the only way an operator
finds out that the page they are reading is not describing the running
system, and it is also how an edit made on the other surface becomes
visible on this one.
"""
try:
info = await selfcfg.info()
except selfconfig.SupervisorUnavailable as err:
_LOG.error("cannot read the add-on's own options: %s", err)
return web.json_response({"error": str(err)}, status=502)
options = info.get("options") or {}
lang = str(request.query.get("lang", "en") or "en")[:8]
model = field_model(info.get("schema") or [],
info.get("translations") or {}, lang)
model.update({
"options": options,
"fingerprint": selfconfig.fingerprint(options),
"running": controller.o,
"running_differs": changed_keys(controller.o, options),
"lang": lang,
})
return web.json_response(model)
async def config_validate(request):
"""The SHIPPED validator, run against a proposed blob. Writes nothing.
⚠️ IT READS HOME ASSISTANT AND WRITES NOTHING ANYWHERE. The two
device-range rules need `hass.limits()`, which is a GET of an entity's
state. The page debounces, so a burst of typing is one call after the
typing stops rather than one per keystroke.
⚠️ THE STRINGS ARE PASSED THROUGH UNTOUCHED. Not summarised, not
renumbered, not mapped to a severity. validate.py's sentences are the
product this card is delivering; anything this layer did to them would
be a second opinion about a rule it does not own.
"""
_body, options = await _proposed(request)
problems, unread = await selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(
options, controller.hass)
by_key, unanchored = problems_by_field(problems, _keys_of(options))
payload = {"problems": problems, "by_key": by_key,
"unanchored": unanchored}
if unread:
payload["device_note"] = DEVICE_NOTE % ", ".join(sorted(set(unread)))
return web.json_response(payload)
def _keys_of(options):
# ⚠️ THE ANCHOR LIST IS THE KEYS OF THE BLOB UNDER TEST, and that is
# sound only because the page posts the WHOLE blob it read - which is
# `App.options`, the merge of config.yaml's defaults with the stored
# ones, so every option key is in it. Nothing here types a key name;
# see configui.problems_by_field() for what is done with them.
return sorted(options)
async def config_save(request):
"""Validate, compare-and-swap, write. Or refuse and write NOTHING."""
body, options = await _proposed(request)
expect = str(body.get("fingerprint") or "")
try:
result = await selfconfig.save(selfcfg, options, expect,
hass=controller.hass)
except selfconfig.SaveRefused as refused:
if refused.kind == "stale":
stored = refused.stored or {}
return web.json_response(
{"kind": "stale", "changed": refused.changed,
"stored": stored,
# The page needs the CURRENT token to be able to save
# again after the operator has read the difference. That
# is not a force door: it takes a second, deliberate press
# made in front of what changed.
"fingerprint": selfconfig.fingerprint(stored)},
status=409)
by_key, unanchored = problems_by_field(refused.problems,
_keys_of(options))
return web.json_response(
{"kind": "invalid", "problems": refused.problems,
"by_key": by_key, "unanchored": unanchored}, status=422)
except selfconfig.SupervisorUnavailable as err:
_LOG.error("saving options failed: %s", err)
return web.json_response({"error": str(err)}, status=502)
controller.log_event("configuration saved from the panel - "
"not applied until the add-on restarts")
return web.json_response({"ok": True, **result})
async def config_restart(request):
"""Restart the add-on, at the operator's explicit request.
⚠️ THIS IS THE ONE ROUTE ON THIS SURFACE THAT COSTS ANYTHING. The
wind-down commands 0 W on every inverter (`Controller.shutdown()`), so
the request must carry the intent token; a reload, a retry or a stray
POST cannot spend a control interruption. It restarts THIS ADD-ON and
nothing else: no setpoint is written from here, and a latched failsafe
is restored from the Store on the way back up rather than cleared.
"""
try:
body = await request.json()
except ValueError:
raise web.HTTPBadRequest(text="expected JSON")
try:
await selfcfg.restart(str(body.get("confirm") or ""))
except selfconfig.NotConfirmed as err:
return web.json_response({"error": str(err)}, status=400)
except selfconfig.SupervisorUnavailable as err:
_LOG.error("restart request failed: %s", err)
return web.json_response({"error": str(err)}, status=502)
controller.log_event("restart requested from the configuration panel")
return web.json_response({"ok": True})
app = web.Application()
app.add_routes([
web.get("/", index),
web.get("/status", status),
web.post("/action", action),
web.get("/config", config_index),
web.get("/config/model", config_model),
web.post("/config/validate", config_validate),
web.post("/config/save", config_save),
web.post("/config/restart", config_restart),
])
return app
async def start(controller, port: int = 8099, selfcfg=None):
runner = web.AppRunner(build_app(controller, selfcfg))
async def start(controller, port: int = 8099):
runner = web.AppRunner(build_app(controller))
await runner.setup()
site = web.TCPSite(runner, "0.0.0.0", port)
await site.start()
+13 -29
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
name: GoodWe RS485 Controller
version: "0.9.0"
version: "0.8.0"
slug: goodwe_controller
description: >-
Drives a GoodWe ES/BP battery inverter over RS485 by emulating its smart
@@ -548,10 +548,8 @@ options:
# only ever ran at 500 could not tell this wiring from a hard-coded number.
#
# How long ONE inverter may stand at a discharge share it is not producing -
# short by more than `saturation_w`, OR short by more than a fixed FRACTION
# of its own share (SAFETY-43; the fraction is derived and is not an option,
# see app/delivery.py) - while at least one sibling is NOT in that state,
# before the add-on names it. It REPORTS: nothing is commanded
# short by more than `saturation_w` - while at least one sibling is NOT in
# that state, before the add-on names it. It REPORTS: nothing is commanded
# differently, the loop is untouched, and the site goes on running short by
# that unit's share until somebody looks. app/delivery.py carries why, with
# the rig measurements on both sides of the decision.
@@ -562,31 +560,17 @@ options:
# ⚠️ MEASURED ON THE TEST-19 TWO-MASTER RIG, NOT CHOSEN. 2640 closed-loop runs
# at a roster of two in which nothing was faulty, over 6 gains x 5 slews - the
# whole range this schema accepts - across load reversals, a flapping load and
# ASYMMETRIC SPLITS, plus a roster-of-ONE arm as the control. At the shipped
# threshold the worst CONTINUOUS legitimate episode is 35.0 s (the weighted
# family; 30.0 s on reversals, 0.0 s on flapping, and 0.0 s at every threshold
# in every one-inverter run). 185 s is 5.29x that.
# ASYMMETRIC SPLITS, plus 1890 runs at a roster of ONE as the control. At the
# shipped threshold the worst CONTINUOUS legitimate episode is 30.0 s (the
# weighted family; 20.0 s on reversals, 0.0 s on flapping, and 0.0 s at every
# threshold in all 1890 one-inverter runs). 185 s is 6.2x that.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE CAMPAIGN IS RE-RUNNABLE NOW, WHICH IT WAS NOT WHEN THIS NUMBER
# SHIPPED. TEST-21 (2026-09-07) committed the harness to the OTHER repository,
# `admin/goodwe:sim/delivery_window.py` - it imports plantsim and frame_check,
# which that repo owns. From clean checkouts of both, side by side:
#
# cd goodwe/sim && GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon \
# python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest --campaign --blag
#
# ⚠️ THE ORIGINAL RECORD SAID 30.0 s AND IT DID NOT REPRODUCE - the re-run
# says 35.0 s. 185 s still clears all four bounds and is unchanged; what
# changed is the claim. DECISIONS/SAFETY-42-unit-delivery.md §3.3 carries both
# tables and what did and did not reproduce.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE MARGIN IS A SENSITIVITY STUDY ON A HYPOTHESIS, NOT A MEASUREMENT,
# BECAUSE INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST (~2026-09-12). The rig's B is A
# COPIED. Sweeping a DIFFERENT second unit through that campaign: the worst
# legitimate episode barely moves with B's ramp (35.0 s at half A's ramp) and
# scales with its LAG - 45.0 s at twice A's measured 10 s lag, 75.0 s at four
# times it. 185 s is 2.47x even the four-times-slower case. NO NUMBER HERE IS
# A MEASUREMENT OF INVERTER B.
# ⚠️ AND THE MARGIN IS SIZED ON A MEASUREMENT, NOT ON A FEELING, BECAUSE
# INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST. The rig's B is A copied. Sweeping a
# DIFFERENT second unit through that campaign: the worst legitimate episode is
# insensitive to B's ramp (30.0 s at half A's ramp) and scales with its LAG -
# 45.0 s at twice A's measured 10 s lag, 90.0 s at four times it. 185 s is
# 2.06x even the four-times-slower case.
#
# DELIBERATELY NOT 180 - that is SAFETY-02's site hold and this is not it -
# and not 150 or 200. 37 control cycles.
-372
View File
@@ -1,372 +0,0 @@
"""UX-04 - the defaults pin UX-01 AC 4 promised and never built.
`python3 -B test_defaults_pin.py`
WHAT UX-01 AC 4 ASKED FOR, IN ITS OWN WORDS: "every `schema:` key absent from
`options:` has exactly one defaults-table entry ... the table changed goes red
... and NO MODULE CARRIES ITS OWN LITERAL FALLBACK FOR A SCHEMA DEFAULT - an AST
check, not a grep."
WHAT SHIPPED. Clause one is VACUOUS: `options:` and `schema:` declare the same
71 keys, so "every schema key absent from options" quantifies over the empty set
and is true of any tree, including one with no defaults at all. Clause two -
"the table changed goes red" - does work, six times over, once per mirror in its
own suite. Clause three, THE ONE WITH THE CONTENT, was never written. The only
literal scan in this repository before this file is
`test_validate.py`'s `re.findall(r'"(maintenance_[a-z_]+)"...')`, which is a
grep, is restricted to eight `maintenance_*` keys and three named files, and
predates UX-01.
⚠️ AND A CHECK THAT CANNOT GO RED IS NOT A CHECK, so this file does not repeat
clause one's mistake. Every part below states the size of the set it quantifies
over and grades that size against a floor derived from the tree, and part 5
plants a literal in a synthetic module and REQUIRES the scanner to catch it, so
the red direction is exercised on every run rather than attested in a commit
message. MUTATION.md habit 4.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
WHAT AN "IN-CODE LITERAL FALLBACK" IS, STRUCTURALLY, so a reader can argue with
the definition rather than guess it. It is a call in `app/` that takes a STRING
LITERAL naming a `schema:` key and, in the next positional slot, a CONSTANT:
opts.get("max_w", 2000) _number(opts, "max_w", 2000.0)
Two shapes, one rule, found by walking `ast.Call` nodes - not by matching text,
so `opts.get(\n "max_w",\n 2000,\n)` and a renamed `opts` are found too and
a `max_w` inside a comment or a docstring is not.
TWO EXCLUSIONS, both structural and both narrow:
* `getattr(obj, "max_w", 0.0)` reads an ATTRIBUTE off an object, not an option
off the operator's blob. Its third argument is an absent-attribute guard and
has no relationship to config.yaml. Excluded by function name.
* THE EMPTY STRING. `opts.get("static_profile", "")` is Python's "this key is
not stated", and every one of the six sites in `validate.py` immediately
normalises it - `str(opts.get(k, "") or "").strip()`. It cannot be a stale
copy of a NUMBER, which is the whole of the CFG-04 defect class, and
rewriting those six to index a mirror would replace a sentence that reads
"absent" with one that reads "the shipped default" at sites where absent is
what is meant. Excluded by value. `0` is NOT excluded: `slew_w: 0` and
`integrator_max_w: 0` are real shipped defaults with real meanings.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
WHAT THIS FILE DOES *NOT* DO, said before the parts rather than after them.
It does not remove the 27 (module, key) pairs in part 4's ledger. That is
CFG-03's open ticket - option defaults living in four places - and it is a body
of behaviour change across `main.py`, `p1.py`, `inverter.py` and `validate.py`
that no single card should make in passing. What this file does instead is
FREEZE the ledger: the set is graded EXACTLY, so the twenty-eighth pair is red
on the commit that introduces it and the ledger can only ever shrink. A backlog
that cannot grow is a backlog being paid down; one that is merely written in a
comment is the state UX-01 left.
MUTATION.md is the method for the red-direction evidence in part 5, and
`tools/mutation_run.sh` is the harness.
"""
import ast
import io
import re
import sys
from pathlib import Path
HERE = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
APP = HERE / "app"
FAILED = 0
def check(what, ok):
global FAILED
print((" ok " if ok else " FAIL ") + what)
if not ok:
FAILED += 1
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# config.yaml, parsed by hand.
#
# ⚠️ NO PyYAML, AND NOT AS A PREFERENCE. The add-on image installs py3-aiohttp
# and py3-paho-mqtt only; `import yaml` raises in the checks container and a
# check that skips on ImportError is not a check. `test_maintenance.py` and
# `test_price.py` each carry their own two-line reader for the same reason, and
# this is the third - which is itself an instance of the defect this file
# grades, one level up. It is written down rather than tidied away because
# tidying it into a shared helper is a change to two suites that are green.
CFG_TEXT = io.open(HERE / "config.yaml", encoding="utf-8").read()
_SCHEMA_AT = CFG_TEXT.index("\nschema:")
_OPTS_BLOCK, _SCHEMA_BLOCK = CFG_TEXT[:_SCHEMA_AT], CFG_TEXT[_SCHEMA_AT:]
def _scalar(raw):
"""One `options:` value, as the yaml module this image lacks would read it."""
raw = raw.split("#", 1)[0].strip().strip('"').strip("'")
if raw in ("true", "false"):
return raw == "true"
if raw == "[]":
return []
for cast in (int, float):
try:
return cast(raw)
except ValueError:
pass
return raw
def _block_keys(block):
return [m.group(1) for m in re.finditer(r"^ ([a-z0-9_]+):", block, re.M)]
SHIPPED = {m.group(1): _scalar(m.group(2))
for m in re.finditer(r"^ ([a-z0-9_]+): *(.*)$", _OPTS_BLOCK, re.M)}
SCHEMA = set(_block_keys(_SCHEMA_BLOCK))
print("UX-04 - the defaults pin\n")
print("1. the surface this file quantifies over")
print(f" config.yaml: {len(SHIPPED)} keys under `options:`, {len(SCHEMA)} "
f"under `schema:`")
# The floor, for part 1's own reason: a reader that returned {} would make every
# check below vacuously true. 60 is the count of REQUIRED schema keys and is the
# number `tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py` section F now grades; any floor well
# inside the real size does the job, and this one cannot be reached by accident.
check(f"the hand reader found a real options block ({len(SHIPPED)} keys, floor 60)",
len(SHIPPED) >= 60)
check(f"...and a real schema block ({len(SCHEMA)} keys, floor 60)",
len(SCHEMA) >= 60)
check("every shipped default names a schema key, so a mirror pinned to one is "
"pinned to the other",
sorted(set(SHIPPED) - SCHEMA) == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("2. the mirrors, DISCOVERED from the tree rather than listed here")
# ⚠️ WHY DISCOVERED. Six suites already pin their own mirror to config.yaml -
# test_maintenance, test_price, test_watchdog (twice), test_peakguard,
# test_delivery. Every one of those pins names its table by hand, so a SEVENTH
# table added tomorrow is pinned by nobody and nothing says so. This walks
# `app/` for module-level assignments whose name ends in OPTION_DEFAULTS and
# grades whatever it finds, so the seventh is covered on the commit that
# introduces it. That is the property the six hand-written pins cannot have.
MODULES = sorted(p.name for p in APP.glob("*.py"))
TREES = {name: ast.parse(io.open(APP / name, encoding="utf-8").read(), name)
for name in MODULES}
MIRROR = {} # schema key -> (module, table name, value)
TABLES = []
for name in MODULES:
for node in TREES[name].body:
if not (isinstance(node, ast.Assign) and len(node.targets) == 1
and isinstance(node.targets[0], ast.Name)
and node.targets[0].id.endswith("OPTION_DEFAULTS")):
continue
table = node.targets[0].id
TABLES.append((name, table))
for k, v in zip(node.value.keys, node.value.values):
# A literal key with a literal value is the only shape a mirror
# has; anything else is not a table this file can grade, and
# saying so out loud beats skipping it silently.
MIRROR[k.value] = (name, table, ast.literal_eval(v))
print(f" {len(TABLES)} table(s): " + ", ".join(f"{m}:{t}" for m, t in TABLES))
print(f" {len(MIRROR)} mirrored key(s) of {len(SCHEMA)} in `schema:`")
check(f"the walk found the mirrors that exist ({len(TABLES)} tables, floor 6)",
len(TABLES) >= 6)
_unschemad = sorted(k for k in MIRROR if k not in SCHEMA)
check(f"every mirrored key is a real schema key {_unschemad or ''}",
_unschemad == [])
_unshipped = sorted(k for k in MIRROR if k not in SHIPPED)
check(f"...and is shipped in the options block {_unshipped or ''}",
_unshipped == [])
_drift = sorted(k for k, (m, t, v) in MIRROR.items()
if k in SHIPPED and v != SHIPPED[k])
check(f"...and reproduces config.yaml exactly, so ANY mirror - including one no "
f"suite names by hand - goes red on drift {_drift or ''}",
_drift == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("3. the AST scan: no module carries its own literal fallback for a "
"MIRRORED schema default")
def literal_fallbacks(tree, name):
"""Every `f(..., "<schema key>", <constant>, ...)` in one module.
Yields (module, lineno, callee, key, value). See the header for the two
exclusions and the argument for each.
"""
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
fn = node.func
callee = fn.attr if isinstance(fn, ast.Attribute) else getattr(fn, "id", "")
if callee == "getattr":
continue
for i, arg in enumerate(node.args[:-1]):
if not (isinstance(arg, ast.Constant) and isinstance(arg.value, str)
and arg.value in SCHEMA):
continue
default = node.args[i + 1]
if not isinstance(default, ast.Constant):
continue
if default.value is None or default.value == "":
continue
yield (name, node.lineno, callee, arg.value, default.value)
ALL_SITES = [s for name in MODULES for s in literal_fallbacks(TREES[name], name)]
MIRRORED_SITES = [s for s in ALL_SITES if s[3] in MIRROR]
UNMIRRORED_SITES = [s for s in ALL_SITES if s[3] not in MIRROR]
print(f" scanned {len(MODULES)} modules, {len(ALL_SITES)} literal fallback "
f"site(s): {len(MIRRORED_SITES)} over mirrored keys, "
f"{len(UNMIRRORED_SITES)} over unmirrored ones")
# ⚠️ THE SCANNER'S OWN FLOOR, and it is the line that stops this whole file
# rotting into clause one. A scanner that silently stopped matching - a renamed
# helper, an ast API change, a `SCHEMA` that came back empty - would report ZERO
# sites and every check below would pass. So the total is graded against a floor
# the tree already exceeds by a wide margin, and part 5 additionally feeds the
# scanner a source it MUST flag.
check(f"the scanner is not blind: it found {len(ALL_SITES)} sites (floor 20)",
len(ALL_SITES) >= 20)
for site in sorted(MIRRORED_SITES):
print(f" {site[0]}:{site[1]} {site[2]}({site[3]!r}, {site[4]!r})")
check(f"no literal fallback survives for any of the {len(MIRROR)} keys a mirror "
f"already answers for - those sites must index the mirror",
MIRRORED_SITES == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("4. the CFG-03 ledger: the unmirrored keys that still carry a literal, "
"frozen at exactly today's set")
# ⚠️ WHY A FROZEN SET AND NOT A COUNT. A count goes green again the moment
# somebody deletes one site and adds another, which is the same-size drift this
# repository keeps finding. The pair (module, key) is stable under every edit
# that is not the one being guarded against: reformatting, moving the call
# within the file, renaming the local `opts`. It changes only when a module
# starts or stops carrying a literal for a key - which is exactly the event.
#
# LINE NUMBERS ARE DELIBERATELY NOT IN THE KEY. A ledger that goes red when an
# unrelated edit shifts a line is a ledger people learn to re-bless without
# reading, and a ledger re-blessed without reading grades nothing.
LEDGER = {
("inverter.py", "max_w"),
("main.py", "auto_start"),
("main.py", "cycle_floor_s"),
("main.py", "deadband_w"),
("main.py", "estop_fitted"),
("main.py", "gain"),
("main.py", "heartbeat_s"),
("main.py", "log_level"),
("main.py", "meter_freeze_s"),
("main.py", "meter_max_age_s"),
("main.py", "meter_phases"),
("main.py", "peak_cap_w"),
("main.py", "saturation_cycles"),
("main.py", "saturation_w"),
("main.py", "sign_disagree_s"),
("main.py", "sign_disagree_w"),
("main.py", "slew_w"),
("main.py", "stale_input_s"),
("main.py", "step_w"),
("main.py", "target_grid_w"),
("p1.py", "meter_poll_s"),
("p1.py", "meter_source"),
("validate.py", "max_w"),
("validate.py", "meter_max_age_s"),
("validate.py", "meter_phases"),
("validate.py", "sign_disagree_w"),
("validate.py", "slew_w"),
}
_found = {(s[0], s[3]) for s in UNMIRRORED_SITES}
_new = sorted(_found - LEDGER)
_gone = sorted(LEDGER - _found)
print(f" {len(_found)} (module, key) pair(s) carry a literal for a key no "
f"mirror answers for")
check(f"no NEW module/key pair has started carrying a literal fallback {_new or ''}",
_new == [])
check(f"...and none has been paid off without the ledger being shortened - "
f"shrink LEDGER when it has {_gone or ''}",
_gone == [])
# --- and every one of them is graded AGAINST config.yaml, which is the half
# that catches CFG-04's actual failure: two copies of one number, one moves.
DIVERGENT = {
# main.py:290 `target_grid_w=float(opts.get("target_grid_w", 0))`.
# config.yaml ships -10 W. MEASURED here for the first time, 2026-09-07,
# and it is a real divergence, not a sentinel: a dict handed to
# `Controller` WITHOUT the key holds net exchange at 0 W instead of the
# shipped -10 W bias into import. On a Supervisor install the key is always
# present - the deep-merge of `options:` guarantees it - so this cannot
# reach an operator; the paths that CAN hand over a partial dict are
# `sim/inject.py` and this repository's own fixtures. It is recorded rather
# than corrected because changing it is a behaviour change to the control
# loop's target, which belongs to a card that grades the loop.
("main.py", "target_grid_w"): (0, -10),
}
_diverge = {}
for mod, line, callee, key, value in UNMIRRORED_SITES:
want = SHIPPED.get(key)
same = (isinstance(value, bool) == isinstance(want, bool)) and value == want
if not same:
_diverge[(mod, key)] = (value, want)
for pair, (got, want) in sorted(_diverge.items()):
print(f" {pair[0]} {pair[1]}: code {got!r} vs config.yaml {want!r}")
check(f"every remaining literal still AGREES with config.yaml, except the "
f"{len(DIVERGENT)} divergence(s) recorded above it",
_diverge == DIVERGENT)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("5. the red direction, RUN on every invocation")
# ⚠️ A CHECK THAT HAS NEVER BEEN SHOWN FAILING IS NOT A CHECK. Parts 3 and 4
# both pass on a clean tree, which is exactly what UX-01 AC 4's clause one did
# while grading nothing. So the scanner is fed a source that is a deliberate
# violation of each rule and is REQUIRED to flag it - in-process, against the
# same `literal_fallbacks()` the parts above call, so a scanner that stops
# working stops working here too.
_PLANTED = '''
def build(opts):
a = opts.get("maintenance_charge_w", 2000) # mirrored key -> part 3
b = _number(opts, "cycle_floor_s", 15) # unmirrored, main.py's key
c = opts.get("static_profile", "") # the "" sentinel: NOT a hit
d = getattr(unit, "max_w", 0.0) # attribute guard: NOT a hit
e = opts.get("peak_soc_floor", 20) # mirrored key -> part 3
return a, b, c, d, e
'''
_hits = list(literal_fallbacks(ast.parse(_PLANTED, "<planted>"), "<planted>"))
_keys = sorted(h[3] for h in _hits)
for h in _hits:
print(f" caught {h[2]}({h[3]!r}, {h[4]!r}) at line {h[1]}")
check("a planted literal for a MIRRORED key is caught - this is part 3's red "
"direction, exercised",
"maintenance_charge_w" in _keys and "peak_soc_floor" in _keys)
check("a planted literal for an unmirrored key is caught too - part 4's",
"cycle_floor_s" in _keys)
check('...and the two documented exclusions still hold: the "" sentinel and '
"getattr are not reported",
"static_profile" not in _keys and _keys.count("max_w") == 0)
check(f"exactly the three intended sites, no more {_keys}",
_keys == ["cycle_floor_s", "maintenance_charge_w", "peak_soc_floor"])
# ...and the mirror comparison's red direction, likewise executed rather than
# claimed: part 2 goes red when a table and config.yaml disagree by one.
_drifted = dict(MIRROR)
_pick = sorted(MIRROR)[0]
_mod, _tab, _val = _drifted[_pick]
_drifted[_pick] = (_mod, _tab, "###drifted###")
check(f"part 2's comparison rejects a mirror that has drifted (simulated on "
f"{_pick!r})",
any(v != SHIPPED.get(k) for k, (_, _, v) in _drifted.items()))
print()
if FAILED:
print(f"{FAILED} FAILED")
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+6 -109
View File
@@ -33,9 +33,8 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from app.control import Tuning
from app.delivery import (
DELIVERY_OPTION_DEFAULTS, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION, REASON_CODE,
DeliveryConfig, DeliveryWatchdog, UnitDelivery, account, delinquent,
short_by,
DELIVERY_OPTION_DEFAULTS, REASON_CODE, DeliveryConfig, DeliveryWatchdog,
UnitDelivery, account, delinquent, short_by,
)
from app.inverter import LINK_STALE_S
from app.main import Controller
@@ -152,77 +151,6 @@ check("a unit given no share is not asked and cannot be named, and it is not "
"a peer either - with only one unit asked there is nothing to compare",
delinquent([U("a", 0, 0), U("b", 2000, 0)], 500) == {})
print()
print(" SAFETY-43: THE RELATIVE ARM - short OF ITS OWN ASK, not just short")
# ⚠️ `share_frac=None` IS SAFETY-42's RULE EXACTLY, and every check in this part
# above this line is run under BOTH rules below to show the card took nothing
# away. What it ADDS is one thing: a unit can now be named for delivering almost
# none of a SMALL share. OPT-09's weights make small shares ordinary - a
# low-headroom unit is weighted down to 125 W of a 1630 W site target - so
# before this card a wedged unit could be 100 % delinquent and 125 W short, and
# 125 W is under a 500 W threshold. test_packshare.py part 8b measures that end
# to end on the real loop; what is graded here is the predicate.
_ABS = None # SAFETY-42's rule
_tiny = [U("a", 1505, 1505), U("b", 125, 0)]
check("A UNIT DELIVERING 0 OF 125 W IS NAMED, AND UNDER THE OLD RULE IT WAS "
"NOT. Same three units, same `min_w`, one input changed: the absolute arm "
"alone answers {} because 125 W < 500 W, and the shipped rule names it "
"because 100 % of its ask is not arriving",
delinquent(_tiny, 500, _ABS) == {}
and list(delinquent(_tiny, 500)) == ["b"])
# ⚠️ `.get`, NOT `["b"]`, AND THAT IS NOT STYLE. A bare subscript here raises
# KeyError on any tree where the relative arm is broken or absent, which ABORTS
# THE FILE at part 1 and leaves parts 2-8 UNGRADED. The direction is safe - an
# abort is a red, and MUTATION.md's defect can only fabricate a green - but the
# recorded coverage of a mutation run then reads larger than it was, which is
# the shape M11's entry in test_packshare.py part 11 already discloses. Found
# in review of this card, on M12 and M13.
_tiny_said = delinquent(_tiny, 500).get("b", "(not named - see the check above)")
print(f" {_tiny_said}")
check("...and the sentence carries the PROPORTION as well as the watts, because "
"'125 W is not arriving' reads like a rounding error and '125 W (100 % of "
"it)' is the fault",
"125 W of its share (100 % of it) is not arriving" in _tiny_said)
check("THE ACCOUNT GATE IS UNTOUCHED BY IT - the same 0 of 125 W with the "
"shortfall EXPLAINED names nobody. A relative criterion that could talk "
"its way past `account()` would report every pack sitting at its own "
"cut-out on a small share, which is the crying-wolf failure this module "
"exists to avoid",
delinquent([U("a", 1505, 1505), U("b", 125, 0, "its pack is empty")],
500) == {})
check("...and so is the PROPER-SUBSET rule: both units delivering none of a "
"small share is a SITE condition and is still nobody's fault to name",
delinquent([U("a", 125, 0), U("b", 125, 0)], 500) == {})
check("...and the relative bound is STRICT, like the absolute one. A gap of "
"EXACTLY the fraction of the share is not over it; one watt more is",
delinquent([U("a", 2000, 2000),
U("b", 1000, 1000 * (1.0 - DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION))],
5000) == {}
and list(delinquent([U("a", 2000, 2000),
U("b", 1000,
1000 * (1.0 - DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION) - 1)],
5000)) == ["b"])
_both_rules = [(delinquent(u, w, _ABS), delinquent(u, w)) for u, w in (
([U("a", 2000, 2000), U("b", 2000, 0)], 500),
([U("a", 2000, 2000), U("b", 2000, 0, "its pack is empty")], 500),
([U("a", 2000, 0), U("b", 2000, 0)], 500),
([U("a", 2000, 2000), U("b", 2000, 0), U("c", 2000, 0)], 500),
([U("a", 2000, 0, "at its floor"), U("b", 2000, 0)], 500),
([U("a", 2000, 2000), U("b", 2000, 1500)], 500),
([U("a", 0, 0), U("b", 2000, 0)], 500),
)]
check(f"⚠️ AND IT TOOK NOTHING AWAY: all {len(_both_rules)} fixtures above this "
f"block answer IDENTICALLY under SAFETY-42's rule and the shipped one. "
f"The relative arm is an `or`, so it can only ever ADD a naming - and on "
f"every case this part already graded it adds none. That is the "
f"difference between adding a second way to be named and lowering "
f"`min_w`, which would have moved all seven",
all(a == b for a, b in _both_rules))
print()
print(" AC 5: AT ONE INVERTER IT IS INERT, AND BY ALGEBRA RATHER THAN BY A")
print(" ROSTER GUARD - `len(asked) < 2` is unreachable-by-construction there")
@@ -395,14 +323,9 @@ class _DeliveryHass:
same in both.
"""
def __init__(self, load_w=_LOAD_W, b_soc=50.0, b_frac=0.0):
def __init__(self, load_w=_LOAD_W, b_soc=50.0):
self.load_w = float(load_w)
self.b_soc = float(b_soc)
# SAFETY-43. What fraction of its command B actually delivers. 0.0 is a
# WEDGED unit and is every arm in this file but part 4b(a) - see there
# for why that one arm needs a unit that is short WITHOUT being 100 %
# short.
self.b_frac = float(b_frac)
self.writes = []
self.calls = []
self.ctrl = None
@@ -420,11 +343,8 @@ class _DeliveryHass:
# A obeys. B produces NOTHING, whatever it is told - and whether that is
# a wedged power stage or an empty pack is not a question its power
# register can answer.
b = self.ctrl.inverters[1]
b_cmd = float((b.last_write if b.last_write is not None else b.target)
or 0.0)
return [float((a.last_write if a.last_write is not None else a.target)
or 0.0), self.b_frac * b_cmd]
or 0.0), 0.0]
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
m = self.measured()
@@ -710,27 +630,15 @@ print(" schema. Same load, same wedged unit, two configured thresholds.")
# load is what puts B's shortfall BETWEEN the two: above the shipped threshold,
# below the raised one. The gap itself is printed by the run that produces it
# and is never written down here; what is asserted is the ORDERING.
#
# ⚠️ AND B IS DERATED HERE RATHER THAN WEDGED, WHICH SAFETY-43 MADE NECESSARY.
# `delinquent()` now names a unit whose gap exceeds `min_w` OR a fraction of its
# own share, so a unit delivering NONE of its ask is named at every `min_w`
# there is - which is the whole point of that card, and which would make the
# raised arm below fire for a reason that has nothing to do with the watts. A
# unit delivering HALF of what it is asked for is short in absolute watts and
# comfortably inside the fraction, so it is the fixture that still isolates
# `saturation_w`. `_SAT_B_FRAC` is asserted below to be inside the relative
# arm's silence, so a future change to the fraction turns this red rather than
# quietly turning the pin vacuous.
_SAT_RAISED = 1800
_SAT_LOAD_W = 1600.0
_SAT_B_FRAC = 0.5
_SAT_SHIPPED = int(read_option("saturation_w"))
_sat_lo, _sat_hi = (int(x) for x in re.match(
r"int\((\d+),(\d+)\)", read_option("saturation_w", "schema")).groups())
async def _at_saturation_w(sat, b_frac=_SAT_B_FRAC):
hass = _DeliveryHass(load_w=_SAT_LOAD_W, b_frac=b_frac)
async def _at_saturation_w(sat):
hass = _DeliveryHass(load_w=_SAT_LOAD_W)
c = _ctrl(hass, saturation_w=sat)
return c, await _drive(c, watch=_sample)
@@ -766,17 +674,6 @@ check("the raised arm REACHED the comparison: B was asked for a discharge "
and not _b_up.sign_wd.tripped
and account(live=True, parked=False, soc=_b_up.soc,
bms_floor=_b_up.bms_soc_floor) is None)
check("...and SAFETY-43's RELATIVE arm is silent on both arms of this fixture, "
"which is what leaves the watts as the only moving part. B delivers half "
"of what it is asked for, so its gap is half its share and that is "
"inside `DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION`. ⚠️ A FIXTURE WHERE THE RELATIVE ARM "
"FIRED WOULD NAME B AT EVERY `saturation_w` AND THIS PIN WOULD BE "
"VACUOUS, so it is asserted rather than assumed",
_gap_up / float(_b_up.standing_w()) <= DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION
and _gap_ship / float(_b_ship.standing_w()) <= DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION
and delinquent([U("a", 1000, 1000),
U("b", float(_b_up.standing_w()), _b_up.batt)],
_SAT_RAISED) == {})
check("...and its shortfall lands STRICTLY BETWEEN the two configured "
"thresholds, which is the one place the two answers can differ. Part 4's "
"fixtures are all above both, which is exactly why they cannot see this",
+50 -196
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ Read MUTATION.md before you report a survivor.
import asyncio
import dataclasses
import logging
import re
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
@@ -35,8 +34,7 @@ from app.inverter import UNIT_A
from app.main import Controller
from app.store import (
DEFAULTS, MAINT_SCHEMA_KEY, MAINT_SCHEMA_VERSION, MAINT_UNIT_KEYS,
SCHEMA_KEY, SCHEMA_VERSION, migrate_maint_keys, migrate_unit_keys,
unit_key,
migrate_maint_keys, unit_key,
)
fails = []
@@ -1413,39 +1411,45 @@ check("...while the SAME site with the house importing more than the drain "
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("13. FIXED (SAFETY-44): SAFETY-02's migration takes the roster too, and "
"the guard is no longer defeated by the key the defect wrote")
print("13. RECORDED, NOT FIXED: SAFETY-02's migration has the same "
"wrong-namespace hole, and it is a LATCH")
# ⚠️ THIS SECTION USED TO BE THE SPECIFICATION OF A DEFECT. It was written while
# fixing MAINT-05's own instance, as a RUNNING check rather than a comment, with
# the instruction that "the card that fixes it should expect them to go red and
# should replace them". SAFETY-44 is that card and this is that replacement.
# ⚠️ FOUND WHILE FIXING THIS CARD'S OWN INSTANCE, AND WRITTEN DOWN AS A RUNNING
# CHECK RATHER THAN A COMMENT SO IT CANNOT BE FORGOTTEN OR QUIETLY "FIXED" BY AN
# UNRELATED EDIT. It is the SAME defect one module over, and it costs more.
#
# WHAT IT WAS. `Controller.__init__` called `migrate_unit_keys(store, UNIT_A)` -
# a hardcoded constant, where the maintenance migration already passed the
# roster's own first name. On a DECLARED roster the pre-DEV-02 flat
# `sign_tripped: true` landed under `unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped`, which no
# unit on the site reads, and `_verify_moves()` read it back under the name it
# had been handed and was satisfied.
# WHAT IT IS. `Controller.__init__` calls `migrate_unit_keys(store, UNIT_A)` -
# a hardcoded constant, where the maintenance migration now passes the roster's
# own first name. It has to run BEFORE `build_roster()`, because each
# `Inverter` restores its sign latch in its constructor, so there is no roster
# to name yet and `_verify_moves()` is passed `roster=None`. On a DECLARED
# roster the pre-DEV-02 flat `sign_tripped: true` therefore lands under
# `unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped`, which no unit on this site reads.
#
# AND THE GUARD DID NOT CATCH IT, WHICH WAS THE PART WORTH PINNING.
# `_grade_store_migration()` re-arms when the flat key says tripped and NOTHING
# NAMESPACED IS LATCHED - and the misdirected write IS namespaced and IS
# latched. The guard was defeated by the very key the defect wrote.
# WHY THE EXISTING GUARD DOES NOT CATCH IT, WHICH IS THE PART WORTH PINNING.
# `_grade_store_migration()` re-arms the latch when the flat key says tripped
# and NOTHING NAMESPACED IS LATCHED. The misdirected write IS namespaced and IS
# latched, so `namespaced_latched` is True, the guard returns, and no inverter
# on the roster comes up tripped. The guard is defeated by the very key the
# defect wrote.
#
# ⚠️ THE REASON IT WAS LEFT - "there is no roster to name yet, because each
# `Inverter` restores its latch in its constructor" - WAS THE HALF-TRUTH THAT
# KEPT IT ALIVE. The keys must be written before the `Inverter`s read them; the
# NAMES do not come from the `Inverter`s. `roster_names(opts)` reads them off
# the options before anything is constructed, which is what it already existed
# to do for `MqttPublisher`. The factoring this section said the fix would need
# had been done a card earlier.
# WHY IT IS NOT FIXED HERE. The remedy is to name the migration's target from
# the config before any `Inverter` exists, which means factoring
# `build_roster()`'s naming rule out of `build_roster()` so there is still only
# ONE spelling of it - inverter.py and SAFETY-02's latch semantics, with its own
# mutation battery over test_inverter.py and test_watchdog.py. MAINT-05 moves
# the maintenance history and nothing about the sign latch.
#
# ⚠️ AND IT IS A DISARMED SAFETY GUARD, NOT LOST HISTORY. Read the checks below
# as the SPECIFICATION OF A DEFECT: every one of them is asserting the WRONG
# behaviour, on purpose, and the card that fixes it should expect them to go
# red and should replace them.
#
# ⚠️ NO `schema_version` IN THIS STORE, AND THAT IS THE PRE-DEV-02 SHAPE
# ITSELF: an install that has never run a version with namespaced keys, which is
# what makes `migrate_unit_keys()` run at all.
_lat_store = MemStore({"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured"})
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: measured pre-DEV-02"})
_lat, _ = controller(NAMED_OPTS, store=_lat_store)
print(f" pre-DEV-02 flat latch + declared roster {_C2_NAMES} -> "
f"{_lat.store_migration.explain()}")
@@ -1453,179 +1457,29 @@ print(f" latch keys in the store: "
f"{sorted(k for k in _lat_store.data if k.endswith('sign_tripped'))}")
print(f" roster came up tripped: "
f"{[(i.name, i.sign_wd.tripped) for i in _lat.inverters]}")
check("⭐ the flat pre-DEV-02 latch is migrated into the ROSTER'S OWN first "
"namespace and NOT into `unit/inverter-a/` - the same wrong-namespace "
"write `migrate_maint_keys()` refuses, now refused in the migration that "
"runs before the `Inverter` objects exist",
_lat_store.data.get(unit_key(_C2_NAMES[0], "sign_tripped")) is True
and unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped") not in _lat_store.data)
check("⭐ AND AN INVERTER ON THE ROSTER COMES UP LATCHED, which is the whole "
"card: a store whose file reads `sign_tripped: true` no longer produces "
"a site that drives",
_lat.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped
check("the flat pre-DEV-02 latch is migrated into `unit/inverter-a/` - a name "
"that is NOT on this roster, so no unit reads it. This is the same "
"wrong-namespace write `migrate_maint_keys()` now refuses, in the "
"migration that runs before there is a roster to grade against",
_lat_store.data.get(unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped")) is True
and unit_key(_C2_NAMES[0], "sign_tripped") not in _lat_store.data)
check("⚠️ AND NO INVERTER ON THE ROSTER COMES UP LATCHED, on a store whose file "
"still reads `sign_tripped: true`. That is DEV-02's own sentence for the "
"worst case - a disarmed safety guard on an install that believes it is "
"protected",
not any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _lat.inverters)
and _lat_store.data["sign_tripped"] is True)
check("...and the latch that came back carries the REASON, not just the "
"boolean - an operator meeting a FAILSAFE banner with no sentence under "
"it has been told the site stopped and not why",
"SIGN_DISAGREEMENT" in _lat.inverters[0].sign_wd.reason)
check("⚠️ ...and the OTHER units on the roster are NOT latched by it. The flat "
"key is one site-level boolean and re-arming every unit off it would be "
"DEV-02's defect in the opposite direction - a healthy pack parked "
"because its sibling once disagreed",
not any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _lat.inverters[1:]))
# ⚠️ AND THE OTHER PATH, WHICH THE MIGRATION FIX ALONE DOES NOT REACH: a store
# ALREADY STAMPED by the shipped version. `migrate_unit_keys()` returns at its
# `from_version >= SCHEMA_VERSION` check and never moves anything, so the
# stranded `unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped` just sits there. This is the STAGED
# shape - "upgrade now, declare the roster later" - and it is the one an
# operator actually produces. Only the GUARD repairs it.
_staged_store = MemStore({
"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured",
unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped"): True,
unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_reason"): "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured",
SCHEMA_KEY: SCHEMA_VERSION})
_staged, _ = controller(NAMED_OPTS, store=_staged_store)
print(f" already-stamped store + declared roster -> ran="
f"{_staged.store_migration.ran}, came up tripped: "
f"{[(i.name, i.sign_wd.tripped) for i in _staged.inverters]}")
check("⚠️ PRECONDITION: the migration really does NOT run on this store - the "
"marker is already there - so anything below is the guard's doing and "
"not the migration's",
not _staged.store_migration.ran)
check("⭐ and the roster's first unit STILL comes up latched: the guard no "
"longer counts a latch stranded under `UNIT_A`, which is not on this "
"roster, as protection an operator has",
_staged.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped)
check("...and the re-armed latch is written where a machine reads it, so the "
"NEXT start finds it without needing the guard again",
_staged_store.data.get(unit_key(_C2_NAMES[0], "sign_tripped")) is True)
# ⚠️ THE NEGATIVE CONTROL FOR THAT NARROWING, because "off the roster" on its
# own was too blunt and test_inverter.py's DEV-02 restart case caught it: a
# latch stranded under a name that is NOT `UNIT_A` is a real unit out of
# today's config, and it MUST still count as protection.
_other_store = MemStore({
"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: B disagreed, mirrored flat",
unit_key("inverter-b", "sign_tripped"): True,
unit_key("inverter-b", "sign_reason"): "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: B disagreed",
SCHEMA_KEY: SCHEMA_VERSION})
_other, _ = controller(NAMED_OPTS, store=_other_store)
print(f" stranded latch under `inverter-b` -> came up tripped: "
f"{[(i.name, i.sign_wd.tripped) for i in _other.inverters]}")
check("⚠️ a latch stranded under a name that is not `UNIT_A` is NOT re-armed "
"onto the roster: it belongs to a unit the operator has taken out of "
"the config, the flat key is its own mirror, and re-arming a healthy "
"sibling off it is the defect DEV-02 removed",
not any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _other.inverters))
# ⭐ AND THE ARRANGEMENT NEITHER FIXTURE ABOVE HOLDS: **BOTH** KEYS AT ONCE.
# ⚠️ THIS IS INSTANCE #17 OF HABIT 4 AND IT WAS FOUND IN THIS CARD'S OWN FIX.
# The first version of the guard classified each key and then wrote ONE shared
# `namespaced_latched` flag for both "on the roster" and "off-roster but not
# UNIT_A". `_staged_store` above holds only an `inverter-a` latch and
# `_other_store` below holds only an `inverter-b` one, so the flag was never
# written twice with opposite intents in a single store - and a per-key check
# whose keys have never disagreed WITHIN ONE STORE is a check over whichever
# key happened to come last. Measured on that build, one added key:
#
# sign_tripped + unit/inverter-a/sign_tripped -> garage latched, repaired
# ...AND unit/old-shed/sign_tripped -> ⚠️ NOTHING latched
#
# A site DRIVING on a state file that reads `sign_tripped: true` - the sentence
# this card exists to make false - reached by an operator taking one unit out of
# `inverters:` after it had tripped. "A roster is configuration and it changes"
# is this module's own phrase, and the second inverter goes in this month.
_both_store = MemStore({
"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured",
unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped"): True,
unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_reason"): "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured",
unit_key("old-shed", "sign_tripped"): True,
unit_key("old-shed", "sign_reason"): "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: old-shed, since removed",
SCHEMA_KEY: SCHEMA_VERSION})
_both, _ = controller(NAMED_OPTS, store=_both_store)
print(f" stranded `inverter-a` AND an unrelated off-roster `old-shed` -> "
f"{[(i.name, i.sign_wd.tripped) for i in _both.inverters]}")
check("⭐ A STRANDED `inverter-a` LATCH IS STILL REPAIRED WHEN AN UNRELATED "
"OFF-ROSTER LATCH SITS BESIDE IT. One shared flag let `old-shed` veto the "
"repair, and the site came up driving on a file that says it is latched",
_both.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped)
check("...and the repair still lands on the roster's first unit, not on the "
"removed one",
_both_store.data.get(unit_key(_C2_NAMES[0], "sign_tripped")) is True)
check("⚠️ ...and the reason carried across is the FLAT one - the misdirected "
"latch's own - and not `old-shed`'s, which belongs to a different "
"physical inverter",
"old-shed" not in _both.inverters[0].sign_wd.reason)
# ⚠️ AND THE OPERATOR MESSAGE IS ASSERTED, because review deleted it whole
# (`if stranded:` -> `if False:`) and 28/28 stayed green. `stranded` has no
# other consumer, so the list existed only to print a line nothing checked -
# and the line is the entire operator-facing half of this repair: it names the
# key that was stranded and the roster it was measured against. A repair an
# operator cannot see is a repair they cannot confirm.
_log_store = MemStore({
"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured",
unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped"): True,
unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_reason"): "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured",
SCHEMA_KEY: SCHEMA_VERSION})
_records = []
_h = logging.Handler()
_h.emit = lambda r: _records.append(r.getMessage())
logging.getLogger("goodwe").addHandler(_h)
try:
_logged, _ = controller(NAMED_OPTS, store=_log_store)
finally:
logging.getLogger("goodwe").removeHandler(_h)
_s44_lines = [m for m in _records if "SAFETY-44" in m]
print(f" SAFETY-44 operator lines logged: {len(_s44_lines)}")
check("⭐ the repair SAYS SO, at ERROR, naming SAFETY-44 - deleting this line "
"left the whole suite green, and it is how an operator learns their "
"latch was re-armed rather than never lost",
len(_s44_lines) == 1)
check("...and it names the STRANDED KEY, so the operator can find it in the "
"state file rather than being told something happened",
any(unit_key(UNIT_A, "sign_tripped") in m for m in _s44_lines))
check("...and the ROSTER it was measured against, which is the half that says "
"WHY no machine read it",
any("garage" in m and "shed" in m for m in _s44_lines))
# ⭐ AND `misdirected` IS MEASURED AT THE FUNCTION'S OWN LEVEL, BECAUSE IT IS
# UNREACHABLE FROM THE CALL SITE. `Controller.__init__` passes
# `roster_names(opts)[0]`, which `build_roster()` also names its first entry
# from, so `unit` is a member of `roster` by construction and the refusal can
# never fire there. Review measured that: dropping the `roster` argument from
# `_verify_moves()` inside `migrate_unit_keys()` survives 28/28. The argument is
# kept for the reason `_verify_moves()` gives for its own `roster=None` branch -
# it is what a NEW caller gets by default - and a guard nothing exercises is a
# guard nobody knows works, so it is exercised HERE rather than claimed.
_mis_store = MemStore({"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured"})
_mis = migrate_unit_keys(_mis_store, UNIT_A, ["garage", "shed"])
print(f" migrate_unit_keys(store, 'inverter-a', ['garage','shed']) -> "
f"ok={_mis.ok} misdirected={sorted(_mis.misdirected)}")
check("⭐ a WRONG `unit` - one that is not on the roster it was handed - comes "
"back `misdirected`, which is the refusal `migrate_maint_keys()` already "
"had and this one did not",
bool(_mis.misdirected) and not _mis.ok)
check("...and the schema marker is NOT stamped, so the migration runs again on "
"the next start rather than being recorded as finished - the one thing "
"store.py's header says must never happen",
_mis_store.data.get(SCHEMA_KEY) != SCHEMA_VERSION)
check("⚠️ ...while the SAME call with a unit that IS on the roster stamps the "
"marker - so the refusal is caused by the name and not by the fixture",
migrate_unit_keys(
MemStore({"sign_tripped": True, "sign_reason": "x"}),
"garage", ["garage", "shed"]).ok)
check("...and `_grade_store_migration()` is DEFEATED BY THE KEY THE DEFECT "
"WROTE, which is why this needs a card rather than a tweak: its "
"'is anything namespaced latched' test is satisfied by the misdirected "
"value itself, so it returns instead of re-arming",
any(k.startswith("unit/") and k.endswith("/sign_tripped") and v
for k, v in _lat_store.data.items())
and not any(i.sign_wd.tripped for i in _lat.inverters))
# The counterfactual, and it is the accepted baseline habit 7 asks for: the
# same store, the same migration, one thing different - the roster shape.
_flat_lat_store = MemStore({"sign_tripped": True,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: SYNTHETIC FIXTURE, not measured"})
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: measured pre-DEV-02"})
_flat_lat, _ = controller(FLAT_OPTS, store=_flat_lat_store)
print(f" the same store on the FLAT config -> roster "
f"{[(i.name, i.sign_wd.tripped) for i in _flat_lat.inverters]}")
+88 -354
View File
@@ -41,9 +41,7 @@ from app.arbiter import (
ACTUATOR_SITE, CLAIM_SCOPE, P_LOOP, P_SAFETY, SCOPE_UNIT, Claim, resolve,
)
from app.control import Tuning, compute
from app.delivery import (
DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION, UnitDelivery, account, delinquent,
)
from app.delivery import UnitDelivery, account, delinquent
from app.peakguard import discharge_permitted
fails = []
@@ -607,87 +605,65 @@ check("...and SAFETY-42 is where the case this card CANNOT reach is handled. A "
"site ASKING a pack whose own SoC says it cannot deliver; SAFETY-42 "
"alarms when a pack that said it could does not. ⚠️ THE WEIGHT, HOWEVER, "
"DOES MOVE - this check used to say it did not - and part 8b grades what "
"that cost the alarm, and what SAFETY-43 did about it",
"that costs the alarm",
not packshare.envelope(PE(Bee, 55.0, B_KWH)).binding)
# ==============================================================================
print()
print("8b. ⚠️ WHAT THE WEIGHTS DID TO SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW, AND WHAT "
"SAFETY-43 DID ABOUT IT - GRADED UNDER BOTH RULES, ON ONE FIXTURE")
print("8b. ⚠️ AND WHAT THE WEIGHTS DO TO SAFETY-42's DETECTION WINDOW, WHICH IS "
"A REGRESSION AND IS PINNED HERE AS ONE")
# ⚠️ THIS PART USED TO PIN THE UNFLATTERING ANSWER ON PURPOSE, AND SAFETY-43 IS
# THE CARD THAT INVERTED IT. What it said - and it was true when it was written
# - was: a wedged unit's weight MOVES whenever its energy headroom differs from
# its sibling's (it is a pack fact, not a delivery fact), `delivery.delinquent()`
# named a unit only while its `short_by()` gap exceeded `min_w`
# (`Tuning.saturation_w`, 500 W) IN ABSOLUTE WATTS, and shrinking a unit's share
# shrinks its gap. Shrink it below 500 W and the alarm stopped firing on a unit
# that was still delivering nothing. The old text ended "if it ever goes red
# because the alarm fired, read the card that made it fire before 'fixing' this
# line". SAFETY-43 is that card, this is that red, and the checks below are the
# same three measurements with their answers the other way round.
# ⚠️ READ THIS BEFORE READING THE CHECKS: THEY ASSERT THE UNFLATTERING ANSWER ON
# PURPOSE. An earlier draft of §5 of the decision said a wedged unit's weight
# does not move, so OPT-09 "cannot see it at all". The first clause is about the
# ENVELOPE and is true; the second is FALSE. A wedged unit's weight moves
# whenever its energy headroom differs from its sibling's - it is a pack fact,
# not a delivery fact - and `delivery.delinquent()` names a unit only while its
# `short_by()` gap exceeds `min_w` (`Tuning.saturation_w`, 500 W) IN ABSOLUTE
# WATTS. Shrinking a unit's share shrinks its gap. Shrink it below 500 W and the
# alarm stops firing on a unit that is still delivering nothing.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE EVIDENCE IS THE DIFF BETWEEN TWO RULES ON ONE RUN, NOT A NUMBER
# THAT CHANGED IN A COMMIT. `delinquent()` takes `share_frac`, and
# `share_frac=None` is SAFETY-42's rule EXACTLY - the absolute arm alone. So
# `wedged_loop` grades every cycle twice, once under each rule, and the red and
# the green sit side by side in one output:
# So the seam is not "OPT-09 cannot see it". It is: OPT-09 stops the ask AND
# narrows SAFETY-42's detection window on the same unit. At equal weights the
# window is `site target < 2 * min_w` = 1000 W; at OPT-09's weights it is
# `site target < min_w * (w_A + w_B) / w_B`, which on this fixture is 6500 W.
#
# load 1500 W, OPT-09 weights, absolute arm only named on 0/200 cycles
# load 1500 W, OPT-09 weights, the shipped rule named on 200/200 cycles
#
# A future reader who wants to know what this card did runs this file.
#
# ⚠️ WHAT SAFETY-43 DID NOT DO IS LOWER `min_w`, and the check on the window
# arithmetic below is what holds that open: the ABSOLUTE arm's suppression
# window is still 500 W wide and still widens to 6500 W under these weights.
# Nothing that was quiet became noisy; a SECOND way to be named was added, and
# it is a fraction of the unit's OWN ask, so it fires on a unit delivering none
# of 125 W exactly as it fires on one delivering none of 1500 W.
# ⚠️ THIS IS A DETECTION REGRESSION AT N=2 AND IT IS NOT FIXED HERE. Making
# `delinquent()` relative to the ask rather than absolute is SAFETY-42's code and
# a design change; it is filed as its own card. What this part does is GRADE THE
# CURRENT BEHAVIOUR so that the day it changes, a named check moves.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE FIXTURE IS A SAFETY-42 TRUE POSITIVE BY THAT CARD'S OWN DEFINITION,
# checked below before anything is concluded from it: B is WEDGED - it accepts
# its share and produces nothing - at a HEALTHY 15 % against its own 10 % floor,
# so `envelope()` does not close and `account()` explains nothing. This is
# exactly the case §5 says the envelope cannot reach, which is why it is the
# case where the weights' side effect mattered.
# case where the weights' side effect matters.
#
# ⚠️ TWO COPIES OF A. Inverter B does not exist; the plant below is modelled in
# this file the way part 8's is, and B's ratings are datasheet.
WEDGED_A_SOC, WEDGED_B_SOC = 90.0, 15.0 # both healthy, both above their floor
MIN_W = Tuning().saturation_w # what `delinquent()` is handed
ABSOLUTE_ONLY = None # `share_frac=None` - SAFETY-42's rule
def wedged_loop(load_w, weighted, cycles=200, share_frac=DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION,
b_delivers=0.0, b_soc=WEDGED_B_SOC, no_account=False):
def wedged_loop(load_w, weighted, cycles=200):
"""The closed loop with unit B WEDGED at a healthy SoC. Real everything.
Real `compute()`, real `plan()`, real `packshare.weights()`, real
`delivery.account()` and real `delivery.delinquent()`. The only model is the
plant: A obeys within one cycle inside its rating, B delivers `b_delivers`
of whatever it is told - 0.0 is the wedged box, and is what makes this a
plant: A obeys within one cycle inside its rating, B accepts whatever it is
told and delivers 0 W - which is the wedged box, and is what makes this a
SAFETY-42 case rather than an OPT-09 one.
`weighted=False` is equal weights - what shipped. Envelopes are left OPEN in
both arms deliberately: neither pack's SoC closes one here, so filing them
would change nothing and would blur which half of the card is being graded.
`share_frac` is SAFETY-43's relative arm. `ABSOLUTE_ONLY` grades the same
cycles under SAFETY-42's rule, which is how the red and the green below come
out of ONE run over ONE tree instead of out of two commits.
`no_account=True` DELETES the account gate - every unit is handed
`accounted=None` - and it exists to answer "would this arm still be silent
if `account()` did nothing at all?". A control that answers the same way
with the gate removed is not grading the gate, and the cut-out arm below is
exactly that case. See it there; it is the point of that block.
Returns `(cycles on which delinquent() named somebody, last cycle)`.
"""
packs = [PE(A, WEDGED_A_SOC, A_KWH), PE(Bee, b_soc, B_KWH)]
packs = [PE(A, WEDGED_A_SOC, A_KWH), PE(Bee, WEDGED_B_SOC, B_KWH)]
tuning = Tuning(gain=1.0, slew_w=1000.0, max_w=A_W + B_W)
prev, i_w, sat = 0.0, None, 0
power = [0.0, 0.0]
@@ -700,15 +676,13 @@ def wedged_loop(load_w, weighted, cycles=200, share_frac=DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION
r = plan(d.target_w, {A: _B(-A_W, A_W), Bee: _B(-B_W, B_W)}, weights=w)
assert r.ok, r.refused
# THE MODELLED PLANT: A within one cycle inside its rating; B WEDGED.
power = [max(-A_W, min(A_W, float(r.shares[A]))),
b_delivers * max(-B_W, min(B_W, float(r.shares[Bee])))]
power = [max(-A_W, min(A_W, float(r.shares[A]))), 0.0]
grid = load_w - sum(power)
who = delinquent(
[UnitDelivery(p.name, r.shares[p.name], m,
None if no_account else
account(live=True, parked=False, soc=p.soc,
bms_floor=p.bms_floor))
for p, m in zip(packs, power)], MIN_W, share_frac)
for p, m in zip(packs, power)], MIN_W)
named += bool(who)
last = (d.target_w, dict(r.shares), grid, who)
return named, last
@@ -722,271 +696,71 @@ check("PRECONDITION: the wedged unit is a SAFETY-42 TRUE POSITIVE and NOT an "
not packshare.envelope(_WEDGED_PACK).binding
and account(live=True, parked=False, soc=WEDGED_B_SOC,
bms_floor=FLOOR) is None)
check("PRECONDITION: the shipped fraction is a fraction, and it is STRICTLY "
"below 1.0 - at 1.0 the relative arm could only fire on a unit IMPORTING "
"while asked to discharge, which is SAFETY-30's fault and not this one, "
"and this card's own case (a unit delivering NONE of its share, gap over "
"share exactly 1.0) would be missed",
0.0 < DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION < 1.0)
_wedge = {}
for _load in (1500.0, 6000.0):
for _weighted in (False, True):
for _frac in (ABSOLUTE_ONLY, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION):
_n, _t = wedged_loop(_load, _weighted, share_frac=_frac)
_wedge[(_load, _weighted, _frac)] = (_n, _t)
print(f" load {_load:.0f} W, B wedged at 15 %, "
f"{'OPT-09 weights' if _weighted else 'equal weights ':<14} "
+ ("absolute arm only" if _frac is ABSOLUTE_ONLY
else f"frac {_frac:.2f} ")
+ f", named on {_n:3d}/200 cycles, site target {_t[0]:+.0f} W,"
+ " shares "
+ ", ".join(f"{u}{v:+d}" for u, v in sorted(_t[1].items()))
+ f", grid {_t[2]:+.0f} W, named="
+ (str(sorted(_t[3])) if _t[3] else "(nobody)"))
_n, _t = wedged_loop(_load, _weighted)
_wedge[(_load, _weighted)] = (_n, _t)
print(f" load {_load:.0f} W, B wedged at 15 %, "
f"{'OPT-09 weights' if _weighted else 'equal weights ':<14} "
f"named on {_n:3d}/200 cycles, site target {_t[0]:+.0f} W, shares "
+ ", ".join(f"{u}{v:+d}" for u, v in sorted(_t[1].items()))
+ f", grid {_t[2]:+.0f} W, named="
+ (str(sorted(_t[3])) if _t[3] else "(nobody)"))
check("⚠️ THE CARD, RED: UNDER SAFETY-42's RULE AND OPT-09's WEIGHTS THE WEDGED "
"UNIT IS NAMED ON NONE OF THE 200. Same wedged box, same healthy SoC, "
"same load, same detector: the split moves to 1505/125, the gap on the "
"wedged unit falls to 125 W, and 125 W < 500 W so the absolute arm "
"returns {}. This is the defect SAFETY-43 was filed for, and it is "
"measured here rather than remembered",
_wedge[(1500.0, True, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][0] == 0
and _wedge[(1500.0, True, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][1][3] == {}
and _wedge[(1500.0, True, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][1][1] == {A: 1505, Bee: 125})
check("AT EQUAL WEIGHTS - WHAT SHIPPED - the wedged unit is named on every "
"cycle but the first, at a load its sibling can carry on its own. The "
"loop winds the site target to twice the load, the 50/50 split stands "
"+1500 W on a box producing nothing, and 1500 W > 500 W is what "
"`delinquent()` reads",
_wedge[(1500.0, False)][0] == 199
and sorted(_wedge[(1500.0, False)][1][3]) == [Bee]
and _wedge[(1500.0, False)][1][1] == {A: 1500, Bee: 1500})
check("⚠️ THE CARD, GREEN: THE SHIPPED RULE NAMES IT ON ALL 200, ON THE SAME "
"RUN. The unit is standing at +125 W and delivering 0 W - 100 % of its "
"ask is not arriving - and `gap > frac * share` does not care that 125 W "
"is a small number. The ONLY input that moved between this check and the "
"one above is `share_frac`",
_wedge[(1500.0, True, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][0] == 200
and sorted(_wedge[(1500.0, True, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][1][3]) == [Bee]
and _wedge[(1500.0, True, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][1][1] \
== {A: 1505, Bee: 125})
check("AT EQUAL WEIGHTS - WHAT SHIPPED BEFORE OPT-09 - the wedged unit was "
"already named under the absolute rule on every cycle but the first, at "
"a load its sibling can carry on its own. The loop winds the site target "
"to twice the load, the 50/50 split stands +1500 W on a box producing "
"nothing, and 1500 W > 500 W is what the absolute arm reads",
_wedge[(1500.0, False, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][0] == 199
and sorted(_wedge[(1500.0, False, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][1][3]) == [Bee]
and _wedge[(1500.0, False, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][1][1] == {A: 1500, Bee: 1500})
check("...and the shipped rule adds exactly the FIRST cycle to that arm and "
"nothing else - 199 becomes 200. On cycle one the slew limit holds the "
"split at 500/500, a 500 W gap is NOT over a 500 W threshold (the "
"absolute bound is strict), and the relative arm names a box delivering "
"none of its 500 W. That one cycle is the whole of what this card costs "
"an arm that was already firing",
_wedge[(1500.0, False, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][0] == 200
and _wedge[(1500.0, False, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][0]
- _wedge[(1500.0, False, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][0] == 1)
check("⚠️ AND WITH OPT-09's WEIGHTS IT IS NAMED ON NONE OF THE 200. Same wedged "
"box, same healthy SoC, same load, same detector: the split moves to "
"1505/125, the gap on the wedged unit falls to 125 W, and 125 W < 500 W "
"so `delinquent()` returns {}. THIS CHECK PINS A REGRESSION - it asserts "
"what the code DOES, not what anyone wants, and if it ever goes red "
"because the alarm fired, read the card that made it fire before "
"'fixing' this line",
_wedge[(1500.0, True)][0] == 0
and _wedge[(1500.0, True)][1][3] == {}
and _wedge[(1500.0, True)][1][1] == {A: 1505, Bee: 125})
check("...and this is the regime where NOTHING ELSE TELLS THE OPERATOR "
"ANYTHING: the meter is satisfied (grid within 5 W of zero), `unmet_w` is "
"0 because both units accepted their shares, no envelope closed and no "
"action-log line fires. The site is quietly running one inverter, and "
"before this card the one instrument built to say so had gone quiet with "
"it",
abs(_wedge[(1500.0, True, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][1][2]) <= 5.0
and abs(_wedge[(1500.0, False, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][1][2]) <= 5.0)
"action-log line fires. The site is quietly running one inverter and the "
"one instrument built to say so has gone quiet with it",
abs(_wedge[(1500.0, True)][1][2]) <= 5.0
and abs(_wedge[(1500.0, False)][1][2]) <= 5.0)
_w = packshare.weights([PE(A, WEDGED_A_SOC, A_KWH), _WEDGED_PACK], 1000.0)
_window_equal = MIN_W * 2.0
_window_opt09 = MIN_W * sum(_w.values()) / _w[Bee]
print(f" the ABSOLUTE arm's suppression window is UNCHANGED by SAFETY-43: "
f"equal weights, site target < {_window_equal:.0f} W; OPT-09 weights, "
f"site target < {_window_opt09:.0f} W of a {A_W + B_W:.0f} W site")
check("⚠️ AND `min_w` WAS NOT LOWERED, WHICH IS THE HALF OF THIS CARD THAT IS "
"EASIEST TO GET WRONG. The absolute arm still suppresses below 1000 W at "
"equal weights and below 6500 W at these ones - the same arithmetic this "
"part has always printed - because SAFETY-43 ADDED a second way to be "
"named rather than loosening the first. Lowering `saturation_w` would "
"have reported normal saturation on every unit at once, which is the "
"false-trip regime SAFETY-41 spent four attempts in",
abs(_window_equal - 1000.0) < 1.0 and abs(_window_opt09 - 6500.0) < 1.0
and MIN_W == Tuning().saturation_w == 500.0)
check("⚠️ AND THE ABSOLUTE ARM WAS NEVER SILENT EVERYWHERE - which is what a "
"check that only ever ran the quiet load would be pinning. Push the load "
"past the healthy pack's OWN RATING and `_fill()`'s last-resort pass "
"hands the wedged unit 3000 W anyway, the gap goes back over 500 W, and "
"both arms named it under SAFETY-42's rule too. The window was real and "
"it had an upper edge; the hole was the quiet regime below that edge, "
"and the shipped rule now names the unit on every cycle of all four runs",
_wedge[(6000.0, True, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][0] == 195
and _wedge[(6000.0, False, ABSOLUTE_ONLY)][0] == 199
and _wedge[(6000.0, True, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][0] == 200
and _wedge[(6000.0, False, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][0] == 200
and sorted(_wedge[(6000.0, True, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][1][3]) == [Bee])
print()
print(" THE POSITIVE CONTROL: what the relative arm must STILL NOT say")
# ⚠️ A CARD THAT ADDS A WAY TO RAISE AN ALARM HAS TO SHOW WHAT IT DID NOT ADD,
# or it has traded a missed alarm for a false one - which in this system is not
# a rhetorical risk. SAFETY-41 took four attempts on notification cadence and
# the owner's words were "i'm getting really annoyed by the notifications in my
# HA". So: the same fixture, the same weights, the same tiny 125 W share, with
# the ONE fact that makes the shortfall legitimate changed.
# ⚠️ AND THE FIRST DRAFT OF THIS BLOCK WAS VACUOUS, WHICH IS WHY IT NOW PRINTS
# ITS SHARES. It ran the cut-out arm, saw 0/200, and concluded "`account()`
# explains it" and "identical trace to the wedged arm". BOTH WERE FALSE. At its
# own cut-out the pack's usable energy ABOVE that cut-out is zero, so
# `weights()` gives it 0.0, `_fill()`'s preferred pass gives it nothing, the
# healthy sibling covers the load alone so the LAST-RESORT pass never runs, and
# its share is 0 W on ALL 200 CYCLES. A unit with a 0 W share is not in `asked`,
# so `len(asked) < 2` returns {} BEFORE EITHER ARM IS EVALUATED and `account()`
# is never consulted - measured below by deleting the gate and getting the same
# answer. The wedged arm's share is the 125 W printed on its own line above;
# this one's is 0, printed and asserted below. Nothing was identical and nothing
# reached the comparison.
#
# ⚠️ THE FACT THAT REPLACES IT IS BETTER, NOT WEAKER: at its own cut-out OPT-09
# STOPS ASKING THE PACK AT ALL, so SAFETY-43's relative arm is never reached.
# That is a SECOND, INDEPENDENT protection sitting UPSTREAM of `account()` - the
# allocator declines to ask before the detector has to decline to alarm. The
# account gate itself is graded where it is REAL, on a positive 125 W share, in
# `test_delivery.py` part 1 ("THE ACCOUNT GATE IS UNTOUCHED BY IT").
#
# ⚠️ AND IT WAS INVISIBLE FOR ONE REASON: this was the only line in part 8b that
# did not print its shares. `inverter-b+0` would have been on screen from the
# first run. Every line in this part prints them now.
_sat_named, _sat_last = wedged_loop(1500.0, True, b_soc=FLOOR)
_sat_nogate, _sat_nogate_last = wedged_loop(1500.0, True, b_soc=FLOOR,
no_account=True)
print(f" load 1500 W, B AT ITS OWN {FLOOR:.0f} % CUT-OUT, OPT-09 weights, "
f"frac {DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION:.2f}: named on {_sat_named:3d}/200 "
f"cycles, shares "
+ ", ".join(f"{u}{v:+d}" for u, v in sorted(_sat_last[1].items()))
+ ", named="
+ (str(sorted(_sat_last[3])) if _sat_last[3] else "(nobody)")
+ f"; with account() DELETED: {_sat_nogate:3d}/200")
# ⚠️ AND THE `no_account=True` SWITCH ITSELF WAS GRADED BY NOTHING. It is used
# in exactly one place - the fixture above - where it PROVABLY cannot change the
# answer, because a cut-out pack is never asked and the gate is never reached.
# Review neutered the switch so it removed nothing: the file stayed GREEN and
# printed "with account() DELETED: 0/200" while `account()` had not been
# deleted. A line asserting a mechanism that did not happen - B1's shape, one
# level down, in the fix for B1.
#
# The switch DOES bite, on a fixture already reachable from this helper: at the
# cut-out with EQUAL weights, `plan()` hands B a 50/50 share, so the gate is the
# only thing keeping it silent. Measured: gate on 0/200, gate deleted 200/200.
# That proves the switch removes the gate, AND gives this part the end-to-end
# account-gate control on a POSITIVE share that it otherwise has to outsource to
# test_delivery.py part 1.
_eq_gate, _eq_last = wedged_loop(1500.0, False, b_soc=FLOOR)
_eq_nogate, _ = wedged_loop(1500.0, False, b_soc=FLOOR, no_account=True)
print(f" ...and the SWITCH is real: same cut-out, EQUAL weights so B IS "
f"asked ({_eq_last[1][Bee]:+d} W last cycle) - gate on {_eq_gate:3d}/200, "
f"gate DELETED {_eq_nogate:3d}/200")
check("⭐ THE `no_account` SWITCH ACTUALLY REMOVES THE GATE, on a fixture where "
"the gate is the only thing keeping the pack silent. Without this the "
"line above prints 'with account() DELETED' about a run in which nothing "
"was deleted - which is exactly the defect this block was rewritten for",
_eq_gate == 0 and _eq_nogate == 200 and _eq_last[1][Bee] > 0)
check("A PACK AT ITS OWN CUT-OUT IS NEVER ASKED, SO THE RELATIVE ARM IS NEVER "
"REACHED. Its usable energy above its own cut-out is zero, `weights()` "
"answers 0.0 for it, the healthy sibling covers the load so `_fill()`'s "
"last-resort pass never runs, and its share is 0 W on every one of the "
"200 cycles - so it is not in `asked` and `len(asked) < 2` returns {} "
"before either arm is compared. ⚠️ THE SHARE IS ASSERTED, not inferred "
"from the silence: a control that cannot say WHY it is quiet is a control "
"that cannot fail",
_sat_named == 0 and _sat_last[3] == {} and _sat_last[1][Bee] == 0)
check("⚠️ AND THAT IS A SECOND, INDEPENDENT PROTECTION - NOT THE ACCOUNT GATE, "
"WHICH THIS ARM DOES NOT TOUCH. Delete `account()` entirely, hand every "
"unit `accounted=None`, and this arm is STILL silent on all 200 cycles, "
"because the protection is UPSTREAM of it: the allocator declines to ask "
"before the detector has to decline to alarm. ⚠️ SO DO NOT READ THIS "
"BLOCK AS EVIDENCE ABOUT `account()` - it is evidence about the ask. The "
"account gate on a POSITIVE share is graded in test_delivery.py part 1",
_sat_nogate == 0 and _sat_nogate_last[3] == {})
_derate_named, _derate_last = wedged_loop(1500.0, True, b_delivers=0.5)
print(f" load 1500 W, B delivering HALF its share, OPT-09 weights, frac "
f"{DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION:.2f}: named on {_derate_named:3d}/200 cycles, "
f"shares "
+ ", ".join(f"{u}{v:+d}" for u, v in sorted(_derate_last[1].items()))
+ ", named="
+ (str(sorted(_derate_last[3])) if _derate_last[3] else "(nobody)"))
check("...and ORDINARY TRACKING ON A SMALL SHARE IS NOT DELINQUENCY EITHER. "
"The same unit at the same weights delivering HALF of what it is asked "
"for is short by 50 % - well inside the shipped fraction - and its gap "
"in watts is far under `min_w`, so NEITHER arm names it. A relative "
"criterion that fired here would be the saturation-shaped alarm this "
"whole module is written against",
_derate_named == 0 and _derate_last[3] == {})
check("...and the DERATED control is not vacuous, which is asserted on the ONE "
"thing that could make it so: unlike the cut-out arm above, its unit IS "
"asked - a positive share on every cycle - so it really does reach both "
"arms and is turned away by the size of its shortfall. ⚠️ THIS GUARD USED "
"TO RE-ASSERT THE WEDGED ARM's 200/200 INSTEAD, WHICH IS WHY IT DID NOT "
"CATCH THE CUT-OUT ARM BEING VACUOUS: a check on a DIFFERENT run cannot "
"say anything about whether THIS one reached the comparison",
_derate_last[1][Bee] > 0
and _wedge[(1500.0, True, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)][0] == 200)
print()
print(" N=1 IS BYTE-IDENTICAL, AND THAT IS ASSERTED RATHER THAN ARGUED")
# ⚠️ THE LIVE INSTALL IS N=1 AND THIS CARD MUST NOT REACH IT. Two independent
# statements, and each is checked against the thing that would break it:
# 1. `plan()` RETURNS BEFORE `weights` IS READ AT ALL, so no weighting - and
# no change to how one is derived - can move a one-inverter share. Graded
# with a `weights` object that RAISES if anything reads it.
# 2. `delinquent()` returns {} at a roster of one for every input, including
# the input the RELATIVE arm was built for. The proper-subset algebra runs
# before either arm, so the fraction is never even multiplied.
class _Poison(dict):
"""A `weights` that cannot be read without saying so. Not a mock: a tripwire."""
def get(self, *a, **k):
raise AssertionError("plan() read weights at a roster of one")
def __getitem__(self, k):
raise AssertionError("plan() read weights at a roster of one")
_n1_plain = plan(1234.5, {A: _B(-A_W, A_W)})
_n1_poison = plan(1234.5, {A: _B(-A_W, A_W)}, weights=_Poison())
check("`plan()` at a roster of ONE returns the site target unread, and it "
"returns it WITHOUT TOUCHING `weights` - handed a mapping that raises on "
"any read, it answers identically to the same call with no weights at "
"all. The N=1 pass-through is above the weighting, so OPT-09 could not "
"move it and SAFETY-43 does not either",
_n1_poison.shares == _n1_plain.shares == {A: 1234.5}
and _n1_poison.unmet_w == _n1_plain.unmet_w)
try:
plan(1234.5, {A: _B(-A_W, A_W), Bee: _B(-B_W, B_W)}, weights=_Poison())
except AssertionError:
_poison_bites = True
else:
_poison_bites = False
check("...and the tripwire is a real one: the SAME poisoned mapping at a roster "
"of TWO is read and raises. A check that could not fail would be "
"measuring nothing",
_poison_bites)
_n1_rel = [delinquent([UnitDelivery(A, s, m)], MIN_W, f)
for s in (0, 125, 500, 2000, 5000, -2000, None)
for m in (0, 60, 125, 2000, -2000, None)
for f in (ABSOLUTE_ONLY, DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION)]
check(f"...and `delinquent()` answers {{}} at a roster of one on all "
f"{len(_n1_rel)} of (share, measured, rule) - INCLUDING 0 of 125 W, the "
f"exact input this card added an arm for. `len(asked) < 2` returns "
f"before either threshold is compared, so the one-inverter install this "
f"add-on is running today cannot tell that SAFETY-43 happened",
all(r == {} for r in _n1_rel))
print(f" suppression window on this fixture: equal weights, site target "
f"< {_window_equal:.0f} W; OPT-09 weights, site target "
f"< {_window_opt09:.0f} W of a {A_W + B_W:.0f} W site")
check("...and the arithmetic behind it, stated as a window rather than as one "
"fixture: `delinquent()` reads an ABSOLUTE gap, so a unit weighted to a "
"fraction f of the site target is invisible while `f * target < min_w`. "
"Equal weights suppress below 1000 W; these weights suppress below "
"6500 W of a 9600 W site. That is the regression, and it is a property "
"of the threshold being absolute rather than of any number chosen here",
abs(_window_equal - 1000.0) < 1.0 and abs(_window_opt09 - 6500.0) < 1.0)
check("⚠️ AND IT IS NOT THAT THE WEIGHTED ARM NEVER NAMES ANYBODY - which is "
"what a check that only ever ran the quiet load would be pinning. Push "
"the load past the healthy pack's OWN RATING and `_fill()`'s last-resort "
"pass hands the wedged unit 3000 W anyway, the gap goes back over 500 W, "
"and BOTH arms name it. The window is real and it has an upper edge; the "
"hole is the quiet regime below that edge",
_wedge[(6000.0, True)][0] == 195
and sorted(_wedge[(6000.0, True)][1][3]) == [Bee]
and _wedge[(6000.0, False)][0] == 199
and sorted(_wedge[(6000.0, False)][1][3]) == [Bee])
# ==============================================================================
print()
@@ -1198,12 +972,9 @@ print(" a preference and are honest about being one.")
print(" * A WEDGED UNIT IS NOT REACHABLE BY THE ENVELOPE. Its SoC reads")
print(" healthy, so nothing closes, and SAFETY-42 owns the detection.")
print(" ⚠️ BUT IT IS REACHABLE BY THE WEIGHTS, WHICH MOVE ON ENERGY")
print(" HEADROOM AND NOT ON DELIVERY. That narrowed SAFETY-42's")
print(" detection window - a regression this file PINNED rather than")
print(" fixed - and SAFETY-43 closed it by making delinquency relative")
print(" to the ask as well as absolute. Part 8b now grades both rules")
print(" on one fixture: the absolute arm still says nothing, and the")
print(" shipped one names the unit on all 200 cycles.")
print(" HEADROOM AND NOT ON DELIVERY - part 8b grades what that does")
print(" to SAFETY-42's window, and the answer is a REGRESSION that is")
print(" pinned rather than fixed.")
# ==============================================================================
print()
@@ -1246,41 +1017,13 @@ MUT = [
"mutation took it down with a TypeError three lines into part 1"),
("M11 weights(): keep the shape, force every weight to 1.0 <- THE PROOF "
"THAT PART 8b CAN GO RED",
"test_packshare 8b, FIVE named checks - re-run for SAFETY-43 rather than "
"carried across, because the part it grades was rewritten: the split "
"reverts to 1500/1500 so the absolute arm names the unit on 199/200 "
"(taking the card's RED check down), the shipped rule's 200/200 comes "
"from the wrong shares (taking the GREEN one down), the OPT-09 window "
"collapses from 6500 W to 1000 W, the 6000 W arm's 195 becomes 199, and "
"the derated positive control moves from 0/200 to 3/200. ⚠️ RUN, NOT "
"REASONED ABOUT - a check that pins a behaviour has to be shown capable "
"of failing, or it is indistinguishable from a check that pins nothing. "
"test_packshare 8b, three named checks: the wedged unit goes back to being "
"named on 199/200 at 1500 W, the split reverts to 1500/1500 and the "
"window collapses from 6500 W to 1000 W. ⚠️ RUN, NOT REASONED ABOUT - a "
"check that pins an UNFLATTERING behaviour has to be shown capable of "
"failing, or it is indistinguishable from a check that pins nothing. "
"(It also takes parts 1, 3, 7 and 8 down, which is M3's territory; 8b is "
"the part that names the SAFETY-42 interaction)"),
# --- SAFETY-43's three, and they pin the new arm from BOTH sides --------
("M12 delinquent(): drop the relative arm, keep `gap > min_w` <- THE "
"CARD ITSELF REVERTED",
"SEVEN named checks: test_delivery 1 (THREE - the 0-of-125 W naming, the "
"proportion in the sentence, and the strict relative bound) and "
"test_packshare 8b (FOUR - the GREEN check goes back to 0/200 under "
"OPT-09's weights, the equal arm's 200 back to 199, the 6000 W arm back "
"to 195/199, and the derated control's vacuity guard falls with them). "
"test_alloc and test_control stay green, which is the point - nothing "
"outside this check moves"),
("M13 DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION 0.85 -> 1.0 <- THE TOO-LOOSE DIRECTION",
"SEVEN named checks: test_delivery 1 (TWO) and test_packshare 8b (FIVE), "
"including the PRECONDITION that the fraction is strictly below 1.0. At "
"1.0 the arm can only fire on a unit IMPORTING while asked to discharge, "
"so the card's own case - 0 of 125 W, gap over share exactly 1.0 - is "
"missed and the whole card is a no-op"),
("M14 DELIVERY_SHARE_FRACTION 0.85 -> 0.05 <- THE TOO-SENSITIVE ONE",
"SIX named checks: test_delivery 1 (TWO - the strict bound, and 'IT TOOK "
"NOTHING AWAY' stops being true) and 4b (THREE - the `saturation_w` pin "
"goes VACUOUS, because the relative arm names B at every threshold), plus "
"test_packshare 8b's DERATED positive control, where a unit delivering "
"half its share starts being named. ⚠️ THIS IS THE ROW THAT MATTERS - the "
"fraction is pinned from BOTH directions, so it is a derived number with "
"checks around it rather than a literal nobody can move"),
]
for _n, _w in MUT:
print(f" caught {_n}")
@@ -1290,17 +1033,8 @@ check("every mutation in the table above was RUN and every one of them is "
"M6: the whole defect this card fixes - a parameter nothing passes - is "
"invisible to every behavioural fixture in this repository, because they "
"all build their own claim list and call `resolve()` themselves. That is "
"why the call site is pinned statically as well. ⚠️ M12-M14 ARE "
"SAFETY-43's and were run the same way, on trees copied fresh and "
"mounted :ro so no `.pyc` could go stale - MUTATION.md's defect. All "
"three are REDS, which is the direction that defect cannot fabricate. "
"⚠️ AND THEIR COUNTS WERE RE-RUN IN REVIEW AND TWO OF THEM MOVED: "
"test_delivery.py part 1 used to subscript `delinquent(...)['b']` for a "
"print, which raised KeyError under M12 and M13 and ABORTED THE FILE at "
"part 1, leaving parts 2-8 ungraded and the recorded coverage smaller "
"than the truth. It is a `.get` now. M14's count was simply wrong: five "
"named checks in test_delivery, not four",
len(MUT) == 14)
"why the call site is pinned statically as well",
len(MUT) == 11)
print()
if fails:
+2 -80
View File
@@ -272,19 +272,16 @@ check("the provenance audit REFUSES a carried hour flagged non-provisional - "
"the 'stale but plausible' point, which is SAFETY-18's frozen-but-fresh "
"meter one layer up",
raises(lambda: _fc._audit([_stale_copy], {}), ValueError))
# ⚠️ `published` MAPS AN HOUR TO A TUPLE, not to a point (FCST-04 H1). An hour
# may legitimately hold four published points - see the quarter-hourly block
# below - so the audit takes the whole set and checks membership by identity.
check("...and refuses a published hour that arrived as a COPY rather than as "
"the published object, which is where a flag gets lost",
raises(lambda: _fc._audit(
[PricePoint(start=TODAY_PART.points[0].start,
eur_per_kwh=TODAY_PART.points[0].eur_per_kwh,
provisional=TODAY_PART.points[0].provisional)],
{D0: (TODAY_PART.points[0],)}), ValueError))
{D0: TODAY_PART.points[0]}), ValueError))
check("...and never repairs a flag: the audit's only outcomes are silence and "
"an exception, so a series it passed was already correct",
_fc._audit(list(FILLED.points), {u: (TODAY_PART.points[i],)
_fc._audit(list(FILLED.points), {u: TODAY_PART.points[i]
for i, u in enumerate(DAY[:PUBLISHED_N])})
is None)
@@ -301,81 +298,6 @@ check("a PUBLISHED point that the feed itself flagged provisional keeps that "
and all(p.provisional for p in _eddy_filled.points[:2])
and _eddy_filled.points[0] is _eddy.points[0])
# ⚠️ AND A SUB-HOURLY FEED IS NOT DECIMATED TO ONE POINT AN HOUR (FCST-04 H1).
# `eneco_eddy` settles per QUARTER and `_validate_raw()` accepts any
# strictly-increasing spacing, so a published hour can hold four points. The
# fill walks WHOLE HOURS to decide what needs carrying; that must not become a
# rule about what a published hour may contain. Measured on FCST-04's first
# draft, which keyed the published set `{_utc_hour(p.start): p ...}`: a
# 96-point feed came out 15 points long and its arbitrage spread fell from
# 0.143 to 0.014 EUR/kWh, on an ALL-FIRM, fully-published series.
_QN = 16 # four hours of quarters
_QUARTERS = PriceRead.series(
[PricePoint(start=brussels(D0 + timedelta(minutes=15 * n)),
eur_per_kwh=round(0.100000 + 0.011300 * n, 6),
provisional=False)
for n in range(_QN)],
PriceProduct.REALTIME, "eneco_eddy", D0)
_QHOURS = {_fc._utc_hour(p.start) for p in _QUARTERS.points}
check(f"the quarter-hourly fixture really is sub-hourly - {_QN} points across "
f"{len(_QHOURS)} hours - or every check below passes for an hourly feed "
f"too and grades nothing",
len(_QUARTERS.points) == _QN and len(_QHOURS) == _QN // 4)
_qfill = derived(lambda: fill_from_yesterday(_QUARTERS, yesterday=YESTERDAY,
since=D0, until=D1, stamp=D0))
_qfirm = derived(lambda: [p for p in _qfill.points if not p.provisional])
check(f"every one of the {_QN} published points survives the fill BY IDENTITY "
f"({len(_qfirm)} kept). One-per-hour keying would leave {_QN // 4}, and "
f"the spread over the hours the feed actually published would collapse "
f"with them",
len(_qfirm) == _QN
and all(any(p is q for q in _QUARTERS.points) for p in _qfirm))
check(f"...and the {len(DAY) - len(_QHOURS)} whole hours it published NOTHING "
f"for are carried, ONE point each: a carried hour is hourly whatever the "
f"feed's spacing is, because yesterday's profile is only known per "
f"wall-clock hour",
_qfill.kind == "series"
and len([p for p in _qfill.points if p.provisional])
== len(DAY) - len(_QHOURS))
check("...and the filled series is still ordered by instant across the two "
"kinds, so `at()` and `window()` are not reading a shuffled list",
_qfill.kind == "series"
and [p.start.astimezone(UTC) for p in _qfill.points]
== sorted(p.start.astimezone(UTC) for p in _qfill.points))
_PUB_Q = _fc._published_by_hour(_QUARTERS)
# ⚠️ `derived`, NOT A RAW CALL. Under the decimating mutation this check
# exists for, `_audit` RAISES here - and a harness that dies on the mutation it
# is grading reports a traceback instead of a FAIL, which MUTATION.md forbids.
check("the audit ACCEPTS four published points inside one hour, which is the "
"case the repeated-hour COUNT it replaced could not express",
derived(lambda: _fc._audit(list(_QUARTERS.points), _PUB_Q)) is None)
check("...and still REFUSES a repeated CARRIED hour, which is the DST "
"mispricing that count existed to catch",
raises(lambda: _fc._audit([_fc._carried(D0, 0.11),
_fc._carried(D0, 0.12)], {}), ValueError))
check("...and refuses the SAME published point emitted twice - the provider's "
"points are strictly increasing, so a repeat is never a second print",
raises(lambda: _fc._audit([_QUARTERS.points[0], _QUARTERS.points[0]],
_PUB_Q), ValueError))
check("...and refuses a CARRIED point standing in an hour the feed DID "
"publish, which the old count never looked at",
raises(lambda: _fc._audit([_fc._carried(D0, 0.11)], _PUB_Q), ValueError))
# ⚠️ THE HORIZON IS WHOLE HOURS AT BOTH ENDS (FCST-04 L8). `since` is floored
# and `until` was not, so a 48 h request made at any instant off the hour came
# back 49 hours long. Graded at an OFF-THE-HOUR instant, because on the hour
# the two implementations agree and the check would grade nothing.
_off = D0 + timedelta(hours=8, minutes=17, seconds=43)
for _h in (1, 12, 48):
_n = derived(lambda h=_h: len(fill_from_yesterday(
TODAY_PART, yesterday=YESTERDAY, since=_off,
until=_off + timedelta(hours=h), stamp=_off).points))
check(f"a {_h} h horizon asked for at {_off.isoformat()} - 17 min 43 s "
f"past the hour, the shape a running controller always has - is "
f"{_h} points long, not {_h + 1}",
_n == _h)
# The structural half: the constructor has nothing to pass, and the file is
# scanned so the pass-through idiom cannot come back looking ordinary.
check("_carried() has NO `provisional` parameter, so a caller has nothing to "
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
-893
View File
@@ -1,893 +0,0 @@
"""Runnable check for the ingress configuration surface. `python3 test_selfconfig.py`
UX-02. The panel edits, validates and saves the add-on's own options. Four of
its properties are the ones that could hurt somebody, and they are what this
file spends its length on:
1. AN INVALID BLOB IS NEVER WRITTEN. Not "warned about": not written. An
invalid blob plus a restart is exit 78, and an add-on that is not running
is not serving the panel either - the operator's way back would be the
Supervisor UI, which is the surface this card exists because it is hard to
read. Part 2 attempts the write and counts what the Supervisor received.
2. A BLOB THAT MOVED UNDERNEATH IS NEVER CLOBBERED. There are two config
surfaces and only one blob. Part 3 simulates the other one writing between
this page's read and its save.
3. EVERY MESSAGE COMES FROM THE SHIPPED VALIDATOR. Part 6 adds a NEW RULE to
a COPY of validate.py, serves the page out of that copy in a subprocess,
and watches the new sentence arrive on the field it names - with every UI
file byte-identical, which is asserted by hashing them.
4. NOTHING HERE COMMANDS AN INVERTER. Part 7 lists what the panel exposes and
compares it with what `/action` already offered.
⚠️ MUTATING THE MODULE THIS FILE GRADES? PURGE `__pycache__` FIRST - or run
`tools/mutation_run.sh`, which does. `python3 -B` alone does NOT save you: it
stops bytecode being WRITTEN, not a stale one being READ. That is TEST-15, and
part 6 below builds a mutated tree on purpose, so it purges its own copy.
"""
import asyncio
import hashlib
import io
import json
import os
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
from aiohttp import ClientSession, web as aioweb
from app import config_page, configui, selfconfig, web
from app.validate import validate_startup_config
HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
fails = []
def check(name, cond):
print(f" {'ok ' if cond else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not cond:
fails.append(name)
def run(coro):
return asyncio.run(coro)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# Fixtures.
#
# ⚠️ `SCHEMA` AND `TRANSLATIONS` ARE FIXTURES OF SOMEBODY ELSE'S RESPONSE SHAPE,
# and they are graded against the real thing somewhere else on purpose.
# `tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py` builds the same two structures with
# Supervisor 2026.08.0's OWN `UiOptions` and `_read_app_translations` and runs
# this repository's `field_model()` over them - §C and §E. This file cannot: the
# CI image is Alpine + python3 + aiohttp + paho and has neither the Supervisor
# nor PyYAML. So the shapes below are small, and the claim that they are the
# shapes that arrive is the probe's, not this file's.
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
SCHEMA = [
{"name": "setpoint_entity", "required": True, "type": "string"},
{"name": "max_w", "lengthMin": 100.0, "lengthMax": 5000.0,
"required": True, "type": "integer"},
{"name": "meter_source", "required": True, "type": "select",
"options": ["off", "ha_dsmr"]},
{"name": "log_level", "required": True, "type": "select",
"options": ["info", "trace"]},
{"name": "batt_invert", "required": True, "type": "boolean"},
{"name": "inverters", "type": "schema", "optional": True, "multiple": True,
"schema": [
{"name": "name", "required": True, "type": "string"},
{"name": "setpoint_entity", "required": True, "type": "string"},
{"name": "max_w", "lengthMin": 100.0, "lengthMax": 5000.0,
"required": True, "type": "integer"},
{"name": "bms_soc_floor", "lengthMin": 0.0, "lengthMax": 50.0,
"required": True, "type": "integer"}]},
]
TRANSLATIONS = {
"en": {"configuration": {
"setpoint_entity": {"name": "Hardware · Inverter setpoint entity",
"description": "Where the setpoint is written."},
"max_w": {"name": "Limits · Inverter rating (W)",
"description": "The ceiling this site may command."},
"meter_source": {"name": "Meter · Source",
"description": "Where the grid reading comes from."},
"log_level": {"name": "Advanced · Log level",
"description": "How much the add-on writes to its log."},
"batt_invert": {"name": "Hardware · Battery power sign is reversed",
"description": "Only if your sensor is backwards."},
"inverters": {"name": "Hardware · Inverter list",
"description": "Leave empty for one inverter.",
"fields": {
"name": {"name": "Name"},
"setpoint_entity": {"name": "Setpoint entity"},
"max_w": {"name": "Rating (W)"},
"bms_soc_floor": {"name": "Battery cut-out (%)"}}}}},
"nl": {"configuration": {
"max_w": {"name": "Grenzen · Omvormervermogen (W)",
"description": "Het plafond voor deze site."}}},
}
def base(**over):
"""An options blob that STARTS. Everything else is this, spoilt.
The same fixture shape as test_validate.py's `base()`, for the same reason
it gives: a check that is measuring a broken config has to be able to show
that the unbroken one is accepted, or it is measuring nothing.
"""
o = {"setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint", "max_w": 2000,
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "log_level": "info", "batt_invert": False,
"inverters": [],
"maintenance_charge_w": 2000, "maintenance_discharge_w": 2000}
o.update(over)
return o
class FakeSupervisor:
"""The Supervisor's stored options, and a count of what reached them.
⚠️ IT COUNTS WRITES, NOT CALLS. "Nothing was written" is the property parts
2 and 3 are about, and a fake that only recorded that `write_options` was
reached could not tell a refusal from a write that failed afterwards.
"""
def __init__(self, options=None):
self.options = dict(options or base())
self.writes = []
self.restarts = 0
async def info(self):
return {"options": dict(self.options), "schema": SCHEMA,
"translations": TRANSLATIONS, "state": "started"}
async def write_options(self, options):
self.writes.append(dict(options))
self.options = dict(options)
async def restart(self, confirm):
if confirm != selfconfig.RESTART_CONFIRM:
raise selfconfig.NotConfirmed("not confirmed")
self.restarts += 1
class FakeHass:
"""`hass.limits()` and nothing else. It cannot write: that is the point."""
def __init__(self, ranges=None):
self.ranges = ranges or {}
self.reads = []
async def limits(self, entity):
self.reads.append(entity)
return self.ranges.get(entity, (None, None, None))
class FakeController:
def __init__(self, opts=None, hass=None):
self.o = dict(opts or base())
self.hass = hass or FakeHass()
self.inverters = []
self.events = []
def log_event(self, text):
self.events.append(text)
def status_payload(self):
return {"banner": "", "level": "ok", "rows": [], "checks": []}
async def handle_action(self, what):
raise AssertionError("the configuration surface must never reach "
f"handle_action ({what!r})")
# ⚠️ THE ANCHOR LIST IS EVERY OPTION KEY config.yaml DECLARES, read off the
# file with the shipped parser rather than typed here. That is what the running
# panel anchors against too: `GET /addons/self/info` returns the MERGED options,
# so every key is present in the blob the page posts back. A test that anchored
# against a small fixture's keys would report a rule as "unanchored" purely
# because its fixture did not mention the key - which is what the first draft
# of part 4 did, for the price rules.
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(HERE, "tools"))
import translations_lint as _tl # noqa: E402
ALL_KEYS, _NESTED = _tl.config_surface(
io.open(os.path.join(HERE, "config.yaml"), encoding="utf-8").read())
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("1. the compare-and-swap token")
_a = base()
_b = dict(reversed(list(base().items()))) # same content, other key order
check("two blobs with the same content have the same fingerprint, whatever "
"order their keys were built in - a token that changed on a dict "
"reordering would refuse every save for no reason",
selfconfig.fingerprint(_a) == selfconfig.fingerprint(_b))
check("one changed value changes it",
selfconfig.fingerprint(base()) != selfconfig.fingerprint(base(max_w=2001)))
check("...and so does a changed ROSTER ORDER, because roster order is meaning",
selfconfig.fingerprint(base(inverters=[{"name": "a"}, {"name": "b"}]))
!= selfconfig.fingerprint(base(inverters=[{"name": "b"}, {"name": "a"}])))
check("it is a hex digest and not the blob - nothing about the configuration "
"leaves through it",
re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-f]{64}", selfconfig.fingerprint(base())) is not None)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("2. AN INVALID BLOB IS REFUSED, AND NOTHING IS WRITTEN")
sup = FakeSupervisor()
fp = selfconfig.fingerprint(sup.options)
bad = base(setpoint_entity="") # rule 2: a controller with no actuator
refused = None
try:
run(selfconfig.save(sup, bad, fp))
except selfconfig.SaveRefused as err:
refused = err
check("the save raises SaveRefused(invalid)",
refused is not None and refused.kind == "invalid")
check("⚠️ AND THE SUPERVISOR RECEIVED NOTHING. Not a write that was rolled "
"back, not a write of the old blob - no write at all",
sup.writes == [])
check("the stored options are byte-identical to what they were",
selfconfig.fingerprint(sup.options) == fp)
check("...and the refusal carries the validator's OWN sentence, unedited",
refused.problems == validate_startup_config(bad, None, None))
check("...which is the sentence that names the key and says what it costs",
any("setpoint_entity is not set" in p for p in refused.problems))
_good = base()
res = run(selfconfig.save(sup, _good, fp))
check("a config that STARTS is saved - or nothing above means anything",
len(sup.writes) == 1 and sup.writes[0] == _good)
check("...and the caller gets the new token back, so the next save can "
"compare against what it just wrote",
res["fingerprint"] == selfconfig.fingerprint(_good))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("2b. ⚠️ THE TWO HALVES OF THE max_w FIX, EACH PINNED SO IT CANNOT BE UNDONE")
# Review found that BOTH halves reverted with the whole 24-file suite still
# green - including the half that turns a crash into a SILENT ACCEPTANCE, which
# is the more dangerous of the two and was a wrong first attempt at this very
# fix. A fix nothing grades is a fix that comes back. MUTATION.md habit 4.
from app.inverter import _flat_max_w, build_roster # noqa: E402
from app.validate import _number # noqa: E402
# ⚠️ THIS CHECK EXISTS BECAUSE THE OBVIOUS ONE HAS A HOLE. "problems_and_ranges
# does not raise" is ALSO satisfied by the backstop swallowing the exception and
# returning [] - which is the silent-acceptance bug half two exists to prevent.
# Measured: with BOTH halves reverted, every max_w check below reported ok and
# only the forced-boom pins went red. So half one is pinned HERE, on the
# composition itself, where the backstop cannot answer for it.
_raised = None
try:
build_roster(base(max_w=""), None)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
_raised = exc
check("⭐ THE COMPOSITION ITSELF TOLERATES A CLEARED max_w - not merely the "
"backstop above it. `validate.py`'s `_number()` reads '' as the default, "
"so rule 9 sees 2000 and is content; a bare `float('')` in the flat path "
"raised instead, inverting inverter.py's own rule that a shape rule 9 "
"tolerates must be composable",
_raised is None)
# HALF ONE: composition tolerates exactly what rule 9 tolerates.
for raw in ("", None, 0, False, True, -1, "2000", " 2000 ", "2e3", 1e18):
o = base(max_w=raw)
expect = _number(o, "max_w", 2000.0)
if expect is not None:
check(f"_flat_max_w agrees with _number() for max_w={raw!r}",
_flat_max_w(o) == expect)
_raised = None
try:
_probs, _ = run(selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(base(max_w=""), None))
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
_raised, _probs = exc, None
check("⚠️ A CLEARED max_w BOX ANSWERS WITH A VERDICT, NOT AN EXCEPTION. It "
"used to raise ValueError from inside Controller.__init__, which the "
"panel served as HTTP 500 on a non-JSON body and the page rendered as "
"'cannot reach the add-on' - untrue, for the most prominent limit "
"field's most likely transient state",
_raised is None)
check("...and it agrees with the validator, which reads '' as the default",
_probs == list(validate_startup_config(base(max_w=""), None, None)))
_raised = None
try:
_probs, _ = run(selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(base(max_w="abc"), None))
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
_raised, _probs = exc, None
check("an UNPARSEABLE max_w answers with the validator's own sentence",
_raised is None and any("is not a number" in p for p in (_probs or [])))
# HALF ONE, THE PART THAT MAKES IT SAFE RATHER THAN MERELY NOT-CRASHING:
# clearing the box on the LIVE shape must FAIL CLOSED, not silently halve the
# rail. `unit_caps_indexed` reads the flat rail through the same `_number`, so
# the rail collapses to 2000 in lockstep and rule 10 catches the collapse.
_live = base(max_w=5000, slew_w=400)
_probs, _ = run(selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(dict(_live), None))
check("the live shape (5000 W rail, slew_w 400) starts", _probs == [])
_probs, _ = run(selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(dict(_live, max_w=""), None))
check("⚠️ CLEARING max_w ON THE LIVE SHAPE IS REFUSED - rule 10 catches the "
"rail collapsing to the 2000 default under an explicit 400 W slew, so "
"the box cannot be emptied into a quietly halved rail",
any("site rail of 2000 W" in p for p in _probs))
# HALF TWO: the backstop cannot report "no problems" for a config it could not
# compose. Returning [] there enables Save - a crash became a green.
_orig_roster = selfconfig.build_roster
def _boom(*_a, **_kw):
raise ValueError("forced boom")
selfconfig.build_roster = _boom
try:
_probs, _ = run(selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(base(), None))
finally:
selfconfig.build_roster = _orig_roster
check("⚠️ THE BACKSTOP NEVER RETURNS AN EMPTY LIST. A roster that cannot be "
"composed while the validator names no reason is itself the finding - "
"returning [] would turn a crash into a silent acceptance and enable "
"Save, which is worse than the 500 it replaced",
_probs != [] and len(_probs) == 1)
check("...and it says so in words, naming the exception",
any("could not be composed" in p and "forced boom" in p
for p in _probs))
check("...and the patch was undone, so nothing below inherits it",
selfconfig.build_roster is _orig_roster)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("3. THE OTHER SURFACE WRITES WHILE THIS PAGE IS OPEN")
# ⚠️ SIMULATED AT THE EXACT MOMENT IT MATTERS. The Supervisor's Configuration
# tab is not removable, so this is not a hypothetical race - it is the normal
# way two people, or one person on two devices, use this add-on. The blob is
# changed AFTER the page's read and BEFORE its save.
# ⚠️ EVERY BLOB IN THIS SECTION MUST BE ONE THAT STARTS. The gate validates
# BEFORE it compares, so a fixture that is also invalid would be refused for
# the wrong reason and this section would be measuring rule 6 instead of the
# compare-and-swap. (It was, in the first draft: `max_w: 1800` beneath the
# fixture's `maintenance_charge_w: 2000` is a genuine refusal.)
sup = FakeSupervisor(base(max_w=2000))
page_fp = selfconfig.fingerprint(sup.options) # what the page loaded
sup.options = base(max_w=2500) # the other tab saves
mine = base(max_w=3000, log_level="trace") # what the operator typed
refused = None
try:
run(selfconfig.save(sup, mine, page_fp))
except selfconfig.SaveRefused as err:
refused = err
check("the save raises SaveRefused(stale)",
refused is not None and refused.kind == "stale")
check("⚠️ AND AGAIN NOTHING WAS WRITTEN - the other surface's value stands, "
"and the operator's edits were not silently thrown at it",
sup.writes == [] and sup.options["max_w"] == 2500)
check("the refusal NAMES the keys that differ, so the page can print them "
"rather than saying 'something changed'",
refused.changed == ["log_level", "max_w"])
check("...and carries what is stored, so the operator decides in front of the "
"difference rather than through it",
refused.stored["max_w"] == 2500)
_after = run(selfconfig.save(sup, mine, selfconfig.fingerprint(sup.options)))
check("saving again against the CURRENT token succeeds - the refusal is a "
"gate, not a lock",
len(sup.writes) == 1 and sup.options["max_w"] == 3000
and _after["fingerprint"] == selfconfig.fingerprint(mine))
# ⚠️ AND THERE IS NO WAY ROUND IT. A caller with no token cannot save.
sup = FakeSupervisor()
try:
run(selfconfig.save(sup, base(max_w=2400), ""))
check("an empty token is refused", False)
except selfconfig.SaveRefused as err:
check("an empty token is refused as stale rather than treated as 'do not "
"check' - there is no force door in this module",
err.kind == "stale" and sup.writes == [])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("4. WHERE A REFUSAL LANDS ON THE PAGE")
# ⚠️ MEASURED, NOT CLAIMED. The anchoring is name occurrence: a sentence is
# printed under every option key it spells. Rather than assert a coverage
# figure, this runs the SHIPPED validator on a spread of broken configs and
# prints what anchored and what did not.
_cases = [
("no actuator", base(setpoint_entity="")),
("max_w over the device", base(max_w=4000)),
("charge rate above the ceiling", base(maintenance_charge_w=3000)),
("sign threshold at the ceiling", base(sign_disagree_w=2000)),
("two writers on one actuator",
base(inverters=[{"name": "a", "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint",
"max_w": 2000, "bms_soc_floor": 10}])),
("a price source that cannot mean what it says",
base(price_provider="manual_csv")),
]
_ranges = {"number.goodwe_setpoint": (-3000.0, 3000.0, 1.0)}
_total = _anchored = 0
_orphans = []
for title, opts in _cases:
probs = run(selfconfig.problems_for(opts, FakeHass(_ranges)))
by_key, un = configui.problems_by_field(probs, ALL_KEYS)
_total += len(probs)
_anchored += len(probs) - len(un)
_orphans += [(title, p[:70]) for p in un]
print(f" {title:34s} {len(probs)} problem(s), "
f"{len(probs) - len(un)} beside a field")
check(f"every one of the {_total} refusals these six broken configs produce "
f"lands beside at least one of the fields it is about. Unanchored: "
f"{_orphans}", _total > 0 and not _orphans)
_probs = run(selfconfig.problems_for(base(max_w=4000), FakeHass(_ranges)))
_by, _un = configui.problems_by_field(_probs, ALL_KEYS)
check("the device-range rule is REACHED from the panel - the setpoint entity's "
"own range is read, so rule 1 fires here exactly as it does at startup",
any("THE DEVICE WINS" in p for p in _probs))
check("...and it lands on `max_w`, which is the field the operator has to "
"change", "max_w" in _by)
# ⚠️ THE COLLISION, CHECKED HERE AND NOT ONLY IN THE PROBE. `sign_disagree_w`
# is a suffix of both `unit_sign_disagree_w` and `site_sign_disagree_w` - three
# real options, two of them SAFETY-30's. A plain substring test would print
# every per-unit refusal next to the SITE field as well, which is a message
# about unit-0 beside a box that has nothing to do with it. CI runs this file
# and not the probe, so the assertion has to live here too.
_collide = [k for k in ALL_KEYS
if any(o != k and o.endswith("_" + k) for o in ALL_KEYS)]
check(f"config.yaml really does declare keys that are suffixes of other keys, "
f"so the boundary matching is load-bearing: {_collide}", bool(_collide))
check("...and a sentence naming `unit_sign_disagree_w` is NOT also filed under "
"`sign_disagree_w`",
sorted(configui.problems_by_field(
["unit_sign_disagree_w is 3000 W but unit-0's max_w is 2000 W"],
ALL_KEYS)[0]) == ["max_w", "unit_sign_disagree_w"])
check("a cross-field refusal is filed under EVERY key it names, because a "
"cross-field rule is about all of its fields",
len(configui.problems_by_field(
["max_w is 8000 W but number.x accepts at most 5000 W"],
["max_w", "setpoint_entity"])[0]) == 1)
check("the panel shows no refusal at all for a config that starts",
run(selfconfig.problems_for(base(), FakeHass(_ranges))) == [])
# ⚠️ AND WHEN A DEVICE DOES NOT ANSWER, THE PAGE SAYS WHICH ONE. The two
# device-range rules are then skipped - here and at startup, identically - so a
# green page would be green for a reason the operator cannot see.
_p, _unread = run(selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(base(max_w=4000), FakeHass()))
check("with the setpoint device silent, rule 1 does not fire and the entity "
"that did not answer is named, so the page can say what was skipped",
_p == [] and _unread == ["number.goodwe_setpoint"])
_p2, _unread2 = run(selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(base(max_w=4000),
FakeHass(_ranges)))
check("...and with the same device answering, the same config IS refused - "
"which is what makes the line above a skip rather than a pass",
any("THE DEVICE WINS" in p for p in _p2) and _unread2 == [])
check("the note is about the config UNDER TEST, not about the running roster: "
"a newly typed entity that does not answer is the one named",
run(selfconfig.problems_and_ranges(
base(setpoint_entity="number.just_typed"), FakeHass(_ranges)))[1]
== ["number.just_typed"])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("5. THE UI OWNS NO COPY OF ANY RULE, LABEL OR KEY")
_page = io.open(os.path.join(HERE, "app", "config_page.py"),
encoding="utf-8").read()
_ui_files = {name: io.open(os.path.join(HERE, "app", name),
encoding="utf-8").read()
for name in ("config_page.py", "configui.py", "web.py")}
# The option keys config.yaml declares, read off the file rather than typed
# here - a hand-written list would go stale in the direction that hides a
# copy.
# `name` and `max_w` also occur as ordinary English/JS words or as model field
# names, so the test is on the SCRIPT half of the page and on keys that could
# only be there deliberately.
_script = _page.split("<script>", 1)[1]
_leaked = sorted(k for k in ALL_KEYS
if len(k) > 6 and re.search(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]" + k + r"[^A-Za-z0-9_]",
_script))
check(f"the page's script names NOT ONE option key - so it cannot be rendering "
f"a field list of its own. Leaked: {_leaked}", not _leaked)
_phrases = ["THE DEVICE WINS", "has no actuator", "two writers",
"setpoint_entity is not set", "would silently never happen"]
_copied = sorted(p for p in _phrases
for f, text in _ui_files.items() if p in text)
check(f"no phrase out of a validate.py refusal appears anywhere in the three "
f"UI files - the sentences are fetched, never written here. Copied: "
f"{_copied}", not _copied)
# ⚠️ THIS ONE HAS ALREADY EARNED ITS KEEP. The suffix map shipped with
# `("_hour", "h (0-23)")` in it - a RANGE, next to a field, in a second place
# from config.yaml's `int(0,23)`. It is exactly the drift this card forbids,
# in the one corner of the panel that is allowed to print anything of its own.
check("no unit string contains a digit, so the unit map cannot be stating a "
"bound, a default or a relation - config.yaml is the only place a range "
"is written and the schema is where the form gets it from",
all(not any(ch.isdigit() for ch in unit)
for _suffix, unit in configui._UNITS))
check("...and no entry of it is a whole option key - it is a suffix map, so it "
"cannot become a per-key opinion by accident",
not [suf for suf, _u in configui._UNITS if suf.lstrip("_") in ALL_KEYS])
# ⚠️ RELATIVE URLS, WHICH IS WHAT INGRESS REQUIRES. An absolute path works
# perfectly on a laptop and 404s in the field, so it cannot be left to review.
_abs = re.findall(r"""(?:fetch\(|href=)['"](/[^'"]*)['"]""",
_page + _ui_files["web.py"])
check(f"no absolute URL in either page - every fetch and every link is "
f"relative, because ingress serves this under a generated path prefix. "
f"Absolute: {_abs}", not _abs)
check("the page declares a viewport, which is the whole of 'readable on the "
"phone you are holding at the inverter'",
'name="viewport"' in _page and "max-width:760px" in _page)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("6. ⚠️ A RULE ADDED TO validate.py APPEARS IN THE UI WITH NO UI CHANGE")
# THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERION, RUN RATHER THAN ARGUED. A copy of this package is
# made, ONE new rule is inserted into validate.py's `validate_startup_config()`,
# and the real HTTP route is served out of that copy in a subprocess. If the
# page carried any list of known rules, the new sentence would not arrive.
SENTINEL = ("SENTINEL-UX02: log_level is set to 'trace', which this rule "
"refuses so that a check can watch it arrive.")
_INSERT = (' if str(opts.get("log_level", "")) == "trace":\n'
f' problems.append({SENTINEL!r})\n')
_probe = r'''
import asyncio, json, os, sys
sys.path.insert(0, os.environ["TREE"])
from aiohttp import ClientSession, web as aioweb
from app import web
class H:
session = None
token = ""
async def limits(self, e): return (None, None, None)
class C:
o = json.loads(os.environ["OPTS"]); hass = H(); inverters = []
def log_event(self, t): pass
def status_payload(self): return {}
async def handle_action(self, w): raise AssertionError("no")
async def main():
app = web.build_app(C())
runner = aioweb.AppRunner(app); await runner.setup()
site = aioweb.TCPSite(runner, "127.0.0.1", 0); await site.start()
port = site._server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
async with ClientSession() as s:
async with s.post(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/config/validate",
json={"options": json.loads(os.environ["OPTS"])}) as r:
print(json.dumps(await r.json()))
await runner.cleanup()
asyncio.run(main())
'''
_tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="ux02-mutant-")
try:
_tree = os.path.join(_tmp, "goodwe_controller")
shutil.copytree(os.path.join(HERE, "app"), os.path.join(_tree, "app"))
# ⚠️ PURGE THE COPY'S BYTECODE. MUTATION.md habit: `python3 -B` stops
# bytecode being WRITTEN, never a stale one being READ, and a copytree
# brings any `__pycache__` along with it.
_purged = 0
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(_tree):
for d in list(dirs):
if d == "__pycache__":
shutil.rmtree(os.path.join(root, d))
dirs.remove(d)
_purged += 1
print(f" purged {_purged} __pycache__ director(y|ies) from the copy; "
f"{sum(1 for r, _d, fs in os.walk(_tree) for f in fs if f.endswith('.pyc'))}"
" .pyc left")
_vpath = os.path.join(_tree, "app", "validate.py")
_src = io.open(_vpath, encoding="utf-8").read()
_at = _src.index("def validate_startup_config")
_anchor = " problems: list[str] = []\n"
_cut = _src.index(_anchor, _at) + len(_anchor)
io.open(_vpath, "w", encoding="utf-8").write(
_src[:_cut] + _INSERT + _src[_cut:])
check("the mutated copy differs from the shipped tree in validate.py, and "
"in validate.py ONLY - so anything the page gains is the rule's",
[name for name in sorted(os.listdir(os.path.join(HERE, "app")))
if name.endswith(".py")
and hashlib.sha256(io.open(os.path.join(HERE, "app", name), "rb")
.read()).hexdigest()
!= hashlib.sha256(io.open(os.path.join(_tree, "app", name), "rb")
.read()).hexdigest()] == ["validate.py"])
_env = dict(os.environ, TREE=_tree, OPTS=json.dumps(base(log_level="trace")),
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE="1")
_out = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-B", "-c", _probe], env=_env,
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)
if _out.returncode != 0:
print(_out.stdout[-2000:])
print(_out.stderr[-2000:])
check("the page's own /config/validate route answers out of the mutated "
"tree", _out.returncode == 0)
_payload = json.loads(_out.stdout.strip().splitlines()[-1]) if _out.stdout else {}
check("⚠️ THE NEW RULE'S SENTENCE IS ON THE PAGE, and no file under app/ "
"other than validate.py was touched to put it there",
SENTINEL in (_payload.get("problems") or []))
check("...and it is filed under `log_level`, the field it names, by the "
"same anchoring that files every other rule - so a new rule arrives "
"in the right place rather than in a catch-all",
SENTINEL in (_payload.get("by_key") or {}).get("log_level", []))
check("...while the SHIPPED tree does not refuse that config at all, which "
"is what makes the line above evidence about the rule rather than "
"about the fixture",
run(selfconfig.problems_for(base(log_level="trace"), None)) == [])
finally:
shutil.rmtree(_tmp, ignore_errors=True)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("7. THE PANEL'S REACH INTO THE INVERTER IS UNCHANGED")
_app = web.build_app(FakeController(), FakeSupervisor())
_routes = sorted({(r.method, r.get_info().get("path"))
for r in _app.router.routes() if r.method != "HEAD"})
print(" " + " ".join(f"{m} {p}" for m, p in _routes))
check("the configuration surface adds five routes and touches none of the "
"three that were there",
_routes == [("GET", "/"), ("GET", "/config"), ("GET", "/config/model"),
("GET", "/status"), ("POST", "/action"),
("POST", "/config/restart"), ("POST", "/config/save"),
("POST", "/config/validate")])
_selfconfig_src = io.open(os.path.join(HERE, "app", "selfconfig.py"),
encoding="utf-8").read()
for forbidden in ("set_number", "write_setpoint", "handle_action",
"command_site_zero", "sign_wd", "reset("):
check(f"neither selfconfig.py nor the page can reach `{forbidden}`",
forbidden not in _selfconfig_src
and forbidden not in _ui_files["config_page.py"])
# ⚠️ ASSERTED ON THE CONSTANTS, NOT ON A GREP OF THE FILE. The module's own
# docstring quotes Supervisor's bypass regex, which names `security`, `update`
# and `options/validate`; a grep would find those and report a reach the code
# does not have. The three constants are what `_call()` can be given.
check("the ONLY Supervisor endpoints this module defines are self/info, "
"self/options and self/restart",
sorted(v for k, v in vars(selfconfig).items()
if k.startswith("SELF_"))
== ["http://supervisor/addons/self/info",
"http://supervisor/addons/self/options",
"http://supervisor/addons/self/restart"])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("8. end to end, over real HTTP, against a fake Supervisor")
async def _serve(app):
runner = aioweb.AppRunner(app)
await runner.setup()
site = aioweb.TCPSite(runner, "127.0.0.1", 0)
await site.start()
return runner, site._server.sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
async def _e2e():
out = {}
sup = FakeSupervisor(base(max_w=2000))
ctrl = FakeController(base(max_w=1500), # running != stored
FakeHass({"number.goodwe_setpoint":
(-3000.0, 3000.0, 1.0)}))
runner, port = await _serve(web.build_app(ctrl, sup))
root = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
try:
async with ClientSession() as s:
async with s.get(f"{root}/config") as r:
out["page"] = (r.status, await r.text())
async with s.get(f"{root}/config/model?lang=nl") as r:
out["model"] = await r.json()
async with s.post(f"{root}/config/validate",
json={"options": base(setpoint_entity="")}) as r:
out["invalid"] = await r.json()
# ⚠️ THE COUNTS ARE SNAPSHOTTED AT EACH STAGE. Asserting
# `sup.writes == []` after the whole sequence would be asserting
# about the LAST request, not this one - the first draft did, and
# went red only because a later, legitimate save had happened.
async with s.post(f"{root}/config/save",
json={"options": base(setpoint_entity=""),
"fingerprint": out["model"]["fingerprint"]}
) as r:
out["save_invalid"] = (r.status, await r.json(),
len(sup.writes))
async with s.post(f"{root}/config/save",
json={"options": base(max_w=2400),
"fingerprint": "not-the-token"}) as r:
out["save_stale"] = (r.status, await r.json(), len(sup.writes))
async with s.post(f"{root}/config/save",
json={"options": base(max_w=2400),
"fingerprint": out["model"]["fingerprint"]}
) as r:
out["save_ok"] = (r.status, await r.json())
async with s.post(f"{root}/config/restart", json={}) as r:
out["restart_bare"] = (r.status, await r.json(), sup.restarts)
async with s.post(f"{root}/config/restart",
json={"confirm": "restart"}) as r:
out["restart_ok"] = (r.status, await r.json())
finally:
await runner.cleanup()
out["sup"] = sup
out["ctrl"] = ctrl
return out
E = run(_e2e())
check("GET config serves the page", E["page"][0] == 200
and "GoodWe - Configuration" in E["page"][1])
_m = E["model"]
check("the model carries the groups, the stored blob and its token",
# `Grenzen`, not `Limits`: this request asked for nl, and nl.yaml
# carries `max_w`. The three groups around it fall back to English per
# key, which is the frontend's own rule and is asserted two checks below.
[g["name"] for g in _m["groups"]] == ["Hardware", "Grenzen", "Meter",
"Advanced"]
and _m["options"]["max_w"] == 2000
and _m["fingerprint"] == selfconfig.fingerprint(_m["options"]))
check("...and it says which stored settings are NOT what this add-on is "
"running - which is how an edit made in the Configuration tab, or a save "
"not yet restarted into, becomes visible here",
_m["running_differs"] == ["max_w"] and _m["running"]["max_w"] == 1500)
check("...and it honours the browser's language per key, falling back to "
"English for the keys nl.yaml does not carry - the frontend's own rule",
_m["lang"] == "nl"
and [f["label"] for g in _m["groups"] for f in g["fields"]
if f["key"] == "max_w"] == ["Omvormervermogen (W)"]
and [f["label_lang"] for g in _m["groups"] for f in g["fields"]
if f["key"] == "meter_source"] == ["en"])
check("POST config/validate returns the validator's sentences, anchored",
E["invalid"]["problems"]
and "setpoint_entity" in E["invalid"]["by_key"])
check("a save of an invalid blob answers 422 and the Supervisor got nothing",
E["save_invalid"][0] == 422
and E["save_invalid"][1]["kind"] == "invalid"
and E["save_invalid"][2] == 0)
check("a save with a stale token answers 409, writes nothing, and hands back "
"the CURRENT token so the operator can save again in front of the "
"difference",
E["save_stale"][0] == 409
and E["save_stale"][1]["kind"] == "stale"
and E["save_stale"][1]["fingerprint"]
== selfconfig.fingerprint(E["save_stale"][1]["stored"])
and E["save_stale"][2] == 0)
check("a valid save with the right token is written, once",
E["save_ok"][0] == 200 and len(E["sup"].writes) == 1
and E["sup"].writes[0]["max_w"] == 2400)
check("...and it does NOT restart anything - applying is a separate, "
"confirmed act, because it costs a control interruption",
E["restart_bare"][0] == 400 and E["restart_bare"][2] == 0)
check("...which the confirmed request performs",
E["restart_ok"][0] == 200)
check("the action log records both, so §15 can say who changed what",
any("configuration saved" in e for e in E["ctrl"].events)
and any("restart requested" in e for e in E["ctrl"].events))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("9. the page says what a save costs BEFORE it is pressed")
for phrase in ("0 W on every inverter", "Saving does not restart anything",
"Restart to apply"):
check(f"the page states {phrase!r} in its own markup, not in a message "
"that only appears afterwards", phrase in _page)
check("the restart confirmation names the cost again at the moment of pressing",
"Yes, restart now" in _page
and _page.count("0 W on every inverter") >= 2)
_flat = " ".join(_page.split())
check("and it says which surface is authoritative when the add-on is down",
"If the add-on is not running, the Configuration tab is the only one of "
"the two that still exists" in _flat)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
print("10. the Supervisor conversation itself, over real HTTP")
# ⚠️ EVERYTHING ABOVE INJECTED A FAKE `selfcfg`, so none of it exercised the
# one piece that talks to somebody else's server: the headers, the request
# body's shape, the `{"result": "ok", "data": {...}}` envelope and what a
# refusal turns into. A gate whose transport is never run is a gate that has
# only been read.
async def _transport():
seen = []
async def h_info(request):
seen.append(("info", request.headers.get("Authorization"), None))
return aioweb.json_response({"result": "ok",
"data": {"options": {"max_w": 2000}}})
async def h_options(request):
body = await request.json()
seen.append(("options", request.headers.get("Authorization"), body))
return aioweb.json_response({"result": "ok", "data": {}})
async def h_restart(request):
seen.append(("restart", request.headers.get("Authorization"), None))
return aioweb.json_response({"result": "ok", "data": {}})
async def h_denied(_request):
return aioweb.json_response(
{"result": "error", "message": "Missing API permission"},
status=403)
app = aioweb.Application()
app.add_routes([aioweb.get("/addons/self/info", h_info),
aioweb.post("/addons/self/options", h_options),
aioweb.post("/addons/self/restart", h_restart),
aioweb.get("/denied", h_denied)])
runner, port = await _serve(app)
root = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}"
saved = (selfconfig.SELF_INFO, selfconfig.SELF_OPTIONS,
selfconfig.SELF_RESTART)
selfconfig.SELF_INFO = f"{root}/addons/self/info"
selfconfig.SELF_OPTIONS = f"{root}/addons/self/options"
selfconfig.SELF_RESTART = f"{root}/addons/self/restart"
out = {}
try:
async with ClientSession() as session:
cfg = selfconfig.SelfConfig(session, "TOKEN-123")
out["info"] = await cfg.info()
await cfg.write_options({"max_w": 2400})
await cfg.restart(selfconfig.RESTART_CONFIRM)
try:
await cfg.restart("")
out["unconfirmed"] = None
except selfconfig.NotConfirmed as err:
out["unconfirmed"] = str(err)
try:
await cfg._call("GET", f"{root}/denied")
out["denied"] = None
except selfconfig.SupervisorUnavailable as err:
out["denied"] = str(err)
try:
await cfg._call("GET", f"{root}/nothing-here")
out["missing"] = None
except selfconfig.SupervisorUnavailable as err:
out["missing"] = str(err)
finally:
(selfconfig.SELF_INFO, selfconfig.SELF_OPTIONS,
selfconfig.SELF_RESTART) = saved
await runner.cleanup()
out["seen"] = seen
return out
T = run(_transport())
check("`info()` unwraps the Supervisor's `{result, data}` envelope",
T["info"] == {"options": {"max_w": 2000}})
check("every request carries the add-on's own SUPERVISOR_TOKEN as a bearer",
[auth for _what, auth, _b in T["seen"]] == ["Bearer TOKEN-123"] * 3)
check("the options write goes to /addons/self/options as {'options': blob} - "
"the shape `SCHEMA_OPTIONS` accepts, and the shape that REPLACES the "
"stored user options",
[(w, b) for w, _a, b in T["seen"] if w == "options"]
== [("options", {"options": {"max_w": 2400}})])
check("the restart is a POST to /addons/self/restart and reaches it only when "
"confirmed",
[w for w, _a, _b in T["seen"]] == ["info", "options", "restart"]
and T["unconfirmed"])
check("a Supervisor refusal is carried through with ITS message and its status "
"rather than rewritten - the page shows what the Supervisor said",
"403" in T["denied"] and "Missing API permission" in T["denied"])
check("...and so is a 404, so a path this add-on is not permitted is "
"distinguishable from one that does not exist",
"404" in T["missing"])
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: " + "; ".join(fails))
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+3 -6
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ from app.price import (
Absence, PricePoint, PriceProduct, PriceRead, arbitrage_allowed, brussels,
plan_is_provisional, required_spread, uncertainty_of,
)
from app.price_history import NoHistory
from app.static_tariff import (
MEAN_WINDOW_DAYS, ProfileInvalid, StaticProfile, TariffPlan,
parse_static_profile, resolve_tariff, static_plan, static_status,
@@ -747,8 +746,7 @@ _cfg = opts(TWO_PERIOD, price_provider="generic_dayahead",
price_feed_url="https://api.energy-charts.info/price?bzn=BE",
price_timeout_s=1, price_markup_eur_kwh=0.03,
price_taxes_eur_kwh=0.06)
_fb = run(resolve_tariff(_cfg, THU, THU + timedelta(days=1), transport=_dead,
history=NoHistory()))
_fb = run(resolve_tariff(_cfg, THU, THU + timedelta(days=1), transport=_dead))
check("a dead feed falls back to the static profile rather than to nothing",
_fb.origin == "fallback" and _fb.has_prices)
check("...with the SAME prices the configured-product path produces, because "
@@ -771,8 +769,7 @@ check("...and the provisional plan has no cheap window either: §8.3 forbids an
not any(_fb.cheap_now(at_local(THU, h)) for h in range(24)))
_fb_none = run(resolve_tariff(opts(None, price_provider="generic_dayahead",
price_timeout_s=1),
THU, THU + timedelta(days=1), transport=_dead,
history=NoHistory()))
THU, THU + timedelta(days=1), transport=_dead))
check("a dead feed with NO static_profile has nothing to fall back to, and "
"says that rather than inventing a tariff",
_fb_none.origin == "none" and not _fb_none.has_prices)
@@ -788,7 +785,7 @@ async def _live(url, timeout_s):
_live_plan = run(resolve_tariff(_cfg, THU, THU + timedelta(days=1),
transport=_live, history=NoHistory()))
transport=_live))
check("a live feed is used in preference to the static profile",
_live_plan.origin == "provider"
and _live_plan.product is PriceProduct.DAY_AHEAD)
+4 -10
View File
@@ -248,15 +248,9 @@ for what, text in BAD:
check(f"every shape outside the accepted subset RAISES rather than being "
f"skipped. Silently accepted: {_accepted}", not _accepted)
check("...and the accepted subset really does round-trip the shipped files - "
# ⚠️ COUNTED, NOT TYPED. UX-02 corrected this sentence's option count
# 70 -> 71 while OPT-09 independently added an eighth per-entry key
# (`capacity_kwh`), and the two edits collided here on the rebase - each
# restating a number the other had moved. The counts now come from the
# same parse the assertion uses, so the sentence cannot drift from it
# again. PROC-01.
f"{len(ORDER)} options and {sum(len(v) for v in NESTED.values())} "
f"per-entry keys came back out of each, which is what says the "
f"strictness above is not just refusing everything",
"70 options and 8 per-entry keys came back out of each (OPT-09 added the "
"eighth, `capacity_kwh`), which is what says the strictness above is not "
"just refusing everything",
all(len(TR[lg]["configuration"]) == len(ORDER)
and len(TR[lg]["configuration"]["inverters"]["fields"]) == 8
for lg in LANGS))
@@ -362,7 +356,7 @@ print("\n7. no behaviour and no value moved")
# test_peakguard.py's. This line is the cheap one that says the reorder did not
# lose or duplicate a key on the way.
check("no option was lost, gained or duplicated by the reordering: the two "
"halves of config.yaml hold the same 71 keys, once each",
"halves of config.yaml hold the same 70 keys, once each",
sorted(_opt_order) == sorted(ORDER) and len(set(ORDER)) == len(ORDER))
check("...and `inverters: []` is still shipped in the options half, which is "
"what Supervisor 2026.08.0 refuses every pre-0.6.0 options blob without "
-282
View File
@@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
"""PKG-09 - grade the check that refuses a no-op deploy. `python3 test_version_gate.py`
⚠️ THE POINT OF THIS FILE IS THE REFUSALS, NOT THE CLEARANCES. A pre-deploy
check that only ever says "CLEARED" is the defect `MUTATION.md` habit 4 names -
"a check whose DATA cannot reach the failure it names" - which this repository
has recorded twelve times. So every refusal below is DRIVEN: a repository is
built in which the failure is really present, and the check is required to say
so. A clearance is only meaningful next to a refusal from the same harness.
The third property is the one that is easy to lose: a SKIPPED check must not
look like a PASSED one. Omitting `--options` cannot exit 0.
"""
import json
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
GATE = os.path.join(HERE, "tools", "predeploy_check.py")
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(HERE, "tools"))
fails = []
tmpdirs = []
def check(name, ok):
print(f" {'ok ' if ok else 'FAIL'} {name}")
if not ok:
fails.append(name)
def git(repo, *args):
return subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", repo, "-c", "user.email=t@t", "-c", "user.name=t", *args],
capture_output=True, text=True)
def make_repo(version="0.7.0"):
"""A repo shaped like this one: <root>/goodwe_controller/{config.yaml,app,tools}."""
root = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="test_version_gate.")
tmpdirs.append(root)
addon = os.path.join(root, "goodwe_controller")
os.makedirs(os.path.join(addon, "app"))
write(addon, "config.yaml", f'name: t\nversion: "{version}"\n')
write(addon, "app/control.py", "X = 1\n")
write(addon, "CHANGELOG.md", "# Changelog\n")
git(root, "init", "-q", ".")
git(root, "add", "-A")
git(root, "commit", "-q", "-m", f"initial at {version}")
return root, addon
def write(addon, rel, text):
p = os.path.join(addon, rel)
with open(p, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
fh.write(text)
def run_gate(addon, root, deployed, options=None):
"""Run the REAL gate against a throwaway tree.
⚠️ The script is invoked where it SHIPS, not copied into the fixture. It
imports the validator from its own sibling `app/`, which is the behaviour
that matters: the gate must check a config against the validator it ships
beside, not against whatever happens to sit next to a copy. Copying it into
the fixture made every validator assertion silently SKIP - the first draft
of this file did exactly that and reported four green skips as passes.
"""
cmd = [sys.executable, GATE,
"--deployed-version", deployed, "--tree", addon, "--repo", root]
if options:
cmd += ["--options", options]
return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
VALID = {"max_w": 2000, "slew_w": 0, "target_grid_w": -10, "gain": 0.6,
"inverters": [], "setpoint_entity": "number.goodwe_setpoint_w"}
def opts_file(d):
fd, p = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=".json")
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as fh:
json.dump(d, fh)
return p
print("classification - what forces a rebuild and what does not")
from predeploy_check import is_runtime, shipped_version # noqa: E402
for p in ("goodwe_controller/app/control.py", "goodwe_controller/config.yaml",
"goodwe_controller/translations/en.yaml", "goodwe_controller/run.sh"):
check(f"runtime: {p}", is_runtime(p))
for p in ("goodwe_controller/CHANGELOG.md", "goodwe_controller/DOCS.md",
"goodwe_controller/test_control.py", "goodwe_controller/tools/x.py",
"goodwe_controller/DECISIONS/a.md", "README.md"):
check(f"NOT runtime: {p}", not is_runtime(p))
print("\nTHE REFUSAL - a runtime change behind an unchanged version")
root, addon = make_repo("0.7.0")
write(addon, "app/control.py", "X = 2\n")
git(root, "commit", "-qam", "SAFETY-99: change behaviour, bump nothing")
r = run_gate(addon, root, "0.7.0", opts_file(VALID))
check("refuses (exit 1)", r.returncode == 1)
check("...and says the deploy would be a NO-OP", "NO-OP" in r.stdout)
check("...and names the offending commit", "SAFETY-99" in r.stdout)
check("...and does NOT say cleared", "CLEARED for deploy" not in r.stdout)
print("\nPOSITIVE CONTROL - the same check must NOT fire on a docs-only change")
root2, addon2 = make_repo("0.7.0")
write(addon2, "CHANGELOG.md", "# Changelog\n\n## notes\n")
git(root2, "commit", "-qam", "PKG-99: documentation only")
r2 = run_gate(addon2, root2, "0.7.0", opts_file(VALID))
check("does not refuse a docs-only tree", r2.returncode == 0)
check("...and says there is nothing to deploy",
"nothing to deploy" in r2.stdout)
print("\nTHE CLEARANCE - a bumped version with a valid config")
root3, addon3 = make_repo("0.7.0")
write(addon3, "app/control.py", "X = 3\n")
write(addon3, "config.yaml", 'name: t\nversion: "0.8.0"\n')
git(root3, "commit", "-qam", "PKG-99: change and bump together")
r3 = run_gate(addon3, root3, "0.7.0", opts_file(VALID))
check("clears (exit 0)", r3.returncode == 0)
check("...and says so", "CLEARED for deploy" in r3.stdout)
print("\n⭐ A SKIPPED CHECK MUST NOT LOOK LIKE A PASSED ONE")
r4 = run_gate(addon3, root3, "0.7.0") # no --options
check("omitting --options cannot exit 0", r4.returncode != 0)
check("...says SKIPPED", "SKIPPED" in r4.stdout)
check("...says the config was NEVER CHECKED", "NEVER CHECKED" in r4.stdout)
check("...and does NOT claim clearance", "CLEARED for deploy" not in r4.stdout)
print("\nTHE OTHER REFUSAL - a config this version's validator rejects")
bad = dict(VALID, slew_w=1000) # rule 10: > 2/18 x 2000 = 222 W
r5 = run_gate(addon3, root3, "0.7.0", opts_file(bad))
check("refuses a config the validator rejects", r5.returncode == 1)
check("...and warns it is exit 78", "78" in r5.stdout)
check("...and warns the ingress panel goes too", "ingress panel" in r5.stdout)
check("...and prints the validator's own words", "slew_w is 1000 W" in r5.stdout)
print()
print("⭐ HISTORY WITH MORE THAN ONE BUMP - THE FIXTURE THE FIRST DRAFT LACKED")
# ⚠️ EVERY FIXTURE ABOVE BUILDS A FRESH REPOSITORY WHOSE `version:` LINE IS
# INTRODUCED ONCE AND NEVER EDITED. That is precisely the shape in which the
# original `git log -S 'version: "'` looked correct - the pickaxe finds commits
# that change a string's COUNT, and introducing the line changes it from 0 to 1.
# A real repository edits the line IN PLACE, the count never moves again, and
# the lookup silently returns the commit that first added it.
#
# MEASURED on admin/goodwe-addon before the fix: `-S` named `0a1e61d`
# (2026-08-23, the original packaging commit) as "the last bump", so a correctly
# bumped tree was reported as 87 commits behind an unbumped version - with
# PKG-06's and PKG-07's own bump commits listed among the offenders. The tool
# cried wolf on every run, and none of the fixtures above could see it, because
# a test that builds its own one-bump history is a test asserting against a
# structure it built itself. MUTATION.md habit 4, in the file written to
# prevent a recurrence.
from predeploy_check import last_version_change # noqa: E402
root4 = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="test_version_gate.hist.")
tmpdirs.append(root4)
addon4 = os.path.join(root4, "goodwe_controller")
os.makedirs(os.path.join(addon4, "app"))
write(addon4, "config.yaml", 'name: t\nversion: "0.5.0"\n')
write(addon4, "app/control.py", "X = 1\n")
git(root4, "init", "-q", ".")
git(root4, "add", "-A")
git(root4, "commit", "-q", "-m", "initial at 0.5.0")
_first = git(root4, "rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
write(addon4, "app/control.py", "X = 2\n")
git(root4, "commit", "-qam", "runtime change between bumps")
write(addon4, "config.yaml", 'name: t\nversion: "0.6.0"\n')
git(root4, "commit", "-qam", "bump to 0.6.0")
write(addon4, "app/control.py", "X = 3\n")
git(root4, "commit", "-qam", "another runtime change")
write(addon4, "config.yaml", 'name: t\nversion: "0.7.0"\n')
git(root4, "commit", "-qam", "bump to 0.7.0")
_last_bump = git(root4, "rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
check("⭐ THE LAST BUMP IS FOUND, NOT THE FIRST. An in-place edit of the "
"version line does not change how many times the string occurs, so a "
"pickaxe search returns the commit that introduced it and every bump "
"after that is invisible",
last_version_change(root4) == _last_bump)
check("...and it is emphatically not the commit that introduced the line",
last_version_change(root4) != _first)
r6 = run_gate(addon4, root4, "0.7.0", opts_file(VALID))
check("a tree bumped with nothing after it clears, even with bumps in history",
r6.returncode == 0 and "CLEARED for deploy" in r6.stdout)
write(addon4, "app/control.py", "X = 4\n")
git(root4, "commit", "-qam", "SAFETY-98: runtime change after the last bump")
r7 = run_gate(addon4, root4, "0.7.0", opts_file(VALID))
check("and one runtime commit after that last bump is refused", r7.returncode == 1)
check("...naming only the commit since the LAST bump, not since the first",
"SAFETY-98" in r7.stdout and "runtime change between bumps" not in r7.stdout)
# ⚠️ AND THE FIXTURE ABOVE STILL COULD NOT TELL TWO IMPLEMENTATIONS APART.
# Review swapped `last_version_change` for "-G's newest raw hit, skip the value
# comparison entirely" and THE WHOLE SUITE STAYED GREEN, including the section
# above - because a linear history of real bumps never produces a commit that
# touches the version LINE without changing the version VALUE. So the docstring's
# central claim ("the VALUE is compared, and that is the only thing that answers
# it") was not pinned by anything, and `-G` alone would have shipped as if it
# were the fix. That is the third distinct shape of habit 4 in this one file.
#
# A cosmetic touch of the version line is the discriminator: `-G '^version: "'`
# matches it, and the value comparison does not.
write(addon4, "config.yaml", 'name: t\nversion: "0.7.0" # pinned deliberately\n')
git(root4, "commit", "-qam", "COSMETIC: annotate the version line, same value")
_cosmetic = git(root4, "rev-parse", "HEAD").stdout.strip()
check("⭐ A COMMIT THAT TOUCHES THE VERSION LINE WITHOUT CHANGING THE VERSION "
"IS NOT A BUMP. `-G` matches it and a filter-only lookup would name it; "
"only comparing the VALUE against the parent's answers the question the "
"tool is actually asking",
last_version_change(root4) == _last_bump)
check("...and it is emphatically not the cosmetic commit",
last_version_change(root4) != _cosmetic)
r8 = run_gate(addon4, root4, "0.7.0", opts_file(VALID))
check("...and because config.yaml IS a runtime path, that cosmetic commit is "
"still counted as something unshipped - conservative, and correct: the "
"Supervisor rebuilds on the version string alone, so a changed file "
"behind an unchanged version is a no-op whatever changed in it",
r8.returncode == 1 and "COSMETIC" in r8.stdout)
print()
print("⭐ A GIT LOOKUP THAT GENUINELY FAILS - THE SHAPE NO FIXTURE COULD REACH")
# ⚠️ EVERY FIXTURE ABOVE CREATES ITS OWN REPOSITORY AS ITS OWN UID, so none of
# them could ever meet the failure that actually happened: the documented
# invocation runs the container as uid 0 against a checkout owned by the
# operator, git refuses with "detected dubious ownership", `_git` returns
# non-zero, and the no-op half reports SKIPPED. It degraded honestly - exit 2,
# never a false clearance - but the check this file exists for had never once
# run in its documented form, and nothing here could see that.
#
# `_git` now sets `safe.directory`, so ownership no longer breaks it. This
# section grades the REMAINING failure mode: git answering not at all.
root5 = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="test_version_gate.nogit.")
tmpdirs.append(root5)
addon5 = os.path.join(root5, "goodwe_controller")
os.makedirs(addon5)
write(addon5, "config.yaml", 'name: t\nversion: "0.7.0"\n') # NOT a git repo
check("a repository git cannot answer for reports no last-bump commit",
last_version_change(root5) is None)
r9 = run_gate(addon5, root5, "0.7.0", opts_file(VALID))
check("⭐ AND THE GATE DOES NOT CLEAR ON IT. An unanswerable git lookup is "
"INCONCLUSIVE, not clean - the one thing it must never do is call a "
"tree it could not inspect deployable",
r9.returncode != 0 and "CLEARED for deploy" not in r9.stdout)
check("...it says INCONCLUSIVE in those words", "INCONCLUSIVE" in r9.stdout)
# ⚠️ AND THE EXIT CODES ARE PINNED BY VALUE, NOT BY TRUTHINESS. `returncode != 0`
# is satisfied by collapsing NOT-CLEARED into REFUSED, which review found the
# earlier draft could not tell apart. 1 and 2 mean different things to an
# operator: 1 says "this deploy is wrong", 2 says "nobody checked".
check("NOT CLEARED is exactly 2, not merely non-zero", r9.returncode == 2)
r10 = run_gate(addon3, root3, "0.7.0", opts_file(dict(VALID, slew_w=1000)))
check("REFUSED is exactly 1, not merely non-zero",
r10.returncode == 1 and "REFUSED" in r10.stdout)
print("\nthe shipped tree's own version is readable")
check("shipped_version() finds a version", bool(shipped_version(HERE)))
for d in tmpdirs:
shutil.rmtree(d, ignore_errors=True)
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: " + "; ".join(fails))
sys.exit(1)
print("all checks passed")
+10 -185
View File
@@ -722,41 +722,18 @@ print(f" e.g. {_sustained.reason!r}")
print()
print(" ⚠️ AND NOT ON THE TRANSIENT, WHICH IS THE FALSE-ALARM CASE")
# THE SHAPE BELOW IS THE RIG'S: the serialised write path means that on a
# reversing cycle B's new number lands up to a whole control cycle after A's,
# both slew through zero behind a real ramp and a real lag, and between the two
# crossings they genuinely oppose. A guard that trips on that is a false-alarm
# generator, and this project's doctrine on crying wolf is explicit (SAFETY-15,
# SAFETY-19).
#
# ⚠️ THE MAGNITUDE IS A FIXTURE INPUT, NOT A MEASUREMENT, AND THIS COMMENT USED
# TO SAY OTHERWISE. It read "the worst single transient the rig can produce -
# 1700 W", sourced to a 924-run campaign whose harness IS NOT COMMITTED IN
# EITHER REPOSITORY (DECISIONS/SAFETY-31-circulating-power.md §3 says so in its
# own words). Three sweeps have now been run against that claim and no two agree:
#
# 924-run campaign, harness uncommitted peak 1700 W, 505.0 s at 100 W
# independent reviewer sweep, 2026-09-07 peak 2750 W, 15.0 s above 700 W
# goodwe `two_master_circulation`, 840 runs peak 1048 W, 5.0 s above 700 W
#
# ⚠️ THAT IS NOT EVIDENCE THAT ANY OF THEM IS WRONG. The three swept different
# grids, and the last one measured WHY the spread is so wide: on its own grid the
# worst legitimate peak is 1048 W on the modelled plant, 2250 W on `INSTANT`, and
# 0 W on `INSTANT` with no write stagger reaching a whole cycle. The plant model
# and the stagger set are TERMS of the number, and a worst case quoted without
# them is not a measurement. It is evidence that the claim cannot be adjudicated
# while the instrument is missing.
#
# So what this check now says is what it can support: 1700 W is LARGER than
# anything any of the three sweeps produced legitimately, and one control cycle
# of it does not trip. The committed, re-runnable version of the claim is
# `admin/goodwe`'s `sim/inject.py two_master_circulation`, which runs on every
# pull request there and requires ZERO of ~840 non-faulty runs to trip.
# ⚠️ THE SHAPES BELOW ARE THE RIG'S, NOT INVENTED. Measured on TEST-19 over 924
# closed-loop runs in which every unit executed the share it was given: the
# worst continuous opposition above 700 W is 5.0 s - ONE control cycle - at a
# peak of 1700 W. That is the serialised write path: on a reversing cycle B's
# new number lands up to a whole cycle after A's, both slew through zero at
# 800 W/s behind a 10 s lag, and between the two crossings they genuinely
# oppose. A guard that trips on that is a false-alarm generator, and this
# project's doctrine on crying wolf is explicit (SAFETY-15, SAFETY-19).
_one_cycle = [0.0] * 5 + [1700.0] + [0.0] * 30
_t1, _ = circ_drive(_one_cycle)
check("a single transient of 1700 W - larger than the worst peak any committed "
"sweep of the legitimate family has produced - lasting ONE control cycle "
"does not trip", not _t1.tripped)
check("the worst single transient the rig can produce - 1700 W for ONE control "
"cycle - does not trip", not _t1.tripped)
_repeated = ([0.0] * 3 + [1700.0]) * 20
_t2, _ = circ_drive(_repeated)
check("...and neither does it REPEATED every fourth cycle for 400 s, which is "
@@ -1114,158 +1091,6 @@ check("...and it does not raise the same card on every cycle - a per-PROCESS "
"this' a different question from 'is this site tripped'",
len(_notes2) == 1)
print()
print("6a. AC 4: THE ALARM NAMES WHICH PACKS, AND WHICH WAY ROUND")
# ⚠️ THIS BLOCK EXISTS BECAUSE A MUTATION SURVIVED ALL 26 FILES. Replacing
#
# pos, neg = opposing([inv.batt for inv in self.inverters],
# min_w=self.circ_wd.cfg.min_w / 2.0)
#
# in `check_circulating()` with `pos, neg = ([], [])` (-102 B) silently deletes
# the "Right now X is discharging while Y charges" clause from the notification,
# and the whole suite stayed GREEN. The block above asserts three tokens -
# METER CANNOT SEE, CONTROL HAS BEEN STOPPED, isolator - and NEVER an inverter
# name, so the one sentence `circulation.py` calls "the first thing somebody
# woken by this alarm needs" and "impossible to reconstruct from the number
# alone" was graded by nothing at all.
#
# ⚠️ IT IS NOT DEAD CODE, WHICH IS THE PART THAT MAKES IT A CHECK GAP RATHER
# THAN A REACHABILITY ONE. Ledger M18 - the `await self.check_circulating()`
# call removed - goes red on four checks above, so this function runs. What
# nothing asserted was the ATTRIBUTION.
#
# ⚠️ AND THE ROSTER IS ["garage", "shed", "cellar"], WHICH IS THE OTHER HALF OF
# THE FIX. Every fixture above runs on `inverter-a`/`inverter-b`;
# test_maintenance.py section 11 records what that costs - on a fixture whose
# names are the module's own constants, a check cannot tell the roster from the
# constant, and `UNIT_A` is not even what a nameless entry falls back to. Here
# the names are an operator's, the two participants pull OPPOSITE ways so the
# sentence is not symmetric, and a third pack rests at 5 W. That makes three
# DIFFERENT mutations - the clause dropped, the two directions swapped, and the
# `min_w` floor dropped - into three DIFFERENT red checks. A fixture naming both
# units the same, or one in which the direction did not matter, would see the
# first and neither of the others.
_CIRC_ROSTER = [
dict(name="garage", setpoint_entity="number.sp_a", soc_entity="sensor.soc_a",
batt_entity="sensor.batt_a", max_w=5000),
# ⚠️ B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS, and part 4's note above says why it is not 4600:
# inverter B does not physically exist and a datasheet is not a measurement.
dict(name="shed", setpoint_entity="number.sp_b", soc_entity="sensor.soc_b",
batt_entity="sensor.batt_b", max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS),
# THE BYSTANDER. A third pack resting at standby draw, on the roster, read
# every cycle, and NOT a participant in anybody's loop.
dict(name="cellar", setpoint_entity="number.sp_c", soc_entity="sensor.soc_c",
batt_entity="sensor.batt_c", max_w=B_RATING_HYPOTHESIS),
]
_CIRC_NAMES = [e["name"] for e in _CIRC_ROSTER]
_REST_W = 5.0
class _NamedCircHass(_Hass):
"""Three named packs; the meter still reads exactly zero.
Same house as `_CircHass` - grid = load - sum(B) with two units cancelling -
with one extra pack idling at standby draw so that "who is named" and "who
is merely on the roster" are different questions.
"""
def __init__(self, a_w, b_w, c_w=_REST_W):
super().__init__()
self.vals = {"sensor.batt_a": a_w, "sensor.batt_b": b_w,
"sensor.batt_c": c_w}
async def number(self, entity, invert=False):
return {"sensor.grid": 0.0, "sensor.soc_a": 50.0,
"sensor.soc_b": 50.0, "sensor.soc_c": 50.0,
**self.vals}.get(entity)
def _named_trio(hass, store, *, hold_s=1, min_w=700):
opts = {"meter_entity": "sensor.grid", "meter_source": "off",
"max_w": 5000, "gain": 0.6, "auto_start": True,
"circulation_w": min_w, "circulation_hold_s": hold_s,
"inverters": _CIRC_ROSTER}
c = Controller(opts, hass, store, _P(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
for inv in c.inverters:
inv.dev_min, inv.dev_max = -5000.0, 5000.0
return c
async def _circ_named(a_w, b_w):
hass = _NamedCircHass(a_w, b_w)
c = _named_trio(hass, _MemStore())
for _ in range(14):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
await asyncio.sleep(0.25)
notes = [x for x in hass.calls
if x[0] == "persistent_notification"
and x[2].get("notification_id") == "goodwe_circulating_power"]
return c, notes
_cg, _notes_g = asyncio.run(_circ_named(+3000.0, -3000.0))
_cs, _notes_s = asyncio.run(_circ_named(-3000.0, +3000.0))
_msg_g = _notes_g[0][2]["message"] if _notes_g else ""
_msg_s = _notes_s[0][2]["message"] if _notes_s else ""
print(f" roster : {_cg.units}")
print(f" garage discharging, measured: "
f"{dict(zip(_cg.units, [i.batt for i in _cg.inverters]))}")
print(f" -> {_msg_g.split(chr(10))[2] if _msg_g.count(chr(10)) > 2 else _msg_g!r}")
print(f" shed discharging, measured: "
f"{dict(zip(_cs.units, [i.batt for i in _cs.inverters]))}")
print(f" -> {_msg_s.split(chr(10))[2] if _msg_s.count(chr(10)) > 2 else _msg_s!r}")
# --- THE PRECONDITIONS, AS THEIR OWN CHECKS (MUTATION.md rule 1) ------------
check("PRECONDITION: the roster carries three DISTINCT operator-chosen names, "
f"none of them `UNIT_A` ({UNIT_A!r}) - so every claim below is a claim "
"about the roster and not about a constant that happens to equal it",
_cg.units == tuple(_CIRC_NAMES) and len(set(_CIRC_NAMES)) == 3
and UNIT_A not in _CIRC_NAMES)
check("PRECONDITION: the two runs are MIRROR IMAGES - same house, same meter at "
"0 W, same magnitudes, and the two participants swapped. Without this the "
"direction claim below could be satisfied by a sentence that ignores the "
"measurement entirely",
[i.batt for i in _cg.inverters] == [+3000.0, -3000.0, _REST_W]
and [i.batt for i in _cs.inverters] == [-3000.0, +3000.0, _REST_W]
and _cg.grid == 0.0 and _cs.grid == 0.0)
check("PRECONDITION: both runs actually tripped and actually raised the card, "
"so an absent sentence below is an absent sentence and not an absent alarm",
_cg.circ_wd.tripped and _cs.circ_wd.tripped
and len(_notes_g) == 1 and len(_notes_s) == 1)
# --- AC 4: THE ATTRIBUTION ITSELF -------------------------------------------
_WHO_G = "Right now garage is discharging while shed charges."
_WHO_S = "Right now shed is discharging while garage charges."
check("⚠️ THE ALARM NAMES THE TWO PACKS AND SAYS WHICH WAY EACH ONE IS PULLING. "
"`circulation.py` calls this the first thing somebody woken at 3 a.m. "
"needs and impossible to reconstruct from the watts alone, and until this "
"line the sentence could be deleted with all 26 files green",
_WHO_G in _msg_g)
check("⚠️ AND WITH THE TWO SWAPPED, THE SENTENCE SWAPS. This is the half a "
"single fixture cannot have: `pos` and `neg` exchanged, or a hard-coded "
"sentence, satisfies the check above and fails this one. The operator is "
"being told which pack to walk to",
_WHO_S in _msg_s)
check("...and each run carries ONLY its own sentence - the mirrored alarm does "
"not also contain the other direction, so the clause is derived from this "
"cycle's measurement rather than assembled from the roster",
_WHO_S not in _msg_g and _WHO_G not in _msg_s)
check("...and the RESTING pack is not named. `cellar` is on the roster, is read "
"every cycle and is measured at 5 W of standby draw - `opposing()` is "
"called with a floor of half the trip threshold precisely so a pack idling "
"beside a 6 kW loop is not reported as one of its two participants",
"cellar" not in _msg_g and "cellar" not in _msg_s
and _cg.inverters[2].batt == _REST_W)
check("...and the sentence sits with the figure, not instead of it: the same "
"card still carries the watts, the window and the three things only this "
"alarm can say",
all("CIRCULATING_POWER" in m and "METER CANNOT SEE" in m
and "CONTROL HAS BEEN STOPPED" in m and "isolator" in m
for m in (_msg_g, _msg_s)))
print()
print(" the operator's press is the only way out, and it clears BOTH halves")
-306
View File
@@ -1,306 +0,0 @@
"""PKG-09 - refuse a deploy that would be a no-op, or that the add-on would reject.
python3 tools/predeploy_check.py --deployed-version 0.7.0 --options live-options.json
⚠️ RUN IT WHERE THE ADD-ON'S DEPENDENCIES EXIST. `app/validate.py` imports its
siblings and those need aiohttp, so on a bare host the validator half SKIPS -
loudly, and exit 2, never a silent pass. To get both halves:
docker run --rm -v <repo>:/w:ro goodwe-addon-checks:1 \
python3 /w/goodwe_controller/tools/predeploy_check.py \
--deployed-version 0.7.0 --options /w/live-options.json
EXIT CODES. 0 cleared; 1 REFUSED, do not deploy; 2 NOT CLEARED - a check did not
run, and that is not the same as passing.
TWO FAILURES THIS ANSWERS, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE HAPPENED.
1. THE SILENT NO-OP. The Supervisor keys the built image by `version:` in
config.yaml. `ha apps update` against an unchanged version does nothing and
REPORTS SUCCESS. PKG-06 recorded this on 2026-09-05 with SIX merges behind
an unbumped version - its own commit message says so, and this line said
"four" through two review rounds; PKG-07 recorded it again on 2026-09-06 with six. Both
times a human noticed. Nothing else was ever going to.
2. THE REFUSED CONFIG. A config the shipped validator rejects is
`SystemExit(78)` - the add-on does not start. ⚠️ AND THE INGRESS PANEL GOES
WITH IT, because the add-on serving it is not running, so recovery means the
Supervisor UI. SAFETY-39's rule 10 made this reachable by a config that
started fine on the previous version: it refuses an explicit `slew_w` above
SLEW_RAIL_FRAC x the site rail, and 0.7.0's own shipped default of 1000
exceeds the 555.6 W ceiling on a 5000 W rail.
⚠️ WHY THIS IS NOT A CI CHECK. The obvious version gate - "a pull request that
touches runtime code must bump the version" - is the WRONG shape for this
project, which deliberately batches many merges into one deploy. It would demand
a bump per pull request, put every branch in conflict over one line of
config.yaml, and still not prevent the actual failure, which happens at DEPLOY
and not at merge. The check belongs where the mistake is made.
⚠️ WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO. It does not read the live box. The options blob is
reachable only through the Supervisor API, which needs a supervisor token, so
the operator exports it and passes `--options`. Without that flag the validator
half is SKIPPED and says so - a skipped check must never look like a passed one.
"""
import argparse
import json
import os
import re
import subprocess
import sys
HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
ADDON = os.path.dirname(HERE)
sys.path.insert(0, ADDON)
# Files that end up in the built image and can change what it DOES. A change to
# any of these needs a new `version:` or the Supervisor will not rebuild.
# CHANGELOG.md, DOCS.md, MUTATION.md, DECISIONS/, test_*.py, tools/ and
# scenarios/ are deliberately absent: they ship in the repo but cannot change
# runtime behaviour, and demanding a bump for a typo fix trains people to bump
# without reading, which is the habit this file exists to prevent.
RUNTIME = (
"goodwe_controller/app/",
"goodwe_controller/translations/",
"goodwe_controller/config.yaml",
"goodwe_controller/Dockerfile",
"goodwe_controller/run.sh",
"goodwe_controller/requirements.txt",
"goodwe_controller/build.yaml",
)
CONFIG_PATH = "goodwe_controller/config.yaml"
_VER = re.compile(r'^version:\s*"([^"]+)"', re.M)
def shipped_version(tree=ADDON):
with open(os.path.join(tree, "config.yaml"), encoding="utf-8") as fh:
m = _VER.search(fh.read())
return m.group(1) if m else None
def is_runtime(path):
return any(path == p or path.startswith(p) for p in RUNTIME)
def _git(*args, repo=None):
"""git, run so it answers regardless of who owns the checkout.
⚠️ WITHOUT `safe.directory` THIS TOOL SILENTLY DID HALF ITS JOB. The
invocation this file's own docstring documents runs the container as uid 0
against a checkout owned by the operator, and git refuses that:
fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at '/w/goodwe-addon'
`_git` then returned non-zero, `last_version_change()` returned None, and
the no-op check reported SKIPPED - so **the silent-no-op half, which is the
reason this file exists, had never once run in its documented form.**
It degraded honestly: exit 2, INCONCLUSIVE, never a false clearance. But a
check that cannot fire is not a check, and the two documented environments
were mutually exclusive - in the container the validator ran and git
skipped; on a bare host git ran and the validator skipped on aiohttp.
Neither documented command ran both halves.
⚠️ AND IT WAS INVISIBLE IN THE ONLY CASE ANYONE HAD RUN. `main()` consults
the git result only when `shipped == deployed`; every real run so far
compared 0.7.0 against 0.9.0 and printed its verdict without needing git.
`test_version_gate.py` could not see it either: it invokes the gate with
`sys.executable` against fixtures it creates as its own uid, so no fixture
ever met the ownership mismatch. MUTATION.md habit 4, in a fourth shape,
inside the file written to prevent it.
`safe.directory` is the right fix rather than `--user`: it makes the tool
correct however it is invoked, instead of making every future caller
remember a flag. The read is read-only, on a repository the operator is
about to deploy from.
"""
where = repo or os.path.dirname(ADDON)
return subprocess.run(
["git", "-c", f"safe.directory={where}", "-C", where, *args],
capture_output=True, text=True)
def _version_at(sha, repo=None, path=CONFIG_PATH):
"""`version:` as of one commit, or None if the file or the key is absent."""
r = _git("show", f"{sha}:{path}", repo=repo)
if r.returncode != 0:
return None
m = _VER.search(r.stdout)
return m.group(1) if m else None
def last_version_change(repo=None):
"""The newest commit whose `version:` VALUE differs from its parent's.
⚠️ THIS USED TO BE `git log -S 'version: "'` AND IT WAS WRONG ON EVERY REAL
REPOSITORY. `-S` is the pickaxe: it finds commits that change the COUNT of
a literal string. A bump edits the line in place - `version: "0.7.0"` ->
`version: "0.8.0"` - so the substring still occurs exactly once before and
after, and `-S` never sees it. It found only the commit that first
INTRODUCED the line.
Measured on this repository: `-S` returned `0a1e61d` (2026-08-23, the
original packaging commit) as "the last bump", so the script reported the
correctly-bumped tree as 87 commits behind an unbumped version - listing
PKG-06's and PKG-07's own bump commits among the offenders. A tool whose
entire purpose is to be trusted before a deploy cried wolf on every run.
⚠️ AND `-G` IS NOT THE FIX EITHER, ONLY A BETTER FILTER. `-G'^version: "'`
matches a commit whose diff touches a line with that shape - which includes
a reformat, a quote change, or a comment moved onto the line, none of which
are bumps. So `-G` narrows the candidates and then the VALUE is compared
against the parent's. The question is "did the version change", and that is
the only thing that answers it.
⚠️ TWO GIT SHAPES THIS STILL GETS WRONG, NEITHER OF WHICH HAS EVER OCCURRED
IN THIS REPOSITORY - every bump here has been a clean, linear, forward-only
edit. Both were constructed in review rather than found:
1. A BUMP RESOLVED INSIDE A MERGE COMMIT IS INVISIBLE. `git log -G -- path`
does not diff merge commits at all without `-m`, so a version line whose
final value is decided by a conflict resolution is never a candidate.
The lookup then names the last ordinary bump, and the merge itself counts
as a runtime change since it - a FALSE REFUSAL of a tree that is in fact
correctly bumped.
2. REVERTING A BUMP WHILE KEEPING THE WORK MASKS THE WORK. Bump, change
`app/`, then revert only `config.yaml`: the version is back where it
started, the runtime change is still in the tree, and this reports
"nothing to deploy" - a FALSE CLEARANCE, which is the dangerous
direction.
Card PKG-11 carries both. They are recorded here rather than fixed because
a lookup that handles them costs more than the failure they represent, and
a caveat a reader can check beats a guarantee that is not true.
"""
r = _git("log", "--format=%H", "-G", r'^version: "', "--", CONFIG_PATH,
repo=repo)
if r.returncode != 0:
return None
shas = r.stdout.split()
for sha in shas: # newest first
here = _version_at(sha, repo)
there = _version_at(sha + "^", repo)
if here is not None and here != there:
return sha
return shas[-1] if shas else None
def runtime_commits_since_version_change(repo=None):
"""Commits touching RUNTIME since `version:` last changed. ([], None) if unknown.
Returns (commits, last_bump_sha). An empty list with a sha means the tree is
clean; an empty list with None means git could not answer and the caller
must NOT read that as a pass.
"""
last = last_version_change(repo)
if not last:
return [], None
r = _git("log", "--format=%H %s", f"{last}..HEAD", repo=repo)
if r.returncode != 0:
return [], None
out = []
for line in r.stdout.splitlines():
sha, _, subject = line.partition(" ")
f = _git("show", "--name-only", "--format=", sha, repo=repo)
if any(is_runtime(p) for p in f.stdout.split()):
out.append((sha[:10], subject))
return out, last[:10]
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--deployed-version", required=True,
help="the version currently running ON THE BOX")
ap.add_argument("--options", help="path to the live options blob, exported "
"from the Supervisor. Omitted = that half is SKIPPED.")
ap.add_argument("--tree", default=ADDON)
ap.add_argument("--repo", default=None)
a = ap.parse_args()
problems, skipped = [], []
shipped = shipped_version(a.tree)
print(f" deployed on the box : {a.deployed_version}")
print(f" shipped in this tree: {shipped}")
commits, last = runtime_commits_since_version_change(a.repo)
if shipped is None:
problems.append("could not read `version:` out of config.yaml")
elif shipped == a.deployed_version:
if last is None:
skipped.append("could not ask git what changed since the last bump; "
"the no-op check is INCONCLUSIVE, not clean")
if commits:
problems.append(
f"THE DEPLOY WOULD BE A NO-OP. Version is {shipped} on both sides, and "
f"{len(commits)} commit(s) touching runtime files have landed since the "
f"version last changed ({last}). `ha apps update` will report success "
f"and install NOTHING. Bump `version:` first.")
for sha, subj in commits[:12]:
print(f" {sha} {subj[:76]}")
elif last is not None:
print(" no runtime change since the last bump - nothing to deploy")
if a.options:
# ⚠️ A TOOL RUN IN A HURRY BEFORE A DEPLOY MUST NOT ANSWER WITH A
# TRACEBACK. A missing or malformed export is the likeliest operator
# error here, and it is a REFUSAL, not a skip - the config was not
# checked and the script must not be re-run past it.
opts = None
try:
with open(a.options, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
opts = json.load(fh)
except FileNotFoundError:
problems.append(f"--options file not found: {a.options}")
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
problems.append(f"--options file could not be read as JSON "
f"({type(exc).__name__}: {exc}); the config was NOT checked")
if a.options and opts is not None:
try:
from app.validate import validate_startup_config
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover
skipped.append(
f"could not import the shipped validator ({exc}); the config check "
f"did NOT run. `app/validate.py` imports its siblings, and those need "
f"the add-on's runtime dependencies - so THIS SCRIPT ONLY CHECKS A "
f"CONFIG WHERE THOSE DEPENDENCIES EXIST: inside the add-on container, "
f"or in the CI image. Re-run it as:\n"
f" docker run --rm -v <repo>:/w:ro goodwe-addon-checks:1 \\\n"
f" python3 /w/goodwe_controller/tools/predeploy_check.py \\\n"
f" --deployed-version <ver> --options /w/<options.json>")
else:
found = validate_startup_config(opts)
if found:
problems.append(
f"THE LIVE CONFIG IS REFUSED BY THIS VERSION'S VALIDATOR "
f"({len(found)} problem(s)). Deploying it is SystemExit(78): the "
f"add-on does not start, and the ingress panel goes with it because "
f"the add-on serving it is not running. Recovery is the Supervisor UI.")
for p in found:
print(f" - {p}")
else:
print(" live options pass this version's validator")
else:
skipped.append("--options was not given, so the live config was NEVER CHECKED "
"against this version's validator. A config refused at startup is "
"exit 78. Export the options and re-run before deploying.")
print()
for s in skipped:
print(f" ⚠️ SKIPPED: {s}")
if problems:
for p in problems:
print(f" ❌ {p}")
print("\n REFUSED - do not deploy.")
return 1
if skipped:
print(" NOT CLEARED - checks above did not run. Deploying now is a decision "
"made without them.")
return 2
print(" CLEARED for deploy.")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
# WHAT THIS BUILD IS SUPPOSED TO ANNOUNCE, recorded so that a change to the
# composition has something to disagree with. THREE COLUMNS:
#
# <entity_id> <unique_id> <device identifier>
#
# ⚠️ ALL THREE, AND THE SECOND AND THIRD ARE THE HALF THE FIRST DRAFT MISSED.
# A reference that carries only entity_ids cannot see the two changes that
# orphan an install without changing a single composed id:
#
# `BASE` renamed (`goodwe_ctl` -> anything) every unique_id changes
# `DEVICE["identifiers"]` changed HA sees a NEW device
#
# Home Assistant's MQTT integration keys its entity registry on `unique_id` and
# its device registry on the device identifier. Change either and HA creates a
# NEW entity beside the old one - and because discovery is published with
# `retain=True` and nothing publishes a removal payload, the OLD config stays on
# the broker and the dead entity stays in the registry, still named by every
# automation that referenced it, never updating again. The composed entity_id is
# identical on both, so an entity_id-only comparison reports a clean transition.
# That is the same shape as the habit-4 this file's own card already caught
# once: a reference that does not carry the thing that moved.
#
# ⚠️ AND `object_id` IS DELIBERATELY NOT A COLUMN. `app/mqtt.py` lines 36-42 and
# 61-76 record that HA 2026.8 does NOT honour `object_id` in a discovery
# payload - the id is composed from device name plus entity name - so renaming
# one is a true no-op and a column for it would make this file refuse a change
# that costs nothing. The check is graded on what HA actually keys on.
#
# PROVENANCE, stated exactly:
# - recorded 2026-09-08 from `release/1.0` at `meter_source: firmware`,
# roster of one, by reading `mqtt.discovery_payloads(units=[])`. It is what
# the code announces.
# - `sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age` is additionally recorded in `app/mqtt.py` as
# VERIFIED AGAINST THE LIVE SYSTEM on 2026-08-26, and the ESP32's ingest
# guard subscribes to that exact string.
# - ⚠️ IT IS NOT A DUMP OF THE LIVE INSTALL'S ENTITY REGISTRY. That is what
# `--live-entities` is for. This file is about THE BUILD.
#
# Editing this file is how you say "the announcement changed on purpose". Do not
# edit it to make a check pass.
sensor.goodwe_setpoint goodwe_ctl_setpoint goodwe_rs485_controller
sensor.goodwe_grid_power goodwe_ctl_grid goodwe_rs485_controller
sensor.goodwe_battery_power goodwe_ctl_battery goodwe_rs485_controller
sensor.goodwe_battery_soc goodwe_ctl_soc goodwe_rs485_controller
sensor.goodwe_circulating_power goodwe_ctl_circulation goodwe_rs485_controller
sensor.goodwe_maintenance_phase goodwe_ctl_phase goodwe_rs485_controller
sensor.goodwe_controller_status goodwe_ctl_status goodwe_rs485_controller
sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age goodwe_ctl_p1_age goodwe_rs485_controller
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
# ARCH-02 fixture: THE SHAPE THE LIVE BOX IS IN TODAY (a flat, single-inverter
# config). ⚠️ ILLUSTRATIVE ENTITY NAMES, NOT THE LIVE ONES - the owner runs the
# rehearsal against a copy of the real options blob, and this file exists so
# that the harness has a synthetic transition it can be graded on.
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_setpoint
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_soc_pct
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_power_w
batt_invert: false
max_w: 5000
bms_soc_floor: 10
meter_source: 'off'
meter_entity: sensor.p1_active_power
inverters: []
gain: 0.6
slew_w: 0
deadband_w: 15
target_grid_w: 0
step_w: 10
heartbeat_s: 10
stale_input_s: 15
maintenance_discharge_w: 2000
maintenance_charge_w: 2000
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
# THE ENTITY IDS THE INSTALL HAS — a stand-in for the owner's real export.
#
# ⚠️ THIS FILE AND `announced-reference.txt` ANSWER DIFFERENT QUESTIONS AND ARE
# NOT INTERCHANGEABLE:
#
# announced-reference.txt what the BUILD announces. Loaded on EVERY run.
# Three columns, because HA keys on `unique_id` and
# on the device identifier as well as on the
# composed entity_id.
# this file (--live-entities)
# what the INSTALL has. One id per line. Orphans
# are graded against it: an id the install has and
# the AFTER shape does not announce is an orphan
# whatever the build's own history says.
#
# ⚠️ OMITTING `--live-entities` IS A REFUSAL (exit 2), NOT A QUIETER RUN. It
# used to be the other way round - an unreadable file refused, a missing flag
# passed with exit 0 and said nothing about the half it had not checked - and
# the owner runs this ONCE, at commissioning, under time pressure.
# `--no-live-entities` is the deliberate opt-out and it prints a standing
# banner in the report header and again on the exit line.
#
# PROVENANCE: these eight are what `release/1.0` announces at
# `meter_source: firmware`, roster of one, recorded 2026-09-08. They stand in
# for the export so the checks run in CI. ⚠️ THE REAL INSTALL CARRIES ROUGHLY 49
# `goodwe*` ENTITIES (card ARCH-02, read 2026-09-06); the other ~41 belong to
# the ESPHome firmware, to template sensors and to helpers, and this add-on
# announces none of them. The tool separates the ids it owns from the ids it
# does not rather than claiming orphans it cannot cause - which is the half of
# this file the eight-line stand-in cannot exercise, and the reason DOCS.md's
# owner step asks for the real export.
sensor.goodwe_battery_power
sensor.goodwe_battery_soc
sensor.goodwe_circulating_power
sensor.goodwe_controller_status
sensor.goodwe_grid_power
sensor.goodwe_maintenance_phase
sensor.goodwe_p1_sample_age
sensor.goodwe_setpoint
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# ARCH-02 fixture: THE SHAPE AFTER INVERTER B IS COMMISSIONED.
#
# ⚠️ THE FIRST ROSTER ENTRY IS **NOT** CALLED `inverter-a`, AND THAT IS THE
# WHOLE FIXTURE. `MUTATION.md` habit 4's seventh instance is MAINT-05 shipping
# `migrate_maint_keys(store, UNIT_A, ...)` under a comment saying it must not:
# every two-pack fixture in the suite named its first entry `inverter-a`, so
# `UNIT_A` and `inverters[0].name` were the same string in every check that
# existed and the defect was invisible. Names that are not `inverter-a` are what
# make a misdirected namespace something a rehearsal can SEE.
#
# `roster-inverter-a.yaml` beside this file is the same roster with the first
# entry named `inverter-a`, so the two can be compared - see DOCS.md.
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_setpoint
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_soc_pct
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_power_w
batt_invert: false
max_w: 5000
bms_soc_floor: 10
meter_source: 'off'
meter_entity: sensor.p1_active_power
gain: 0.6
slew_w: 0
deadband_w: 15
target_grid_w: 0
step_w: 10
heartbeat_s: 10
stale_input_s: 15
maintenance_discharge_w: 2000
maintenance_charge_w: 2000
inverters:
- name: inverter-a
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_setpoint
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_soc_pct
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_power_w
max_w: 5000
bms_soc_floor: 10
- name: inverter-b
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_b_setpoint
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_soc_pct
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power_w
max_w: 4600
bms_soc_floor: 10
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# ARCH-02 fixture: THE SHAPE AFTER INVERTER B IS COMMISSIONED.
#
# ⚠️ THE FIRST ROSTER ENTRY IS **NOT** CALLED `inverter-a`, AND THAT IS THE
# WHOLE FIXTURE. `MUTATION.md` habit 4's seventh instance is MAINT-05 shipping
# `migrate_maint_keys(store, UNIT_A, ...)` under a comment saying it must not:
# every two-pack fixture in the suite named its first entry `inverter-a`, so
# `UNIT_A` and `inverters[0].name` were the same string in every check that
# existed and the defect was invisible. Names that are not `inverter-a` are what
# make a misdirected namespace something a rehearsal can SEE.
#
# `roster-inverter-a.yaml` beside this file is the same roster with the first
# entry named `inverter-a`, so the two can be compared - see DOCS.md.
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_setpoint
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_soc_pct
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_power_w
batt_invert: false
max_w: 5000
bms_soc_floor: 10
meter_source: 'off'
meter_entity: sensor.p1_active_power
gain: 0.6
slew_w: 0
deadband_w: 15
target_grid_w: 0
step_w: 10
heartbeat_s: 10
stale_input_s: 15
maintenance_discharge_w: 2000
maintenance_charge_w: 2000
inverters:
- name: garage
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_setpoint
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_soc_pct
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_battery_power_w
max_w: 5000
bms_soc_floor: 10
- name: shed
setpoint_entity: number.goodwe_b_setpoint
soc_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_soc_pct
batt_entity: sensor.goodwe_b_battery_power_w
max_w: 4600
bms_soc_floor: 10
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
{
"_comment": "ARCH-02 SYNTHETIC FIXTURE - a store that has ALREADY run the flat config under 0.7.0+, so DEV-02's `schema_version` is stamped and the SAFETY-02 latch is not tripped. NOT a copy of the live box's /data/state.json. This is the CLEAN CONTROL for the MAINT-05 half of the rehearsal: the flat->roster transition over it must come out with NO findings, which is what makes each deliberate mutation's RED mean something. A harness that is red on every input has not measured anything.",
"schema_version": 1,
"phase": "idle",
"phase_started": "2026-08-07T10:00:00+00:00",
"last_completed": "2026-08-07T18:42:00+00:00",
"last_start_attempt": "2026-08-07T10:00:00+00:00",
"sign_tripped": false,
"sign_reason": "",
"auto": true
}
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
{
"_comment": "ARCH-02 SYNTHETIC FIXTURE - a FRESH INSTALL. No maintenance history, no latch, no schema markers: what /data/state.json looks like before the add-on has ever completed a cycle. It is a clean control, and it earned its place: the first draft of the harness reported this transition RED, because the DEV-02 migration writes both SAFETY-02 defaults under `inverter-a` before a roster exists and the tool called them stranded. Losing a default loses nothing."
}
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"_comment": "INSTR-01 SYNTHETIC FIXTURE - `state-legacy.json` with a SECOND roster unit already latched. Not a copy of any live state file. It exists to restore M12 END-TO-END on the STAGED leg, which is the arrangement SAFETY-44 and INSTR-01's first draft both missed: `snapshot_over()` starts the after-leg over the file the BEFORE-leg wrote, so a transition-made destination is available there and the two questions the provenance clause and the narrowing ask are NOT incompatible. Every same-step arrangement makes them incompatible; that is what was measured and over-generalised to 'no fixture can'.",
"phase": "idle",
"phase_started": "2026-08-07T10:00:00+00:00",
"last_completed": "2026-08-07T18:42:00+00:00",
"last_start_attempt": "2026-08-07T10:00:00+00:00",
"sign_tripped": true,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded -1800 W against a meter reading -1450 W for 190 s",
"auto": true,
"unit/shed/sign_tripped": true,
"unit/shed/sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: shed, latched before the switch"
}
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
{
"_comment": "ARCH-02 SYNTHETIC FIXTURE - a PRE-DEV-02 flat state file. NOT a copy of the live box's /data/state.json; this session cannot read that one and did not try. It is built to carry, deliberately, the two shapes that state built by the happy path does not have: a LATCHED SAFETY-02 failsafe under the flat spelling, and a real maintenance history under the flat spelling. Both are LEGACY-SHAPED: there is no schema_version and no maint_schema_version, so this file was last written by a controller that had never heard of unit namespaces. Losing either one is silent.",
"phase": "idle",
"phase_started": "2026-08-07T10:00:00+00:00",
"last_completed": "2026-08-07T18:42:00+00:00",
"last_start_attempt": "2026-08-07T10:00:00+00:00",
"sign_tripped": true,
"sign_reason": "SIGN_DISAGREEMENT: commanded -1800 W against a meter reading -1450 W for 190 s",
"auto": true
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -1,334 +0,0 @@
"""UX-02: can this add-on read and write its OWN options, and what comes back?
⚠️ WHY THIS SCRIPT EXISTS. The UX-02 card asserts that `GET /addons/self/info`,
`POST /addons/self/options` and `POST /addons/self/restart` are permitted to an
add-on with `hassio_api: true` and no special `hassio_role`, and it says - in
its own words - "confirm this again in the PR by calling it, rather than citing
this card". A permission read off a regex in somebody else's repository is a
hypothesis; the whole configuration surface rests on it, so it is RUN here,
against the compiled patterns out of the release image this site runs.
It also answers the question the panel's design depends on next: WHAT the info
response carries. app/configui.py builds the entire form from `schema` and
`translations` and owns no copy of either, which is only sound if those two
really are in the response and really are the loader's own output. Both are
constructed here, out of the image, and this repository's own model is built
from them.
HOW TO RUN IT (the version is the one `ha info` reports on the target install -
2026.08.0 is what 192.168.2.158 ran when UX-02 landed, and it is the same image
tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py pins):
docker run --rm \
-v "$PWD:/w:ro" -v "$PWD/app:/app:ro" -v "$PWD/tools:/probe:ro" \
--entrypoint python3 \
ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 \
/probe/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py
⚠️ IT TOUCHES NOTHING, AND IT TOUCHES THE LIVE SITE LEAST OF ALL. It reads
config.yaml and translations/, imports Supervisor's own modules and runs them in
a throwaway container. It opens no socket, contacts no Supervisor, POSTs no
options and restarts nothing. The add-on is live in a real house; the only
honest way to measure this is against a copy of the software, not against it.
⚠️ WHAT IT CANNOT MEASURE, SAID OUT LOUD. It does not execute an HTTP request
against a running Supervisor, because doing that would mean pointing it at the
live one. So §A grades the ACCESS DECISION (the compiled patterns, run against
the exact paths) and §B grades the RESPONSE KEYS (the constants `info_data`
builds its dict from), rather than a captured response body. What is NOT
verified here is the wiring between the two - that the handler which builds that
dict is the one mounted at that path. That is read, not run, and this is the
sentence saying so.
"""
import copy
import json
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, "/usr/src/supervisor")
sys.path.insert(0, "/") # app/ is mounted at /app
import voluptuous as vol # noqa: E402
from pathlib import Path # noqa: E402
from supervisor.utils.yaml import read_yaml_file # noqa: E402
from supervisor.apps.validate import SCHEMA_APP_CONFIG # noqa: E402
from supervisor.apps.options import AppOptions, UiOptions # noqa: E402
from supervisor.apps.app import _OPTIONS_MERGER # noqa: E402
from supervisor.store.data import _read_app_translations # noqa: E402
from supervisor.const import (ATTR_OPTIONS, ATTR_SCHEMA, # noqa: E402
ATTR_TRANSLATIONS)
from supervisor.api.middleware.security import _V1_PATTERNS # noqa: E402
from app import configui # noqa: E402
FAILED = []
def show(title, ok, detail=""):
print(f" {'PASS' if ok else 'FAIL'} {title}")
if detail:
print(" " + str(detail)[:400])
if not ok:
FAILED.append(title)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("== A. THE PERMISSION, RUN RATHER THAN READ ==")
# ⚠️ THE PATTERNS ARE SUPERVISOR'S OWN COMPILED OBJECTS, imported, not retyped.
# `token_validation()` tests `api_bypass` against `request.path` for an
# installed app BEFORE it consults `access_hassio_api` or any role, so a match
# here is the whole permission question for these paths.
for path, want in (("/addons/self/info", True),
("/addons/self/options", True),
("/addons/self/restart", True),
("/addons/self/options/config", True),
# The two the pattern explicitly excludes, asserted so that
# a future widening of it does not go unnoticed here.
("/addons/self/security", False),
("/addons/self/update", False)):
got = bool(_V1_PATTERNS.api_bypass.match(path))
show(f"{path:32s} bypass={got}", got == want)
# ⚠️ THE ONE THE CARD DID NOT PREDICT, AND IT IS A NEGATIVE RESULT WORTH HAVING.
# Supervisor has its OWN options validator at `/addons/{app}/options/validate`.
# It is two path segments after `self`, so `[^/]+` cannot match it, and it is
# not one of the listed literals either. An add-on cannot call it. That does
# not hurt this card - the Supervisor validator knows only types and ranges, and
# the whole reason this panel exists is the cross-field rules it structurally
# cannot express - but "there is exactly one validator reachable from inside the
# add-on, and it is ours" is a fact the design should rest on knowingly.
_val = bool(_V1_PATTERNS.api_bypass.match("/addons/self/options/validate"))
show("/addons/self/options/validate is NOT reachable from an add-on - so the "
"ONLY validator this panel can call is app/validate.py, which is the one "
"with the cross-field rules", not _val, f"bypass={_val}")
# ⚠️ AND WHICH OF THE TWO MECHANISMS IS CARRYING EACH PATH - MEASURED, BECAUSE
# THE FIRST DRAFT OF THIS SECTION GOT IT WRONG. It asserted that the `default`
# role admits none of the three, and that FAILED: the default role's pattern is
# `^(?:|/.+/info)$`, which matches `/addons/self/info` perfectly well. So the
# split is:
#
# /addons/self/info - admitted by BOTH the bypass and the default role
# /addons/self/options - the bypass ONLY
# /addons/self/restart - the bypass ONLY
#
# i.e. the two WRITING paths rest entirely on the bypass list, and if it were
# narrowed this panel could still read its own options and could no longer save
# them. That is a more useful thing to know than the tidier claim that was
# asserted first, and it is only known because the claim was run.
_default = _V1_PATTERNS.role_access["default"]
show("`/addons/self/info` is admitted by the DEFAULT role as well as by the "
"bypass (`/.+/info`) - so reading has two independent licences",
bool(_default.match("/addons/self/info")))
show("...while `/addons/self/options` and `/addons/self/restart` are admitted "
"by the BYPASS ONLY. The two writing paths rest on that list alone",
not _default.match("/addons/self/options")
and not _default.match("/addons/self/restart"))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("\n== B. WHAT `GET /addons/self/info` IS BUILT FROM ==")
# `AppsAPI.info_data()` builds its dict with these constants as keys. Their
# VALUES are what the panel reads off the JSON, so they are asserted here
# rather than typed into app/selfconfig.py as a guess.
show("the response keys the panel reads are named `options`, `schema` and "
"`translations`",
(ATTR_OPTIONS, ATTR_SCHEMA, ATTR_TRANSLATIONS)
== ("options", "schema", "translations"),
f"{ATTR_OPTIONS} / {ATTR_SCHEMA} / {ATTR_TRANSLATIONS}")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("\n== C. `schema` - what App.schema_ui actually is, for THIS config.yaml ==")
raw = read_yaml_file(Path("/w/config.yaml"))
cfg = SCHEMA_APP_CONFIG(raw)
schema, defaults = cfg["schema"], cfg["options"]
ui = UiOptions(None)(schema)
show(f"UiOptions renders every key config.yaml declares ({len(ui)})",
len(ui) == len(schema), f"schema keys {len(schema)}, ui nodes {len(ui)}")
# ⚠️ THE NAME IS THE MEASUREMENT. A NUMERIC range comes back as `lengthMin` /
# `lengthMax` - which reads like a string length and is not - and app/configui.py
# copies those two names straight through into the form's `min`/`max`. Guessing
# `valueMin` would have produced a form with no bounds at all and no error
# anywhere.
_maxw = [n for n in ui if n["name"] == "max_w"][0]
show("a numeric range arrives as lengthMin/lengthMax (NOT valueMin/valueMax), "
"which is why app/configui.py reads those two names",
_maxw.get("lengthMin") == 100 and _maxw.get("lengthMax") == 5000,
json.dumps(_maxw))
_sel = [n for n in ui if n["name"] == "meter_source"][0]
show("an enum arrives as type `select` with its `options` listed",
_sel.get("type") == "select" and "homewizard_local" in _sel.get("options", []),
json.dumps(_sel))
_inv = [n for n in ui if n["name"] == "inverters"][0]
show("the roster arrives as type `schema` + `multiple`, carrying its per-entry "
"fields - which is what the panel's roster editor draws cards from",
_inv.get("type") == "schema" and _inv.get("multiple") is True
and [s["name"] for s in _inv["schema"]][:3] == ["name", "setpoint_entity",
"max_w"],
json.dumps([s["name"] for s in _inv["schema"]]))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("\n== D. `options` - and what a POST to /addons/self/options REPLACES ==")
# ⚠️ THE HAZARD THE COMPARE-AND-SWAP EXISTS FOR, DEMONSTRATED. `App.options` is
# `deepmerge(config.yaml defaults, the STORED user options)` and the setter is
# `persist[options] = deepcopy(value)` - a REPLACEMENT. So a key left out of a
# POST does not keep its previous value; it falls back to the config.yaml
# DEFAULT. Both halves are run below on real objects.
_persist_before = {"max_w": 4200, "gain": 0.42}
_effective_before = _OPTIONS_MERGER.merge(copy.deepcopy(defaults),
copy.deepcopy(_persist_before))
show("stored user options merge OVER the config.yaml defaults, so every key is "
"present in what an add-on reads back",
_effective_before["max_w"] == 4200
and set(_effective_before) == set(defaults),
f"max_w={_effective_before['max_w']} gain={_effective_before['gain']}")
_persist_after = {"gain": 0.42} # a POST that simply omits max_w
_effective_after = _OPTIONS_MERGER.merge(copy.deepcopy(defaults),
copy.deepcopy(_persist_after))
show("...and a POST that OMITS a key does not preserve it - the key reverts to "
"config.yaml's default. That is why this panel posts the WHOLE blob it "
"read, and why it refuses to post one built on a stale read",
_effective_after["max_w"] == defaults["max_w"] != 4200,
f"omitted max_w -> {_effective_after['max_w']} "
f"(default {defaults['max_w']}, was 4200)")
# The blob the panel would actually POST: the full merged options, unchanged.
# If Supervisor refused that shape the read-modify-write would be unusable.
_v = vol.Schema(vol.All(dict, AppOptions(None, schema, cfg["name"],
"local_goodwe_controller")))
try:
_validated = _v(copy.deepcopy(_effective_before))
show("the WHOLE merged blob - what this panel sends back - is accepted by "
"Supervisor's own options validator", True)
except vol.Invalid as err:
_validated = None
show("the WHOLE merged blob is accepted", False, str(err))
# ⚠️ AND WHETHER IT COMES BACK BYTE-IDENTICAL, because the panel tells the
# operator which settings are "stored but not running" by comparing the stored
# blob with `/data/options.json`. Supervisor writes that file through
# `schema.validate(self.options)`, so any COERCION in that step would show up
# as a spurious difference on every page load.
if _validated is not None:
_drift = sorted(k for k in set(_validated) | set(_effective_before)
if _validated.get(k) != _effective_before.get(k))
show("...and validation does not COERCE it, so `stored vs running` compares "
"like with like and shows a difference only when there is one. "
f"Keys changed by validation: {_drift}", not _drift)
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("\n== E. `translations` - UX-01's labels, reaching a SECOND surface ==")
translations = _read_app_translations(Path("/w"))
show("Supervisor's own loader accepts both files, so `info['translations']` "
"carries them", set(translations) == {"en", "nl"}, sorted(translations))
for lang, groups_expected in (("en", 7), ("nl", 7)):
model = configui.field_model(ui, translations, lang)
names = [g["name"] for g in model["groups"]]
show(f"[{lang}] this repository's own field_model() turns those into "
f"{len(names)} real section headings out of UX-01's `Group · ` prefix "
f"- which the Supervisor's flat list cannot render at all",
len(names) == groups_expected and not model["ungrouped"],
f"{names} ungrouped={model['ungrouped']}")
_raw = [f["key"] for g in model["groups"] for f in g["fields"]
if f["label_lang"] == "raw"]
show(f"[{lang}] ...and not one field falls back to its raw key name. "
f"Raw: {_raw}", not _raw)
_nohelp = [f["key"] for g in model["groups"] for f in g["fields"]
if not f["help"]]
show(f"[{lang}] ...and not one is left without the sentence that says "
f"whether to touch it. Missing: {_nohelp}", not _nohelp)
# ⚠️ THE ONE PLACE THIS PANEL IS STRICTLY BETTER THAN THE CONFIGURATION TAB ON
# THE SAME DATA, and shape_probe §F is the measurement that makes it a claim
# rather than a boast: on frontend 20250925.1 the roster's per-entry keys go to
# `ha-selector-object`, which labels them `fields[name].label || name`, and the
# converter sets no label - so they render RAW there, however well UX-01
# translated them. Here they are read out of the same `fields:` block and shown.
_model_en = configui.field_model(ui, translations, "en")
_roster = [f for g in _model_en["groups"] for f in g["fields"]
if f["key"] == "inverters"][0]
_sub = [(s["key"], s["label"], s["label_lang"]) for s in _roster["fields"]]
show("the roster's PER-ENTRY keys resolve to their UX-01 labels here, which is "
"exactly what the Supervisor's Configuration tab renders raw on frontend "
"20250925.1 (shape_probe §F)",
all(lang == "en" for _, _, lang in _sub) and len(_sub) == 7,
json.dumps([(k, l) for k, l, _ in _sub]))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("\n== F. the anchor list is the SCHEMA's keys, and collisions are real ==")
# app/configui.py files each validator sentence under every option key it
# NAMES, with word boundaries. Three of this schema's keys are suffixes of one
# another, so a naive `in` test would file every per-unit refusal under the site
# key as well. Run against the real key list rather than a hand-made one.
_keys = sorted(defaults)
_collide = [k for k in _keys if any(o != k and o.endswith("_" + k)
for o in _keys)]
show(f"config.yaml really does contain keys that are suffixes of other keys, "
f"so the boundary matching is load-bearing: {_collide}", bool(_collide))
_by, _un = configui.problems_by_field(
["unit_sign_disagree_w is 3000 W but unit-0's max_w is 2000 W"], _keys)
show("...and a sentence naming `unit_sign_disagree_w` is NOT also filed under "
"`sign_disagree_w`",
sorted(_by) == ["max_w", "unit_sign_disagree_w"] and not _un,
json.dumps(sorted(_by)))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print("\n== G. COULD THE SUPERVISOR'S CONFIGURATION TAB BE REMOVED? ==")
# ⚠️ THE CARD SAYS IT CANNOT BE. THAT TURNS OUT TO BE THE RIGHT DECISION FOR
# THE WRONG REASON, AND THE DIFFERENCE MATTERS - a constraint you believe is
# imposed is one nobody re-examines, while a choice is something a decision
# record has to justify. So it was RUN.
#
# The tab renders `App.schema_ui`, which is `UiOptions(...)(data["schema"])`.
# Delete `schema:` from config.yaml and there is nothing to render. Supervisor
# ACCEPTS that manifest - the key is optional and defaults to `{}` - so the tab
# really would go away.
#
# What goes away with it is the add-on. `AppOptions` DROPS every option that
# the schema does not declare (one "Option 'x' does not exist in the schema"
# warning per key, and nothing else), so `App.options` validates down to the
# EMPTY DICT, `write_options()` writes `{}` to /data/options.json, and
# `load_options()` hands the controller nothing. The startup gate then refuses
# it for having no actuator - exit 78 - and the ingress panel this card builds
# is not running either, because the add-on serving it is not.
#
# So: removable, at the cost of every setting on the site and the add-on with
# them. That is the measured reason DECISIONS/UX-02-two-config-surfaces.md
# keeps the tab, and it is a much better reason than "the platform will not
# let us".
_noschema = {k: v for k, v in raw.items() if k != "schema"}
try:
_cfg2 = SCHEMA_APP_CONFIG(_noschema)
_accepted, _detail = True, repr(_cfg2.get("schema"))
except vol.Invalid as err:
_cfg2, _accepted, _detail = None, False, str(err)
show("a manifest with NO `schema:` block is ACCEPTED by Supervisor, and its "
"`schema_ui` is empty - so the Configuration tab is removable after all",
_accepted and _cfg2.get("schema") == {}
and UiOptions(None)(_cfg2["schema"]) == [], _detail)
if _accepted:
_v2 = vol.Schema(vol.All(dict, AppOptions(None, _cfg2["schema"],
_cfg2["name"], "local_x")))
try:
_out2 = _v2(copy.deepcopy(_cfg2["options"]))
_kept = len(_out2)
except vol.Invalid as err:
_kept = f"refused: {err}"
show("⚠️ ...and EVERY OPTION IS DROPPED WITH IT. Options not declared in "
"the schema are discarded with one log warning each, so the add-on "
"would start on an empty configuration, be refused by its own startup "
"gate for having no actuator, and take the ingress panel down with "
"it. That is why the tab stays",
_kept == 0, f"options surviving an empty schema: {_kept} "
f"of {len(defaults)}")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
print()
if FAILED:
print(f"== {len(FAILED)} CASE(S) FAILED ==")
for title in FAILED:
print(" - " + title)
sys.exit(1)
print("== all cases passed ==")
@@ -315,114 +315,6 @@ print(f" the Configuration tab renders {len(ui)} fields, in `schema:` order "
"(App.schema_ui is UiOptions(...)(data['schema']), so the ORDER IS THE "
"SCHEMA BLOCK'S and not the options block's)")
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# ⚠️ UX-04: THAT COUNT IS NOW GRADED, AND IT IS WHY UX-01's AC 3 IS WITHDRAWN.
#
# UX-01 AC 3 said the visible count would drop to ~15, with the rest behind
# HA's "show unused optional configuration options" toggle. The line above has
# printed the refutation since the day it was written - 71, not 15 - and PRINTED
# IS NOT GRADED: this probe exited 0 through the whole of UX-01's review while
# displaying the number that contradicted the criterion it was evidence for.
# That is the defect, not the count.
#
# THE FRONTEND RULE, transcribed from the bundle in THIS image at the top of
# this section and replayed rather than paraphrased:
#
# _filteredSchema = (opts, schema) => schema.filter(e => e.name in opts
# || e.required)
#
# `opts` is the add-on's OPTIONS AS SUPERVISOR SERVES THEM - the operator's
# stored blob after `options:` has been deep-merged into it - so a key is
# hideable only when it is BOTH absent from `options:` AND not required.
#
# WHY THE CRITERION IS WITHDRAWN RATHER THAN IMPLEMENTED, in two measurements:
#
# 1. IT IS ARITHMETICALLY UNREACHABLE. Supervisor's own UiOptions marks
# `required` on every non-`?` key, and the filter above shows a required
# key UNCONDITIONALLY. So the floor - what the tab renders with `options:`
# EMPTIED ALTOGETHER, which is the most hiding that is even expressible -
# is the required count below. It is nowhere near 15. No arrangement of
# `options:` can reach the target; the criterion was never satisfiable.
#
# 2. THE 12 KEYS THAT *COULD* BE HIDDEN COST THE DEEP-MERGE DEFAULT. A key
# absent from `options:` has nothing for the Supervisor to merge into an
# existing box's stored blob. That is exactly the `delivery_hold_s`
# mechanism the 0.9.0 upgrade rests on: a key that 0.7.0's stored blob
# cannot contain resolves to its `options:` default instead of failing
# validation, and moving it out of `options:` is precisely how you get the
# exit 78 that mechanism exists to prevent. Worse, it would promote the 27
# unpinned in-code literal fallbacks that `test_defaults_pin.py` part 4
# ledgers into the LOAD-BEARING source of those defaults on a live install
# - which is the CFG-03 defect the same card's AC 4 exists to police.
#
# So: four fewer clicks, bought with the upgrade path and with the defaults
# pin. The decision is written up in
# DECISIONS/UX-04-the-configuration-tab-and-the-defaults-pin.md
# and the three assertions below are what keeps it a decision rather than an
# omission - if anyone empties `options:` to shorten the form, this goes red.
_hideable = sorted(set(schema) - set(defaults))
_required = [n["name"] for n in ui if n.get("required")]
def _filtered(opts):
"""The frontend's own `_filteredSchema`, replayed on this manifest."""
return [n for n in ui if n["name"] in opts or n.get("required")]
show(f"every one of the {len(schema)} `schema:` keys is ALSO in `options:`, so "
f"schema-only - the only set HA's toggle can hide - is EMPTY. UX-01 AC 3 "
f"is not partially met, it is unstarted. Hideable: {_hideable}",
not _hideable and len(schema) == len(defaults))
show(f"...so replaying the frontend's own _filteredSchema on the served options "
f"hides NOTHING: {len(_filtered(defaults))} of {len(ui)} fields render",
len(_filtered(defaults)) == len(ui))
# ⚠️ DERIVED, NOT TYPED, AND NOT A FLOOR. The assertion above read
# `len(_required) > 15` while the prose said 59 - so a manifest change dropping
# the required count to 20 would have passed while the sentence beside it stayed
# wrong. That is the same shape as the count this repo already fixed in
# `test_translations.py`: a number displayed but not graded.
#
# So the expected value is computed from config.yaml by Supervisor's OWN rule -
# a key is optional iff its schema string ends in `?`, plus `inverters`, which
# `UiOptions` marks optional because it is a list - and the assertion is an
# EQUALITY against that. Typing 59 here would rot the first time a key is added.
_OPTIONAL = {k for k, v in schema.items()
if isinstance(v, str) and v.rstrip().endswith("?")} | {"inverters"}
_EXPECT_REQ = len(schema) - len(_OPTIONAL)
show(f"...and that floor is DERIVED: {len(schema)} schema keys minus "
f"{len(_OPTIONAL)} optional ones (the `?` suffix, plus `inverters`) is "
f"{_EXPECT_REQ}, and Supervisor's own required flag agrees",
_EXPECT_REQ == len(_required))
# ⚠️ AND THE WITHDRAWAL'S OWN PREMISE, GRADED SEPARATELY. The equality above is
# deliberately NOT enough on its own: both sides read the same `?` convention,
# so marking a key optional moves BOTH and it stays green. That is correct - it
# makes the printed number impossible to leave stale - but it grades Supervisor
# agreeing with us, not the thing AC 3 was withdrawn for.
#
# AC 3 was withdrawn because the floor is FAR above the ~15 it asked for. If
# enough keys ever became optional that the floor approached 15, the withdrawal
# stops being true and this file should say so rather than keep printing a
# sentence that has quietly become wrong.
_AC3_ASKED = 15
show(f"...and the floor of {_EXPECT_REQ} is still far above the ~{_AC3_ASKED} "
f"AC 3 asked for, which is the whole reason it was withdrawn. If this ever "
f"goes red the withdrawal needs re-arguing, not re-asserting",
_EXPECT_REQ > 2 * _AC3_ASKED)
# ⚠️ AN ISOLATED COUNTERFACTUAL, and the number is Supervisor's own `required`
# flag rather than a count typed here. `options:` is emptied and NOTHING else
# varies, so the answer cannot be about anything but the merge.
show(f"...and with `options:` EMPTIED ENTIRELY - the maximum hiding that is "
f"expressible - the tab still renders {len(_filtered({}))} required "
f"fields. THAT is the floor, and AC 3 asked for ~15. The criterion is "
f"withdrawn as unsatisfiable, not deferred.",
len(_filtered({})) == len(_required) and len(_required) == _EXPECT_REQ)
def _entry(lang, name, path=()):
node = TRANSLATIONS.get(lang, {}).get("configuration")
+3 -3
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@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
# ⚠️ WHAT THIS FILE IS FOR, AND WHAT HOME ASSISTANT ACTUALLY DOES WITH IT.
# Without a `translations/` directory the Configuration tab renders the raw
# option KEYS - `unit_sign_disagree_w`, `saturation_cycles`, `integrator_max_w`.
# The frontend keeps a field when `e.name in options || e.required`, and all 71
# keys are in `options:` (59 of them are `required` as well), so ALL SEVENTY-ONE are
# The frontend keeps a field when `e.name in options || e.required`, and all 70
# keys are in `options:` (59 of them are `required` as well), so ALL SEVENTY are
# rendered, always, in `schema:` order, with no description. This file is what
# turns that into sentences.
#
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ configuration:
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY. DERIVED (SAFETY-31): 75 s is fifteen control cycles - 15 times the worst legitimate episode the rig can produce, 2.5 times the firmware's own 30 s link veto, and twelve times inside the 900 s billing quarter. It is deliberately not a round 60 or 120, which would be a guess wearing a measurement's clothes. Do not change it without re-deriving it."
delivery_hold_s:
name: "Safety · Not-delivering report after (s) — derived, do not change"
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY; with one inverter this check cannot fire at all, and that is deliberate rather than a limitation. How long ONE inverter may stand at a discharge share it is not producing - short by more than the saturation threshold, with nothing this add-on can read to explain it - while at least one sibling is NOT in that state, before it is named. REPORTS ONLY (SAFETY-42): nothing is commanded differently, the loop is untouched, and the site goes on running short by that unit's share until you look. DERIVED FROM 2640 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS in which nothing was faulty (SAFETY-42, plus a one-inverter arm as the control, which reports nothing at any threshold): the worst legitimate episode those runs produce is 35.0 s, and the ceiling is the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff. 185 s is 5.29 times that. ⚠️ The schema lets you set this as low as 30 s, which is BELOW that measured 35.0 s - at 30 s you should expect reports on legitimate saturation. The second inverter in those tests is a COPY OF THE FIRST, because the second inverter does not exist yet: what a unit four times slower would produce (75.0 s) is a sensitivity study on that idea, not a measurement of any real second inverter. Do not change it without re-deriving it - and it can be re-derived now: admin/goodwe sim/delivery_window.py --campaign --blag (TEST-21). A pack at or below its own bms_soc_floor is never reported: an empty pack and a wedged one are identical watt for watt, and that setting is the only thing that tells them apart - so if this fires on a pack you believe is empty, that setting does not describe your battery."
description: "TWO OR MORE INVERTERS ONLY; with one inverter this check cannot fire at all, and that is deliberate rather than a limitation. How long ONE inverter may stand at a discharge share it is not producing - short by more than the saturation threshold, with nothing this add-on can read to explain it - while at least one sibling is NOT in that state, before it is named. REPORTS ONLY (SAFETY-42): nothing is commanded differently, the loop is untouched, and the site goes on running short by that unit's share until you look. DERIVED FROM 2640 CLOSED-LOOP TEST RUNS in which nothing was faulty (SAFETY-42, plus 1890 runs at one inverter as the control, which report nothing at any threshold): the worst legitimate episode those runs produce is 30.0 s, the floor of 30 s is the firmware's own link veto below which a unit is already being dropped from the split, and the ceiling is the 900 s quarter that bills the capacity tariff. 185 s is 6.2 times that, and the margin is sized on a measurement rather than a feeling: the second inverter in those tests is a copy of the first, and a second unit four times slower produces 90.0 s. Do not change it without re-deriving it. A pack at or below its own bms_soc_floor is never reported: an empty pack and a wedged one are identical watt for watt, and that setting is the only thing that tells them apart - so if this fires on a pack you believe is empty, that setting does not describe your battery."
auto_start:
name: "Advanced · Start controlling automatically on boot"
description: "Off by default. Leave it off until the site has been commissioned: with it off, somebody has to press Start after every restart of the add-on, which is what you want while you are still checking signs and entities."
+1 -1
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@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ configuration:
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS. AFGELEID (SAFETY-31): 75 s zijn vijftien regelcycli - 15 keer de langste terechte episode die de testopstelling kan produceren, 2,5 keer het eigen veto van 30 s in de firmware, en twaalf keer binnen het factuurkwartier van 900 s. Het is bewust geen ronde 60 of 120, want dat zou een gok zijn in het jasje van een meting. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken."
delivery_hold_s:
name: "Veiligheid · Melding niet-leverende omvormer na (s) — afgeleid, niet wijzigen"
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS; bij één omvormer kan deze controle helemaal niet aanslaan, en dat is een bewuste keuze en geen tekortkoming. Hoe lang één omvormer mag blijven staan op een ontlaadaandeel dat hij niet levert - meer dan de verzadigingsdrempel te weinig, zonder dat deze add-on er een verklaring voor kan uitlezen - terwijl minstens één andere omvormer dat NIET doet, voordat hij bij naam wordt gemeld. ALLEEN MELDEN (SAFETY-42): er wordt niets anders gestuurd, de regeling blijft ongemoeid, en de installatie blijft draaien met het aandeel van die omvormer te weinig tot u gaat kijken. AFGELEID UIT 2640 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS waarbij niets defect was (SAFETY-42, plus een arm met één omvormer als controlegroep, die bij geen enkele drempel iets meldt): de langste terechte episode in die tests duurt 35,0 s, en de bovengrens is het factuurkwartier van 900 s. 185 s is 5,29 keer zoveel. ⚠️ Het schema laat u zo laag als 30 s instellen, en dat is ONDER die gemeten 35,0 s - op 30 s moet u meldingen bij terechte verzadiging verwachten. De tweede omvormer in die tests is een KOPIE VAN DE EERSTE, want de tweede omvormer bestaat nog niet: wat een vier keer tragere eenheid zou opleveren (75,0 s) is een gevoeligheidsstudie op dat idee en geen meting aan een echte tweede omvormer. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken - en dat kan nu: admin/goodwe sim/delivery_window.py --campaign --blag (TEST-21). Een accu op of onder zijn eigen bms_soc_floor wordt nooit gemeld: een lege accu en een vastgelopen omvormer zijn watt voor watt identiek, en die instelling is het enige wat ze uit elkaar houdt - slaat dit toch aan bij een accu die volgens u leeg is, dan beschrijft die instelling uw batterij niet."
description: "ALLEEN BIJ TWEE OF MEER OMVORMERS; bij één omvormer kan deze controle helemaal niet aanslaan, en dat is een bewuste keuze en geen tekortkoming. Hoe lang één omvormer mag blijven staan op een ontlaadaandeel dat hij niet levert - meer dan de verzadigingsdrempel te weinig, zonder dat deze add-on er een verklaring voor kan uitlezen - terwijl minstens één andere omvormer dat NIET doet, voordat hij bij naam wordt gemeld. ALLEEN MELDEN (SAFETY-42): er wordt niets anders gestuurd, de regeling blijft ongemoeid, en de installatie blijft draaien met het aandeel van die omvormer te weinig tot u gaat kijken. AFGELEID UIT 2640 GESLOTEN-LUSTESTS waarbij niets defect was (SAFETY-42, plus 1890 tests met een omvormer als controlegroep, die bij geen enkele drempel iets melden): de langste terechte episode in die tests duurt 30.0 s, de ondergrens van 30 s is het eigen veto van de firmware waaronder een omvormer al uit de verdeling wordt gehaald, en de bovengrens is het factuurkwartier van 900 s. 185 s is 6,2 keer zoveel, en die marge is op een meting gebaseerd en niet op een gevoel: de tweede omvormer in die tests is een kopie van de eerste, en een tweede eenheid die vier keer trager is levert 90,0 s op. Verander dit niet zonder de afleiding opnieuw te maken. Een accu op of onder zijn eigen bms_soc_floor wordt nooit gemeld: een lege accu en een vastgelopen omvormer zijn watt voor watt identiek, en die instelling is het enige wat ze uit elkaar houdt - slaat dit toch aan bij een accu die volgens u leeg is, dan beschrijft die instelling uw batterij niet."
auto_start:
name: "Geavanceerd · Automatisch beginnen te regelen bij opstarten"
description: "Staat standaard uit. Laat het uit tot de installatie in dienst is genomen: zolang het uit staat, moet iemand na elke herstart van de add-on op Start drukken, en dat is precies wat u wilt terwijl u tekens en entiteiten nog aan het nakijken bent."