SAFETY-10: the whole decision path runs and nothing reaches the inverter
checks / unit (pull_request) Successful in 7m58s

Every optimiser defect this project has found was invisible from outside
while it was happening, and each was paid for at the meter first: SAFETY-45's
28 charge onsets an hour against a binding peak_cap_w, TARIFF-14's wrong
quarter-hour for 45 minutes in every 60, SAFETY-46's 598 Wh spent to gain
310 Wh. There was no way to watch what the optimiser WOULD do without letting
it do it.

`shadow_mode` runs strategies, arbiter, clamps and guards, records the
decision with its reason, and commands nothing.

⚠️ IT WRITES. It writes 0 W, on the ordinary heartbeat, through the ordinary
single writer. The inverter holds its last command forever - it has no meter
timeout - so "commands nothing" implemented as "stops writing" would leave
whatever was standing when shadow mode came on standing for as long as it was
left on, under a page saying nothing is being commanded. That is the failure
this repository keeps finding. Refreshing 0 W is also what
firmware/goodwe-master.yaml's 30 s stale-input watchdog requires of us; going
quiet would keep that board tripped for the whole run, which is an alarm being
used as a mode.

⚠️ IT IS NOT A SECOND WRITE PATH. No claim, no transport, no arithmetic of its
own. It is a substitution inside Controller._write_unit() - the single choke
point every write already reaches - in the same form as the three above it,
and it is the LAST of them, so SAFETY-28's gate and SAFETY-03's clamp still
grade the number the decision path produced.

⚠️ THE DEFAULT IS `auto`, NOT `true`, AND THAT IS THE CARD'S REAL CONTENT. The
Supervisor composes options as {**config.yaml defaults, **stored user
options}, so a new key with a new default reaches EVERY EXISTING INSTALL on
the next update - including the one regulating a real battery. A boolean
default-on would have stopped it silently. There is no mechanism by which one
key can default differently for a new install and an existing one, so
"default-on for new" is a value the add-on RESOLVES: `auto` is shadow while
control is STOPPED and live once it is STARTED. A fresh install ships
`auto_start: false` and comes up observing; an install that is controlling is
started and does not change by one watt.

THE FAILSAFES. Sign watchdogs (SAFETY-02/30): INERT - they grade
Inverter.standing_w(), which shadow mode holds at 0 W. Fed the shadow decision
they would disagree with a meter that never saw it and LATCH A TRIP THAT
SURVIVES INTO LIVE OPERATION AND A RESTART. Clamp (SAFETY-03), write gate
(SAFETY-28), meter freeze (SAFETY-18), peak guard: OBSERVE. Circulation
(SAFETY-31) and delivery (SAFETY-42): observe and may legitimately latch,
because their evidence is measured power. The operator stop is the one
deliberate change: enforced at the wire rather than as a P_SAFETY claim, which
would otherwise make every recorded decision read "stopped".

⚠️ RECORDED LIMITATION: _shadow_settle() re-seeds the carried command to what
stands on the wire, which makes the exit safe by construction - and therefore
the loop leg's shadow decision is ONE SLEW STEP, not a trajectory. A shadow
run answers "what would it command now", not "what would it have done next".
The strategies are unaffected; all three defects above are visible from one.

Graded on the writes and on the rendered surface, never on the flag: 22
mutations, no survivors, including one that lets a write escape and one that
goes silent instead of commanding 0 W. Closed loop on TEST-23 stage 3's rig,
same hour twice: live drives the pack to -2000 W and SoC 50.000 -> 62.331 %;
shadow commands 0 W throughout, SoC stays 50.0 exactly, and the arbitrage
decision is identical in action, instant, signed power, reason and arbiter
winner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BwRLw7eKYj2byVdwB6kbjU
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-09-14 17:25:43 +02:00
parent 8f82dd4e06
commit 8fa4febfef
13 changed files with 1767 additions and 7 deletions
+444 -3
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ Read MUTATION.md before you report a survivor.
import asyncio
import io
import math
import re
import sys
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ from app.arbiter import P_LOOP, Claim, UnitBounds, allocate, resolve
from app.control import Tuning, compute
from app.inverter import Inverter
from app.main import Controller
from app import shadow
fails = []
T0 = datetime(2026, 8, 30, 9, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
@@ -670,8 +672,15 @@ def arm(c, value):
async def _direct():
hass = _Hass(0.0)
# ⚠️ SAFETY-10: `shadow_mode: "off"` EXPLICITLY, BECAUSE THIS FIXTURE
# NEVER PRESSES START. The shipped default is `auto`, which is SHADOW
# MODE while control is stopped - so without this line the probe below
# would be graded against a controller that is correctly refusing to
# command anything, and the clamp it is here to exercise would never be
# reached. The shipped write path is unaffected: a stopped controller
# only ever writes 0 W in production, which shadow mode also writes.
c = Controller({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "max_w": 2000,
"meter_source": "off"},
"meter_source": "off", "shadow_mode": "off"},
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
# The shape the heartbeat, shutdown() and handle_action() all use - each one
@@ -1121,10 +1130,16 @@ A_UNIT, B_HYPO = "inverter-a", "inverter-b"
def fresh(**over):
"""A Controller with a stub HA, no cycle run, and therefore NO record."""
"""A Controller with a stub HA, no cycle run, and therefore NO record.
⚠️ SAFETY-10: `shadow_mode: "off"` for `_direct()`'s reason - this fixture
never presses Start, and the shipped default is shadow mode while control
is stopped. Part 7 grades who is allowed to reach the WIRE; a controller
that is correctly commanding nothing cannot answer that question.
"""
hass = _Hass(0.0)
c = Controller(dict({"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "max_w": 2000,
"meter_source": "off"}, **over),
"meter_source": "off", "shadow_mode": "off"}, **over),
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
return hass, c
@@ -1414,6 +1429,432 @@ check("...and the numbers those cycles put on the wire are the arbiter's own "
hass_r.writes and all(abs(w) <= LIVE_MAX_W for w in hass_r.writes))
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# 8. SAFETY-10 - SHADOW MODE: THE DECISION PATH RUNS AND NOTHING REACHES THE
# INVERTER
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
# This part belongs in THIS file and not in a new one: shadow mode is a
# substitution inside `_write_unit()`, one line below SAFETY-03's clamp and two
# below SAFETY-28's gate, and the property it claims - "nothing reaches the
# inverter" - is the same property parts 5 and 7 already grade from the other
# side. The fake `set_number()` in this file IS the wire.
#
# ⚠️ EVERY CHECK BELOW IS GRADED ON THE WRITES OR ON THE RENDERED SURFACE, NOT
# ON `Controller.shadow`. A check that asserted the flag would pass on a build
# in which the flag is set and the substitution is deleted, which is precisely
# the build this section exists to refuse.
#
# ⚠️ AND EVERY ONE OF THEM RUNS THE SAME STIMULUS IN BOTH MODES. MUTATION.md's
# rule: a per-thing check that has never seen the things DISAGREE is a total.
# `_s10_live` and `_s10_shadow` are the same 6000 W import through the same
# `Controller.cycle()`; the only difference is one option.
print("\n8. SAFETY-10 - shadow mode\n")
def _s10(shadow_mode, *, auto=True, cycles=25, grid=6000.0, dev=None, **over):
"""The same wired run as part 3, with `shadow_mode` and the start button.
⚠️ `auto` IS A PARAMETER BECAUSE `shadow_mode: auto` READS IT. The three
values and the two button positions are six states and they are not all
the same state; the pure-function table over all six is in
`test_validate.py`, and 8f says why it is not here.
"""
async def go():
hass = _Hass(grid, track=True)
c = Controller(dict(
{"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": 0,
"step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15,
"shadow_mode": shadow_mode},
**over), hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = auto
# `dev` narrows what the DEVICE says it will accept, which is the
# clamp's second stage - the only way to make the clamp engage on a
# target the loop has already bounded at `max_w`.
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = ((-LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W) if dev is None
else (-dev, dev))
# ⚠️ CAPTURED PER CYCLE, BECAUSE THE HEARTBEAT OVERWRITES IT.
# `clamp_last` is assigned by every write, and the heartbeat below
# writes `inv.target` - 0 W in shadow mode - so the clamp's verdict on
# the DECISION is gone by the end of the run. Looking for it afterwards
# would grade the refresh instead of the cycle.
c.clamp_seen = []
for n in range(cycles):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
if c.clamp_last is not None:
c.clamp_seen.append(c.clamp_last)
# ⚠️ THE HEARTBEAT IS DRIVEN HERE AND NOT LEFT OUT, BECAUSE IT IS
# THE HALF THAT PROVES SHADOW MODE IS NOT SILENCE. `_write_unit()`
# skips an unchanged value unless `force` is set, so a cycles-only
# fixture sees exactly ONE 0 W write and could not tell "holds the
# inverter at 0 W" from "wrote 0 W once and went quiet" - and the
# second of those leaves a real install's ESP32 in a tripped
# stale-input watchdog for the whole run. `heartbeat_s=0` makes
# every tick due, which is the shipped path with its clock wound
# forward rather than a second implementation of it.
await c.send_heartbeats(float(n), 0.0)
return hass, c
return asyncio.run(go())
_live_h, _live_c = _s10("off")
_shad_h, _shad_c = _s10("on")
# --- 8a. THE PRECONDITION, WHICH IS THE HALF THAT MAKES THE REST MEAN ANYTHING
# MUTATION.md habit 4: a check whose DATA cannot reach the failure it names is
# decoration. "No non-zero value was written" is trivially true of a stimulus
# that would not have produced one, so the same stimulus is first shown to
# produce a large one with the option off.
check("PRECONDITION: with shadow_mode off this stimulus really does drive the "
f"wire - {len(_live_h.writes)} writes, "
f"{len([w for w in _live_h.writes if w != 0.0])} of them non-zero, "
f"largest {max((abs(w) for w in _live_h.writes), default=0):.0f} W",
len([w for w in _live_h.writes if w != 0.0]) >= 10
and max((abs(w) for w in _live_h.writes), default=0) > 1000.0
and 0.0 not in _live_h.writes)
# --- 8b. NOTHING THE DECISION PATH PRODUCED REACHES THE INVERTER -------------
check("AC 1: in shadow mode EVERY value that reached set_number() is 0 W. "
f"Distinct values written: {sorted(set(_shad_h.writes))}",
_shad_h.writes and set(_shad_h.writes) == {0.0})
# ⚠️ AND IT IS NOT SILENCE. The inverter holds its last command forever and the
# ESP32's stale-input watchdog needs a refresh; a shadow mode that stopped
# writing would leave a standing command up under a page saying nothing is
# commanded. A check that only asserted "no non-zero write" would pass on that
# build too - this is the half that separates them.
check("...and it WROTE that 0 W rather than going silent, which is what keeps "
f"the inverter from holding its last command ({len(_shad_h.writes)} "
"writes)",
len(_shad_h.writes) >= 2)
# --- 8c. THE DECISION PATH ACTUALLY RAN ------------------------------------
# "Nothing reached the inverter" is also true of a controller that decided
# nothing. Both halves, or the feature is an off switch with a long name.
check("the full decision path still ran: the loop reached a target and the "
f"arbiter resolved one ({_shad_c.loop_w!r} W, "
f"would have commanded {_shad_c.shadow_would_w!r} W)",
_shad_c.loop_w is not None and abs(_shad_c.loop_w) > 500.0
and _shad_c.shadow_would_w is not None
and abs(_shad_c.shadow_would_w) > 500.0)
check("...and the decision it recorded is a number a live controller would "
"have written - it is inside the rail and it is not the 0 W that went "
"on the wire",
_shad_c.shadow_would_w != 0.0
and abs(_shad_c.shadow_would_w) <= LIVE_MAX_W)
# --- 8d. THE CARRIED COMMAND TRACKS THE WIRE, WHICH IS WHAT MAKES THE EXIT
# SAFE
check("the carried site command is what is STANDING ON THE WIRE, not the "
f"decision ({_shad_c.target!r} W standing, "
f"{_shad_c.shadow_would_w!r} W decided)",
_shad_c.target == 0.0 and _shad_c.shadow_would_w != 0.0)
check("...and every unit's share is too, so SAFETY-42's delivery watchdog is "
"not handed a share nothing was told to produce",
all(i.target == 0.0 for i in _shad_c.inverters))
def _s10_exit(shadow_first):
"""Run twelve cycles, force shadow mode off, take ONE more cycle.
Answers with `inv.last_write` either side of that boundary - WHAT STANDS ON
THE WIRE, updated only on an accepted write, which is the number the
inverter is actually latched on. Reading `hass.writes` instead would be
blind to the converged case, where the controller correctly re-sends
nothing at all.
⚠️ THE COMPARISON IS AGAINST THE SAME RUN THAT NEVER ENTERED SHADOW MODE,
not against a constant. `slew_w` bounds a step from the standing command,
so "did it resume from the wire or from a fiction" is a question about a
DIFFERENCE, and a hard-coded expectation would be the number the code
produces compared with itself.
"""
async def go():
hass = _Hass(6000.0, track=True)
c = Controller(
{"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": 0,
"step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15,
"shadow_mode": "on" if shadow_first else "off"},
hass, _Store(), _Pub(), stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
for _ in range(12):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
before = c.inverters[0].last_write
c.o["shadow_mode"] = "off"
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
# ⚠️ NOT `float()`. `last_write` is None until something is ACCEPTED,
# and a build in which shadow mode writes nothing at all would turn
# this fixture into a TypeError - which MUTATION.md's FCST-06 section
# is about: a traceback grades none of the checks after it AND reads
# like a survivor. It is handed back as None and named below instead.
return before, c.inverters[0].last_write, c
return asyncio.run(go())
_exit_before, _exit_after, _exit_c = _s10_exit(True)
_never_before, _never_after, _never_c = _s10_exit(False)
print(f" shadow run: standing {_exit_before!r} W -> {_exit_after!r} W on "
"the first live cycle")
print(f" never in shadow: standing {_never_before!r} W -> "
f"{_never_after!r} W on the same cycle")
check("SOMETHING REACHED THE WIRE IN SHADOW MODE. `last_write` is set only on "
"an ACCEPTED write, so None here is the build that stops writing "
"altogether and leaves the inverter latched on its last command - the "
"failure shadow mode must not be a new way to reach",
_exit_before is not None and _exit_after is not None
and _never_before is not None and _never_after is not None)
_exit_before = -1.0 if _exit_before is None else float(_exit_before)
_exit_after = -1.0 if _exit_after is None else float(_exit_after)
_never_before = 0.0 if _never_before is None else float(_never_before)
_never_after = 0.0 if _never_after is None else float(_never_after)
check("PRECONDITION: the two arrangements DISAGREE - the run that was never in "
"shadow mode is standing somewhere else entirely at that boundary, so "
"the comparison below is not a number against itself",
_never_before != _exit_before and abs(_never_before) > 1000.0)
check("PRECONDITION: and the shadow run really was standing at 0 W, so the "
"step below is measured from the wire and not from a coincidence",
_exit_before == 0.0)
check("AC 2, leaving: the first live command after shadow mode is one slew "
"step from the 0 W that was actually standing on the wire - NOT one step "
"from the decision shadow mode reached, which never existed at the "
f"battery. |{_exit_after:.0f}| <= slew 1000 W",
abs(_exit_after) <= 1000.0)
check("...and the run that was never in shadow mode is NOT inside that bound "
"at the same cycle, which is what says the bound is a real constraint "
"here and not a property of the stimulus",
abs(_never_after) > 1000.0)
def _s10_enter():
"""Live first, then shadow mode, on a battery standing somewhere else."""
async def go():
hass = _Hass(6000.0, track=True)
c = Controller(
{"setpoint_entity": "number.sp", "meter_entity": "sensor.grid",
"soc_entity": "sensor.soc", "batt_entity": "sensor.batt",
"meter_source": "off", "max_w": LIVE_MAX_W, "gain": 0.6,
"slew_w": 1000, "deadband_w": 15, "target_grid_w": 0,
"step_w": 10, "heartbeat_s": 10, "stale_input_s": 15,
"shadow_mode": "off"}, hass, _Store(), _Pub(),
stop=asyncio.Event())
c.auto = True
c.dev_min, c.dev_max = -LIVE_MAX_W, LIVE_MAX_W
for _ in range(12):
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
standing = hass.writes[-1]
c.o["shadow_mode"] = "on"
await c.read_inputs()
await c.cycle()
# ⚠️ `inverters[0].last_write`, NOT `hass.writes[-1]`. The question is
# WHAT THE INVERTER IS LATCHED ON after the first shadow cycle, and a
# build that writes NOTHING leaves it latched on the live value while
# `hass.writes[-1]` still reads that same number - the two look
# identical from the write list and are opposite at the battery.
return standing, float(c.inverters[0].last_write), c
return asyncio.run(go())
_stood, _first_shadow, _enter_c = _s10_enter()
print(f" standing when shadow mode came on: {_stood:.0f} W")
check("PRECONDITION: the battery was standing at a real, non-zero command when "
"shadow mode was switched on - otherwise 'it reached 0 W' says nothing",
abs(_stood) > 500.0)
check("AC 2, entering: after ONE shadow cycle the inverter is latched on 0 W, "
"not on what it was doing a cycle earlier. The inverter holds its last "
"command FOREVER, so a shadow mode that merely stopped writing would "
"leave that command standing under a page saying nothing is commanded "
f"({_stood:+.0f} W -> {_first_shadow:+.0f} W)",
_first_shadow == 0.0)
# --- 8e. THE OTHER GUARDS ON THE WRITE PATH STILL OBSERVE --------------------
# The substitution is the LAST thing before the wire, below SAFETY-28's gate and
# below SAFETY-03's clamp, so both still grade the number the decision path
# produced. A shadow run that could not say "it would have hit the rating here"
# is answering a different question from the one it is for.
_cl_h, _cl_c = _s10("on", cycles=12, grid=9000.0, dev=400.0)
_cl_req = [r.requested_w for r in _cl_c.clamp_seen]
print(f" decision {_cl_c.shadow_would_w!r} W; what the clamp was asked "
f"about at each cycle boundary: {sorted(set(_cl_req))}")
check("PRECONDITION: the decision is a real, non-zero number and the wire "
"carried only 0 W on this run, so the two are distinguishable",
_cl_c.shadow_would_w is not None and _cl_c.shadow_would_w != 0.0
and set(_cl_h.writes) == {0.0})
check("SAFETY-03 still OBSERVES in shadow mode: the clamp was asked about the "
"number THE DECISION PATH PRODUCED, not about the 0 W that went on the "
"wire. That is what puts the substitution BELOW the clamp, and it is "
"what lets a shadow run report that the rating would have been hit",
_cl_req and all(r == _cl_c.shadow_would_w for r in _cl_req))
check("...and the clamp's own alarm still ran on it - the winding-loop "
"engagement reached the action log on a run where nothing was commanded",
any("clamp" in e.lower() or "CLAMP" in e for e in _cl_c.events))
check("SAFETY-28's gate still OBSERVES too - it refused nothing on this run, "
"which is the same answer it gives live, so shadow mode has not been "
"implemented by making every write unauthorised",
not [e for e in _cl_c.events if "WRITE REFUSED" in e])
# ⚠️ AND SAFETY-18 IS GRADED ON WHAT IT WAS HANDED, WHICH IS AN ORDERING
# CLAIM. `check_meter_frozen()` takes `self.target` - the arbiter's RESOLVED
# INTENT - and `_shadow_settle()` re-seeds that to 0 W at the very end of the
# cycle, AFTER it. Re-seed one line earlier and the freeze detector grades a
# 0 W that no decision produced: its conjunction needs a command at the rail,
# so it goes permanently blind and the whole suite stays green. The detector's
# own `evaluate` is wrapped here because the arguments are the only place that
# ordering is observable.
_fz_seen = []
_fz_real = _shad_c.freeze_wd.evaluate
def _fz_spy(unchanged, target, *a, **k):
_fz_seen.append(target)
return _fz_real(unchanged, target, *a, **k)
_shad_c.freeze_wd.evaluate = _fz_spy
async def _one_more():
await _shad_c.read_inputs()
await _shad_c.cycle()
asyncio.run(_one_more())
_shad_c.freeze_wd.evaluate = _fz_real
print(f" SAFETY-18 was handed: {_fz_seen}")
check("PRECONDITION: the freeze detector was consulted at all on that cycle",
len(_fz_seen) == 1)
check("SAFETY-18 still OBSERVES the DECISION: it is handed the arbiter's "
"resolved intent, not the 0 W the wire gate substituted. Re-seeding one "
"line earlier would hand it a command no decision produced and its "
"conjunction - a command at the rail against a meter that has stopped "
"moving - could never be satisfied again",
_fz_seen and _fz_seen[0] == _shad_c.shadow_would_w
and _fz_seen[0] != shadow.WIRE_W)
# --- 8f. THE MODE TABLE LIVES IN test_validate.py ---------------------------
# `shadow.engaged()` is a pure function of the option and the start button, and
# the six states it answers for are graded beside the rule that validates the
# option - not here, where a defeat of the DEFAULT stops part 3's wired run
# reaching the wire at all and takes this whole file down before part 8 runs.
# ⚠️ THAT IS MEASURED, NOT ANTICIPATED: the mutation that makes `auto` resolve
# to shadow unconditionally aborts part 3 with an IndexError, so its red count
# here is a LOWER BOUND and none of part 8 is graded (MUTATION.md, FCST-06).
# --- 8g. THE OPERATOR STOP, WHICH IS THE ONE FAILSAFE THIS CARD CHANGES ------
_stop_live_h, _stop_live_c = _s10("off", auto=False, cycles=6)
_stop_shad_h, _stop_shad_c = _s10("auto", auto=False, cycles=6)
print(f" stopped, shadow off: {_stop_live_c.reason!r}")
print(f" stopped, shadow on : {_stop_shad_c.reason!r}")
check("PRECONDITION: with shadow mode off, a stopped controller files the "
"P_SAFETY stop claim and the arbiter resolves to THAT source, at 0 W",
_stop_live_c.reason.startswith("safety")
and _stop_live_c.target == 0.0)
check("in shadow mode that claim is NOT filed, so the arbiter resolves to the "
"REAL winner and the recorded decision is the real one. A P_SAFETY claim "
"out-ranks everything - left in, every shadow run would answer the wrong "
f"question ({_stop_shad_c.reason!r})",
_stop_shad_c.reason.startswith("loop")
and _stop_shad_c.shadow_would_w is not None
and abs(_stop_shad_c.shadow_would_w) > 0.0)
check("...and the actuator ends at exactly the same place either way, because "
"the substitution that replaced the claim is STRICTLY STRONGER: a claim "
"can be out-ranked and a wire gate cannot",
set(_stop_shad_h.writes) == {0.0} == set(_stop_live_h.writes))
# --- 8h. THE RENDERED SURFACE (TARIFF-11's pattern) -------------------------
# Graded on `status_payload()`, which IS the status page: web.py's `PAGE` is a
# static shell whose banner and rows are filled from this JSON. Named slots, not
# substring tests, so a transposition moves a slot.
_ROW = "Shadow mode"
_shad_pay = _shad_c.status_payload()
_live_pay = _live_c.status_payload()
_shad_rows = dict(_shad_pay["rows"])
_live_rows = dict(_live_pay["rows"])
print(f" banner: {_shad_pay['banner']!r}")
print(f" row : {_shad_rows.get(_ROW)!r}")
check("the status page has a Shadow mode row in BOTH states, so its ABSENCE is "
"never how an operator learns which one they are in",
_ROW in _shad_rows and _ROW in _live_rows)
check("AC 3: the banner states plainly that the battery is not being "
"controlled",
"SHADOW MODE" in _shad_pay["banner"]
and "NOT being controlled" in _shad_pay["banner"])
check("...and it is not green. A page that reads `ok` while nothing is being "
"commanded is the 'looks healthy but is inert' failure itself",
_shad_pay["level"] == "warn")
check("...and it is FIRST in the cascade: the same controller has other "
"conditions to report and none of them displaces this sentence",
_live_pay["banner"] != _shad_pay["banner"]
and "SHADOW MODE" not in _live_pay["banner"])
_slot = re.search(r"WOULD HAVE COMMANDED ([-+][\d ]+) W, inverter held at "
r"([-\d]+) W", _shad_rows[_ROW])
check("the row answers 'what would it have done' with a NUMBER in its own "
"named slot, and says where the inverter actually is in a second one - "
"two slots in one sentence, so a transposition moves them",
_slot is not None)
if _slot is not None:
_would = float(_slot.group(1).replace(" ", ""))
check("...and that number is the decision the path reached, not the 0 W "
f"standing on the wire ({_would:.0f} vs {_shad_c.target:.0f})",
_would == round(float(_shad_c.shadow_would_w))
and _would != _shad_c.target)
check("...and the second slot is the STANDING command, so the two cannot "
"be read as one number",
float(_slot.group(2)) == 0.0)
check("the row answers 'and why' by carrying the arbiter's own sentence, "
"rather than a re-derivation of it",
_shad_c.reason in _shad_rows[_ROW])
check("with shadow mode off the row says so, and says what follows from it - "
"which is the arrangement that makes the one above a claim about this "
"controller and not about the string",
"NOT in shadow mode" in _live_rows[_ROW]
and "DOES reach the inverter" in _live_rows[_ROW]
and "WOULD HAVE COMMANDED" not in _live_rows[_ROW])
# ⚠️ A STANDING LATCH IS NAMED RATHER THAN HIDDEN. The shadow banner sits above
# the three `bad` branches, so it has to carry what they would have said - a
# latch that is up while the controller is inert is up the moment it stops
# being inert.
_shad_c.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped = True
_latched = _shad_c.status_payload()
print(f" banner with a latch up: {_latched['banner']!r}")
check("a failsafe latch that is standing is NAMED in the shadow banner and "
"turns it red, so nobody turns shadow mode off into a battery that will "
"not move and a page that never mentioned why",
_latched["level"] == "bad"
and "LATCH IS STILL UP" in _latched["banner"]
and _shad_c.inverters[0].name in _latched["banner"])
check("...and it still says the battery is not being controlled, so the latch "
"has not displaced the sentence that may never be displaced",
"NOT being controlled" in _latched["banner"])
_shad_c.inverters[0].sign_wd.tripped = False
# --- 8i. THE RECORD A LATER ANALYSIS READS ----------------------------------
# A shadow run is only worth running if it answers "what would it have done,
# and why" AFTERWARDS, from the 40-row action log, and not only on a page
# somebody happened to be looking at.
_shadow_lines = [e for e in _shad_c.events if "SHADOW" in e]
print(f" action log, shadow lines: {len(_shadow_lines)} of "
f"{len(_shad_c.events)}")
check("the action log records that shadow mode came on, in words",
any("SHADOW MODE ON" in e for e in _shadow_lines))
check("...and what it would have commanded, with the arbiter's reason beside "
"it",
any("would have commanded" in e and "loop" in e for e in _shadow_lines))
check("...EDGE-logged, not level-logged: 25 cycles did not flush the 40-row "
"log that has to carry the context of what the run found",
len(_shadow_lines) < 25 and len(_shad_c.events) <= 40)
print()
if fails:
print(f"{len(fails)} FAILED: {', '.join(fails)}")