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 glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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2c516a032c |
UX-08 2c: short refusals, error texts and option texts
Validator refusals name the setting by its label and key, say what is wrong and what to change, and keep the rejected value and limit. Option names and descriptions are short in en and nl; citations moved to DOCS "For installers" and the test_translations citation check now pins the instruction on the tab and the record in DOCS. No rule, key, schema, default or exit code changed. Allowlist 167 -> 43 (log lines only). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LyR88rXETvwhTgx6yHE39p |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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e3ccd9f6ea |
SAFETY-47: what a shadow run can show, and the watts on its status row
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m48s
Not a leak and not a write-path defect. Shadow mode's safety is intact -
the substitution, the re-seed, the authorisation gate and the clamp are
untouched. What was wrong is what three merged documents SAY a shadow run
can show you, and a number on the status row that can be 6.61x what a live
controller would command.
SHADOW MODE CANNOT SURFACE A CLOSED-LOOP DEFECT, AND THE DOCUMENTS NOW SAY
SO. The battery is held at 0 W and the carried command is re-seeded to it,
so every measured input - the meter, the billed-quarter accumulator behind
it, the battery power, the SoC - describes a plant that did not respond. A
closed-loop defect is one whose stimulus IS that response. This is the same
property that makes shadow mode safe, so it is not a gap to close later:
the closed-loop answer comes from the closed-loop rig or from a live run.
SAFETY-10 §5 already conceded this for the grid-following loop. It was
never the loop leg's limitation; it is the general case.
THE "STRATEGIES ARE UNAFFECTED" EXEMPTION WAS TRUE UNTIL SAFETY-45 MERGED,
ONE COMMIT EARLIER. That card sizes the buy leg as min(asked, headroom)
with headroom = (900/remaining) x (ceiling - projected), and `projected`
reads the open quarter's accumulator - the meter - which is a function of
what the battery did earlier in that quarter. Measured on TEST-23 stage 3
at peak_cap_w 1500 / house 1200 / max_w 2000, one hour at 5 s:
SAFETY-45's limit cycle NOT visible. 28 onsets live vs 1; grid
-455.5..+3200.0 W vs flat at the 1200 W house;
guard engaged 410/720 cycles vs 0/720.
SAFETY-46's SoC churn NOT visible. The SoC moves 0.000000000 pp.
TARIFF-14's wrong hour VISIBLE, and it is the only one: which hour, at
what price, clearing what spread - identical on
720 of 720 charging cycles at a binding cap.
The exemption narrows to exactly what survives: WHICH hour a strategy picks
and WHY are unaffected; HOW HARD it trades is not. The peak guard's ceiling
and reasons are worth reading from a shadow run; its ENGAGEMENTS are not.
THE NUMBER IS CAVEATED, NOT RE-COMPUTED, AND THAT IS THE DECISION. The
arithmetic is not wrong - 900/remaining is correct for a meter genuinely
under the ceiling, and in shadow the meter genuinely is. It is the right
answer to a question nobody asked. Both surfaces now introduce the watts as
what would have been commanded ON THIS CYCLE, in every state, and carry
shadow.SIZED_FROM_METER whenever a measured billed quarter sized them.
Rejected, and recorded in the decision doc: re-computing it (the recorded
decision would no longer be the decision the shipped path reached, while the
arbiter, clamp, SAFETY-28 gate, log and MQTT all ran on the real one - a
second controller everywhere except the wire); recording nothing (blanks the
row exactly when arbitrage is trading, and the log's edge key is the watts);
and recording the unsized ask beside it (a second number, no warning, and at
the shipped 3500/2000 both figures read 2000 W).
"UPPER BOUND" AND NOT "SMALLER", AND THE DIFFERENCE WAS MEASURED. Charging
only adds offtake, so the shadow size is >= the live size with EQUALITY at
the start of every quarter. Pairwise over 3600 charging cycles in five
configurations: 0 below, 730 exactly equal. The first draft said "smaller",
which would have been false on every one of those 730.
AND THE PREDICATE IS NOT KEYED ON WHETHER THE TRADE WAS CAPPED. arbitrage's
own sentence says "SIZED BY THE CAPACITY-TARIFF GUARD" only when the
headroom came out below the ask - in a shadow run, the START of the quarter,
where the two runs agree to the float. By the end, 900/remaining has
multiplied the headroom past the ask, the trade is not capped, the sentence
is silent, and the record is at its most wrong. A caveat keyed on it would
be quietest exactly where it is needed loudest.
SAFETY-10 §6's COMMITTED EVIDENCE COULD NEVER HAVE FAILED, FOR TWO
INDEPENDENT REASONS, AND CLOSING EITHER ALONE CLOSES NOTHING. Its fixture is
peak_cap_w 15000 against a 350 W house, so the guard never engages and the
sizing is inert - the harness's own comment says so. AND every identity row
reads the FIRST charging sample, where at elapsed=0 the projection IS the
held level and the two runs agree to the float even at a cap that does bind.
Measured: widening the fixture alone leaves that comparison passing. That
second reason is a new shape for MUTATION.md's habit-4 list - an INDEX, not
a fixture - and it is recorded there as the twelfth instance. §6 is re-taken
at a binding cap across the whole run: 716 of 720 charging cycles differ,
headroom 300.0..54000.0 W in shadow against 299.9..307.8 W live, recorded
-2000.0 W against a live -302.4 W.
THE GRADER IS test_arbitrage.py PART 3d, beside SAFETY-45's own closed-loop
regression and built on the same s45_loop() harness, so the runs differ in
one argument. Three lines stand in for _write_unit()'s substitution and
_shadow_settle()'s record and re-seed, marked as a transcription;
test_clamp.py part 8 remains the check on the shipped placement. The section
carries its own precondition into every check: a mutation that stopped
either run trading made it raise on its first min(), kill the file and
report ZERO reds - FCST-06's shape, driven rather than imagined.
AND THE FIX'S OWN FIRST DRAFT CARRIED THE SAME DEFECT. Deleting the caveat
from the action-log line left all 29 files green, because the sentence was
an f-string inside _shadow_settle() and the only suite that drives it uses a
meter_source:off fixture where no arbitrage decision exists. It is
shadow.log_line() now, for the reason words() is a function.
14 mutations, no survivors; M13 and M14 are +0 B and were confirmed on disk
by sha256 with every run purged. M14's first form was aimed at the wrong
direction and correctly survived - min->max makes the shadow record larger,
which is still an upper bound. All 29 check files green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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e1b9254626 |
SAFETY-45: a price-driven charge is SIZED by the capacity guard, not switched by it
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m42s
With arbitrage armed at the shipped defaults, arbitrage and the capacity-tariff guard drove each other in a sustained limit cycle. Re-measured on TEST-23 stage 3's closed rig against |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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f8e501393f |
OPT-09: the weights parameter nothing ever passed, and what it cannot do
`allocator.plan()` has taken a `weights` argument since ALLOC-01 and NOTHING
had ever passed one - main.py called `resolve()` without it and the arbiter
defaulted it to 1.0 per unit - so the site target was split 50/50 regardless
of what either pack could do. Two things now feed it, and they are different
kinds of thing:
* a `pack` UNIT claim at P_SAFETY that CLOSES a unit's envelope at its own
`bms_soc_floor` or at 100 % - a PERMISSION, obeyed absolutely, so an empty
pack is not asked to discharge and its share goes to the sibling;
* SoC-aware weights by ENERGY headroom in kWh - a PREFERENCE, which
`_fill()`'s last-resort pass will override the moment the sibling saturates.
Measured (test_packshare.py part 8): at a load one pack cannot cover, the
weighted arm and the shipped arm command the IDENTICAL watts into an empty pack
and deliver the IDENTICAL watts. Only the envelope stops the ask, and what it
buys is not delivery - it is a reported `unmet_w` where the record used to read
impeccable. Weights are a comfort choice for STABILITY and NOT for DELIVERY.
Also: an optional per-entry `capacity_kwh` (schema change, all-or-nothing across
the roster, rule 9 refuses a partial one); per-pack arbitrage sizing, with the
sell side's no-op stated rather than hidden; and a 0 W trade refused by name,
because a 0 W arbitrage claim is a park order that outranks the loop.
SAFETY-42 and this card meet at one hazard from opposite sides - OPT-09 stops
the site ASKING a pack whose SoC says it cannot deliver, SAFETY-42 alarms when a
pack that said it could does not - and its end-to-end fixture moved as a result.
Its finding is unchanged and is now stated on the two quantities its rejected
discriminator actually reads.
Not filed at all at a roster of one: at N=1 every source routes to the site, so
the interval would bound the SITE TARGET, and SAFETY-25's decided Option A
stands untouched on the live install.
⚠️ INVERTER B DOES NOT EXIST. Its 4600 W / 20.48 kWh / 10 % are FROM DATASHEET
AND SERIAL, and `sim/plantsim.py`'s INVERTER_B is inverter A copied
(`measured=False`), so every two-inverter figure here is arithmetic or two
copies of A. No hardware was touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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 adminandClaude Opus 5
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06f95e0a64 |
ARB-03: restore Claim.actuator and make resolve() three-stage
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m45s
specs.md:467 declares `actuator: str` as the FIRST field of `Claim`.
app/arbiter.py:55 had no such field. The specification designed
per-actuator claims and the implementation dropped it, so every claim was
implicitly about "the one and only actuator", resolve() returned one scalar
Resolution.target_w, and main.py assigned it to one self.target. THERE WAS
NO SEAM AN ALLOCATOR COULD OCCUPY - and ARCH-01 (specs.md §6.2, 2026-09-02)
decided the site grid target is ALLOCATED across several inverters and never
broadcast. This is a regression fix against the written design; creating that
seam is the whole of the change.
WHY IT MATTERS, IN THE UNITS THE SYSTEM IS BILLED IN. The control primitive
is meter emulation: the master reports a fabricated grid reading and the
inverter regulates itself to it, so one number means "the battery moves X W"
to the add-on and "the grid is at X W" to the inverter - an identity that
holds only at N=1. Broadcast one target to two inverters and each supplies it
in full; the loop gain at the meter becomes N times the per-unit gain, which
at the gain config.yaml:374 accepts is a permanent limit cycle with every
watchdog in §11.2 reporting healthy. And a per-inverter reserve filed as a
site `hi` against the peak guard's site `lo` is `lo > hi`, arbiter clause 3,
0 W IN THE BILLED QUARTER - the parked battery SAFETY-25's memo calls fatal.
THE SPLIT, VERIFIED AT EACH CONSTRUCTION SITE RATHER THAN ACCEPTED FROM THE
SURVEY. Four sources are about the GRID CONNECTION and are SITE claims:
`loop` (compute() regulates grid_w, the P1 measurement, and §6.2's whole
architecture is one integrator on P1 whose output is then split), `peak` (the
15-minute average offtake AT the grid connection, which is what the capacity
tariff bills - one quarter-hour peak per site, not one per pack),
`arbitrage` (buys and sells at the grid against a day-ahead price; the price
is a property of the connection and the energy crosses the meter) and
`safety` (both construction sites read: "stopped" is the operator switching
control off for the site, "inputs missing" is the site's own meter gone -
neither is about a pack, and both must stop every inverter).
Four are about a pack, a device or one write and are PER-INVERTER: `device`
(one inverter's own reported min/max - there is no site rating),
`supervised` (max_w caps what may be WRITTEN to one setpoint entity, §11.3,
so it is scoped like `device` for the same reason), `maintenance` (§12's
recalibration is a pack procedure - drain THIS pack, charge THIS pack,
recalibrate THIS pack's counter) and `failsafe`. `failsafe` is the entry that
needed the reading rather than the survey: SAFETY-02's EVIDENCE is site-wide
(it compares P1 against the standing command) but its CONCLUSION is
"the unit I am driving is pushing power the wrong way" and its remedy is to
park that unit. At N>=2 the same evidence cannot be attributed to a sibling
this controller never commanded, so a site-wide stop would park an inverter
this watchdog never graded. The reasoning for all eight is recorded AT THE
LINE, in arbiter.CLAIM_SCOPE and again at each claims.append in main.py.
WHAT WAS BUILT. resolve() is three stages, each a separate function so a test
can construct a case at any one of them:
pre_resolve() - one inverter's own claims -> that unit's interval. Clauses
1 and 2 transposed: the unit's own winning SET gates its
own limits. The SET's value travels BESIDE the interval,
not inside it - folding a -2500 W drain into
[-2500, -2500] would turn "clamped to max_w" into
"contradicts max_w", a different and wrong answer.
site_resolve() - THE SHIPPED ARBITER, UNCHANGED. Same code, new name.
allocate() - THE SEAM, AND DELIBERATELY NOT AN ALLOCATOR. ALLOC-01
builds it. At N<=1 it passes the target through (§6.2's
identity). At N>=2 it DECLINES - no shares,
allocated=False - and main.py refuses to write rather than
broadcast, because the obvious placeholder (hand the target
to each) is the fault ARCH-01 was filed about and no guard
we have can tell it apart from the real thing.
THE CONTRADICTION IS NOT GUARDED AGAINST, IT CANNOT BE WRITTEN DOWN. The
partition is by `actuator` and it is a partition: a unit's `hi` and the site's
`lo` are never both terms of one `lo > hi` test. Constructed and swept - 40
filings (every per-inverter source x unit x bound, including a unit
contradicting ITSELF at lo 900 > hi 100) against a live site floor, and not
one moves the site target or raises a contradiction. A unit's own impossible
pair parks that unit and says so on its own bounds; it does not park the site.
That is SAFETY-25 §0c's table made mechanical.
AT N=1 THIS IS A PURE REFACTOR, AND THAT IS PROVEN RATHER THAN ASSERTED. With
one inverter the fabricated grid reading and the battery setpoint are the same
number, so the grid connection and the only unit ARE one actuator:
actuator_for() routes every source to the site, no claim is filed on a unit,
stage 2 sees the whole list and answers what the shipped arbiter answered.
All 17 suites replay UNEDITED above the ARB-03 sections and are green on the
same numbers; test_arbiter.py additionally runs 13 claim lists through both
resolve() and site_resolve() and compares target, winner, binder,
contradiction flag, the considered list and the operator line.
EVIDENCE, BY BREAKING EACH THING (tools/mutation_run.sh, purged tree):
* Claim's dataclass default emptied -> RED (test_arbiter)
...and it survived until the check was added: the two helpers pass their
own default down, so the FIELD's default never ran. Now checked directly.
* `peak` reclassified SCOPE_UNIT -> RED (arbiter x4, peakguard x2)
* `maintenance` reclassified SCOPE_SITE -> RED (arbiter x4, peakguard)
* the N=1 identity dropped in actuator_for() -> RED (arbiter, peakguard
incl. the maintenance/peak suppression checks, freeze) - which is the
measurement that says splitting at N=1 would be a behaviour change
* resolve() stops partitioning -> RED (arbiter x4)
* allocate() broadcasts at N>=2 -> RED (arbiter x2)
* stage 1 drops clause-2 gating -> RED (arbiter)
* a call site routes `device` through `loop` -> RED (peakguard 10g)
* SAFETY-25 Option B built as a ninth source -> RED (peakguard 10f, both
halves, plus 10g) - the tripwire still bites
SAFETY-24's asymmetry proof is re-run and holds: 0 negative floors over the
shipped sweep, `hi` still +inf on every claim the guard files, and it now also
asserts every one of them is on the SITE actuator - a floor bound to one
inverter's share would leave the site, the thing the capacity tariff meters,
with no floor at all.
test_peakguard.py part 10f is kept, not adapted around. `source` is still
Claim.set()'s first positional argument precisely so its AST scan keeps
reading it, which is why `actuator` is the LAST field of Claim and not the
first - moving `source` off position 0 would silently blind the tripwire that
guards SAFETY-25's deferred option. The one adaptation is `**kw` on its spy,
so main.py's roster passes through unread rather than being silently dropped.
New part 10g pins CLAIM_SCOPE to the same eight-source set and grades a REAL
two-inverter cycle, which is the only place a mis-typed actuator_of(...) at a
call site is observable - at N=1 every source legitimately routes to the site,
so a swap there is invisible by construction.
No config key, no option, no operator surface, no default moved. Inverter B
does not exist yet and nothing here measures it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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bdd7f18a54 |
OPT-04: charge cheap, discharge expensive - and only when it pays
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 3m16s
Four cards built the price stack and nothing traded on it. app/arbitrage.py is §10.1's priority 3, and it consumes all four rather than re-deciding anything: whether a trade is permitted at all, on which two hours, against which widened threshold is TariffPlan.arbitrage()'s answer, and that answer cannot be obtained without first saying whether the peak guard is holding. §9.1's "peak shaving outranks arbitrage" is therefore honoured structurally - there is no path to a spread that skips the question - and again in the arbiter, where P_PEAK (50) clamps a claim filed at P_ARBITRAGE (30). A guard that never ran is not a guard that is clear. On meter_source off the peak guard is never evaluated; that third state is carried as None and refuses, because charging at the rail creates the billed quantity while nothing measures the quarter. validate.py refuses that configuration too, along with arbitrage armed with no price source and a SoC floor at or above the ceiling. §17: never export into a negative price. The guard is on the hour being sold into, not on the spread - a day priced -0.30 .. -0.05 clears any threshold and its dearest hour is still negative. Buying in a negative hour stays allowed. resolve_tariff() may open an HTTPS connection and the tick feeds the ESP32 heartbeat, so the fetch runs in its own task at a 30 min cadence and the tick reads an attribute and an age bound. test_arbitrage.py section 8 asserts that structurally on the shipped AST: a fetch put back on cycle() is red. AC4 is NOT met and is not restated - this repository holds no price history. Section 7 replays a synthetic year and asserts the property that does not need real prices: every executed round trip cleared its own widened requirement, and zero discharges landed in the 522 negative-priced hours. At the shipped 0.10 EUR/kWh threshold a realistic Belgian day/night site does not trade at all. Reported, not tuned: that number and FCST-03's widening factors are one product decision and it is the owner's. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015VXjA3LWccN1rJsk3okyPC |