3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	753f700539	DEV-02: merge release/1.0, and close the two review blockers ... PR #43 was rejected on two findings and had gone unmergeable behind SAFETY-28 and the ALLOC-01 fix. This is the merge commit; the conflict resolution and both fixes are below, because a merge that also changes behaviour has to say so. THE MERGE, AND WHAT IT COST =========================== Two conflicts in main.py, both where SAFETY-28 and this card touched the same method: * `write_setpoint()` split into a site entry point plus a per-unit `_write_unit()` here, while SAFETY-28 put its record gate in the old single-unit body. `write_refusal()` now takes the INVERTER it is about. Asking it with `self.unit` - as release/1.0 does - would authorise A's share on B's wire, and would also trip test_inverter.py part 1's AST scan, which goes red on any read of a Controller N=1 view inside Controller. * the SAFETY-28 gate sits above the clamp and below the non-finite coercion, exactly where release/1.0 put it, and is now asked about `inv`. Fallout the merge produced in the checks, re-aimed rather than relaxed: * every fixture that calls `write_setpoint()` DIRECTLY - the clamp probe, the hung-heartbeat experiment and its serialised counterfactual, the split deadline probe - now arms a real allocation record first. test_inverter.py grows an `arm()` built through the shipped `resolve()`, the same shape test_clamp.py's is: the per-unit envelopes are filed as real `supervised` claims and the site target is their sum, so the water-fill has exactly one answer and the fixture cannot quietly become its own allocator. * test_clamp.py's two-unit failsafe fixture assigned `c.units`, which DEV-02 made a derived property with no setter. It appends a real `Inverter`. BLOCKER 1 - AC 4's ARBITER-BOUND EVIDENCE WAS VACUOUS ===================================================== test_peakguard.py claimed "each unit's `supervised` bound is ITS OWN `max_w` - give inverter B a different rating and the claim filed on inverter B moves with it", and compared B's bound against `_b2.max_w`. `second_inverter()` DEFAULTED B's rating to `LIVE_MAX_W`, which is A's. IT COMPARED (-5000, 5000) AGAINST (-5000, 5000): a number against itself, unable to observe the failure it named. Reproduced: filing the per-unit `device`/`supervised` claims from `self.inverters[0]`'s numbers while leaving `actuator=self.actuator_of(..., inv)` alone left ALL 19 FILES GREEN. At a roster of two with A=5000/B=3000 that makes inverter B's planned envelope (-5000, 5000) instead of (-3000, 3000) - a 2000 W over-command the arbiter believes is supervised. It is a DIFFERENT defect from the actuator variant the static routing pin catches, and only the actuator variant was in the mutation table. * `second_inverter()` gives B 3000 W - a hypothesis, marked as one - for every fixture in the file, so no check there can compare B against A by accident. * the claim is asserted against LITERAL numbers rather than against an expression that can read the same object twice, for `supervised` AND for `device` (whose `dev` had the same defect), plus the envelope the ARBITER RESOLVED for B - a claim filed right and resolved wrong is the same defect one layer down. * a PRECONDITION check fails if the two ratings are ever made equal again. * the BOUND mutation is in the table, beside the actuator one, and was observed RED (3 checks in test_peakguard.py) via tools/mutation_run.sh. ⚠️ THIRD INSTANCE THIS SESSION of a check whose DATA cannot reach the failure it names - ARB-03's call-site scan saw 3 of 8 appends, ALLOC-01's replay generator saw 0 escapes where a widened one saw 39,991. MUTATION.md gains a section for it beside the stale-bytecode and masking ones, and the rule is written at the line: ANY CHECK ASSERTING "X DIFFERS FROM Y" MUST BE RUN ONCE WITH X AND Y ACTUALLY MADE DIFFERENT. BLOCKER 2 - THE LATCH WAS SILENTLY DISARMED BY THE ROLLBACK ROUND TRIP ====================================================================== store.py's rule 2 keeps the flat keys "so a rollback still finds its latch". The operator path that rule contemplates is a ROUND TRIP, and this card lost the latch on it: 1. install migrates -> schema_version=1, unit/inverter-a/... = False 2. operator DOWNGRADES; SAFETY-02 trips inside the downgrade window and the old add-on writes only the flat `sign_tripped: true` 3. operator upgrades again -> `rep.ran` is False, so `_grade_store_migration()` returned early, and `Inverter.__init__` read the namespaced key: False Observed: the controller came up with `sign_wd.tripped = False` while /data/state.json said `sign_tripped: true`. That is store.py's own header sentence - "the file still says sign_tripped: true, the banner is green, and the controller resumes driving the wrong way" - rebuilt by the version marker. A firmware version change with a rollback path was performed on this site on 2026-09-02, so this is not hypothetical. Three changes, each graded by a mutation observed RED: * THE OPERATOR'S CLEAR CLEARS BOTH SPELLINGS. That is what removes the "re-arm forever" objection the `rep.ran` gate existed to answer: with the fossil cleared, `flat True + namespaced False` is unambiguously a downgrade-window latch. * A TRIP MIRRORS THE FLAT PAIR. Rule 2 only ever covered the latch present AT MIGRATION TIME - nothing flat was written for a trip taken afterwards, so an operator who downgraded found `sign_tripped: false` and came up DRIVING. store.py claimed the staleness could only fail toward a SPURIOUS latch. It could not; that sentence is corrected rather than left standing. * THE GUARD RUNS ON EVERY START, and asks the STORE - not the roster - whether anything namespaced is latched. A mirrored trip on B must not re-arm a healthy A, and the store is the right place to ask because it holds every `unit/*/sign_tripped` this install has written, including one belonging to a unit that is not in today's roster. Graded by the three-step scenario itself, run end to end in test_inverter.py part 2, with all three preconditions asserted - including that the catching start did NOT migrate anything, which is what used to skip the guard. Part 2's idempotence check now PRESSES the button instead of hand-writing the store, because the state it used to construct is not one the shipped clear path can produce. Part 3 grades the mirror and the clear on a real roster of two. test_watchdog.py's "the flat key is NOT written" assertion is re-aimed rather than deleted: its argument was right about the READ and wrong about the WRITE. Nothing at runtime reads that key, and the one thing that does ignores it whenever any namespaced latch is set - which a sibling's trip always leaves. What its absence actually cost was the rollback. HANDOVER.md and DOCS.md said the flat key "is never read again", which was the instruction an operator clearing a trip by hand would follow. Both corrected: it is a maintained rollback view, it IS read on every start, and clearing a trip by hand means clearing both spellings. MUTATIONS THIS ROUND, each applied on a purged tree via tools/mutation_run.sh and observed RED: * per-unit `device`/`supervised` BOUNDS from `self.inverters[0]`, actuator left correct -> test_peakguard.py 10g * `_grade_store_migration()` gated on `rep.ran` -> test_inverter.py part 2 * the operator's clear leaving the flat keys set -> test_inverter.py part 2/3 * a trip not mirroring the flat pair -> test_inverter.py part 3 * the guard asking only `self.inverters[0]` -> test_inverter.py part 3 19/19 files green on the merged tree. No hardware was touched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-03 23:37:23 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	e941bf7f62	DEV-02: zero every unit's target when the operator stops, not just the site's ... A hazard THIS CARD CREATED, found by re-reading the operator paths rather than by a failing check - so a check now exists for it. Before DEV-02 the heartbeat re-emitted `self.target`, so the stop button zeroing that one scalar was enough: the next refresh carried the zero. The heartbeat now re-emits `inv.target` - it has to, or it would put the SITE number on every inverter, which is the ARCH-01 broadcast fault arriving once every `heartbeat_s` on a path with no allocator in it. So a stop that zeroed only `self.target` left each unit's LAST SHARE standing. No cycle has run yet at that moment, so nothing else would have cleared it, and the very next heartbeat - up to `heartbeat_s` later - would put it back on the wire. The operator presses stop, watches the inverter go to zero, and sees it resume seconds later. `command_site_zero()` moves both together and carries the reason. It is one method rather than two lines at three call sites precisely because the two lines have to stay together: shutdown(), the stop button and maint_abort all mean the same thing, and 0 W is the one value that may legitimately be written site-wide. test_inverter.py part 6 presses stop with 995/995 standing and then runs the SHIPPED `send_heartbeats()` before any cycle, which is the racing refresh. The mutation that zeroes the site target alone takes it red. 19 files green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-02 14:58:54 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	e306c74cb8	DEV-02: per-instance inverter objects, so nothing is graded against a sibling ... Every piece of per-device state in the Controller was a scalar, and several of them are safety inputs. app/inverter.py introduces an `Inverter` that owns its entities, its rating, its device range, its SignWatchdog, its last_write and its last_beat, under store keys namespaced by unit name. The Controller holds a list of them and keeps only what is genuinely site-level: the P1 reading, the site integrator, and the tariff quarter. WHAT THE SCALARS WERE SILENTLY ASSERTING dev_min/dev_max one pair, read from one setpoint_entity. A second inverter's rating was NEVER READ AT ALL, so its clamp, its freeze rail and the peak guard's achievable_w were the first one's numbers. soc one reading into the maintenance FSM, SAFETY-24's pack floor and arbitrage's bounds. An average lets the emptier pack be driven below its own floor. sign_wd ONE SignWatchdog, whose own docstring says "one instance per actuator", latched under FLAT store keys - so a trip caused by B latched A across restarts and one operator press cleared both. last_beat one deadline and one serialised hass.call(), so a hung write to A ate B's 30 s layer-1 budget. actual_w BECAME SITE LEVEL WHILE THE READINGS BECAME PER-INSTANCE, and those are opposite directions on purpose. compute()'s anti-windup test is `abs(prev_w - actual_w) > saturation_w` with prev_w the SITE target, so feeding it one inverter's power compares a site number against a unit number, trips the saturation freeze permanently and leaves a standing grid error. Measured on admin/goodwe's two-master rig (tools/alloc_sim.py --splits, 2 kW load, 40 cycles), worst |delta| between splits at the meter: gain one unit's power the site sum 0.2 510 W 0 W 0.4 250 W 0 W 0.6 50 W 0 W That was ALLOC-01's disclosed finding; test_alloc.py part 8 kept its stimulus and now grades the other row. THE STORE MIGRATION IS GRADED, NOT MERELY PERFORMED. sign_tripped/sign_reason move to unit/<name>/... once, verified by READING BACK what was written, and the version marker is set only when nothing that carried state was lost. The flat keys stay in the file so a rollback still finds its latch. And __init__ compares the pre-migration flat latch against what unit A actually came up with: if the latch did not survive it is RE-ARMED from the legacy value and shouted about. A latch that silently fails to migrate is a disarmed safety guard on an install whose state file says it is protected - which is strictly worse than never persisting it, because now there is evidence saying it is fine. test_inverter.py part 2 breaks the migration and watches the guard fire. HEARTBEATS ARE INDEPENDENT AND THE BUDGET IS DERIVED. Each inverter owns its deadline, the refreshes go out concurrently, and each write is bounded by WRITE_BUDGET_S = 4 s. The inequality is graded rather than asserted: 4 + heartbeat_s's schema maximum of 25 < 30, validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S. Verified by injecting a transport that accepts and never answers. live_units() ANSWERS HONESTLY. A unit whose every write has been rejected for a whole layer-1 window is not commandable; the allocator drops it, the survivors carry its share, the action log names it, and the dropped unit is commanded 0 W rather than left standing on its last share. A roster entry with NO setpoint_entity is deliberately not handled there - that is a configuration that cannot be delivered, and it reaches main.py's refusal branch, which is how that branch keeps a live trigger after this card removed its old one. AT N=1 NOTHING MOVES. The removed scalars survive as read/write properties of the sole inverter, so every existing replay runs unmodified - and they REFUSE at N>=2 rather than answering for the first inverter, which is the tripwire on a consumer that was never made per-instance. EVIDENCE. 19 files green. test_inverter.py is new (82 checks). Eighteen mutations were applied to the shipped modules on a purged tree via tools/mutation_run.sh and each was observed RED. Two of them SURVIVED first time and the checks were changed rather than the table: the serialised dispatch and the shared last_beat both passed while part 6 gathered its own writes and computed its own `due` list. send_heartbeats() was extracted from run_control() so the shipped dispatch is reachable by a check at all. INVERTER B STILL DOES NOT EXIST. build_roster() returns exactly one inverter from the flat options and is the one function CFG-04 changes; every two-unit figure here is architecture, and the second rating in the checks is marked a hypothesis. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-02 14:50:43 +02:00