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 Claude dev agent
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d69fd8fbfd |
OPT-11 P1: per-battery mode limits, on/off, solar order
A battery's mode is a soft unit limit (source `mode`, P_MODE 35) kept
apart from the hard limits in pre_resolve(). The allocator applies it
only while the site target is decided at or below 35 (new
Resolution.deciding_priority), so the peak floor releases it and a mode
`hi` never meets the site `lo`. At N=1 resolve() applies the same rule
to the site target after stage 2. A mode range without 0 W is dropped
as a software fault, so REFUSE_SIGN stays unreachable from a mode.
compute() gets the loop bound (sum over live units of hard limits with
modes applied), so the loop never asks for watts no battery may give
and the saturation freeze never parks on them. While charging, Leftover
solar weighs 0 so Solar first fills first. Store keys pack_use and
pack_mode per battery, set by two new /action values; Off stops and
skips maintenance with a log line. Minimal Batteries cards (EN/NL).
Off by default (battery_modes_enabled); off, commands are byte-identical
to
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5.5
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f4f72211a9 |
SAFETY-60/62: operator tools refuse input they cannot read
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 8m31s
predeploy_check.py and rehearse_roster.py now assert a positive property of their input (a JSON object, most of whose top-level keys are known option or store keys) and refuse anything else with the shape named. The `ha apps info --raw-json` wrapper, a truncated or list-wrapped state file and a wrapped config no longer produce "CLEARED" / "NO FINDINGS" with exit 0. Also: a clean --no-live-entities rehearsal exits 3, not 0; alloc_sim.py exits 1 when split-invariance FAILS; decode_bus_capture.py takes several paths and exits 1 on a file that is mostly not frames. Graded by the new test_tool_inputs.py; DOCS.md says to pass .data.options. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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e306c74cb8 |
DEV-02: per-instance inverter objects, so nothing is graded against a sibling
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m15s
Every piece of per-device state in the Controller was a scalar, and several of
them are safety inputs. app/inverter.py introduces an `Inverter` that owns its
entities, its rating, its device range, its SignWatchdog, its last_write and
its last_beat, under store keys namespaced by unit name. The Controller holds a
list of them and keeps only what is genuinely site-level: the P1 reading, the
site integrator, and the tariff quarter.
WHAT THE SCALARS WERE SILENTLY ASSERTING
dev_min/dev_max one pair, read from one setpoint_entity. A second
inverter's rating was NEVER READ AT ALL, so its clamp, its
freeze rail and the peak guard's achievable_w were the
first one's numbers.
soc one reading into the maintenance FSM, SAFETY-24's pack
floor and arbitrage's bounds. An average lets the emptier
pack be driven below its own floor.
sign_wd ONE SignWatchdog, whose own docstring says "one instance
per actuator", latched under FLAT store keys - so a trip
caused by B latched A across restarts and one operator
press cleared both.
last_beat one deadline and one serialised hass.call(), so a hung
write to A ate B's 30 s layer-1 budget.
actual_w BECAME SITE LEVEL WHILE THE READINGS BECAME PER-INSTANCE, and those
are opposite directions on purpose. compute()'s anti-windup test is
`abs(prev_w - actual_w) > saturation_w` with prev_w the SITE target, so feeding
it one inverter's power compares a site number against a unit number, trips the
saturation freeze permanently and leaves a standing grid error. Measured on
admin/goodwe's two-master rig (tools/alloc_sim.py --splits, 2 kW load, 40
cycles), worst |delta| between splits at the meter:
gain one unit's power the site sum
0.2 510 W 0 W
0.4 250 W 0 W
0.6 50 W 0 W
That was ALLOC-01's disclosed finding; test_alloc.py part 8 kept its stimulus
and now grades the other row.
THE STORE MIGRATION IS GRADED, NOT MERELY PERFORMED. sign_tripped/sign_reason
move to unit/<name>/... once, verified by READING BACK what was written, and
the version marker is set only when nothing that carried state was lost. The
flat keys stay in the file so a rollback still finds its latch. And __init__
compares the pre-migration flat latch against what unit A actually came up
with: if the latch did not survive it is RE-ARMED from the legacy value and
shouted about. A latch that silently fails to migrate is a disarmed safety
guard on an install whose state file says it is protected - which is strictly
worse than never persisting it, because now there is evidence saying it is
fine. test_inverter.py part 2 breaks the migration and watches the guard fire.
HEARTBEATS ARE INDEPENDENT AND THE BUDGET IS DERIVED. Each inverter owns its
deadline, the refreshes go out concurrently, and each write is bounded by
WRITE_BUDGET_S = 4 s. The inequality is graded rather than asserted: 4 +
heartbeat_s's schema maximum of 25 < 30, validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S.
Verified by injecting a transport that accepts and never answers.
live_units() ANSWERS HONESTLY. A unit whose every write has been rejected for a
whole layer-1 window is not commandable; the allocator drops it, the survivors
carry its share, the action log names it, and the dropped unit is commanded
0 W rather than left standing on its last share. A roster entry with NO
setpoint_entity is deliberately not handled there - that is a configuration
that cannot be delivered, and it reaches main.py's refusal branch, which is how
that branch keeps a live trigger after this card removed its old one.
AT N=1 NOTHING MOVES. The removed scalars survive as read/write properties of
the sole inverter, so every existing replay runs unmodified - and they REFUSE
at N>=2 rather than answering for the first inverter, which is the tripwire on
a consumer that was never made per-instance.
EVIDENCE. 19 files green. test_inverter.py is new (82 checks). Eighteen
mutations were applied to the shipped modules on a purged tree via
tools/mutation_run.sh and each was observed RED. Two of them SURVIVED first
time and the checks were changed rather than the table: the serialised dispatch
and the shared last_beat both passed while part 6 gathered its own writes and
computed its own `due` list. send_heartbeats() was extracted from run_control()
so the shipped dispatch is reachable by a check at all.
INVERTER B STILL DOES NOT EXIST. build_roster() returns exactly one inverter
from the flat options and is the one function CFG-04 changes; every two-unit
figure here is architecture, and the second rating in the checks is marked a
hypothesis.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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186e13ceca |
ALLOC-01: allocate the site grid target, sum-invariant, never broadcast
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 4m6s
ARB-03 left `allocate()` as a documented seam that passed through at N<=1 and
DECLINED at N>=2, with the reasoning recorded at the line: the obvious
placeholder - hand the site target to each inverter - IS the ARCH-01 fault, and
"a placeholder that cannot be told apart from the real thing by any guard we
have is worse than no placeholder". This fills the seam.
WHY A BROADCAST IS A FAULT AND NOT AN INEFFICIENCY. The control primitive is
meter emulation: the master reports a FABRICATED grid reading and the inverter
regulates itself to it, so one number means "the battery moves X W" to this
add-on and "the grid is at X W" to the inverter - an identity that holds only at
N=1. Hand two inverters the same target and each supplies it IN FULL, so the
loop gain at the meter becomes N times the per-unit gain. Reproduced on
admin/goodwe's two-master rig against this tree: -400 W export overshoot at
gain 0.6, and at gain 1.0 - which config.yaml accepts as its documented maximum
- a permanent 4000 W peak-to-peak limit cycle, commands alternating
1000/2000/1000/0 W, with NOT ONE GUARD FIRING. The sign watchdog is evaluated on
every cycle and never trips, because the disagreement flips on alternate ticks
and never holds its 180 s window.
WHAT WAS BUILT. `app/allocator.py`, host-side and strictly above the driver
seam. It consumes intervals and a number and nothing else - no claims, no
priorities, and no measurement, because an allocator that read P1 would be a
SECOND integrator on the site measurement.
* ENVELOPE CLAMP, from ARB-03 stage 1's `UnitBounds`, read PER TICK. `plan()`
is a pure function and the module holds no state, so there is nowhere for a
construction-time envelope to be cached.
* WATER-FILL by weight, with the surplus of a full unit moving to the others.
Weights express PREFERENCE, envelopes express PERMISSION: a zero weight is
honoured while another unit has headroom and overridden when it does not,
because the SUM is the safety property and stranding capacity behind a
comfort choice manufactures a standing error at the meter.
* LARGEST-REMAINDER ROUNDING. The target is rounded ONCE, at the top; every
sum below that line is integer arithmetic, so it cannot drift. Measured: a
per-unit round() drifts -125 W over 50 000 ticks at three inverters.
* THE ALLOCATION RECORD, with `unmet_w`, `dropped` and a per-unit reason.
`ok` is one boolean for SAFETY-28 to gate on, and `unmet_w` is deliberately
NOT fused into it - a saturated inverter must not park the whole site.
THE STABILITY PROPERTY IS STRUCTURAL. With sum(a_i) = 1 the gain at the meter is
sum(a_i * g_i), a convex combination of the per-unit gains, so it lies in
[min g_i, max g_i] FOR ANY SPLIT. That is what makes the weights a comfort
choice rather than a tuning parameter, and it is why a bad split cannot
destabilise the site. Graded directly, and measured end to end: 90/10, 50/50 and
100/0 give a bit-identical aggregate trace at the meter, and a gain sweep to 1.0
at every split has a flat tail at all 84 combinations.
THE TWO REFUSALS main.py NOW MAKES, AND WHY THERE ARE TWO. `allocated=False` no
longer means "no allocator"; it means no safe split EXISTS - a mis-routed claim,
an empty envelope set, or a split that could only be made by commanding one pack
to charge while another discharges. Separately, and this guard is the price of
making allocate() succeed rather than something inherited, main.py refuses to
act on a valid split it cannot DELIVER: there is one `setpoint_entity`, so
writing the site target to the one inverter it can reach would over-command that
inverter by exactly the other's share. Commanding a partial site is a worse
instruction than commanding nothing. DEV-02 gives it the second writer.
scope_violations() IS NOW CONSUMED, AND AS A REFUSAL. ARB-03 left it logging
without changing the resolution. A mis-routed claim means the number about to be
divided may itself be wrong, and dividing a number that may be wrong is worse
than not dividing it - the same answer clause 3 already gives a contradiction.
It is NOT promoted into an envelope: a unit-scoped claim that landed on the site
names no unit, so promoting it would mean guessing one, or applying one
inverter's rating to a sibling that does not have it.
AT N<=1 IT IS A PASS-THROUGH, BYTE-IDENTICAL: the share is the site target, as a
float, unrounded and unclamped. All 17 existing suites replay unedited.
test_peakguard.py part 10h and test_arbiter.py part 7 were RE-AIMED, not
deleted. PR #40's reviewer proved that refusal branch was unreachable and
untested once; removing its trigger without giving it a new one would have
rebuilt the hole. Part 10h now drives three real cycles - a deliverable split, a
dead sibling, and every master stale - and grades all three.
KNOWN AND NOT CLOSED HERE: at a roster of two the loop's `actual_w` is one
inverter's power used as a site measurement, because the add-on binds a single
`inverter_power` sensor. That is the SENSING half of the same N=1 identity this
card removes from the COMMANDING half, and it makes the aggregate trace
split-dependent below gain 1.0. Measured with its counterfactual in test_alloc.py
part 8 and tools/alloc_sim.py --splits. It belongs to DEV-02.
Verified: all 18 suites green in the CI image. 16 mutations run through
tools/mutation_run.sh on a purged tree; 13 red, and the 3 survivors are recorded
in test_alloc.py part 12 with the reason each cannot be caught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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