TEST-21
4
Commits
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  adminandClaude Opus 5
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57775d4e06 |
TEST-21: delivery_hold_s's floor re-derived, and 30.0 s did not reproduce
No code and no option changes. What changes is a number this repository claimed
about a shipped safety constant.
`delivery_hold_s: 185` shipped resting on "30.0 s, the worst continuous
legitimate episode at the shipped threshold across all 2640 runs", plus a lag
sweep giving 45.0 s and 90.0 s - from a harness `DECISIONS/SAFETY-42` §1
deliberately did NOT commit, because it imports `plantsim` and `frame_check` out
of admin/goodwe. So the floor under a safety constant could not be re-run. That
is PROC-01's shape, with eleven instances in three days.
The harness is committed now, in admin/goodwe as `sim/delivery_window.py`, and
NOT here. `plantsim` and `frame_check` are that repo's; restating them in this
tree is CI-08's coupling, which has broken three times, and the alternative
fate - skipped for want of its imports - is a green that establishes nothing.
There the dependency runs one way: THIS repo's `control`, `arbiter` and the
shipped `delivery.delinquent()` are imported live out of whichever checkout is
under test. Its `--selftest` is now a step in that repo's `checks.yml`, so a
change here that moves `saturation_w`, `max_w`, `delivery_hold_s` or the shape
of `delinquent()` goes red there instead of leaving a stale number here.
cd goodwe/sim && GOODWE_ADDON_REPO=/path/to/goodwe-addon \
python3 -B delivery_window.py --selftest --campaign --blag
⚠️ THE HEADLINE DID NOT REPRODUCE: 35.0 s, not 30.0 s. Recorded as measured. The
harness was not adjusted until it agreed - the one correction made during the
rebuild was made AGAINST the doc's number (§1 records it) and made every figure
LARGER.
WHAT REPRODUCED - and it is the part the compatibility promise rests on:
* the N=1 control arm is 0.0 s at EVERY threshold in EVERY run. §3.2's algebra
measured, not argued.
* the flapping family is 0.0 s everywhere in all 840 runs - the family that
defeated SAFETY-30's site window still cannot touch this check.
* 45.0 s at twice A's lag, to the cycle.
WHAT DID NOT:
* the headline, by one control cycle (30.0 -> 35.0 s); the reversal family by
two (20.0 -> 30.0 s).
* the NON-MONOTONE curve. §3.3 finding 3 read 55.0 s at 250 W against 40.0 s
at 100 W as a property of the reduction. This rebuild's curve is monotone.
The mechanism is real and is still the reason not to read either table as a
sensitivity curve, but it is an ARGUMENT now, not a measurement, and it is
written down as weaker.
* the low-threshold rows, badly (40.0 -> 120.0 s at 100 W). Nothing ships
there, but that gap is the honest measure of how much of the original table
was a property of axes nobody wrote down. §3.3 fixes every axis COUNT and
RANGE and no individual value; the rebuild prints its choices above its own
table so the caveat travels with the number.
* the four-times-slower row moved the OTHER way: 75.0 s, not 90.0 s.
185 s IS NOT CHANGED. It is 5.29x the re-measured worst (the record claimed
6.2x), 2.47x the four-times-slower case, 6.2x the firmware's LINK_STALE_S veto
and 4.9x inside the billing quarter. All four bounds clear and none narrowly,
and the ordering of the argument is unchanged. Moving a shipped safety constant
because a margin went from 6.2x to 5.3x while every bound holds would re-open
SAFETY-41's four-attempt false-trip regime for nothing.
⚠️ ONE CONSEQUENCE AN OPERATOR CAN HIT. At 30.0 s the rig's floor coincided with
the firmware's veto and a reader could not tell which was binding. At 35.0 s the
rig's is strictly the binding one - and it is ABOVE the schema's own
`int(30,900)` minimum. `delivery_hold_s: 30` is therefore below a MEASURED
legitimate episode and would report on ordinary saturation. Both translations
now say so. Raising the schema floor is a change to a shipped option's contract
and is left to its own card rather than smuggled in here.
⚠️ THE B-LAG ROWS ARE RELABELLED THROUGHOUT. Inverter B does not physically
exist (~2026-09-12); `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is A COPIED, `measured=False`. Every
two-inverter figure in this record is two copies of A, and the lag sweep is a
SENSITIVITY STUDY ON A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT B, not a measurement of it. The old
wording - "MEASURED, not felt" - overstated exactly that, and "the RAMP does not
move it at all" was too strong: halving it is worth 0 s at A's lag and +5 s at
twice it.
Touched: DECISIONS/SAFETY-42 §1 and §3.3, app/delivery.py's provenance comment,
config.yaml's `delivery_hold_s` block, both translations, CHANGELOG Unreleased.
26/26 suites pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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Claude
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090a8ecc35 |
SAFETY-42 round 2: pin the two thresholds at a config that is not the shipped one
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 6m7s
THE BLOCKER. At the `delinquent()` call site, `self.tuning.saturation_w` -> `250.0` (-19 B) was a survivor of all 23 suites. It is not an equivalent mutant: two copies of inverter A, B wedged, `saturation_w: 1800` (inside its own schema int(100,2000)) and a load of 1600 W put B's shortfall strictly between the literal and the configured value - head names nobody, the mutant names B. At the shipped 500 both name it, which is exactly why every fixture in part 4 was blind: their gaps are all above both thresholds. It matters beyond a mutation score. `delivery.py`'s MIN_W_IS_SATURATION_W note and the `delivery_hold_s` block in config.yaml both promise an operator, in shipped prose, that there is no fourth copy of a threshold to keep in step and no way for the two to drift - raise `saturation_w` and this check moves with you. A literal at the call site removes exactly that promise, silently, and the promise is why the design was chosen over a `delivery_w` key. ASKING THE SAME QUESTION OF EVERY OTHER NUMBER THIS CHECK READS FOUND A SECOND SURVIVOR OF ALL 23 SUITES: `bms_floor=inv.bms_soc_floor` -> `10.0` (-13 B), invisible because config.yaml's own example states 10 % and every fixture in this file used it. Two arms bracket it: a pack at 15 % against its own 25 % cut-out is cold and must stay unnamed (the literal names an empty pack), and a pack at 8 % against its own 5 % cut-out is wedged and must be named (the literal explains the fault away). One arm on each side leaves no constant at all. `delivery_hold_s` and `is_live()`'s window were ALREADY pinned - the fixtures had to move them to run - and `LINK_STALE_S` has no option behind it, so "pinned across a changed config" is not available for it and is not claimed. DECISIONS section 9 enumerates all of it with the deltas and which check kills which. Verified in the CI image, tree mounted :ro, `python3 -B`, `__pycache__` purged and counted before every run (TEST-15): R5 saturation_w -> 250.0 -19 B killed by part 4b(a) R6 bms_soc_floor -> 10.0 -13 B killed by part 4b(b), both arms R7 arm(self.delivery_cfg) -> DeliveryConfig() -1 B killed (already) R8 is_live(now) -> is_live(now, 3600.0) +8 B killed (already) R9 pack cut-out -> conjoined site floor +105 B killed twice head: 23/23 test files PASS, no bytecode written during the run. No shipped behaviour changes: the only edits to app/ are comments. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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c7eb8c6b97 |
SAFETY-42: close two mutation gaps, and correct what makes N=1 inert
The battery is 12 mutations, one freshly copied tree each, purged, `:ro`,
`python3 -B`, byte deltas measured. First round: 9 red, 3 survivors. All three
are now accounted for and the ledger is in DECISIONS §8.
M5 - `share <= 0` relaxed to `share == 0`, +0 B - WAS A REAL GAP AND THE TWO
OBVIOUS CHECKS DID NOT CLOSE IT. `short_by(-2000, 0) is None` and
`short_by(-2000, -100) is None` both stayed GREEN under the mutant: for a charge
share that is UNDER-delivered `share - measured` is negative and the `gap > 0`
test answers None anyway, so neither input can separate the two spellings. The
one that can is a unit moving MORE than its charge share - -2000 W told,
-3000 W measured, `share - measured` = +1000 W - which the mutant reports as a
shortfall. It is not one; it is something else driving that pack, which is
SAFETY-30's and SAFETY-31's question. That input is now the check, and M5 is RED.
MUTATION.md's third failure mode in miniature: the assertion ran, the sentence
was true, and the data could not reach the failure it named.
M11 - `inv.is_live(now)[0]` replaced by a literal `True`, -15 B - was a WIRING
gap the pure checks structurally could not see. `account(live=False, ...)` was
graded as a FUNCTION; nothing graded that `cycle()` asks the question, because no
fixture had a unit whose writes were being rejected. Such a unit still has its
last ACCEPTED command standing on the wire (`write_setpoint` leaves `last_write`
alone on a rejected write) and still measures nothing, so it looks exactly like a
wedged one to every number this check reads - and reporting it would be the
second, louder alarm about a state the allocator has already handled and logged.
`test_delivery.py` part 6 now builds that unit, with `rejected_since` back-dated
past LINK_STALE_S because the fixture runs in two seconds and the timer is
test_inverter.py's to grade. M11 is RED.
M3 - `len(asked) < 2` relaxed to `< 1`, +0 B - IS STILL A SURVIVOR, and it is an
EQUIVALENT MUTANT. With one asked unit `unaccounted` is a subset of a one-element
set, so it is either empty (`not unaccounted` returns {}) or equal to `asked`
(`len(unaccounted) == len(asked)` returns {}); with zero asked units both
spellings return {} as well. No input separates them, so no check can.
⚠️ AND FINDING IT CORRECTED THE MODULE'S OWN PROSE, WHICH IS THE MORE USEFUL
HALF. `delinquent()`'s docstring claimed `len(asked) < 2` was what makes N=1
inert. It is not - the PROPER-SUBSET rule is, and that line is a fast path and a
signpost. A false attribution of the mechanism in the file's own prose is exactly
what this repository keeps finding, and a mutation that survives is how it
surfaced. The line stays, with the equivalence written down beside it the way
circulation.circulating_w() records its own max(0.0, ...).
Also recorded, rather than left implicit: `account()`'s `parked` branch is graded
as a function but its WIRING is not mutated on its own; part 6's reversed-unit
fixture exercises it end to end, which is weaker, and the ledger says so.
Baseline 23/23 green before and after. app/main.py is byte-identical to the
previous commit - both closures are a test and a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
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glenn schrooyenandClaude Opus 5
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706e625d99 |
SAFETY-42: a unit that stops delivering, and the discriminator the card asked for does not exist
A unit standing at a non-zero share and producing nothing is seen by NOTHING. SAFETY-30's per-unit sign gate needs OPPOSITION on both sides of 250 W and a unit at 0 W is not opposing, it is ABSENT. The site sum still agrees with the meter in direction. Circulating power is exactly zero when one unit does nothing. The only trace left is `reason == "saturated-freeze"`, which clamp.py:93-96 documents as the alarm an operator learns to ignore. It is HW-01's shape, which ran 6 h 25 m with all three layers spectators. ⚠️ THE CARD'S OWN DISCRIMINATOR WAS BUILT FIRST AND FALSIFIED, AND THAT IS THE MAIN CONTENT. SAFETY-42 asks for "saturation persisting past N while |grid error| > X, both derived". Run on the two-master rig it fails in BOTH directions, and no (N, X) fixes either: FALSE POSITIVE `plantsim.Plant.limit()` returns 0 W for a discharge command into a pack at its own floor, and a wedged unit produces 0 W too. Load 2000 W, equal weights, 2000 W per-unit cap, 120 cycles: THE TWO ARMS ARE IDENTICAL ON ALL 120 in grid, site target, every share and every measured watt. Both saturated-freeze on 116 of them, both hold |grid error| over 300 W on all 120 and settle at 1200 W, both read circulating 0.0 W. The predicate's inputs do not differ, so no threshold on them can differ. And "a cold pack at its floor must not alarm" is the card's own AC 2. FALSE NEGATIVE the standing grid error is what a HEALTHY SIBLING ERASES. Load 800 W, same config, B wedged: over the last 30 of 200 cycles the loop is frozen on 30 of 30 while the worst |grid error| is 30 W, with B standing at +770 W and delivering 0 W. Any X above 30 W is silent for the whole run on the exact fault the card describes. WHAT REPLACES IT. Per unit, for a discharge share, `share - measured`; readable because of a reduction that only exists at N>=2: a unit is named while it is short by more than `saturation_w` with NO ACCOUNT for it, and the units in that state are a PROPER SUBSET of the units asked to discharge. THE ACCOUNT keeps the cold pack out and is the only thing that can: the two cases are identical in the power domain, so the discriminator has to be a non-power fact, and there is exactly one - the pack's own SoC against its own `bms_soc_floor`, asked through `peakguard.discharge_permitted()` rather than transcribed. ⚠️ `bms_soc_floor` ALONE, not `pack_floor_pct()`'s conjunction with `peak_soc_floor`: that floor bounds a money-saving discharge only and using it would explain away a wedged unit anywhere between the two. THE PROPER SUBSET keeps a whole-site cause out - a derate this add-on cannot see hits every unit; one box that stopped listening does not - and it is what makes this INERT AT N=1, by algebra rather than by a roster guard. IT REPORTS. IT DOES NOT ACT, and the strongest argument is for acting. Dropping the wedged unit from `live` genuinely recovers a site the shipped path does not: at load 1500 W, kept in the split the site settles at 800 W with a 700 W error and NEVER comes inside 100 W in 150 cycles (the freeze pins the target, so the sibling's SHARE never grows); dropped, it delivers 1500 W from cycle 14. What refuses it is that the only re-allocation this add-on can express is all-or-nothing: a unit derated to 50 % is short by more than saturation_w with nothing to explain it, so this detector names it too, and at load 3000 W dropping it leaves the site delivering 2000 W against 2400 W kept - 400 W WORSE. A partial re-allocation is what would make acting safe and the allocator cannot express it. That is a card. control.py is NOT MODIFIED. The freeze shapes the loop; this reports on it. NUMBERS, MEASURED. The watts side is `Tuning.saturation_w`, read at runtime, so there is no fourth CFG-03 copy and it cannot drift from the number the control law itself calls "not following". `delivery_hold_s: 185` comes off 2640 closed-loop two-inverter runs in which nothing is faulty (6 gains x 5 slews over the whole schema range, across load reversals, a flapping load and ASYMMETRIC SPLITS - a family SAFETY-30's campaign did not have and the one that dominates here) plus 1890 runs at a roster of ONE as the control: threshold reversals flapping weighted N=1 control * 500 W 20.0 s 0.0 s 30.0 s 0.0 s The N=1 column is 0.0 s at EVERY threshold in all 1890 runs, and the flapping column - the family that defeated SAFETY-30's site window - is zero too, because a common stimulus makes both units short at once and the subset stops being proper. ⚠️ The curve is NOT monotone (55.0 s at 250 W against 40.0 s at 100 W): lowering the threshold can turn a proper subset into the whole roster and BREAK the run. ⚠️ THE MARGIN IS MEASURED, NOT FELT, BECAUSE INVERTER B DOES NOT PHYSICALLY EXIST. `plantsim.INVERTER_B` is A COPIED, `measured=False`, so every two-inverter figure above is two copies of A. Sweeping a different second unit: the worst legitimate episode is insensitive to B's RAMP (30.0 s at half A's) and scales with its LAG - 45.0 s at twice A's measured 10 s, 90.0 s at four times it. 185 s is 6.2x the measured worst, 2.06x the four-times-slower case, 6.2x LINK_STALE_S and 4.9x inside the 900 s quarter. Deliberately not 180, which is SAFETY-02's site hold. SAFETY-34. `unit/<name>/delivery_tripped` in the store, one notification id per unit, re-raised on the first cycle of every process, cleared by the Start press. No flat mirror: a rollback lands on a version that drives one actuator, where this check is inert. ⚠️ SCHEMA CHANGE - `delivery_hold_s` joins options: and schema:, so this needs a version bump before it ships. Additive and defaulted, so an existing options blob stays valid. STATED GAPS: charge shares are not graded (no configured charge ceiling exists, so a constant-voltage taper cannot be explained and arming it would fire on every maintenance charge); every unit wedged at once is not caught (the subset is not proper and no instrument here separates that from a plant that cannot). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU |