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8 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 7b4877d56d TEST-15: purge the bytecode cache before a mutation run, not after
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m35s
FCST-03's developer reverted `self.provisional` to `here.provisional`, re-ran,
and reported the mutation as a survivor. It was not one. CPython validates a
cached `.pyc` on (source size, source mtime truncated to whole seconds), and
that edit moved neither number - same length, same second - so the interpreter
loaded the bytecode it already had. Disassembly settled it at the time: the
source read `here`, the running code loaded `self`. A mutation run had graded
code that was not there, with no error and exit status 0.

This does not make the results already on the record wrong. It makes them
UNVERIFIED, and that distinction is the whole card - so nothing here re-runs a
campaign and nothing here quietly assumes the old numbers hold.

REPRODUCED, THEN CLOSED. test_bytecode.py builds a real package whose two
return values are the same length, imports it in a real subprocess, rewrites it
inside the same second (retrying until both writes land in one whole second -
milliseconds, no sleep) and reads back which value ran. Part 1 shows the
interpreter running SELF off a file that says HERE.

AND THE TWO OBVIOUS MITIGATIONS DO NOT WORK. Measured, not read off
documentation: `python3 -B` and PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 are write-side only.
Neither stops an EXISTING stale .pyc being read, and a mutation run always has
one, because the previous run wrote it. Part 2 grades both still running the old
code. The advice in test_control.py's coverage audit led with `-B`; it is
corrected here - the purge is the half that works, and `-B` earns its place by
keeping THIS run from leaving a cache for the NEXT edit to inherit.

NO SLEEP ANYWHERE. One-second mtime resolution is the mechanism, not the enemy.
Waiting it out would slow every run down and would still only cover the edit
somebody remembered to slow down.

THE HARNESS. tools/mutation_run.sh purges, prints a sha256/byte fingerprint of
every app/*.py it is about to grade - so a mutation report can say WHICH source
produced it, which is the reviewer's addition to this card - runs each suite
under `python3 -B`, refuses a tree with no test_*.py (CI-01's rule, for CI-01's
reason), and fails if a cache appears during the run. It takes the tree as an
argument so the infra repo's replay harnesses can call it without being moved.

WHERE IT IS SAID (AC 2). MUTATION.md carries the mechanism, the measurement,
the reporting rules and the survey, and every one of the 16 suites now points at
it from its docstring. That list is DERIVED FROM THE TREE by test_bytecode.py
part 5, so a new suite that joins this directory without the pointer is red -
the same failure shape CI-01's file glob exists to prevent.

CI WAS ALREADY IMMUNE, AND IS DESCRIBED THAT WAY (AC 4). Verified rather than
reasoned: with the checkout bind mounted `-v "$WS:/w:ro"` the interpreter writes
no __pycache__ into the tree at all, and it fails SILENTLY - no error, exit
status 0 - while the same probe on a writable mount produces one. Each job also
rm -rf's its workspace and clones afresh, so nothing crosses between jobs on the
shared runner. PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 is added as belt and braces only: the
`:ro` is one character wide and the next person debugging a write will be
tempted by it. Part 6 grades both ON THE DOCKER COMMAND LINE rather than on the
file - the first draft searched the whole workflow and stayed green after the
flag was deleted, because the comment explaining it still named it.

THE SHIPPED ADD-ON IS NOT AFFECTED and the question is closed:
goodwe_controller/Dockerfile has set PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 since it was
written. There is no deploy-side finding.

THE SURVEY (AC 3), in MUTATION.md, scoped BY THE PROPERTY. The defect is
one-directional - a mutation that never took leaves the suite green, so stale
bytecode manufactures SURVIVORS and cannot manufacture a red - which puts every
"all red, no survivors" claim in the window out of scope, along with mutations
executed in-process (SAFETY-07's B1/B2/B3, test_peakguard parts 7 and 10, where
no source file is edited) and everything run after the purge discipline landed
on 2026-08-31 (SAFETY-24, SAFETY-26, OPT-04, FCST-03's re-run). What is left is
the recorded SURVIVORS from source-edit runs before that date. Two were re-run
here under the harness and both still stand: TARIFF-01's record_block() ignoring
its policy argument, and SAFETY-03's abs() on the clamp limit - 15 suites green
each, on the tree as it stood. The rest are labelled still-unverified rather
than assumed or re-run; each is one harness run to close, and the moment to
spend it is when somebody next touches that module.

OUT OF SCOPE AND RECORDED: the infra repo's sim/ replay harnesses import the
add-on and write bytecode into both trees (goodwe/sim/__pycache__ exists today),
so SAFETY-02's headline replay carries the same exposure. mutation_run.sh takes
a tree argument for exactly that, but the change belongs in that repo and some
of those harnesses want the rig.

RED AND GREEN. Every new check was broken and watched fail: the purge commented
out of the harness turns part 4 red (and its non-vacuity probe already proves
the fixture would mis-grade without it); one docstring pointer removed turns
part 5 red naming the file; `:ro` and the `-e` flag removed from the workflow
turn part 6 red. Full suite green, 16 files, in the CI image on a read-only
mount - the shape the runner uses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-01 02:07:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0942228d65 Merge release/1.0 (SAFETY-03) into TEST-06
checks / unit (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
Two conflicts, both predicted, both mine as the later merger.

app/main.py - #12 inserted `await self.check_output_clamp()` on the line
immediately above `await self.check_meter_frozen()`, so its hunk abuts my
comment correction. Resolved so EACH CALL CARRIES ITS OWN BOUNDARY,
because the two guards do not share one:

  - check_output_clamp() reads `self.clamp_last`, which is None until
    write_setpoint() has run, so its boundary IS the write;
  - check_meter_frozen() grades `self.target`, assigned further up, so
    its boundary is the assignment.

Letting my correction generalise across both would have been worse than
the vague comment it replaces, because it would read as deliberate. The
AST of app/main.py is identical to merged release/1.0 (+1251 bytes, all
comment).

test_freeze.py - #12 independently added `frozen_notes()` keyed on the
same id. `notes_of()` subsumes it: same id, plus the title fallback that
keeps the id's own check independently falsifiable, plus `all_notes_of()`
for claims about the whole surface.

THE THREE SURFACE-WIDE ASSERTIONS, DECIDED ONE AT A TIME. Measured on the
merged tree:

  scenario                              surface  ids             freeze
  frozen meter, railed command             2     frozen + clamp     1
  TEL-05 converged, -14.2 W                0     -                  0
  moving meter, a real 8 kW load           1     clamp              0
  uncovered transport, no unchanged_s      1     clamp              0

  - the wiring scenario STAYS SURFACE-WIDE and now asserts exactly TWO
    alarms with BOTH IDS NAMED. The answer to "is this still meant to
    raise one alarm" is no, it raises two, and a third guard has to come
    back to this line. That is the one assertion in the file that
    accounts for the controller's entire alarm output;
  - the CONVERGED case stays surface-wide and stays silent: at the
    operating point the whole add-on should have nothing to say, that is
    still true, and narrowing it would give away a real property;
  - the other two NARROW to notes_of(). The clamp alarm there is correct
    and is SAFETY-03's subject: a real 8 kW load does drive the loop past
    the rating, and an uncovered transport does not stop it. Asserting
    whole-surface silence would make this file fail whenever another
    guard correctly does its job. Each still owns the load-bearing half -
    THE FREEZE DETECTOR SAID NOTHING - and the surface is PRINTED so a
    reader sees what else fired without this file grading it.

Re-verified on the merged tree: M1 RED 4, M2 RED 5, M3 RED 3 + RED 2,
N6 RED 1, N3 green (correctly), N8 RED 4, R1 RED 2, R2 RED 1. All nine
suites green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:45:09 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 d31a12b7c6 TEST-06: the id-selection note said 'the only assertion'; there are two
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 2m32s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:10:42 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 611d3dbcdf TEST-06 review follow-ups: two notification surfaces, the real ordering boundary, the schema bounds
1. notes_of() could not tell this guard's alarm from anybody else's. It
   selected by SERVICE, so against #12's app/ (which adds
   goodwe_output_clamp) eight assertions went red, AC1's core check among
   them. Blanket id-keying is not the repair and was measured, not
   guessed:

       selector                    vs #12's app/   id renamed
       by service (as committed)     8 red           1 red
       by id alone                   3 red           6 red
       by id or title (shipped)      3 red           1 red

   all_notes_of() is the whole surface; notes_of() is this guard's,
   recognised by the id it should carry OR the title it writes - the `or`
   is what keeps the one assertion whose subject IS the id able to fail on
   its own. The three surface-wide claims stay surface-wide, each with a
   comment naming which surface it is about and why the next guard's
   author must decide rather than narrow them. They are the three that go
   red against #12, which is the correct signal.

2. The ordering comment named the wrong boundary. N3 - moving the call to
   immediately before write_setpoint() - is green and correctly so:
   self.target is assigned two lines earlier, write_setpoint() clamps only
   a local and can skip the write entirely. So the invariant is "after
   `self.target = resolution.target_w`", and the detector grades pre-clamp
   INTENT, not the wire. Corrected in test_freeze.py and in main.py's own
   note above the call (comment-only; I merge second and own the
   conflict). N8 - moving the call above the assignment - is RED 4.

3. The schema range's own bounds are now pinned. int(60,3600) ->
   int(1,86400) survived green: an operator could set meter_freeze_s:
   86400 and the guard is dead with nothing red. Both bounds are
   re-derived rather than restated.

4. find_hwsim() crashed the whole suite on a checkout one level below the
   root (HERE.parents[1] -> IndexError, reproduced at C:/goodwe_controller).
   Guarded. And part 3 now names its transport in the summary: the rig
   hwsim and the stub are not equivalent - the rig path failed 1 run in 3
   - so a green log has to say which one backed it.

Also: the "revived transport re-rails" check is labelled a PRECONDITION
like its sibling; freeze_rows() records that flipping p1_enabled exercises
the row's content and never its gate; and the note about the deleted
assertion is corrected - it was REDUNDANT, not undecidable. The reviewer
falsified it in one line (move the hass.call above `if not fired: return`,
RED 9). "I could not construct a falsifier, therefore it cannot fail" was
exactly the inference this file exists to distrust.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 17:05:28 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c34b5a2922 TEST-06: close the three gaps that survived SAFETY-18's suite green
None of the three is a bug in the shipped code. They are gaps in what the
suite could detect, and the next person to touch freeze.py had less
protection than the passing count implied.

1. WHERE check_meter_frozen() runs in cycle(). Moving it to the top left
   the whole file green. Pinned by CONSEQUENCE, not by source order, so a
   refactor that keeps the semantics stays green:
     - the alarm must land on the SAME cycle the command reaches the rail
       (at the top it grades the previous command against this cycle's
       meter and arrives a cycle late);
     - the dead-poll-task composition: poll task dies, stale_input_s is
       crossed, the arbiter commands 0 W, and on THAT cycle the alarm is
       already clear - because the detector ran after the 0 W write.
   wired() now returns a per-cycle trace, which is what makes "on which
   cycle" an observation rather than a hope.

2. The NOT COVERED status row. The old check only asserted that an
   uncovered transport is SILENT, which a page claiming `armed` on a guard
   that cannot run also satisfies. The string is now asserted in both
   directions: the uncovered row must say NOT COVERED, name the
   meter_source and homewizard_local, and warn; the covered row must still
   say armed, or "does not say armed" would be satisfied by deleting the
   armed branch.

3. meter_freeze_s. Pinned in test_validate.py by MAINT-04's regex
   technique (no PyYAML in the image), and in test_freeze.py by its
   consequences: the shipped value drives the replays, must stay inside
   the 900 s billing quarter, and 3600/hold_s must stay inside the shipped
   deadband. A Controller built with the key ABSENT must land on the same
   number, which pins main.py's fallback without touching CFG-03.

All three demonstrated red before being accepted green, and every new
check was mutated to confirm it can fail; one candidate assertion ("no new
notification while parked at 0 W") was DELETED because no mutation could
break it, and replaced by the exact notification count across a revived
transport, which can.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 15:50:08 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 c040aac4b8 SAFETY-03: alarm when a computed setpoint exceeds the rating, do not just clip it
The clamp was never the missing half. specs.md 10.3 records an unclamped
integrator climbing ~130 W per 4 s past 10 kW and reporting 14 768 W pinned at
the 5 kW rail; clipped silently that is a flat, legal-looking 5000 W hold and
nothing says the loop asked for three times it.

write_setpoint() - the one path every write takes - now clamps to the VALIDATED
max_w and reports whether the raw value differed; check_output_clamp() raises
OUTPUT_CLAMP as a notification, an ERROR, an event row and a red status banner.
Not a trip: the clamped value is written and the loop keeps running.

The rating is max_w and nothing is min()ed at runtime - CFG-01 already refuses a
max_w outside the device range at startup. The device range is applied second as
defence in depth; it cannot bite after a successful validation, so if it ever
does it alarms too and names the bound. No new config key.

Decision grew i_clamped / clamped booleans, and that is the load-bearing part:
`reason` is one string that slew-limiting and the saturation freeze overwrite,
so an alarm keyed on it is silent on exactly the cycles a winding loop produces.
Mutating main.py back onto the string drops the 10.3 replay from 2 engagements
to 0.

Distinct from saturation by construction - no shared reason code, notification
id, status row or counter - and checked in the negative, after first asserting
the saturation freeze really did engage.

Two things found by running it rather than by reading it: a row per engagement
flushed the 40-row event log and evicted SAFETY-18's own METER FROZEN? row (now
coalesced per episode with an exact count), and a naive clamp turns a nan into a
command at the full rating because every comparison against nan is False.

test_clamp.py is new: assert-based, no framework. Six author mutations
reproduced red, including "clamp kept, alarm deleted". Two of the check's own
hypotheses about the freeze/clamp interaction were refused by its sweep and
rewritten to what it measured.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 15:22:22 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 0ba3a200fe SAFETY-18: verify on the real rig, and record what it showed
AC3 says "verified on the rig". The previous commit drove hwsim in-process
because `riglock status` reported UNKNOWN - which is the tool declining to
observe, not an observation. riglock shells out to the local docker CLI; on a
Windows host without DOCKER_HOST that resolves to a Docker Desktop npipe which
is not running, and the result is indistinguishable from a genuinely absent rig.
The rig was up the whole time. With DOCKER_HOST=ssh://homelab@192.168.2.147 it
reads FREE.

Re-run under sim/riglock.py against the real goodwe-sim compose project, with
the shipped modules staged into goodwe-sim-plant so they poll that container's
own hwsim while plantsim drives it. Both phases passed, lock released cleanly.

The rig produced a result the in-process stub could not, and it strengthens the
design rather than merely confirming it: in the NEGATIVE twin - +8000 W of house
load, healthy meter, correctly railed command - `active_power_w` did not move at
all, sitting at exactly 10130.0 W for 26 consecutive polls. The only thing
keeping `unchanged_s` at 0.0 s was the kWh registers advancing.

So the register terms in measurement_fingerprint() are not belt-and-braces for
this detector, they ARE the negative case: fingerprinted on the power figure
alone it would have raised a false alarm on a healthy meter under a real load,
which is precisely how a safety guard gets switched off. Recorded in freeze.py
so nobody simplifies the fingerprint without meeting that run first.

No behaviour change - documentation and the harness note only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 02:49:55 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 7aa1bd052e SAFETY-18: a meter frozen at a wrong-but-fresh value now raises an alarm
A meter that answers 200 OK with a stale document forever is ARRIVING on every
poll, so every freshness mechanism in the stack reads it as healthy while the
loop integrates a constant error and rails: 360/135/75 s at the live install's
max_w: 5000 for a meter frozen at 350/1000/>=3000 W. Fifteen minutes of a 5 kW
unattended import sets the month's billed capaciteitstarief peak.

The detector is a conjunction, not the bare unchanged_s threshold TEL-05
measured and rejected:

    unchanged_s >= meter_freeze_s   AND   |command| within 5 % of max_w

Both terms already existed and were already on the status page, and they fail
for independent reasons: at the converged point the command is nowhere near the
rail, and at the rail against a real load the kWh registers move in seconds. At
the shipped 300 s the relation is structural rather than a margin - the slowest
a healthy 1 Wh register can tick and still look unchanged is 12 W, which is
inside the 15 W deadband, so the command there is parked at 0 W.

Notification only, deliberately: an HA persistent notification with a fixed
notification_id, an ERROR log line, a UI event and a red status row. No claim,
no latch, no 0 W. A false trip parks the battery; a false notification costs an
alert. Only meter_source: homewizard_local is covered - the status page says
NOT COVERED elsewhere rather than pretending the guard is armed.

DOCS.md states the capacity-tariff exposure this does NOT close: peak_cap_w caps
maintenance charging and nothing caps the loop. That cap is SAFETY-07.

test_freeze.py grades both directions and was verified by breaking what it
watches (six mutations, all red): silent over the committed 40-minute converged
capture, silent over an hour of TEL-05's low-power case where the rejected bare
threshold is shown to fire, alarming on a genuinely frozen meter driven over
real HTTP through the real HomeWizardLocalSource (the rig's own hwsim freeze
fault when reachable), silent on the same railed command against a meter that is
still moving, and asserting on the service call that leaves Controller.cycle()
rather than on the watchdog's own flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC
2026-08-30 02:39:54 +02:00