MAINT-21: comments only - trim restated notes, add DECISIONS pointers

No code change: tools/maint21_same_ast.py and tools/maint20_same_code.py HEAD~
both print OK, and the -OO code objects are the same.

- Trims 56 comment and docstring lines (2088 -> 2032) in app/main.py and the
  new files that only restated their MAIN-orchestration.md bullet, each cut to
  its first sentence and a pointer. What the cut comments said and the bullet
  did not is now in the bullet: why a SAFETY-02 latch is restored, why the
  SAFETY-30 site check is not armed at one inverter, the SAFETY-18 re-derive,
  the MAINT-05 one-config rule, the OPT-09 sizing rules, the "no plan" row,
  the 5 400 s age bound, and the guard being the only latch repair.
- Adds the missing DECISIONS pointers on the SMA-10, SAFETY-137 and SMA-2
  comments (FALLBACK_BUDGET_S, write_setpoint, _await_inflight,
  _release_last, the retry wait, the failed-release branch, release_zero_sent,
  the in-flight write, the stop_event hand-back, the SMA-2 read and driver).
- DECISIONS/SAFETY-32: the stale `main.py:932-936` now names
  Controller.pack_floor_soc.
- main.py's docstring and import block say where the Controller's parts are.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

goodwe_controller/DECISIONS/MAIN-orchestration.md

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 docstrings of `app/main.py`, so the module can keep one line and a pointer. The
 comments that were shortened but not rewritten here are kept word for word in
 [[MAIN-orchestration-archive]], by their line in `app/main.py` at release/1.0
-`d4c01da`. Related: [[SAFETY-07-peak-guard]], [[FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried]],
+`d4c01da`. Since MAINT-21 the Controller's methods are split by job into
+`app/main.py` and `app/ctl_*.py`; a comment keeps its text and moves with its code. Related: [[SAFETY-07-peak-guard]], [[FCST-04-the-day-that-is-carried]],
 [[SAFETY-30-per-unit-sign]], [[SAFETY-73-refusal-per-inverter]],
 [[SAFETY-121-bound-every-quarter]], [[TARIFF-10-fetching-is-not-trading]],
 [[TARIFF-24-modes-need-the-tariff-task]], [[OPT-34-the-night-charge-keeps-its-level]].
@@ -12,17 +13,18 @@ comments that were shortened but not rewritten here are kept word for word in
 ## Controller construction
 
 - **Per-write budget (DEV-02).** Each write is dispatched concurrently and bounded, so one hung `hass.call()` cannot eat a sibling's layer-1 budget (the ESP32 zeroes after about 30 s, and a fault on A could zero a healthy B). The number is derived: `heartbeat_s` max 25 s, layer-1 veto `validate.FIRMWARE_INGEST_VETO_S` 30 s, so 25 + 4 < 30. test_inverter.py grades the inequality, so raising the heartbeat ceiling goes red instead of taking an inverter to zero. Below hass.py's 10 s HTTP timeout on purpose: abandon the write and re-issue it next tick, since `last_write` moves only on an accepted write.
-- **Tariff refresh (OPT-04).** `resolve_tariff()` may do an HTTPS fetch. The tick feeds the ESP32 heartbeat, so a supplier's TLS timeout on the tick would push the add-on into layer 1. The tick never awaits a fetch. The 30 min cadence is not about price change (day-ahead publishes once at 14-16 h CET and 8.3's carried hours go firm then); it picks the switch up within the hour at 48 fetches a day. The age bound answers another question: a failed refresh still stores a plan (the 11.4 static fallback), the bound covers the refresh task dying while a plan from hours ago stands as current. Three missed refreshes, for `p1.max_age_s`'s reason.
-- **Status rows (TARIFF-11).** The Tariff row used to be `static_status()`'s sentence alone and never saw the provider plan (read 'no static profile' at all 802 samples of a 40 h soak with a live feed). `tick_words` and `plan` are two clocks and the row says so; the plan is stamped with its own age from `tariff_at` (TARIFF-12 does not move it on a kept plan), and `age_s` is the caller's measurement. The Arbitrage row used to be `"off (arbitrage_enabled)" if self.arb is None`, under a comment saying `arb is None` iff trading was off; false, since `cycle()` returns at the input hold before `self.arb = None`: `arbitrage_enabled: true` plus a sensor answering None rendered 'off (arbitrage_enabled)', naming an option that is on, and past the first cycle the previous decision stood as current. Three states: off, armed with no decision this cycle, a decision with its age (always printed: a row that reports staleness only once stale cannot be told from one that never does).
+- **Tariff refresh (OPT-04).** `resolve_tariff()` may do an HTTPS fetch. The tick feeds the ESP32 heartbeat, so a supplier's TLS timeout on the tick would push the add-on into layer 1. The tick never awaits a fetch. The 30 min cadence is not about price change (day-ahead publishes once at 14-16 h CET and 8.3's carried hours go firm then); it picks the switch up within the hour at 48 fetches a day. The age bound answers another question: a failed refresh still stores a plan (the 11.4 static fallback), the bound covers the refresh task dying while a plan from hours ago stands as current. Three missed refreshes (5 400 s), for `p1.max_age_s`'s reason.
+- **Status rows (TARIFF-11).** The Tariff row used to be `static_status()`'s sentence alone and never saw the provider plan (read 'no static profile' at all 802 samples of a 40 h soak with a live feed). `tick_words` and `plan` are two clocks and the row says so; the plan is stamped with its own age from `tariff_at` (TARIFF-12 does not move it on a kept plan), and `age_s` is the caller's measurement. "No plan" is said aloud on a site that configured a provider. The Arbitrage row used to be `"off (arbitrage_enabled)" if self.arb is None`, under a comment saying `arb is None` iff trading was off; false, since `cycle()` returns at the input hold before `self.arb = None`: `arbitrage_enabled: true` plus a sensor answering None rendered 'off (arbitrage_enabled)', naming an option that is on, and past the first cycle the previous decision stood as current. Three states: off, armed with no decision this cycle, a decision with its age (always printed: a row that reports staleness only once stale cannot be told from one that never does).
 - **`stop` is required (review catch).** `stop=None` made a Controller that cannot stop itself the default: on the late-refusal path in `run_control()` it logged the banner, returned and left the process alive forever with no loop and no output.
 - **Action log first.** The store migration can log to it (15: how an operator finds a latch was re-armed); an AttributeError on the way to saying so would stop the add-on booting.
 - **Roster and migrations (DEV-02, SAFETY-44, MAINT-05).** Every per-device value lives on the roster objects (app/inverter.py); a `Tuning` and an integrator are deliberately not per device (6.2: one integrator on P1 above the split; a second regulating the same meter is the two-writers failure). The SAFETY-02 key migration runs before the first `Inverter` reads its latch, else a tripped install comes up armed with a green banner. SAFETY-44: it is handed `roster_names(opts)[0]`, never `UNIT_A` (on a declared roster the flat latch landed under `unit/inverter-a/`, read back under the name it was handed, stamping the marker); `roster_names()` returns `[UNIT_A]` on the flat shape so today's path is byte-identical. `misdirected` is unreachable from that call site (`unit` is a roster member by construction; dropping the `roster` argument survives 28/28), so the claim that the call site buys the refusal is gone; the argument stays for new callers and is graded in test_maintenance.py. The maintenance migration targets `self.inverters[0].name`, not `UNIT_A`: with `UNIT_A` the history would sit under a name on no roster (a nameless entry falls back to a positional `inverter-1`). Every two-pack fixture once named its first entry `inverter-a`, so swapping them left 19 files green; `migrate_maint_keys()` now grades the namespace it wrote against the names the machines read, and test_maintenance.py sections 9 and 11 use `["garage", "shed"]`.
+- **One maintenance config (MAINT-05).** The `maintenance_*` options describe the procedure, the same on every pack; the schedule and history are per pack, in the store. A per-entry config block would be a second shape for CFG-04 and a fifth place for `maintenance_charge_w` to disagree with config.yaml; two procedures would be a roster-schema card.
 - **CFG-04 disclosure.** A declared `inverters:` roster ignores `soc_entity`, `batt_entity`, `batt_invert` and `max_w`, which the UI still shows. Rule 9(e) refuses the dangerous one (a flat `setpoint_entity`); the rest cannot be refused (the schema has no blank value) so one action-log line at every start names the roster and the ignored keys.
 - **Site bound.** Summed from the roster, not `opts["max_w"]`: it is the integrator bound and rail of the site loop, then split. Identical at N=1; a per-unit `max_w` binds each share through its `supervised` claim.
 - **SAFETY-39 slew fallback** is 0 ("follow the rail"); it was 1000, a stale third copy. `control.slew_limit_w()` is the one reader.
 - **CFG-03 in main.py.** Eight `opts.get(key, <literal>)` calls used to live in the maintenance setup and two disagreed with config.yaml (2500 against 2000). `MaintConfig.from_options()` reads them. A ninth key goes in config.yaml `options:`/`schema:` and `maintenance.MAINT_OPTION_DEFAULTS` only.
 - **Watchdog thresholds (SAFETY-30).** The per-unit pair is re-derived at two inverters, not carried (it grades a command against one unit's own power). The site pair is used only at N>=2: the 300 W threshold carries (meter noise, deadband), the window does not (110 s at one inverter, 215 s at two, against a 180 s hold).
-- **Latches (SAFETY-02, -31, -34, -42, -18).** SAFETY-02: one per actuator, restored from namespaced keys; graded on every start (a latch that failed to move namespace, or was taken by an older add-on in a rollback, is a disarmed guard, so a disagreement re-arms by hand and shouts). SAFETY-31: site-level, flat keys (circulating power is defined over the roster), restored because it acts. SAFETY-42's delivery latch does not act, so it is restored only so the ALARM survives (the 2026-09-02 outage went unseen 6 h 25 m with the detector correct). SAFETY-18 is not restored (does not act). SAFETY-30's site check is armed only at N>=2.
+- **Latches (SAFETY-02, -31, -34, -42, -18).** SAFETY-02: one per actuator, restored from namespaced keys (a latch held only in memory is cleared by the restart an operator tries first); graded on every start (a latch that failed to move namespace, or was taken by an older add-on in a rollback, is a disarmed guard, so a disagreement re-arms by hand and shouts). SAFETY-31: site-level, flat keys (circulating power is defined over the roster), restored because it acts: a cleared latch would restart straight into the loop it stopped. SAFETY-42's delivery latch does not act, so it is restored only so the ALARM survives (the 2026-09-02 outage went unseen 6 h 25 m with the detector correct). SAFETY-18 is not restored (does not act; a restart re-derives it within one `meter_freeze_s`). SAFETY-30's site check is armed only at N>=2: arming it at one inverter would duplicate `inverters[0].sign_wd` (two latches, two banners, a false-positive record spent twice), so it is constructed there and never evaluated; `cycle()` enforces it.
 - **PV (TEL-11).** Instrumentation only; wiring it in would be an unrequested behaviour change and would destroy the measurement.
 - **Peak guard setup (SAFETY-07, TARIFF-01, FCST-04).** See SAFETY-07-peak-guard.md and FCST-04. The windowing caveat for FCST-04: hours already elapsed leave the spread, so a cheap night that has gone no longer sets the day's cheapest hour.
 
@@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ comments that were shortened but not rewritten here are kept word for word in
 - **`self.arb` (TARIFF-11).** See "Status rows" above; `arb_at < cycle_at` is the derived "the latest cycle did not reach the arbitrage step".
 - **Shadow (SAFETY-10, SAFETY-47).** `shadow_would_w` is what a live controller would have put on the wire; `self.target` is what is standing on the wire (held at `shadow.WIRE_W`, re-seeded each shadow cycle). Folding them shows an operator a number nothing is doing. The "sized from the billed-quarter meter" flag is recorded where the decision was taken (the page runs on its own task); False, not None, before the first shadow cycle.
 - **ARB-03.** `units` is a property derived from the roster so a site cannot claim two actuators while holding one writer. At N=1 (6.2) the grid connection and the only inverter are one actuator; a second entry makes per-inverter claims stop being site claims (ALLOC-01).
-- **DEV-02 latch guard (`_check_sign_latch...`).** Runs on every start: gating on `rep.ran` swallowed store.py's rule-2 round trip (upgrade, downgrade with a trip in the window, upgrade; the controller came up untripped while state.json said `sign_tripped: true`; a firmware rollback path was performed on this site on 2026-09-02). The gate could go because `handle_action()` clears the flat keys with the namespaced ones and the trip mirrors them. SAFETY-44 second half: the question is whether a namespaced latch THAT A MACHINE READS is set. An earlier version accepted any `unit/*/sign_tripped`, which blinded the guard on exactly the installs the broken migration had put the latch under `unit/inverter-a/` (a key nothing reads). The first blunt fix (every off-roster latch is litter) re-armed a healthy A off B's mirrored flat key (test_inverter.py DEV-02 restart case). `UNIT_A` is the discriminator: the only name the broken migration wrote. A single flag written for two intents was defeated by one removed unit's key (roster ['garage','shed'] with `unit/old-shed/sign_tripped` drove on a state file reading `sign_tripped: true`; `tools/rehearse_roster.py` exit 1); the fixtures now hold both arrangements. Residual: a first unit really named `inverter-a`, latched and removed from the roster is re-armed on `inverters[0]` (conservative). The printed reason is the flat mirror's (whatever tripped last), so on a multi-unit site one inverter's evidence may appear under another's name; test_maintenance.py's check that the reason is not the removed unit's depends on that fixture's flat string, not on this code.
+- **DEV-02 latch guard (`_check_sign_latch...`).** Runs on every start: gating on `rep.ran` swallowed store.py's rule-2 round trip (upgrade, downgrade with a trip in the window, upgrade; the controller came up untripped while state.json said `sign_tripped: true`; a firmware rollback path was performed on this site on 2026-09-02). The gate could go because `handle_action()` clears the flat keys with the namespaced ones and the trip mirrors them. SAFETY-44 second half: the question is whether a namespaced latch THAT A MACHINE READS is set. An earlier version accepted any `unit/*/sign_tripped`, which blinded the guard on exactly the installs the broken migration had put the latch under `unit/inverter-a/` (a key nothing reads). The first blunt fix (every off-roster latch is litter) re-armed a healthy A off B's mirrored flat key (test_inverter.py DEV-02 restart case). `UNIT_A` is the discriminator: the only name the broken migration wrote. A single flag written for two intents was defeated by one removed unit's key (roster ['garage','shed'] with `unit/old-shed/sign_tripped` drove on a state file reading `sign_tripped: true`; `tools/rehearse_roster.py` exit 1); the fixtures now hold both arrangements. Residual: a first unit really named `inverter-a`, latched and removed from the roster is re-armed on `inverters[0]` (conservative). This guard is the only repair for sites upgraded before the fix. The printed reason is the flat mirror's (whatever tripped last), so on a multi-unit site one inverter's evidence may appear under another's name; test_maintenance.py's check that the reason is not the removed unit's depends on that fixture's flat string, not on this code.
 - **Maintenance views (MAINT-05).** `maints` is one FSM per roster entry; `maint`, `maint_unit` and the button target are views of the one that holds the slot (`maintenance.arbitrate()` allows at most one out of IDLE). validate.py rule 6 grades `maintenance_charge_w` against the weakest cap on the roster.
 - **N=1 views.** Properties, not fields, and they refuse at N>=2 (6.2's identity is false there). Nothing inside main.py may read them (test_inverter.py AST scan).
 - **`_arm_sign_watchdogs` (SAFETY-30).** Called every cycle because fixtures append an `Inverter` after construction; a detector frozen at construction would be graded against the meter at a roster of two. `arm()` touches no timer or latch.
@@ -49,4 +51,4 @@ comments that were shortened but not rewritten here are kept word for word in
 - **Cycle ordering (SAFETY-02/31/42).** The watchdog evaluations run every cycle, before the input hold, so a run of held cycles cannot leave their timers resuming from a start that predates the gap. Reason first, flag second (each `set` writes the file): a crash between persists a reason nothing reads, not a latch with no explanation. The per-unit trip mirrors the legacy flat keys (store.py rule 2 covered only the latch present at migration time). The site check is flat-keyed, armed only at N>=2. SAFETY-31's input is MEASURED power (`inv.batt`), never the allocation record, which has sign-coherence by construction.
 - **Maintenance FSMs (MAINT-05).** Each pack is ticked with its own SoC (a minimum would abort a cycle on a sibling's state, an average would declare a pack full that is not); `arbitrate()` runs first. A deferral is carried to the status page because the edge-logged line scrolls out of the 40-row log.
 - **Aggregates.** SUM for the site bound, achievable rating and the battery power the site loop regulates against (`compute()`'s saturation test compares against the site target; one unit's power trips the freeze permanently, up to 510 W of split-dependence at gain 0.2, test_alloc.py part 8). MINIMUM for the discharge permission (the emptiest pack). MEASURED power for circulating power. Unknown bounds stay unknown when any unit is silent.
-- **Trade sizing (OPT-09).** `trade_sizing` uses arbitrage's own SoC bounds, not the BMS cut-out (SAFETY-25): sizing is the trade's business, the pack envelope is the pack's. Weights are a preference, so a pack between its arbitrage floor and its cut-out can still take part of a sell; fixing it needs a per-pack envelope depending on which claim won the tick.
+- **Trade sizing (OPT-09).** `trade_sizing` uses arbitrage's own SoC bounds (`arbitrage_soc_floor` / `_ceiling`), not the BMS cut-out (SAFETY-25): sizing is the trade's business, the pack envelope is the pack's. It is what the site can push and still have somewhere to put; it sizes the ask and does not route it. Neither side may be zero on a trading tick: `arbitrage.decide()` refuses `IDLE_NO_SIZE`, since a 0 W claim is a park order. Weights are a preference, so a pack between its arbitrage floor and its cut-out can still take part of a sell; fixing it needs a per-pack envelope depending on which claim won the tick.

goodwe_controller/DECISIONS/SAFETY-32-per-pack-bms-floor.md

@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ rather than smuggled in.
 **Also still not in this card, and named by the shipped code already:** the
 charge *ceiling* is the mirror image — `pack_floor_soc` is the wrong reduction
 for it, because a ceiling is the **fullest** pack and `arbitrage`'s `soc_ceiling`
-takes one number. `main.py:932-936` says so, and it belongs to CFG-04/SPIKE-04's
+takes one number. The `Controller.pack_floor_soc` docstring in `app/main.py` says so, and it belongs to CFG-04/SPIKE-04's
 per-pack bound. Nothing here touched it.
 
 ## 6. What was changed, and one thing that was found on the way