Commit Graph
9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6759d21ea5 SAFETY-94: a healthy battery that lags or reverses is not flagged as frozen or refusing
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 28m10s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 2s
The stale-reading gate counted its 35 s from the register's last change, so
after a rest the first read after a new command tripped it (SAFETY-58; live
2026-10-03, four trips 1 s after the command). It now counts only the time
the command asked the register to move.

At N=1 the refusal engaged after 12 frozen cycles if the reading was under
100 W at that moment, which a battery reversing through its lag passes at a
1 s meter. The refusal now needs the N>1 evidence at every roster size: under
100 W, one way, for 12 cycles spanning 22 s, restarting when the reading
moves 50 W towards the ask.

DECISIONS/SAFETY-94-lagging-battery.md; test_safety94.py.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 00:15:42 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 29837dfaa7 UX-11: safety log lines give one plain sentence and the code, the figures go to DEBUG
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 9m3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
- Every WARNING/ERROR line that reported a safety reason (direction, delivery,
  stuck meter, stale reading, peak guard, circulation, over-rating) now ends in
  the reason's code (messages.reason_code()). The reason itself, figures and
  limits included, is on a DEBUG line right after it and in the action log.
- The reasons and state.json are unchanged, so an old state file loads and
  shows the same way: every saved reason opens with its code.
- test_messages part 6 checks every WARNING+ line at 25 words as logged; nine
  non-safety families are listed with a reason and capped. The byte pin in
  test_watchdog now pins the meaning, in order.
- The meter logs one WARNING per quiet episode, and INFO when back, so the red
  row's "the add-on log shows why" holds. The Why line past the hold names
  the missing reading. Action log: "25 engagements", "Shadow mode off: ...".

No trigger, latch, threshold, log level, notification id, cadence, row colour
or banner order changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 13:34:30 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 23a3a3f5b5 UX-10: the last plain-language leftovers: log lines, two table rows, 'Why: Other', red at 0 s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 9m3s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 2s
- test_messages.py part 6: every dynamic part of a WARNING+ line is classified
  as data or as a built text, and every built text is produced by the real
  code and checked. This is the gap the 2d scan had: it counted `%s` as one
  word, so reasons built by loop_clamp_note() and friends were never seen.
- Quoted reasons rewritten to STYLE.md (red-alarm shape, codes kept):
  OUTPUT_CLAMP, METER_FROZEN, CIRCULATING_POWER, STALE_READING, the peak
  guard (codes now PEAK_GUARD*), the migration report, price feed, price
  history and gate reasons. Plurals via messages.times()/count().
- Top table: Price history "96 prices over 24 hours for 26 Sep", Tariff
  "one every 15 minutes or every hour", "not final yet" dropped.
- Levels and noise: per-cycle shadow line DEBUG, shadow on/off INFO,
  aiohttp access log only at log level debug, settings warnings once per
  start, one plain line per Home Assistant outage (hass.Outage).
- INFO jargon and error texts: no "§8.3", ISO times, "banked", "keys ARE",
  "NOT_OBSERVED", "did NOT land", "AND".
- Display bugs: WHY_WINNER covers every winner and safety reason
  (main.why_key(), part 7 finds them in the code); the meter row is amber
  "waiting for the first reading" inside its limit after a start; the
  missing-reading age is counted when the page asks.
- STYLE.md and DECISIONS/UX-08-short-notifications.md (UX-10 section).

No change to safety behaviour, alarm levels, notification ids, triggers,
cadence or the banner cascade. One row colour changes (meter at start),
justified in DECISIONS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 10:58:43 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 6a95447248 UX-08 2d: plain log lines, the rest of the status page, and DOCS
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Successful in 1s
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m55s
Every WARNING and ERROR line is one plain line of at most 25 words, with
no card ids, capitals or semicolons; the reasoning of the ten longest is
on a DEBUG line. The ux08 allowlist is empty and its cap is 0 (43 -> 0).

The status page: the month-peak and peak-guard rows, the stale-reading
row, the top table (Why, Tariff, Arbitrage, Shadow mode, labels), the
Stopped banner and the line under the buttons, which now shows the plain
hint of each event instead of the raw action log. The Supervisor question
at start logs one line with a real reason.

Refusals are counted as shown (labels expanded, long cases driven), seven
were shortened, the card and parse errors lost their internals, a blank
value reads "empty", and the panel no longer files inverters.max_w under
the flat max_w. Option names lose "(JSON)", the NL texts are checked too.

DOCS gets a glossary (control board, isolator, Developer Tools) and card
ids move from headings to a "For installers" line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 08:01:16 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5.5 d017fc67bf UX-08 phase 2b: short, plain status rows and page banners
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m47s
infra-pin / fresh (pull_request) Failing after 1s
Every Commissioning row and every page banner is now worded in
app/messages.py (row_*, banner_*): one sentence of at most 15 words, a red
row up to three sentences so a latch still says how it clears, banners at
most 12 words. No row names a Home Assistant entity: sensors by their
setting, solar sources by their place in the list. Reason codes and limits
stay on the log line and event list; rows keep the numbers a reader acts on.

UX-07 item 1: ClampWatchdog counts over-rating and integrator-bound
engagements separately, and after an episode each count shows under its own
alarm's title instead of both under "output clamp".

No row colour, visibility or banner order changed. Rows carry an "id" so the
tests pin meaning rather than wording. The row and banner kinds leave the
allowlist (200 -> 168, cap equal). DOCS.md gains "Status page"; choices are in
DECISIONS/UX-08-short-notifications.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p
2026-09-27 02:12:10 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5 770988c902 TEST-26: a missing value in a check is a named FAIL, not a traceback
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m44s
Checks and prints that indexed an empty list, exhausted next(), or formatted
None killed the rest of their file (FCST-06). Read them through the new
named_absence.py (nth/first/field/given/present) and conjoin a presence term.

- every site in the brief, plus the family the new scan and a sweep found
- test_named_absence.py: scans every test_*.py for unguarded filtered-list
  indexing, next() without a default and numeric formats on maybe-None
  names; proven to bite; prints what it cannot see, counted
- test_price.py 16a: the `_T17_CAPS is _T17_CAPS` tautology now grades the
  two assemble() calls' arguments
- test_control.py: coverage table re-measured on runs graded to the end

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-25 00:06:58 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 8a6acd9fa2 SAFETY-56: the gate cannot tell a dead register from a pack that cannot comply, so stop saying it can
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m0s
Text only. No behaviour change - same conjunction, same limits, same MISSING,
same 0 W, same NOT READY. `tools/safety56_behaviour_trace.py` says so: 2390
capture reads, a 66-cell swept grid, and six driven controller worlds produce
the byte-identical document `6030175e...` on origin/release/1.0 and on this
branch, while the sentences differ.

THE DEFECT. SAFETY-37's conjunction is satisfied by two disjoint worlds - the
register has stopped reporting reality, or the SOURCE cannot comply with the
command - and nothing `freshness.py` is handed separates them. Three sentences
asserted the first. On the live 2026-09-21 episode it was the second: the pack
read 11 % for the whole 850 s hold, every command in that hold was a discharge,
and the register answered the first CHARGE command three seconds later. The
readiness row was worse still, because it asserted a false fact about a NAMED
entity that was present, numeric and updating - so the operator opened
Developer Tools, found it working, and had every reason to conclude the
diagnostics were broken.

THE FIX. Each message states what was OBSERVED and names BOTH explanations.
Three wordings, no shared helper: two are a log line about a behaviour, the
third is a banner about an entity, and a helper serving both would drop
whichever half the other caller does not need. SoC stays STATED, NOT WIRED -
part 11b drives the two worlds at 50 % and 11 % and the sentence does not move
one byte. The row does not branch on `batt_fresh.stale` either: `stale_note()`
already rides `liveness_notes()` a few rows below, so the discriminator is "is
that row there?", and part 11d asserts it is present in one world and absent in
the other.

THE CHECKS. test_freshness.py part 11 builds the pair of worlds with ground
truth written down rather than derived from the published stream, asserts they
are really two (40 of 40 reads differ) while the published stream is
bit-identical, and only then grades the sentences. Eleven mutations, all red:
each of the three sentences reverted (3, 2 and 2 named reds), the two
explanations transposed at ZERO bytes (1), the second explanation deleted (1),
the admission of ambiguity replaced by a ranking (1), all three reverted at
once (5), and two aimed at this card's own check - collapsing the world pair
(2) and emptying the accusation list, which a positive control against the
three sentences as 0.10.1 shipped them catches (1).

AND TWO OF THE ELEVEN FOUND DEFECTS IN THE CHECK RATHER THAN IN THE CODE.
Transposing `label` and `entity` in the row made it unfindable and the run died
on an IndexError - a red with no name and every later check ungraded, FCST-06's
shape exactly; `_s56_row()` returns a named absence now, 0 named reds before, 3
after. And the first invariance run compared a tree with itself, because it
archived a branch whose edits were not committed yet; the tool now REFUSES to
report "behaviour unchanged" unless the sentences halves differ, and both of
its refusals are driven.

SAFETY-57's part 10h check was the handoff and is inverted rather than deleted:
it required the accusation to still be present so that removing it had to be a
deliberate act. This is that act. Its escape clause is untouched.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-23 21:02:40 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5 43c144b8d9 SAFETY-57: the stale-reading verdict gets an exit, because its own consequence is what stopped it being tested
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s
SAFETY-37's freshness gate reports a battery-power register as MISSING when it
stops following its own command, and a missing input is "command 0 W and keep
commanding" (§11.1 rule 1). The gate's only exit was "an arrival carrying a
DIFFERENT number" - and at 0 W nothing is asking the register to be anywhere.
The state had no exit reachable from inside it, and the log line promised the
opposite in the same sentence that announced the 0 W.

REPRODUCED FROM THE WIRE, NOT MODELLED. scenarios/safety57-2026-09-21/ is 3840
verbatim frames off the RS-485 pair, read from the passive sniffer, decoded by
tools/decode_bus_capture.py (0 unparsed, 0 bad CRC, 0 unknown shapes; the
mode->sign convention is graded off the capture, not trusted). The box was
running 0.10.0, so the 0 W in the trace IS the add-on's own claim:

  10:51:24.7  0x0518 reaches -3 W. Pack at 11 %, the BMS refuses the discharge,
              the inverter idles. THE REGISTER IS HEALTHY AND TRUTHFUL.
  10:51:29.7  the command reaches +1060 W - 800 W of travel
  10:52:00    the conjunction arms. Inverter.batt becomes None
  10:52:21.7  the site commands 0 W, on the wire
  ...         0x0518 does not change value for 850.0 s. The setpoint does not
              change value for 790.0 s. The house exports 2.4 kW throughout
  ~11:04      a human restarts the add-on. That is what ends it

AND IT HAD BEEN ESCAPING BY LUCK. Replaying the committed 16-day loop capture
through the shipped conjunction finds 93 trips whose wait for the BMS
keep-alive pulse that cleared them has a median of 143.4 s, a worst case of
21440.1 s, and 17 of 93 at or beyond this episode's 710 s. That distribution
belongs to the battery's firmware, not to this code.

THE CARD'S OPTION 2 ALREADY HELD AND IS NOT THE BUG. _grade() has required
|standing| >= MOVE_W since SAFETY-37. The trip was at +1060 W and the stuck
state is at 0 W; they are different moments, and an entry-side rule cannot
reach a state entered legitimately and then persisted. Nothing in the
conjunction is weakened here.

THE RULE, SAFETY-13's SHAPE ONE MODULE OVER - which latches get an exit, not
how long the block lasts:

  the verdict is withdrawn when the obligation that produced it has been gone
  for RELEASE_S, and the register is then re-graded from scratch.

RELEASE_S is BATT_OBLIGED_S, 17.0 s - the obligation window already derived in
the file (6.0 plant + 10.0 publish + 1.0 read), taken at the FLOOR of its band
for the mirror of MOVE_W's reason. Which half is safe is the opposite of
SAFETY-13's: being wrong long is the failure being fixed, being wrong short
costs one bounded re-grading window. Below 17 s the release pre-empts the
cheaper exit - the register answering by itself - and that is graded
behaviourally, not asserted.

The whole parked interval is now stale_input_s + RELEASE_S = 32 s. On the live
episode: telemetry back at 10:52:39 instead of 11:05:35, with 0x0518 still
answering the same -3 W. RED BEFORE (release_s=inf, a graded counterfactual and
not a second implementation), GREEN AFTER.

WHAT IT COSTS, AND IT IS NOT SMALL. A register dead for good is re-graded for
ever: over 1201 reads the held number reaches a consumer on 630 (52.5 %)
against 35 (2.9 %) before. Payable only because one window is at most 35 s and
the two consumers hold for 75 s and 85 s, so neither can reach a verdict inside
one and the re-trip clears both windows. No detection SAFETY-37 had is given
back - a permanent None clears the same windows for ever too - and the command
is derived from the P1 meter, never from batt.

Two clocks, deliberately: changed_mono/unchanged_s() stay facts about the
REGISTER, graded_from/graded_s() are the VERDICT's window. Collapsing them
either lies to the operator or defeats the re-grading.

main.py's stale line had its ESCAPE CLAUSE corrected - it promised a clearance
the state could not produce - and gained a STALE WITHDRAWN edge that says in
its own words that nothing has been learned about the register. The DIAGNOSIS
half is SAFETY-56's and is deliberately untouched, with a named check asserting
it is still there so that rewrite has to be deliberate.

Battery: 22 mutations, 21 red, 1 argued equivalent, 0 unexplained survivors.
Two findings kept in DECISIONS: _release()'s move_w test swapped for
unchanged_s SURVIVED at +5 B because every fixture rested at exactly 0 W (habit
11, closed by a 0/100/300 W fixture); and the code shipped a habit-22 comment
claiming the _release/_grade order was load-bearing, which the battery
falsified - the two act on mutually exclusive predicates, so the order is not
observable. MUTATION.md gains habit 23 for a mutation that ran, fingerprinted
clean, and was a no-op on the fixture because `0.0 or x` is x.

Suite: 30/30 in the CI image, checks.yml's exact command, purged tree, :ro, one
file at a time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-21 12:33:56 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5 6864109a01 SAFETY-37: a stale reading is None, and arrival cannot be what says so
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 5m34s
The architect pass made SAFETY-37, TEL-06 and TEL-08 one systemic problem -
"a stale reading holds its last value and reads healthy" - and this builds the
single policy. Both consumers the card names are gated by one change, and
neither consumer needed a line: `SignWatchdog.evaluate` already CLEARS its
window on a None measurement and `circulating_w` already returns None for a
roster with a missing term. Neither could ever receive one. The gate is the
piece that was missing BETWEEN the shipped read and the shipped checks.

⚠️ ONE CRITERION IN THE CARD COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AS WRITTEN, AND SAYING SO
IS THE MAIN CONTENT. The card says "only arrival separates them". At this layer
arrival cannot: `read_inputs()` polls Home Assistant's state cache about once a
second and HA answers 200 with a number whether or not the publisher behind the
entity is alive, so both members of the pair arrive identically for ever.
test_freshness.py part 1a BUILDS the arrival-age gate the card asks for and
grades it failing - the age is 0.0 s at every instant of both runs, a threshold
that can never fire, which is TEL-06's own defect one layer up. The half of the
rule that survives is honoured absolutely: nothing here reads a Home Assistant
timestamp, and the check asserts the module contains no `last_updated`.

So the criterion became: a reading is stale when it has not moved through a
change it was OBLIGED to follow.

    STALE  <=>  unchanged >= 35 s
                AND |standing| >= 250 W
                AND |standing - standing when the reading last changed| >= 250 W

Latched until a different value arrives. `Inverter.batt` becomes None - never a
held number - which is a missing input, which §11.1 rule 1 answers with 0 W.

WHY A CONJUNCTION AND NOT A THRESHOLD, MEASURED 2026-09-06. Replaying the
committed 30-day capture of this house's own 1 W power entity (485,841 samples
out of HA's recorder, where a row exists only on a CHANGE, so the gap between
rows IS the unchanged duration every consumer saw): the longest legitimate
unchanged run is 263.2 s, held at -899.0 W. A false-positive-free threshold
would have to exceed that, and 263 s is 3.5x too slow for a consumer that trips
at 75 s. There is no admissible threshold. Every one of those long runs is
under an UNMOVING load, which is what the travel term keys on.

THE BOUND, derived at both ends and graded against the shipped config.yaml.
Floor 17.0 s = 6.0 plant settle (NOTES §5.9, measured 2026-08-22) + 10.0
ESPHome publish (firmware/goodwe-master.yaml:181) + 1.0 read period
(run_control's asyncio.sleep(1)). Ceiling 75.0 s = min(circulation_hold_s 75,
unit_sign_disagree_s 85). Band [34.0, 37.5]; 35 is a CHOICE inside a DERIVED
band and the check says so - the first draft claimed the band held one integer
and went red on its own first run. MOVE_W is the LARGEST admissible value,
unit_sign_disagree_w, because below it the consumer cannot speak at all.

SoC is STATED, NOT WIRED, and BOUNDS carries it with wired=False and the reason.
Its obligation term is energy through the pack, not command travel - a rested
pack holds a percent for hours under a 0 W command - and K needs a usable
capacity nobody has measured. That is TEL-08's; the record says so.

⚠️ BEHAVIOUR CHANGES AT THE SHIPPED ROSTER OF ONE, and it is named rather than
hidden: a FROZEN register now stops the site where it used to read as a healthy
measurement for ever. That is HW-01, which was a one-inverter site. A healthy
install is unchanged, asserted over sixty reads of a dithering register under a
reversing command. A false verdict fails toward 0 W behind the existing
stale_input_s hold and clears itself on the register's next move.

⚠️ BOTH UNITS IN EVERY TWO-INVERTER FIXTURE ARE INVERTER A with different
numbers passed in; inverter B does not physically exist (~2026-09-12).

MUTATION: 16 mutations against a purged, :ro, python3 -B tree, fingerprinted
before and after every revert. One survivor, and it is the finding - dropping
the magnitude term left every check green because no fixture separated "the
command travelled 250 W" from "the command ended up above 250 W". Closed, and
recorded as MUTATION.md habit 17. A second process defect is habit 18: a
mutation run that timed out between the edit and the revert left the module
mutated on disk and nothing announced it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
2026-09-06 11:53:26 +02:00