goodwe-addon/goodwe_controller/MUTATION.md

Mutation runs in this repository — and the one way they lie

Nearly every safety claim in this add-on was established the same way: change the shipped module, run the suites, watch one go red, put the module back, watch it go green. There is no coverage tool here and there is not meant to be — the check that matters is whether a check notices when the behaviour it names is removed.

That method has exactly one silent failure mode, and TEST-15 exists because we walked into it.

The defect

FCST-03's developer reverted self.provisional to here.provisional, re-ran, and reported the mutation as a survivor. It was not. CPython decides a cached .pyc is still valid from two numbers:

• the source file's size in bytes, and
• the source file's mtime truncated to whole seconds.

self and here are the same length, and the revert happened in the same second as the edit. Neither number moved, so the interpreter loaded the bytecode it already had. Confirmed at the time by disassembly: the source read here, the running code loaded self. The suite had graded code that was not there — no error, no warning, exit status 0.

The same collision, in the other direction, can leave a red standing on correct source after a revert that never took.

Which way it lies, and why that scopes everything

A mutation that never took effect leaves the suite green, and a green run of a mutated tree is reported as a survivor. So stale bytecode manufactures survivors; it cannot manufacture a red. The false-red case exists but announces itself, because a developer chases a failure they cannot explain.

Two consequences, and both are used below:

• a recorded "all red, no survivors" result is not at risk from this defect;
• a recorded survivor — and a recorded zero, such as a coverage-audit count of 0 — is exactly what this defect produces.

test_control.py's coverage-audit table says the same thing in its own terms: the error is one-directional, so every figure there is a lower bound at worst.

The rule

Purge __pycache__ before every mutation run. Not afterwards, not usually, not when the edit looks big enough.

cd goodwe_controller
tools/mutation_run.sh                     # every test_*.py in this directory
tools/mutation_run.sh . test_tariff.py    # or just the ones you are watching
tools/mutation_run.sh "$GOODWE_ADDON_REPO/goodwe_controller"   # from elsewhere

The harness purges, prints a sha256/byte-count fingerprint of every app/*.py it is about to grade, runs each suite under python3 -B, and fails if a cache appeared during the run. Diff two fingerprints and the file you mutated is the line that changed — which is also how a mutation report proves which source produced it.

What does not fix this

	writes bytecode	reads a stale .pyc
python3 -B	no	yes
PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1	no	yes
purging __pycache__	(unchanged)	no — nothing to read

Both flags are write-side only. A mutation run always has a cache already, because the previous run wrote it, so a harness that only adds -B closes nothing. This is measured, not read off documentation: test_bytecode.py part 2 arranges the collision and shows both flags still running the old code.

-B is still worth passing — it stops this run leaving a cache for the next edit to inherit, which is the one nobody is thinking about three mutations into a batch. Purge for this run, -B for the next one.

And not a sleep

One-second mtime resolution is the mechanism, not the enemy. Waiting out the clock would slow every run down, and would still only cover the edit somebody remembered to slow down. Stop trusting mtime instead.

Reporting a mutation

State the things a reviewer cannot reconstruct afterwards:

1. the byte delta of the mutated file (+5 B, +0 B). +0 B is the risky one — say so;
2. that the mutated line was on disk when the run started (the harness fingerprint, or a grep of the line);
3. which suite went red, and on which named check — "the suite is red" and "the check that watches this is red" are different claims;
4. for a survivor, that the run was purged. An unpurged survivor is not a result.

The other thing a mutation sweep cannot see: masking (TEST-16)

Stale bytecode is not the only way a survivor lies. Two guards can mask each other, and a sweep that mutates one line at a time is structurally blind to it.

TEST-16 is the worked example. static_tariff.arbitrage() refuses a one-firm-hour series at len(firm) < 2, and refuses a flat series at spread == 0.0. A single firm hour also has a spread of zero. So:

• weaken the firm-pair rung alone → the flat rung refuses the stimulus anyway;
• weaken the flat rung alone → the tiny-spread stimulus is still refused, just for the wrong reason;
• and the suite, grading kind == "refused", reports nothing either way.

Both rungs could then be weakened together and still nothing would report — which is precisely the state in which the next edit to either one opens a real hole. It survived four rounds of review on TARIFF-03 and FCST-03.

Two rules come out of it, and both are cheap:

1. Grade the reason, not just the verdict. "Refused" and "refused for the right reason" are different claims, and a masked rung is the case where the first is true and the second is false. A refusal sentence is what the operator reads; it is also the only observable that moves when one rung quietly absorbs another's work.
2. When two rungs can answer the same stimulus, mutate them together. One extra run per suspected pair. If a sweep finds two survivors in the same function, that pair is the first thing to try — TEST-16's two survivors were adjacent lines in one function and neither was individually live.

The third way a check lies: its DATA cannot reach the failure it names

Stale bytecode manufactures survivors from a mutation that never ran. Masking manufactures them from a second guard doing the first one's work. This one manufactures them from a fixture: the check runs, the assertion is evaluated, the sentence above it is true — and the numbers it compares are arranged so that the failure it describes could not have changed the answer.

It is not hypothetical and it is not rare. EIGHT instances in two weeks; four were found by review, two - CFG-04's fixture pair - by an author's own mutation battery, which is the cheaper place, one by review again, in the one place nobody had thought to point the rule at: not a check in the suite, but a COMMITTED EVIDENCE ARTIFACT four documents cite - and the eighth INSIDE THE FIX WRITTEN TO CLOSE THE SEVENTH.

⚠️ AND IT HAS NOW APPEARED IN SIX CONSECUTIVE CARDS. The seventh instance, MAINT-05's, is the one that says why: the defect is not carelessness about fixtures, it is that a check and the thing it checks were built from the same constant. Ask of every difference-claim not "is this assertion true" but "where did each side of this comparison come from" - and if the answer is the same place twice, the check is decoration.

• ARB-03 shipped a call-site scan asserting that every claims.append in cycle() routes through actuator_of(). Its own parse saw 3 of the 8 appends; the other five were invisible to it and would have passed however they were routed.

• ALLOC-01 shipped a replay generator to hunt for envelope escapes. It found 0. A widened generator over the same allocator found 39,991.

• DEV-02 shipped "each unit's supervised bound is ITS OWN max_w — give inverter B a different rating and the claim filed on inverter B moves with it", comparing inverter B's bound against _b2.max_w. The fixture defaulted B's rating to A's, so it compared (-5000, 5000) against (-5000, 5000) — a number against itself. Filing both per-unit bounds from self.inverters[0] left all 19 files green.

• CFG-04 wrote "an entry that omits soc_entity has NO SoC sensor and does not borrow the flat one" against a fixture whose flat soc_entity was blank. Inherited and not-inherited were both "", so the mutation that makes build_roster() fall back to the flat key survived. The fixture now sets a real entity there, and the check asserts that the flat value is present as well as that the entry's is empty.

• CFG-04 also wrote "main.py runs the per-unit range check UNCONDITIONALLY" as a substring test over app/main.py's source. The mutation that defeats it puts the call back inside if entity: — one level of indentation — and the substring is still there. That is habit 4 below in a new costume: the check asserted against the TEXT of the thing under test rather than against its behaviour. It now drives the shipped run_control() on a two-inverter config, under a deadline, because the mutation's real symptom is that the controller enters its loop and never returns.

• MAINT-05 shipped Controller.__init__ calling migrate_maint_keys(store, self.inverters[0].name, ...) under a comment saying "it targets self.inverters[0].name and NOT UNIT_A ... writing UNIT_A here would deposit an install's whole maintenance history under a name that is not on the roster at all". inverter.UNIT_A is the string "inverter-a", and every two-pack fixture in test_maintenance.py named its first roster entry inverter-a — so the two expressions were the same value in every check that existed, and swapping them left all 19 files green while losing a real install's whole maintenance history. Two-pack fixtures are now ["garage", "shed"], each behind a precondition check (habit 1) that the first name is not UNIT_A.

  ⚠️ AND THE POSTCONDITION HAD THE SAME SHAPE AS THE FIXTURE. store._verify_moves() read back the keys it had just written, under the namespace it had just been handed — so it verified clean, and the caller stamped the schema marker, on a migration nothing would ever read. A check that reads back the namespace it was handed cannot detect being handed the wrong one: it compared a thing against itself, exactly as DEV-02's fixture compared (-5000, 5000) against (-5000, 5000). The habit-2 fix is the same one — grade against something the thing under test did not supply, here the ROSTER the machines read.

  ⚠️ AND THE FIX ITSELF CARRIED THE DEFECT, WHICH IS THE SIXTH CARD IN A ROW AND THE FIRST TIME IT HAS APPEARED INSIDE A REMEDY. The fix round's recovery check was migrate_maint_keys(_m5, ROSTER[0], ROSTER) — the corrected name. It measures recovery along the one path where the operator has already fixed the bug, and nothing in the 19 files called migrate_maint_keys() twice with the same wrong unit. So the refusal the card was rejected twice to obtain lasted exactly one start: measured at Controller level over one persisted store, roster ["garage", "shed"] — construction 1 ok=False misdirected=4 moved=4 kept=0 marker=<absent>, construction 2 ok=True misdirected=0 moved=0 kept=4 marker=1. On start 2 rule 1 routes the wrongly-written keys to rep.kept, rep.moved is empty, the roster loop iterates over nothing, and the marker is stamped on a migration that reached no readable key — after which the early return skips it forever, including after the call site is fixed. The check was true and passed for the wrong reason. Habit 9 below is what falls out of it.

• CFG-04's tools/supervisor_shape_probe.py §B — and this one is the rule reaching outside the suite. The probe is the committed evidence that config.yaml's inverters: [] default is load-bearing, and four documents quoted it as answering "Missing option 'inverters' in root". §B validated the reconstructed LIVE options blob, which is missing many required keys unrelated to this card, so its refusal named whichever of THOSE the validator reached first — meter_freeze_s, p1_phase_export_entities and sign_disagree_w on three different runs. The quoted string was never produced by the instrument. And the assertion was a bare not ok: delete inverters: [] from config.yaml and §B went on printing PASS, blind to the exact regression it was cited for. §B is now an isolated counterfactual — the shipped defaults, and the same defaults minus that one key — asserting on the key name in the refusal; the mis-cited blob survives, relabelled, as §B2. Re-run with the default deleted it prints 2 CASE(S) FAILED and exits 1.

  ⚠️ A committed transcript is a check, and it decays like one. Nothing in this document had been pointed at tools/, because the artifacts there are filed as measurements rather than as checks — and a measurement whose assertion cannot fail is exactly the thing this section is about. Two habits follow, and both are habit 5 and 6 below.

Note what these have in common with a masked rung: the mutation runs, and the suite is honestly green. Nothing in a purge, a fingerprint or a disassembly can see it, because the code under test really did behave identically on the stimulus it was given. The defect is upstream of the assertion, in what the check was handed.

The rule, and it is one line:

Any check asserting "X differs from Y" must be run once with X and Y actually made different.

Cheap habits fall out of it, and all of them are now used in this repository:

1. Write the PRECONDITION as its own check. test_peakguard.py 10g asserts that A and B have different ratings before it asserts that B's bound is B's. If a later edit makes them equal again, the precondition goes red rather than the claim going quietly vacuous.

2. Assert against literals, not against the expression under test. == [(-_b2.max_w, _b2.max_w)] cannot distinguish "B's number" from "the number this fixture happens to have twice"; == (-3000.0, 3000.0) beside a printed A = 5000 can.

3. Print what the check saw. Every one of the three above would have been caught by a human reading one line of output — supervised bounds by actuator: {'inverter-a': (-5000, 5000), 'inverter-b': (-5000, 5000)} is self-evidently not evidence of a difference.

4. Assert on the BEHAVIOUR, not on the source text of the thing under test. A substring test over a module is a check on how the code is spelled; whitespace, an alias or a moved line defeats it while the property it names is gone. test_inverter.py part 10 has one of each — a source pin for a claim that genuinely IS about the code's shape, and a driven run_control() for a claim about behaviour — and the second replaced the first after the mutation battery walked straight through it.

5. A check whose failure mode is a HANG needs a deadline. Otherwise the mutation that defeats it produces a CI timeout with no name attached, which reads like flaky infrastructure and gets retried rather than read.

6. Assert on the CONTENT of a refusal, not on the fact that one happened. not ok is satisfied by any error at all, including one about a different key on a different blob. "Missing option 'inverters' in root" in out goes red the moment the refusal stops being about the thing it is cited for. This is habit 2 in the negative direction: a refusal, like a difference, has to be asserted against a literal.

7. Vary ONE thing in a counterfactual, and vary it from an ACCEPTED baseline. supervisor_shape_probe.py §B validates the shipped defaults first, precisely so the refusal on the next line has nowhere else to come from. Without the accepted baseline the second line is a refusal of unknown provenance, which is what §B used to print.

8. A committed transcript is a check. Anything under tools/ that a document quotes is subject to every rule above, and to the mutation battery: break the property, re-run the instrument, and confirm the transcript goes red. inverters: [] was deleted from config.yaml and the probe re-run against ghcr.io/home-assistant/amd64-hassio-supervisor:2026.08.0 for exactly that reason.

9. Exercise a refusal a SECOND time with the SAME wrong input — not the corrected one. A guard that refuses once and then admits the same bad caller is not a guard, it is a delay, and the second call is a different code path whenever the first call left state behind. MAINT-05's roster grading iterated the keys it had just written; on the second start the same wrong caller found them already present, they moved to the already namespaced list, and the loop graded an empty set. Re-running with the fixed argument — which is what the check did — measures the operator's recovery, never the persistence of the refusal. Ask of every refusal: what does this do when the caller has not been fixed and simply runs again? And assert the shape of that second report, not only its verdict, so the check cannot silently revert to grading the first path.

And the mutation-table consequence: a variant is not covered because a near-miss of it is. DEV-02's table listed the actuator variant of the per-unit claim defect (device/supervised filed without inv), which the static routing pin catches. The bound variant — right actuator, wrong numbers — is a different defect with a different fix, and it was absent. Both are in the table now.

Where each surface stands

• Local and dev-harness runs — the exposed one. This is where FCST-03 hit it. goodwe_controller/__pycache__ and app/__pycache__ are gitignored and are sitting in most working trees right now. Use the harness.
• CI — structurally immune, and it was before this card. .gitea/workflows/ checks.yml bind mounts the checkout -v "$WS:/w:ro", so the interpreter cannot write a __pycache__ into the tree under test at all; measured for TEST-15, and it fails silently — no error, exit status 0. Each job also rm -rfs its workspace and clones afresh, so nothing crosses between jobs on the shared runner. PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 is now set there too, as belt and braces: the :ro is one character wide and the next person debugging a write will be tempted by it.
• The shipped add-on — not affected, and this is closed. goodwe_controller/Dockerfile has carried PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 since it was written. There is no deploy-side finding here; do not re-open it.
• The infra repo's sim/ harnesses — exposed, and NOT fixed by this card. sim/replay_sign.py and friends import the add-on out of $GOODWE_ADDON_REPO and write __pycache__ into both trees (goodwe/sim/__pycache__ exists today). SAFETY-02's headline validation is a replay, not a suite, so a mutation graded through it carries the same exposure. tools/mutation_run.sh takes the tree to purge as its first argument precisely so that repo can call it, but the change belongs in that repo and some of those harnesses want the rig. Anyone mutating a module graded by a replay must purge both trees by hand until then.

Survey — mutation claims of 2026-08-25 … 2026-09-01

Scoped by the property, not by re-running everything. A claim is at risk only if a mutation could have preserved the file's byte count and been reverted inside the same second, and the claim is of the kind stale bytecode can fabricate (see "which way it lies"). Sources: git log release/1.0 and the commit and PR bodies.

claim	verdict	why
FCST-03 M9 self.provisional→here.provisional (dd40c56, 71cd784)	re-verified	this is the original false survivor. Re-run with the cache cleared, M9 is caught. The shipped source was correct throughout.
FCST-03 X1, X6 degenerate stimuli (71cd784)	not at risk	run after the purge discipline landed in that branch.
SAFETY-24 11 author + 9 reviewer mutations (e709554, 4601682)	not at risk	the commit records them run under python -B with a purged __pycache__ and real byte deltas. Its one survivor is an equivalent mutant, argued structurally rather than by a green run.
SAFETY-26 tolerance sweep over arbitrage.py and static_tariff.py, 2 survivors (2b8b8cb)	not at risk	purge, printed +5 B delta, mutated line asserted present, tree re-read before each run. One survivor is explicitly recorded at +0 B — the risky delta — and was produced under the purge. Both survivors are now closed by TEST-16 (test_static_tariff.py section 9), which also found that the two of them masked each other — each was individually non-live only because the other rung caught its stimulus, an arrangement single-mutation testing cannot see. Its own ledger is 7 mutations, 4 of them at +0 B, all red.
OPT-04 mutations reported on PR #22 (bdd7f18)	not at risk	test_arbitrage.py's header records the exact command: purge, then python3 -B.
TEST-17 checks() dropping when (504e8da)	not at risk	a red claim, and dropping an argument changes the file length. Neither half of the collision is available.
SAFETY-07 wiring mutations B1/B2/B3 and test_peakguard.py parts 7 and 10 (2d570d8, e7c95bf)	not at risk	those mutations are executed in-process, monkeypatched onto the imported module. No source file is edited, so no .pyc is consulted.
every "all red, no survivors" claim in the window — TARIFF-02 (24/0), TARIFF-03 (11), MAINT-04 (10), SAFETY-18 (6+4), SAFETY-03 (6), TEL-04 (10), TEL-05 (6)	not at risk	direction. Stale bytecode turns a red into a green survivor, never the reverse. A red is evidence that something changed under the check.
TEST-06's deleted assertion, "no new notification while parked at 0 W" (c34b5a2)	not at risk / superseded	it was recorded as undecidable and then falsified — test_freeze.py records the one-line mutation that takes the file red 9 times. The stronger later claim is a red one.
TARIFF-01 reviewer survivor: record_block() ignoring its policy argument (0dbd485)	re-verified — still a survivor	re-run here through tools/mutation_run.sh against the 15 suites that were on the record, all green with billed_w(block, policy) mutated to billed_w(block, POLICY_NET). The recorded diagnosis holds: every block reaching the store is single-phase, where NET, SUM and MAX collapse. Now CLOSED by TEST-13 (test_tariff.py section 7), which round-trips section 7's own unbalanced (3000, 500, -200) W block THROUGH the store under each policy - three distinct banked figures, so a hardcoded policy takes at least two of them red. Third instance of "a stimulus evaluated where the quantity it grades is degenerate", after WITNESS-02's span normalisation and TARIFF-01's own DST window.
SAFETY-25 8 mutations against test_peakguard.py part 10, then 9 more after review, all red	not at risk	each run against a tree copied fresh with __pycache__ excluded and mounted :ro, so no .pyc existed to go stale - the same structural immunity recorded for CI above. Byte deltas recorded on the PR; none is +0 B. All are reds, which is the direction this defect cannot fabricate. ⚠️ The second round exists because the first round's mutations were all aimed at DISARMING the guard, and the claim part 10 actually made was about the guard being FIXED - the reviewer built the fix and the suite stayed green. Bytecode was never the issue there; an unaimed battery was.
SAFETY-03 reviewer survivor: abs() dropped from clamp_to_rating's limit (6aabb83)	re-verified — still a survivor	re-run the same way, all 15 green. Also as recorded: unreachable under the int(100, 5000) schema.
MAINT-05 round 3, migrate_maint_keys() marker gate if rep.ok: → if rep.ok or rep.kept: (+12 B)	was a survivor — now CLOSED	measured against head 65cddf3 under the purge, tree mounted :ro, 19/19 PASS. It stamps the schema marker on a migration that LOST state, defeating the older lost guard as well as the new misdirected one, because every check that reached the marker did so on a store whose kept list was empty. Closed by test_maintenance.py 9d; the mutation is now red on three named checks.
MAINT-05 round 3, migrate_unit_keys() marker gate if rep.ok: → if rep.ok or rep.kept: (+12 B)	found here — SAFETY-02's half, now CLOSED	the SAME mutation one function up, on the LATCH migration rather than the history one. Measured a survivor against this branch under the purge, :ro, 19/19 PASS, then closed by test_inverter.py part 10's new fixture — a store with unit/inverter-a/sign_reason already present (so kept is non-empty) whose sign_tripped: true write is dropped. Shipped: marker withheld. Mutant: marker stamped on a disarmed latch, and the next start skips the migration that would have re-armed it.
TARIFF-01's other three survivors, SAFETY-03's describe() survivor, TARIFF-02's M3/M5/M7, SAFETY-18's three	still unverified	recorded before the purge discipline, with no byte delta on the record, so a +0 B same-second revert cannot be excluded. All are survivors, which is the direction this defect fabricates. TARIFF-02's and SAFETY-18's were closed by later commits whose claims are reds, so what is unverified is the diagnosis, not the current state of the code.

Nothing here says a past result is wrong. The two survivors re-run above both stood. What changed is that they are now on the record as measured rather than assumed, and the rest are labelled honestly. The still-unverified rows are cheap to close — one harness run each — and the right moment is when somebody next touches that module, not in a re-run campaign nobody will read.