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Author SHA1 Message Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 611d3dbcdf TEST-06 review follow-ups: two notification surfaces, the real ordering boundary, the schema bounds
1. notes_of() could not tell this guard's alarm from anybody else's. It
   selected by SERVICE, so against #12's app/ (which adds
   goodwe_output_clamp) eight assertions went red, AC1's core check among
   them. Blanket id-keying is not the repair and was measured, not
   guessed:

       selector                    vs #12's app/   id renamed
       by service (as committed)     8 red           1 red
       by id alone                   3 red           6 red
       by id or title (shipped)      3 red           1 red

   all_notes_of() is the whole surface; notes_of() is this guard's,
   recognised by the id it should carry OR the title it writes - the `or`
   is what keeps the one assertion whose subject IS the id able to fail on
   its own. The three surface-wide claims stay surface-wide, each with a
   comment naming which surface it is about and why the next guard's
   author must decide rather than narrow them. They are the three that go
   red against #12, which is the correct signal.

2. The ordering comment named the wrong boundary. N3 - moving the call to
   immediately before write_setpoint() - is green and correctly so:
   self.target is assigned two lines earlier, write_setpoint() clamps only
   a local and can skip the write entirely. So the invariant is "after
   `self.target = resolution.target_w`", and the detector grades pre-clamp
   INTENT, not the wire. Corrected in test_freeze.py and in main.py's own
   note above the call (comment-only; I merge second and own the
   conflict). N8 - moving the call above the assignment - is RED 4.

3. The schema range's own bounds are now pinned. int(60,3600) ->
   int(1,86400) survived green: an operator could set meter_freeze_s:
   86400 and the guard is dead with nothing red. Both bounds are
   re-derived rather than restated.

4. find_hwsim() crashed the whole suite on a checkout one level below the
   root (HERE.parents[1] -> IndexError, reproduced at C:/goodwe_controller).
   Guarded. And part 3 now names its transport in the summary: the rig
   hwsim and the stub are not equivalent - the rig path failed 1 run in 3
   - so a green log has to say which one backed it.

Also: the "revived transport re-rails" check is labelled a PRECONDITION
like its sibling; freeze_rows() records that flipping p1_enabled exercises
the row's content and never its gate; and the note about the deleted
assertion is corrected - it was REDUNDANT, not undecidable. The reviewer
falsified it in one line (move the hass.call above `if not fired: return`,
RED 9). "I could not construct a falsifier, therefore it cannot fail" was
exactly the inference this file exists to distrust.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:05:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c34b5a2922 TEST-06: close the three gaps that survived SAFETY-18's suite green
None of the three is a bug in the shipped code. They are gaps in what the
suite could detect, and the next person to touch freeze.py had less
protection than the passing count implied.

1. WHERE check_meter_frozen() runs in cycle(). Moving it to the top left
   the whole file green. Pinned by CONSEQUENCE, not by source order, so a
   refactor that keeps the semantics stays green:
     - the alarm must land on the SAME cycle the command reaches the rail
       (at the top it grades the previous command against this cycle's
       meter and arrives a cycle late);
     - the dead-poll-task composition: poll task dies, stale_input_s is
       crossed, the arbiter commands 0 W, and on THAT cycle the alarm is
       already clear - because the detector ran after the 0 W write.
   wired() now returns a per-cycle trace, which is what makes "on which
   cycle" an observation rather than a hope.

2. The NOT COVERED status row. The old check only asserted that an
   uncovered transport is SILENT, which a page claiming `armed` on a guard
   that cannot run also satisfies. The string is now asserted in both
   directions: the uncovered row must say NOT COVERED, name the
   meter_source and homewizard_local, and warn; the covered row must still
   say armed, or "does not say armed" would be satisfied by deleting the
   armed branch.

3. meter_freeze_s. Pinned in test_validate.py by MAINT-04's regex
   technique (no PyYAML in the image), and in test_freeze.py by its
   consequences: the shipped value drives the replays, must stay inside
   the 900 s billing quarter, and 3600/hold_s must stay inside the shipped
   deadband. A Controller built with the key ABSENT must land on the same
   number, which pins main.py's fallback without touching CFG-03.

All three demonstrated red before being accepted green, and every new
check was mutated to confirm it can fail; one candidate assertion ("no new
notification while parked at 0 W") was DELETED because no mutation could
break it, and replaced by the exact notification count across a revived
transport, which can.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 15:50:08 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 ffb8ec6373 MAINT-04 review: pin the default divergence with a check, not a comment
validate.py's comment said "if config.yaml's value moves, move this and
main.py's together" and nothing enforced it - a comment where a check
belonged, in a PR that elsewhere proves it knows the difference.

test_validate.py now reads main.py and maintenance.py directly and asserts
the divergence EXACTLY AS IT STANDS: config.yaml/validate.py at 2000,
main.py's two fallbacks and MaintConfig's dataclass default at 2500. It
records the mismatch rather than demanding it be closed, so it passes today
and goes red if either side moves - including when somebody closes it in
main.py, at which point the check and validate.py's block are deleted
together. Nothing in a file another ticket owns is touched.

The consequence is asserted through the real code as well as the literals:
with the key absent the validator accepts, MaintConfig builds 2500 W against
a 2000 W ceiling, and the arbiter resolves it to 0 W as a contradiction -
the bug rule 6 exists to catch, passing rule 6. Production-unreachable (the
Supervisor always supplies every key) but fully reachable from sim/inject.py
and the tests, which is where anyone debugging maintenance works.

Also: a CHANGELOG section for the upgrade path, covering both the case where
the Supervisor re-derives the default and the case where it persisted the
old one, since which applies was not verifiable without probing the live
install. And maintenance.py's timeout comment said 13.5 kWh where everything
else says 13.8 (300 Ah x 51.2 V, DoD 90); SAFETY-18 does not touch that file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 02:51:40 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 878a6ce452 MAINT-04: refuse a maintenance charge the ceiling cannot deliver
config.yaml shipped max_w 2000 against maintenance_charge_w 2500. The
cheap-window shaping files Claim.limit(hi = -maintenance_charge_w) against
the supervised SAFETY limit's lo = -max_w, so lo > hi - the arbiter's
clause 3, correctly resolved to 0 W and logged as a CONTRADICTION.
Maintenance silently never charged in a cheap window on a default install,
and the only evidence read like a bug in the arbiter rather than like the
two numbers the operator set.

validate_startup_config() now refuses maintenance_charge_w > max_w, the
same shape as CFG-01's sign_disagree_w >= max_w. Equality is reachable
(-max_w is a single valid point) and is not refused. Demonstrated by
starting the add-on on the pre-fix pair: exit 78 and the refusal banner.

maintenance_discharge_w was checked rather than assumed and is NOT the same
case: the drain phase OWNS the actuator (Claim.set at P_MAINTENANCE), so
the ceiling clamps it to +2000 W and the arbiter's explain() names the
clamp every cycle. Loud, and it still moves energy - warned, not refused.

The shipped maintenance rates drop to 2000 so the defaults pass the rule;
max_w was deliberately not raised, because it is the supervised safety
ceiling. test_validate.py now reads config.yaml itself, so a default the
validator refuses cannot ship again.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 02:28:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 9aed43990b SAFETY-02: a loop can be fresh, tracking and inside its rating and still push the wrong way
The stale-input watchdog asks whether the meter is still talking. The saturation
freeze asks whether the inverter can follow. The output clamp asks whether the
number is too big. A loop can pass all three while charging the battery out of
the grid, because the only thing wrong is the sign.

On 2026-08-20 a commercial controller did exactly that four times in one day,
for up to 77 minutes at a stretch, reaching a commanded -14 768 W against a
±5000 W inverter. app/watchdog.py compares the emitted setpoint against the
authoritative P1 figure and, when they oppose each other with both over 300 W
for 180 s continuously, files a failsafe SET claim at P_SAFETY, commands 0 W and
latches there until an operator starts control again.

Validated against that day rather than against an argument: sim/replay_sign.py
in the infra repo drives this module over the committed captures of both
2026-08-20 and the healthy 2026-08-23 and reaches 18 trips on the fault day -
every one inside a window NOTES.md §4.7 accounts for - and 0 on the healthy day.
The four episodes do share one signature: 0.3 / 0.9 / 10.5 / 0.0 % sign
agreement inside them against 92.9 % healthy.

Three decisions the ticket could not make:

- It is DISARMED whenever the grid-following loop is not what is driving. Sign
  agreement is a property of a loop that follows the meter, and a maintenance
  grid charge opposes the meter by design - 2500 W of charge into a house
  drawing 500 W is +3000 W on the meter against a -2500 W command, for hours.
  The gate tests the emitted number, not the winning claim's name, because a
  limit claim can let the loop "win" and still replace its value.
- The trip LATCHES. Commanding 0 W removes the command side of the comparison,
  so the disagreement always clears the moment the trip works.
- sign_disagree_w at or above max_w is refused at startup. The arbiter never
  lets a command exceed max_w, so such a threshold leaves the watchdog incapable
  of firing while the status page still reports it armed.

What it does not catch, said out loud: an inverter that ACTS opposite to its
command moves the meter further the same way, leaving command and meter in
agreement. That is the saturation freeze's job.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 21:51:35 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 547d796c5d CFG-01 review: widen the rule, refuse the firmware-veto case, fix the stop footgun
Review findings, all confirmed in code before changing anything.

THE RULE DID NOT AUTHORISE ITS OWN BEST REFUSAL. The stated test was
"makes a safety mechanism inoperative, or makes a stated limit untrue",
and a blank setpoint_entity does neither - layer 1 pinning the inverter
at 0 W is the failsafe WORKING, as validate.py's own text admitted. The
real justification is a second, separate category: the add-on is inert
and indistinguishable from healthy. Stated as (a) and (b), with each
refusal tagged, and with both halves explicitly bounded - (a) is not
"any two numbers that could disagree", (b) is not "anything degraded".
Left implicit, the gap is where trivia-creep comes back in.

meter_max_age_s ABOVE THE FIRMWARE'S VETO IS NOW REFUSED. The schema
allows int(5,300); the firmware's threshold is a compile-time
`max_age_s: "30"` and it trips layer 1 at `p1_age_s >= 30`. At 120 the
add-on believes a 119 s reading is fresh and keeps commanding while the
board has already vetoed and is holding at 0 W - healthy meter, running
controller, nothing moving. Structurally identical to the max_w case,
and unlike max_w it is settable on this install, so the headline
behaviour finally has a live demonstration. That firmware file's own
comment says a lower bound on this "belongs in CFG-01, not here".

Only ABOVE is refused: below the veto the add-on gives up first, which
is fail-safe and visible on its own status page. Scoped to P1 being
enabled, because meter_max_age_s governs nothing otherwise.
FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S cannot be imported from a compile-time YAML
substitution, so it carries a note on the single direction in which it
can go stale - and a warning that TEL-06 is editing `ingest_stale`, so a
matching integer may stop meaning a matching rule.

stop= WAS A LIVE FOOTGUN. It defaulted to None, which made a Controller
that cannot stop itself the DEFAULT one. On the late-refusal path that
meant: log the banner, return, and leave the process alive forever with
no control loop and no exit - the exact "inert but looks healthy"
failure this module exists to refuse. Now required and keyword-only, so
the broken shape does not construct; test_p1.py's five call sites pass
an Event.

That whole path had no test and no live demo. It has one now: it drives
run_control() against a device that only reports a narrower range once
the loop starts, and asserts it refuses, signals, returns, and writes
NOTHING - plus the converse, that an agreeing device leads to real
writes. This also covers the max_w composition that cannot be reached
through the Supervisor on the live install.

max_w <= 0 is refused. Schema-blocked in production, but
validate_startup_config() is the simulation suite's entry point too, and
a non-positive max_w inverts the arbiter's supervised bounds into a
contradiction that reads as a safety trip rather than a typo.

Verified live 2026-08-28 (backup goodwe_controller-cfg01r2-1787940076):
meter_max_age_s 120 refused with a message naming 120, 30, and THE
FIRMWARE WINS; no traceback; add-on restored byte-exact and running.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 20:05:10 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 fc9bd89dca CFG-01: refuse to start on a configuration that cannot be honoured
main.py used to read the setpoint device's own +-5000 W rating, notice a
configured max_w above it, log one WARNING, and run anyway with
write_setpoint() quietly clamping. The operator's stated ceiling was never
the real ceiling and the only evidence had scrolled off the log. specs
§1.5 is explicit that such a config is refused at startup, not survived at
runtime.

validate_startup_config() runs in amain() before the broker, the web
server or any task exists, so a refusal cannot leave half a controller
running behind a UI. It refuses exactly three things, all sharing one
property - continuing makes a safety mechanism inoperative or makes a
stated limit untrue:

  1. max_w outside the setpoint device's own rating.
  2. No setpoint_entity: every write is a no-op, the device rating is
     never read, and the ESP32 heartbeat that holds off the layer-1
     failsafe never happens. It ran, looked healthy, and moved nothing.
  3. A meter_source that can never produce a reading. These were already
     caught, but they only DISABLED ingestion, which leaves grid None
     forever: permanent inputs-missing, 0 W, and a status page
     indistinguishable from a healthy meter nobody has fed yet.

Those last predicates move into p1.validate_meter_options(), which
build_source() also calls - one definition, two callers, not two
competing validators. ha_dsmr with half its entities and mqtt_p1 with a
blank topic gained the check the other two transports already had.

Deliberately not refused, because untidy is not unsafe: integrator_max_w
above max_w (the arbiter still bounds the wire to +-max_w, so the cost is
unwind latency - warned), a missing soc/batt entity (fail-safe and
already a red NOT READY banner), a setpoint entity that has not appeared
on the Core API yet (ESPHome is routinely late; re-checked in
run_control() once the real rating arrives), and a thin meter_poll_s
margin.

A refusal is legible as one: a banner saying in words that this is
configuration and nothing is broken, numbered problems, no traceback, and
exit 78 (EX_CONFIG).

Verified on the live add-on 2026-08-28, not by reading the code: a blank
setpoint_entity and a meter_poll_s equal to meter_max_age_s each stopped
the add-on with the banner and no stack trace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Du77usMj8XNKNFZGmUiWDa
2026-08-28 19:29:35 +02:00