2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
adminandClaude Opus 5	06f95e0a64	ARB-03: restore Claim.actuator and make resolve() three-stage ... specs.md:467 declares `actuator: str` as the FIRST field of `Claim`. app/arbiter.py:55 had no such field. The specification designed per-actuator claims and the implementation dropped it, so every claim was implicitly about "the one and only actuator", resolve() returned one scalar Resolution.target_w, and main.py assigned it to one self.target. THERE WAS NO SEAM AN ALLOCATOR COULD OCCUPY - and ARCH-01 (specs.md §6.2, 2026-09-02) decided the site grid target is ALLOCATED across several inverters and never broadcast. This is a regression fix against the written design; creating that seam is the whole of the change. WHY IT MATTERS, IN THE UNITS THE SYSTEM IS BILLED IN. The control primitive is meter emulation: the master reports a fabricated grid reading and the inverter regulates itself to it, so one number means "the battery moves X W" to the add-on and "the grid is at X W" to the inverter - an identity that holds only at N=1. Broadcast one target to two inverters and each supplies it in full; the loop gain at the meter becomes N times the per-unit gain, which at the gain config.yaml:374 accepts is a permanent limit cycle with every watchdog in §11.2 reporting healthy. And a per-inverter reserve filed as a site `hi` against the peak guard's site `lo` is `lo > hi`, arbiter clause 3, 0 W IN THE BILLED QUARTER - the parked battery SAFETY-25's memo calls fatal. THE SPLIT, VERIFIED AT EACH CONSTRUCTION SITE RATHER THAN ACCEPTED FROM THE SURVEY. Four sources are about the GRID CONNECTION and are SITE claims: `loop` (compute() regulates grid_w, the P1 measurement, and §6.2's whole architecture is one integrator on P1 whose output is then split), `peak` (the 15-minute average offtake AT the grid connection, which is what the capacity tariff bills - one quarter-hour peak per site, not one per pack), `arbitrage` (buys and sells at the grid against a day-ahead price; the price is a property of the connection and the energy crosses the meter) and `safety` (both construction sites read: "stopped" is the operator switching control off for the site, "inputs missing" is the site's own meter gone - neither is about a pack, and both must stop every inverter). Four are about a pack, a device or one write and are PER-INVERTER: `device` (one inverter's own reported min/max - there is no site rating), `supervised` (max_w caps what may be WRITTEN to one setpoint entity, §11.3, so it is scoped like `device` for the same reason), `maintenance` (§12's recalibration is a pack procedure - drain THIS pack, charge THIS pack, recalibrate THIS pack's counter) and `failsafe`. `failsafe` is the entry that needed the reading rather than the survey: SAFETY-02's EVIDENCE is site-wide (it compares P1 against the standing command) but its CONCLUSION is "the unit I am driving is pushing power the wrong way" and its remedy is to park that unit. At N>=2 the same evidence cannot be attributed to a sibling this controller never commanded, so a site-wide stop would park an inverter this watchdog never graded. The reasoning for all eight is recorded AT THE LINE, in arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE and again at each claims.append in main.py. WHAT WAS BUILT. resolve() is three stages, each a separate function so a test can construct a case at any one of them: pre_resolve() - one inverter's own claims -> that unit's interval. Clauses 1 and 2 transposed: the unit's own winning SET gates its own limits. The SET's value travels BESIDE the interval, not inside it - folding a -2500 W drain into [-2500, -2500] would turn "clamped to max_w" into "contradicts max_w", a different and wrong answer. site_resolve() - THE SHIPPED ARBITER, UNCHANGED. Same code, new name. allocate() - THE SEAM, AND DELIBERATELY NOT AN ALLOCATOR. ALLOC-01 builds it. At N<=1 it passes the target through (§6.2's identity). At N>=2 it DECLINES - no shares, allocated=False - and main.py refuses to write rather than broadcast, because the obvious placeholder (hand the target to each) is the fault ARCH-01 was filed about and no guard we have can tell it apart from the real thing. THE CONTRADICTION IS NOT GUARDED AGAINST, IT CANNOT BE WRITTEN DOWN. The partition is by `actuator` and it is a partition: a unit's `hi` and the site's `lo` are never both terms of one `lo > hi` test. Constructed and swept - 40 filings (every per-inverter source x unit x bound, including a unit contradicting ITSELF at lo 900 > hi 100) against a live site floor, and not one moves the site target or raises a contradiction. A unit's own impossible pair parks that unit and says so on its own bounds; it does not park the site. That is SAFETY-25 §0c's table made mechanical. AT N=1 THIS IS A PURE REFACTOR, AND THAT IS PROVEN RATHER THAN ASSERTED. With one inverter the fabricated grid reading and the battery setpoint are the same number, so the grid connection and the only unit ARE one actuator: actuator_for() routes every source to the site, no claim is filed on a unit, stage 2 sees the whole list and answers what the shipped arbiter answered. All 17 suites replay UNEDITED above the ARB-03 sections and are green on the same numbers; test_arbiter.py additionally runs 13 claim lists through both resolve() and site_resolve() and compares target, winner, binder, contradiction flag, the considered list and the operator line. EVIDENCE, BY BREAKING EACH THING (tools/mutation_run.sh, purged tree): * Claim's dataclass default emptied -> RED (test_arbiter) ...and it survived until the check was added: the two helpers pass their own default down, so the FIELD's default never ran. Now checked directly. * `peak` reclassified SCOPE_UNIT -> RED (arbiter x4, peakguard x2) * `maintenance` reclassified SCOPE_SITE -> RED (arbiter x4, peakguard) * the N=1 identity dropped in actuator_for() -> RED (arbiter, peakguard incl. the maintenance/peak suppression checks, freeze) - which is the measurement that says splitting at N=1 would be a behaviour change * resolve() stops partitioning -> RED (arbiter x4) * allocate() broadcasts at N>=2 -> RED (arbiter x2) * stage 1 drops clause-2 gating -> RED (arbiter) * a call site routes `device` through `loop` -> RED (peakguard 10g) * SAFETY-25 Option B built as a ninth source -> RED (peakguard 10f, both halves, plus 10g) - the tripwire still bites SAFETY-24's asymmetry proof is re-run and holds: 0 negative floors over the shipped sweep, `hi` still +inf on every claim the guard files, and it now also asserts every one of them is on the SITE actuator - a floor bound to one inverter's share would leave the site, the thing the capacity tariff meters, with no floor at all. test_peakguard.py part 10f is kept, not adapted around. `source` is still Claim.set()'s first positional argument precisely so its AST scan keeps reading it, which is why `actuator` is the LAST field of Claim and not the first - moving `source` off position 0 would silently blind the tripwire that guards SAFETY-25's deferred option. The one adaptation is `**kw` on its spy, so main.py's roster passes through unread rather than being silently dropped. New part 10g pins CLAIM_SCOPE to the same eight-source set and grades a REAL two-inverter cycle, which is the only place a mis-typed actuator_of(...) at a call site is observable - at N=1 every source legitimately routes to the site, so a swap there is invisible by construction. No config key, no option, no operator surface, no default moved. Inverter B does not exist yet and nothing here measures it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU	2026-09-02 01:54:29 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	bdd7f18a54	OPT-04: charge cheap, discharge expensive - and only when it pays ... Four cards built the price stack and nothing traded on it. app/arbitrage.py is §10.1's priority 3, and it consumes all four rather than re-deciding anything: whether a trade is permitted at all, on which two hours, against which widened threshold is TariffPlan.arbitrage()'s answer, and that answer cannot be obtained without first saying whether the peak guard is holding. §9.1's "peak shaving outranks arbitrage" is therefore honoured structurally - there is no path to a spread that skips the question - and again in the arbiter, where P_PEAK (50) clamps a claim filed at P_ARBITRAGE (30). A guard that never ran is not a guard that is clear. On meter_source off the peak guard is never evaluated; that third state is carried as None and refuses, because charging at the rail creates the billed quantity while nothing measures the quarter. validate.py refuses that configuration too, along with arbitrage armed with no price source and a SoC floor at or above the ceiling. §17: never export into a negative price. The guard is on the hour being sold into, not on the spread - a day priced -0.30 .. -0.05 clears any threshold and its dearest hour is still negative. Buying in a negative hour stays allowed. resolve_tariff() may open an HTTPS connection and the tick feeds the ESP32 heartbeat, so the fetch runs in its own task at a 30 min cadence and the tick reads an attribute and an age bound. test_arbitrage.py section 8 asserts that structurally on the shipped AST: a fetch put back on cycle() is red. AC4 is NOT met and is not restated - this repository holds no price history. Section 7 replays a synthetic year and asserts the property that does not need real prices: every executed round trip cleared its own widened requirement, and zero discharges landed in the 522 negative-priced hours. At the shipped 0.10 EUR/kWh threshold a realistic Belgian day/night site does not trade at all. Reported, not tuned: that number and FCST-03's widening factors are one product decision and it is the owner's. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC	2026-08-31 01:36:09 +02:00