3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	ab6fbe2f9e	SAFETY-25: record the owner's decision - option a, with alloc-01 as the revisit trigger ... The product owner answered SAFETY-25's §1 on 2026-09-02: OPTION A. The BMS cut-out is the DELIBERATE and only backstop for demand-driven discharge on the grid-following loop, and Option B - a loop-side reserve floor - is DEFERRED rather than rejected. Option A is the shipped behaviour, so this is a recording, not a change. `app/` is touched in exactly two places and both are comments that claimed the question was still open (freeze.py's finding, peakguard.py's point 2). No setpoint, no claim, no option, no default moved. The 17-suite run is green on the same numbers as before. WHY DEFERRING IS THE SAFE DIRECTION. Option B's proof - bms_soc_floor < loop_soc_floor <= peak_soc_floor, run through the real arbiter in test_peakguard.py part 10d - has an unstated premise: the reserve predicate and discharge_permitted() read the SAME state of charge. With two packs they read different numbers. The reserve binds on the emptier pack and files hi = 0; the peak guard, reading the other pack or an average, files lo = excess > 0; lo > hi is arbiter clause 3 and the answer is 0 W - the battery parked in the billed quarter, which is the failure the memo itself marks fatal. And no config validator can catch it: it is a runtime divergence between two readings, not a config ordering, so CFG-01's shape of check passes on the exact tree that parks the battery. Option A's cost is energy; Option B's cost built too early is the one quarter of the month that sets the bill. THE REVISIT TRIGGER IS ALLOC-01, recorded in §0c. Under ARCH-01's host-side allocator the two claims stop sharing a list: the loop floor becomes a per-inverter `hi` consumed as an INTERVAL at stage A, while the peak floor stays a site `lo` at stage B. Different claim lists, different stages, structurally unable to cross - a stronger argument than the ordering rule, because it makes the crossing unreachable rather than harmless. That is the shape in which Option B becomes safe to build. WHAT HAS TO BE RE-EARNED AT N=2 is stated plainly in §0d rather than left for someone to discover. SAFETY-27 now names five floors across two packs, so "the SoC" stops being a scalar the config can bound. And part 10f - the pin that made SAFETY-25 mergeable - CANNOT EXPRESS TWO PACKS: its dynamic half is a scalar 0-100 % SoC sweep against a single-series capture, and a two-pack exposure lives in the DIFFERENCE between two readings, which that sweep visits at no resolution. Its static half, the AST scan pinning the eight claim sources, still bites at N=2; the dynamic half goes silent. Merging a two-pack reserve on 10f's current green would be merging on a check that cannot see the failure. The options analysis is kept intact on purpose - §1-§7 stand exactly as written, including §5's "(recommended)" on Option B and §6's recommendation, with a new §0 saying what was decided and §6 marked as answered. A memo that recorded the verdict and deleted the reasoning is the failure this DECISIONS/ directory exists to prevent. Part 10e's check moved with the memo: it used to pin the honest "Status: OPEN" line and now pins that the memo names the option, the date and the trigger AND still carries both options and the recommendation. The tripwire itself stays - a ninth claim source in Controller.cycle() still takes 10f red on the line it is written, and "deferred" is precisely the state in which someone builds Option B by accident. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-02 00:46:54 +02:00
glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5	e498dd4c1c	SAFETY-25: pin the claim-source set, so the tripwire is one ... The durability claim this PR shipped was FALSE, and the reviewer of #31 disproved it by building the fix. Part 10 said, in four committed places, that it "goes RED the day a loop-side floor is built, so the exposure cannot change size under a green suite". The reviewer implemented the memo's own recommended Option B in main.py - a `Claim.limit("reserve", P_LOOP, hi=0.0)` filed under a `loop_soc_floor` - and the ENTIRE SUITE STAYED GREEN. Part 10 green. Mutation 13 went on printing "NOTHING PREVENTS IT, ON PURPOSE" and the same 21 % -> 10.0 %, on a tree where something DID prevent it. Pushed to an absurd always-binding 95 % reserve it was caught only by SAFETY-24's pre-existing part 7 wiring checks; part 10 was still green. THE CAUSE IS STRUCTURAL, not a missing assertion. `replay_loop()` hand-builds main.py's claim list as a literal `[supervised, loop, peakguard.claim(...)]`, so it is blind to any claim main.py ADDS - which is exactly where AC 2 would be built. That is this repository's named failure mode: a check that observed something other than what it claimed to observe, shipped as a guarantee inside the document that recommends the change. THE FIX IS 10f: THE CLAIM-SOURCE SET, PINNED, two ways because the two fail differently. * STATICALLY, over `Controller.cycle()`'s own AST. Every `claims.append(...)` in it must be one the scan can read - an unreadable append FAILS rather than counting as nothing, which is how a scan like this goes quietly vacuous - and the sources it can file must be exactly {device, supervised, failsafe, safety, peak, arbitrage, maintenance, loop}. A ninth takes part 10 red on the line it is written, in every configuration, whether or not any fixture here reaches the state that files it. * DYNAMICALLY, through REAL `Controller.cycle()`s with main.py's OWN `resolve` spied - not a list this file built and hoped matched - swept over the WHOLE 0..100 % SoC range in the two states 10a-10c replay. Idle: exactly {device, supervised, loop}. Floor-limited: exactly {device, supervised, loop, peak}. A claim conditioned on a low pack, which is the shape a loop-side floor has, cannot hide from a sweep that visits 0 %. And the fold is checked rather than assumed: main.py's two P_SAFETY rating limits are both symmetric LIMITs, so replay_loop() modelling them as one `supervised` claim at the tighter bound is exact. MEASURED AGAINST THE COUNTEREXAMPLE. Reproduced first on the unfixed tree (green, as reported). On this tree the reviewer's Option B at its recommended default takes part 10 RED on 3 checks, and the 95 % variant on 6. Nine mutations were run in all, each against a freshly copied tree with no `__pycache__` present, mounted `:ro`; all nine red, no survivors, no `+0 B` delta. MUTATION.md records why a second round was needed: the first round's mutations were all aimed at DISARMING the guard, while the claim part 10 actually made was about the guard being FIXED. The four false sentences are replaced with what is now true, and each says WHICH half catches WHICH shape - 10f for an arbiter claim (Options B and C), 10a-10c for a clamp inside control.compute() or the guard (Option D), which the replay drives directly. AC 2 IS STILL OPEN AND NOTHING HERE BUILDS IT. The loop-side floor was a test mutant, reverted before commit. The memo still says "Status: OPEN. This is a memo, not a decision." Also, non-blocking, from the same review: the NOT READY banner had inherited the new scope sentence and become a ~550-character paragraph that the row three lines below repeated verbatim. A checks() row may now carry an optional short `banner` form; the floor-limited row does, and `status_payload()` prefers it. THE ROW IS UNCHANGED - shortening that would have been weakening AC 3 - and rows without the key are unaffected. Graded, and mutated: dropping the short form goes red. Merged origin/release/1.0 first (CI-02), keeping both tickets' CHANGELOG entries. Full suite green: 17/17 in goodwe-addon-ci (test_ci_gate.py needs `git`, which CI-02 added to .gitea/ci/Dockerfile but the local image lacks; run with it installed and it passes). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-01 05:04:22 +02:00
adminandClaude Opus 5	182102eeaf	SAFETY-25: say what peak_soc_floor bounds, and measure what it does not ... peak_soc_floor reads like a pack-wide reserve and is not one. The grid-following loop has no SoC guard of any kind, so on a sustained-load evening it discharges straight past that number and keeps going until the pack's own BMS cut-out stops it. The gap has now been written down four times without being filed - SAFETY-18's finding (freeze.py:18), SAFETY-24's module note, its PR body, and its honestly-uncaught 13th mutation - and never once measured. It is measured here, on the committed 2026-08-20 capture, driving the SHIPPED control.compute(), peakguard.decide(), peakguard.claim() and the real arbiter.resolve() in main.py's order: 19:00-22:00 UTC, 830 W mean, minimum 701 W, zero export in the window reference pack (300 Ah x 51.2 V x DoD 90) started at 21 %, one point above peak_soc_floor ends at 10.0 % - the bms_soc_floor cut-out 1525 Wh delivered by the LOOP over 587 cycles 549 cycles below peak_soc_floor, 343 of them still discharging 0 cycles on which the peak guard filed any floor at all AND IT IS A BEHAVIOUR, NOT A CONFIG VALUE. The same evening ends at 9.9715 % at peak_soc_floor = 5, 11, 20 and 60 - the shipped value and both ends of the schema range - identical to four decimal places. The option an operator would reach for cannot move the number by any amount at all. On the same day's high-load block the two states coexist: 49 cycles reporting PEAK GUARD FLOOR-LIMITED and, on all 49 of them, the arbiter simultaneously granting the loop up to 2000 W of discharge. WHY SAFETY-24 COULD NOT CLOSE IT. The peak guard files a `lo` limit - a LOWER bound on the setpoint. That asymmetry is exactly what makes it trustworthy: a reviewer proved across 19,800 combinations that it can never lower a target, cap a discharge or contradict the arbiter. The same property makes it structurally incapable of stopping a discharge the loop itself wants. A floor on the guard cannot become a floor on the pack by being raised, and the sweep above is that sentence measured. WHAT THIS COMMIT CHANGES IS THE HONESTY, on the four surfaces an operator actually reads. That half is required whichever way the open question is answered, and it is the real misstatement on the live system today: * config.yaml, beside the option itself - it BOUNDS THE PEAK GUARD ONLY and is NOT A PACK-WIDE RESERVE, with the replayed evening and the sweep; * DOCS.md, in the options table and in a new section carrying the figures; * the STATUS-PAGE ROW for a floor-limited guard. This is the one line a human reads at the moment the guard stops discharging, and read alone it says "the battery is being held at peak_soc_floor" - which the replay shows is false in every cycle that row is rendered; * the PERSISTENT NOTIFICATION, which outlives the page. It now names what has stopped (the guard buying a lower bill) and what has not (the pack being spent). peakguard.py and freeze.py carry the measurement beside the findings they already recorded, so the next reader does not have to take the caveat on trust. THE PRODUCT DECISION IS NOT TAKEN HERE, and must not be. Whether the loop gets a reserve floor of its own decides whether this house's battery may discharge to the BMS floor on a heavy evening; that moves real energy and it is the owner's call. DECISIONS/SAFETY-25-loop-soc-floor.md is the memo AC 1 asks for: the options, what each costs, what each protects, weighed against MAINT-01 (a pack repeatedly at the BMS floor is the SoC-drift condition the maintenance cycle exists to correct, and an over-tight reserve fights it from the other side) and against the fact that this would be the FIFTH SoC key - OPT-04's arbitrage_soc_floor fired SAFETY-24's "revisit if a third floor appears" trigger unremarked, so SAFETY-27's naming decision should land first. It carries a recommendation and says plainly that it is not a decision. It also records a trap found while writing it, and now CHECKED through the real arbiter rather than described: the obvious shape of a loop-side floor is a `hi` limit at P_LOOP, and filed while the peak guard is asking for a positive floor that is `lo > hi` - which arbiter.py resolves to a CONTRADICTION at 0 W, the battery PARKED in the one quarter of the month that sets the bill. It is the same crossing-limits hazard shaping_suspended() already exists to avoid. The ordering `bms_soc_floor < loop_soc_floor <= peak_soc_floor` removes it provably, because wherever the reserve binds the guard is already floor-limited and files lo = 0; both halves are run in part 10d. test_peakguard.py part 10 is a TRIPWIRE, not a guarantee. It records a defect and goes RED the day somebody builds a loop-side floor, so the exposure cannot change size under a green suite and closing it has to be deliberate. Part 11's mutation 13 stays honestly NOT CAUGHT - nothing prevents the loop discharging past this floor - but it now reports a number instead of a sentence. Verified: 16/16 suites green in the CI image. Eight mutations, each against a tree copied fresh with __pycache__ excluded and mounted :ro, so no .pyc existed to go stale (MUTATION.md's structural immunity, the same one it records for CI); byte deltas +61, -8, -465, -430, -1088, -46, file deleted, and -95; none is +0 B. All eight go red on the named check: M1 peakguard.claim() also files hi=floor_w -> 7 red, incl. 10c M2 control.compute() gain forced to 0 -> 6 red, incl. 10a/10b M3 scope sentence removed from the status row -> 10e red M4 scope sentence removed from the notification -> 10e red M5 scope paragraph removed from config.yaml -> 10e red M6 scope bullet weakened in DOCS.md -> 10e red M7 the decision memo deleted -> 10e red M8 arbiter clamps crossing limits instead of reporting a contradiction -> 5 red, incl. 10d AC 2 is left explicitly OPEN, pending the owner's answer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-01 03:46:43 +02:00