3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	9099ceb1af	SAFETY-31: the grid is 42, not 90, and the wrong number was in the failure text ... Review reproduced every figure in both PRs except one, and rejected on it. ⚠️ "0 of 90 GAINS x SPLITS combinations produce opposing shares" - the SUBSTANCE is right and review re-measured it, but the DENOMINATOR is invented. sitesim.py declares GAINS with 7 entries and SPLITS with 6: the grid is 42. 90 is not even divisible by 7, so no reading of "GAINS x SPLITS" reaches it. It is almost certainly TEST-20`s RUN count (84 + 6), which is a different quantity that happened to be nearby. ⚠️ AND THE WORST COPY OF IT WAS INSIDE THE `PRECONDITION FAILED` TEXT, so the next engineer to see this scenario go red would have been handed an unreproducible measurement as their diagnosis - the exact defect class this campaign exists to correct, in the failure path where it does the most harm. Corrected in all seven places. At the failure-text site the denominator is now `len(GAINS) * len(SPLITS)`, computed rather than typed, so it cannot drift from the grid again - the same fix test_translations.py already took. Also N3: a missing blank line was going to render the S3 and M19 paragraphs as one in DECISIONS. Re-run after the change: `inject.py two_master_circulation` PASS in 35 s, norig, no rig lock taken. Add-on suite 26 files, all pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-07 20:13:01 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	295a2aedb6	SAFETY-31 AC 4: the alarm's attribution was graded by nothing, and a mutation proved it ... `pos, neg = opposing(...)` -> `([], [])` in main.py's `check_circulating()` (-102 B) deletes the "Right now X is discharging while Y charges" clause from the operator notification, and SURVIVED ALL 26 FILES. The commit that shipped this card claimed "18 mutations, all RED"; the ledger has no entry for the attribution, and this is that entry. It is not dead code. Ledger M18 - the whole `await check_circulating()` call removed - is red on four checks, so the function runs. The three checks on the notification asserted METER CANNOT SEE, CONTROL HAS BEEN STOPPED and `isolator`, and never an inverter name. `circulation.py`'s own docstring calls that sentence the first thing somebody woken by this alarm needs and "impossible to reconstruct from the number alone". test_watchdog.py section 6a closes it on a fixture that can tell three failures apart: * the roster is ["garage", "shed", "cellar"] - operator names, none of them `UNIT_A`, for test_maintenance.py section 11's reason: on a fixture whose names are the module's own constants a check cannot tell the roster from the constant; * the site is run TWICE, MIRRORED, so the sentence is not symmetric and a pos/neg swap is a different red from a deletion; * a third pack rests at 5 W, so the floor that stops a pack in standby being named as a participant in a 6 kW loop is graded too. Mutations, on a tree with no __pycache__ mounted :ro into the checks image: M20 pos, neg = opposing(...) -> ([], []) -102 B RED (2 checks) M21 pos and neg exchanged +0 B RED (3 checks) M22 opposing(..., min_w=cfg.min_w/2.0) -> 0.0 -25 B RED (3 checks) 26/26 files green with the block in place. AND A DISCLOSURE, WHICH IS THE UNCOMFORTABLE HALF. DECISIONS section 3 records that the 924-run campaign behind `circulation_w: 700` and `circulation_hold_s: 75` used a harness that is not committed in either repository. Two further sweeps have now been run and no two of the three agree: peaks of 1700 W, 2750 W and 1048 W, and worst-continuous figures above 700 W of 5.0 s, 15.0 s and 5.0 s. That is NOT evidence of fabrication and is not reported as any. The committed sweep measures why the spread is that wide: on one grid, changing only the plant model and the write-stagger set, the worst legitimate peak is 1048 W, or 2250 W, or 0 W. The plant and the stagger are TERMS of the number. What the spread does establish is that the claim cannot be adjudicated while the instrument is missing. The window argument survives and is now committed - all three sweeps trip zero times, on 924 + 48 + 840 non-faulty runs. The threshold CURVE does not survive as stated: `505.0 s at 100 W`, which is what the "knee at 400 W" argument rests on, is 10.0 s on the committed grid. The curve still falls with the threshold, so the knee is real in direction; its depth is established by nothing anybody can run, and this commit says so rather than repeating it. The overclaiming comment at test_watchdog.py's 1700 W fixture ("the worst single transient the rig can produce") is replaced with what the fixture can support. The committed, re-runnable half is admin/goodwe's `two_master_circulation`, opened as a separate PR against that repository. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-07 19:08:33 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5	7ef3d23245	SAFETY-31: measure circulating power, which nets to zero at the meter ... Inverter A charging at 3 kW while inverter B discharges at 3 kW nets ~0 W at P1. The site reads idle while both packs are cycled through two round-trip conversion losses continuously, for no benefit, and the wear is real. NOTHING EXISTING CAN SEE IT, AND THAT IS STRUCTURAL. Every guard in this add-on is a consumer of the NET figure at the grid connection: SAFETY-02's sign watchdog gates on abs(grid_w) > 300 and the gate never opens at a netted zero; the peak guard and the capacity tariff both bill grid exchange. Circulating power is precisely the component of per-inverter power that the sum destroys, so no threshold on any existing detector could reach it. WHAT ALLOC-01 ALREADY COVERED, AND IS NOT RE-IMPLEMENTED HERE. Its AC 7 shipped the sign-coherence gate (allocator.REFUSE_SIGN, graded by test_alloc.py part 6): an allocation whose shares carry two signs is REFUSED, both units named, no shares returned. That is the COMMAND half - the allocator can no longer command circulating power. This commit is the MEASUREMENT half: circulation the allocator NEVER COMMANDED. app/circulation.py the sensor and the trip main.py site_circulating_w, the evaluation, the claim, the alarm arbiter.py `circulation` classified SCOPE_SITE, with the argument store.py a flat, site-level durable latch mqtt.py sensor.goodwe_circulating_power config.yaml two options, two schema ranges, CFG-03 discipline THE SENSOR: sum(|Bi|) - |sum(Bi)|. Zero when the units pull the same way, 2*min(|Ba|,|Bb|) when they oppose. DERIVED FROM MEASURED PER-INVERTER POWER - Inverter.batt, register 0x0518 - and never from the allocation record. The cheap version would be simpler and worth nothing: ALLOC-01's gate already guarantees the record is sign-coherent, so a record-derived sensor reads zero BY CONSTRUCTION and can only confirm that the allocator agrees with itself, which is the third failure mode MUTATION.md names. What this catches is a unit ignoring or lagging its share, a stale share still being executed, a maintenance or SAFETY-25 pin holding one unit while the loop drives the other, or HW-01's power stage running its last instruction for 6 h 25 m with the comms dead and the allocation record impeccable throughout. batt became per-instance in DEV-02; before that this could not have been written. VERIFIED BY MAKING ONE UNIT IGNORE ITS SHARE, on the TEST-19 two-master rig: S = -2500 W shares a = -1250 W b = -1250 W <- record ok, ONE sign, sums MEASURED A = -1250 W B = +1000 W <- hardware sensor over the RECORD : 0 W sensor over MEASURED power : 2000 W -> trips at 190 s and the card's own scenario, A -3000 W against B +3000 W at zero house load: the meter reads +0 W, the sensor reads 6000 W, and the shipped SignWatchdog's predicate is FALSE on 30 of 30 cycles. WHAT "ACTED ON" MEANS - decided, and recorded in DECISIONS/. The trip files Claim.set("circulation", P_SAFETY, 0.0) on the SITE actuator: every inverter to 0 W, latched. HW-01 established that commanding a wedged inverter achieves nothing, so the remedy is not aimed at it. A circulating loop needs TWO participants and one of them is THIS CONTROLLER, faithfully driving the listening sibling into the one that stopped listening. Stopping (1) halves the loop, which needs no cooperation from the wedged unit, and (2) - the more important half - makes the residue VISIBLE at the meter instead of cancelled at it, where every ordinary guard can finally see it. What it cannot do is stop the wedged unit; the notification says so and names the isolator as the last actuator. SITE-scoped because the quantity is defined over the roster and is identically zero for any one unit - there is no fact of the matter about which of two opposing inverters is the offender, so filing it per-unit would invent an attribution and could park the only unit still listening. THE WINDOW IS FROM THE RIG, NOT A ROUND NUMBER (AC 3). 924 closed-loop runs in which NOTHING is faulty, over both families of legitimate opposition (7 reversals x 5 write staggers; 7 flap periods x 4 amplitudes), swept across the whole range the schema accepts for gain and slew_w. Worst CONTINUOUS legitimate opposition by threshold: 505.0 s at 100 W, 40.0 s at 250 W, 10.0 s at 300 W, 5.0 s at 400 W and above. The knee is 400 W and it is the schema floor - below it, ordinary operation holds the sensor over the line for minutes and no window inside the 900 s billing quarter could tell that from a fault. circulation_w 700 is 1.75x the knee, the headroom bought for inverter B's ramp and lag being PLACEHOLDERS until SPIKE-04 measures them. circulation_hold_s 75 clears three bounds: 15x the worst legitimate episode, 2.5x the firmware's own LINK_STALE_S veto, 12x inside the quarter. A momentary opposition while one unit slews through zero is LEGITIMATE - writes are serialised, so B's number lands up to a cycle after A's - and 0 of the 924 runs trip. THE ALARM SURVIVES AN HA RESTART (SAFETY-34). persistent_notification is in memory, which is exactly how the 2026-09-02 outage went unseen for 6 h 25 m with the detector correct throughout. The latch is persisted to /data as flat site-level keys and the notification is RE-RAISED on the first cycle after every start, through the same code path as a fresh trip - two paths would be two chances for the restart one to rot unnoticed. AT N=1 NOTHING CHANGES (AC 5). |B| - |B| is 0 for every reading including one nobody took, no claim is ever filed, the arbitration is byte-identical, and the status page says n/a rather than claiming to watch something that cannot happen. VERIFIED BY BREAKING IT (AC 4). 18 mutations, all RED on named checks, each on a freshly copied tree with no __pycache__ mounted :ro. M10 - the sensor rewritten to read self.allocation.shares - is the headline: it takes AC 2 red. Three mutations are +0 B, the risky delta, and are marked as such. One equivalent mutant (the max(0.0,...) guard) is ARGUED rather than claimed: searched over 700 000 rosters without a negative. One genuine SURVIVOR was found and closed - publish() turning an unknown into a published 0 W, the sensor's own None rule defeated one layer out. Full ledger in DECISIONS/. arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE gains its ninth source, so test_peakguard.py's 10f and 10g tripwires and test_arbiter.py's scope table went red on the line the append was written. Updated deliberately, with the argument, as their own comments require. Full 19-file suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-04 01:56:23 +02:00