5 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5	23a3a3f5b5	UX-10: the last plain-language leftovers: log lines, two table rows, 'Why: Other', red at 0 s ... - test_messages.py part 6: every dynamic part of a WARNING+ line is classified as data or as a built text, and every built text is produced by the real code and checked. This is the gap the 2d scan had: it counted `%s` as one word, so reasons built by loop_clamp_note() and friends were never seen. - Quoted reasons rewritten to STYLE.md (red-alarm shape, codes kept): OUTPUT_CLAMP, METER_FROZEN, CIRCULATING_POWER, STALE_READING, the peak guard (codes now PEAK_GUARD*), the migration report, price feed, price history and gate reasons. Plurals via messages.times()/count(). - Top table: Price history "96 prices over 24 hours for 26 Sep", Tariff "one every 15 minutes or every hour", "not final yet" dropped. - Levels and noise: per-cycle shadow line DEBUG, shadow on/off INFO, aiohttp access log only at log level debug, settings warnings once per start, one plain line per Home Assistant outage (hass.Outage). - INFO jargon and error texts: no "§8.3", ISO times, "banked", "keys ARE", "NOT_OBSERVED", "did NOT land", "AND". - Display bugs: WHY_WINNER covers every winner and safety reason (main.why_key(), part 7 finds them in the code); the meter row is amber "waiting for the first reading" inside its limit after a start; the missing-reading age is counted when the page asks. - STYLE.md and DECISIONS/UX-08-short-notifications.md (UX-10 section). No change to safety behaviour, alarm levels, notification ids, triggers, cadence or the banner cascade. One row colour changes (meter at start), justified in DECISIONS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-27 10:58:43 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5	8a6acd9fa2	SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can ... Text only. No behaviour change - same conjunction, same limits, same MISSING, same 0 W, same NOT READY. `tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` says so: 2390 capture reads, a 66-cell swept grid, and six driven controller worlds produce the byte-identical document `6030175e...` on origin/release/1.0 and on this branch, while the sentences differ. THE DEFECT. SAFETY-37's conjunction is satisfied by two disjoint worlds - the register has stopped reporting reality, or the SOURCE cannot comply with the command - and nothing `freshness.py` is handed separates them. Three sentences asserted the first. On the live 2026-09-21 episode it was the second: the pack read 11 % for the whole 850 s hold, every command in that hold was a discharge, and the register answered the first CHARGE command three seconds later. The readiness row was worse still, because it asserted a false fact about a NAMED entity that was present, numeric and updating - so the operator opened Developer Tools, found it working, and had every reason to conclude the diagnostics were broken. THE FIX. Each message states what was OBSERVED and names BOTH explanations. Three wordings, no shared helper: two are a log line about a behaviour, the third is a banner about an entity, and a helper serving both would drop whichever half the other caller does not need. SoC stays STATED, NOT WIRED - part 11b drives the two worlds at 50 % and 11 % and the sentence does not move one byte. The row does not branch on `batt_fresh.stale` either: `stale_note()` already rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below, so the discriminator is "is that row there?", and part 11d asserts it is present in one world and absent in the other. THE CHECKS. test_freshness.py part 11 builds the pair of worlds with ground truth written down rather than derived from the published stream, asserts they are really two (40 of 40 reads differ) while the published stream is bit-identical, and only then grades the sentences. Eleven mutations, all red: each of the three sentences reverted (3, 2 and 2 named reds), the two explanations transposed at ZERO bytes (1), the second explanation deleted (1), the admission of ambiguity replaced by a ranking (1), all three reverted at once (5), and two aimed at this card's own check - collapsing the world pair (2) and emptying the accusation list, which a positive control against the three sentences as 0.10.1 shipped them catches (1). AND TWO OF THE ELEVEN FOUND DEFECTS IN THE CHECK RATHER THAN IN THE CODE. Transposing `label` and `entity` in the row made it unfindable and the run died on an IndexError - a red with no name and every later check ungraded, FCST-06's shape exactly; `_s56_row()` returns a named absence now, 0 named reds before, 3 after. And the first invariance run compared a tree with itself, because it archived a branch whose edits were not committed yet; the tool now REFUSES to report "behaviour unchanged" unless the sentences halves differ, and both of its refusals are driven. SAFETY-57's part 10h check was the handoff and is inverted rather than deleted: it required the accusation to still be present so that removing it had to be a deliberate act. This is that act. Its escape clause is untouched. Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-23 21:02:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5	43c144b8d9	SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested ... SAFETY-37's freshness gate reports a battery-power register as MISSING when it stops following its own command, and a missing input is "command 0 W and keep commanding" (§11.1 rule 1). The gate's only exit was "an arrival carrying a DIFFERENT number" - and at 0 W nothing is asking the register to be anywhere. The state had no exit reachable from inside it, and the log line promised the opposite in the same sentence that announced the 0 W. REPRODUCED FROM THE WIRE, NOT MODELLED. scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/ is 3840 verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, read from the passive sniffer, decoded by tools/decode_bus_capture.py (0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC, 0 unknown shapes; the mode->sign convention is graded off the capture, not trusted). The box was running 0.10.0, so the 0 W in the trace IS the add-on's own claim: 10:51:24.7 0x0518 reaches -3 W. Pack at 11 %, the BMS refuses the discharge, the inverter idles. THE REGISTER IS HEALTHY AND TRUTHFUL. 10:51:29.7 the command reaches +1060 W - 800 W of travel 10:52:00 the conjunction arms. Inverter.batt becomes None 10:52:21.7 the site commands 0 W, on the wire ... 0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not change value for 790.0 s. The house exports 2.4 kW throughout ~11:04 a human restarts the add-on. That is what ends it AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture through the shipped conjunction finds 93 trips whose wait for the BMS keep-alive pulse that cleared them has a median of 143.4 s, a worst case of 21440.1 s, and 17 of 93 at or beyond this episode's 710 s. That distribution belongs to the battery's firmware, not to this code. THE CARD'S OPTION 2 ALREADY HELD AND IS NOT THE BUG. _grade() has required |standing| >= MOVE_W since SAFETY-37. The trip was at +1060 W and the stuck state is at 0 W; they are different moments, and an entry-side rule cannot reach a state entered legitimately and then persisted. Nothing in the conjunction is weakened here. THE RULE, SAFETY-13's SHAPE ONE MODULE OVER - which latches get an exit, not how long the block lasts: the verdict is withdrawn when the obligation that produced it has been gone for RELEASE_S, and the register is then re-graded from scratch. RELEASE_S is BATT_OBLIGED_S, 17.0 s - the obligation window already derived in the file (6.0 plant + 10.0 publish + 1.0 read), taken at the FLOOR of its band for the mirror of MOVE_W's reason. Which half is safe is the opposite of SAFETY-13's: being wrong long is the failure being fixed, being wrong short costs one bounded re-grading window. Below 17 s the release pre-empts the cheaper exit - the register answering by itself - and that is graded behaviourally, not asserted. The whole parked interval is now stale_input_s + RELEASE_S = 32 s. On the live episode: telemetry back at 10:52:39 instead of 11:05:35, with 0x0518 still answering the same -3 W. RED BEFORE (release_s=inf, a graded counterfactual and not a second implementation), GREEN AFTER. WHAT IT COSTS, AND IT IS NOT SMALL. A register dead for good is re-graded for ever: over 1201 reads the held number reaches a consumer on 630 (52.5 %) against 35 (2.9 %) before. Payable only because one window is at most 35 s and the two consumers hold for 75 s and 85 s, so neither can reach a verdict inside one and the re-trip clears both windows. No detection SAFETY-37 had is given back - a permanent None clears the same windows for ever too - and the command is derived from the P1 meter, never from batt. Two clocks, deliberately: changed_mono/unchanged_s() stay facts about the REGISTER, graded_from/graded_s() are the VERDICT's window. Collapsing them either lies to the operator or defeats the re-grading. main.py's stale line had its ESCAPE CLAUSE corrected - it promised a clearance the state could not produce - and gained a STALE WITHDRAWN edge that says in its own words that nothing has been learned about the register. The DIAGNOSIS half is SAFETY-56's and is deliberately untouched, with a named check asserting it is still there so that rewrite has to be deliberate. Battery: 22 mutations, 21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors. Two findings kept in DECISIONS: _release()'s move_w test swapped for unchanged_s SURVIVED at +5 B because every fixture rested at exactly 0 W (habit 11, closed by a 0/100/300 W fixture); and the code shipped a habit-22 comment claiming the _release/_grade order was load-bearing, which the battery falsified - the two act on mutually exclusive predicates, so the order is not observable. MUTATION.md gains habit 23 for a mutation that ran, fingerprinted clean, and was a no-op on the fixture because `0.0 or x` is x. Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro, one file at a time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-21 12:33:56 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	8e241a3243	SAFETY-37: correct a wall-clock tick and a false size claim ... Two blocking findings from review, both in prose, both corrected at every site. 1. "trips on tick 7" was not what the fixture prints. It prints 11, five runs out of five, and the developer's own report says 11. ⚠️ But the deeper problem is that the number should never have been quoted: the tick is counted on the WALL CLOCK inside cycle() (hold_s 2 s, ticks 0.20 s apart), so it is load-dependent - 7 is what a box slow enough to stretch each tick to ~0.29 s would print - and nothing pins it. The DECISIONS transcript now says 11 because it is a transcript of a run; the CHANGELOG stops quoting a tick at all and states the checkable thing instead: it trips without the gate and never with it, which part 3 grades. 2. ⚠️ SURVIVOR 2's SIZE CLAIM WAS FALSE FOR ONE OF THE TWO CONSUMERS THIS CARD EXISTS TO PROTECT. It read "one contributing at most 250 W to a loop whose reporting floor is 700 W" at three sites. That bounds the COMMAND. Once the register is frozen its REPORTED value is unrelated to the command - which is exactly HW-01's shape: commanded ~0 W, register stuck on the last large number. Measured in review: a unit frozen at -1200 W beside a healthy +900 W sibling yields circulating_w = 1800 W against the 700 W floor, 2.6x OVER, with no gate armed. So the scoping is TRUE for the per-unit sign check and FALSE for circulation. Corrected to say exactly that, and the circulation consumer's exposure below MOVE_W is now recorded as a KNOWN GAP rather than a covered one. It survived because part 9's S2 check asserts only `not stale` and part 4 pairs the frozen unit with a RESTING sibling (circulating_w([A_FROZEN_W, 0.0]) == 0.0) - neither grades the size sentence. No behaviour change. Full suite: 22 passed, 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-06 12:35:27 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	6864109a01	SAFETY-37: a stale reading is None, and arrival cannot be what says so ... The architect pass made SAFETY-37, TEL-06 and TEL-08 one systemic problem - "a stale reading holds its last value and reads healthy" - and this builds the single policy. Both consumers the card names are gated by one change, and neither consumer needed a line: `SignWatchdog.evaluate` already CLEARS its window on a None measurement and `circulating_w` already returns None for a roster with a missing term. Neither could ever receive one. The gate is the piece that was missing BETWEEN the shipped read and the shipped checks. ⚠️ ONE CRITERION IN THE CARD COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AS WRITTEN, AND SAYING SO IS THE MAIN CONTENT. The card says "only arrival separates them". At this layer arrival cannot: `read_inputs()` polls Home Assistant's state cache about once a second and HA answers 200 with a number whether or not the publisher behind the entity is alive, so both members of the pair arrive identically for ever. test_freshness.py part 1a BUILDS the arrival-age gate the card asks for and grades it failing - the age is 0.0 s at every instant of both runs, a threshold that can never fire, which is TEL-06's own defect one layer up. The half of the rule that survives is honoured absolutely: nothing here reads a Home Assistant timestamp, and the check asserts the module contains no `last_updated`. So the criterion became: a reading is stale when it has not moved through a change it was OBLIGED to follow. STALE <=> unchanged >= 35 s AND |standing| >= 250 W AND |standing - standing when the reading last changed| >= 250 W Latched until a different value arrives. `Inverter.batt` becomes None - never a held number - which is a missing input, which §11.1 rule 1 answers with 0 W. WHY A CONJUNCTION AND NOT A THRESHOLD, MEASURED 2026-09-06. Replaying the committed 30-day capture of this house's own 1 W power entity (485,841 samples out of HA's recorder, where a row exists only on a CHANGE, so the gap between rows IS the unchanged duration every consumer saw): the longest legitimate unchanged run is 263.2 s, held at -899.0 W. A false-positive-free threshold would have to exceed that, and 263 s is 3.5x too slow for a consumer that trips at 75 s. There is no admissible threshold. Every one of those long runs is under an UNMOVING load, which is what the travel term keys on. THE BOUND, derived at both ends and graded against the shipped config.yaml. Floor 17.0 s = 6.0 plant settle (NOTES §5.9, measured 2026-08-22) + 10.0 ESPHome publish (firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181) + 1.0 read period (run_control's asyncio.sleep(1)). Ceiling 75.0 s = min(circulation_hold_s 75, unit_sign_disagree_s 85). Band [34.0, 37.5]; 35 is a CHOICE inside a DERIVED band and the check says so - the first draft claimed the band held one integer and went red on its own first run. MOVE_W is the LARGEST admissible value, unit_sign_disagree_w, because below it the consumer cannot speak at all. SoC is STATED, NOT WIRED, and BOUNDS carries it with wired=False and the reason. Its obligation term is energy through the pack, not command travel - a rested pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W command - and K needs a usable capacity nobody has measured. That is TEL-08's; the record says so. ⚠️ BEHAVIOUR CHANGES AT THE SHIPPED ROSTER OF ONE, and it is named rather than hidden: a FROZEN register now stops the site where it used to read as a healthy measurement for ever. That is HW-01, which was a one-inverter site. A healthy install is unchanged, asserted over sixty reads of a dithering register under a reversing command. A false verdict fails toward 0 W behind the existing stale_input_s hold and clears itself on the register's next move. ⚠️ BOTH UNITS IN EVERY TWO-INVERTER FIXTURE ARE INVERTER A with different numbers passed in; inverter B does not physically exist (~2026-09-12). MUTATION: 16 mutations against a purged, :ro, python3 -B tree, fingerprinted before and after every revert. One survivor, and it is the finding - dropping the magnitude term left every check green because no fixture separated "the command travelled 250 W" from "the command ended up above 250 W". Closed, and recorded as MUTATION.md habit 17. A second process defect is habit 18: a mutation run that timed out between the edit and the revert left the module mutated on disk and nothing announced it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-06 11:53:26 +02:00