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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 fdaf3fb54f UX-02: the validator's refusals, next to the field, before the save
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The Configuration tab can only render types and ranges. `validate.py`'s most
useful refusals are CROSS-FIELD - two inverters naming one `setpoint_entity`, a
`maintenance_charge_w` above `max_w`, a flat `setpoint_entity` left set beside a
declared roster - and the Supervisor's UI has no way to express a rule spanning
two keys. Today the operator meets those as exit 78 in a log, after saving and
restarting. This puts them on the screen beside the field they name, before
anything is written.

WHAT IT ADDS
  app/configui.py     the field model, built from `GET /addons/self/info`'s own
                      `schema` + `translations`. No option key, no label, no
                      rule of its own. UX-01's `Group · ` label prefix becomes a
                      real section heading, in whichever language resolved.
  app/selfconfig.py   the Supervisor conversation and the write gate.
  app/config_page.py  the page. Its longest function decides which HTML input a
                      type deserves; it contains no rule.
  app/web.py          five routes. Still the only file a reviewer has to read to
                      answer "does anything here reach the inverter".

THE FOUR THINGS THAT COULD HURT SOMEBODY, AND HOW EACH IS HELD
  1. A blob the SHIPPED validator refuses is never written - not warned about,
     not written. An invalid blob plus a restart is exit 78, and the panel is
     gone with the add-on that serves it.
  2. A blob that moved underneath is refused, not clobbered. Read hands out a
     sha256 of the canonical blob, save hands it back, and the stored blob is
     re-read IMMEDIATELY BEFORE the write. This is SAFETY-28's discipline
     applied to configuration - "a blob reaches the Supervisor only if it was
     derived from the blob stored right now" - with the honest weakening stated
     in the decision record: a second writer is DETECTED, not made
     inexpressible.
  3. Every message is the validator's own, byte for byte. test_selfconfig.py
     part 6 inserts ONE new rule into a COPY of validate.py, hashes every file
     under app/ to show validate.py is the only one that differs, and serves the
     real /config/validate route out of that copy in a subprocess. The new
     sentence arrives, filed under the key it names.
  4. Nothing on the surface commands an inverter or clears a latch. Saving does
     not restart: applying costs a control interruption - the wind-down commands
     0 W on every inverter - so that is a separate, confirmed button that says
     so first.

MEASURED, NOT CITED (tools/supervisor_selfapi_probe.py, run against
Supervisor 2026.08.0's own code; it contacts nothing)
  - the three self-paths are permitted, and `/addons/self/info` is admitted by
    the `default` role too while `options` and `restart` rest on the bypass
    ALONE. The probe's first draft claimed the role admitted none of the three
    and went red.
  - `/addons/self/options/validate` is NOT reachable from inside an add-on, so
    the only validator this panel can call is ours - which is the one with the
    cross-field rules.
  - a POST that omits a key does not preserve it: the key reverts to
    config.yaml's default. Hence whole-blob read-modify-write.
  - the Configuration tab CAN be removed, and doing so drops 0-of-71 options
    through and takes the add-on down. The card said it could not be; it stays
    by decision, which is a better reason.

DOES NOT TOUCH config.yaml, main.py or any control path. UX-01 is a dependency,
not something this supersedes: its translations are where every label,
description and section heading on this page comes from, and the Configuration
tab is still the recovery surface. DECISIONS/UX-02-two-config-surfaces.md
records which surface is authoritative (neither: the stored blob is) and what
the second surface costs.

Also corrects a stale "70 options" in three prose spots to the 71 the probe
counts - config.yaml grew a key in SAFETY-42 and the sentences did not follow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU

---

⚠️ REBASED ONTO release/1.0 @ 3368231, AND HISTORY DELIBERATELY FLATTENED.
The original branch carried `653874d` - an ORPHANED first attempt at PKG-07
whose commit message justified the version bump with a claim that was FALSE
(that `slew_w: 0` used to mean "no limit"; the schema was `int(50,5000)` from
the repo's first commit, so 0 was never legal). That commit's CONTENT was
superseded when release/1.0 was merged in, and the merge resolved correctly -
one 0.8.0 section, no fabricated text. But the retracted claim would have
entered release/1.0's history as a commit message with no retraction attached
to it, where PKG-07's own merged commit is the thing that retracts it.

So the branch is replayed as a single commit on top of the corrected PKG-07
rather than merged with the bad one trailing behind. The tree is byte-identical
to the reviewed branch tip; only the ancestry changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 21:38:31 +02:00

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