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goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller/app/arbiter.py
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SAFETY-30: grade each inverter against its own power, and the site's total against the meter
THE DEFECT, in one line. `inv.sign_wd.evaluate(stood, self.grid, ...)` compared
the command THIS controller put on ONE actuator against what the WHOLE SITE is
exchanging with the network. At a roster of one those are two views of the same
thing - specs.md §6.2's identity - and that is what makes the check sound and
what earned it the best record in the safety table (NOTES.md: 93 % agreement
while healthy against 4 % during runaway, four observed episodes, zero false
positives). At two inverters they are not, and it fails in BOTH directions:

  FALSE TRIP  inverter A commanded -1500 W while the meter reads +1500 W is
              evidence of nothing when inverter B is discharging 3000 W exactly
              as told. Nothing is faulty and the highest-value check fires.
  MISSED      the converse, and it is worse. A unit commanded +1500 W and
              MEASURED at -1500 W, beside a sibling at +1500 W, leaves P1
              exactly where a healthy site leaves it. The summation destroys the
              evidence and no threshold recovers it.

DEV-02 had already shipped the per-INSTANCE half - one SignWatchdog per
inverter, namespaced latch, a trip on B no longer latching A. What was left was
the COMPARISON, and it is two questions rather than one:

  PER UNIT  this unit's standing command against ITS OWN measured power
            (`Inverter.batt`, holding register 0x0518, per-instance since
            DEV-02). Conclusion: "the actuator I am driving is not doing what I
            told it" - a fact about one device, so the remedy stays the per-unit
            `failsafe` SET that arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE has classified SCOPE_UNIT
            from the day it was written. That entry read "the evidence is
            site-wide and the remedy is not"; the first half is now simply true.
  SITE      the SUM of the standing commands against the meter, as a new
            `sign_site` SET at P_SAFETY on the site actuator, latched under flat
            `site_sign_tripped` / `site_sign_reason`. This is the 2026-08-20
            fault day and NO per-unit check can see it, because every inverter
            may be faithfully executing its share of a number that is itself
            wrong. It stops every inverter and the banner names the site.

WHAT IT IS NOT, said here because two guards that overlap without saying so is
how a false-alarm generator gets built. It is not SAFETY-31: circulation.py
compares the units AGAINST EACH OTHER and catches them pushing power THROUGH
each other, which nets to zero at the meter and about which no single command is
evidence. This compares each unit against ITS OWN COMMAND. They overlap in
exactly one scenario - a unit reversing while its sibling pulls the other way -
and test_watchdog.py asserts on that fixture that both fire and what each
concludes. It is also not the saturation freeze, which is a MAGNITUDE test
(|command - measured| > 500 W) that shapes the loop and fires on a merely
saturated unit; this is a DIRECTION test that latches and parks one.

THE FOUR NUMBERS, RE-DERIVED AT TWO INVERTERS - one carried with a justification
and one refused. 1890 closed-loop runs on admin/goodwe's TEST-19 two-master rig
in which NOTHING is faulty, swept over the whole range config.yaml accepts for
`gain` and `slew_w`, across load reversals with write staggers and flapping
loads, and RUN AT BOTH ROSTERS so the N=1 arm is the control:

  unit_sign_disagree_w  250   `saturation_w / 2`. The check gates on both sides,
                              opposed, so the smallest gap it can see is 500 W -
                              exactly where compute()'s own anti-windup test
                              already says the inverter is not following. It
                              cannot fire on a divergence the control law calls
                              ordinary tracking. Worst legitimate opposition at
                              250 W: 10.0 s; the curve is nearly flat, because a
                              unit's own power chases its own command.
  unit_sign_disagree_s   85   8.5x that 10.0 s, 2.8x the firmware's own 30 s
                              link veto (inverter.LINK_STALE_S), under half the
                              180 s site hold.
  site_sign_disagree_w  300   CARRIED. Its argument is the meter's noise floor
                              and the 15 W deadband; the roster touches neither,
                              and the campaign agrees - the gate opens in 994 of
                              1050 runs at two inverters and 955 of 1050 at one.
  site_sign_disagree_s  325   NOT CARRIED, and this is the number the card
                              exists to not assume. The worst legitimate
                              crossing at 300 W is 110 s with one inverter and
                              215 s with TWO, because the command must travel a
                              rail that is the roster sum at a `slew_w` that is
                              not - reachable at gain 0.05, slew_w 50 and a
                              2.2 kW load reversal, all schema-legal. 180 s
                              would have shipped a false trip. 325 s is 1.51x
                              the measured worst, inside the 900 s billing
                              quarter and inside every episode of the fault day.

AT ONE INVERTER NOTHING CHANGES, and "nothing" is asserted rather than assumed.
The two questions are the same sentence there, so only the detector that shipped
is armed: same comparison against the meter, same 300 W / 180 s, same reason
string byte for byte, same namespaced latch and flat rollback mirror, same
`failsafe` claim, same banner, same single status row - and the site detector is
NEVER CALLED, counted on the object over twelve cycles.

VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT. Thirteen mutations on fresh per-mutation trees with no
__pycache__, mounted :ro, with the battery refusing to report at all unless the
baseline is green. Twelve red on the first pass. M4 - the site half armed at N=1
as well - SURVIVED, because the check read `disagree_since is None` and the unit
detector trips first, parks the inverter and leaves the site standing at 0 W:
the assertion ran, the sentence was true, and the data could not reach the
failure it named. Replaced with a call counter on the object; M4 is red now.
Recorded as a survivor in DECISIONS/SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign.md §5, with the
first battery's own RED BASELINE - a shared mutation directory read mid-copy -
discarded rather than reported.

RECORDED, NOT FIXED: the site comparison is defeated by a square-wave load whose
half period is about one control cycle, which holds it opposed for ~1000 s. The
N=1 control arm is what makes that interpretable - it is identical at the roster
this add-on ships, so it is a property of comparing a lagged command against a
meter and has nothing to do with the second inverter. It wants an alternation
test rather than a number, and a card of its own.

SAFETY-24's lo-only asymmetry proof re-run unchanged: 1296 combinations, 0
negative floors, `hi` +inf on every claim, every claim on the SITE actuator.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-04 09:33:20 +02:00

608 lines
32 KiB
Python

"""Who gets to command the inverter, and why.
Every strategy - the grid-following loop, the maintenance cycle, peak shaving,
the safety stops - stops writing the setpoint directly and instead returns a
CLAIM each cycle. This module resolves the claims into one number.
⚠️ THE REASON THIS EXISTS. Two controllers writing one actuator is the failure
this whole system is built to avoid: it is what the vendor controller did to the
reference site, and §4.4 of the project notes calls it out by name. Before this
module, "exactly one writer" was a convention held up by an if/else ladder and
careful reading. With an EV charger and a heat pump eventually wanting the same
battery, a convention is not good enough - so precedence is now a first-class
object with one rule and a printable explanation.
THE RULE, in full:
1. The highest-priority `set` claim wins. If there is no set claim at all, the
target is 0 W - fail toward inaction, never "hold the last value".
2. Every `limit` claim whose priority is >= the winning set's priority is then
applied. Most restrictive wins.
3. Contradictory limits (lo > hi) are a BUG, not a tie to break: command 0 W
and say so loudly.
Clause 2 is the interesting one. It is what makes "money outranks maintenance"
a consequence of the priorities instead of a special case somebody can forget:
the maintenance charge-only limit binds the loop, but a higher-priority peak
shaving claim simply is not bound by it.
⚠️ AND WHICH ACTUATOR IS A CLAIM ABOUT? THAT QUESTION HAS AN ANSWER AGAIN.
specs.md §6.1 declared `actuator: str` as the first field of `Claim` and the
implementation shipped without it, so every claim was implicitly about "the one
and only actuator" and `resolve()` returned one scalar. ARB-03 restores the
field, because §6.2 decided the site grid target is ALLOCATED across several
inverters and never broadcast to each of them - and an allocator needs a seam to
occupy that a single scalar does not have.
So resolution is now THREE STAGES, and they are separate functions so that a
test can construct a case at any one of them:
1. `pre_resolve()` - each inverter's OWN claims become an interval for that
unit. One unit's claims, one unit's bounds.
2. `site_resolve()` - the SITE claims become one grid target S. This is the
rule above, unchanged, and it is deliberately the same
code it was: at N=1 there are no unit claims, so this
stage sees the whole list and answers exactly what the
shipped arbiter answered.
3. `allocate()` - THE SEAM. It turns S into per-inverter shares subject to
stage 1's intervals. ALLOC-01 filled it: the allocator
itself is `app/allocator.py` and the reasoning lives
there, because it consumes intervals and a number and
must never learn about claims, priorities or P1.
⚠️ THE STRUCTURAL PROPERTY, AND IT IS THE REASON FOR THE SPLIT. A per-inverter
constraint is consumed by the allocator as an INTERVAL; it is never promoted
into the site claim list. So a unit `hi` and a site `lo` are never terms of the
same `lo > hi` test, and the contradiction clause below - which resolves to 0 W,
a battery parked inside a billed quarter - cannot be reached across two
inverters. That is DECISIONS/SAFETY-25-loop-soc-floor.md §0c, made mechanical:
not "guarded against", NOT EXPRESSIBLE. Filing a unit constraint as a site claim
to "keep it simple" is the whole bug, and `actuator_for()` is what stops a
strategy doing it by hand.
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from math import inf
# ⚠️ ONE WAY ONLY. `allocator` knows nothing about claims, priorities or
# this module - it consumes intervals and a number - so the dependency
# cannot become a cycle and the allocator stays testable on its own, which
# is what lets test_alloc.py sweep it hundreds of thousands of times
# without building a claim list for each one.
from . import allocator
# Priorities live here and nowhere else. The moment these become magic numbers
# scattered through the strategies, the whole point of this module is lost.
P_SAFETY = 100 # stopped, inputs missing, shutting down, device limits
P_MAINTENANCE = 60 # maintenance owns the actuator outright (drain, hold)
P_PEAK = 50 # capacity-tariff peak shaving - costs real money
P_MAINT_SHAPE = 40 # maintenance shaping the loop (charge-only)
# OPT-04. §10.1 priority 3 - price arbitrage. ⚠️ ITS POSITION IS THE SPEC, NOT A
# preference: P_PEAK (50) is ABOVE it so clause 2 lets the capacity-tariff floor
# clamp an arbitrage charge, which is §9.1's "give peak shaving priority over
# arbitrage whenever the two conflict" expressed as arithmetic rather than as a
# rule somebody has to remember. P_MAINT_SHAPE (40) is above it so a speculative
# spread cannot override the pack's balancing cycle. P_LOOP (10) is below it
# because trading against the meter is the entire point - the grid-following
# loop would otherwise cancel every charge the moment it created import.
P_ARBITRAGE = 30 # price arbitrage - trades against the meter on purpose
P_LOOP = 10 # ordinary grid-following
SET = "set"
LIMIT = "limit"
# --- actuators, and the two scopes a claim can have -------------------------
# ⚠️ §6.2: THE GRID CONNECTION IS AN ACTUATOR TOO. It is the one every inverter
# at the site shares, and two inverters regulating against one meter are two
# writers on it - which is the failure this module exists to prevent, one level
# up from the one it was built for. So it gets a name, and claims about it are
# filed on that name rather than on nothing in particular.
ACTUATOR_SITE = "site"
SCOPE_SITE = "site" # about the grid connection: one of these per site
SCOPE_UNIT = "unit" # about one pack, one inverter, one device
# ⚠️ THE CLASSIFICATION, AND IT IS THE REAL OUTPUT OF ARB-03. Each entry is read
# off what the claim is ABOUT at its construction site in main.py, not off which
# module builds it. Getting an entry wrong is not cosmetic: a per-inverter
# reserve filed as a site `hi` against the peak guard's site `lo` is `lo > hi`,
# clause 3, 0 W - the battery parked in the billed quarter that SAFETY-25's memo
# calls fatal. The reasoning is recorded here, at the line, because this table is
# where a ninth source will be classified and the reasoning is what a future
# reader needs in order to classify it correctly.
CLAIM_SCOPE = {
# --- SITE: about the grid connection ---------------------------------
# main.py: `Claim.set("loop", P_LOOP, decision.target_w, ...)`. compute()
# regulates `grid_w` - the P1 measurement - to zero. Its subject is the
# meter, and §6.2's whole architecture is ONE integrator on P1 whose output
# is then split. A site claim, and the one the split exists for.
"loop": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `peakguard.claim(...)`. The quantity is the 15-minute average
# OFFTAKE AT THE GRID CONNECTION, which is what the Belgian capacity tariff
# bills. There is one quarter-hour peak per site, not one per pack.
"peak": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `arbitrage.claim(...)`. It buys and sells at the grid against a
# day-ahead price. The price is a property of the connection, and the energy
# it trades crosses the meter.
"arbitrage": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `Claim.set("safety", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "stopped" | "inputs missing")`.
# ⚠️ READ BOTH CONSTRUCTION SITES BEFORE MOVING THIS ONE. Neither is about a
# pack. "stopped" is the operator switching control off for the SITE, and
# "inputs missing" is the SITE's own telemetry gone - the meter this whole
# controller regulates against. Both must stop every inverter, and a site
# SET at P_SAFETY is how that is said once rather than N times.
"safety": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `Claim.set("circulation", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "circulating power")`.
# SAFETY-31, and this one is a SITE claim for a reason worth writing down,
# because the neighbouring `failsafe` entry looks like it and is not.
#
# `failsafe` is SAFETY-02: site-wide evidence, per-unit conclusion. It
# compares the meter against THE COMMAND THIS CONTROLLER PUT ON ONE
# ACTUATOR, so what it learns is about that actuator and the remedy is that
# actuator.
#
# Circulating power is not a property any single inverter has. It is
# `sum(|B_i|) - |sum(B_i)|`, defined over the whole roster and identically
# zero for any one unit, and there is NO FACT OF THE MATTER about which of
# two opposing inverters is the offender - a unit ignoring its share and a
# sibling faithfully executing a share computed to sum with it produce the
# same reading. Filing this per-unit would require inventing an attribution
# the measurement cannot support, and would park one inverter while the
# other went on feeding the loop. The evidence is site-level and so is the
# remedy: stop commanding, everywhere, and say why.
"circulation": SCOPE_SITE,
# main.py: `Claim.set("sign_site", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "site sign disagreement")`.
# SAFETY-30, and it is the twin of `failsafe` below rather than a duplicate
# of it - the two exist BECAUSE the same words describe two different
# measurements once there is more than one inverter.
#
# `failsafe` grades ONE unit's standing command against THAT UNIT'S OWN
# measured power (register 0x0518). Its conclusion is "the actuator I am
# driving is not doing what I told it", which is a fact about one device,
# so it parks one device.
#
# This one grades the SUM of the standing commands against P1. Its
# conclusion is "the site as a whole is driving the wrong way" - an inverted
# gain, an integrator wound past the rail, a strategy on the wrong side of
# the meter - and there is nothing per-unit about it: the quantity is a sum
# over the roster and the offending number is the site target, which no
# single inverter owns. Parking one unit on that evidence would leave the
# rest of the site pushing the same way with the guard satisfied.
#
# ⚠️ AT N=1 IT IS NEVER FILED, and that is the identity rather than a
# special case: with one inverter the sum of the commands IS that unit's
# command and `failsafe` already carries exactly this trip, under the keys,
# the banner and the claim an install has had since SAFETY-02 shipped.
# `Controller.cycle()` does not even arm the site detector there.
"sign_site": SCOPE_SITE,
# --- UNIT: about one pack, one inverter, one device -------------------
# main.py: `Claim.limit("device", P_SAFETY, self.dev_min, self.dev_max,
# "rating")`. The numbers are read off ONE inverter's own reported min/max.
# Another inverter has another rating; there is no site rating.
"device": SCOPE_UNIT,
# main.py: `Claim.limit("supervised", P_SAFETY, -max_w, max_w, "max_w")`.
# `max_w` is the supervised cap on what this controller may WRITE to a
# setpoint entity - §11.3's "the actuator is capped below the inverter
# rating". It bounds a write to one device, like `device` does and for the
# same reason, so it is scoped like `device`.
"supervised": SCOPE_UNIT,
# main.py: `Claim.set("failsafe", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "sign disagreement")`.
# ⚠️ THE EVIDENCE IS PER-UNIT AND SO IS THE REMEDY - AND SINCE SAFETY-30 THE
# FIRST HALF OF THAT SENTENCE IS TRUE. It used to read "the evidence is
# site-wide and the remedy is not", because the watchdog compared THIS
# unit's standing command against P1: a site measurement, attributed to one
# actuator on the strength of §6.2's N=1 identity. That identity does not
# survive a second inverter - at N>=2 the meter answers for a sibling this
# unit's command says nothing about, in both directions (a false trip when
# the sibling covers the meter, and a missed one when the sibling MASKS a
# unit that really is reversed).
#
# So at N>=2 the comparison behind this claim is THIS unit's command against
# THIS unit's own measured power - register 0x0518, per-instance since
# DEV-02 - and the scope that was already right for the wrong reason is now
# right for the right one. The site-wide half moved to `sign_site` above.
# At N=1 the two are the same comparison and this claim is the one filed,
# exactly as it shipped.
"failsafe": SCOPE_UNIT,
# main.py: `Claim.set("maintenance", P_MAINTENANCE, ...)` when the cycle owns
# the setpoint, and `Claim.limit("maintenance", P_MAINT_SHAPE, hi=...)` when
# it only shapes. §12's monthly recalibration is a PACK procedure - drain
# this pack to its floor, charge this pack to full, recalibrate this pack's
# coulomb counter. Two packs recalibrate on their own schedules.
"maintenance": SCOPE_UNIT,
}
def actuator_for(source: str, unit: str, units=()) -> str:
"""Which actuator a claim from `source` belongs on, given the site's roster.
⚠️ ROUTE THROUGH THIS, DO NOT PASS `actuator=` BY HAND. An unclassified
source raises `KeyError` here rather than defaulting to the site, which is
the one direction that is not safe to default in: a per-inverter constraint
that lands in the site claim list is exactly the `lo > hi` this card exists
to make unreachable. A ninth claim source has to be classified in
CLAIM_SCOPE before it can be filed, and test_peakguard.py part 10f is the
other half of that - it goes red on the line the ninth append is written.
⚠️ AND AT N=1 EVERY SOURCE ROUTES TO THE SITE. That is not the classification
being ignored, it is §6.2's identity: with one inverter the fabricated grid
reading and the battery setpoint are the same number, so the grid connection
and the only unit ARE the same actuator and there is nothing to allocate.
Splitting the list at N=1 would be a behaviour change on a live safety path -
the `failsafe` and `maintenance` SET claims would stop competing with the
site's for the winner, `explain()` would name a different source, and
`loop_is_following()` reads that name. The identity holds only at N=1, so
this function is the ONE place that stops relying on it, the day the roster
grows.
"""
if CLAIM_SCOPE[source] == SCOPE_SITE:
return ACTUATOR_SITE
return ACTUATOR_SITE if len(units) <= 1 else unit
def scope_violations(claims) -> list:
"""Claims filed on an actuator their source's scope does not permit.
A list of one-line complaints, empty when the routing is right. This is the
check `actuator_for()` cannot make on its own, because a caller can always
write `actuator=` by hand: it grades the claim list that actually reached the
arbiter, whatever built it.
"""
out = []
# ⚠️ THE SECOND TEST IS CONDITIONAL ON THE SITE HAVING NAMED UNITS AT ALL,
# and that is not laxity. At N=1 §6.2's identity holds and a per-inverter
# source filed on the site is CORRECT - it is what `actuator_for()` returns.
# The direction that produces `lo > hi` only exists once there is a second
# actuator for the constraint to have belonged to.
split = any(c.actuator != ACTUATOR_SITE for c in claims)
for c in claims:
scope = CLAIM_SCOPE.get(c.source)
if scope is None:
out.append(f"{c.source}: not classified in CLAIM_SCOPE")
elif scope == SCOPE_SITE and c.actuator != ACTUATOR_SITE:
out.append(f"{c.source}: a SITE claim filed on unit {c.actuator!r} - "
f"it would bound one inverter's share instead of the grid")
elif scope == SCOPE_UNIT and c.actuator == ACTUATOR_SITE and split:
out.append(f"{c.source}: a UNIT claim filed on the site while the "
f"site has named units - it can cross a site limit")
return out
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Claim:
source: str
priority: int
kind: str = SET
value: float = 0.0 # for SET
lo: float = -inf # for LIMIT
hi: float = inf # for LIMIT
reason: str = ""
# ⚠️ specs.md §6.1 DECLARES THIS FIELD FIRST AND IT IS LAST HERE, ON PURPOSE.
# The spec's point is that a claim NAMES its actuator; the tuple position is
# not the point, and it is load-bearing for two things that are. Every
# construction in this repository passes `source` first, and
# test_peakguard.py part 10f reads `Claim.set(...)`/`Claim.limit(...)`'s
# FIRST POSITIONAL ARGUMENT off main.py's AST to pin the claim-source set -
# the tripwire that guards SAFETY-25's deferred option. Moving `source` off
# position 0 would silently blind that scan, which is this repository's named
# failure mode. So the field is restored where it costs nothing.
#
# ⚠️ AND ITS DEFAULT IS THE SITE, EXPLICITLY. Not None, not "". A claim that
# does not name an actuator is a claim about the grid connection and says so;
# "unspecified" is what the shipped code already had, and it is what made
# every claim implicitly about the one and only actuator.
actuator: str = ACTUATOR_SITE
@staticmethod
def set(source: str, priority: int, value: float, reason: str = "", *,
actuator: str = ACTUATOR_SITE) -> "Claim":
return Claim(source, priority, SET, value=value, reason=reason,
actuator=actuator)
@staticmethod
def limit(source: str, priority: int, lo: float = -inf, hi: float = inf,
reason: str = "", *, actuator: str = ACTUATOR_SITE) -> "Claim":
return Claim(source, priority, LIMIT, lo=lo, hi=hi, reason=reason,
actuator=actuator)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class UnitBounds:
"""What one inverter's OWN claims say about that inverter's share.
STAGE 1's output, one per unit, and the thing ALLOC-01 consumes. It is an
INTERVAL plus the two facts an allocator cannot reconstruct from an interval:
* `pinned_w` - the value that unit's own winning SET asked for. A SET is not
a bound: `resolve()` CLAMPS a set value into the limits rather than
intersecting with it, and folding a 2500 W drain into `[2500, 2500]` would
turn "clamped to the rating" into "contradicts the rating". So it travels
beside the interval, not inside it.
* `gate` - the priority of that winning SET, or None. Clause 2 applies a
limit only at or above the winner's priority, and at N>=2 the winner may be
a SITE set chosen at stage 2, i.e. AFTER this. Stage 1 states the
constraint and records what it is gated on; deciding whether it applies is
stage 3's business. Guessing here is how a maintenance charge-only `hi`
would come to bind a peak discharge it does not outrank.
`contradiction` is a unit contradicting ITSELF - its own `lo` above its own
`hi`. It parks that unit and says so; it does not park the site, which is the
entire difference this card is about.
"""
lo: float = -inf
hi: float = inf
lo_src: str | None = None
hi_src: str | None = None
gate: int | None = None
pinned_w: float | None = None
pinned_by: str | None = None
contradiction: bool = False
def explain(self) -> str:
if self.contradiction:
return (f"CONTRADICTION within the unit ({self.lo_src} lo="
f"{self.lo:.0f} > {self.hi_src} hi={self.hi:.0f})")
span = (f"[{'-inf' if self.lo == -inf else format(self.lo, '.0f')}, "
f"{'+inf' if self.hi == inf else format(self.hi, '.0f')}]")
if self.pinned_by is not None:
return f"{span} around {self.pinned_by} -> {self.pinned_w:.0f} W"
return span
@dataclass
class Resolution:
target_w: float
winner: str # which source set the value
bound_by: str | None = None # which limit actually changed it, if any
contradiction: bool = False
considered: list = field(default_factory=list)
# --- the three-stage fields. ⚠️ APPENDED, AND DEFAULTED, ON PURPOSE: every
# existing construction of this type is positional in its first five fields
# and `target_w` still means exactly what it meant - the SITE grid target.
# main.py assigns it to `self.target` unchanged.
unit_bounds: dict = field(default_factory=dict) # stage 1, per actuator
shares: dict = field(default_factory=dict) # stage 3, per actuator
allocated: bool = True # False when stage 3 declined to split
scope_errors: list = field(default_factory=list) # mis-routed claims
# ALLOC-01, appended for the reason the four above were: `target_w` still
# means the SITE grid target and every existing construction is untouched.
#
# `allocation` is stage 3's full record - what each unit was told and why,
# what could not be placed, what was dropped. `shares` and `allocated` are
# two fields OF that record, kept at the top level because main.py and four
# test files already read them there. ⚠️ IT IS THE RECORD, NOT THE PAIR,
# THAT SAFETY-28 GATES THE WRITE PATH ON: `allocated` says the allocator
# stands behind the split, and `unmet_w` says how much of the site target it
# could not place, and fusing those two would make one saturated inverter
# park the whole site.
allocation: object | None = None
# The priority of the SITE claim that chose `target_w`. Stage 3 weighs a
# unit's OWN winning SET against it - see `allocator.plan()`'s PINS note -
# and getting it from here rather than recomputing it is what stops the two
# rules drifting apart: this is set by the same line that picks the winner
# `explain()` names.
winner_priority: int | None = None
def explain(self) -> str:
"""One line an operator can act on - this is the point of the module."""
if self.contradiction:
return f"CONTRADICTION between limits - commanding 0 W ({self.winner})"
if self.bound_by:
return f"{self.winner} -> {self.target_w:.0f} W, limited by {self.bound_by}"
return f"{self.winner} -> {self.target_w:.0f} W"
def pre_resolve(unit_claims: list) -> UnitBounds:
"""STAGE 1. One inverter's own claims -> that inverter's interval.
Clauses 1 and 2 of the rule, transposed: the unit's highest-priority SET
names what the unit wants and gates which of the unit's limits apply, and the
most restrictive of those limits gives the interval. Read UnitBounds on why
the SET value is not folded into the interval.
⚠️ THE INPUT IS ONE UNIT'S CLAIMS AND NOTHING ELSE. A site claim reaching
this function would become a bound on one inverter's share - the mirror image
of the fault this card removes, and the reason `resolve()` partitions rather
than filters twice.
"""
sets = sorted((c for c in unit_claims if c.kind == SET),
key=lambda c: c.priority, reverse=True)
gate = pinned_w = pinned_by = None
if sets:
gate, pinned_w, pinned_by = sets[0].priority, sets[0].value, sets[0].source
lo, hi = -inf, inf
lo_src = hi_src = None
for c in unit_claims:
if c.kind != LIMIT or (gate is not None and c.priority < gate):
continue
if c.lo > lo:
lo, lo_src = c.lo, c.source
if c.hi < hi:
hi, hi_src = c.hi, c.source
return UnitBounds(lo, hi, lo_src, hi_src, gate, pinned_w, pinned_by,
contradiction=lo > hi)
def allocate(target_w: float, bounds: dict, *, weights=None, live=None,
scope_errors=(), site_priority=None) -> tuple:
"""STAGE 3. THE SEAM, AND SINCE ALLOC-01 IT IS OCCUPIED. `(shares, allocated)`.
⚠️ THE ALLOCATOR ITSELF IS `app/allocator.py` AND THE REASONING LIVES THERE.
This is the adapter: it keeps the two-value shape every caller in this
repository already reads, and it exists as a separate name so that the
arbiter's three stages are still three functions a test can enter at any
one of them. `allocator.plan()` returns the full record - use that when you
need `unmet_w`, `dropped` or the per-unit reasons; `resolve()` stashes it on
`Resolution.allocation` for exactly that.
What §6.2 fixed and what this delivers:
* SUM-INVARIANT. `sum(shares) + unmet_w == round(target_w)`, in integer
arithmetic, so it cannot drift. Rounding is largest-remainder because a
per-unit `round()` biases the sum by up to N/2 W every tick and at 1-2 Hz
that is a PERMANENT standing error the site integrator chases forever.
* EACH UNIT IS TOLD A FUNCTION OF ITS OWN SHARE, never of the shared
measurement. That makes the gain at the meter a convex combination of the
per-unit gains for ANY split, which is why the weights are a comfort
choice and a bad split cannot destabilise the site.
* WITH AT MOST ONE UNIT IT IS STILL A PASS-THROUGH, byte-identical to what
ARB-03 shipped: the share IS the site target, as a float, unrounded and
unclamped. §6.2's N=1 identity, and the compatibility promise every
existing replay in this repository depends on.
⚠️ AND IT STILL DECLINES, WHICH IS NOT THE SAME LIST OF CASES AS BEFORE.
ARB-03 declined at N>=2 because it had no allocator; that trigger is gone
and the branch is NOT. It now fires when no safe split exists at all: a
mis-routed claim, no unit left in the envelope set, or a split that could
only be made by commanding one pack to charge while another discharges.
Read `allocator.plan()` for each. main.py's refusal path and
test_peakguard.py part 10h were re-aimed onto those rather than deleted -
PR #40's reviewer proved that guard was unreachable and untested once, and
removing its trigger without giving it a new one would rebuild the hole.
"""
return allocate_record(target_w, bounds, weights=weights, live=live,
scope_errors=scope_errors,
site_priority=site_priority)[:2]
def allocate_record(target_w: float, bounds: dict, *, weights=None, live=None,
scope_errors=(), site_priority=None, tick=None) -> tuple:
"""`allocate()` plus the record - `(shares, allocated, allocation)`.
`tick` is SAFETY-28's freshness token: it identifies the tick the record is
FOR and is handed straight through to `allocator.plan()`. Left None the
record is UNSTAMPED, which the write gate refuses - so a caller that intends
the record to authorise a write must pass one. Every existing caller in this
repository wants the arithmetic and not the authority, and gets None.
"""
rec = allocator.plan(target_w, bounds, weights=weights, live=live,
scope_errors=scope_errors,
site_priority=site_priority, site_key=ACTUATOR_SITE,
tick=tick)
return rec.shares, rec.ok, rec
def site_resolve(claims: list) -> Resolution:
"""STAGE 2. The SITE claims -> one grid target.
⚠️ THIS FUNCTION IS THE SHIPPED ARBITER, UNCHANGED. It is a separate name and
the same code, deliberately: at N=1 nothing is filed on a unit, so `resolve()`
hands it the whole claim list and it answers what it has always answered.
Every check in test_arbiter.py, test_watchdog.py, test_validate.py and
test_peakguard.py replays through here unedited, which is the proof that
ARB-03 changed no behaviour on the live path.
"""
sets = sorted((c for c in claims if c.kind == SET),
key=lambda c: c.priority, reverse=True)
if sets:
winner = sets[0]
else:
# No strategy asked for anything. That is not "carry on as before" - the
# inverter holds its last command forever, so silence must mean zero.
winner = Claim.set("failsafe", P_SAFETY, 0.0, "no claim was made")
lo, hi = -inf, inf
lo_src = hi_src = None
for c in claims:
if c.kind != LIMIT or c.priority < winner.priority:
continue
if c.lo > lo:
lo, lo_src = c.lo, c
if c.hi < hi:
hi, hi_src = c.hi, c
considered = [f"{c.source}:{c.kind}" for c in claims]
if lo > hi:
return Resolution(0.0, winner.source, bound_by=None,
contradiction=True, considered=considered,
winner_priority=winner.priority)
target = max(lo, min(hi, winner.value))
bound_by = None
if target != winner.value:
binder = lo_src if target == lo else hi_src
if binder is not None:
bound_by = f"{binder.source}({binder.reason})" if binder.reason else binder.source
return Resolution(float(target), winner.source, bound_by, False, considered,
winner_priority=winner.priority)
def resolve(claims: list, *, units=None, weights=None, live=None,
tick=None) -> Resolution:
"""The three stages, in order, over one cycle's claims.
`units` is the site's roster of inverters. Left None it is derived from the
claims themselves, which is right for a caller that files a claim for every
unit every cycle (main.py does - `supervised` is unconditional) and wrong for
one that does not, so main.py passes the real roster rather than let a silent
unit look like a smaller site.
`weights` and `live` are ALLOC-01's two per-tick inputs to stage 3, and both
are per-TICK on purpose. `weights` is the comfort choice - SoC, thermals,
wear - and cannot destabilise the site whatever it says. `live` is the set
of units whose master has reported recently enough to be commanded; a unit
left out of it is DROPPED from the envelope set and the record says so,
because the survivor carrying a dead unit's share silently is the failure
SAFETY-30 is about. ⚠️ NEITHER MAY BE CACHED BY A CALLER. A unit's range
moves for reasons unrelated to the allocator - a stale link, a pack at its
floor, a device rating that failed to read - so an envelope read once at
construction over-allocates into a unit that cannot take it.
⚠️ AND THE ARGUMENT HAS TO BE HONOURED, WHICH IS NOT THE SAME AS EXISTING.
Ignore it - derive always - and a unit that filed nothing this cycle ceases
to exist: a site of two reads as a site of one and stage 3 passes the whole
grid target through to the inverter that spoke, which is ARCH-01's fault
with its own evidence removed. That mutation survived the whole suite until
test_arbiter.py part 7 graded it on a SILENT unit.
⚠️ `tick` IS SAFETY-28's FRESHNESS TOKEN AND IT IS NOT OPTIONAL ON THE LIVE
PATH. It identifies the tick this resolution is FOR, and it ends up on
`Resolution.allocation.tick`, where the write gate compares it against the
tick it is writing on. A record with no tick cannot authorise a write, which
is why main.py passes `self.alloc_tick` and why a test that only wants the
arbiter's arithmetic can leave it out and be sure it has not accidentally
minted a licence to write.
⚠️ THE PARTITION IS BY `actuator`, AND IT IS A PARTITION, NOT A FILTER. Every
claim lands in exactly one stage. That is the whole structural argument: a
unit's `hi` and the site's `lo` are never both terms of the same `lo > hi`
test, so SAFETY-25 §0a's cross-inverter contradiction - 0 W inside the billed
quarter - is not something to guard against, it is something that cannot be
written down.
"""
site_claims = [c for c in claims if c.actuator == ACTUATOR_SITE]
if units is None:
units = {c.actuator for c in claims if c.actuator != ACTUATOR_SITE}
units = tuple(sorted(units))
# STAGE 1 - each unit's own claims become that unit's interval.
bounds = {u: pre_resolve([c for c in claims if c.actuator == u])
for u in units}
# STAGE 2 - the site claims become the grid target. At N=1 `site_claims` IS
# `claims`, so this is the shipped arbiter on the shipped list.
out = site_resolve(site_claims)
# STAGE 3 - the seam, and since ALLOC-01 the allocator behind it.
#
# ⚠️ THE ORDER MATTERS: `scope_violations()` IS COMPUTED BEFORE THE SPLIT,
# NOT AFTER, because stage 3 consumes it. A claim filed on an actuator its
# source's scope does not permit means the number about to be divided may
# itself be wrong, and dividing a number that may be wrong is worse than
# not dividing it - `allocator.plan()` carries the full argument, including
# why the mis-routed claim is NOT promoted into somebody's envelope. This
# was the open question ARB-03 left, and it is answered here rather than
# left as a log line nothing grades.
out.scope_errors = scope_violations(claims)
out.unit_bounds = bounds
out.shares, out.allocated, out.allocation = allocate_record(
out.target_w, bounds, weights=weights, live=live,
scope_errors=out.scope_errors, site_priority=out.winner_priority,
tick=tick)
return out